Neurotechnologies, while still emerging, are advancing rapidly and gaining prominence. These technologies have a clear dual-use nature: in addition to civilian applications, military research laboratories are actively exploring ways to enhance soldiers’ cognitive, sensory and physical capabilities, including through direct brain-machine interfaces with uncrewed systems. The potential military use of neurotechnologies raises significant security concerns and could affect the conduct of warfare, presenting complex disarmament, ethical and legal challenges.

The Innovations Dialogue 2025, building on existing international efforts, sought to provide a neutral space to address this topic through the lens of arms control, disarmament and international security. It did so by examining the current state of neurotechnologies, considering associated risks and opportunities for international peace and security, and exploring pathways towards responsible governance.

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By examining official documents, analyzing relevant laws and regulations, and investigating the structure of government agencies, this paper sheds light on the Republic of Korea’s potential to conduct international cyber operations and the principles likely to govern their deployment.

Citation: So Jeong Kim, International Cyber Operations: Doctrines and Capabilities of the Republic of Korea (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026).

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Through a series of dynamic, multi-stakeholder panel discussions, the event examined the ripple effects such incidents can have across borders and sectors, highlighting the growing interdependence of digital ecosystems.

This report also offers clear, action-oriented guidance for relevant stakeholders seeking to enhance resilience, cooperation, and preparedness.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, 2025 Cyber Stability Conference, Crisis Averted: Cyber Resilience in Action (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026).

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Organized into three interrelated sections, the report explores:

• Evolving cyberthreats: From attacks on critical infrastructure and supply chains to the rise of ransomware, disinformation and cybercrime, this section analyses how the growing scale and complexity of cyberattacks pose systemic risks to national, regional and global stability. It explains how these threats operate and includes case-based illustrations of their real-world impacts on peace and security.
• Cyberthreat actors: Examining the increasingly blurred lines between State and non-State actors in cyberspace. This section explores the motivations and tactics of various actors, including States, cybercriminals, hacktivists and private entities, and highlights how overlapping behaviours may complicate response.
• Emerging technologies: Focusing on artificial intelligence and quantum computing, this section outlines how technological advancements are reshaping offensive and defensive cyber operations. The report considers how these technologies offer new opportunities for cybersecurity while also creating new vulnerabilities and strategic risks for the international community.

Throughout, the report provides explanatory textboxes designed to help diplomats and policymakers better understand how cyberattacks work at a technical level, as well as case studies that concretely demonstrate the international security impacts of malicious cyber activity. By demystifying complex technical concepts and contemporary trends, the report hopes to support national and international deliberations to strengthen resilience, reduce risks and advance an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace for all.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, Securing Cyberspace for Peace: Insights into Cyberthreats and International Security in 2025 (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026).

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Facilitated by UNIDIR, the consultations sought to build on the 2024 REAIM Regional Consultations and the 2023 and 2024 Summits, in addition to capturing evolution in national views and policies on responsible AI in the military domain, regional priorities and multi-stakeholder engagement over the year.

This report seeks to capture the main takeaways from the five regional consultations, summarizing participants’ views and a selection of UNIDIR’s observations. Specifically, these observations are centred around a number of common threads that ran through all of the regional consultations (even though minor adjustments were made for each regional event to factor in its respective local context and realities):

• National policies and practices
• Looking back (post-REAIM 2023 and 2024 reflections)
• Looking ahead (reflections for the 2026 REAIM Summit)

In addition, this report provides a comprehensive overview of some of the takeaways from the discussions held with the multi-stakeholder community. One key objective of the consultations, in acknowledgment of the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement, is to take stock of the views of regional representatives from industry, civil society, academia and research institutes, as well as regional and international organizations.

This report also looks into the operationalization of responsible AI principles across the life cycle of AI-enabled military capabilities through the lenses of assurances, incident response, crisis management and risk reduction.

The report then lays out States’ reflections on the REAIM journey three years on from the inaugural summit. It concludes by identifying substantive areas of priority that States wish to see further pursued, both within REAIM and beyond, before presenting a series of concrete recommendations for the road ahead.

Citation: Yasmin Afina, The Global Prism of Military AI Governance: Reflections from the 2025 Regional Consultations on Responsible AI in the Military Domain (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026).

