This intense global interconnectedness clearly comes with great benefits, but it also brings great risks.

A successful hack against a small Ukrainian software company might not sound like a big deal for the rest of us, but within a year of M.E.Doc’s servers being breached in 2017, the NotPetya incident had cost businesses around the world over $10 billion. The WannaCry attack hit the UK’s National Health Service first and hardest, but within days it had spread to over 150 countries. And when the ICRC was targeted in 2022, sensitive data related to more than half a million people worldwide was exposed.

Though much of the damage is the result of a global cybercrime epidemic whose costs already rise into the trillions, the increasing frequency of state-linked cyber attacks on civilian and humanitarian infrastructure means that the picture is not so straightforward.

On the contrary, today’s cyber domain is characterized by impacts cascading across networks, industries and borders, with an incredibly diverse range of actors affected and involved. The growing scale and the sophistication of these challenges mean that narrow, technical solutions to cybersecurity are no longer enough.

The seriousness of these impacts and the need for a concerted, collective response is clear from the fact that the UN Security Council has, in recent years, repeatedly been briefed on cyber threats to international peace and security.

Recognition of the gravity of the situation has also driven a conceptual shift towards the idea of cyber resilience over cybersecurity. The focus has today moved beyond individual networks and onto the broader and better question of how systems and societies can collectively react, adapt, and recover when successful attacks do occur.

Cooperation in times of fragmentation

While businesses and governments alike increasingly understand the need for an intersectoral, global approach, their task is made more difficult by the growing fragmentation of the digital domain itself.

This is driven by rapid technological developments and differences in political posture, regulatory approach, and organizational capacity. Together, these factors create faultlines that make cyber infiltration more likely, as seen in the following areas:

• Political volatility: Political tensions have knock-on effects for cyber risk, with geopolitical considerations the most important influence on cyber risk mitigation strategies for two-thirds of organizations.
• Patchwork regulation: Though regulation itself is seen as having a positive effect, three-quarters of chief information security officers report that the current global patchwork of regulatory approaches significantly hampers their efforts to achieve proper compliance.
• Capacity gaps: There are major differences in capacity levels among countries, with some still lacking even basic legal frameworks and cybersecurity incident response teams.
• SME resilience: Small organizations are twice as likely to have insufficient resilience as compared to larger counterparts. The potentially destabilizing effects of any one player’s security deficiencies are also significantly amplified when they are embedded in the complex, globally diversified, poorly understood digital supply chains behind many of the services and systems we rely on today.
• Emerging tech: Technological advances in different areas also expand the range of vulnerabilities and entry points open to attack, with increasingly sophisticated generative AI the overwhelming concern in 2026 and quantum technology posing a particular threat to existing forms of encryption.

Pulling on the fabric of cyber resilience from a variety of different angles, these diverse pressures and structural gaps mean that no one company, government or international body has the visibility, authority or capacity to fully manage international cyber risks on its own. Yet the same fragmentation that makes cooperation so difficult also makes it more urgent than ever.

Making good on the promise of cyber resilience

Of course, collective, cooperative efforts are already underway, and they provide a solid foundation for the cyber resilience architecture we need. But to really make a difference, we need to move beyond negotiation to the concrete work of implementation.

Take, for example, the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace that were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2015 and reaffirmed in 2021. To realize the potential of its norms around the protection of critical infrastructure, states need first to identify and designate what qualifies as critical infrastructure, assign responsibility for it to a competent agency, build up effective cyber capacity within such agencies, and create rules around incident reporting and cooperation to ensure that attacks and their spread are properly tracked and addressed.

Another complimentary, concrete step that governments can take is to bolster their participation in confidence-building measures like the global points of contact directory. This initiative establishes channels of secure, direct communication on cyber incidents, including those affecting critical infrastructure to de-escalate tensions, clarify misunderstandings, and promote more effective, collective responses by sharing information and capacity.

This capacity itself is a prerequisite for proper compliance and cooperative assistance, and so it must be built up. This could take the form of skills development for one’s own technical staff, the creation of dedicated cyber incident response teams, support from established companies and public institutions for small and medium-sized enterprises in their own capacity-building efforts, and pooling of knowledge and skills to support less well-resourced countries and regions around the world.

Effective cooperation will also depend on treating industry, civil society and academia as operational partners. Initiatives such as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, the Paris Call, the Internet Governance Forum and the World Economic Forum’s Centre for Cybersecurity already point the way forward, as do inclusive platforms like UNIDIR’s Cyber Stability Conference and the wider Geneva Cyber Week, both held annually in May.

The coming months will also see the launch of the UN’s Global Mechanism on ICT Security, which will provide a single permanent track for governments to ensure that steps towards more concrete progress stay on track, to further strengthen confidence‑building measures and to redouble efforts to improve capacity‑building across the board.

It is only this kind of concrete, cooperative and collective effort that can truly build cyber resilience across every link in the chain, and protect the vital digital infrastructure that today plays such a key role in our lives as individuals, and our life as a species.

An earlier version of this article was originally published by the World Economic Forum.

The post Why cyber resilience needs to be concrete, cooperative and collective first appeared on UNIDIR.

With the emergence of the internet and a wave of personal computers, the evolution of ICTs that started at the end of the 20th century transformed how people and societies interacted and how information was created, stored and shared. What started as a small military and academic research network expanded into a global web connecting millions of devices and, eventually, billions of people.

Building on this expansion, the subsequent phase of digital development saw the consolidation of search engines, web browsers, and email as core tools for accessing and exchanging information at scale. Alongside these developments, early cyber risks emerged, including malware and basic intrusion techniques disseminated through physical media and early network infrastructures. In the early 2000s, the wider adoption of wireless connectivity and mobile devices further increased the volume, speed and reach of digital communications, expanding digital opportunities while also introducing additional layers of security vulnerabilities.

AI at the heart of today’s security

Keeping up with past technological innovation, the contemporary global cyber threat landscape is undergoing another major shift driven by rapid advances in new and emerging technologies, with significant implications for international peace and security.

UNIDIR’s Insights into Cyberthreats and International Security in 2025 highlighted how these new and emerging technologies are reshaping both offensive and defensive cyber operations. These advancements, especially AI, bring new opportunities but also new multi-dimensional risks and challenges, underscoring that its disruptive potential is no longer theoretical.

The safety and security concerns anticipated in UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2022 on AI disruption, peace and security have now become immediate and tangible vulnerabilities, expanding attack surfaces and multiplying threat vectors that stakeholders must confront.

To better understand the AI-ICT security nexus, UNIDIR introduced a technical framework showing how AI can influence both perpetrator and defender postures in the ICT environment. However, governance of this nexus does not clearly fit into the five-pillared framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace – which comprises of existing and potential threats, voluntary norms, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. This gap warrants further deliberation, including in the UN Global Permanent Mechanism in the context of international security which is a single‑track, and State‑led mechanism operating under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful and interoperable ICT environment. It conducts consultations through substantive plenary sessions, dedicated thematic groups, intersessional meetings, and periodic review conferences.

Where algorithms meet tomorrow

Looking ahead, quantum technology is identified as one of the most transformative technological innovations on the horizon in UNIDIR’s compendium on enabling technologies and international security. The year 2025, designated the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology, marked a century since the initial research and development of quantum mechanics.

Despite its century-long history, the full implications of quantum technology remain uncertain. Multi-stakeholder discussions during UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2024 underscored the need for careful deliberations, structured governance, proactive policy-making, and inclusive capacity building to reduce the quantum divide and manage the emerging quantum arms race.

In this context, UNIDIR’s research on quantum technology, peace and security highlights several major threats to international peace and security, including the potential decryption of sensitive data from critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, quantum-enabled intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and the integration of AI models with quantum algorithms.

In the recently concluded second UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs in the context of international security, the potential threats emanating from quantum technology were consistently highlighted by Member States.

What’s next for cybersecurity

Since its inception in 2012, UNIDIR’s annual Cyber Stability Conference fosters multistakeholder dialogue to harmonize the policy, legal, technical and diplomatic perspectives on existing and potential cyber threats while exploring ways to enhance cyber resilience through the implementation of the UN Framework of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace.

This year’s conference will reflect on more than two decades of digital evolution and multilateral discussion, while delving into the future trajectory of digital transformation, the cyber threat landscape, and the Global Mechanism emerging out of it. Under the theme “Cyber governance in an era of technological revolution: Past lessons, present realities and future frontiers,” the Cyber Stability Conference 2026 will be held on 4–5 May as part of Geneva Cyber Week. This flagship event is a cornerstone of UNIDIR’s 45-year-long commitment to meaningful collective action towards a more secure world.

The post The evolving road from dial ups to qubits first appeared on UNIDIR.

It highlights the importance of data centres and of access to computing power (“compute” for short) as enablers of AI-driven capabilities. It also points to a clear step up in the steadily growing role and responsibility of private technology actors in 21st century warfare.

The role of the commercial cloud in warfare

It is first worth setting out why commercial data centres may be seen as targets, and what role they – and cloud computing more generally – play in modern military operations. Data centres are the physical backbone of the digital infrastructure that enables much of the digital capabilities now required by military operations.

Cloud computing enables access to the vast quantities of compute needed to train and deploy AI algorithms as well as to store, move and analyse data. Data centres are therefore a key element in the ability of modern militaries to leverage AI for autonomous capabilities, decision-support systems, data-fusion, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and targeting. No public information, however, exists to ascertain whether these specific data centres were directly contributing to ongoing military operations.

The role of AI in military operations is continuing to expand as battlefields produce ever more sensor data and require more compute. Operations are thus becoming increasingly reliant on ever more – and faster – collection, fusion and analysis of data. With these changes, the role of commercial cloud service providers (CSPs) – the only ones currently capable of managing such scale – is only likely to grow.

Security implications of targeting data centres

Targeting data centres has clear security implications.

• First, the reliance by armed forces on commercial CSPs intertwines military applications with the infrastructure that supports civilian digital applications. As the same data centres support both military and civilian workloads, strikes against them carry a dual risk: they elevate the threat to civilian infrastructure and they lead to cascading effects across civilian life, triggering service outages and possible material effects.

• Second, the targeting of data centres raises questions about how to defend such infrastructure. Hyperscalers – the companies operating the largest data centres – boast advanced cybersecurity capabilities and contingency plans for natural disasters that enable them to ensure service continuity. However, these data centres are built for and considered as commercial enterprises. They are not equipped – or even conceptualized – to deal with military threats. Often the size of small cities, data centres are both difficult to hide and extremely costly to secure against kinetic threats.

• Third, as a globally distributed network, data centres need not reside within a State’s borders to serve their purpose. The free flow of data and workloads across borders is, in many respects, a defining feature of modern cloud architecture. Yet, this means that the digital backbone underpinning military capabilities may be distributed geographically across the territory of neutral States. This carries profound implications for conflict should data centres increasingly become targets. A belligerent may, theoretically, be compelled to target infrastructure well beyond the theatre of active hostilities to deny its adversaries access to their cloud enabled-capabilities. Such strikes risk expanding the borders of a conflict, and so may contribute to escalation dynamics and negatively affect regional security.

Legal ramifications of targeting data centres

The legal implications that stem from these strikes relate in particular to international humanitarian law and the extent to which the private sector may be affected. While States remain the primary subjects of international humanitarian law, a host of implications emerge for industry.
First, a data centre that serves both civilian and military purposes may constitute a legitimate target as a consequence of its potential status as a military objective if it is found to

“make an effective contribution to military action and [if its] total or partial destruction . . . in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”

as a result of its nature, location, purpose or use. In the context of data centres and, more generally, digital infrastructure, the crux lies in the extent to which their destruction would offer “definite military advantage”. The assessment of this advantage must be independent of the existence of redundancy measures in the event of damage to this particular facility.

Second, the destruction of digital infrastructure in war points to States’ obligation to take

“all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks”.

This issue is of particular importance given the potential second- and third-order effects that their destruction may have on civilian life and the humanitarian sector, where connectivity may constitute a critical enabler. Whether feasible precautions would require the strict, physical separation of civilian data centres from the military or even added measures (either by the States hosting or benefitting from a data centre or by the technology provider) to secure and protect these facilities. Regardless of which actor takes which steps, the importance of clarifying these questions and the expected distribution of roles and responsibilities is further emphasized by the “increased meshing” of civilian and military cloud technologies.

