On 20-21 August, UNIDIR and the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit convened two multistakeholder dialogues on the margins of the ninth session of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention.
The dialogues explored how science and technology tools can support the convention and the design of a lasting advisory mechanism to keep pace with scientific change. Both events were organized under UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower project and as part of the joint Technical Briefs series on emerging technologies and the convention.
Scientific advice mechanism for the convention
The first event on designing a science and technology advisory mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention brought together experts from international scientific advisory bodies, multilateral policy research and disarmament diplomacy. Drawing on the experiences of the Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board, the International Science Council, the Scientific Advisory Board of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other bodies, participants explored what a comparable mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention could look like, including how it might be composed, identify priorities and build consensus.
OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board offered one of the relevant composition components: its 25 members serve in a personal capacity rather than as government representatives, with rotating terms and informal geographic and gender balance that help the body maintain both independence and legitimacy. On process, speakers shared experience on dealing with disagreements among members, noting that transparently recording dissenting views in a final report can be a legitimate and often more useful outcome.
The experience of the UN Secretary-General’s Scientific Advisory Board offered another important lesson:
Scientific advice has impact only once translated for a diplomatic audience.
Short, accessible briefs and informal briefings can help connect scientists directly with diplomats and bring scientific findings into policy discussions.
Participants also discussed the design of the convention’s own proposed mechanism, which envisages a hybrid model combining an open-ended body for broad participation with a smaller, focused reporting committee, to balance inclusivity with substantive technical work.
Speakers agreed that any mechanism should remain strictly advisory and feed transparently into the convention’s existing review cycle, helping States Parties turn scientific uncertainty into clarity they can act on.
Practical tools for implementation
The second event on applied science and technology tools for prevention, risk assessment and biorisk governance brought together speakers from public health, verification, biosecurity research and biotechnology policy to present concrete tools already in use or under development.
Emerging technologies are creating practical instruments to support the convention’s purpose, offering ways forward even in the continued absence of a formal verification regime.
Identifying governance gaps
The tools presented addressed different governance needs, from diagnosing gaps and assessing risk to building transparency. The Biorisk Implementation and Evaluation Tool, developed by the World Health Organization based on the 2022 Global Guidance Framework for the Responsible Use of Life Sciences, helps States self-diagnose their governance gaps. Available in national and institutional versions, the platform guides users through a step-by-step process to generate a risk score and identify priority actions.
Taking a different approach, VERTIC and King’s College London applied the logic of the IAEA’s Acquisition Path Analysis, used in nuclear safeguards, to hypothetical biological-weapons scenarios. By mapping pathways from agent acquisition to weaponization and identifying associated “observables,” they assessed how different monitoring and verification measures could capture them. By testing these approaches against the convention’s existing confidence-building measures, they revealed key practical gaps that were not captured in all cases, underscoring the level of detail needed to weigh the relative confidence, intrusiveness and cost of proposed measures.
Assessing emerging risks
RAND’s Risk Index Observatory applies a graded risk scale to AI-enabled biological tools such as protein-design algorithms, aiming to flag high-risk capabilities early while avoiding blanket restrictions on responsible research.
Meanwhile, early-stage research under the VERIBIO project at the University of Hamburg and Technical University of Hamburg, is exploring how industrial bioprocesses could be monitored for verification purposes while protecting confidential details of the process. Researchers are using an AI-based anomaly-detection model to identify when a bacterial strain’s “fingerprint” deviates from what is expected, potentially signaling it has been substituted for one producing a harmful agent.
Strengthening transparency
The Global DNA Synthesis Map and Common Mechanism developed by IBBIS give synthesis providers an open-source basis for screening orders against risky sequences across more than fifty regulatory frameworks.
Speakers discussed that these tools could support confidence-building, awareness-raising and national implementation of the convention under its Article IV, while also informing future efforts to the development of a verification mechanism.
As science and technology continue to advance, keeping the Biological Weapons Convention effective will require sustained engagement with the opportunities and challenges they present. Held under UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower, the dialogues demonstrated the value of drawing on existing scientific advisory practice while exploring practical tools that can support prevention, risk assessment, transparency and future verification.