This experience captures something essential about space security. We depend on space infrastructure in our daily lives, yet we rarely think about it. When these systems function correctly, they become invisible. But when something goes wrong, the impact ripples across economies and societies.

Storytelling can be used as both a communication tool and a governance mechanism for space security. When we make space threats tangible and perceptible, we show stakeholders like farmers and entrepreneurs the importance of orbital stability and create the foundation for enforcement mechanisms and safeguards. A major theme discussed at OS25 was the excellent work that the space security community has done in identifying threats and proposing frameworks. What we need now is to make those frameworks real for the billions of people who depend on them, and to put the requisite safeguards in place.

Why space security matters now

Space infrastructure drives modern life in ways most people never recognize. Satellites enable navigation, financial transactions, weather forecasting and countless other global needs. In my home country of Nigeria, a small tailoring business owner uses her mobile phone for financial transactions, tracking deliveries and navigating the congested Lagos traffic using apps enabled by Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS). She might have never thought of herself as a space technology user, but she absolutely is. If GNSS signals were disrupted, her business would grind to a halt. She would not receive payments nor be able to plan deliveries and navigate efficiently. The satellite systems enabling her livelihood feel distant and abstract, yet they are as essential as the electricity powering her sewing machine.

One key lesson I took from the technology demonstration at OS25 were the words of Dr Peter Martinez who highlighted the growing population of active satellites in space as a challenge. His perspective was supported by other speakers who shared their concerns about orbital debris, dual-use technologies and the increasing complexity of managing a domain that was once scarcely occupied but now hosts a fleet of commercial space actors. As Kees van Der Pols emphasized at the conference, space sustainability is something we need to work on right now, not as a future concern, but as an immediate priority. If we continue taking the orbital environment for granted today, it could become unusable tomorrow unless positive action is not taken.

Addressing the communication gap

During my lightning talk at OS25, I stated that when people think about space in Nigeria, they often think about astronauts and aliens or movies like Star Wars and Interstellar. Dr Melissa de Zwart raised an important question during Panel VI that piqued my interest: Does the farmer who uses space technology consider himself to be part of the space industry? In her response, she stated that they might not consider themselves to be, but they are. That observation showcases a fundamental problem. Space security discussions happen in conference rooms in Geneva, but the real stakeholders are everywhere else.

The essence of this gap is that governance requires legitimacy, and legitimacy requires understanding. When the vast majority of space users do not understand their dependence on orbital infrastructure, they cannot participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect them. Without this understanding, space security frameworks risk becoming disconnected from the people they are meant to protect, undermining both public support and effective implementation.

This gap persists partly because of how people experience space technology. During Panel I, Dr Laetitia Cesari noted that technology is not only an opportunity but it also exposes us to challenges. The opportunity and convenience are what most people experience without understanding the vulnerabilities. People are not aware of what could go wrong, so they do not engage with conversations on how to protect these systems that significantly impact them.

Making governance real through stories

Storytelling plays a critical role in governance as the narratives we share, shape what people perceive as urgent, what they believe is solvable, and what they are willing to support politically. Research in science communication shows that narratives have a “privileged status” in human cognition because they are processed more efficiently than logical-scientific formats, recalled more accurately and are intrinsically persuasive. When complex scientific issues are translated into relatable narratives, public understanding improves and political will strengthens. For space security, this means technical expertise alone cannot drive public engagement or policy support. Narratives become not only appropriate, but essential.

In  2023, I coordinated the largest campus cleanup in University of Benin history, gathering over 400 volunteers and raising more than ₦1,000,000 in sponsorships. That was not achieved by lecturing people about waste management policy alone. We used visual storytelling to show them what our campus could look like, connecting abstract environmental goals to the pride of being part of something transformative. This made the problem visible and the solution achievable.

For space security, storytelling can serve three essential functions:

1. Making threats understandable

During Panel II at OS25, Dr Guoyu Wang highlighted three fundamental elements for defining space threats. These include:

(1) intent, referring to deliberate acts;

(2) behavior, encompassing both actions and inactions;

(3) adverse impact, meaning any form or potential of harm such as material or non-material damage.

However, to communicate these effectively to non-technical stakeholders, we must ask what adverse impact from intentional behavior in space actually means for someone in Lagos or Nairobi? It could mean an ATM stops working because the satellites enabling financial transactions are jammed. It could mean an Uber driver cannot find its client because GNSS signals are disrupted. It could also mean flights are grounded because air traffic control loses satellite navigation, or that farmers cannot optimize irrigation because precision agriculture data disappears.

Stories highlight that these threats were real all along, even when space security oftentimes seems far away and disconnected from our daily activities. Stories connect abstract policy debates to lived experience.

2. Broadening the stakeholder map

The farmer in Dr de Zwart’s example exposes another challenge where most space users are invisible to themselves. Many everyday stakeholders of space technologies do not follow multilateral discussions or UN forums on space security.

For effective communication to work, we must present the full complexity of these issues honestly. We cannot simply scare people with worst-case scenarios, as doing so risks breeding apathy rather than action, or worse, driving responses that create security dilemmas rather than solving them. We also cannot pretend that the status quo is adequate, as this risks fostering complacency and undermining the urgency for collective action. This is why intentional and honest storytelling is needed, because it provides a balance by showing real users navigating real risks and contributing to real solutions.

3. Building political will through layered governance

During Panel III, Clive Hughes outlined a possible path forward observing that legally binding and non-legally binding instruments must work in tandem. I believe it was a recognition that enforcement does not mean only hard law but also creating multiple, mutually reinforcing accountability mechanisms that work together.

Here, storytelling plays a crucial role by enabling layered governance through the building of public demand for both formal rules and informal norms. When people understand what is at stake, they support legislation. When they see themselves as stakeholders, they adopt responsible practices. When people recognize their collective dependence on space infrastructure for daily life, national security and economic stability, they participate in building collective security.

In the course of Panel V, Sarah Erickson warned that if we allow nuclear challenges to dominate the space security conversation, we risk sidelining other important issues like sustainability. Her concern reflects a real danger that discussions can become too abstract or too dominated by high politics that they lose connection to the everyday stakes that motivate broader engagement. Storytelling can rebalance priorities by showing that sustainability, debris mitigation, traffic management and peaceful uses of space are not separate from security.

Shifting from narrative to action

My analysis of the sector reveals four key recommendations that the space security community, governments, international organizations, civil society and industry can adopt to strengthen public engagement in space security governance.

1. Invest in accessible narratives: the space security community, including governmental agencies, academic institutions and civil society organizations, can create short documentaries, social media campaigns and educational materials that showcase how everyday users depend on space technology. These narratives should demonstrate real dependencies and real vulnerabilities without resorting to fear tactics.
2. Develop layered communication strategies: when briefing legislators or engaging civil society, it is beneficial to present not only threat assessments and policy options but also demonstrate who is affected, how they are affected and why action matters now. Policy documents could include case studies and testimonials from actual users. Technical reports might open with concrete scenarios that illustrate the real-world consequences of the issues being discussed.
3. Pilot local outreach projects: it would be beneficial for the technical community to work with agricultural cooperatives, transportation networks, educational institutions and small businesses to demonstrate their connection to space systems and invite their participation in governance discussions. These pilots should not be one-way information sessions but genuine dialogues where stakeholders can voice concerns, ask questions and contribute perspectives that policy experts might miss. The goal is to expand the circle of people who feel ownership over space security outcomes.
4. Support creative media initiatives: governments and civil society organizations can fund filmmakers, journalists, podcasters and digital creators who can reach audiences outside the conventional reach of the policy sphere. Trusting creative professionals to translate technical complexity into compelling narrative might mean documentaries that follow satellite operators through a day of work, podcasts that interview space technology users, or social media campaigns that visualize the consequences of satellite system failures. Creative storytelling should not replace technical communication, but complement it by reaching different audiences through different channels.

Storytelling is how we build that foundation. It should be done alongside technical expertise, not instead of it; in support of diplomatic negotiations, not instead of them; enabling law and policy, instead of replacing them. Storytelling transforms space security from an abstract policy concern into a tangible reality that affects everyday lives. When stakeholders see themselves in the narrative, they move from passive beneficiaries to active participants in building the governance frameworks necessary to protect our shared orbital infrastructure.

Adeboye Malumi is a legal graduate and media strategist who has developed storytelling for social impact, translating international policy into accessible media and cinematic narratives. He is the founder of Photo Logic and his work focuses on the intersection of international law, global governance and digital advocacy through media and film for emerging regions.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Adeboye Malumi selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post Bringing space security to life through storytelling first appeared on UNIDIR.

My contribution to this issue was a speculative scenario that imagined how our choices could shape the future. The scenario I created, “Dispatch from 2050”, explored how African-led institutions, youth-driven innovation and ethical AI could play a critical role in maintaining orbital safety. At the heart of these issues lies a fundamental question: how do we ensure that the tools we build to safeguard space do not become sources of division or conflict? This question inspired the creative exercise that follows.

_{In the “Dispatch from 2050” scenario, a critical incident unfolded when a privately operated constellation and a State-led constellation entered conflict over contested frequency bands. Their automated systems, designed to respond independently to perceived threats, initiated a series of uncoordinated manoeuvres. These movements placed both networks on a trajectory that could have resulted in a catastrophic chain reaction of collisions.}

_{To address these mounting risks, African institutions had helped establish the Lusaka Protocol code 101e in 2047, a multilateral agreement aimed at regulating AI assisted decision making in orbit. The Lusaka Protocol code 101e emerged from years of growing concern that existing space governance instruments were ill equipped to manage the rise of autonomous decision making in orbit.}

_{During the crisis, a youth-developed AI system at the Lusaka Orbital Institute detected irregular movement patterns earlier than any human operator could. It predicted the likelihood of a collision and triggered an alert under the Lusaka Protocol code 101e. In response, an Emergency Orbital Hold was activated, freezing high-risk trajectories long enough to prevent immediate impact.}

This scenario, though speculative, reflects trends that are already emerging today. Research shows a rapid expansion of mega-constellations and increasing congestion in low Earth orbit (LEO), raising concerns about collision risks and frequency interference. Participating in the discussion around space policy and security initiatives firsthand has shown me that managing space security challenges requires more than advanced technology. It demands foresight, coordination, and inclusive governance frameworks that allow countries, private operators, and even youth to collaborate rather than compete in ways that could escalate into crises.

Ethical AI and governance in Earth’s orbit

The proliferation of satellites has transformed LEO into one of the busiest environments managed by humankind. Mega constellations, numbering in the thousands of satellites, are redefining connectivity, but also magnifying risks. Frequency interference, orbital crowding, and cascading collision hazards now pose systemic challenges.

Artificial intelligence is increasingly deployed to monitor orbital traffic without continuous human intervention, predict collisions, and optimize frequencies. AI-driven conjunction assessment systems can generate earlier and more precise collision warnings, allowing operators to plan avoidance manoeuvres with reduced fuel costs and minimal disruption to satellite services.

For instance, private companies like Leo Labs use AI-powered radar systems to track thousands of objects in LEO, enabling rapid detection of potential collisions. Intergovernmental and national space agencies, such as the European Space Operations Centre and NASA, also employ AI algorithms to optimize satellite constellation management and reduce congestion risks. These innovations illustrate thatfaster, more accurate monitoring can be an opportunity to prevent accidents, maintain the reliability of satellite services, and support global connectivity. However, risks arise when different operators’ AI systems act independently, potentially leading to uncoordinated manoeuvres. 

The autonomy of these systems also raises new dilemmas. Automated collision avoidance systems operating without shared coordination frameworks may respond to the same perceived challenge in conflicting ways, increasing the chances of secondary conjunctions. Another thing to consider is that private algorithms might determine orbital priorities without human oversight, creating opaque decision making that could undermine coordination and safety.

Current legal and normative frameworks, such as the Outer Space Treaty, provide broad principles of peaceful use but do not explicitly address AI-driven decision making. As autonomous systems, including AI-enabled ones, take on operational control in orbit, new governance tools will be needed. The imagined Lusaka Protocol code 101e offers one such conceptual solution, anchoring decision making in ethical AI design, transparency and inclusive diplomacy.

African institutions are beginning to explore solutions in this space. For example, the South African National Space Agency is developing AI- and data-driven tools for space situational awareness, including monitoring orbital debris and supporting national and regional satellite operations. In academia, the University of Cape Town is conducting research into AI applications for satellite traffic management, while private startups in Nigeria and Kenya are exploring small satellite constellations with integrated AI for improved frequency coordination and orbital safety. These initiatives demonstrate the potential for African-led contributions to global space governance. This fills an important knowledge gap and ensures that African perspectives are represented in emerging norms and standards.

Taken together, these examples reveal that the challenge posed by AI in orbital management is not just technological capacity but governance alignment. While AI systems can significantly enhance safety, efficiency and sustainability, their benefits depend on coordination, transparency and shared rules of engagement among operators. Without common standards for data sharing, decision-making logic, and human oversight, autonomous systems risk reproducing fragmentation in orbit. This dynamic is particularly consequential for emerging space actors, as unequal access to data, infrastructure and governance forums may reinforce existing power asymmetries.

International dialogue is evolving to address these issues. For example, the UN Office for Outer Space Affairs has begun exploring the responsible use of emerging technologies such as AI in relation to space. The 2023 REAIM Call to Action, which received wide international support, underscores the global commitment to responsible AI use in the military domain. Furthermore, the OECD Recommendations on AI  provide guidance on how to improve trustworthiness in AI systems. They offer a useful framework for assessing future AI-enabled orbital management systems, particularly in relation to the transparency of automated decisions, accountability for harm, and preservation of human control over safety in critical domains.

In the African context, scholars are beginning to explore how indigenous ethical systems, such as Ubuntu, could influence AI ethics by emphasizing communality, interconnectedness and shared responsibility. Such contributions show the need to define and operationalize African perspectives within AI policy frameworks.

Building the future we imagine

The imagined orbital crisis of 2050 might seem distant, but the seeds of prevention must be planted now. Governance of AI-driven decision-making systems in space remains underdeveloped. Recent research highlights how governance of AI-enabled space technologies is often reactive, with policy frameworks emerging only after risks or crises materialize. These frameworks should instead employ foresight, human oversight, and accountability at the design stage. This would ensure that systems managing space assets reflect collective human values.

In my “Dispatch from 2050” fictional scenario, the Lusaka Protocol code 101e was not written by domain experts alone, but together with storytellers, elders, scientists, and youth from Lusaka. The future of space governance must be inclusive. Historically, decisions about space exploration have been concentrated among a few nations. The UN Space 2030 Agenda and the African Union’s Space Policy and Strategy demonstrate growing recognition of the Global South’s role in shaping the future of space.

Africa, in particular, has shown leadership through data-driven projects in Earth observation, climate monitoring, and satellite innovation. Zambia’s increasing participation in technology innovation highlights the transformative power of youth-led research and policy development. Ethical AI systems developed by African institutions can ensure that space technologies serve developmental goals improving agriculture, education and disaster response while aligning with local values and human rights.

Internationally, instruments like the envisioned Lusaka Protocol code 101e could formalize ethical obligations, much as the Paris Agreement did for climate. At UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025,  Zhanna Malekos Smith emphasized how data ethics underpins responsible governance in emerging technologies, providing a concrete example of how ethical practices in AI and data management can strengthen trust and accountability in space operations. Just as physical debris threatens satellites, ethical neglect threatens the stability of governance.

The 2050 vision where inclusively constructed AI systems protect Earth’s orbit may seem aspirational, yet it is built on principles we can adopt today. The fictional Lusaka Protocol code 101e reflects the real potential of collaborative, human-centred innovation. If we succeed, the Lusaka Protocol code 101e of tomorrow will not be fictional, but a living embodiment of a world that chooses dialogue over dominance, inclusion over isolation, and ethics over expediency. In the end, space security is not about protecting satellites, it is about protecting our shared future.

Kondwani Mbale is an Artificial Intelligence student at the Specialized Institute of Applied Technology — City of Trades and Skills. His work focuses on computer vision, data analysis and intelligent systems. He has participated in international initiatives, including the ICANN80 NextGen programme and the FIRST Global Challenges, and is a laureate of the International Youth Competition of Scientific and Sci-Fi Works.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Kondwani Mbale, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post Preventing orbital crises with ethical AI first appeared on UNIDIR.

This reflection shaped my contribution to the OS25 youth video competition, in which I argued that a 2050 hypothetical orbital conflict should be understood as a realistic possibility shaped by decisions being made today. Rather than treating 2050 as an abstract endpoint, I framed it as the cumulative outcome of present choices on access, responsibility and restraint in an increasingly congested orbital environment. The question we should be asking is therefore not what the future of space will look like, but rather what kind of orbital environment are we creating today.

Shared risks and uneven decision-making

The rapid expansion of human activity in low Earth orbit (LEO) represents a remarkable technological achievement. At the same time, it has introduced governance challenges that existing frameworks were not designed to manage. Hundreds of satellites are now launched each year, increasing congestion, collision risks, and the accumulation of long-lasting debris. Satellite tracking data shows how sharply the orbital population has grown over the past decade, driven by the deployment of large-scale mega constellations.
 
Technological tools such as improved tracking and collision-avoidance systems have developed quickly, but they cannot replace governance arrangements capable of managing collective risk. Many of the coordination mechanisms relied upon today were shaped in an era when space activity was slower, less crowded, and primarily State-led.

International space law, including the Outer Space Treaty, continues to provide essential principles and remains a cornerstone of space governance. However, as became clear during OS25 discussions, the current law alone cannot address the operational realities of a highly congested and commercially active orbital environment. The challenge is not the absence of rules, but the growing gap between legal principles and how space activity is conducted in practice.

States and private companies with advanced space capabilities now play a decisive role in shaping access to orbit. For non-spacefaring and space-nascent States, this often translates into reliance on external operators for critical services such as climate monitoring, navigation, communications, and disaster response. While these services deliver significant benefits, they also create new dependencies and vulnerabilities that risk reproducing familiar inequalities seen in other global commons. These include climate governance or international telecommunications, within a domain that was once imagined as universally shared.

One of the clearest examples of a shared threat discussed during OS25 was the long-term impact of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests on orbital sustainability. During Panel II, experts highlighted how kinetic ASAT tests contribute to persistent debris and increased collision risk in LEO. Data compiled by the Secure World Foundation show that kinetic ASAT tests alone have produced thousands of trackable debris objects, many of which will remain in orbit well into the coming decades.

The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) has repeatedly highlighted space debris as a growing threat to the long-term sustainability of outer space activities, emphasising the need for collective mitigation efforts. Technical assessments by the European Space Agency further demonstrate how debris generated by single events can increase collision probabilities over time, creating cascading risks that affect all operators regardless of their role in the original action.

Commercial activity adds another layer of complexity as private operators are rapidly occupying orbital slots and radio-frequency spectrum, often faster than international coordination mechanisms can support. International space law – most notably article VI of the Outer Space Treaty – establishes that States bear international responsibility for all national space activities. This includes those carried out by non-governmental actors, such as commercial entities, under their authorization and continuing supervision. However, it remains far less clear how the cumulative risks created by these activities should be assessed and managed collectively in an increasingly crowded orbital environment.

The growing integration of artificial intelligence introduces additional governance challenges. These capabilities offer clear operational advantages, yet they also raise difficult questions about accountability and oversight. Autonomous systems are distinctive because they can execute operational decisions in real time without direct human authorization. In this context, decision-making unfolds on timescales that far outpaces diplomatic coordination or regulatory intervention. In the event of an error or unintended interaction, responsibility may be difficult to trace – particularly when decision-making is distributed across multiple actors and jurisdictions.

These multifaceted developments highlight a broader pattern where technological capabilities advance more rapidly than the institutional capacity to govern them. Addressing these gaps will require a shared understanding of acceptable risk, restraint and responsibility.

Rethinking space security through justice

Discussions throughout OS25 repeatedly returned to the idea that space security cannot be measured solely through technological strength or strategic advantage. Over time, I came to see justice, not as a moral add-on, but as a practical requirement for sustainable governance. Operationalizing orbital governance from a justice lens can be understood in the following ways.

Distributive justice shapes who benefits from space-based services and who remains dependent on others for access. This concern is increasingly reflected in UN discussions around the implementation of the Space2030 Agenda. Notably related work under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space emphasise improving access to space science, technology and data so that all States can benefit socioeconomically from space-derived services.

Procedural justice is concerned with who participates in shaping the rules that govern orbit. Current initiatives within UNOOSA, for example, highlight that including non-space-faring and space-nascent States strengthens legitimacy and trust in shared environments such as outer space. Likewise past space security initiatives like the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, made sure to open participation to all States and additional stakeholders.