Third, in addition to destruction of the physical hardware, another question arises as to whether the data hosted in dual-use data centres could, itself, constitute a lawful military objective. If this is the case, then the data could be subject to attack by way of (partial) destruction of the infrastructure that hosts it. This issue is of particular relevance due to the increased integration of AI into military systems – and the dependence of these technologies on data throughout their life cycle.

Beyond the technology, the possible targetability of staff working at these data centres arises. While civilians are, in principle, protected from attacks under international humanitarian law, they may lose their protection if they are found to be directly participating in hostilities. Independently of whether contributing to the operation of a dual-use data centre could constitute direct participation in hostilities, this question is of particular importance in the light of today’s technology-heavy defence landscape.

This trend may, subsequently, require the presence of technical personnel, such as engineers, in or near the frontlines for maintenance and other operational functions critical to the deployment and use of military capabilities. There is precedent of such maintenance workshops being established by governmental armed forces. However, States’ dependence on the private sector for military capabilities – extending beyond weapon systems to data centres and other technological infrastructure – is growing. This may lead in the foreseeable future to the deployment in the battlefield of civilian engineers and technicians from technology suppliers to ensure the continued operation and maintenance of that infrastructure.

The need for structured engagement between the public and private sectors

These observations ultimately attest to two realities.
The foremost of these is that risk assessments and mitigation measures for both the public and the private sectors will inevitably evolve from traditional structures. While the destruction of military factories is far from being a novel strategy, the increased reliance on dual-use digital infrastructures such as data centres further emphasizes the need for both States and technology suppliers to re-evaluate their risk assessments.

The large prime contractors in the defence industry may already have established structures and processes for such risk assessments. To the extent that their facilities may be military objectives, technology companies should follow suit if they are to supply, even remotely, capabilities to the military. To this end, States and the private sector should clarify expectations with respect to the distribution of roles and responsibilities, including in the context of risk assessments and mitigation.

The other, equally significant, reality is that the need for structured engagement between the public and the private sectors is now more evident than ever. Beyond risks assessments and clarity on the distribution of roles and responsibilities, establishing shared expectations could ultimately foster predictability, mutual trust and accountability and could contribute positively to international peace and security. States and non-state actors (including industry) have engaged extensively since 2018 on information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the context of international security as part of two United Nations open-ended working groups. The upcoming Global Mechanism on ICT in the context of international security subsequently provides an opportunity to deepen the multi-stakeholder dialogue on, among other things, voluntary norms and international law, particularly the protection of dual-use infrastructure and data.

Specifically on AI, UNIDIR in partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights launched an initiative dedicated to the development of a Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain. The framework seeks to provide a practical and actionable set of voluntary guidelines firmly grounded in international law and norms, to be co-developed in collaboration with industry actors and governments.

As the boundary between commercial cloud computing and the military domain continues to blur, the strikes on the data centres in the Gulf confirm that digital infrastructure is not only the backbone of our society, but that it also lies on the frontline of modern conflict. The engagement of the international, multi-stakeholder community with governance processes, including within the United Nations, is now more critical than ever to ensure that current and future infrastructure fosters international peace and security, and does not become the catalyst for escalation and conflict.

The post Clouds of war: The implications of targeting data centres first appeared on UNIDIR.

Every year, on 23 April, the UN celebrates International Girls in ICT Day. This year’s theme “AI for Development: Girls Shaping the Digital Future” draws attention to the digital gender divide: How can we ensure that AI benefits everyone when 90% of adolescent girls and young women in low-income countries are offline? If not developed responsibly, AI technology risks perpetuating and reinforcing gendered inequalities through unequal access, biased algorithms and new forms of AI-enabled digital harm.

An important step for addressing these issues is to ensure that women diplomats, who remain under-represented in multilateral cyber governance forums, have a seat at the decision-making table. Every year, UNIDIR organizes the Women in AI Fellowship and the Women in Cyber Fellowship, bringing together women diplomats from across the world working on AI and cybersecurity for week-long trainings. The fellowships are part of UNIDIR’s broader effort to contribute to women’s meaningful participation in international security.

Q: How does your work relate to AI and/or cybersecurity? And how do you see your role as a diplomat in shaping the digital future?  

A: My work sits at the intersection of technology, security and global governance. As a diplomat, I contribute to building international consensus on how artificial intelligence and digital technologies should be developed and used in a responsible, ethical and secure manner.  

I see my role as that of a translator between different worlds: the technical, the political, and the human.

Ultimately, the digital future is not defined only by what technology can do, but by what we decide as societies it should do. From Chile, I seek to bring a perspective that places people, their rights and their dignity at the centre, ensuring that digital transformation becomes a tool to reduce inequalities rather than deepen them. 

Q: What aspects of the UNIDIR Women in AI Fellowship and/or Women in Cyber Fellowship have been most helpful to you and how?

A: One of the most transformative aspects of these fellowships has been the opportunity to connect with amazing women from different regions and professional backgrounds, all sharing a common conviction: that we can and want to actively shape more inclusive technological futures.

Beyond technical knowledge, I particularly value the space to question assumptions and enrich discussions through interdisciplinary perspectives. For example, through the fellowships I was able to more effectively integrate ethical and gender considerations into discussions on security and emerging technologies, strengthening my ability to contribute more holistically in multilateral settings.

Q: Which emerging challenge related to AI or cybersecurity concerns you the most – and why?

A: I am deeply concerned about the pace at which these technologies are advancing compared to our collective ability to govern them. In particular, the risk that artificial intelligence may reproduce or amplify existing inequalities, often in ways that are not immediately visible.

I have worked in regulating tech my entire professional career and as regulators, we are always lagging behind. AI is a whole new challenge as it revolutionizes multiple sectors at the same time, making it very hard for current governing structures and institutions to follow up.

I am also concerned about the increasing autonomy of certain systems in sensitive contexts, such as security and defence. This raises fundamental questions:

Where do we draw the line? How do we ensure accountability? And, above all, how do we guarantee that these technologies remain in service of people?

Perhaps even more fundamentally, I often ask myself whether we will be able to collectively prioritize what truly matters. In an international context that frequently incentivizes competition – technological, economic and strategic – the real challenge lies in achieving the agreements needed to establish shared principles and limits. The question is not only what we can do with these technologies, but whether we will have the collective will to ensure that their development serves the common good, rather than narrow interests.

Q: What do you think are the biggest barriers to women and girls’ meaningful participation in the digital space?

A: The barriers are not only about access, but also about perception and confidence. Many girls and young women grow up without seeing themselves reflected in these spaces, or they grow up feeling that they do not belong.

These challenges are compounded by structural inequalities in education, opportunities and access to digital tools, as well as online environments that are not always safe or welcoming. Addressing these barriers requires not only public policy, but also deeper cultural change. And most of all, it requires strong networks of professionals inspiring and supporting each other.

Q: What advice would you share with girls and young women aspiring to contribute to AI and cybersecurity governance?

A: I would tell them that curiosity is a form of courage. Asking questions, exploring, making mistakes, and trying again are all essential parts of the journey.

But above all, I would remind them of something they should never lose sight of: technology is not an end in itself. Any innovation that truly matters must be, at its core, by and for people. It should improve lives, expand opportunities, and protect what makes us human.

They do not need to fit into a predefined mold to contribute to this field. Their perspectives, experiences, and questions are exactly what is needed to build a more just digital future. I would encourage them to step forward, to make their voices heard, and to imagine different kinds of technologies: more inclusive, more ethical, and more human-centred. Technology that reflects and supports their needs and dreams.

Q: Any final thoughts on girls’ and women’s empowerment in the digital space?

A: Digital empowerment is not only about access, but also about agency… the ability to influence, decide and transform. It is not just about increasing the number of women in technology, but about ensuring that they can shape how these technologies are designed, implemented and governed.

If we truly integrate diverse perspectives, we will not only close gaps, but we will also build better technologies. Because a more inclusive digital future is not only fairer; it is also more innovative and sustainable.

The post Women shaping our digital future first appeared on UNIDIR.

This marked the first time UNIDIR was invited to present its work as a cooperation partner of SOMTC-Cambodia during the open session of the Working Group on Arms Smuggling. The Institute delivered the presentation to delegations from ASEAN Member States and representatives of the ASEAN Secretariat.

UNIDIR highlighted two areas for potential cooperation:

1. It presented outcomes from the capacity-building on reporting under international instruments on conventional arms and ammunition control, held in Phnom Penh.
2. It highlighted policy-relevant research on emerging production methods and knowledge transfers related to improvised weapons, including collaborations with organizations and experts in Southeast Asia.

This event was a landmark for deepening cooperation between UNIDIR and its partners across the region, particularly with Cambodia as the SOMTC voluntary lead shepherd for the arms smuggling priority area. UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme reiterated its commitment to supporting the efforts of SOMTC-Cambodia and the SOMTC Working Group on Arms Smuggling to curb the illicit smuggling of firearms and its ammunition.

ASEAN’s approach to preventing arms smuggling

The ASEAN Declaration on Combating Arms Smuggling was adopted on 21 August 2023 in Labuan Bajo, Indonesia. The declaration recognizes the pervasive threats of arms smuggling in Southeast Asia and the challenges in preventing and curbing cross-border illicit trade and smuggling of firearms and its ammunition.

The ASEAN SOMTC Working Group on Arms Smuggling meets annually and serves as a dedicated platform for Member States to exchange views on challenges, share best practices, and identify practical solutions related to arms smuggling. The Working Group plays a central role in supporting the implementation of the declaration. It is also a forum for ASEAN Member States and invited dialogue partners to seize opportunities for collaboration on capacity-building, training and information-sharing to enhance regional responses to arms smuggling.

The post Advancing cooperation against arms smuggling in Southeast Asia first appeared on UNIDIR.

Organized by UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme, the training sought to strengthen Malaysia’s cyber resilience by promoting greater alignment and cooperation among key national actors. It also advanced efforts to operationalize the UN cyber norms and address the growing need for demand-driven and responsive capacity-building, as highlighted by the UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICT Security. 

Ranging from the rapid growth of ransomware to supply-chain compromises and AI-enabled disinformation, the training addressed the evolving cyber threat landscape and the practical challenges of responding to high-impact ICT incidents. Participants gained a comprehensive picture of how cyber threats can disrupt critical infrastructure and services through scenario-based and multi-stage table-top exercises by applying UNIDIR Taxonomy of Malicious ICT Incidents. The dedicated policy briefings highlighted how recent advancements and trends in quantum computing and artificial intelligence are expected to reshape cybersecurity and broader security dynamics.

Aligning national capabilities with UN frameworks

By featuring extensive discussions on the role of UN voluntary cyber norms and developing a national position on the interpretation of international law, the training helped advance Malaysia’s long-term cyber resilience.

In addition to the UNIDIR’s Foundational Cyber Capabilities Framework, the programme introduced strategic approaches that decision-makers may consider for responding to malicious ICT incidents and de-escalating tensions with potentially significant impacts on regional security and stability. These included:

• diplomatic engagement,
• acts of retorsion,
• countermeasures, and
• the activation of confidence-building measures.

An interactive session led by the International Telecommunication Union complemented these discussions, sharing good practices and practical tools for integrating the UN framework in the development of the national cybersecurity strategies.

Towards stronger regional cyber resilience

This training forms part of a growing regional series of bilateral trainings – also held in Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Thailand – aimed at reinforcing national and regional cybersecurity capacities. UNIDIR remains committed to supporting governments with tailored tools and training, enabling them to respond effectively to rapidly evolving threats in the ICT environment. 

To learn more about UNIDIR’s research-driven training and capacity-building programmes, visit the UNIDIR Academy. 

This project is funded by Global Affairs Canada under its Indo-Pacific Strategy.

The post UNIDIR builds national cyber resilience in Malaysia first appeared on UNIDIR.

