It highlights the different forms TFGBV may take globally and includes statistics on this emerging issue. TFGBV is a threat to individual and collective safety and has direct and indirect implications for international peace and security, particularly in cyberspace, where online violence transcends borders and can generate transnational security risks.

The factsheet concludes with suggested areas of action for multilateral organizations, national governments, civil society and industry actors that aim to prevent and mitigate the risk of TFGBV.

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While not a new technology, recent advances in machine capabilities and declining costs have accelerated its integration into military supply chains, operational environments and industrial production. As a dual-use, cyber-physical manufacturing technology, additive manufacturing offers strategic advantages, but it also raises proliferation and diversion risks that warrant closer scrutiny by policymakers and the arms control community.

As part of UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower project, this primer provides a short overview of what additive manufacturing is and how it works, explains what types of military equipment it can help produce, who is involved, why it is sought and what its limitations are. It also examines the risks emerging from the use of this technology in manufacturing and provides an overview of existing arms control and transfer control measures, as well as their gaps and limitations. The primer concludes by outlining several considerations for policymakers on how to overcome existing challenges.

Citation: Grand-Clément, Sarah and Sunniva Selmer Reinertsen, Additive Manufacturing of Conventional Military Equipment: Implications for Arms Control and Security. A Primer (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026). https://doi.org/10.37559/CWP/26/ERC/06.

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In response, the Fourth Review Conference of the PoA in 2024 established an Open-Ended Technical Expert Group (OETEG). This report aims to introduce national representatives to the four primary issues under the OETEG’s mandate:

1. Polymer frames and receivers
2. Modular SALW
3. 3D printing of SALW
4. Technology to counter diversion of SALW

The report summarizes the current state of knowledge, building on a series of webinars convened between October 2025 and February 2026, background research, and interviews with experts from international organizations, governments, academia, civil society and industry.

It explains each of the four issues, detailing the challenges they pose, outlining approaches to addressing them and highlighting key considerations for the OETEG.

Citation: Ruben Nicolin, Paula Soumaya Domit, Sunniva Selmer Reinertsen and Matilde Vecchioni. Technological Developments in Small Arms: Implications for International Arms Control Instruments. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026. https://doi.org/10.37559/CWP/26/ASC/05

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Neurotechnologies, while still emerging, are advancing rapidly and gaining prominence. These technologies have a clear dual-use nature: in addition to civilian applications, military research laboratories are actively exploring ways to enhance soldiers’ cognitive, sensory and physical capabilities, including through direct brain-machine interfaces with uncrewed systems. The potential military use of neurotechnologies raises significant security concerns and could affect the conduct of warfare, presenting complex disarmament, ethical and legal challenges.

The Innovations Dialogue 2025, building on existing international efforts, sought to provide a neutral space to address this topic through the lens of arms control, disarmament and international security. It did so by examining the current state of neurotechnologies, considering associated risks and opportunities for international peace and security, and exploring pathways towards responsible governance.

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Citation: Federico Mantellassi and Edward Madziwa, Neurotechnology in the Military Domain: A Primer (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025)

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This UNIDIR research examines trends in the development and use of UMS between 2019 and 2024, identifying 60 UMS programmes across 17 countries that have utilized a wide range of systems. More than 40 attacks took place during the same period, with a notable rise since 2023.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms could play an important role in enhancing mutual trust and confidence between States if it were to contain information on international transfers and acquisitions of armed UMS. Due to their technical characteristics, however, most UMS fall outside the Register’s reporting categories, therefore remaining unreported.

This research puts forward four options for consideration by the Group of Governmental Experts in 2024-2025 on the continuing operation and future development of the Register. These options could also be considered by States participating in other multilateral instruments that contribute to increasing transparency in international transfers and acquisitions.

Citation: Anabel García García, Sarah Grand-Clément, Paul Holtom, “Changing Tides in Maritime Warfare: Closing the Reporting Gap on Uncrewed Maritime Systems in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025, https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/25/ERC/03.

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To address this knowledge gap, UNIDIR’s annual Compendium on Enabling Technologies and International Security focuses on identifying and analysing key advancements in enabling technologies, with a particular emphasis on those still in their early stages of development or application. This 2024 edition builds upon the 2023 compendium, providing an update on the latest developments in enabling technologies as they relate to international peace and security. While this edition addresses technological developments and applications specific to 2024, the 2023 compendium remains an essential resource for more detailed foundational analyses. 

