While not a new technology, recent advances in machine capabilities and declining costs have accelerated its integration into military supply chains, operational environments and industrial production. As a dual-use, cyber-physical manufacturing technology, additive manufacturing offers strategic advantages, but it also raises proliferation and diversion risks that warrant closer scrutiny by policymakers and the arms control community.

This primer provides a short overview of what additive manufacturing is and how it works, explains what types of military equipment it can help produce, who is involved, why it is sought and what its limitations are. It also examines the risks emerging from the use of this technology in manufacturing and provides an overview of existing arms control and transfer control measures, as well as their gaps and limitations. The primer concludes by outlining several considerations for policymakers on how to overcome existing challenges.

Citation: Grand-Clément, Sarah and Sunniva Selmer Reinertsen, Additive Manufacturing of Conventional Military Equipment: Implications for Arms Control and Security. A Primer (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026). https://doi.org/10.37559/CWP/26/ERC/06.

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In response, the Fourth Review Conference of the PoA in 2024 established an Open-Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG). This report aims to introduce national representatives to the four primary issues under the OETEG’s mandate:

1. Polymer frames and receivers
2. Modular SALW
3. 3D printing of SALW
4. Technology to counter diversion of SALW

The report summarizes the current state of knowledge, building on a series of webinars convened between October 2025 and February 2026, background research, and interviews with experts from international organizations, governments, academia, civil society and industry.

It explains each of the four issues, detailing the challenges they pose, outlining approaches to addressing them and highlighting key considerations for the OETEG.

Citation: Ruben Nicolin, Paula Soumaya Domit, Sunniva Selmer Reinertsen and Matilde Vecchioni. Technological Developments in Small Arms: Implications for International Arms Control Instruments. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026. https://doi.org/10.37559/CWP/26/ASC/05

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Neurotechnologies, while still emerging, are advancing rapidly and gaining prominence. These technologies have a clear dual-use nature: in addition to civilian applications, military research laboratories are actively exploring ways to enhance soldiers’ cognitive, sensory and physical capabilities, including through direct brain-machine interfaces with uncrewed systems. The potential military use of neurotechnologies raises significant security concerns and could affect the conduct of warfare, presenting complex disarmament, ethical and legal challenges.

The Innovations Dialogue 2025, building on existing international efforts, sought to provide a neutral space to address this topic through the lens of arms control, disarmament and international security. It did so by examining the current state of neurotechnologies, considering associated risks and opportunities for international peace and security, and exploring pathways towards responsible governance.

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Citation: Federico Mantellassi and Edward Madziwa, Neurotechnology in the Military Domain: A Primer (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025)

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This UNIDIR research examines trends in the development and use of UMS between 2019 and 2024, identifying 60 UMS programmes across 17 countries that have utilized a wide range of systems. More than 40 attacks took place during the same period, with a notable rise since 2023.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms could play an important role in enhancing mutual trust and confidence between States if it were to contain information on international transfers and acquisitions of armed UMS. Due to their technical characteristics, however, most UMS fall outside the Register’s reporting categories, therefore remaining unreported.

This research puts forward four options for consideration by the Group of Governmental Experts in 2024-2025 on the continuing operation and future development of the Register. These options could also be considered by States participating in other multilateral instruments that contribute to increasing transparency in international transfers and acquisitions.

Citation: Anabel García García, Sarah Grand-Clément, Paul Holtom, “Changing Tides in Maritime Warfare: Closing the Reporting Gap on Uncrewed Maritime Systems in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025, https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/25/ERC/03.

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To address this knowledge gap, UNIDIR’s annual Compendium on Enabling Technologies and International Security focuses on identifying and analysing key advancements in enabling technologies, with a particular emphasis on those still in their early stages of development or application. This 2024 edition builds upon the 2023 compendium, providing an update on the latest developments in enabling technologies as they relate to international peace and security. While this edition addresses technological developments and applications specific to 2024, the 2023 compendium remains an essential resource for more detailed foundational analyses. 

The compendium categorises enabling technologies into four areas: 

• Category I: advanced materials, including semiconductors, superconductors and nanotechnology; 

• Category II: parts and components, such as microchips and sensors; 

• Category III: processing and computing, covering cloud, edge and quantum computing; and 

• Category IV: connectivity infrastructure, spanning fifth- and sixth-generation telecommunications (5G and 6G), the Internet of Things and satellite communications. 

