The broad diffusion of AI across scientific disciplines is increasingly evident in bibliometric studies. The number of AI-related natural science publications rose to nearly 80,000 in 2025, up 26% from 2024. This accounted for roughly 6–9% of scientific output across major scientific domains in 2025, compared to less than 1% in 2010. Recent studies also highlight particularly rapid growth in AI-biotechnology research, including in areas such as gene editing, drug discovery and bioinformatics.

These trends suggest that once-niche AI models are becoming increasingly embedded across the scientific research ecosystem. No longer the preserve of specific communities in specialized domains, these models are evolving into general-purpose capabilities available to specialists and non-specialists alike. This expanded access and rapid improvement in capability suggest significant implications for the governance of dual-use biology and its threat outlook.

Biological threats, including biological weapons, have traditionally been associated with access to specialized material, facilities and expertise. The growing integration of AI models into biological research and their rapid advancement add another dimension to these threat perceptions. Frontier AI models are increasingly enabling actors to acquire and apply biological knowledge more efficiently than was possible just a few years ago, potentially lowering some of the knowledge and expertise barriers associated with sensitive dual-use research.

Though Anthropic’s findings provide evidence that actors have already attempted to misuse AI for sensitive and potentially weaponized biological research, they do not demonstrate that AI models enable the development of biological weapons, nor that such efforts would have meaningfully advanced the prospect of success. They do, however, suggest that actors see strategic value in exploiting frontier AI models for dual-use biological activities that may be inaccessible through traditional pathways.

For that reason, it is encouraging to see frontier AI companies engaging in multilateral discussions on threat models, biological risk assessment and evaluations with respect to their tools. This is particularly important given that the private sector has been responsible for the development of the overwhelming majority of frontier AI models. But key governance and oversight challenges remain, and the most capable models continue to exhibit the least transparency.

At the same time, the international community cannot become wholly reliant on private sector actors to identify and mitigate every single situation in which AI could be exploited in the development of biology for hostile purposes. Nor can the private AI industry afford to remain detached from ongoing multilateral efforts to strengthen biological weapons controls.

Effective governance of emerging AI-biology dual-use capabilities will require sustained coordination with existing biological weapons prohibition and biosecurity frameworks, including the core, near-universal regime governing biological threats, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Efforts to strengthen the BWC’s ability to address emerging science and technology developments may ultimately prove to be relevant to the broader debate on AI governance, both within industry and among governments.

Moreover, the convergence of AI and biology, while deserving particular attention, is only one of several converging science and technology areas that may shape the biological threat spectrum and warrant our attention as we look to avert a darker biological weapons future. In such a future, biology could be exploited to develop threats beyond traditional conceptions of biological weapons, including localized attacks, terrorism and economic sabotage via disruption of agriculture or livestock supplies.

The nature of biological enablement by AI raises both the floor and ceiling of what could be achieved. Novices can attain previously inaccessible scientific knowledge, whereas experts can use AI to overcome domain-specific hurdles in their research. And a wide range of actors could exploit AI to facilitate mis- and disinformation related to biological weapons.

Averting such a future will require approaches that address the broader convergence of emerging science and technology developments rather than focusing solely on any single capability or technological phenomenon. More importantly, no one safeguard would be sufficient. A layered approach is needed to address the rapidly evolving scientific landscape in the context of varying real-world circumstances.

A web of prevention

Fortunately, States have developed several measures to prohibit and prevent biological weapons. Particularly important at the international level is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This agreement prohibits, among other things, the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, which are defined broadly under the convention to include any form of biological weapons, including any biological weapon developed using AI. With 189 States Parties, the treaty covers the vast majority of the world. The BWC has served States well for more than half a century; no State admits to having a biological weapons programme, and allegations of association with biological weapons have been met with sharp denials.

Moreover, many States have transposed this international prohibition into national law, as well as a range of other regulatory and normative measures designed to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons. This process of national implementation via measures that prohibit through national laws and prevent through wider technological governance mechanisms is particularly important. It helps to construct both a “web of prevention” and communities of compliance that can together bolster the prohibition on biological weapons.

International and national implementation of measures to prevent biological weapons needs to be nurtured to ensure that these measures remain fit for purpose in the age of digital biology. Indeed, Anthropic’s threat report provides details of cases in which users took evasive measures to hide their tracks and circumvent existing safety mechanisms. Implementation strategies must therefore be developed with varied obfuscation methods in mind.

A decisive moment for the Biological Weapons Convention

Despite a number of concrete steps undertaken nationally and internationally, the BWC continues to have several operational limitations. It has no verification mechanism, for example, even though States tried throughout the 1990s to negotiate a protocol with a verification component. Moreover, in contrast to treaties on chemical and nuclear weapons, which are supported by organizations employing hundreds or even thousands of staff, the BWC is supported by a four-person Implementation Support Unit hosted within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The Working Group on strengthening the BWC will meet for its tenth and final session in December 2026. Over the course of this process, a draft report has emerged that contains a package of measures designed to advance the treaty. These include a plan for further work on verification through a dedicated open-ended working group, a mechanism for reviewing science and technology, and a second mechanism focused on international cooperation and assistance. These measures have considerable potential to advance the BWC and strengthen biological security.

Success in the Working Group would pave the way for the upcoming BWC Review Conference in 2027, during which States and stakeholders will have the opportunity to chart a course towards effective prevention of biological weapons for another 50 years.

But if the Working Group fails to achieve consensus in December, there is a real risk that biological disarmament diplomacy could be set back 25 years, to the doldrums of 2001, when negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the BWC collapsed acrimoniously.

A similar collapse of the Working Group may not irreparably damage the BWC or the current prohibitions on biological weapons, but it would severely curtail momentum towards strengthening the BWC. Avoiding such a fragmentation of multilateral efforts by States and stakeholders would help us tackle one of the most pressing security challenges of our time.

The post Averting a darker biological weapons future first appeared on UNIDIR.

Outer space is entering a renewed phase of strategic importance, shaped by rapid technological innovation, growing competition and deepening global dependence on space-enabled infrastructure and services. As the domain becomes increasingly critical to global infrastructure and attracts diverse commercial actors, the ways in which space is accessed, used and governed are also changing.

Against this backdrop, the conference provided a platform for policymakers, industry, academia and civil society to exchange perspectives and explore practical pathways towards strengthening the security and sustainability of outer space.

A changing space security environment

Opening the conference, UNIDIR Director Robin Geiss highlighted four developments reshaping the space security environment:

• Space is now treated as a strategic domain.

• Counterspace activity is increasing.

• Advances in technology are changing how space systems operate.

• Mega constellations and the interconnection of commercial and government systems are redefining what security in orbit means.

In her keynote address, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu welcomed the range of actors participating in the discussion and highlighted the importance of identifying areas of convergence as the space security environment continues to evolve.

© 2026 UNIDIR/Antoine Tardy

Strategic dialogue in expert panels and beyond

Over the two days, participants examined the technical, legal and policy dimensions of developments in space activity through focused discussions on some of the most pressing questions facing the international space security community. The conference programme featured a series of expert panels:

• Mapping space threats and consequences highlighted how ambiguity in the space security environment, compounded by the widespread use of dual-use technologies and the absence of common frameworks, can lead to different interpretations of the same activities. The panellists emphasized the importance of strengthening governance and compliance mechanisms and improving legal clarity to reduce the risks of miscalculation and escalation.

• Strategic stability and the security of space architecture examined the growing integration of space systems into nuclear command, control and communications, noting how the same space capabilities can both strengthen stability through enhanced situational awareness and undermine it by creating vulnerabilities or increasing uncertainty during crises.

• Taking stock of efforts to advance the prevention of an arms race in outer space brought together distinguished diplomatic representatives to discuss how shared commitments can be translated into concrete approaches for preventing an arms race in outer space. The discussion also examined the respective contributions of legally binding instruments and non-binding norms to strengthening stability and security in outer space.

• Complex interactions in a multi-actor orbit considered how commercial participation and the proliferation of new actors and activities are reshaping the space security environment. The discussion focused on the application of international law to these evolving dynamics, including the responsibility of States for national activities in outer space and emerging questions around thresholds of targetability.

• Monitoring, verification and visibility in outer space explored what space situational awareness can do as a means of verifying legally binding agreements and monitoring norms of behaviour. The panel highlighted that although orbital manoeuvres are becoming transparent, the trajectories of objects alone rarely reveal intent, meaning there is a growing need for shared standards.

• Securing space data and information and communication technology infrastructure looked at the threats and risks facing terrestrial and orbital systems. The panel also considered what the manipulation, disruption or denial of space-derived data means for strategic stability, with particular consequences for States that rely on infrastructure hosted elsewhere. As greater autonomy in orbit becomes harder to avoid, speakers emphasized verifiability and the need to retain human involvement in decision-making.

The conference also featured a collaborative session with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). This discussion featured Rosanna Diem-Hoffmann, Lead for Space Law, Policy and Sustainability at UNOOSA, and Fatima Salem Al Shamsi, Chair of the United Nations Expert Group on Space Situational Awareness. The two speakers briefed participants on recent progress made regarding intersecting topics from the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This included work by the Group on Space Resource Activity and deliberations on information-sharing that led to the newly established United Nations Satellite Operator Contact Hub.

Bringing youth centre stage

For the third year in a row, the conference ran a global campaign that sought to bring in and amplify young people’s perspectives on space. The 2026 edition asked young people to submit videos exploring how innovations in space architecture and shared technical standards can address emerging security and sustainability challenges. The winners, Ali Shan and Joel Pajiah, were also able to present their innovative work through a pair of lightning talks on the second day of the conference.

© 2026 UNIDIR/Antoine Tardy

Building the next generation of space security expertise

The 2026 conference also marked an important milestone for UNIDIR’s Space Security Programme, with the inaugural cohort of Space Security Research Fellows joining the conference for the first time. These nine fellows from across all five United Nations regional groups were selected for the year-long programme through a highly competitive process. Their participation in the conference, where they engaged with diplomats and experts from around the world, came as part of a week-long series of workshop activities held in person in Geneva.

Looking ahead, UNIDIR will continue to support dialogue on space security, foster common understanding among diverse stakeholders and advance practical approaches to strengthening security and stability in outer space.

The post Navigating a new era of strategic importance in outer space first appeared on UNIDIR.

What is the electromagnetic spectrum?

The electromagnetic spectrum is the range of all electromagnetic waves, including radio waves, microwaves, infrared, visible light, ultraviolet, x-rays, and gamma rays, each distinguished by a specific frequency and wavelength. These regions of the spectrum all behave differently, leading to distinct applications in science and daily life. For example, radio waves enable long-range communications, microwaves support radar functions by reflecting off objects, and infrared light allows the detection of heat signatures. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) underpins everyday capabilities, from wireless mobile communications and the positioning necessary for various forms of transport to the imaging necessary in advanced medical applications. As such, the EMS is one of the main enablers of modern life.

