To respond effectively, it is important to consider the different ways in which threats, risks and vulnerabilities are experienced by women, men, boys, girls and gender-diverse persons. By applying this “gender lens”, we can help to improve policy interventions and deliver better outcomes to the various groups affected by violence.

In conflict situations, men and boys are often the majority of those killed and injured, while women and girls are most at risk of sexual and gender-based violence. In most conflicts, applying a gender lens will also uncover patterns which may not be immediately obvious to security experts. For example, women and girls are the ones who bear the brunt of caring for children and injured family members during crises.

Recognizing different patterns of harm

A gender lens is essential to uncover patterns of harm and identify specific needs of different groups of society. A gender lens is not about creating hierarchies or comparing experiences as better or worse; it is about acknowledging different experiences during conflict and learning how to integrate these considerations into humanitarian response, arms control and disarmament, and peacebuilding.

The Arms Trade Treaty is the first multilateral arms control instrument to recognize the differentiated impact of weapons on women, men, boys and girls. Article 7.4 of the treaty requires States Parties to conduct a risk assessment to ensure that exported weapons are not used to commit gender-based violence (GBV) or serious violence against women and children.

At the national level, many countries across the world have taken additional steps to prevent femicides and GBV facilitated by weapons. These include regulations that deny gun licences to people who have been convicted of domestic violence, intimate partner violence, violent intimidation or stalking.

Ensuring that no one is left behind

A gender lens is crucial to inform both immediate humanitarian response and long-term relief and recovery efforts. Access to healthcare in the aftermath of a conflict is heavily influenced by gender, as well as cultural and socio-economic factors. UNIDIR research has shown that women and girls with visible injuries are more likely to experience stigma and social exclusion. Men and boys also experience stigma, which may prevent them from seeking mental health support due to cultural and gender norms.

Inclusive victim assistance has become an important part of humanitarian disarmament treaties and agreements, such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. With provisions related to gender- and age-sensitive assistance to victims, these instruments represent a successful step towards the strengthening of a rights-based approach in disarmament.

At the implementation level, however, more resources are needed to assist survivors of conflict, as many affected States struggle to effectively integrate victim assistance into already-stretched national health and social welfare systems.

Anticipating new risks and threats

The means of conflict and violence are changing, and digital technologies are increasingly being used to commit, assist or exacerbate GBV. This evolving phenomenon is commonly referred to as technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV).

As many as 38% of women have experienced some form of TFGBV, and this increases to about 70% of women if we consider human rights defenders, activists and journalists.

The rapid advancements in AI, including generative AI, have amplified TFGBV by enabling new forms of abuse, including the creation of non-consensual deepfake content. Studies estimate that 98% of online deepfakes are pornographic, and 99% of these target women.

When it comes to arms control discussions covering military applications of AI, concerns have already been raised about the need to mitigate gender and racial biases in weapon systems supported by AI. Such biases can make populations invisible or lead to targeting of people on the basis of biased assumptions. As States discuss new frameworks to govern AI and other digital technologies, these issues should be urgently addressed.

From research to practice

UNIDIR’s Integrated Approaches Programme supports States through research, advice and capacity-building activities that ensure gender considerations are part of international security strategies and governance frameworks.

We also deliver programmes that advance women’s equal participation in arms control and disarmament processes – an area where women remain underrepresented.

Our latest data shows that, on average, women represent only 36% of the diplomats attending arms control and disarmament discussions and negotiations.

Achieving gender equality should not be seen as a luxury or a minor task; it is key to overcoming conflict. Where women’s inclusion is prioritized, peace is more likely to last – particularly when women are able to influence decision-making.

Statistical analysis suggests that women’s participation has a positive impact on the durability of peace agreements.

A study of 156 peace agreements concluded that when women are included in peace processes there is a 20% increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least 2 years, and a 35% increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least 15 years.

This Disarmament Week, as we are confronted by multiple conflicts and crises, we cannot afford to exclude women from decision-making or to turn a gender-blind eye to the suffering of millions of people affected by conflict and insecurity around the world. Ultimately, a gender lens reminds us that arms control and disarmament are not abstract measures; they are key instruments to protect people and deliver more equitable and enduring recovery.

The post Why a gender lens is important to achieve international peace and security first appeared on UNIDIR.

Adopted in 2013, the ATT created global rules to regulate the international trade in conventional weapons and thereby prevent and eradicate their diversion to the illicit trade. The treaty ultimately aims to reduce human suffering and contribute to international peace, security and stability.

Across 2026 and 2027, UNIDIR and its partners are working to deliver the first comprehensive impact evaluation of the ATT. This evaluation will assess the treaty’s influence on national transfer control systems, efforts to counter diversion, and international cooperation to strengthen international security and reduce human suffering. The project aims to inform efforts to prepare and adopt the ATT’s first five-year strategy.

At the launch, the United Kingdom’s Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, David Riley, who will also serve as President of the next Conference of States Parties, underlined that impact evaluation represents a valuable tool in shaping a five-year ATT strategy, which will be a priority of the UK presidency.

The event centred on a discussion among gathered participants around three essential questions for the evaluation methodology:

• What impacts should be assessed?

• How to assess the ATT’s impact?

• How to attribute change and impact to the ATT?

What impacts should be assessed?

UNIDIR Associate Researcher Paula Soumaya Domit asked participants what impacts they felt the ATT should be having, with responses ranging from improved transparency in the arms trade to the prevention of gender-based violence. The initiative will examine the ATT’s impact in five areas related to the treaty’s object and purpose, ranked by participants as follows:

How to assess the ATT’s impact?

Turning from what to assess to how to assess it, Stimson Center Acting President and Chief Executive Officer Rachel Stohl asked participants what data to use for the impact evaluation. Some data sources, such as ATT initial and annual reports, are readily accessible. But others proposed by participants are either completely unavailable or are available only for a few States, as in the case of licence denials. Participants’ candid reflections on data collection challenges (see below) were particularly useful for the initiative’s assessment methodology.

How to attribute change and impact to the ATT?

Conflict Armament Research Head of Research Rob Hunter-Perkins asked participants to help the team credibly attribute observed changes to the ATT. Participants provided a long list of ways to demonstrate the ATT’s contribution to a particular outcome, some of which are shown below:

Two major challenges stand in the way of establishing clear causality between the ATT and the various impacts related to its object and purpose:

1. The ATT’s effect is hard to isolate from that of other frameworks
   The treaty sits within an overlapping set of regional and international frameworks that together recommend or require that States put in place a national transfer control system, establish a legal and regulatory framework, and conduct risk assessments before authorizing international arms transfers. Attributing any specific change to the ATT alone is therefore challenging.
   
2. Changes in human suffering are hard to measure and attribute
   It is very difficult to determine whether human suffering is greater, smaller or the same as it would have been without the treaty, let alone if these changes can be attributed directly to national implementation of the treaty and application of its provisions. Nonetheless, many participants highlighted this as an important metric for evaluating the ATT’s impact.

The project team is now embarking on a pilot study to explore how best to minimize the impact of these challenges on the study’s results.

© 2026, UNIDIR

From pilot to full evaluation

The first phase of the initiative is a pilot study with ten States Parties, which will help to validate impact indicators and determine the feasibility of data collection.

Pilot study results will be shared on the margins of the ATT working group meetings for the Thirteenth Conference of States Parties in March 2027. The final evaluation study, meanwhile, will present the full methodology and results. These can then feed into efforts to develop a baseline for the five-year strategy, which will in turn facilitate better monitoring of its implementation.

The initiative aspires to show where the ATT is having a positive impact and to identify areas where more work is needed.

For more non-party States to come on board and spread the ATT’s benefits, we need clearer evidence of progress towards its core goal: a responsible international arms trade with minimal diversion risks that contributes to international peace, security, stability and sustainable development.

The post UNIDIR and partners launch first comprehensive evaluation of Arms Trade Treaty impact first appeared on UNIDIR.

The session supports a multi-year workplan of the Working Group on the Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer Space, under the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Article XI commits States Parties to inform the UN Secretary-General, the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of their activities in outer space.

Why Article XI matters now

This is a moment of rapidly rising activity, of a growing number of actors, and of capabilities that are very often dual-use. It is also, regrettably, a moment of eroding trust between States. As such, transparency is not a luxury. It is one of the few measures that can be advanced incrementally, without waiting for the resolution of larger and more contested questions. And much of what is needed already exists.

The Registration Convention and General Assembly resolution 1721 B (Article XVI) are not new obligations to be negotiated, they are existing commitments with latent potential. Increased utilization of Article XI could significantly enhance the security and stability of outer space.

On the question of dual-use capabilities, existing export control regimes are worth examining as a means of further encouraging implementation. These already involve States in classifying and tracking sensitive capabilities. The habits of categorization and channels of trust they rely on could inform how the international community thinks about what information is suitable for sharing under Article XI, and through what mechanisms.

Processes like The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation are voluntary and sit outside the UN system, but their use of information templates, regional workshops and annual meetings are all relevant practices to consider.

UNIDIR’s role in bridging policy and practice

UNIDIR has convened regional and industry workshops that bring multilateral space security mandates and processes closer to the places where national and regional decisions are discussed. These workshops also work to raise awareness of the governance frameworks that already exist.

Article XI is of particular value here because more States are party to the Outer Space Treaty than to the Registration Convention, offering a channel for information-sharing that is open to a wider community of States and covers a wider range of activity. Ad hoc, extrabudgetary State contributions to UNOOSA to support and expand work on national engagement with Article XI could lead to enhanced State practice in this area.

UNIDIR also maintains the Space Security Portal, a digital hub that gathers national and intergovernmental information on space laws, policies and activities. Although it is curated through a security lens, user feedback indicates the portal is helpful to understand national space positions and activities — a reminder that transparency, by whatever door it enters, can serve a range of purposes.

The portal does not rely solely on information contributed by States; it is sustained by a research team that proactively examines primary-source documents and government activities to keep it current. This in no way substitutes for States willingly furnishing information, but it does suggest a complementary model worth exploring. Implementing bodies could help gather information, whether through dedicated personnel or with the assistance of AI-based tools, and present it back to States for review and approval before sharing it through dedicated State-to-State or State-to-public channels.

NASA / Bill Ingalls, public domain

Creating a shared foundation

This is why a draft template for submissions of information under Article XI holds considerable potential. Practitioners are not always aware of Article XI; and even where they are, the provision can feel abstract. A template responds to both difficulties. It makes the act of sharing concrete — indicating what a State, or potentially a non-State industry actor, might share, and in what form — and in doing so it lowers the threshold to participation.

Security concerns and sensitive information can understandably inhibit willingness to share information. However, general information-sharing, even concerning unclassified or otherwise non-sensitive activities, has value in its own right as it helps establish information channels, builds regularity of practice and can improve confidence in the possibility of future, more substantial sharing arrangements.

In that spirit, it may be useful for the Working Group to examine, through a structured exercise, why States that are not currently sharing information under Article XI choose not to do so. It could also classify the types of information at stake — distinguishing, for instance, information that is genuinely sensitive from information that is simply not habitually shared. One concrete category that could be highlighted as good practice is information on derelict objects, which is generally non-sensitive and directly relevant to the shared interest in a sustainable space environment.

