It has three core objectives:

• First, it maps the current landscape of official nuclear risk reduction policy proposals.
• Second, it organizes proposed risk reduction measures into a framework of eight overarching categories, enabling the range of measures to be considered within a single, coherent resource.
• And third, it analyses these measures by drawing out the similarities, differences and nuances across the various policy proposals.

The compendium concludes with a list of the official risk reduction documents referenced throughout the publication, totalling over 100 documents. This list provides easy access to over a decade of official proposals by States in their own words.

Citation: Sarah Ruth Opatowski, Nuclear Risk Reduction: An Illustrative Compendium (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026). https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/26/NRR/01.

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The workshop focused on promoting equality and innovation in international cooperation and capacity building in the nuclear field. It featured expert presentations and open discussions covering a range of approaches to training and technical cooperation.

Citation: UNIDIR and VCDNP, “Promoting equality and innovation in the nuclear field: Workshop report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025.

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The report also surveys the current security environment, highlighting deteriorating arms control frameworks, strained dialogue among nuclear powers, and expanding arsenals as critical concerns. It emphasizes that arms races sustain or intensify hostility among protagonists, compounding the inherent risks of nuclear weapons through deliberate competitive build-ups that are likely to exacerbate existing tensions. The conclusion explores what approaches can be used to manage these risks.

Citation: Tim Caughley, Racing Towards Risk: The Hidden Costs of Nuclear Arms Build-Up (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025), https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NRR/01.

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This report suggests an approach to verifying obligations assumed by States through a mechanism of demonstrative verification, in which a State that wants to demonstrate compliance with its obligations unilaterally implements measures to positively prove its compliance to an international audience. To be effective, these measures must include a detailed verification protocol, rely on open data rather than intelligence estimates, and potentially involve independent observers. This report discusses potential applications of this approach to nuclear arms control and space security.

Citation: Tamara Patton and Pavel Podvig, “Verification Without a Treaty. Demonstrative Verification in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Space Security”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/01.

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This convergence introduces new and potentially significant risks. They include possible attacks on biological research and development facilities, targeting the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of information. In the context of international peace and security, ICT incidents present a spectrum of consequences, from minor to significant. For example, a minor event could involve a malicious actor spoofing an agricultural facility’s sensors to transmit false data to owner, impacting the annual production of crops. Conversely, a significant event could involve a malicious actor infiltrating the ICT systems of a biological research and development facility, to interfere with an automated production system, remotely altering the compounds, thus rendering its product ineffective, or worse, harmful.

Various scholars and practitioners have attempted to name and define a concept recognizing the unique characteristics of the infrastructure, data, vectors, and risk implications at this nexus. Cyberbiosecurity refers to a collection of practices aimed at addressing the potential ICT threats to those systems at the intersection of the digital and biological domains. More specifically, it includes methods, procedures and measures to tackle ICT threats to biosafety and biosecurity.

To better understand the nexus between ICT and the biological field, and as part of UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower project, this paper begins with an outline of some of the benefits introduced by the integration of advanced ICT in biological research and development.

It then introduces the above definition of the concept of ‘cyberbiosecurity’ and proceeds to outline some of the key risks at this nexus. The New Agenda for Peace launched by the Secretary-General in 2023 highlights the need for Member States to prevent the weaponization of emerging domains and promote responsible innovation (Action 11). The 2024 Summit of the Future was an opportunity for Member States to reaffirm their commitment to the prevention of biorisks and misuse of emerging technologies. This was particularly reflected in the Pact for the Future, specifically in Action 26 (to uphold disarmament obligations and commitments) and Action 27 (to seize opportunities associated with new and emerging technologies and address potential risks posed by their misuse). Cyberbiosecurity appears at the junction of these two goals.

This notion has however received tangential attention in the multilateral discussion on international ICT security, specifically the General Assembly subsidiary bodies the Groups of Governmental Experts from 2004 to 2021 and Open-ended Working Groups since 2019. In the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), limited attention has been given to cyberbiosecurity related issues. There are however cyber-related elements mentioned in documents and statements of the last 10 years.

Finally, in the United Nations Security Council, several States have expressed concern over the increase in cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure, including in the health sector, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While not encompassing all aspects of this issue, these discussions can help in sensitizing the international community and practitioners on the need for better measures.

