In June, States will set new priorities to control small arms and light weapons (SALW) and review the United Nations’ Counter-Terrorism Strategy. These two multilateral processes share one concern: addressing rising armed violence levels. New West African evidence on integrating armed violence prevention and SALW control comes at the right moment to shape global policymaking.
In 2025, one in six people were exposed to armed conflict, and firearms account for nearly half of all violent deaths worldwide. In regions affected by armed extremism, armed groups cause the majority of civilian fatalities. Where illicit SALW proliferate, such groups flourish and can sustain violence for longer, driving demand for more weapons. This is a vicious cycle.
Policy responses have struggled to address this complexity. Global SALW control debates have for decades prioritized measures to curb illicit weapon supply, with little attention paid to why people take up arms. Tackling armed violence, notably violent extremism, tends to be over-securitized and reactive, addressing symptoms more than causes. In recent years, while necessary, neither approach has proofed to be sufficient.
In 2024, the Pact for the Future brought prevention back to the fore, calling on Member States to address the root causes of violence. That same year, the fourth Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms (RevCon4) pushed States to examine what drives weapons demand, not just supply. These were promising signs of a paradigm shift.
But how can these commitments be implemented locally and lessons from the field be fed back into global policymaking? As States approach the ninth Biennial Meeting of States under the Programme of Action (BMS9) and the ninth review of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy in June this year, West Africa shows global policymakers what integrating prevention and SALW control can practically look like and how the puzzle could be pieced together
West Africa spotlight
Driven by the rise of armed groups and their continuing spread from the Sahel to the littoral States of the Gulf of Guinea, armed violence has intensified across West Africa. It hosts four of the world’s most terrorism-affected countries and an estimated 11 million civilian-held firearms, the highest concentration on the continent.
The West African evidence is clear: fragmented and over-securitized approaches fall short in preventing armed violence sustainably.
At a 2023 regional workshop by UNIDIR and partners, West African stakeholders called for an integrated approach to tackle both the root causes of violence and the weapons (primarily SALW) that fuel it. This echoes the New Agenda for Peace’s appeal for comprehensive and more prevention-focused approaches to these issues. To support this change, a recent study by UNIDIR, the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs documents what joined-up efforts look like in practice.
What comes out clearly is that demand for arms and engagement in violent extremism share common drivers – which mainly affect communities in border areas – and these include:
- Weak state presence,
- Economic hardship,
- Distrust in public institutions
- Absence of effective state security.
This convergence is a key, often overlooked entry point for joining up armed violence prevention and SALW control. Translating integrated approaches into practice hinges on three mutually reinforcing dimensions: policy, institutions, and operations.
Integration in practice to learn from
At the policy level, West African practices show that developing and reviewing strategic frameworks are important for integrating approaches. Benin’s Draft National SALW Action Plan (2020-2024) is a good example, addressing both weapons demand and supply.
National frameworks only deliver if they are grounded in local realities and co-created by those who live them. Community leaders, women’s groups, youth
,and local authorities must therefore be partners in the design and implementation of plans to address violence and weapons proliferation.
For instance, Mali illustrates this in its upcoming SALW National Action Plan (2026–2030) – which was co-developed through inclusive dialogue with customary and religious leaders.
Institutions must follow. Integrated frameworks mean little if bodies responsible for delivery operate in silos. Coordination of government mechanisms for violence prevention and SALW control goes a long way, as witnessed in Nigeria. The Office of the National Security Adviser houses both the National Centre for the Control of SALW and the National Counter Terrorism Centre, easing interaction. Representation in respective governance boards could also play a bridging, still underutilized role. Inclusive representation has – here too – proved useful for integrated thinking. In Sierra Leone for instance, the Advisory Committee of the National SALW Commission brings various government agencies together with local government, civil society, paramount chiefs, and youth and women’s representatives, as part of a whole-of-society approach.
In operations, integrated activities concretize most impactfully at the community level. In Côte d’Ivoire, the SALW Commission engages dialogue with communities not just to sensitize to the risks of weapons proliferation, but also to non-violence and the prevention of radicalization, often with traditional leaders and women’s groups as key players. Likewise, the voluntary surrender of SALW has proved most sustainable when combined with the provision of socio-economic alternatives addressing drivers for weapons demand, as seen in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire.
Looking ahead, community-led arms control holds particular untapped potential. It can build trust and local agency to reduce armed violence at their roots, with peace or civil-military committees as entry points for dialogue.
When communities are involved and see tangible benefits, prevention becomes a collective engagement with more sustainable outcome.
Advancing integrated approaches can come with teething troubles, including:
- The lack of shared understanding and space for exchange among stakeholders
, - Conflicting responsibilities
, - Limited political will and ownership
, - Capacity constraints
, - And many others
.
West African practices demonstrate what potential is unlocked when clearing some of these hurdles.
The puzzle needs all its pieces
Policy shapes implementation and implementation must shape policy. In 2024, States made promising commitments at RevCon4 and in the Pact for the Future toward holistic, prevention-centred approaches to armed violence. The recent study by UNIDIR and partners, alongside initiatives in West Africa like the UN Development Programme – Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre’s work on conflict prevention and weapons and ammunition management, as well as the Saving-Lives Entity’s support to armed violence reduction in Ghana and Mali, demonstrate how to put these commitments into practice. The missing piece is to feed lessons from these efforts back into global frameworks to scale what works, adapted to context. The 2026 meetings should close the loop.
BMS9 is an opportunity for considering good practices to deliver on RevCon4 commitments. It could emphasize that joined-up responses to both issues deliver best when done across all dimensions: from policymaking to institutional cooperation and implementation. It could also go further, affirming the role of genuine multi-stakeholder processes in making joined-up efforts effective and sustainable – with communities and dialogue as central levers.
The ninth review of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy is expected to build on the UN Secretary-General’s call to avoid siloing the prevention and countering of extremism. The eighth review addressed SALW control mainly in terms of countering supply to terrorist groups. The ninth review could recognize that SALW control also has a preventive dimension in reducing demand for weapons, thereby helping to address local drivers of extremism.
The evidence is there. The entry points are clear. The policy windows are open. Whether 2026 marks an upscale in policymaking – or a missed beat – is now the question on the table.
Vedika Pillai was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. She holds a Master’s in International Development from the Geneva Graduate Institute, and degrees in sociology, international relations, and peacebuilding from Lady Shri Ram College and Sciences Po Paris. She has worked across research and policy roles with UNICEF, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Legal Action Worldwide. Her published work includes research on social protection in Ethiopia with UNICEF Innocenti, and on rural livelihoods, conflict and gender in South Asia.
Ursign Hofmann is a Senior Researcher with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. Previously, he served as a Programme Officer at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, as a Policy Advisor at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and as a Research Assistant at the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations System. He holds a Master’s degree in History and French and a Bachelor’s degree in History and Political Science from the University of Lausanne.