A parallel exercise to map the information that is already available, including through the portal and UNOOSA resources, could further lower the barriers to using Article XI. This assessment could help identify when channelling available information through Article XI strengthens multilateralism and international trust — and when existing information ecosystems are already sufficiently robust and well used, such that duplicating the effort is unnecessary and resources are better focused elsewhere.

In addition to advancing work in Vienna, this could also play a role in supporting space-security-related processes in Geneva, specifically the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its aspects. The fourth session of this group will discuss, inter alia: “elements on basic obligations … related to the national space policies, doctrines and strategies and other measures that could reduce the risk of escalation, conflict and an arms race in outer space”. Having an understanding of wider opportunities and challenges in this area could therefore inform and advance work in other domains.

Small steps, lasting confidence

Even where information is shared unilaterally, taking the additional step of channelling it through multilateral and international legal mechanisms aligns it with the wider international community and demonstrates a certain kind of political will for transparency. That is exactly the kind of small, incremental step that can, over time, build confidence and trust.

After all, the security, safety and sustainability of outer space, and its continued use for peaceful purposes, will not be secured by any single instrument — but they will be greatly enhanced through the patient use of the mutually reinforcing mechanisms we already have.

The post Building trust in space through greater transparency first appeared on UNIDIR.

The training, supported by the Government of Japan, combined technical sessions with practical group exercises. Participants mapped local risks, potential diversion routes, vulnerable locations as well as observable indicators, and developed simple community risk profiles and recommendations to strengthen early warning in their own contexts.

Sessions emphasized the role of community actors in observing, verifying, documenting and reporting emerging risks. Participants explored how information gathered at community level can complement national and regional efforts to identify patterns of arms and ammunition diversion, trafficking and misuse, while recognizing that community monitors are not law-enforcement or interdiction actors.

A central focus was turning community observations into reliable and usable alerts. Through practical scenarios and reporting exercises, participants practised distinguishing facts from rumours and assumptions, assessing the reliability of sources, triangulating information where it could be done safely, and documenting incidents.

© 2026, UNIDIR

Adapting early warning to a border setting

Ouangolodougou is a strategically important city in northern Côte d’Ivoire, situated close to the borders with Burkina Faso and Mali. The training adapted risk and indicator identification to the local context, including informal border crossings, transhumance routes, markets, seasonal movements, farmer-herder dynamics, local leadership tensions and mining areas.

Participants reflected on the importance of understanding local patterns, movements and community concerns, while ensuring that information is responsibly verified and channelled through appropriate early-warning and institutional mechanisms.

The discussions also highlighted the importance of trust, confidentiality and the safety of community monitors. Effective community early warning depends not only on collecting information, but also on ensuring that communities understand how information will be used and that there are clear and credible channels for reporting and response.

Local leadership and community prevention

The training underscored the importance of traditional and administrative leadership in strengthening community-based prevention.

Preventing the diversion and trafficking of ammunition is a shared responsibility. Traditional leaders have a vital role in strengthening community vigilance, building trust and encouraging people to speak up when they see risks. By working together, communities, traditional authorities and security actors can help protect our people and keep our communities safe.

His Majesty Issiaka Tiéba Ouattara, village chief of Ouangolodougou

Niamké Eba Assouan, Secretary General of the Prefecture of Ouangolodougou, highlighted the role of community-based early warning in ensuring that information from local communities reaches the relevant authorities in a timely and responsible manner. In a border area connected to both Burkina Faso and Mali, he emphasized the importance of vigilance, coordination and collective responsibility in preventing the diversion and trafficking of ammunition and contributing to the safety and resilience of local communities.

© 2026, UNIDIR

From early warning to prevention

The Ouangolodougou training forms part of a broader UNIDIR–WANEP initiative to strengthen community-based approaches to preventing ammunition diversion and trafficking in West Africa. It builds on earlier engagement in northern Ghana and provides an opportunity to identify lessons that can inform approaches across border and conflict-affected areas.

Our experience has shown that communities are often the first to recognize the warning signs of insecurity. They observe unusual movements, detect emerging tensions, and understand local dynamics long before such risks become visible to external actors. In many instances, communities possess critical information that can help prevent violence before it occurs. This is why community monitoring remains one of the most effective pillars of early warning and preventive action.

Kalie Sillar, Regional Analyst, Organised Crime and Violent Extremism, WANEP

A key lesson emerging from the initiative is that community early warning is most useful when local knowledge is connected to a clear chain of observation, verification, documentation, reporting and institutional response. The practical exercises reinforced this end-to-end approach: communities can contribute valuable information without taking on responsibilities that belong to the competent authorities.

Lessons from the activities in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire will inform community-based approaches to preventing ammunition diversion and trafficking, while supporting broader efforts to prevent armed violence and enhance community resilience in West Africa.

The post UNIDIR and WANEP support communities on the frontline of early warning first appeared on UNIDIR.

Abayomi Adeomi of the ECOWAS Commission, Lilian Wamuyu of RECSA and Thayani Gumede of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Cooperation Organisation examined lessons learned from reviewing 20 years of implementation of the SADC Firearms Protocol in 2021, and of the Nairobi Protocol on SALW in 2024. The discussion aimed to support a similar review of the ECOWAS Convention on SALW.

A milestone anniversary can be an important moment to reflect, take stock of achievements and obstacles overcome, and consider new challenges and opportunities ahead.

Dr Paul Holtom, Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme

What has worked?

Member states of ECOWAS, RECSA and SADC have made progress in implementing regional SALW control instruments, particularly by establishing national coordination mechanisms and government focal points, strengthening physical security and stockpile management, and marking weapons through capacity-building programmes.

For ECOWAS, the Convention’s exemption procedure introduced a norm under which no State should import SALW without the knowledge and non-objection of fellow member states. A joint UNIDIR-RECSA regional assessment also shows tangible progress in RECSA member states’ transfer-control legislation and inter-agency coordination. Across the SADC region, the Firearms Protocol prompted reviews of national legislation and administrative measures.

For the RECSA region, national focal points are the backbone of our regional cooperation.

Lilian Wamuyu, Regional Centre on Small Arms

© 2024, Getty Images/Alexander Koerner

What remains a challenge?

Fully implementing these regional control instruments faces persistent challenges. Recurring conflicts drive demand for arms and ammunition, while porous borders facilitate their illicit trafficking from one conflict to another. Speakers also highlighted weak cooperation between police, customs and border services. Many efforts still rely on donor-driven projects rather than nationally owned efforts to build local capacity and deliver sustainable SALW control.

In Southern Africa, legislation has been reviewed, but the harmonization of laws remains slow. For RECSA, regional information exchanges and cooperation in tracing lag behind the Nairobi Protocol’s aspirations: States are not yet realizing the value of improved marking and record-keeping, which comes only “when a recovered weapon is actually traced, and the results are shared across borders”.

RECSA and ECOWAS both highlighted threats posed by “improvised weapons” outside their instruments’ scope, particularly improvised explosive devices and uncrewed systems. They also pointed to the role of technology in facilitating diversion and trafficking.

For Gumede, “inadequate resources and capacity have created a gap between the commitments contained in the Protocol and their implementation”.

© 2025, CNCCAI

Next steps for regional SALW control

RECSA and SADC shared key lessons learned from their reviews of 20 years of implementation of their control instruments.

In early 2026, UNIDIR and RECSA unveiled a regional scorecard, the first comprehensive assessment of two decades of implementation. It recommended new provisions for the Nairobi Protocol for new technologies, gender-responsive arms control, enhanced cross-border cooperation and regional information sharing.

SADC, meanwhile, conducted its review of the Protocol during 2020-2021. The review resulted in amendments on brokering and tracing, as well as the elaboration and adoption of an action plan and updated standard operating procedures to aid implementation. Reflecting on the SADC experience, Gumede urged ECOWAS to mainstream gender and youth perspectives given that “the proliferation of illicit weapons is closely linked to issues like gender-based violence”.

For RECSA and SADC, key lessons from these processes included the need to:

• Secure a clear political mandate for the review and its recommendations through a regional meeting of ministers (as for RECSA) or Heads of State and Government (as for SADC)

• Ensure member state ownership and leadership of the review process and recommendations

• Build strong partnerships with civil society, research institutes and international organizations to secure a solid evidence base, allowing comparisons of each member state’s situation when the instrument was adopted with its situation today.

Adeomi said that “these ideas resonate with what we have planned” for the ECOWAS review, which will be driven by on-the-ground evaluations by independent experts and by stakeholder consultations. He stressed the importance of strengthening the ECOWAS framework “from an ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of people”, combining State and human security to address not only the supply of illicit arms but also the root causes of demand.

© 2015, MONUSCO

The benefits of reviewing regional small arms instruments

The event demonstrated the value of sharing not only the results of landmark reviews, but also lessons from the review process itself and how findings can strengthen regional and national small arms control.

Further milestones include:

• the Kinshasa Convention marks the tenth anniversary of its entry into force on 8 March 2027; and

• the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials marks the thirtieth anniversary of its adoption on 14 November 2027 – and of its entry into force on 1 July 2028.

UNIDIR will continue to support efforts to highlight progress and challenges in implementing regional SALW control instruments. It will also explore lessons that can strengthen national and regional efforts to counter the diversion, illicit trade and misuse of conventional arms and ammunition.

The post Reviewing two decades of subregional arms and ammunition control in Africa first appeared on UNIDIR.

Every year, diplomats and officials arrive in Geneva to take up responsibilities in disarmament and arms control, including participation in related negotiations. For many, this means navigating a complex field spanning nuclear, biological and conventional weapons, as well as outer space security and rapidly evolving technologies such as artificial intelligence. 

The annual course supports these newly arrived officials with a practical introduction to the institutions, processes and substantive issues that shape Geneva’s disarmament community, as well as current challenges and developments in an increasingly complex global security environment. 

Foundations of disarmament diplomacy in Geneva 

The course opened with remarks from UNIDIR Director Robin Geiss, followed by a video message from Her Excellency Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at UNODA. 

We want delegates to leave this course not only with an enhanced understanding of disarmament and arms control, but also knowing that UNIDIR stands beside you as you perform this important role, ready to provide expertise and technical advice.

Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

Both speakers reflected on the challenges facing the disarmament and arms control community. They also pointed to recent developments that demonstrate the potential for progress, including the report recently agreed by consensus in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems as a positive example of what can be achieved through continued international engagement. 

Despite these challenges, I believe there are reasons why we can maintain a sense of pragmatic optimism with respect to what we can accomplish within the field of arms control and international security.

H.E. Izumi Nakamitsu, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at UNODA

Delegates explored the key institutions and processes that underpin the multilateral disarmament machinery, alongside practical resources to support their work in Geneva. The course also examined cross-cutting perspectives on disarmament, including gender and youth. The sessions then turned to the Conference on Disarmament, exploring its history and mandate, how it functions, and its current work. 

