Key takeaways

• Merging quantum and AI could unlock capabilities beyond what either delivers alone, reshaping future military competition and strategic dynamics.
• This convergence risks deepening existing concerns about military AI use, including greater unpredictability, less transparent decision-making and harder accountability and legal compliance.
• Staying ahead of these risks will require ongoing, cross-disciplinary monitoring spanning technical, legal, policy and military expertise.

Both quantum technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) are advancing rapidly, with an increasingly symbiotic relationship between these two transformative fields. AI’s role is becoming more evident in quantum research and development, facilitating experimentation and system optimisation. In turn, progress in quantum technologies is also expected to enhance future AI capabilities through improved computational performance.

Alongside potential opportunities, this convergence could introduce new complexities and challenges that extend beyond technical domains and into the realm of international security. For instance, quantum-AI systems could generate challenges that compound existing concerns surrounding the military use of AI, such as heightened unpredictability, opaque decision-making, and structural difficulties related to accountability and legal compliance.

While relevant military applications of the quantum-AI convergence remain largely conceptual or in early development, examining this emerging security dimension provides an opportunity to proactively identify potential risks and inform early policy responses. Building on discussions from UNIDIR’s webinar series on quantum-AI convergence, this primer provides a technological overview of the quantum-AI convergence, assesses emerging and future defence use cases, and examines potential international security implications.

The post Entangled Frontiers: Quantum-AI Convergence in Defence and International Security first appeared on UNIDIR.

The resulting publication identifies relevant initiatives and good practices developed by Member States and the multistakeholder community and distils key insights, lessons learned, and recommendations on integrating gender perspectives into cybersecurity. It also serves to support Member States and other relevant stakeholders in their efforts to meaningfully integrate gender considerations in national ICT architectures and advance the implementation of the Framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace with a gender perspective in mind.

This publcation is structured into four chapters following the four focus areas of the workshops convened:

1. Gendered threats and impacts of ICT: Analyses how the use and misuse of ICT affects individuals and communities differently and illustrates the diversity of gendered impacts.
2. Gender and international law in cyberspace: Compiles examples and existing guidelines in which international law obligations and normative commitments can be interpreted and implemented in ways that reflect the lived experiences of those affected by ICT-related threats.
3. Mainstreaming gender into national cyber policies and practices: Examines gender equality commitments, multistakeholder participation, inclusive workforce development, and gender-responsive institutional mandates and incident-reporting mechanisms guiding national cybersecurity and digital policies and practices.
4. Gender-responsive cyber capacity-building: Explores examples of targeted upskilling initiatives that can contribute to the full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership of women and other marginalized groups in technology design and development, cybersecurity measures and incident response, in the formulation of policies, and in cybersecurity governance and diplomacy.

The publication concludes with a list of cross-cutting recommendations stemming from the analyses in the chapters and overarching considerations gathered through the research project. In addition, a curated list of practical resources is also included as a toolbox at the end to guide further reading and engagement.

The post Mainstreaming Gender in Cybersecurity: A Compendium of Good Practices first appeared on UNIDIR.

Notably, there are divergent interpretations of “attack” and of whether “digital data” is an object under IHL. This deficiency of clarity, particularly concerning what constitutes permissible or impermissible cyber behaviour in armed conflict, could inhibit legal protections of civilians and civilian objects.

In an effort to facilitate future multilateral discussions on how international law, and in particular IHL, applies to cyber operations, this report highlights two main interpretive approaches found in scholarship and, most importantly, national positions on international law in cyberspace:

• A restrictive interpretation, which limits the notion of “attack” under IHL to cyber operations that cause physical harm and generally excludes digital data as an object.
• An expansive interpretation, which includes operations that result in a “loss of functionality” within the notion of attack and considers essential civilian data as a legally protected object.

Ultimately, the report argues that the incremental convergence of common understanding, while unlikely to ever achieve absolute uniformity, is crucial for establishing clearer international limits on the use of ICTs in armed conflict.

The post International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations: (Consequences of) Divergent National Interpretations of “Attack” and “Data” first appeared on UNIDIR.

Over the course of its mandate, the OEWG adopted three annual progress reports and a final report. These outcomes helped further develop the existing framework and led to the establishment of a new permanent forum: the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs. In addition, the OEWG discussions also generated substantial material on how UN Member States addressed key issues related to ICTs and international security, which were not captured in the agreed reports.