Intergenerational justice is a concept central to environmental governance and is increasingly applied to space, particularly in discussions concerning space sustainability. It emphasises preservation of the orbital environment for future generations.

Recent policy-oriented research reflects this shift toward justice-based approaches, arguing that long-term stability in outer space depends on sustainability and collective risk reduction rather than dominance alone.

Youth participation as a governance lens

Youth are often described as future decision-makers, yet UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025 made clear that meaningful participation matters in the present. As a youth participant, I found that our role was not to offer idealism, but to ask questions that are sometimes avoided like whose security is prioritized, how is risk distributed, and whether current practices align with long-term goals.

One insight that stayed with me was how differently States understand the concept of security in orbit. For some, security is framed primarily in terms of protection and resilience, while for others, it is understood through restraint and risk reduction. These differences are rarely articulated explicitly, yet they shape negotiations and governance outcomes in meaningful ways.

Framing 2050 as a realistic governance horizon helped ground these discussions. It encouraged a shift away from reactive thinking toward preventive approaches, and from short-term competition toward shared responsibility. In this way, youth participation contributed not sentiment, but perspective, particularly by extending the time horizons through which space security is evaluated.

Outer space does not generate inequalities on its own; it reflects and amplifies the decisions we make. Our orbital environment can remain a domain of shared progress if it is governed through transparency, inclusion, and long-term responsibility. Preserving Earth’s orbit, therefore, is not only about managing congestion or preventing conflict. It requires confronting distributive, procedural, and intergenerational justice in the way access is structured, decisions are made, and risks are distributed. If governance mechanisms remain fragmented while activity intensifies, existing asymmetries risk becoming permanently embedded above our heads.

Emily Karakoleva is an international relations student and served as the Bulgarian Youth Delegate to the United Nations (2024–2025). Her work focuses on youth participation in global governance and international policy processes. She has represented Bulgarian youth in international forums, including the UN General Assembly Third Committee, the Economic and Social Council Youth Forum, and the UNESCO Youth Forum, and serves as a European Climate Pact Ambassador.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Emily Karakoleva, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post The impact of orbital governance first appeared on UNIDIR.

Improving coordination is essential, yet in many contexts it is difficult to obtain the information needed to coordinate effectively. Limited access to data, remote locations and fragmented systems often make it difficult to gather information regularly. Even when data exists, it may be incomplete, outdated, interpreted inconsistently across actors, or simply not used when decisions are made. These gaps make it harder for actors to understand needs accurately and reach the people who require support most urgently.

From fragmented data to coordinated action

When information from multiple sources is brought together, the picture becomes clearer. Integrated data systems, dashboards and mapping tools can help actors to better understand what has happened, what the needs are and how best to respond. These tools can make it easier to identify gaps, reduce duplication and support more coordinated planning. They do not solve the underlying challenges on their own, but they provide a stronger foundation for timely and informed decision‑making in fast‑moving environments to support communities in urgent need.

This vision reflects the direction set by the UN Secretary‑General’s data strategy, which calls for improved data access, stronger interoperability and more timely data‑driven decision‑making across the system. The strategy recognizes that better information alone is not enough, but that when data is accessible, connected and responsibly used, it provides an integrated platform for coordinated and effective action in complex environments.

The promise and limits of technological change

To improve coordination, we need to do it fast, using high quality information, and with a holistic approach.

Technology plays an important role in enabling this shift. Digitization accelerates the flow of information. Data can now be collected from remote locations using mobile devices, coordination across multiple actors is supported through integrated data management platforms, and analysis that once required lengthy manual steps can be automated by different analytical tools. These advances make it possible to respond to the needs of conflict affected populations in more targeted and timely ways. Instead of navigating slow, fragmented and manual systems, actors can focus on understanding needs and directing support where it is most urgently required.

Early in my data career, when I first began working with a local NGO during the Rohingya refugee response in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh, technology had barely reached the remote camp areas scattered across the hills and mountains. We collected information over the phone or through paper‑based questionnaires: a slow, manual process that was far from ideal in an emergency response, where every minute matters.

When we transitioned to an ODK‑based data collection system, everything changed. Instead of chasing phone calls and sorting through stacks of paper, field teams could send data directly from their mobile devices. As the information came in, we could analyse and visualize it within minutes. That shift dramatically improved the speed and quality of our decision‑making, allowing teams on the ground to respond faster and with far greater confidence.

Rabby Shakur, UNIDIR Associate Researcher

But even with better systems and new technology, the way information is presented still needs to work for the people who use it. Many actors are already stretched thin, juggling several crises at once and expected to do more with fewer resources. If tools are complicated or take extra time to learn, they can become a burden rather than an asset for the actors. Formats need to be simple, practical and easy to use so that busy teams can quickly understand the information and act on it. When data is presented in a way that fits how people actually work, it is far more likely to support real decision-making.

This focus on usability also aligns with the broader direction of the UN80 initiative, which the UN Secretary-General has framed as essential to reducing duplication, strengthening coherence and enabling the UN system to operate more efficiently with limited resources. While still in process, the initiative reflects the direction set out in statements from the Secretary-General and in guidance circulated by Guy Ryder and senior leadership emphasizing clearer roles, shared approaches and more streamlined ways of working. By simplifying processes and reducing unnecessary complexity, UN80 seeks to ensure that actors can spend less time navigating systems and more time supporting people in need.

Beyond accessibility and usability, data must be reliable, ethically collected and managed and interpreted carefully. Poor-quality or misinterpreted data can reinforce blind spots rather than resolve them. Strong systems must therefore be accompanied by strong analytical capacity and governance frameworks that ensure ethical generation and use.

Ethical implications behind the numbers

Research findings that are usually disseminated via static outputs, such as reports and briefings, may sometimes limit the ability to respond to immediate questions. To realize the full value of the data collected, interactive and comparative data dashboards transform these findings into dynamic, user-friendly visualizations, on the one hand allowing deeper engagement, and on the other, maximizing the utility of this information for all. The latter is an underappreciated ethical imperative.

The focus on ethics in research is often at the design and implementation stage – ensuring respondents are fully informed, consent protocols are followed and personal information is protected. Yet, while each of these steps is essential, this is only one aspect of ethical research.

In considering ethics in this discussion, we especially address the moral responsibility that arises when research involves vulnerable people impacted by conflict. It is incumbent upon researchers to ensure that the data generated from their time and engagement is fully utilized and shared in recognition of the burden of their engagement and as part of efforts to ensure they are not overly interviewed.  The UN, as an organization that promotes values like human rights, dignity and the protection of vulnerable populations, should be at the forefront of this type of ethical data use especially as UN actors seek to fulfill the Secretary-General’s data strategy vision.

Evidence that is collected from vulnerable, conflict-affected populations, but remains underused, inaccessible, or disconnected from policy and practice risks falling short of this ethical responsibility. In this sense, effective communication of research findings becomes part of ethical research practice, not merely a dissemination task.

Delivering results in a format that meets the need to inform real-time decisions is an ethical obligation to ensure that research is meaningfully used. Doing so via visual tools becomes increasingly critical, especially when addressing policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders working across conflict transition contexts, often operating under time constraints.

Data is never just numbers. It is a human story – originated from someone who asked a question and shaped by the lived experience of someone who answered. Behind every number is a life, a story, a moment of trust.

Clara Zuccarino, UNIDIR Graduate Professional

At UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project, we encounter these dynamics directly. The project conducts research to understand how and why individuals exit armed conflict, and how institutions can better support those transitions. Reintegration processes for individuals leaving armed groups are complex and deeply context specific. Generating rigorous evidence and assessments on conflict trajectories is essential to understanding what contributes to sustainable reintegration outcomes. However, research findings must be accessible if they are to inform real-world decisions.

By transforming UNIDIR’s evidence into accessible data portals and visualizations, we aim to make it easier for policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders to translate evidence into action. The goal is not only to produce knowledge, but to ensure that it can inform planning, coordination and programmatic adjustments in meaningful ways and in semi-real time.

Maximizing the public value of evidence for future initiatives

Today, the UN system is asked to respond to complex global challenges amid tightening resources, resulting in both a practical and ethical responsibility to maximize the public value of data. Evidence generated through significant investment of time and trust by participants should not remain underused.

Evidence, however, is not an end in itself. Data has limitations, but strengthening how evidence is interpreted and applied across the system is both an efficiency measure and a commitment to ethical, impactful research and assessment. When information is translated into forms that genuinely support decision-making and shared responsibly in accessible formats such as dashboards or analytical tools, it becomes a foundation for more informed decisions in complex conflict response, ultimately improving outcomes for the populations the UN seeks to serve.

Mohammed Rabby Shakur is an Associate Researcher with UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict project. Previously, he served as an Information Management Delegate with the Finnish Red Cross in Ethiopia, as a Senior Information Management Officer with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in Bangladesh, and as a Management Information System Officer with BRAC in Bangladesh. He has also worked as a consultant with the United Nations. Rabby holds a bachelor’s degree in management information systems from North South University. 

Clara Zuccarino was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Strategic Communications Unit. She holds a master’s in international and development studies from the Geneva Graduate Institute and a bachelor’s in philosophy, international and economic studies from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, where she graduated cum laude. Previously, Clara worked at the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe on media and social media relations and strategy with multiple international stakeholders.

The post Data and digital tools driving more effective conflict response first appeared on UNIDIR.

For much of modern history, outer space has been contested in the popular imagination. Since the Cold War, it has been viewed as a domain for geopolitical competition through technological supremacy. In recent decades, public debate has been shaped as much by science fiction as by the material realities of space infrastructure concerning space exploration, the militarisation of outer space and a growing space industry.

As discussed at UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025, space is central to daily lives for everyday citizens. Space systems provide Earth observation (EO) data used to monitor agriculture, track pollution and disaster management, as well as positioning, navigation and timing systems that support telecommunications, civilian aviation and international commerce. EO data is also used for military purposes including intelligence gathering, targeting and mission planning, and weapons deployment.

Space systems are so embedded in daily life that they are paradoxically mundane, such that, their presence often goes unnoticed. However, public understanding of space remains uneven, frequently shaped by the flashier and more sensational aspects of space activity – such as exploration missions and space entrepreneurs – rather than by its social, economic and political functions. Space literacy is one response to this gap.

In the absence of a single agreed definition, space literacy can be understood through a civic lens as the capacity to understand and engage with space as a public issue. It is also a form of civic preparedness for space security: when people understand why space matters to everyday life, they are more likely to participate meaningfully in public debates and policy decisions surrounding the resilience, governance and protection of space systems.

At present, discussions about space security often remain confined to academics, technical experts, international diplomats and industry leaders. Education and science communication play key roles in broadening participation and bringing space security into wider public conversation. 

Space as a civic issue

While outer space itself is governed as a global commons, many of these space-enabled services function as public goods that deliver broad benefit to entire communities and directly support all 17 UN Sustainable Development Goals. Civics is about how citizens understand and participate in the systems, institutions and decisions that influence public life.

It is key in a sector that is highly technological, heavily reliant on public investment, increasingly shaped by public–private collaboration and sensitive to government spending decisions. Framing space as a civic issue brings it into the public sphere and equips citizens to engage in debates about funding, environmental impacts, commercial activity and national security. This, in turn, strengthens democratic accountability and informed public participation.

To understand why space should be treated as a civic issue, it is helpful to view space systems through four segments that show how space touches different layers of society and carries civic relevance for diverse stakeholders.

As discussed at UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2025, if space systems were compromised, the effects would cascade across critical sectors and touch multiple international security dimensions.

The loss of space capabilities would affect environmental and climate security by weakening extreme-weather monitoring, threaten human security by disrupting humanitarian coordination and disaster response, and jeopardize economic and national security as financial systems, supply chains and critical infrastructure become compromised.

Treating space as a civic concern builds public awareness and buy-in for responsible behaviour and governance of space systems. It broadens the conversation to include the many communities and sectors that rely on space, while strengthening public expectations of transparency and accountability. This framing places space within the public imagination as a public issue.

While space law, policy and security issues are often viewed through international relations, a civic lens reframes them not only as international issues, but also as domestic public concerns. This reframing reflects the foundational principle of Article 1 of the Outer Space Treaty that states space activities must be carried out “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,” stressing space as a shared public domain rather than a narrow topic.

The role of science communication

Once space is understood as a civic issue, science communication becomes the next step. Public understanding supports trust in the institutions that manage space systems and governance and encourages meaningful public engagement. Science communication broadly refers to the translation of scientific, technical and policy information into forms which the public can access, through education, multimedia, museums and other dissemination and outreach interfaces. At its core is science literacy: creating touchpoints that help people understand how scientific systems shape everyday life.

Applied to space, science communication can embed space in public discourse and build political support for engaged space policy. When a clear “space story” becomes embedded in public discourse, governments are likely better placed to justify investment in resilient space infrastructure, support more informed discussions on space policy and sustain political support for international cooperation. While space agencies have undertaken education and public outreach, these efforts should continue. Public messaging about why space matters is needed to foster long-term public ownership of space as a civic and scientific concern, with direct and indirect implications for space security.

Space and food security in Australia

Much of Australia’s space infrastructure is concentrated in its ground segment, which supports important sectors such as agriculture and mining. Farmers and irrigation technicians rely on EO data for precision agriculture, sustainable farming, pasture management and early detection of pests and disease.

This is an example of an issue not usually associated with space security. It is more often seen as a domestic or economic concern, and this dependence is less discussed in public. Framing space as a civic issue is consequently important, particularly in an economy where food production, food security and regional industries rely heavily on space-enabled services.

Science communication provides practical tools to bridge this gap and reveal how everyday dependencies are directly linked to space and food security. Targeted public narratives that present space systems as enablers of the industries that feed the nation and sustain regional livelihoods can elevate space as a public concern tied to food security and economic resilience.

As one of the most influential sectors in Australia’s economy, increased awareness would likely create more opportunities for agricultural communities to engage with space capabilities, integrate them into their operations, and build industry interest in supporting investment in the infrastructure they depend on. This framing shifts how space is understood, making an issue often seen as technical or international visible as a domestic civic concern with real, and often overlooked, security implications.

Further public perception research should be undertaken to better understand how different communities currently view space systems and where awareness gaps persist, which may help inform more effective engagement strategies.

Lifting space literacy

Space literacy aims to present space as a civic issue that cuts across multiple security dimensions. The ideas below outline how this could potentially be operationalized in education, workforce development and government.

1. Embed education and dissemination in space policy. Future space policy and reviews of existing policies should explicitly integrate education and outreach strategies. Educators and institutions should be consulted in national space planning to reflect the needs of students and communities. Governments and industry should expand curriculum partnerships across academic and research institutions to show how space connects with existing subjects. Cross-disciplinary programmes can position space as a mainstream civic and economic issue, increase public touchpoints and support long-term space literacy.
2. Strengthen school-to-industry pathways. Governments, education providers and industry should collaborate to expand internships, apprenticeships, vocational programmes and mentorships that provide practical exposure to multi-disciplinary space careers. International models such as the UK’s Space Placements in Industry programme offer instructive reference points. These pathways should highlight the diversity of careers across the space sector, including law, communications, cybersecurity, environmental science, business and the creative industries, to encourage a broad and inclusive future workforce.
3. Strengthen space literacy to governments. Space literacy should also be strengthened across the public service. Although space infrastructure underpins defence, border protection, environmental monitoring and other government functions, its role often remains less visible outside specialist government agencies. Targeted training and development would help public servants understand how space systems support their portfolios, improve whole-of-government coordination and ensure that resourcing and governance decisions are made with a clearer understanding of national priorities.

Towards a space literacy agenda

Seeing space as a civic issue provides the foundational step for understanding how space systems shape a wide range of security concerns. Moving toward a space literacy agenda builds on this civic framing by lifting public awareness of how deeply societies depend on space systems.

Once education, outreach and public messaging efforts begin to take hold, space literacy can grow beyond awareness-raising into a more nuanced civic understanding. At this stage, space literacy aims to deepen public engagement with how space systems operate across societies, and how public ownership and responsibility for space span individual, community, national and international levels. The progression of space literacy can guide a more mature public conversation about collective dependence, shared interests in outer space and evolving ideas of citizenship, stewardship and responsibility in a 21st-century, space-enabled world.

Framing space as a civic issue also creates pathways for understanding how space security is shaped by cultural and regional contexts. Using Australia as an illustrative case, future directions for space literacy in the Asia-Pacific should consider how space is understood across different historical, cultural and linguistic contexts. Space literacy therefore offers a means to further understand how space dependencies intersect with State-specific and regional priorities, while informing broader discourse on space governance. Ultimately, embedding space in the public imagination strengthens the foundations of space security. Space literacy is not peripheral to space security; it is a long-term investment in the civic conditions that make secure and sustainable space activity possible.

Andre Kwok is an Australian lawyer and researcher at the Australasian Centre for Space Governance. He is interested in space law and space diplomacy with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. He has a background in criminal law and international criminal law, supporting high-profile criminal investigations, advising civil society research initiatives and serving as a legal consultant to the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials. Andre has degrees in law and Asian Studies from Australian National University.

The author wishes to thank Thando Mathe, Sarah Erickson, Almudena Azcaráte Ortega and Chealsea Mai for their expert review and feedback.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, Andre Kwok, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2025 Youth Campaign. The author writes in his personal capacity, and the views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Australian government, UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

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Gangs have systematically used sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) to control territory, carry out reprisals, and intimidate the local population. Between January and September 2025, the United Nations verified 1,361 incidents of sexual violence by armed actors, involving 1,452 survivors; the majority of survivors are women (90%), and 139 cases involved children. Due to severe underreporting, these figures likely represent only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, humanitarian actors reported over 3,500 cases of rape during the same period. The UN has observed that sexual violence is facilitated by widespread access to smuggled military-grade weapons and ammunition.

A new opportunity to tackle these problems emerged in September 2025 when the UN Security Council adopted a resolution transforming the Multinational Security Support Mission into a Gang Suppression Force (GSF). This new mandate, if paired with strengthened national criminal justice and prevention capacities, offers a window to tackle the link between firearms’ proliferation and SGBV. In particular, the UN system and regional partners should comprehensively address illicit flows of weapons and implement gender-sensitive arms control by, among other measures, strengthening data collection and analysis on firearm-related SGBV; strengthening capacities of Haitian institutions; and prioritizing an inclusive approach involving women’s groups, civil society, and survivors.

Gangs, weapons and sexual violence in Haiti

The main gang coalition, Viv Ansanm, controls approximately 85% of Port-au-Prince, while other gangs exert influence in the Artibonite, West, and Central departments, exposing residents to massacres, sexual violence, child recruitment, and abductions. Sexual violence in gang-controlled areas mainly takes the form of gang rape, often committed during home invasions or while victims are walking in the street, sometimes in front of family members or accompanied by the murder of a partner. Most cases involve a firearm. While armed actors are not the only ones involved in sexual violence, gangs remain the main perpetrators.

Gangs are increasingly obtaining high-caliber and military-grade firearms and ammunition through air, sea and land routes, mostly originating from the United States through the Caribbean. There are currently an estimated 500,000 illegal firearms in circulation in Haiti. Lack of resources and inspection capabilities, as well as diversion or theft from public and private stocks, also fuel these flows. Some criminal groups therefore possess firepower that exceeds law enforcement capabilities. The proliferation of weapons is closely linked to sexual violence. Firearms are used to commit rape, cause injury or death, and intimidate, control and silence victims, undermining the rule of law and indirectly increasing the incidence of SGBV.

Despite severe challenges, Haitian authorities and international partners are taking steps to address SGBV and curb illicit arms flows. However, these measures are often fragmented and under-resourced. For example, at the national level, Haiti has adopted a National Strategy on Disarmament, Dismantling and Reintegration and Community Violence Reduction (DDR-CVR),^[1] which recognizes the heightened risk of sexual exploitation among women and girls but lacks concrete actions to address the incidence of SGBV or indicators to assess progress. Haiti has also endorsed the Caribbean Firearms Roadmap as a regional initiative to reduce illicit arms flows, which is reflected in a National Firearms Action Plan. Yet, this initiative lacks reference to the gendered dimension of illicit firearms or their impact on SGBV.

Some policies have been slowed down amid the current political instability. For example, a draft Firearms Bill, which aligns with international arms control instruments, contains provisions to prevent the use of firearms for sexual violence by allowing the suspension of firearm licences when such risk is reported. This draft bill has been under review by the Ministry of Justice and Public Security for at least 18 months at the time of writing.