In addition to its centrality to civilian life, the EMS is critical for the military domain. It enables key military functions including sensing, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, positioning, weapons guidance, battlefield networking, and command and control. With the modernization of the battlefield, and the increase in capabilities that rely on the EMS for their functioning, its importance to the military domain has grown. For instance, modern capabilities increasingly require continuous data exchange, precision navigation, and sensor integration. It follows that weaponizing these dependences, and disrupting access to the EMS has become central to the conduct of war.

Why does it matter for peace, security and disarmament?

Armed forces do not just rely on the EMS; they actively compete within it. Through what is commonly termed “electronic warfare”, they seek to deny or degrade adversaries’ access to the EMS, while securing their own use. By jamming (the degrading or blocking of a signal) or spoofing (replacing a signal by a fake one) armed forces seek to deny adversaries the ability to utilize networked capabilities or to rely on their communications.

Electronic warfare has therefore become a mainstay of modern conflicts, turning the EMS into a heavily contested domain. Accordingly, seeking ways to overcome EMS disruptions to ensure continued operations is today a central aspect of military operations. This has created a “measure- countermeasure” dynamic – whereby developments to disrupt the EMS are matched by developments seeking to overcome disruptions – that has acted as a strong driver of innovation in weapon systems.

For example, the proliferation of fibre optic UAVs, that are now common on modern battlefields, is a result of efforts to overcome a highly contested electromagnetic environment. Relatedly, spectrum denial has contributed to accelerating the integration of AI-enabled autonomy in specific functions of various weapon systems. This is especially true, for example, of terminal guidance for UAVs, where jamming can sever the link between drone and operator. Such advances have been matched by innovations in electronic warfare capabilities, such as its convergence with AI into “cognitive electronic warfare”. Hence, competition in the EMS can be understood as a strategic force driving the path of development of weapon systems, and military capabilities more broadly.

Adobe Stock

Harmful interference, mainly through jamming and spoofing, has, however, become more common beyond battlefields. Between January and August 2024 alone, a 500% increase in spoofing of civil aviation was noted, while the first quarter of 2026 marked the single largest concentration of maritime jamming events ever recorded. This trend risks increasing instability due to the potential cascading effects of these disruptions on civilian life and critical sectors that rely on the EMS.

Notably, a 2025 joint statement by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) raises concerns over the rise of harmful interference with Radio Navigation Satellite Services (RNSS).

The EMS is an inherently dual use resource; shared by both civilian and military systems.

Hence, increased disruption, either caused by the growing use of electronic warfare in conflicts, or intentional harmful interference by state and non-state actors, should be cause for concern. An escalation of competition and confrontation in the EMS must be avoided.

What comes next for the disarmament community?

The dynamics that emerge from or in reaction to EMS disruptions warrant the attention of the disarmament community. The EMS is an operational environment that shapes military effectiveness, drives technological innovation across sectors, results in the development of novel disruptive capabilities, and whose disruptions have cascading effects across civilian domains. Therefore, it is necessary to:

• Foster a better understanding of the importance of the EMS, the relationship between disruption and military innovation, the path of development of weapon systems, and the implications for disarmament and arms control;
• Determine the relevance of norms and measures to build confidence, increase transparency or reduce risks given that the rapidly evolving, dual-use capabilities employed to disrupt the EMS do not fit easily into existing arms control efforts;
• Ensure that growing competition in this domain does not lead to more instability and impacts on civilian life and industry.

To this end, UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2026 will focus on electromagnetic disruption, peace and security. On November 11, 2026, technical experts, state representatives, members of the private sector, and international security and disarmament experts will meet to discuss the issue and explore the role of the disarmament community in managing the multitude of consequences related to the growing centrality of the EMS in the military domain.

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UNIDIR’s Space Security Research Fellowship is a year‑long programme designed to equip early-career space security professionals with the knowledge, skills and networks needed to navigate today’s rapidly evolving outer space environment. Fellows come from a diverse range of countries and academic backgrounds. 

The recent gathering in Geneva provided an important opportunity for Fellows to engage directly with UNIDIR’s space security team, as well as with practitioners from States, international organizations, academia and the private sector. Coming together in person created space for the kinds of conversations, exchanges and sharing of insights and experiences that can be difficult to achieve by virtual means. 

Experiencing the international community  

On the first day, the Fellows were welcomed at the Palais des Nations, where they held an interactive session with UNIDIR’s Director, Dr Robin Geiss, and the Head of UNIDIR’s Space Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes, Dr James Revill. They then heard from Michael Spies, Deputy Chief of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs Geneva Branch. During these sessions, the Fellows learned firsthand from those who support multilateral space processes. 

Next, they took part in a guided tour of the Palais des Nations, followed by a luncheon with experienced diplomats actively engaged in disarmament negotiations. During this unique opportunity for exchange, the diplomats generously shared their perspectives on the current challenges facing disarmament diplomacy, including those related to multilateral processes on space security. 

The first day continued with a visit to the Permanent Delegation of the European Union to UN Geneva, where they heard from Klemen Polak, the Head of the Disarmament Section, on the challenges of addressing disarmament issues relating to conventional arms, emerging technologies, outer space security, and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

The following two days were dedicated to the Outer Space Security Conference 2026 (OS26), which featured a diverse cohort of experienced professionals from 94 countries, participating both in person and online. The Fellows engaged actively throughout the event, asking insightful questions and connecting with participants during the breaks. Through their active participation and exchanges, they contributed to the success of OS26. 

© 2026, UNIDIR/Antoine Tardy

Discovering industry and academic perspectives  

The Fellows then headed to the nearby city of Lausanne for a highly interactive exchange at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), where they were welcomed by Emmanuelle David, Executive Director of the EPFL Space Center. There, they learned about how academia is contributing to space situational awareness and space sustainability. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

This was followed by a visit to the private company ClearSpace, which is developing active debris removal systems for on-orbit operations, putting space sustainability into practice. The Fellows gained a deeper understanding of the engineering, policy and business challenges behind operations in space. The engagement also underlined the importance of greater transparency and access to satellite data, including model information and optical markers that can make missions and sustainability efforts both easier and safer. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

Engaging with global institutions in the space governance landscape 

The last day began with a visit to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The visit included a tour of the ICRC Museum, which showcases the history and worldwide humanitarian action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. This was followed by an interactive discussion with Mauro Vignati, an ICRC Advisor on Digital Technologies of Warfare, who explored the intersection between space security and International humanitarian law, as well as outlining the ICRC’s contributions to the Open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

The Fellows’ final appointment of the week took them to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), where Senior Radiocommunication Engineer, Véronique Glaude, walked them through the ITU’s history and its current role within the UN system. Fellows also learned how the ITU functions and manages increasingly congested resources, whether in terms of orbital slots or the electromagnetic spectrum.  

UNIDIR, and the Space Security Fellows in particular, would like to thank all of the organizations and individuals who shared their valuable time and expertise throughout the course of the week. The Fellows gained new knowledge, insights and practical experience, ending the week with renewed motivation to further develop their independent research and their careers. The UNIDIR Space Security Programme aims to continue receiving support that will allow this initiative to continue in the coming years, furthering UNIDIR’s goal of cultivating and amplifying diverse expertise from new generations to ensure the sustainable and peaceful use of outer space. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

The post UNIDIR Space Security Fellows experience multilateral Geneva first appeared on UNIDIR.

Building on previous efforts to strengthen youth engagement in multilateral space security discussions, the competition gave young people a platform to share their innovations and research for a more secure outer space environment.

This year’s competition received over 200 submissions, breaking last year’s record, with representation from all United Nations regional groups. This growing global interest highlights the importance of including younger generations in space security conversations and amplifying their work.

Through this initiative, UNIDIR and CIGI have engaged with almost 450 participants to date, which is a testament to an increasing awareness of space security issues among young people around the world.

Fresh perspectives on space security

The video competition invited young people aged 18-25 to showcase their technical research and explain what innovations to space systems could contribute to a more secure and sustainable space for all humankind.

The competition attracted submissions covering shared technical standards, cyber-resilient architecture, enhanced operational transparency and open-source monitoring frameworks. These proposals offered solutions to a wide range of challenges and priorities for the technically informed, multilateral governance of space security, with particular attention paid to security and sustainability dilemmas and the evolving threat landscape in outer space.

Spotlighting this year’s winners

A panel of independent experts from UNIDIR and CIGI, serving in their personal capacities, reviewed all of this year’s submissions. To ensure a fair and equitable selection process, the panel applied a set of established evaluation criteria. The top two videos selected demonstrate original, compelling and timely innovations for the future of space security. UNIDIR awarded the creators of these videos a fully funded trip to Geneva to attend UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2026, where they were able to present their videos to an international audience of experts and decision makers.

This year’s Youth Video Competition winners are:

Ali Shan, Youth Advocate and STEM Student, Pakistan

Ali Shan has a passion for youth advocacy and engaging underprivileged young people in STEM. He organizes Beaconhouse Notion of Academia, one of the largest high school STEM Olympiads in Pakistan, which brings together over 1,000 students to experiment with miniature satellite systems, heat shield prototyping and rocketry. He earned an Outstanding Performance Award at the STEMx bootcamp and represented Pakistan at the 2022 World Scholar’s Cup. Beyond STEM, Ali is interested in policymaking and delivered a speech on youth and peacebuilding at the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services.

Drawing on his experience of engaging with young people on space innovation, Ali’s video proposes solutions for analysing orbital patterns and flagging anomalous satellite manoeuvres through a specialized large language model system. It also suggests that a set of international standards on satellite design, debris removal and deorbit timelines be established to minimize space debris.

Joel Modokpe Pajiah, Law Trainee, Nigerian Law School

Joel Modokpe Pajiah is a law graduate and professional trainee at the Nigerian Law School, specializing in public international law, international humanitarian law and space law. He has participated in major international moot competitions, including Oxford University’s 2024 Monroe E. Price Media Moot Court Competition and the 2025 Nigerian Championship of the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Competition, where he was named Best Counsel. Previously, Joel interned at the Department of International Law and Comparative Law in the Federal Ministry of Justice in Abuja, Nigeria.

Addressing the challenge of orbital collisions, Joel’s video suggests building a shared tracking and monitoring system, which would allow actors to broadcast verifiable satellite routes and resolve a technical ambiguity that increases the risk of conflict in space.

Collaborating with the next generation on space security

The Outer Space Security Conference Youth Video Competition demonstrates that young leaders have important, innovative ideas to contribute and underlines the need to deepen their inclusion in multilateral processes. Their perceptive comments and questions enriched the discussions among experts and policymakers throughout the two days of the conference. They also provided crucial insights into both the immediate and the more long-standing areas of interest for the next generation of decision makers. UNIDIR remains committed to strengthening young people’s research capacity and to amplifying their voices in space security governance. They have a vital role to play in ensuring that the space domain remains peaceful and sustainable for all.

The post Amplifying youth-led innovations for space security first appeared on UNIDIR.

Despite the recurring gap between expectations and reality, directed energy weapons have repeatedly attracted strong interest and investment. While there has been progress in the maturation of this technology, the nature of warfare has also changed since the Cold War when this technology was first conceived. This raises the question: what implications might integrating directed energy weapons into layered air defence have for countering drones and international security more broadly?