This report provides an analysis of the evolution of the process and a detailed account of those discussions, including major themes and trends, across the main pillars of the framework: threats, rules, norms and principles, international law, confidence-building measures, capacity-building, and regular institutional dialogue.

This publication is made up of eight individual chapters, which can be downloaded and used independently or as a single volume (see Download section above):

• Chapter 1 | Introduction, by Dr Samuele Dominioni and Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli.
  Introduces the report’s focus on the 2021–2025 UN OEWG on ICT security, outlining its background, research questions, chapter structure, and methodology.

• Chapter 2 | Existing and potential threats, by Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli, Aamna Rafiq and Chimdi Igwe.
  Addresses how States have discussed and understood major ICT threats in the context of international security during the 2021–2025 OEWG.

• Chapter 3 | Rules, norms and principles of responsible State behaviour, by Dr Andraz Kastelic.
  Provides an overview of how States have addressed Rules, Norms, and Principles of Responsible State Behaviour in their use of ICTs during the 2021-2025 OEWG.

• Chapter 4 | International law, by Andrea Gronke and Dominique Steinbrecher.
  Analyses States’ discussions on international law and its applicability to the ICT environment during the 2021-2025 OEWG.

• Chapter 5 | Confidence-building measures, by Dr Samuele Dominioni.
  Explores how States have discussed and developed CBMs, including the Global Intergovernmental Points of Contact Directory, during the OEWG 2021-2025.

• Chapter 6 | Capacity-building, by Dr Ekaterina Martynova and Moliehi Makumane.
  Identifies major milestones and themes discussed by States on Capacity Building during the OEWG 2021-2025.

• Chapter 7 | Regular institutional dialogue, by Pavel Mraz and Lenka Filipova.
  Examines how States have negotiated and agreed on the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs during the OEWG 2021-2025.

• Chapter 8 | Cross-sectional analysis and conclusions, by Dr Samuele Dominioni and Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli.
  Conducts a cross-cutting analysis of all the chapters and identifies key factors that characterized States’ negotiations during the OEWG (2021-2025) and provides some concluding reflections.

The post Unpacking the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on ICT in the Context of International Security (2021–2025) first appeared on UNIDIR.

Ahead of the conference’s second edition, a series of three reports – the first of the AISE Markers series – takes stock of the key takeaways from the previous year and provides an initial basis and scaffolding for UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2026. By acting as a bridge between editions, the AISE Markers series ensures that each conference is built on solid ground and constitutes a natural evolution of the discussions held in the previous conference.

This third report provides a structured account of where use cases – both governance and technological – stood in 2025. It offers an overview of discussions surrounding the human element in practice, surveys regional perspectives, zooms in on AI for peace operations and humanitarian applications, and then offers cross-cutting observations that may serve as a baseline for the 2026 edition. Accompanying reports will cover the state of governance and technology.

The post Benchmark III: Use Cases – Insights from the Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2025 first appeared on UNIDIR.

Ahead of the conference’s second edition, a series of three reports – the first of the AISE Markers series – takes stock of the key takeaways from the previous year and provides an initial basis and scaffolding for UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2026. By acting as a bridge between editions, the AISE Markers series ensures that each conference is built on solid ground and constitutes a natural evolution of the discussions held in the previous conference.

This second report provides a structured account of where the conversation on technology stood in 2025. It offers an overview of shared understandings – particularly in the areas of dual-use transformation, life cycle management, data and assurances – and identifies areas that may subsequently serve as a baseline for the 2026 edition. Accompanying reports will cover the state of governance and use cases.

The post Benchmark II: Technology – Insights from the Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2025 first appeared on UNIDIR.

Ahead of the conference’s second edition, a series of three reports – the first of the AISE Markers series – takes stock of the key takeaways from the previous year and provides an initial basis and scaffolding for UNIDIR’s Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2026. By acting as a bridge between editions, the AISE Markers series ensures that each conference is built on solid ground and constitutes a natural evolution of the discussions held in the previous conference.

This first report provides a structured account of where the conversation on governance stood in 2025. It offers an overview of shared understandings and possible areas of tension, and identifies issues that remain unresolved and may subsequently serve as a baseline for the 2026 edition. Accompanying reports will cover the state of technology and use cases.

The post Benchmark I: Governance – Insights from the Global Conference on AI, Security and Ethics 2025 first appeared on UNIDIR.

