This report outlines seven approaches to biosecurity related educational initiatives drawing from a wide range of past and present activities in this area. It provides a general overview of the relevance of this form of education in the work of both the Biological Weapons Convention and the World Health Organization. The report then explores a roadmap for the development of a systematic process of integrating biosecurity into life science teaching. Finally, the appendix showcases some of the biosecurity-related education initiatives undertaken by national, regional and international actors.

The post Biorisk Governance: Advancing Biosecurity Education for Life Scientists first appeared on UNIDIR.

This report provides conceptual insights on verification ahead of the BWC Working Group meetings in December 2024. It also presents the perspectives of four experts—Dr Ajey Lele (India), Dr Jeremy Littlewood (Canada), Dr Anastasia Malygina (Russian Federation), and Mr Matthew Shearer (United States)—each of whom was invited to respond to three key questions:

• What do you understand by the term BWC verification?
• What is the purpose of BWC verification?
• And what do we want to verify?

This report reflects the views of the respective expert and is intended to provide food for thought on the focus and function of BWC verification.

Funded by

Effective Giving

The post The Focus and Function of BWC Verification first appeared on UNIDIR.

However, the traditional model of verification is not the only model available to BWC States Parties. Depending on the function(s) and focus of any verification mechanism, other options could be developed for BWC verification that might more effectively address the concerns of BWC States Parties and potentially reduce costs of verification while still increasing confidence in compliance.

Funded by

Effective Giving

The post Possible Models of BWC Verification first appeared on UNIDIR.

To address these limitations and look for innovative approaches to strengthen the Convention, some states parties have explored the concept of voluntary transparency initiatives (VTIs), non-binding measures agreed by interested states parties to enhance transparency among other things. Among several VTIs is the concept of peer review exercises (PREs) in which one or more states parties invite others to assess selected aspects of their treaty implementation through a flexible and tailored approach that can include document review, facility visits and exchanges of best practices. Since 2013, six PREs have been organized along with several other initiatives under the broader VTI framework.

This report begins by laying out the genesis and evolution of the implementation of peer review-type initiatives in the context of other voluntary initiatives to enhance transparency. The report proceeds to outline the key elements of the six PREs that were organized to date, providing an overview of their duration, location, objectives, focus, stakeholders, process and results. The report then turns to address the wider discussion within the BWC around the VTIs in general and the PREs in particular.

The report concludes with some reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of such initiatives and possible ways to advance work on this topic. An annex to this report includes a side by side summary of the main features of each of the PREs that were held to help compare the different ways in which they are conceived and executed.

The post Voluntary Transparency Initiatives: The Case of Peer Review Exercises in the Context of the BWC first appeared on UNIDIR.

The Biorisks, Biosecurity and Biological Disarmament Conference took place in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4–5 July 2023. The event provided an opportunity to discuss ongoing diplomatic processes and current and upcoming issues in the areas of biorisk, biosecurity and biological disarmament. 

More than 80 individuals from 30 countries, representing 60 institutions, participated in the discussion in person, and a further 334 individuals joined the discussion virtually from around the world. The participants included diplomats, public health professionals, security experts and scientists from a wide range of organizations. 

The Conference consisted of seven substantive panels, which explored a range of topics, centred on advances in science and technology and their related risks and benefits, biosecurity implementation, dual-use governance, disease response, international cooperation, and verification technologies. The discussions that took place during all seven panels are summarized in this conference report.

The post 2023 Biorisks, Biosecurity and Biological Disarmament Conference Report first appeared on UNIDIR.

Although these treaties and their respective Review Conference processes vary, the experiences over 12 months between August 2022 and May 2023 provide an important snapshot of the state of the WMD treaty regime. As such, there is merit in reflecting on these three processes jointly and exploring the commonalities and differences across three agreements dealing with the world’s most destructive weapons, as well as gathering lessons learned for future work in these fields.