Directed energy weapons emit highly focused energy that travels at the speed of light to disable, degrade or destroy targets, enabling faster engagement compared to physical projectiles. The term covers a wide range of technologies, each differing in their underlying physics, impact on the target and level of maturity.

The most mature types, high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves, are widely discussed in the context of their perceived cost-efficiency and defensive potential against the mass proliferation of drones. Currently, high-energy lasers receive more attention in the context of countering drones due to greater precision and longer effective range than high-power microwaves, with several States having already deployed the former in limited instances.

So, what could hamper the use of this technology for defensive purposes? During UNIDIR’s technology briefing on the topic, panellists pointed out that some of the more consequential challenges are operational rather than purely technological.

Effective range is one of the primary operational challenges, as both high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves can only impact targets within a limited range.

“Old” technology, new economics

Despite operational and technological challenges to directed energy weapons, there is an interest in examining how they may be used in air defence, especially given the rising use of drones, by State and non-State actors. Low-cost drones have altered the economic balance between air offence and defence, pitting interceptor missiles costing as high as millions of dollars against considerably cheaper threats.

Consequently, the interest in directed energy weapons is largely driven by the promise of cost-efficiency. The cost-per-shot of an operational high-energy laser or high-power microwave often equals the cost of electricity used, which can be as little as a few dollars, making them appealing against inexpensive threats. However, this narrative assumes the operational maturity of these systems, whereas in reality, even the most mature ones are facing challenges in progressing from testing to scaled deployment.

Speaking at UNIDIR’s event on the matter, Richard Hoad highlighted that the high upfront cost of developing an operational directed energy system is a potential barrier to industry and the customer, nuancing the simplified economic pitch driving the interest in directed energy weapons.

A related issue is revenue generation for the industry to offset upfront costs, Hoad further noted. Unlike traditional munitions, which have a finite lifetime and allow industry to generate revenue through the replenishment of stockpiles, directed energy weapons do not follow the same lifecycle, leaving the question of how industry might offset upfront costs still to be determined.

Despite decades of research and development, these weapons’ capabilities still require a continuous and extensive funding commitment. Nonetheless, smaller companies entering the market alongside large defence contractors could contribute to the advancement of the capability, reinforcing interest and investment.

The hardening of aerial systems

Besides international law implications, a scaled deployment of directed energy weapons could also impact military innovation and arms control efforts. The renewed interest in the development of these weapons in response to the mass proliferation of drones may prompt drones to adapt, which could in turn drive further adaptation of directed energy weapons, creating a familiar measure-countermeasure cycle seen with emerging military capabilities.

Since high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves operate on different principles when engaging targets, the pathways for hardening drones against each differ accordingly:

• High-energy lasers impact a target by focusing a beam of light on its surface, so hardening focuses on protecting the exterior with reflective and ablative coatings, as well as protecting optical sensors, which are especially vulnerable.
• High-power microwaves target the internal electronics of a system using pulses of microwave energy that can enter through antennas and other points of entry, so hardening focuses on the electromagnetic shielding of the airframe and the use of filters at these points to block or weaken incoming energy.

At the same time, completely shielding drones remains unfeasible as long as they must retain Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) positioning and communications with remote operators. Increasing autonomous navigation could reduce drones’ reliance on GNSS and communications with remote operators. Already explored in response to electronic warfare threats, this approach could also make drones more resilient to high-power microwaves by enabling complete shielding. Altogether, these alterations would also affect their production costs, cutting into the economic logic that revived the interest for directed energy weapons in the first place.

On the other hand, while some drones may harden and become costlier to produce, low-cost, disposable drones could still be used to counter high-power microwaves. Edl Schamiloglu noted that there is no hard maximum amount of drones a high-power microwave could target within the reach and direction of its beam.

Building on this, David Hambling suggested that swarms comprising a large number of drones could attack from multiple directions at once, overwhelming such systems. In response, defenders may deploy additional high-power microwave systems, triggering a cycle in which larger drone swarms are met with a bigger deployment of directed energy weapons.

From defence to offence

Directed energy weapons are generally most effective in short-range defence roles, owing to their limited effective range. While most systems are either ground-based or mounted on naval or ground vehicles, directed energy weapons might also be integrated in aircraft as power supply systems evolve.

Panellists at UNIDIR’s technology briefing similarly raised the possibility of integrating these weapons with drones, highlighting that it may be one solution to the range restriction in counter-drone applications. Hambling further pointed out that such a development would also open the door to offensive applications of directed energy weapons technology.

This is particularly concerning in the case of high-power microwaves, which can affect a wider area than high-energy lasers and therefore pose greater risks to civilian infrastructure. Even when used defensively, the former may unintentionally affect a friendly electronic system.

In offensive scenarios, the risk becomes more acute when military targets are situated near civilian infrastructure, potentially disabling civilian structures, including critical infrastructure. This concern is heightened by the growing prevalence of urban warfare, where the wide effects of high-power microwaves in densely populated and structurally complex environments could carry serious humanitarian consequences.

Strip away the sensationalist claims that have persisted for decades, and a more realistic assessment among experts emerges: Directed energy weapons will likely become one layer of a complex air defence.

For the disarmament community, this evolving capability still warrants consideration, from the dynamics of weapon development and use to the humanitarian risks that may follow if directed energy weapons shift from defensive to offensive applications.

The post The role of directed energy weapons in counter-drone defence first appeared on UNIDIR.

The dialogues explored how science and technology tools can support the convention and the design of a lasting advisory mechanism to keep pace with scientific change. Both events were organized under UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower project and as part of the joint Technical Briefs series on emerging technologies and the convention.

Scientific advice mechanism for the convention

The first event on designing a science and technology advisory mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention brought together experts from international scientific advisory bodies, multilateral policy research and disarmament diplomacy. Drawing on the experiences of the Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board, the International Science Council, the Scientific Advisory Board of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other bodies, participants explored what a comparable mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention could look like, including how it might be composed, identify priorities and build consensus.

OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board offered one of the relevant composition components: its 25 members serve in a personal capacity rather than as government representatives, with rotating terms and informal geographic and gender balance that help the body maintain both independence and legitimacy. On process, speakers shared experience on dealing with disagreements among members, noting that transparently recording dissenting views in a final report can be a legitimate and often more useful outcome.

The experience of the UN Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board offered another important lesson:

Scientific advice has impact only once translated for a diplomatic audience.

Short, accessible briefs and informal briefings can help connect scientists directly with diplomats and bring scientific findings into policy discussions.

Participants also discussed the design of the convention’s own proposed mechanism, which envisages a hybrid model combining an open-ended body for broad participation with a smaller, focused reporting committee, to balance inclusivity with substantive technical work.

Speakers agreed that any mechanism should remain strictly advisory and feed transparently into the convention’s existing review cycle, helping States Parties turn scientific uncertainty into clarity they can act on.

Practical tools for implementation

The second event on applied science and technology tools for prevention, risk assessment and biorisk governance brought together speakers from public health, verification, biosecurity research and biotechnology policy to present concrete tools already in use or under development.

Emerging technologies are creating practical instruments to support the convention’s purpose, offering ways forward even in the continued absence of a formal verification regime.

Identifying governance gaps

The tools presented addressed different governance needs, from diagnosing gaps and assessing risk to building transparency. The Biorisk Implementation and Evaluation Tool, developed by the World Health Organization based on the 2022 Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of Life Sciences, helps States self-diagnose their governance gaps. Available in national and institutional versions, the platform guides users through a step-by-step process to generate a risk score and identify priority actions.

Taking a different approach, VERTIC and King’s College London applied the logic of the IAEA’s Acquisition Path Analysis, used in nuclear safeguards, to hypothetical biological-weapons scenarios. By mapping pathways from agent acquisition to weaponization and identifying associated “observables,” they assessed how different monitoring and verification measures could capture them. By testing these approaches against the convention’s existing confidence-building measures, they revealed key practical gaps that were not captured in all cases, underscoring the level of detail needed to weigh the relative confidence, intrusiveness and cost of proposed measures.

Assessing emerging risks

RAND’s Risk Index Observatory applies a graded risk scale to AI-enabled biological tools such as protein-design algorithms, aiming to flag high-risk capabilities early while avoiding blanket restrictions on responsible research.

Meanwhile, early-stage research under the VERIBIO project at the University of Hamburg and Technical University of Hamburg, is exploring how industrial bioprocesses could be monitored for verification purposes while protecting confidential details of the process. Researchers are using an AI-based anomaly-detection model to identify when a bacterial strain’s “fingerprint” deviates from what is expected, potentially signaling it has been substituted for one producing a harmful agent.

Strengthening transparency

The Global DNA Synthesis Map and Common Mechanism developed by IBBIS give synthesis providers an open-source basis for screening orders against risky sequences across more than fifty regulatory frameworks.

Speakers discussed that these tools could support confidence-building, awareness-raising and national implementation of the convention under its Article IV, while also informing future efforts to the development of a verification mechanism.

As science and technology continue to advance, keeping the Biological Weapons Convention effective will require sustained engagement with the opportunities and challenges they present. Held under UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower, the dialogues demonstrated the value of drawing on existing scientific advisory practice while exploring practical tools that can support prevention, risk assessment, transparency and future verification.

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More than 20 participants from Sirigu and Manyoro, communities situated along the Ghana–Burkina Faso border, took part in the workshop. Participants included traditional leaders, volunteers who serve as WANEP community-based conflict early warning monitors, the Regional Peace Council, and local security actors – including the police and immigration.

Communities at the frontline of prevention

Communities living in border areas are often among the first to observe changes in local security dynamics. Their knowledge of local contexts and networks also provides important insights into emerging risks, including the movement and diversion of arms and ammunition.

Building on this local knowledge, the workshop strengthened this existing community-based early warning capacity by equipping participants with a better understanding of how ammunition diversion and trafficking can contribute to insecurity and how related warning signs can be identified, documented and reported.

The project we are commencing here today contributes particularly to the Global Framework for Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management objectives relating to diversion prevention, accountability, monitoring and information sharing. Lessons gathered here are intended to become a model for community prevention across West Africa.

H.E. Hiroshi Yoshimoto, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Ghana

Building practical skills to identify ammunition diversion

Through interactive discussions and practical exercises, community monitors explored how to:

• understand arms and ammunition diversion dynamics in border communities;

• identify indicators of arms and ammunition diversion and trafficking; and

• strengthen practical skills for the safe and systematic collection, documentation and reporting of diversion-relevant information.

The movement of unauthorized arms and ammunition destabilizes local communities, fuels chieftaincy and land disputes… When our local citizens are empowered to detect early warning signs of ammunition diversion, they become active partners alongside our security forces rather than passive bystanders.

Hon. Faustina Abalu, Municipal Chief Executive of the Kassena Nankana Municipal Assembly

Connecting community actors and local authorities

Effective conflict early warning also depends on trusted channels for information-sharing and cooperation between communities and relevant authorities.

On the third day of the workshop, community monitors engaged in an open dialogue with representatives from the National Peace Council, Immigration Office and civil society. The discussion provided an opportunity to explore ways of strengthening trust, communication and collaboration between community actors and local security institutions.

