The conversations are beginning, but the processes remain separate. And there are real costs to having these two expert communities operate in silos. The mechanisms needed to connect the dots already exist. What we need now is to build the right bridges between them.

Two distinct yet related non-kinetic threats

Words matter in multilateral governance because ideas are necessarily converted into practices and processes. But when it comes to non-kinetic threats to space systems, two distinct phenomena are often lumped together: electromagnetic interference with radio-frequency links, and malicious ICT activity directed at the computers and networks on which those systems run.

The first is the more visible, because the jamming and spoofing of global navigation satellite systems can have cascading effects on civil aviation, maritime navigation, energy grids, financial systems and humanitarian operations. It is also the better governed: the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) addresses it under its Radio Regulations. It is a regular feature of national statements in the Conference on Disarmament and in the current Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in all its aspects.

The second is the less visible: the security of the ICTs that form the backbone of space infrastructure. Indeed, such counterspace capabilities “can target data and the systems that use, transmit, and control the flow of data. Information and communication technologies can be used to target satellites as well as ground stations or even end-user components, such as modems, with the objective of interfering with services (such as Internet coverage), intercepting information, or inserting false or corrupt data into a system”.

The two should be kept apart, not least because the law already blurs them. The ITU Constitution defines “harmful interference” as interference which “endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service operating in accordance with Radio Regulations”, a definition confined to radio frequencies.

Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty uses the same words without defining them. There, the notion can be read as turning on the activity disrupted rather than on the means of disruption. That is, as “the external blocking or lessening of services provided by space systems, which can be accidental or intentional”, which is broad enough to cover a close approach, jamming or spoofing, and a malicious ICT operation. The same words imply varying scopes in different legal regimes, which is a source of confusion rather than a safeguard against it.

Understanding the full spectrum of vulnerabilities

Space infrastructure comprises a space segment, a ground segment, a link segment and a user segment. ICTs are embedded in all four: in space-based assets, throughout the interconnected computers and networks at ground stations, across the links, and in every user terminal.

Every ICT vulnerability has the potential to become a space vulnerability, and the pattern of malicious ICT activity against the space sector confirms this.

Such operations are increasing, and most target the ground and user segments rather than the satellites themselves.

The dependence runs the other way too. Satellite links carry internet and telephone traffic to places that fibre fails to reach. They also act as backup for terrestrial links. Navigation constellations, meanwhile, supply the precise timing that synchronizes mobile networks, power grids and financial transactions.

A degraded space system is, potentially, a degraded ICT service on Earth.

Nor are vulnerabilities confined to satellites in operation. They may be created at the design stage, through the software tools and manufacturing systems used to build satellites and ground equipment. They can accumulate during assembly, testing and launch, every step of which depends on networked computers. And they may outlive the mission, since decommissioned satellites retain residual data and emissions long after anyone is paying for their protection.

Supply chains are littered with weaknesses as well. Single-source dependencies, reliance on off-the-shelf components from foreign suppliers, component shortages and the well-documented existence of backdoors can all build in significant risks years before a system ever gets off the ground.

When communications and operations overlap in orbit

To understand why the security of space infrastructure is so distinctive, it helps to stop treating satellites monolithically and to analyse them instead in terms of their components and functions.

Industry security practitioners have long relied on a useful divide between information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT). Translated into UN terms, with ICT in place of IT, the distinction makes the same analytical clarity available to multilateral discussions, even though there is no single, universally binding UN-wide definition of either category.

• IT/ICT generally refers to systems whose purpose is the processing, storage and communication of information. In orbit, this means the hardware, software and connectivity that enable satellite communications. A satellite is, in this sense, a functional node of a global network, “a router that happens to fly”, whose performance is measured in the native metrics of networking (throughput, latency and availability). Its weaknesses are network vulnerabilities, from interception and denial of service to the hijacking of links and the compromise of ground-based infrastructure.

• OT generally refers to systems that sense and act upon the physical world. In orbit, this means the hardware and software behind the essential functions of a satellite other than communications: the technology and instruments behind applications ranging from Earth observation to in-orbit servicing, but also the on-board electronics for power, propulsion and station keeping.

The two types of technology are neither protected nor assessed in the same way by those who build and operate them. ICT calls for defences appropriate to a network, OT for those of an industrial control system.

Seen in this way, the problem is unforgiving. On board a satellite the two converge: the command and data handling chain that carries communications is also the chain through which the platform and its payload are controlled. Compromising the ICT can therefore provide a path to adverse effects against the OT, such as corrupting the flight software. Standard terrestrial cybersecurity practices fall down here, just when they are needed most: one cannot refresh hardware or physically reset a server on systems one cannot reach.

There is a second difficulty.

From the ground, a malfunction and an attack can look identical. The space environment offers a degree of natural cover that no terrestrial domain can match.

Radiation events, debris impacts, component failures and software anomalies occur constantly, and a malicious ICT operation can be concealed among them. Distinguishing between an accidental and an intentional incident is therefore challenging. This blurs the line between an accident and a hostile act, complicates attribution, and carries a risk of escalation through misunderstanding or miscalculation.

Reactive fixes being extremely difficult in orbit, security must be built in on the ground, by design and through rigorous standards. Yet because space networks are globally distributed, those standards are only as strong as their weakest link. For them to work in practice, standards, geopolitical understanding and implementation capacity must evolve together.

Why terminology matters

In multilateral practice, word choice carries weight. Referring to “the security of ICTs” rather than “cyber” aligns with the language of the United Nations. There, the operative term is security of and in the use of ICTs, and the malicious use of ICTs is the formulation that has found its way into space security documents.

The point that matters at the join is simple: the threat under discussion uses ICTs as its means and space systems as its target. The means is digital, the consequence physical.

The competing terms are not interchangeable. “Information security”, preferred by some States, includes content and data as well as systems. “Cyber”, preferred by others, points to infrastructure and to a domain of activity. Each choice encodes a different view of what is being protected.

The compromise has nonetheless proved workable. The 11 norms of responsible State behaviour were agreed by consensus in 2015 and reaffirmed by consensus in the final reports of the two OEWGs in 2021 and 2025. The phrasing that they use centres on ICT activity and its effects rather than a particular domain. They were accepted by States on every side of the terminological divide. This precedent is one that space discussions can use to their advantage.

The many tools already within reach

Several avenues are open, and none requires resolving the disagreement between those who favour a legally binding instrument and those who favour norms of responsible behaviour. The issue may be addressed within the OEWG on PAROS in all its aspects or within the Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. It may also be addressed within the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security, established by the 2025 OEWG’s final report as the permanent successor to the ICT processes.

But transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) represent the most readily available tools. The 2013 Group of Governmental Experts on TCBMs in outer space activities agreed by consensus on a range of such measures: information exchange, risk-reduction notifications, points of contact, visits to facilities and consultative mechanisms. Their implementation would soften some differences of opinion and alleviate mistrust, particularly where an anomaly cannot easily be distinguished from an attack.

Helpful legal instruments are also hiding in plain sight. The consultation mechanism of Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, almost never invoked, could be used discreetly to address incidents of interference. By asking States to inform the Secretary-General, the public and the scientific community of their space activities, Article XI also offers a treaty basis in which information sharing about the security of space systems could be anchored. The points-of-contact directory that the ICT process spent years building shows what such sharing can look like in practice.

Real trust-building needs every channel to be working in parallel: formal processes with a UN mandate, minilateral efforts between States, and the informal, discreet settings that non-governmental conveners can provide. The latter in particular can allow questions too sensitive for any formal plenary, such as real-world incidents, to mature in Track 1.5 and Track 2 formats.

Getting out of our silos

What that Geneva Cyber Week event back in May demonstrated is modest yet important: put a technologist, a disarmament practitioner and a diplomat versed in both space and ICT security in the same room, and the silos soon dissolve.

Reproducing that effect in the multilateral processes requires no new machinery. The international community has the space TCBMs agreed in 2013, the norms and points of contact already agreed in the ICT processes, and the Outer Space Treaty articles awaiting operationalization. What we need now is to forge more deliberate connections between the mechanisms we already have.

The post Finding the missing links between space and ICT diplomacy first appeared on UNIDIR.

At its core, the logic of maritime security has not changed. We need to know who is doing what and where, which activities pose a threat and how best we can respond. But the technological environment in which our lives are enmeshed is evolving rapidly, with new risks and new opportunities emerging every day.

Shifting tides in maritime security

1. New technologies are lowering the barriers to projecting power at sea.
   
   Small, cheap and increasingly autonomous systems can now threaten much larger vessels and pose a serious risk to critical infrastructure. Once the preserve of sophisticated navies, these capabilities are becoming increasingly accessible, including to non-State actors. While UNIDIR research found just one attack using an uncrewed maritime system in 2019, the annual figure had risen more than 2,000% by 2024. We can expect that upward trajectory to have become even steeper in 2026.
   


2. The oceans are becoming more transparent.
   
   Artificial intelligence, satellites, advanced detection systems, fibre-optic sensing and the automated fusion of varied data streams are transforming our awareness of activity at sea, both above and below the surface. But greater transparency also has strategic consequences, especially where concealment is of paramount concern, as with submarine-based nuclear deterrence.
   


3. The maritime and digital domains are becoming increasingly interdependent.
   
   Maritime operations today rely on digital systems, and the digital economy depends on physical infrastructure at sea. More than 99% of data moving between continents travels by subsea cable. And with today’s ports operating as complex digital ecosystems, a successful cyberattack on a single vulnerability within them can be enough to paralyse a whole web of global supply chains. Interdependence creates new vulnerabilities. And disruption in one domain can quickly cascade into others.
   


4. Maritime insecurity is being fuelled by illicit trafficking in conventional arms.
   
   This trafficking exacerbates armed violence, organized crime and conflict, as well as undermining the effective implementation of Security Council arms embargoes and other international arms control measures. For this reason, maritime security and conventional arms control should be viewed as mutually reinforcing objectives.
   


5. Our international instruments are not keeping up with the new world we live in.
   
   The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, for instance, does a good job of building trust through reporting on conventional arms transfers, including warships. But armed, uncrewed maritime systems may fall outside the scope of the Register’s technical descriptions and definitions of what constitutes a “warship”, which focus on tonnage and missile or torpedo range. As maritime capabilities evolve, multilateral arms control frameworks need to evolve with them.

Priorities for action on maritime security

Strengthening these agreements would help create a virtuous circle where a more secure maritime domain leads to better maritime governance, which in turn facilitates more effective implementation of arms control commitments.

The third is sustained and systematic attention, particularly from the Security Council.

The Council has led the way on ensuring structured engagement on cross-cutting issues with lasting peace and security implications. Maritime security warrants the same treatment. This work could and should be founded on continuous scanning of the technological horizon to pick out new developments that will reshape risks and opportunities at sea. The recent establishment of the Informal Expert Group on Science and Technology also represents a positive and meaningful step towards integrating the security implications of emerging technologies into the full range of the Council’s activities. UNIDIR and its dedicated maritime security workstream naturally stand ready to support the work of the Council and the wider international community.

New technologies may be lowering the barriers to projection of power at sea, making our oceans more transparent and interweaving our maritime and digital systems. But with the right approach, we can keep pace with these changes, build resilience and ensure that the seas we depend on remain safe, secure and stable in the years and decades to come.