One way forward could be to clarify the breadth of the concept of cyberbiosecurity through exchanges with relevant communities and considering cyberbiosecurity in the context of the ongoing BWC Working Group, notably in discussions on scientific and technological developments. This approach could allow for an exchange of views and good practices in the cyber domain and their applicability to biological research and development facilities.

Citation: Louison Mazeaud and Andraz Kastelic, “Cyberbiosecurity: A Matter of International Peace and Security?” UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/CBW/02.

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This report outlines seven approaches to biosecurity related educational initiatives drawing from a wide range of past and present activities in this area. It provides a general overview of the relevance of this form of education in the work of both the Biological Weapons Convention and the World Health Organization. The report then explores a roadmap for the development of a systematic process of integrating biosecurity into life science teaching. Finally, the appendix showcases some of the biosecurity-related education initiatives undertaken by national, regional and international actors.

Citation: Sarah Ruth Opatowski, Biorisk Governance: Advancing Biosecurity Education for Life Scientists (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025), https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/CBW/01.

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Transparency can play an important role in building confidence in international agreements, including the NPT. While several nuclear weapon States have provided information on Article VI obligations and related commitments, limited progress on disarmament has led to increased calls for greater transparency and accountability.

Various proposals have outlined how this might be achieved and what information should be provided, but there is less clarity around the options regarding the format and process of interactive discussion.

To help fill this gap, this report reviews models from other multilateral processes – including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Financial Action Task Force, the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, and the World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review Mechanism – and presents potential options for integrating interactive dialogue into the NPT review cycle.

Citation: James Revill, Victoria Viana Souza Guimarães, and Luiza Delaflora Cassol, “Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations”, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/02.

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Indonesia invited countries that had submitted working papers on NNP at the 2022 NPT Review Conference – including those currently developing this technology – as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, to engage in further discussions on the issue. UNIDIR facilitated the discussion and provided background material on the topic at hand.

Citation: Luiza Delaflora Cassol and James Revill (eds.), “Strengthening the NPT Safeguards Regime for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Development: Event Summary”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/01.

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The retreat report defines the various forms of nuclear risks, highlights States’ differing interpretations of precautionary measures, explores potential flashpoints that could lead to nuclear use and examines ways to mitigate these risks.

The report also covers the contrasting views on deterrence, perceptions and misperceptions, the role of norms, challenges in signaling and the risks of escalation. Participants worked to identify islands of convergence amongst them, as well as potential areas of collaboration with non-nuclear-weapon States to advance risk reduction dialogue and measures.

Citation: Andrey Baklitskiy and Sarah Ruth Opatowski, Nuclear Risks: Perceptions and Pathways, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/NRR/01.

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This report provides conceptual insights on verification ahead of the BWC Working Group meetings in December 2024. It presents the perspectives of four experts—Dr Ajey Lele (India), Dr Jeremy Littlewood (Canada), Dr Anastasia Malygina (Russian Federation), and Mr Matthew Shearer (United States)—each of whom was invited to respond to three key questions:

• What do you understand by the term BWC verification?
• What is the purpose of BWC verification?
• And what do we want to verify?

This report reflects the views of the respective expert and is intended to provide food for thought on the focus and function of BWC verification.

Citation: Ajey Lele, Jeremy Littlewood, Anastasia Malygina and Matthew P. Shearer. 2024. The Focus and Function of BWC Verification. UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/CBW/04.

Funded by

Effective Giving

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However, the traditional model of verification is not the only model available to BWC States Parties. Depending on the function(s) and focus of any verification mechanism, other options could be developed for BWC verification that might more effectively address the concerns of BWC States Parties and potentially reduce costs of verification while still increasing confidence in compliance.

Funded by

Effective Giving

Citation – Revill, James. 2024. Possible Models of BWC Verification, UNIDIR, Geneva

https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/CBW/03

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This report begins by laying out the genesis and evolution of the implementation of peer review-type initiatives in the context of other voluntary initiatives to enhance transparency. The report proceeds to outline the key elements of the six PREs that were organized to date, providing an overview of their duration, location, objectives, focus, stakeholders, process and results. The report then turns to address the wider discussion within the BWC around the VTIs in general and the PREs in particular. The report concludes with some reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of such initiatives and possible ways to advance work on this topic. An annex to this report includes a side by side summary of the main features of each of the PREs that were held to help compare the different ways in which they are conceived and executed.