A key outcome from the workshop was the development of community monitoring and information-sharing plans, providing a practical basis for participants to apply their learning within their respective communities.

Effective arms control begins with understanding the realities and risks communities face. By connecting community knowledge with formal early warning and security structures, we can strengthen prevention and reduce the risks associated with the diversion and misuse of arms and ammunition.

Fiifi Edu-Afful, Senior Researcher, Conventional Weapons Programme, UNIDIR

From insights to action

The three-day workshop forms part of the broader community-led arms control initiative of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, which seeks to integrate arms control measures into conflict prevention, peacebuilding and armed violence reduction. Insights shared by the participants will inform the development of a “menu of options” to support communities in managing weapons and ammunition, thereby preventing proliferation and misuse.

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Most international conventional arms control and humanitarian disarmament instruments – including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – have mandated review conferences every five years, and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms every six years.

The ATT, however, has no dedicated review conference. The treaty mandates the annual CSP to review implementation, but informal consultations convened by UNIDIR and Panama in late 2025 and early 2026 found that important aspects of implementation are not being examined through the current process.

As States Parties look ahead to the treaty’s next phase, the discussions have opened a broader debate about how the ATT can periodically assess its effectiveness, identify challenges, and strengthen implementation over time.

The current approach

The ATT reviews implementation through its annual conferences and is supported by three standing working groups focusing on:

• effective treaty implementation (WGETI)

• transparency and reporting (WGTR)

• and universalization (WGTU)

Each follows a multi-year work plan that identifies priority issues and outlines the sequencing for their consideration.

The WGETI and WGTR review the implementation status, identify common challenges, and develop voluntary guidance to overcome them. The WGTU reviews progress on universalization, assesses barriers to ratification and accession, and proposes more coordinated approaches to outreach and assistance.   

The “informal” WGTR developed reporting templates, which the CSP2 recommended for use by States. It also suggested that this be “kept under review by the States Parties in order to benefit from the practical experiences gained from its use.” Five years later, the reporting templates were reviewed, and the CSP7 endorsed the revised versions. The WGTR has also recommended updates to the voluntary guidance on ATT annual reports.  

Some elements of the ATT framework have more structured review processes. For example, the CSP5 adopted a structured project evaluation framework to assess whether projects funded by the Voluntary Trust Fund have achieved their intended objectives. Further, when the CSP6 established the Diversion Information Exchange Forum to support the treaty’s information-sharing provisions, it also agreed to review its usefulness at the CSP8. Although the COVID-19 pandemic delayed this review, it was eventually conducted at the CSP10.

This shows that ATT States Parties are open to exploring new ways to support treaty implementation and review what does and doesn’t work. At the same time, the existing review mechanisms are diffuse, and there is no comprehensive approach for assessing the treaty’s overall progress toward achieving its object and purpose.   

What hasn’t been reviewed? 

Despite the ATT’s extensive working-group structure, three issues are not currently being reviewed.   

1. The ATT requires the CSP to review “developments in the field of conventional arms”, but no mechanism currently examines this and related scope issues. The WGETI considered a proposal earlier this year to create an informal working group on scope and national control lists. This builds on a proposal from five years ago to establish an informal group that, as a first step, could review submitted lists, identify common approaches and challenges, and develop guidance for States Parties on establishing and maintaining control lists.
   
   Given technological developments in conventional weapons – including the transfer of parts, components and knowledge under joint and licensed production arrangements – such a group could ensure there are no loopholes in State Party regulation of the international arms trade. A geographically diverse group of national government and non-governmental experts on these issues would provide a unique forum, complementing less inclusive existing export control regimes.
   
   
2. Information contained in State Party initial and annual reports is not systematically reviewed. While the WGTR initially considered how information contained in State Party reports could be used, these discussions ended at the CSP5. The five-year strategy represents a timely opportunity to revisit this issue, also given the renewed interest in updating initial reports. These could be used in a peer-review process to support national implementation and increase understanding of the treaty’s impact.
   
   The UN Firearms Protocol provides a possible model for an ATT voluntary peer-review. Like the ATT, the CSPs of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Firearms Protocol provide space for a general review of implementation. States Parties also conduct individual “country reviews” involving a self-assessment questionnaire, which two other States review and provide feedback on.
   
   For the ATT, an updated initial report and annual reports could provide the evidence base for the review, with all three States agreeing on a list of gaps, assistance needs, and best practices – which is then summarized for the CSP. An optional peer-review mechanism could help ATT States Parties strengthen their national control systems, give clear purpose for reporting, and support the development of implementation roadmaps and project proposals for the Voluntary Trust Fund.
   
   
3. As noted by civil society at several ATT conferences, the implementation of presidential themes and working group decisions is not regularly reviewed. While the WGETI sub-working group on current and emerging implementation issues addresses some of the presidency recommendations on the themes of gender, the role of industry, and inter-agency cooperation, many conference decisions have not been reviewed.

The benefits of a comprehensive review

Even if these gaps were addressed, they would only examine certain aspects of treaty implementation. There is currently no mechanism to conduct an overarching review of the treaty’s implementation and impact.

The current work towards a five-year strategy for the ATT focuses on identifying priority areas, establishing indicators and tracking progress over this period. Yet reviewing progress against the strategy’s indicators at the end of the five-year cycle is not comparable to undertaking a comprehensive review of all aspects of treaty implementation.

Experiences and lessons learned from other international instruments show the potential benefits that a review conference could offer to the ATT. A State-led, inclusive, participatory and needs-driven process could provide an opportunity to take stock of ATT implementation since its entry into force to identify common gaps and needs, and assess whether the treaty needs to adapt to new realities and emerging challenges.  

Such a process could also strengthen the ATT’s architecture, create innovative tools for its effective implementation, and consider provisions that have received less attention – as well as other issues not covered by the treaty’s negotiation process. An ATT Review Conference could therefore help renew the treaty’s visibility and ensure that it remains fit for purpose, by strengthening the regulation of the international arms trade, preventing diversion, and reducing human suffering, without requiring treaty amendments.

There is “no one size fits all” formula to attain this goal. The ATT has a unique nature due to its export-control dimension and does not ban any specific type of weapon. This is an aspect to consider when developing any potential measurable, time-bound indicators to monitor the status and operations of the ATT. The timing, frequency and modalities of a comprehensive ATT review process merit further consideration by interested parties.

From reflection to action

The ATT’s 10th anniversary in 2024, followed by the development of a five-year strategy, has created a timely opportunity to reflect on the treaty’s implementation and impact.

The UNIDIR-Panama informal consultations revealed different priorities, particularly on civil society’s call for greater transparency on national decisions regarding transfer authorizations and denials – a sensitive issue for some States Parties.

Whether through enhanced working-group mandates, using reports for peer reviews, or a review conference process, States Parties have a range of options to assess the treaty’s implementation and increase its impact.

While cognizant of capacity and financial constraints, the upcoming CSP12 offers an important space to systematically review the implementation and impact of ATT. In this context, UNIDIR, in collaboration with Conflict Armament Research and Stimson, will host a side event on 24 August to launch a new initiative to deliver the first comprehensive evaluation of the treaty’s impact.

Igor Barreto was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, supporting research on weapons and ammunition management. He holds a Master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. Previously, Igor worked with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Embassy of Brazil in Stockholm, the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center.

Paul Holtom is the Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. He conducts research on the illicit trade, diversion and uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons and ammunition. Paul has authored and co-authored publications on the international arms trade and conventional arms control. Before joining UNIDIR, he worked at the Small Arms Survey, Coventry University and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. He holds a PhD and Master’s degree in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Birmingham, UK.

Grisselle Rodríguez is the Delegate for Disarmament and International Security of the Permanent Mission of Panama to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva since 2015. She is an MA candidate in Global Security at King’s College London and was awarded certificates for the 2019 UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament and the 2021 Visiting Fellows Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Previously, she interned at diplomatic missions, the UN and NGOs.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this commentary are those of Grisselle Rodríguez.

The post Reviewing the Arms Trade Treaty first appeared on UNIDIR.

With more than 50,000 objects now in orbit, and that number expected to keep rising, outer space faces mounting questions about how to distinguish benign from hostile activity, how emerging technologies affect strategic stability, and how existing legal and governance frameworks can keep pace.

The Outer Space Security Conference 2026 will provide a platform for cross-sectoral dialogue on these questions, with the aim of exploring and moving towards practical pathways to strengthen the security and peaceful use of the space domain.

Over two days, the programme will centre on key discussions including: threats to space systems and the ambiguity of intent; how reliance on space infrastructure for military operations intersects with arms control regimes; and progress on preventing an arms race in outer space.

The accelerated pace of space technology development and the increasing diversity of actors requires that all stakeholders converge towards shared understanding of how governance should keep up. The Outer Space Security Conference remains the premier track 1.5 platform where both future-facing and grounded thinking around the security of these systems, their operators and their environment occur.

— James Revill, Head of UNIDIR’s Space Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes.

For more than 20 years, UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference has helped advance practical approaches to outer space security. It connects strategic dialogue with insights from technical and policy practice, contributing to more transparent and informed decision-making. Registration is open to participate.

For further information, please contact Claudia Marquina, UNIDIR Head of Communications at claudia.marquina@un.org.

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institution within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community in developing solutions to critical security problems. For more information, visit unidir.org. 

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Introduced on the sidelines of the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva, the initiative “Working towards a mine-free Africa: Building African capacity to remove threats posed by anti-personnel landmines to peace, security and development” comes at a critical time.

Since 1997, the APMBC has achieved significant progress – facilitating widespread mine clearance and reducing human costs of weapons. Yet, challenges persist. Thirty-three States Parties have outstanding Article 5 (mine clearance) obligations. Sixteen of these are from Africa, and many face constraints in securing domestic resources and international cooperation including assistance.

These challenges have been compounded by broader pressures on arms control and humanitarian disarmament instruments, which in turn underscores the importance of the effective implementation by all States Parties of the APMBC and its universalization.

Strengthening capacity and accelerating progress towards completion

As part of this initiative, a dedicated project aims to support five of the African States that are receiving low levels of international cooperation and assistance to fulfill their APMBC Article 5 obligations. It has two, interconnected objectives:

• First, to build national capacity in up to five African States to fulfil their APMBC Article 5 obligations related to mine clearance and land release; and
• Second, to promote and support the exchange of knowledge and experience on building African national capacity to implement APMBC obligations.

It will focus on African States Parties that have existing extensions granted by the Meeting of States Parties, established national action plans, and comparatively small or medium levels of contamination. These include Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The diversity and uniqueness of each context can help generate knowledge and understanding of how targeted support can be adapted to different country settings.

In addition to strengthening national capacities, the initiative will help ensure that the knowledge and experiences generated are socialized among key stakeholders. This includes other APMBC States Parties, African Union (AU) and UN Member States, other regional organizations such as the AU, regional economic communities, expert non-governmental organizations, and the public at large.