Funded by

Citation: He, Wenting. “Enabling Technologies and International Security: A Compendium (2024 edition)”, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2024.

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The dialogue featured multidisciplinary discussions on quantum computing, communications and sensing, focusing on equitable access, capacity building, and the role of multilateral frameworks. Key themes included bridging the “quantum divide,” fostering collaboration across sectors and integrating quantum advancements with Sustainable Development Goals.  

The 2024 Innovations Dialogue emphasized fostering inclusive, collaborative and forward-thinking approaches to quantum governance. By uniting global stakeholders and leveraging innovative ideas, the conference explored possible pathways to responsibly harness quantum technologies’ transformative power. It laid the groundwork for future multilateral discussions to shape secure, equitable and innovative quantum advancements.

This report is not intended to be a detailed account of the conference proceedings but rather an easily accessible reference point. For more information, watch the full conference recording.

Citation: Dongyoun Cho, 2024 Innovations Dialogue: Quantum Technologies and Their Implications for International Peace and Security, Conference Summary Report, Geneva, UNIDIR, 2024.

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The centrality of cloud computing to modern life and the concentration of services among a few actors mean that failures – either accidental or as the result of adversarial action – can be severe, with cascading effects across industries, services and states. To understand the profound impacts of this critical enabling technology on international security, this report provides an overview of relevant use cases, benefits and risks of cloud computing, as well as its key governance challenges and implications for arms control. Structured into two parts – a technology primer and a governance primer – this report offers both technical insights and policy analysis.

Citation

Brief – Federico Mantellassi and Giacomo Persi Paoli, Cloud Computing Governance: a Research Brief (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024).

Full report – Federico Mantellassi and Giacomo Persi Paoli, Cloud Computing and International Security: Risks, Opportunities and Governance Challenges (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024).

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• First, the development of AI technologies has – at least in part – depended on the availability of large datasets to train AI models.
• Second, data is a resource whose availability, collection, cleaning, use and sharing is affected by factors such as collection costs, lack of real-world data in certain domains, as well as regulatory, legal and ethical constraints.
• Third, data quality, representativeness, and diversity are directly linked to an AI model’s performance, level of bias, accuracy and reliability.

Synthetic data – data that is artificially generated in the digital world with properties that are often derived from an original set of data – has been proposed as a solution to address some of these data-related issues, especially for AI model training. However, synthetic data is no panacea, and has been shown to potentially exacerbate many of the issues it seeks to curtail, sparking governance discussions.

To explore the governance challenges of synthetic data in the context of international security, UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme held an event titled Technology and Security Seminar on Synthetic Data: Exploring Governance Implications.

This report provides a summary of the key themes and takeaways from discussions at the event. The report is divided into two parts, reflecting the structure of the event. The first part provides a short overview of the technology and its uses in the military domain. The second part presents the various views, issues and potential challenges to governance presented by synthetic data in the context of international security.

Citation: Federico Mantellassi, “Governance Implications of Synthetic Data in the Context of International Security”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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Since 1999, the UN has expressed concern over the misuse of ICTs and initiated multilateral processes, including Groups of Governmental Experts and Open-ended Working Groups (OEWGs), to address ICT threats. With the second OEWG concluding in 2025, there is a recognized need for a permanent mechanism under UN auspices to ensure continuity in addressing ICT security. Key resolutions (75/240, 77/37, and 78/16) and past consensus OEWG reports have laid the groundwork for further action, culminating in States recommending the establishment of a future permanent mechanism at the 8th substantive session of the OEWG in July 2024.

Background

The initial iteration of this report was developed as food-for-thought to support discussions among State representatives during a UNIDIR workshop on future permanent mechanism convened in June 2024. An updated version of this report was shared with delegates ahead of the 8th substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) in July 2024, where formal deliberations on establishing a permanent mechanism on ICT security took place.

The new iteration synthesizes insights from UN General Assembly resolutions, OEWG sessions and State submissions, offering potential pathways for creating a fit-for-purpose permanent mechanism on ICT security. It also contains an appendix summarizing discussions from the June 2024 UNIDIR workshop and highlighting specific elements of the future permanent mechanism agreed by States at the OEWG in July 2024.