To this end, UNIDIR invited the Presidents of the three Review Conferences to provide their reflections on their respective Review Conference processes. This publication brings together insights from Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen (Argentina), President of the tenth NPT Review Conference; Ambassador Leonardo Bencini (Italy), President of the ninth BWC Review Conference; and Ambassador Henk Cor Van der Kwast (the Kingdom of the Netherlands) who presided over the fifth CWC Review Conference. The Ambassadors take stock of the preparatory processes and the events that unfolded, and provide reflections for moving forward in the NPT, the BWC and the CWC respectively. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, provides a foreword. The publication also includes a short summary of findings by the editors.

The post Reflections on Review Conferences: the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention first appeared on UNIDIR.

This UNIDIR report, the first in a series, serves as a primer for the consideration of verification in the context of the BWC, with a particular focus on Article I and the core obligations contained in the title of the BWC. The paper begins with elements of a working definition of verification, before considering theoretically what contemporary biological weapons and biological weapons programmes might look like. The paper proceeds to discuss tools and approaches to verification of the BWC, and the importance of agreed procedures and resources, before concluding with some reflections on what the Working Group might be able to achieve.

This research was made possible by support from China and Effective Giving.

The post Verifying the BWC: A Primer first appeared on UNIDIR.

Progress with the CWC will however require careful preparation both in terms of the development of substantive inputs and ideas, but also raising awareness and understanding of the CWC and the Review Conference process. To support the CWC delegates, this report includes factual material on the historical experiences related to preparations, proposals, procedures, and participation in past Review Conferences.

It also includes a brief, balanced analysis of salient issues that are likely to be addressed at the Fifth Review Conference. Furthermore, it makes recommendation for preparing for the Review Conference.

The post Preparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Issues first appeared on UNIDIR.

To address this gap, in 2022, France, Senegal and Togo submitted a revised proposal to the BWC for the “establishment of an international platform dedicated to biosecurity and biosafety: SecBio”. The proposal includes three pillars: a searchable repository for biosafety- and biosecurity-related materials; a learning module; and a forum for expert networking to exchange information, data and best practices. To this end, this report draws lessons from past initiatives to develop repositories, learning modules and expert forums in order to inform the development of the SecBio platform (and any such similar initiatives).

The report begins with an overview of the importance of biosafety and biosecurity in the context of the BWC. It then proceeds to look at each of the platform pillars in turn, drawing from past experiences to identify lessons and develop options for state parties to consider. 

The post Assessing the SecBio Platform Proposal for the Biological Weapons Convention first appeared on UNIDIR.

To address this challenge, UNIDIR invited a diverse range of stakeholders and representatives from around the world and with diverse backgrounds to contribute their insights to this report. The contributions reflect activities they had undertaken in support of the BWC, what more their respective communities could do, and provide recommendations on what States Parties to the BWC should do (or not do) to advance the BWC. Collectively, these contributions provide several concrete ideas for BWC States Parties to consider in seeking to strengthen the Convention.

The post Stakeholder Perspectives on the Biological Weapons Convention first appeared on UNIDIR.

This report discusses and analyses the use of a novichok nerve agent in the United Kingdom in March 2018. This triggered a political process at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that led to the amendment of the CWC schedules. It provides a factual overview of the scientific discussion around the novichok class of chemical agents, and how this has changed since the amendment of the CWC schedules was adopted. Against the background of the cases where nerve agents have been used for political assassination, the report concludes with a discussion of implications of the schedule amendments for compliance with, and implementation of, the chemical weapons prohibition regime. 

Sponsor Organizations: Government of Norway.

The post Adding Novichok Nerve Agents to the CWC Annex on Chemicals: a Technical Fix and Its Implications for the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Regime first appeared on UNIDIR.

Sponsor Organizations: Government of Norway.

The post Back to the Future for Verification in the Biological Disarmament Regime? first appeared on UNIDIR.

To stimulate thinking ahead of the Review Conference, which is currently scheduled for August 2022, this report provides a forthright assessment of the risks, benefits, and financial implications of four different potential Review Conference outcomes.

A quick reference table of potential outcomes of the Ninth BWC Review Conference is also available.

Sponsor Organizations: Governments of France, Germany, Norway and the Philippines.

The post Potential Outcomes of the Ninth BWC Review Conference first appeared on UNIDIR.