Ultimately, this will also benefit communities and individuals – including women, men, girls and boys – who continue to suffer from the negative, age-differentiated and gendered impacts of anti-personnel landmines on the African continent, and elsewhere.

The project is implemented by UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, in cooperation with the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and in close coordination with the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), other stakeholders and partners.

Speaking at the launch event, and joined by all partners and the APMBC Zambia presidency, the EU highlighted its commitment to humanitarian disarmament and its concrete support for the initiative:

The EU Council has committed 3 million EUR under the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget to support five African States close to completion in fulfilling their Article 5 obligations through a 36-month project, implemented by UNIDIR in partnership with MAG.

Ambassador Michele Cervone d’Urso, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva

The EU further emphasized the initiative’s alignment with its broader strategic priorities on peace, security and sustainable development, as outlined in its Global Strategy and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

An inclusive, cooperative and partnership-driven approach

Central to the initiative is a strong emphasis on national ownership, cooperation and coordination across stakeholders to translate political commitments into practical, on the ground impact.

As President of the convention and as an African State, Zambia is honoured to have been part of the launch of this project that will accelerate progress toward a mine-free future.

Mulima Lisimba, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Zambia to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva

Zambia further stressed that humanitarian disarmament including mine action is not only a technical undertaking, but a humanitarian imperative, adding that “behind every clearance target and compliance deadline are communities seeking safety, dignity and the opportunity to live free from the threat of landmines.”

Juan Carlos Ruan, Director of the APMBC Implementation Support Unit, also highlighted the initiative’s contribution to strengthening the overall functioning of the convention. This includes cooperation between States Parties in meeting legal obligations related to Article 5 and commitments. It also means generating lessons that can inform broader discussions to strengthen cooperation and assistance, as well as progress of the Siem Reap–Angkor Action Plan (2025–2029).

Delivering practical results and shared knowledge

The project combines research, analytical and knowledge-exchange with operational components. Key core activities will include:

• joint initial review meetings with national authorities,
• joint piloting and use of a prioritization tool, and
• upon request support in the preparation of annual reports.

Key optional and context-specific activities may include:

• surveys;
• clearance operations; and
• institutional and operational capacity-building provided by MAG (such as for example in information management, national standards, explosive ordnance risk education and community liaison).

At the same time, UNIDIR and its partners will document lessons and facilitate exchanges among African States Parties and the wider international community. This includes:

• a knowledge-exchange workshop and report,
• development of a prioritization tool,
• publication of country-specific factsheets and analytical outputs,
• co-hosting and organization of events in the margins of regional and international forum both in multilateral Geneva and in African countries.

Over the next three years, activities will focus on delivering concrete clearance outcomes, strengthening national systems, and generating actionable knowledge for the community of policy and practice. Partners also intend to engage regularly with European and African States Parties, regional organizations, and international stakeholders to share progress and findings, including through side events at future APMBC meetings, the conference of states parties, and regional outreach in Africa. Thus, the beneficiaries will not only be the five States, but also other APMBC States Parties, and the international community at large.

Looking ahead

During the initial phase, UNIDIR and MAG will hold joint review meetings with national authorities of the five States. The aim is to support States Parties in identifying, further prioritizing and sequencing assistance to fulfil Article 5 obligations. This should help move from broad expressions of needs towards structured, prioritized and nationally owned plans that can also inform individualized approaches, international assistance requests, and future cooperation.

The initiative also aims to enable States and the continent to take ownership in fulfilling Article 5 obligations and commit to shared responsibilities in working towards a mine-free Africa.

Other States in Africa and beyond face significant Article 5 challenges and require sustained international cooperation and assistance. This initiative and dedicated project is therefore a first, targeted, and focused contribution. It may become a vehicle and has the potential to generate further interest, support and resources to achieve mine-free objectives. Additional resources allowed expanding the geographical scope of the project or the type and depth of support that could be provided.

By working together, governments, regional organizations, implementing partners, donors, and affected communities, can make significant progress.

Mulima Lisimba, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Zambia to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva

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Held at the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the workshop brought together representatives from across the Government of Thailand to explore practical approaches for translating international commitments into national policies, institutional processes and operational practices. It builds on a series of similar bilateral trainings UNIDIR has already delivered in Thailand and across the region in Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

Building on a long-standing partnership

UNIDIR has worked with Thailand for several years to support the development of cyber resilience. In May 2025, a joint cyber capacity-building and policy training featured an interactive tabletop exercise simulating a major ICT incident. The objective was to test national coordination, decision-making, and response arrangements.

This exercise helped identify a number of practical actions to strengthen cyber resilience.

UNIDIR and Thailand then worked together to develop a national roadmap to address priority issues in greater depth, and support implementation of specific elements of the UN framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

Co-developing implementation-focused support

As a part of this broader initiative, in July 2026 UNIDIR in collaboration with the NSC, NCSA and MFA designed a follow up workshop tailored specifically to Thailand’s priorities and institutional context. The training focused on translating select elements of the UN framework into national policies, processes and practices suited to Thailand’s specific context.

This approach reflects the capacity-building principles set out by the Open-ended Working Group on ICT Security: support should be demand-driven, context-specific, developed with national partners, non-duplicative and building on previous engagement. By adapting programme design to nationally identified priorities, UNIDIR’s activities are built to support long-term implementation of the UN framework rather than functioning as standalone training events.

Bringing together the national cyber governance community

Effective implementation of the UN framework requires coordination across government. To support this, the recent workshop brought together representatives from Thailand’s technical, legal and diplomatic communities.

Through expert briefings, policy dialogues and simulated tabletop exercises, participants explored how different institutions can contribute to implementing the UN framework while building synergies across Thailand’s national cyber governance ecosystem.

The workshop provided a platform for cross-sector dialogue, enabling participants to examine implementation challenges around specific UN cyber norms from complementary technical, legal and policy perspectives.

Looking ahead

This workshop represents the latest milestone in the Institute’s ongoing partnership with Thailand and broader capacity-building efforts in Asia-Pacific, delivered through UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme. It reflects a shared commitment to translating the UN framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace from principle into national policy and practice.

UNIDIR will continue working with Thailand and other Member States through practical, tailored capacity-building activities that strengthen national cyber resilience while contributing to regional cooperation and a more stable, secure and peaceful cyberspace.

For further information on UNIDIR’s research-based training and capacity building initiatives, visit the UNIDIR Academy.

This project is funded by Global Affairs Canada under its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The post UNIDIR and Thailand advance national implementation of UN cyber norms first appeared on UNIDIR.

Mirroring a similarly diverse multi-stakeholder visit to Mongolia earlier this year, the visit deepened UNIDIR’s existing relationships in the People’s Republic of China and created opportunities to build new collaborations.

Strong partnerships are at the heart of effective multilateral dialogue and forward-looking research. They are one of four key enablers in UNIDIR’s strategy and essential for the work of the Institute. The Beijing mission illustrates what that commitment looks like in practice, spanning three distinct constituencies: Member State authorities, research institutions, and private sector actors working on emerging technology.

Partnering with Member State authorities

Sustained dialogue with UN Member States remains central to UNIDIR’s work. It reinforces the Institute’s unique role as a trusted partner and convening actor, especially in times of rising global tensions.

Beyond its regular exchanges with permanent missions in Geneva, UNIDIR places particular value on engagement with national stakeholders at the capital level, where policy is shaped.

In Beijing, UNIDIR Director held discussions with Ambassador Lu Kang, Vice Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. UNIDIR also met with representatives of the Department of Disarmament Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, and engaged with the organizers of the Beijing Xiangshan Forum – a leading platform for international security dialogue.

Across these bilateral discussions, Dr Geiss highlighted UNIDIR’s recently launched Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security as a concrete mechanism through which the Institute can support Member States’ capacity-building needs.

These conversations also provided an opportunity to exchange on issues of shared concern and discuss pathways for strengthening international dialogue, themes that are also emphasized by the Global Governance Initiative.

Expanding the research partner network

Research institutes, think tanks, and academia form another essential pillar of UNIDIR’s partnership approach. The Institute’s work draws on in-house expertise and continuous exchange with a vast network of research partners to build on diverse perspectives. A key initiative reflecting this commitment is UNIDIR’s Global Disarmament Research Network, which brings together experts and institutions worldwide to address shared security challenges.

In Beijing, UNIDIR formalized its long-standing collaboration with the Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS) by signing a partnership agreement with Tsinghua University. The agreement builds on an existing relationship through CISS Deputy Director Xiao Qian’s membership in UNIDIR’s Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics – the sole multistakeholder platform convening experts from all permanent members of the Security Council and all UN regional groups.

This relationship is further reflected in UNIDIR’s hosting of Fellow Lefeng Zheng, an established form of engagement that was well received by Chinese counterparts throughout the mission.

During the visit, UNIDIR Director delivered a Global Vision Lecture on AI at the crossroads of peace and security, co-hosted by Tsinghua’s Office of International Affairs and CISS, engaging early-career scholars on current security challenges. Discussions continued at a youth dialogue with a smaller group of Tsinghua researchers and students. CISS and UNIDIR also jointly organized a symposium on artificial intelligence and international security, examining associated risks, opportunities and persisting governance gaps.

UNIDIR also participated in the 14th World Peace Forum, where Dr Geiss took part in a panel on the use of unmanned systems in armed conflict, organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation in East Asia. Yasmin Afina, Researcher in UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme, also moderated a closed-door panel discussion on AI and international security, for which Dr Geiss provided opening remarks.

Beyond Tsinghua University, UNIDIR Director met with the senior leadership of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, including Dai Huaicheng, Secretary-General and member of UNIDIR’s Board of Trustees, to discuss ongoing collaboration. A welcome dinner hosted by the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs provided further opportunity for exchange with its representatives.

Engaging the private sector

Private sector engagement is increasingly important to UNIDIR’s research, particularly on AI, cyberspace and other emerging technologies. As innovation accelerates, dialogue with industry provides valuable insights into developments shaping the future security landscape.

UNIDIR visited two Beijing-based AI companies for discussions on peace and security, ensuring the Institute’s research remains grounded in current technological realities.

Supporting forward-looking research

UNIDIR’s recent engagements in Beijing demonstrate how the Institute’s partnerships – with governments, research institutions and industry – inform research that is both evidence-based and responsive to a fast-changing security environment.

As artifical intelligence and other emerging technologies continue to reshape questions of international peace and security, this kind of sustained, multi-stakeholder approach will remain at the core of UNIDIR’s ability to deliver relevant, forward-looking analysis.

The post UNIDIR advances partnerships on AI, peace and security in Beijing first appeared on UNIDIR.

For more than a decade, the international community has discussed the IHL implications of LAWS. States agreed on 11 Guiding Principles, advanced their understandings of key concepts, and charted a direction of travel toward what became informally known as the two-tier approach. This consists of a combination of prohibitions and regulations of LAWS, grounded in the fundamental rules and principles of IHL.

Discussions at the multilateral level, however, retain a high degree of abstraction. States have reiterated, for example, on multiple occasions that IHL continues to apply fully to the development and use of LAWS. States have also broadly expressed agreement over the fact that the ‘operational context’ is central to any determination of the quality and extent of the human-machine interaction, and to considerations of human judgment and control.

