The report draws on lessons from existing trust fund models, namely the:

• Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund
• United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on Arms Regulation
• Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Tsunami, Disaster and Climate Preparedness
• United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Human Trafficking

The aim is to identify key operational and administrative elements and outline three options to inform ongoing discussions among States Parties as they prepare for the First Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in late 2026. 

Citation: David C. Atwood and Luiza Delaflora Cassol, “Steps Towards a Voluntary Trust Fund for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons” (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026). https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/26/NDV/01

The post Steps Towards a Voluntary Trust Fund for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons first appeared on UNIDIR.

Citation: Abdolrasool Divsallar, “Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Trends in the Middle East: Report of the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Project (2023–2026)”, (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026), https://doi.org/10.37559/MEWMDFZ/2026/NP-trends-ME.

The post Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Trends in the Middle East: Report of the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Project (2023–2026) first appeared on UNIDIR.

It has three core objectives:

• First, it maps the current landscape of official nuclear risk reduction policy proposals.
• Second, it organizes proposed risk reduction measures into a framework of eight overarching categories, enabling the range of measures to be considered within a single, coherent resource.
• And third, it analyses these measures by drawing out the similarities, differences and nuances across the various policy proposals.

The compendium concludes with a list of the official risk reduction documents referenced throughout the publication, totalling over 100 documents. This list provides easy access to over a decade of official proposals by States in their own words.

Citation: Sarah Ruth Opatowski, Nuclear Risk Reduction: An Illustrative Compendium (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026). https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/26/NRR/01.

The post Nuclear Risk Reduction: An Illustrative Compendium first appeared on UNIDIR.

The workshop focused on promoting equality and innovation in international cooperation and capacity building in the nuclear field. It featured expert presentations and open discussions covering a range of approaches to training and technical cooperation.

Citation: UNIDIR and VCDNP, “Promoting equality and innovation in the nuclear field: Workshop report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025.

The post Promoting Equality and Innovation in the Nuclear Field: Workshop Report first appeared on UNIDIR.

The report emphasizes the need for early and sustained engagement through proactive dialogue, and balancing regional security objectives with NWS strategic interests.

Citation: Chen Zak Kane and Sarah Ruth Opatowski, “The Role of Extraregional States in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone”, Geneva, 2025.  https://www.doi.org/10.37559/MEWMDFZ/2025/ExtraRegRole.

The post The Role of Extraregional States in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone first appeared on UNIDIR.

Citation: Middle East WMD-Free Zone Project (2025) “Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

The post Submission on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 79/241 “Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects” first appeared on UNIDIR.

The report also surveys the current security environment, highlighting deteriorating arms control frameworks, strained dialogue among nuclear powers, and expanding arsenals as critical concerns. It emphasizes that arms races sustain or intensify hostility among protagonists, compounding the inherent risks of nuclear weapons through deliberate competitive build-ups that are likely to exacerbate existing tensions. The conclusion explores what approaches can be used to manage these risks.

Citation: Tim Caughley, Racing Towards Risk: The Hidden Costs of Nuclear Arms Build-Up (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025), https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NRR/01.

The post Racing Towards Risk: The Hidden Costs of Nuclear Arms Build-up first appeared on UNIDIR.

This report suggests an approach to verifying obligations assumed by States through a mechanism of demonstrative verification, in which a State that wants to demonstrate compliance with its obligations unilaterally implements measures to positively prove its compliance to an international audience. To be effective, these measures must include a detailed verification protocol, rely on open data rather than intelligence estimates, and potentially involve independent observers. This report discusses potential applications of this approach to nuclear arms control and space security.

Citation: Tamara Patton and Pavel Podvig, “Verification Without a Treaty. Demonstrative Verification in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Space Security”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/01.

The post Verification Without a Treaty first appeared on UNIDIR.

It identifies the possible implications of such adjustments on States’ positions regarding non-proliferation and disarmament initiatives, including the Middle East WMD Free Zone. The paper proposes a number of options to promote and enhance the security value of the Zone, including greater integration of the Zone with ongoing and future regional dialogues. The proposed options aim at strengthening the Zone’s core threat reduction, confidence-building and regional cooperation functions.

Citation: Abdolrasool Divsallar,“Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: The Role of the WMD-Free Zone Initiative,” (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025), https://www.doi.org/10.37559/MEWMDFZ/2025/CombatingWMD.

The post Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: The Role of the WMD-Free Zone Initiative first appeared on UNIDIR.

Transparency can play an important role in building confidence in international agreements, including the NPT. While several nuclear weapon States have provided information on Article VI obligations and related commitments, limited progress on disarmament has led to increased calls for greater transparency and accountability.

Various proposals have outlined how this might be achieved and what information should be provided, but there is less clarity around the options regarding the format and process of interactive discussion.

To help fill this gap, this report reviews models from other multilateral processes – including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Financial Action Task Force, the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, and the World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review Mechanism – and presents potential options for integrating interactive dialogue into the NPT review cycle.

