At its core, the logic of maritime security has not changed. We need to know who is doing what and where, which activities pose a threat and how best we can respond. But the technological environment in which our lives are enmeshed is evolving rapidly, with new risks and new opportunities emerging every day.

Shifting tides in maritime security

1. New technologies are lowering the barriers to projecting power at sea.
   
   Small, cheap and increasingly autonomous systems can now threaten much larger vessels and pose a serious risk to critical infrastructure. Once the preserve of sophisticated navies, these capabilities are becoming increasingly accessible, including to non-State actors. While UNIDIR research found just one attack using an uncrewed maritime system in 2019, the annual figure had risen more than 2,000% by 2024. We can expect that upward trajectory to have become even steeper in 2026.
   


2. The oceans are becoming more transparent.
   
   Artificial intelligence, satellites, advanced detection systems, fibre-optic sensing and the automated fusion of varied data streams are transforming our awareness of activity at sea, both above and below the surface. But greater transparency also has strategic consequences, especially where concealment is of paramount concern, as with submarine-based nuclear deterrence.
   


3. The maritime and digital domains are becoming increasingly interdependent.
   
   Maritime operations today rely on digital systems, and the digital economy depends on physical infrastructure at sea. More than 99% of data moving between continents travels by subsea cable. And with today’s ports operating as complex digital ecosystems, a successful cyberattack on a single vulnerability within them can be enough to paralyse a whole web of global supply chains. Interdependence creates new vulnerabilities. And disruption in one domain can quickly cascade into others.
   


4. Maritime insecurity is being fuelled by illicit trafficking in conventional arms.
   
   This trafficking exacerbates armed violence, organized crime and conflict, as well as undermining the effective implementation of Security Council arms embargoes and other international arms control measures. For this reason, maritime security and conventional arms control should be viewed as mutually reinforcing objectives.
   


5. Our international instruments are not keeping up with the new world we live in.
   
   The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, for instance, does a good job of building trust through reporting on conventional arms transfers, including warships. But armed, uncrewed maritime systems may fall outside the scope of the Register’s technical descriptions and definitions of what constitutes a “warship”, which focus on tonnage and missile or torpedo range. As maritime capabilities evolve, multilateral arms control frameworks need to evolve with them.

Priorities for action on maritime security

Strengthening these agreements would help create a virtuous circle where a more secure maritime domain leads to better maritime governance, which in turn facilitates more effective implementation of arms control commitments.

The third is sustained and systematic attention, particularly from the Security Council.

The Council has led the way on ensuring structured engagement on cross-cutting issues with lasting peace and security implications. Maritime security warrants the same treatment. This work could and should be founded on continuous scanning of the technological horizon to pick out new developments that will reshape risks and opportunities at sea. The recent establishment of the Informal Expert Group on Science and Technology also represents a positive and meaningful step towards integrating the security implications of emerging technologies into the full range of the Council’s activities. UNIDIR and its dedicated maritime security workstream naturally stand ready to support the work of the Council and the wider international community.

New technologies may be lowering the barriers to projection of power at sea, making our oceans more transparent and interweaving our maritime and digital systems. But with the right approach, we can keep pace with these changes, build resilience and ensure that the seas we depend on remain safe, secure and stable in the years and decades to come.

The post The five tech trends reshaping maritime security first appeared on UNIDIR.

But with data becoming increasingly strategic for peace, security and defence, there are still important questions to be answered about ownership, control and strategic dependence between States. Data is also increasingly central to areas like health, commerce, finance and defence, which are critical to national security, leading to a surge in interest in issues of technological and data sovereignty.

Although relatively elastic, technological sovereignty is the ability to safeguard national agency in the domain of technology and innovation. This includes the capability to act independently in the global technological system and to resist unfavourable positions in key value chains, which may be controlled by perceived adversaries. Data sovereignty, meanwhile, extends this self-determination to the use and processing of data surrounding these strategic technologies. For States, this means the sovereignty, control and power to protect their fundamental right to their countries’ data.

Several States have sought data sovereignty by enacting data protection laws, including regulations requiring that certain categories of their citizens’ data be stored or processed within their jurisdiction. Placing data centres in orbit would clearly make this harder to enforce, gumming up one key policy lever in the hands of State authorities. This is especially concerning for developing regions, which have not had the chance to properly regulate, control or demand localization of data centres. Having only nascent or emerging space ecosystems, these regions also lack the infrastructure, know-how, and investment to put data centres of their own into orbit.

Unequal distribution, unequal control

The global data centre landscape currently follows a pronounced geographical and economic pattern. At present, 77% of global co-location data centre capacity is located in developed regions and operated by private enterprises whose usership is global. These operators have also extended their investment into cooperating middle-income countries, which host an 18% share of data centre capacity. These countries are perceived as offering political stability, robust connectivity, reliable electricity, mature data-protection regulation and favourable fiscal environments.

When measured against these metrics, developing regions are rarely seen to provide the same advantages, which partially explains the persistent underinvestment in their data infrastructure. Only 6% of capacity is currently hosted in these regions, although promises of future development persist. The African region, for example, accounts for 17% of the world’s population, making it a significant market for digital technology. Africa is also projected to make up an increasing portion of usership across data applications in the future, not least because its youthful population will continue to expand more rapidly than in developed regions. Despite all this, the region hosts less than 1% of global data centre capacity and attracted only 3% of data centre investment in 2024.

The issue of technological and data sovereignty also comes to the fore when archived datasets generated by civilian users are used to improve operational efficiency in military AI applications, including surveillance, autonomous weapon systems, predictive analytics and targeting. Developing countries generate much of this foundational data, but they have little control over the infrastructure that processes it. This results in an involuntary participation and an asymmetric exchange in which these countries inadvertently export unprocessed data as a resource while importing the high-value applications derived from it. These derivatives, moreover, are imported with prices and conditions set by the exporting State.

If the infrastructure enabling this process were to migrate into orbit, this imbalance would only become further institutionalized, at an altitude where significant gaps persist in the governance of such systems in orbit. In effect, this means that those owning and controlling data-derived applications can hold a less capable actor at risk, even if these actors contributed to the fundamental development of these applications.

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Data sovereignty and Earth observation

The early applications of data infrastructure in orbit are leaning towards Earth observation because the data itself is generated in orbit, making the addition of compute to the satellites involved an obvious choice. There is also a clear commercial logic to circumventing the transmission bottleneck to ground stations by reducing latency, eliminating delays and automating processing through sophisticated on-orbit AI applications.

Commercial and government providers of satellite data have actively sought to partner with and serve developing regions. When developing countries are recorded in satellite imagery, the satellites and the on-orbit processing technology are owned and controlled by their developed counterparts, whose capacity to make decisions about and for the former is enhanced.

Developing countries access these platforms through aid-conditioned agreements and rarely through commercial partnerships. They may receive access to an analytical product, but they gain limited access to the raw data, processing algorithms or AI-model parameters and have little influence in the creation and application of derived products. This is particularly important in defence-relevant applications, where access to Earth observation-derived intelligence can constitute a meaningful capability differentiator. This impacts technological sovereignty and weakens agency in key sectors like border surveillance, armed conflict, climate security, food security and critical minerals.

In the absence of pragmatic reciprocity, data sovereignty is also further compromised by the risks of soft-power bargaining. More advanced States can provide sophisticated capabilities as defence cooperation under allyship while simultaneously exercising asymmetric leverage in wider geopolitical and trade agreements. The dependency structure of current international Earth observation partnerships, for example, already hints at how power could play out in the orbital data-centre governance of the future. It is imperative that such imbalances be addressed, because their effects on collective security and stability are all too real.

Pixabay licence

Towards a secure, sovereign and equitable future

Emerging space actors have an early opportunity to prioritize research that improves domestic analytical capacity, bolsters their interests, advances credible positions in multilateral forums and enables properly informed negotiation on terrestrial and orbital data governance. Some tech-savvy emerging States have already begun to contribute to a more pluralistic form of terrestrial data governance, an approach which could also be adapted to multilateral space security processes. Targeted investment in research at the nexus of space security, data governance and strategic emerging technology could further strengthen these efforts.

Regional initiatives like the African Union’s space policy, space strategy and data policy framework, together with the Africa Declaration on Artificial Intelligence, can also serve as vehicles for coordinated agenda-setting, enabling smaller States to pool technocratic capacity and present unified positions.

There remains, however, a need to close governance gaps here by addressing:

• Benefit-sharing

• Access rights to on-orbit data processing algorithms

• Obligations on operators, including third States

• Dispute resolution mechanisms available to States lacking independent capability

The Outer Space Treaty provides a normative and legal foundation for equitable governance of orbital data infrastructure, particularly through its principle that the exploration and use of outer space should benefit all peoples, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. Lessons can also be drawn from the norms of responsible State behaviour on information and communication technology, which acknowledge capacity disparities between States while recognizing the continuously evolving technological landscape. These principles can be operationalized to develop regulations that ensure ethical, accountable, equitable and accessible use of orbital data.

Finally, as geostrategic globalization begins to span Earth and space, developing regions should seek fair partnership models and avoid becoming arenas of competition between world powers. Strategic technological partnerships should aim to reduce long-term dependence and eventually allow capability transfer and co-development arrangements that go beyond access. These could even limit use of derived products in security-sensitive sectors unless there is explicit cooperation, co-ownership of hardware and software, sharing of high-value data, and explainability and auditability of responsible AI-powered processes in space data.

Preventing terrestrial inequalities from reaching orbit

Orbital data infrastructure could soon become a reality, and its sovereignty and governance implications require immediate attention. For developed States with greater access to technology and space capabilities, these new ambitions represent a familiar case of technological advantage being extended across domains. For developing States with fewer capabilities, this could foreclose governance options that have yet even to be fully exercised here on Earth. The security considerations in play call for the kinds of urgent research, inclusive dialogue and coordinated multilateral engagement that will help prevent humanity’s digital future in space from reproducing the inequalities we find here on Earth today.

The post The sovereignty question of orbital data centres first appeared on UNIDIR.

In September 2026, the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapon systems in Geneva agreed on a set of elements for a future instrument on these weapons. Yet, AI-enabled capabilities can take much more diverse forms in and beyond the military domain.  

As both a force multiplier and a disruptor on many fronts, AI can enhance or disrupt logistics; sharpen or distort intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; strengthen cyber defences or deepen vulnerabilities; and help detect or spread disinformation.  

Where industry makes decisive decisions 

Long before an AI-enabled system reaches the battlefield, someone determines what data it learns from, how it is tested and how much it is allowed to decide on its own.

That someone is usually an engineer in the private sector, rather than a State.

These design choices shape whether a system is reliable, predictable and lawful, and they are made years before any commander uses it. The decisive role of industry extends to the entire system life cycle of most AI-enabled military capabilities, spanning from the design and testing phase to post-deployment maintenance and decommissioning.  

Across all stages, technology developers, integrators and providers make crucial decisions on how to source and handle data, how to simulate operational conditions and where to set the degree of autonomy through decision thresholds. 

This centrality, and often even primacy, in consequential technical decisions makes the private sector’s role and responsibility a focal point of international governance discussions on military AI. The pace of development also sits primarily in the hands of companies.  

As drivers of innovation, they tend to move faster than States can regulate them. That speed puts them closest to new capabilities and therefore first in line to explore, understand and draw leverage from them. 

What’s more, the military AI industry itself is quickly evolving alongside the technologies it develops. As demand for their systems grows, new firms are entering the market while established defence companies form new partnerships, acquire AI start-ups and expand AI implementation into their products. Importantly, newer entrants and established defence companies may differ in their institutional experience and in the internal structures they have built for compliance and accountability. 

Beyond the narrower defence industry landscape, AI now spans nearly every sector and security domain. While specialized companies focus on dedicated battlefield capabilities, the ecosystem of actors with a stake in the life cycle and supply chains of these systems is growing more complex and interconnected. Involvement of industry players can range from direct procurement, through subcontracting networks, to third-party testing. 

Making military AI lawful by design  

Translating governance principles for military AI into operational and technical practice is a necessary step towards making these systems “lawful by design“. This means integrating legal requirements as core design parameters from the earliest stages of development, and sustaining compliance across the entire life cycle of these technologies. This approach cannot, however, displace the responsibility of States.  

In principle and practice: 

• Companies, for their part, have a responsibility to respect human rights that exists over and above legal compliance, as set out in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. They can integrate legal assessments into their risk management frameworks and factor international humanitarian law considerations into design and testing processes.  

• States remain bound by international humanitarian law and international human rights law and, as customers, require assurance that the capabilities they acquire enable them to meet these obligations. They can embed responsible AI principles into procurement and export control processes, articulate clear expectations for suppliers, and invest in the technological, human, operational, financial and procedural capacity to apply them. This includes legal reviews of new weapons, means and methods of warfare under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, which may need to be conducted iteratively given the evolving nature of AI systems.

Multi-stakeholder consultations convened by UNIDIR point to a shared recognition, among States and industry alike, that legal and ethical requirements need to be translated into technical requirements, and that a clear distribution of roles and responsibilities is essential for effective public–private partnerships. 

Building a shared baseline with industry 

Before companies and governments can act on these measures, there needs to be a shared understanding and expectation of what responsible industry behaviour means. A framework that takes stock of multi-stakeholder perspectives through close consultations on responsibility and ethics, and turns them into clear guidance on accountability and compliance, would give all stakeholders involved the shared baseline they need.

Industry actors must be included in such a process. UN Secretary-General António Guterres regularly emphasizes the involvement of a range of stakeholders, including industry, in policy initiatives on responsible military applications of AI. Consultation with experts and academia, civil society and other stakeholders, such as the humanitarian sector, is equally crucial. It ensures that popular and diverse expectations are included and galvanized, and that these efforts are credible. 

The inclusion of industry perspectives is also vital for ensuring that any frameworks for responsible behaviour remain appropriate, effective and grounded:

• Practical experience. When it comes to translating requirements into system design and engineering choices, industry has the most direct and practical experience of what is possible and where technical constraints are.

• Realistic outcomes. Industry involvement and input ensure that outcomes for AI are realistic, feasible and actionable, and meet the expectations.

• Technical expertise. The private sector can bring valuable technical expertise and understanding States lack to the development process of governance frameworks.

• Buy-in. Ultimately, close consultation with companies increases buy-in for any solutions proposed.

Gaining insight into and maintaining access to the technological frontier is increasingly a priority and integral aspect of national AI strategies of States, spanning from military systems to frontier foundational models.  

Why States have a stake in responsible industry behaviour 

Frameworks for responsible industry behaviour are thus equally in the interest of States. Swiss Federal Councillor Albert Rösti, who heads the Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications, has called for companies to set their own guidelines and standards for trustworthy AI, alongside voluntary commitments, even before international agreements or other forms of global regulation materialize.  

States are also invested in what these commitments and measures would entail in substance. Military procurement can be a direct mechanism by which States implement legal obligations.  

Although many of the critical design choices rest in the hands of companies, international legal responsibility falls on the State that uses a system, not on whoever developed it.  

For example, the interpretability of AI outputs is often limited by their “black box” nature of these systems. While warfare will inherently require navigating uncertainties, obscure system logs may add layers of complexity to States’ obligation to conduct effective investigations of alleged violations of international humanitarian law.  

In practice, governments need to be clear about the questions they expect industry partners to answer as the basis for partnerships. Explicit expectations, a clear allocation of roles, and an understanding of compliance responsibility within and beyond contracts foster sustainable public-private partnerships and procurement relationships. These give States access to the information and documentation they need, and greater confidence about technical reliability. 

UNIDIR’s role in turning expectations into guidance 

This is where UNIDIR’s work matters. With its subject matter expertise and convening power, the Institute can help industry, States and other stakeholders unpack these complex questions on responsibility, accountability and compliance in military AI.  

Through its Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain, UNIDIR’s Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security aims to support industry and States in defining their roles for responsible military AI. Developed with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and in consultation with industry, States, civil society and the humanitarian sector, the framework will translate these expectations into voluntary, practical guidance on what responsible behaviour looks like at each stage of a system’s life cycle.  

The work reflects UNIDIR’s commitment to designing inclusive processes that foster greater trust, sustained dialogue and principled technological development in a field crucial to global peace and security discussions. 

The post Industry responsibility in developing military AI first appeared on UNIDIR.