​The first week concluded with a focus on conventional weapons. Delegates examined the international instruments addressing the humanitarian impact of anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions and explosive weapons in populated areas, alongside frameworks governing conventional weapons and ammunition more broadly. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

Responding to scientific and technological change 

The second week began with a focus on the Biological Weapons Convention. Participants explored its history and ongoing efforts to strengthen the Convention, including in response to advances in science and technology that present both new opportunities and emerging challenges. The sessions also examined efforts to promote and support its effective implementation. 

Delegates went on to examine outer space security, including the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Participants also examined different approaches to space security and considered the implications of advances in dual-use space technologies. 

​During the final module, delegates explored the rapidly evolving role of artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons in the military domain, alongside developments in international cybersecurity. Discussions examined how these technologies are reshaping the security environment and the challenges they pose to global peace and security. Participants also considered ongoing efforts to develop common approaches and responsible international frameworks to address these emerging challenges. 

​Since 2019, some 281 diplomats from more than 100 Member States have taken the course. As each new cohort takes up their responsibilities in Geneva, UNIDIR and UNODA remain committed to supporting their engagement in the multilateral disarmament process and to strengthening the knowledge, expertise and dialogue needed to advance global peace and security. 

The post UNIDIR and UNODA equip diplomats to navigate a changing disarmament landscape  first appeared on UNIDIR.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was the first treaty to prohibit an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. With 189 States Parties, the treaty remains a critical component of the broader framework of measures designed to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons. However, the BWC currently lacks a verification mechanism to assess whether States are in compliance with their treaty obligations. It also lacks operational means to assess risks and opportunities arising from developments in science and technology and to facilitate international cooperation on biology for peaceful purposes, among other things.

To address these limitations, States Parties established a Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC at the Ninth Review Conference in 2022. Over the course of nine sessions in Geneva since 2023, diplomats from around the world have been working on a draft agreement covering a range of measures to strengthen and institutionalize the BWC. These include the establishment of two mechanisms: one to provide advice on science and technology, and another to support international cooperation and assistance. The draft also includes proposals for an Open-Ended Working Group on compliance and verification.

A pivotal moment ahead of December negotiations

Agreement on the draft text at the tenth and final session in December 2026 would therefore represent an important step forward in strengthening and advancing the Convention. Melanie Regimbal, Chief of Service of the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, noted that the importance of reaching agreement goes far beyond the Working Group itself. She recalled the words of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, who described the tenth session of the Working Group as a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to strengthen the Convention. Conversely, Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director, warned that failure in December would risk a return to the divisions and discord that followed the collapse of negotiations on a BWC Protocol in 2001.

Against this backdrop, the retreat brought together representatives from approximately 32 States from across regional groups to Montreux to advance discussion on the draft text. Participants worked in breakout groups addressing three clusters of unresolved issues in the draft report: international cooperation and assistance under Article X; science and technology; and compliance and verification. The moderators indicated that possible ways forward identified in the discussions would be transmitted to the Chair of the Working Group, Ambassador Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer of Brazil, for consideration and further work.

Preparing for implementation and the future of the Convention

Participants also discussed practical steps needed for the swift implementation of the two mechanisms envisaged in the draft report of the Working Group. The BWC Implementation Support Unit will need to plan ahead for an expected start date of 2028.

Participants received an overview of the BWC review conference process, which represents a critical opportunity for States Parties to assess progress under the Convention and set its future direction. Achieving a successful outcome at the Tenth Review Conference in 2027 will require sustained preparation and political commitment. Failure to reach agreement could jeopardize key elements of the Convention’s architecture at a time when rapid technological developments and geopolitical tensions make a strengthened BWC more important than ever.

In his closing remarks, Ambassador Meyer highlighted the importance of the collective achievements since 2022 and invited delegations to reflect on the distinction between what is preferable and what is fundamental in negotiations on the BWC. He concluded the retreat by noting that political engagement will be essential in the coming weeks. He also encouraged participants to carry the “spirit of Montreux” back to Geneva and onwards to capitals with a view to concluding an agreement on the final document in December.

Beyond the retreat

UNIDIR continues working to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons through a range of initiatives, including supporting BWC-related processes, strengthening biosecurity capacity at the national and regional levels, advancing understanding of the evolving biological threat spectrum and supporting next-generation biosecurity education, training and awareness-raising.

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The broad diffusion of AI across scientific disciplines is increasingly evident in bibliometric studies. The number of AI-related natural science publications rose to nearly 80,000 in 2025, up 26% from 2024. This accounted for roughly 6–9% of scientific output across major scientific domains in 2025, compared to less than 1% in 2010. Recent studies also highlight particularly rapid growth in AI-biotechnology research, including in areas such as gene editing, drug discovery and bioinformatics.

These trends suggest that once-niche AI models are becoming increasingly embedded across the scientific research ecosystem. No longer the preserve of specific communities in specialized domains, these models are evolving into general-purpose capabilities available to specialists and non-specialists alike. This expanded access and rapid improvement in capability suggest significant implications for the governance of dual-use biology and its threat outlook.

Biological threats, including biological weapons, have traditionally been associated with access to specialized material, facilities and expertise. The growing integration of AI models into biological research and their rapid advancement add another dimension to these threat perceptions. Frontier AI models are increasingly enabling actors to acquire and apply biological knowledge more efficiently than was possible just a few years ago, potentially lowering some of the knowledge and expertise barriers associated with sensitive dual-use research.

Though Anthropic’s findings provide evidence that actors have already attempted to misuse AI for sensitive and potentially weaponized biological research, they do not demonstrate that AI models enable the development of biological weapons, nor that such efforts would have meaningfully advanced the prospect of success. They do, however, suggest that actors see strategic value in exploiting frontier AI models for dual-use biological activities that may be inaccessible through traditional pathways.

For that reason, it is encouraging to see frontier AI companies engaging in multilateral discussions on threat models, biological risk assessment and evaluations with respect to their tools. This is particularly important given that the private sector has been responsible for the development of the overwhelming majority of frontier AI models. But key governance and oversight challenges remain, and the most capable models continue to exhibit the least transparency.

At the same time, the international community cannot become wholly reliant on private sector actors to identify and mitigate every single situation in which AI could be exploited in the development of biology for hostile purposes. Nor can the private AI industry afford to remain detached from ongoing multilateral efforts to strengthen biological weapons controls.

Effective governance of emerging AI-biology dual-use capabilities will require sustained coordination with existing biological weapons prohibition and biosecurity frameworks, including the core, near-universal regime governing biological threats, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Efforts to strengthen the BWC’s ability to address emerging science and technology developments may ultimately prove to be relevant to the broader debate on AI governance, both within industry and among governments.

Moreover, the convergence of AI and biology, while deserving particular attention, is only one of several converging science and technology areas that may shape the biological threat spectrum and warrant our attention as we look to avert a darker biological weapons future. In such a future, biology could be exploited to develop threats beyond traditional conceptions of biological weapons, including localized attacks, terrorism and economic sabotage via disruption of agriculture or livestock supplies.

The nature of biological enablement by AI raises both the floor and ceiling of what could be achieved. Novices can attain previously inaccessible scientific knowledge, whereas experts can use AI to overcome domain-specific hurdles in their research. And a wide range of actors could exploit AI to facilitate mis- and disinformation related to biological weapons.

Averting such a future will require approaches that address the broader convergence of emerging science and technology developments rather than focusing solely on any single capability or technological phenomenon. More importantly, no one safeguard would be sufficient. A layered approach is needed to address the rapidly evolving scientific landscape in the context of varying real-world circumstances.

A web of prevention

Fortunately, States have developed several measures to prohibit and prevent biological weapons. Particularly important at the international level is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This agreement prohibits, among other things, the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, which are defined broadly under the convention to include any form of biological weapons, including any biological weapon developed using AI. With 189 States Parties, the treaty covers the vast majority of the world. The BWC has served States well for more than half a century; no State admits to having a biological weapons programme, and allegations of association with biological weapons have been met with sharp denials.

Moreover, many States have transposed this international prohibition into national law, as well as a range of other regulatory and normative measures designed to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons. This process of national implementation via measures that prohibit through national laws and prevent through wider technological governance mechanisms is particularly important. It helps to construct both a “web of prevention” and communities of compliance that can together bolster the prohibition on biological weapons.

International and national implementation of measures to prevent biological weapons needs to be nurtured to ensure that these measures remain fit for purpose in the age of digital biology. Indeed, Anthropic’s threat report provides details of cases in which users took evasive measures to hide their tracks and circumvent existing safety mechanisms. Implementation strategies must therefore be developed with varied obfuscation methods in mind.

A decisive moment for the Biological Weapons Convention

Despite a number of concrete steps undertaken nationally and internationally, the BWC continues to have several operational limitations. It has no verification mechanism, for example, even though States tried throughout the 1990s to negotiate a protocol with a verification component. Moreover, in contrast to treaties on chemical and nuclear weapons, which are supported by organizations employing hundreds or even thousands of staff, the BWC is supported by a four-person Implementation Support Unit hosted within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The Working Group on strengthening the BWC will meet for its tenth and final session in December 2026. Over the course of this process, a draft report has emerged that contains a package of measures designed to advance the treaty. These include a plan for further work on verification through a dedicated open-ended working group, a mechanism for reviewing science and technology, and a second mechanism focused on international cooperation and assistance. These measures have considerable potential to advance the BWC and strengthen biological security.

Success in the Working Group would pave the way for the upcoming BWC Review Conference in 2027, during which States and stakeholders will have the opportunity to chart a course towards effective prevention of biological weapons for another 50 years.

But if the Working Group fails to achieve consensus in December, there is a real risk that biological disarmament diplomacy could be set back 25 years, to the doldrums of 2001, when negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the BWC collapsed acrimoniously.

A similar collapse of the Working Group may not irreparably damage the BWC or the current prohibitions on biological weapons, but it would severely curtail momentum towards strengthening the BWC. Avoiding such a fragmentation of multilateral efforts by States and stakeholders would help us tackle one of the most pressing security challenges of our time.

The post Averting a darker biological weapons future first appeared on UNIDIR.

Outer space is entering a renewed phase of strategic importance, shaped by rapid technological innovation, growing competition and deepening global dependence on space-enabled infrastructure and services. As the domain becomes increasingly critical to global infrastructure and attracts diverse commercial actors, the ways in which space is accessed, used and governed are also changing.

Against this backdrop, the conference provided a platform for policymakers, industry, academia and civil society to exchange perspectives and explore practical pathways towards strengthening the security and sustainability of outer space.

A changing space security environment

Opening the conference, UNIDIR Director Robin Geiss highlighted four developments reshaping the space security environment:

• Space is now treated as a strategic domain.

• Counterspace activity is increasing.

• Advances in technology are changing how space systems operate.

• Mega constellations and the interconnection of commercial and government systems are redefining what security in orbit means.

In her keynote address, Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu welcomed the range of actors participating in the discussion and highlighted the importance of identifying areas of convergence as the space security environment continues to evolve.