Key findings 

This report highlights the following areas of convergence, divergence and key findings:

• Areas of convergence: States agree on the need for a permanent mechanism to promote international peace and security in cyberspace, as well as its general purpose, structure and guiding principles of inclusivity, flexibility, transparency, sustainability, complementarity and non-duplication.
• Areas of divergence: Differences remain regarding the mechanism’s precise modalities, thematic focus and programmatic priorities. Specific issues, such as its name, sequencing of activities, participation of non-governmental stakeholders and thematic groups, also require further discussions.

The report also highlights that the success and long-term viability of a permanent UN mechanism on ICT security will depend on finding a balance between high-level political discussions and technical exchanges. By building on areas of convergence and incorporating ongoing discussions around divergences, States can establish a sustainable mechanism capable of enhancing international cooperation and strengthening global ICT security over time while minimizing the risk of institutional gridlocks.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, “Towards regular institutional dialogue on international ICT security: Review of current proposals and considerations for effective dialogue”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024. 

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Citation: Malekos Smith, Zhanna L., and Persi Paoli, Giacomo. “Quantum Technology, Peace and Security: A Primer”. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2024.

Funded by

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National positions can foster transparency on the national level as well as internationally. They can act as a reference document and can therefore guide bilateral engagement with international partners as well as national contributions to multilateral processes dedicated to State use of information and communications technology in the context of international peace and security. When drafted in consultation with international partners, a national position can foster international cooperation. It can also enhance preparedness to address future cyber operations by providing national guidelines with respect to assessment, classification and response to variety of malicious cyber operations. Finally, the utility of national positions can be found in their ability to contribute to the development of international law in general.

National positions are dynamic in nature. A State’s national position could initially focus on key issues as defined by that State’s interest and capacity. This approach requires prioritizing certain legal areas, with the understanding that the position may evolve in the future. In particular, it may need to adapt to technological developments and evolving multilateral discussions.

To maximize their utility, national positions should prioritize the interpretation of principles and rules previously agreed by the various multilateral discussions as applicable to State use of ICT. When deciding on the content of its national position, a State could further consult existing regional approaches to the topic and the national positions of other States. Indeed, topics most frequently addressed by existing national positions include the United Nations Charter, international humanitarian law, the law of State responsibility, due diligence and international human rights law.

Last but not least, this compendium suggests 10 steps that a State could consider taking when developing its national position – starting with defining the scope of the position through, inter alia, threat landscape assessment and consideration of foreign policy priorities, and concluding with publication and dissemination of the position.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, “A Compendium of Good Practices: Developing a National Position on the Interpretation of International Law and State Use of ICT”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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To address this knowledge gap, this compendium is dedicated to the identification and analysis of the most salient advancements in enabling technologies, with a particular emphasis on those still in their early stages of development or application. The compendium explores four categories of enabling technologies: advanced materials (semiconductors, superconductors and nanotechnology), parts and components (microchips and sensors), processing and computing (cloud, edge and quantum computing), and infrastructure (fifth- and sixth-generation telecommunications (5G and 6G), the Internet of Things, cloud infrastructure and satellite communications).

Citation: Wenting He (2024). “Enabling Technologies and International Security: A Compendium (2023 Edition)”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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This paper seeks to bridge this gap by presenting a needs-driven, systematic, and context-sensitive framework to identify and assess technologies that could strengthen efforts to counter the diversion of conventional arms and related components.

The first step of this framework requires an understanding of the risks and methods of diversion, tailored to each specific type of conventional weapon and its life-cycle context. The second step examines the existing technologies which could help address the identified risk(s). The final step assesses the identified technologies according to the context(s) in which they would be applied, as well as against selected attributes the technologies should possess.

The paper also provides two illustrations to show how the framework could be applied to small arms and light weapons on the one hand, and components of conventional weapons on the other.

Sponsor Organizations: Germany (Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme) and Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Microsoft (Security and Technology Programme).

Citation: Sarah Grand-Clément and Diederik Cops (2023) “Project D-TECT: Technologies to Counter the Diversion of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and Components of Conventional Weapons”, UNIDIR and the Flemish Peace Institute. https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/23/ERC/08

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Traditionally, ceasefire monitoring and verification has been human-led. In some circumstances, it can however be difficult deploy observers on the ground. While technology cannot replace humans in all aspects of the monitoring and verification of ceasefires, especially within dialogue and de-escalation efforts, technology can nonetheless support and complement human-led activities. 