The post The five tech trends reshaping maritime security first appeared on UNIDIR.

This third phase of the Lomé Initiative comes at a critical time. Armed violence has intensified in many parts of Africa, particularly in West and Central Africa, driven by the rise of armed groups. The steady supply of illicit weapons facilitates armed violence, which in turn drives the demand for more arms and ammunition, creating a vicious cycle.

Both threats have often been tackled through securitized responses. While important, these responses have not sufficiently addressed the root causes of violence and the demand for weapons.

Common drivers include weak State presence, marginalization or a lack of livelihood opportunities. In contrast, experience shows that integrated approaches can prevent armed violence more sustainably.

Sustainable prevention of armed violence requires a shift in perspective: looking beyond illicit supply and asking why individuals and communities feel the need to arm themselves, and how their security needs can be addressed peacefully.

Dagmar Schmidt Tartagli, Deputy Head, Peace and Human Rights Division, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

© 2026, UNIDIR

How the Lomé Initiative took shape

Against this background, UNIDIR partnered with UNREC and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) to kick off the Lomé Initiative in 2023. The inaugural regional dialogue brought together, for the first time in a dedicated space, West African national prevention and small arms control institutions, regional organizations, the UN, academia, and civil society.

Participants called for an integrated approach to preventing armed violence and illicit weapons proliferation in West Africa, tackling both the common root causes of violence and demand for weapons as well as illicit weapons supply. They recommended an empirical study to guide this new way of working.

In 2024 and 2025, UNIDIR, UNREC and the Swiss FDFA, together with experts across the region, gathered and analysed West African good practices of an integrated approach to armed violence prevention (AVP) and weapons and ammunition management (WAM).

At a regional multi-stakeholder dialogue in 2025, key West African actors expressed their resolve to further pursue such an approach and requested support for their efforts.

In early 2026, the partners released a study offering practical steps to help West African stakeholders implement an integrated approach to AVP and WAM.

This marked a shift for the Lomé Initiative, from research and dialogue to practical guidance.

Silencing the guns starts long before anyone picks one up. It starts with giving people a reason not to do so.

Anselme Yabouri, Director, UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

© 2026, UNIDIR

Expanding support to West and Central Africa

In the next phase of the Lomé Initiative, which runs until 2028, UNIDIR, UNREC and the Swiss FDFA will continue to strengthen armed violence prevention in West Africa while also extending the initiative to Central Africa, in line with requests from the region.

They will support States, regional organizations and other stakeholders in operationalizing an integrated approach to AVP and WAM by:

• Supporting national partners in West Africa in initiating or strengthening integrated approaches to AVP and WAM within their policy frameworks, institutions and operational practices

• Developing a training module to institutionalize know-how on integrated approaches in partnership with renowned training institutes in the region

• Convening regional multi-stakeholder dialogue between prevention and WAM experts in West Africa to share best practices, foster learning across the region, and encourage wider implementation

• Engaging key Central African partners on integrated approaches, with a view to documenting and promoting successful integration practices

• Disseminating lessons learned during the implementation of the initiative to ground regional, continental and global policy debates in what has been shown to work in real-world settings

Through the Lomé Initiative, Switzerland accompanies States to think weapons management and prevention of armed violence together, in policymaking, institutional coordination and implementation – an innovative path to tackle armed violence more durably.

Carol Mottet, Senior Advisor, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs

© 2026, UNIDIR

Inclusive local ownership for lasting results

Discussions at the launch event at the Geneva Peace Forum underlined that integration of AVP and WAM yields the best results when it involves all relevant stakeholders, in particular trusted local actors such as mayors and community leaders.

The Lomé Initiative will support processes that are inclusive and crafted, owned and sustained over time by local, national and regional partners – a key for sustainability and responding to local priorities.

Ursign Hofmann, Senior Researcher, Conventional Weapons Programme, UNIDIR

Through this third phase of the Lomé Initiative, UNIDIR, UNREC and the Swiss FDFA aim to strengthen armed violence prevention with practical tools and support. The initiative will also help implement key political commitments: the UN’s Pact for the Future, the African Union’s Silencing the Guns initiative and other sub-regional African instruments.

The post Breaking the cycle of armed violence in Africa first appeared on UNIDIR.

But with data becoming increasingly strategic for peace, security and defence, there are still important questions to be answered about ownership, control and strategic dependence between States. Data is also increasingly central to areas like health, commerce, finance and defence, which are critical to national security, leading to a surge in interest in issues of technological and data sovereignty.

Although relatively elastic, technological sovereignty is the ability to safeguard national agency in the domain of technology and innovation. This includes the capability to act independently in the global technological system and to resist unfavourable positions in key value chains, which may be controlled by perceived adversaries. Data sovereignty, meanwhile, extends this self-determination to the use and processing of data surrounding these strategic technologies. For States, this means the sovereignty, control and power to protect their fundamental right to their countries’ data.

Several States have sought data sovereignty by enacting data protection laws, including regulations requiring that certain categories of their citizens’ data be stored or processed within their jurisdiction. Placing data centres in orbit would clearly make this harder to enforce, gumming up one key policy lever in the hands of State authorities. This is especially concerning for developing regions, which have not had the chance to properly regulate, control or demand localization of data centres. Having only nascent or emerging space ecosystems, these regions also lack the infrastructure, know-how, and investment to put data centres of their own into orbit.

Unequal distribution, unequal control

The global data centre landscape currently follows a pronounced geographical and economic pattern. At present, 77% of global co-location data centre capacity is located in developed regions and operated by private enterprises whose usership is global. These operators have also extended their investment into cooperating middle-income countries, which host an 18% share of data centre capacity. These countries are perceived as offering political stability, robust connectivity, reliable electricity, mature data-protection regulation and favourable fiscal environments.

When measured against these metrics, developing regions are rarely seen to provide the same advantages, which partially explains the persistent underinvestment in their data infrastructure. Only 6% of capacity is currently hosted in these regions, although promises of future development persist. The African region, for example, accounts for 17% of the world’s population, making it a significant market for digital technology. Africa is also projected to make up an increasing portion of usership across data applications in the future, not least because its youthful population will continue to expand more rapidly than in developed regions. Despite all this, the region hosts less than 1% of global data centre capacity and attracted only 3% of data centre investment in 2024.

The issue of technological and data sovereignty also comes to the fore when archived datasets generated by civilian users are used to improve operational efficiency in military AI applications, including surveillance, autonomous weapon systems, predictive analytics and targeting. Developing countries generate much of this foundational data, but they have little control over the infrastructure that processes it. This results in an involuntary participation and an asymmetric exchange in which these countries inadvertently export unprocessed data as a resource while importing the high-value applications derived from it. These derivatives, moreover, are imported with prices and conditions set by the exporting State.

If the infrastructure enabling this process were to migrate into orbit, this imbalance would only become further institutionalized, at an altitude where significant gaps persist in the governance of such systems in orbit. In effect, this means that those owning and controlling data-derived applications can hold a less capable actor at risk, even if these actors contributed to the fundamental development of these applications.

Pixabay licence

Data sovereignty and Earth observation

The early applications of data infrastructure in orbit are leaning towards Earth observation because the data itself is generated in orbit, making the addition of compute to the satellites involved an obvious choice. There is also a clear commercial logic to circumventing the transmission bottleneck to ground stations by reducing latency, eliminating delays and automating processing through sophisticated on-orbit AI applications.

Commercial and government providers of satellite data have actively sought to partner with and serve developing regions. When developing countries are recorded in satellite imagery, the satellites and the on-orbit processing technology are owned and controlled by their developed counterparts, whose capacity to make decisions about and for the former is enhanced.

Developing countries access these platforms through aid-conditioned agreements and rarely through commercial partnerships. They may receive access to an analytical product, but they gain limited access to the raw data, processing algorithms or AI-model parameters and have little influence in the creation and application of derived products. This is particularly important in defence-relevant applications, where access to Earth observation-derived intelligence can constitute a meaningful capability differentiator. This impacts technological sovereignty and weakens agency in key sectors like border surveillance, armed conflict, climate security, food security and critical minerals.

In the absence of pragmatic reciprocity, data sovereignty is also further compromised by the risks of soft-power bargaining. More advanced States can provide sophisticated capabilities as defence cooperation under allyship while simultaneously exercising asymmetric leverage in wider geopolitical and trade agreements. The dependency structure of current international Earth observation partnerships, for example, already hints at how power could play out in the orbital data-centre governance of the future. It is imperative that such imbalances be addressed, because their effects on collective security and stability are all too real.

Pixabay licence

Towards a secure, sovereign and equitable future

Emerging space actors have an early opportunity to prioritize research that improves domestic analytical capacity, bolsters their interests, advances credible positions in multilateral forums and enables properly informed negotiation on terrestrial and orbital data governance. Some tech-savvy emerging States have already begun to contribute to a more pluralistic form of terrestrial data governance, an approach which could also be adapted to multilateral space security processes. Targeted investment in research at the nexus of space security, data governance and strategic emerging technology could further strengthen these efforts.

Regional initiatives like the African Union’s space policy, space strategy and data policy framework, together with the Africa Declaration on Artificial Intelligence, can also serve as vehicles for coordinated agenda-setting, enabling smaller States to pool technocratic capacity and present unified positions.

There remains, however, a need to close governance gaps here by addressing:

• Benefit-sharing

• Access rights to on-orbit data processing algorithms

• Obligations on operators, including third States

• Dispute resolution mechanisms available to States lacking independent capability

The Outer Space Treaty provides a normative and legal foundation for equitable governance of orbital data infrastructure, particularly through its principle that the exploration and use of outer space should benefit all peoples, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. Lessons can also be drawn from the norms of responsible State behaviour on information and communication technology, which acknowledge capacity disparities between States while recognizing the continuously evolving technological landscape. These principles can be operationalized to develop regulations that ensure ethical, accountable, equitable and accessible use of orbital data.

Finally, as geostrategic globalization begins to span Earth and space, developing regions should seek fair partnership models and avoid becoming arenas of competition between world powers. Strategic technological partnerships should aim to reduce long-term dependence and eventually allow capability transfer and co-development arrangements that go beyond access. These could even limit use of derived products in security-sensitive sectors unless there is explicit cooperation, co-ownership of hardware and software, sharing of high-value data, and explainability and auditability of responsible AI-powered processes in space data.

Preventing terrestrial inequalities from reaching orbit

Orbital data infrastructure could soon become a reality, and its sovereignty and governance implications require immediate attention. For developed States with greater access to technology and space capabilities, these new ambitions represent a familiar case of technological advantage being extended across domains. For developing States with fewer capabilities, this could foreclose governance options that have yet even to be fully exercised here on Earth. The security considerations in play call for the kinds of urgent research, inclusive dialogue and coordinated multilateral engagement that will help prevent humanity’s digital future in space from reproducing the inequalities we find here on Earth today.

The post The sovereignty question of orbital data centres first appeared on UNIDIR.

In September 2026, the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems in Geneva agreed on a set of elements for a future instrument on these weapons. Yet, AI-enabled capabilities can take much more diverse forms in and beyond the military domain.  

As both a force multiplier and a disruptor on many fronts, AI can enhance or disrupt logistics; sharpen or distort intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; strengthen cyber defences or deepen vulnerabilities; and help detect or spread disinformation.  