© 2026 UNIDIR/Antoine Tardy

Strategic dialogue in expert panels and beyond

Over the two days, participants examined the technical, legal and policy dimensions of developments in space activity through focused discussions on some of the most pressing questions facing the international space security community. The conference programme featured a series of expert panels:

• Mapping space threats and consequences highlighted how ambiguity in the space security environment, compounded by the widespread use of dual-use technologies and the absence of common frameworks, can lead to different interpretations of the same activities. The panellists emphasized the importance of strengthening governance and compliance mechanisms and improving legal clarity to reduce the risks of miscalculation and escalation.

• Strategic stability and the security of space architecture examined the growing integration of space systems into nuclear command, control and communications, noting how the same space capabilities can both strengthen stability through enhanced situational awareness and undermine it by creating vulnerabilities or increasing uncertainty during crises.

• Taking stock of efforts to advance the prevention of an arms race in outer space brought together distinguished diplomatic representatives to discuss how shared commitments can be translated into concrete approaches for preventing an arms race in outer space. The discussion also examined the respective contributions of legally binding instruments and non-binding norms to strengthening stability and security in outer space.

• Complex interactions in a multi-actor orbit considered how commercial participation and the proliferation of new actors and activities are reshaping the space security environment. The discussion focused on the application of international law to these evolving dynamics, including the responsibility of States for national activities in outer space and emerging questions around thresholds of targetability.

• Monitoring, verification and visibility in outer space explored what space situational awareness can do as a means of verifying legally binding agreements and monitoring norms of behaviour. The panel highlighted that although orbital manoeuvres are becoming transparent, the trajectories of objects alone rarely reveal intent, meaning there is a growing need for shared standards.

• Securing space data and information and communication technology infrastructure looked at the threats and risks facing terrestrial and orbital systems. The panel also considered what the manipulation, disruption or denial of space-derived data means for strategic stability, with particular consequences for States that rely on infrastructure hosted elsewhere. As greater autonomy in orbit becomes harder to avoid, speakers emphasized verifiability and the need to retain human involvement in decision-making.

The conference also featured a collaborative session with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA). This discussion featured Rosanna Diem-Hoffmann, Lead for Space Law, Policy and Sustainability at UNOOSA, and Fatima Salem Al Shamsi, Chair of the United Nations Expert Group on Space Situational Awareness. The two speakers briefed participants on recent progress made regarding intersecting topics from the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This included work by the Group on Space Resource Activity and deliberations on information-sharing that led to the newly established United Nations Satellite Operator Contact Hub.

Bringing youth centre stage

For the third year in a row, the conference ran a global campaign that sought to bring in and amplify young people’s perspectives on space. The 2026 edition asked young people to submit videos exploring how innovations in space architecture and shared technical standards can address emerging security and sustainability challenges. The winners, Ali Shan and Joel Pajiah, were also able to present their innovative work through a pair of lightning talks on the second day of the conference.

© 2026 UNIDIR/Antoine Tardy

Building the next generation of space security expertise

The 2026 conference also marked an important milestone for UNIDIR’s Space Security Programme, with the inaugural cohort of Space Security Research Fellows joining the conference for the first time. These nine fellows from across all five United Nations regional groups were selected for the year-long programme through a highly competitive process. Their participation in the conference, where they engaged with diplomats and experts from around the world, came as part of a week-long series of workshop activities held in person in Geneva.

Looking ahead, UNIDIR will continue to support dialogue on space security, foster common understanding among diverse stakeholders and advance practical approaches to strengthening security and stability in outer space.

The post Navigating a new era of strategic importance in outer space first appeared on UNIDIR.

What is the electromagnetic spectrum?

The electromagnetic spectrum is the range of all electromagnetic waves, including radio waves, microwaves, infrared, visible light, ultraviolet, x-rays, and gamma rays, each distinguished by a specific frequency and wavelength. These regions of the spectrum all behave differently, leading to distinct applications in science and daily life. For example, radio waves enable long-range communications, microwaves support radar functions by reflecting off objects, and infrared light allows the detection of heat signatures. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) underpins everyday capabilities, from wireless mobile communications and the positioning necessary for various forms of transport to the imaging necessary in advanced medical applications. As such, the EMS is one of the main enablers of modern life.

In addition to its centrality to civilian life, the EMS is critical for the military domain. It enables key military functions including sensing, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, positioning, weapons guidance, battlefield networking, and command and control. With the modernization of the battlefield, and the increase in capabilities that rely on the EMS for their functioning, its importance to the military domain has grown. For instance, modern capabilities increasingly require continuous data exchange, precision navigation, and sensor integration. It follows that weaponizing these dependences, and disrupting access to the EMS has become central to the conduct of war.

Why does it matter for peace, security and disarmament?

Armed forces do not just rely on the EMS; they actively compete within it. Through what is commonly termed “electronic warfare”, they seek to deny or degrade adversaries’ access to the EMS, while securing their own use. By jamming (the degrading or blocking of a signal) or spoofing (replacing a signal by a fake one) armed forces seek to deny adversaries the ability to utilize networked capabilities or to rely on their communications.

Electronic warfare has therefore become a mainstay of modern conflicts, turning the EMS into a heavily contested domain. Accordingly, seeking ways to overcome EMS disruptions to ensure continued operations is today a central aspect of military operations. This has created a “measure- countermeasure” dynamic – whereby developments to disrupt the EMS are matched by developments seeking to overcome disruptions – that has acted as a strong driver of innovation in weapon systems.

For example, the proliferation of fibre optic UAVs, that are now common on modern battlefields, is a result of efforts to overcome a highly contested electromagnetic environment. Relatedly, spectrum denial has contributed to accelerating the integration of AI-enabled autonomy in specific functions of various weapon systems. This is especially true, for example, of terminal guidance for UAVs, where jamming can sever the link between drone and operator. Such advances have been matched by innovations in electronic warfare capabilities, such as its convergence with AI into “cognitive electronic warfare”. Hence, competition in the EMS can be understood as a strategic force driving the path of development of weapon systems, and military capabilities more broadly.

Adobe Stock

Harmful interference, mainly through jamming and spoofing, has, however, become more common beyond battlefields. Between January and August 2024 alone, a 500% increase in spoofing of civil aviation was noted, while the first quarter of 2026 marked the single largest concentration of maritime jamming events ever recorded. This trend risks increasing instability due to the potential cascading effects of these disruptions on civilian life and critical sectors that rely on the EMS.

Notably, a 2025 joint statement by the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization raises concerns over the rise of harmful interference with Radio Navigation Satellite Services.

The EMS is an inherently dual use resource; shared by both civilian and military systems.

Hence, increased disruption, either caused by the growing use of electronic warfare in conflicts, or intentional harmful interference by state and non-state actors, should be cause for concern. An escalation of competition and confrontation in the EMS must be avoided.

What comes next for the disarmament community?

The dynamics that emerge from or in reaction to EMS disruptions warrant the attention of the disarmament community. The EMS is an operational environment that shapes military effectiveness, drives technological innovation across sectors, results in the development of novel disruptive capabilities, and whose disruptions have cascading effects across civilian domains. Therefore, it is necessary to:

• Foster a better understanding of the importance of the EMS, the relationship between disruption and military innovation, the path of development of weapon systems, and the implications for disarmament and arms control;
• Determine the relevance of norms and measures to build confidence, increase transparency or reduce risks given that the rapidly evolving, dual-use capabilities employed to disrupt the EMS do not fit easily into existing arms control efforts;
• Ensure that growing competition in this domain does not lead to more instability and impacts on civilian life and industry.

To this end, UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2026 will focus on electromagnetic disruption, peace and security. On 11 November 2026, technical experts, state representatives, members of the private sector, and international security and disarmament experts will meet to discuss the issue and explore the role of the disarmament community in managing the multitude of consequences related to the growing centrality of the EMS in the military domain.

The post Electromagnetic disruption, peace and security first appeared on UNIDIR.

UNIDIR’s Space Security Research Fellowship is a year‑long programme designed to equip early-career space security professionals with the knowledge, skills and networks needed to navigate today’s rapidly evolving outer space environment. Fellows come from a diverse range of countries and academic backgrounds. 

The recent gathering in Geneva provided an important opportunity for Fellows to engage directly with UNIDIR’s space security team, as well as with practitioners from States, international organizations, academia and the private sector. Coming together in person created space for the kinds of conversations, exchanges and sharing of insights and experiences that can be difficult to achieve by virtual means. 

Experiencing the international community  

On the first day, the Fellows were welcomed at the Palais des Nations, where they held an interactive session with UNIDIR’s Director, Dr Robin Geiss, and the Head of UNIDIR’s Space Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes, Dr James Revill. They then heard from Michael Spies, Deputy Chief of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs Geneva Branch. During these sessions, the Fellows learned firsthand from those who support multilateral space processes. 

Next, they took part in a guided tour of the Palais des Nations, followed by a luncheon with experienced diplomats actively engaged in disarmament negotiations. During this unique opportunity for exchange, the diplomats generously shared their perspectives on the current challenges facing disarmament diplomacy, including those related to multilateral processes on space security. 

The first day continued with a visit to the Permanent Delegation of the European Union to UN Geneva, where they heard from Klemen Polak, the Head of the Disarmament Section, on the challenges of addressing disarmament issues relating to conventional arms, emerging technologies, outer space security, and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

The following two days were dedicated to the Outer Space Security Conference 2026 (OS26), which featured a diverse cohort of experienced professionals from 94 countries, participating both in person and online. The Fellows engaged actively throughout the event, asking insightful questions and connecting with participants during the breaks. Through their active participation and exchanges, they contributed to the success of OS26. 

© 2026, UNIDIR/Antoine Tardy

Discovering industry and academic perspectives  

The Fellows then headed to the nearby city of Lausanne for a highly interactive exchange at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), where they were welcomed by Emmanuelle David, Executive Director of the EPFL Space Center. There, they learned about how academia is contributing to space situational awareness and space sustainability. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

This was followed by a visit to the private company ClearSpace, which is developing active debris removal systems for on-orbit operations, putting space sustainability into practice. The Fellows gained a deeper understanding of the engineering, policy and business challenges behind operations in space. The engagement also underlined the importance of greater transparency and access to satellite data, including model information and optical markers that can make missions and sustainability efforts both easier and safer. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

Engaging with global institutions in the space governance landscape 

The last day began with a visit to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The visit included a tour of the ICRC Museum, which showcases the history and worldwide humanitarian action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. This was followed by an interactive discussion with Mauro Vignati, an ICRC Advisor on Digital Technologies of Warfare, who explored the intersection between space security and International humanitarian law, as well as outlining the ICRC’s contributions to the Open-ended working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

The Fellows’ final appointment of the week took them to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), where Senior Radiocommunication Engineer, Véronique Glaude, walked them through the ITU’s history and its current role within the UN system. Fellows also learned how the ITU functions and manages increasingly congested resources, whether in terms of orbital slots or the electromagnetic spectrum.  

UNIDIR, and the Space Security Fellows in particular, would like to thank all of the organizations and individuals who shared their valuable time and expertise throughout the course of the week. The Fellows gained new knowledge, insights and practical experience, ending the week with renewed motivation to further develop their independent research and their careers. The UNIDIR Space Security Programme aims to continue receiving support that will allow this initiative to continue in the coming years, furthering UNIDIR’s goal of cultivating and amplifying diverse expertise from new generations to ensure the sustainable and peaceful use of outer space. 