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Drawing on desk research and interviews with national CSIRTs and international and regional networks, the brief analyses how domestic institutional arrangements shape CSIRTs’ capacity to engage in effective information exchange and collaboration at the bilateral, regional and global levels.

The brief identifies key challenges and highlights good practices to enhance information exchange and coordination, as well as offering practical recommendations to support States in strengthening national CSIRTs and advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

Citation: Samuele Dominioni and Helena Hinkel, Strengthening National CSIRT Cooperation: From Domestic Setups to International Networks (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026)

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Citation: Federico Mantellassi and Edward Madziwa, Neurotechnology in the Military Domain: A Primer (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025)

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This convergence introduces new and potentially significant risks. They include possible attacks on biological research and development facilities, targeting the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of information. In the context of international peace and security, ICT incidents present a spectrum of consequences, from minor to significant. For example, a minor event could involve a malicious actor spoofing an agricultural facility’s sensors to transmit false data to owner, impacting the annual production of crops. Conversely, a significant event could involve a malicious actor infiltrating the ICT systems of a biological research and development facility, to interfere with an automated production system, remotely altering the compounds, thus rendering its product ineffective, or worse, harmful.

Various scholars and practitioners have attempted to name and define a concept recognizing the unique characteristics of the infrastructure, data, vectors, and risk implications at this nexus. Cyberbiosecurity refers to a collection of practices aimed at addressing the potential ICT threats to those systems at the intersection of the digital and biological domains. More specifically, it includes methods, procedures and measures to tackle ICT threats to biosafety and biosecurity.

To better understand the nexus between ICT and the biological field, this paper begins with an outline of some of the benefits introduced by the integration of advanced ICT in biological research and development. It then introduces the above definition of the concept of ‘cyberbiosecurity’ and proceeds to outline some of the key risks at this nexus. The New Agenda for Peace launched by the Secretary-General in 2023 highlights the need for Member States to prevent the weaponization of emerging domains and promote responsible innovation (Action 11). The 2024 Summit of the Future was an opportunity for Member States to reaffirm their commitment to the prevention of biorisks and misuse of emerging technologies. This was particularly reflected in the Pact for the Future, specifically in Action 26 (to uphold disarmament obligations and commitments) and Action 27 (to seize opportunities associated with new and emerging technologies and address potential risks posed by their misuse). Cyberbiosecurity appears at the junction of these two goals.

This notion has however received tangential attention in the multilateral discussion on international ICT security, specifically the General Assembly subsidiary bodies the Groups of Governmental Experts from 2004 to 2021 and Open-ended Working Groups since 2019. In the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), limited attention has been given to cyberbiosecurity related issues. There are however cyber-related elements mentioned in documents and statements of the last 10 years.

Finally, in the United Nations Security Council, several States have expressed concern over the increase in cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure, including in the health sector, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While not encompassing all aspects of this issue, these discussions can help in sensitizing the international community and practitioners on the need for better measures.

 One way forward could be to clarify the breadth of the concept of cyberbiosecurity through exchanges with relevant communities and considering cyberbiosecurity in the context of the ongoing BWC Working Group, notably in discussions on scientific and technological developments. This approach could allow for an exchange of views and good practices in the cyber domain and their applicability to biological research and development facilities.

Citation: Louison Mazeaud and Andraz Kastelic, “Cyberbiosecurity: A Matter of International Peace and Security?” UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/CBW/02.

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This year, with the agenda turning 25, the factsheet provides ideas around how AI represents an opportunity and an obstacle for its realization. It also presents an analysis of the current state of the integration of emerging technologies like AI within WPS national and regional action plans.

The factsheet concludes by proposing further areas of action to better include AI in the WPS Agenda, making it fit for purpose amidst changing realities around peace and conflict.

Citation: Shimona Mohan (2025) “Factsheet: Artificial Intelligence and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

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This has been prompted by initiatives outside the United Nations, such as the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summits and the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. These processes were fundamental in increasing awareness and served as incubators for policy action on the international stage. Against this backdrop and for many years, UNIDIR has contributed significantly to initiating and shaping national, regional and international discussions through its research, its capacity-building and its convening power.

The push for responsible AI in the military domain has opened new channels for dialogue among states. The shared recognition of AI’s disruptive potential, both positive and negative, has led to international discussions specifically about ensuring its safe and controlled development, deployment, and use.