Where industry makes decisive decisions 

Long before an AI-enabled system reaches the battlefield, someone determines what data it learns from, how it is tested and how much it is allowed to decide on its own.

That someone is usually an engineer in the private sector, rather than a State.

These design choices shape whether a system is reliable, predictable and lawful, and they are made years before any commander uses it. The decisive role of industry extends to the entire system life cycle of most AI-enabled military capabilities, spanning from the design and testing phase to post-deployment maintenance and decommissioning.  

Across all stages, technology developers, integrators and providers make crucial decisions on how to source and handle data, how to simulate operational conditions and where to set the degree of autonomy through decision thresholds. 

This centrality, and often even primacy, in consequential technical decisions makes the private sector’s role and responsibility a focal point of international governance discussions on military AI. The pace of development also sits primarily in the hands of companies.  

As drivers of innovation, they tend to move faster than States can regulate them. That speed puts them closest to new capabilities and therefore first in line to explore, understand and draw leverage from them. 

What’s more, the military AI industry itself is quickly evolving alongside the technologies it develops. As demand for their systems grows, new firms are entering the market while established defence companies form new partnerships, acquire AI start-ups and expand AI implementation into their products. Importantly, newer entrants and established defence companies may differ in their institutional experience and in the internal structures they have built for compliance and accountability. 

Beyond the narrower defence industry landscape, AI now spans nearly every sector and security domain. While specialized companies focus on dedicated battlefield capabilities, the ecosystem of actors with a stake in the life cycle and supply chains of these systems is growing more complex and interconnected. Involvement of industry players can range from direct procurement, through subcontracting networks, to third-party testing. 

Making military AI lawful by design  

Translating governance principles for military AI into operational and technical practice is a necessary step towards making these systems “lawful by design“. This means integrating legal requirements as core design parameters from the earliest stages of development, and sustaining compliance across the entire life cycle of these technologies. This approach cannot, however, displace the responsibility of States.  

In principle and practice: 

• Companies, for their part, have a responsibility to respect human rights that exists over and above legal compliance, as set out in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. They can integrate legal assessments into their risk management frameworks and factor international humanitarian law considerations into design and testing processes.  

• States remain bound by international humanitarian law and international human rights law and, as customers, require assurance that the capabilities they acquire enable them to meet these obligations. They can embed responsible AI principles into procurement and export control processes, articulate clear expectations for suppliers, and invest in the technological, human, operational, financial and procedural capacity to apply them. This includes legal reviews of new weapons, means and methods of warfare under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, which may need to be conducted iteratively given the evolving nature of AI systems.

Multi-stakeholder consultations convened by UNIDIR point to a shared recognition, among States and industry alike, that legal and ethical requirements need to be translated into technical requirements, and that a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities is essential for effective public–private partnerships. 

Building a shared baseline with industry 

Before companies and governments can act on these measures, there needs to be a shared understanding and expectation of what responsible industry behaviour means. A framework that takes stock of multi-stakeholder perspectives through close consultations on responsibility and ethics, and turns them into clear guidance on accountability and compliance, would give all stakeholders involved the shared baseline they need.

Industry actors must be included in such a process. UN Secretary-General António Guterres regularly emphasizes the involvement of a range of stakeholders, including industry, in policy initiatives on responsible military applications of AI. Consultation with experts and academia, civil society and other stakeholders, such as the humanitarian sector, is equally crucial. It ensures that popular and diverse expectations are included and galvanized, and that these efforts are credible. 

The inclusion of industry perspectives is also vital for ensuring that any frameworks for responsible behaviour remain appropriate, effective and grounded:

• Practical experience. When it comes to translating requirements into system design and engineering choices, industry has the most direct and practical experience of what is possible and where technical constraints are.

• Realistic outcomes. Industry involvement and input ensure that outcomes for AI are realistic, feasible and actionable, and meet the expectations.

• Technical expertise. The private sector can bring valuable technical expertise and understanding States lack to the development process of governance frameworks.

• Buy-in. Ultimately, close consultation with companies increases buy-in for any solutions proposed.

Gaining insight into and maintaining access to the technological frontier is increasingly a priority and integral aspect of national AI strategies of States, spanning from military systems to frontier foundational models.  

Why States have a stake in responsible industry behaviour 

Frameworks for responsible industry behaviour are thus equally in the interest of States. Swiss Federal Councillor Albert Rösti, who heads the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, has called for companies to set their own guidelines and standards for trustworthy AI, alongside voluntary commitments, even before international agreements or other forms of global regulation materialize.  

States are also invested in what these commitments and measures would entail in substance. Military procurement can be a direct mechanism by which States implement legal obligations.  

Although many of the critical design choices rest in the hands of companies, international legal responsibility falls on the State that uses a system, not on whoever developed it.  

For example, the interpretability of AI outputs is often limited by their “black box” nature of these systems. While warfare will inherently require navigating uncertainties, obscure system logs may add layers of complexity to States’ obligation to conduct effective investigations of alleged violations of international humanitarian law.  

In practice, governments need to be clear about the questions they expect industry partners to answer as the basis for partnerships. Explicit expectations, a clear allocation of roles, and an understanding of compliance responsibility within and beyond contracts foster sustainable public-private partnerships and procurement relationships. These give States access to the information and documentation they need, and greater confidence about technical reliability. 

UNIDIR’s role in turning expectations into guidance 

This is where UNIDIR’s work matters. With its subject matter expertise and convening power, the Institute can help industry, States and other stakeholders unpack these complex questions on responsibility, accountability and compliance in military AI.  

Through its Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain, UNIDIR’s Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security aims to support industry and States in defining their roles for responsible military AI. Developed with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and in consultation with industry, States, civil society and the humanitarian sector, the framework will translate these expectations into voluntary, practical guidance on what responsible behaviour looks like at each stage of a system’s life cycle.  

The work reflects UNIDIR’s commitment to designing inclusive processes that foster greater trust, sustained dialogue and principled technological development in a field crucial to global peace and security discussions. 

The post Industry responsibility in developing military AI first appeared on UNIDIR.

As Cybersecurity Awareness Month comes to an end, it is an opportunity to reflect on how UNIDIR works to address these challenges. Through its Security and Technology Programme, UNIDIR addresses cybersecurity not merely as a technical challenge, but as a policy, legal and diplomatic issue. Our research and cyber capacity-building activities bridge technical, legal and diplomatic communities, offering practical tools and conceptual frameworks for navigating an increasingly complex digital domain.

The evolving threat landscape

Understanding why cybersecurity requires international cooperation begins with the nature of the threats themselves. Malicious cyber activity has become a constant feature of the digital environment.

UNIDIR estimates that ransomware attacks increased approximately threefold between 2023 and 2024.

Supply-chain compromises illustrate how interconnected networks create systemic vulnerabilities that no single organization can address alone, as malicious actors penetrate trusted software updates to reach thousands of downstream victims.

The human cost is increasingly visible: hospitals forced to cancel surgeries, water systems disrupted, and humanitarian organizations targeted. The 2022 ICRC breach alone exposed sensitive data on over half a million people. Other risks may take years to materialize. In “Harvest now, decrypt later” operations, adversaries steal encrypted data today, anticipating that future quantum computing could render current encryption obsolete.

Artificial intelligence is compounding these risks, lowering the barriers to sophisticated cyber operations and expanding their surface.

These interconnected and evolving threats highlight the need not only to understand cyber incidents, but also to develop shared approaches to preventing, mitigating and responding to them.

Making cyber incidents legible

To help policymakers understand the nature of cyber incidents, UNIDIR has developed accessible analytical tools. Our Taxonomy of Malicious ICT Incidents offers a structured way to categorize incidents and their effects, from disruption of service and data attacks to physical and reputational harm.

Building on this, the Intrusion Path framework divides the ICT environment into three layers: outside, on, and inside the perimeter, visualizing where malicious activities occur. During UNIDIR’s Cyber Stability Conference 2025, the framework showed participants at which point technical, legal and diplomatic responses come into play. A scenario-based exercise set in the fictional region of “Dystopia” illustrated how an ICT incident could escalate into cross-border disruptions.

But understanding incidents is only one part of the challenge. Addressing them also requires a shared international framework to guide State behaviour and support cooperation.

Strengthening policy and diplomacy

The UN Framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, comprising the 11 voluntary norms, international law, confidence-building measures and capacity-building, remains the cornerstone of multilateral efforts to ensure security in the use of ICTs.

UNIDIR’s analysis of the 2021-2025 Open-Ended Working Group on ICT security provides a comprehensive account of how States advanced this framework, informing discussions as they transitioned to the permanent Global Mechanism on ICT security in 2026.

Translating this framework into practice requires efforts tailored to national and regional contexts. In Southeast Asia, UNIDIR worked with ASEAN Member States and the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence to develop the ASEAN Norms Implementation Checklist, providing step-by-step guidance for embedding the 11 voluntary norms into national policy, legal, technical, and diplomatic practice.

Confidence-building is another essential dimension of international cooperation. UNIDIR’s Cyber Policy Portal serves as a practical transparency tool, profiling the cyber policies of 193 UN Member States and enabling governments, policymakers and other stakeholders to compare national approaches, track implementation of the UN Framework, and identify areas for cooperation.

However, shared commitments and transparency alone are not enough. States also need the capabilities to implement these commitments and participate effectively in international efforts.

From norms to practice

International consensus on frameworks for responsible behaviour means little if States lack the capacity to implement them. UNIDIR’s Foundational Cyber Capabilities framework outlines essential components for national cyber preparedness: strategic planning, legal and institutional development, operational capabilities, and trusted partnerships.

In Thailand, UNIDIR partnered with national authorities to develop a roadmap addressing priority issues and supporting implementation of specific elements of the UN Framework. This was followed by a targeted workshop that brought together Thailand’s technical, legal and diplomatic communities to translate select norms into national processes and practices suited to their institutional context.

Beyond demand-driven workshops, UNIDIR also delivers a dedicated Training Course on Norms, International Law and Cyberspace, designed to help government legal advisers and diplomats engage effectively in multilateral discussions on ICT security. Across five editions, 116 diplomats from 82 States have benefited from the programme.

Building capacity also means ensuring that a wider range of voices can participate in multilateral discussions. To support women’s participation in multilateral ICT security discussions, UNIDIR runs the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship, equipping women diplomats with knowledge and skills for engagement in the Global Mechanism. Its impact is measurable: in the Global Mechanism’s first substantive plenary, women delivered 51% of statements, and fellows alone delivered more than half of all of women’s interventions.

Alongside implementation and participation, another key challenge is clarifying how international law applies to State conduct in cyberspace.

International law and State conduct in cyberspace

In 2013, the UN Group of Governmental Experts agreed that international law applies to the State use of ICT. Since then, States have focused on how it applies in practice. UNIDIR’s research maps where States’ interpretations converge and where they diverge, including the positions of regional organizations on the application of international law in cyberspace.

Due diligence is a case in point. The UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2015 articulated a voluntary norm that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”. Still, due diligence as a legal concept applicable in cyberspace remains subject to divergent State interpretations. As observed by UNIDIR, key outstanding questions include the legal status of due diligence, the scope of expected conduct, the required level of knowledge, and the harm threshold.