The compendium categorises enabling technologies into four areas: 

• Category I: advanced materials, including semiconductors, superconductors and nanotechnology; 

• Category II: parts and components, such as microchips and sensors; 

• Category III: processing and computing, covering cloud, edge and quantum computing; and 

• Category IV: connectivity infrastructure, spanning fifth- and sixth-generation telecommunications (5G and 6G), the Internet of Things and satellite communications. 

Funded by

Citation: He, Wenting. “Enabling Technologies and International Security: A Compendium (2024 edition)”, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2024.

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The dialogue featured multidisciplinary discussions on quantum computing, communications and sensing, focusing on equitable access, capacity building, and the role of multilateral frameworks. Key themes included bridging the “quantum divide,” fostering collaboration across sectors and integrating quantum advancements with Sustainable Development Goals.  

The 2024 Innovations Dialogue emphasized fostering inclusive, collaborative and forward-thinking approaches to quantum governance. By uniting global stakeholders and leveraging innovative ideas, the conference explored possible pathways to responsibly harness quantum technologies’ transformative power. It laid the groundwork for future multilateral discussions to shape secure, equitable and innovative quantum advancements.

This report is not intended to be a detailed account of the conference proceedings but rather an easily accessible reference point. For more information, watch the full conference recording.

Citation: Dongyoun Cho, 2024 Innovations Dialogue: Quantum Technologies and Their Implications for International Peace and Security, Conference Summary Report, Geneva, UNIDIR, 2024.

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The centrality of cloud computing to modern life and the concentration of services among a few actors mean that failures – either accidental or as the result of adversarial action – can be severe, with cascading effects across industries, services and states. To understand the profound impacts of this critical enabling technology on international security, this report provides an overview of relevant use cases, benefits and risks of cloud computing, as well as its key governance challenges and implications for arms control. Structured into two parts – a technology primer and a governance primer – this report offers both technical insights and policy analysis.

Citation

Brief – Federico Mantellassi and Giacomo Persi Paoli, Cloud Computing Governance: a Research Brief (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024).

Full report – Federico Mantellassi and Giacomo Persi Paoli, Cloud Computing and International Security: Risks, Opportunities and Governance Challenges (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024).

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• First, the development of AI technologies has – at least in part – depended on the availability of large datasets to train AI models.
• Second, data is a resource whose availability, collection, cleaning, use and sharing is affected by factors such as collection costs, lack of real-world data in certain domains, as well as regulatory, legal and ethical constraints.
• Third, data quality, representativeness, and diversity are directly linked to an AI model’s performance, level of bias, accuracy and reliability.

Synthetic data – data that is artificially generated in the digital world with properties that are often derived from an original set of data – has been proposed as a solution to address some of these data-related issues, especially for AI model training. However, synthetic data is no panacea, and has been shown to potentially exacerbate many of the issues it seeks to curtail, sparking governance discussions.

To explore the governance challenges of synthetic data in the context of international security, UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme held an event titled Technology and Security Seminar on Synthetic Data: Exploring Governance Implications.

This report provides a summary of the key themes and takeaways from discussions at the event. The report is divided into two parts, reflecting the structure of the event. The first part provides a short overview of the technology and its uses in the military domain. The second part presents the various views, issues and potential challenges to governance presented by synthetic data in the context of international security.

Citation: Federico Mantellassi, “Governance Implications of Synthetic Data in the Context of International Security”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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Since 1999, the UN has expressed concern over the misuse of ICTs and initiated multilateral processes, including Groups of Governmental Experts and Open-ended Working Groups (OEWGs), to address ICT threats. With the second OEWG concluding in 2025, there is a recognized need for a permanent mechanism under UN auspices to ensure continuity in addressing ICT security. Key resolutions (75/240, 77/37, and 78/16) and past consensus OEWG reports have laid the groundwork for further action, culminating in States recommending the establishment of a future permanent mechanism at the 8th substantive session of the OEWG in July 2024.

Background

The initial iteration of this report was developed as food-for-thought to support discussions among State representatives during a UNIDIR workshop on future permanent mechanism convened in June 2024. An updated version of this report was shared with delegates ahead of the 8th substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) in July 2024, where formal deliberations on establishing a permanent mechanism on ICT security took place.

