The 12th Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT CSP) will take place from 24-28 August, and will take the next steps to develop a five-year strategy for the treaty. This initiative emerged from discussions marking the treaty’s 10th anniversary, which prompted State Parties to take stock of implementation and progress towards achieving the ATT’s object and purpose.
Most international conventional arms control and humanitarian disarmament instruments – including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons – have mandated review conferences every five years, and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms every six years.
The ATT, however, has no dedicated review conference. The treaty mandates the annual CSP to review implementation, but informal consultations convened by UNIDIR and Panama in late 2025 and early 2026 found that important aspects of implementation are not being examined through the current process.
As States Parties look ahead to the treaty’s next phase, the discussions have opened a broader debate about how the ATT can periodically assess its effectiveness, identify challenges, and strengthen implementation over time.
The current approach
The ATT reviews implementation through its annual conferences and is supported by three standing working groups focusing on:
- effective treaty implementation (WGETI)
- transparency and reporting (WGTR)
- and universalization (WGTU)
Each follows a multi-year work plan that identifies priority issues and outlines the sequencing for their consideration.
The WGETI and WGTR review the implementation status, identify common challenges, and develop voluntary guidance to overcome them. The WGTU reviews progress on universalization, assesses barriers to ratification and accession, and proposes more coordinated approaches to outreach and assistance.
The “informal” WGTR developed reporting templates, which the CSP2 recommended for use by States. It also suggested that this be “kept under review by the States Parties in order to benefit from the practical experiences gained from its use.” Five years later, the reporting templates were reviewed, and the CSP7 endorsed the revised versions. The WGTR has also recommended updates to the voluntary guidance on ATT annual reports.
Some elements of the ATT framework have more structured review processes. For example, the CSP5 adopted a structured project evaluation framework to assess whether projects funded by the Voluntary Trust Fund have achieved their intended objectives. Further, when the CSP6 established the Diversion Information Exchange Forum to support the treaty’s information-sharing provisions, it also agreed to review its usefulness at the CSP8. Although the COVID-19 pandemic delayed this review, it was eventually conducted at the CSP10.
This shows that ATT States Parties are open to exploring new ways to support treaty implementation and review what does and doesn’t work. At the same time, the existing review mechanisms are diffuse, and there is no comprehensive approach for assessing the treaty’s overall progress toward achieving its object and purpose.
What hasn’t been reviewed?
Despite the ATT’s extensive working-group structure, three issues are not currently being reviewed.
- The ATT requires the CSP to review “developments in the field of conventional arms”, but no mechanism currently examines this and related scope issues. The WGETI considered a proposal earlier this year to create an informal working group on scope and national control lists. This builds on a proposal from five years ago to establish an informal group that, as a first step, could review submitted lists, identify common approaches and challenges, and develop guidance for States Parties on establishing and maintaining control lists.
Given technological developments in conventional weapons – including the transfer of parts, components and knowledge under joint and licensed production arrangements – such a group could ensure there are no loopholes in State Party regulation of the international arms trade. A geographically diverse group of national government and non-governmental experts on these issues would provide a unique forum, complementing less inclusive existing export control regimes. - Information contained in State Party initial and annual reports is not systematically reviewed. While the WGTR initially considered how information contained in State Party reports could be used, these discussions ended at the CSP5. The five-year strategy represents a timely opportunity to revisit this issue, also given the renewed interest in updating initial reports. These could be used in a peer-review process to support national implementation and increase understanding of the treaty’s impact.
The UN Firearms Protocol provides a possible model for an ATT voluntary peer-review. Like the ATT, the CSPs of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Firearms Protocol provide space for a general review of implementation. States Parties also conduct individual “country reviews” involving a self-assessment questionnaire, which two other States review and provide feedback on.
For the ATT, an updated initial report and annual reports could provide the evidence base for the review, with all three States agreeing on a list of gaps, assistance needs, and best practices – which is then summarized for the CSP. An optional peer-review mechanism could help ATT States Parties strengthen their national control systems, give clear purpose for reporting, and support the development of implementation roadmaps and project proposals for the Voluntary Trust Fund. - As noted by civil society at several ATT conferences, the implementation of presidential themes and working group decisions is not regularly reviewed. While the WGETI sub-working group on current and emerging implementation issues addresses some of the presidency recommendations on the themes of gender, the role of industry, and inter-agency cooperation, many conference decisions have not been reviewed.
The benefits of a comprehensive review
Even if these gaps were addressed, they would only examine certain aspects of treaty implementation. There is currently no mechanism to conduct an overarching review of the treaty’s implementation and impact.
The current work towards a five-year strategy for the ATT focuses on identifying priority areas, establishing indicators and tracking progress over this period. Yet reviewing progress against the strategy’s indicators at the end of the five-year cycle is not comparable to undertaking a comprehensive review of all aspects of treaty implementation.
Experiences and lessons learned from other international instruments show the potential benefits that a review conference could offer to the ATT. A State-led, inclusive, participatory and needs-driven process could provide an opportunity to take stock of ATT implementation since its entry into force to identify common gaps and needs, and assess whether the treaty needs to adapt to new realities and emerging challenges.
Such a process could also strengthen the ATT’s architecture, create innovative tools for its effective implementation, and consider provisions that have received less attention – as well as other issues not covered by the treaty’s negotiation process. An ATT Review Conference could therefore help renew the treaty’s visibility and ensure that it remains fit for purpose, by strengthening the regulation of the international arms trade, preventing diversion, and reducing human suffering, without requiring treaty amendments.
There is “no one size fits all” formula to attain this goal. The ATT has a unique nature due to its export-control dimension and does not ban any specific type of weapon. This is an aspect to consider when developing any potential measurable, time-bound indicators to monitor the status and operations of the ATT. The timing, frequency and modalities of a comprehensive ATT review process merit further consideration by interested parties.
From reflection to action
The ATT’s 10th anniversary in 2024, followed by the development of a five-year strategy, has created a timely opportunity to reflect on the treaty’s implementation and impact.
The UNIDIR-Panama informal consultations revealed different priorities, particularly on civil society’s call for greater transparency on national decisions regarding transfer authorizations and denials – a sensitive issue for some States Parties.
Whether through enhanced working-group mandates, using reports for peer reviews, or a review conference process, States Parties have a range of options to assess the treaty’s implementation and increase its impact.
While cognizant of capacity and financial constraints, the upcoming CSP12 offers an important space to systematically review the implementation and impact of ATT. In this context, UNIDIR, in collaboration with Conflict Armament Research and Stimson, will host a side event on 24 August to launch a new initiative to deliver the first comprehensive evaluation of the treaty’s impact.
Igor Barreto was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme, supporting research on weapons and ammunition management. He holds a Master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University and a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. Previously, Igor worked with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, the Embassy of Brazil in Stockholm, the Parliamentary Forum on Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Brazilian Peace Operations Joint Training Center.
Paul Holtom is the Head of UNIDIR’s Conventional Weapons Programme. He conducts research on the illicit trade, diversion and uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons and ammunition. Paul has authored and co-authored publications on the international arms trade and conventional arms control. Before joining UNIDIR, he worked at the Small Arms Survey, Coventry University and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. He holds a PhD and Master’s degree in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Birmingham, UK.
Grisselle Rodríguez is the Delegate for Disarmament and International Security of the Permanent Mission of Panama to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva since 2015. She is an MA candidate in Global Security at King’s College London and was awarded certificates for the 2019 UN Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament and the 2021 Visiting Fellows Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. Previously, she interned at diplomatic missions, the UN and NGOs.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this commentary are those of Grisselle Rodríguez.