This report explains what technological solutions are available to help monitor and verify ceasefires, outlining the respective technological advantages and limitations of each solution. The report also provides a series of guiding considerations around the use of technology, highlighting recommended issues to reflect upon before using technology to aid with ceasefire monitoring and verification 

Sponsor Organizations: Germany (Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme) and Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Microsoft (Security and Technology Programme).

Citation: Sarah Grand-Clément (2022) “Exploring the Use of Technology for Remote Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification”, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/22/ERC/06

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HIGHLIGHTS & RECORDINGS:

• Read a brief summary of the Conference Highlights
• Watch all of the conference sessions again (via the UNIDIR YouTube channel or below)

Teaser: Deepfakes, Trust and International Security

Citation: Alisha Anand and Belen Bianco (2021) “The 2021 Innovations Dialogue Conference Report: Deepfakes, Trust and International Security”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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This paper provides a brief overview of DLT, including its main characteristics, benefits and risks, as well as its potential applications and utility in the context of arms control and non-proliferation.

Sponsor Organizations: Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and Microsoft

Citation: Giacomo Persi Paoli and Cindy Vestergaard (2021) “Exploring Distributed Ledger Technology for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: A Primer”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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This study seeks to inform discussions on establishing a dedicated and systematic S&T review process under the BWC through an examination of existing S&T review-type mechanisms employed in different regimes beyond the BWC, a survey of States Parties views on a possible review mechanism and a study of past and present discourse on this issue in the BWC. Based on the analysis conducted, this study also presents options for BWC States Parties to consider ahead of the Ninth BWC Review Conference.

Citation: James Revill, Alisha Anand and Giacomo Persi Paoli (2021) “Exploring Science and Technology Review Mechanisms Under the Biological Weapons Convention”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/SECTEC/2021/SandTreviews/01

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Citation: Alisha Anand (2020) “The 2020 Innovations Dialogue Conference Report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

Teaser: Life Sciences, International Security and Disarmament

Sponsor Organizations: SecTec core funders: the Governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, and by Microsoft.

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Citation: Security and Technology Programme (2017) “The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Autonomous Weapon Systems and Cyber Operations”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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One’s position on both an appropriate definition and an adequate policy response ultimately depends on what one is concerned about. Different definitions will attend different sets of concerns, as well as privilege different sets of characteristics.

The objective of this primer is to consolidate and give an overview of both concerns and characteristics and illustrate how different definitional approaches attend to these.

Citation: Security and Technology Programme (2017) “The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Concerns, Characteristics and Definitional Approaches”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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It highlights the importance of data centres and of access to computing power (“compute” for short) as enablers of AI-driven capabilities. It also points to a clear step up in the steadily growing role and responsibility of private technology actors in 21st century warfare.

The role of the commercial cloud in warfare

It is first worth setting out why commercial data centres may be seen as targets, and what role they – and cloud computing more generally – play in modern military operations. Data centres are the physical backbone of the digital infrastructure that enables much of the digital capabilities now required by military operations.

Cloud computing enables access to the vast quantities of compute needed to train and deploy AI algorithms as well as to store, move and analyse data. Data centres are therefore a key element in the ability of modern militaries to leverage AI for autonomous capabilities, decision-support systems, data-fusion, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and targeting. No public information, however, exists to ascertain whether these specific data centres were directly contributing to ongoing military operations.

The role of AI in military operations is continuing to expand as battlefields produce ever more sensor data and require more compute. Operations are thus becoming increasingly reliant on ever more – and faster – collection, fusion and analysis of data. With these changes, the role of commercial cloud service providers (CSPs) – the only ones currently capable of managing such scale – is only likely to grow.

Security implications of targeting data centres

Targeting data centres has clear security implications.

• First, the reliance by armed forces on commercial CSPs intertwines military applications with the infrastructure that supports civilian digital applications. As the same data centres support both military and civilian workloads, strikes against them carry a dual risk: they elevate the threat to civilian infrastructure and they lead to cascading effects across civilian life, triggering service outages and possible material effects.

• Second, the targeting of data centres raises questions about how to defend such infrastructure. Hyperscalers – the companies operating the largest data centres – boast advanced cybersecurity capabilities and contingency plans for natural disasters that enable them to ensure service continuity. However, these data centres are built for and considered as commercial enterprises. They are not equipped – or even conceptualized – to deal with military threats. Often the size of small cities, data centres are both difficult to hide and extremely costly to secure against kinetic threats.