New opportunities for action

The UN Security Council has mandated the GSF to use all necessary measures to counter gangs, seize firearms, and provide the Haitian National Police (PNH) and the Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH) with expertise and training, including on the prevention of and response to sexual violence. The GSF will receive logistical and operational support from a new UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH), which will coordinate with the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), the Organization of American States, and Haitian authorities.

Prevention of sexual violence, accountability mechanisms, and arms control are highlighted in the mandates of both BINUH and the GSF. As this configuration takes shape, effective coordination between the GSF, UNSOH, BINUH, other UN agencies (including those implementing the UN’s development cooperation framework), and national institutions will be essential to tackle SGBV in a comprehensive manner. This approach offers an opportunity to address the proliferation of weapons and SGBV more systematically, particularly in three areas.

Improving the collection and sharing of disaggregated data

Despite political instability and a volatile security context, the PNH are still operational, and recent reports have shown they are conducting active operations along with a Government-established anti-gang task force supported by private military contractors, seizing weapons, and arresting gang members. The PNH, along with other law enforcement authorities, should collect disaggregated data on SGBV, documenting the firearms involved (origin, specifications, type, role in coercion). Data collection must be standardized and use trauma-informed interview techniques to avoid re-traumatization. Information-sharing protocols should ensure survivors are never put at risk.

In 2022, the UN Security Council established a sanctions regime and arms embargo on Haiti, targeting those who support or engage in firearms trafficking, gang violence, and human rights abuses, including SGBV. As of February 2026, seven individuals had been sanctioned for criminal activities, five of them including SGBV. The panel of experts monitoring the sanctions regularly reports on violations of the arms embargo and SGBV cases, highlighting their incidence. Nonetheless, enforcement of the embargo is weak due to limited cooperation between states and insufficient resources for monitoring. Through BINUH’s mandate to monitor and report on SGBV, the mission should collect and analyse data on weapons involved as part of its ongoing efforts. Better information on the use of firearms could enhance accountability by identifying trends and patterns among armed gangs, inform prevention activities by the mission, support monitoring and implementation of the arms embargo and sanctions regime, and where necessary, inform revision of its scope.

Enhanced data collection by both BINUH and national authorities can improve prevention and accountability. Such data, including analysis of weapons, can inform more robust counter-proliferation strategies. In addition, it can guide advisory bodies such as the Working Group on DDR-CVR, support gender-sensitive assessments of regulatory and policy frameworks governing weapons and ammunition, and advance implementation of national strategies like the National Action Plan on Firearms and the National Strategy on DDR-CVR.

Strengthening the capacities of national actors

Both BINUH and the GSF have mandates to strengthen the capacity of the PNH and FADH. Providing resources, training, and logistical support can improve responses to sexual violence, including specialized training on investigations, evidence management, and survivor protection, particularly in gang-related cases. Raising awareness of the role that arms control and disarmament play in preventing SGBV should be part of national and local capacity building.

BINUH and specialized UN entities, such as the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC); UN Office on Drugs and Crime; and UN Development Programme, are supporting the PNH and customs authorities to counter firearms trafficking and strengthen arms control. UNLIREC will notably train criminal justice officials on integrating gender perspectives into responses to firearms-related crime and on using arms control to prevent SGBV.

An effective response must, however, go beyond law enforcement. The justice system is essential to ensure justice for survivors, strengthen the rule of law, and restore social cohesion. A positive development in this regard is the creation of a specialized judicial unit for mass crimes, including SGBV, which could accelerate accountability. Training judges and prosecutors to identify links between illicit firearms and SGBV will enable effective and transparent investigations. Sustained investment in judicial capacity, particularly to accelerate investigations and prosecutions through survivor-centred approaches, is essential.

Including women, survivors and civil society organizations in prevention

Local survivor-led advocacy and community protection organizations, such as Nègès Mawon, Kay Fanm and Solidarite Fanm Ayisyèn, play a critical role in documenting sexual violence and providing assistance and protection for survivors. They are often the first to document, verify and respond to incidents of SGBV due to restricted access to gang-controlled areas. Past experiences like the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali show that engaging with and building the capacity of local civil society are essential for sustaining efforts to prevent, respond to, and report on SGBV.

The UN and its partners should invest in technical and financial support to strengthen local actors’ operational capacity, enabling them to reach survivors in hard-to-access areas. A dedicated mechanism could be envisaged to ensure that UNSOH and BINUH regularly consult with civil society and to provide feedback loops on illicit firearms trafficking and its links to SGBV, informing UN protection priorities. The UN and its partners could also support community violence reduction programs that promote alternative models of masculinity and break the association between virility and firearms.

Looking ahead

On 29 January 2026, the UN Security Council gave BINUH a new mandate to work in an “integrated manner” with all UN entities in Haiti on monitoring sexual violence and supporting Haitian authorities in implementing arms control measures. This, together with the deployment of the GSF and UNSOH, presents an opportunity to address the links between illicit firearms trafficking and SGBV in Haiti. This will require close coordination between intelligence and operations, DDR-CVR mechanisms, national agencies, and other relevant actors. Such coherence could link security operations to disengagement and reintegration pathways, particularly for children recruited by gangs. However, the international community should exercise sustained vigilance to ensure that the GSF does not become a source of sexual exploitation and abuse, as it happened during the previous UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti. Member States must therefore establish stringent vetting mechanisms and provide comprehensive, mandatory training to all personnel to prevent any occurrence of sexual abuse.

Ultimately reducing sexual violence and other forms of violence in Haiti requires addressing the illicit trafficking of weapons within an integrated strategy combining security, criminal justice, governance and social transformation. Centred on survivors and disaggregated data, this strategy should address both structural gender inequality and the immediate dynamics of violence in Haiti. Success could be measured through reduced cases of SGBV, strengthened national frameworks (for example, a firearms law better able to prevent sexual violence facilitated by firearms), increased national capacity to respond to SGBV, and meaningful participation of survivors and civil society in prevention efforts.

An earlier version of this article was originally published in the Global Observatory.

[1] The strategy was adopted in 2021 and is founded on four axes of intervention: (1) security, (2) economic recovery and strengthening community capacities, (3) community and social mobilization and citizen engagement, and (4) protection. SGBV is mentioned directly in the axis on strengthening community capacities and indirectly in the protection axis when referring to vulnerable populations, including women and girls who are victims of armed violence.

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The energy was electric. As a young Malawian stepping into COP30, I was swept into the rush: high-level delegates weaving between pavilions, back-to-back meetings, cameras flashing, conversations in dozens of languages. This was my first international conference of this calibre, the global stage where decisions shaping our present and future are being made. 

I carried the voices of young people from one of the many fragile and climate-vulnerable States, and yet the silence on climate-security issues was deafening. 

The missing link 

We expected the impacts of the climate crisis on peace and security to feature prominently on the agenda. The Pearce Sustainability Consulting Group warned that climate security remained “the missing link” in climate diplomacy.  And still, when the agenda dropped, that link was missing once again. 

There were glimmers of hope. In his opening speech, Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva referenced conflict and military spending, signaling awareness of the climate, peace and security nexus. But those signals never translated into substance. Unlike COP28 – which produced a Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery, and Peace – COP30 offered no Peace Day and no negotiation item on climate security. Even the celebrated Belém Declaration on Hunger and Poverty omitted any mention of displaced or conflict-affected populations. ODI Global criticized this gap, noting that fragility had been treated as context, not constituency despite clear evidence that conflict and hunger are deeply intertwined in climate-vulnerable regions. 

Youth refused the silence 

While older generations largely sidestepped the nexus, young people refused to. At the UN Climate Change Conference of Children and Youth (COY20), held in the run-up to COP, linkages between climate and conflict were brought to the table. Our collective output, the Global Youth Statement called for formal recognition of the interdependence between climate action, peace and security. For us, this is not just rhetorical; we are the ones who will live longest with the consequences of today’s inaction.  

We didn’t just analyse the problem – we offered practical solutions. The Global Centre for Climate Mobility organized a series of panel sessions to highlight climate mobility solutions from young people. Youth leaders from Uganda, Zimbabwe and Tonga offered adaptation initiatives such as capacity-building for internally displaced persons, disaster zones mapping initiatives and improving access to clean water and health care to support displaced communities. 

Then came the question that cut through the room: “How do we protect youth from being drawn into armed groups after climate-induced displacement?”, a Somali youth delegate asked. 

His question reminded me of the work carried out by UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project. Field research from the Lake Chad Basin region and Colombia shows how climate change impacts individuals’ economic livelihoods and communities’ social structures, driving people into armed groups in search of better opportunities. Integrating climate considerations into peace programming and strengthening conflict-sensitive climate change adaptation and mitigation is key to address these multidirectional dynamics.  

Side events bridged the gap 

Thankfully, COP corridors told a different story. Side events stepped in where formal negotiations fell short. At the UN Climate Security Mechanism’s session “Bridging the Gap: Making Climate Finance Work for the Underserved”, the core message was clear: Climate finance must shift from short-term crisis response to long-term, peace-positive resilience in fragile and conflict-affected States. Speakers from fragile contexts like Somalia stressed the need for accessible, simplified financing models that actually work for countries navigating both climate impacts and instability. 
 
Similarly, I joined a discussion at the International Organization of Migration’s pavilion on the security risks emerging from climate migration across Africa. High-level panellists from the African Union, Ghana, and academia described how climate disasters push people to move, strain already fragile institutions, and expose young people to recruitment pressures. 

These conversations echoed what research has long been highlighting: climatic stresses increase the risks of instability, heighten vulnerabilities, and widen protection gaps.  

Progress, gaps and what comes next 

While COP30 will be remembered for many things, climate security may likely not be one of them. Just as some parties expressed frustration over the lack of a fossil fuel phase-out roadmap in the final text, others – myself included – were disappointed by the silence surrounding the climate, peace and security nexus. 

Yes, there has been progress. Climate migration and climate-related security risks are no longer taboo topics. Youth, civil society, and research institutions continue to push the agenda forward. But side events are not enough. Climate security risks must move from the margins to the mainstream of negotiations. 

If future COPs continue to overlook this reality, they risk crafting climate solutions that fail the people most affected. For those of us living daily at the intersection of climate fragility and insecurity, this is not an academic debate – it’s survival. 

The next COP must do better. Climate security is not a side event. 
It is the main event. 

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Four years later, the Outer Space Treaty entered into force, with Article IV prohibiting placing “in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.” This provision effectively institutionalized the idea that strategic stability in space was inseparable from nuclear restraint. The 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems further reinforced that principle, restricting development, testing and deployment of missile defence, and space-based missile defence. This restriction recognized that space technology itself and the intent to pursue such technology could undermine stability if unconstrained.

These treaties acknowledged that introducing new avenues for nuclear competition into orbit could worsen crisis instability without delivering meaningful military advantage. As such, the early legal architecture of outer space was in large part about managing nuclear danger. For example, the Soviet Union in their remarks to a 1983 UNGA Special Committee debate warned that orbital systems designed to neutralize early-warning and command-and-control satellites could create conditions for a successful pre-emptive strike, while undermining confidence in the ability to retaliate. Thus, heightening nuclear escalation risks.

Yet, space activity has changed profoundly since the 1980s and so have some of the debates that couple it. Space-enabled services are more valuable to human wellbeing than ever before, and the space environment now includes thousands of commercial satellites and the continued advance toward cislunar and lunar exploration. Strategic anxieties persist amidst challenges of debris, congestion and sustainability; factors that do not always have a direct nuclear analogue. Re-examining the nuclear inheritance in a time of increased nuclear anxiety and proposed space-based missile defence is therefore useful. Not to overly emphasize it, but to rebalance it. Future protections need to be created to manage nuclear risk and escalation in outer space. These protections, however, should form the floor, not the ceiling, for a modern and inclusive approach to space governance.

The persistence of nuclear fragility

Modern nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) systems depend on satellites for early warning, detection and communication. This reliance introduces acute vulnerabilities since jamming, dazzling, cyber intrusion, or proximity operations can disrupt signals in ways that mimic or prefigure hostile intent. Experts have argued this phenomenon of entanglement between nuclear and non-nuclear systems creates pathways for inadvertent escalation, and space assets are certainly included. Recent research underscores how dual-use satellites and the influence of the private sector can confound strategic stability as differing incentive structures and ambiguous leadership roles make technical anomalies and activity difficult to interpret. Such activity may create even more escalation pathways, where misperception rather than intent could trigger a crisis.

The risk lies not only in technology but in psychology, as there is also a perception of vulnerability. Early warning satellites and space-based communications are anchors of deterrence. Any disruption, be it accidental or deliberate, can appear to threaten a State’s ability to detect or respond to a nuclear strike, creating powerful incentives for pre-emption. In this context, the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) remains as relevant as ever. Though progress has often stalled, the idea of prevention—acting before destabilizing dynamics become entrenched—captures the essence of why shared restraint in space remains indispensable.

However, two key challenges complicate pursuing solutions to this problem.

• Asymmetry. Reliance on space assets differs markedly among nuclear-armed States, and the specific role and degree of reliance on space-based infrastructure within a State’s early-warning architecture remains unclear. As such, non-interference norms around NC3 satellites could disproportionately benefit the most space-dependent actors. Securing such commitments therefore requires a measure of empathy, or a willingness to safeguard a rival’s sense of security, even when the immediate advantage appears uneven. It is a difficult political ask, one that demands attempts at trust-building and mutual understanding before any formal measures can take shape.

• Inequality. Privileging nuclear systems risks re-entrenching a two-tier security order reminiscent of the broader asymmetries embedded in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The logic that protects nuclear-armed States and their strategic assets can unintentionally reinforce hierarchies of vulnerability, leaving important civilian and humanitarian infrastructures comparatively unprotected. This framing could also narrow outer space security discourse to the threat perceptions of a few, treating space as an extension of nuclear deterrence rather than a shared environment with diverse users and collective risks. Ensuring stability in space therefore requires that the protections afforded to strategic systems be equally extended to the broader infrastructures that underpin human security and equitable access to the benefits of space.

The rise of space-centric challenges

While nuclear fragility persists, some of the most pressing space challenges today arise from the space environment’s own dynamics. The number of active satellites now exceeds 13,000 and constellations are projected to surpass 100,000 in the coming decade. This degree of densification escalates debris risks sharply, as well as further complicates spectrum allocation and harmful interference concerns. Exacerbating this problem, some national security debates are popularizing the concept of resiliency via redundancy to respond to space insecurity. This creates overlaps, constellation proliferation, crosslinking, and rapid launch replacement. In a global model where only one country pursued such a national security architecture, the environmental effects may be minimal. However, should multiple States adopt such a model, as is likely the case in the current multipolar context, the impact on the environment and international security relations would be damaging. Moreover, assessments on resiliency via redundancy have shown potential increased vulnerabilities to fragmentation events which may significantly increase the risk of consequential collision events. Large-scale redundancy architectures can also crowd orbital regimes and spectrum resources, constraining access for emerging spacefaring States and complicating efforts to uphold the Outer Space Treaty’s obligation to use outer space “on a basis of equality and in accordance with international law.”

Proposals for space-based missile interceptors often present large constellations as a route to deterrence by denial. Yet, technical modelling finds boost-phase, space-based architectures technically and economically challenging, requiring hundreds to thousands of on-orbit interceptors. These findings make space-based interceptor concepts as much a commons-management issue as a deterrence question. Any large in-orbit interceptor layer would add significant density to already congested orbits, with debris-hazard externalities borne by all operators and benefactors of space systems. Recent expert remarks have emphasized that the co-orbital ASAT potential of such systems is a more salient concern than claims about boost-phase interception. This is because the co-orbital potential is more feasible to realize than an effective boost-phase interception, arguably making space-based interceptor systems a more immediate threat to the space environment and space-based infrastructure.

The extension of human activity into cislunar and lunar space introduces not only new operational and governance challenges but also new layers of a security dilemma. As States and private actors aspire towards sustained presence beyond Earth orbit, even scientific missions may generate competitive insecurity. The orbital dynamics of the cislunar region, characterized by weak stability zones and sparse situational awareness coverage, further heighten uncertainty about intent. This intersects with a broader and enduring feature of outer space activity, its dual-use and dual-purpose dilemma. Dual-use describes the simultaneous or overlapping use of a technology for civilian and military applications. Dual-purpose refers to systems that can be repurposed from their stated function to serve different (potentially aggressive) ends. In space, these dilemmas are particularly acute. The high cost of access, limited redundancy in infrastructure, and incentive structures that reward versatility of function mean that few actors can afford to develop purely single-use or -purpose systems. Civil, commercial and military missions therefore share technologies, launch infrastructure, and orbits thereby blurring distinctions of intent. Even technologies developed to enhance sustainability of the space environment can be reinterpreted as tools for interference or negation. These structural and financial realities make space uniquely prone to dual-nature ambiguity, where current mechanisms for generating transparency can help identify where and what an object is but cannot ensure the intent behind its use.

These are space-centric problems, rooted in the physics of orbital mechanics, the economics of commercial activity, and the ambiguity of dual-natured operations. They generate instability theoretically through fears of deterrence failure, but more concretely through system complexity, resource competition, and the absence of coordinated management. The nuclear lens explains why restraint matters, but not how to manage the collective action problems that now define orbital sustainability and space security overall.

A broader vision of space security governance

Progressing space governance requires moving beyond the assumption that nuclear stability is the highest good. It may remain a necessary condition, but it is no longer solely sufficient for the challenges that define today’s orbital environment. The persistence of nuclear deterrence logic driving future space security debates could have two consequences: it continues to centre great-power rivalry as the lens for all space governance, and it marginalizes the concerns of space nascent or non-spacefaring States whose priorities lie in access, sustainability and equitable benefit.

A more inclusive approach is needed to advance space governance, what we apply to the concept of prevention in PAROS matters. Prevention of an arms race should encompass not only prospective weapons deployments but also the competitive dynamics, postures and perceptions that precipitate arms racing. Practical steps towards this already exist. Transparency and confidence-building measures, endorsed by UNGA Resolution 68/50 (2013), encourage among other things information exchange on national policies, pre-launch notifications, and cooperative data sharing on space situational awareness. Yet, transparency without confidence can resemble deterrence signalling rather than reassurance. Turning transparency into dialogue—through sustained communication and reciprocal understanding—is what transforms procedure into prevention, especially if routed through structured consultations and due-regard obligations already embedded in the Outer Space Treaty.

Equally vital are non-interference pledges. Commitments to avoid actions that could degrade satellites supporting nuclear command and control, but also those essential to humanitarian and civilian functions offer substantive starting-off points for extending restraint beyond strategic assets to the systems that sustain human security.

Finally, diplomacy, dialogue and cultural exchange remain essential for sustaining stability in space. Historical arms control progress depended on the continuous contact among scientists, diplomats and policymakers who learned to interpret each other’s signals. In strategic terms, patience is not passive. It reflects restraint built through familiarity, shared understanding, and confidence in the other’s intentions. In the space environment, where there may be countless opportunities for misinterpretation, nurturing such patience is difficult yet indispensable. Mechanisms to promote understanding and patience do exist. The Outer Space Treaty’s provisions for consultation, due regard, and information-sharing offer avenues for enhancing trust and restraint, provided States find the political will to use them and translate legal commitments into State practice. The same holds for multilateral bodies such as the Conference on Disarmament and the UN General Assembly; their value in trust building is determined not by their existence but by the seriousness and sincerity with which States participate.

The early treaties of the space age created a durable foundation for preventing nuclear conflict in orbit or on Earth. Their logic of restraint remains vital. Yet, six decades later, the space environment they helped stabilize has evolved into something far more complex. Recognizing the persistence of nuclear fragility is essential. Threats to early-warning satellites and NC3 systems still embody the sensitivities and danger of deterrence failure. The space environment’s vulnerabilities, encompassing debris, congestion, expansion beyond Earth orbit, and the blurred lines of dual-use development, show that effective governance must now pursue sustainability alongside stability. If nuclear deterrence logics once tried to preserve peace by managing fear and uncertainty, the next generation of governance must preserve peace by managing interdependence. Protecting nuclear systems should be the floor, not the ceiling, for a governance approach that recognizes the broader interconnections of security, sustainability and equity in space.

The author would like to thank Andrey Baklitskiy, Sam Hickey, Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Pavel Podvig, and James Revill for their expert review and feedback.

The post The long shadow of the nuclear age on space security governance first appeared on UNIDIR.