The new iteration synthesizes insights from UN General Assembly resolutions, OEWG sessions and State submissions, offering potential pathways for creating a fit-for-purpose permanent mechanism on ICT security. It also contains an appendix summarizing discussions from the June 2024 UNIDIR workshop and highlighting specific elements of the future permanent mechanism agreed by States at the OEWG in July 2024.

Key findings 

This report highlights the following areas of convergence, divergence and key findings:

• Areas of convergence: States agree on the need for a permanent mechanism to promote international peace and security in cyberspace, as well as its general purpose, structure and guiding principles of inclusivity, flexibility, transparency, sustainability, complementarity and non-duplication.
• Areas of divergence: Differences remain regarding the mechanism’s precise modalities, thematic focus and programmatic priorities. Specific issues, such as its name, sequencing of activities, participation of non-governmental stakeholders and thematic groups, also require further discussions.

The report also highlights that the success and long-term viability of a permanent UN mechanism on ICT security will depend on finding a balance between high-level political discussions and technical exchanges. By building on areas of convergence and incorporating ongoing discussions around divergences, States can establish a sustainable mechanism capable of enhancing international cooperation and strengthening global ICT security over time while minimizing the risk of institutional gridlocks.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, “Towards regular institutional dialogue on international ICT security: Review of current proposals and considerations for effective dialogue”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024. 

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Citation: Malekos Smith, Zhanna L., and Persi Paoli, Giacomo. “Quantum Technology, Peace and Security: A Primer”. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2024.

Funded by

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National positions can foster transparency on the national level as well as internationally. They can act as a reference document and can therefore guide bilateral engagement with international partners as well as national contributions to multilateral processes dedicated to State use of information and communications technology in the context of international peace and security. When drafted in consultation with international partners, a national position can foster international cooperation. It can also enhance preparedness to address future cyber operations by providing national guidelines with respect to assessment, classification and response to variety of malicious cyber operations. Finally, the utility of national positions can be found in their ability to contribute to the development of international law in general.

National positions are dynamic in nature. A State’s national position could initially focus on key issues as defined by that State’s interest and capacity. This approach requires prioritizing certain legal areas, with the understanding that the position may evolve in the future. In particular, it may need to adapt to technological developments and evolving multilateral discussions.

To maximize their utility, national positions should prioritize the interpretation of principles and rules previously agreed by the various multilateral discussions as applicable to State use of ICT. When deciding on the content of its national position, a State could further consult existing regional approaches to the topic and the national positions of other States. Indeed, topics most frequently addressed by existing national positions include the United Nations Charter, international humanitarian law, the law of State responsibility, due diligence and international human rights law.

Last but not least, this compendium suggests 10 steps that a State could consider taking when developing its national position – starting with defining the scope of the position through, inter alia, threat landscape assessment and consideration of foreign policy priorities, and concluding with publication and dissemination of the position.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, “A Compendium of Good Practices: Developing a National Position on the Interpretation of International Law and State Use of ICT”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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To address this knowledge gap, this compendium is dedicated to the identification and analysis of the most salient advancements in enabling technologies, with a particular emphasis on those still in their early stages of development or application. The compendium explores four categories of enabling technologies: advanced materials (semiconductors, superconductors and nanotechnology), parts and components (microchips and sensors), processing and computing (cloud, edge and quantum computing), and infrastructure (fifth- and sixth-generation telecommunications (5G and 6G), the Internet of Things, cloud infrastructure and satellite communications).

Citation: Wenting He (2024). “Enabling Technologies and International Security: A Compendium (2023 Edition)”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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This paper seeks to bridge this gap by presenting a needs-driven, systematic, and context-sensitive framework to identify and assess technologies that could strengthen efforts to counter the diversion of conventional arms and related components.

The first step of this framework requires an understanding of the risks and methods of diversion, tailored to each specific type of conventional weapon and its life-cycle context. The second step examines the existing technologies which could help address the identified risk(s). The final step assesses the identified technologies according to the context(s) in which they would be applied, as well as against selected attributes the technologies should possess.

The paper also provides two illustrations to show how the framework could be applied to small arms and light weapons on the one hand, and components of conventional weapons on the other.