© 2026, UNIDIR

The post UNIDIR Space Security Fellows experience multilateral Geneva first appeared on UNIDIR.

Building on previous efforts to strengthen youth engagement in multilateral space security discussions, the competition gave young people a platform to share their innovations and research for a more secure outer space environment.

This year’s competition received over 200 submissions, breaking last year’s record, with representation from all United Nations regional groups. This growing global interest highlights the importance of including younger generations in space security conversations and amplifying their work.

Through this initiative, UNIDIR and CIGI have engaged with almost 450 participants to date, which is a testament to an increasing awareness of space security issues among young people around the world.

Fresh perspectives on space security

The video competition invited young people aged 18-25 to showcase their technical research and explain what innovations to space systems could contribute to a more secure and sustainable space for all humankind.

The competition attracted submissions covering shared technical standards, cyber-resilient architecture, enhanced operational transparency and open-source monitoring frameworks. These proposals offered solutions to a wide range of challenges and priorities for the technically informed, multilateral governance of space security, with particular attention paid to security and sustainability dilemmas and the evolving threat landscape in outer space.

Spotlighting this year’s winners

A panel of independent experts from UNIDIR and CIGI, serving in their personal capacities, reviewed all of this year’s submissions. To ensure a fair and equitable selection process, the panel applied a set of established evaluation criteria. The top two videos selected demonstrate original, compelling and timely innovations for the future of space security. UNIDIR awarded the creators of these videos a fully funded trip to Geneva to attend UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2026, where they were able to present their videos to an international audience of experts and decision makers.

This year’s Youth Video Competition winners are:

Ali Shan, Youth Advocate and STEM Student, Pakistan

Ali Shan has a passion for youth advocacy and engaging underprivileged young people in STEM. He organizes Beaconhouse Notion of Academia, one of the largest high school STEM Olympiads in Pakistan, which brings together over 1,000 students to experiment with miniature satellite systems, heat shield prototyping and rocketry. He earned an Outstanding Performance Award at the STEMx bootcamp and represented Pakistan at the 2022 World Scholar’s Cup. Beyond STEM, Ali is interested in policymaking and delivered a speech on youth and peacebuilding at the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services.

Drawing on his experience of engaging with young people on space innovation, Ali’s video proposes solutions for analysing orbital patterns and flagging anomalous satellite manoeuvres through a specialized large language model system. It also suggests that a set of international standards on satellite design, debris removal and deorbit timelines be established to minimize space debris.

Joel Modokpe Pajiah, Law Trainee, Nigerian Law School

Joel Modokpe Pajiah is a law graduate and professional trainee at the Nigerian Law School, specializing in public international law, international humanitarian law and space law. He has participated in major international moot competitions, including Oxford University’s 2024 Monroe E. Price Media Moot Court Competition and the 2025 Nigerian Championship of the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Competition, where he was named Best Counsel. Previously, Joel interned at the Department of International Law and Comparative Law in the Federal Ministry of Justice in Abuja, Nigeria.

Addressing the challenge of orbital collisions, Joel’s video suggests building a shared tracking and monitoring system, which would allow actors to broadcast verifiable satellite routes and resolve a technical ambiguity that increases the risk of conflict in space.

Collaborating with the next generation on space security

The Outer Space Security Conference Youth Video Competition demonstrates that young leaders have important, innovative ideas to contribute and underlines the need to deepen their inclusion in multilateral processes. Their perceptive comments and questions enriched the discussions among experts and policymakers throughout the two days of the conference. They also provided crucial insights into both the immediate and the more long-standing areas of interest for the next generation of decision makers. UNIDIR remains committed to strengthening young people’s research capacity and to amplifying their voices in space security governance. They have a vital role to play in ensuring that the space domain remains peaceful and sustainable for all.

The post Amplifying youth-led innovations for space security first appeared on UNIDIR.

Despite the recurring gap between expectations and reality, directed energy weapons have repeatedly attracted strong interest and investment. While there has been progress in the maturation of this technology, the nature of warfare has also changed since the Cold War when this technology was first conceived. This raises the question: what implications might integrating directed energy weapons into layered air defence have for countering drones and international security more broadly?

Directed energy weapons emit highly focused energy that travels at the speed of light to disable, degrade or destroy targets, enabling faster engagement compared to physical projectiles. The term covers a wide range of technologies, each differing in their underlying physics, impact on the target and level of maturity.

The most mature types, high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves, are widely discussed in the context of their perceived cost-efficiency and defensive potential against the mass proliferation of drones. Currently, high-energy lasers receive more attention in the context of countering drones due to greater precision and longer effective range than high-power microwaves, with several States having already deployed the former in limited instances.

So, what could hamper the use of this technology for defensive purposes? During UNIDIR’s technology briefing on the topic, panellists pointed out that some of the more consequential challenges are operational rather than purely technological.

Effective range is one of the primary operational challenges, as both high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves can only impact targets within a limited range.

“Old” technology, new economics

Despite operational and technological challenges to directed energy weapons, there is an interest in examining how they may be used in air defence, especially given the rising use of drones, by State and non-State actors. Low-cost drones have altered the economic balance between air offence and defence, pitting interceptor missiles costing as high as millions of dollars against considerably cheaper threats.

Consequently, the interest in directed energy weapons is largely driven by the promise of cost-efficiency. The cost-per-shot of an operational high-energy laser or high-power microwave often equals the cost of electricity used, which can be as little as a few dollars, making them appealing against inexpensive threats. However, this narrative assumes the operational maturity of these systems, whereas in reality, even the most mature ones are facing challenges in progressing from testing to scaled deployment.

Speaking at UNIDIR’s event on the matter, Richard Hoad highlighted that the high upfront cost of developing an operational directed energy system is a potential barrier to industry and the customer, nuancing the simplified economic pitch driving the interest in directed energy weapons.

A related issue is revenue generation for the industry to offset upfront costs, Hoad further noted. Unlike traditional munitions, which have a finite lifetime and allow industry to generate revenue through the replenishment of stockpiles, directed energy weapons do not follow the same lifecycle, leaving the question of how industry might offset upfront costs still to be determined.

Despite decades of research and development, these weapons’ capabilities still require a continuous and extensive funding commitment. Nonetheless, smaller companies entering the market alongside large defence contractors could contribute to the advancement of the capability, reinforcing interest and investment.

The hardening of aerial systems

Besides international law implications, a scaled deployment of directed energy weapons could also impact military innovation and arms control efforts. The renewed interest in the development of these weapons in response to the mass proliferation of drones may prompt drones to adapt, which could in turn drive further adaptation of directed energy weapons, creating a familiar measure-countermeasure cycle seen with emerging military capabilities.

Since high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves operate on different principles when engaging targets, the pathways for hardening drones against each differ accordingly:

• High-energy lasers impact a target by focusing a beam of light on its surface, so hardening focuses on protecting the exterior with reflective and ablative coatings, as well as protecting optical sensors, which are especially vulnerable.
• High-power microwaves target the internal electronics of a system using pulses of microwave energy that can enter through antennas and other points of entry, so hardening focuses on the electromagnetic shielding of the airframe and the use of filters at these points to block or weaken incoming energy.

At the same time, completely shielding drones remains unfeasible as long as they must retain Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) positioning and communications with remote operators. Increasing autonomous navigation could reduce drones’ reliance on GNSS and communications with remote operators. Already explored in response to electronic warfare threats, this approach could also make drones more resilient to high-power microwaves by enabling complete shielding. Altogether, these alterations would also affect their production costs, cutting into the economic logic that revived the interest for directed energy weapons in the first place.

On the other hand, while some drones may harden and become costlier to produce, low-cost, disposable drones could still be used to counter high-power microwaves. Edl Schamiloglu noted that there is no hard maximum amount of drones a high-power microwave could target within the reach and direction of its beam.

Building on this, David Hambling suggested that swarms comprising a large number of drones could attack from multiple directions at once, overwhelming such systems. In response, defenders may deploy additional high-power microwave systems, triggering a cycle in which larger drone swarms are met with a bigger deployment of directed energy weapons.

From defence to offence

Directed energy weapons are generally most effective in short-range defence roles, owing to their limited effective range. While most systems are either ground-based or mounted on naval or ground vehicles, directed energy weapons might also be integrated in aircraft as power supply systems evolve.

Panellists at UNIDIR’s technology briefing similarly raised the possibility of integrating these weapons with drones, highlighting that it may be one solution to the range restriction in counter-drone applications. Hambling further pointed out that such a development would also open the door to offensive applications of directed energy weapons technology.

This is particularly concerning in the case of high-power microwaves, which can affect a wider area than high-energy lasers and therefore pose greater risks to civilian infrastructure. Even when used defensively, the former may unintentionally affect a friendly electronic system.

In offensive scenarios, the risk becomes more acute when military targets are situated near civilian infrastructure, potentially disabling civilian structures, including critical infrastructure. This concern is heightened by the growing prevalence of urban warfare, where the wide effects of high-power microwaves in densely populated and structurally complex environments could carry serious humanitarian consequences.

Strip away the sensationalist claims that have persisted for decades, and a more realistic assessment among experts emerges: Directed energy weapons will likely become one layer of a complex air defence.

For the disarmament community, this evolving capability still warrants consideration, from the dynamics of weapon development and use to the humanitarian risks that may follow if directed energy weapons shift from defensive to offensive applications.

The post The role of directed energy weapons in counter-drone defence first appeared on UNIDIR.

The dialogues explored how science and technology tools can support the convention and the design of a lasting advisory mechanism to keep pace with scientific change. Both events were organized under UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower project and as part of the joint Technical Briefs series on emerging technologies and the convention.

Scientific advice mechanism for the convention

The first event on designing a science and technology advisory mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention brought together experts from international scientific advisory bodies, multilateral policy research and disarmament diplomacy. Drawing on the experiences of the Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board, the International Science Council, the Scientific Advisory Board of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other bodies, participants explored what a comparable mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention could look like, including how it might be composed, identify priorities and build consensus.

OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board offered one of the relevant composition components: its 25 members serve in a personal capacity rather than as government representatives, with rotating terms and informal geographic and gender balance that help the body maintain both independence and legitimacy. On process, speakers shared experience on dealing with disagreements among members, noting that transparently recording dissenting views in a final report can be a legitimate and often more useful outcome.

The experience of the UN Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board offered another important lesson:

Scientific advice has impact only once translated for a diplomatic audience.

Short, accessible briefs and informal briefings can help connect scientists directly with diplomats and bring scientific findings into policy discussions.

Participants also discussed the design of the convention’s own proposed mechanism, which envisages a hybrid model combining an open-ended body for broad participation with a smaller, focused reporting committee, to balance inclusivity with substantive technical work.

Speakers agreed that any mechanism should remain strictly advisory and feed transparently into the convention’s existing review cycle, helping States Parties turn scientific uncertainty into clarity they can act on.

Practical tools for implementation

The second event on applied science and technology tools for prevention, risk assessment and biorisk governance brought together speakers from public health, verification, biosecurity research and biotechnology policy to present concrete tools already in use or under development.

