Against this backdrop, UNIDIR convenes the Outer Space Security Conference 2026 as a platform for meaningful exchange across policymakers, defence actors, industry, academia and civil society. Through focused panel discussions on technical, legal and policy dimensions, participants will explore practical pathways to strengthen the security and sustainability of outer space, ensuring it remains stable and accessible for all.

Agenda

Tuesday, 8 September 2026 | Day 1

09:30 – 10:00 | Morning refreshments

10:00 – 10:15 | Welcome remarks

• Dr Robin Geiss, Director, UNIDIR

10:15 – 10:45 | Keynote address

10:45 – 12:15 | Panel I: Mapping space threats and consequences

Space systems are increasingly subject to threats that raise important security concerns, particularly for systems that support both civilian and military functions. This panel will focus on the consequences of space threats. It will examine how space threats can affect capabilities in orbit and generate cascading effects in space and on Earth, as well as how certain activities blur the line between benign and hostile intent. Bringing together perspectives from military, industry and civil society, the discussion will seek to understand how these impacts unfold, how ambiguity can be navigated and where key gaps remain in current understanding.

Speakers

• Anca Agachi, Defense Policy Analyst, RAND Corporation

• Natalia Fuzhenkova, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva

• Sebastiano Fulci, Coordinator for Space Security Matters, General Directorate for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy

• Olavo de Oliveira Bittencourt Neto, Professor, Catholic University of Santos

Moderator

• Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Fellow, Space Security Programme, UNIDIR; Senior Program Analyst, Secure World Foundation

12:15 – 12:30 | Lightning talk: OS26 youth campaign winner

12:30 – 13:30 | Lunch break

13:30 – 15:00 | Panel II: Strategic stability and the security of space architecture

This panel will examine how reliance on integrated space infrastructure for tactical and strategic operations impacts global stability. It will evaluate how space-based force multipliers and the prospective deployment of strategic orbital capabilities challenge existing arms control regimes and broader international security. The panel will seek to identify practical steps and pathways to safeguard international security.

Speakers

• Dmitry Stefanovich, Research Fellow, Center for International Security, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations

• Nivedita Raju, Senior Researcher, Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

• James Acton, Co-Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

• Yue Yuan, Assistant Professor, Institute of International Relations, China Foreign Affairs University

Moderator

• Victoria Samson, Chief Director, Space Security and Stability, Secure World Foundation

15:00 – 15:45 | Vienna exchange: Updates from the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA)

Several multilateral processes are underway to advance space governance through international efforts. In this session, UNOOSA will provide an update on its work and progress in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), with a particular focus on areas that may be of relevance to space security. The presentation will be followed by a brief question and answer session.

Speaker

• Rosanna Hoffmann, Lead, Space Law and Policy, United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs

Moderator

• Chelsea Mai, Research Assistant, Space Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes, UNIDIR

15:45 – 16:15 | Coffee break

16:15 – 17:45 | Panel III: Taking stock of efforts to advance the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in all its aspects

Efforts to advance PAROS are focused on how to move from general commitments toward practical implementation. This panel will examine how space security debates on both international legally binding measures and non-binding measures related to PAROS are developing and how they may be pursued in practice. It will consider where common ground is emerging, where differences remain and how current discussions in multilateral processes are shaping our near-term future.

Speakers

• Emilia Sidorova, Head of Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

• Marjolijn Van Deelen, Special Envoy for Space, European External Action Service

• Ambassador Foradori, Chair, Open-Ended Working Group on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space in all its Aspects

• Clive Hughes, Head of Space Security and Advanced Threats, UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office

• Ambassador Li Chijiang, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, China

Moderator

• Peter Martinez, Executive Director, Secure World Foundation

18:00 – 20:00 | Reception

Wednesday, 9 September 2026  | Day 2

09:30 – 10:00 | Morning refreshments

10:00 – 10:15 | Opening remarks

• Izumi Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

10:15 – 11:45 | Panel IV: Complex interactions in a multi-actor orbit

Whereas the early phases of the space race were primarily dominated by States, the current space ecosystem has seen the competitive participation of industry actors. The proliferation of new actors and novel activities in orbit has created a complex web of interactions that have raised questions related to traditional legal frameworks. This panel will examine the impact of these shifting dynamics on the application of international law and the thresholds for targetability in the space domain.

Speakers

• Cassandra Steer, Chief Executive Officer and Founder, Australasian Centre for Space Governance

• Vasily Gudnov, Head, Multilateral Cooperation Division, State Space Corporation ROSCOSMOS

• Bin Li, Deputy Head of School (Teaching and Learning), School of Law and Justice, University of Newcastle

• Jessica Tok, Senior Space Multilateral Affairs Advisor, Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Space Policy, U.S.

• Arlette Tanga, President, African Association of Air and Space Law

Moderator

• Jessica West, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation; Senior Researcher, Project Ploughshares

11:45 – 12:00 | Lightning talk: OS26 youth campaign winner

12:00 – 13:00 | Lunch break

13:00 – 14:30 | Panel V: Monitoring, verification and visibility in outer space

The cumulative number of objects launched into space now exceeds 24,000 and is expected to continue rising as more actors engage in space activities. The ability to monitor activities in orbit is now more important than ever for space safety and security. Space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities can track objects and detect certain activities, but challenges remain with using SSA. This panel will examine how new tools and technologies could be developed to support space security, including as a means to verify legally binding agreements and monitor norms of behaviour. It will explore current SSA capabilities and other tools, how data is interpreted and assessed and the opportunities and challenges associated with monitoring and verifying activities in outer space.

Speakers

• Joana Ruiter, Coordinator, EU Affairs and Space Safety Delegate, Netherlands Space Agency

• Areg Danagoulian, Associate Professor, Nuclear Science and Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

• Regina Peldszus, Specialist, Space Security, European External Action Service

• Thomas González Roberts, Assistant Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs and Daniel Guggenheim School of Aerospace Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology

Moderator

• Bruno Martini, Researcher, Space Security Programme, UNIDIR

14:30 – 15:15 | Vienna exchange: Updates from COPUOS and the Expert Group on Space Situational Awareness

The Expert Group on Space Situational Awareness, established by the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, is mandated, inter alia, to identify the information relevant for effective international SSA coordination, the technical and governance mechanisms through which such information could be exchanged, and the institutional arrangements for hosting, governing and accessing SSA information. This exchange will provide an update on the work of the group, initial recommendations and the utility of outcomes to safety, security and sustainability of the outer space environment. 

15:15 – 15:45 | Coffee break

15:45 – 17:15 | Panel VI: Securing space data and information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure

The modern space ecosystem relies on a complex, interconnected network of orbital assets and terrestrial ICT infrastructure. As reliance on these networks deepens, critical nodes—ranging from ground-based terminals to emerging concepts for data storage and processing in orbit—face evolving risks of hostile ICT activities and physical disruption. This panel will explore how the manipulation, disruption or denial of space-derived data impacts strategic stability, the security challenges surrounding both terrestrial and orbital data infrastructure and the multilateral and technical measures required to safeguard integrity and resilience across these systems.

Speakers

• Patricia Cooper, Founder, Constellation Advisory

• Floyd D’Costa, Co-Founder, Space Armour and Blockchain Worx

• Karryl Kim Sagun Trajano, Research Fellow, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

• Google representative

• Laetitia Cesari, Fellow, Space Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes, UNIDIR

Moderator

• Thando Mathe, Research Assistant, Space Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programmes, UNIDIR

17:15 – 17:30 | Concluding remarks

• Dr Robin Geiss, Director, UNIDIR

When and where

Tuesday, 8 September and Wednesday, 9 September 2026 | Room VIII – Palais des Nations, Geneva and online.

RSVP

For in-person attendance, please register here.

For online attendance, please register here.

Further information

For any questions, please contact sarah.erickson@un.org.

Please note that the event agenda is subject to change. Additional speakers will be added as their participation is confirmed.

The post Outer Space Security Conference 2026 first appeared on UNIDIR.

The spread and evolution of improvised weapons are strongly shaped by regional and national dynamics. Yet, a common thread is that their unregulated nature challenges established national and international arms control systems. As barriers to weapons production decrease, how should States and the international community adapt to this evolving threat?

Categories of ‘improvisation’

A first step is understanding what ‘improvised’ means. The table below illustrates two main categories of improvisation across three types of conventional weapons: improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms and light weapons (SALW), and uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).

Key common enablers and trends

The use and types of improvised weapons are contextual, but they also share commonalities. A series of regional expert consultations conducted by UNIDIR in 2025 shed light on key trends.  