To this end, UNIDIR sought input from a diverse range of experts on ideas for advancing Article X, with a particular focus on the promotional aspects of this important article. Building on the contributions of authors, this report outlines ten concrete ideas for States Parties to consider in seeking to enhance the implementation of Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention.

Sponsor Organizations: Government of Norway.

The post Options for Article X of the Biological Weapons Convention first appeared on UNIDIR.

Teaser: A Guide to the Issues

Sponsor Organizations: The Governments of Norway and France

The post Preparing for Success at the Ninth Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Review Conference first appeared on UNIDIR.

Over the last decade it has become increasingly clear that effective action will require a concerted effort from all those who can play a role in ensuring that the life sciences continue to be used safely, securely and solely for beneficial purposes. This book gathers together many of the best contributions from the recent work within the BWC framework and provides expert reviews of key themes, case studies of interesting national approaches, as well as unique perspectives from the ground. It is a practical tool for implementing the convention, an introductory guide to current best practice at the health/security interface and adds to the historical record of this important international instrument.

Citation: Piers Millett (ed.), et al. (2011). “Improving Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention: The 2007-2010 Intersessional Process”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

Sponsor Organizations: Piers Millett (ed.), Piers Millett, Masood Khan, Scott Spence, Implementation Support Unit,Implementation Support Unit,Implementation Support Unit, Ngoc Phuong Huynh, Piers Millett, Georgi Avramchev, Piers Millett, Isabelle Daoust-Maleval, Aamer Ikram, Marianne Heisz, Teck Mean Chua, Katsuhisa Furukawa, Robert Mathews, Koos van der Bruggen, Katherine Bowman, Jo Husbands, Ben Rusek & Barbara Schaal, Graham Pearson, Brian Rappert,Cathy Bollaert, Malcolm Dando & Simon Whitby, Marius Grinius, Pedro Oyarce, Ali Mohammadi, Keith Hamilton & Kazuaki Miyagishima, Joris De Baerdemaeker, Robin Coupland, Austin Ochieng Aluoch & Maurice Owuor Ope, Louise Gresham & Leslie Pray, Randall Murch, Richard Lennane

The post Improving Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention: The 2007-2010 Intersessional Process first appeared on UNIDIR.

This issue of Disarmament Forum focuses on advances in science and technology and their implications for the chemical and biological weapons regimes. After an overview of scientific and technological developments and their relation to the regimes, authors explore a few worrying applications made possible by developments in neuroscience and immunology, current research on “non-lethal” weapons, and the possible utility of a code of conduct for those working in the life sciences.

Citation: Kerstin Vignard (ed.) (2005). “Disarmament Forum: Science, Technology and the CBW Regimes”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

Disponible aussi en français.

Content

• Editor’s note, Kerstin Vignard
• Special Comment, Robin M. Coupland
• Science, technology and the CBW control regimes, Alexander Kelle
• The malign misuse of neuroscience, Malcolm Dando
• Assault on the immune system, Kathryn Nixdorff
• Non-lethal technologies—an overview, Nick Lewer & Neil Davison
• Biological weapons and the life sciences: the potential for professional codes, Brian Rappert
• Lessons from the implementation of the anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention, Ambassador Stephan Nellen
• UNIDIR Focus

The post Disarmament Forum: Science, Technology and the CBW Regimes first appeared on UNIDIR.

South Africa’s covert CBW programme, code-named Project Coast, began in 1981 and formally ended in 1995. Ostensibly motivated by the need to develop better crowd control agents and defensive CBW gear, in practice the programme focussed on the production of poisons intended for the assassination of state enemies within and outside the country and of unsuitable chemical substances. Conceived and operated beyond ordinary political, military and financial controls, Project Coast functioned on the basis of a myriad of front companies, illicit transactions, personal relationships and invisible power structures.