It offers a comprehensive, neutral and technical resource for States, organized around realistic illustrations of how international humanitarian law (IHL) principles and obligations may be considered in practice.Specifically, the scenarios examine situations of both international and non-international armed conflict across three domains of warfare: air, land and naval. Each scenario includes guiding questions on IHL compliance relevant to the (potential) use of LAWS in that context.

The compendium consists of three volumes:

• Volume I | Introduction and user guide: This volume provides background on discussions surrounding LAWS and IHL, including the current status of multilateral discussions. It also introduces the compendium, its objectives, structure and guidance on how to use the scenarios. 
• Volume II | International armed conflict: This volume includes scenario catalogues grouped by domain (land, naval, air).
• Volume III | Non-international armed conflict: This volume includes scenario catalogues grouped by domain (land, naval, air).

Additionally, the compendium provides a framework for considering operational and legal questions related to the use of LAWS, and can be leveraged for two main purposes:

• At the national level, the compendium may support efforts to carry structured legal analysis, which can contribute to the development and refinement of IHL interpretation, as well as the stress-testing of existing, or the development of, new policies, tactics, rules of engagements, etc.
• At the international level, the compendium can be leveraged for capacity building and confidence building. First, the scenarios provide ready-made constructs to explore legal and operational questions, especially useful for States with limited modelling capabilities. Second, in international discussions, the compendium can serve as a common analytical reference to compare and discuss interpretations of IHL and identify areas of convergence and divergence.

The post Scenario Compendium for the Legal, Operational and Technical Analysis of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems first appeared on UNIDIR.

While not a new technology, recent advances in machine capabilities and declining costs have accelerated its integration into military supply chains, operational environments and industrial production. As a dual-use, cyber-physical manufacturing technology, additive manufacturing offers strategic advantages, but it also raises proliferation and diversion risks that warrant closer scrutiny by policymakers and the arms control community.

As part of UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower project, this primer provides a short overview of what additive manufacturing is and how it works, explains what types of military equipment it can help produce, who is involved, why it is sought and what its limitations are. It also examines the risks emerging from the use of this technology in manufacturing and provides an overview of existing arms control and transfer control measures, as well as their gaps and limitations. The primer concludes by outlining several considerations for policymakers on how to overcome existing challenges.

The post Additive Manufacturing of Conventional Military Equipment: Implications for Arms Control and Security first appeared on UNIDIR.

Neurotechnologies, while still emerging, are advancing rapidly and gaining prominence. These technologies have a clear dual-use nature: in addition to civilian applications, military research laboratories are actively exploring ways to enhance soldiers’ cognitive, sensory and physical capabilities, including through direct brain-machine interfaces with uncrewed systems. The potential military use of neurotechnologies raises significant security concerns and could affect the conduct of warfare, presenting complex disarmament, ethical and legal challenges.

The Innovations Dialogue 2025, building on existing international efforts, sought to provide a neutral space to address this topic through the lens of arms control, disarmament and international security. It did so by examining the current state of neurotechnologies, considering associated risks and opportunities for international peace and security, and exploring pathways towards responsible governance.

The post Innovations Dialogue 2025: Conference Report first appeared on UNIDIR.

By examining official documents, analyzing relevant laws and regulations, and investigating the structure of government agencies, this paper sheds light on the Republic of Korea’s potential to conduct international cyber operations and the principles likely to govern their deployment.

The post International Cyber Operations: Doctrines and Capabilities of the Republic of Korea first appeared on UNIDIR.

Through a series of dynamic, multi-stakeholder panel discussions, the event examined the ripple effects such incidents can have across borders and sectors, highlighting the growing interdependence of digital ecosystems.

This report also offers clear, action-oriented guidance for relevant stakeholders seeking to enhance resilience, cooperation, and preparedness.

The post Cyber Stability Conference 2025: Crisis Averted: Cyber Resilience in Action first appeared on UNIDIR.

Organized into three interrelated sections, the report explores:

• Evolving cyberthreats: From attacks on critical infrastructure and supply chains to the rise of ransomware, disinformation and cybercrime, this section analyses how the growing scale and complexity of cyberattacks pose systemic risks to national, regional and global stability. It explains how these threats operate and includes case-based illustrations of their real-world impacts on peace and security.
• Cyberthreat actors: Examining the increasingly blurred lines between State and non-State actors in cyberspace. This section explores the motivations and tactics of various actors, including States, cybercriminals, hacktivists and private entities, and highlights how overlapping behaviours may complicate response.
• Emerging technologies: Focusing on artificial intelligence and quantum computing, this section outlines how technological advancements are reshaping offensive and defensive cyber operations. The report considers how these technologies offer new opportunities for cybersecurity while also creating new vulnerabilities and strategic risks for the international community.