Citation: Espona, M.J. (2024). Voluntary Transparency Initiatives: The Case of Peer Review Exercises in the Context of the BWC, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/CBW/02.

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The Biorisks, Biosecurity and Biological Disarmament Conference took place in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4–5 July 2023. The event provided an opportunity to discuss ongoing diplomatic processes and current and upcoming issues in the areas of biorisk, biosecurity and biological disarmament. 

More than 80 individuals from 30 countries, representing 60 institutions, participated in the discussion in person, and a further 334 individuals joined the discussion virtually from around the world. The participants included diplomats, public health professionals, security experts and scientists from a wide range of organizations. 

The Conference consisted of seven substantive panels, which explored a range of topics, centred on advances in science and technology and their related risks and benefits, biosecurity implementation, dual-use governance, disease response, international cooperation, and verification technologies. The discussions that took place during all seven panels are summarized in this conference report.

Citation: Daniel Feakes, Maria Garzon Maceda, Alex Lampalzer, Jade Mason, Soatiana Rajatonirina, James Revill, Anna Laura Ross, Veronica Rovegno, Emmanuelle Tuerlings, Taylor Winkleman (eds), “2023 Biorisks, Biosecurity and Biological Disarmament Conference Report”, UNIDIR, UNODA, WHO, Geneva, 2024. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/CBW/01  

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Several initiatives over the past decade have advanced the discussions on an FMCT. In addition, several states have indicated strong support for beginning negotiations on an FMCT, including through a recent initiative led by the Government of Japan. 

In December 2023, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that urged the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a treaty and urged states that possess or produce fissile materials for weapons to engage in transparency and confidence-building measures. However, the prospects for commencing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament remain uncertain. 

This paper outlines some of the issues that have complicated progress in the negotiation of an FMCT and lays out options for states to consider in seeking to revive discussions around this important concept. It covers some of the key questions regarding a future treaty, including whether or not the FMCT should be a disarmament treaty – that is, whether it should require the active elimination of fissile materials. 

The paper then lays out options for dealing with the related challenge of how to deal with existing stocks before considering issues related to transfers of fissile materials as well as options for transparency and confidence-building measures.

This project is generously supported by the Government of Japan.

Citation: Pavel Podvig, “Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Process”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024: https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/FMCT/1

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Although these treaties and their respective Review Conference processes vary, the experiences over 12 months between August 2022 and May 2023 provide an important snapshot of the state of the WMD treaty regime. As such, there is merit in reflecting on these three processes jointly and exploring the commonalities and differences across three agreements dealing with the world’s most destructive weapons, as well as gathering lessons learned for future work in these fields.

To this end, UNIDIR invited the Presidents of the three Review Conferences to provide their reflections on their respective Review Conference processes. This publication brings together insights from Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen (Argentina), President of the tenth NPT Review Conference; Ambassador Leonardo Bencini (Italy), President of the ninth BWC Review Conference; and Ambassador Henk Cor Van der Kwast (the Kingdom of the Netherlands) who presided over the fifth CWC Review Conference. The Ambassadors take stock of the preparatory processes and the events that unfolded, and provide reflections for moving forward in the NPT, the BWC and the CWC respectively. Izumi Nakamitsu, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, provides a foreword. The publication also includes a short summary of findings by the editors.

Citation: Leonardo Bencini, Henk Cor van der Kwast & Gustavo Zlauvinen (2023) “Reflections on Review Conferences: the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention”, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/RevCon/01

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This UNIDIR report, the first in a series, serves as a primer for the consideration of verification in the context of the BWC, with a particular focus on Article I and the core obligations contained in the title of the BWC. The paper begins with elements of a working definition of verification, before considering theoretically what contemporary biological weapons and biological weapons programmes might look like. The paper proceeds to discuss tools and approaches to verification of the BWC, and the importance of agreed procedures and resources, before concluding with some reflections on what the Working Group might be able to achieve.

This research was made possible by support from China and Effective Giving.