The spread and evolution of improvised weapons are strongly shaped by regional and national dynamics. Yet, a common thread is that their unregulated nature challenges established national and international arms control systems. As barriers to weapons production decrease, how should States and the international community adapt to this evolving threat?

Categories of ‘improvisation’

A first step is understanding what ‘improvised’ means. The table below illustrates two main categories of improvisation across three types of conventional weapons: improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms and light weapons (SALW), and uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).

Key common enablers and trends

The use and types of improvised weapons are contextual, but they also share commonalities. A series of regional expert consultations conducted by UNIDIR in 2025 shed light on key trends.  

In most cases, the non-industrial nature of improvised weapons, makes them relatively cost-effective, accessible and hard to trace – as such, they are strategically and operationally attractive to non-state armed groups (NSAGs), criminals and terrorists.

Emerging and dual-use technologies that are not intended for weapons production have amplified the accessibility, efficacy and manufacturing possibilities of improvised weapons. Take additive manufacturing – better known as 3D printing – as an example. Since 2020, there has been a steady rise in the number of 3D-printed firearms seizures globally, with North America, Europe and Australia recording the highest numbers.

Several conflict theatres, such as Myanmar, Ukraine and more recently Somalia, have also witnessed the incorporation of 3D printing into modern warfare strategy. For example, Ukrainian forces have pioneered 3D-printed drones – such as the Titan Falcon and the Stinger – and have manufactured IEDs known as ‘candy bombs’ (a 3D-printed casing filled with conventional explosive). NSAGs in Myanmar have adopted tactics from the Ukrainian forces, building their own 3D-printed fixed wing drones (the Liberator MKI and MKII). They have also experimented with 3D-printed firearms. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab was reported to be using 3D-printing to manufacture explosives, weapons and drone components.

Manufacturers of improvised weapons do not just exploit new technologies but also commercial markets and materials. These include purchasing off-the-shelf drones for subsequent modification, computer numerical control milling machines, and chemical precursors. For example, triacetone triperoxide, which can be synthesized using commercially available materials, has been the explosive of choice in several ISIS-linked attacks e.g. 2015 Paris, 2016 Brussels, 2017 Manchester Arena. Converted firearms also remain a prominent challenge, particularly in Europe: they are reported to be involved in more shootings than ‘real’ firearms in the UK and comprise about 40% of annual seizures in the  Netherlands.

The main common enabler for improvised production, however, is not hardware – it’s knowledge. The transfer of technical expertise and ‘know-how’ across borders, ideologies, and networks sustains weapons production and supplements the accessibility of commercial technologies. Knowledge transfer happens at multiple levels: 

1. Knowledge and expertise transfer across groups: For example, African Islamic State affiliates such as Islamic State West Africa Province have benefitted from the transfer of drone expertise from affiliates in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula developed offensive drone capabilities as a result of knowledge and technology transfer from the Houthis. This signalled a cross-ideological transfer: both groups have maintained operational links and cooperation despite their opposing ideologies for pragmatic, tactical and operational reasons.
2. Knowledge transfer from conflict theatres to organized crime: Latin American organized crime cartels have, for instance, adopted improvised drones and IEDs to carry out attacks against enemy targets mimicking modern warfare techniques. Some cartel members have even travelled to Ukraine to learn, train and import expertise mimicking how foreign terrorist fighters travel to join terrorist groups overseas. 
3. Online knowledge transfer, through the open and dark web: Information on the manufacture of SALW is aplenty on open-source websites and platforms such as Odysee. Encrypted messaging platforms such as Rocket.Chat and Telegram have been used for the dissemination of weapons design files, the sale of black-market weapons, and information relating to their production. The spread of more traditional, artisanal weapons – known as ‘pumpi’ guns in Manipur – has also been accelerated by social media and encrypted messaging platforms.
4. ‘In-house’ knowledge development: Through the different – and at times overlapping – layers of knowledge available, NSAGs, criminal and extremist groups have also been developing specialized ‘in-house’ units for improvised weapons production. ISIS was one of the first terrorist groups to industrialize the procurement and development of drones in Iraq and Syria between 2016-2017. Since then, many groups have adopted similar tactics: in Somalia, Al-Shabaab has invested in hiring skilled personnel to experiment with 3D-printing technology; in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham developed their own indigenous drone programme, the Al-Shaheen Brigade; in Mexico, the Jalisco Cartel New Generation has a specialized unit dedicated to operating drones.

Finally, the accessibility of knowledge – particularly online – and the close link between improvised weapons production and new technologies translate to a final concerning trend: the involvement of youth. The improvised weapons programmes of NSAGs in Myanmar, for example, have mostly been driven by younger and tech-savvy recruits. Criminal and extremist plots involving 3D-printed firearms also increasingly involve young individuals. This further points to an overall characteristic of improvised weapons production: it collapses barriers between contexts, ideologies and potentially generations of producers. 

What can the international community do?

The regulatory challenges posed by improvised weapons are multiple and layered: no single approach – whether at the national, regional or international level – is a silver bullet. The prioritization of specific preventive measures to counter such weapons production and modification will inevitably vary depending on the regional and regulatory context. Nevertheless, several key elements can serve as the foundation for an adaptive, multi-layered counter-strategy.

1. It is important to better understand and regulate access to dual-use goods, technologies, and components essential to improvised production. The 3D printing process is an excellent example of how preventative measures can be enhanced: it encompasses multiple stages – from blueprint design to software, hardware and materials. Each of these steps has potential for better prevention. This may include, for instance, the registration or certification of printers, regulation of blueprints, or collaboration with industry to embed detection algorithms in software platforms. Also, existing regulations – such as those on readily convertible blank-firing firearms – can inspire similar approaches and offer a practical pathway for controlling items and components with high misuse potential.
2. Although SALW, IEDs and UAS are usually boxed into separate regulatory frameworks, a few exceptions offer opportunities to advance regulatory approaches for improvised weapons. The implementation of Security Council Resolution 2370 is a prime example.
3. The diffusion of online technical guidance on improvised weapons production can be better contained. Systematic monitoring of digital spaces – particularly those hosting open-source blueprints or forums sharing illicit manufacturing instructions – is essential. Cooperation between law enforcement and social media providers can be promising in this space, enhancing online monitoring of illicit content.
4. Mapping and disrupting key knowledge nodes and networks is critical. Further research is needed to understand the social and technical ecosystems that facilitate and drive improvised production. This includes identifying influential knowledge nodes – individuals and online communities – that serve as accelerators for unregulated innovation, as well as potential loopholes that facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and guidance. Counter-measures can combine investigative tools with awareness-raising initiatives to diminish the appeal and accessibility of such networks. Information sharing, coordination mechanisms and intelligence cooperation at the national, regional and international levels are also key in this regard.

Potential approaches to strengthening national, regional and international responses to the illicit proliferation of improvised weapons are wide-ranging – and extend far beyond those mentioned above. The multi-layered nature of this issue makes designing a single global response a challenge – and a new international instrument on improvised weapons may not be needed. There are numerous entry points – both in existing frameworks and in operational practice – for developing tailored preventive and response measures against the proliferation and misuse of improvised weapons, and just as many actors that can play a decisive role in countering this threat. 

To advance this effort, at the end of 2025, UNIDIR will provide a dedicated platform to explore the many dimensions of improvised weapons production, with a focus on the networks that facilitate their spread. This year’s conference will mark a key step toward building the collaborative frameworks and technical awareness needed to curb this fast-evolving threat.

The post “Do not try this at home!”: Current trends and developments in improvised weapons production first appeared on UNIDIR.

Kathryn Bigelow’s A House of Dynamite, a political thriller about the US response to a nuclear attack, has attracted a wide range of reactions from the nuclear policy community – some positive, others sharply critical.

At first, I thought the criticism might concern the depiction of missile defence – the Pentagon even issued a statement taking issue with it – or perhaps other technical details, procedural accuracy, or how people behaved under stress. To my surprise, it was none of those. It is actually a very good film.

To be fair, you can question the plausibility of the attack scenario, some of the characters’ decisions, or even the presidential line of succession (which the movie oddly gets wrong). But dismissing it for those reasons misses the point.

Borrowing the film’s own metaphor, the story is about the fact that the house we live in is made of dynamite. One could argue whether it should have been nitroglycerin instead of trinitrotoluene, but that doesn’t change the bigger picture.

A House of Dynamite takes creative liberties, but they serve a purpose: they make the viewer think about real and urgent issues surrounding nuclear weapons, deterrence, and war.

Yes, a single sea-launched ballistic missile attack on the United States is implausible. But it is also part of the rationale for US missile defence, which has long been pitched as protection not only against North Korea but also against “limited” coercive attacks (single digit launches) from Russia or China.

Yes, the US would likely be better at pinpointing the launch location. But if the missile came from an unidentified submarine, as the film suggests, that knowledge would not help much –especially within the 18 minutes the movie covers.

And yes, missile defence might have performed slightly better against a single intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) – firing four or more interceptors instead of just two. But add even a few more incoming missiles with modern countermeasures, and the outcome would probably be the same.

Finally, it is true there would be no immediate military pressure to launch a nuclear response with command and control still intact. But there could be enormous psychological and political pressure. One rationale voiced in the film – that failure to respond would be seen as weakness inviting further attacks – feels all too plausible amid today’s rhetoric of “credibility,” “resolve,” and “deterrence.”

And outside the US context, many nuclear-armed States wouldn’t even have the luxury of deliberation. They do not have robust early warning systems or strategic missile defence. The first time they would know about an incoming ICBM might be when it hits. Imagine those pressures.

Two scenes capture the film’s message perfectly, and both are brilliantly executed. In the first, after the interceptor fails, the missile-defence operator pleads, “We did everything right, right?” The second comes when the president, faced with response options, says: “If they see how prepared we are, no one starts a nuclear war, right? But someone did. So, none of this makes sense.”

Nuclear deterrence seems like an intuitive and reliable system – until it fails. And if it does, every option is catastrophic. Doing everything “right” doesn’t guarantee survival.

Deterrence is often portrayed as a deliberate, rational strategy. Many treat it as the cornerstone of their country’s security and therefore something to be defended from criticism. But no one had deterrence in mind when building the atomic bomb. No one in 1945 foresaw nine nuclear-armed States, thousands of warheads dwarfing those that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki, missiles that can cross oceans in minutes, or the extension of deterrence to allies. All this evolved later, and people tried to make political and technological realities fit together. It has worked so far.

But unless we acknowledge that we’ve created a force capable of killing us all, and that all we are really doing is managing that risk, we’ll keep missing the forest for the trees.

Some people will say that having dynamite in the walls is worth it because it deters others. Others will argue that, with the right strategy, they can survive or even prevail, even if some floors of the house explode.

But for everyone else, this movie should be a wake-up call. There is dynamite in our walls, and instead of removing it, we’re currently planning to add more.

The post Dynamite makes a poor building material first appeared on UNIDIR.

The impacts of conflict are felt differently by individuals. Factors such as sex, age and gender shape how civilians experience and recover from explosive violence. The EWIPA political declaration recognizes these realities. It explicitly acknowledges the severe direct and indirect harm caused to civilians — including women, men and children — and commits States to provide assistance that is holistic, inclusive and sensitive to gender, age and disability.

As the San José conference focuses on turning these words into concrete action, one lesson stands out from decades of humanitarian disarmament: Age- and gender-sensitive victim assistance is not optional. It is essential. Understanding why it matters is fundamental to moving from commitments to long-lasting change for civilians and communities affected by explosive weapons.

1. Tailored victim assistance delivers real results

Programmes tailored to survivors’ specific needs lead to higher participation by those most affected, faster recovery and better long-term reintegration.

Gender responsive initiatives such as mobile clinics staffed by gender-balanced teams have shown to increase uptake of care in contexts where women and girls often face cultural or logistical barriers to accessing health services, while cash and voucher programmes that take gender into consideration in their design have enabled women survivors to start small businesses and regain livelihoods. By doing so they contribute to family and community resilience, and prevent the adoption of negative survival strategies.

Age-appropriate assistance that anticipates changing bodies and needs is vital to children injured by explosive weapons (who may need up to 25 prosthetic replacements over a lifetime) – it helps to ensure continuity of care, access to education and greater social inclusion. The establishment of peer-to-peer support networks and integration of mental health support with other programmes can reach men who may be more reluctant to seek mental health support.

Acknowledging the different and diverse needs of affected civilians by integrating age and gender considerations throughout the entire programme cycle, means victims and survivors have a greater chance of benefitting equally. Tailored interventions may cost more upfront, but they save resources in the long run. They reduce dropout rates, minimize duplication, and promote self-sufficiency. Designing for difference is simply smarter humanitarian investment.

2. Recovery isn’t one-size-fits-all

The consequences of the use of explosive weapons are anything but equal. Gender and age shape both who is harmed and how recovery unfolds.

The sex, age and gendered dimensions of war are well documented. Explosive weapons harm individuals differently — because of both biological differences, and because of distinct gendered social roles that influence exposure to harm. For example, pregnant women face a higher risk of pregnancy-related complications, including miscarriages. Children are more likely to die from blast injuries than adults, their smaller bodies making blast injuries more severe and rehabilitation more complex.

Men and boys are often the most frequent direct casualties of explosive violence due to the work they do and their daily routines in conflict; however in some contexts, such as Gaza and Syria – where explosive weapons have been used to target densely populated neighbourhoods – women, children and older people are often among the most directly affected, because they are more likely to be at home.

Beyond physical injuries, the use of explosive weapons causes psychological harm that can impact families for generations. While all civilians are likely to experience some form of mental health trauma, children’s exposure to violence and loss of loved ones and homes is more likely to cause acute and lasting psychological consequences than in adults. Older people also face distinct and layered vulnerabilities — mobility challenges, chronic illness, loss of caregivers, and isolation – that cause mental health impacts.

Access to care is also heavily influenced by cultural and economic barriers. Women and girls with visible injuries are more likely to experience stigma and exclusion, which may prevent them from seeking assistance. Similarly men and boys are also more likely to experience stigma when seeking mental health support due to cultural and gender norms. Older people can also experience discrimination due to their age; many can also find themselves cut off from medical support or caring for grandchildren with no access to assistance.

Treating survivors as a uniform group leads to inefficiency and waste — prosthetics that no longer fit, unreachable health services, and financial constraints that deepen inequalities and exclusion. By contrast, assistance designed with gender and age considerations in mind achieves measurable improvements in recovery, participation and long-term wellbeing. An approach that recognises difference delivers better outcomes for everyone.

3. Inclusive recovery rebuilds trust

Victim assistance does more than heal bodies — it helps rebuild societies. When survivors are meaningfully included in recovery planning and community life, they help rebuild trust and resilience from the ground up. Inclusion turns assistance into a shared social process – one that restores dignity and belonging.

When women, youth, older persons, and persons with disabilities participate in decision-making, communities become more representative and responsive. Conversely, exclusion creates new divisions: people left without livelihoods, children whose rehabilitation ends halfway, older survivors cut off from care. Such gaps fracture the very social foundations that recovery seeks to restore.

Inclusive victim assistance recognizes survivors not only as beneficiaries but as agents of change. By visibly addressing disparities in service provision – for example, by working to ensure women are included in livelihood projects –, it reduces perceptions of neglect and helps to restore trust in local institutions. Rebuilding is strongest when everyone belongs, and when every survivor’s voice helps shape the future.

4. Inclusion delivers on disarmament, development and peace

By delivering on the political declaration’s commitments to inclusive victim assistance, States can contribute to peacebuilding, sustainable development, and gender equality. Victim assistance that includes women and girl victims and survivors in all their diversity can complement and amplify efforts under the Women, Peace and Security Agenda.

Inclusive victim assistance that aims to ensure no-one is left behind and activities to promote the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development Agenda are often mutually reinforcing. And local victim assistance interventions can be a powerful tool in supporting community-based peacebuilding and security, addressing underlying drivers of fragility while strengthening social cohesion, trust and resilience.

Peer-to-peer support networks, for example, create a space where people can jointly share information on recovery and engage in activities that rebuild community bonds.

5. States have already committed to it

The political declaration on EWIPA commits States to providing “holistic, integrated, gender-sensitive and non-discriminatory assistance” to victims. This builds on a growing body of disarmament practice including from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

But implementation gaps remain wide. Age- and gender-disaggregated data are scarce; funding for tailored services is inconsistent; and coordination between government, humanitarian and local actors often falls short. Some countries, however, are showing what progress looks like:

• Colombia, for example, has integrated age, gender and disability dimensions into its national framework for victims of conflict, ensuring that survivor support spans psychosocial, educational and economic domains. The national mine action authority is also in the process of formalising peer-to-peer support networks as ‘Victim Associations’ to bridge the gap between national policies and local realities, and to promote the socioeconomic inclusion of victims and survivors.
• Cambodia’s mine action authority established a gender mainstreaming team, improving representation and outcomes for women survivors and community deminers alike, and incorporated diversity objectives into its 2019-2025 strategy. It has also adopted a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan that includes collection and use of disaggregated data in planning and prioritization of mine action activities including victim assistance.

These examples demonstrate that inclusive policy design is achievable — and it works. The San José conference offers an opportunity for States to share experiences, renew commitments, and translate these commitments into action.

From words to action

Age- and gender-sensitive victim assistance works better, costs less over time, and delivers more equitable and enduring recovery. States gathering in San José should consider the following recommendations as critical steps towards making victim assistance work for civilians in their diversity:

• Share good practices and foster knowledge exchange and dialogues in order to inform more effective, age- and gender-sensitive programming under the political declaration.
• Fund victim assistance programmes that integrate inclusion throughout the design, implementation and evaluation phases.
• Discuss and agree concrete steps towards improving the collection of disaggregated data on the victims of explosive weapons and use it to inform tailored and effective victim assistance.
• Prioritize and fund interventions such as peer-to-peer support networks and cash assistance programmes that have proven to be efficient, sustainable and capable of reaching those at greatest risk of exclusion.
• Improve knowledge among diplomats, funders, government officials and implementing partners on what age- and gender-sensitive victim assistance entails.

The global outlook is deeply challenging. Cuts have left critical national aid budgets in tatters, humanitarian needs are rising and conflicts protracted, progress made in gender and diversity is being actively dismantled, and trust in multilateralism is under severe strain. Yet this is precisely why the commitments under the political declaration on EWIPA matter.

They remind us that protecting civilians is not an abstract principle — it is a daily test of our collective humanity and commitment to protect those most vulnerable.

The post Age- and gender-sensitive victim assistance – Why it matters first appeared on UNIDIR.

Illegal small arms and light weapons play a major role in fuelling crime, conflict and armed violence. Not only that, but they  undermine development and peacebuilding. States have taken actions to address the scourge of unregulated weapons, in the form of legal-regulatory frameworks or by embarking on top-down disarmament programmes to remove illicit and unregulated weapons from communities.

Yet, these efforts often fail or backfire. The reasons for failure vary. In some cases, civilians retain weapons for perceived self‑defence. In others, they mistrust State protection, or fear being left vulnerable to attacks from State security forces and non-state armed entities if they surrender arms. Understanding these failures requires looking beyond national frameworks to the local security dilemmas that compel communities to view arms as essential to survival

The “local” security dilemma and small arms races

Communities – in conflict-affected, post conflict, or resource scares environment – understood here as local groups bound by shared geography, livelihoods, social or economic activities, cultural heritage or kinship often view firearms as the only reliable means of protecting their vital resources be they grazing land, water points, or oil deposits.

In the southern Philippines, for example, firearms are often seen as necessary for self-defence. This is especially true in the context of clan conflicts (locally known as “rido”), protection against criminal threats or for personal security in communities where people feel vulnerable despite the formal end of armed hostilities.

Similarly, in parts of Latin America, the widespread availability of small arms and ammunition within communities is linked to the operational power of criminal gangs and drug cartels. In Kenya’s borderlands, periods of communal violence saw local politicians encourage the arming of their constituents. In this context, the Marakwet and Samburu communities pooled their resources to purchase firearms, transforming previously unarmed societies into highly militarized enclaves within a decade.[i]

This dynamic is known as a “security dilemma”. After one group arms itself, neighbouring communities feel compelled to do the same out of fear. This leads to arms races and entrenches insecurity amongst neighbouring communities. In such situations, communities that surrender their weapons can find themselves at the mercy of better-armed neighbours or criminals. This not only undermines peacebuilding but also risks escalating violence, driving weapons into illicit markets and exacerbating issues such as gender-based violence and erosion of community trust.