Multilateral engagement and the path forward

Clarifying legal questions, building national capabilities and advancing shared norms all depend on sustained dialogue among States and other stakeholders. Multilateral engagement provides a space to bring these efforts together and address the challenges posed by technological change.

UNIDIR’s flagship Cyber Stability Conference, celebrating its milestone 15th edition in 2027, serves as a key platform for multistakeholder dialogue, bringing together policy, legal, technical, and diplomatic perspectives on cybersecurity. The 2026 conference focused on the current rapid technological change. Its central takeaway:

Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing reshape both offensive and defensive capabilities, and whether governance frameworks can keep pace with technological change remains an open question.

The same interdependence that makes cyberspace vulnerable also makes cooperation indispensable. As States take forward the new Global Mechanism on ICT security, UNIDIR stands ready to support them: through research, policy tools, and a range of capacity-building initiatives.

Awareness, translated into participation, is how resilience is built.

Awareness tells us the risks are shared. But awareness without capacity, and capacity without international cooperation, leaves cyberspace vulnerable. Stability depends on whether the capacity to manage those risks is shared too, and UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme works to help close that gap.

The post Advancing cyber stability in an interdependent world first appeared on UNIDIR.

Consider a cyber incident that disrupts a country’s electricity supply. The national cybersecurity agency must assess the technical situation, law enforcement may open an investigation, the ministry of foreign affairs may need to consider whether the incident has an international dimension, and the ministry of energy must work closely with the operator to restore essential services. Each institution may have its own plan. The question is: how well can these plans function together in practice?

Testing national arrangements before a real crisis hits

National cybersecurity strategies, legislation and incident-response frameworks provide essential foundations, and many countries have made important progress in developing them. Yet written frameworks cannot anticipate every operational dependency or point of friction between the institutions responsible for applying them, such as:

• Who leads?

• What information can be shared?

• When does an information and communication technology (ICT) incident become a public-safety or national security concern?

• How do technical, legal, policy and law-enforcement decisions fit together?

These issues often become visible only when institutions work through a crisis scenario together.  

Implementation is therefore a capability in its own right. National arrangements need to be tested and rehearsed in a low-risk environment before a real crisis occurs. This helps stakeholders identify gaps, clarify roles, strengthen information sharing, and build the working relationships needed for a coordinated response. Because institutions, risks and legal frameworks differ from country to country, this work must be tailored to national realities.

An Asia-Pacific success story

UNIDIR’s cyber capacity-building initiative across Asia-Pacific supports countries in strengthening national preparedness, testing institutional arrangements and improving coordination in ways tailored to their specific contexts.

The trainings conducted were not technical cyber drills, but strategic tabletop exercises. In line with a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, they brought together stakeholders including cybersecurity agencies, law enforcement, ministries of foreign affairs, critical infrastructure operators and senior decision makers.

Since May 2025, UNIDIR – with support from Global Affairs Canada – has successfully delivered national capacity-building trainings in eight countries: Thailand, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Malaysia, Cambodia and Viet Nam, alongside a dedicated thematic training programme in Thailand.

© 2026, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications of Cambodia

To ensure that each training programme responds to the specific national context, UNIDIR follows a three-phase approach. This reflects the principles for ICT capacity-building agreed by Member States in the UN Open-ended Working Group on ICT Security, including that capacity-building should be demand-driven, nationally owned and tailored to national needs and priorities.

• The first phase combined research and consultations with government institutions and other national stakeholders. Its purpose was to understand the priorities of partner countries alongside their unique national threat landscapes and national designations of critical infrastructure, institutional and legislative arrangements, capabilities, and future plans.

• The second phase built on these findings through capacity-building programmes co-designed with national authorities, which included the strategic tabletop exercises. These exercises allowed participants to apply national legislation, institutional arrangements and the framework of responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs to realistic cybersecurity scenarios. By testing how a response would operate in practice, these exercises helped participants surface coordination gaps, information-sharing challenges and overlapping responsibilities before an incident occurs.

• The ongoing third phase provides targeted, in-depth support in areas identified during the exercises. These include cyber crisis management and strategic communication, implementation of the framework, national approaches to attribution, responses consistent with international law, cybersecurity workforce development and whole-of-government coordination.

From a single exercise to a national framework in Thailand

UNIDIR’s deepening collaboration with the Government of Thailand is an example of how tailored, sustained engagement can move from testing arrangements to concretely supporting implementation of the framework.

In May 2025, UNIDIR and Thailand’s National Cyber Security Agency delivered a tailored cyber capacity-building and policy training programme, including a tabletop exercise simulating an ICT incident targeting vital energy infrastructure. Based on research on national cyber-related legislation and cyber incident response framework, the exercise helped national authorities identify practical steps to further operationalize the framework.

© 2025, National Cyber Security Agency of Thailand

UNIDIR then worked with Thailand to develop a tailored follow-up training programme, delivered in July 2026 in partnership with the Office of the National Security Council, National Cyber Security Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It explored how selected elements of the framework could be translated into national policies, institutional processes and operational practices.

The training also convened technical, policy, law enforcement and diplomatic communities to allow them to address a challenge that none of them could effectively address on their own. As a result, Thai authorities are developing a national framework to further implement specific elements of the framework of responsible State behaviour.

This progression illustrates the value of capacity-building as a sustained process rather than a one-off event. It also reflects a straightforward principle of UNIDIR’s approach:

Effective capacity-building cannot be designed from afar. It must be grounded in national institutional, legislative and policy contexts, and guided by the priorities of the countries it seeks to support.

What’s next?

As cyber threats evolve, their effects increasingly cross institutional boundaries. Ransomware can disrupt essential services and economic activity; supply-chain compromises can involve government, industry and international partners; and emerging technologies, including AI and quantum, can create new challenges for security and governance. No single institution or community of practice can address these challenges alone.

UNIDIR’s cyber capacity-building supports countries to turn national frameworks and international commitments into practical cooperation. It strengthens the relationships, shared understanding and institutional habits that allow national frameworks to function when they are needed most.

© 2026, National Cyber Security Agency of Malaysia

UNIDIR will continue to expand its engagement across the Asia-Pacific region, working with partner countries to deliver tailored training, scenario-based exercises and support that respond to evolving national priorities and cyber threats. Through its recently established Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security, UNIDIR will also extend its capacity-building work to the field of artificial intelligence.

The post Preparing for cyber crises before they occur first appeared on UNIDIR.

In 2025, more inter- and intra-State conflicts were waged than in any year since the Second World War. Conflicts are also intensifying, lasting longer and growing more intractable.

Around 245,000 people were killed in conflict last year alone. Some 120 million were forcibly displaced by major conflicts such as those in the Sudan, Ukraine and Myanmar. And long after fighting ends, people may still face physical and psychological suffering, as well as disrupted livelihoods.

The time to act is before armed conflict breaks out. Prevention not only reduces human suffering, it also limits the financial cost. Research suggests that armed conflict cost the global economy $835 billion in 2025. According to the World Bank, every dollar invested in peacebuilding and prevention could save $16 over the long term.

Why weapons matter

One way to prevent armed conflict is to tackle an essential ingredient: weapons proliferation and misuse. Logically, without weapons there can be no armed conflict. With them, fighting appears to break out more easily, last longer or intensify, depending on the context. In northwestern Nigeria, for example, research shows that environmental stress generates conflict, conflict drives demand for weapons, and the widespread availability of weapons further aggravates insecurity.

Crucially, weapons can also warn of conflict on the horizon:

• Rising prices on illicit arms markets may indicate greater demand and a heightened risk of fighting.

• The appearance of new weapons or tactics may signal an escalation in violence.

• Fewer seizures may suggest that fewer illicit weapons are circulating – or that the government has lost control on the ground.

Interpreted in context and alongside other indicators, such data can sharpen conflict analysis and forecasting.

From underused resource to emerging priority

Yet, prevention strategies often overlook these signals. Weapons-related issues can, for instance, be seen as too politically sensitive or technical. Further, arms control and prevention experts have few opportunities to exchange knowledge. Weapons data may also be inaccessible to the public, subject to time lags, insufficiently granular or otherwise poorly suited to prevention. And even where high-quality data can be obtained and analysed, it may be difficult to convert that analysis into preventative action.

The good news is that attention is growing

In 2018, the UN Secretary-General recognized that there had been “limited engagement within the system on how issues relating to arms […] can be utilized for conflict prevention.” He urged UN partners to explore how to better integrate weapons-related information and risks into conflict prevention activities.

UNIDIR responded with, among other initiatives, the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit, which offers practical guidance on weapons-related risk factors, indicators and data sources, and on how to incorporate them into conflict analysis and prevention.

Two key developments then accelerated political momentum. In the 2023 New Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary-General called on States to “prioritize prevention,” and specifically to integrate arms control into conflict prevention initiatives. In the 2024 Pact for the Future, States responded by committing to strengthen their strategies for preventing armed conflict, including their early-warning systems. Notably, they also pledged to address the risks associated with illicit weapons through national prevention strategies.

Weapons data for more effective early warning

Conflict early-warning systems play a vital role in effective conflict prevention by identifying risks and alerting those able to respond. But they are only as good as the data they rely on, and few systematically collect, monitor or analyse information about weapons.

That is changing. In 2024, UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, and the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System brought together leading experts in weapons data and early warning. These two communities have historically had little contact. Together, they charted practical paths forward to strengthen the use of weapons data in early warning.

This work is already bearing fruit:

• The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding is training community monitors in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire to better identify and report weapons-related risks, on the expectation that more granular data will make its early-warning system more effective. Research has shown that community-led arms control initiatives, including local data collection for early warning, can help to prevent conflict.

• The UN Department of Peace Operations is developing an early-warning and response toolkit, including weapons-related indicators and guidance. It is designed to help peacekeeping missions collect, verify and analyse information, and to act on warnings.

• The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is designing an AI model to better assess risks of conflict-related sexual violence, and aims to draw on weapons data to make those assessments more accurate.

States are also engaging. In 2025, some recommended the dissemination of innovative approaches, technologies, and weapons data for early warning and conflict prevention. The UN Secretary-General further encouraged States to strengthen their capacity to collect, analyse and share weapons data as part of their conflict prevention and early-warning strategies.

Priorities for the next United Nations leadership

UN Secretary-General António Guterres made conflict prevention a key priority when he took office in 2017. Promising progress has since been made in bringing weapons-related risks into conflict prevention. Much of the potential of weapons data, however, remains unrealized. Now is the time to unlock it. Priorities include:

• Encouraging the UN Security Council to use arms control measures not just reactively in support of peacekeeping operations, but more often proactively to prevent conflict.

• Building UN missions’ capacity to collect, interpret and harness weapons data, and to share that data responsibly, thereby strengthening conflict analysis and early warning.

• Collecting and disseminating good practice on weapons data for conflict prevention, for example through UNIDIR’s Arms Data and Early Warning Dashboard, which is being converted into a knowledge repository for weapons data and early-warning experts.

• Using reviews of arms control and conflict prevention frameworks, such as the recent review of the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms, to prioritize weapons-related risks.

UNIDIR will continue to build tools and share resources that help turn weapons data into preventative action. The next UN Secretary-General must keep conflict prevention at the heart of the UN’s agenda – and place weapons data closer to the heart of conflict prevention.

The post Unlocking the potential of weapons data to prevent conflict first appeared on UNIDIR.