Throughout, the report provides explanatory textboxes designed to help diplomats and policymakers better understand how cyberattacks work at a technical level, as well as case studies that concretely demonstrate the international security impacts of malicious cyber activity. By demystifying complex technical concepts and contemporary trends, the report hopes to support national and international deliberations to strengthen resilience, reduce risks and advance an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace for all.

The post Securing Cyberspace for Peace: Insights into Cyberthreats and International Security in 2025 first appeared on UNIDIR.

Facilitated by UNIDIR, the consultations sought to build on the 2024 REAIM Regional Consultations and the 2023 and 2024 Summits, in addition to capturing evolution in national views and policies on responsible AI in the military domain, regional priorities and multi-stakeholder engagement over the year.

This report seeks to capture the main takeaways from the five regional consultations, summarizing participants’ views and a selection of UNIDIR’s observations. Specifically, these observations are centred around a number of common threads that ran through all of the regional consultations (even though minor adjustments were made for each regional event to factor in its respective local context and realities):

• National policies and practices
• Looking back (post-REAIM 2023 and 2024 reflections)
• Looking ahead (reflections for the 2026 REAIM Summit)

In addition, this report provides a comprehensive overview of some of the takeaways from the discussions held with the multi-stakeholder community. One key objective of the consultations, in acknowledgment of the importance of multi-stakeholder engagement, is to take stock of the views of regional representatives from industry, civil society, academia and research institutes, as well as regional and international organizations.

This report also looks into the operationalization of responsible AI principles across the life cycle of AI-enabled military capabilities through the lenses of assurances, incident response, crisis management and risk reduction.

The report then lays out States’ reflections on the REAIM journey three years on from the inaugural summit. It concludes by identifying substantive areas of priority that States wish to see further pursued, both within REAIM and beyond, before presenting a series of concrete recommendations for the road ahead.

The post The Global Prism of Military AI Governance: Reflections from the 2025 Regional Consultations on Responsible AI in the Military Domain first appeared on UNIDIR.

Drawing on desk research and interviews with national CSIRTs, as well as international and regional networks, the brief analyses how domestic institutional arrangements influence their capacity for effective information exchange and collaboration. It explores cooperation at the bilateral, regional and global levels.

The brief also identifies key challenges and highlights good practices to enhance information exchange and coordination. In addition, it offers practical recommendations to support States in strengthening national computer security incident response teams and advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

The post Strengthening National CSIRT Cooperation: From Domestic Setups to International Networks first appeared on UNIDIR.

In particular, the dual-use nature of neurotechnologies raises the potential for them to become disruptive military technologies. Militaries worldwide have explored the integration of a wide suite of neurotechnologies into the military domain throughout the 21st century, with some initiatives dating back to the late 20th century. Recent advances in various scientific and technological fields have rendered the integration of neurotechnology into military contexts increasingly likely to become a reality in the near future.

In contrast to civilian neurotechnology, this trend has received comparatively less attention, while carrying with it significant potential risks for international peace and security. A preliminary mapping of the potential risks, challenges and opportunities specifically associated with the militarization of neurotechnology is therefore both timely and necessary.

The post Neurotechnology in the Military Domain: A Primer first appeared on UNIDIR.

This convergence introduces new and potentially significant risks. They include possible attacks on biological research and development facilities, targeting the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of information. In the context of international peace and security, ICT incidents present a spectrum of consequences, from minor to significant. For example, a minor event could involve a malicious actor spoofing an agricultural facility’s sensors to transmit false data to owner, impacting the annual production of crops. Conversely, a significant event could involve a malicious actor infiltrating the ICT systems of a biological research and development facility, to interfere with an automated production system, remotely altering the compounds, thus rendering its product ineffective, or worse, harmful.

Various scholars and practitioners have attempted to name and define a concept recognizing the unique characteristics of the infrastructure, data, vectors, and risk implications at this nexus. Cyberbiosecurity refers to a collection of practices aimed at addressing the potential ICT threats to those systems at the intersection of the digital and biological domains. More specifically, it includes methods, procedures and measures to tackle ICT threats to biosafety and biosecurity.