To break out of this insecurity cycle, UNIDIR is launching a new initiative to support community-level actors, especially those working in conflict prevention and violence reduction, to address a critical yet often overlooked question: if communities are unwilling or unable to disarm, how can we keep the guns silent?

Rethinking arms control in the community

Many peacebuilding efforts emphasize resilience and local engagement as pathways to peace and development, yet they often overlook the challenge of managing unregulated weapons in contexts where communities are ready to cease hostilities but not to surrender their arms to state authorities.

The Community-Led Arms Control (CLAC) initiative seeks to respond to this dilemma by integrating arms control measures into peacebuilding and armed violence reduction efforts at the community level – supporting a comprehensive approach to security and development that acknowledges, rather than ignores, the realities of civilian armament.

UNIDIR’s CLAC initiative examines how to combine strong State leadership with authentic community engagement to prevent illicit proliferation and misuse of arms held by civilians in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The initiative seeks to support local actors in co-designing context specific measures that link arms control with tangible improvements in community security and development, fostering trust, accountability, and shared responsibility between the communities and State institutions.

CLAC advances an adaptive and inclusive approach, recognizing communities as active agents in managing arms and mitigating armed violence. It complements existing legal and policy frameworks by emphasizing the role of local norms, social capital, and collective accountability in reducing the risks associated with civilian-held arms. The initiative would focus on:

• Community-level weapons and ammunition management e.g. safe storage, local registration and record-keeping, etc.;
• Arms control trust and confidence-building mechanisms between communities e.g. “hotlines”, information sharing on weapons holdings, etc.;
• Early warning, prevention and response mechanisms dealing with the movement of arms e.g. community monitors for illicit arms flows, integrating arms control into local conflict mediation.  

The approach recognizes that communities have practical knowledge, social capital, and real incentives to manage their arms responsibly when provided with a voice, resources, and security assurances.

Why does CLAC matter now?

It is time we listened more closely to those living at the frontlines of armed violence; time to empower them to be the architects for safer, more just communities. A community-led arms control approach can build on existing community experiences to design and lead innovative strategies to reduce armed violence that go beyond traditional disarmament and demobilization approaches in the peace-making and peacebuilding toolbox. To do so the CLAC initiative will be guided by common principles across context:

• Participation and inclusion: Engage elders, traditional authorities, youth, women and marginalized groups in designing arms governance measures.
• Local ownership and co-construction: Communities lead decision‑making, supported by technical, legal and financial assistance from partners.
• Context-specific: Tailor measures to whether the setting is post-conflict, affected by organized crime, clan rivalry, inter-communal pastoralist conflict, or urban gang violence.
• Community accountability: To maintain compliance, use social norms, peer pressure, and locally legitimate sanctions alongside formal oversight.
• Hybrid models: Combine community-managed arrangements with state guarantees (security patrols, policing reforms, legal protections) and development incentives.

Experience shows that top‑down “best practices” drafted in Geneva or New York rarely gain traction in communities – including those in Marsabit, Kenya; Barranquilla, Colombia; and Dimasalang town, Philippines. Rather than producing a single prescriptive guidance document, UNIDIR is developing a compilation of context-specific options – a “recipe book” – to support communities in managing their weapons while preventing proliferation, misuse and human suffering.

In the coming years, the initiative will gather experience from diverse settings, including Kenya’s borderlands, Colombia’s urban gang and conflict-affected areas, the Philippines’ post-conflict normalization processes, the Liptako-Gourma civilian volunteer forces, and Albanian local self-governments and safety councils among others. This approach allows community peacebuilders to select and adapt strategies that suit their local realities, while maintaining the shared objective of strengthening arms control, building trust, and enhancing security.

By combining State, community and civil society perspectives in the co-design of locally-led measures, the initiative aims to establish a comprehensive, resilient, and locally owned framework for preventing armed violence and fostering sustainable peace. UNIDIR welcomes practitioners, researchers, peacebuilders and local actors to share their experiences, contribute insights from their contexts, and collaborate with us whether as data collectors, learning partners, or co-designers in this effort. This initiative depends on a growing network of contributors who can help shape tools that reflect real-world complexity and support meaningful local change. Sustained peace is achievable when communities are empowered to determine their own pathways to stability. Supporting such local ownership, community by community, strengthens the foundations of a safer and more peaceful world.

[i] Stakeholder Interview. (2025, June 10). Conducted on the sidelines of the RECSA 20th anniversary, Nairobi, Kenya.

The post Using community-led arms control to reduce armed violence first appeared on UNIDIR.

In 2024 alone, over 41,370 grave violations were committed against children living in conflict including killing, maiming and the recruitment of child soldiers. UNICEF estimates that more than 473 million children – one in six worldwide – are living in areas directly affected by violence.

In many conflict-affected contexts, youth make up the majority of the population and are disproportionately impacted by violence (e.g. in Gaza, nearly 70% of the population is under 30). Despite the impact of war on young people, children and youth are rarely heard or seen in the rooms where peace is discussed and decisions are made.

Our exclusion from peace processes isn’t just a missed opportunity – it is what allows cycles of violence to continue. This is not only a policy failure; it is a moral one.

Behind the numbers

But behind these statistics are real lives and voices – like that of Kawthar, a young woman from Iraq, who shares her story:

My childhood memories of Mosul echo the sounds of war, the loss of security, and the departure of many of my family members. I would wake up every day in fear, and sometimes the sounds of explosions would visit me in my dreams, waking me up terrified. Many of those around me disappeared, and our home was transformed into a painful void. Eventually, we were forced to leave our home and live in a camp – suffocating in the heat – where I witnessed things no child should ever see. My suffering didn’t end with the end of the war. I wasn’t to blame for what happened, but I lived it. I abandoned my studies and dreams. Everything I once loved felt heavy. Still, I carried a lot of pain inside me, but it turned into a motivation to continue, and to tell the world: I am here, despite everything.

Kawthar Younis, 21-year-old, Mosul, Iraq

Kawthar’s story is one of many that rarely make the headlines. But her message echoes far beyond Iraq.

Shared struggles, shared strength

In Malawi, I have witnessed a similar truth. I‘ve seen firsthand the toll of war in the region. I have met young people fleeing violence in Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi – their dreams interrupted, but not lost. In my work in refugee camps, I have listened to their stories. These experiences shaped my conviction that young people are not just survivors of conflict, they are leaders in the pursuit of peace.

How conflict has manifested in our homelands is different, but many of our experiences are the same. Kawthar reflected, “Young people were mentioned in plans, but our real opinions are rarely heard. We know our pain better than anyone. We understand our streets and the tragedies of our homes. So why are our voices excluded when solutions are made?”

While most youth is disregarded in peacebuilding, Kawthar and I have been lucky to have some opportunities and we’ve seen the transformative power of including young people in discussions in building peace. In 2022, I co-founded the Clean Cities Project in Lilongwe, Malawi, originally focused on climate action and youth empowerment. Over time, our work evolved to include peacebuilding, recognizing the deep connections between climate security and resource-based conflict. To help prevent young people from being drawn into cycles of violence, we mobilized and trained youth in green skills, equipping them with tools for economic empowerment.

In 2023, Kawthar joined a photography and research programme in Mosul, organized by UNIDIR, 100cameras, War Child, and UNICEF.

It was the first time I held a camera, but the goal wasn’t just to take pictures; it was much deeper. Every photo I took carried something my words couldn’t express. Photography gave me a voice. The camera was like a translator for my heart. A year later I returned as a facilitator, helping other young people express their feelings through their lenses. I no longer felt alone – I was now capable of supporting others, just as I wished someone had supported me at the beginning of my journey.

Kawthar Younis

Reframing the narrative

Through photography, I tried to challenge the image of Mosul as only a city of war. I saw something else: Children laughing despite the devastation, mothers enduring fatigue and loss, and broken young people building hope from rubble. My photos carried a message: We are not finished. And we will not finish.

Kawthar Younis

Kawthar and I have both seen the power of photography and storytelling. They are universal languages that transcend literacy, status and borders. A single photograph can document injustice, reimagine futures, and humanize lives that policy and politics frequently overlook.

This belief is what drives Youth Visions of Peace, a global campaign launched by UNIDIR in partnership with 100cameras and War Child. It invites young people worldwide to share photos that reflect their own visions of peace – grounded in experience and hope. This is not a competition, but a platform for authentic expression. A diverse panel of youth and experts will curate submissions, which will be featured across global platforms and exhibitions.

A call for structural change

But we need more than visibility. We need structural change.

It’s time for governments, civil society, and global institutions to step up by creating safe platforms where youth can express themselves, be heard, and shape peace and security policies. This also means rethinking how we engage citizens – especially young people – by meeting them where they are and embracing the diverse ways they choose to communicate, whether through photography, storytelling, digital media, or other creative expressions. Remember, “Peace cannot be built without us. Don’t build our future without hearing our voices.”

So, young people everywhere: This is your invitation. Use your lens. Tell your truth. Let the world see your vision.

Because peace is not only what leaders sign into law – it is what young people like you dare to build, every single day, even in the shadows of war. As Kawthar says, “…peace is not just the absence of war. It’s walking without fear and returning home without seeing sadness fill my mother’s eyes. Peace is having my voice and future in my own hands.”

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Amos Benjamin is a Graduate Professional at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). He holds a Bachelor’s degree in Environmental Health from the University of Malawi and has worked closely with the national government on participatory research initiatives. He is passionate about developing child-sensitive methodologies to amplify youth voices in peacebuilding and reintegration efforts.

Kawthar Younis is a 21-year-old from Mosul, Iraq. Currently in the fifth grade of middle school, she is developing a small project on Instagram that reflects her creativity and determination. Looking ahead, Kawthar aspires to pursue a career in the medical field and dreams of one day owning her own bookstore.

The post Through our eyes: Why youth perspectives matter in peacebuilding first appeared on UNIDIR.

The proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI) carries implications for international peace and security. Risks, in particular the access to the technology by malicious non-State actors, have been mentioned in numerous forums – including in multilateral meetings and UN documents. For example, in the ongoing discussions in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, the Guiding Principles adopted in 2019 explicitly refer to the risk of proliferation of these weapons and their acquisition by terrorist groups. Further, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in December 2024, refers to the concerns and possible impact of AI proliferation to non-State actors.

The risks of AI proliferation remain, however, relatively underexplored and somewhat simplified to imply diversion of autonomous weapons to non-State groups. This research project aims to fill a significant gap in current policy debates by providing an in-depth analysis of what the proliferation of AI effectively entails, how AI technologies may proliferate, and how policy responses may be devised to counter proliferation. 

Mapping AI proliferation risks

The first phase of the project (2025-2026) will map out the main pathways for the proliferation and diversion of AI, including how these technologies can be repurposed, accessed, developed and misused by non-State actors.

AI relies on a vast and decentralized ecosystem of software, hardware infrastructure and talent distribution, with numerous entry points for vulnerabilities, which can be exploited for the purpose of proliferation, diversion, and misuse or weaponization. A break-down of the AI value chain can help point to possible pathways for proliferation.

A broad analysis, however, renders incomplete conclusions in the context of a general-purpose technology where different use cases will entail specific or unique proliferation risks. Because AI can be embedded and used across a wide range of domains, including physical (robotic) systems and digital technologies, different challenges and enabling factors for proliferation will surface across domains of use. For example, the elements making possible the proliferation of autonomous systems (e.g. drones) are not invariably the same as for the proliferation of large language models (LLMs). Varied considerations of compute, data, talent, scalability and costs come into play and these may trigger, at times, different implications for non-proliferation governance.

The research will highlight these challenges through two case studies. The first one will focus on the proliferation of autonomous weapons, in particular the retrofitting or repurposing of commercial unmanned systems for combat or other military functions. The second one will focus on malicious uses of LLMs, exploring open-source models and their proliferation for malicious purposes.

Towards effective policy responses

The next phase of the project (2026) will build on the technical research and case studies from Phase I, delving deeper into existing and possible future policy frameworks to counter proliferation.

The research will evaluate the effectiveness of current non-proliferation and arms control frameworks at the national and international level, including export control policies or measures agreed among States (e.g. information exchange arrangements). This will examine the adaptability of existing mechanisms to a rapidly evolving technological – and threat – landscape.  Close attention will be given to possible gaps in compliance and implementation policies, including gaps in law enforcement at the national level, as well as jurisdictional challenges.

From this, UNIDIR will then formulate concrete and implementable recommendations to support counter-proliferation efforts for AI. These will be tailored for national policymaking and multilateral institutions, as well as industry stakeholders.

Safeguarding peace in the age of AI

Through this two-phase initiative, UNIDIR seeks not only to enhance understanding of how AI may proliferate, but also to strengthen the international community’s capacity to respond effectively. By combining rigorous technical research with actionable policy guidance, the project embodies UNIDIR’s mandate to deliver independent, forward-looking analysis at the intersection of security and technology.

The post Countering the proliferation of artificial intelligence first appeared on UNIDIR.

On this WYSD, artificial intelligence (AI) takes centre stage. As the digital landscape grows increasingly complex, so do the skills required to navigate it. WYSD promotes open dialogue between stakeholders – technical and vocational education and training (TVET) institutions, policymakers, organizations and, above all, young people.

The conversation extends beyond the essential skills needed to thrive in the 21st century. It serves as a stark reminder that rapid technological progress often leaves many behind. To enable sustainable, human-centered development, youth empowerment in an AI-driven world must be, first and foremost, inclusive.

Best equipped to face technological challenges

People born between the mid-to-late 1990s and the early 2010s have grown up with digital devices as an integral part of their daily lives, fostering a deeper affinity with technological advancements than any previous generation. However, if one were to describe the AI revolution in a single word, it would be: ever-evolving. Consequently, the understanding of what future-ready skills are is under constant scrutiny. According to the World Economic Forum’s Future of Jobs report, 65% of children starting primary school today are expected to eventually work in occupations that have not yet been created.

Young people recognize challenges of the digital era, joining initiatives across the globe to promote technological approaches that empower rather than work against them. One such example is Youth for Privacy, a youth-led advocacy group that calls attention to the invasion of privacy in a data-driven world. The group actively promotes responsible AI development and cybersecurity awareness, and their engagement in the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on information and communication technologies stands as a testament to their commitment.

Inclusivity as a driving pillar

Despite the active engagement of many young people and their general familiarity with the rapidly evolving digital world, this is not a universal trend. The digital divide continues to be a pressing reality, marginalizing certain groups from technological advancements and, by extension, placing them at a disadvantage in AI-enabled workplaces. According to the UN, 90% of adolescent girls and young women in low-income countries remain offline.

This month, Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, emphasized the need to “work towards an inclusive and open digital environment for everyone, everywhere”. Given the profound impact of advanced technologies on future opportunities for employment, equitable access to the very tools is a matter of rights. Digital rights are human rights and must be guided by the same principles.

20 years after #WSIS—the 1st world summit on digital cooperation—we face critical choices on #AI & data governance

Leaders must deliver on their commitments to protect human rights in the digital age

Now is the time to work together & build an open & safe digital future for all

— Volker Türk (@volker_turk) July 7, 2025

In the context of WYSD, it becomes clear that without greater attention to protecting digital rights and aligning young people’s skills with current technological developments, progress toward Sustainable Development Goal 4 to ensure inclusive and equitable education will be hindered. It remains out of reach if the AI revolution reinforces existing inequalities instead of fostering a more peaceful, inclusive and sustainable future.

AI and the future of education and training

WYSD is a call to action for education and training institutions to recognize both the opportunities and challenges that the AI revolution presents for TVET and its provision.

UNESCO-UNEVOC – who established the international day – identifies several key challenges associated with the integration of AI in education and training:

• Bias and inequality
• Low educator readiness
• Limited infrastructure
• High costs
• Ethical and privacy concerns
• Digital misinformation
• Underrepresentation
• Human disconnection

With the growing use of AI tools such as chatbots, it is critical to address their potential misuse in educational and training contexts. The key lies in raising awareness of how these tools function, alongside a clear understanding of their appropriate, responsible use cases and limitations. When approached with a critical mindset, AI can support more personalized learning, streamline workflow, and encourage proactive, rather than passive, engagement with technology.

Despite the prevalence of this debate and how AI has dominated the global discourse, readiness for AI-driven industries remains low. The UN reports that 86% of students do not feel adequately prepared for an AI-enabled workplace. This emphasizes the urgent need for education systems to adapt, and for institutions to ensure access to appropriate infrastructure, tools and training.

UNIDIR’s commitment to support the youth

UNIDIR recognizes that empowering youth through education is essential to building a secure, sustainable and inclusive future. Particularly in the context of emerging technologies, the Institute’s initiatives aim to cultivate a deeper understanding and meaningful engagement among young people with the technological developments shaping international peace and security.

A compelling example is the UNIDIR Youth Disarmament Orientation Course, which equips participants with foundational concepts in disarmament and arms control. It explores contemporary disarmament affairs through critical domains, such as AI, cybersecurity and outer space security.

Then as part of its flagship Outer Space Security Conference, UNIDIR invites future leaders to take part in a video competition. In the form of a short video, individuals aged 18–25 are invited to present their vision of the challenges ahead in outer space security.

These efforts are intended to strengthen youth agency and ensure that young people are not merely affected by future transformations but are actively shaping the principles that govern them. WYSD is a reminder of our collective responsibility to work toward this vision. Young people are not just observers of what lies ahead. They define its course.

The post Empowering young people in an AI-driven world first appeared on UNIDIR.

Violence weaves a tangled web

While human suffering from violence goes beyond quantifiable metrics, the financial costs of homicides and injuries from firearms-related violence are increasingly well understood and measured. [1] There is a growing body of research documenting how much a single homicide costs a city or the foregone GDP due to violence. However, the armed violence research community tends to tread lightly when measuring the ‘reverberating’ impacts of firearms-related violence – sometimes also referred to as ripple events.[2]

As a result, we may be failing to fully account for cascading harm, transmission events, and vicious cycles, such as poor life outcomes, retaliatory spirals, and interrelated forms of violence. Conversely, we may be underestimating the prevention payoff. This means that we could be missing the full scope of harm from firearms-related violence when it occurs and failing to claim the returns when it is prevented.

Reverberating impacts refer to the outwardly rippling, interconnected, and prolonged web-like network of consequences from an act of firearms-related violence.[3] An effort to map the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence would investigate shootings, not just as singular or discrete events between individuals, static in time and place, but rather as starting nodes that trigger threads and spirals of harm.

For example, one grave consequence from an act of violence can be more violence; and such offspring events can come in the way of retaliatory cycles and/or interrelated forms of violence.[4] The effort to map the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence would also examine the channels of influence through which these threads and spirals of harm spread and reinforce each other.  

While it is challenging to measure a counterfactual (e.g., how many retaliatory cycles are prevented when a single act of violence is prevented) or establish causality between exposure and outcomes (e.g., a child witnessing violence causes an impoverished adulthood), attempting to do so -in a systematic way- could be transformational. Having a widely agreed framework to understand and measure the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence can lead to a stronger business case for facing it as the universal and costly scourge it is. In an environment of shrinking budgets, we need this evidence to make a louder case for violence prevention and its cost-effectiveness.

Firearms-related violence is costly and contagious

A 2024 report by the National Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (NICJR) found that in Columbus, Ohio, USA, a fatal shooting, with one suspect, had a governmental cost of USD 2,126,931. This figure accounted for crime scene responses, medical expenses, criminal investigations, incarcerations costs, victim and social services, and lost tax revenue.[5] Nationally, firearms-related violence is estimated to cost the US around USD 557 billion per year, about 2.6% of its GDP.

In Latin America and the Caribbean – a region where only 8% of the world’s population resides yet accounts for one third of global homicides, disproportionately committed with firearms – the Inter-American Development Bank estimated that the costs of crime and violence reached 3.44% of its GDP in 2022. This figure accounted for losses in human capital, spending on crime mitigation by private business, and public spending on criminal justice. To put into context, the financial costs of crime and violence in the region is about double the budget for social assistance programmes.

As significant as the financial costs are, the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence spread well beyond economic impacts.[6] Public health literature can be instrumental in understanding wider costs – and the chain of infection associated with the spread of firearms-related violence and its consequences. This is because community violence, which is often perpetrated with the presence of firearms, behaves like an epidemic. Violent behaviours – just like a contagious disease – cluster, transmit, and spread, with the highest predictor of future violence being close exposure to past violence.[7]

A 2023 report by New York University outlined costs incurred by individual victims of violence, taking inspiration from the ‘burden of disease’ literature. This model adds costs associated with a condition that would not have been incurred should the disease not exist. Researchers categorized tangible direct costs, tangible indirect costs, and intangible costs. In this model, tangible direct costs are medical treatment, care, and criminal justice expenses; tangible indirect costs are income losses and reduced productivity; and intangible costs are values for injury, such as pain, reduced quality of life, and fear, or the Value of Statistical Life.