Drawing on the evidence presented at the criminal trial of Dr. Wouter Basson, managing officer of Project Coast, numerous interviews and other relevant documentation, Project Coast: Apartheid’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme by Chandré Gould and Peter Folb offers a meticulous account of South Africa’s clandestine CBW programme under apartheid. The book, which contains a preface by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, makes a major contribution to our knowledge of the South African apartheid CBW programme and serves as a warning of the grave dangers posed by CBW in the absence of adequate supervision.

Citation: Chandré Gould and Peter Folb (2002). “Project Coast: Apartheid’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

The post Project Coast: Apartheid’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme first appeared on UNIDIR.

In this issue of Disarmament Forum, experts weigh in with proposals and  recommendations for the Review Conference and the post-conference period, discussing specific concerns such as universality, verification, transparency, the general purpose criterion, developments in non-lethal weapons, and institutional issues. A short reference section includes a variety of additional reading on this topic.

Citation: Kerstin Vignard (ed.) (2002). “Disarmament Forum: The CWC Review Conference”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

Disponible aussi en français.

Content

• Editor’s note, Kerstin Vignard
• The first CWC Review Conference: taking stock and paving the way ahead, Alexander Kelle
• Evaluating the CWC verification system, Daniel Feakes
• The Chemical Weapons Convention and universality: A question of quality over quantity? Jean Pascal Zanders
• Scientific and technological change and the future of the CWC: the problem of non-lethal weapons, Malcolm Dando
• Organizational culture of the OPCW Secretariat, Maurizio Barbeschi
• Select Online Resources, compiled by Melinda Mennel
• Tactical nuclear weapons in South Asia: the need to disavow development and deployment, Gaurav Rajen

The post Disarmament Forum: The CWC Review Conference first appeared on UNIDIR.

With an eye on next year’s Review Conference, this issue of Disarmament Forum is well in advance of the meeting – to give delegates and interested parties the opportunity to absorb the information contained herein. In this issue you will find an overview of where the BWC is going as well as where it has been – the historical context of this Review Conference, the spectrum of possible outcomes of the Protocol negotiations, speculation on rates of change in biotechnologies, and suggestions for strengthening the regime.

Citation: Kerstin Vignard (ed.) (2000). “Disarmament Forum: Biological Weapons: From the BWC to Biotech”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

Disponible aussi en français.

Content

• Editor’s note, Kerstin Vignard
• Special Comment, János Martonyi
• The Proliferation of Biological Weapons: A Threat Assessment, Jean Pascal Zanders
• The BTWC in Historical Perspective: From Review and Strengthening Processes to an Integrated Treaty Regime, Nicholas a. Sims
• Opportunities for the Fifth Review Conference, Graham S. Pearson
• Fighting the Proliferation of Biological Weapons: Beyond the BWC Protocol, Michael Moodie
• New Technology and Future Developments in Biological Warfare, Mark Wheelis & Malcolm Dando
• Unilateral or negotiated arms control?, Jozef Goldblat
• Biological Weapons Resource List, compiled by Joshua Margolin

The post Disarmament Forum: Biological Weapons: From the BWC to Biotech first appeared on UNIDIR.

The post The Projected Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament first appeared on UNIDIR.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was the first treaty to prohibit an entire class of weapons of mass destruction. With 189 States Parties, the treaty remains a critical component of the broader framework of measures designed to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons. However, the BWC currently lacks a verification mechanism to assess whether States are in compliance with their treaty obligations. It also lacks operational means to assess risks and opportunities arising from developments in science and technology and to facilitate international cooperation on biology for peaceful purposes, among other things.

To address these limitations, States Parties established a Working Group on the Strengthening of the BWC at the Ninth Review Conference in 2022. Over the course of nine sessions in Geneva since 2023, diplomats from around the world have been working on a draft agreement covering a range of measures to strengthen and institutionalize the BWC. These include the establishment of two mechanisms: one to provide advice on science and technology, and another to support international cooperation and assistance. The draft also includes proposals for an Open-Ended Working Group on compliance and verification.

