The production of 3D-printed small arms and light weapons (SALW) has increased significantly since 2020, particularly in regions such as North America, Western Europe, Australia and Latin America. The ‘plastic pipeline’ has been primarily linked to criminal actors associated with organized crime, narcotics and illicit weapons manufacturing and trafficking networks. There have also been at least 52 documented incidents of extremist engagement with these weapons between January 2017 and August 2025. Though 3D-printed SALW are still on the periphery of the illicit arms spectrum, the commercial availability of this technology, coupled with reducing barriers to entry facilitated by the spread of knowledge online, has led the international community to call for action to address their illicit proliferation and misuse.
The 4th Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), held in 2024, established an open-ended technical expert group (OETEG) to develop recommendations for the full and effective implementation of these instruments in light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design. The first meeting of the OETEG takes place in New York this week and will examine measures to counter illicit 3D-printing of SALW, alongside other issues. Several considerations are outlined below for national and international experts as they seek to identify effective strategic and operational measures to enable States to implement the PoA and ITI in preventing the illicit 3D printing of SALW.
Why is 3D-printing a problem for SALW control?
The UN PoA and ITI provide a series of measures that States should take to counter the illicit manufacture and trafficking of SALW. 3D-printing of SALW poses several challenges for PoA and ITI implementation, including:
- the decentralized and unregulated production of these weapons;
- the commercial availability of production machinery (i.e. 3D-printers);
- the production of unmarked weapons; and
- the intangible flows of knowledge online.
While the first three challenges are also features for other types of craft-produced SALW, 3D-printing takes the issue from the physical to the virtual realm. The proliferation of digital blueprints online and the strong shift towards increasingly do-it-yourself designs that do not rely on the use of government-regulated components means that decentralized, undetectable networks can produce lethal 3D-printed SALW beyond the control of States.
It is therefore essential that the OETEG provides a platform for national and international experts to share current and emerging challenges posed by 3D printing for the full and effective implementation of the PoA and ITI, but also recommendations for:
- legislation to ensure national control;
- international intelligence sharing and cooperation to enhance investigation protocols;
- the use of new technologies for disrupting illicit knowledge sharing; and
- capacity-building, training and awareness raising to prevent the use of 3D-printers for illicit SALW production.
Strengthening legal frameworks
A cornerstone of the effective implementation of international instruments is comprehensive national-level legislation. Several countries, such as Australia, Canada, Jamaica, North Macedonia and Singapore, have taken proactive measures to enhance their legislative frameworks by means of criminalizing digital blueprints for 3D production of SALW. The UK has proposed a similar bill to Parliament.
At the regional level, an EU Commission proposal from February 2026 to harmonize definitions and penalties to combat the illicit trafficking of firearms includes suggestions for EU Member States to introduce the following penalties in their national systems:
- an upper limit of at least two years of imprisonment for the illicit creation, acquisition, possession and dissemination of 3D-printed SALW blueprints;
- five years for the possession of illicit firearms, components and ammunition; and
- eight years for trafficking and manufacturing.
While the criminalization of blueprints is a good first step, States should also ensure that their SALW control legislation covers the illicit manufacture, possession, use and trafficking of all forms of 3D-printed SALW and their components.
Intelligence sharing and cooperation
Intelligence sharing and international cooperation between law enforcement agencies are crucial in stemming the proliferation of 3D-printed SALW. While many States already have national points of contact for PoA/ITI implementation, it does not appear that intelligence on 3D-printed SALW is moving beyond regional level exchanges between national firearms focal points and specialist units. States could consider ways of including information about illicit 3D-printed SALW in shared databases, such as INTERPOL’s ‘iARMS’. This all requires law enforcement agencies to develop and maintain approaches and protocols for data collection, analysis, and sharing related to seizures of 3D-printed SALW.
Law enforcement agencies must also develop close cooperation with the 3D-printing industry. As stipulated in the outcomes from the 4th Review Conference, bringing 3D-printing companies to the discussion table and promoting active dialogue without infringing on the legitimate uses of this technology is key. Cooperation must also be fostered with other stakeholders, such as postal services, e-commerce sites, and social media platforms, as these continue to be used to sell and promote 3D-printed SALW.
New technologies to disrupt illicit 3D-printing
It is imperative for law enforcement agencies to use new technologies to detect and disrupt illicit networks involved in illicit information sharing and the production of 3D-printed SALW. Pilot projects are already underway that could lead the way. For example, the CEASEFIRE project, a three-year multidimensional project that was implemented during 2022-25 involving the EU, EUROPOL and INTERPOL, aimed to incorporate various cyber-detection methods, AI-driven tools, shared databases, information fusion and offline techniques to interdict illegal firearms trafficking, including the distribution of digital blueprints for 3D-printed SALW. Successful pilot projects could be expanded, replicated and sustained, while new initiatives should be developed.
Several US states are exploring the introduction of ‘blocking software’ to detect blueprints and block 3D-printing of SALW. At present, this has several limitations, including:
- the need to be constantly updated to account for new designs;
- the susceptibility to circumvention;
- the risk of flagging false positives; and
- the dependence on federal legislation mandating compliance by various stakeholders.
It remains to be seen if AI could help overcome the first two limitations.
A promising development is the Secure Information Embedding and Extraction framework, which aims to embed unique fingerprints into 3D-printed objects that are resistant to physical tampering, breakage and digital interdiction.
Capacity building, training and awareness-raising
States must also focus on training law enforcement officers to identify and document 3D-printed SALW and their components, develop standard operating procedures for evidence collection, and enhance forensic capabilities. While developments within the forensic space that are focused on chemical signature tracing of polymers, toolmark analysis of nozzle and print bed deposition artifacts and fingerprinting of printers are still limited, they remain useful in aiding investigations and enhancing prosecution. Future developments in nano-topographical and micro-CT analysis may enhance forensic identification of 3D-printed SALW. All of this requires adequate resources.
International organizations like INTERPOL and the UN play a crucial role in assisting Member States develop their capabilities to counter the illicit production, proliferation and misuse of 3D-printed SALW. INTERPOL’s Project Stonefish and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’s SALW Fellowship Training Programme are examples of capacity-building programmes that aim to increase awareness and strengthen the investigative capabilities of Member States in this area.
At the national level, States should consider introducing awareness programmes targeted at young people, given the increasing involvement of youths in the 3D-printing of firearms.
The way forward
Current proliferation trends suggest that the OETEG’s consideration of how to counter the threat posed by 3D-printed SALW is timely. UNIDIR has been actively supporting the preparations for all the issues under the purview of the OETEG, as can be seen in this recent report. Developments that seemed like a chimaera a decade ago have become a reality today. Therefore, it is imperative that we put the necessary preventive measures in place now to stem further misuse of this technology.
At the same time, we have seen that 3D-printing has evolved rapidly and is not standing still. Therefore, we should already be considering how to ensure that opportunities like the OETEG, which brings together a unique group of national and international experts, can be used to address technological challenges as they emerge. The 2026 OETEG meeting will therefore be a useful “pilot” opportunity.