The international community now has an opportunity to shape the future of international peace and security in the era of AI, putting principles of responsible AI at the core. Such engagement can build trust and mutual understanding, future-proofing the international peace and security architecture.

To further advance multilateral discussions on this new and rapidly evolving issue, it is crucial to clarify what “the military domain” means and entails; to survey key applications of AI in military settings in order to understand the associated opportunities; and to analyse the challenges and consider recommendations for policy development at all levels. This report addresses each of these aspects in turn, drawing on UNIDIR’s research and analysis on these topics over the years. It then proposes a 10-step road map towards effective national and international governance of AI in the military domain.

Citation: UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme. “Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: An Evidence-Based Road Map for Future Policy Action”. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2025.

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In 2023, UNIDIR published its first report on subsea cables, entitled Wading Murky Waters: Subsea Communications Cables and Responsible State Behaviour. The initial scoping study sought to raise awareness of this essential transmission technology. Since then, a slew of new initiatives have been proposed, including at the international level, signalling both the strategic importance of the infrastructure and the need to strengthen security and resilience across all of its components.

This follow-on study sets out to understand what it means in policy and practice when governments qualify or designate subsea telecommunications cables as critical infrastructure (CI). The report draws from the CI literature to frame government approaches to security and resilience, identifying how government policy and practice interact with core CI concepts such as absorptive, restorative and adaptive resilience capacities. While subsea cable systems are generally designed and deployed with these capacities in mind, effective government action on security and resilience can contribute to strengthening them.

Citation: C. Kavanagh, J. Franken, and W. He. “Achieving Depth: Subsea Telecommunications Cables as Critical Infrastructure”. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2025.

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Against this backdrop, UNIDIR conducted a project on working “Towards a Common Understanding of the Application of IHL to Emerging Technologies in the Area of LAWS”. Building on the momentum on this topic, UNIDIR’s primary objective was to take stock of the existing state of affairs and to capture existing views, positions and approaches – across sectors and across regions – to the application of IHL to LAWS. To this end, the Institute has drafted a separate background paper that summarizes publicly available views expressed by states, scholars and other experts participating in multilateral discussions on the applicability and interpretation of IHL with respect to the development, deployment and use of LAWS. To complement this research, UNIDIR conducted a series of bilateral and regional consultations between November 2024 and March 2025. In partnership with regional partners, regional consultations were held in The Hague, Brasília, Pretoria and Singapore. The consultations were designed to provide a platform for open discussions, knowledge and information sharing and the deepening of regional understandings on the intersection between IHL and LAWS. Held in-person under the Chatham House Rule, participants included government-affiliated experts in law, policy and defence from various ministries, national agencies and authorities, as well as a select number of scholars specializing in IHL and policy.

Citation: Yasmin Afina, “Regional Perspectives on the Application of International Humanitarian Law to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025.

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This briefing note will contribute to a report submitted to the 18th session of General Assembly and aims to support States in the formulation of their national views on this topic. It seeks to ensure that the resulting report is as comprehensive, diverse and geographically representative as possible. The brief includes some contextual information on the topic of AI in the military domain, a set of considerations for States to refer to, and a list of suggested readings that draws on UNIDIR’s own research and selected external publications.

Citation: Giacomo Persi Paoli and Yasmin Afina, “AI in the Military Domain: A briefing note for States”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025.

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To support these ongoing discussions, UNIDIR implemented a series of activities as part of the project “Towards a Common Understanding of the Application of IHL to Emerging Technologies in the Area of LAWS”.  This background paper summarizes publicly available views expressed by States, scholars and other experts participating in multilateral discussions on the applicability and interpretation of IHL with respect to the development and use of LAWS.

The background paper finds that, while all contributions to the discussion stem from the common starting point that IHL applies to the development and use of LAWS, divergences of both form and content persist in publicly available views. Despite the breadth of the discussions, a coherent comparison of views remains difficult to achieve and some IHL rules that govern the development and use of LAWS remain underexamined. Publicized views on measures that States can, do or should take with respect to the development and use of LAWS to avoid or minimize the effects of LAWS on civilian populations, civilians and civilian objects often do not specify whether such measures derive from an IHL principle or rule. The background paper underscores the considerations that arise in ensuring that LAWS are developed and used only in accordance with IHL and the challenges in achieving a level of certainty about the interpretation and application of IHL to these technologies.

