“Do not try this at home!”: Current trends and developments in improvised weapons production

In recent years, improvised and craft-produced weapons have become a ubiquitous feature of modern warfare, crime and terrorism. From the role of weaponized commercial drones in conflicts in Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine, to the use of DIY firearms by criminals and terrorists in Africa, the Americas and Europe, improvised weapons are increasingly complementing, and sometimes even replacing, industrially-produced ones. We appear to be entering the DIY age in conventional weapons production.

The spread and evolution of improvised weapons are strongly shaped by regional and national dynamics. Yet, a common thread is that their unregulated nature challenges established national and international arms control systems. As barriers to weapons production decrease, how should States and the international community adapt to this evolving threat?

Categories of ‘improvisation’

A first step is understanding what ‘improvised’ means. The table below illustrates two main categories of improvisation across three types of conventional weapons: improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms and light weapons (SALW), and uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).

Key common enablers and trends

The use and types of improvised weapons are contextual, but they also share commonalities. A series of regional expert consultations conducted by UNIDIR in 2025 shed light on key trends.  

In most cases, the non-industrial nature of improvised weapons, makes them relatively cost-effective, accessible and hard to trace – as such, they are strategically and operationally attractive to non-state armed groups (NSAGs), criminals and terrorists.

Emerging and dual-use technologies that are not intended for weapons production have amplified the accessibility, efficacy and manufacturing possibilities of improvised weapons. Take additive manufacturing – better known as 3D printing – as an example. Since 2020, there has been a steady rise in the number of 3D-printed firearms seizures globally, with North America, Europe and Australia recording the highest numbers.

Several conflict theatres, such as Myanmar, Ukraine and more recently Somalia, have also witnessed the incorporation of 3D printing into modern warfare strategy. For example, Ukrainian forces have pioneered 3D-printed drones – such as the Titan Falcon and the Stinger – and have manufactured IEDs known as ‘candy bombs’ (a 3D-printed casing filled with conventional explosive). NSAGs in Myanmar have adopted tactics from the Ukrainian forces, building their own 3D-printed fixed wing drones (the Liberator MKI and MKII). They have also experimented with 3D-printed firearms. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab was reported to be using 3D-printing to manufacture explosives, weapons and drone components.

Manufacturers of improvised weapons do not just exploit new technologies but also commercial markets and materials. These include purchasing off-the-shelf drones for subsequent modification, computer numerical control milling machines, and chemical precursors. For example, triacetone triperoxide, which can be synthesized using commercially available materials, has been the explosive of choice in several ISIS-linked attacks e.g. 2015 Paris, 2016 Brussels, 2017 Manchester Arena. Converted firearms also remain a prominent challenge, particularly in Europe: they are reported to be involved in more shootings than ‘real’ firearms in the UK and comprise about 40% of annual seizures in the  Netherlands.

The main common enabler for improvised production, however, is not hardware – it’s knowledge. The transfer of technical expertise and ‘know-how’ across borders, ideologies, and networks sustains weapons production and supplements the accessibility of commercial technologies. Knowledge transfer happens at multiple levels: 

1. Knowledge and expertise transfer across groups: For example, African Islamic State affiliates such as Islamic State West Africa Province have benefitted from the transfer of drone expertise from affiliates in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula developed offensive drone capabilities as a result of knowledge and technology transfer from the Houthis. This signalled a cross-ideological transfer: both groups have maintained operational links and cooperation despite their opposing ideologies for pragmatic, tactical and operational reasons.
2. Knowledge transfer from conflict theatres to organized crime: Latin American organized crime cartels have, for instance, adopted improvised drones and IEDs to carry out attacks against enemy targets mimicking modern warfare techniques. Some cartel members have even travelled to Ukraine to learn, train and import expertise mimicking how foreign terrorist fighters travel to join terrorist groups overseas. 
3. Online knowledge transfer, through the open and dark web: Information on the manufacture of SALW is aplenty on open-source websites and platforms such as Odysee. Encrypted messaging platforms such as Rocket.Chat and Telegram have been used for the dissemination of weapons design files, the sale of black-market weapons, and information relating to their production. The spread of more traditional, artisanal weapons – known as ‘pumpi’ guns in Manipur – has also been accelerated by social media and encrypted messaging platforms.
4. ‘In-house’ knowledge development: Through the different – and at times overlapping – layers of knowledge available, NSAGs, criminal and extremist groups have also been developing specialized ‘in-house’ units for improvised weapons production. ISIS was one of the first terrorist groups to industrialize the procurement and development of drones in Iraq and Syria between 2016-2017. Since then, many groups have adopted similar tactics: in Somalia, Al-Shabaab has invested in hiring skilled personnel to experiment with 3D-printing technology; in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham developed their own indigenous drone programme, the Al-Shaheen Brigade; in Mexico, the Jalisco Cartel New Generation has a specialized unit dedicated to operating drones.