In most cases, the non-industrial nature of improvised weapons, makes them relatively cost-effective, accessible and hard to trace – as such, they are strategically and operationally attractive to non-state armed groups (NSAGs), criminals and terrorists.

Emerging and dual-use technologies that are not intended for weapons production have amplified the accessibility, efficacy and manufacturing possibilities of improvised weapons. Take additive manufacturing – better known as 3D printing – as an example. Since 2020, there has been a steady rise in the number of 3D-printed firearms seizures globally, with North America, Europe and Australia recording the highest numbers.

Several conflict theatres, such as Myanmar, Ukraine and more recently Somalia, have also witnessed the incorporation of 3D printing into modern warfare strategy. For example, Ukrainian forces have pioneered 3D-printed drones – such as the Titan Falcon and the Stinger – and have manufactured IEDs known as ‘candy bombs’ (a 3D-printed casing filled with conventional explosive). NSAGs in Myanmar have adopted tactics from the Ukrainian forces, building their own 3D-printed fixed wing drones (the Liberator MKI and MKII). They have also experimented with 3D-printed firearms. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab was reported to be using 3D-printing to manufacture explosives, weapons and drone components.

Manufacturers of improvised weapons do not just exploit new technologies but also commercial markets and materials. These include purchasing off-the-shelf drones for subsequent modification, computer numerical control milling machines, and chemical precursors. For example, triacetone triperoxide, which can be synthesized using commercially available materials, has been the explosive of choice in several ISIS-linked attacks e.g. 2015 Paris, 2016 Brussels, 2017 Manchester Arena. Converted firearms also remain a prominent challenge, particularly in Europe: they are reported to be involved in more shootings than ‘real’ firearms in the UK and comprise about 40% of annual seizures in the  Netherlands.

The main common enabler for improvised production, however, is not hardware – it’s knowledge. The transfer of technical expertise and ‘know-how’ across borders, ideologies, and networks sustains weapons production and supplements the accessibility of commercial technologies. Knowledge transfer happens at multiple levels: 

1. Knowledge and expertise transfer across groups: For example, African Islamic State affiliates such as Islamic State West Africa Province have benefitted from the transfer of drone expertise from affiliates in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula developed offensive drone capabilities as a result of knowledge and technology transfer from the Houthis. This signalled a cross-ideological transfer: both groups have maintained operational links and cooperation despite their opposing ideologies for pragmatic, tactical and operational reasons.
2. Knowledge transfer from conflict theatres to organized crime: Latin American organized crime cartels have, for instance, adopted improvised drones and IEDs to carry out attacks against enemy targets mimicking modern warfare techniques. Some cartel members have even travelled to Ukraine to learn, train and import expertise mimicking how foreign terrorist fighters travel to join terrorist groups overseas. 
3. Online knowledge transfer, through the open and dark web: Information on the manufacture of SALW is aplenty on open-source websites and platforms such as Odysee. Encrypted messaging platforms such as Rocket.Chat and Telegram have been used for the dissemination of weapons design files, the sale of black-market weapons, and information relating to their production. The spread of more traditional, artisanal weapons – known as ‘pumpi’ guns in Manipur – has also been accelerated by social media and encrypted messaging platforms.
4. ‘In-house’ knowledge development: Through the different – and at times overlapping – layers of knowledge available, NSAGs, criminal and extremist groups have also been developing specialized ‘in-house’ units for improvised weapons production. ISIS was one of the first terrorist groups to industrialize the procurement and development of drones in Iraq and Syria between 2016-2017. Since then, many groups have adopted similar tactics: in Somalia, Al-Shabaab has invested in hiring skilled personnel to experiment with 3D-printing technology; in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham developed their own indigenous drone programme, the Al-Shaheen Brigade; in Mexico, the Jalisco Cartel New Generation has a specialized unit dedicated to operating drones.

Finally, the accessibility of knowledge – particularly online – and the close link between improvised weapons production and new technologies translate to a final concerning trend: the involvement of youth. The improvised weapons programmes of NSAGs in Myanmar, for example, have mostly been driven by younger and tech-savvy recruits. Criminal and extremist plots involving 3D-printed firearms also increasingly involve young individuals. This further points to an overall characteristic of improvised weapons production: it collapses barriers between contexts, ideologies and potentially generations of producers. 

What can the international community do?

The regulatory challenges posed by improvised weapons are multiple and layered: no single approach – whether at the national, regional or international level – is a silver bullet. The prioritization of specific preventive measures to counter such weapons production and modification will inevitably vary depending on the regional and regulatory context. Nevertheless, several key elements can serve as the foundation for an adaptive, multi-layered counter-strategy.

1. It is important to better understand and regulate access to dual-use goods, technologies, and components essential to improvised production. The 3D printing process is an excellent example of how preventative measures can be enhanced: it encompasses multiple stages – from blueprint design to software, hardware and materials. Each of these steps has potential for better prevention. This may include, for instance, the registration or certification of printers, regulation of blueprints, or collaboration with industry to embed detection algorithms in software platforms. Also, existing regulations – such as those on readily convertible blank-firing firearms – can inspire similar approaches and offer a practical pathway for controlling items and components with high misuse potential.
2. Although SALW, IEDs and UAS are usually boxed into separate regulatory frameworks, a few exceptions offer opportunities to advance regulatory approaches for improvised weapons. The implementation of Security Council Resolution 2370 is a prime example.
3. The diffusion of online technical guidance on improvised weapons production can be better contained. Systematic monitoring of digital spaces – particularly those hosting open-source blueprints or forums sharing illicit manufacturing instructions – is essential. Cooperation between law enforcement and social media providers can be promising in this space, enhancing online monitoring of illicit content.
4. Mapping and disrupting key knowledge nodes and networks is critical. Further research is needed to understand the social and technical ecosystems that facilitate and drive improvised production. This includes identifying influential knowledge nodes – individuals and online communities – that serve as accelerators for unregulated innovation, as well as potential loopholes that facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and guidance. Counter-measures can combine investigative tools with awareness-raising initiatives to diminish the appeal and accessibility of such networks. Information sharing, coordination mechanisms and intelligence cooperation at the national, regional and international levels are also key in this regard.

Potential approaches to strengthening national, regional and international responses to the illicit proliferation of improvised weapons are wide-ranging – and extend far beyond those mentioned above. The multi-layered nature of this issue makes designing a single global response a challenge – and a new international instrument on improvised weapons may not be needed. There are numerous entry points – both in existing frameworks and in operational practice – for developing tailored preventive and response measures against the proliferation and misuse of improvised weapons, and just as many actors that can play a decisive role in countering this threat. 

To advance this effort, at the end of 2025, UNIDIR will provide a dedicated platform to explore the many dimensions of improvised weapons production, with a focus on the networks that facilitate their spread. This year’s conference will mark a key step toward building the collaborative frameworks and technical awareness needed to curb this fast-evolving threat.

The post “Do not try this at home!”: Current trends and developments in improvised weapons production first appeared on UNIDIR.

Violence weaves a tangled web

While human suffering from violence goes beyond quantifiable metrics, the financial costs of homicides and injuries from firearms-related violence are increasingly well understood and measured. [1] There is a growing body of research documenting how much a single homicide costs a city or the foregone GDP due to violence. However, the armed violence research community tends to tread lightly when measuring the ‘reverberating’ impacts of firearms-related violence – sometimes also referred to as ripple events.[2]

As a result, we may be failing to fully account for cascading harm, transmission events, and vicious cycles, such as poor life outcomes, retaliatory spirals, and interrelated forms of violence. Conversely, we may be underestimating the prevention payoff. This means that we could be missing the full scope of harm from firearms-related violence when it occurs and failing to claim the returns when it is prevented.

Reverberating impacts refer to the outwardly rippling, interconnected, and prolonged web-like network of consequences from an act of firearms-related violence.[3] An effort to map the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence would investigate shootings, not just as singular or discrete events between individuals, static in time and place, but rather as starting nodes that trigger threads and spirals of harm.

For example, one grave consequence from an act of violence can be more violence; and such offspring events can come in the way of retaliatory cycles and/or interrelated forms of violence.[4] The effort to map the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence would also examine the channels of influence through which these threads and spirals of harm spread and reinforce each other.  

While it is challenging to measure a counterfactual (e.g., how many retaliatory cycles are prevented when a single act of violence is prevented) or establish causality between exposure and outcomes (e.g., a child witnessing violence causes an impoverished adulthood), attempting to do so -in a systematic way- could be transformational. Having a widely agreed framework to understand and measure the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence can lead to a stronger business case for facing it as the universal and costly scourge it is. In an environment of shrinking budgets, we need this evidence to make a louder case for violence prevention and its cost-effectiveness.