The workshop was designed to increase the awareness among national authorities on international conventional weapons instruments, strengthen their capacity to fulfill reporting commitments under them, and identify priority areas for enhanced international cooperation and assistance. It brought together some 40 government officials from Cambodia’s capital and border provinces involved in conventional arms and ammunition control and counter-trafficking efforts.

The workshop opened with a high-level address from H.E. Police General Por Phak, Secretary of State and Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) Cambodia Leader at the Ministry of Interior. He emphasized Cambodia’s commitment to strengthening national control systems and adapting to evolving global standards:

This [event] reflects our determination to fulfill our obligation and strengthen [our] national control system. At the same time, we are taking steps to align [with] emerging framework[s], including the Global Framework on Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management, which require enhanced technical capacity and coordination. This workshop provides a timely opportunity to advance these efforts.

H.E. Pol. Gen. Por Phak, Secretary of State and SOMTC-Cambodia Leader, Ministry of Interior, Kingdom of Cambodia

Strengthening national reporting processes

The training focused on the institutionalization of effective inter-agency cooperation to collect and share the information needed for national reports on:

• The implementation of the UN Programme on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI)
• The implementation of the Global Framework on Through-Life Conventional Ammunition Management (GFA)
• International arms transfers for the UN Register on Conventional Weapons

UNIDIR experts Dr Paul Holtom, Head of Programme, and Joshua Angelo Bata, Associate Researcher, both with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, delivered presentations and facilitated group exercises. A highlight of the training was the process of drafting a “national procedures document” to support the institutionalization of reporting in Cambodia. This exercise entailed identifying “what” data and information is needed, “who” holds it, and “when” to collect, share, and prepare reports for each instrument.  

Enhancing the quality and use of reports

This training is timely as the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs has requested Member States to submit their national report on the implementation of the UN PoA and ITI in advance of the 2026 Biennial Meeting of States. In parallel, Member States are also requested to voluntarily submit their initial overview of the GFA implementation in 2026.

The two-day event, while national in scope, also included regional and global considerations.  Workshop participants not only explored how to ensure high-quality national reports but also identified issues on which Cambodia could share effective practices in implementing these instruments, as well as international cooperation and assistance needs.

Reporting on the implementation of conventional arms and ammunition control instruments helps to build confidence between States, reduce tensions relating to authorized and illicit arms flows, and support efforts to foster peace, security, stability and sustainable development.

Dr Paul Holtom, Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms Programme

Supporting Cambodia’s regional leadership

The training also supports Cambodia in its role as the voluntary lead shepherd of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) SOMTC Working Group on Arms Smuggling. The workshop helped to show how preparing national reports for the PoA and GFA helps to review national legal frameworks related to manufacturing, trafficking and use of arms, as well as for data collection regarding illicit arms manufacturing and trafficking, in accordance with the ASEAN Declaration on Combating Arms Smuggling.

Experts from Non-Violence International Southeast Asia, Mitzi Austero and Dr Fred Lubang also contributed to the training by sharing the national experiences of ASEAN Member States regarding inter-agency cooperation.

The workshop forms part of UNIDIR’s broader efforts to support States in strengthening national systems and processes for reporting on international conventional weapons instruments. Through its Conventional Arms Programme, UNIDIR continues to deliver tailored advice and training to help States build sustainable, nationally owned capacities for effective and transparent reporting.

The post UNIDIR strengthens Cambodia’s capacity for conventional arms reporting first appeared on UNIDIR.

The discussions have confirmed an emerging international consensus that the UN system should address this agenda more systematically and strategically. Maritime security is increasingly understood as a global responsibility to protect the sea; ensure freedom of navigation and safe passage for international trade; fight blue crimes, such as piracy; and safeguard marine ecosystems.

Achieving these objectives requires a comprehensive, multi-level approach spanning national, regional, and global frameworks. The effectiveness of the UN system — its coordination with regional actors, its support to Member States, and its capacity to respond to maritime emergencies — remains critical.

But how can the UN system be further strengthened to address both traditional and emerging maritime security challenges? Closing persistent gaps will be essential to ensure strategic coherence, long-term sustainability, and greater foresight.

This leads to concrete reform proposals which are modest in ambition, but significant in impact. The UN’s approach would be stronger through a thematic Security Council resolution, a Secretary General report, deeper in-house expertise, and mainstreaming the maritime security agenda.

Too many agencies, too little coordination

A significant number of UN agencies have developed programmes on maritime security since the early 2000s. A large and still-growing number of agencies, programmes and bodies — each with their own mandate, funding stream, and reporting line — deals with aspects of maritime security. Yet, none have a comprehensive mandate.

A first attempt to map the responsible agencies by UNIDIR has identified five agencies with large scale maritime security programmes (the Big Five), 19 other relevant agencies, and nine international organizations not formally part of the UN system. In addition, many formal and informal regional organizations work in the field.

While this breadth reflects the cross-cutting nature of maritime threats, it generates significant risks of overlap, duplication and governance gaps. There is no single entity with the mandate, authority or capacity to coordinate these activities at the global level, presenting a risk of competitive fragmentation rather than complementary specialization.

Capacity building gaps: Who trains whom in what?

Weak national and regional capacities in maritime security governance continue to be a substantial problem. This is a major challenge not only for countries recovering from armed conflict or grappling with development challenges, but also for small island states.

Major international investments in maritime security capacity building, technical assistance, and security sector reform have been made since the early 2000s. Much of this work is concentrated and run by the “Big Five” group of agencies. Yet, attempts to coordinate their delivery work remain limited in scope.

This may lead to programming that reflects the strategic priorities of providers rather than the needs of recipients, alongside risks of overlap and duplication, gaps in coverage, insufficient attention to long-term requirements and emerging challenges, and limited evaluation of effectiveness — including instances where “zombie projects” continue to absorb resources without delivering commensurate impact.

Data gaps: Towards a global picture of the maritime domain

This points to another important gap: the absence of an authoritative global dataset on maritime security threats and incidents to identify problems, assess responses, and guide priorities.

Reporting mechanisms by the “Big Five” are mandate-specific, fragmented across agencies, and heavily dependent on voluntary member-state submissions. Interpol and Interport Police facilitate operational exchanges, and regional Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives now provide near-comprehensive coverage of most ocean basins — with a persistent South Atlantic gap.

A growing share of maritime data infrastructure — satellites, sensors and data platforms — is commercially owned, improving access for some but raising concerns about affordability, equity and whether such data should be treated as a global public good rather than a commodity.

The UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime’s Global Maritime Crime Programme has begun to facilitate dialogue between different platforms and actors. However, there are yet no agreed international standards and mechanisms for international data exchange and fusion. This limits the ability of the international community to identify patterns, assess trends, and allocate resources rationally.

Making sense of data

Even where data exists, the UN system does not have an institutional home for the kind of expertise and strategic analysis needed to translate information into policy priorities.

Regional analytical centres exist — often focused on specific issue areas such as narcotics or sanctioned shipping — and ad hoc reports are produced by UNODC, UNIDIR, and academic institutions.

But these are insufficient substitutes for a standing analytical capacity with a global mandate. The absence of such a capacity means that international responses to maritime security threats remain reactive rather than anticipatory.

The strategic and foresight gap

Since 2000, the maritime security threat landscape has evolved through four overlapping phases, each introducing new actors and challenges:

• Early 2000s: an early focus on counter-terrorism 
• Late 2000s: counter-piracy
• Early 2010s: increasing attention to blue crimes like smuggling and illegal fishing
• Present: a dominant focus on grey-zone threats

This current phase is marked by deliberate ambiguity, with state-sponsored or tolerated actors operating below the threshold of armed conflict and exploiting legal gaps, as seen in activities such as GNSS spoofing and jamming, maritime cyber attacks, and potential sabotage of critical infrastructure like undersea cables and pipelines.

These activities reveal significant norm deficits — areas where international law is unclear, contested or simply absent. They present unresolved and rapidly changing legal and governance challenges that existing institutions are not well-equipped to address.

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis is a telling example. While it demands an emergency response, it should also invite strategic thinking on what future options are available to ensure safe passage for civilian vessels in strategic waterways during and after armed conflict. Options for future crises need to be developed, drawing on the lessons from past initiatives.

A concrete path to reform

Addressing the structural deficits identified above requires both immediate steps and longer-term institutional reform. The following measures represent a sequenced and politically feasible path:

Adopt a UN Security Council resolution on maritime security. Building on the current momentum, the Security Council could adopt a comprehensive thematic resolution establishing maritime security as a standing priority and mandating inter-agency coordination. The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis provides a timely catalyst for action, and the elected Council members (E-10) could jointly lead the way.

Publish an annual UN Secretary-General Report. An annual report on maritime security trends, governance gaps, and system-wide activities could provide the analytical foundation for strategic decision-making and increase accountability across the UN system. Debates on the annual report in the Security Council and General Assembly could ensure sustained attention for a comprehensive approach.

Ensure appropriate liaison functions. Representation and liaison of all relevant UN agencies – notably the “Big Five” – in New York is important to enhance coordination and ensure expertise is brought to bear when needed. Remote participation can only partially compensate.

Establish a dedicated maritime security body. A section or division in the General Secretariat with cross-cutting coordination and analysis mandate is essential. Such a body could serve as a clearing house for data, a coordinator for information sharing and best practices on capacity-building, and a provider of strategic assessments to the Security Council and General Assembly. A few (seconded) staff members could make a major difference and enhance resource efficiency.

Create an expert network for maritime security. An expert network or United Nations University Institute could ensure that UN entities, regional organizations, and Member States have access to comprehensive expertise when needed. It would also help enhance analytical capabilities, cross-regional and cross-agency exchange of best practices, global assessments, and strategic foresight.

Mainstream maritime security across the UN System. Maritime security dimensions need to be systematically integrated into the UN Ocean Decade, the World Ocean Assessment, the UN Ocean Conferences, relevant peacebuilding and sustainable development frameworks and human rights work. Treating maritime security as a siloed ‘hard security’ issue disconnected from ocean health and blue economy goals is analytically incoherent and operationally counterproductive.

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In the past, successful Review Conference outcomes – such as an agreement on a final document comprised of some combination of a review of the operation of the treaty, and conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions – have been achieved in difficult circumstances. This commentary provides an overview of the various forms of consensus achieved at past NPT Review Conferences, which can be clustered into comprehensive consensus, partial consensus, and conditional consensus.

2000: Achieving comprehensive consensus

To date, only one of the ten NPT Review Conferences has managed to agree on a final document, based on comprehensive consensus without caveats. The 1995 decision on strengthening the review process established the forward-looking part of the document, in addition to the review of the implementation of the treaty in the preceding five years.

In 2000, the Review Conference was the first and the only one to achieve consensus on both. It is widely considered the most significant substantive success with the adoption of the “13 Practical Steps” for systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI on disarmament, following various concerning international developments in the preceding review cycle. The steps included significant language on:

• nuclear disarmament commitments,
• the principle of irreversibility,     
• the elimination of nuclear arsenals, and
• accelerated efforts toward the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Negotiations were complex and required significant compromise on language related to key issues, leading some to note that consensus was only possible because “deep differences between States on several crucial matters were papered over” and the wording used was “sufficiently ambiguous to enable all sides to claim victory.”

Accordingly, the prospect of implementation of the agreed upon steps was already perceived as “bleak” at the time. Such concerns were later confirmed by the disavowal of the “13 Practical Steps” by several nuclear-weapon States (NWS) at the following Review Conference in 2005, as well as the persistent implementation gaps that continue to impact upon the NPT regime today.

1995 and 2010: Years marked by partial consensus

States Parties have achieved partial consensus twice to date; at the highly consequential 1995 and 2010 Review Conferences, the latter which remains the last one to have adopted a consensus final document. In both cases, comprehensive consensus could not be achieved, but diplomatic skill and procedural openness enabled consensus on key issues.     