In 2013, the UN Group of Governmental Experts affirmed that international law applies to State use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) – which was welcomed by the UN General Assembly. What States have continued to discuss in successive multilateral processes is how it applies. For example, when a cyber operation could amount to a prohibited use of force, when a State may respond and what obligations it owes. 

The consequences of leaving these questions unsettled are not abstract, as legal uncertainty does not stay in the legal domain.

Cyber operations can disrupt critical infrastructure and essential services, including healthcare, transport, financial systems and government functions.

In a crisis, uncertainty about how States understand the applicable rules can compound the risks of misattribution, misperception and escalation.

Addressing the representation gap

National positions on the application of international law in cyberspace are meant to enhance transparency and contribute to common understandings. A national position is an official public statement explaining how a State understands the application of international law to its conduct in cyberspace: where it draws its lines, what it considers lawful, and how it understands its own obligations. To date, 37 States have published one, and the African Union and European Union have adopted regional views.

Participation is, however, uneven. Many of the individual positions come from the Western European and Others Group and only a handful come from other regions. For example, only one national position comes from the African Group, and four from Latin America and Caribbean Group. This is not a matter of States having nothing to contribute, but one of the conditions that shape participation: available legal and technical capacity, political will, competing national priorities and awareness of the issue.

The 2024 Common African Position reflects this uneven landscape and expressly encourages African Union Member States to issue national statements on the application of international law to cyberspace. It positions the regional view as a catalyst for, rather than a substitute for, individual national positions.

Against this backdrop, developing capacity on how international law applies in cyberspace has gained prominence in multilateral processes. States have encouraged capacity building initiatives that can contribute to the equal and effective participation of a broader and diverse range of States in these discussions.

How UNIDIR supports States

UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme supports States seeking to develop their own national positions.

Our approach is grounded in a simple principle. Every State has an equal right to participate in shaping international law as it applies in cyberspace, and every State’s views carry equal weight in that process.

Our role is not to prescribe what a State’s legal position should be. It is to provide practical support, facilitate exchange and help States navigate the process of developing their own views.

In 2024, UNIDIR published A Compendium of Good Practices: Developing a National Position on the Interpretation of International Law and State Use of ICT. It draws on a closed-door workshop with representatives of 19 States (two thirds had published views at that time). The Compendium distils practical lessons on three questions:

1. Why do States develop a position?
   
2. What could it cover?
   
3. How could the process work?

The Compendium sets out ten recommended steps, from defining scope and identifying stakeholders to capacity building, drafting, adoption and dissemination.

UNIDIR is currently preparing Compendium 2.0, which will capture new and updated national positions and analyse the two regional positions for the first time. It will also examine how the process of developing a position has evolved, with a wider range of national authorities now involved and additional areas of international law being increasingly explored.

Alongside research, the Institute develops and delivers tailored capacity building initiatives. At the request of Member States, it:

• Runs workshops on developing a national position and trainings on norms, international law and cyberspace;

• Facilitates substantive exchanges among States at different stages of the process;

• Connects officials with peers who have already navigated this process;

• Supports events where the States we assist launch their national positions.

To date, UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme has supported around 14 individual States in their processes, ranging from dedicated workshops to tailored assistance during the drafting of legal interpretations.   

The breadth of participation in these discussions matters. Common understandings are more likely to reflect the realities and concerns of States when a wider range of national perspectives is brought into the conversation.

Why this is not just a legal exercise

It would be easy, but maybe misleading, to see national and regional positions as a niche concern for international lawyers. In practice, they serve wider purposes:

• They build transparency and predictability in international relations: Publishing a legal position communicates expectations to other States. It clarifies what a State considers acceptable under international law and what it does not. This predictability lowers the risk of misunderstanding and escalation in cyberspace.

• They enhance preparedness: Clarifying where a State draws its lines, a national position provides a framework for assessing and potentially responding to incidents. When a crisis hits, governments may not have the luxury of starting from basic principles. An agreed national legal position may enable faster, more coherent and more credible responses.

• They improve coordination at home: Developing a position encourages a State to bring its relevant national authorities (from the foreign ministry, to the defence unit, cybersecurity agency, law enforcement and other stakeholders) together around a shared understanding. The document that results becomes a common reference point, reducing the risk that different parts of government advance conflicting interpretations, and ensuring that the State’s position is consistent at home and abroad.

• They give States a voice: A national position is the clearest way for a State to contribute to the development of common understandings on how international law applies to cyberspace. For developing States in particular, a position is a practical instrument for ensuring their perspectives are part of the global conversation.

The moment to shape international law is now

Common understandings of how international law applies in cyberspace are being currently shaped. The Global Mechanism on ICT in the context of international security, which began its work in 2026, continues to examine how international law applies to State use of ICTs. Its focused discussions cover topics such as sovereignty, the prohibition of intervention, State responsibility and the peaceful settlement of disputes, among others. The positions States publish today will also shape these conversations and the common understandings of tomorrow.

Broad and geographically diverse participation will be important to develop common understandings that reflect the perspectives and experiences of States across regions.

That is why UNIDIR’s work matters. It does not just support States in producing documents with interesting legal interpretations, but helps ensure that the legal framework governing cyberspace is shaped by all of those who will live under it.

The post The future of international law in cyberspace needs more diverse voices first appeared on UNIDIR.

To respond effectively, it is important to consider the different ways in which threats, risks and vulnerabilities are experienced by women, men, boys, girls and gender-diverse persons. By applying this “gender lens”, we can help to improve policy interventions and deliver better outcomes to the various groups affected by violence.

In conflict situations, men and boys are often the majority of those killed and injured, while women and girls are most at risk of sexual and gender-based violence. In most conflicts, applying a gender lens will also uncover patterns which may not be immediately obvious to security experts. For example, women and girls are the ones who bear the brunt of caring for children and injured family members during crises.

Recognizing different patterns of harm

A gender lens is essential to uncover patterns of harm and identify specific needs of different groups of society. A gender lens is not about creating hierarchies or comparing experiences as better or worse; it is about acknowledging different experiences during conflict and learning how to integrate these considerations into humanitarian response, arms control and disarmament, and peacebuilding.

The Arms Trade Treaty is the first multilateral arms control instrument to recognize the differentiated impact of weapons on women, men, boys and girls. Article 7.4 of the treaty requires States Parties to conduct a risk assessment to ensure that exported weapons are not used to commit gender-based violence (GBV) or serious violence against women and children.

At the national level, many countries across the world have taken additional steps to prevent femicides and GBV facilitated by weapons. These include regulations that deny gun licences to people who have been convicted of domestic violence, intimate partner violence, violent intimidation or stalking.

Ensuring that no one is left behind

A gender lens is crucial to inform both immediate humanitarian response and long-term relief and recovery efforts. Access to healthcare in the aftermath of a conflict is heavily influenced by gender, as well as cultural and socio-economic factors. UNIDIR research has shown that women and girls with visible injuries are more likely to experience stigma and social exclusion. Men and boys also experience stigma, which may prevent them from seeking mental health support due to cultural and gender norms.

Inclusive victim assistance has become an important part of humanitarian disarmament treaties and agreements, such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. With provisions related to gender- and age-sensitive assistance to victims, these instruments represent a successful step towards the strengthening of a rights-based approach in disarmament.

At the implementation level, however, more resources are needed to assist survivors of conflict, as many affected States struggle to effectively integrate victim assistance into already-stretched national health and social welfare systems.

Anticipating new risks and threats

The means of conflict and violence are changing, and digital technologies are increasingly being used to commit, assist or exacerbate GBV. This evolving phenomenon is commonly referred to as technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV).

As many as 38% of women have experienced some form of TFGBV, and this increases to about 70% of women if we consider human rights defenders, activists and journalists.

The rapid advancements in AI, including generative AI, have amplified TFGBV by enabling new forms of abuse, including the creation of non-consensual deepfake content. Studies estimate that 98% of online deepfakes are pornographic, and 99% of these target women.

When it comes to arms control discussions covering military applications of AI, concerns have already been raised about the need to mitigate gender and racial biases in weapon systems supported by AI. Such biases can make populations invisible or lead to targeting of people on the basis of biased assumptions. As States discuss new frameworks to govern AI and other digital technologies, these issues should be urgently addressed.

From research to practice

UNIDIR’s Integrated Approaches Programme supports States through research, advice and capacity-building activities that ensure gender considerations are part of international security strategies and governance frameworks.

We also deliver programmes that advance women’s equal participation in arms control and disarmament processes – an area where women remain underrepresented.

Our latest data shows that, on average, women represent only 36% of the diplomats attending arms control and disarmament discussions and negotiations.

Achieving gender equality should not be seen as a luxury or a minor task; it is key to overcoming conflict. Where women’s inclusion is prioritized, peace is more likely to last – particularly when women are able to influence decision-making.

Statistical analysis suggests that women’s participation has a positive impact on the durability of peace agreements.

A study of 156 peace agreements concluded that when women are included in peace processes there is a 20% increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least 2 years, and a 35% increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least 15 years.

This Disarmament Week, as we are confronted by multiple conflicts and crises, we cannot afford to exclude women from decision-making or to turn a gender-blind eye to the suffering of millions of people affected by conflict and insecurity around the world. Ultimately, a gender lens reminds us that arms control and disarmament are not abstract measures; they are key instruments to protect people and deliver more equitable and enduring recovery.

The post Why a gender lens is important to achieve international peace and security first appeared on UNIDIR.

Policymakers and practitioners face a crucial challenge: despite decades of disarmament and reintegration programming, people’s motivations to join, leave and potentially rejoin armed groups are often poorly understood. As a result, there is a significant knowledge gap as to which approaches are most effective in helping sustain the transition to civilian life after conflict. Without a nuanced understanding of these dynamics, interventions risk being ill-equipped to facilitate disarmament and reintegration, which in turn can increase the risks of recidivism and conflict renewal.

Identifying what drives individuals’ recruitment and reintegration journeys is essential for designing effective interventions. UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project helps fill critical evidence gaps and inform better-tailored approaches that promote and sustain pathways from conflict to peace.

Across six countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Colombia and Iraq) the project has gathered fine-grained data that gets to the heart of why people disarm and demobilize, and before that, what leads them to join an armed group. This is done through:

• Quantitative methods (large-scale surveys of former armed group associates, former and current affiliates of community security and militia groups, and unaffiliated community members)

• Qualitative work (focus groups and key informant interviews)

• Other experimental and participatory approaches (such as research and photography workshops with conflict-affected youth).

A holistic assessment of conflict trajectories

UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project adopts a holistic approach to understanding reintegration progress. It examines former associates’ reintegration journeys through various dimensions, including economic, social and psychological well-being and perceptions of community trust and acceptance. This multifaceted approach helps examine the progress and challenges people face on their reintegration journeys and how different factors – including livelihood difficulties, environmental challenges, governance policies and gender norms – affect transitions to civilian life.

For individuals to disarm fully and permanently, it is important that they manage to establish civilian livelihoods and find ways to reintegrate into social life. This can be difficult amid ongoing insecurity, structural barriers or other factors.

In Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, for instance, the project found that individuals who left Boko Haram often felt physically threatened by their old group and faced significant obstacles in finding new income sources, partly due to restrictions on farming.