Emerging technologies are creating practical instruments to support the convention’s purpose, offering ways forward even in the continued absence of a formal verification regime.

Identifying governance gaps

The tools presented addressed different governance needs, from diagnosing gaps and assessing risk to building transparency. The Biorisk Implementation and Evaluation Tool, developed by the World Health Organization based on the 2022 Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of Life Sciences, helps States self-diagnose their governance gaps. Available in national and institutional versions, the platform guides users through a step-by-step process to generate a risk score and identify priority actions.

Taking a different approach, VERTIC and King’s College London applied the logic of the IAEA’s Acquisition Path Analysis, used in nuclear safeguards, to hypothetical biological-weapons scenarios. By mapping pathways from agent acquisition to weaponization and identifying associated “observables,” they assessed how different monitoring and verification measures could capture them. By testing these approaches against the convention’s existing confidence-building measures, they revealed key practical gaps that were not captured in all cases, underscoring the level of detail needed to weigh the relative confidence, intrusiveness and cost of proposed measures.

Assessing emerging risks

RAND’s Risk Index Observatory applies a graded risk scale to AI-enabled biological tools such as protein-design algorithms, aiming to flag high-risk capabilities early while avoiding blanket restrictions on responsible research.

Meanwhile, early-stage research under the VERIBIO project at the University of Hamburg and Technical University of Hamburg, is exploring how industrial bioprocesses could be monitored for verification purposes while protecting confidential details of the process. Researchers are using an AI-based anomaly-detection model to identify when a bacterial strain’s “fingerprint” deviates from what is expected, potentially signaling it has been substituted for one producing a harmful agent.

Strengthening transparency

The Global DNA Synthesis Map and Common Mechanism developed by IBBIS give synthesis providers an open-source basis for screening orders against risky sequences across more than fifty regulatory frameworks.

Speakers discussed that these tools could support confidence-building, awareness-raising and national implementation of the convention under its Article IV, while also informing future efforts to the development of a verification mechanism.

As science and technology continue to advance, keeping the Biological Weapons Convention effective will require sustained engagement with the opportunities and challenges they present. Held under UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower, the dialogues demonstrated the value of drawing on existing scientific advisory practice while exploring practical tools that can support prevention, risk assessment, transparency and future verification.

The post UNIDIR advances dialogue on science and technology for the Biological Weapons Convention first appeared on UNIDIR.

More than 20 participants from Sirigu and Manyoro, communities situated along the Ghana–Burkina Faso border, took part in the workshop. Participants included traditional leaders, volunteers who serve as WANEP community-based conflict early warning monitors, the Regional Peace Council, and local security actors – including the police and immigration.

Communities at the frontline of prevention

Communities living in border areas are often among the first to observe changes in local security dynamics. Their knowledge of local contexts and networks also provides important insights into emerging risks, including the movement and diversion of arms and ammunition.

Building on this local knowledge, the workshop strengthened this existing community-based early warning capacity by equipping participants with a better understanding of how ammunition diversion and trafficking can contribute to insecurity and how related warning signs can be identified, documented and reported.

The project we are commencing here today contributes particularly to the Global Framework for Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management objectives relating to diversion prevention, accountability, monitoring and information sharing. Lessons gathered here are intended to become a model for community prevention across West Africa.

H.E. Hiroshi Yoshimoto, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Ghana

Building practical skills to identify ammunition diversion

Through interactive discussions and practical exercises, community monitors explored how to:

• understand arms and ammunition diversion dynamics in border communities;

• identify indicators of arms and ammunition diversion and trafficking; and

• strengthen practical skills for the safe and systematic collection, documentation and reporting of diversion-relevant information.

The movement of unauthorized arms and ammunition destabilizes local communities, fuels chieftaincy and land disputes… When our local citizens are empowered to detect early warning signs of ammunition diversion, they become active partners alongside our security forces rather than passive bystanders.

Hon. Faustina Abalu, Municipal Chief Executive of the Kassena Nankana Municipal Assembly

Connecting community actors and local authorities

Effective conflict early warning also depends on trusted channels for information-sharing and cooperation between communities and relevant authorities.

On the third day of the workshop, community monitors engaged in an open dialogue with representatives from the National Peace Council, Immigration Office and civil society. The discussion provided an opportunity to explore ways of strengthening trust, communication and collaboration between community actors and local security institutions.

A key outcome from the workshop was the development of community monitoring and information-sharing plans, providing a practical basis for participants to apply their learning within their respective communities.

Effective arms control begins with understanding the realities and risks communities face. By connecting community knowledge with formal early warning and security structures, we can strengthen prevention and reduce the risks associated with the diversion and misuse of arms and ammunition.

Fiifi Edu-Afful, Senior Researcher, Conventional Weapons Programme, UNIDIR

From insights to action

The three-day workshop forms part of the broader community-led arms control initiative of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, which seeks to integrate arms control measures into conflict prevention, peacebuilding and armed violence reduction. Insights shared by the participants will inform the development of a “menu of options” to support communities in managing weapons and ammunition, thereby preventing proliferation and misuse.

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Most international conventional arms control and humanitarian disarmament instruments – including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – have mandated review conferences every five years, and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms every six years.

The ATT, however, has no dedicated review conference. The treaty mandates the annual CSP to review implementation, but informal consultations convened by UNIDIR and Panama in late 2025 and early 2026 found that important aspects of implementation are not being examined through the current process.

As States Parties look ahead to the treaty’s next phase, the discussions have opened a broader debate about how the ATT can periodically assess its effectiveness, identify challenges, and strengthen implementation over time.

The current approach

The ATT reviews implementation through its annual conferences and is supported by three standing working groups focusing on:

• effective treaty implementation (WGETI)

• transparency and reporting (WGTR)

• and universalization (WGTU)

Each follows a multi-year work plan that identifies priority issues and outlines the sequencing for their consideration.

The WGETI and WGTR review the implementation status, identify common challenges, and develop voluntary guidance to overcome them. The WGTU reviews progress on universalization, assesses barriers to ratification and accession, and proposes more coordinated approaches to outreach and assistance.   

The “informal” WGTR developed reporting templates, which the CSP2 recommended for use by States. It also suggested that this be “kept under review by the States Parties in order to benefit from the practical experiences gained from its use.” Five years later, the reporting templates were reviewed, and the CSP7 endorsed the revised versions. The WGTR has also recommended updates to the voluntary guidance on ATT annual reports.  

Some elements of the ATT framework have more structured review processes. For example, the CSP5 adopted a structured project evaluation framework to assess whether projects funded by the Voluntary Trust Fund have achieved their intended objectives. Further, when the CSP6 established the Diversion Information Exchange Forum to support the treaty’s information-sharing provisions, it also agreed to review its usefulness at the CSP8. Although the COVID-19 pandemic delayed this review, it was eventually conducted at the CSP10.

This shows that ATT States Parties are open to exploring new ways to support treaty implementation and review what does and doesn’t work. At the same time, the existing review mechanisms are diffuse, and there is no comprehensive approach for assessing the treaty’s overall progress toward achieving its object and purpose.   

What hasn’t been reviewed? 

Despite the ATT’s extensive working-group structure, three issues are not currently being reviewed.   

1. The ATT requires the CSP to review “developments in the field of conventional arms”, but no mechanism currently examines this and related scope issues. The WGETI considered a proposal earlier this year to create an informal working group on scope and national control lists. This builds on a proposal from five years ago to establish an informal group that, as a first step, could review submitted lists, identify common approaches and challenges, and develop guidance for States Parties on establishing and maintaining control lists.
   
   Given technological developments in conventional weapons – including the transfer of parts, components and knowledge under joint and licensed production arrangements – such a group could ensure there are no loopholes in State Party regulation of the international arms trade. A geographically diverse group of national government and non-governmental experts on these issues would provide a unique forum, complementing less inclusive existing export control regimes.
   
   
2. Information contained in State Party initial and annual reports is not systematically reviewed. While the WGTR initially considered how information contained in State Party reports could be used, these discussions ended at the CSP5. The five-year strategy represents a timely opportunity to revisit this issue, also given the renewed interest in updating initial reports. These could be used in a peer-review process to support national implementation and increase understanding of the treaty’s impact.
   
   The UN Firearms Protocol provides a possible model for an ATT voluntary peer-review. Like the ATT, the CSPs of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Firearms Protocol provide space for a general review of implementation. States Parties also conduct individual “country reviews” involving a self-assessment questionnaire, which two other States review and provide feedback on.
   
   For the ATT, an updated initial report and annual reports could provide the evidence base for the review, with all three States agreeing on a list of gaps, assistance needs, and best practices – which is then summarized for the CSP. An optional peer-review mechanism could help ATT States Parties strengthen their national control systems, give clear purpose for reporting, and support the development of implementation roadmaps and project proposals for the Voluntary Trust Fund.
   
   
3. As noted by civil society at several ATT conferences, the implementation of presidential themes and working group decisions is not regularly reviewed. While the WGETI sub-working group on current and emerging implementation issues addresses some of the presidency recommendations on the themes of gender, the role of industry, and inter-agency cooperation, many conference decisions have not been reviewed.

The benefits of a comprehensive review

Even if these gaps were addressed, they would only examine certain aspects of treaty implementation. There is currently no mechanism to conduct an overarching review of the treaty’s implementation and impact.

The current work towards a five-year strategy for the ATT focuses on identifying priority areas, establishing indicators and tracking progress over this period. Yet reviewing progress against the strategy’s indicators at the end of the five-year cycle is not comparable to undertaking a comprehensive review of all aspects of treaty implementation.

Experiences and lessons learned from other international instruments show the potential benefits that a review conference could offer to the ATT. A State-led, inclusive, participatory and needs-driven process could provide an opportunity to take stock of ATT implementation since its entry into force to identify common gaps and needs, and assess whether the treaty needs to adapt to new realities and emerging challenges.  

Such a process could also strengthen the ATT’s architecture, create innovative tools for its effective implementation, and consider provisions that have received less attention – as well as other issues not covered by the treaty’s negotiation process. An ATT Review Conference could therefore help renew the treaty’s visibility and ensure that it remains fit for purpose, by strengthening the regulation of the international arms trade, preventing diversion, and reducing human suffering, without requiring treaty amendments.

There is “no one size fits all” formula to attain this goal. The ATT has a unique nature due to its export-control dimension and does not ban any specific type of weapon. This is an aspect to consider when developing any potential measurable, time-bound indicators to monitor the status and operations of the ATT. The timing, frequency and modalities of a comprehensive ATT review process merit further consideration by interested parties.

From reflection to action

The ATT’s 10th anniversary in 2024, followed by the development of a five-year strategy, has created a timely opportunity to reflect on the treaty’s implementation and impact.

The UNIDIR-Panama informal consultations revealed different priorities, particularly on civil society’s call for greater transparency on national decisions regarding transfer authorizations and denials – a sensitive issue for some States Parties.

Whether through enhanced working-group mandates, using reports for peer reviews, or a review conference process, States Parties have a range of options to assess the treaty’s implementation and increase its impact.