The 1995 conference is often considered the most unique and significant in the history of the NPT’s review process. The treaty’s initial 25-year duration was ending, making its extension a priority for many States Parties, who successfully adopted a package of four key decisions. These included:

• the indefinite extension of the NPT,
• the adoption of “principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,”
• the strengthening of the review process, and
• a resolution on the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The package of decisions was passed without a vote but required careful and clever drafting to ensure that key demands of different groups were satisfied in the bargain. The NWS strong interest in indefinite extension of the treaty gave the non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), especially the Non-Aligned Movement, a significant bargaining chip, which was used to progress the Middle East Resolution. While a deal was struck for the forward-looking package of decisions, consensus was not achieved on the review part of the document as fundamental disagreements prevailed. These tensions were bypassed by not insisting on a traditional comprehensive consensus final document, allowing the important package of decisions to be passed.

The case of 1995 stands out because of its procedural creativity. Yet, the choice to adopt a package of decisions was less revolutionary at the time than it seems today, as States Parties had submitted draft resolutions, decisions and even protocols to the NPT at previous Review Conferences, showing that States Parties then considered a broader scope of possible outcome formats.

The 2010 Review Conference was the last one to date to adopt a consensus final document, though consensus was achieved only on the forward-looking action plan, while the review instead became a “President’s reflection” without necessarily representing the views of all the States Parties. Nonetheless, the outcome was significant with a 64-point Action Plan covering all three pillars of the NPT and including specific steps for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, endorsing a 2012 conference.

The 2010 Action Plan also reaffirmed the “13 practical steps” of the 2000 conference, embedding them into a larger, more complex political bargain that went beyond disarmament to also include non-proliferation and peaceful uses.

1975 and 1985: Establishing conditional consensus

The Review Conferences in 1975 and 1985 both managed to achieve consensus on a final document, but introduced notable conditionalities.

The short 1975 Final Declaration (which is under 5000 words) was drafted primarily by the President of the Conference. Consensus was only achieved by attaching various interpretive statements and reservations to the record, reflecting the differing views of delegations. This required flexibility on the part of the delegations, who chose to not block consensus, and of the President, who accepted the inclusion of national and group statements. Because of the caveats attached to the final document, the conference was not necessarily seen as an unequivocal success by all parties at the time.

In 1985, a similar approach was taken, ensuring that a consensus final document could again be adopted despite significant rifts. Explicit disagreement was noted around the lack of progress on a CTBT, in much stronger terms than in the 1975 final document. While formal consensus was thus preserved, the readily apparent lack of unanimity on the CTBT led one scholar to describe this as a “bogus consensus”.

Past pathways to success

A variety of approaches have contributed to meaningful outcomes and final documents at past NPT Review Conferences – yet no single method offers a guaranteed recipe for success. Only one Review Conference (in 2000) produced a fully negotiated, consensus-based and comprehensive final document—suggesting that such an outcome should be regarded as the exception rather than the norm.

Furthermore, the size and scope of Review Conference final documents have varied considerably. While discussions during the conferences may be wide-ranging, the issues explicitly captured in the final documents have, in practice, often been relatively narrow.

Table 1. Inclusion of language related to selected issues in NPT Review Conferences

Lessons for future NPT Review Conferences

Most NPT Review Conferences with successful outcomes were characterized by a degree of flexibility regarding the format of the final document. Examples of this begin with the very first Review Conference in 1975, which produced a final document written primarily by the President and which included the reservations of State Parties to specific statements.

Similarly, the 1985 final document included explicit mentions of disagreement on key issues, allowing formal consensus to be achieved despite intense substantive disagreement. The 1995 Review Conference pushed this further by not adopting a final document at all, instead passing a set of important decisions that continue to define the NPT Review Process today.

The most recent successful outcome at a Review Conference occurred in 2010 and whilst a final document was agreed and the forward-looking conclusions and recommendations achieved consensus, the review segment was not agreed by consensus and instead reflected the President’s views. Even as a President’s document, the review section featured language that qualified the degree of agreement on issues, rather than suggesting consensus.

Taken together, these cases show that successful NPT Review Conference outcome documents vary in terms of length, scope, focus and the type and route to consensus. While the goal of comprehensive consensus has presented a challenge at all Review Conferences, flexibility and procedural creativity have enabled past successes, even in tense international environments.

Nick Arndt was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme. He holds a Master of Philosophy in International Relations with distinction from the University of Oxford and a Bachelor of Arts in History and a minor in International Relations from the University of Groningen, where he graduated cum laude.

The post Unpacking the challenge of consensus at the NPT Review Conference first appeared on UNIDIR.

Returning after a successful inaugural edition, Geneva Cyber Week 2026 comes at a time of mounting cyber insecurity, intensifying geopolitical tension, and rapid technological change. Under the theme “Advancing Global Cooperation in Cyberspace”, the week will bring together policymakers, diplomats, technical experts, industry leaders, academics and civil society representatives to discuss cyber stability, resilience, governance, digitalization and the security implications of emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence.

Cybersecurity is no longer a niche technical issue; it is a strategic policy challenge with implications for international peace, economic stability and public trust. At a moment of growing fragmentation and accelerating technological change, Geneva Cyber Week brings together the communities that need to be in the room — diplomatic, technical, operational and policy — to move from shared concern to practical cooperation.

— Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli, Head of Security and Technology Programme, UNIDIR

Geneva Cyber Week reflects a commitment to dialogue, trust-building and international cooperation in cyberspace. With nearly 90 events, this year’s programme highlights Geneva’s role as a global centre for cyber diplomacy, international cooperation and digital governance.

The programme will include UNIDIR’s Cyber Stability Conference; Peak Incident Response, organized by the Swiss CSIRT Forum; Digital International Geneva, featuring a strategic fireside chat with the Swiss FDFA State Secretary; the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting on Cybersecurity, as well as the session Steering through Cyber Turbulence; and the Council of Europe session Artificial Intelligence, Cybercrime and Electronic Evidence: Risks, Opportunities, and Global Cooperation.

At a time when digital threats know no borders, fostering inclusive discussions is essential to building trust, advancing common norms, and promoting a secure and open cyberspace for all. International Geneva provides an unparalleled multilateral environment to address these cybersecurity challenges collectively. Geneva Cyber Week’s diverse programme embodies this collaborative spirit.

— Marina Wyss Ross, Deputy Head of International Security Division and Chief of Section for Arms Control, Disarmament and Cybersecurity, Swiss FDFA 

Throughout the week, partner-led panels, workshops, simulations, exhibitions and networking events will further enrich the programme. Geneva will also showcase the week citywide, from flags on the Mont Blanc Bridge to the Jet d’Eau illuminated in Geneva Cyber Week colours on Monday evening.

To learn more, visit the Geneva Cyber Week website. For further information, please contact Claudia Marquina, UNIDIR Head of Communications at claudia.marquina@un.org.

About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. For more information, visit unidir.org.

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Describing the report as both “timely and necessary,” Dr Raymond Omollo, Principal Secretary at Kenya’s Ministry Interior and National Administration, emphasized its clear analysis of achievements and remaining gaps. “It provides a clear-eyed view of where we stand and what needs to be done,” he noted during the launch.

Presenting the key findings, Dr Paul Holtom, Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, called the study a “milestone for combating the scourge of illicit small arms and light weapons and their misuse in eastern Africa.” He contrasted the region’s nascent national SALW control systems in 2005 with significant progress made by States by 2025.

In his remarks, Douglas Kanja, Inspector General of the Kenya National Police Service and President of the AFRIPOL General Assembly, highlighted the measurable gains in legislative and regulatory frameworks, stockpile management, marking, recordkeeping systems, and inter-agency coordination mechanisms.

Progress by the numbers

In 2005, no State in the region marked their weapons. By 2025, five States could confidently report that they had marked all State-owned SALW, with the remaining seven States assessed in the study making good progress.

We can say with confidence that the RECSA region has made remarkable and measurable progress.

Jean Pierre Betindji, RECSA’s Executive Secretary

Table: Progress made in marking and recordkeeping for SALW, 2005-2025

Despite the notable progress, persistent challenges remain. Dr Omollo cautioned that “the study equally and clearly captures persistent gaps.” Dr Holtom also highlighted continued challenges in implementing the Nairobi Protocol – especially concerning the mobilization of adequate resources, the operationalization of tracing mechanisms, border controls, law enforcement cooperation, and regional information exchange.

The proliferation of SALW in the region continues to fuel conflicts, to undermine development, and to threaten safety and security of our communities.

Felix Namurahonye, Inspector General of Police in Rwanda and Chair of RECSA’s Technical Advisory Committee

A roadmap for renewal

The report launch represents an important opportunity for States and key stakeholders to renew their commitment to addressing the illicit SALW trade in the region. It provides recommendations to revise the Nairobi Protocol’s provisions to:

• strengthen cross-border cooperation or national coordination mechanisms;
• align the protocol with relevant international and regional arms control frameworks; and
• take into account emerging weapon technologies posing a threat to peace and security in the region, including improvised explosive devices and armed uncrewed aerial vehicles.

RECSA has incorporated the report’s recommendations into its next five-year plan (2026-2031). It will present proposals to update the Nairobi Protocol and its best-practice guidelines to the Technical Advisory Committee, which will meet in Kigali, Rwanda next June. This represents an important first step toward translating the report’s findings into practical measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing, trafficking, possession and use of SALW in the region.

Revitalizing partnerships

Looking ahead, Dr Ivor Fung of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and Francis Wairagu of the Small Arms Survey both highlighted that to realize the new vision for the protocol, cooperation with international and regional organizations, civil society, academia and industry will need to be revitalized and enhanced. In this regard, Nerys Smith of the United Kingdom’s High Commission to Kenya expressed encouragement for these renewed efforts, stating: “We have a shared commitment to reduce human suffering and build a safer future in the region and the continent.”

The report on the Nairobi Protocol on SAWL at 20 is the final output of the joint UNIDIR-RECSA project, funded by the United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. The report is intended to support RECSA Member States and Secretariat in responding to the call of RECSA’s 11^th Council of Ministers Meeting to review the Nairobi Protocol.

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This experience captures something essential about space security. We depend on space infrastructure in our daily lives, yet we rarely think about it. When these systems function correctly, they become invisible. But when something goes wrong, the impact ripples across economies and societies.

Storytelling can be used as both a communication tool and a governance mechanism for space security. When we make space threats tangible and perceptible, we show stakeholders like farmers and entrepreneurs the importance of orbital stability and create the foundation for enforcement mechanisms and safeguards. A major theme discussed at OS25 was the excellent work that the space security community has done in identifying threats and proposing frameworks. What we need now is to make those frameworks real for the billions of people who depend on them, and to put the requisite safeguards in place.

Why space security matters now

Space infrastructure drives modern life in ways most people never recognize. Satellites enable navigation, financial transactions, weather forecasting and countless other global needs. In my home country of Nigeria, a small tailoring business owner uses her mobile phone for financial transactions, tracking deliveries and navigating the congested Lagos traffic using apps enabled by Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). She might have never thought of herself as a space technology user, but she absolutely is. If GNSS signals were disrupted, her business would grind to a halt. She would not receive payments nor be able to plan deliveries and navigate efficiently. The satellite systems enabling her livelihood feel distant and abstract, yet they are as essential as the electricity powering her sewing machine.

One key lesson I took from the technology demonstration at OS25 were the words of Dr Peter Martinez who highlighted the growing population of active satellites in space as a challenge. His perspective was supported by other speakers who shared their concerns about orbital debris, dual-use technologies and the increasing complexity of managing a domain that was once scarcely occupied but now hosts a fleet of commercial space actors. As Kees van Der Pols emphasized at the conference, space sustainability is something we need to work on right now, not as a future concern, but as an immediate priority. If we continue taking the orbital environment for granted today, it could become unusable tomorrow unless positive action is not taken.

Addressing the communication gap

During my lightning talk at OS25, I stated that when people think about space in Nigeria, they often think about astronauts and aliens or movies like Star Wars and Interstellar. Dr Melissa de Zwart raised an important question during Panel VI that piqued my interest: Does the farmer who uses space technology consider himself to be part of the space industry? In her response, she stated that they might not consider themselves to be, but they are. That observation showcases a fundamental problem. Space security discussions happen in conference rooms in Geneva, but the real stakeholders are everywhere else.

The essence of this gap is that governance requires legitimacy, and legitimacy requires understanding. When the vast majority of space users do not understand their dependence on orbital infrastructure, they cannot participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect them. Without this understanding, space security frameworks risk becoming disconnected from the people they are meant to protect, undermining both public support and effective implementation.

This gap persists partly because of how people experience space technology. During Panel I, Dr Laetitia Cesari noted that technology is not only an opportunity but it also exposes us to challenges. The opportunity and convenience are what most people experience without understanding the vulnerabilities. People are not aware of what could go wrong, so they do not engage with conversations on how to protect these systems that significantly impact them.

Making governance real through stories

Storytelling plays a critical role in governance as the narratives we share, shape what people perceive as urgent, what they believe is solvable, and what they are willing to support politically. Research in science communication shows that narratives have a “privileged status” in human cognition because they are processed more efficiently than logical-scientific formats, recalled more accurately and are intrinsically persuasive. When complex scientific issues are translated into relatable narratives, public understanding improves and political will strengthens. For space security, this means technical expertise alone cannot drive public engagement or policy support. Narratives become not only appropriate, but essential.

In  2023, I coordinated the largest campus cleanup in University of Benin history, gathering over 400 volunteers and raising more than ₦1,000,000 in sponsorships. That was not achieved by lecturing people about waste management policy alone. We used visual storytelling to show them what our campus could look like, connecting abstract environmental goals to the pride of being part of something transformative. This made the problem visible and the solution achievable.

For space security, storytelling can serve three essential functions:

1. Making threats understandable

During Panel II at OS25, Dr Guoyu Wang highlighted three fundamental elements for defining space threats. These include:

(1) intent, referring to deliberate acts;

(2) behavior, encompassing both actions and inactions;

(3) adverse impact, meaning any form or potential of harm such as material or non-material damage.

However, to communicate these effectively to non-technical stakeholders, we must ask what adverse impact from intentional behavior in space actually means for someone in Lagos or Nairobi? It could mean an ATM stops working because the satellites enabling financial transactions are jammed. It could mean an Uber driver cannot find its client because GNSS signals are disrupted. It could also mean flights are grounded because air traffic control loses satellite navigation, or that farmers cannot optimize irrigation because precision agriculture data disappears.

Stories highlight that these threats were real all along, even when space security oftentimes seems far away and disconnected from our daily activities. Stories connect abstract policy debates to lived experience.

2. Broadening the stakeholder map

The farmer in Dr de Zwart’s example exposes another challenge where most space users are invisible to themselves. Many everyday stakeholders of space technologies do not follow multilateral discussions or UN forums on space security.

For effective communication to work, we must present the full complexity of these issues honestly. We cannot simply scare people with worst-case scenarios, as doing so risks breeding apathy rather than action, or worse, driving responses that create security dilemmas rather than solving them. We also cannot pretend that the status quo is adequate, as this risks fostering complacency and undermining the urgency for collective action. This is why intentional and honest storytelling is needed, because it provides a balance by showing real users navigating real risks and contributing to real solutions.

3. Building political will through layered governance

During Panel III, Clive Hughes outlined a possible path forward observing that legally binding and non-legally binding instruments must work in tandem. I believe it was a recognition that enforcement does not mean only hard law but also creating multiple, mutually reinforcing accountability mechanisms that work together.

Here, storytelling plays a crucial role by enabling layered governance through the building of public demand for both formal rules and informal norms. When people understand what is at stake, they support legislation. When they see themselves as stakeholders, they adopt responsible practices. When people recognize their collective dependence on space infrastructure for daily life, national security and economic stability, they participate in building collective security.

In the course of Panel V, Sarah Erickson warned that if we allow nuclear challenges to dominate the space security conversation, we risk sidelining other important issues like sustainability. Her concern reflects a real danger that discussions can become too abstract or too dominated by high politics that they lose connection to the everyday stakes that motivate broader engagement. Storytelling can rebalance priorities by showing that sustainability, debris mitigation, traffic management and peaceful uses of space are not separate from security.

Shifting from narrative to action

My analysis of the sector reveals four key recommendations that the space security community, governments, international organizations, civil society and industry can adopt to strengthen public engagement in space security governance.

1. Invest in accessible narratives: the space security community, including governmental agencies, academic institutions and civil society organizations, can create short documentaries, social media campaigns and educational materials that showcase how everyday users depend on space technology. These narratives should demonstrate real dependencies and real vulnerabilities without resorting to fear tactics.
2. Develop layered communication strategies: when briefing legislators or engaging civil society, it is beneficial to present not only threat assessments and policy options but also demonstrate who is affected, how they are affected and why action matters now. Policy documents could include case studies and testimonials from actual users. Technical reports might open with concrete scenarios that illustrate the real-world consequences of the issues being discussed.
3. Pilot local outreach projects: it would be beneficial for the technical community to work with agricultural cooperatives, transportation networks, educational institutions and small businesses to demonstrate their connection to space systems and invite their participation in governance discussions. These pilots should not be one-way information sessions but genuine dialogues where stakeholders can voice concerns, ask questions and contribute perspectives that policy experts might miss. The goal is to expand the circle of people who feel ownership over space security outcomes.
4. Support creative media initiatives: governments and civil society organizations can fund filmmakers, journalists, podcasters and digital creators who can reach audiences outside the conventional reach of the policy sphere. Trusting creative professionals to translate technical complexity into compelling narrative might mean documentaries that follow satellite operators through a day of work, podcasts that interview space technology users, or social media campaigns that visualize the consequences of satellite system failures. Creative storytelling should not replace technical communication, but complement it by reaching different audiences through different channels.

Storytelling is how we build that foundation. It should be done alongside technical expertise, not instead of it; in support of diplomatic negotiations, not instead of them; enabling law and policy, instead of replacing them. Storytelling transforms space security from an abstract policy concern into a tangible reality that affects everyday lives. When stakeholders see themselves in the narrative, they move from passive beneficiaries to active participants in building the governance frameworks necessary to protect our shared orbital infrastructure.

Adeboye Malumi is a legal graduate and media strategist who has developed storytelling for social impact, translating international policy into accessible media and cinematic narratives. He is the founder of Photo Logic and his work focuses on the intersection of international law, global governance and digital advocacy through media and film for emerging regions.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Adeboye Malumi selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

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My contribution to this issue was a speculative scenario that imagined how our choices could shape the future. The scenario I created, “Dispatch from 2050”, explored how African-led institutions, youth-driven innovation and ethical AI could play a critical role in maintaining orbital safety. At the heart of these issues lies a fundamental question: how do we ensure that the tools we build to safeguard space do not become sources of division or conflict? This question inspired the creative exercise that follows.

_{In the “Dispatch from 2050” scenario, a critical incident unfolded when a privately operated constellation and a State-led constellation entered conflict over contested frequency bands. Their automated systems, designed to respond independently to perceived threats, initiated a series of uncoordinated manoeuvres. These movements placed both networks on a trajectory that could have resulted in a catastrophic chain reaction of collisions.}

_{To address these mounting risks, African institutions had helped establish the Lusaka Protocol code 101e in 2047, a multilateral agreement aimed at regulating AI assisted decision making in orbit. The Lusaka Protocol code 101e emerged from years of growing concern that existing space governance instruments were ill equipped to manage the rise of autonomous decision making in orbit.}

_{During the crisis, a youth-developed AI system at the Lusaka Orbital Institute detected irregular movement patterns earlier than any human operator could. It predicted the likelihood of a collision and triggered an alert under the Lusaka Protocol code 101e. In response, an Emergency Orbital Hold was activated, freezing high-risk trajectories long enough to prevent immediate impact.}

This scenario, though speculative, reflects trends that are already emerging today. Research shows a rapid expansion of mega-constellations and increasing congestion in low Earth orbit (LEO), raising concerns about collision risks and frequency interference. Participating in the discussion around space policy and security initiatives firsthand has shown me that managing space security challenges requires more than advanced technology. It demands foresight, coordination, and inclusive governance frameworks that allow countries, private operators, and even youth to collaborate rather than compete in ways that could escalate into crises.

Ethical AI and governance in Earth’s orbit

The proliferation of satellites has transformed LEO into one of the busiest environments managed by humankind. Mega constellations, numbering in the thousands of satellites, are redefining connectivity, but also magnifying risks. Frequency interference, orbital crowding, and cascading collision hazards now pose systemic challenges.

Artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed to monitor orbital traffic without continuous human intervention, predict collisions, and optimize frequencies. AI-driven conjunction assessment systems can generate earlier and more precise collision warnings, allowing operators to plan avoidance manoeuvres with reduced fuel costs and minimal disruption to satellite services.

For instance, private companies like Leo Labs use AI-powered radar systems to track thousands of objects in LEO, enabling rapid detection of potential collisions. Intergovernmental and national space agencies, such as the European Space Operations Centre and NASA, also employ AI algorithms to optimize satellite constellation management and reduce congestion risks. These innovations illustrate thatfaster, more accurate monitoring can be an opportunity to prevent accidents, maintain the reliability of satellite services, and support global connectivity. However, risks arise when different operators’ AI systems act independently, potentially leading to uncoordinated manoeuvres. 

The autonomy of these systems also raises new dilemmas. Automated collision avoidance systems operating without shared coordination frameworks may respond to the same perceived challenge in conflicting ways, increasing the chances of secondary conjunctions. Another thing to consider is that private algorithms might determine orbital priorities without human oversight, creating opaque decision making that could undermine coordination and safety.

Current legal and normative frameworks, such as the Outer Space Treaty, provide broad principles of peaceful use but do not explicitly address AI-driven decision making. As autonomous systems, including AI-enabled ones, take on operational control in orbit, new governance tools will be needed. The imagined Lusaka Protocol code 101e offers one such conceptual solution, anchoring decision making in ethical AI design, transparency and inclusive diplomacy.

African institutions are beginning to explore solutions in this space. For example, the South African National Space Agency is developing AI- and data-driven tools for space situational awareness, including monitoring orbital debris and supporting national and regional satellite operations. In academia, the University of Cape Town is conducting research into AI applications for satellite traffic management, while private startups in Nigeria and Kenya are exploring small satellite constellations with integrated AI for improved frequency coordination and orbital safety. These initiatives demonstrate the potential for African-led contributions to global space governance. This fills an important knowledge gap and ensures that African perspectives are represented in emerging norms and standards.

Taken together, these examples reveal that the challenge posed by AI in orbital management is not just technological capacity but governance alignment. While AI systems can significantly enhance safety, efficiency and sustainability, their benefits depend on coordination, transparency and shared rules of engagement among operators. Without common standards for data sharing, decision-making logic, and human oversight, autonomous systems risk reproducing fragmentation in orbit. This dynamic is particularly consequential for emerging space actors, as unequal access to data, infrastructure and governance forums may reinforce existing power asymmetries.

International dialogue is evolving to address these issues. For example, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs has begun exploring the responsible use of emerging technologies such as AI in relation to space. The 2023 REAIM Call to Action, which received wide international support, underscores the global commitment to responsible AI use in the military domain. Furthermore, the OECD Recommendations on AI  provide guidance on how to improve trustworthiness in AI systems. They offer a useful framework for assessing future AI-enabled orbital management systems, particularly in relation to the transparency of automated decisions, accountability for harm, and preservation of human control over safety in critical domains.

In the African context, scholars are beginning to explore how indigenous ethical systems, such as Ubuntu, could influence AI ethics by emphasizing communality, interconnectedness and shared responsibility. Such contributions show the need to define and operationalize African perspectives within AI policy frameworks.

Building the future we imagine

The imagined orbital crisis of 2050 might seem distant, but the seeds of prevention must be planted now. Governance of AI-driven decision-making systems in space remains underdeveloped. Recent research highlights how governance of AI-enabled space technologies is often reactive, with policy frameworks emerging only after risks or crises materialize. These frameworks should instead employ foresight, human oversight, and accountability at the design stage. This would ensure that systems managing space assets reflect collective human values.

In my “Dispatch from 2050” fictional scenario, the Lusaka Protocol code 101e was not written by domain experts alone, but together with storytellers, elders, scientists, and youth from Lusaka. The future of space governance must be inclusive. Historically, decisions about space exploration have been concentrated among a few nations. The UN Space 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Space Policy and Strategy demonstrate growing recognition of the Global South’s role in shaping the future of space.