Why a scenario compendium on LAWS and IHL?

Any use of LAWS in armed conflict – like with any other weapon system – would be embedded in an operational context shaped by specific variables, unique time-bound circumstances, and existing doctrinal guidance. Against the universality of IHL principles, their practical application often depends on context.

Nevertheless, thus far, less effort has been made to understand how IHL applies and what concrete measures might need to be developed to enhance compliance when LAWS are deployed.

With this compendium, UNIDIR provides a tool – the first of its kind – for States to engage in in-depth conversations about compliance with IHL in defined tactical and operational environments.

What the compendium provides

The compendium includes a catalogue of 43 scenarios spanning the land, naval and air domains, covering both international and non-international armed conflict. Each scenario is accompanied by a detailed list of IHL questions to support granular legal analysis. These are scenario-specific but also include a number of cross-cutting questions that integrate more general considerations about the technical characteristics of LAWS.

Critically, the compendium does not provide answers, it merely steers users to consider an array of pertinent legal questions to enable structured legal and operational discussions.

The publication also provides ample guidance for interested stakeholders to be able to ‘play’ the scenarios in their respective national organizations or in international formats.

Supporting national and international engagement

At the national level, the compendium can support States in developing and refining their interpretations of how IHL applies to the possible use of LAWS.

The scenarios can help operationalize abstract concepts and consider them in practice.

States can opt for specialized deep dives, as well as cross-cutting national dialogues bringing together experts from across policy, military, legal and diplomatic communities.

At the international level, the compendium can serve as a confidence-building and a capacity-building tool. By providing shared tactical reference points, the scenarios enable States to compare how they interpret and apply IHL, how they structure safeguards and oversight, and identify areas of convergence and divergence without disclosure of sensitive information.

Looking ahead

Following the launch of the compendium, UNIDIR will undertake additional efforts to disseminate the compendium and facilitate its use.

Over the next months, the Institute will continue to promote and socialize the compendium among interested stakeholders. Activities will range from virtual briefings and training programmes to in-country workshops.

In addition, UNIDIR will further enhance the user experience by creating a digital version of the compendium, which will allow greater customization and more interactive options to play the scenarios. The digital tool will not replace the existing compendium, which remains permanently hosted on the UNIDIR website.

The post Navigating international humanitarian law in the age of autonomy first appeared on UNIDIR.

Due diligence is a well-established concept in international law, whereby States should not knowingly allow the use of their territory for activities contrary to the rights of other States. In international cybersecurity, States have recognized it as an important element of the agreed voluntary normative framework of responsible State use of information and communications technologies (ICTs), with some arguing it constitutes a binding rule in cyberspace. At the same time, the ILC has addressed due diligence in various contexts, most notably in relation to transboundary environmental harm, and in 2025 it added “due diligence in international law” to its programme of work as a distinct topic.

A well-established concept

As early as in 1928, the Island of Palmas arbitration linked due diligence to States’ obligation to act with reasonable care and established it as a corollary to territorial sovereignty. In the 1941 Trail Smelter case, the arbitral tribunal framed due diligence within the general obligation not to cause transboundary harm, proclaiming that no State has the right to use its territory, or permit its use, to cause significant injury to another State or persons located in another State’s territory.

Perhaps the most famous formulation of due diligence in international law comes from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its Corfu Channel judgment:

States have an “obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”

In doing so, the Court suggested there are two prerequisites:

• State knowledge of a potential harm to the rights of another State emanating from its territory; and
• a real possibility that reasonable action taken by the territorial State could prevent or minimize that harm.

The ICJ later extended this reasoning in the Tehran Hostages case, where it held that the State was responsible for omitting to protect foreign diplomatic premises and its diplomatic and consular staff from attacks by non-State actors when it had both knowledge of the harm and capacity to act.

Modern doctrine approaches due diligence in at least three ways: as a principle of international law, as a stand-alone obligation, and as modality attached to a duty of care (a standard of conduct). Irrespective of its legal qualification, the practical exercise of due diligence by a State depends on two factors:

• First, the State should have power over the source of the risk to another State’s rights, property or citizens.
• Second, the State should be aware of or anticipate the risk that triggers due diligence.

As the ICJ emphasized in the Corfu Channel, the mere presence on the State territory of the source of harmful acts is not sufficient to impute knowledge of these acts to the State.

Cyberspace raises new questions

Alongside doctrinal debates on the legal nature and scope of due diligence, the discussion has recently gained a second wind specifically in the cyber context. In particular, the application of due diligence to State use of ICTs, and its implications for State responsibility, have become subjects of extensive debate.

The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, in its 2015 consensus report, articulated a voluntary norm that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”. The 2021 GGE report clarified that:

a State should not permit another State or non-State actor to use ICTs within its territory to commit internationally wrongful acts.

As noted, due diligence is conditioned on knowledge. In the cyber context, the 2021 GGE report further qualified “knowledge” of malicious ICT conduct as requiring the State to be “aware or has been notified in good faith” that an internationally wrongful act involving ICTs is being carried out from or through its territory. The report also indicated that States will take all appropriate, reasonably available, and feasible steps to detect, investigate and stop internationally wrongful ICT activities emanating from or transiting their territory; it does not, however, impose a duty to monitor all ICT activities within their territory.

Despite years of negotiations among States on how international law applies to cyberspace, due diligence in cyberspace remains subject to divergent State interpretations. As observed by UNIDIR, key outstanding questions include the legal status of due diligence, the scope of expected conduct, the required level of knowledge, and the harm threshold.

The ILC takes up the issue

Due diligence previously featured on the ILC’s agenda in specific contexts, most notably in the 2001 Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. Article 3 provides that “the State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof” – an obligation of conduct requiring the State to exert its best efforts to minimize the risk, without guaranteeing that no harm will occur (commentary 7 to Article 3 of the Draft articles).

Furthermore, in 2025 the ILC decided to include “due diligence in international law” in its programme of work and to appoint Dr Penelope Ridings as Special Rapporteur. Her first report in April 2026 reviews the long pedigree of due diligence in international law and the past work of the ILC on related topics. It acknowledges the lack of clarity regarding the legal character of due diligence and proposes to identify its common elements applicable both generally in international law and to special regimes, including potentially its application in the ICT domain.

This ILC endeavor is particularly relevant for cyberspace. As noted:

divergent State interpretations of cyber due diligence persist, and the ILC’s forthcoming work offers a timely opportunity to bring valuable clarity to how the concept applies in the cyber context.

UNIDIR at the 2026 ILC session

As part of UNIDIR’s ongoing work on international cyber stability, the Institute will organize a side event on Due Diligence in Cyberspace on 2 July, on the margins of the 77th session of the ILC.

The objective is to bridge the parallel discussions in the cyber diplomatic and international legal communities, fostering a much-needed exchange between these two groups.

This event, organized with a contribution from Dr Penelope Ridings, Special Rapporteur of the ILC on due diligence, is designed to explore national and regional interpretations, highlight practical challenges States face, and to facilitate an exchange of views between ILC members, cyber diplomats, and legal experts on how to further clarify and operationalize cyber due diligence.

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As AI transforms security dynamics, from military operations and critical infrastructure to the information environment, governments and institutions are grappling with how to govern its risks and opportunities. The new centre responds to this challenge by bringing together analysis, dialogue and practical support under one roof, serving as the umbrella for UNIDIR’s work on AI and security.

To learn more, we spoke with Dr Robin Geiss, UNIDIR’s Director, and Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli, UNIDIR’s Head of Security and Technology Programme.

Q: AI is advancing at extraordinary speed. From a peace and security perspective, what developments concern you most, and what new risks are they creating for international security?

RG: The pace of advances in artificial intelligence is remarkable. While it brings significant benefits, it is also creating new challenges for international peace and security.

The concern is less about any single application, but rather the cumulative impact across multiple domains.

AI is now being integrated into military systems, cyber operations, critical infrastructure, and the information environment. This can enhance efficiency and decision-making, but it can also increase complexity, create new risks and pathways for escalation, increase the pace of battle, and add new layers of uncertainty in a highly dynamic global security environment. AI can lower the barriers to sophisticated cyberattacks, enable more convincing disinformation, and heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in crisis situations.

At the same time, governance and regulatory frameworks are struggling to keep pace. This creates a growing gap between technological capabilities and our collective ability to understand and manage their implications.

Addressing these challenges requires more than technical solutions. It calls for sustained dialogue, shared understanding, and practical cooperation among governments, industry, researchers, and civil society to ensure AI strengthens – rather than undermines – international peace and security.

Q: Governance of AI is often described as fragmented. Where do you see the most pressing challenges today, and why is addressing them becoming increasingly urgent?

RG: The challenge is not a lack of effort. Across the world, a wide range of stakeholders are actively working to shape AI governance. The problem is that these efforts often unfold in parallel – across different communities, processes and policy domains that do not connect effectively.

AI issues are being discussed across multiple domains, from international security and arms control to human rights, development and digital governance. While each track is important, this dispersion creates a fragmented landscape, making it harder to maintain a shared understanding of risks, opportunities and emerging policy approaches.

This fragmentation is becoming increasingly urgent as AI is already embedded in systems that affect security, stability and societal resilience. Policymakers face growing pressure to act in areas where technology, policy and security intersect – often without a fully aligned picture.

The goal is not a single, unified framework. It is better coordination, stronger capacity, and more informed dialogue so that the responses are coherent, inclusive and effective.

Q: Why is UNIDIR launching a Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security now?

RG: UNIDIR is launching its Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security at a pivotal moment, as artificial intelligence becomes central to international peace and security. In the coming weeks alone, Geneva will host two major gatherings – one focused on military application of AI and another one on global AI governance – bringing together Member States and a broader community of actors. The centre therefore responds to a clear need for sustained analysis, inclusive dialogue, and practical support.

While important governance initiatives are emerging around the world, many stakeholders still face capacity constraints, and there remains a gap between policy discussions, technical expertise, and real-world implementation.

This launch also reflects UNIDIR’s own evolution. In recent years, the Institute has become a trusted platform for research, dialogue and capacity-building on AI and security. The centre consolidates and scales this work, providing a more focused and sustained contribution to global efforts on AI, peace and security.

Q: There is no shortage of AI initiatives and forums. What makes this centre different, and what unique value can it bring?

GPP: It is true that there is no shortage of initiatives focused on AI, but relatively few focus on the most consequential and sensitive dimensions: international peace and security.

Many existing platforms centre on innovation, economic growth, digital governance, human rights, and broader societal impacts. These are essential conversations, but issues such as military applications, strategic stability, conflict dynamics, and the future of warfare have often been addressed in more specialized – and fragmented – settings.

The centre is designed to close that gap. It focuses on the intersection of AI, peace and security, examining risks and opportunities associated with AI-enabled capabilities, crisis decision-making, and international stability.

At the same time, many of the most advanced practices on AI governance – such as safety, accountability, testing, risk management, and responsible use – are emerging outside the security domain. A core objective of the centre is to bridge these worlds, connecting expertise, and transferring insights across communities that rarely engage directly.