Citation: James Revill, Victoria Viana Souza Guimarães, and Luiza Delaflora Cassol, “Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations”, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/02.

The post Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations first appeared on UNIDIR.

Indonesia invited countries that had submitted working papers on NNP at the 2022 NPT Review Conference – including those currently developing this technology – as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, to engage in further discussions on the issue. UNIDIR facilitated the discussion and provided background material on the topic at hand.

Citation: Luiza Delaflora Cassol and James Revill (eds.), “Strengthening the NPT Safeguards Regime for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Development: Event Summary”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/01.

The post Strengthening the NPT Safeguards Regime for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Development: Event Summary first appeared on UNIDIR.

The author examines plausible scenarios, such as the emergence of an arms race in military applications of AI among regional states, which could either increase WMD proliferation risks in the region or, conversely, help reduce them. The paper also discusses key factors AI may have in the negotiations to establish a WMD-Free Zone, including urgency and the potential technical benefits of AI in arms control processes.

Citation: Nasser bin Nasser, “The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Regional Security, Threat Perceptions and the Middle East WMD-Free Zone”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025, https://www.doi.org/10.37559/MEWMDFZ/2025/ZoneAI.

The post The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Regional Security, Threat Perceptions and the Middle East WMD-Free Zone first appeared on UNIDIR.

The retreat report defines the various forms of nuclear risks, highlights States’ differing interpretations of precautionary measures, explores potential flashpoints that could lead to nuclear use and examines ways to mitigate these risks.

The report also covers the contrasting views on deterrence, perceptions and misperceptions, the role of norms, challenges in signaling and the risks of escalation. Participants worked to identify islands of convergence amongst them, as well as potential areas of collaboration with non-nuclear-weapon States to advance risk reduction dialogue and measures.

Citation: Andrey Baklitskiy and Sarah Ruth Opatowski, Nuclear Risks: Perceptions and Pathways, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/NRR/01.

The post Nuclear Risks: Perceptions and Pathways first appeared on UNIDIR.

Several initiatives over the past decade have advanced the discussions on an FMCT. In addition, several states have indicated strong support for beginning negotiations on an FMCT, including through a recent initiative led by the Government of Japan. 

In December 2023, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that urged the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a treaty and urged states that possess or produce fissile materials for weapons to engage in transparency and confidence-building measures. However, the prospects for commencing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament remain uncertain. 

This paper outlines some of the issues that have complicated progress in the negotiation of an FMCT and lays out options for states to consider in seeking to revive discussions around this important concept. It covers some of the key questions regarding a future treaty, including whether or not the FMCT should be a disarmament treaty – that is, whether it should require the active elimination of fissile materials. 

The paper then lays out options for dealing with the related challenge of how to deal with existing stocks before considering issues related to transfers of fissile materials as well as options for transparency and confidence-building measures.

This project is generously supported by the Government of Japan.

Citation: Pavel Podvig, “Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Process”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024: https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/FMCT/1

The post Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Process first appeared on UNIDIR.

Although these treaties and their respective Review Conference processes vary, the experiences over 12 months between August 2022 and May 2023 provide an important snapshot of the state of the WMD treaty regime. As such, there is merit in reflecting on these three processes jointly and exploring the commonalities and differences across three agreements dealing with the world’s most destructive weapons, as well as gathering lessons learned for future work in these fields.

To this end, UNIDIR invited the Presidents of the three Review Conferences to provide their reflections on their respective Review Conference processes. This publication brings together insights from Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen (Argentina), President of the tenth NPT Review Conference; Ambassador Leonardo Bencini (Italy), President of the ninth BWC Review Conference; and Ambassador Henk Cor Van der Kwast (the Kingdom of the Netherlands) who presided over the fifth CWC Review Conference. The Ambassadors take stock of the preparatory processes and the events that unfolded, and provide reflections for moving forward in the NPT, the BWC and the CWC respectively. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, provides a foreword. The publication also includes a short summary of findings by the editors.

Citation: Leonardo Bencini, Henk Cor van der Kwast & Gustavo Zlauvinen (2023) “Reflections on Review Conferences: the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention”, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/RevCon/01

The post Reflections on Review Conferences: the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention first appeared on UNIDIR.

The Menzingen Verification Experiment was designed to test practical procedures for verifying the absence of nuclear weapons at a storage site. The experiment, which was conducted on 8 March 2023, was organized by UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, and the Open Nuclear Network. The project was supported by the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.

This report describes the procedure and the key results of the Menzingen Verification Experiment.

Citation: Podvig, Pavel (ed.). 2023. “Menzingen Verification Experiment. Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field”, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/MVE.

The post Menzingen Verification Experiment: Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field first appeared on UNIDIR.

This workshop report provides a summary of the discussion, key findings and insights from a workshop organised by UNIDIR to inform discussion on this issue in the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone context.

