In June 2026, the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) convened a consultation in Vienna on information-sharing related to space activities and the implementation of Article XI of the Outer Space Treaty.
The session supports a multi-year workplan of the Working Group on the Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer Space, under the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Article XI commits States Parties to inform the UN Secretary-General, the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of their activities in outer space.
Why Article XI matters now
This is a moment of rapidly rising activity, of a growing number of actors, and of capabilities that are very often dual-use. It is also, regrettably, a moment of eroding trust between States. As such, transparency is not a luxury. It is one of the few measures that can be advanced incrementally, without waiting for the resolution of larger and more contested questions. And much of what is needed already exists.
The Registration Convention and General Assembly resolution 1721 B (Article XVI) are not new obligations to be negotiated, they are existing commitments with latent potential. Increased utilization of Article XI could significantly enhance the security and stability of outer space.
On the question of dual-use capabilities, existing export control regimes are worth examining as a means of further encouraging implementation. These already involve States in classifying and tracking sensitive capabilities. The habits of categorization and channels of trust they rely on could inform how the international community thinks about what information is suitable for sharing under Article XI, and through what mechanisms.
Processes like The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation are voluntary and sit outside the UN system, but their use of information templates, regional workshops and annual meetings are all relevant practices to consider.
UNIDIR’s role in bridging policy and practice
UNIDIR has convened regional and industry workshops that bring multilateral space security mandates and processes closer to the places where national and regional decisions are discussed. These workshops also work to raise awareness of the governance frameworks that already exist.
Article XI is of particular value here because more States are party to the Outer Space Treaty than to the Registration Convention, offering a channel for information-sharing that is open to a wider community of States and covers a wider range of activity. Ad hoc, extrabudgetary State contributions to UNOOSA to support and expand work on national engagement with Article XI could lead to enhanced State practice in this area.
UNIDIR also maintains the Space Security Portal, a digital hub that gathers national and intergovernmental information on space laws, policies and activities. Although it is curated through a security lens, user feedback indicates the portal is helpful to understand national space positions and activities — a reminder that transparency, by whatever door it enters, can serve a range of purposes.
The portal does not rely solely on information contributed by States; it is sustained by a research team that proactively examines primary-source documents and government activities to keep it current. This in no way substitutes for States willingly furnishing information, but it does suggest a complementary model worth exploring. Implementing bodies could help gather information, whether through dedicated personnel or with the assistance of AI-based tools, and present it back to States for review and approval before sharing it through dedicated State-to-State or State-to-public channels.
Creating a shared foundation
This is why a draft template for submissions of information under Article XI holds considerable potential. Practitioners are not always aware of Article XI; and even where they are, the provision can feel abstract. A template responds to both difficulties. It makes the act of sharing concrete — indicating what a State, or potentially a non-State industry actor, might share, and in what form — and in doing so it lowers the threshold to participation.
Security concerns and sensitive information can understandably inhibit willingness to share information. However, general information-sharing, even concerning unclassified or otherwise non-sensitive activities, has value in its own right as it helps establish information channels, builds regularity of practice and can improve confidence in the possibility of future, more substantial sharing arrangements.
In that spirit, it may be useful for the Working Group to examine, through a structured exercise, why States that are not currently sharing information under Article XI choose not to do so. It could also classify the types of information at stake — distinguishing, for instance, information that is genuinely sensitive from information that is simply not habitually shared. One concrete category that could be highlighted as good practice is information on derelict objects, which is generally non-sensitive and directly relevant to the shared interest in a sustainable space environment.
A parallel exercise to map the information that is already available, including through the portal and UNOOSA resources, could further lower the barriers to using Article XI. This assessment could help identify when channelling available information through Article XI strengthens multilateralism and international trust — and when existing information ecosystems are already sufficiently robust and well used, such that duplicating the effort is unnecessary and resources are better focused elsewhere.
In addition to advancing work in Vienna, this could also play a role in supporting space-security-related processes in Geneva, specifically the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its aspects. The fourth session of this group will discuss, inter alia: “elements on basic obligations … related to the national space policies, doctrines and strategies and other measures that could reduce the risk of escalation, conflict and an arms race in outer space”. Having an understanding of wider opportunities and challenges in this area could therefore inform and advance work in other domains.
Small steps, lasting confidence
Even where information is shared unilaterally, taking the additional step of channelling it through multilateral and international legal mechanisms aligns it with the wider international community and demonstrates a certain kind of political will for transparency. That is exactly the kind of small, incremental step that can, over time, build confidence and trust.
After all, the security, safety and sustainability of outer space, and its continued use for peaceful purposes, will not be secured by any single instrument — but they will be greatly enhanced through the patient use of the mutually reinforcing mechanisms we already have.