Further, the NICJR report outlined some indirect costs from violence at the community level. The research documented that violence leads to decreased property values, business and investment flight, community tension and trauma, increased firearms possession, and more use of violence to resolve disputes. It also found intergenerational impacts, noting that children exposed to violence tend to have worse life outcomes, such as impacted health, lower school performance, higher likelihood of impoverishment, and more contact with the criminal justice system.[8]

An ecological model to study violence as a public health issue, outlined by the World Health Organization, in 2002, offered four levels to understand the complex interplay of relations and environmental factors that affect and are affected by violence. These levels being individual, proximal social relationships (such as close family), community, and societal. In analyzing the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence, this ecological model could offer an initial sketch to map the threads and spirals, relationships and channels, and visualize how different harms from violence outspread from a single shooting event.

A research agenda to untangle the reverberating impacts   

This commentary outlines a research agenda to develop a framework that better captures the full scale and scope of the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence, because there is still so much harm from violence and its consequences that we do not fully capture or understand yet.

As a first step, we need to define and more clearly differentiate between direct and indirect costs; tangible versus intangible costs; ripple, cascading, and offspring events; first-second-and-third order effects; and a better definition of reverberating impacts too. Having a broad agreement on terms, and how to measure them, will be a solid starting place.

As a second step, we need to map the different threads of harm that outspread from a shooting event, like radial lines from the center of a spider web. This mapping effort could help identify key components in the chain of infection and capture a broad range of harm from an incident, starting with:

• More violence: one thread could illustrate violence leading to more violence, including retaliatory cycles and/or interrelated forms of violence.
• Individual outcomes: the next thread could focus on unpacking life outcomes for individual victims, following the burden of disease model, such as medical expenses, income losses, pain, and fear.
• Proximal network outcomes: a further thread could capture life outcomes for the close social network of a victim, separated by relationships, age, and gender. These outcomes could include, for example, poverty, drop-out rates, physical and mental health[9], and contact with the criminal justice system.
• Community outcomes: the following thread could capture community-level outcomes. These can include, for example, distrust, disinvestment, and intergenerational trauma[10].
• Societal outcomes: then a different thread could focus on societal outcomes, like forgone GDP or opportunity costs in governmental expenses, including criminal justice expenditures.

As a third step, we need to identify how these threads connect with each other to form spirals. This exercise can help identify pathways of influence and reinforcing effects between different categories of harm. Taken together, the radial threads and spirals, originating from one incident, can illustrate the many ways the reverberating impacts of firearms-related violence permeate all of society.

Three clear benefits emerge from having a more comprehensive framework:

1. Academically, it will help better understand the full scale and scope of the consequences of firearms-related violence.
2. Budgetarily, it will help make a stronger case for the prevention payoff.
3. Operationally, it can help practitioners more clearly identify intervention points to stop the spread of firearms-related violence and its consequences.

The budgets from many national and local governments, as well as in the UN, are facing significant pressure to cut spending. Not surprisingly, the OECD report on States of Fragility found that resources for prevention are diminishing. This is all happening when community violence intervention is at a crossroads: continued growth as a field with a well-connected public safety infrastructure or disinvestment that threatens to “dismantle its progress just as its proving its worth”. Considering current pressures and what is at stake, now, more than ever, we need to invest astutely. Investing in violence prevention is, without a doubt, worth it. And the louder we can make the case, the better chance we stand.

[1] This commentary recognizes that human suffering from violence is beyond quantifiable metrics. It is only an attempt to inform a research agenda and policy decisions by investigating the magnitude of the broader consequences from firearms-related violence, which tend to be overlooked or underestimated.

[2] In recent years, researchers have made significant advances in shedding light on the many costs of violence, including human and economic costs. See, for example, reports from New York University and Everytown for Gun Safety, as well as The mental health consequences of interpersonal gun violence: A systematic review.

[3] This is a working definition to illustrate the broad spread of the ‘reverberating’ impacts. This commentary later argues for the need to develop a more detailed definition with buy-in from the research community.

[4] Retaliatory spirals of violence among gang-involved individuals are well documented, with one study from the University of California in Los Angeles finding their contagion level as triggering twice as many offspring events as non-gang related incidents. It has also grown increasingly clear that different forms of violence are interrelated. A report from the Peace in Our Cities network highlighted that individuals involved in one form of violence (e.g., street shootings) are usually also involved in different forms of violence (e.g., gender-based violence). The report also finds that bullying at schools increases the likelihood that those involved will suffer or perpetrate violence outside of schools.

[5] Also, for example, consider the city of Bristol, England. In 2020, the Bristol City Council, based on the methodology of the Home Office, estimated the cost of a single homicide at £3,217,740 (approximately $3,966,170). This figure accounts for lost output, health services, victim services, and police expenses, among other direct and indirect cost categories.

[6] Globally, the Global Peace Index estimated that, for 2022, interpersonal violence had an economic impact of $2.6 trillion.

[7] See, Cure Violence Global.

[8] Studies have also found that adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) may be significant antecedent risk factors to future firearms-related violence, see Childhood Trauma Exposure and Gun Violence Risk Factors among Victims of Gun Violence.

[9] As a further example of the growing body of literature, Rutgers University recently released a study suggesting a link between community firearms-related violence and impacted dental health. 

[10] See, for example, Beyond Measure: Gun Violence Trauma.

The post Untangling the reverberating impacts from firearms-related violence first appeared on UNIDIR.

What is the Small Quantities Protocol?

Many Non-Nuclear-Weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that have small amounts of nuclear material, but have no nuclear material in facilities, have concluded SQPs with the IAEA. An SQP is not a stand-alone agreement; rather, it is an addition to the standard CSA (based on INFCIRC/153) that suspends the implementation of certain safeguards procedures in Part II of the main agreement.

Although SQPs were designed to reduce the burden on the IAEA and on States with no significant nuclear programme, they limit the Agency’s ability to receive initial declarations on nuclear material subject to safeguards (based on the original SQPs) and to conduct routine inspections in such States (under both the original and revised SQPs). Consequently, they reduce the IAEA’s ability to verify those States’ nuclear activities.

The IAEA General Conference has repeatedly adopted a resolution reaffirming “the urgent need for all States in the Middle East to forthwith accept the application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all their nuclear activities as an important confidence-building measure among all States in the region”. States in the region have tabled this annual resolution and emphasized the confidence-building role of CSAs because their application enables the Agency to verify a State’s nuclear activities to ensure its peaceful nature and to raise the alarm if it detects signs of possible non-compliance.

The evolution of the protocol

The original SQP text was developed in 1974. Under this now-outdated model, a State qualified for an SQP if it had no nuclear material in a nuclear facility (as defined in paragraph 106 of the CSA) and the total quantities of nuclear material in the State were below the thresholds defined in paragraph 37 of the CSA.[1]  Under the 1974 version of the SQP, the implementation of most reporting and all inspection procedures in Part II of the CSA are suspended – or “held in abeyance” – for the State concerned as long as it meets the two eligibility criteria or until it rescinds its SQP.

If either of the two criteria ceases to apply – that is, if the quantities of nuclear material exceed the set limitation or if nuclear material is moved into a nuclear facility – then the SQP ceases to be operational. The suspended safeguards procedures include those that require the State to make an initial report of all its nuclear material and those related to inspections and to design information verification (in which the IAEA verifies that a facility corresponds with design information submitted to the Agency). This means that the IAEA cannot verify nuclear material or facilities in a State with an original SQP, for as long as the State still qualifies for the SQP.

These constraints on the Agency’s verification compounded the view that the original SQP is “a remaining weakness in the safeguards system”. These concerns prompted the IAEA to modify the eligibility criteria for the SQP, making it unavailable to a State that had decided to construct a nuclear facility. In his 2003 report to the Board of Governors of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, Director General of the Agency, proposed two options: to get rid of all SQPs or to modify existing and future SQPs. Under the first option, no new SQP based on the original text would be approved with States that had yet to conclude a CSA, and the IAEA would call on States with existing SQPs to rescind them. Under the second option, the eligibility criteria in the SQP would change, and the IAEA would call on those with an original SQP to amend or rescind it to meet the Agency’s concerns. Although, according to the Director General’s report, the Agency preferred the first option since it could treat all States with a CSA in force equally regarding reporting and inspections, the Board of Governors adopted the second option.

The modifications were adopted by the Board of Governors in 2005. Following the adoption of the revised SQP by the Board, the IAEA Director General sent letters to all States with operational SQPs based on the original standard text, calling on them to either amend their original SQP to align with the new model or rescind it.

There are three main distinctions between the original and revised SQPs:

• The revised SQP mandates the State to declare an initial inventory of all nuclear material, including zero inventory as appropriate, and allows the Agency to conduct ad hoc inspections to verify these declarations.
• Under the revised SQP, the IAEA may also carry out special inspections.
• A revised SQP ceases to be operational as soon as a State decides to construct or approve the construction of a nuclear facility. States are required to inform the Agency once they make such a decision. In contrast, under the original SQP, they were only under an obligation to do so six months before nuclear material is introduced into the new facility.

The protocol’s status in the Middle East

Eleven Middle Eastern countries have adopted SQPs, in addition to their CSAs with the IAEA: Bahrain, the Comoros, Djibouti, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, the State of Palestine, the Sudan, and Yemen. All but one, Yemen, has adopted or updated their SQP to the revised version. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia used to have SQPs, which they rescinded recently in 2019 and 2024, respectively (see Figure 1).

Since Israel is not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it does not have a CSA with the IAEA. Instead, it has agreed to an Item Specific Safeguards with the Agency, which apply only to the nuclear materials and facilities specified in the agreement, not all of the State’s nuclear activities. Somalia is yet to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Figure 1: Status of States in the Middle East in Relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Related Agreements

The protocol’s limitations in the Middle East

The revised SQP significantly improves the IAEA’s ability to verify States’ declarations as it allows the Agency to conduct ad hoc and special inspections (see Table 1). However, no routine inspections may be conducted in a State with an original or modified SQP, unless and until the State either has nuclear material in a facility (under the original SQP) or decides to construct a facility (under the modified SQP) – in both cases, the SQP becomes non-operational.

Note:

1. Subsidiary arrangements refer to a document specifying in detail how the procedures laid down in a safeguards agreement are to be applied. See IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 14.
2. Containment refers to the structural features of a facility, containers, or equipment that are used to maintain the continuity of knowledge of items by preventing undetected access to or movement of them. Complementary containment/surveillance measures usually ensure the continuing integrity of the containment. Ibid, 77.

Routine inspections constitute the majority of the Agency’s inspections at facilities and locations outside facilities. The intensity and frequency of routine inspections are specified in subsidiary arrangements. A State with an SQP is not required to bring subsidiary arrangements into force, as long as its SQP remains operational. By consistently receiving reports and conducting routine inspections to ensure that their content matches the reality of the State’s material inventory, the IAEA is aware of the State’s nuclear activities – an advantage that is not available under the original SQP (and to some degree the modified SQP).

Ad hoc inspections are carried out to verify a State’s initial declaration on nuclear material and any changes that arise or when material is imported into or exported from the State. A special inspection may be conducted as envisaged in the CSA, and it requires arrangements to be concluded between the State and the IAEA.

Considering the SQP’s limitation, the volatile conditions in the Middle East, the history of diversion, covert programmes, the past use of weapons of mass destruction, and the deep mistrust among the region’s States, discussions on the safeguards and verification standards of the future ME WMDFZ should consider which measures will offer regional States the most assurances related to compliance.

Considering minimum standards for safeguards

A future treaty on an ME WMDFZ will require assurances among Middle Eastern States regarding their compliance with their commitments to the treaty. To enhance this trust, States could discuss adopting a confidence-building measure within the framework of that treaty that aligns all of their nuclear non-proliferation commitments – based, at a minimum, on the CSA with none of the exceptions allowed by an SQP. As a first stage, those States that have not adopted a safeguards agreement will adopt, at the least, a CSA with the IAEA, and those that have a revised or original SQP will rescind it.

The advantage of such a measure is that the IAEA may then implement all safeguards procedures available under a CSA, such as conducting all types of inspections and design information verification, receiving routine reports, and monitoring compliance. It will assure all States in the region that they are unified in their obligations in relation to the Agency and that all nuclear materials and activities in the region – whether significant or not – are subject to the Agency’s scrutiny.

It should be acknowledged that fully implementing a CSA will incur some financial costs for the 11 States with an SQP, as it will require them to establish State institutions (including an authority responsible for safeguards) and recruit, train, and maintain qualified personnel. While paragraph 15 of the CSA outlines that the State is responsible for the costs associated with implementing the CSA, wealthier countries of the region could establish a fund to alleviate the financial burden on those countries that do not possess a significant nuclear programme and cannot afford to create the necessary support institutions and infrastructure.

[1]  These thresholds are: (a) 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one of more of the following: (i) plutonium; (ii) uranium with an enrichment of 20% and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and (iii) uranium with an enrichment below 20% and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by 5 times the square of its enrichment; (b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above 0.5%; (c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.5% or below; and (d) 20 metric tons of thorium; or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board of Governors for uniform application.

Fateme Fazel was a Graduate Professional in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone project. Previously, she interned at the Tehran Peace Museum, an Iranian NGO whose mission revolves around combatting weapons of mass destruction, and worked for several Iranian research institutions in fields such as data governance, health law and migration studies. Fateme holds a Bachelor of Arts in Law from Tehran University and a Master’s in International Law from Shahid Beheshti University, Iran

The post Harmonizing the minimum nuclear non-proliferation commitments of States in the Middle East first appeared on UNIDIR.

The number of malicious ICT activities is on the rise, and both the private sector and the international community have expressed preoccupation with this trend. In particular, Member States reiterated in a recent progress report of the Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of ICTs 2021–2025, increasing concern that ICT threats in the international security context have intensified and evolved significantly in the current geopolitical environment.

The international community and non-technical stakeholders often face several challenges in understanding malicious ICT activities, either due to the complex language used by the technical community or the frequently simplistic language used by media to portray ICT incidents. To help Member States, UNIDIR has produced a new framework for analyzing ICT activities: The UNIDIR Intrusion Path.  

Understanding the complexities of ICT threats

The UNIDIR Intrusion Path is an accessible framework to analyze both malicious and security activities in the ICT environment. It is built around the concept of the network perimeter, which categorizes the ICT environment into the dichotomy of outside and inside according to an organization’s network. Thanks to this ‘spatial’ understanding of the ICT environment, it aims to help visualize the different layers where ICT activities can take place, thus offering a tool to make cyber diplomacy more inclusive and better informed.

In general terms, a ‘network perimeter’ refers to those systems that delimit a specific network from the broader Internet, mostly by managing security of and access to internal networks (see fig. 1).

Figure 1. Simplified overview of a network perimeter

This understanding creates three key layers of analysis – outside the perimeter, on the perimeter and inside the perimeter.[1]

• Outside the perimeter encompasses all the systems, networks and data sources that exist beyond an organization’s direct control (e.g., public databases and repositories,[2] social media and public websites, dark web, and cybercriminal forums[3]).
• On the perimeter represents the boundary between an organization’s internal systems and the external world. This boundary is protected by layers of security meant to filter, monitor and control access (e.g., firewalls and intrusion detection or prevention systems[4]).
• Inside the perimeter is the internal, private part of an organization’s network. It is often characterized by a series of segmented and monitored subnetworks and devices that house sensitive data and operational systems (e.g., data servers and file repositories, desktop computers, mobile devices, and other equipment).

For each of these layers, there are specific actions that perpetrators (i.e., the attackers) seeking to penetrate and those in charge of the security of the network (i.e., the defenders) must conduct. Perpetrators need to find out how to breach the system defences and achieve their goals, while defenders need to monitor and deter any unwanted and unauthorized intrusion. There are several ways of categorizing the different actions that these actors should take. The most famous are the Cyber Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK.

Complementarity with existing models and practical use

The Cyber Kill Chain, developed by Lockheed Martin, is a model that outlines different stages of a cyberattack, from initial reconnaissance to data exfiltration. It consists of seven sequential phases: reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on objectives. The purpose of the model is to help defenders to detect, prevent and respond to intrusion attempts by identifying and disrupting adversarial actions at each stage of the chain. It is particularly useful in understanding how attacks operate and where defensive measures can be most effectively applied. The Kill Chain presents intrusion as a linear and temporal progression through seven stages, yet often real-world malicious activities involve non-linear, iterative, or parallel tactics that may not properly fit into this model.

The MITRE ATT&CK framework was developed and is maintained by MITRE Corporation as part of a research project to understand adversary behaviours better and to improve defences against cyber attacks through real-world, evidence-based models. It categorizes the tactics, techniques and procedures used by perpetrators across different stages of an intrusion. Unlike linear models, ATT&CK presents a matrix that maps specific techniques to broader tactical goals, such as initial access, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. While the MITRE ATT&CK framework is a powerful tool for understanding adversary behaviour, it has some limitations, including its complexity and technical depth, which can make it difficult to use effectively without suitable knowledge and training.

The UNIDIR Intrusion Path model builds on and complements these two well-established tools for analyzing malicious ICT activities. In fact, its elements are compatible with and can include both the Cyber Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK categorizations (see table 1).

Moreover, the UNIDIR Intrusion Path builds on already existing intrusion frameworks in terms of what activities both the perpetrators and the defenders might do in their respective roles. Considering that these activities may involve highly technical skills and knowledge, the UNIDIR Intrusion Path provides a simplified summary of what both perpetrators and defenders can do in each layer of the model.

The UNIDIR Intrusion Path model has already been used in a research project aimed at understanding how artificial intelligence (AI) is changing the capabilities and behaviours of both perpetrators and defenders throughout the different layers of the intrusion path.

As malicious activities in the ICT environment increase and pose growing threats to international peace and stability, it is essential to equip policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders with tools to understand, inform and act for a more transparent, stable and peaceful digital space. We hope that the UNIDIR Intrusion Path will contribute to this end.

[1] Note on ‘cloud’ resources: virtual or remote resources are integral to modern networks, often spanning both outside and on the perimeter. External services like public cloud platforms typically fall outside the perimeter, requiring robust policies for access and configuration security. In contrast, organization-controlled cloud infrastructure, such as hybrid clouds or cloud-hosted applications, functions on the perimeter, serving as critical access points and potential vulnerabilities. As extensions of the network, cloud resources demand tailored security strategies and shared accountability with providers. While this is an important topic, a detailed discussion of the security of cloud resources is outside the scope of this paper.

[2] These may store information on potential vulnerabilities, system configurations and employee profiles.

[3] Information on new exploits, vulnerabilities, or prepackaged intrusion tools can be found in such spaces.

[4] These are stationed at the network’s edge (as well as at other parts of the network) to monitor, filter and block malicious traffic.

The post Introducing a new framework to analyze ICT activities first appeared on UNIDIR.

Q: What inspired you to take part in the peace negotiations in the Philippines?

A: The short answer is the conflict. The conflict in the Mindanao region in the Philippines has been going on for the longest time, and as part of civil society, myself along with others have been campaigning specifically for a meaningful political process to settle it. Every time the government withdrew from a process or violence broke out, we engaged with the parties to come back – to talk again, restore the ceasefire and resume dialogue. When the opportunity came with a new president taking office and a new team being formed, I was asked to join the peace negotiation team. I accepted the job without hesitation.

Q: How would you characterize this conflict?

A: It was a typical ethno-nationalist movement, born out of colonial history, the construct of the state, and center-periphery dynamics. It wasn’t a religious conflict, as some have assumed, although religious identity – specifically Islam – is a significant part of the identity of the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao. So yes, there’s a religious dimension, but at its core, it was really an ethno-nationalist conflict.

Q: What do you think the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda brought to peace negotiations, particularly those you were involved in?

A: The WPS agenda created awareness that there should be additional voices in the room, specifically those of women. Secondly, it raised the issue of responding to women’s needs in conflict and post-conflict situations by including gender-specific provisions in peace agreements. That was very much part of the dynamics when we resumed the peace negotiations in the Philippines in 2010 – the fact that the other side had no women, and that many of us on the government side were women was striking.

When we began negotiating specific provisions – starting with the first document, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro – it included an iteration of rights. One of those was about women’s rights being guaranteed under the new political arrangement. So from the beginning, the agenda was there, although we faced difficulties in keeping it in the agenda of the negotiations.