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This UNIDIR research examines trends in the development and use of UMS between 2019 and 2024, identifying 60 UMS programmes across 17 countries that have utilized a wide range of systems. More than 40 attacks took place during the same period, with a notable rise since 2023.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms could play an important role in enhancing mutual trust and confidence between States if it were to contain information on international transfers and acquisitions of armed UMS. Due to their technical characteristics, however, most UMS fall outside the Register’s reporting categories, therefore remaining unreported.

This research puts forward four options for consideration by the Group of Governmental Experts in 2024-2025 on the continuing operation and future development of the Register. These options could also be considered by States participating in other multilateral instruments that contribute to increasing transparency in international transfers and acquisitions.

Citation: Anabel García García, Sarah Grand-Clément, Paul Holtom, “Changing Tides in Maritime Warfare: Closing the Reporting Gap on Uncrewed Maritime Systems in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025, https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/25/ERC/03.

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To address this knowledge gap, UNIDIR’s annual Compendium on Enabling Technologies and International Security focuses on identifying and analysing key advancements in enabling technologies, with a particular emphasis on those still in their early stages of development or application. This 2024 edition builds upon the 2023 compendium, providing an update on the latest developments in enabling technologies as they relate to international peace and security. While this edition addresses technological developments and applications specific to 2024, the 2023 compendium remains an essential resource for more detailed foundational analyses. 

The compendium categorises enabling technologies into four areas: 

• Category I: advanced materials, including semiconductors, superconductors and nanotechnology; 

• Category II: parts and components, such as microchips and sensors; 

• Category III: processing and computing, covering cloud, edge and quantum computing; and 

• Category IV: connectivity infrastructure, spanning fifth- and sixth-generation telecommunications (5G and 6G), the Internet of Things and satellite communications. 

Funded by

Citation: He, Wenting. “Enabling Technologies and International Security: A Compendium (2024 edition)”, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2024.

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The dialogue featured multidisciplinary discussions on quantum computing, communications and sensing, focusing on equitable access, capacity building, and the role of multilateral frameworks. Key themes included bridging the “quantum divide,” fostering collaboration across sectors and integrating quantum advancements with Sustainable Development Goals.  

The 2024 Innovations Dialogue emphasized fostering inclusive, collaborative and forward-thinking approaches to quantum governance. By uniting global stakeholders and leveraging innovative ideas, the conference explored possible pathways to responsibly harness quantum technologies’ transformative power. It laid the groundwork for future multilateral discussions to shape secure, equitable and innovative quantum advancements.

This report is not intended to be a detailed account of the conference proceedings but rather an easily accessible reference point. For more information, watch the full conference recording.

Citation: Dongyoun Cho, 2024 Innovations Dialogue: Quantum Technologies and Their Implications for International Peace and Security, Conference Summary Report, Geneva, UNIDIR, 2024.

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The centrality of cloud computing to modern life and the concentration of services among a few actors mean that failures – either accidental or as the result of adversarial action – can be severe, with cascading effects across industries, services and states. To understand the profound impacts of this critical enabling technology on international security, this report provides an overview of relevant use cases, benefits and risks of cloud computing, as well as its key governance challenges and implications for arms control. Structured into two parts – a technology primer and a governance primer – this report offers both technical insights and policy analysis.

Citation

Brief – Federico Mantellassi and Giacomo Persi Paoli, Cloud Computing Governance: a Research Brief (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024).

Full report – Federico Mantellassi and Giacomo Persi Paoli, Cloud Computing and International Security: Risks, Opportunities and Governance Challenges (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024).

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• First, the development of AI technologies has – at least in part – depended on the availability of large datasets to train AI models.
• Second, data is a resource whose availability, collection, cleaning, use and sharing is affected by factors such as collection costs, lack of real-world data in certain domains, as well as regulatory, legal and ethical constraints.
• Third, data quality, representativeness, and diversity are directly linked to an AI model’s performance, level of bias, accuracy and reliability.

Synthetic data – data that is artificially generated in the digital world with properties that are often derived from an original set of data – has been proposed as a solution to address some of these data-related issues, especially for AI model training. However, synthetic data is no panacea, and has been shown to potentially exacerbate many of the issues it seeks to curtail, sparking governance discussions.

To explore the governance challenges of synthetic data in the context of international security, UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme held an event titled Technology and Security Seminar on Synthetic Data: Exploring Governance Implications.