The concern with returnees who continue to feel unsafe after demobilizing or who struggle to meet their basic needs is that they may retain weapons to protect themselves or take up arms for their economic survival. Both outcomes can have destabilizing effects and undermine weapons collection programmes.

© 2015, ICRC/Jesus Andres Serrano Redondo

Measuring progress over time

Alongside its holistic assessment, a distinctive feature of the Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project is its longitudinal approach, following former associates and returnees for up to four consecutive years. This has allowed researchers to assess reintegration over time rather than through a single snapshot. It also makes it possible to identify factors that support or impede progress, such as receiving programming support or civil documentation.

The project’s findings confirm that reintegration is not an event but a long-term process shaped by individual, community and societal factors.

Disarmament and reintegration programmes therefore need to take into account what motivates individuals to disarm, their sources of resilience and the barriers that former associates may face for years after leaving their group, to better support them on their pathways away from conflict.

Addressing armed group recruitment to improve conflict prevention

Another important aspect of interrupting conflict cycles and preventing new ones from forming is to address the root causes of armed group recruitment and weapons proliferation. To better understand the drivers of armed violence, the project has collected robust evidence about people’s entries into armed groups. For instance, in a survey in the North East of Nigeria, around a quarter of respondents formerly associated with Boko Haram reported that they were promised something by the group when they initially became associated. These incentives included promises of economic well-being, but also education, a sense of belonging, assistance with marriage and safety from violence.

By unpacking the factors that influence recruitment, the project helps improve understanding of the root causes of conflict and supports partners in adapting prevention and peacebuilding strategies to people’s needs and realities on the ground. For example, the project has shown how climatic and environmental pressures can create conditions favourable to armed recruitment.

Across multiple surveys in the Lake Chad Basin, a notable percentage of former Boko Haram associates who reported climate-related livelihood difficulties before joining the group said that these difficulties played a role in their recruitment.

UNIDIR continues to explore the links between climate change and armed group involvement and behaviour to help identify emerging conflict risks and ensure that interventions remain responsive to changing conditions.

Through its holistic, comparative approach across multiple case studies, the project has shown that recruitment dynamics can be highly context-specific and vary significantly across settings. In Colombia, for instance, UNIDIR’s research found that some survivors of sexual violence from the Nasa Indigenous communities of northern Cauca joined FARC dissident groups in search of justice, in part because the mechanisms available in their communities failed to deliver justice and accountability for perpetrators.

The project works with local partners and communities across conflict settings to disseminate its research findings and supports them in adopting evidence-based approaches that respond to local needs. Its research contributes to improving understanding of why individuals enter armed groups and acquire weapons. This nuanced knowledge is crucial to inform and support conflict prevention initiatives, which are often underprioritized but vital elements of a comprehensive disarmament strategy.

© 2020, ICRC/Prichilla Absi

The two-way reality of reintegration

The reintegration of former associates of armed groups is not a one-way process. For them to return to civilian life, they need to be received and accepted by the communities to which they return. Given this reality, UNIDIR also gathers evidence about the lived experiences of unaffiliated communities affected by conflict.

This is important for two reasons:

1. It helps understand how communities are affected by and cope with insecurity and conflict, and how aid programmes can be tailored to address their needs and assist victims and survivors.
   
2. It provides a fuller picture of reintegration progress.

The project’s nuanced approach is essential in this regard, because although superficial measures of acceptance can seem high in some cases, qualitative analysis can reveal specific instances of rejection or discrimination against returnees.

In Iraq, for example, the high acceptance rates reported by Iraqi returnees from Al-Hol camp in Syria, who were often perceived to be affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, were not necessarily mirrored by the perceptions of community members living in the same areas of return to the same extent.

UNIDIR’s evidence can uncover specific barriers that need to be addressed by policies and interventions in conflict-affected communities to promote receptivity in practice. By underlining the importance of investing in returnees’ community entry and promoting social cohesion, this research helps strengthen reintegration support and the prospects of sustainable transitions away from conflict.

Evidence to inform policy and practice

The project builds on UNIDIR’s expertise in disarmament by taking into consideration the multifaceted dimensions of human security and integrating a people-centred approach to disarmament and reintegration programming. Through collaboration with UN, regional, national and local partners, the Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project equips practitioners and policymakers with high-quality, evidence-based information that fills critical knowledge gaps.

Earlier in the year, the project was shortlisted for the first edition of the UN 2.0 Awards, which recognize UN system initiatives that are achieving outstanding results through new ways of working and new solutions.

UNIDIR’s work helps inform the international community’s design and implementation of effective interventions that assist individuals and their communities in transitioning away from violent conflict and building durable peace.

The post Championing a people-centred approach to disarmament and reintegration first appeared on UNIDIR.

From mobile phones, GPS and satellites to air traffic control, emergency services and drones, modern societies and military operations increasingly depend on access to and control of the electromagnetic spectrum. As competition within this domain intensifies, disruptions to the spectrum are emerging as a serious challenge for international peace and security.

UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2026 will examine what these developments mean for conflict, strategic stability and global governance. Discussions will cover the impact on military capabilities and the vulnerabilities created by dependence on connected systems. Participants will also explore how arms control and disarmament frameworks can adapt to this changing security landscape.

Mostly invisible, the electromagnetic spectrum is becoming a defining feature of modern warfare. As dependence on this domain grows, understanding the risks of disruption is essential to safeguarding both security and stability.

Dr Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

Recent UNIDIR analysis has shown how electronic warfare is shaping innovation in uncrewed aerial systems, with militaries increasingly adapting platforms and operational concepts to function in contested electromagnetic environments. As technologies change in response to spectrum-related vulnerabilities, policymakers face new questions about the implications for conflict, stability and international security governance.

Despite its significance for security and conflict, the electromagnetic spectrum remains relatively underexplored within arms control and disarmament discussions. The conference will provide an opportunity to consider how existing governance frameworks can adapt to the realities of 21st-century conflict and technological change.

To register for the event, visit UNIDIR’s website. For further information, please contact Claudia Marquina, UNIDIR Head of Communications at claudia.marquina@un.org.

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institution within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community in developing solutions to critical security problems. For more information, visit unidir.org.

The post Electromagnetic disruption to headline UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2026 first appeared on UNIDIR.

Adopted in 2013, the ATT created global rules to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons and thereby prevent and eradicate their diversion to the illicit trade. The treaty ultimately aims to reduce human suffering and contribute to international peace, security and stability.

Across 2026 and 2027, UNIDIR and its partners are working to deliver the first comprehensive impact evaluation of the ATT. This evaluation will assess the treaty’s influence on national transfer control systems, efforts to counter diversion, and international cooperation to strengthen international security and reduce human suffering. The project aims to inform efforts to prepare and adopt the ATT’s first five-year strategy.

At the launch, the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, David Riley, who will also serve as President of the next Conference of States Parties, underlined that impact evaluation represents a valuable tool in shaping a five-year ATT strategy, which will be a priority of the UK presidency.

The event centred on a discussion among gathered participants around three essential questions for the evaluation methodology:

• What impacts should be assessed?

• How to assess the ATT’s impact?

• How to attribute change and impact to the ATT?

What impacts should be assessed?

UNIDIR Associate Researcher Paula Soumaya Domit asked participants what impacts they felt the ATT should be having, with responses ranging from improved transparency in the arms trade to the prevention of gender-based violence. The initiative will examine the ATT’s impact in five areas related to the treaty’s object and purpose, ranked by participants as follows:

How to assess the ATT’s impact?

Turning from what to assess to how to assess it, Stimson Center Acting President and Chief Executive Officer Rachel Stohl asked participants what data to use for the impact evaluation. Some data sources, such as ATT initial and annual reports, are readily accessible. But others proposed by participants are either completely unavailable or are available only for a few States, as in the case of licence denials. Participants’ candid reflections on data collection challenges (see below) were particularly useful for the initiative’s assessment methodology.

How to attribute change and impact to the ATT?

Conflict Armament Research Head of Research Rob Hunter-Perkins asked participants to help the team credibly attribute observed changes to the ATT. Participants provided a long list of ways to demonstrate the ATT’s contribution to a particular outcome, some of which are shown below:

Two major challenges stand in the way of establishing clear causality between the ATT and the various impacts related to its object and purpose:

1. The ATT’s effect is hard to isolate from that of other frameworks
   The treaty sits within an overlapping set of regional and international frameworks that together recommend or require that States put in place a national transfer control system, establish a legal and regulatory framework, and conduct risk assessments before authorizing international arms transfers. Attributing any specific change to the ATT alone is therefore challenging.
   
2. Changes in human suffering are hard to measure and attribute
   It is very difficult to determine whether human suffering is greater, smaller or the same as it would have been without the treaty, let alone if these changes can be attributed directly to national implementation of the treaty and application of its provisions. Nonetheless, many participants highlighted this as an important metric for evaluating the ATT’s impact.

The project team is now embarking on a pilot study to explore how best to minimize the impact of these challenges on the study’s results.

© 2026, UNIDIR

From pilot to full evaluation

The first phase of the initiative is a pilot study with ten States Parties, which will help to validate impact indicators and determine the feasibility of data collection.

Pilot study results will be shared on the margins of the ATT working group meetings for the Thirteenth Conference of States Parties in March 2027. The final evaluation study, meanwhile, will present the full methodology and results. These can then feed into efforts to develop a baseline for the five-year strategy, which will in turn facilitate better monitoring of its implementation.

The initiative aspires to show where the ATT is having a positive impact and to identify areas where more work is needed.

For more non-party States to come on board and spread the ATT’s benefits, we need clearer evidence of progress towards its core goal: a responsible international arms trade with minimal diversion risks that contributes to international peace, security, stability and sustainable development.

The post UNIDIR and partners launch first comprehensive evaluation of Arms Trade Treaty impact first appeared on UNIDIR.

The session supports a multi-year workplan of the Working Group on the Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer Space, under the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Article XI commits States Parties to inform the UN Secretary-General, the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of their activities in outer space.

Why Article XI matters now

This is a moment of rapidly rising activity, of a growing number of actors, and of capabilities that are very often dual-use. It is also, regrettably, a moment of eroding trust between States. As such, transparency is not a luxury. It is one of the few measures that can be advanced incrementally, without waiting for the resolution of larger and more contested questions. And much of what is needed already exists.

The Registration Convention and General Assembly resolution 1721 B (Article XVI) are not new obligations to be negotiated, they are existing commitments with latent potential. Increased utilization of Article XI could significantly enhance the security and stability of outer space.

On the question of dual-use capabilities, existing export control regimes are worth examining as a means of further encouraging implementation. These already involve States in classifying and tracking sensitive capabilities. The habits of categorization and channels of trust they rely on could inform how the international community thinks about what information is suitable for sharing under Article XI, and through what mechanisms.

Processes like The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation are voluntary and sit outside the UN system, but their use of information templates, regional workshops and annual meetings are all relevant practices to consider.

UNIDIR’s role in bridging policy and practice

UNIDIR has convened regional and industry workshops that bring multilateral space security mandates and processes closer to the places where national and regional decisions are discussed. These workshops also work to raise awareness of the governance frameworks that already exist.

Article XI is of particular value here because more States are party to the Outer Space Treaty than to the Registration Convention, offering a channel for information-sharing that is open to a wider community of States and covers a wider range of activity. Ad hoc, extrabudgetary State contributions to UNOOSA to support and expand work on national engagement with Article XI could lead to enhanced State practice in this area.