As Cybersecurity Awareness Month comes to an end, it is an opportunity to reflect on how UNIDIR works to address these challenges. Through its Security and Technology Programme, UNIDIR addresses cybersecurity not merely as a technical challenge, but as a policy, legal and diplomatic issue. Our research and cyber capacity-building activities bridge technical, legal and diplomatic communities, offering practical tools and conceptual frameworks for navigating an increasingly complex digital domain.

The evolving threat landscape

Understanding why cybersecurity requires international cooperation begins with the nature of the threats themselves. Malicious cyber activity has become a constant feature of the digital environment.

UNIDIR estimates that ransomware attacks increased approximately threefold between 2023 and 2024.

Supply-chain compromises illustrate how interconnected networks create systemic vulnerabilities that no single organization can address alone, as malicious actors penetrate trusted software updates to reach thousands of downstream victims.

The human cost is increasingly visible: hospitals forced to cancel surgeries, water systems disrupted, and humanitarian organizations targeted. The 2022 ICRC breach alone exposed sensitive data on over half a million people. Other risks may take years to materialize. In “Harvest now, decrypt later” operations, adversaries steal encrypted data today, anticipating that future quantum computing could render current encryption obsolete.

Artificial intelligence is compounding these risks, lowering the barriers to sophisticated cyber operations and expanding their surface.

These interconnected and evolving threats highlight the need not only to understand cyber incidents, but also to develop shared approaches to preventing, mitigating and responding to them.

Making cyber incidents legible

To help policymakers understand the nature of cyber incidents, UNIDIR has developed accessible analytical tools. Our Taxonomy of Malicious ICT Incidents offers a structured way to categorize incidents and their effects, from disruption of service and data attacks to physical and reputational harm.

Building on this, the Intrusion Path framework divides the ICT environment into three layers: outside, on, and inside the perimeter, visualizing where malicious activities occur. During UNIDIR’s Cyber Stability Conference 2025, the framework showed participants at which point technical, legal and diplomatic responses come into play. A scenario-based exercise set in the fictional region of “Dystopia” illustrated how an ICT incident could escalate into cross-border disruptions.

But understanding incidents is only one part of the challenge. Addressing them also requires a shared international framework to guide State behaviour and support cooperation.

Strengthening policy and diplomacy

The UN Framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace, comprising the 11 voluntary norms, international law, confidence-building measures and capacity-building, remains the cornerstone of multilateral efforts to ensure security in the use of ICTs.

UNIDIR’s analysis of the 2021-2025 Open-Ended Working Group on ICT security provides a comprehensive account of how States advanced this framework, informing discussions as they transitioned to the permanent Global Mechanism on ICT security in 2026.

Translating this framework into practice requires efforts tailored to national and regional contexts. In Southeast Asia, UNIDIR worked with ASEAN Member States and the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence to develop the ASEAN Norms Implementation Checklist, providing step-by-step guidance for embedding the 11 voluntary norms into national policy, legal, technical, and diplomatic practice.

Confidence-building is another essential dimension of international cooperation. UNIDIR’s Cyber Policy Portal serves as a practical transparency tool, profiling the cyber policies of 193 UN Member States and enabling governments, policymakers and other stakeholders to compare national approaches, track implementation of the UN Framework, and identify areas for cooperation.

However, shared commitments and transparency alone are not enough. States also need the capabilities to implement these commitments and participate effectively in international efforts.

From norms to practice

International consensus on frameworks for responsible behaviour means little if States lack the capacity to implement them. UNIDIR’s Foundational Cyber Capabilities framework outlines essential components for national cyber preparedness: strategic planning, legal and institutional development, operational capabilities, and trusted partnerships.

In Thailand, UNIDIR partnered with national authorities to develop a roadmap addressing priority issues and supporting implementation of specific elements of the UN Framework. This was followed by a targeted workshop that brought together Thailand’s technical, legal and diplomatic communities to translate select norms into national processes and practices suited to their institutional context.

Beyond demand-driven workshops, UNIDIR also delivers a dedicated Training Course on Norms, International Law and Cyberspace, designed to help government legal advisers and diplomats engage effectively in multilateral discussions on ICT security. Across five editions, 116 diplomats from 82 States have benefited from the programme.

Building capacity also means ensuring that a wider range of voices can participate in multilateral discussions. To support women’s participation in multilateral ICT security discussions, UNIDIR runs the Women in International Security and Cyberspace Fellowship, equipping women diplomats with knowledge and skills for engagement in the Global Mechanism. Its impact is measurable: in the Global Mechanism’s first substantive plenary, women delivered 51% of statements, and fellows alone delivered more than half of all of women’s interventions.

Alongside implementation and participation, another key challenge is clarifying how international law applies to State conduct in cyberspace.

International law and State conduct in cyberspace

In 2013, the UN Group of Governmental Experts agreed that international law applies to the State use of ICT. Since then, States have focused on how it applies in practice. UNIDIR’s research maps where States’ interpretations converge and where they diverge, including the positions of regional organizations on the application of international law in cyberspace.

Due diligence is a case in point. The UN Group of Governmental Experts in 2015 articulated a voluntary norm that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”. Still, due diligence as a legal concept applicable in cyberspace remains subject to divergent State interpretations. As observed by UNIDIR, key outstanding questions include the legal status of due diligence, the scope of expected conduct, the required level of knowledge, and the harm threshold.

Multilateral engagement and the path forward

Clarifying legal questions, building national capabilities and advancing shared norms all depend on sustained dialogue among States and other stakeholders. Multilateral engagement provides a space to bring these efforts together and address the challenges posed by technological change.

UNIDIR’s flagship Cyber Stability Conference, celebrating its milestone 15th edition in 2027, serves as a key platform for multistakeholder dialogue, bringing together policy, legal, technical, and diplomatic perspectives on cybersecurity. The 2026 conference focused on the current rapid technological change. Its central takeaway:

Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing reshape both offensive and defensive capabilities, and whether governance frameworks can keep pace with technological change remains an open question.

The same interdependence that makes cyberspace vulnerable also makes cooperation indispensable. As States take forward the new Global Mechanism on ICT security, UNIDIR stands ready to support them: through research, policy tools, and a range of capacity-building initiatives.

Awareness, translated into participation, is how resilience is built.

Awareness tells us the risks are shared. But awareness without capacity, and capacity without international cooperation, leaves cyberspace vulnerable. Stability depends on whether the capacity to manage those risks is shared too, and UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme works to help close that gap.

The post Advancing cyber stability in an interdependent world first appeared on UNIDIR.

Consider a cyber incident that disrupts a country’s electricity supply. The national cybersecurity agency must assess the technical situation, law enforcement may open an investigation, the ministry of foreign affairs may need to consider whether the incident has an international dimension, and the ministry of energy must work closely with the operator to restore essential services. Each institution may have its own plan. The question is: how well can these plans function together in practice?

Testing national arrangements before a real crisis hits

National cybersecurity strategies, legislation and incident-response frameworks provide essential foundations, and many countries have made important progress in developing them. Yet written frameworks cannot anticipate every operational dependency or point of friction between the institutions responsible for applying them, such as:

• Who leads?

• What information can be shared?

• When does an information and communication technology (ICT) incident become a public-safety or national security concern?

• How do technical, legal, policy and law-enforcement decisions fit together?

These issues often become visible only when institutions work through a crisis scenario together.  

Implementation is therefore a capability in its own right. National arrangements need to be tested and rehearsed in a low-risk environment before a real crisis occurs. This helps stakeholders identify gaps, clarify roles, strengthen information sharing, and build the working relationships needed for a coordinated response. Because institutions, risks and legal frameworks differ from country to country, this work must be tailored to national realities.

An Asia-Pacific success story

UNIDIR’s cyber capacity-building initiative across Asia-Pacific supports countries in strengthening national preparedness, testing institutional arrangements and improving coordination in ways tailored to their specific contexts.

The trainings conducted were not technical cyber drills, but strategic tabletop exercises. In line with a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, they brought together stakeholders including cybersecurity agencies, law enforcement, ministries of foreign affairs, critical infrastructure operators and senior decision makers.

Since May 2025, UNIDIR – with support from Global Affairs Canada – has successfully delivered national capacity-building trainings in eight countries: Thailand, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Indonesia, the Philippines, Pakistan, Malaysia, Cambodia and Viet Nam, alongside a dedicated thematic training programme in Thailand.

© 2026, Ministry of Post and Telecommunications of Cambodia

To ensure that each training programme responds to the specific national context, UNIDIR follows a three-phase approach. This reflects the principles for ICT capacity-building agreed by Member States in the UN Open-ended Working Group on ICT Security, including that capacity-building should be demand-driven, nationally owned and tailored to national needs and priorities.

• The first phase combined research and consultations with government institutions and other national stakeholders. Its purpose was to understand the priorities of partner countries alongside their unique national threat landscapes and national designations of critical infrastructure, institutional and legislative arrangements, capabilities, and future plans.

• The second phase built on these findings through capacity-building programmes co-designed with national authorities, which included the strategic tabletop exercises. These exercises allowed participants to apply national legislation, institutional arrangements and the framework of responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs to realistic cybersecurity scenarios. By testing how a response would operate in practice, these exercises helped participants surface coordination gaps, information-sharing challenges and overlapping responsibilities before an incident occurs.

• The ongoing third phase provides targeted, in-depth support in areas identified during the exercises. These include cyber crisis management and strategic communication, implementation of the framework, national approaches to attribution, responses consistent with international law, cybersecurity workforce development and whole-of-government coordination.

From a single exercise to a national framework in Thailand

UNIDIR’s deepening collaboration with the Government of Thailand is an example of how tailored, sustained engagement can move from testing arrangements to concretely supporting implementation of the framework.

In May 2025, UNIDIR and Thailand’s National Cyber Security Agency delivered a tailored cyber capacity-building and policy training programme, including a tabletop exercise simulating an ICT incident targeting vital energy infrastructure. Based on research on national cyber-related legislation and cyber incident response framework, the exercise helped national authorities identify practical steps to further operationalize the framework.

© 2025, National Cyber Security Agency of Thailand

UNIDIR then worked with Thailand to develop a tailored follow-up training programme, delivered in July 2026 in partnership with the Office of the National Security Council, National Cyber Security Agency and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It explored how selected elements of the framework could be translated into national policies, institutional processes and operational practices.

The training also convened technical, policy, law enforcement and diplomatic communities to allow them to address a challenge that none of them could effectively address on their own. As a result, Thai authorities are developing a national framework to further implement specific elements of the framework of responsible State behaviour.

This progression illustrates the value of capacity-building as a sustained process rather than a one-off event. It also reflects a straightforward principle of UNIDIR’s approach:

Effective capacity-building cannot be designed from afar. It must be grounded in national institutional, legislative and policy contexts, and guided by the priorities of the countries it seeks to support.

What’s next?

As cyber threats evolve, their effects increasingly cross institutional boundaries. Ransomware can disrupt essential services and economic activity; supply-chain compromises can involve government, industry and international partners; and emerging technologies, including AI and quantum, can create new challenges for security and governance. No single institution or community of practice can address these challenges alone.

UNIDIR’s cyber capacity-building supports countries to turn national frameworks and international commitments into practical cooperation. It strengthens the relationships, shared understanding and institutional habits that allow national frameworks to function when they are needed most.

© 2026, National Cyber Security Agency of Malaysia

UNIDIR will continue to expand its engagement across the Asia-Pacific region, working with partner countries to deliver tailored training, scenario-based exercises and support that respond to evolving national priorities and cyber threats. Through its recently established Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security, UNIDIR will also extend its capacity-building work to the field of artificial intelligence.

The post Preparing for cyber crises before they occur first appeared on UNIDIR.

In 2025, more inter- and intra-State conflicts were waged than in any year since the Second World War. Conflicts are also intensifying, lasting longer and growing more intractable.

Around 245,000 people were killed in conflict last year alone. Some 120 million were forcibly displaced by major conflicts such as those in the Sudan, Ukraine and Myanmar. And long after fighting ends, people may still face physical and psychological suffering, as well as disrupted livelihoods.

The time to act is before armed conflict breaks out. Prevention not only reduces human suffering, it also limits the financial cost. Research suggests that armed conflict cost the global economy $835 billion in 2025. According to the World Bank, every dollar invested in peacebuilding and prevention could save $16 over the long term.

Why weapons matter

One way to prevent armed conflict is to tackle an essential ingredient: weapons proliferation and misuse. Logically, without weapons there can be no armed conflict. With them, fighting appears to break out more easily, last longer or intensify, depending on the context. In northwestern Nigeria, for example, research shows that environmental stress generates conflict, conflict drives demand for weapons, and the widespread availability of weapons further aggravates insecurity.

Crucially, weapons can also warn of conflict on the horizon:

• Rising prices on illicit arms markets may indicate greater demand and a heightened risk of fighting.

• The appearance of new weapons or tactics may signal an escalation in violence.

• Fewer seizures may suggest that fewer illicit weapons are circulating – or that the government has lost control on the ground.

Interpreted in context and alongside other indicators, such data can sharpen conflict analysis and forecasting.

From underused resource to emerging priority

Yet, prevention strategies often overlook these signals. Weapons-related issues can, for instance, be seen as too politically sensitive or technical. Further, arms control and prevention experts have few opportunities to exchange knowledge. Weapons data may also be inaccessible to the public, subject to time lags, insufficiently granular or otherwise poorly suited to prevention. And even where high-quality data can be obtained and analysed, it may be difficult to convert that analysis into preventative action.

The good news is that attention is growing

In 2018, the UN Secretary-General recognized that there had been “limited engagement within the system on how issues relating to arms […] can be utilized for conflict prevention.” He urged UN partners to explore how to better integrate weapons-related information and risks into conflict prevention activities.

UNIDIR responded with, among other initiatives, the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit, which offers practical guidance on weapons-related risk factors, indicators and data sources, and on how to incorporate them into conflict analysis and prevention.

Two key developments then accelerated political momentum. In the 2023 New Agenda for Peace, the UN Secretary-General called on States to “prioritize prevention,” and specifically to integrate arms control into conflict prevention initiatives. In the 2024 Pact for the Future, States responded by committing to strengthen their strategies for preventing armed conflict, including their early-warning systems. Notably, they also pledged to address the risks associated with illicit weapons through national prevention strategies.

Weapons data for more effective early warning

Conflict early-warning systems play a vital role in effective conflict prevention by identifying risks and alerting those able to respond. But they are only as good as the data they rely on, and few systematically collect, monitor or analyse information about weapons.

That is changing. In 2024, UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, and the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System brought together leading experts in weapons data and early warning. These two communities have historically had little contact. Together, they charted practical paths forward to strengthen the use of weapons data in early warning.

This work is already bearing fruit:

• The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding is training community monitors in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire to better identify and report weapons-related risks, on the expectation that more granular data will make its early-warning system more effective. Research has shown that community-led arms control initiatives, including local data collection for early warning, can help to prevent conflict.

• The UN Department of Peace Operations is developing an early-warning and response toolkit, including weapons-related indicators and guidance. It is designed to help peacekeeping missions collect, verify and analyse information, and to act on warnings.

• The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is designing an AI model to better assess risks of conflict-related sexual violence, and aims to draw on weapons data to make those assessments more accurate.

States are also engaging. In 2025, some recommended the dissemination of innovative approaches, technologies, and weapons data for early warning and conflict prevention. The UN Secretary-General further encouraged States to strengthen their capacity to collect, analyse and share weapons data as part of their conflict prevention and early-warning strategies.

Priorities for the next United Nations leadership

UN Secretary-General António Guterres made conflict prevention a key priority when he took office in 2017. Promising progress has since been made in bringing weapons-related risks into conflict prevention. Much of the potential of weapons data, however, remains unrealized. Now is the time to unlock it. Priorities include:

• Encouraging the UN Security Council to use arms control measures not just reactively in support of peacekeeping operations, but more often proactively to prevent conflict.

• Building UN missions’ capacity to collect, interpret and harness weapons data, and to share that data responsibly, thereby strengthening conflict analysis and early warning.

• Collecting and disseminating good practice on weapons data for conflict prevention, for example through UNIDIR’s Arms Data and Early Warning Dashboard, which is being converted into a knowledge repository for weapons data and early-warning experts.

• Using reviews of arms control and conflict prevention frameworks, such as the recent review of the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms, to prioritize weapons-related risks.

UNIDIR will continue to build tools and share resources that help turn weapons data into preventative action. The next UN Secretary-General must keep conflict prevention at the heart of the UN’s agenda – and place weapons data closer to the heart of conflict prevention.

The post Unlocking the potential of weapons data to prevent conflict first appeared on UNIDIR.