To better understand the nexus between ICT and the biological field, and as part of UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower project, this paper begins with an outline of some of the benefits introduced by the integration of advanced ICT in biological research and development.

It then introduces the above definition of the concept of ‘cyberbiosecurity’ and proceeds to outline some of the key risks at this nexus. The New Agenda for Peace launched by the Secretary-General in 2023 highlights the need for Member States to prevent the weaponization of emerging domains and promote responsible innovation (Action 11). The 2024 Summit of the Future was an opportunity for Member States to reaffirm their commitment to the prevention of biorisks and misuse of emerging technologies. This was particularly reflected in the Pact for the Future, specifically in Action 26 (to uphold disarmament obligations and commitments) and Action 27 (to seize opportunities associated with new and emerging technologies and address potential risks posed by their misuse). Cyberbiosecurity appears at the junction of these two goals.

This notion has however received tangential attention in the multilateral discussion on international ICT security, specifically the General Assembly subsidiary bodies the Groups of Governmental Experts from 2004 to 2021 and Open-ended Working Groups since 2019. In the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), limited attention has been given to cyberbiosecurity related issues. There are however cyber-related elements mentioned in documents and statements of the last 10 years.

Finally, in the United Nations Security Council, several States have expressed concern over the increase in cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure, including in the health sector, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While not encompassing all aspects of this issue, these discussions can help in sensitizing the international community and practitioners on the need for better measures.

One way forward could be to clarify the breadth of the concept of cyberbiosecurity through exchanges with relevant communities and considering cyberbiosecurity in the context of the ongoing BWC Working Group, notably in discussions on scientific and technological developments. This approach could allow for an exchange of views and good practices in the cyber domain and their applicability to biological research and development facilities.

The post Cyberbiosecurity: A Matter of International Peace and Security? first appeared on UNIDIR.

As the agenda marks its 25th anniversary this year, the factsheet examines how AI can represent both an opportunity and an obstacle to its realization. It also analyses the current integration of emerging technologies, such as AI, into WPS national and regional action plans.

Finally, the factsheet identifies areas for further action to better incorporate AI into the WPS Agenda and ensure it remains fit for purpose amid changing realities of peace and conflict.

The post Factsheet: Artificial Intelligence and the Women, Peace and Security Agenda first appeared on UNIDIR.

This has been prompted by initiatives outside the United Nations, such as the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summits and the Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy. These processes were fundamental in increasing awareness and served as incubators for policy action on the international stage. Against this backdrop and for many years, UNIDIR has contributed significantly to initiating and shaping national, regional and international discussions through its research, its capacity-building and its convening power.

The push for responsible AI in the military domain has opened new channels for dialogue among states. The shared recognition of AI’s disruptive potential, both positive and negative, has led to international discussions specifically about ensuring its safe and controlled development, deployment, and use.

The international community now has an opportunity to shape the future of international peace and security in the era of AI, putting principles of responsible AI at the core. Such engagement can build trust and mutual understanding, future-proofing the international peace and security architecture.

To further advance multilateral discussions on this new and rapidly evolving issue, it is crucial to clarify what “the military domain” means and entails; to survey key applications of AI in military settings in order to understand the associated opportunities; and to analyse the challenges and consider recommendations for policy development at all levels. This report addresses each of these aspects in turn, drawing on UNIDIR’s research and analysis on these topics over the years. It then proposes a 10-step road map towards effective national and international governance of AI in the military domain.

The post Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain and Its Implications for International Peace and Security: An Evidence-Based Road Map for Future Policy Action first appeared on UNIDIR.

In 2023, UNIDIR published its first report on subsea cables, entitled Wading Murky Waters: Subsea Communications Cables and Responsible State Behaviour. The initial scoping study sought to raise awareness of this essential transmission technology. Since then, a slew of new initiatives have been proposed, including at the international level, signalling both the strategic importance of the infrastructure and the need to strengthen security and resilience across all of its components.

This follow-on study sets out to understand what it means in policy and practice when governments qualify or designate subsea telecommunications cables as critical infrastructure (CI). The report draws from the CI literature to frame government approaches to security and resilience, identifying how government policy and practice interact with core CI concepts such as absorptive, restorative and adaptive resilience capacities. While subsea cable systems are generally designed and deployed with these capacities in mind, effective government action on security and resilience can contribute to strengthening them.

Citation: C. Kavanagh, J. Franken, and W. He. “Achieving Depth: Subsea Telecommunications Cables as Critical Infrastructure”. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2025.