• Third, as a globally distributed network, data centres need not reside within a State’s borders to serve their purpose. The free flow of data and workloads across borders is, in many respects, a defining feature of modern cloud architecture. Yet, this means that the digital backbone underpinning military capabilities may be distributed geographically across the territory of neutral States. This carries profound implications for conflict should data centres increasingly become targets. A belligerent may, theoretically, be compelled to target infrastructure well beyond the theatre of active hostilities to deny its adversaries access to their cloud enabled-capabilities. Such strikes risk expanding the borders of a conflict, and so may contribute to escalation dynamics and negatively affect regional security.

Legal ramifications of targeting data centres

The legal implications that stem from these strikes relate in particular to international humanitarian law and the extent to which the private sector may be affected. While States remain the primary subjects of international humanitarian law, a host of implications emerge for industry.
First, a data centre that serves both civilian and military purposes may constitute a legitimate target as a consequence of its potential status as a military objective if it is found to

“make an effective contribution to military action and [if its] total or partial destruction . . . in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”

as a result of its nature, location, purpose or use. In the context of data centres and, more generally, digital infrastructure, the crux lies in the extent to which their destruction would offer “definite military advantage”. The assessment of this advantage must be independent of the existence of redundancy measures in the event of damage to this particular facility.

Second, the destruction of digital infrastructure in war points to States’ obligation to take

“all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects under their control against the effects of attacks”.

This issue is of particular importance given the potential second- and third-order effects that their destruction may have on civilian life and the humanitarian sector, where connectivity may constitute a critical enabler. Whether feasible precautions would require the strict, physical separation of civilian data centres from the military or even added measures (either by the States hosting or benefitting from a data centre or by the technology provider) to secure and protect these facilities. Regardless of which actor takes which steps, the importance of clarifying these questions and the expected distribution of roles and responsibilities is further emphasized by the “increased meshing” of civilian and military cloud technologies.

Third, in addition to destruction of the physical hardware, another question arises as to whether the data hosted in dual-use data centres could, itself, constitute a lawful military objective. If this is the case, then the data could be subject to attack by way of (partial) destruction of the infrastructure that hosts it. This issue is of particular relevance due to the increased integration of AI into military systems – and the dependence of these technologies on data throughout their life cycle.

Beyond the technology, the possible targetability of staff working at these data centres arises. While civilians are, in principle, protected from attacks under international humanitarian law, they may lose their protection if they are found to be directly participating in hostilities. Independently of whether contributing to the operation of a dual-use data centre could constitute direct participation in hostilities, this question is of particular importance in the light of today’s technology-heavy defence landscape.

This trend may, subsequently, require the presence of technical personnel, such as engineers, in or near the frontlines for maintenance and other operational functions critical to the deployment and use of military capabilities. There is precedent of such maintenance workshops being established by governmental armed forces. However, States’ dependence on the private sector for military capabilities – extending beyond weapon systems to data centres and other technological infrastructure – is growing. This may lead in the foreseeable future to the deployment in the battlefield of civilian engineers and technicians from technology suppliers to ensure the continued operation and maintenance of that infrastructure.

The need for structured engagement between the public and private sectors

These observations ultimately attest to two realities.
The foremost of these is that risk assessments and mitigation measures for both the public and the private sectors will inevitably evolve from traditional structures. While the destruction of military factories is far from being a novel strategy, the increased reliance on dual-use digital infrastructures such as data centres further emphasizes the need for both States and technology suppliers to re-evaluate their risk assessments.

The large prime contractors in the defence industry may already have established structures and processes for such risk assessments. To the extent that their facilities may be military objectives, technology companies should follow suit if they are to supply, even remotely, capabilities to the military. To this end, States and the private sector should clarify expectations with respect to the distribution of roles and responsibilities, including in the context of risk assessments and mitigation.

The other, equally significant, reality is that the need for structured engagement between the public and the private sectors is now more evident than ever. Beyond risks assessments and clarity on the distribution of roles and responsibilities, establishing shared expectations could ultimately foster predictability, mutual trust and accountability and could contribute positively to international peace and security. States and non-state actors (including industry) have engaged extensively since 2018 on information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the context of international security as part of two United Nations open-ended working groups. The upcoming Global Mechanism on ICT in the context of international security subsequently provides an opportunity to deepen the multi-stakeholder dialogue on, among other things, voluntary norms and international law, particularly the protection of dual-use infrastructure and data.