In 2013, the UN Group of Governmental Experts affirmed that international law applies to State use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) – which was welcomed by the UN General Assembly. What States have continued to discuss in successive multilateral processes is how it applies. For example, when a cyber operation could amount to a prohibited use of force, when a State may respond and what obligations it owes. 

The consequences of leaving these questions unsettled are not abstract, as legal uncertainty does not stay in the legal domain.

Cyber operations can disrupt critical infrastructure and essential services, including healthcare, transport, financial systems and government functions.

In a crisis, uncertainty about how States understand the applicable rules can compound the risks of misattribution, misperception and escalation.

Addressing the representation gap

National positions on the application of international law in cyberspace are meant to enhance transparency and contribute to common understandings. A national position is an official public statement explaining how a State understands the application of international law to its conduct in cyberspace: where it draws its lines, what it considers lawful, and how it understands its own obligations. To date, 37 States have published one, and the African Union and European Union have adopted regional views.

Participation is, however, uneven. Many of the individual positions come from the Western European and Others Group and only a handful come from other regions. For example, only one national position comes from the African Group, and four from Latin America and Caribbean Group. This is not a matter of States having nothing to contribute, but one of the conditions that shape participation: available legal and technical capacity, political will, competing national priorities and awareness of the issue.

The 2024 Common African Position reflects this uneven landscape and expressly encourages African Union Member States to issue national statements on the application of international law to cyberspace. It positions the regional view as a catalyst for, rather than a substitute for, individual national positions.

Against this backdrop, developing capacity on how international law applies in cyberspace has gained prominence in multilateral processes. States have encouraged capacity building initiatives that can contribute to the equal and effective participation of a broader and diverse range of States in these discussions.

How UNIDIR supports States

UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme supports States seeking to develop their own national positions.

Our approach is grounded in a simple principle. Every State has an equal right to participate in shaping international law as it applies in cyberspace, and every State’s views carry equal weight in that process.

Our role is not to prescribe what a State’s legal position should be. It is to provide practical support, facilitate exchange and help States navigate the process of developing their own views.

In 2024, UNIDIR published A Compendium of Good Practices: Developing a National Position on the Interpretation of International Law and State Use of ICT. It draws on a closed-door workshop with representatives of 19 States (two thirds had published views at that time). The Compendium distils practical lessons on three questions:

1. Why do States develop a position?
   
2. What could it cover?
   
3. How could the process work?

The Compendium sets out ten recommended steps, from defining scope and identifying stakeholders to capacity building, drafting, adoption and dissemination.

UNIDIR is currently preparing Compendium 2.0, which will capture new and updated national positions and analyse the two regional positions for the first time. It will also examine how the process of developing a position has evolved, with a wider range of national authorities now involved and additional areas of international law being increasingly explored.

Alongside research, the Institute develops and delivers tailored capacity building initiatives. At the request of Member States, it:

• Runs workshops on developing a national position and trainings on norms, international law and cyberspace;

• Facilitates substantive exchanges among States at different stages of the process;

• Connects officials with peers who have already navigated this process;

• Supports events where the States we assist launch their national positions.

To date, UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme has supported around 14 individual States in their processes, ranging from dedicated workshops to tailored assistance during the drafting of legal interpretations.   

The breadth of participation in these discussions matters. Common understandings are more likely to reflect the realities and concerns of States when a wider range of national perspectives is brought into the conversation.

Why this is not just a legal exercise

It would be easy, but maybe misleading, to see national and regional positions as a niche concern for international lawyers. In practice, they serve wider purposes:

• They build transparency and predictability in international relations: Publishing a legal position communicates expectations to other States. It clarifies what a State considers acceptable under international law and what it does not. This predictability lowers the risk of misunderstanding and escalation in cyberspace.

• They enhance preparedness: Clarifying where a State draws its lines, a national position provides a framework for assessing and potentially responding to incidents. When a crisis hits, governments may not have the luxury of starting from basic principles. An agreed national legal position may enable faster, more coherent and more credible responses.

• They improve coordination at home: Developing a position encourages a State to bring its relevant national authorities (from the foreign ministry, to the defence unit, cybersecurity agency, law enforcement and other stakeholders) together around a shared understanding. The document that results becomes a common reference point, reducing the risk that different parts of government advance conflicting interpretations, and ensuring that the State’s position is consistent at home and abroad.

• They give States a voice: A national position is the clearest way for a State to contribute to the development of common understandings on how international law applies to cyberspace. For developing States in particular, a position is a practical instrument for ensuring their perspectives are part of the global conversation.

The moment to shape international law is now

Common understandings of how international law applies in cyberspace are being currently shaped. The Global Mechanism on ICT in the context of international security, which began its work in 2026, continues to examine how international law applies to State use of ICTs. Its focused discussions cover topics such as sovereignty, the prohibition of intervention, State responsibility and the peaceful settlement of disputes, among others. The positions States publish today will also shape these conversations and the common understandings of tomorrow.

Broad and geographically diverse participation will be important to develop common understandings that reflect the perspectives and experiences of States across regions.

That is why UNIDIR’s work matters. It does not just support States in producing documents with interesting legal interpretations, but helps ensure that the legal framework governing cyberspace is shaped by all of those who will live under it.

The post The future of international law in cyberspace needs more diverse voices first appeared on UNIDIR.

To respond effectively, it is important to consider the different ways in which threats, risks and vulnerabilities are experienced by women, men, boys, girls and gender-diverse persons. By applying this “gender lens”, we can help to improve policy interventions and deliver better outcomes to the various groups affected by violence.

In conflict situations, men and boys are often the majority of those killed and injured, while women and girls are most at risk of sexual and gender-based violence. In most conflicts, applying a gender lens will also uncover patterns which may not be immediately obvious to security experts. For example, women and girls are the ones who bear the brunt of caring for children and injured family members during crises.

Recognizing different patterns of harm

A gender lens is essential to uncover patterns of harm and identify specific needs of different groups of society. A gender lens is not about creating hierarchies or comparing experiences as better or worse; it is about acknowledging different experiences during conflict and learning how to integrate these considerations into humanitarian response, arms control and disarmament, and peacebuilding.

The Arms Trade Treaty is the first multilateral arms control instrument to recognize the differentiated impact of weapons on women, men, boys and girls. Article 7.4 of the treaty requires States Parties to conduct a risk assessment to ensure that exported weapons are not used to commit gender-based violence (GBV) or serious violence against women and children.

At the national level, many countries across the world have taken additional steps to prevent femicides and GBV facilitated by weapons. These include regulations that deny gun licences to people who have been convicted of domestic violence, intimate partner violence, violent intimidation or stalking.

Ensuring that no one is left behind

A gender lens is crucial to inform both immediate humanitarian response and long-term relief and recovery efforts. Access to healthcare in the aftermath of a conflict is heavily influenced by gender, as well as cultural and socio-economic factors. UNIDIR research has shown that women and girls with visible injuries are more likely to experience stigma and social exclusion. Men and boys also experience stigma, which may prevent them from seeking mental health support due to cultural and gender norms.

Inclusive victim assistance has become an important part of humanitarian disarmament treaties and agreements, such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. With provisions related to gender- and age-sensitive assistance to victims, these instruments represent a successful step towards the strengthening of a rights-based approach in disarmament.

At the implementation level, however, more resources are needed to assist survivors of conflict, as many affected States struggle to effectively integrate victim assistance into already-stretched national health and social welfare systems.

Anticipating new risks and threats

The means of conflict and violence are changing, and digital technologies are increasingly being used to commit, assist or exacerbate GBV. This evolving phenomenon is commonly referred to as technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV).

As many as 38% of women have experienced some form of TFGBV, and this increases to about 70% of women if we consider human rights defenders, activists and journalists.

The rapid advancements in AI, including generative AI, have amplified TFGBV by enabling new forms of abuse, including the creation of non-consensual deepfake content. Studies estimate that 98% of online deepfakes are pornographic, and 99% of these target women.

When it comes to arms control discussions covering military applications of AI, concerns have already been raised about the need to mitigate gender and racial biases in weapon systems supported by AI. Such biases can make populations invisible or lead to targeting of people on the basis of biased assumptions. As States discuss new frameworks to govern AI and other digital technologies, these issues should be urgently addressed.

From research to practice

UNIDIR’s Integrated Approaches Programme supports States through research, advice and capacity-building activities that ensure gender considerations are part of international security strategies and governance frameworks.

We also deliver programmes that advance women’s equal participation in arms control and disarmament processes – an area where women remain underrepresented.

Our latest data shows that, on average, women represent only 36% of the diplomats attending arms control and disarmament discussions and negotiations.

Achieving gender equality should not be seen as a luxury or a minor task; it is key to overcoming conflict. Where women’s inclusion is prioritized, peace is more likely to last – particularly when women are able to influence decision-making.

Statistical analysis suggests that women’s participation has a positive impact on the durability of peace agreements.

A study of 156 peace agreements concluded that when women are included in peace processes there is a 20% increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least 2 years, and a 35% increase in the probability of an agreement lasting at least 15 years.

This Disarmament Week, as we are confronted by multiple conflicts and crises, we cannot afford to exclude women from decision-making or to turn a gender-blind eye to the suffering of millions of people affected by conflict and insecurity around the world. Ultimately, a gender lens reminds us that arms control and disarmament are not abstract measures; they are key instruments to protect people and deliver more equitable and enduring recovery.

The post Why a gender lens is important to achieve international peace and security first appeared on UNIDIR.

Policymakers and practitioners face a crucial challenge: despite decades of disarmament and reintegration programming, people’s motivations to join, leave and potentially rejoin armed groups are often poorly understood. As a result, there is a significant knowledge gap as to which approaches are most effective in helping sustain the transition to civilian life after conflict. Without a nuanced understanding of these dynamics, interventions risk being ill-equipped to facilitate disarmament and reintegration, which in turn can increase the risks of recidivism and conflict renewal.

Identifying what drives individuals’ recruitment and reintegration journeys is essential for designing effective interventions. UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project helps fill critical evidence gaps and inform better-tailored approaches that promote and sustain pathways from conflict to peace.

Across six countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Colombia and Iraq) the project has gathered fine-grained data that gets to the heart of why people disarm and demobilize, and before that, what leads them to join an armed group. This is done through:

• Quantitative methods (large-scale surveys of former armed group associates, former and current affiliates of community security and militia groups, and unaffiliated community members)

• Qualitative work (focus groups and key informant interviews)

• Other experimental and participatory approaches (such as research and photography workshops with conflict-affected youth).

A holistic assessment of conflict trajectories

UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project adopts a holistic approach to understanding reintegration progress. It examines former associates’ reintegration journeys through various dimensions, including economic, social and psychological well-being and perceptions of community trust and acceptance. This multifaceted approach helps examine the progress and challenges people face on their reintegration journeys and how different factors – including livelihood difficulties, environmental challenges, governance policies and gender norms – affect transitions to civilian life.

For individuals to disarm fully and permanently, it is important that they manage to establish civilian livelihoods and find ways to reintegrate into social life. This can be difficult amid ongoing insecurity, structural barriers or other factors.

In Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon, for instance, the project found that individuals who left Boko Haram often felt physically threatened by their old group and faced significant obstacles in finding new income sources, partly due to restrictions on farming.

The concern with returnees who continue to feel unsafe after demobilizing or who struggle to meet their basic needs is that they may retain weapons to protect themselves or take up arms for their economic survival. Both outcomes can have destabilizing effects and undermine weapons collection programmes.

© 2015, ICRC/Jesus Andres Serrano Redondo

Measuring progress over time

Alongside its holistic assessment, a distinctive feature of the Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project is its longitudinal approach, following former associates and returnees for up to four consecutive years. This has allowed researchers to assess reintegration over time rather than through a single snapshot. It also makes it possible to identify factors that support or impede progress, such as receiving programming support or civil documentation.

The project’s findings confirm that reintegration is not an event but a long-term process shaped by individual, community and societal factors.

Disarmament and reintegration programmes therefore need to take into account what motivates individuals to disarm, their sources of resilience and the barriers that former associates may face for years after leaving their group, to better support them on their pathways away from conflict.

Addressing armed group recruitment to improve conflict prevention

Another important aspect of interrupting conflict cycles and preventing new ones from forming is to address the root causes of armed group recruitment and weapons proliferation. To better understand the drivers of armed violence, the project has collected robust evidence about people’s entries into armed groups. For instance, in a survey in the North East of Nigeria, around a quarter of respondents formerly associated with Boko Haram reported that they were promised something by the group when they initially became associated. These incentives included promises of economic well-being, but also education, a sense of belonging, assistance with marriage and safety from violence.

By unpacking the factors that influence recruitment, the project helps improve understanding of the root causes of conflict and supports partners in adapting prevention and peacebuilding strategies to people’s needs and realities on the ground. For example, the project has shown how climatic and environmental pressures can create conditions favourable to armed recruitment.

Across multiple surveys in the Lake Chad Basin, a notable percentage of former Boko Haram associates who reported climate-related livelihood difficulties before joining the group said that these difficulties played a role in their recruitment.

UNIDIR continues to explore the links between climate change and armed group involvement and behaviour to help identify emerging conflict risks and ensure that interventions remain responsive to changing conditions.

Through its holistic, comparative approach across multiple case studies, the project has shown that recruitment dynamics can be highly context-specific and vary significantly across settings. In Colombia, for instance, UNIDIR’s research found that some survivors of sexual violence from the Nasa Indigenous communities of northern Cauca joined FARC dissident groups in search of justice, in part because the mechanisms available in their communities failed to deliver justice and accountability for perpetrators.

The project works with local partners and communities across conflict settings to disseminate its research findings and supports them in adopting evidence-based approaches that respond to local needs. Its research contributes to improving understanding of why individuals enter armed groups and acquire weapons. This nuanced knowledge is crucial to inform and support conflict prevention initiatives, which are often underprioritized but vital elements of a comprehensive disarmament strategy.

© 2020, ICRC/Prichilla Absi

The two-way reality of reintegration

The reintegration of former associates of armed groups is not a one-way process. For them to return to civilian life, they need to be received and accepted by the communities to which they return. Given this reality, UNIDIR also gathers evidence about the lived experiences of unaffiliated communities affected by conflict.

This is important for two reasons:

1. It helps understand how communities are affected by and cope with insecurity and conflict, and how aid programmes can be tailored to address their needs and assist victims and survivors.
   
2. It provides a fuller picture of reintegration progress.

The project’s nuanced approach is essential in this regard, because although superficial measures of acceptance can seem high in some cases, qualitative analysis can reveal specific instances of rejection or discrimination against returnees.

In Iraq, for example, the high acceptance rates reported by Iraqi returnees from Al-Hol camp in Syria, who were often perceived to be affiliated with the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, were not necessarily mirrored by the perceptions of community members living in the same areas of return to the same extent.

UNIDIR’s evidence can uncover specific barriers that need to be addressed by policies and interventions in conflict-affected communities to promote receptivity in practice. By underlining the importance of investing in returnees’ community entry and promoting social cohesion, this research helps strengthen reintegration support and the prospects of sustainable transitions away from conflict.

Evidence to inform policy and practice

The project builds on UNIDIR’s expertise in disarmament by taking into consideration the multifaceted dimensions of human security and integrating a people-centred approach to disarmament and reintegration programming. Through collaboration with UN, regional, national and local partners, the Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project equips practitioners and policymakers with high-quality, evidence-based information that fills critical knowledge gaps.

Earlier in the year, the project was shortlisted for the first edition of the UN 2.0 Awards, which recognize UN system initiatives that are achieving outstanding results through new ways of working and new solutions.

UNIDIR’s work helps inform the international community’s design and implementation of effective interventions that assist individuals and their communities in transitioning away from violent conflict and building durable peace.

The post Championing a people-centred approach to disarmament and reintegration first appeared on UNIDIR.

The session supports a multi-year workplan of the Working Group on the Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer Space, under the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Article XI commits States Parties to inform the UN Secretary-General, the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of their activities in outer space.

Why Article XI matters now

This is a moment of rapidly rising activity, of a growing number of actors, and of capabilities that are very often dual-use. It is also, regrettably, a moment of eroding trust between States. As such, transparency is not a luxury. It is one of the few measures that can be advanced incrementally, without waiting for the resolution of larger and more contested questions. And much of what is needed already exists.

The Registration Convention and General Assembly resolution 1721 B (Article XVI) are not new obligations to be negotiated, they are existing commitments with latent potential. Increased utilization of Article XI could significantly enhance the security and stability of outer space.