Sponsor Organizations: Germany (Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme) and Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Microsoft (Security and Technology Programme).

Citation: Sarah Grand-Clément and Diederik Cops (2023) “Project D-TECT: Technologies to Counter the Diversion of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and Components of Conventional Weapons”, UNIDIR and the Flemish Peace Institute. https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/23/ERC/08

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Part I of the report seeks to provide a foundational understanding of the concept of AI and its state of play.

Part II examines the disruptive impact of AI on international peace and security. In particular, it discusses the risks and benefits of uses of AI in military operations and across domains of warfare as well as the opportunities and challenges of harnessing AI technologies for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Part III of the report examines the path to Responsible AI. It unpacks the RAI governance approach and discusses how it is and can be operationalized. It also reflects on the value of building an RAI culture.

HIGHLIGHTS & RECORDINGS:

• Read a brief summary of the Conference Highlights
• Watch all of the conference sessions again (via the UNIDIR YouTube channel or below)

Citation: Wenting He and Alisha Anand (2023) “The 2022 Innovations Dialogue: AI Disruption, Peace and Security”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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Traditionally, ceasefire monitoring and verification has been human-led. In some circumstances, it can however be difficult deploy observers on the ground. While technology cannot replace humans in all aspects of the monitoring and verification of ceasefires, especially within dialogue and de-escalation efforts, technology can nonetheless support and complement human-led activities. 

This report explains what technological solutions are available to help monitor and verify ceasefires, outlining the respective technological advantages and limitations of each solution. The report also provides a series of guiding considerations around the use of technology, highlighting recommended issues to reflect upon before using technology to aid with ceasefire monitoring and verification 

Sponsor Organizations: Germany (Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme) and Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Microsoft (Security and Technology Programme).

Citation: Sarah Grand-Clément (2022) “Exploring the Use of Technology for Remote Ceasefire Monitoring and Verification”, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/22/ERC/06

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HIGHLIGHTS & RECORDINGS:

• Read a brief summary of the Conference Highlights
• Watch all of the conference sessions again (via the UNIDIR YouTube channel or below)

Teaser: Deepfakes, Trust and International Security

Citation: Alisha Anand and Belen Bianco (2021) “The 2021 Innovations Dialogue Conference Report: Deepfakes, Trust and International Security”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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This paper provides a brief overview of DLT, including its main characteristics, benefits and risks, as well as its potential applications and utility in the context of arms control and non-proliferation.

Sponsor Organizations: Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and Microsoft

Citation: Giacomo Persi Paoli and Cindy Vestergaard (2021) “Exploring Distributed Ledger Technology for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: A Primer”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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This study seeks to inform discussions on establishing a dedicated and systematic S&T review process under the BWC through an examination of existing S&T review-type mechanisms employed in different regimes beyond the BWC, a survey of States Parties views on a possible review mechanism and a study of past and present discourse on this issue in the BWC. Based on the analysis conducted, this study also presents options for BWC States Parties to consider ahead of the Ninth BWC Review Conference.

Citation: James Revill, Alisha Anand and Giacomo Persi Paoli (2021) “Exploring Science and Technology Review Mechanisms Under the Biological Weapons Convention”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/SECTEC/2021/SandTreviews/01

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Citation: Alisha Anand (2020) “The 2020 Innovations Dialogue Conference Report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

Teaser: Life Sciences, International Security and Disarmament

Sponsor Organizations: SecTec core funders: the Governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland, and by Microsoft.

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Through the generous support of the Governments of Germany, India, Qatar and Switzerland, UNIDIR convened the 2019 Innovations Dialogue on Digital Innovations and International Security on 19 August 2019 at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.

Citation: Security and Technology Programme (2019) “2019 Innovations Dialogue Report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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Citation: Security and Technology Programme (2017) “The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Autonomous Weapon Systems and Cyber Operations”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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One’s position on both an appropriate definition and an adequate policy response ultimately depends on what one is concerned about. Different definitions will attend different sets of concerns, as well as privilege different sets of characteristics.

The objective of this primer is to consolidate and give an overview of both concerns and characteristics and illustrate how different definitional approaches attend to these.

Citation: Security and Technology Programme (2017) “The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Concerns, Characteristics and Definitional Approaches”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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