Firearms-related violence is costly and contagious

A 2024 report by the National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) found that in Columbus, Ohio, USA, a fatal shooting, with one suspect, had a governmental cost of USD 2,126,931. This figure accounted for crime scene responses, medical expenses, criminal investigations, incarcerations costs, victim and social services, and lost tax revenue.[5] Nationally, firearms-related violence is estimated to cost the US around USD 557 billion per year, about 2.6% of its GDP.

In Latin America and the Caribbean – a region where only 8% of the world’s population resides yet accounts for one third of global homicides, disproportionately committed with firearms – the Inter-American Development Bank estimated that the costs of crime and violence reached 3.44% of its GDP in 2022. This figure accounted for losses in human capital, spending on crime mitigation by private business, and public spending on criminal justice. To put into context, the financial costs of crime and violence in the region is about double the budget for social assistance programmes.

As significant as the financial costs are, the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence spread well beyond economic impacts.[6] Public health literature can be instrumental in understanding wider costs – and the chain of infection associated with the spread of firearms-related violence and its consequences. This is because community violence, which is often perpetrated with the presence of firearms, behaves like an epidemic. Violent behaviours – just like a contagious disease – cluster, transmit, and spread, with the highest predictor of future violence being close exposure to past violence.[7]

A 2023 report by New York University outlined costs incurred by individual victims of violence, taking inspiration from the ‘burden of disease’ literature. This model adds costs associated with a condition that would not have been incurred should the disease not exist. Researchers categorized tangible direct costs, tangible indirect costs, and intangible costs. In this model, tangible direct costs are medical treatment, care, and criminal justice expenses; tangible indirect costs are income losses and reduced productivity; and intangible costs are values for injury, such as pain, reduced quality of life, and fear, or the Value of Statistical Life.

Further, the NICJR report outlined some indirect costs from violence at the community level. The research documented that violence leads to decreased property values, business and investment flight, community tension and trauma, increased firearms possession, and more use of violence to resolve disputes. It also found intergenerational impacts, noting that children exposed to violence tend to have worse life outcomes, such as impacted health, lower school performance, higher likelihood of impoverishment, and more contact with the criminal justice system.[8]

An ecological model to study violence as a public health issue, outlined by the World Health Organization, in 2002, offered four levels to understand the complex interplay of relations and environmental factors that affect and are affected by violence. These levels being individual, proximal social relationships (such as close family), community, and societal. In analyzing the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence, this ecological model could offer an initial sketch to map the threads and spirals, relationships and channels, and visualize how different harms from violence outspread from a single shooting event.

A research agenda to untangle the reverberating impacts   

This commentary outlines a research agenda to develop a framework that better captures the full scale and scope of the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence, because there is still so much harm from violence and its consequences that we do not fully capture or understand yet.

As a first step, we need to define and more clearly differentiate between direct and indirect costs; tangible versus intangible costs; ripple, cascading, and offspring events; first-second-and-third order effects; and a better definition of reverberating impacts too. Having a broad agreement on terms, and how to measure them, will be a solid starting place.

As a second step, we need to map the different threads of harm that outspread from a shooting event, like radial lines from the center of a spider web. This mapping effort could help identify key components in the chain of infection and capture a broad range of harm from an incident, starting with:

• More violence: one thread could illustrate violence leading to more violence, including retaliatory cycles and/or interrelated forms of violence.
• Individual outcomes: the next thread could focus on unpacking life outcomes for individual victims, following the burden of disease model, such as medical expenses, income losses, pain, and fear.
• Proximal network outcomes: a further thread could capture life outcomes for the close social network of a victim, separated by relationships, age, and gender. These outcomes could include, for example, poverty, drop-out rates, physical and mental health[9], and contact with the criminal justice system.
• Community outcomes: the following thread could capture community-level outcomes. These can include, for example, distrust, disinvestment, and intergenerational trauma[10].
• Societal outcomes: then a different thread could focus on societal outcomes, like forgone GDP or opportunity costs in governmental expenses, including criminal justice expenditures.

As a third step, we need to identify how these threads connect with each other to form spirals. This exercise can help identify pathways of influence and reinforcing effects between different categories of harm. Taken together, the radial threads and spirals, originating from one incident, can illustrate the many ways the reverberating impacts of firearms-related violence permeate all of society.

Three clear benefits emerge from having a more comprehensive framework:

1. Academically, it will help better understand the full scale and scope of the consequences of firearms-related violence.
2. Budgetarily, it will help make a stronger case for the prevention payoff.
3. Operationally, it can help practitioners more clearly identify intervention points to stop the spread of firearms-related violence and its consequences.

The budgets from many national and local governments, as well as in the UN, are facing significant pressure to cut spending. Not surprisingly, the OECD report on States of Fragility found that resources for prevention are diminishing. This is all happening when community violence intervention is at a crossroads: continued growth as a field with a well-connected public safety infrastructure or disinvestment that threatens to “dismantle its progress just as its proving its worth”. Considering current pressures and what is at stake, now, more than ever, we need to invest astutely. Investing in violence prevention is, without a doubt, worth it. And the louder we can make the case, the better chance we stand.

[1] This commentary recognizes that human suffering from violence is beyond quantifiable metrics. It is only an attempt to inform a research agenda and policy decisions by investigating the magnitude of the broader consequences from firearms-related violence, which tend to be overlooked or underestimated.

[2] In recent years, researchers have made significant advances in shedding light on the many costs of violence, including human and economic costs. See, for example, reports from New York University and Everytown for Gun Safety, as well as The mental health consequences of interpersonal gun violence: A systematic review.

[3] This is a working definition to illustrate the broad spread of the ‘reverberating’ impacts. This commentary later argues for the need to develop a more detailed definition with buy-in from the research community.

[4] Retaliatory spirals of violence among gang-involved individuals are well documented, with one study from the University of California in Los Angeles finding their contagion level as triggering twice as many offspring events as non-gang related incidents. It has also grown increasingly clear that different forms of violence are interrelated. A report from the Peace in Our Cities network highlighted that individuals involved in one form of violence (e.g., street shootings) are usually also involved in different forms of violence (e.g., gender-based violence). The report also finds that bullying at schools increases the likelihood that those involved will suffer or perpetrate violence outside of schools.

[5] Also, for example, consider the city of Bristol, England. In 2020, the Bristol City Council, based on the methodology of the Home Office, estimated the cost of a single homicide at £3,217,740 (approximately $3,966,170). This figure accounts for lost output, health services, victim services, and police expenses, among other direct and indirect cost categories.

[6] Globally, the Global Peace Index estimated that, for 2022, interpersonal violence had an economic impact of $2.6 trillion.

[7] See, Cure Violence Global.

[8] Studies have also found that adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) may be significant antecedent risk factors to future firearms-related violence, see Childhood Trauma Exposure and Gun Violence Risk Factors among Victims of Gun Violence.

[9] As a further example of the growing body of literature, Rutgers University recently released a study suggesting a link between community firearms-related violence and impacted dental health. 

[10] See, for example, Beyond Measure: Gun Violence Trauma.

The post Untangling the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence first appeared on UNIDIR.

What is the Small Quantities Protocol?

Many Non-Nuclear-Weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that have small amounts of nuclear material, but have no nuclear material in facilities, have concluded SQPs with the IAEA. An SQP is not a stand-alone agreement; rather, it is an addition to the standard CSA (based on INFCIRC/153) that suspends the implementation of certain safeguards procedures in Part II of the main agreement.

Although SQPs were designed to reduce the burden on the IAEA and on States with no significant nuclear programme, they limit the Agency’s ability to receive initial declarations on nuclear material subject to safeguards (based on the original SQPs) and to conduct routine inspections in such States (under both the original and revised SQPs). Consequently, they reduce the IAEA’s ability to verify those States’ nuclear activities.

The IAEA General Conference has repeatedly adopted a resolution reaffirming “the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region”. States in the region have tabled this annual resolution and emphasized the confidence-building role of CSAs because their application enables the Agency to verify a State’s nuclear activities to ensure its peaceful nature and to raise the alarm if it detects signs of possible non-compliance.

The evolution of the protocol

The original SQP text was developed in 1974. Under this now-outdated model, a State qualified for an SQP if it had no nuclear material in a nuclear facility (as defined in paragraph 106 of the CSA) and the total quantities of nuclear material in the State were below the thresholds defined in paragraph 37 of the CSA.[1]  Under the 1974 version of the SQP, the implementation of most reporting and all inspection procedures in Part II of the CSA are suspended – or “held in abeyance” – for the State concerned as long as it meets the two eligibility criteria or until it rescinds its SQP.