Eventually, some of those challenges were overcome. We couldn’t include everything, and that’s why I view it not as a one-time effort but as a continuing process. In this specific case in 2010, what couldn’t be achieved during the political negotiations was addressed in the next phase – through the legislation establishing the new autonomous government.

In that phase, more guarantees were provided for women and also for minority indigenous communities.  In brief, the WPS agenda created awareness, consciousness and even responsibility. I didn’t represent women’s groups – I was appointed by the president and represented the president. But as a woman, there was a responsibility and expectation to carry that agenda into the negotiating room. On the other side, it created some defensiveness if women’ issues weren’t being addressed – and that’s a good thing. It did not always lead to inclusion, but at least the issue remained on the agenda.

Q: Can you expand on the difficulties you faced in the negotiations?

A: Women’s rights and other issues raised by women were often seen as interference – something external, and not essential to the core issues we were negotiating. But over time, it became integrated through specific provisions and actions, such as bringing in, first, one woman, then two, on their side. Eventually, they accepted the idea of a woman chairing the government’s negotiating panel, which was a first.

Women had always been part of the government team, but never in that leadership role. So that was new – especially for them. Initially, it created discomfort, but I think it was something they ultimately overcame.

Q: What do you see as the remaining challenges, particularly in Southeast Asia? And how is the role of women’s civil society groups evolving?

A: When you look at community initiatives and peacebuilding at the grassroots level, women are everywhere in Southeast Asia – especially in conflict-affected areas or regions threatened by violent extremism. Women have taken the lead. They’ve organized and developed creative programmes to address violence and political instability in peaceful, comprehensive ways.

But at the middle and upper levels, as part of governments for example, women are still not very visible. That’s been part of the ongoing campaign. The seeds are there. Leadership changes, and with it, the commitment to gender equality can vary.

It’s a continuous struggle. Sometimes you move one step forward, and then under new leadership, two steps back – but you keep pushing. Once women are organized and realize they have agency – that they can make change – there’s no going back. You can’t just push them aside anymore. So it becomes a cumulative process.

Q: Do you have any examples – maybe from your region or negotiations you’ve participated in – of women involved in disarmament processes? What were the outcomes and challenges?

A: As usual, very few women are formally acknowledged in disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes as combatants or included in the official rolls for benefits or even the headcounts that were agreed on. That is also true in the Bangsamoro process.

Today things are different. In Myanmar, for example, many women are fighting there – not just in ethnic groups but also in the People’s Defence Forces, which include members of the majority Burman community. Yet women’s involvement in formal disarmament processes has generally been very limited, both in numbers and in actual participation.

The inclusion of women is becoming more common in peace agreements. In our own peace agreement in the Philippines, in the final annex on normalization, we did mention women. We also included them in discussions around economic development and politics. But it was and still is an uphill battle.

The Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) part of the peace agreement in the Philippines, which was responsible for overseeing the decommissioning of MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) combatants and their weapons, is one of the few bodies in our implementation infrastructure with no women. That’s how it turned out. But awareness is growing. There’s now recognition that women should be specifically included in DDR – not only as combatants but also as widows or members of affected communities.

Q: What would you change about how peace is negotiated? What advice would you give to women in the region who are facing different types of conflicts and want to contribute to peace?

A: When women see other women doing peacebuilding – at the community level and in higher-level politics – it becomes real for them. That’s the first step. It starts with the women themselves.

Then they have to overcome the barriers within their own cultures. It’s hard for outsiders to lead that change. We can catalyze, but we can’t sustain it. It must come from within the communities – whether the constraints are cultural, religious, family or clan-based.

So, for those of us outside, it’s about accompaniment – supporting them in ways that are sensitive to their culture and context.

Networking is also essential. Without networks, women remain isolated in their own spaces and never become a collective political force. That’s why we still need women-specific activities. Otherwise, in mixed meetings, women often get sidelined.

We also need to engage men – talk to them about the kind of partnerships that lead to meaningful political outcomes. Because in the end, peace processes should be about meaningful partnerships – for everyone, men and women alike.

The post A conversation with Prof. Miriam Coronel-Ferrer on the continuity of peacebuilding first appeared on UNIDIR.

Despite global commitments to gender-sensitive and gender-representative reintegration programming, there has been little realization of these aims for women and girls exiting Boko Haram. For them, demobilization is not truly an option; many of these women and girls remain married to the very men they were forced into relationships with while with Boko Haram. Few legal avenues and dire economic necessity mean that women and girls remain tethered to their Boko Haram ‘husbands’ (often for their very survival). Other women and girls have had more positive experiences and have come to appreciate their husbands and the care they have provided for them, showing the often-missed nuances of the experiences of women and girls who are exiting armed groups.

The question remains as to what reintegration can truly look like for these women and girls. UNIDIR’s report Survival and Struggle: The Experience of Women and Girls With and After Boko Haram evidences how reintegration processes must not be viewed as an acute, singular moment, but rather as an ongoing reckoning. The impact of remnant legacies of violence and prolonged isolation do not disappear upon return; rather they continue to shape these women and girls, their children, families and communities at large. 

Legacies of violence past the point of return

Women and girls who leave Boko Haram do so under vastly different circumstances. Narratives from the extensive field research from UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project with women and girls in the Lake Chad Basin region highlight tales of women and girls fleeing in the middle of the night and having to select an opportune moment to escape with their children as safely as possible. Upon their return, many women and girls bypass screening and formal support, due to being viewed as passive victims and not viewed as a threat. Women and girls then arrive (often with multiple children in tow) directly into communities, sometimes those of origin, and sometimes entirely new ones, where they struggle to directly access support.  

The absence of targeted reintegration efforts highlights a broader issue within reintegrating programming—its failure to address the distinct needs of women and girls. These processes largely focus on men, with benefits such as financial and material assistance primarily being allocated to men and boys. Women and girls, in contrast, often receive minimal support, reinforcing gendered disparities and placing them and their children at a heightened risk of economic insecurity. Without adequate support, women and girls are often forced to engage in precarious and dangerous survival strategies. Many are forced to sell portions of their limited assistance kits for food, embark on hazardous forest trips to collect firewood, or exchange sex for money and other essentials. These actions underscore the false notion of ‘choice’ in their reintegration—many women and girls have no viable alternatives to meet their basic needs. The structural barriers they face further entrench their marginalization, limiting not only their opportunities for economic independence and social reintegration, but those of their children too.

Past the point of return, communities’ responses to returning women and girls vary vastly. While survey data from UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project indicates that most communities demonstrate high levels of acceptance and sympathy, pockets of fear, stigma and rejection persist in some. For women and girls reintegrating into situations of displacement, a fundamental problem arises when they do not speak the same language as their peers, making it almost impossible to communicate their peaceful intentions. In addition, the enduring impact of prolonged forced isolation while with Boko Haram has also meant a loss of social skills, with some women and girls finding it difficult to adjust to their newfound freedom and engage with other community members.

Beyond this, women and girls reintegrate into an environment shaped by broader crises of displacement, economic instability, and climate-related challenges. Many return to communities experiencing severe livelihood difficulties and resource shortages, making reintegration even more difficult. While humanitarian actors, military personnel, and government agencies attempt to provide basic needs such as food, water and shelter, these efforts fall short in fostering long-term stability. These women and girls do not reintegrate into stability and often find themselves reintegrating into situations of protracted and even secondary displacement.

Indeed, reintegration does not happen in a vacuum – it is shaped by innumerable facets, from bureaucratic hurdles, entrenched gender norms to a polycrisis of overlapping humanitarian challenges. To pretend otherwise is to ignore the lived realities of women and girls within this process. Ignoring these structural barriers does not just risk failing women and girls; it perpetuates their marginalization, deepens insecurity, and threatens the very foundation of lasting peace and recovery.

Temporal bounds of reintegration

When viewing the experience of reintegration as a singular, and temporally bound process ending soon after the point of return, we lose sight of the valuable insights to be learned from the lived realities of women and girls and ignore the continued impact that violence endured has on everyday lives. For women and girls, reintegration is not a finite process but an ongoing negotiation with identity, stigma and survival. The ‘present’ of reintegration cannot be disentangled from the ‘past; of violence or the ‘future’ of societal change.

The phenomenon of forced marriages can provide one example of these challenges. Many screening processes do not attempt to identify victims of forced marriage and other forms of gender-based violence. As such, many women and girls who were forcefully married whilst with Boko Haram remain tethered to these relationships upon leaving the group. In Chad, which is the only country in the region to have a legal statute that requires marriages to be voluntary, women and girls were offered the option to separate from their ‘bush husbands’. This reality, often complicated by economic dependency and the threat of losing their children from that relationship, rendered this notion of choice obsolete. Further, in such societies where arranged marriages are common, even if these women and girls were to secure a divorce, they would often be remarried immediately after and, likely not to a man of their choosing. Many women and girls therefore remain in these marriages, potentially perpetuating cycles of violence and control.

These dynamics underscore the need to expand our temporal frame, recognizing reintegration as a process influenced by past traumas and future uncertainties. 

Holistic reintegration for women and girls

If reintegration is to be meaningful, and reflective of the lived realities of women and girls, it must be approached as a holistic process. This means addressing not just the immediate needs of women and girls but also the structural and societal factors that hinder their full inclusion. The Survival and Struggle report offers a roadmap, highlighting several key areas for intervention:

1. Gender-sensitive programming: Women and girls’ meaningful participation in reintegration policy and practices is missing.  Reintegration programming must move beyond viewing women and girls as passive victims. Acknowledging their agency—both during their time with Boko Haram and in their efforts to rebuild—is crucial. Tailored support that considers their unique experiences, such as physical and psychological trauma, economic dependency and caregiving responsibilities, is also essential.
2. Community engagement: Stigma, fear and rejection are community-level issues that require community-level solutions. Dialogue programmes that foster understanding and reconciliation can help bridge the gap between returnees and their neighbours. Working with community-based associations to provide lasting and meaningful participation in all aspects of DDR-like processes ultimately aids in supporting returning women and girls, fostering strengthened capacities and skills.
3. Economic empowerment: Livelihood opportunities are a cornerstone of sustainable reintegration. Providing women with skills training, funding or access to markets can reduce their dependence on others and enhance their social standing. Programmes must be designed to account for the specific barriers women and girls face, such as limited mobility, displacement and time constraints due to caregiving roles.
4. Policy coherence and inclusivity: Governments must align their policies with the realities of women and girls’ experiences and give them choices. This includes creating legal frameworks that address forced marriages, trafficking and gender-based violence. Moreover, involving women and girls in the design and implementation of reintegration programmes can ensure that their needs and perspectives are adequately represented.

Towards a deeper understanding

To build truly effective and long-lasting reintegration efforts, we must bridge the gaps between research, practice and experience. Whilst there is growing recognition of the challenges women and girls face upon exiting Boko Haram, critical gaps remain. First, reintegration is not a singularly gendered experience—understanding how men, too, navigate vulnerability is essential to shaping effective interventions. Second, despite persistent calls for gender-responsive and gender-transformative approaches, funding remains inadequate, and many programmes are inaccessible to and unable to address the needs of women and girls. Moving forward, we must invest in ongoing, participatory research with women and girls to ensure that their evolving needs inform policy and programme design in real time. Without this, reintegration risks being a well-intentioned aspiration rather than a lived reality.

Francesca Batault is an Associate Researcher with UNIDIR’s Managing Exits from Armed Conflict Project. Previously, Francesca worked on humanitarian mine action and weapons dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin for Mines Advisory Group, as well as the ICRC and the International Crisis Group. She received a master’s degree in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a bachelor’s degree in with honours in politics, philosophy and economics.

Jack Conneely was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Strategic Communications team. He is currently Project Lead at Everyone’s Invited in the Violence against Women at Girl’s sector and acts as a Research Assistant at Oxford University. Previously, Jack worked at International Alert and at Ireland’s Think-tank for Action on Social Change. He holds an MSc in Gender, Peace and Security from LSE, and a BA in Sociology and Social Policy from Trinity College Dublin.

The post Women and girls’ struggle to (re)integrate after Boko Haram first appeared on UNIDIR.

These countries face unequal access to space, limited resources, and vulnerabilities in a domain that is being entirely re-shaped. This commentary will explore how space security and sustainability intersect with the development needs of the Global South, drawing on insights from UNIDIR’s Outer Space Security Conference 2024 (OS24) in Geneva, Switzerland, where I participated as one of the youth video competition winners. 

Space governance and the Global South: Contributions and barriers   

The term ‘Global South’ refers to regions in Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania, typically associated with low- to middle-income countries that have historically been marginalized in global power dynamics. It reflects economic, political and technological inequalities, particularly in access to development opportunities. For the purposes of this commentary, the term will be used interchangeably with emerging space nations, including both emerging-spacefaring and non-spacefaring countries that depend on external space services.  

The Global South includes nations building their space capabilities or relying on external actors for critical services like telecommunications, climate monitoring, and disaster management. Despite limited involvement in early space exploration, these countries have made significant contributions to space law, advocating for equitable access and the peaceful use of outer space. For instance, while only seven Latin American countries participated in UNCOPUOS in 1980, they played a key role in drafting space treaties. However, countries from the Global South continue to face challenges in influencing multilateral space governance, often hindered by disparities in resources and representation.    

Key challenges in space security and sustainability   

While consensus-based decision-making seeks to ensure equal participation, involvement in relevant multilateral processes can sometimes reflect disparities in resources and capacities among Member States. Many emerging space nations have highly skilled experts in the field of space governance and technology; however, limited resources to effectively connect this expertise to their capitals and delegations can hinder their ability to contribute fully.

As Victoria F. Valdivia Cerda noted during her panel, these disparities are compounded by the fact that political decision-makers in some regions are often disconnected from the operational and technical realities of space activities. This disconnect highlights the importance of not only raising public awareness but also of fostering dialogue between policymakers and technical experts, ensuring that decisions are informed by both diplomatic and technical perspectives. Strengthening mechanisms for resource-sharing, enhancing communication channels, and integrating space diplomacy as a strategic capability could help bridge these gaps, fostering more inclusive and effective governance.  

In the area of space security, there is an increasing need for multilateral cooperation to enhance the sharing of information on the monitoring of space objects and enabling broad, credible, and accessible space situational awareness (SSA). For Brazil, strengthening SSA capabilities is critical to addressing the perception that outer space is ‘congested’. Enhanced SSA capabilities would not only provide a clearer picture of orbital usage and improve the safety of space operations, but also serve security-related purposes. These include detecting abnormal and malicious behaviour, identifying compromised satellites, issuing warnings about vulnerabilities, and mitigating threats to critical services. Strengthening SSA can also play a pivotal role in supporting attribution and verification within the existing outer space legal framework, as well as any future legally binding instruments on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS).  

Discussions around strengthening SSA capabilities highlight the varying priorities that developed and emerging space nations bring to multilateral forums. For developed space nations, key concerns often include protecting existing space assets, ensuring secure communications, and mitigating the challenges associated with space traffic management (STM) and space debris. Meanwhile, for emerging space nations, priorities tend to revolve around leveraging space technologies for Earth observation, navigation, climate monitoring, and ensuring continuity of critical services, which are vital for addressing immediate socio-economic challenges as well as tackling the challenges established in the Sustainable Development Goals.

These differing priorities underscore both the challenges and opportunities inherent in multilateral collaboration. While disparities in power, resources and capacities persist, these issues highlight areas of shared interest, emphasizing the importance of collaboration. Real advancement can only be achieved by building on these shared priorities while addressing the inequalities that limit the participation and benefits for nations in the Global South. Such was the spirit of the latest OEWG on reducing space threats.  

The growing militarization of space

The Global South faces significant challenges in addressing space security and sustainability, which are increasingly interconnected in today’s geopolitical context. As discussed during OS24, the growing militarization of space exacerbates these challenges, threatening both the security and sustainability of outer space. This escalating militarization, driven by the proliferation of dual-use technologies and intensified geopolitical competition, increases the risk of conflict and raises concerns about the potential weaponization of space systems. It is important to distinguish between dual-use technologies—those serving both civilian and military purposes, where the military aspect is not inherently aggressive—and dual-purpose space systems, which can involve both non-aggressive and aggressive applications, including those with entirely commercial origins. 

At the same time, space technologies offer transformative opportunities for emerging space nations. Regional perspectives, such as those shared during UNIDIR’s workshop African Perspectives for Advancing Space Security Through Norms, Rules, and Principles of Responsible Behaviours, emphasize the role of space-enabled services in advancing the SDGs and regional frameworks like the African Union’s Agenda 2063. These technologies, including precision farming, weather monitoring, and telehealth services, not only address socio-economic disparities but also contribute to regional stability and growth. However, the realization of these benefits is jeopardized by strategic vulnerabilities in space security.  

Many emerging space nations lack robust protective measures, such as hardened satellite architectures, advanced encryption protocols, and comprehensive cyber defence systems. The reliance of many of these nations on foreign-controlled space services, such as GNSS, exemplifies these vulnerabilities. This dependency exposes them to geopolitical pressures and limits their autonomy in critical sectors. The lack of robust cybersecurity measures and reliance on outdated ground station infrastructure also leave these nations particularly vulnerable to cyberattacks and space-based disruptions, which could cripple essential services like communications and disaster response. These risks highlight the urgent need for regional capacity-building and investment in secure, indigenous space technologies.  

Pathways to equitable space governance

Frameworks like the Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space and the Woomera Manual offer relevant pathways for addressing these challenges. By advocating for legally binding international instruments, transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), these initiatives aim to curb the growing militarization of space and promote equitable governance. However, the Woomera Manual goes further, extending its scope to also address operations in the context of an actual armed conflict. 

Space sustainability cannot be achieved, or will be greatly hindered, if there is no security or if security is threatened. For many emerging space nations, the high cost of accessing space, coupled with limited developmental technical capabilities, perpetuates inequalities. Space debris presents another barrier, as it disproportionately impacts emerging spacefaring nations by limiting the safe use of orbits. Efforts to address these challenges through international cooperation, such as shared access to satellite data and active debris removal initiatives, are essential to creating a more inclusive and sustainable space environment.   

The Global South plays a vital role by advocating for differentiated responsibilities, equitable access, and capacity-building. South-South cooperation, driven by scientific diplomacy, strengthens its voice in multilateral forums like GRULAC and the G77, ensuring that space security frameworks address their vulnerabilities and priorities while shaping future governance mechanisms.  

A call for inclusive, secure and sustainable space governance   

Dynamics of power are often unjust and discriminatory, that is why the spirit of multilateralism must be put to hard work in relieving these difficulties. The international governance frameworks established over the past century, particularly those related to space issues, are strong enough to effectively confront these challenges and ensure fair solutions. In this regard, we could further consider Ambassador Cousiño’s remarks at OS24, where he highlighted the critical role space technology plays for emerging nations and proposed the negotiation of additional optional protocols to the Outer Space Treaty (OST). This approach allows interested States to gradually advance and reinforce the treaty, adapting it to the needs of the new space era and could strengthen the existing framework without requiring a complete renegotiation.

Ambassador Cousiño also emphasized the importance of involving non-governmental entities, such as the space industry, academia, and civil society, in discussions and decision-making processes related to space security. In line with this, a broad range of actors could contribute to the creation of new international conventions through active and consistent participation in international negotiations at the United Nations, advocating for a multistakeholder approach.  

A conclusion could be made from the insights on the debate between legally binding and non-legally binding mechanisms discussed during OS24; that they are not opposing nor merely supplementary, but rather complementary. Despite years of progressive development in international law, fundamental issues in the space domain still lack consensus. This is why international guidelines are an important first step in making space more secure and sustainable. In the absence of legally binding agreements, TCBMs also play a vital role in maintaining stability and security in the space domain.  

As Madin Maseeh noted, these measures are not supplementary, but essential for preventing disasters and mitigating risks. Small island nations, which face significant vulnerabilities due to their reliance on space technologies for critical services, emphasize the urgent need for proactive and actionable TCBMs. Strengthening these measures can help bridge the gap while the international community negotiates more comprehensive and binding agreements, ensuring immediate operational needs are met without compromising long-term governance goals. Nevertheless, providing resources and raising awareness is not enough. Counterspace activities are already underway, and without additional measures, there is a risk of more escalatory actions in the years ahead.  