Specifically on AI, UNIDIR in partnership with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights launched an initiative dedicated to the development of a Framework of Responsible Industry Behaviour for AI in the Military Domain. The framework seeks to provide a practical and actionable set of voluntary guidelines firmly grounded in international law and norms, to be co-developed in collaboration with industry actors and governments.

As the boundary between commercial cloud computing and the military domain continues to blur, the strikes on the data centres in the Gulf confirm that digital infrastructure is not only the backbone of our society, but that it also lies on the frontline of modern conflict. The engagement of the international, multi-stakeholder community with governance processes, including within the United Nations, is now more critical than ever to ensure that current and future infrastructure fosters international peace and security, and does not become the catalyst for escalation and conflict.

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The rapid pace of scientific and technological innovation is reshaping the global security landscape, presenting both opportunities and risks for disarmament efforts. Advances in artificial intelligence (AI), biotechnology, additive manufacturing, and autonomous systems are blurring traditional boundaries between civilian and military applications, creating new challenges for weapons control and verification regimes.

In a response to scientific and technological advancements surpassing global disarmament frameworks, UNIDIR hosted the Watchtower project launch as a side event to the 80th session of the UN General Assembly First Committee. The launch underscored the urgent need to bridge the gap between innovation and international security.

What experts are saying

The launch event spotlighted some of the most pressing implications of science and technology for disarmament regimes. In the realm of conventional arms and ammunition, Rueben Dass, Senior Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research at the S. Rajatnaram School of International Studies noted that “additive manufacturing (3D printing) enables the rapid, decentralized production of weapons components, potentially undermining export controls and fuelling illicit proliferation.”

Blockchain and cryptocurrency innovations, while promising for supply chain transparency, could also facilitate anonymous funding for arms trafficking. For nuclear weapons, Dr Manpreet Sethi, Science and Technology Advisor at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, highlighted that “cyber vulnerabilities in command-and-control systems and the rise of small modular reactors introduce dual-edged risks: enhanced energy security alongside proliferation concerns if safeguards lag.”

Key risks and opportunities

Emerging biotechnologies, such as gene editing and synthetic biology, blur lines between beneficial medical research and chemical or biological weapon development. This is exacerbated by AI tools that democratize access to hazardous designs. Quantum computing further threatens encryption protecting sensitive disarmament data, while AI-driven autonomous systems could erode human oversight in conflict escalation.

Yet, these technologies also hold opportunities for stronger monitoring. AI algorithms could revolutionize safeguards verification by analyzing satellite imagery for undeclared nuclear activities, and mobile apps might empower citizen science for radiation detection. Challenges in science and technology monitoring, however, loom large. The sheer velocity of breakthroughs demands agile, inclusive data-sharing; geopolitical tensions hinder cross-border collaboration; dual-use ambiguities complicate risk assessment; and bridging the divide between scientific communities and policymakers requires sustained trust-building and geographical diversity to ensure equitable representation.

The Watchtower project will provide a systematic horizon-scanning function, track emerging innovations, and assess their potential implications for international peace and security. It will also foster dialogue between policymakers, scientists and disarmament experts to bridge technical and policy perspectives.

What’s next

In January, UNIDIR is gearing up for the launch of the Expert Networks across three disarmament areas:

• Conventional Arms and Ammunition (co-chaired by Rueben Dass and Josephine Dresner);
• Nuclear Weapons (co-chaired by Dr Manpreet Sethi and Dr Hassan Elbahtimy); and
• Chemical and Biological Weapons (co-chaired by Dr Jonathan Forman and Dr Una Jakob).

These Expert Networks will serve as a collaborative platform to exchange insights, pilot methodologies for technological monitoring, and publish periodic assessments.

The Watchtower project builds on UNIDIR’s ongoing research on emerging technologies and their security implications, including recent analyses under the Security and Technology Programme. Previous publications have examined the role of AI in arms control verification, neurotechnology in the military domain, and trends in biotechnology and material science relevant to non-proliferation. The project will complement and expand this body of work, helping ensure that international disarmament policy evolves in step with scientific progress.  

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