This report provides a summary of the key themes and takeaways from discussions at the event. The report is divided into two parts, reflecting the structure of the event. The first part provides a short overview of the technology and its uses in the military domain. The second part presents the various views, issues and potential challenges to governance presented by synthetic data in the context of international security.

Citation: Federico Mantellassi, “Governance Implications of Synthetic Data in the Context of International Security”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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This publication unpacks the AI-ICT security nexus and outlines, through a very easy-to-read, infographic the main current applications of AI for offensive and defensive purposes. To explain AI applications to the ICT environment, this study introduces the UNIDIR’s Intrusion Phases model, which is a framework that identifies three areas where AI can be used: outside the network perimeter, on the network perimeter, and inside the network perimeter.

Citation: Giacomo Persi Paoli, Samuele Dominioni. “Exploring the AI-ICT Security Nexus”. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2024.

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Since 1999, the UN has expressed concern over the misuse of ICTs and initiated multilateral processes, including Groups of Governmental Experts and Open-ended Working Groups (OEWGs), to address ICT threats. With the second OEWG concluding in 2025, there is a recognized need for a permanent mechanism under UN auspices to ensure continuity in addressing ICT security. Key resolutions (75/240, 77/37, and 78/16) and past consensus OEWG reports have laid the groundwork for further action, culminating in States recommending the establishment of a future permanent mechanism at the 8th substantive session of the OEWG in July 2024.

Background

The initial iteration of this report was developed as food-for-thought to support discussions among State representatives during a UNIDIR workshop on future permanent mechanism convened in June 2024. An updated version of this report was shared with delegates ahead of the 8th substantive session of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) in July 2024, where formal deliberations on establishing a permanent mechanism on ICT security took place.

The new iteration synthesizes insights from UN General Assembly resolutions, OEWG sessions and State submissions, offering potential pathways for creating a fit-for-purpose permanent mechanism on ICT security. It also contains an appendix summarizing discussions from the June 2024 UNIDIR workshop and highlighting specific elements of the future permanent mechanism agreed by States at the OEWG in July 2024.

Key findings 

This report highlights the following areas of convergence, divergence and key findings:

• Areas of convergence: States agree on the need for a permanent mechanism to promote international peace and security in cyberspace, as well as its general purpose, structure and guiding principles of inclusivity, flexibility, transparency, sustainability, complementarity and non-duplication.
• Areas of divergence: Differences remain regarding the mechanism’s precise modalities, thematic focus and programmatic priorities. Specific issues, such as its name, sequencing of activities, participation of non-governmental stakeholders and thematic groups, also require further discussions.

The report also highlights that the success and long-term viability of a permanent UN mechanism on ICT security will depend on finding a balance between high-level political discussions and technical exchanges. By building on areas of convergence and incorporating ongoing discussions around divergences, States can establish a sustainable mechanism capable of enhancing international cooperation and strengthening global ICT security over time while minimizing the risk of institutional gridlocks.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, “Towards regular institutional dialogue on international ICT security: Review of current proposals and considerations for effective dialogue”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024. 

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Citation: Malekos Smith, Zhanna L., and Persi Paoli, Giacomo. “Quantum Technology, Peace and Security: A Primer”. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2024.

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This primer provides an overview of LLMs and their relevance and impact in the context of international security, through select case studies, which illustrate the technology’s dual-use character. It covers emerging uses in defense (such as for decision support, intelligence and wargaming), as well as areas of potential misuse by malicious actors (for example, for biological weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks and disinformation).

The paper highlights main areas of risks of LLMs, as well as limitations both in the technology and how it may be leveraged or misused in the current context.

The primer concludes with suggested action items to mitigate risks and points to possible future directions for the integration of LLMs in conversations about AI governance.

Citation: Ioana Puscas, Large Language Models and International Security: A Primer, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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Between 2 July and 5 September 2024, UNIDIR and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs co-organized a series of three webinars on UAS. This summary highlights the key points made by the speakers on issues pertaining to terms and classifications of UAS, benefits and risks of (mis)use, and possible actions to address the identified threats.

Citation: Sarah Grand-Clément, “Armed and dangerous? A brief overview of uncrewed aerial systems: risks, impacts, and avenues for action”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024. https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/24/ERC/11.

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