Citation: James Revill (2023) “Verifying the BWC: A Primer”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/Bio.verification.primer1

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The Menzingen Verification Experiment was designed to test practical procedures for verifying the absence of nuclear weapons at a storage site. The experiment, which was conducted on 8 March 2023, was organized by UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, and the Open Nuclear Network. The project was supported by the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.

This report describes the procedure and the key results of the Menzingen Verification Experiment.

Citation: Podvig, Pavel (ed.). 2023. “Menzingen Verification Experiment. Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field”, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/MVE.

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Citation: Amy F. Woolf (2023) “The Past and Future of Bilateral Nuclear Arms Control”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/DDAC/01.

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Progress with the CWC will however require careful preparation both in terms of the development of substantive inputs and ideas, but also raising awareness and understanding of the CWC and the Review Conference process. To support the CWC delegates, this report includes factual material on the historical experiences related to preparations, proposals, procedures, and participation in past Review Conferences.

It also includes a brief, balanced analysis of salient issues that are likely to be addressed at the Fifth Review Conference. Furthermore, it makes recommendation for preparing for the Review Conference.
 

Executive Summaries in All UN Languages

Arabic • Chinese • English • French • Russian • Spanish

Citation: Alexander Ghionis, Alexander Kelle and María Garzón Maceda (2023) “Preparing for Success at the Fifth Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Issues”, UNIDIR, Geneva, https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/CWC/01

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To address this gap, in 2022, France, Senegal and Togo submitted a revised proposal to the BWC for the “establishment of an international platform dedicated to biosecurity and biosafety: SecBio”. The proposal includes three pillars: a searchable repository for biosafety- and biosecurity-related materials; a learning module; and a forum for expert networking to exchange information, data and best practices. To this end, this report draws lessons from past initiatives to develop repositories, learning modules and expert forums in order to inform the development of the SecBio platform (and any such similar initiatives).

The report begins with an overview of the importance of biosafety and biosecurity in the context of the BWC. It then proceeds to look at each of the platform pillars in turn, drawing from past experiences to identify lessons and develop options for state parties to consider. 

Citation: Kai Ilchmann and James Revill (2022) “Assessing the SecBio Platform Proposal for the Biological Weapons Convention”, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/BWC/04

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To address this challenge, UNIDIR invited a diverse range of stakeholders and representatives from around the world and with diverse backgrounds to contribute their insights to this report. The contributions reflect activities they had undertaken in support of the BWC, what more their respective communities could do, and provide recommendations on what States Parties to the BWC should do (or not do) to advance the BWC. Collectively, these contributions provide several concrete ideas for BWC States Parties to consider in seeking to strengthen the Convention.

Citation: James Revill, Vivienne Zhang and María Garzón Maceda (eds.) (2022) “Stakeholder perspectives on the Biological Weapons Convention”, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/BWC/03

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Citation: Lewis A. Dunn (2022) “The Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Implications of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine – and What Next for Reducing Global Nuclear Dangers”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/DDAC/01.

The post The Disarmament, Arms Control, and Non-Proliferation Implications of the Invasion of Ukraine – and What Next for Reducing Global Nuclear Dangers first appeared on UNIDIR.

This report discusses and analyses the use of a novichok nerve agent in the United Kingdom in March 2018. This triggered a political process at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) that led to the amendment of the CWC schedules. It provides a factual overview of the scientific discussion around the novichok class of chemical agents, and how this has changed since the amendment of the CWC schedules was adopted. Against the background of the cases where nerve agents have been used for political assassination, the report concludes with a discussion of implications of the schedule amendments for compliance with, and implementation of, the chemical weapons prohibition regime. 

Citation: Alexander Kelle (2022) “Adding Novichok Nerve Agents to the CWC Annex on Chemicals: A Technical Fix and its Implications for the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Regime”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.
https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/WMDCE/01

Sponsor Organizations: Government of Norway.

The post Adding Novichok Nerve Agents to the CWC Annex on Chemicals: a Technical Fix and Its Implications for the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Regime first appeared on UNIDIR.

Preview image by GeoEye.

Sponsor Organizations: Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute’s activities. This research project of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme is supported by the Government of New Zealand.

Citation: Pavel Podvig (ed.) (2022) “Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, UNIDIR, Geneva. Switzerland, https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/TPNW/01

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