The impact of orbital governance

13 March 2026
The impact of orbital governance

For much of modern history, space has symbolized human progress and scientific ambition, yet as I listened to discussions at UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference (OS25), it became increasingly clear that outer space today tells us as much about our political and moral choices on Earth as it does about technological advancement. As satellites quietly support communication, navigation, climate monitoring, and disaster response, the way we govern orbit is no longer distant or abstract. It has become a mirror—reflecting how we cooperate, how we compete, and how seriously we take responsibility for shared spaces.

This reflection shaped my contribution to the OS25 youth video competition, in which I argued that a 2050 hypothetical orbital conflict should be understood as a realistic possibility shaped by decisions being made today. Rather than treating 2050 as an abstract endpoint, I framed it as the cumulative outcome of present choices on access, responsibility and restraint in an increasingly congested orbital environment. The question we should be asking is therefore not what the future of space will look like, but rather what kind of orbital environment are we creating today.

Shared risks and uneven decision-making

The rapid expansion of human activity in low Earth orbit (LEO) represents a remarkable technological achievement. At the same time, it has introduced governance challenges that existing frameworks were not designed to manage. Hundreds of satellites are now launched each year, increasing congestion, collision risks, and the accumulation of long-lasting debris. Satellite tracking data shows how sharply the orbital population has grown over the past decade, driven by the deployment of large-scale mega constellations.
 
Technological tools such as improved tracking and collision-avoidance systems have developed quickly, but they cannot replace governance arrangements capable of managing collective risk. Many of the coordination mechanisms relied upon today were shaped in an era when space activity was slower, less crowded, and primarily State-led.

International space law, including the Outer Space Treaty, continues to provide essential principles and remains a cornerstone of space governance. However, as became clear during OS25 discussions, the current law alone cannot address the operational realities of a highly congested and commercially active orbital environment. The challenge is not the absence of rules, but the growing gap between legal principles and how space activity is conducted in practice.

States and private companies with advanced space capabilities now play a decisive role in shaping access to orbit. For non-spacefaring and space-nascent States, this often translates into reliance on external operators for critical services such as climate monitoring, navigation, communications, and disaster response. While these services deliver significant benefits, they also create new dependencies and vulnerabilities that risk reproducing familiar inequalities seen in other global commons. These include climate governance or international telecommunications, within a domain that was once imagined as universally shared.

One of the clearest examples of a shared threat discussed during OS25 was the long-term impact of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests on orbital sustainability. During Panel II, experts highlighted how kinetic ASAT tests contribute to persistent debris and increased collision risk in LEO. Data compiled by the Secure World Foundation show that kinetic ASAT tests alone have produced thousands of trackable debris objects, many of which will remain in orbit well into the coming decades.

The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has repeatedly highlighted space debris as a growing threat to the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, emphasising the need for collective mitigation efforts. Technical assessments by the European Space Agency further demonstrate how debris generated by single events can increase collision probabilities over time, creating cascading risks that affect all operators regardless of their role in the original action.

Commercial activity adds another layer of complexity as private operators are rapidly occupying orbital slots and radio-frequency spectrum, often faster than international coordination mechanisms can support. International space law – most notably article VI of the Outer Space Treaty – establishes that States bear international responsibility for all national space activities. This includes those carried out by non-governmental actors, such as commercial entities, under their authorization and continuing supervision. However, it remains far less clear how the cumulative risks created by these activities should be assessed and managed collectively in an increasingly crowded orbital environment.

The growing integration of artificial intelligence introduces additional governance challenges. These capabilities offer clear operational advantages, yet they also raise difficult questions about accountability and oversight. Autonomous systems are distinctive because they can execute operational decisions in real time without direct human authorization. In this context, decision-making unfolds on timescales that far outpaces diplomatic coordination or regulatory intervention. In the event of an error or unintended interaction, responsibility may be difficult to trace – particularly when decision-making is distributed across multiple actors and jurisdictions.

These multifaceted developments highlight a broader pattern where technological capabilities advance more rapidly than the institutional capacity to govern them. Addressing these gaps will require a shared understanding of acceptable risk, restraint and responsibility.

Rethinking space security through justice

Discussions throughout OS25 repeatedly returned to the idea that space security cannot be measured solely through technological strength or strategic advantage. Over time, I came to see justice, not as a moral add-on, but as a practical requirement for sustainable governance. Operationalizing orbital governance from a justice lens can be understood in the following ways.

Distributive justice shapes who benefits from space-based services and who remains dependent on others for access. This concern is increasingly reflected in UN discussions around the implementation of the Space2030 Agenda. Notably related work under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space emphasise improving access to space science, technology and data so that all States can benefit socioeconomically from space-derived services.

Procedural justice is concerned with who participates in shaping the rules that govern orbit. Current initiatives within UNOOSA, for example, highlight that including non-space-faring and space-nascent States strengthens legitimacy and trust in shared environments such as outer space. Likewise past space security initiatives like the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, made sure to open participation to all States and additional stakeholders.

Intergenerational justice is a concept central to environmental governance and is increasingly applied to space, particularly in discussions concerning space sustainability. It emphasises preservation of the orbital environment for future generations.

Recent policy-oriented research reflects this shift toward justice-based approaches, arguing that long-term stability in outer space depends on sustainability and collective risk reduction rather than dominance alone.

Youth participation as a governance lens

Youth are often described as future decision-makers, yet UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025 made clear that meaningful participation matters in the present. As a youth participant, I found that our role was not to offer idealism, but to ask questions that are sometimes avoided like whose security is prioritized, how is risk distributed, and whether current practices align with long-term goals.

One insight that stayed with me was how differently States understand the concept of security in orbit. For some, security is framed primarily in terms of protection and resilience, while for others, it is understood through restraint and risk reduction. These differences are rarely articulated explicitly, yet they shape negotiations and governance outcomes in meaningful ways.

Framing 2050 as a realistic governance horizon helped ground these discussions. It encouraged a shift away from reactive thinking toward preventive approaches, and from short-term competition toward shared responsibility. In this way, youth participation contributed not sentiment, but perspective, particularly by extending the time horizons through which space security is evaluated.

Outer space does not generate inequalities on its own; it reflects and amplifies the decisions we make. Our orbital environment can remain a domain of shared progress if it is governed through transparency, inclusion, and long-term responsibility. Preserving Earth’s orbit, therefore, is not only about managing congestion or preventing conflict. It requires confronting distributive, procedural, and intergenerational justice in the way access is structured, decisions are made, and risks are distributed. If governance mechanisms remain fragmented while activity intensifies, existing asymmetries risk becoming permanently embedded above our heads.


Emily Karakoleva is an international relations student and served as the Bulgarian Youth Delegate to the United Nations (2024–2025). Her work focuses on youth participation in global governance and international policy processes. She has represented Bulgarian youth in international forums, including the UN General Assembly Third Committee, the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum, and the UNESCO Youth Forum, and serves as a European Climate Pact Ambassador.


This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Emily Karakoleva, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors.