Unpacking the challenge of consensus at the NPT Review Conference

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear regime, grounded in its three pillars of non-proliferation (Articles I, II and III), the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV), and disarmament (Article VI). Yet, as States Parties prepare for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, they do so in an international security environment marked by armed conflict, major-power rivalry, the erosion of bilateral arms control, destabilizing technological advances, and diminished trust. These conditions leave the overall mood pertaining to the continued vitality of the treaty, at best, cautiously optimistic.

In the past, successful Review Conference outcomes – such as an agreement on a final document comprised of some combination of a review of the operation of the treaty, and conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions – have been achieved in difficult circumstances. This commentary provides an overview of the various forms of consensus achieved at past NPT Review Conferences, which can be clustered into comprehensive consensus, partial consensus, and conditional consensus.

2000: Achieving comprehensive consensus

To date, only one of the ten NPT Review Conferences has managed to agree on a final document, based on comprehensive consensus without caveats. The 1995 decision on strengthening the review process established the forward-looking part of the document, in addition to the review of the implementation of the treaty in the preceding five years.

In 2000, the Review Conference was the first and the only one to achieve consensus on both. It is widely considered the most significant substantive success with the adoption of the “13 Practical Steps” for systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI on disarmament, following various concerning international developments in the preceding review cycle. The steps included significant language on:

• nuclear disarmament commitments,
• the principle of irreversibility,     
• the elimination of nuclear arsenals, and
• accelerated efforts toward the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Negotiations were complex and required significant compromise on language related to key issues, leading some to note that consensus was only possible because “deep differences between States on several crucial matters were papered over” and the wording used was “sufficiently ambiguous to enable all sides to claim victory.”

Accordingly, the prospect of implementation of the agreed upon steps was already perceived as “bleak” at the time. Such concerns were later confirmed by the disavowal of the “13 Practical Steps” by several nuclear-weapon States (NWS) at the following Review Conference in 2005, as well as the persistent implementation gaps that continue to impact upon the NPT regime today.

1995 and 2010: Years marked by partial consensus

States Parties have achieved partial consensus twice to date; at the highly consequential 1995 and 2010 Review Conferences, the latter which remains the last one to have adopted a consensus final document. In both cases, comprehensive consensus could not be achieved, but diplomatic skill and procedural openness enabled consensus on key issues.     

The 1995 conference is often considered the most unique and significant in the history of the NPT’s review process. The treaty’s initial 25-year duration was ending, making its extension a priority for many States Parties, who successfully adopted a package of four key decisions. These included:

• the indefinite extension of the NPT,
• the adoption of “principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,”
• the strengthening of the review process, and
• a resolution on the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The package of decisions was passed without a vote but required careful and clever drafting to ensure that key demands of different groups were satisfied in the bargain. The NWS strong interest in indefinite extension of the treaty gave the non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), especially the Non-Aligned Movement, a significant bargaining chip, which was used to progress the Middle East Resolution. While a deal was struck for the forward-looking package of decisions, consensus was not achieved on the review part of the document as fundamental disagreements prevailed. These tensions were bypassed by not insisting on a traditional comprehensive consensus final document, allowing the important package of decisions to be passed.

The case of 1995 stands out because of its procedural creativity. Yet, the choice to adopt a package of decisions was less revolutionary at the time than it seems today, as States Parties had submitted draft resolutions, decisions and even protocols to the NPT at previous Review Conferences, showing that States Parties then considered a broader scope of possible outcome formats.

The 2010 Review Conference was the last one to date to adopt a consensus final document, though consensus was achieved only on the forward-looking action plan, while the review instead became a “President’s reflection” without necessarily representing the views of all the States Parties. Nonetheless, the outcome was significant with a 64-point Action Plan covering all three pillars of the NPT and including specific steps for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, endorsing a 2012 conference.

The 2010 Action Plan also reaffirmed the “13 practical steps” of the 2000 conference, embedding them into a larger, more complex political bargain that went beyond disarmament to also include non-proliferation and peaceful uses.

1975 and 1985: Establishing conditional consensus

The Review Conferences in 1975 and 1985 both managed to achieve consensus on a final document, but introduced notable conditionalities.

The short 1975 Final Declaration (which is under 5000 words) was drafted primarily by the President of the Conference. Consensus was only achieved by attaching various interpretive statements and reservations to the record, reflecting the differing views of delegations. This required flexibility on the part of the delegations, who chose to not block consensus, and of the President, who accepted the inclusion of national and group statements. Because of the caveats attached to the final document, the conference was not necessarily seen as an unequivocal success by all parties at the time.

In 1985, a similar approach was taken, ensuring that a consensus final document could again be adopted despite significant rifts. Explicit disagreement was noted around the lack of progress on a CTBT, in much stronger terms than in the 1975 final document. While formal consensus was thus preserved, the readily apparent lack of unanimity on the CTBT led one scholar to describe this as a “bogus consensus”.

Past pathways to success

A variety of approaches have contributed to meaningful outcomes and final documents at past NPT Review Conferences – yet no single method offers a guaranteed recipe for success. Only one Review Conference (in 2000) produced a fully negotiated, consensus-based and comprehensive final document—suggesting that such an outcome should be regarded as the exception rather than the norm.

Furthermore, the size and scope of Review Conference final documents have varied considerably. While discussions during the conferences may be wide-ranging, the issues explicitly captured in the final documents have, in practice, often been relatively narrow.

Table 1. Inclusion of language related to selected issues in NPT Review Conferences

Lessons for future NPT Review Conferences

Most NPT Review Conferences with successful outcomes were characterized by a degree of flexibility regarding the format of the final document. Examples of this begin with the very first Review Conference in 1975, which produced a final document written primarily by the President and which included the reservations of State Parties to specific statements.

Similarly, the 1985 final document included explicit mentions of disagreement on key issues, allowing formal consensus to be achieved despite intense substantive disagreement. The 1995 Review Conference pushed this further by not adopting a final document at all, instead passing a set of important decisions that continue to define the NPT Review Process today.

The most recent successful outcome at a Review Conference occurred in 2010 and whilst a final document was agreed and the forward-looking conclusions and recommendations achieved consensus, the review segment was not agreed by consensus and instead reflected the President’s views. Even as a President’s document, the review section featured language that qualified the degree of agreement on issues, rather than suggesting consensus.

Taken together, these cases show that successful NPT Review Conference outcome documents vary in terms of length, scope, focus and the type and route to consensus. While the goal of comprehensive consensus has presented a challenge at all Review Conferences, flexibility and procedural creativity have enabled past successes, even in tense international environments.

Nick Arndt was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme. He holds a Master of Philosophy in International Relations with distinction from the University of Oxford and a Bachelor of Arts in History and a minor in International Relations from the University of Groningen, where he graduated cum laude.