Africa, in particular, has shown leadership through data-driven projects in Earth observation, climate monitoring, and satellite innovation. Zambia’s increasing participation in technology innovation highlights the transformative power of youth-led research and policy development. Ethical AI systems developed by African institutions can ensure that space technologies serve developmental goals improving agriculture, education and disaster response while aligning with local values and human rights.

Internationally, instruments like the envisioned Lusaka Protocol code 101e could formalize ethical obligations, much as the Paris Agreement did for climate. At UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025,  Zhanna Malekos Smith emphasized how data ethics underpins responsible governance in emerging technologies, providing a concrete example of how ethical practices in AI and data management can strengthen trust and accountability in space operations. Just as physical debris threatens satellites, ethical neglect threatens the stability of governance.

The 2050 vision where inclusively constructed AI systems protect Earth’s orbit may seem aspirational, yet it is built on principles we can adopt today. The fictional Lusaka Protocol code 101e reflects the real potential of collaborative, human-centred innovation. If we succeed, the Lusaka Protocol code 101e of tomorrow will not be fictional, but a living embodiment of a world that chooses dialogue over dominance, inclusion over isolation, and ethics over expediency. In the end, space security is not about protecting satellites, it is about protecting our shared future.

Kondwani Mbale is an Artificial Intelligence student at the Specialized Institute of Applied Technology — City of Trades and Skills. His work focuses on computer vision, data analysis and intelligent systems. He has participated in international initiatives, including the ICANN80 NextGen programme and the FIRST Global Challenges, and is a laureate of the International Youth Competition of Scientific and Sci-Fi Works.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Kondwani Mbale, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post Preventing orbital crises with ethical AI first appeared on UNIDIR.

All engineering systems are developed across a lifecycle which generally consists of stages which include planning, development, implementation, operation and maintenance, and decommissioning.

The latter is an integral part of the systems engineering lifecycle process. The current opacity around decommissioning practices for AI systems, particularly military AI systems, leaves a gap in the understanding of their complete lifecycle. All systems ultimately have an end-of-life; that is, a point at which they are no longer fit for purpose and continuing to operate a system beyond this point presents both safety and legal risks.

This project will specifically focus on the decommissioning phase of AI-enabled military systems.

Unpacking decommissioning

What distinguishes decommissioning considerations of AI-enabled systems from that of conventional engineering counterparts is their software-driven nature. While many are cyber-physical systems (having both software and hardware components), it is the software component which introduces unique points of consideration.

Software is intangible and not subject to physical degradation or erosion over time. Its malleability and amorphousness also mean it changes with time. These factors impact when, why and how these systems are decommissioned.

The increasingly intertwined relationship between civil and military technology sectors, evident through data sharing and capacity building, adds an additional layer of complexity to decommissioning. The overlapping uses and applications of AI-enabled technologies and their infrastructure across these two domains also impacts when, why and how these systems are decommissioned.

The journey ahead

UNIDIR’s project will investigate the end-of-life of AI systems, presenting a framework to determine when a software-enabled system is no longer fit for purpose. It will also explore how these systems can be subsequently decommissioned.

Over the next two years, this research initiative will focus on:

1. Determining what constitutes the end-of-life of software.
2. Exploring different forms of decommissioning.
3. Understanding repurposing as a form of decommissioning.

In addition, the decommissioning of AI-systems project will convene multidisciplinary expert workshops across different regions to inform and advance this research.

Led by UNIDIR Fellow Associate Professor Zena Assad, the research is conducted in collaboration with UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme. To learn more about the project or to get involved, please contact zena.assaad@anu.edu.au.

The post Decommissioning military AI systems first appeared on UNIDIR.

This reflection shaped my contribution to the OS25 youth video competition, in which I argued that a 2050 hypothetical orbital conflict should be understood as a realistic possibility shaped by decisions being made today. Rather than treating 2050 as an abstract endpoint, I framed it as the cumulative outcome of present choices on access, responsibility and restraint in an increasingly congested orbital environment. The question we should be asking is therefore not what the future of space will look like, but rather what kind of orbital environment are we creating today.

Shared risks and uneven decision-making

The rapid expansion of human activity in low Earth orbit (LEO) represents a remarkable technological achievement. At the same time, it has introduced governance challenges that existing frameworks were not designed to manage. Hundreds of satellites are now launched each year, increasing congestion, collision risks, and the accumulation of long-lasting debris. Satellite tracking data shows how sharply the orbital population has grown over the past decade, driven by the deployment of large-scale mega constellations.
 
Technological tools such as improved tracking and collision-avoidance systems have developed quickly, but they cannot replace governance arrangements capable of managing collective risk. Many of the coordination mechanisms relied upon today were shaped in an era when space activity was slower, less crowded, and primarily State-led.

International space law, including the Outer Space Treaty, continues to provide essential principles and remains a cornerstone of space governance. However, as became clear during OS25 discussions, the current law alone cannot address the operational realities of a highly congested and commercially active orbital environment. The challenge is not the absence of rules, but the growing gap between legal principles and how space activity is conducted in practice.

States and private companies with advanced space capabilities now play a decisive role in shaping access to orbit. For non-spacefaring and space-nascent States, this often translates into reliance on external operators for critical services such as climate monitoring, navigation, communications, and disaster response. While these services deliver significant benefits, they also create new dependencies and vulnerabilities that risk reproducing familiar inequalities seen in other global commons. These include climate governance or international telecommunications, within a domain that was once imagined as universally shared.

One of the clearest examples of a shared threat discussed during OS25 was the long-term impact of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests on orbital sustainability. During Panel II, experts highlighted how kinetic ASAT tests contribute to persistent debris and increased collision risk in LEO. Data compiled by the Secure World Foundation show that kinetic ASAT tests alone have produced thousands of trackable debris objects, many of which will remain in orbit well into the coming decades.

The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has repeatedly highlighted space debris as a growing threat to the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, emphasising the need for collective mitigation efforts. Technical assessments by the European Space Agency further demonstrate how debris generated by single events can increase collision probabilities over time, creating cascading risks that affect all operators regardless of their role in the original action.

Commercial activity adds another layer of complexity as private operators are rapidly occupying orbital slots and radio-frequency spectrum, often faster than international coordination mechanisms can support. International space law – most notably article VI of the Outer Space Treaty – establishes that States bear international responsibility for all national space activities. This includes those carried out by non-governmental actors, such as commercial entities, under their authorization and continuing supervision. However, it remains far less clear how the cumulative risks created by these activities should be assessed and managed collectively in an increasingly crowded orbital environment.

The growing integration of artificial intelligence introduces additional governance challenges. These capabilities offer clear operational advantages, yet they also raise difficult questions about accountability and oversight. Autonomous systems are distinctive because they can execute operational decisions in real time without direct human authorization. In this context, decision-making unfolds on timescales that far outpaces diplomatic coordination or regulatory intervention. In the event of an error or unintended interaction, responsibility may be difficult to trace – particularly when decision-making is distributed across multiple actors and jurisdictions.

These multifaceted developments highlight a broader pattern where technological capabilities advance more rapidly than the institutional capacity to govern them. Addressing these gaps will require a shared understanding of acceptable risk, restraint and responsibility.

Rethinking space security through justice

Discussions throughout OS25 repeatedly returned to the idea that space security cannot be measured solely through technological strength or strategic advantage. Over time, I came to see justice, not as a moral add-on, but as a practical requirement for sustainable governance. Operationalizing orbital governance from a justice lens can be understood in the following ways.

Distributive justice shapes who benefits from space-based services and who remains dependent on others for access. This concern is increasingly reflected in UN discussions around the implementation of the Space2030 Agenda. Notably related work under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space emphasise improving access to space science, technology and data so that all States can benefit socioeconomically from space-derived services.

Procedural justice is concerned with who participates in shaping the rules that govern orbit. Current initiatives within UNOOSA, for example, highlight that including non-space-faring and space-nascent States strengthens legitimacy and trust in shared environments such as outer space. Likewise past space security initiatives like the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, made sure to open participation to all States and additional stakeholders.

Intergenerational justice is a concept central to environmental governance and is increasingly applied to space, particularly in discussions concerning space sustainability. It emphasises preservation of the orbital environment for future generations.

Recent policy-oriented research reflects this shift toward justice-based approaches, arguing that long-term stability in outer space depends on sustainability and collective risk reduction rather than dominance alone.

Youth participation as a governance lens

Youth are often described as future decision-makers, yet UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025 made clear that meaningful participation matters in the present. As a youth participant, I found that our role was not to offer idealism, but to ask questions that are sometimes avoided like whose security is prioritized, how is risk distributed, and whether current practices align with long-term goals.

One insight that stayed with me was how differently States understand the concept of security in orbit. For some, security is framed primarily in terms of protection and resilience, while for others, it is understood through restraint and risk reduction. These differences are rarely articulated explicitly, yet they shape negotiations and governance outcomes in meaningful ways.

Framing 2050 as a realistic governance horizon helped ground these discussions. It encouraged a shift away from reactive thinking toward preventive approaches, and from short-term competition toward shared responsibility. In this way, youth participation contributed not sentiment, but perspective, particularly by extending the time horizons through which space security is evaluated.

Outer space does not generate inequalities on its own; it reflects and amplifies the decisions we make. Our orbital environment can remain a domain of shared progress if it is governed through transparency, inclusion, and long-term responsibility. Preserving Earth’s orbit, therefore, is not only about managing congestion or preventing conflict. It requires confronting distributive, procedural, and intergenerational justice in the way access is structured, decisions are made, and risks are distributed. If governance mechanisms remain fragmented while activity intensifies, existing asymmetries risk becoming permanently embedded above our heads.

Emily Karakoleva is an international relations student and served as the Bulgarian Youth Delegate to the United Nations (2024–2025). Her work focuses on youth participation in global governance and international policy processes. She has represented Bulgarian youth in international forums, including the UN General Assembly Third Committee, the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum, and the UNESCO Youth Forum, and serves as a European Climate Pact Ambassador.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Emily Karakoleva, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post The impact of orbital governance first appeared on UNIDIR.

Improving coordination is essential, yet in many contexts it is difficult to obtain the information needed to coordinate effectively. Limited access to data, remote locations and fragmented systems often make it difficult to gather information regularly. Even when data exists, it may be incomplete, outdated, interpreted inconsistently across actors, or simply not used when decisions are made. These gaps make it harder for actors to understand needs accurately and reach the people who require support most urgently.

From fragmented data to coordinated action

When information from multiple sources is brought together, the picture becomes clearer. Integrated data systems, dashboards and mapping tools can help actors to better understand what has happened, what the needs are and how best to respond. These tools can make it easier to identify gaps, reduce duplication and support more coordinated planning. They do not solve the underlying challenges on their own, but they provide a stronger foundation for timely and informed decision‑making in fast‑moving environments to support communities in urgent need.

This vision reflects the direction set by the UN Secretary‑General’s data strategy, which calls for improved data access, stronger interoperability and more timely data‑driven decision‑making across the system. The strategy recognizes that better information alone is not enough, but that when data is accessible, connected and responsibly used, it provides an integrated platform for coordinated and effective action in complex environments.

The promise and limits of technological change

To improve coordination, we need to do it fast, using high quality information, and with a holistic approach.

Technology plays an important role in enabling this shift. Digitization accelerates the flow of information. Data can now be collected from remote locations using mobile devices, coordination across multiple actors is supported through integrated data management platforms, and analysis that once required lengthy manual steps can be automated by different analytical tools. These advances make it possible to respond to the needs of conflict affected populations in more targeted and timely ways. Instead of navigating slow, fragmented and manual systems, actors can focus on understanding needs and directing support where it is most urgently required.

Early in my data career, when I first began working with a local NGO during the Rohingya refugee response in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, technology had barely reached the remote camp areas scattered across the hills and mountains. We collected information over the phone or through paper‑based questionnaires: a slow, manual process that was far from ideal in an emergency response, where every minute matters.

When we transitioned to an ODK‑based data collection system, everything changed. Instead of chasing phone calls and sorting through stacks of paper, field teams could send data directly from their mobile devices. As the information came in, we could analyse and visualize it within minutes. That shift dramatically improved the speed and quality of our decision‑making, allowing teams on the ground to respond faster and with far greater confidence.