While cognizant of capacity and financial constraints, the upcoming CSP12 offers an important space to systematically review the implementation and impact of ATT. In this context, UNIDIR, in collaboration with Conflict Armament Research and Stimson, will host a side event on 24 August to launch a new initiative to deliver the first comprehensive evaluation of the treaty’s impact.

Igor Barreto was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, supporting research on weapons and ammunition management. He holds a Master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. Previously, Igor worked with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Embassy of Brazil in Stockholm, the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center.

Paul Holtom is the Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. He conducts research on the illicit trade, diversion and uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons and ammunition. Paul has authored and co-authored publications on the international arms trade and conventional arms control. Before joining UNIDIR, he worked at the Small Arms Survey, Coventry University and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. He holds a PhD and Master’s degree in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Birmingham, UK.

Grisselle Rodríguez is the Delegate for Disarmament and International Security of the Permanent Mission of Panama to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva since 2015. She is an MA candidate in Global Security at King’s College London and was awarded certificates for the 2019 UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament and the 2021 Visiting Fellows Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Previously, she interned at diplomatic missions, the UN and NGOs.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this commentary are those of Grisselle Rodríguez.

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With more than 50,000 objects now in orbit, and that number expected to keep rising, outer space faces mounting questions about how to distinguish benign from hostile activity, how emerging technologies affect strategic stability, and how existing legal and governance frameworks can keep pace.

The Outer Space Security Conference 2026 will provide a platform for cross-sectoral dialogue on these questions, with the aim of exploring and moving towards practical pathways to strengthen the security and peaceful use of the space domain.

Over two days, the programme will centre on key discussions including: threats to space systems and the ambiguity of intent; how reliance on space infrastructure for military operations intersects with arms control regimes; and progress on preventing an arms race in outer space.

The accelerated pace of space technology development and the increasing diversity of actors requires that all stakeholders converge towards shared understanding of how governance should keep up. The Outer Space Security Conference remains the premier track 1.5 platform where both future-facing and grounded thinking around the security of these systems, their operators and their environment occur.

— James Revill, Head of UNIDIR’s Space Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes.

For more than 20 years, UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference has helped advance practical approaches to outer space security. It connects strategic dialogue with insights from technical and policy practice, contributing to more transparent and informed decision-making. Registration is open to participate.

For further information, please contact Claudia Marquina, UNIDIR Head of Communications at claudia.marquina@un.org.

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institution within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community in developing solutions to critical security problems. For more information, visit unidir.org. 

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Introduced on the sidelines of the APMBC Intersessional Meetings in Geneva, the initiative “Working towards a mine-free Africa: Building African capacity to remove threats posed by anti-personnel landmines to peace, security and development” comes at a critical time.

Since 1997, the APMBC has achieved significant progress – facilitating widespread mine clearance and reducing human costs of weapons. Yet, challenges persist. Thirty-three States Parties have outstanding Article 5 (mine clearance) obligations. Sixteen of these are from Africa, and many face constraints in securing domestic resources and international cooperation including assistance.

These challenges have been compounded by broader pressures on arms control and humanitarian disarmament instruments, which in turn underscores the importance of the effective implementation by all States Parties of the APMBC and its universalization.

Strengthening capacity and accelerating progress towards completion

As part of this initiative, a dedicated project aims to support five of the African States that are receiving low levels of international cooperation and assistance to fulfill their APMBC Article 5 obligations. It has two, interconnected objectives:

• First, to build national capacity in up to five African States to fulfil their APMBC Article 5 obligations related to mine clearance and land release; and
• Second, to promote and support the exchange of knowledge and experience on building African national capacity to implement APMBC obligations.

It will focus on African States Parties that have existing extensions granted by the Meeting of States Parties, established national action plans, and comparatively small or medium levels of contamination. These include Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The diversity and uniqueness of each context can help generate knowledge and understanding of how targeted support can be adapted to different country settings.

In addition to strengthening national capacities, the initiative will help ensure that the knowledge and experiences generated are socialized among key stakeholders. This includes other APMBC States Parties, African Union (AU) and UN Member States, other regional organizations such as the AU, regional economic communities, expert non-governmental organizations, and the public at large.

Ultimately, this will also benefit communities and individuals – including women, men, girls and boys – who continue to suffer from the negative, age-differentiated and gendered impacts of anti-personnel landmines on the African continent, and elsewhere.

The project is implemented by UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, in cooperation with the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and in close coordination with the APMBC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), other stakeholders and partners.

Speaking at the launch event, and joined by all partners and the APMBC Zambia presidency, the EU highlighted its commitment to humanitarian disarmament and its concrete support for the initiative:

The EU Council has committed 3 million EUR under the Common Foreign and Security Policy budget to support five African States close to completion in fulfilling their Article 5 obligations through a 36-month project, implemented by UNIDIR in partnership with MAG.

Ambassador Michele Cervone d’Urso, Deputy Head, EU Delegation to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva

The EU further emphasized the initiative’s alignment with its broader strategic priorities on peace, security and sustainable development, as outlined in its Global Strategy and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

An inclusive, cooperative and partnership-driven approach

Central to the initiative is a strong emphasis on national ownership, cooperation and coordination across stakeholders to translate political commitments into practical, on the ground impact.

As President of the convention and as an African State, Zambia is honoured to have been part of the launch of this project that will accelerate progress toward a mine-free future.

Mulima Lisimba, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Zambia to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva

Zambia further stressed that humanitarian disarmament including mine action is not only a technical undertaking, but a humanitarian imperative, adding that “behind every clearance target and compliance deadline are communities seeking safety, dignity and the opportunity to live free from the threat of landmines.”

Juan Carlos Ruan, Director of the APMBC Implementation Support Unit, also highlighted the initiative’s contribution to strengthening the overall functioning of the convention. This includes cooperation between States Parties in meeting legal obligations related to Article 5 and commitments. It also means generating lessons that can inform broader discussions to strengthen cooperation and assistance, as well as progress of the Siem Reap–Angkor Action Plan (2025–2029).

Delivering practical results and shared knowledge

The project combines research, analytical and knowledge-exchange with operational components. Key core activities will include:

• joint initial review meetings with national authorities,
• joint piloting and use of a prioritization tool, and
• upon request support in the preparation of annual reports.

Key optional and context-specific activities may include:

• surveys;
• clearance operations; and
• institutional and operational capacity-building provided by MAG (such as for example in information management, national standards, explosive ordnance risk education and community liaison).

At the same time, UNIDIR and its partners will document lessons and facilitate exchanges among African States Parties and the wider international community. This includes:

• a knowledge-exchange workshop and report,
• development of a prioritization tool,
• publication of country-specific factsheets and analytical outputs,
• co-hosting and organization of events in the margins of regional and international forum both in multilateral Geneva and in African countries.

Over the next three years, activities will focus on delivering concrete clearance outcomes, strengthening national systems, and generating actionable knowledge for the community of policy and practice. Partners also intend to engage regularly with European and African States Parties, regional organizations, and international stakeholders to share progress and findings, including through side events at future APMBC meetings, the conference of states parties, and regional outreach in Africa. Thus, the beneficiaries will not only be the five States, but also other APMBC States Parties, and the international community at large.

Looking ahead

During the initial phase, UNIDIR and MAG will hold joint review meetings with national authorities of the five States. The aim is to support States Parties in identifying, further prioritizing and sequencing assistance to fulfil Article 5 obligations. This should help move from broad expressions of needs towards structured, prioritized and nationally owned plans that can also inform individualized approaches, international assistance requests, and future cooperation.

The initiative also aims to enable States and the continent to take ownership in fulfilling Article 5 obligations and commit to shared responsibilities in working towards a mine-free Africa.

Other States in Africa and beyond face significant Article 5 challenges and require sustained international cooperation and assistance. This initiative and dedicated project is therefore a first, targeted, and focused contribution. It may become a vehicle and has the potential to generate further interest, support and resources to achieve mine-free objectives. Additional resources allowed expanding the geographical scope of the project or the type and depth of support that could be provided.

By working together, governments, regional organizations, implementing partners, donors, and affected communities, can make significant progress.

Mulima Lisimba, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Zambia to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva

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Held at the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the workshop brought together representatives from across the Government of Thailand to explore practical approaches for translating international commitments into national policies, institutional processes and operational practices. It builds on a series of similar bilateral trainings UNIDIR has already delivered in Thailand and across the region in Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

Building on a long-standing partnership

UNIDIR has worked with Thailand for several years to support the development of cyber resilience. In May 2025, a joint cyber capacity-building and policy training featured an interactive tabletop exercise simulating a major ICT incident. The objective was to test national coordination, decision-making, and response arrangements.

This exercise helped identify a number of practical actions to strengthen cyber resilience.

UNIDIR and Thailand then worked together to develop a national roadmap to address priority issues in greater depth, and support implementation of specific elements of the UN framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

Co-developing implementation-focused support

As a part of this broader initiative, in July 2026 UNIDIR in collaboration with the NSC, NCSA and MFA designed a follow up workshop tailored specifically to Thailand’s priorities and institutional context. The training focused on translating select elements of the UN framework into national policies, processes and practices suited to Thailand’s specific context.

This approach reflects the capacity-building principles set out by the Open-ended Working Group on ICT Security: support should be demand-driven, context-specific, developed with national partners, non-duplicative and building on previous engagement. By adapting programme design to nationally identified priorities, UNIDIR’s activities are built to support long-term implementation of the UN framework rather than functioning as standalone training events.

Bringing together the national cyber governance community

Effective implementation of the UN framework requires coordination across government. To support this, the recent workshop brought together representatives from Thailand’s technical, legal and diplomatic communities.

Through expert briefings, policy dialogues and simulated tabletop exercises, participants explored how different institutions can contribute to implementing the UN framework while building synergies across Thailand’s national cyber governance ecosystem.

The workshop provided a platform for cross-sector dialogue, enabling participants to examine implementation challenges around specific UN cyber norms from complementary technical, legal and policy perspectives.

Looking ahead

This workshop represents the latest milestone in the Institute’s ongoing partnership with Thailand and broader capacity-building efforts in Asia-Pacific, delivered through UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme. It reflects a shared commitment to translating the UN framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace from principle into national policy and practice.

UNIDIR will continue working with Thailand and other Member States through practical, tailored capacity-building activities that strengthen national cyber resilience while contributing to regional cooperation and a more stable, secure and peaceful cyberspace.

For further information on UNIDIR’s research-based training and capacity building initiatives, visit the UNIDIR Academy.

This project is funded by Global Affairs Canada under its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

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Mirroring a similarly diverse multi-stakeholder visit to Mongolia earlier this year, the visit deepened UNIDIR’s existing relationships in the People’s Republic of China and created opportunities to build new collaborations.

Strong partnerships are at the heart of effective multilateral dialogue and forward-looking research. They are one of four key enablers in UNIDIR’s strategy and essential for the work of the Institute. The Beijing mission illustrates what that commitment looks like in practice, spanning three distinct constituencies: Member State authorities, research institutions, and private sector actors working on emerging technology.