The report provides an overview of the status of nuclear energy programmes in the Middle East, reviews existing mechanisms for regional cooperation on nuclear research and energy, identifies potential areas for cooperation in nuclear safety and security, and offers insights on these in the context of the Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone.

Citation: Sarah Ruth Opatowski (2023) “Development and Cooperation on Nuclear Research and Energy in the Middle East: Workshop Report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

The post Development and Cooperation on Nuclear Research and Energy in the Middle East: Workshop Report first appeared on UNIDIR.

This paper addresses the complexities associated with nuclear disarmament in the absence of an internationally accepted multilateral framework. The paper sketches out and examines the implications of two primary pathways to achieve nuclear disarmament in a future WMDFZ treaty, and the inclusion of specific disarmament provisions in the zone treaty. The paper also discusses the implications for each pathway.

The paper’s objective is to provide officials and experts with an overview of existing frameworks and tools for nuclear disarmament and how these might be addressed in the regional context and within the Middle East WMDFZ treaty.

Citation: Tomisha Bino and Karim Haggag (2023) “Examining Modalities for Nuclear Disarmament in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Treaty”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/MEWMDFZ/2023/modalities

EVENT RECORDING

A recording of this event can be viewed on UNIDIR’s Youtube channel, or below.

The post Examining Modalities for Nuclear Disarmament in the Middle East WMD-Free Zone Treaty first appeared on UNIDIR.

Citation: Amy F. Woolf (2023) “The Past and Future of Bilateral Nuclear Arms Control”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/DDAC/01.

The post The Past and Future of Bilateral Nuclear Arms Control first appeared on UNIDIR.

Preview image by GeoEye.

Sponsor Organizations: Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute’s activities. This research project of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme is supported by the Government of New Zealand.

Citation: Pavel Podvig (ed.) (2022) “Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, UNIDIR, Geneva. Switzerland, https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/TPNW/01

The post Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons first appeared on UNIDIR.

To this end, UNIDIR convened a two-day virtual workshop with partners from the University of Leicester and Yale-NUS College (Singapore). The workshop brought together members of the diplomatic community and experts in nuclear and cyber policy to jointly explore the cyber-nuclear nexus, identify areas of concern, and consider potential options to reduce risk. The discussion over the course of this two-day workshop is summarized in this report.

Citation: Rinko Kawamoto, Eleanor Krabill, and Harry Spencer (2022) “Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop Series: The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus, Summary Report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/NRR/01. 

The post The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus Summary: Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop Series first appeared on UNIDIR.

This report covers various aspects of verification arrangements that could be applied to missiles. The authors look at the experience of past arms control and disarmament efforts, provide an overview of existing verification tools, and initiate a discussion of potential arrangements that could make future arms control agreements possible.

The general conclusion of the report is that there is a variety of options to consider. Most verification arrangements would require a fairly high level of transparency, but that is what makes them stronger and more reliable. The path to building an effective verification arrangement is to design it in a way that facilitates cooperation and transparency. 

Citation: Podvig, Pavel (ed.) (2022) “Exploring Options for Missile Verification”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/)2/Misver/01

Listings image: Detail of “Topol TEL in Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineers and Signal Corps St. Petersburg” by Tobias Begemann, CC BY 2.0 licence

Sponsor Organizations: Government of Germany.

The post Exploring Options for Missile Verification first appeared on UNIDIR.

It traces trends both in the development of cyber capabilities and the digitalization of nuclear weapons systems that could drive more frequent interactions at the cyber–nuclear nexus. It considers how these interactions, direct and indirect, might impact on escalatory risk scenarios—drawing upon State doctrines, postures, and capabilities in the nuclear and cyber spheres. It then outlines a series of recommendations for States both to minimize cyber–nuclear interactions and to mitigate their effects when they do occur.

As part of UNIDIR’s ongoing research on nuclear risk reduction, this paper is intended to feed into the dialogue on taking forward risk reduction—and on the development of practical and feasible measures that can help to close pathways to use.

Citation: Wilfred Wan, Andraz Kastelic, and Eleanor Krabill (2021) “The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus: Interactions and Risks” NRR: Friction Points Series, Paper 2. UNIDIR, Geneva, https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/21/NRR/03

The post The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus: Interactions and Risks first appeared on UNIDIR.

It considers the multipolar dynamics between the United States, the Russian Federation, and China, and examines how fundamental mistrust among the three filters into their readings of each other’s nuclear strategies, with the potential to have an impact on escalatory risk scenarios. It then outlines a series of recommendations for the ‘great powers’ to bridge strategic perception gaps and reduce relevant risks.

Part of UNIDIR’s ongoing research on nuclear risk reduction, this study is intended to feed into the dialogue on taking forward risk reduction – and on the development of practical and feasible baskets of measures that can close pathways to use of nuclear weapons.

Citation: Wilfred Wan (2021) “Nuclear Escalation Strategies and Perceptions: The United States, the Russian Federation, and China.” NRR: Friction Points Series, Paper One, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/21/NRR/02. 

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