If either of the two criteria ceases to apply – that is, if the quantities of nuclear material exceed the set limitation or if nuclear material is moved into a nuclear facility – then the SQP ceases to be operational. The suspended safeguards procedures include those that require the State to make an initial report of all its nuclear material and those related to inspections and to design information verification (in which the IAEA verifies that a facility corresponds with design information submitted to the Agency). This means that the IAEA cannot verify nuclear material or facilities in a State with an original SQP, for as long as the State still qualifies for the SQP.

These constraints on the Agency’s verification compounded the view that the original SQP is “a remaining weakness in the safeguards system”. These concerns prompted the IAEA to modify the eligibility criteria for the SQP, making it unavailable to a State that had decided to construct a nuclear facility. In his 2003 report to the Board of Governors of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the Agency, proposed two options: to get rid of all SQPs or to modify existing and future SQPs. Under the first option, no new SQP based on the original text would be approved with States that had yet to conclude a CSA, and the IAEA would call on States with existing SQPs to rescind them. Under the second option, the eligibility criteria in the SQP would change, and the IAEA would call on those with an original SQP to amend or rescind it to meet the Agency’s concerns. Although, according to the Director General’s report, the Agency preferred the first option since it could treat all States with a CSA in force equally regarding reporting and inspections, the Board of Governors adopted the second option.

The modifications were adopted by the Board of Governors in 2005. Following the adoption of the revised SQP by the Board, the IAEA Director General sent letters to all States with operational SQPs based on the original standard text, calling on them to either amend their original SQP to align with the new model or rescind it.

There are three main distinctions between the original and revised SQPs:

• The revised SQP mandates the State to declare an initial inventory of all nuclear material, including zero inventory as appropriate, and allows the Agency to conduct ad hoc inspections to verify these declarations.
• Under the revised SQP, the IAEA may also carry out special inspections.
• A revised SQP ceases to be operational as soon as a State decides to construct or approve the construction of a nuclear facility. States are required to inform the Agency once they make such a decision. In contrast, under the original SQP, they were only under an obligation to do so six months before nuclear material is introduced into the new facility.

The protocol’s status in the Middle East

Eleven Middle Eastern countries have adopted SQPs, in addition to their CSAs with the IAEA: Bahrain, the Comoros, Djibouti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, the State of Palestine, the Sudan, and Yemen. All but one, Yemen, has adopted or updated their SQP to the revised version. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia used to have SQPs, which they rescinded recently in 2019 and 2024, respectively (see Figure 1).

Since Israel is not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it does not have a CSA with the IAEA. Instead, it has agreed to an Item Specific Safeguards with the Agency, which apply only to the nuclear materials and facilities specified in the agreement, not all of the State’s nuclear activities. Somalia is yet to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Figure 1: Status of States in the Middle East in Relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Related Agreements

The protocol’s limitations in the Middle East

The revised SQP significantly improves the IAEA’s ability to verify States’ declarations as it allows the Agency to conduct ad hoc and special inspections (see Table 1). However, no routine inspections may be conducted in a State with an original or modified SQP, unless and until the State either has nuclear material in a facility (under the original SQP) or decides to construct a facility (under the modified SQP) – in both cases, the SQP becomes non-operational.

Note:

1. Subsidiary arrangements refer to a document specifying in detail how the procedures laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied. See IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 14.
2. Containment refers to the structural features of a facility, containers, or equipment that are used to maintain the continuity of knowledge of items by preventing undetected access to or movement of them. Complementary containment/surveillance measures usually ensure the continuing integrity of the containment. Ibid, 77.

Routine inspections constitute the majority of the Agency’s inspections at facilities and locations outside facilities. The intensity and frequency of routine inspections are specified in subsidiary arrangements. A State with an SQP is not required to bring subsidiary arrangements into force, as long as its SQP remains operational. By consistently receiving reports and conducting routine inspections to ensure that their content matches the reality of the State’s material inventory, the IAEA is aware of the State’s nuclear activities – an advantage that is not available under the original SQP (and to some degree the modified SQP).

Ad hoc inspections are carried out to verify a State’s initial declaration on nuclear material and any changes that arise or when material is imported into or exported from the State. A special inspection may be conducted as envisaged in the CSA, and it requires arrangements to be concluded between the State and the IAEA.

Considering the SQP’s limitation, the volatile conditions in the Middle East, the history of diversion, covert programmes, the past use of weapons of mass destruction, and the deep mistrust among the region’s States, discussions on the safeguards and verification standards of the future ME WMDFZ should consider which measures will offer regional States the most assurances related to compliance.

Considering minimum standards for safeguards

A future treaty on an ME WMDFZ will require assurances among Middle Eastern States regarding their compliance with their commitments to the treaty. To enhance this trust, States could discuss adopting a confidence-building measure within the framework of that treaty that aligns all of their nuclear non-proliferation commitments – based, at a minimum, on the CSA with none of the exceptions allowed by an SQP. As a first stage, those States that have not adopted a safeguards agreement will adopt, at the least, a CSA with the IAEA, and those that have a revised or original SQP will rescind it.

The advantage of such a measure is that the IAEA may then implement all safeguards procedures available under a CSA, such as conducting all types of inspections and design information verification, receiving routine reports, and monitoring compliance. It will assure all States in the region that they are unified in their obligations in relation to the Agency and that all nuclear materials and activities in the region – whether significant or not – are subject to the Agency’s scrutiny.

It should be acknowledged that fully implementing a CSA will incur some financial costs for the 11 States with an SQP, as it will require them to establish State institutions (including an authority responsible for safeguards) and recruit, train, and maintain qualified personnel. While paragraph 15 of the CSA outlines that the State is responsible for the costs associated with implementing the CSA, wealthier countries of the region could establish a fund to alleviate the financial burden on those countries that do not possess a significant nuclear programme and cannot afford to create the necessary support institutions and infrastructure.

[1]  These thresholds are: (a) 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one of more of the following: (i) plutonium; (ii) uranium with an enrichment of 20% and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and (iii) uranium with an enrichment below 20% and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by 5 times the square of its enrichment; (b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.5%; (c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.5% or below; and (d) 20 metric tons of thorium; or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board of Governors for uniform application.

Fateme Fazel was a Graduate Professional in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone project. Previously, she interned at the Tehran Peace Museum, an Iranian NGO whose mission revolves around combatting weapons of mass destruction, and worked for several Iranian research institutions in fields such as data governance, health law and migration studies. Fateme holds a Bachelor of Arts in Law from Tehran University and a Master’s in International Law from Shahid Beheshti University, Iran

The post Harmonizing the minimum nuclear non-proliferation commitments of States in the Middle East first appeared on UNIDIR.

The History of the Gulf Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone Initiative

The idea of a Gulf Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone was officially announced by the GCC on 18 December 2005 during the 26^th annual GCC summit.[1] Members to the proposed treaty included the six members of the Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) in addition to Iraq, Iran, and Yemen.

The idea of a Gulf WMDFZ was first cultivated as a Track II initiative by the Gulf Research Centre.[2] The first meeting to introduce the initiative was held a year prior to the formal announcement in December 2004. Several other international research institutions, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Verification Research, Training, and Information Centre, supported the initiative by holding meetings on the prospects of a Gulf WDMFZ in May 2005 and May 2006, respectively.[3]

The deliberations regarding the establishment of a subregional WMDFZ in the Persian Gulf emerged in the aftermath of the breakdown of the 2004 Paris Agreement, the agreement between France, Germany, and the United Kingdom with Iran regarding limiting Tehran’s nuclear enrichment capabilities. The primary objective of the Gulf WMDFZ was to address the security threats that the states in the region had, largely pertaining to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The initiative reflected a shift in priorities of security perceptions between the GCC member States and other regional states of what was before relatively unified homogenous positions within the broader ME WMDFZ framework.

During the preliminary discussion about the treaty, it was agreed that the prerequisite to the establishment of a Gulf WMDFZ would be for all states involved to be parties to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC), and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which all states of the proposed Gulf WMDFZ have successfully done at the time of the discussion.

However, while guarding the Persian Gulf region from proliferation risks, the idea of only creating a sub-regional arrangement does not address important proliferation issues in other parts of the region, and does not resolve some of the ongoing challenges, and possibly may not prevent further proliferation.

The Benefits of a Gulf WMD-Free Zone

There are three primary benefits to a Gulf WMDFZ. First, it could serve as a first, intermediate step a to a wider Middle East WMDFZ given the ongoing impasse concerning the latter. The establishment of a Gulf WMDFZ could signal to neighbouring states the potential gains of a broader Middle East free zone. Notably, proponents of this concept theorise that additional states from the proposed Middle East zone could join over time, drawing parallels with the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America and the Treaty of Pelindaba in Africa, where regional nuclear-free zone agreements have garnered broader participation over time.