On the question of dual-use capabilities, existing export control regimes are worth examining as a means of further encouraging implementation. These already involve States in classifying and tracking sensitive capabilities. The habits of categorization and channels of trust they rely on could inform how the international community thinks about what information is suitable for sharing under Article XI, and through what mechanisms.

Processes like The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation are voluntary and sit outside the UN system, but their use of information templates, regional workshops and annual meetings are all relevant practices to consider.

UNIDIR’s role in bridging policy and practice

UNIDIR has convened regional and industry workshops that bring multilateral space security mandates and processes closer to the places where national and regional decisions are discussed. These workshops also work to raise awareness of the governance frameworks that already exist.

Article XI is of particular value here because more States are party to the Outer Space Treaty than to the Registration Convention, offering a channel for information-sharing that is open to a wider community of States and covers a wider range of activity. Ad hoc, extrabudgetary State contributions to UNOOSA to support and expand work on national engagement with Article XI could lead to enhanced State practice in this area.

UNIDIR also maintains the Space Security Portal, a digital hub that gathers national and intergovernmental information on space laws, policies and activities. Although it is curated through a security lens, user feedback indicates the portal is helpful to understand national space positions and activities — a reminder that transparency, by whatever door it enters, can serve a range of purposes.

The portal does not rely solely on information contributed by States; it is sustained by a research team that proactively examines primary-source documents and government activities to keep it current. This in no way substitutes for States willingly furnishing information, but it does suggest a complementary model worth exploring. Implementing bodies could help gather information, whether through dedicated personnel or with the assistance of AI-based tools, and present it back to States for review and approval before sharing it through dedicated State-to-State or State-to-public channels.

NASA / Bill Ingalls, public domain

Creating a shared foundation

This is why a draft template for submissions of information under Article XI holds considerable potential. Practitioners are not always aware of Article XI; and even where they are, the provision can feel abstract. A template responds to both difficulties. It makes the act of sharing concrete — indicating what a State, or potentially a non-State industry actor, might share, and in what form — and in doing so it lowers the threshold to participation.

Security concerns and sensitive information can understandably inhibit willingness to share information. However, general information-sharing, even concerning unclassified or otherwise non-sensitive activities, has value in its own right as it helps establish information channels, builds regularity of practice and can improve confidence in the possibility of future, more substantial sharing arrangements.

In that spirit, it may be useful for the Working Group to examine, through a structured exercise, why States that are not currently sharing information under Article XI choose not to do so. It could also classify the types of information at stake — distinguishing, for instance, information that is genuinely sensitive from information that is simply not habitually shared. One concrete category that could be highlighted as good practice is information on derelict objects, which is generally non-sensitive and directly relevant to the shared interest in a sustainable space environment.

A parallel exercise to map the information that is already available, including through the portal and UNOOSA resources, could further lower the barriers to using Article XI. This assessment could help identify when channelling available information through Article XI strengthens multilateralism and international trust — and when existing information ecosystems are already sufficiently robust and well used, such that duplicating the effort is unnecessary and resources are better focused elsewhere.

In addition to advancing work in Vienna, this could also play a role in supporting space-security-related processes in Geneva, specifically the work of the Open-ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its aspects. The fourth session of this group will discuss, inter alia: “elements on basic obligations … related to the national space policies, doctrines and strategies and other measures that could reduce the risk of escalation, conflict and an arms race in outer space”. Having an understanding of wider opportunities and challenges in this area could therefore inform and advance work in other domains.

Small steps, lasting confidence

Even where information is shared unilaterally, taking the additional step of channelling it through multilateral and international legal mechanisms aligns it with the wider international community and demonstrates a certain kind of political will for transparency. That is exactly the kind of small, incremental step that can, over time, build confidence and trust.

After all, the security, safety and sustainability of outer space, and its continued use for peaceful purposes, will not be secured by any single instrument — but they will be greatly enhanced through the patient use of the mutually reinforcing mechanisms we already have.

The post Building trust in space through greater transparency first appeared on UNIDIR.

The broad diffusion of AI across scientific disciplines is increasingly evident in bibliometric studies. The number of AI-related natural science publications rose to nearly 80,000 in 2025, up 26% from 2024. This accounted for roughly 6–9% of scientific output across major scientific domains in 2025, compared to less than 1% in 2010. Recent studies also highlight particularly rapid growth in AI-biotechnology research, including in areas such as gene editing, drug discovery and bioinformatics.

These trends suggest that once-niche AI models are becoming increasingly embedded across the scientific research ecosystem. No longer the preserve of specific communities in specialized domains, these models are evolving into general-purpose capabilities available to specialists and non-specialists alike. This expanded access and rapid improvement in capability suggest significant implications for the governance of dual-use biology and its threat outlook.

Biological threats, including biological weapons, have traditionally been associated with access to specialized material, facilities and expertise. The growing integration of AI models into biological research and their rapid advancement add another dimension to these threat perceptions. Frontier AI models are increasingly enabling actors to acquire and apply biological knowledge more efficiently than was possible just a few years ago, potentially lowering some of the knowledge and expertise barriers associated with sensitive dual-use research.

Though Anthropic’s findings provide evidence that actors have already attempted to misuse AI for sensitive and potentially weaponized biological research, they do not demonstrate that AI models enable the development of biological weapons, nor that such efforts would have meaningfully advanced the prospect of success. They do, however, suggest that actors see strategic value in exploiting frontier AI models for dual-use biological activities that may be inaccessible through traditional pathways.

For that reason, it is encouraging to see frontier AI companies engaging in multilateral discussions on threat models, biological risk assessment and evaluations with respect to their tools. This is particularly important given that the private sector has been responsible for the development of the overwhelming majority of frontier AI models. But key governance and oversight challenges remain, and the most capable models continue to exhibit the least transparency.

At the same time, the international community cannot become wholly reliant on private sector actors to identify and mitigate every single situation in which AI could be exploited in the development of biology for hostile purposes. Nor can the private AI industry afford to remain detached from ongoing multilateral efforts to strengthen biological weapons controls.

Effective governance of emerging AI-biology dual-use capabilities will require sustained coordination with existing biological weapons prohibition and biosecurity frameworks, including the core, near-universal regime governing biological threats, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Efforts to strengthen the BWC’s ability to address emerging science and technology developments may ultimately prove to be relevant to the broader debate on AI governance, both within industry and among governments.

Moreover, the convergence of AI and biology, while deserving particular attention, is only one of several converging science and technology areas that may shape the biological threat spectrum and warrant our attention as we look to avert a darker biological weapons future. In such a future, biology could be exploited to develop threats beyond traditional conceptions of biological weapons, including localized attacks, terrorism and economic sabotage via disruption of agriculture or livestock supplies.

The nature of biological enablement by AI raises both the floor and ceiling of what could be achieved. Novices can attain previously inaccessible scientific knowledge, whereas experts can use AI to overcome domain-specific hurdles in their research. And a wide range of actors could exploit AI to facilitate mis- and disinformation related to biological weapons.

Averting such a future will require approaches that address the broader convergence of emerging science and technology developments rather than focusing solely on any single capability or technological phenomenon. More importantly, no one safeguard would be sufficient. A layered approach is needed to address the rapidly evolving scientific landscape in the context of varying real-world circumstances.

A web of prevention

Fortunately, States have developed several measures to prohibit and prevent biological weapons. Particularly important at the international level is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This agreement prohibits, among other things, the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, which are defined broadly under the convention to include any form of biological weapons, including any biological weapon developed using AI. With 189 States Parties, the treaty covers the vast majority of the world. The BWC has served States well for more than half a century; no State admits to having a biological weapons programme, and allegations of association with biological weapons have been met with sharp denials.

Moreover, many States have transposed this international prohibition into national law, as well as a range of other regulatory and normative measures designed to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons. This process of national implementation via measures that prohibit through national laws and prevent through wider technological governance mechanisms is particularly important. It helps to construct both a “web of prevention” and communities of compliance that can together bolster the prohibition on biological weapons.

International and national implementation of measures to prevent biological weapons needs to be nurtured to ensure that these measures remain fit for purpose in the age of digital biology. Indeed, Anthropic’s threat report provides details of cases in which users took evasive measures to hide their tracks and circumvent existing safety mechanisms. Implementation strategies must therefore be developed with varied obfuscation methods in mind.

A decisive moment for the Biological Weapons Convention

Despite a number of concrete steps undertaken nationally and internationally, the BWC continues to have several operational limitations. It has no verification mechanism, for example, even though States tried throughout the 1990s to negotiate a protocol with a verification component. Moreover, in contrast to treaties on chemical and nuclear weapons, which are supported by organizations employing hundreds or even thousands of staff, the BWC is supported by a four-person Implementation Support Unit hosted within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The Working Group on strengthening the BWC will meet for its tenth and final session in December 2026. Over the course of this process, a draft report has emerged that contains a package of measures designed to advance the treaty. These include a plan for further work on verification through a dedicated open-ended working group, a mechanism for reviewing science and technology, and a second mechanism focused on international cooperation and assistance. These measures have considerable potential to advance the BWC and strengthen biological security.

Success in the Working Group would pave the way for the upcoming BWC Review Conference in 2027, during which States and stakeholders will have the opportunity to chart a course towards effective prevention of biological weapons for another 50 years.

But if the Working Group fails to achieve consensus in December, there is a real risk that biological disarmament diplomacy could be set back 25 years, to the doldrums of 2001, when negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the BWC collapsed acrimoniously.

A similar collapse of the Working Group may not irreparably damage the BWC or the current prohibitions on biological weapons, but it would severely curtail momentum towards strengthening the BWC. Avoiding such a fragmentation of multilateral efforts by States and stakeholders would help us tackle one of the most pressing security challenges of our time.

The post Averting a darker biological weapons future first appeared on UNIDIR.

What is the electromagnetic spectrum?

The electromagnetic spectrum is the range of all electromagnetic waves, including radio waves, microwaves, infrared, visible light, ultraviolet, x-rays, and gamma rays, each distinguished by a specific frequency and wavelength. These regions of the spectrum all behave differently, leading to distinct applications in science and daily life. For example, radio waves enable long-range communications, microwaves support radar functions by reflecting off objects, and infrared light allows the detection of heat signatures. The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) underpins everyday capabilities, from wireless mobile communications and the positioning necessary for various forms of transport to the imaging necessary in advanced medical applications. As such, the EMS is one of the main enablers of modern life.

In addition to its centrality to civilian life, the EMS is critical for the military domain. It enables key military functions including sensing, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, positioning, weapons guidance, battlefield networking, and command and control. With the modernization of the battlefield, and the increase in capabilities that rely on the EMS for their functioning, its importance to the military domain has grown. For instance, modern capabilities increasingly require continuous data exchange, precision navigation, and sensor integration. It follows that weaponizing these dependences, and disrupting access to the EMS has become central to the conduct of war.

Why does it matter for peace, security and disarmament?

Armed forces do not just rely on the EMS; they actively compete within it. Through what is commonly termed “electronic warfare”, they seek to deny or degrade adversaries’ access to the EMS, while securing their own use. By jamming (the degrading or blocking of a signal) or spoofing (replacing a signal by a fake one) armed forces seek to deny adversaries the ability to utilize networked capabilities or to rely on their communications.

Electronic warfare has therefore become a mainstay of modern conflicts, turning the EMS into a heavily contested domain. Accordingly, seeking ways to overcome EMS disruptions to ensure continued operations is today a central aspect of military operations. This has created a “measure- countermeasure” dynamic – whereby developments to disrupt the EMS are matched by developments seeking to overcome disruptions – that has acted as a strong driver of innovation in weapon systems.

For example, the proliferation of fibre optic UAVs, that are now common on modern battlefields, is a result of efforts to overcome a highly contested electromagnetic environment. Relatedly, spectrum denial has contributed to accelerating the integration of AI-enabled autonomy in specific functions of various weapon systems. This is especially true, for example, of terminal guidance for UAVs, where jamming can sever the link between drone and operator. Such advances have been matched by innovations in electronic warfare capabilities, such as its convergence with AI into “cognitive electronic warfare”. Hence, competition in the EMS can be understood as a strategic force driving the path of development of weapon systems, and military capabilities more broadly.

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Harmful interference, mainly through jamming and spoofing, has, however, become more common beyond battlefields. Between January and August 2024 alone, a 500% increase in spoofing of civil aviation was noted, while the first quarter of 2026 marked the single largest concentration of maritime jamming events ever recorded. This trend risks increasing instability due to the potential cascading effects of these disruptions on civilian life and critical sectors that rely on the EMS.

Notably, a 2025 joint statement by the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization raises concerns over the rise of harmful interference with Radio Navigation Satellite Services.

The EMS is an inherently dual use resource; shared by both civilian and military systems.

Hence, increased disruption, either caused by the growing use of electronic warfare in conflicts, or intentional harmful interference by state and non-state actors, should be cause for concern. An escalation of competition and confrontation in the EMS must be avoided.

What comes next for the disarmament community?

The dynamics that emerge from or in reaction to EMS disruptions warrant the attention of the disarmament community. The EMS is an operational environment that shapes military effectiveness, drives technological innovation across sectors, results in the development of novel disruptive capabilities, and whose disruptions have cascading effects across civilian domains. Therefore, it is necessary to:

• Foster a better understanding of the importance of the EMS, the relationship between disruption and military innovation, the path of development of weapon systems, and the implications for disarmament and arms control;
• Determine the relevance of norms and measures to build confidence, increase transparency or reduce risks given that the rapidly evolving, dual-use capabilities employed to disrupt the EMS do not fit easily into existing arms control efforts;
• Ensure that growing competition in this domain does not lead to more instability and impacts on civilian life and industry.

To this end, UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2026 will focus on electromagnetic disruption, peace and security. On 11 November 2026, technical experts, state representatives, members of the private sector, and international security and disarmament experts will meet to discuss the issue and explore the role of the disarmament community in managing the multitude of consequences related to the growing centrality of the EMS in the military domain.

The post Electromagnetic disruption, peace and security first appeared on UNIDIR.

Despite the recurring gap between expectations and reality, directed energy weapons have repeatedly attracted strong interest and investment. While there has been progress in the maturation of this technology, the nature of warfare has also changed since the Cold War when this technology was first conceived. This raises the question: what implications might integrating directed energy weapons into layered air defence have for countering drones and international security more broadly?

Directed energy weapons emit highly focused energy that travels at the speed of light to disable, degrade or destroy targets, enabling faster engagement compared to physical projectiles. The term covers a wide range of technologies, each differing in their underlying physics, impact on the target and level of maturity.

The most mature types, high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves, are widely discussed in the context of their perceived cost-efficiency and defensive potential against the mass proliferation of drones. Currently, high-energy lasers receive more attention in the context of countering drones due to greater precision and longer effective range than high-power microwaves, with several States having already deployed the former in limited instances.

So, what could hamper the use of this technology for defensive purposes? During UNIDIR’s technology briefing on the topic, panellists pointed out that some of the more consequential challenges are operational rather than purely technological.

Effective range is one of the primary operational challenges, as both high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves can only impact targets within a limited range.

“Old” technology, new economics

Despite operational and technological challenges to directed energy weapons, there is an interest in examining how they may be used in air defence, especially given the rising use of drones, by State and non-State actors. Low-cost drones have altered the economic balance between air offence and defence, pitting interceptor missiles costing as high as millions of dollars against considerably cheaper threats.

Consequently, the interest in directed energy weapons is largely driven by the promise of cost-efficiency. The cost-per-shot of an operational high-energy laser or high-power microwave often equals the cost of electricity used, which can be as little as a few dollars, making them appealing against inexpensive threats. However, this narrative assumes the operational maturity of these systems, whereas in reality, even the most mature ones are facing challenges in progressing from testing to scaled deployment.

Speaking at UNIDIR’s event on the matter, Richard Hoad highlighted that the high upfront cost of developing an operational directed energy system is a potential barrier to industry and the customer, nuancing the simplified economic pitch driving the interest in directed energy weapons.

A related issue is revenue generation for the industry to offset upfront costs, Hoad further noted. Unlike traditional munitions, which have a finite lifetime and allow industry to generate revenue through the replenishment of stockpiles, directed energy weapons do not follow the same lifecycle, leaving the question of how industry might offset upfront costs still to be determined.

Despite decades of research and development, these weapons’ capabilities still require a continuous and extensive funding commitment. Nonetheless, smaller companies entering the market alongside large defence contractors could contribute to the advancement of the capability, reinforcing interest and investment.