UNIDIR also maintains the Space Security Portal, a digital hub that gathers national and intergovernmental information on space laws, policies and activities. Although it is curated through a security lens, user feedback indicates the portal is helpful to understand national space positions and activities — a reminder that transparency, by whatever door it enters, can serve a range of purposes.

The portal does not rely solely on information contributed by States; it is sustained by a research team that proactively examines primary-source documents and government activities to keep it current. This in no way substitutes for States willingly furnishing information, but it does suggest a complementary model worth exploring. Implementing bodies could help gather information, whether through dedicated personnel or with the assistance of AI-based tools, and present it back to States for review and approval before sharing it through dedicated State-to-State or State-to-public channels.

NASA / Bill Ingalls, public domain

Creating a shared foundation

This is why a draft template for submissions of information under Article XI holds considerable potential. Practitioners are not always aware of Article XI; and even where they are, the provision can feel abstract. A template responds to both difficulties. It makes the act of sharing concrete — indicating what a State, or potentially a non-State industry actor, might share, and in what form — and in doing so it lowers the threshold to participation.

Security concerns and sensitive information can understandably inhibit willingness to share information. However, general information-sharing, even concerning unclassified or otherwise non-sensitive activities, has value in its own right as it helps establish information channels, builds regularity of practice and can improve confidence in the possibility of future, more substantial sharing arrangements.

In that spirit, it may be useful for the Working Group to examine, through a structured exercise, why States that are not currently sharing information under Article XI choose not to do so. It could also classify the types of information at stake — distinguishing, for instance, information that is genuinely sensitive from information that is simply not habitually shared. One concrete category that could be highlighted as good practice is information on derelict objects, which is generally non-sensitive and directly relevant to the shared interest in a sustainable space environment.

A parallel exercise to map the information that is already available, including through the portal and UNOOSA resources, could further lower the barriers to using Article XI. This assessment could help identify when channelling available information through Article XI strengthens multilateralism and international trust — and when existing information ecosystems are already sufficiently robust and well used, such that duplicating the effort is unnecessary and resources are better focused elsewhere.

In addition to advancing work in Vienna, this could also play a role in supporting space-security-related processes in Geneva, specifically the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its aspects. The fourth session of this group will discuss, inter alia: “elements on basic obligations … related to the national space policies, doctrines and strategies and other measures that could reduce the risk of escalation, conflict and an arms race in outer space”. Having an understanding of wider opportunities and challenges in this area could therefore inform and advance work in other domains.

Small steps, lasting confidence

Even where information is shared unilaterally, taking the additional step of channelling it through multilateral and international legal mechanisms aligns it with the wider international community and demonstrates a certain kind of political will for transparency. That is exactly the kind of small, incremental step that can, over time, build confidence and trust.

After all, the security, safety and sustainability of outer space, and its continued use for peaceful purposes, will not be secured by any single instrument — but they will be greatly enhanced through the patient use of the mutually reinforcing mechanisms we already have.

The post Building trust in space through greater transparency first appeared on UNIDIR.

The training, supported by the Government of Japan, combined technical sessions with practical group exercises. Participants mapped local risks, potential diversion routes, vulnerable locations as well as observable indicators, and developed simple community risk profiles and recommendations to strengthen early warning in their own contexts.

Sessions emphasized the role of community actors in observing, verifying, documenting and reporting emerging risks. Participants explored how information gathered at community level can complement national and regional efforts to identify patterns of arms and ammunition diversion, trafficking and misuse, while recognizing that community monitors are not law-enforcement or interdiction actors.

A central focus was turning community observations into reliable and usable alerts. Through practical scenarios and reporting exercises, participants practised distinguishing facts from rumours and assumptions, assessing the reliability of sources, triangulating information where it could be done safely, and documenting incidents.

© 2026, UNIDIR

Adapting early warning to a border setting

Ouangolodougou is a strategically important city in northern Côte d’Ivoire, situated close to the borders with Burkina Faso and Mali. The training adapted risk and indicator identification to the local context, including informal border crossings, transhumance routes, markets, seasonal movements, farmer-herder dynamics, local leadership tensions and mining areas.

Participants reflected on the importance of understanding local patterns, movements and community concerns, while ensuring that information is responsibly verified and channelled through appropriate early-warning and institutional mechanisms.

The discussions also highlighted the importance of trust, confidentiality and the safety of community monitors. Effective community early warning depends not only on collecting information, but also on ensuring that communities understand how information will be used and that there are clear and credible channels for reporting and response.

Local leadership and community prevention

The training underscored the importance of traditional and administrative leadership in strengthening community-based prevention.

Preventing the diversion and trafficking of ammunition is a shared responsibility. Traditional leaders have a vital role in strengthening community vigilance, building trust and encouraging people to speak up when they see risks. By working together, communities, traditional authorities and security actors can help protect our people and keep our communities safe.

His Majesty Issiaka Tiéba Ouattara, village chief of Ouangolodougou

Niamké Eba Assouan, Secretary General of the Prefecture of Ouangolodougou, highlighted the role of community-based early warning in ensuring that information from local communities reaches the relevant authorities in a timely and responsible manner. In a border area connected to both Burkina Faso and Mali, he emphasized the importance of vigilance, coordination and collective responsibility in preventing the diversion and trafficking of ammunition and contributing to the safety and resilience of local communities.

© 2026, UNIDIR

From early warning to prevention

The Ouangolodougou training forms part of a broader UNIDIR–WANEP initiative to strengthen community-based approaches to preventing ammunition diversion and trafficking in West Africa. It builds on earlier engagement in northern Ghana and provides an opportunity to identify lessons that can inform approaches across border and conflict-affected areas.

Our experience has shown that communities are often the first to recognize the warning signs of insecurity. They observe unusual movements, detect emerging tensions, and understand local dynamics long before such risks become visible to external actors. In many instances, communities possess critical information that can help prevent violence before it occurs. This is why community monitoring remains one of the most effective pillars of early warning and preventive action.

Kalie Sillar, Regional Analyst, Organised Crime and Violent Extremism, WANEP

A key lesson emerging from the initiative is that community early warning is most useful when local knowledge is connected to a clear chain of observation, verification, documentation, reporting and institutional response. The practical exercises reinforced this end-to-end approach: communities can contribute valuable information without taking on responsibilities that belong to the competent authorities.

Lessons from the activities in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire will inform community-based approaches to preventing ammunition diversion and trafficking, while supporting broader efforts to prevent armed violence and enhance community resilience in West Africa.

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Abayomi Adeomi of the ECOWAS Commission, Lilian Wamuyu of RECSA and Thayani Gumede of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation examined lessons learned from reviewing 20 years of implementation of the SADC Firearms Protocol in 2021, and of the Nairobi Protocol on SALW in 2024. The discussion aimed to support a similar review of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW.

A milestone anniversary can be an important moment to reflect, take stock of achievements and obstacles overcome, and consider new challenges and opportunities ahead.

Dr Paul Holtom, Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme

What has worked?

Member states of ECOWAS, RECSA and SADC have made progress in implementing regional SALW control instruments, particularly by establishing national coordination mechanisms and government focal points, strengthening physical security and stockpile management, and marking weapons through capacity-building programmes.

For ECOWAS, the Convention’s exemption procedure introduced a norm under which no State should import SALW without the knowledge and non-objection of fellow member states. A joint UNIDIR-RECSA regional assessment also shows tangible progress in RECSA member states’ transfer-control legislation and inter-agency coordination. Across the SADC region, the Firearms Protocol prompted reviews of national legislation and administrative measures.

For the RECSA region, national focal points are the backbone of our regional cooperation.

Lilian Wamuyu, Regional Centre on Small Arms

© 2024, Getty Images/Alexander Koerner

What remains a challenge?

Fully implementing these regional control instruments faces persistent challenges. Recurring conflicts drive demand for arms and ammunition, while porous borders facilitate their illicit trafficking from one conflict to another. Speakers also highlighted weak cooperation between police, customs and border services. Many efforts still rely on donor-driven projects rather than nationally owned efforts to build local capacity and deliver sustainable SALW control.

In Southern Africa, legislation has been reviewed, but the harmonization of laws remains slow. For RECSA, regional information exchanges and cooperation in tracing lag behind the Nairobi Protocol’s aspirations: States are not yet realizing the value of improved marking and record-keeping, which comes only “when a recovered weapon is actually traced, and the results are shared across borders”.

RECSA and ECOWAS both highlighted threats posed by “improvised weapons” outside their instruments’ scope, particularly improvised explosive devices and uncrewed systems. They also pointed to the role of technology in facilitating diversion and trafficking.

For Gumede, “inadequate resources and capacity have created a gap between the commitments contained in the Protocol and their implementation”.

© 2025, CNCCAI

Next steps for regional SALW control

RECSA and SADC shared key lessons learned from their reviews of 20 years of implementation of their control instruments.

In early 2026, UNIDIR and RECSA unveiled a regional scorecard, the first comprehensive assessment of two decades of implementation. It recommended new provisions for the Nairobi Protocol for new technologies, gender-responsive arms control, enhanced cross-border cooperation and regional information sharing.

SADC, meanwhile, conducted its review of the Protocol during 2020-2021. The review resulted in amendments on brokering and tracing, as well as the elaboration and adoption of an action plan and updated standard operating procedures to aid implementation. Reflecting on the SADC experience, Gumede urged ECOWAS to mainstream gender and youth perspectives given that “the proliferation of illicit weapons is closely linked to issues like gender-based violence”.

For RECSA and SADC, key lessons from these processes included the need to:

• Secure a clear political mandate for the review and its recommendations through a regional meeting of ministers (as for RECSA) or Heads of State and Government (as for SADC)

• Ensure member state ownership and leadership of the review process and recommendations

• Build strong partnerships with civil society, research institutes and international organizations to secure a solid evidence base, allowing comparisons of each member state’s situation when the instrument was adopted with its situation today.

Adeomi said that “these ideas resonate with what we have planned” for the ECOWAS review, which will be driven by on-the-ground evaluations by independent experts and by stakeholder consultations. He stressed the importance of strengthening the ECOWAS framework “from an ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of people”, combining State and human security to address not only the supply of illicit arms but also the root causes of demand.

© 2015, MONUSCO

The benefits of reviewing regional small arms instruments

The event demonstrated the value of sharing not only the results of landmark reviews, but also lessons from the review process itself and how findings can strengthen regional and national small arms control.

Further milestones include:

• the Kinshasa Convention marks the tenth anniversary of its entry into force on 8 March 2027; and

• the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials marks the thirtieth anniversary of its adoption on 14 November 2027 – and of its entry into force on 1 July 2028.

UNIDIR will continue to support efforts to highlight progress and challenges in implementing regional SALW control instruments. It will also explore lessons that can strengthen national and regional efforts to counter the diversion, illicit trade and misuse of conventional arms and ammunition.

The post Reviewing two decades of subregional arms and ammunition control in Africa first appeared on UNIDIR.

Every year, diplomats and officials arrive in Geneva to take up responsibilities in disarmament and arms control, including participation in related negotiations. For many, this means navigating a complex field spanning nuclear, biological and conventional weapons, as well as outer space security and rapidly evolving technologies such as artificial intelligence. 