A pivotal moment ahead of December negotiations

Agreement on the draft text at the tenth and final session in December 2026 would therefore represent an important step forward in strengthening and advancing the Convention. Melanie Regimbal, Chief of Service of the Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, noted that the importance of reaching agreement goes far beyond the Working Group itself. She recalled the words of the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, who described the tenth session of the Working Group as a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to strengthen the Convention. Conversely, Robin Geiss, UNIDIR Director, warned that failure in December would risk a return to the divisions and discord that followed the collapse of negotiations on a BWC Protocol in 2001.

Against this backdrop, the retreat brought together representatives from approximately 32 States from across regional groups to Montreux to advance discussion on the draft text. Participants worked in breakout groups addressing three clusters of unresolved issues in the draft report: international cooperation and assistance under Article X; science and technology; and compliance and verification. The moderators indicated that possible ways forward identified in the discussions would be transmitted to the Chair of the Working Group, Ambassador Frederico S. Duque Estrada Meyer of Brazil, for consideration and further work.

Preparing for implementation and the future of the Convention

Participants also discussed practical steps needed for the swift implementation of the two mechanisms envisaged in the draft report of the Working Group. The BWC Implementation Support Unit will need to plan ahead for an expected start date of 2028.

Participants received an overview of the BWC review conference process, which represents a critical opportunity for States Parties to assess progress under the Convention and set its future direction. Achieving a successful outcome at the Tenth Review Conference in 2027 will require sustained preparation and political commitment. Failure to reach agreement could jeopardize key elements of the Convention’s architecture at a time when rapid technological developments and geopolitical tensions make a strengthened BWC more important than ever.

In his closing remarks, Ambassador Meyer highlighted the importance of the collective achievements since 2022 and invited delegations to reflect on the distinction between what is preferable and what is fundamental in negotiations on the BWC. He concluded the retreat by noting that political engagement will be essential in the coming weeks. He also encouraged participants to carry the “spirit of Montreux” back to Geneva and onwards to capitals with a view to concluding an agreement on the final document in December.

Beyond the retreat

UNIDIR continues working to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons through a range of initiatives, including supporting BWC-related processes, strengthening biosecurity capacity at the national and regional levels, advancing understanding of the evolving biological threat spectrum and supporting next-generation biosecurity education, training and awareness-raising.

The post Montreux retreat advances work towards a stronger Biological Weapons Convention first appeared on UNIDIR.

The broad diffusion of AI across scientific disciplines is increasingly evident in bibliometric studies. The number of AI-related natural science publications rose to nearly 80,000 in 2025, up 26% from 2024. This accounted for roughly 6–9% of scientific output across major scientific domains in 2025, compared to less than 1% in 2010. Recent studies also highlight particularly rapid growth in AI-biotechnology research, including in areas such as gene editing, drug discovery and bioinformatics.

These trends suggest that once-niche AI models are becoming increasingly embedded across the scientific research ecosystem. No longer the preserve of specific communities in specialized domains, these models are evolving into general-purpose capabilities available to specialists and non-specialists alike. This expanded access and rapid improvement in capability suggest significant implications for the governance of dual-use biology and its threat outlook.

Biological threats, including biological weapons, have traditionally been associated with access to specialized material, facilities and expertise. The growing integration of AI models into biological research and their rapid advancement add another dimension to these threat perceptions. Frontier AI models are increasingly enabling actors to acquire and apply biological knowledge more efficiently than was possible just a few years ago, potentially lowering some of the knowledge and expertise barriers associated with sensitive dual-use research.

Though Anthropic’s findings provide evidence that actors have already attempted to misuse AI for sensitive and potentially weaponized biological research, they do not demonstrate that AI models enable the development of biological weapons, nor that such efforts would have meaningfully advanced the prospect of success. They do, however, suggest that actors see strategic value in exploiting frontier AI models for dual-use biological activities that may be inaccessible through traditional pathways.

For that reason, it is encouraging to see frontier AI companies engaging in multilateral discussions on threat models, biological risk assessment and evaluations with respect to their tools. This is particularly important given that the private sector has been responsible for the development of the overwhelming majority of frontier AI models. But key governance and oversight challenges remain, and the most capable models continue to exhibit the least transparency.