The hardening of aerial systems

Besides international law implications, a scaled deployment of directed energy weapons could also impact military innovation and arms control efforts. The renewed interest in the development of these weapons in response to the mass proliferation of drones may prompt drones to adapt, which could in turn drive further adaptation of directed energy weapons, creating a familiar measure-countermeasure cycle seen with emerging military capabilities.

Since high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves operate on different principles when engaging targets, the pathways for hardening drones against each differ accordingly:

• High-energy lasers impact a target by focusing a beam of light on its surface, so hardening focuses on protecting the exterior with reflective and ablative coatings, as well as protecting optical sensors, which are especially vulnerable.
• High-power microwaves target the internal electronics of a system using pulses of microwave energy that can enter through antennas and other points of entry, so hardening focuses on the electromagnetic shielding of the airframe and the use of filters at these points to block or weaken incoming energy.

At the same time, completely shielding drones remains unfeasible as long as they must retain Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) positioning and communications with remote operators. Increasing autonomous navigation could reduce drones’ reliance on GNSS and communications with remote operators. Already explored in response to electronic warfare threats, this approach could also make drones more resilient to high-power microwaves by enabling complete shielding. Altogether, these alterations would also affect their production costs, cutting into the economic logic that revived the interest for directed energy weapons in the first place.

On the other hand, while some drones may harden and become costlier to produce, low-cost, disposable drones could still be used to counter high-power microwaves. Edl Schamiloglu noted that there is no hard maximum amount of drones a high-power microwave could target within the reach and direction of its beam.

Building on this, David Hambling suggested that swarms comprising a large number of drones could attack from multiple directions at once, overwhelming such systems. In response, defenders may deploy additional high-power microwave systems, triggering a cycle in which larger drone swarms are met with a bigger deployment of directed energy weapons.

From defence to offence

Directed energy weapons are generally most effective in short-range defence roles, owing to their limited effective range. While most systems are either ground-based or mounted on naval or ground vehicles, directed energy weapons might also be integrated in aircraft as power supply systems evolve.

Panellists at UNIDIR’s technology briefing similarly raised the possibility of integrating these weapons with drones, highlighting that it may be one solution to the range restriction in counter-drone applications. Hambling further pointed out that such a development would also open the door to offensive applications of directed energy weapons technology.

This is particularly concerning in the case of high-power microwaves, which can affect a wider area than high-energy lasers and therefore pose greater risks to civilian infrastructure. Even when used defensively, the former may unintentionally affect a friendly electronic system.

In offensive scenarios, the risk becomes more acute when military targets are situated near civilian infrastructure, potentially disabling civilian structures, including critical infrastructure. This concern is heightened by the growing prevalence of urban warfare, where the wide effects of high-power microwaves in densely populated and structurally complex environments could carry serious humanitarian consequences.

Strip away the sensationalist claims that have persisted for decades, and a more realistic assessment among experts emerges: Directed energy weapons will likely become one layer of a complex air defence.

For the disarmament community, this evolving capability still warrants consideration, from the dynamics of weapon development and use to the humanitarian risks that may follow if directed energy weapons shift from defensive to offensive applications.

The post The role of directed energy weapons in counter-drone defence first appeared on UNIDIR.

Most international conventional arms control and humanitarian disarmament instruments – including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – have mandated review conferences every five years, and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms every six years.

The ATT, however, has no dedicated review conference. The treaty mandates the annual CSP to review implementation, but informal consultations convened by UNIDIR and Panama in late 2025 and early 2026 found that important aspects of implementation are not being examined through the current process.

As States Parties look ahead to the treaty’s next phase, the discussions have opened a broader debate about how the ATT can periodically assess its effectiveness, identify challenges, and strengthen implementation over time.

The current approach

The ATT reviews implementation through its annual conferences and is supported by three standing working groups focusing on:

• effective treaty implementation (WGETI)

• transparency and reporting (WGTR)

• and universalization (WGTU)

Each follows a multi-year work plan that identifies priority issues and outlines the sequencing for their consideration.

The WGETI and WGTR review the implementation status, identify common challenges, and develop voluntary guidance to overcome them. The WGTU reviews progress on universalization, assesses barriers to ratification and accession, and proposes more coordinated approaches to outreach and assistance.   

The “informal” WGTR developed reporting templates, which the CSP2 recommended for use by States. It also suggested that this be “kept under review by the States Parties in order to benefit from the practical experiences gained from its use.” Five years later, the reporting templates were reviewed, and the CSP7 endorsed the revised versions. The WGTR has also recommended updates to the voluntary guidance on ATT annual reports.  

Some elements of the ATT framework have more structured review processes. For example, the CSP5 adopted a structured project evaluation framework to assess whether projects funded by the Voluntary Trust Fund have achieved their intended objectives. Further, when the CSP6 established the Diversion Information Exchange Forum to support the treaty’s information-sharing provisions, it also agreed to review its usefulness at the CSP8. Although the COVID-19 pandemic delayed this review, it was eventually conducted at the CSP10.

This shows that ATT States Parties are open to exploring new ways to support treaty implementation and review what does and doesn’t work. At the same time, the existing review mechanisms are diffuse, and there is no comprehensive approach for assessing the treaty’s overall progress toward achieving its object and purpose.   

What hasn’t been reviewed? 

Despite the ATT’s extensive working-group structure, three issues are not currently being reviewed.   

1. The ATT requires the CSP to review “developments in the field of conventional arms”, but no mechanism currently examines this and related scope issues. The WGETI considered a proposal earlier this year to create an informal working group on scope and national control lists. This builds on a proposal from five years ago to establish an informal group that, as a first step, could review submitted lists, identify common approaches and challenges, and develop guidance for States Parties on establishing and maintaining control lists.
   
   Given technological developments in conventional weapons – including the transfer of parts, components and knowledge under joint and licensed production arrangements – such a group could ensure there are no loopholes in State Party regulation of the international arms trade. A geographically diverse group of national government and non-governmental experts on these issues would provide a unique forum, complementing less inclusive existing export control regimes.
   
   
2. Information contained in State Party initial and annual reports is not systematically reviewed. While the WGTR initially considered how information contained in State Party reports could be used, these discussions ended at the CSP5. The five-year strategy represents a timely opportunity to revisit this issue, also given the renewed interest in updating initial reports. These could be used in a peer-review process to support national implementation and increase understanding of the treaty’s impact.
   
   The UN Firearms Protocol provides a possible model for an ATT voluntary peer-review. Like the ATT, the CSPs of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Firearms Protocol provide space for a general review of implementation. States Parties also conduct individual “country reviews” involving a self-assessment questionnaire, which two other States review and provide feedback on.
   
   For the ATT, an updated initial report and annual reports could provide the evidence base for the review, with all three States agreeing on a list of gaps, assistance needs, and best practices – which is then summarized for the CSP. An optional peer-review mechanism could help ATT States Parties strengthen their national control systems, give clear purpose for reporting, and support the development of implementation roadmaps and project proposals for the Voluntary Trust Fund.
   
   
3. As noted by civil society at several ATT conferences, the implementation of presidential themes and working group decisions is not regularly reviewed. While the WGETI sub-working group on current and emerging implementation issues addresses some of the presidency recommendations on the themes of gender, the role of industry, and inter-agency cooperation, many conference decisions have not been reviewed.

The benefits of a comprehensive review

Even if these gaps were addressed, they would only examine certain aspects of treaty implementation. There is currently no mechanism to conduct an overarching review of the treaty’s implementation and impact.

The current work towards a five-year strategy for the ATT focuses on identifying priority areas, establishing indicators and tracking progress over this period. Yet reviewing progress against the strategy’s indicators at the end of the five-year cycle is not comparable to undertaking a comprehensive review of all aspects of treaty implementation.

Experiences and lessons learned from other international instruments show the potential benefits that a review conference could offer to the ATT. A State-led, inclusive, participatory and needs-driven process could provide an opportunity to take stock of ATT implementation since its entry into force to identify common gaps and needs, and assess whether the treaty needs to adapt to new realities and emerging challenges.  

Such a process could also strengthen the ATT’s architecture, create innovative tools for its effective implementation, and consider provisions that have received less attention – as well as other issues not covered by the treaty’s negotiation process. An ATT Review Conference could therefore help renew the treaty’s visibility and ensure that it remains fit for purpose, by strengthening the regulation of the international arms trade, preventing diversion, and reducing human suffering, without requiring treaty amendments.

There is “no one size fits all” formula to attain this goal. The ATT has a unique nature due to its export-control dimension and does not ban any specific type of weapon. This is an aspect to consider when developing any potential measurable, time-bound indicators to monitor the status and operations of the ATT. The timing, frequency and modalities of a comprehensive ATT review process merit further consideration by interested parties.

From reflection to action

The ATT’s 10th anniversary in 2024, followed by the development of a five-year strategy, has created a timely opportunity to reflect on the treaty’s implementation and impact.

The UNIDIR-Panama informal consultations revealed different priorities, particularly on civil society’s call for greater transparency on national decisions regarding transfer authorizations and denials – a sensitive issue for some States Parties.

Whether through enhanced working-group mandates, using reports for peer reviews, or a review conference process, States Parties have a range of options to assess the treaty’s implementation and increase its impact.

While cognizant of capacity and financial constraints, the upcoming CSP12 offers an important space to systematically review the implementation and impact of ATT. In this context, UNIDIR, in collaboration with Conflict Armament Research and Stimson, will host a side event on 24 August to launch a new initiative to deliver the first comprehensive evaluation of the treaty’s impact.

Igor Barreto was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, supporting research on weapons and ammunition management. He holds a Master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. Previously, Igor worked with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Embassy of Brazil in Stockholm, the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center.

Paul Holtom is the Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. He conducts research on the illicit trade, diversion and uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons and ammunition. Paul has authored and co-authored publications on the international arms trade and conventional arms control. Before joining UNIDIR, he worked at the Small Arms Survey, Coventry University and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. He holds a PhD and Master’s degree in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Birmingham, UK.

Grisselle Rodríguez is the Delegate for Disarmament and International Security of the Permanent Mission of Panama to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva since 2015. She is an MA candidate in Global Security at King’s College London and was awarded certificates for the 2019 UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament and the 2021 Visiting Fellows Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Previously, she interned at diplomatic missions, the UN and NGOs.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this commentary are those of Grisselle Rodríguez.

The post Reviewing the Arms Trade Treaty first appeared on UNIDIR.

For more than a decade, the international community has discussed the IHL implications of LAWS. States agreed on 11 Guiding Principles, advanced their understandings of key concepts, and charted a direction of travel toward what became informally known as the two-tier approach. This consists of a combination of prohibitions and regulations of LAWS, grounded in the fundamental rules and principles of IHL.

Discussions at the multilateral level, however, retain a high degree of abstraction. States have reiterated, for example, on multiple occasions that IHL continues to apply fully to the development and use of LAWS. States have also broadly expressed agreement over the fact that the ‘operational context’ is central to any determination of the quality and extent of the human-machine interaction, and to considerations of human judgment and control.

Why a scenario compendium on LAWS and IHL?

Any use of LAWS in armed conflict – like with any other weapon system – would be embedded in an operational context shaped by specific variables, unique time-bound circumstances, and existing doctrinal guidance. Against the universality of IHL principles, their practical application often depends on context.

Nevertheless, thus far, less effort has been made to understand how IHL applies and what concrete measures might need to be developed to enhance compliance when LAWS are deployed.

With this compendium, UNIDIR provides a tool – the first of its kind – for States to engage in in-depth conversations about compliance with IHL in defined tactical and operational environments.

What the compendium provides

The compendium includes a catalogue of 43 scenarios spanning the land, naval and air domains, covering both international and non-international armed conflict. Each scenario is accompanied by a detailed list of IHL questions to support granular legal analysis. These are scenario-specific but also include a number of cross-cutting questions that integrate more general considerations about the technical characteristics of LAWS.

Critically, the compendium does not provide answers, it merely steers users to consider an array of pertinent legal questions to enable structured legal and operational discussions.

The publication also provides ample guidance for interested stakeholders to be able to ‘play’ the scenarios in their respective national organizations or in international formats.

Supporting national and international engagement

At the national level, the compendium can support States in developing and refining their interpretations of how IHL applies to the possible use of LAWS.

The scenarios can help operationalize abstract concepts and consider them in practice.

States can opt for specialized deep dives, as well as cross-cutting national dialogues bringing together experts from across policy, military, legal and diplomatic communities.

At the international level, the compendium can serve as a confidence-building and a capacity-building tool. By providing shared tactical reference points, the scenarios enable States to compare how they interpret and apply IHL, how they structure safeguards and oversight, and identify areas of convergence and divergence without disclosure of sensitive information.

Looking ahead

Following the launch of the compendium, UNIDIR will undertake additional efforts to disseminate the compendium and facilitate its use.

Over the next months, the Institute will continue to promote and socialize the compendium among interested stakeholders. Activities will range from virtual briefings and training programmes to in-country workshops.

In addition, UNIDIR will further enhance the user experience by creating a digital version of the compendium, which will allow greater customization and more interactive options to play the scenarios. The digital tool will not replace the existing compendium, which remains permanently hosted on the UNIDIR website.

The post Navigating international humanitarian law in the age of autonomy first appeared on UNIDIR.

Due diligence is a well-established concept in international law, whereby States should not knowingly allow the use of their territory for activities contrary to the rights of other States. In international cybersecurity, States have recognized it as an important element of the agreed voluntary normative framework of responsible State use of information and communications technologies (ICTs), with some arguing it constitutes a binding rule in cyberspace. At the same time, the ILC has addressed due diligence in various contexts, most notably in relation to transboundary environmental harm, and in 2025 it added “due diligence in international law” to its programme of work as a distinct topic.

A well-established concept

As early as in 1928, the Island of Palmas arbitration linked due diligence to States’ obligation to act with reasonable care and established it as a corollary to territorial sovereignty. In the 1941 Trail Smelter case, the arbitral tribunal framed due diligence within the general obligation not to cause transboundary harm, proclaiming that no State has the right to use its territory, or permit its use, to cause significant injury to another State or persons located in another State’s territory.

Perhaps the most famous formulation of due diligence in international law comes from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its Corfu Channel judgment:

States have an “obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”

In doing so, the Court suggested there are two prerequisites:

• State knowledge of a potential harm to the rights of another State emanating from its territory; and
• a real possibility that reasonable action taken by the territorial State could prevent or minimize that harm.

The ICJ later extended this reasoning in the Tehran Hostages case, where it held that the State was responsible for omitting to protect foreign diplomatic premises and its diplomatic and consular staff from attacks by non-State actors when it had both knowledge of the harm and capacity to act.

Modern doctrine approaches due diligence in at least three ways: as a principle of international law, as a stand-alone obligation, and as modality attached to a duty of care (a standard of conduct). Irrespective of its legal qualification, the practical exercise of due diligence by a State depends on two factors:

• First, the State should have power over the source of the risk to another State’s rights, property or citizens.
• Second, the State should be aware of or anticipate the risk that triggers due diligence.

As the ICJ emphasized in the Corfu Channel, the mere presence on the State territory of the source of harmful acts is not sufficient to impute knowledge of these acts to the State.

Cyberspace raises new questions

Alongside doctrinal debates on the legal nature and scope of due diligence, the discussion has recently gained a second wind specifically in the cyber context. In particular, the application of due diligence to State use of ICTs, and its implications for State responsibility, have become subjects of extensive debate.

The UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, in its 2015 consensus report, articulated a voluntary norm that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts using ICTs”. The 2021 GGE report clarified that:

a State should not permit another State or non-State actor to use ICTs within its territory to commit internationally wrongful acts.

As noted, due diligence is conditioned on knowledge. In the cyber context, the 2021 GGE report further qualified “knowledge” of malicious ICT conduct as requiring the State to be “aware or has been notified in good faith” that an internationally wrongful act involving ICTs is being carried out from or through its territory. The report also indicated that States will take all appropriate, reasonably available, and feasible steps to detect, investigate and stop internationally wrongful ICT activities emanating from or transiting their territory; it does not, however, impose a duty to monitor all ICT activities within their territory.

Despite years of negotiations among States on how international law applies to cyberspace, due diligence in cyberspace remains subject to divergent State interpretations. As observed by UNIDIR, key outstanding questions include the legal status of due diligence, the scope of expected conduct, the required level of knowledge, and the harm threshold.