Second, a Gulf WMDFZ could address the GCC’s distinct concerns regarding Iran to prevent a situation in which GCC states may be compelled to contend in the future with a nuclear-armed Iran, re-examining their regional security strategies and possibly moving forward to forge their own nuclear capabilities. The establishment of a Gulf WMDFZ holds the potential to also promote the development of confidence-building measures (CBMs) within the Persian Gulf region, particularly concerning Iran’s nuclear program.

Third, the establishment of a Gulf WMDFZ could play a critical role in restricting nuclear non-peaceful capabilities in the region and standardizing civilian nuclear power programs among the states in the proposed Gulf WMDFZ. Several GCC members have expressed their intentions to embrace nuclear energy as part of their long-term energy strategies due to the depletion of oil and gas reserves and the growing concerns related to climate change.

While Iran’s nuclear escalation concerns some regional states more than others, the possibility of Saudi Arabia pursuing nuclear capabilities in response to Iran’s actions may have added a non-proliferation element that underscores the regional significance and further highlights the benefit of a Gulf WMDFZ to prevent nuclear competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia has expressed a strong interest in pursuing nuclear power, with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman publicly expressing the kingdom’s nuclear aspirations.[4] Specifically Saudi Arabia has emphasised that it would consider developing nuclear weapons in response to Iran’s potential acquisition of nuclear arsenal. In addition, Saudi Arabia has ambitions to domestically enrich uranium in order to establish a self-sustaining nuclear fuel cycle. If this endeavour is implemented, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may contemplate renegotiating its existing 123 agreement with the United States, under which it forgone domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, potentially initiating inter-regional competition to develop uranium enrichment capabilities.

The Challenges of a Gulf WMD-Free Zone

The adoption of the proposed Gulf WMDFZ carries with it potential implications that warrant careful consideration, particularly in light of the perspectives put forth by key stakeholders. One of the challenges to establish a Gulf WMDFZ as articulated by Amr Moussa, the then-Secretary General of the League of Arab States (LAS) is the concern that the establishment of a Gulf WMDFZ might undermine broader collective Arab efforts aimed at formulating a zone to include all states in the region, with the overarching goal of eliminating all WMD from the region.[5]

Moussa’s reservation at the time centred on Israel’s nuclear capabilities. While most GCC states share these concerns, certain members voiced a distinct perspective and priority, emphasizing that Iran’s Bushehr nuclear facilities posed a more immediate and proximate security threat to the Persian Gulf region,[6] as it is geographically closer to the Arab states’ shores than to Tehran. The region highly depends on the Persian Gulf as the primary water source[7]; therefore, the risk of a nuclear disaster is seen as a significant security concern for the GCC that trumps the prospects of a direct nuclear attack by Israel. The potential establishment of a Gulf WMDFZ could convey the impression that the GCC is prioritizing its concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear capabilities over Israel’s.

In turn, some non-Gulf Arab states are concerned that this perception would relieve some of the international pressure that has historically been brought to bear on Israel to address its nuclear program. The concern regarding Israel was that if Iran’s nuclear program is constrained by the establishment of a Gulf WMDFZ, especially if the zone goes beyond the existing framework of the NPT, then from the Israeli perspective, the threat from Iran’s nuclear capabilities is neutralized. The pressure on Israel to address its nuclear capabilities in exchange of addressing Iran’s program through joining the NPT and undertake disarmament commitments will significantly be diminished. This argument reflects the position articulated by the LAS, which held that creating a sub-regional free zone in the Persian Gulf would primarily serve the interests of the GCC and, to some extent, address the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear capabilities but as a result, the diplomatic pressure exerted on Israel to relinquish its nuclear arsenal may not carry as substantial an impact, given that a Gulf WMDFZ would alter the regional nuclear dynamics.

The question of Israel’s potential participation in a ME WMDFZ is of paramount importance, as its stance on nuclear disarmament significantly impacts the prospects for regional denuclearization. While some have hoped that the Gulf WMDFZ initiative could serve as a starting point for a wider Middle East WMDFZ free zone, the issue of Israel’s nuclear arsenal must be earnestly confronted in any comprehensive security dialogue to foster stability and disarmament within the Middle East.

Another concern expressed is how much the proposed Gulf ME WMDFZ could address concerns over Iran’s nuclear program. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) adopted in 2015 was a significant milestone in addressing the Gulf states concerns over Iran’s nuclear program by implementing restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activities and ensuring their peaceful use. The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 ultimately led to the deal’s collapse, and the prospects of a renewed agreement remain bleak.[8] The collapse of the JCPOA and Iran’s subsequent nuclear escalation have prompted exploring alternative solutions to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions. One potential avenue is the Gulf WMDFZ to further ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. However, the Gulf WMDFZ as a way to ensure Iran’s nuclear peaceful program exhibits multifaced issues.

First, it is unlikely the Gulf WMDFZ will be as effective as the JCPOA in constraining Iran’s nuclear activities as the JCPOA’s framework incorporated strict restrictions and verification measures that went well beyond the NPT. Second, Iran’s capabilities today supressed those it had in the early 2000s when the conception of the Gulf WMDFZ was initiated. Given that Iran’s increased enrichment levels exceeds those needed for civilian nuclear activities, it stopped implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol and monitoring requirements, the only plausible way that a Gulf WMDFZ would be able to replicate similar constrains on Iran’s program and ensure its peaceful nature would be if the limitations of the free zone go beyond the framework of the NPT.

In addition, it is crucial to acknowledge that Iran alongside Egypt were the initiators of the nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, which was later expanded to the ME WMDFZ.[9] Therefore, it is probably unlikely that Iran will agree to undermine their initiative and traditional role by agreeing to a Gulf WMDFZ, unless, at the least Israel commits to similar obligations. Further, while a Gulf WMDFZ may address GCC security perceptions vis-a-vie Iran, Iran’s main security perceptions, namely Israel, and the US involvement in the region[10] are unlikely to be addressed in such a sub-regional arrangement.  

In addition, several critical aspects would need to be addressed within the framework of a Gulf WMDFZ to alleviate concerns regarding existing and future regional proliferation concerns. These include identifying the nuclear obligations under the agreement and the body that will verify the nuclear obligations, probably the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure compliance, transparency, and cooperation.

In the current geopolitical and security climate, however, it is probably unlikely for Iran to willingly join a Gulf WMDFZ initiative[11] unless a substantive change in regional security dynamics are addressed, such as Israel’s nuclear ambiguity. Iran is in favour of the regional-wide model for the reasons mentioned above. At the same time, the U.S. withdrawal from the region, and the increased involvement of Russia and China have altered regional dynamics, the Israeli nuclear threat, asymmetrical capabilities, and non-proliferation obligations remain a significant issue.

Addressing complex interregional relations is also essential, particularly the competition for regional dominance between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In light of the recent Saudi-Iran deal and Saudi Arabia’s interest in civilian nuclear power plants, the prospect of nuclear cooperation between the two regional powers is an important element to explore as the deal progresses. It further raises questions regarding the likelihood of nuclear cooperation between the two states and its implications for the ME WMDFZ process. 

In conclusion, the origins of the Gulf WMDFZ stemmed from concerns over sub-regional proliferation developments and frustration with the pace of progress toward a Middle East WMDFZ. At its inception, the Gulf initiative held promise as a potential steppingstone toward establishing a Middle East WMDFZ. Yet, when assessing its current trajectory, the prospects for a successful Gulf Free Zone appear increasingly challenging within the complex global political landscape. It is evident that several other regional issues and increased regional dialogue are necessary to establish any meaningful free zone in the region.  

Against this backdrop, the recent improvement in relations between Tehran and Riyadh has created an opportunity for discussions on potential nuclear cooperation between these two regional powers. Such cooperation has the potential to foster CBMs not only between Saudi Arabia and Iran but also among other states within the Gulf WMDFZ. These CBMs may encompass various aspects, including military-to-military dialogues concerning disaster response strategies, the sharing of responsibilities related to nuclear enrichment, and the establishment of monitoring mechanisms, with the support and oversight of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This collaborative approach could significantly enhance regional stability and security by fostering mutual trust and transparency in the nuclear domain.

[1]      “GCC Initiative for a Gulf WMDFZ,” 18 December 2005, https://unidir.org/node/5650.