In doing so, it seeks to strengthen understanding, reduce fragmentation, and support more coherent approaches to AI governance in the security domain.

Q: UNIDIR’s Centre of Excellence for AI, Peace and Security will serve as the umbrella for the Institute’s work on AI. What are its initial priorities, and where do you expect the centre’s work to have the greatest impact in the years ahead?

GPP: The centre builds on several years of UNIDIR’s work at the intersection of AI and international security – bringing research, dialogue and capacity-building under a single, dedicated framework. This allows the Institute to scale its contribution at a time of rapidly growing demand and expertise.

Its initial priorities span three areas: deepening analysis, strengthening engagement, and delivering practical tools. On the research side, this includes emerging issues such as agentic AI, cross-domain security implications – from cyber to biosecurity – and the risks linked to proliferation.

Engagement will also expand, especially with industry, recognizing the critical role that developers and deployers play in shaping security outcomes. In parallel, the centre will produce practical outputs, such as guidance for national AI and defence strategies, and an AI security lexicon to support clearer, shared understanding across communities.

Looking ahead, its greatest impact will come from its ability to act as a bridge: between policy and technology, across security and non-security communities, and from global debates to real-world implementation.

As AI reshapes security dynamics, the need for trusted platforms that enable informed, inclusive and actionable policymaking will only grow. That is the space the centre aims to occupy.

Q: The centre is built around three pillars: knowledge, dialogue and action. How will these translate into practical support for governments and other stakeholders?

GPP: The three pillars reflect our belief that effective AI governance in the peace and security domain requires more than analysis alone; it requires connection and implementation.

• The knowledge pillar focuses on generating policy-relevant research on emerging issues, helping decisionmakers understand risks, opportunities and trends.
• The dialogue pillar creates trusted spaces for exchange among governments, industry, academia, civil society, and international organizations – bringing together communities that do not often engage and fostering shared understanding and trust.
• The action pillar turns insights into practice. It focuses on tools, guidance, training and capacity-building – helping translate principles into concrete policies and operational measures.

Together, these pillars are designed to equip governments and other actors not only to understand AI’s implications for peace and security, but to respond collaboratively, coherently and effectively.

Q: Geneva has long been a hub for diplomacy and international cooperation. What makes it particularly well suited to host a global centre focused on AI, peace and security?

RG: Geneva is uniquely placed at the crossroads of international security, technology governance, humanitarian action, and human rights – fields that are increasingly intertwined in the age of AI. Few places in the world bring together such a diverse and influential mix of actors working across these domains.

The city hosts international organizations, diplomatic missions, technical experts, humanitarian actors, standards-setting bodies, and civil society organizations that are shaping discussions on the future of technology and its societal impacts. It has also emerged as an important centre for AI governance, with a growing ecosystem focused on digital technologies, responsible innovation, and international cooperation.

For a centre focused on AI and security, this convergence is a decisive advantage. The implications of AI extend far beyond traditional security institutions, touching everything from human rights and development to cyber resilience and humanitarian action. Geneva provides a unique environment in which these different perspectives can be brought together.

By anchoring the centre here while engaging globally, UNIDIR can leverage this ecosystem to connect communities, deepen dialogue, and support more coherent and inclusive approaches to AI governance in the peace and security domain.

The post A new home for AI governance first appeared on UNIDIR.

This year’s programme provided the Institute’s growing network of Women in AI fellows with grounding in the technical, legal, governance and ethical dimensions of AI, particularly in terms of its applications in international peace and security. The training enabled participants to navigate present and future challenges around emerging technologies.

A programme across the AI spectrum

Through expert-led lectures, interactive sessions, and tabletop exercises, the programme reflected the breadth and diversity of both its participants and its subject matter. Fellows explored AI across multiple dimensions – the technological foundation of AI and biases, military applications and international humanitarian law, and multilateral approaches to advancing AI governance.

Discussions extended to AI’s place in the broader international defence architecture, strategic foresight around its use, and the growing policy relevance of the nexus of emerging technologies like AI and cybersecurity. Fellows were also introduced to broader considerations and implications of military AI, including through the lenses of human rights, gender considerations, responsible AI and ethics, as well as multistakeholder and regional perspectives from across Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Europe.

UNIDIR actively leads initiatives to strengthen knowledge and dialogue on the governance of military AI. This fellowship reflects the Institute’s key priority of ensuring that women can participate meaningfully in shaping these discussions.

Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

The training allowed fellows to engage with UNIDIR experts, intergovernmental organizations, diplomats and policymakers, academia, industry representatives, military personnel, and high-level officials such as the UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu. The substantive bedrock of the sessions drew from a range of research and robust work across several countries and organizations. The programme covered the broad spectrum of UNIDIR’s work on AI, including dialogues like the upcoming Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics, digital tools like the AI Policy Portal, and research on the cyber-AI nexus, military AI governance processes, confidence-building around military AI, and the intersection of gender and AI. 

Apart from thematic sessions, the programme also included interactive tabletop exercises on the governance of military AI, a strategic foresight activity on AI, a screening and discussion of the Netflix documentary Unknown: Killer Robots, and structured daily mini-lateral discussions amongst the participants.

The fellowship also factored in opportunities for networking, including a speed-friending lunch with UNIDIR’s Women in AI Fellows from previous years as well as a dinner with the diplomatic community in Geneva. The final day included a visit to the CERN Science Gateway on the Franco-Swiss border, where fellows took a guided walking tour of the premises, learnt about emerging technologies in use at CERN, and had the chance to witness up close the functioning of a successful, science and technology-focused organization born out of international cooperation.

Fellows provided overwhelmingly positive feedback at the end of the week. Participants highlighted the importance of inclusive and well-informed approaches to AI governance, in particular the need to integrate human rights and gender perspectives while strengthening links between technical and policy communities. They also pointed to the value of sustained capacity-building, multistakeholder engagement, and the exchange of good practices to support international cooperation, drawing on lessons from existing governance processes in areas such as cybersecurity.

The way ahead

As AI becomes an established issue domain in disarmament as well as international peace and security, interest in UNIDIR’s Women in AI Fellowship has grown rapidly, with the 2026 edition receiving over 200 applications from 100 countries – the most diverse application pool thus far. UNIDIR is building on this momentum by expanding its capacity-building offerings and exploring opportunities to deliver the fellowship across additional regional contexts.

Uncertainty is not an impediment for governance.

UNIDIR Women in AI Fellow

The 2026 Women in AI Fellowship was made possible by the generous support of donors to UNIDIR’s Integrated Approaches Programme and UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme, specifically Canada, Czechia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and Microsoft.

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Over six days, a team composed of diverse representatives (from UNIDIR, Interpeace, the Small Arms Survey, the Regional Centre for Small Arms Control, Kenya’s Ministry of Interior, National Defence University-Kenya, NEPCOH and local county authorities) conducted focus group discussions, stakeholder consultations, and community meetings. These took place in both urban centres and remote hotspots in Samburu, Baringo, Turkana, Elgeyo Marakwet, and West Pokot, where the State’s reach is limited and the presence of illicit weapons is not.

The team interacted with county commissioners, peace directors, National Police Service officers, elders, youth, women, and religious leaders. The findings were highly illuminating. In the Suguta Valley, one elder told the delegation:

Guns have brought more harm than good to our families. Nearly every home has lost someone.

Across all five counties, communities consistently identified three conditions for sustainable disarmament:

• simultaneous action across borders;
• credible post-surrender security guarantees; and
• concrete links between arms control and livelihood support.

Five counties, one picture

Meetings in Maralal, Samburu County, painted a detailed picture of the local security landscape, highlighting the linkages between livestock wealth, raiding and firearms possession. For households living more than ten kilometres from urban centres, guns are considered essential for protection.

A focus group with elders, youth, teachers, religious leaders, and local administrators in Suguta Valley in Turkana County’s Kapedo area highlighted:

• the widespread presence of firearms among young people;
• the uneven effects of Operation Maliza Uhalifu; and
• the urgent need for simultaneous disarmament across neighbouring communities.

The message was clear: unilateral community disarmament is perceived not as a pre-condition for peace, but as exposure and vulnerability.

In Baringo County, community members in Tangulbei and Kolowa in the Kerio Valley traced the roots of arms proliferation to cross-border inflows from Uganda during the 1970s and 1990s. They also reflected on recent voluntary arms surrenders, which followed the arrest of several high-profile individuals in neighbouring areas. That momentum reportedly contributed to the surrender of more than 100 weapons locally, reinforcing an important lesson from the field: accountability at higher levels can create space for meaningful community action.

In West Pokot County, County Commissioner, D.N. Saruni noted that 99% of recovered firearms had been voluntarily surrendered. This is a striking figure that underscores the potential of trust-based approaches to arms control. Community dialogues in Sigor and Orwa-Calabash brought together Pokot and Marakwet participants to share lessons learned and impact from joint farming initiatives between youth from both communities to build trust and cooperation.

What comes next

This first CLAC mission will directly inform the development of UNIDIR’s broader effort to develop a practical “menu of options” for use in community-led arms control initiatives across the globe. UNIDIR’s role in this process reflects its wider commitment to evidence- based and people-centred approaches to conventional arms control connecting global policy discussions to the everyday realities faced by communities most affected by insecurity and armed violence.

The post Kenyan communities break silence on small arms and insecurity first appeared on UNIDIR.

Held under UNIDIR’s Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics initiative and co-sponsored by Microsoft, the conference will bring together diplomats, policymakers, military officials, industry leaders, researchers and civil society to examine how AI is already shaping security – and what this means for global governance.

The conference takes place at a critical moment as governments move from conceptual discussions towards implementation. Advances in AI capabilities, coupled with growing international attention to its security implications, are accelerating efforts to develop shared approaches to risk management, accountability and international cooperation.

The challenge before us is no longer whether AI will influence international peace and security, but how we shape that influence. The pace of technological change is outstripping many existing governance frameworks. Bringing together diverse perspectives is essential to better understand emerging risks, identify opportunities, and strengthen international cooperation.

Dr Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

The two-day programme is structured around four thematic tracks:

• Technology foundations: Understanding AI systems, data practices, bias and dual-use technologies.
• Applications and integration: AI in military contexts, cyber operations and crisis response.
• Stakeholder perspectives: The roles of governments, industry and investors, including regional perspectives from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean.
• Future directions: Governance frameworks, accountability mechanisms and opportunities for cooperation.

Discussions will address issues including AI in warfare, cyber threats, deepfakes in conflict, and human oversight of automated systems. The programme will feature expert presentations, high-level panel discussions and demonstrations of emerging technologies.

Building on its inaugural edition in 2025, the Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics also forms part of UNIDIR’s expanding work on AI, peace and security. It will take place consecutively to the informal exchanges on AI in the military domain in Geneva, offering a timely opportunity to connect broader policy discussions with ongoing multilateral processes.

The conference will also mark the launch of UNIDIR’s Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security, which will serve as the Institute’s umbrella platform for research, dialogue and capacity-building on AI governance and security.