The ILC takes up the issue

Due diligence previously featured on the ILC’s agenda in specific contexts, most notably in the 2001 Draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. Article 3 provides that “the State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk thereof” – an obligation of conduct requiring the State to exert its best efforts to minimize the risk, without guaranteeing that no harm will occur (commentary 7 to Article 3 of the Draft articles).

Furthermore, in 2025 the ILC decided to include “due diligence in international law” in its programme of work and to appoint Dr Penelope Ridings as Special Rapporteur. Her first report in April 2026 reviews the long pedigree of due diligence in international law and the past work of the ILC on related topics. It acknowledges the lack of clarity regarding the legal character of due diligence and proposes to identify its common elements applicable both generally in international law and to special regimes, including potentially its application in the ICT domain.

This ILC endeavor is particularly relevant for cyberspace. As noted:

divergent State interpretations of cyber due diligence persist, and the ILC’s forthcoming work offers a timely opportunity to bring valuable clarity to how the concept applies in the cyber context.

UNIDIR at the 2026 ILC session

As part of UNIDIR’s ongoing work on international cyber stability, the Institute will organize a side event on Due Diligence in Cyberspace on 2 July, on the margins of the 77th session of the ILC.

The objective is to bridge the parallel discussions in the cyber diplomatic and international legal communities, fostering a much-needed exchange between these two groups.

This event, organized with a contribution from Dr Penelope Ridings, Special Rapporteur of the ILC on due diligence, is designed to explore national and regional interpretations, highlight practical challenges States face, and to facilitate an exchange of views between ILC members, cyber diplomats, and legal experts on how to further clarify and operationalize cyber due diligence.

The post Due diligence in early practice, the International Law Commission agenda and cyberspace first appeared on UNIDIR.

As AI transforms security dynamics, from military operations and critical infrastructure to the information environment, governments and institutions are grappling with how to govern its risks and opportunities. The new centre responds to this challenge by bringing together analysis, dialogue and practical support under one roof, serving as the umbrella for UNIDIR’s work on AI and security.

To learn more, we spoke with Dr Robin Geiss, UNIDIR’s Director, and Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli, UNIDIR’s Head of Security and Technology Programme.

Q: AI is advancing at extraordinary speed. From a peace and security perspective, what developments concern you most, and what new risks are they creating for international security?

RG: The pace of advances in artificial intelligence is remarkable. While it brings significant benefits, it is also creating new challenges for international peace and security.

The concern is less about any single application, but rather the cumulative impact across multiple domains.

AI is now being integrated into military systems, cyber operations, critical infrastructure, and the information environment. This can enhance efficiency and decision-making, but it can also increase complexity, create new risks and pathways for escalation, increase the pace of battle, and add new layers of uncertainty in a highly dynamic global security environment. AI can lower the barriers to sophisticated cyberattacks, enable more convincing disinformation, and heighten the risk of miscalculation or unintended escalation in crisis situations.

At the same time, governance and regulatory frameworks are struggling to keep pace. This creates a growing gap between technological capabilities and our collective ability to understand and manage their implications.

Addressing these challenges requires more than technical solutions. It calls for sustained dialogue, shared understanding, and practical cooperation among governments, industry, researchers, and civil society to ensure AI strengthens – rather than undermines – international peace and security.

Q: Governance of AI is often described as fragmented. Where do you see the most pressing challenges today, and why is addressing them becoming increasingly urgent?

RG: The challenge is not a lack of effort. Across the world, a wide range of stakeholders are actively working to shape AI governance. The problem is that these efforts often unfold in parallel – across different communities, processes and policy domains that do not connect effectively.

AI issues are being discussed across multiple domains, from international security and arms control to human rights, development and digital governance. While each track is important, this dispersion creates a fragmented landscape, making it harder to maintain a shared understanding of risks, opportunities and emerging policy approaches.

This fragmentation is becoming increasingly urgent as AI is already embedded in systems that affect security, stability and societal resilience. Policymakers face growing pressure to act in areas where technology, policy and security intersect – often without a fully aligned picture.

The goal is not a single, unified framework. It is better coordination, stronger capacity, and more informed dialogue so that the responses are coherent, inclusive and effective.

Q: Why is UNIDIR launching a Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security now?

RG: UNIDIR is launching its Centre of Excellence on AI, Peace and Security at a pivotal moment, as artificial intelligence becomes central to international peace and security. In the coming weeks alone, Geneva will host two major gatherings – one focused on military application of AI and another one on global AI governance – bringing together Member States and a broader community of actors. The centre therefore responds to a clear need for sustained analysis, inclusive dialogue, and practical support.

While important governance initiatives are emerging around the world, many stakeholders still face capacity constraints, and there remains a gap between policy discussions, technical expertise, and real-world implementation.

This launch also reflects UNIDIR’s own evolution. In recent years, the Institute has become a trusted platform for research, dialogue and capacity-building on AI and security. The centre consolidates and scales this work, providing a more focused and sustained contribution to global efforts on AI, peace and security.

Q: There is no shortage of AI initiatives and forums. What makes this centre different, and what unique value can it bring?

GPP: It is true that there is no shortage of initiatives focused on AI, but relatively few focus on the most consequential and sensitive dimensions: international peace and security.

Many existing platforms centre on innovation, economic growth, digital governance, human rights, and broader societal impacts. These are essential conversations, but issues such as military applications, strategic stability, conflict dynamics, and the future of warfare have often been addressed in more specialized – and fragmented – settings.

The centre is designed to close that gap. It focuses on the intersection of AI, peace and security, examining risks and opportunities associated with AI-enabled capabilities, crisis decision-making, and international stability.

At the same time, many of the most advanced practices on AI governance – such as safety, accountability, testing, risk management, and responsible use – are emerging outside the security domain. A core objective of the centre is to bridge these worlds, connecting expertise, and transferring insights across communities that rarely engage directly.

In doing so, it seeks to strengthen understanding, reduce fragmentation, and support more coherent approaches to AI governance in the security domain.

Q: UNIDIR’s Centre of Excellence for AI, Peace and Security will serve as the umbrella for the Institute’s work on AI. What are its initial priorities, and where do you expect the centre’s work to have the greatest impact in the years ahead?

GPP: The centre builds on several years of UNIDIR’s work at the intersection of AI and international security – bringing research, dialogue and capacity-building under a single, dedicated framework. This allows the Institute to scale its contribution at a time of rapidly growing demand and expertise.

Its initial priorities span three areas: deepening analysis, strengthening engagement, and delivering practical tools. On the research side, this includes emerging issues such as agentic AI, cross-domain security implications – from cyber to biosecurity – and the risks linked to proliferation.

Engagement will also expand, especially with industry, recognizing the critical role that developers and deployers play in shaping security outcomes. In parallel, the centre will produce practical outputs, such as guidance for national AI and defence strategies, and an AI security lexicon to support clearer, shared understanding across communities.

Looking ahead, its greatest impact will come from its ability to act as a bridge: between policy and technology, across security and non-security communities, and from global debates to real-world implementation.

As AI reshapes security dynamics, the need for trusted platforms that enable informed, inclusive and actionable policymaking will only grow. That is the space the centre aims to occupy.

Q: The centre is built around three pillars: knowledge, dialogue and action. How will these translate into practical support for governments and other stakeholders?

GPP: The three pillars reflect our belief that effective AI governance in the peace and security domain requires more than analysis alone; it requires connection and implementation.

• The knowledge pillar focuses on generating policy-relevant research on emerging issues, helping decisionmakers understand risks, opportunities and trends.
• The dialogue pillar creates trusted spaces for exchange among governments, industry, academia, civil society, and international organizations – bringing together communities that do not often engage and fostering shared understanding and trust.
• The action pillar turns insights into practice. It focuses on tools, guidance, training and capacity-building – helping translate principles into concrete policies and operational measures.

Together, these pillars are designed to equip governments and other actors not only to understand AI’s implications for peace and security, but to respond collaboratively, coherently and effectively.

Q: Geneva has long been a hub for diplomacy and international cooperation. What makes it particularly well suited to host a global centre focused on AI, peace and security?

RG: Geneva is uniquely placed at the crossroads of international security, technology governance, humanitarian action, and human rights – fields that are increasingly intertwined in the age of AI. Few places in the world bring together such a diverse and influential mix of actors working across these domains.

The city hosts international organizations, diplomatic missions, technical experts, humanitarian actors, standards-setting bodies, and civil society organizations that are shaping discussions on the future of technology and its societal impacts. It has also emerged as an important centre for AI governance, with a growing ecosystem focused on digital technologies, responsible innovation, and international cooperation.

For a centre focused on AI and security, this convergence is a decisive advantage. The implications of AI extend far beyond traditional security institutions, touching everything from human rights and development to cyber resilience and humanitarian action. Geneva provides a unique environment in which these different perspectives can be brought together.

By anchoring the centre here while engaging globally, UNIDIR can leverage this ecosystem to connect communities, deepen dialogue, and support more coherent and inclusive approaches to AI governance in the peace and security domain.

The post A new home for AI governance first appeared on UNIDIR.

The 4^th Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), held in 2024, established an open-ended technical expert group (OETEG) to develop recommendations for the full and effective implementation of these instruments in light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design. The first meeting of the OETEG takes place in New York this week and will examine measures to counter illicit 3D-printing of SALW, alongside other issues. Several considerations are outlined below for national and international experts as they seek to identify effective strategic and operational measures to enable States to implement the PoA and ITI in preventing the illicit 3D printing of SALW. 

Why is 3D-printing a problem for SALW control?

The UN PoA and ITI provide a series of measures that States should take to counter the illicit manufacture and trafficking of SALW. 3D-printing of SALW poses several challenges for PoA and ITI implementation, including: 

• the decentralized and unregulated production of these weapons; 
• the commercial availability of production machinery (i.e. 3D-printers);
• the production of unmarked weapons; and
• the intangible flows of knowledge online. 

While the first three challenges are also features for other types of craft-produced SALW, 3D-printing takes the issue from the physical to the virtual realm. The proliferation of digital blueprints online and the strong shift towards increasingly do-it-yourself designs that do not rely on the use of government-regulated components means that decentralized, undetectable networks can produce lethal 3D-printed SALW beyond the control of States.

It is therefore essential that the OETEG provides a platform for national and international experts to share current and emerging challenges posed by 3D printing for the full and effective implementation of the PoA and ITI, but also recommendations for: 

• legislation to ensure national control;
• international intelligence sharing and cooperation to enhance investigation protocols;
• the use of new technologies for disrupting illicit knowledge sharing; and 
• capacity-building, training and awareness raising to prevent the use of 3D-printers for illicit SALW production. 

Strengthening legal frameworks

A cornerstone of the effective implementation of international instruments is comprehensive national-level legislation. Several countries, such as Australia, Canada, Jamaica, North Macedonia and Singapore, have taken proactive measures to enhance their legislative frameworks by means of criminalizing digital blueprints for 3D production of SALW. The UK has proposed a similar bill to Parliament.

At the regional level, an EU Commission proposal from February 2026 to harmonize definitions and penalties to combat the illicit trafficking of firearms includes suggestions for EU Member States to introduce the following penalties in their national systems: 

• an upper limit of at least two years of imprisonment for the illicit creation, acquisition, possession and dissemination of 3D-printed SALW blueprints;
• five years for the possession of illicit firearms, components and ammunition; and 
• eight years for trafficking and manufacturing. 

While the criminalization of blueprints is a good first step, States should also ensure that their SALW control legislation covers the illicit manufacture, possession, use and trafficking of all forms of 3D-printed SALW and their components. 

Intelligence sharing and cooperation

Intelligence sharing and international cooperation between law enforcement agencies are crucial in stemming the proliferation of 3D-printed SALW. While many States already have national points of contact for PoA/ITI implementation, it does not appear that intelligence on 3D-printed SALW is moving beyond regional level exchanges between national firearms focal points and specialist units. States could consider ways of including information about illicit 3D-printed SALW in shared databases, such as INTERPOL’s ‘iARMS’. This all requires law enforcement agencies to develop and maintain approaches and protocols for data collection, analysis, and sharing related to seizures of 3D-printed SALW. 

Law enforcement agencies must also develop close cooperation with the 3D-printing industry. As stipulated in the outcomes from the 4^th Review Conference, bringing 3D-printing companies to the discussion table and promoting active dialogue without infringing on the legitimate uses of this technology is key. Cooperation must also be fostered with other stakeholders, such as postal services, e-commerce sites, and social media platforms, as these continue to be used to sell and promote 3D-printed SALW. 

New technologies to disrupt illicit 3D-printing

It is imperative for law enforcement agencies to use new technologies to detect and disrupt illicit networks involved in illicit information sharing and the production of 3D-printed SALW. Pilot projects are already underway that could lead the way. For example, the CEASEFIRE project, a three-year multidimensional project that was implemented during 2022-25 involving the EU, EUROPOL and INTERPOL, aimed to incorporate various cyber-detection methods, AI-driven tools, shared databases, information fusion and offline techniques to interdict illegal firearms trafficking, including the distribution of digital blueprints for 3D-printed SALW. Successful pilot projects could be expanded, replicated and sustained, while new initiatives should be developed.

Several US states are exploring the introduction of ‘blocking software’ to detect blueprints and block 3D-printing of SALW. At present, this has several limitations, including: 

• the need to be constantly updated to account for new designs;
• the susceptibility to circumvention;
• the risk of flagging false positives; and 
• the dependence on federal legislation mandating compliance by various stakeholders.

It remains to be seen if AI could help overcome the first two limitations. 

A promising development is the Secure Information Embedding and Extraction framework, which aims to embed unique fingerprints into 3D-printed objects that are resistant to physical tampering, breakage and digital interdiction. 

Capacity building, training and awareness-raising

States must also focus on training law enforcement officers to identify and document 3D-printed SALW and their components, develop standard operating procedures for evidence collection, and enhance forensic capabilities. While developments within the forensic space that are focused on chemical signature tracing of polymers, toolmark analysis of nozzle and print bed deposition artifacts and fingerprinting of printers are still limited, they remain useful in aiding investigations and enhancing prosecution. Future developments in nano-topographical and micro-CT analysis may enhance forensic identification of 3D-printed SALW. All of this requires adequate resources.

International organizations like INTERPOL and the UN play a crucial role in assisting Member States develop their capabilities to counter the illicit production, proliferation and misuse of 3D-printed SALW. INTERPOL’s Project Stonefish and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’s SALW Fellowship Training Programme are examples of capacity-building programmes that aim to increase awareness and strengthen the investigative capabilities of Member States in this area. 

At the national level, States should consider introducing awareness programmes targeted at young people, given the increasing involvement of youths in the 3D-printing of firearms.

The way forward

Current proliferation trends suggest that the OETEG’s consideration of how to counter the threat posed by 3D-printed SALW is timely. UNIDIR has been actively supporting the preparations for all the issues under the purview of the OETEG, as can be seen in this recent report. Developments that seemed like a chimaera a decade ago have become a reality today. Therefore, it is imperative that we put the necessary preventive measures in place now to stem further misuse of this technology. 

At the same time, we have seen that 3D-printing has evolved rapidly and is not standing still. Therefore, we should already be considering how to ensure that opportunities like the OETEG, which brings together a unique group of national and international experts, can be used to address technological challenges as they emerge. The 2026 OETEG meeting will therefore be a useful “pilot” opportunity.  

The post Mitigating the proliferation of 3D-printed small arms and light weapons first appeared on UNIDIR.

This year’s meeting comes at a time of rising global insecurity and escalating armed violence around the world, with women and girls particularly affected. The effects are visible across a wide range of national contexts.

Each year, around 50,000 women and girls are killed by intimate partners or family members, accounting for more than half of all female homicides.

These deaths rarely occur without warning, they are the culmination of long cycles of abuse, threats and coercion, often involving firearms. Where firearms are present, violence is more likely to escalate in severity, to involve sustained coercive control and to end in death.

Research conducted in Mexico illustrates this stark trend, with firearm-related murders of women surging by 375% from 2004 to 2024. This reflects the increasing accessibility of firearms as well as their growing lethality in domestic and community settings.

Gender matters in the UN PoA

The UN PoA matters for efforts to prevent gender-based violence committed by firearms. From the outset, the UN PoA has acknowledged that the illicit proliferation of SALW affects both women and men. Over time, successive Biennial Meetings of States have sharpened this understanding, recognizing the differentiated impacts of illicit SALW on women, men, boys and girls.

This progress was significantly strengthened at the Third Review Conference in 2018, where States explicitly linked the illicit trade in SALW to gender-based violence and human rights violations. But it was the Fourth Review Conference, in 2024, which marked the most significant step forward to date.