The post Achieving Depth: Subsea Telecommunications Cables as Critical Infrastructure first appeared on UNIDIR.

Against this backdrop, UNIDIR conducted a project on working “Towards a Common Understanding of the Application of IHL to Emerging Technologies in the Area of LAWS”. Building on momentum around this topic, UNIDIR’s primary objective was to take stock of existing discussions and capture views, positions and approaches across sectors and regions on the application of IHL to LAWS.

To this end, the Institute drafted a background paper summarizing publicly available views from States, scholars and other experts participating in multilateral discussions on the applicability and interpretation of IHL with respect to the development, deployment and use of LAWS.

Additionally, UNIDIR conducted a series of bilateral and regional consultations between November 2024 and March 2025. In partnership with regional partners, UNIDIR held consultations in The Hague, Brasília, Pretoria and Singapore. These consultations provided a platform for open discussions, knowledge and information sharing, and deeper regional understandings of the intersection between IHL and LAWS.

Through these consultations, participants explored key legal, policy and defence perspectives. Held in person under the Chatham House Rule, the discussions brought together government-affiliated experts from ministries, national agencies and authorities, as well as selected scholars specializing in IHL and policy.

Citation: Yasmin Afina, “Regional Perspectives on the Application of International Humanitarian Law to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025.

The post Regional Perspectives on the Application of International Humanitarian Law to Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems first appeared on UNIDIR.

This briefing note contributes to a report submitted to the 18th session of the General Assembly and aims to support States in formulating their national views on this topic. In doing so, it seeks to ensure that the resulting report reflects a comprehensive, diverse and geographically representative range of perspectives.

To support this objective, the brief provides contextual information on AI in the military domain, outlines key considerations for States and includes suggested readings. These resources draw on UNIDIR’s research as well as selected external publications.

Citation: Giacomo Persi Paoli and Yasmin Afina, “AI in the Military Domain: A briefing note for States”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025.

The post AI in the Military Domain: A briefing note for States first appeared on UNIDIR.

Core topics in the views of States, scholars and other experts include the circumstances under which LAWS may be used in attacks and the measures needed to minimize civilian harm. The discourse has also addressed measures that should be taken before and after attacks involving LAWS to prevent violations of IHL and ensure accountability.

To support these ongoing discussions, UNIDIR implemented a series of activities as part of the project “Towards a Common Understanding of the Application of International Humanitarian Law to Emerging Technologies in the Area of LAWS”. This background paper summarizes publicly available views expressed by States, scholars and other experts participating in multilateral discussions on the applicability and interpretation of IHL regarding the development and use of LAWS.

The background paper finds that, while all contributions to the discussion share the common starting point that IHL applies to the development and use of LAWS, divergences in both form and content persist. Despite the breadth of discussions, comparing views coherently remains challenging, and some IHL rules governing the development and use of LAWS remain underexamined. Publicly available views on measures that States can, do or should take to avoid or minimize the effects of LAWS on civilians and civilian objects often do not specify whether these measures derive from an IHL principle or rule.

The background paper highlights the considerations involved in ensuring that LAWS are developed and used in accordance with IHL. It also underscores the challenges of achieving greater certainty on the interpretation and application of IHL to these technologies.

The post The Interpretation and Application of International Humanitarian Law in Relation to Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems first appeared on UNIDIR.

This UNIDIR research examines trends in the development and use of UMS between 2019 and 2024, identifying 60 UMS programmes across 17 countries that have utilized a wide range of systems. More than 40 attacks took place during the same period, with a notable rise since 2023.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms could play an important role in enhancing mutual trust and confidence between States if it were to contain information on international transfers and acquisitions of armed UMS. Due to their technical characteristics, however, most UMS fall outside the Register’s reporting categories, therefore remaining unreported.

This research puts forward four options for consideration by the Group of Governmental Experts in 2024-2025 on the continuing operation and future development of the Register. These options could also be considered by States participating in other multilateral instruments that contribute to increasing transparency in international transfers and acquisitions.

Citation: Anabel García García, Sarah Grand-Clément, Paul Holtom, “Changing Tides in Maritime Warfare: Closing the Reporting Gap on Uncrewed Maritime Systems in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025, https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/25/ERC/03.

The post Changing Tides in Maritime Warfare: Closing the Reporting Gap on Uncrewed Maritime Systems in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms first appeared on UNIDIR.