At the same time, the international community cannot become wholly reliant on private sector actors to identify and mitigate every single situation in which AI could be exploited in the development of biology for hostile purposes. Nor can the private AI industry afford to remain detached from ongoing multilateral efforts to strengthen biological weapons controls.

Effective governance of emerging AI-biology dual-use capabilities will require sustained coordination with existing biological weapons prohibition and biosecurity frameworks, including the core, near-universal regime governing biological threats, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Efforts to strengthen the BWC’s ability to address emerging science and technology developments may ultimately prove to be relevant to the broader debate on AI governance, both within industry and among governments.

Moreover, the convergence of AI and biology, while deserving particular attention, is only one of several converging science and technology areas that may shape the biological threat spectrum and warrant our attention as we look to avert a darker biological weapons future. In such a future, biology could be exploited to develop threats beyond traditional conceptions of biological weapons, including localized attacks, terrorism and economic sabotage via disruption of agriculture or livestock supplies.

The nature of biological enablement by AI raises both the floor and ceiling of what could be achieved. Novices can attain previously inaccessible scientific knowledge, whereas experts can use AI to overcome domain-specific hurdles in their research. And a wide range of actors could exploit AI to facilitate mis- and disinformation related to biological weapons.

Averting such a future will require approaches that address the broader convergence of emerging science and technology developments rather than focusing solely on any single capability or technological phenomenon. More importantly, no one safeguard would be sufficient. A layered approach is needed to address the rapidly evolving scientific landscape in the context of varying real-world circumstances.

A web of prevention

Fortunately, States have developed several measures to prohibit and prevent biological weapons. Particularly important at the international level is the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. This agreement prohibits, among other things, the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, which are defined broadly under the convention to include any form of biological weapons, including any biological weapon developed using AI. With 189 States Parties, the treaty covers the vast majority of the world. The BWC has served States well for more than half a century; no State admits to having a biological weapons programme, and allegations of association with biological weapons have been met with sharp denials.

Moreover, many States have transposed this international prohibition into national law, as well as a range of other regulatory and normative measures designed to prevent the re-emergence of biological weapons. This process of national implementation via measures that prohibit through national laws and prevent through wider technological governance mechanisms is particularly important. It helps to construct both a “web of prevention” and communities of compliance that can together bolster the prohibition on biological weapons.

International and national implementation of measures to prevent biological weapons needs to be nurtured to ensure that these measures remain fit for purpose in the age of digital biology. Indeed, Anthropic’s threat report provides details of cases in which users took evasive measures to hide their tracks and circumvent existing safety mechanisms. Implementation strategies must therefore be developed with varied obfuscation methods in mind.

A decisive moment for the Biological Weapons Convention

Despite a number of concrete steps undertaken nationally and internationally, the BWC continues to have several operational limitations. It has no verification mechanism, for example, even though States tried throughout the 1990s to negotiate a protocol with a verification component. Moreover, in contrast to treaties on chemical and nuclear weapons, which are supported by organizations employing hundreds or even thousands of staff, the BWC is supported by a four-person Implementation Support Unit hosted within the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

The Working Group on strengthening the BWC will meet for its tenth and final session in December 2026. Over the course of this process, a draft report has emerged that contains a package of measures designed to advance the treaty. These include a plan for further work on verification through a dedicated open-ended working group, a mechanism for reviewing science and technology, and a second mechanism focused on international cooperation and assistance. These measures have considerable potential to advance the BWC and strengthen biological security.

Success in the Working Group would pave the way for the upcoming BWC Review Conference in 2027, during which States and stakeholders will have the opportunity to chart a course towards effective prevention of biological weapons for another 50 years.

But if the Working Group fails to achieve consensus in December, there is a real risk that biological disarmament diplomacy could be set back 25 years, to the doldrums of 2001, when negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the BWC collapsed acrimoniously.

A similar collapse of the Working Group may not irreparably damage the BWC or the current prohibitions on biological weapons, but it would severely curtail momentum towards strengthening the BWC. Avoiding such a fragmentation of multilateral efforts by States and stakeholders would help us tackle one of the most pressing security challenges of our time.

The post Averting a darker biological weapons future first appeared on UNIDIR.