For further information, please contact Claudia Marquina, UNIDIR Head of Communications at claudia.marquina@un.org.

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. For more information, visit unidir.org.

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The 4^th Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), held in 2024, established an open-ended technical expert group (OETEG) to develop recommendations for the full and effective implementation of these instruments in light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design. The first meeting of the OETEG takes place in New York this week and will examine measures to counter illicit 3D-printing of SALW, alongside other issues. Several considerations are outlined below for national and international experts as they seek to identify effective strategic and operational measures to enable States to implement the PoA and ITI in preventing the illicit 3D printing of SALW. 

Why is 3D-printing a problem for SALW control?

The UN PoA and ITI provide a series of measures that States should take to counter the illicit manufacture and trafficking of SALW. 3D-printing of SALW poses several challenges for PoA and ITI implementation, including: 

• the decentralized and unregulated production of these weapons; 
• the commercial availability of production machinery (i.e. 3D-printers);
• the production of unmarked weapons; and
• the intangible flows of knowledge online. 

While the first three challenges are also features for other types of craft-produced SALW, 3D-printing takes the issue from the physical to the virtual realm. The proliferation of digital blueprints online and the strong shift towards increasingly do-it-yourself designs that do not rely on the use of government-regulated components means that decentralized, undetectable networks can produce lethal 3D-printed SALW beyond the control of States.

It is therefore essential that the OETEG provides a platform for national and international experts to share current and emerging challenges posed by 3D printing for the full and effective implementation of the PoA and ITI, but also recommendations for: 

• legislation to ensure national control;
• international intelligence sharing and cooperation to enhance investigation protocols;
• the use of new technologies for disrupting illicit knowledge sharing; and 
• capacity-building, training and awareness raising to prevent the use of 3D-printers for illicit SALW production. 

Strengthening legal frameworks

A cornerstone of the effective implementation of international instruments is comprehensive national-level legislation. Several countries, such as Australia, Canada, Jamaica, North Macedonia and Singapore, have taken proactive measures to enhance their legislative frameworks by means of criminalizing digital blueprints for 3D production of SALW. The UK has proposed a similar bill to Parliament.

At the regional level, an EU Commission proposal from February 2026 to harmonize definitions and penalties to combat the illicit trafficking of firearms includes suggestions for EU Member States to introduce the following penalties in their national systems: 

• an upper limit of at least two years of imprisonment for the illicit creation, acquisition, possession and dissemination of 3D-printed SALW blueprints;
• five years for the possession of illicit firearms, components and ammunition; and 
• eight years for trafficking and manufacturing. 

While the criminalization of blueprints is a good first step, States should also ensure that their SALW control legislation covers the illicit manufacture, possession, use and trafficking of all forms of 3D-printed SALW and their components. 

Intelligence sharing and cooperation

Intelligence sharing and international cooperation between law enforcement agencies are crucial in stemming the proliferation of 3D-printed SALW. While many States already have national points of contact for PoA/ITI implementation, it does not appear that intelligence on 3D-printed SALW is moving beyond regional level exchanges between national firearms focal points and specialist units. States could consider ways of including information about illicit 3D-printed SALW in shared databases, such as INTERPOL’s ‘iARMS’. This all requires law enforcement agencies to develop and maintain approaches and protocols for data collection, analysis, and sharing related to seizures of 3D-printed SALW. 

Law enforcement agencies must also develop close cooperation with the 3D-printing industry. As stipulated in the outcomes from the 4^th Review Conference, bringing 3D-printing companies to the discussion table and promoting active dialogue without infringing on the legitimate uses of this technology is key. Cooperation must also be fostered with other stakeholders, such as postal services, e-commerce sites, and social media platforms, as these continue to be used to sell and promote 3D-printed SALW. 

New technologies to disrupt illicit 3D-printing

It is imperative for law enforcement agencies to use new technologies to detect and disrupt illicit networks involved in illicit information sharing and the production of 3D-printed SALW. Pilot projects are already underway that could lead the way. For example, the CEASEFIRE project, a three-year multidimensional project that was implemented during 2022-25 involving the EU, EUROPOL and INTERPOL, aimed to incorporate various cyber-detection methods, AI-driven tools, shared databases, information fusion and offline techniques to interdict illegal firearms trafficking, including the distribution of digital blueprints for 3D-printed SALW. Successful pilot projects could be expanded, replicated and sustained, while new initiatives should be developed.

Several US states are exploring the introduction of ‘blocking software’ to detect blueprints and block 3D-printing of SALW. At present, this has several limitations, including: 

• the need to be constantly updated to account for new designs;
• the susceptibility to circumvention;
• the risk of flagging false positives; and 
• the dependence on federal legislation mandating compliance by various stakeholders.

It remains to be seen if AI could help overcome the first two limitations. 

A promising development is the Secure Information Embedding and Extraction framework, which aims to embed unique fingerprints into 3D-printed objects that are resistant to physical tampering, breakage and digital interdiction. 

Capacity building, training and awareness-raising

States must also focus on training law enforcement officers to identify and document 3D-printed SALW and their components, develop standard operating procedures for evidence collection, and enhance forensic capabilities. While developments within the forensic space that are focused on chemical signature tracing of polymers, toolmark analysis of nozzle and print bed deposition artifacts and fingerprinting of printers are still limited, they remain useful in aiding investigations and enhancing prosecution. Future developments in nano-topographical and micro-CT analysis may enhance forensic identification of 3D-printed SALW. All of this requires adequate resources.

International organizations like INTERPOL and the UN play a crucial role in assisting Member States develop their capabilities to counter the illicit production, proliferation and misuse of 3D-printed SALW. INTERPOL’s Project Stonefish and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’s SALW Fellowship Training Programme are examples of capacity-building programmes that aim to increase awareness and strengthen the investigative capabilities of Member States in this area. 

At the national level, States should consider introducing awareness programmes targeted at young people, given the increasing involvement of youths in the 3D-printing of firearms.

The way forward

Current proliferation trends suggest that the OETEG’s consideration of how to counter the threat posed by 3D-printed SALW is timely. UNIDIR has been actively supporting the preparations for all the issues under the purview of the OETEG, as can be seen in this recent report. Developments that seemed like a chimaera a decade ago have become a reality today. Therefore, it is imperative that we put the necessary preventive measures in place now to stem further misuse of this technology. 

At the same time, we have seen that 3D-printing has evolved rapidly and is not standing still. Therefore, we should already be considering how to ensure that opportunities like the OETEG, which brings together a unique group of national and international experts, can be used to address technological challenges as they emerge. The 2026 OETEG meeting will therefore be a useful “pilot” opportunity.  

The post Mitigating the proliferation of 3D-printed small arms and light weapons first appeared on UNIDIR.

As advances in AI raise increasingly complex questions for policymakers, regulators and international institutions alike, States and stakeholders are seeking shared understandings, common norms and coordinated approaches that can support responsible governance across security and defence contexts.

This growing momentum is reflected in an expanding ecosystem of international and regional initiatives. Recent developments, including the UN General Assembly resolutions 79/239 and 80/58, the Secretary-General’s report on AI in the military domain, REAIM and a growing number of national and regional AI strategies, point to a broader shift from abstract debates toward implementation, practical governance measures and sustained multilateral engagement.

At the same time, the pace of technological innovation continues to challenge existing policy frameworks, making international cooperation and cross-sector dialogue increasingly necessary.

Amid this rapidly evolving landscape, UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2026 (AISE26) served as an agile and inclusive space for bridging technical and policy communities and strengthening cooperative approaches to AI-related security challenges.

A platform for dialogue

The inaugural edition of the conference took place in March 2025, against a highly dynamic backdrop. Policymakers and regulators worldwide had begun to recognize the urgency of shared understandings, norms and regulations that transcend national borders and individual interests, including in the context of AI’s applications for security and defence.

In parallel, AI in the military and security domains were often, if not most of the times discussed at either end of the spectrum: as a question of governance, international law and global norms, or as a question of technical design and corporate governance.

In response, UNIDIR leveraged its existing network of experts – building on the work of the Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics (RAISE) launched in 2024 – and giving a voice to under-represented perspectives from all five UN regional groups in an inclusive manner that transcends geopolitical barriers.

As such, UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics constituted a platform for independent, neutral and expert-led dialogue.

By fostering mutual understanding and cross-sectoral action, it established itself as a channel for substantive input feeding into multilateral, international, regional and national governance initiatives. The conference was also held ahead of the deadline for the submission of States’ and the multistakeholder community’s views to the UN Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 79/239 on AI in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security.

Unwavering commitment to AI and security

UNIDIR’s conference is also part of the Institute’s broader work on AI and autonomy. This explores these technologies’ evolution, their applications and implications on international, regional and national peace and security, and the policy options available to respond effectively – informing both the deliberations on lethal autonomous weapons systems and broader discussions on military AI.

Recent projects include the co-development with OHCHR of a voluntary framework that provides guidelines for industry actors in AI in the military domain. Acknowledging the private sector’s increasingly important role throughout these technologies’ lifecycle, UNIDIR seeks to collaborate with organizations, industry actors, civil society and Member States to formulate guidelines translating existing international law and norms into measures for their implementation and operationalization.

The Institute emphasizes regional engagement for the responsible development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain and for the application of international humanitarian law in relation to lethal autonomous weapons systems. It does so while preserving an inherently inter-disciplinary approach due to the multi-faceted nature of these technologies. This is reflected in its work surrounding large language models, decommissioning, as well as the publication of its roadmap encapsulating the Institute’s recommendations for future policy action.

Additionally, given the growing number of national initiatives in this space, UNIDIR has developed, over the past years, tools for furthering national capacity. These include its AI Policy Portal, which fosters transparency and information-sharing, and is complemented by the Draft Guidelines for the Development of a National Strategy on AI in Security and Defence. In addition, UNIDIR’s Women in AI Fellowship, taking place annually in Geneva, equips women diplomats with the expertise to explore the latest and emerging AI applications from policy, legal and technical lens.

What’s next for AI, security and ethics

UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2026 convened policymakers, diplomats, military representatives, industry leaders, researchers, academia and civil society to address the evolving implications of AI for international security and resilience.

Held on 18–19 June at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, and online, the conference served as a catalyst for action at a pivotal moment for global AI governance.

By bringing together technical and policy communities from across sectors and regions, the conference reflected a shared commitment to a more secure world. Through an expanded programme featuring technical deep dives, high-level panels, interactive roundtables, demonstrations and poster presentations, it created space not only for dialogue across disciplines, but also for practical exchange between technical and policy communities.

In the lead-up this year’s edition, UNIDIR is also expanded these discussions through the Road to AISE26 webinar series and the launch of the AISE Markers policy notes. Together, these initiatives helped sustain dialogue ahead of the event, while identifying emerging questions, areas of convergence and issues that continue to require deeper reflection across policy and technical communities.

At a time when technological developments risk outpacing governance processes, spaces for inclusive, informed and action-oriented dialogue are critical. The governance of AI and its implications for international peace and security cannot be addressed in isolation. It requires sustained cooperation, shared understanding and continued engagement across the international community in the years ahead.

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