Rabby Shakur, UNIDIR Associate Researcher

But even with better systems and new technology, the way information is presented still needs to work for the people who use it. Many actors are already stretched thin, juggling several crises at once and expected to do more with fewer resources. If tools are complicated or take extra time to learn, they can become a burden rather than an asset for the actors. Formats need to be simple, practical and easy to use so that busy teams can quickly understand the information and act on it. When data is presented in a way that fits how people actually work, it is far more likely to support real decision-making.

This focus on usability also aligns with the broader direction of the UN80 initiative, which the UN Secretary-General has framed as essential to reducing duplication, strengthening coherence and enabling the UN system to operate more efficiently with limited resources. While still in process, the initiative reflects the direction set out in statements from the Secretary-General and in guidance circulated by Guy Ryder and senior leadership emphasizing clearer roles, shared approaches and more streamlined ways of working. By simplifying processes and reducing unnecessary complexity, UN80 seeks to ensure that actors can spend less time navigating systems and more time supporting people in need.

Beyond accessibility and usability, data must be reliable, ethically collected and managed and interpreted carefully. Poor-quality or misinterpreted data can reinforce blind spots rather than resolve them. Strong systems must therefore be accompanied by strong analytical capacity and governance frameworks that ensure ethical generation and use.

Ethical implications behind the numbers

Research findings that are usually disseminated via static outputs, such as reports and briefings, may sometimes limit the ability to respond to immediate questions. To realize the full value of the data collected, interactive and comparative data dashboards transform these findings into dynamic, user-friendly visualizations, on the one hand allowing deeper engagement, and on the other, maximizing the utility of this information for all. The latter is an underappreciated ethical imperative.

The focus on ethics in research is often at the design and implementation stage – ensuring respondents are fully informed, consent protocols are followed and personal information is protected. Yet, while each of these steps is essential, this is only one aspect of ethical research.

In considering ethics in this discussion, we especially address the moral responsibility that arises when research involves vulnerable people impacted by conflict. It is incumbent upon researchers to ensure that the data generated from their time and engagement is fully utilized and shared in recognition of the burden of their engagement and as part of efforts to ensure they are not overly interviewed.  The UN, as an organization that promotes values like human rights, dignity and the protection of vulnerable populations, should be at the forefront of this type of ethical data use especially as UN actors seek to fulfill the Secretary-General’s data strategy vision.

Evidence that is collected from vulnerable, conflict-affected populations, but remains underused, inaccessible, or disconnected from policy and practice risks falling short of this ethical responsibility. In this sense, effective communication of research findings becomes part of ethical research practice, not merely a dissemination task.

Delivering results in a format that meets the need to inform real-time decisions is an ethical obligation to ensure that research is meaningfully used. Doing so via visual tools becomes increasingly critical, especially when addressing policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders working across conflict transition contexts, often operating under time constraints.

Data is never just numbers. It is a human story – originated from someone who asked a question and shaped by the lived experience of someone who answered. Behind every number is a life, a story, a moment of trust.

Clara Zuccarino, UNIDIR Graduate Professional

At UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project, we encounter these dynamics directly. The project conducts research to understand how and why individuals exit armed conflict, and how institutions can better support those transitions. Reintegration processes for individuals leaving armed groups are complex and deeply context specific. Generating rigorous evidence and assessments on conflict trajectories is essential to understanding what contributes to sustainable reintegration outcomes. However, research findings must be accessible if they are to inform real-world decisions.

By transforming UNIDIR’s evidence into accessible data portals and visualizations, we aim to make it easier for policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders to translate evidence into action. The goal is not only to produce knowledge, but to ensure that it can inform planning, coordination and programmatic adjustments in meaningful ways and in semi-real time.

Maximizing the public value of evidence for future initiatives

Today, the UN system is asked to respond to complex global challenges amid tightening resources, resulting in both a practical and ethical responsibility to maximize the public value of data. Evidence generated through significant investment of time and trust by participants should not remain underused.

Evidence, however, is not an end in itself. Data has limitations, but strengthening how evidence is interpreted and applied across the system is both an efficiency measure and a commitment to ethical, impactful research and assessment. When information is translated into forms that genuinely support decision-making and shared responsibly in accessible formats such as dashboards or analytical tools, it becomes a foundation for more informed decisions in complex conflict response, ultimately improving outcomes for the populations the UN seeks to serve.

Mohammed Rabby Shakur is an Associate Researcher with UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict project. Previously, he served as an Information Management Delegate with the Finnish Red Cross in Ethiopia, as a Senior Information Management Officer with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Bangladesh, and as a Management Information System Officer with BRAC in Bangladesh. He has also worked as a consultant with the United Nations. Rabby holds a bachelor’s degree in management information systems from North South University. 

Clara Zuccarino was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Strategic Communications Unit. She holds a master’s in international and development studies from the Geneva Graduate Institute and a bachelor’s in philosophy, international and economic studies from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, where she graduated cum laude. Previously, Clara worked at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe on media and social media relations and strategy with multiple international stakeholders.

The post Data and digital tools driving more effective conflict response first appeared on UNIDIR.

Arms control and disarmament measures are often absent from multilateral discussions concerning the WPS Agenda. Yet at the national level, States are increasingly connecting these policy areas through their National Action Plans (NAPs) on WPS.

UNIDIR’s recently released Closing Gaps report analyzed 197 NAPs on WPS, revealing that over 70% include at least one mention to arms control and disarmament issues. However, most of these references appear only in introductory sections, rather than under proposed actions. To support States with moving from recognition to implementation, UNIDIR gathered concrete examples of actions and indicators that can advance the WPS Agenda and prepared a practical toolkit for addressing weapons-related risks in NAPs. These resources formed a key foundation for discussions throughout the workshop.

A diverse group of engaged actors

The event brought together more than 30 experts from a dozen European countries – including Albania, Austria, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, North Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Participants represented a wide range of stakeholders, including officials from ministries, gender equality agencies, military and academic institutions, national cybersecurity authorities, civil society and international organizations.

The workshop opened with high-level remarks from Slovenian officials Neva Grašič, State Secretary, and Darja Bavdaž Kuret, Ambassador-at-Large for Women, Peace and Security. Both highlighted the urgency of addressing evolving security risks — including weapons proliferation, hybrid warfare and emerging technologies — through a gender-responsive lens. They also stressed the importance of full, meaningful and equal participation of women in all areas of international security, which is one of the main pillars of the WPS Agenda.

Gendered dimensions of weapons, technology and security

The programme included thematic sessions outlining how gender-related considerations shape demand for, as well as impacts of, firearms in the region. Participants discussed options to strengthen arms control and disarmament measures that also seek to prevent the occurrence of sexual and gender‑based violence, in line with the WPS Agenda.

Given current developments concerning the use of landmines, the workshop also featured experts working with mine action in a number of contexts. They shared common challenges and good practices to foster inclusive participation in demining, risk education, victim assistance and international cooperation.

Participants also had an opportunity to discuss cybersecurity and military applications of artificial intelligence. They explored how these technologies intersect with the WPS Agenda and how national actors can integrate these topics into their work, including in WPS NAPs. This can help to ensure that the WPS framework remains relevant in the digital age, and efforts around addressing challenges and opportunities created by new technologies are not undertaken in silos.

Learning by doing

One of the highlights of the programme was a hands-on simulation, where participants split into two groups, taking on distinct roles in a drafting exercise focused on developing a WPS NAP that included specific arms control and disarmament measures. This exercise aimed at providing national actors with concrete ideas on how to integrate arms control and disarmament into their WPS design, drafting process and implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation efforts.

The workshop concluded with renewed commitment from participants and new networks that will foster regional cooperation on arms control, disarmament and the WPS Agenda. UNIDIR and its partners will continue supporting States in advancing an inclusive approach to arms control and disarmament – one that ensures that gender equality and the WPS Agenda are not seen as add-on considerations, but rather central elements of international security.

The post UNIDIR delivers regional workshop in Slovenia to advance the Women, Peace and Security Agenda first appeared on UNIDIR.

For much of modern history, outer space has been contested in the popular imagination. Since the Cold War, it has been viewed as a domain for geopolitical competition through technological supremacy. In recent decades, public debate has been shaped as much by science fiction as by the material realities of space infrastructure concerning space exploration, the militarisation of outer space and a growing space industry.

As discussed at UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025, space is central to daily lives for everyday citizens. Space systems provide Earth observation (EO) data used to monitor agriculture, track pollution and disaster management, as well as positioning, navigation and timing systems that support telecommunications, civilian aviation and international commerce. EO data is also used for military purposes including intelligence gathering, targeting and mission planning, and weapons deployment.

Space systems are so embedded in daily life that they are paradoxically mundane, such that, their presence often goes unnoticed. However, public understanding of space remains uneven, frequently shaped by the flashier and more sensational aspects of space activity – such as exploration missions and space entrepreneurs – rather than by its social, economic and political functions. Space literacy is one response to this gap.

In the absence of a single agreed definition, space literacy can be understood through a civic lens as the capacity to understand and engage with space as a public issue. It is also a form of civic preparedness for space security: when people understand why space matters to everyday life, they are more likely to participate meaningfully in public debates and policy decisions surrounding the resilience, governance and protection of space systems.

At present, discussions about space security often remain confined to academics, technical experts, international diplomats and industry leaders. Education and science communication play key roles in broadening participation and bringing space security into wider public conversation. 

Space as a civic issue

While outer space itself is governed as a global commons, many of these space-enabled services function as public goods that deliver broad benefit to entire communities and directly support all 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals. Civics is about how citizens understand and participate in the systems, institutions and decisions that influence public life.

It is key in a sector that is highly technological, heavily reliant on public investment, increasingly shaped by public–private collaboration and sensitive to government spending decisions. Framing space as a civic issue brings it into the public sphere and equips citizens to engage in debates about funding, environmental impacts, commercial activity and national security. This, in turn, strengthens democratic accountability and informed public participation.

To understand why space should be treated as a civic issue, it is helpful to view space systems through four segments that show how space touches different layers of society and carries civic relevance for diverse stakeholders.

As discussed at UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025, if space systems were compromised, the effects would cascade across critical sectors and touch multiple international security dimensions.

The loss of space capabilities would affect environmental and climate security by weakening extreme-weather monitoring, threaten human security by disrupting humanitarian coordination and disaster response, and jeopardize economic and national security as financial systems, supply chains and critical infrastructure become compromised.

Treating space as a civic concern builds public awareness and buy-in for responsible behaviour and governance of space systems. It broadens the conversation to include the many communities and sectors that rely on space, while strengthening public expectations of transparency and accountability. This framing places space within the public imagination as a public issue.

While space law, policy and security issues are often viewed through international relations, a civic lens reframes them not only as international issues, but also as domestic public concerns. This reframing reflects the foundational principle of Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty that states space activities must be carried out “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,” stressing space as a shared public domain rather than a narrow topic.

The role of science communication

Once space is understood as a civic issue, science communication becomes the next step. Public understanding supports trust in the institutions that manage space systems and governance and encourages meaningful public engagement. Science communication broadly refers to the translation of scientific, technical and policy information into forms which the public can access, through education, multimedia, museums and other dissemination and outreach interfaces. At its core is science literacy: creating touchpoints that help people understand how scientific systems shape everyday life.

Applied to space, science communication can embed space in public discourse and build political support for engaged space policy. When a clear “space story” becomes embedded in public discourse, governments are likely better placed to justify investment in resilient space infrastructure, support more informed discussions on space policy and sustain political support for international cooperation. While space agencies have undertaken education and public outreach, these efforts should continue. Public messaging about why space matters is needed to foster long-term public ownership of space as a civic and scientific concern, with direct and indirect implications for space security.

Space and food security in Australia

Much of Australia’s space infrastructure is concentrated in its ground segment, which supports important sectors such as agriculture and mining. Farmers and irrigation technicians rely on EO data for precision agriculture, sustainable farming, pasture management and early detection of pests and disease.