There, States committed to go beyond recognition of differential impacts by addressing the gender roles, norms and expectations that shape how women and men acquire illicit arms. They also emphasized the importance of encouraging the participation of men and boys in the mainstreaming of gender perspectives within SALW policies and programmes.

For the first time, Member States also recognized that violence linked to the illicit proliferation of SALW is more than just a security issue, as there a range of complex links between armed violence and the physical and mental health of women, men, girls and boys.

Reporting trends suggest that these commitments have gained traction. In 2025, 74% of States reporting under the PoA indicated that they integrate gender considerations into national arms control efforts – up 62% from the previous year. However, gaps remain.

In 2025, only 29% of States reported that they collect gender-disaggregated data. This is essential in designing effective responses that reflect the distinct risks, needs and experiences of women, men, girls and boys.

New technology, old problems

At the Fourth Review Conference, States established the Open-Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG) to examine developments in the manufacturing, technology and design of SALW – including polymer weapons, modular systems and illicit 3D printing of firearms. While gender is not explicitly included in this mandate, it remains highly relevant.

Emerging evidence suggests that some parts of the 3D-printed gun community overlap with hypermasculine and misogynistic online cultures. These dynamics sometimes translate into real-world violence.

A gender perspective can therefore strengthen the OETEG’s work by addressing critical questions: who is manufacturing and acquiring these weapons, who is affected by new forms of diversion, and who is excluded from technical decision-making?

It also helps ensure that tools for tracing, marking and recovery reflect the differentiated impacts of SALW, including patterns linked to intimate partner violence, femicide and conflict-related sexual violence.

These are not abstract concerns. They are practical questions central to whether technical work under the UN PoA can inform national implementation measures that are both technically sound and genuinely responsive to real-world patterns of armed violence, diversion and gendered harm.

From words to action

The task at BMS9 is straightforward but consequential: to hold on to what states have already agreed and to ensure that these commitments remain central as implementation moves into new areas, including those covered by the OETEG.

To that end, States gathering in New York should consider four key steps:

• Reaffirm their commitments on gender mainstreaming and ensure gender-responsive approaches are integrated into the implementation of the PoA, including in national laws, action plans and operational practices.
• Improve disaggregation by sex, gender, age and disability in data collection and analysis to enable a clearer understanding of how small arms are involved in different forms of violence, including intimate partner violence and conflict-related sexual violence. A stronger evidence base favours better-targeted and more effective responses.
• Collaborate with experts and civil society networks on further understanding and addressing gender norms, especially masculinities that shape the acquisition and use of weapons, including 3D printed firearms.
• Promote gender balance and the meaningful participation of women, gender experts and civil society at BMS9 and within expert groups like OETEG.

States attending BMS9 should focus on ensuring that these commitments are not treated as peripheral or optional. Instead, they need to be translated into concrete national measures, better data, inclusive decision-making and sustained political attention as the small arms landscape continues to evolve.

Natalie Briggs is a Program Officer at New York University’s Centre on International Cooperation (CIC), supporting the Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies and the coordination of the Gender Equality Network for Small Arms Control. Prior to joining CIC, she worked with organizations such as UNIDIR, Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just, and Inclusive Societies and the International Action Network on Small Arms on projects focused on disarmament and small arms control.

Hana Salama is a Researcher at UNIDIR’s Integrated Approaches Programme. She is the co-author of Women Managing Weapons, a report which investigates the previously unexplored area of women’s participation in Weapons and Ammunition Management. Currently, Hana is leading several projects on gender in conventional arms control and disarmament. She is conducting a study on gender responsive arms control in conflict prevention and investigating good practices for gender equality in decision-making and implementation of conventional arms control and disarmament.

The post What next for the UN Programme of Action? Gender perspectives and the future of small arms control first appeared on UNIDIR.

In 2025, one in six people were exposed to armed conflict, and firearms account for nearly half of all violent deaths worldwide. In regions affected by armed extremism, armed groups cause the majority of civilian fatalities. Where illicit SALW proliferate, such groups flourish and can sustain violence for longer, driving demand for more weapons. This is a vicious cycle.

Policy responses have struggled to address this complexity. Global SALW control debates have for decades prioritized measures to curb illicit weapon supply, with little attention paid to why people take up arms. Tackling armed violence, notably violent extremism, tends to be over-securitized and reactive, addressing symptoms more than causes. In recent years, while necessary, neither approach has proofed to be sufficient.

In 2024, the Pact for the Future brought prevention back to the fore, calling on Member States to address the root causes of violence. That same year, the fourth Review Conference of the Programme of Action on Small Arms (RevCon4) pushed States to examine what drives weapons demand, not just supply. These were promising signs of a paradigm shift.

But how can these commitments be implemented locally and lessons from the field be fed back into global policymaking? As States approach the ninth Biennial Meeting of States under the Programme of Action (BMS9) and the ninth review of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy in June this year, West Africa shows global policymakers what integrating prevention and SALW control can practically look like and how the puzzle could be pieced together

West Africa spotlight

Driven by the rise of armed groups and their continuing spread from the Sahel to the littoral States of the Gulf of Guinea, armed violence has intensified across West Africa. It hosts four of the world’s most terrorism-affected countries and an estimated 11 million civilian-held firearms, the highest concentration on the continent.

The West African evidence is clear: fragmented and over-securitized approaches fall short in preventing armed violence sustainably.

At a 2023 regional workshop by UNIDIR and partners, West African stakeholders called for an integrated approach to tackle both the root causes of violence and the weapons (primarily SALW) that fuel it. This echoes the New Agenda for Peace’s appeal for comprehensive and more prevention-focused approaches to these issues. To support this change, a recent study by UNIDIR, the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs documents what joined-up efforts look like in practice.

What comes out clearly is that demand for arms and engagement in violent extremism share common drivers – which mainly affect communities in border areas – and these include:

• Weak state presence,
• Economic hardship,
• Distrust in public institutions
• Absence of effective state security.

This convergence is a key, often overlooked entry point for joining up armed violence prevention and SALW control. Translating integrated approaches into practice hinges on three mutually reinforcing dimensions: policy, institutions, and operations.

Integration in practice to learn from

At the policy level, West African practices show that developing and reviewing strategic frameworks are important for integrating approaches. Benin’s Draft National SALW Action Plan (2020-2024) is a good example, addressing both weapons demand and supply.

National frameworks only deliver if they are grounded in local realities and co-created by those who live them. Community leaders, women’s groups, youth, and local authorities must therefore be partners in the design and implementation of plans to address violence and weapons proliferation.

For instance, Mali illustrates this in its upcoming SALW National Action Plan (2026–2030) – which was co-developed through inclusive dialogue with customary and religious leaders.

Institutions must follow. Integrated frameworks mean little if bodies responsible for delivery operate in silos. Coordination of government mechanisms for violence prevention and SALW control goes a long way, as witnessed in Nigeria. The Office of the National Security Adviser houses both the National Centre for the Control of SALW and the National Counter Terrorism Centre, easing interaction. Representation in respective governance boards could also play a bridging, still underutilized role. Inclusive representation has – here too – proved useful for integrated thinking. In Sierra Leone for instance, the Advisory Committee of the National SALW Commission brings various government agencies together with local government, civil society, paramount chiefs, and youth and women’s representatives, as part of a whole-of-society approach.

In operations, integrated activities concretize most impactfully at the community level. In Côte d’Ivoire, the SALW Commission engages dialogue with communities not just to sensitize to the risks of weapons proliferation, but also to non-violence and the prevention of radicalization, often with traditional leaders and women’s groups as key players. Likewise, the voluntary surrender of SALW has proved most sustainable when combined with the provision of socio-economic alternatives addressing drivers for weapons demand, as seen in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d’Ivoire.

Looking ahead, community-led arms control holds particular untapped potential. It can build trust and local agency to reduce armed violence at their roots, with peace or civil-military committees as entry points for dialogue.

When communities are involved and see tangible benefits, prevention becomes a collective engagement with more sustainable outcome.

Advancing integrated approaches can come with teething troubles, including:

• The lack of shared understanding and space for exchange among stakeholders,
• Conflicting responsibilities,
• Limited political will and ownership,
• Capacity constraints,
• And many others.

West African practices demonstrate what potential is unlocked when clearing some of these hurdles.

The puzzle needs all its pieces

Policy shapes implementation and implementation must shape policy. In 2024, States made promising commitments at RevCon4 and in the Pact for the Future toward holistic, prevention-centred approaches to armed violence. The recent study by UNIDIR and partners, alongside initiatives in West Africa like the UN Development Programme – Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre’s work on conflict prevention and weapons and ammunition management,  as well as the Saving-Lives Entity’s support to armed violence reduction in Ghana and Mali, demonstrate how to put these commitments into practice. The missing piece is to feed lessons from these efforts back into global frameworks to scale what works, adapted to context. The 2026 meetings should close the loop.

BMS9 is an opportunity for considering good practices to deliver on RevCon4 commitments. It could emphasize that joined-up responses to both issues deliver best when done across all dimensions: from policymaking to institutional cooperation and implementation. It could also go further, affirming the role of genuine multi-stakeholder processes in making joined-up efforts effective and sustainable – with communities and dialogue as central levers.

The ninth review of the UN Counter-Terrorism Strategy is expected to build on the UN Secretary-General’s call to avoid siloing the prevention and countering of extremism. The eighth review addressed SALW control mainly in terms of countering supply to terrorist groups. The ninth review could recognize that SALW control also has a preventive dimension in reducing demand for weapons, thereby helping to address local drivers of extremism.

The evidence is there. The entry points are clear. The policy windows are open. Whether 2026 marks an upscale in policymaking – or a missed beat – is now the question on the table.

Vedika Pillai was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. She holds a Master’s in International Development from the Geneva Graduate Institute, and degrees in sociology, international relations, and peacebuilding from Lady Shri Ram College and Sciences Po Paris. She has worked across research and policy roles with UNICEF, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Legal Action Worldwide. Her published work includes research on social protection in Ethiopia with UNICEF Innocenti, and on rural livelihoods, conflict and gender in South Asia.

Ursign Hofmann is a Senior Researcher with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. Previously, he served as a Programme Officer at the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, as a Policy Advisor at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and as a Research Assistant at the Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations System. He holds a Master’s degree in History and French and a Bachelor’s degree in History and Political Science from the University of Lausanne.

The post Time to piece together prevention and small arms control first appeared on UNIDIR.

This intense global interconnectedness clearly comes with great benefits, but it also brings great risks.

A successful hack against a small Ukrainian software company might not sound like a big deal for the rest of us, but within a year of M.E.Doc’s servers being breached in 2017, the NotPetya incident had cost businesses around the world over $10 billion. The WannaCry attack hit the UK’s National Health Service first and hardest, but within days it had spread to over 150 countries. And when the ICRC was targeted in 2022, sensitive data related to more than half a million people worldwide was exposed.

Though much of the damage is the result of a global cybercrime epidemic whose costs already rise into the trillions, the increasing frequency of state-linked cyber attacks on civilian and humanitarian infrastructure means that the picture is not so straightforward.

On the contrary, today’s cyber domain is characterized by impacts cascading across networks, industries and borders, with an incredibly diverse range of actors affected and involved. The growing scale and the sophistication of these challenges mean that narrow, technical solutions to cybersecurity are no longer enough.

The seriousness of these impacts and the need for a concerted, collective response is clear from the fact that the UN Security Council has, in recent years, repeatedly been briefed on cyber threats to international peace and security.

Recognition of the gravity of the situation has also driven a conceptual shift towards the idea of cyber resilience over cybersecurity. The focus has today moved beyond individual networks and onto the broader and better question of how systems and societies can collectively react, adapt, and recover when successful attacks do occur.

Cooperation in times of fragmentation

While businesses and governments alike increasingly understand the need for an intersectoral, global approach, their task is made more difficult by the growing fragmentation of the digital domain itself.

This is driven by rapid technological developments and differences in political posture, regulatory approach, and organizational capacity. Together, these factors create faultlines that make cyber infiltration more likely, as seen in the following areas:

• Political volatility: Political tensions have knock-on effects for cyber risk, with geopolitical considerations the most important influence on cyber risk mitigation strategies for two-thirds of organizations.
• Patchwork regulation: Though regulation itself is seen as having a positive effect, three-quarters of chief information security officers report that the current global patchwork of regulatory approaches significantly hampers their efforts to achieve proper compliance.
• Capacity gaps: There are major differences in capacity levels among countries, with some still lacking even basic legal frameworks and cybersecurity incident response teams.
• SME resilience: Small organizations are twice as likely to have insufficient resilience as compared to larger counterparts. The potentially destabilizing effects of any one player’s security deficiencies are also significantly amplified when they are embedded in the complex, globally diversified, poorly understood digital supply chains behind many of the services and systems we rely on today.
• Emerging tech: Technological advances in different areas also expand the range of vulnerabilities and entry points open to attack, with increasingly sophisticated generative AI the overwhelming concern in 2026 and quantum technology posing a particular threat to existing forms of encryption.

Pulling on the fabric of cyber resilience from a variety of different angles, these diverse pressures and structural gaps mean that no one company, government or international body has the visibility, authority or capacity to fully manage international cyber risks on its own. Yet the same fragmentation that makes cooperation so difficult also makes it more urgent than ever.

Making good on the promise of cyber resilience

Of course, collective, cooperative efforts are already underway, and they provide a solid foundation for the cyber resilience architecture we need. But to really make a difference, we need to move beyond negotiation to the concrete work of implementation.

Take, for example, the 11 voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace that were endorsed by the UN General Assembly in 2015 and reaffirmed in 2021. To realize the potential of its norms around the protection of critical infrastructure, states need first to identify and designate what qualifies as critical infrastructure, assign responsibility for it to a competent agency, build up effective cyber capacity within such agencies, and create rules around incident reporting and cooperation to ensure that attacks and their spread are properly tracked and addressed.

Another complimentary, concrete step that governments can take is to bolster their participation in confidence-building measures like the global points of contact directory. This initiative establishes channels of secure, direct communication on cyber incidents, including those affecting critical infrastructure to de-escalate tensions, clarify misunderstandings, and promote more effective, collective responses by sharing information and capacity.

This capacity itself is a prerequisite for proper compliance and cooperative assistance, and so it must be built up. This could take the form of skills development for one’s own technical staff, the creation of dedicated cyber incident response teams, support from established companies and public institutions for small and medium-sized enterprises in their own capacity-building efforts, and pooling of knowledge and skills to support less well-resourced countries and regions around the world.

Effective cooperation will also depend on treating industry, civil society and academia as operational partners. Initiatives such as the Cybersecurity Tech Accord, the Paris Call, the Internet Governance Forum and the World Economic Forum’s Centre for Cybersecurity already point the way forward, as do inclusive platforms like UNIDIR’s Cyber Stability Conference and the wider Geneva Cyber Week, both held annually in May.

The coming months will also see the launch of the UN’s Global Mechanism on ICT Security, which will provide a single permanent track for governments to ensure that steps towards more concrete progress stay on track, to further strengthen confidence‑building measures and to redouble efforts to improve capacity‑building across the board.

It is only this kind of concrete, cooperative and collective effort that can truly build cyber resilience across every link in the chain, and protect the vital digital infrastructure that today plays such a key role in our lives as individuals, and our life as a species.

An earlier version of this article was originally published by the World Economic Forum.

The post Why cyber resilience needs to be concrete, cooperative and collective first appeared on UNIDIR.

With the emergence of the internet and a wave of personal computers, the evolution of ICTs that started at the end of the 20th century transformed how people and societies interacted and how information was created, stored and shared. What started as a small military and academic research network expanded into a global web connecting millions of devices and, eventually, billions of people.

Building on this expansion, the subsequent phase of digital development saw the consolidation of search engines, web browsers, and email as core tools for accessing and exchanging information at scale. Alongside these developments, early cyber risks emerged, including malware and basic intrusion techniques disseminated through physical media and early network infrastructures. In the early 2000s, the wider adoption of wireless connectivity and mobile devices further increased the volume, speed and reach of digital communications, expanding digital opportunities while also introducing additional layers of security vulnerabilities.

AI at the heart of today’s security

Keeping up with past technological innovation, the contemporary global cyber threat landscape is undergoing another major shift driven by rapid advances in new and emerging technologies, with significant implications for international peace and security.