Partnering with Member State authorities

Sustained dialogue with UN Member States remains central to UNIDIR’s work. It reinforces the Institute’s unique role as a trusted partner and convening actor, especially in times of rising global tensions.

Beyond its regular exchanges with permanent missions in Geneva, UNIDIR places particular value on engagement with national stakeholders at the capital level, where policy is shaped.

In Beijing, UNIDIR Director held discussions with Ambassador Lu Kang, Vice Minister of the International Department of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee. UNIDIR also met with representatives of the Department of Disarmament Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, and engaged with the organizers of the Beijing Xiangshan Forum – a leading platform for international security dialogue.

Across these bilateral discussions, Dr Geiss highlighted UNIDIR’s recently launched Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security as a concrete mechanism through which the Institute can support Member States’ capacity-building needs.

These conversations also provided an opportunity to exchange on issues of shared concern and discuss pathways for strengthening international dialogue, themes that are also emphasized by the Global Governance Initiative.

Expanding the research partner network

Research institutes, think tanks, and academia form another essential pillar of UNIDIR’s partnership approach. The Institute’s work draws on in-house expertise and continuous exchange with a vast network of research partners to build on diverse perspectives. A key initiative reflecting this commitment is UNIDIR’s Global Disarmament Research Network, which brings together experts and institutions worldwide to address shared security challenges.

In Beijing, UNIDIR formalized its long-standing collaboration with the Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS) by signing a partnership agreement with Tsinghua University. The agreement builds on an existing relationship through CISS Deputy Director Xiao Qian’s membership in UNIDIR’s Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics – the sole multistakeholder platform convening experts from all permanent members of the Security Council and all UN regional groups.

This relationship is further reflected in UNIDIR’s hosting of Fellow Lefeng Zheng, an established form of engagement that was well received by Chinese counterparts throughout the mission.

During the visit, UNIDIR Director delivered a Global Vision Lecture on AI at the crossroads of peace and security, co-hosted by Tsinghua’s Office of International Affairs and CISS, engaging early-career scholars on current security challenges. Discussions continued at a youth dialogue with a smaller group of Tsinghua researchers and students. CISS and UNIDIR also jointly organized a symposium on artificial intelligence and international security, examining associated risks, opportunities and persisting governance gaps.

UNIDIR also participated in the 14th World Peace Forum, where Dr Geiss took part in a panel on the use of unmanned systems in armed conflict, organized by the International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation in East Asia. Yasmin Afina, Researcher in UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme, also moderated a closed-door panel discussion on AI and international security, for which Dr Geiss provided opening remarks.

Beyond Tsinghua University, UNIDIR Director met with the senior leadership of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, including Dai Huaicheng, Secretary-General and member of UNIDIR’s Board of Trustees, to discuss ongoing collaboration. A welcome dinner hosted by the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs provided further opportunity for exchange with its representatives.

Engaging the private sector

Private sector engagement is increasingly important to UNIDIR’s research, particularly on AI, cyberspace and other emerging technologies. As innovation accelerates, dialogue with industry provides valuable insights into developments shaping the future security landscape.

UNIDIR visited two Beijing-based AI companies for discussions on peace and security, ensuring the Institute’s research remains grounded in current technological realities.

Supporting forward-looking research

UNIDIR’s recent engagements in Beijing demonstrate how the Institute’s partnerships – with governments, research institutions and industry – inform research that is both evidence-based and responsive to a fast-changing security environment.

As artifical intelligence and other emerging technologies continue to reshape questions of international peace and security, this kind of sustained, multi-stakeholder approach will remain at the core of UNIDIR’s ability to deliver relevant, forward-looking analysis.

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For more than a decade, the international community has discussed the IHL implications of LAWS. States agreed on 11 Guiding Principles, advanced their understandings of key concepts, and charted a direction of travel toward what became informally known as the two-tier approach. This consists of a combination of prohibitions and regulations of LAWS, grounded in the fundamental rules and principles of IHL.

Discussions at the multilateral level, however, retain a high degree of abstraction. States have reiterated, for example, on multiple occasions that IHL continues to apply fully to the development and use of LAWS. States have also broadly expressed agreement over the fact that the ‘operational context’ is central to any determination of the quality and extent of the human-machine interaction, and to considerations of human judgment and control.

Why a scenario compendium on LAWS and IHL?

Any use of LAWS in armed conflict – like with any other weapon system – would be embedded in an operational context shaped by specific variables, unique time-bound circumstances, and existing doctrinal guidance. Against the universality of IHL principles, their practical application often depends on context.

Nevertheless, thus far, less effort has been made to understand how IHL applies and what concrete measures might need to be developed to enhance compliance when LAWS are deployed.

With this compendium, UNIDIR provides a tool – the first of its kind – for States to engage in in-depth conversations about compliance with IHL in defined tactical and operational environments.

What the compendium provides

The compendium includes a catalogue of 43 scenarios spanning the land, naval and air domains, covering both international and non-international armed conflict. Each scenario is accompanied by a detailed list of IHL questions to support granular legal analysis. These are scenario-specific but also include a number of cross-cutting questions that integrate more general considerations about the technical characteristics of LAWS.

Critically, the compendium does not provide answers, it merely steers users to consider an array of pertinent legal questions to enable structured legal and operational discussions.

The publication also provides ample guidance for interested stakeholders to be able to ‘play’ the scenarios in their respective national organizations or in international formats.

Supporting national and international engagement

At the national level, the compendium can support States in developing and refining their interpretations of how IHL applies to the possible use of LAWS.

The scenarios can help operationalize abstract concepts and consider them in practice.

States can opt for specialized deep dives, as well as cross-cutting national dialogues bringing together experts from across policy, military, legal and diplomatic communities.

At the international level, the compendium can serve as a confidence-building and a capacity-building tool. By providing shared tactical reference points, the scenarios enable States to compare how they interpret and apply IHL, how they structure safeguards and oversight, and identify areas of convergence and divergence without disclosure of sensitive information.

Looking ahead

Following the launch of the compendium, UNIDIR will undertake additional efforts to disseminate the compendium and facilitate its use.

Over the next months, the Institute will continue to promote and socialize the compendium among interested stakeholders. Activities will range from virtual briefings and training programmes to in-country workshops.

In addition, UNIDIR will further enhance the user experience by creating a digital version of the compendium, which will allow greater customization and more interactive options to play the scenarios. The digital tool will not replace the existing compendium, which remains permanently hosted on the UNIDIR website.

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Due diligence is a well-established concept in international law, whereby States should not knowingly allow the use of their territory for activities contrary to the rights of other States. In international cybersecurity, States have recognized it as an important element of the agreed voluntary normative framework of responsible State use of information and communications technologies (ICTs), with some arguing it constitutes a binding rule in cyberspace. At the same time, the ILC has addressed due diligence in various contexts, most notably in relation to transboundary environmental harm, and in 2025 it added “due diligence in international law” to its programme of work as a distinct topic.

A well-established concept

As early as in 1928, the Island of Palmas arbitration linked due diligence to States’ obligation to act with reasonable care and established it as a corollary to territorial sovereignty. In the 1941 Trail Smelter case, the arbitral tribunal framed due diligence within the general obligation not to cause transboundary harm, proclaiming that no State has the right to use its territory, or permit its use, to cause significant injury to another State or persons located in another State’s territory.

Perhaps the most famous formulation of due diligence in international law comes from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its Corfu Channel judgment:

States have an “obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”

In doing so, the Court suggested there are two prerequisites:

• State knowledge of a potential harm to the rights of another State emanating from its territory; and
• a real possibility that reasonable action taken by the territorial State could prevent or minimize that harm.

The ICJ later extended this reasoning in the Tehran Hostages case, where it held that the State was responsible for omitting to protect foreign diplomatic premises and its diplomatic and consular staff from attacks by non-State actors when it had both knowledge of the harm and capacity to act.

Modern doctrine approaches due diligence in at least three ways: as a principle of international law, as a stand-alone obligation, and as modality attached to a duty of care (a standard of conduct). Irrespective of its legal qualification, the practical exercise of due diligence by a State depends on two factors:

• First, the State should have power over the source of the risk to another State’s rights, property or citizens.
• Second, the State should be aware of or anticipate the risk that triggers due diligence.

As the ICJ emphasized in the Corfu Channel, the mere presence on the State territory of the source of harmful acts is not sufficient to impute knowledge of these acts to the State.

Cyberspace raises new questions

Alongside doctrinal debates on the legal nature and scope of due diligence, the discussion has recently gained a second wind specifically in the cyber context. In particular, the application of due diligence to State use of ICTs, and its implications for State responsibility, have become subjects of extensive debate.

The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, in its 2015 consensus report, articulated a voluntary norm that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”. The 2021 GGE report clarified that:

a State should not permit another State or non-State actor to use ICTs within its territory to commit internationally wrongful acts.

As noted, due diligence is conditioned on knowledge. In the cyber context, the 2021 GGE report further qualified “knowledge” of malicious ICT conduct as requiring the State to be “aware or has been notified in good faith” that an internationally wrongful act involving ICTs is being carried out from or through its territory. The report also indicated that States will take all appropriate, reasonably available, and feasible steps to detect, investigate and stop internationally wrongful ICT activities emanating from or transiting their territory; it does not, however, impose a duty to monitor all ICT activities within their territory.

Despite years of negotiations among States on how international law applies to cyberspace, due diligence in cyberspace remains subject to divergent State interpretations. As observed by UNIDIR, key outstanding questions include the legal status of due diligence, the scope of expected conduct, the required level of knowledge, and the harm threshold.

The ILC takes up the issue

Due diligence previously featured on the ILC’s agenda in specific contexts, most notably in the 2001 Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. Article 3 provides that “the State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof” – an obligation of conduct requiring the State to exert its best efforts to minimize the risk, without guaranteeing that no harm will occur (commentary 7 to Article 3 of the Draft articles).

Furthermore, in 2025 the ILC decided to include “due diligence in international law” in its programme of work and to appoint Dr Penelope Ridings as Special Rapporteur. Her first report in April 2026 reviews the long pedigree of due diligence in international law and the past work of the ILC on related topics. It acknowledges the lack of clarity regarding the legal character of due diligence and proposes to identify its common elements applicable both generally in international law and to special regimes, including potentially its application in the ICT domain.

This ILC endeavor is particularly relevant for cyberspace. As noted:

divergent State interpretations of cyber due diligence persist, and the ILC’s forthcoming work offers a timely opportunity to bring valuable clarity to how the concept applies in the cyber context.

UNIDIR at the 2026 ILC session

As part of UNIDIR’s ongoing work on international cyber stability, the Institute will organize a side event on Due Diligence in Cyberspace on 2 July, on the margins of the 77th session of the ILC.

The objective is to bridge the parallel discussions in the cyber diplomatic and international legal communities, fostering a much-needed exchange between these two groups.

This event, organized with a contribution from Dr Penelope Ridings, Special Rapporteur of the ILC on due diligence, is designed to explore national and regional interpretations, highlight practical challenges States face, and to facilitate an exchange of views between ILC members, cyber diplomats, and legal experts on how to further clarify and operationalize cyber due diligence.

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