This is an example of an issue not usually associated with space security. It is more often seen as a domestic or economic concern, and this dependence is less discussed in public. Framing space as a civic issue is consequently important, particularly in an economy where food production, food security and regional industries rely heavily on space-enabled services.

Science communication provides practical tools to bridge this gap and reveal how everyday dependencies are directly linked to space and food security. Targeted public narratives that present space systems as enablers of the industries that feed the nation and sustain regional livelihoods can elevate space as a public concern tied to food security and economic resilience.

As one of the most influential sectors in Australia’s economy, increased awareness would likely create more opportunities for agricultural communities to engage with space capabilities, integrate them into their operations, and build industry interest in supporting investment in the infrastructure they depend on. This framing shifts how space is understood, making an issue often seen as technical or international visible as a domestic civic concern with real, and often overlooked, security implications.

Further public perception research should be undertaken to better understand how different communities currently view space systems and where awareness gaps persist, which may help inform more effective engagement strategies.

Lifting space literacy

Space literacy aims to present space as a civic issue that cuts across multiple security dimensions. The ideas below outline how this could potentially be operationalized in education, workforce development and government.

1. Embed education and dissemination in space policy. Future space policy and reviews of existing policies should explicitly integrate education and outreach strategies. Educators and institutions should be consulted in national space planning to reflect the needs of students and communities. Governments and industry should expand curriculum partnerships across academic and research institutions to show how space connects with existing subjects. Cross-disciplinary programmes can position space as a mainstream civic and economic issue, increase public touchpoints and support long-term space literacy.
2. Strengthen school-to-industry pathways. Governments, education providers and industry should collaborate to expand internships, apprenticeships, vocational programmes and mentorships that provide practical exposure to multi-disciplinary space careers. International models such as the UK’s Space Placements in Industry programme offer instructive reference points. These pathways should highlight the diversity of careers across the space sector, including law, communications, cybersecurity, environmental science, business and the creative industries, to encourage a broad and inclusive future workforce.
3. Strengthen space literacy to governments. Space literacy should also be strengthened across the public service. Although space infrastructure underpins defence, border protection, environmental monitoring and other government functions, its role often remains less visible outside specialist government agencies. Targeted training and development would help public servants understand how space systems support their portfolios, improve whole-of-government coordination and ensure that resourcing and governance decisions are made with a clearer understanding of national priorities.

Towards a space literacy agenda

Seeing space as a civic issue provides the foundational step for understanding how space systems shape a wide range of security concerns. Moving toward a space literacy agenda builds on this civic framing by lifting public awareness of how deeply societies depend on space systems.

Once education, outreach and public messaging efforts begin to take hold, space literacy can grow beyond awareness-raising into a more nuanced civic understanding. At this stage, space literacy aims to deepen public engagement with how space systems operate across societies, and how public ownership and responsibility for space span individual, community, national and international levels. The progression of space literacy can guide a more mature public conversation about collective dependence, shared interests in outer space and evolving ideas of citizenship, stewardship and responsibility in a 21st-century, space-enabled world.

Framing space as a civic issue also creates pathways for understanding how space security is shaped by cultural and regional contexts. Using Australia as an illustrative case, future directions for space literacy in the Asia-Pacific should consider how space is understood across different historical, cultural and linguistic contexts. Space literacy therefore offers a means to further understand how space dependencies intersect with State-specific and regional priorities, while informing broader discourse on space governance. Ultimately, embedding space in the public imagination strengthens the foundations of space security. Space literacy is not peripheral to space security; it is a long-term investment in the civic conditions that make secure and sustainable space activity possible.

Andre Kwok is an Australian lawyer and researcher at the Australasian Centre for Space Governance. He is interested in space law and space diplomacy with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. He has a background in criminal law and international criminal law, supporting high-profile criminal investigations, advising civil society research initiatives and serving as a legal consultant to the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials. Andre has degrees in law and Asian Studies from Australian National University.

The author wishes to thank Thando Mathe, Sarah Erickson, Almudena Azcaráte Ortega and Chealsea Mai for their expert review and feedback.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Andre Kwok, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The author writes in his personal capacity, and the views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Australian government, UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post Moving towards a space literacy agenda first appeared on UNIDIR.

The proliferation of illicit conventional arms and ammunition in West Africa continues to pose a significant threat to State and human security, undermining both stability and development across the region. Recognizing these challenges, Guinea undertook a nationally led WAM baseline assessment, utilizing UNIDIR’s reference methodology to systematically review institutional and operational capacities, processes and practices, in line with regional and international standards. The assessment also identified needs and national priority areas for improvement, and fostered ownership of the arms control agenda among national stakeholders.

A nationally led WAM baseline assessment

The opening ceremony, held under the auspices of ComNat-ALPC, featured remarks from senior government officials, including General David Haba, Chief of Cabinet of the Minister of Defense. Speaking on behalf of the Minister of Defense and high-level national authorities, he highlighted the vital importance of this initiative for the country’s security and stability. Joseph Ahoba, Director of the Small Arms Division at ECOWAS, formally opened the ceremony on behalf of the regional organization.

Building foundations for the future

Over the course of the week, participants engaged in high-level and technical discussions to establish a clear baseline of Guinea’s institutional and operational capacities across ten key functional areas of WAM. These include:

• National coordination mechanisms
• The legal and regulatory framework
• Transfer controls
• Stockpile management of weapons and ammunition
• Marking
• Recordkeeping
• Tracing and profiling
• Processing of illicit arms and ammunition
• Weapons collection
• Disposal of weapons and ammunition

The assessment provided a platform for stakeholders to share experiences, identify challenges and validate practical recommendations for strengthening the national WAM framework.

Driving an integrated and sustainable approach

The assessment process required active engagement to guide discussions and extract actionable findings. The workshop culminated in the substantive consolidation of key outputs including the drafting of a national roadmap. In exercising ownership of the assessment process, Guinean stakeholders led the validation of this roadmap during the final plenary session, facilitated by UNIDIR experts. In closing, national stakeholders confirmed that Guinea will utilize the validated options and recommendations to strengthen the national WAM framework. They emphasized the critical role of safe, secure and sustainable WAM for peace, security and development.

The path forward

As a next step, UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme remains closely engaged with ECOWAS and the ComNat-ALPC. UNIDIR hopes to draw upon the assessment findings to produce a publicly available WAM Country Insight publication, intended to inform targeted international assistance as well as future policy development.

Crucially, this national WAM baseline assessment undertaken by Guinea also strengthened ECOWAS’ regional ownership and leadership in utilizing UNIDIR’s reference methodology in support of its Member States. Concurrently, it directly contributed to the strengthening of Guinea’s national framework through actionable, guided, expert recommendations.

UNIDIR remains committed to supporting Member States in building resilient and effective national and regional frameworks for weapons and ammunition management. Recent similar work in Senegal demonstrates UNIDIR’s ongoing efforts to raise awareness and monitor WAM progress made across West Africa. The Institute’s reference methodology will also soon be made available in Portuguese, unlocking new avenues for support and cooperation across the region.

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Through a series of dedicated sessions, UNIDIR shepherded discussions reflecting its ongoing work on AI and international peace and security. The Institute led on exchanges to advance the operationalization of responsible AI principles – a priority identified in the summit’s outcome document.

A longstanding commitment to responsible AI

UNIDIR’s participation at REAIM 2026 builds on sustained contributions to the initiative. The Institute has played an advisory role to successive host States (the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, and Spain) – well before 2023, helping inform REAIM’s evolution.

This leadership has extended beyond intergovernmental settings, through the design and delivery of the 2025 REAIM Regional Consultations. It also facilitated structured multi-stakeholder engagement, as well as expert contributions to the Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain.

Rooted in independence, technical depth, and constant engagement, UNIDIR continues to translate evidence into policy-relevant pathways and solutions – particularly as States face governance challenges around the military implications of AI.

Regional dialogue and partnerships at the forefront

In the margins of REAIM 2026, UNIDIR Director Robin Geiss met with Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Defense, Hon. Soipan Tuya, reaffirming and deepening cooperation between the Institute and Kenya on responsible AI in the military domain. The exchange reflected a shared commitment to advancing responsible approaches to military AI and underscored the importance of trust-based, inclusive partnerships at both regional and global levels.

Kenya’s leadership was also evident as the host of the 2024 and 2025 REAIM Regional Consultations for Africa, which highlighted the value of inclusive regional dialogue and locally grounded perspectives in shaping global governance debates on emerging technologies and international security.

In this vein, UNIDIR launched its summary report capturing the perspectives shared at the 2025 REAIM Regional Consultations. The Global Prism of Military AI Governance presents existing national policies and best practices for the governance of AI in the military domain, as well as views from discussions held with multi-stakeholder communities across regions.

The report looks into the operationalization of responsible AI principles across the life cycle of AI-enabled military capabilities through lenses of procurement, incident response, crisis management and risk reduction. It offers quantitative data on assurance prioritization for the purchase of different military AI capabilities. The publication also lays out States’ reflections on the REAIM journey – three years from the inaugural summit. It concludes by identifying substantive priority areas that States wish to see further pursued, both within REAIM and beyond, before presenting a series of concrete recommendations for the road ahead.

UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme also met with representatives from the Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) of Tsinghua University. The discussions highlighted the value of partnerships with leading academic institutions and built on ongoing collaboration through UNIDIR’s Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics (RAISE). The meeting also constituted an opportunity to exchange on good practices of confidence-building measures on AI in the military domain, emphasizing the work of CISS Tsinghua University’s US-China Track-2 Dialogue on AI and International Security with the Brookings Institution, and offered pathways for further cooperation with UNIDIR.

Engaging industry on military AI

Industry engagement was another central focus for UNIDIR at REAIM 2026, reflecting the increasingly decisive role of private sector actors in shaping AI-enabled military capabilities. From system design and data practices to testing, deployment and post-deployment support, industry decisions have a direct impact on reliability, predictability, accountability and the risk of harm in real-world contexts. As governance efforts in the military AI domain advance, effective collaboration with industry has become critical to translating shared principles into practice.

At the summit, UNIDIR – in partnership with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) – launched the Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain. This sets out a practical and actionable set of voluntary guidelines aimed at providing a common baseline for responsible industry conduct. The framework offers governments and other stakeholders greater clarity on responsible AI procurement and public-private partnerships.

Ahead of the launch, UNIDIR and the OHCHR convened a closed-door roundtable with industry representatives attending the summit. They were joined by framework collaborators from Microsoft, the Japan Defense Technology Foundation and Hitachi America, Ltd. The exchanges, held under the Chatham House rule, provided space for the private sector to share perspectives on substantive and project-oriented themes. They explored risk perceptions and practical strategies to address them, misuse pathways and assurance gaps, priority areas for governance, and the value of the framework at this point in time.

What’s next for military AI governance

During his remarks at the high-level plenary session, UNIDIR Director echoed what many participants at the summit have noted: REAIM is at an inflection point. The summit has been instrumental in catalyzing global momentum on responsible military AI. The 2024 and 2025 REAIM Regional Consultations, in particular, have translated international debate into regional and national relevance.

Yet, as UN processes are now growing, future efforts for the governance of AI in the military domain must be approached with coherence in mind. Coherence will be key for the effectiveness and optimization of available resources, and to ensure that ultimately, the development and deployment of AI will foster international peace and security – not undermine it.

With proper governance in place, military AI could help reduce harm to civilians by improving situational awareness, highlighting uncertainty, and supporting more careful use of force.

Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director

UNIDIR’s participation at REAIM 2026 marks the beginning of much work to build on the discussions held in A Coruña, with a host of opportunities for States, the private sector and the wider multi-stakeholder community to contribute meaningfully to the Institute’s work.

UNIDIR is actively on the lookout for collaborators to support the development of the Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain. Collaboration does not imply endorsement or entail binding commitments, but industry participation in the development process will be critical to the framework’s ultimate utility and effectiveness.

Looking ahead, UNIDIR will organize the second edition of its Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics on 18-19 June 2026. This will be held consecutively to the informal exchange in Geneva on AI in the military domain and its implications for international peace and security, organized pursuant to the UN First Committee Resolution 80/58. UNIDIR welcomes the submission of proposals to hold thematic deep-dives, lightning talks and poster presentations, the details of which will be released in late February.

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