The international community must prioritize instruments that ensure accountability while fostering cooperation on shared challenges like space debris management, counterspace threats, and equitable access to space resources. Any future instruments should address the accessibility of space for emerging space nations. Ensuring adequate representation of the Global South in multilateral fora requires political will and the provision of resources to empower delegations to participate effectively in shaping policies and regulations. This could involve providing assistance for space operations and ensuring access to space-enabled services and data in a sustainable and secure manner. Raising awareness among national counterparts is also essential to ensure decision-makers fully grasp the stakes involved in space governance. 

The role of youth in shaping the future

Space security and sustainability are not just technical or geopolitical challenges; they represent profound human concerns that require collaborative and inclusive solutions. As a youth participant at OS24, I witnessed firsthand the critical importance of amplifying the voices of emerging space nations, particularly those in the Global South. For young professionals like me, the future of space governance is not a distant abstract, it is the reality we will inherit and shape.  

Consensus-based decision-making often reflects existing disparities in resources and capacities, particularly for nations in the Global South. These nations bring vital expertise and innovative approaches to space governance, but often face challenges in translating technical knowledge into effective policy due to resource constraints and lack of awareness in decision makers. Strengthening mechanisms for resource-sharing and enhancing communication between technical experts and policymakers are critical steps to foster more inclusive governance.  

The growing militarization of space calls for multistakeholder cooperation to prevent conflict and secure sustainable use of the space domain. The proposals for optional protocols to the Outer Space Treaty and the prioritization of guidelines and TCBMs represent pragmatic paths forward. These measures allow for progress while balancing the urgent operational needs of vulnerable nations with long-term strategic goals.  

Ultimately, achieving inclusive space security and sustainability requires collaboration across generations, sectors and borders. By integrating the creativity and optimism of youth with the expertise of seasoned policymakers, and by empowering all nations to contribute, we can ensure that space remains a secure, sustainable, and shared resource for all and for generations to come.  

José Ignacio Vieux is an International Relations student specializing in the global space ecosystem and its governance. His work examines the role of emerging powers in global governance and the economic and geopolitical implications of space activities. He has participated in high-level discussions, including the UNIDIR conference on space security, and is an alumnus of the US Department of State’s Youth Ambassador programme.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, José Ignacio Vieux, was selected as a winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2024 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors. 

The post The importance of space security for the Global South    first appeared on UNIDIR.

What do we mean by ‘space security’? Despite its importance, many people are unfamiliar with the term. In many countries, the terms ‘security’ and ‘safety’ are often used interchangeably, which can make things more confusing. Space security is concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security, and disarmament, including the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Whereas, space safety is commonly understood to refer to measures aimed at preventing accidental or unintentional hazards to space systems.

Space safety along with space security are integral aspects of the broader concept — space sustainability. Acknowledging this complementarity will facilitate future discussions on space security.

OS24 focused on three primary areas: the policy, legal and technical aspects of space security. The legal and policy discussions were particularly fascinating, as they introduced new ways of thinking about issues. Simply developing a product is not the end goal; it requires the ability to monitor its functioning in accordance with the regulations agreed upon by States as well as allowing for coordination according to mutual agreements.

The introduction of new technologies can therefore lead to improved accuracy and reliability compared to previous methods. Space law and policy, which define these regulations, have evolved alongside the advancement of human technology. With the rapid technological development of the 21st century, it has become even more crucial to respond promptly to these changes.

Merely streamlining procedures is not sufficient; recognizing and adapting these frameworks to new technologies is essential. The conference also emphasized the need for establishing, refining and anticipating regulations in light of the burgeoning space market. While new entrants, such as startups and emerging spacefaring nations, may introduce complexity, it is vital to maintain an atmosphere of collaboration as participation increases. Given that space is inherently linked to military considerations, it is crucial to approach this field with caution. We must collectively strive to avoid falling into a cycle of arms competition.

Space hardware and cybersecurity risks

OS24 touched upon technical aspects of space security, including spacecraft hardware, outer space orbits, and post-processing of data. Regarding spacecraft hardware, satellites and space launch vehicles are essential components of space security. Internal sensors and communication devices constitute the backbone of these systems, as all activities in space rely on this equipment. One can think of these satellites as specialized counterparts to everyday smartphones, designed for specific functionalities. This means that they share similar vulnerabilities, including potentially becoming targets for hacking. Given the substantial costs involved in satellite deployment, they can attract the attention of individuals with malicious intent aiming to exploit existing technologies.

This does not entail the dramatic scenarios often depicted in science fiction, such as commandeering and destroying devices. While such actions are indeed forms of hacking, threats also include unauthorized replication of data from other satellites, violating intellectual property rights, or altering existing firmware to reconfigure a satellite for one’s own purposes. Hackers could also create backdoors to transmit fabricated data back to their home country. The risk of subtle modifications going unnoticed can lead to significant repercussions during later stages of data processing. Furthermore, traditional tactics may still pose a threat, such as launching a satellite equipped with hardware designed to disrupt or damage other satellites. Related technologies have already been developed and implemented, and there are laws in place to regulate them, which is why continuous attention is necessary.

Space debris and orbit management

Outer space orbits are also an important aspect to consider, especially given that – as highlighted during OS24 – space is currently filled with a significant amount of debris. Satellites are positioned at various altitudes from low Earth orbit (LEO) to geostationary orbit (GEO) and polar orbit, depending on their distance from Earth. Satellites in GEO are in free-fall motion, maintaining a precise balance with Earth’s gravity, which allows them to stay in the same orbit without the need for significant adjustments.

Other satellites are affected by gravity, causing them to drift from their orbits, and therefore require continuous orbital corrections. Satellites that have completed their mission and remain inoperative in orbit are also referred to as space debris. In GEO, space debris remains in orbit unless it changes its trajectory, as it moves at the same speed as the Earth. On the other hand, smaller derelict satellites among the space debris in LEO gradually re-enter the atmosphere and disintegrate, lingering in space until they burn up.

Because missions in LEO are far more numerous than those in other orbits, space debris in LEO is significantly more abundant. This space debris poses a physical threat to operational satellites, potentially causing damage and interference. Currently, there are approximately 130 million pieces of debris moving at speeds of up to 8 km/s making it difficult to avoid them. While we can implement collision avoidance strategies, this does not equate to a solution to the underlying problem. To address this issue effectively, we must recognize that space debris plays a critical role in space security and should begin removing space debris while preventing its further accumulation.

The removal of space debris is not a straightforward task though; it involves complex and challenging procedures. For instance, many CubeSats will adopt a disposal strategy starting in 2025 that involves deorbiting and incinerating the satellites upon their mission’s completion. If we fail to manage the issue of space debris adequately, operational satellites may be damaged through collision, leading to an even greater proliferation of debris. Such scenarios can and must be averted. Without proactive measures, we could face a future where Earth’s ability to explore space is severely restricted by the accumulation of debris.

Data post-processing and security considerations

One must also consider the post-processing of data, specifically the raw observational data and the corrected data that results from post-processing. As mentioned during OS24, States, industry and other stakeholders already have data collection and monitoring processes to some extent through various tools. The significance of raw data can vary depending on how the information is interpreted during post-processing.

For instance, a satellite image of a country is raw data. This data contains a large amount of information before it is processed. Afterward, it is processed by different organizations according to their objectives, which allows it to be transformed for specific purposes. If observing weather patterns, for example, the data becomes weather information; if analysing traffic conditions, it turns into traffic data. In a military context, it could be used to assess the progress of enemy operations or the overall disposition of troops.

The same data can lead to many different outcomes. Information beyond what was originally collected can be further organized and potentially used for purposes such as military secrets or espionage. This does not imply, however, that we must monitor every step of the post-processing of data.

Just as space security is crucial, so is information protection. These data sets are vital assets that reflect the technological capabilities and expertise of individual nations and companies. However, leaving such important issues solely to individual judgment in the realm of information security is problematic. With the advancement of AI, the importance of data is increasingly emphasized, prompting us to consider how we can effectively navigate this landscape. Today, everything in our world is interconnected through binary data. It is becoming increasingly apparent that systematically organizing data which leaves ample room for interpretation is essential for effective policymaking.

Collaboration for a secure space future

In the new space era, international cooperation is becoming more important than ever. Trust between nations is essential for continuing future missions. However, if the transparency regarding the purpose of data collection is not shared, trust in shared resources will be compromised. Through OS24 and the youth video competition experience, I had the opportunity to witness experts from around the world come together to discuss a common purpose and collaboratively shape the path forward.

Previously, my perspective was primarily rooted in engineering. I have now come to realize that progress in space exploration must be intertwined with policy considerations. Space regulations should be continuously updated in line with technological advancements, and measures to enhance hardware security and prevent space debris generation must be implemented. Comprehensive monitoring strategies for post-processing data should also be established. Through these efforts, countries must collaborate and take steps toward the new space era.

O Junyoung is currently majoring in Electrical Engineering and Aerospace Engineering at Korea Aerospace University. He has a strong interest in artificial systems launched into space, with particular focus on their electronic design.

This commentary is a special feature of UNIDIR’s Youth Engagement initiative. The author, O Junyoung, was a selected winner of the Outer Space Security Conference 2024 Youth Campaign. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the UN, UNIDIR nor their staff members or sponsors.

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This commentary will look at the benefits of ratification of international space treaties for States Parties and briefly highlight under-explored opportunities within the existing space governance toolbox. Drawing on primary resources via open-source research as part of the author’s work on UNIDIR’s Space Security Portal, the commentary focuses on the Southeast Asian region – specifically, on the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a case study. This builds on earlier UNIDIR regionally focused activities in Africa, GRULAC and Small Island States, among other regions.  

ASEAN Member States in space 

Member States of ASEAN demonstrate a growing interest in space-related activities for peaceful purposes, increasingly to the attention of private sector actors. Across international fora, statements are regularly and consistently delivered on behalf of ASEAN Member States, reiterating the right to the peaceful use and exploration of outer space, for the benefit of all humankind.  

As such, the region is an illustrative mosaic of how countries take steps towards becoming more established actors in space. Within this group, there are countries that have ratified some or most space treaties (with a majority being members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and others having requested to participate as observers); countries that have signed but not ratified space treaties; and countries that are not party to most or any space treaties. A timeline of ratification and signatories is provided in Figure 1.  

While ratification binds a State Party to a treaty, a “signatory State” status indicates the desire to continue the treaty implementation process; to proceed to ratification, acceptance or approval, and to avoid acts contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. As Figure 1 illustrates, a number of countries are party to several treaties. For example, Indonesia has ratified four of the five space treaties. The Philippines has expressed intentions to ratify the Outer Space Treaty (OST), Liability Convention and Rescue Agreement and seems set to become party to all five space treaties, joining the ranks of only 15 other countries worldwide to have ratified all five. Other examples of progress include Malaysia’s ongoing work to become party to the OST and Rescue Agreement. 

The ratification of treaties and the development of domestic policies and legislation can be a long, difficult and resource-intensive process. Nonetheless, as indicated by Figure 1, Southeast Asia is witnessing a growing amount of domestic space legislation and guidelines. For example:  

• The Philippines’ Space Act is a robust example of domestic efforts reinforcing international treaties, having established a policy “to ensure that the Philippines abides by the various international space treaties and principles promulgated by the United Nations”. As such, the Act directly references the OST, Registration Convention and Liability Convention. 
   

• Singapore’s Guidelines for Singapore-Related Space Activities covers the registration of space objects. It is also worth highlighting that Singapore’s Guidelines goes beyond focusing on treaty obligations in promoting space sustainability through “international requirements, guidelines, standards and best practices” such as the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines and Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines.  
   

• Malaysia’s Space Board Act 2022 covers the registration of space objects and creates a register of space objects. Notably, the legislation also has provisions which go further than similar provisions found in the OST: the Space Board Act prohibits the placement, installation, launch, testing or operation of weapons of mass destruction in space; and also prohibits the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications in space. In contrast, the OST specifically prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and their stationing in outer space, without addressing their launch, testing or operation. Regarding military bases, installations and fortifications, the OST forbids their installation on celestial bodies rather than in outer space more generally.  

Unilateral steps to take on more expansive laws and policies can be beneficial for the international regime. This may be one way to overcome impasses at the international level and serve as a trust and confidence-building measure. If this were repeated by more countries, these practices could eventually become recognized as international customary law.  

These three examples show how domestic instruments could serve as stepping stones towards ratification by encouraging and expediating future decisions to become a Party to relevant treaties. On top of being an opportunity for knowledge-sharing, domestic mechanisms can be designed with provisions, which in essence, implement treaty obligations. Moreover, contributions such as these to the global space governance landscape can help improve security, safety and sustainability overall and serve as useful examples to other countries, including at the regional level where regional dialogue in Southeast Asia and beyond is already shaping discourse around space security.   

ASEAN plays multiple roles for Southeast Asia in space. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994, serves to foster dialogue, consultation and confidence-building on political and security issues relevant to the Asia-Pacific, and includes a geographically diverse total of 27 members. There have been three ARF Track I workshops on space security to date, hosted by Hoi An in 2012, Tokyo in 2014 and Beijing in 2015. 

Separate to the ARF, ASEAN established a Sub-Committee on Space Technology and Applications (SCOSA) in 1999. SCOSA serves as an avenue for projects, activities and programmes such as knowledge-sharing workshops with international partners outside of Southeast Asia. The current objectives of SCOSA were determined in 2016 and run until 2025. It will be interesting to monitor the objectives that emerge subsequently.   

Lastly, it should also be noted that the Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum and the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organisation regularly organise activities more broadly for the Asia-Pacific region.  

Doubling down on space governance 

All countries have a role to play in preventing space governance from fragmenting, and there is no need to reinvent the wheel. As important as it is to make headway into dealing with new challenges, risks and threats, it is also important to buy into and strengthen existing governance mechanisms. After all, arguably the current toolbox has not been fully utilized by States Parties. While it is beyond the scope of the commentary to explore this topic in greater depth, some preliminary examples follow.  

With respect to the OST: 

• Article IX provides a consultative mechanism between State Parties. The article has latent potential to address issues related to harmful interference in space-related activities, improve transparency in space and benefit relations through demonstrations of trust and cooperation. 
   

• Article XI calls for the sharing and exchange information “to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the nature, conduct, locations and results” of activities conducted in outer space. This could reduce the risk of miscommunication, misperception and misunderstandings. 
   

• And as lunar activities are set to increase, article XII opens the door to “all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other celestial bodies… to representatives of other states parties to the Treaty on a basis of reciprocity”. 

Regarding the Registration Convention, increasing compliance and the provision of information beyond what is minimally required would improve this treaty’s key role in transparency and confidence building. Additionally, article VI of the Registration Convention creates a mechanism for requests for information which could also aid in providing greater transparency in space-related activities.  

Information requests and consultations, if utilized in good faith, provide opportunities for countries to explain the rationale behind space activities that are of interest to others and could aid in the identification of space objects and mitigate concerns over their purpose and intent. While providing greater information may generate national security concerns, in an increasingly congesting and contested space environment, the benefits of greater transparency could enable countries to strike a balance in accounting for such concerns.  

Moving beyond treaties, countries are afforded an assortment of initiatives to strengthen existing frameworks for space security governance. States not yet party to the Registration Convention are still able to provide information on their space objects through A/RES/1721(XVI) B. For instance, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic have registered space objects using this approach. Also of relevance is A/RES/62/101 which recommends methods to strengthen the Registration Convention.  

Finally, the reports of the 2013 Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities and 2023 UN Disarmament Commission Working Group II provide a rich selection of transparency and confidence building measures. Instruments such as the Long-Term Sustainability Guidelines (A/74/20, para 163 and Annex II) and Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines remain available for further implementation as well.  

A Path Forward 

An increasing number of countries are charting their journey into the stars. Their ratification of and adherence to space treaties; development of domestic instruments such as legislation and guidelines; and use of existing mechanisms could create a complementary, global patchwork with which to strengthen space governance.  

This would aid in establishing State practice under international law, and the broader acceptance of general principles of law makes it more likely that they could eventually become customary international law. A tapestry of common understanding is ready to be weaved, improving transparency and (re)building trust and confidence. 

The five space treaties, negotiated during the Cold War, remain as enduring symbols of how positive, constructive engagement is possible amidst tension and rivalry. The benefits from the treaties continue to be accrued to this day. While important, forward-looking discussions continue to work on addressing issues relevant to space security, safety and sustainability, the international space community – regardless of their degree of spacefaring prowess – should not lose sight of what it has at present, and the possibilities already available.  

Ching Wei Sooi was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Space Security and WMD Programmes and is currently pursuing an MA in International Peace and Security at King’s College London. Previously, he was an intern with the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs under the Office of the Director. The author would like to thank Almudena Azcárate Ortega, Sarah Erickson and James Revill for their invaluable advice and support on this commentary. 

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The incoming Council members bring diverse yet complementary maritime perspectives. Greece stands as a shipping superpower, controlling over 17% of global maritime carrying capacity and has already announced maritime security to be one of its six priorities for Council membership. Denmark, home to Moeller-Maersk, the world’s largest container shipping company, has demonstrated consistent leadership in counter-piracy initiatives through its contributions to multinational operations and capacity-building efforts. Panama, as the world’s premier flag state, represents approximately 16% of global shipping and brings important expertise in maritime administration and regulation, but also the challenges faced by small island states.

Somalia brings crucial firsthand experience in maritime security challenges, having transformed from the epicentre of Indian Ocean piracy to a partner in regional maritime security. This remarkable transformation, achieved through international cooperation and capacity building, offers valuable lessons for addressing maritime security challenges elsewhere. Pakistan contributes significant naval capabilities and has established a strong record of maritime security operations in the Western Indian Ocean, including leadership roles in multinational task forces and regional security initiatives.

A de facto Maritime Security Council

The new Security Council members will join the permanent members (China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia), all established maritime powers with global naval presence. This unprecedented concentration of maritime expertise and interests effectively establishes a de facto Maritime Security Council, which offers an opportunity to transcend the gridlock of the Council.

Maritime security represents a realm of shared interests, as all nations depend on secure sea lanes and ocean health for their economic wellbeing. While differences exist within the Council, for instance, regarding the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, maritime security challenges could provide common ground for cooperation. Recent escalations of maritime threats, from attacks on commercial shipping, critical infrastructure breakdowns to environmental degradation, demonstrate that no nation can ensure maritime security alone.

Timing is critical

The maritime domain faces increasing volatility and emerging threats that require coordinated international responses. Recent UNIDIR research has identified 20 critical challenges that will determine the future of security at sea. These range from immediate threats like the proliferation of low-cost weapon systems, the return of sea mine risks, and maritime cyberattacks, to emerging challenges such as securing green energy infrastructure at sea and protecting subsea data cables.

The research also highlights novel concerns including the rise of ‘shadow fleets’ for sanctions evasion, the increasing use of civil vessels for military purposes, and the complex intersection of maritime and outer space security. Environmental challenges feature prominently, from enforcing the new high seas treaty and protecting marine areas to addressing the maritime security implications of climate change, particularly for small island states. Human security dimensions, including Indigenous Peoples’ rights and human rights at sea, complete this comprehensive picture of maritime security challenges.

Moreover, a report from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations highlighted the potential value of UN-flagged maritime operations. Such initiatives could address ongoing maritime security challenges in regions like the Red Sea and the Gulf of Guinea, where coordinated international responses are essential. The success of previous UN-backed maritime security initiatives, such as the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, demonstrates the potential for effective multilateral responses to maritime threats.

Strengthening global maritime security governance

In 2025, the Security Council – with members representing major shipping nations, flag states, naval powers and states with direct experience of maritime security challenges – will be uniquely positioned to address emerging maritime threats and spearhead a unified strategic response.

If the five new maritime members act concertedly through their presidencies, the Council could follow up the discussion on establishing a dedicated maritime security mechanism – as debated in 2021 under the presidency of India. Such a mechanism could aid in coordinating responses to urgent maritime security challenges across the United Nations system, feed essential expertise into decision making and develop long-term comprehensive strategies for addressing emerging threats.

As first steps the Council could establish a dedicated committee, utilizing organizational frameworks similar to those employed by its Counter-Terrorism Committee, – and request a report by the Secretary General to develop options for a UN maritime security strategy and office. This would significantly enhance rapid and early response to maritime security incidents, enhancing information sharing among Member States, and developing guidelines for UN-flagged maritime security operations.

The Council’s unique composition also could facilitate the development of innovative approaches to maritime security cooperation. This might include establishing new frameworks for protecting critical maritime infrastructure, developing international standards for maritime cybersecurity, and creating formats for coordinating responses to environmental threats in the maritime domain. By leveraging the diverse expertise and experiences of its members, the Security Council could lead the way in building a more secure and sustainable maritime order for the 21st century.

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