[2]      Christian Koch, Ghassan Shams and Layla Ali, “The Role of Think Tanks in Public Policy: The Case of the Gulf WMD Free Zone Project,” Gulf Research Center, March 2022, https://grc.net/documents/62309c402168fTheRoleofThinkTanksinPublicPolicyCommentaryAnalysis.pdf.

[3]      Mustafa Alani, “The Gulf NW and WMD Free Zone: A Track II Initiative,” International Relations 22, no 3, (September 2008): 358–362, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117808094180.

[4]      Julian Borger, “Crown Prince Confirms Saudi Arabia will seek Nuclear Arsenal if Iran Develops One,” The Guardian, 21 September 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/crown-prince-confirms-saudi-arabia-seek-nuclear-arsenal-iran-develops-one.

[5]      “Letter from SG of the Arab League of the SG of the GCC Objecting to the Gulf WMD Free Zone Initiative,” 26 July 2005, https://unidir.org/node/6985.

[6]      “UAE Responds to a Letter from the SG of the Arab League,” 20 December 2005, https://unidir.org/node/6987.

[7]      Najmedin Meshkati, “Gulf Escalation Threatens Drinking Water,” The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 26 June 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/gulf-escalation-threatens-drinking-water.

[8]      Maziar Motamedi, “Five Years After Trump’s Exit, No Return to the Iran Nuclear Deal,” Al Jazeera, 8 May 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/8/five-years-after-trumps-exit-no-return-to-the-iran-nuclear-deal.   

[9]     “Iran-Egypt Joint Letter Regarding the Name of the Agenda Item on the Zone,” 22 August 1974,  https://app.unidir.org/node/6146.

[10]     Farzan Sabet, “Iranian Narrative,” in Narratives of the Middle East WMD-Free Zone: Drivers, Theses and Historical Accounts, 2023, Geneva: UNIDIR, https://doi.org/10.37559/MEWMDFZ/2023/narratives.

[11]     Peter Jones, “A Gulf WMD Free Zone within a Broader Gulf and Missile East Security Architectures,” Gulf Research Centre, 2005, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/14747/2005-03_WMD%20-%20Peter%20Jones%20Digital.pdf; and Michael Crowley, Farnaz Fassihi and Ronen Bergman, “Hoping to Avert Nuclear Crisis, U.S. Seeks Informal Agreement with Iran,”14 June 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/14/us/politics/biden-iran-nuclear-program.html.

The post Navigating the Gulf: A Subregional Approach to Regional Proliferation Trends first appeared on UNIDIR.

Cognisant of their attractiveness as a weapon, as well as their potential threat and impact on international security if used maliciously, DEWs are included as one of the technology areas within the UN Secretary-General’s 2021 report Current developments in science and technology and their potential impact on international security and disarmament efforts.

What exactly are directed energy weapons?

The term “directed energy weapon” is used as a catch-all, to encapsulate a number of different technologies under one umbrella. These technologies are all at different levels of maturity, therefore talking about DEWs as a whole omits important nuances between the different types. There are three main systems which come under this umbrella term:

• Laser-based systems: Different types of lasers exist, of which chemical, solid-state and free-electron lasers are most relevant. Despite being invented in the 1960s, the main obstacle to laser weapons has been the power required. Out of the different laser types, chemical lasers are the most mature. However, chemical lasers suffer from a number of impracticalities, including the fact they use hazardous substances. Free-electron lasers are a more recent discovery and therefore the least developed for weapon use. The laser weapons beginning to be deployed are solid-state (fibre) lasers.
• Radio frequency systems: This category includes high-powered microwaves as well as millimetre waves. These types of systems are more technologically mature than laser-based systems and are already in operational use.
• Particle beam systems: Particle beam systems are the least mature of the three types of DEW; these systems, unlike the others, fire atomic and sub-atomic particles. Particle beam systems would emit either charged or neutral particles. Neutral particle beam systems hold particular interest given these could be used outside of the atmosphere.

What effect can directed energy weapons achieve?

These systems are used in different circumstances and therefore lead to different effects, which can be either lethal or non-lethal.

Lasers, in particular high-power ones and particle beam systems, can lead to the disruption and destruction of equipment, whereas low-power lasers can mainly dazzle systems, such as sensors, including those on satellites. High-powered microwaves can degrade and damage electronics, and as such can be used to counter threats from uncrewed aerial systems. But they could also be used to disrupt a wide range of electronics, from smartphones and motors to command posts. Finally, millimetre waves can be used as an anti-personnel area denial weapon; while not lethal, this system can produce a burning sensation on the skin.

While low-powered lasers and radio frequency-based systems are much more frequently used in the field, high-powered lasers are beginning to reach the technological maturity required to be used operationally, whereas particle-beam weapons remain far from that point.

DEWs are of increasing concern given their low operational cost per shot, their use of shots that travel much faster than those from conventional weapons and are unaffected by gravity, and their ability to launch silent and invisible attacks. Additionally, radio frequency attacks, in particular from high-powered microwaves, can be hard to attribute. While DEWs would not replace conventional weapons, they could – and to some extent already can – complement existing capabilities.

Yet, DEWs are not without their operational limitations. Taking high-power lasers as an example, their effect on a target, unlike that of conventional weapons, is not instantaneous but rather cumulative – several seconds are needed before damage is done. Weather, such as rain or clouds, can also impact the effectiveness of lasers. Finally, the target needs to be visible for the laser to be effective. With regards to radio-frequency systems, their optimal use also depends on certain weather conditions. Microwaves or millimetre waves are also prone to more dispersion than lasers and therefore, unlike lasers, are not able to send a directed beam, and the waves can be hampered by conductive material.

Does anything need to be done about directed energy weapons?

A range of countries are known to already possess or be developing DEWs, and some are even using such weapons in the field. For example, the United States recently released a call to develop a next-generation high-power laser and has deployed microwave technology. China and Russia are known to have developed mobile laser systems, and Israel has tested an airborne laser system.

One type of DEW, namely blinding weapons, has been banned as a means or method of warfare since the 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons, under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). This protocol aims to avoid the “unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury” caused by lasers which could cause blindness.

Yet, this protocol is primarily focused on the humanitarian implications of one type of effect caused by lasers. To date, there has not been any further structured debate on DEWs more broadly, neither with respect to humanitarian law beyond blinding lasers nor on their impact on wider international security. This is despite certain radio frequency systems already being used and laser weapons nearing operationalisation. Given the increase in development and use of these different weapon systems, a closer examination of these systems in a multilateral setting may be timely. This could for example take place during domain-specific discussions such as the open-ended working group on reducing space threats, to better understand what these systems mean for international security, to examine the consequences of their misuse, and to put in place adequate measures in response to the risks these weapon systems could present.

Sarah Grand-Clément is a researcher working across our programmes on Conventional Arms and on Security and Technology. Her areas of expertise include international security, counter-terrorism, futures methodologies, and how new and emerging tech impacts on defence and security. 

The post Directed Energy Weapons: A New Look at an ‘Old’ Technology first appeared on UNIDIR.

“Each time the bombing escalates, people escape. It’s the same in each city. We were in a state of continual settlement and forced migration. There is no safe place, no prospect of tomorrow. We lived in a state of suspense, waiting in fear that someone would die in a bombing, a mine incident, or from sickness.” 

Amira, Syrian survivor

In 2007, our world reached a milestone: for the first time in human history more than half of the world’s population lived in an urban area. By 2050, more than two thirds of humans are expected to live in cities. Such acceleration is notable because cities may be one of humankind’s greatest inventions, as they have the potential to make us healthier, happier, greener, and culturally and economically wealthier. Yet, in conflict-affected cities, hard-earned progress can be reversed quickly, with armed conflicts threatening to set development back by decades. Simply put, urban warfare threatens to reduce these hubs for human progress to little more than rubble.

Urban warfare is not new, but cities are all too often the battlefields of today’s armed conflicts. Heavy and unguided artillery, mortars, multi-barrel rocket launchers, missiles, large bombs, and IEDs are used extensively in today’s urban warfare. The use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects – those with large payloads, inaccurate delivery systems or multiple munitions – in urban and other populated areas is a particular concern for the UN. This is because of the significant likelihood that their effects will impact an area larger than the intended target, and thus impact civilians and things we hold dear indiscriminately. Not just houses, but homes; not just businesses, but livelihoods; not just monuments, but our history, our identity, and our shared humanity.

In recent conflicts involving the use of explosive weapons in cities, the pattern of civilian harm is clear, and the extent of the human toll is simply unacceptable. It is estimated that when explosive weapons are used in populated areas, an average of 90 percent of reported casualties and injuries are civilians. When considering longer-term effects, the number of victims is surely higher than initial estimates of fatalities. There are also those who survive but for whom life is dramatically affected, with many maimed, displaced, traumatised, or suffering the irreparable loss of a loved one.