Finally, the accessibility of knowledge – particularly online – and the close link between improvised weapons production and new technologies translate to a final concerning trend: the involvement of youth. The improvised weapons programmes of NSAGs in Myanmar, for example, have mostly been driven by younger and tech-savvy recruits. Criminal and extremist plots involving 3D-printed firearms also increasingly involve young individuals. This further points to an overall characteristic of improvised weapons production: it collapses barriers between contexts, ideologies and potentially generations of producers. 

What can the international community do?

The regulatory challenges posed by improvised weapons are multiple and layered: no single approach – whether at the national, regional or international level – is a silver bullet. The prioritization of specific preventive measures to counter such weapons production and modification will inevitably vary depending on the regional and regulatory context. Nevertheless, several key elements can serve as the foundation for an adaptive, multi-layered counter-strategy.

1. It is important to better understand and regulate access to dual-use goods, technologies, and components essential to improvised production. The 3D printing process is an excellent example of how preventative measures can be enhanced: it encompasses multiple stages – from blueprint design to software, hardware and materials. Each of these steps has potential for better prevention. This may include, for instance, the registration or certification of printers, regulation of blueprints, or collaboration with industry to embed detection algorithms in software platforms. Also, existing regulations – such as those on readily convertible blank-firing firearms – can inspire similar approaches and offer a practical pathway for controlling items and components with high misuse potential.
2. Although SALW, IEDs and UAS are usually boxed into separate regulatory frameworks, a few exceptions offer opportunities to advance regulatory approaches for improvised weapons. The implementation of Security Council Resolution 2370 is a prime example.
3. The diffusion of online technical guidance on improvised weapons production can be better contained. Systematic monitoring of digital spaces – particularly those hosting open-source blueprints or forums sharing illicit manufacturing instructions – is essential. Cooperation between law enforcement and social media providers can be promising in this space, enhancing online monitoring of illicit content.
4. Mapping and disrupting key knowledge nodes and networks is critical. Further research is needed to understand the social and technical ecosystems that facilitate and drive improvised production. This includes identifying influential knowledge nodes – individuals and online communities – that serve as accelerators for unregulated innovation, as well as potential loopholes that facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and guidance. Counter-measures can combine investigative tools with awareness-raising initiatives to diminish the appeal and accessibility of such networks. Information sharing, coordination mechanisms and intelligence cooperation at the national, regional and international levels are also key in this regard.

Potential approaches to strengthening national, regional and international responses to the illicit proliferation of improvised weapons are wide-ranging – and extend far beyond those mentioned above. The multi-layered nature of this issue makes designing a single global response a challenge – and a new international instrument on improvised weapons may not be needed. There are numerous entry points – both in existing frameworks and in operational practice – for developing tailored preventive and response measures against the proliferation and misuse of improvised weapons, and just as many actors that can play a decisive role in countering this threat. 

To advance this effort, at the end of 2025, UNIDIR will provide a dedicated platform to explore the many dimensions of improvised weapons production, with a focus on the networks that facilitate their spread. This year’s conference will mark a key step toward building the collaborative frameworks and technical awareness needed to curb this fast-evolving threat.