The annual course supports these newly arrived officials with a practical introduction to the institutions, processes and substantive issues that shape Geneva’s disarmament community, as well as current challenges and developments in an increasingly complex global security environment. 

Foundations of disarmament diplomacy in Geneva 

The course opened with remarks from UNIDIR Director Robin Geiss, followed by a video message from Her Excellency Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at UNODA. 

We want delegates to leave this course not only with an enhanced understanding of disarmament and arms control, but also knowing that UNIDIR stands beside you as you perform this important role, ready to provide expertise and technical advice.

Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

Both speakers reflected on the challenges facing the disarmament and arms control community. They also pointed to recent developments that demonstrate the potential for progress, including the report recently agreed by consensus in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems as a positive example of what can be achieved through continued international engagement. 

Despite these challenges, I believe there are reasons why we can maintain a sense of pragmatic optimism with respect to what we can accomplish within the field of arms control and international security.

H.E. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at UNODA

Delegates explored the key institutions and processes that underpin the multilateral disarmament machinery, alongside practical resources to support their work in Geneva. The course also examined cross-cutting perspectives on disarmament, including gender and youth. The sessions then turned to the Conference on Disarmament, exploring its history and mandate, how it functions, and its current work. 

​The first week concluded with a focus on conventional weapons. Delegates examined the international instruments addressing the humanitarian impact of anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions and explosive weapons in populated areas, alongside frameworks governing conventional weapons and ammunition more broadly. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

Responding to scientific and technological change 

The second week began with a focus on the Biological Weapons Convention. Participants explored its history and ongoing efforts to strengthen the Convention, including in response to advances in science and technology that present both new opportunities and emerging challenges. The sessions also examined efforts to promote and support its effective implementation. 

Delegates went on to examine outer space security, including the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Participants also examined different approaches to space security and considered the implications of advances in dual-use space technologies. 

​During the final module, delegates explored the rapidly evolving role of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons in the military domain, alongside developments in international cybersecurity. Discussions examined how these technologies are reshaping the security environment and the challenges they pose to global peace and security. Participants also considered ongoing efforts to develop common approaches and responsible international frameworks to address these emerging challenges. 

​Since 2019, some 281 diplomats from more than 100 Member States have taken the course. As each new cohort takes up their responsibilities in Geneva, UNIDIR and UNODA remain committed to supporting their engagement in the multilateral disarmament process and to strengthening the knowledge, expertise and dialogue needed to advance global peace and security. 

The post UNIDIR and UNODA equip diplomats to navigate a changing disarmament landscape  first appeared on UNIDIR.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was the first treaty to prohibit an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. With 189 States Parties, the treaty remains a critical component of the broader framework of measures designed to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons. However, the BWC currently lacks a verification mechanism to assess whether States are in compliance with their treaty obligations. It also lacks operational means to assess risks and opportunities arising from developments in science and technology and to facilitate international cooperation on biology for peaceful purposes, among other things.

To address these limitations, States Parties established a Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC at the Ninth Review Conference in 2022. Over the course of nine sessions in Geneva since 2023, diplomats from around the world have been working on a draft agreement covering a range of measures to strengthen and institutionalize the BWC. These include the establishment of two mechanisms: one to provide advice on science and technology, and another to support international cooperation and assistance. The draft also includes proposals for an Open-Ended Working Group on compliance and verification.

A pivotal moment ahead of December negotiations

Agreement on the draft text at the tenth and final session in December 2026 would therefore represent an important step forward in strengthening and advancing the Convention. Melanie Regimbal, Chief of Service of the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, noted that the importance of reaching agreement goes far beyond the Working Group itself. She recalled the words of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, who described the tenth session of the Working Group as a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to strengthen the Convention. Conversely, Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director, warned that failure in December would risk a return to the divisions and discord that followed the collapse of negotiations on a BWC Protocol in 2001.

Against this backdrop, the retreat brought together representatives from approximately 32 States from across regional groups to Montreux to advance discussion on the draft text. Participants worked in breakout groups addressing three clusters of unresolved issues in the draft report: international cooperation and assistance under Article X; science and technology; and compliance and verification. The moderators indicated that possible ways forward identified in the discussions would be transmitted to the Chair of the Working Group, Ambassador Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer of Brazil, for consideration and further work.

Preparing for implementation and the future of the Convention

Participants also discussed practical steps needed for the swift implementation of the two mechanisms envisaged in the draft report of the Working Group. The BWC Implementation Support Unit will need to plan ahead for an expected start date of 2028.

Participants received an overview of the BWC review conference process, which represents a critical opportunity for States Parties to assess progress under the Convention and set its future direction. Achieving a successful outcome at the Tenth Review Conference in 2027 will require sustained preparation and political commitment. Failure to reach agreement could jeopardize key elements of the Convention’s architecture at a time when rapid technological developments and geopolitical tensions make a strengthened BWC more important than ever.

In his closing remarks, Ambassador Meyer highlighted the importance of the collective achievements since 2022 and invited delegations to reflect on the distinction between what is preferable and what is fundamental in negotiations on the BWC. He concluded the retreat by noting that political engagement will be essential in the coming weeks. He also encouraged participants to carry the “spirit of Montreux” back to Geneva and onwards to capitals with a view to concluding an agreement on the final document in December.

Beyond the retreat

UNIDIR continues working to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons through a range of initiatives, including supporting BWC-related processes, strengthening biosecurity capacity at the national and regional levels, advancing understanding of the evolving biological threat spectrum and supporting next-generation biosecurity education, training and awareness-raising.

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The broad diffusion of AI across scientific disciplines is increasingly evident in bibliometric studies. The number of AI-related natural science publications rose to nearly 80,000 in 2025, up 26% from 2024. This accounted for roughly 6–9% of scientific output across major scientific domains in 2025, compared to less than 1% in 2010. Recent studies also highlight particularly rapid growth in AI-biotechnology research, including in areas such as gene editing, drug discovery and bioinformatics.

These trends suggest that once-niche AI models are becoming increasingly embedded across the scientific research ecosystem. No longer the preserve of specific communities in specialized domains, these models are evolving into general-purpose capabilities available to specialists and non-specialists alike. This expanded access and rapid improvement in capability suggest significant implications for the governance of dual-use biology and its threat outlook.

Biological threats, including biological weapons, have traditionally been associated with access to specialized material, facilities and expertise. The growing integration of AI models into biological research and their rapid advancement add another dimension to these threat perceptions. Frontier AI models are increasingly enabling actors to acquire and apply biological knowledge more efficiently than was possible just a few years ago, potentially lowering some of the knowledge and expertise barriers associated with sensitive dual-use research.

Though Anthropic’s findings provide evidence that actors have already attempted to misuse AI for sensitive and potentially weaponized biological research, they do not demonstrate that AI models enable the development of biological weapons, nor that such efforts would have meaningfully advanced the prospect of success. They do, however, suggest that actors see strategic value in exploiting frontier AI models for dual-use biological activities that may be inaccessible through traditional pathways.

For that reason, it is encouraging to see frontier AI companies engaging in multilateral discussions on threat models, biological risk assessment and evaluations with respect to their tools. This is particularly important given that the private sector has been responsible for the development of the overwhelming majority of frontier AI models. But key governance and oversight challenges remain, and the most capable models continue to exhibit the least transparency.

At the same time, the international community cannot become wholly reliant on private sector actors to identify and mitigate every single situation in which AI could be exploited in the development of biology for hostile purposes. Nor can the private AI industry afford to remain detached from ongoing multilateral efforts to strengthen biological weapons controls.

Effective governance of emerging AI-biology dual-use capabilities will require sustained coordination with existing biological weapons prohibition and biosecurity frameworks, including the core, near-universal regime governing biological threats, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Efforts to strengthen the BWC’s ability to address emerging science and technology developments may ultimately prove to be relevant to the broader debate on AI governance, both within industry and among governments.

Moreover, the convergence of AI and biology, while deserving particular attention, is only one of several converging science and technology areas that may shape the biological threat spectrum and warrant our attention as we look to avert a darker biological weapons future. In such a future, biology could be exploited to develop threats beyond traditional conceptions of biological weapons, including localized attacks, terrorism and economic sabotage via disruption of agriculture or livestock supplies.

The nature of biological enablement by AI raises both the floor and ceiling of what could be achieved. Novices can attain previously inaccessible scientific knowledge, whereas experts can use AI to overcome domain-specific hurdles in their research. And a wide range of actors could exploit AI to facilitate mis- and disinformation related to biological weapons.

Averting such a future will require approaches that address the broader convergence of emerging science and technology developments rather than focusing solely on any single capability or technological phenomenon. More importantly, no one safeguard would be sufficient. A layered approach is needed to address the rapidly evolving scientific landscape in the context of varying real-world circumstances.

A web of prevention

Fortunately, States have developed several measures to prohibit and prevent biological weapons. Particularly important at the international level is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This agreement prohibits, among other things, the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, which are defined broadly under the convention to include any form of biological weapons, including any biological weapon developed using AI. With 189 States Parties, the treaty covers the vast majority of the world. The BWC has served States well for more than half a century; no State admits to having a biological weapons programme, and allegations of association with biological weapons have been met with sharp denials.

Moreover, many States have transposed this international prohibition into national law, as well as a range of other regulatory and normative measures designed to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons. This process of national implementation via measures that prohibit through national laws and prevent through wider technological governance mechanisms is particularly important. It helps to construct both a “web of prevention” and communities of compliance that can together bolster the prohibition on biological weapons.

International and national implementation of measures to prevent biological weapons needs to be nurtured to ensure that these measures remain fit for purpose in the age of digital biology. Indeed, Anthropic’s threat report provides details of cases in which users took evasive measures to hide their tracks and circumvent existing safety mechanisms. Implementation strategies must therefore be developed with varied obfuscation methods in mind.

A decisive moment for the Biological Weapons Convention

Despite a number of concrete steps undertaken nationally and internationally, the BWC continues to have several operational limitations. It has no verification mechanism, for example, even though States tried throughout the 1990s to negotiate a protocol with a verification component. Moreover, in contrast to treaties on chemical and nuclear weapons, which are supported by organizations employing hundreds or even thousands of staff, the BWC is supported by a four-person Implementation Support Unit hosted within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The Working Group on strengthening the BWC will meet for its tenth and final session in December 2026. Over the course of this process, a draft report has emerged that contains a package of measures designed to advance the treaty. These include a plan for further work on verification through a dedicated open-ended working group, a mechanism for reviewing science and technology, and a second mechanism focused on international cooperation and assistance. These measures have considerable potential to advance the BWC and strengthen biological security.

Success in the Working Group would pave the way for the upcoming BWC Review Conference in 2027, during which States and stakeholders will have the opportunity to chart a course towards effective prevention of biological weapons for another 50 years.

But if the Working Group fails to achieve consensus in December, there is a real risk that biological disarmament diplomacy could be set back 25 years, to the doldrums of 2001, when negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the BWC collapsed acrimoniously.

A similar collapse of the Working Group may not irreparably damage the BWC or the current prohibitions on biological weapons, but it would severely curtail momentum towards strengthening the BWC. Avoiding such a fragmentation of multilateral efforts by States and stakeholders would help us tackle one of the most pressing security challenges of our time.

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