The same interconnected infrastructure of cities that makes them engines of development also means that damage wrought within them has “reverberating” effects that extend well beyond the explosive blast. These impacts ripple out across space and time through interdependent structural networks, and the knock-on effects cause broad and enduring harm.

For example, when water supply networks or wastewater treatment systems are shelled, contamination and disruptions to safe water and sanitation services follow, thereby exposing populations to health and environmental hazards. And the consequences of inadequate or insufficient safe drinking water and sanitation facilities are deadly. As UNICEF have noted, children under the age of five in conflict-affected settings are “nearly 20 times more likely to die from diarrhoeal disease than from the conflict itself”.

When cities and other populated areas are targeted with explosive weapons, food supply, energy, transportation, housing, education, the wider economy, and healthcare, water and sanitation systems can all quickly collapse. Explosive weapons can also lead to contamination of air, soil, and water. The effects of collapse and contamination combine and intersect with each other, leaving civilians affected in numerous ways, and also impacting on neighbouring areas. As a result, many civilians are forcibly displaced, while many others remain trapped in the conflict. 

Those indirectly harmed by the targeting of cities and other populated areas with explosive weapons are likely to outnumber the direct causalities from the initial blast. Yet, these “reverberating” effects are often underestimated – if they are estimated at all.

What is UNIDIR doing?

Heeding the UN Secretary-General’s call for “Parties to conflict [to] track and learn from allegations of harm to civilians and civilian homes, markets and infrastructure, in order to gauge the impact of their operations and find ways to minimize harm”, the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) has developed two Menus of Indicators to support the efforts to examine and understand the reverberating effects from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas:

• The First Menu of Indicators focuses on documenting civilian casualties and injuries, as well as disruptions to the infrastructure of sustainable cities and communities, good health, and education.

• The Second Menu of Indicators examines the consequences from disruptions to water, sanitation and hygiene services, food security, environmental standards, and economic opportunity.

Taken together, these Menus of Indicators can be used to capture, measure, compare, and understand how the use of explosive weapons in populated areas impacts the survival, well-being, human rights, and dignity of civilians in ways that are often overlooked or underestimated. We hope that disaggregated data detailing how these impacts spread and evolve, including differences by gender and age, will help inform the understanding of parties to conflict about the reasonably foreseeable “reverberating” effects from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Collecting and sharing this kind of data can also facilitate the design of appropriate military doctrine, practice, tactics, and strategy, as well as standards to prevent civilian harm in urban warfare.

What is the international community doing?

With the aim of advancing the protection of civilians in urban warfare, national delegations, UN entities, and civil society are meeting in Geneva from 6 to 8 April 2022 in order to conduct negotiations Towards a political declaration to address the humanitarian harm arising from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas. Speaking directly on the issue of the political declaration, the UN Secretary-General called for a strong text that includes an express commitment to avoid the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects in populated areas. UN entities fully support efforts to address the humanitarian consequences from the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, including through appropriate limitations, common standards and operational policies. Against a backdrop of destruction in many cities across the world, these consultations offer an opportunity to adopt measures that will go a long way towards preventing and mitigating the impact of urban warfare on civilians.

By taking armed conflict out of our cities and other populated areas – in particular the use of explosive weapons with wide-area effects – we can more effectively harness the promise of urban growth as an accelerator for human development. By defending cities from armed conflict, we can give humanity greater hope for a better tomorrow.

The post In Defence of Cities first appeared on UNIDIR.

The post The nuclear threat is rising. Europe cannot just stand and watch first appeared on UNIDIR.

WHEN & WHERE:

18-20 and 25-27 August, Online

PROGRAMME:

18 August | Module 1: Scene-setting: context, history and mechanisms

Preparatory video

Live interactive discussion: 08:30-10:00 Tuesday 18 August 

Key learning objectives: 

1. Understand the relationship and interactions between the global political and security environment and disarmament diplomacy.
2. Know the roles and operations of the key components of the multilateral disarmament machinery.

Topics

• The global security context: An overview of current and recent developments and their implications for arms control and disarmament and the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda.
• Disarmament machinery: SSOD I and the development of the existing disarmament machinery; the role, history and current situation of the Conference on Disarmament; other mechanisms within and outside the UN.
• Panelists will include UNODA and UNIDIR representatives, along with senior government representatives and academics.
• Moderator: Tim Caughley, UNIDIR.

19 August | Module 2: Weapons of mass destruction

Preparatory video

Live interactive discussion: 13:30-15:00  Wednesday 19 August

Key learning objectives: 

1. Understand the key issues and treaties in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and acquire an overview of the challenges and opportunities for the tenth NPT Review Conference.
2. Understand the key issues and treaties related to biological and chemical weapons.

Topics

• Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation: The NPT, an overview, preparing for the postponed 2020 Review Conference, and challenges and opportunities for the 2021-2025 review cycle, including coverage of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East.
• Biological and chemical weapons: Biological weapons: the work of the Geneva-based BWC Implementation Support Unit (ISU), insights into issues arising from intersessional period 2018 to the present, and current issues approaching the 2021 Review Conference. Chemical Weapons: brief insights into the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague.
• Panelists will include academic experts, senior government representatives, a representative of the BWC ISU, and a representative of civil society.
• Moderator: Radha Day, UNODA.

20 August | Module 3: Conventional weapons

Preparatory video (Part 1)

Preparatory video (Part 2)

Live interactive discussion: 08:30-10:00 Thursday 20 August 

Key learning objectives: 

1. Acquire an overview of the various treaties and processes dealing with conventional weapons, and the key political and practical issues involved.
2. Understand the motivations, advantages and limitations of the different approaches and legal bases.

Topics

• Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW): The CCW and its Protocols: looking towards the upcoming 9-13 November 2020 Annual Conferences: CCW APII on mines, booby-traps and other devices, Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War and Meeting of the High Contracting Parties.
• Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC): Looking towards the 18th Meeting of States Parties, 16-20 November 2020.
• Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM): looking towards the Second Review Conference, 23-27 November 2020.
• Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA): discussions on a political declaration.
• Preventing diversion and illicit proliferation: The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (UNPoA); Group of Governmental Experts on conventional ammunition stockpiles.
• Panelists will include representatives of UNODA, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the APMBC and CCM ISUs, and the ATT Secretariat.
• Moderator: Peter Kolarov, UNODA.

25 August |  Module 4: Space and missiles

Preparatory video

Live interactive discussion: 08:30-10:00 Tuesday 25 August

Key learning objectives: 

1. Understand the key issues and emerging challenges for multilateral governance of space, missiles, and related technologies.
2.  Acquire an overview of current multilateral processes regulating missile technologies.

Topics

• Space: The PAROS process; convergence across technologies.
• Missiles: Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), hypersonic weapons
• Panelists to include representatives of the ATT Secretariat, UNODA and civil society, UNIDIR space and missile experts, academics.
• Moderator: Richard Lennane, UNIDIR.

26 August | Module 5: ICT, artificial intelligence and cyber

Preparatory video

Live interactive discussion: 13:30-15:00 Tuesday 26 August

Key learning objectives: 

1. Acquire an overview of the implications for international security and arms control of current and emerging information and AI technologies.
2. Understand the roles and operations of the multilateral processes established to address these issues.

Topics

• Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML): lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), including the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on LAWS; other military applications of AI/ML; AI/ML implications for verification of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation regimes.
• Cyber: the two UN processes addressing international security and the use of information and communication technologies: the Open-Ended Working Group and the Group of Governmental Experts.
• Panelists will include UNIDIR and academic experts, representatives of the ICRC, ICT industry and civil society.
• Moderator: Giacomo Persi Paoli, UNIDIR.

27 August | Module 6: Cross-cutting issues

Preparatory video

Live interactive discussion: 08:30-10:00 Tuesday 27 August

Key learning objectives: 

1. Explore how structural issues and influences affect all areas of disarmament diplomacy.
2. Consider the roles, perspectives and potential contributions of different actors working on multilateral disarmament.

Topics

• Gender issues: gender parity in disarmament processes; gender Disarmament Impact Group; gender analysis of disarmament and international security.
• International Humanitarian Law (IHL): the relationship between IHL and disarmament; role of IHL in creating and implementing disarmament and arms control treaties.
• Role of civil society: different types of civil society actors and stakeholders; motivations and trade-offs for NGOs in disarmament; building coalitions and working effectively with civil society partners.
• Panelists will include UNIDIR experts, government and civil society representatives.
• Moderator: Richard Lennane, UNIDIR.

The post Disarmament in Geneva: 2020 Orientation Course first appeared on UNIDIR.