UNIDIR’s Insights into Cyberthreats and International Security in 2025 highlighted how these new and emerging technologies are reshaping both offensive and defensive cyber operations. These advancements, especially AI, bring new opportunities but also new multi-dimensional risks and challenges, underscoring that its disruptive potential is no longer theoretical.

The safety and security concerns anticipated in UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2022 on AI disruption, peace and security have now become immediate and tangible vulnerabilities, expanding attack surfaces and multiplying threat vectors that stakeholders must confront.

To better understand the AI-ICT security nexus, UNIDIR introduced a technical framework showing how AI can influence both perpetrator and defender postures in the ICT environment. However, governance of this nexus does not clearly fit into the five-pillared framework of responsible State behaviour in cyberspace – which comprises of existing and potential threats, voluntary norms, international law, confidence-building measures, and capacity building. This gap warrants further deliberation, including in the UN Global Permanent Mechanism in the context of international security which is a single‑track, and State‑led mechanism operating under the auspices of the United Nations, aimed at promoting an open, secure, stable, accessible, peaceful and interoperable ICT environment. It conducts consultations through substantive plenary sessions, dedicated thematic groups, intersessional meetings, and periodic review conferences.

Where algorithms meet tomorrow

Looking ahead, quantum technology is identified as one of the most transformative technological innovations on the horizon in UNIDIR’s compendium on enabling technologies and international security. The year 2025, designated the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology, marked a century since the initial research and development of quantum mechanics.

Despite its century-long history, the full implications of quantum technology remain uncertain. Multi-stakeholder discussions during UNIDIR’s Innovations Dialogue 2024 underscored the need for careful deliberations, structured governance, proactive policy-making, and inclusive capacity building to reduce the quantum divide and manage the emerging quantum arms race.

In this context, UNIDIR’s research on quantum technology, peace and security highlights several major threats to international peace and security, including the potential decryption of sensitive data from critical infrastructure and critical information infrastructure, quantum-enabled intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and the integration of AI models with quantum algorithms.

In the recently concluded second UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICTs in the context of international security, the potential threats emanating from quantum technology were consistently highlighted by Member States.

What’s next for cybersecurity

Since its inception in 2012, UNIDIR’s annual Cyber Stability Conference fosters multistakeholder dialogue to harmonize the policy, legal, technical and diplomatic perspectives on existing and potential cyber threats while exploring ways to enhance cyber resilience through the implementation of the UN Framework of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace.

This year’s conference reflected on more than two decades of digital evolution and multilateral discussion, while delving into the future trajectory of digital transformation, the cyber threat landscape, and the Global Mechanism emerging out of it. Under the theme “Cyber governance in an era of technological revolution: Past lessons, present realities and future frontiers,” the Cyber Stability Conference 2026 was held on 4–5 May as part of Geneva Cyber Week. This flagship event continues to be a cornerstone of UNIDIR’s 45-year-long commitment to meaningful collective action towards a more secure world.

The post The evolving road from dial ups to qubits first appeared on UNIDIR.

It highlights the importance of data centres and of access to computing power (“compute” for short) as enablers of AI-driven capabilities. It also points to a clear step up in the steadily growing role and responsibility of private technology actors in 21st century warfare.

The role of the commercial cloud in warfare

It is first worth setting out why commercial data centres may be seen as targets, and what role they – and cloud computing more generally – play in modern military operations. Data centres are the physical backbone of the digital infrastructure that enables much of the digital capabilities now required by military operations.

Cloud computing enables access to the vast quantities of compute needed to train and deploy AI algorithms as well as to store, move and analyse data. Data centres are therefore a key element in the ability of modern militaries to leverage AI for autonomous capabilities, decision-support systems, data-fusion, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and targeting. No public information, however, exists to ascertain whether these specific data centres were directly contributing to ongoing military operations.

The role of AI in military operations is continuing to expand as battlefields produce ever more sensor data and require more compute. Operations are thus becoming increasingly reliant on ever more – and faster – collection, fusion and analysis of data. With these changes, the role of commercial cloud service providers (CSPs) – the only ones currently capable of managing such scale – is only likely to grow.

Security implications of targeting data centres

Targeting data centres has clear security implications.

• First, the reliance by armed forces on commercial CSPs intertwines military applications with the infrastructure that supports civilian digital applications. As the same data centres support both military and civilian workloads, strikes against them carry a dual risk: they elevate the threat to civilian infrastructure and they lead to cascading effects across civilian life, triggering service outages and possible material effects.

• Second, the targeting of data centres raises questions about how to defend such infrastructure. Hyperscalers – the companies operating the largest data centres – boast advanced cybersecurity capabilities and contingency plans for natural disasters that enable them to ensure service continuity. However, these data centres are built for and considered as commercial enterprises. They are not equipped – or even conceptualized – to deal with military threats. Often the size of small cities, data centres are both difficult to hide and extremely costly to secure against kinetic threats.

• Third, as a globally distributed network, data centres need not reside within a State’s borders to serve their purpose. The free flow of data and workloads across borders is, in many respects, a defining feature of modern cloud architecture. Yet, this means that the digital backbone underpinning military capabilities may be distributed geographically across the territory of neutral States. This carries profound implications for conflict should data centres increasingly become targets. A belligerent may, theoretically, be compelled to target infrastructure well beyond the theatre of active hostilities to deny its adversaries access to their cloud enabled-capabilities. Such strikes risk expanding the borders of a conflict, and so may contribute to escalation dynamics and negatively affect regional security.

Legal ramifications of targeting data centres

The legal implications that stem from these strikes relate in particular to international humanitarian law and the extent to which the private sector may be affected. While States remain the primary subjects of international humanitarian law, a host of implications emerge for industry.
First, a data centre that serves both civilian and military purposes may constitute a legitimate target as a consequence of its potential status as a military objective if it is found to

“make an effective contribution to military action and [if its] total or partial destruction . . . in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”

as a result of its nature, location, purpose or use. In the context of data centres and, more generally, digital infrastructure, the crux lies in the extent to which their destruction would offer “definite military advantage”. The assessment of this advantage must be independent of the existence of redundancy measures in the event of damage to this particular facility.

Second, the destruction of digital infrastructure in war points to States’ obligation to take

“all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks”.

This issue is of particular importance given the potential second- and third-order effects that their destruction may have on civilian life and the humanitarian sector, where connectivity may constitute a critical enabler. Whether feasible precautions would require the strict, physical separation of civilian data centres from the military or even added measures (either by the States hosting or benefitting from a data centre or by the technology provider) to secure and protect these facilities. Regardless of which actor takes which steps, the importance of clarifying these questions and the expected distribution of roles and responsibilities is further emphasized by the “increased meshing” of civilian and military cloud technologies.

Third, in addition to destruction of the physical hardware, another question arises as to whether the data hosted in dual-use data centres could, itself, constitute a lawful military objective. If this is the case, then the data could be subject to attack by way of (partial) destruction of the infrastructure that hosts it. This issue is of particular relevance due to the increased integration of AI into military systems – and the dependence of these technologies on data throughout their life cycle.

Beyond the technology, the possible targetability of staff working at these data centres arises. While civilians are, in principle, protected from attacks under international humanitarian law, they may lose their protection if they are found to be directly participating in hostilities. Independently of whether contributing to the operation of a dual-use data centre could constitute direct participation in hostilities, this question is of particular importance in the light of today’s technology-heavy defence landscape.

This trend may, subsequently, require the presence of technical personnel, such as engineers, in or near the frontlines for maintenance and other operational functions critical to the deployment and use of military capabilities. There is precedent of such maintenance workshops being established by governmental armed forces. However, States’ dependence on the private sector for military capabilities – extending beyond weapon systems to data centres and other technological infrastructure – is growing. This may lead in the foreseeable future to the deployment in the battlefield of civilian engineers and technicians from technology suppliers to ensure the continued operation and maintenance of that infrastructure.

The need for structured engagement between the public and private sectors

These observations ultimately attest to two realities.
The foremost of these is that risk assessments and mitigation measures for both the public and the private sectors will inevitably evolve from traditional structures. While the destruction of military factories is far from being a novel strategy, the increased reliance on dual-use digital infrastructures such as data centres further emphasizes the need for both States and technology suppliers to re-evaluate their risk assessments.

The large prime contractors in the defence industry may already have established structures and processes for such risk assessments. To the extent that their facilities may be military objectives, technology companies should follow suit if they are to supply, even remotely, capabilities to the military. To this end, States and the private sector should clarify expectations with respect to the distribution of roles and responsibilities, including in the context of risk assessments and mitigation.

The other, equally significant, reality is that the need for structured engagement between the public and the private sectors is now more evident than ever. Beyond risks assessments and clarity on the distribution of roles and responsibilities, establishing shared expectations could ultimately foster predictability, mutual trust and accountability and could contribute positively to international peace and security. States and non-state actors (including industry) have engaged extensively since 2018 on information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the context of international security as part of two United Nations open-ended working groups. The upcoming Global Mechanism on ICT in the context of international security subsequently provides an opportunity to deepen the multi-stakeholder dialogue on, among other things, voluntary norms and international law, particularly the protection of dual-use infrastructure and data.

Specifically on AI, UNIDIR in partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights launched an initiative dedicated to the development of a Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain. The framework seeks to provide a practical and actionable set of voluntary guidelines firmly grounded in international law and norms, to be co-developed in collaboration with industry actors and governments.

As the boundary between commercial cloud computing and the military domain continues to blur, the strikes on the data centres in the Gulf confirm that digital infrastructure is not only the backbone of our society, but that it also lies on the frontline of modern conflict. The engagement of the international, multi-stakeholder community with governance processes, including within the United Nations, is now more critical than ever to ensure that current and future infrastructure fosters international peace and security, and does not become the catalyst for escalation and conflict.

The post Clouds of war: The implications of targeting data centres first appeared on UNIDIR.

The discussions have confirmed an emerging international consensus that the UN system should address this agenda more systematically and strategically. Maritime security is increasingly understood as a global responsibility to protect the sea; ensure freedom of navigation and safe passage for international trade; fight blue crimes, such as piracy; and safeguard marine ecosystems.

Achieving these objectives requires a comprehensive, multi-level approach spanning national, regional, and global frameworks. The effectiveness of the UN system — its coordination with regional actors, its support to Member States, and its capacity to respond to maritime emergencies — remains critical.

But how can the UN system be further strengthened to address both traditional and emerging maritime security challenges? Closing persistent gaps will be essential to ensure strategic coherence, long-term sustainability, and greater foresight.

This leads to concrete reform proposals which are modest in ambition, but significant in impact. The UN’s approach would be stronger through a thematic Security Council resolution, a Secretary General report, deeper in-house expertise, and mainstreaming the maritime security agenda.

Too many agencies, too little coordination

A significant number of UN agencies have developed programmes on maritime security since the early 2000s. A large and still-growing number of agencies, programmes and bodies — each with their own mandate, funding stream, and reporting line — deals with aspects of maritime security. Yet, none have a comprehensive mandate.

A first attempt to map the responsible agencies by UNIDIR has identified five agencies with large scale maritime security programmes (the Big Five), 19 other relevant agencies, and nine international organizations not formally part of the UN system. In addition, many formal and informal regional organizations work in the field.

While this breadth reflects the cross-cutting nature of maritime threats, it generates significant risks of overlap, duplication and governance gaps. There is no single entity with the mandate, authority or capacity to coordinate these activities at the global level, presenting a risk of competitive fragmentation rather than complementary specialization.

Capacity building gaps: Who trains whom in what?

Weak national and regional capacities in maritime security governance continue to be a substantial problem. This is a major challenge not only for countries recovering from armed conflict or grappling with development challenges, but also for small island states.

Major international investments in maritime security capacity building, technical assistance, and security sector reform have been made since the early 2000s. Much of this work is concentrated and run by the “Big Five” group of agencies. Yet, attempts to coordinate their delivery work remain limited in scope.

This may lead to programming that reflects the strategic priorities of providers rather than the needs of recipients, alongside risks of overlap and duplication, gaps in coverage, insufficient attention to long-term requirements and emerging challenges, and limited evaluation of effectiveness — including instances where “zombie projects” continue to absorb resources without delivering commensurate impact.

Data gaps: Towards a global picture of the maritime domain

This points to another important gap: the absence of an authoritative global dataset on maritime security threats and incidents to identify problems, assess responses, and guide priorities.

Reporting mechanisms by the “Big Five” are mandate-specific, fragmented across agencies, and heavily dependent on voluntary member-state submissions. Interpol and Interport Police facilitate operational exchanges, and regional Maritime Domain Awareness initiatives now provide near-comprehensive coverage of most ocean basins — with a persistent South Atlantic gap.

A growing share of maritime data infrastructure — satellites, sensors and data platforms — is commercially owned, improving access for some but raising concerns about affordability, equity and whether such data should be treated as a global public good rather than a commodity.

The UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime’s Global Maritime Crime Programme has begun to facilitate dialogue between different platforms and actors. However, there are yet no agreed international standards and mechanisms for international data exchange and fusion. This limits the ability of the international community to identify patterns, assess trends, and allocate resources rationally.

Making sense of data

Even where data exists, the UN system does not have an institutional home for the kind of expertise and strategic analysis needed to translate information into policy priorities.

Regional analytical centres exist — often focused on specific issue areas such as narcotics or sanctioned shipping — and ad hoc reports are produced by UNODC, UNIDIR, and academic institutions.

But these are insufficient substitutes for a standing analytical capacity with a global mandate. The absence of such a capacity means that international responses to maritime security threats remain reactive rather than anticipatory.

The strategic and foresight gap

Since 2000, the maritime security threat landscape has evolved through four overlapping phases, each introducing new actors and challenges:

• Early 2000s: an early focus on counter-terrorism 
• Late 2000s: counter-piracy
• Early 2010s: increasing attention to blue crimes like smuggling and illegal fishing
• Present: a dominant focus on grey-zone threats

This current phase is marked by deliberate ambiguity, with state-sponsored or tolerated actors operating below the threshold of armed conflict and exploiting legal gaps, as seen in activities such as GNSS spoofing and jamming, maritime cyber attacks, and potential sabotage of critical infrastructure like undersea cables and pipelines.

These activities reveal significant norm deficits — areas where international law is unclear, contested or simply absent. They present unresolved and rapidly changing legal and governance challenges that existing institutions are not well-equipped to address.

The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis is a telling example. While it demands an emergency response, it should also invite strategic thinking on what future options are available to ensure safe passage for civilian vessels in strategic waterways during and after armed conflict. Options for future crises need to be developed, drawing on the lessons from past initiatives.

A concrete path to reform

Addressing the structural deficits identified above requires both immediate steps and longer-term institutional reform. The following measures represent a sequenced and politically feasible path:

Adopt a UN Security Council resolution on maritime security. Building on the current momentum, the Security Council could adopt a comprehensive thematic resolution establishing maritime security as a standing priority and mandating inter-agency coordination. The 2026 Strait of Hormuz crisis provides a timely catalyst for action, and the elected Council members (E-10) could jointly lead the way.

Publish an annual UN Secretary-General Report. An annual report on maritime security trends, governance gaps, and system-wide activities could provide the analytical foundation for strategic decision-making and increase accountability across the UN system. Debates on the annual report in the Security Council and General Assembly could ensure sustained attention for a comprehensive approach.

Ensure appropriate liaison functions. Representation and liaison of all relevant UN agencies – notably the “Big Five” – in New York is important to enhance coordination and ensure expertise is brought to bear when needed. Remote participation can only partially compensate.

Establish a dedicated maritime security body. A section or division in the General Secretariat with cross-cutting coordination and analysis mandate is essential. Such a body could serve as a clearing house for data, a coordinator for information sharing and best practices on capacity-building, and a provider of strategic assessments to the Security Council and General Assembly. A few (seconded) staff members could make a major difference and enhance resource efficiency.

Create an expert network for maritime security. An expert network or United Nations University Institute could ensure that UN entities, regional organizations, and Member States have access to comprehensive expertise when needed. It would also help enhance analytical capabilities, cross-regional and cross-agency exchange of best practices, global assessments, and strategic foresight.

Mainstream maritime security across the UN System. Maritime security dimensions need to be systematically integrated into the UN Ocean Decade, the World Ocean Assessment, the UN Ocean Conferences, relevant peacebuilding and sustainable development frameworks and human rights work. Treating maritime security as a siloed ‘hard security’ issue disconnected from ocean health and blue economy goals is analytically incoherent and operationally counterproductive.

The post Strengthening the UN’s role in maritime security first appeared on UNIDIR.