The workshop will constitute an opportunity to engage a knowledgeable audience in discussions on gender and arms control and to exchange ideas on how gender perspectives can inform arms control policies in Africa.

There will be simultaneous translation available in English and French. 

The post Gender Perspectives on Arms Control and Disarmament: Views from Africa first appeared on UNIDIR.

Outer Space Security Conference 2025

UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025 took place on 9–10 September in a hybrid format at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and online.

Held as a flagship event, the conference discussed emerging technologies and their impact on space security, evolving approaches to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the security of cislunar space, strategic unpredictability in the space domain, and the roles and responsibilities of commercial actors.

Watch the full conference on YouTube and read the report.

 

Outer Space Security Conference 2024

UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2024 took place on 10–11 September in a hybrid format at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and online.

The conference examined mapping threats and risks to space security, the thresholds of prohibited action in space, multilateral efforts to build space security, transparency and confidence-building measures, and verification and monitoring tools for space security.

Watch the full conference on YouTube and read the report.

Outer Space Security Conference 2023

UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2023 took place on 13–14 September in a hybrid format at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and online.

On its 20th edition, the conference took stock of multilateral efforts to build space security, discussed preparing for success in future multilateral space security initiatives, practical tools to facilitate space security, safety and sustainability, the importance of global diversity, inclusiveness and multilateralism, and building common understandings between stakeholders.

Watch the full conference on YouTube and read the report.

Outer Space Security Conference 2022

UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2022 took place on 1–2 November in a hybrid format at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and online.

The conference covered the space domain and space systems, past, present and future efforts towards the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the need for diversity in achieving it, the intersection between outer space and other domains, and the pursuit of common understanding on space security.

Watch the full conference on YouTube and read the report.

Outer Space Security Conference 2021

UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2021 took place on 27–28 September in a hybrid format at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and online.

The conference addressed how the space domain has evolved since the Outer Space Treaty entered into force, space threats and challenges, the dual-use nature of space assets, non-binding norms and transparency and confidence-building measures, legally binding measures, verification mechanisms, and the role of non-governmental entities in wider space governance.

Watch the full conference on YouTube and read the report.

Space Security Conference 2019

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2019 took place on 28–29 May, under the theme “Supporting Diplomacy: Clearing the Path for Dialogue”, in a hybrid format at the Palais des Nations in Geneva and online.

The conference took stock of multilateral processes on space security, the emergence of dedicated military space forces, dual-use challenges in rocket and missile technology, monitoring and evidence-gathering in orbit, and next steps for multilateral dialogue.

Watch the full conference on YouTube and read the report.

Space Security Conference 2018

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2018 took place on 7-8 May, under the theme “Space Security: The Next Chapter”, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

The conference discussed national and regional approaches to space security, the maturing space economy, whether existing rules and practices remain fit for purpose, emerging challenges such as quantum communications and military outsourcing, and viable steps forward on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Watch the speaker interviews on YouTube and read the report.

Space Security Conference 2017

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2017 took place on 20–21 April, under the theme “Celebrating the Outer Space Treaty: 50 Years of Space Governance and Stability”, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

The conference covered national and regional approaches to space security, foundational concepts of space security and stability, the next generation of space activities such as debris removal and resource extraction, multilateral initiatives including the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the International Code of Conduct.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2016

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2016 took place on 28–29 April, under the theme “Sustaining the Momentum: The Current Status of Space Security”, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

The conference examined national perspectives on space security, foundational concepts such as space debris and space weapons, current status updates on multilateral initiatives and the roles of UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the International Telecommunication Union in the wider space security regime.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2015

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2015 took place on 24–25 August, under the theme “Underpinning Foundations of Space Security”, at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

The conference discussed national approaches to space security, foundational concepts such as self-defence and the definition of space weapons, the roles of UN bodies in coordinating space governance, and status updates on current initiatives including the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the International Code of Conduct.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2014

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2014 took place on 19–20 March, under the theme “The Evolving Space Security Regime: Implementation, Compliance, and New Initiatives”, in Geneva.

The conference covered national perspectives on space security, foundational policy issues such as anti-satellite weapons and radio frequency interference, international space security measures including the space debris mitigation guidelines and the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, status updates on the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the International Code of Conduct, and NGO perspectives on advancing space security.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2013

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2013 took place on 2–3 April, under the theme “Enhancing Confidence, Securing Space Stability”, in Geneva.

The conference explored current vulnerabilities in outer space, multilateral non-binding initiatives on transparency and confidence-building measures, lessons from the commercial space sector, the comprehensiveness of existing legal frameworks, and the potential contributions of civil and commercial actors to future cooperative approaches.

Read the conference report.

 

Space Security Conference 2012

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2012 took place on 29–30 March, under the theme “Laying the Groundwork for Progress”, in Geneva.

On it’s 10th edition, the conference discussed the growing international consensus on space sustainability, the many diverging paths forward including the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the International Code of Conduct and the upcoming Group of Governmental Experts on transparency and confidence-building measures, and technical considerations such as radio frequency interference, space situational awareness and active debris removal.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2011

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2011 took place on 4–5 April, under the theme “Building on the Past, Stepping towards the Future”, in Geneva.

The conference reviewed current and emerging threats in the space domain and ongoing efforts to address them, the technical aspects of ensuring space security, the necessity and benefits of cooperation among the growing range of space actors, and the engagement needed to sustain the long-term safety and accessibility of outer space.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2010

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2010 took place on 29–30 March, under the theme “From Foundations to Negotiations”, in Geneva.

The conference examined the technological constraints and opportunities for a space security regime, the latest developments in efforts by multilateral, governmental, academic and industrial organizations to address different pieces of the space security puzzle, and the lessons previous arms control and confidence-building negotiations might offer for future instruments to secure space.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2009

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2009 took place on 15–16 June, under the theme “Moving towards a Safer Space Environment”, in Geneva.

The conference explored architectures for improving space security, ensuring space sustainability through confidence- and security-building measures, elements of treaty-based security, international law and space security, and emerging issues for space sustainability.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2008

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2008 took place on 31 March–1 April, under the theme “Security in Space: The Next Generation”, in Geneva.

The conference addressed ways to build trust in space activities and move from confrontation to cooperation to increase space security and improve access to outer space for peaceful uses, with particular attention to the need for new international legal instruments, including the China–Russia proposal for a treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2007

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2007 took place on 2–3 April, under the theme “Celebrating the Space Age: 50 Years of Space Technology, 40 Years of the Outer Space Treaty”, in Geneva.

The conference marked the 40th anniversary of the Outer Space Treaty and the 50th anniversary of the launch of Sputnik I, examining the growing dependence of developed and developing countries alike on space-based assets, the emergence of new civil and military actors transforming the use of outer space, and the challenge of preserving both the security of space-based objects and unrestricted access to outer space for all nations.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2006

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2006 took place on 30–31 March, under the theme “Building the Architecture for Sustainable Space Security”, in Geneva.

The conference examined current threats to the peaceful uses of outer space, both technological and political/military in origin, and weighed them against the potential for a rules-based approach to space security, such as a code of conduct, space asset security and debris mitigation. It also considered the role of international instruments, including the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the Outer Space Treaty, the possible development of confidence-building measures and their implications for a future ban on space weapons, and the role of public awareness and advocacy in shaping governmental policy.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2005

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2005 took place on 21–22 March, under the theme “Safeguarding Space Security: Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space”, in Geneva.

The conference discussed new developments and challenges to space security, the relevance and urgency of preventing the weaponization of outer space, elements of national and multilateral instruments for regulating weapons in space, space surveillance, monitoring and compliance mechanisms, and the road ahead for advancing an international agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Read the conference report.

Space Security Conference 2004

UNIDIR’s Space Security Conference 2004 took place on 25–26 March, under the theme “Safeguarding Space for All: Security and Peaceful Uses”, in Geneva.

The event built on UNIDIR’s Outer Space and Global Security Conference 2002, presenting a holistic framework for thinking about security in space that encompassed the wide range of peaceful uses of outer space alongside the threats that could jeopardize a secure space environment, with participants working to identify practical steps policymakers could take to safeguard space for peaceful use by all.

Read the conference report.

Outer Space and Global Security Conference 2002

UNIDIR’s inaugural Outer Space and Global Security Conference took place on 26–27 November in Geneva.

Held as the first conference in what would become UNIDIR’s flagship annual space security series, it examined the current and future uses of outer space, assessed ways to prevent the deployment or use of weapons in, from and against outer space, and explored  both practical confidence-building measures and longer-term strategies to strengthen space security.

Read the conference report.

The post UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference first appeared on UNIDIR.