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The stalemate in the Middle East Peace Process has taken a drastic turn for the worse in the past months. With violence exploding, hopes for positive steps towards a Palestinian-Israeli accord in the near future are all but extinguished. How will this deteriorating situation effect the rest of the Middle East? What are the near to mid-term prospects for the region? What’s happening with ACRS and what, if anything, are its possibilities? Topics such as the international community’s wavering equivocations on how to deal with Iraq, recent elections throughout the region and their implications, and the indisputable strategic importance of the Middle East demand a new examination through a regional security and disarmament lens. This issue of Disarmament Forum will offer a deeper exploration of how and why the Middle East constitutes such an important challenge to arms control and disarmament.

At the beginning of a new century, we are facing crises on several disarmament and arms control fronts. Weapons (from small arms to nuclear warheads) seem to be proliferating at increasing rates around the globe. Some would go so far as to claim that the norm of non-proliferation and our control regimes are crumbling. In response to this state of affairs, there has been a renewed interest in education for disarmament and non-proliferation. In November the General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General prepare a two-year study addressing this issue. A ten-person expert group will start their work on this study in April.

UNIDIR feels that the issue of education will be a crucial one in the coming years and for that reason we are dedicating the next issue of Disarmament Forum to an exploration of previous initiatives and potential directions. This issue of Disarmament Forum will hopefully be only the first of several activities to be undertaken by the Institute in this area. This issue will look both curriculum-based programmes and out-of-school initiatives, as well as try to propose potential avenues for progress. Additionally we will be trying to identify how UNIDIR, as a UN research institute, could best serve as an interface between other international organizations and the research community on this topic.

We are pleased to announce that Disarmament Forum, due to the requests of our readers, now features a ‘letters to the editor’ section. As evident in this issue’s contribution, reactions to articles in earlier editions are welcome. Of course, we reserve the right to edit letters for length and clarity. We look forward to hearing from you — your letters contribute to our journal’s development into an increasingly open “forum”.

Work on the UNIDIR/VERTIC Verification Handbook has already begun with the appointment of researcher Jane Boulden. Dr Boulden, currently a visiting scholar at Oxford University, will be examining regional and global verification regimes, with the aim of supporting the Middle East Peace Process. Please see the activities section for updates on this and other UNIDIR projects.
Due to an error during the layout process, Derek Brown’s name was left off the credits for issue 1 2001 of Disarmament Forum on National Missile Defence. Derek, a junior at Davidson College in North Carolina, spent several months at UNIDIR undertaking research on issues related to the Middle East, missile defence and sanctions. Our apologies to Derek for this oversight.

Kerstin Vignard
In looking at the Middle East from a non-proliferation perspective, a curious anomaly presents itself. Since the Second World War, the region has been at the forefront in terms of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, the Middle East remains one of the few regions that has not seen the development of a meaningful arms control process.

Consider the following. The region is one of the highest amongst the Third World in terms of military expenditures, both in absolute dollar terms and as a percentage of GDP. For the last two decades, the Middle East has seen the unchecked expansion of weapons programmes in all classes of WMD. Many of the holdouts blocking the universality of the key global non-proliferation treaty regimes are in the Middle East, the most notable being Israel’s refusal to adhere to the NPT and its retention of an advanced nuclear programme outside of IAEA safeguards. This, in turn, has prompted a number of Arab states to refrain from accession to, or ratification of, both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

In looking at the region’s unfortunate record of proliferation, it would be erroneous to perceive the problem as merely an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although it is true that the Arab-Israeli conflict has exacerbated the trend, proliferation has occurred along multiple axes of conflict in the region. This assessment is also borne out by regional trends in military expenditure. Despite the peace process that has been ongoing for the better part of the last decade, the absence of any major Arab-Israeli wars, and with more and more states at peace with each other, military expenditures have remained relatively constant — at an overall annual total of about $53 billion, with a 38% share of the world’s arms imports according to official United States statistics.

It is this reality of proliferation as a region-wide trend, more than any other factor, which constitutes the strongest case for a comprehensive and aggressive arms control approach for the Middle East. Such an approach must be both inclusive and comprehensive: inclusive in that it cannot exempt any particular state from what is designed to be a region-wide arms control process, and comprehensive in that it should deal with all classes of weapons systems — non-conventional and conventional alike. It is important to stress this point because it was the inability to agree on these parameters that led to the collapse of the region’s first, and so far only, experiment in arms control embodied in the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group.

The negotiating history of the ACRS process, initiated within the context of the Madrid peace process, provides invaluable lessons for future arms control prospects in the Middle East. There is a prevalent misperception about ACRS that it foundered over differences concerning how to deal with the nuclear issue. The differences in fact ran deeper, and reflected a fundamental divergence in how to approach regional security issues. In essence, the debate was not over whether to focus on WMD or conventional weapons, but over whether to engage in any type of arms control at all or restrict the agenda to confidence-building measures (CBMs) of a limited and humanitarian nature.
The differences in approach were a reflection of the political postures of the parties to the process. Egypt, because it was the one state at peace with all the other participants, was in a position to envision a long-term end state for the region’s security architecture centred around the establishment of a zone free of all WMD. Israel, on the other hand, initially did not have peaceful relations with any state involved in the ACRS talks — with the exception of Egypt — and thus sought to limit the agenda strictly to CBMs devoid of any arms control component. Israel’s position in the ACRS process reflected what may be termed its “long-corridor” approach to regional arms control, an approach that lays down a series of demanding criteria before meaningful arms control measures can be adopted. According to this approach, regional arms control can only come about after a comprehensive peace has been established in the region, to be followed by a state of peace between peoples beyond the formal peace agreements between states, and only then can an arms control process be initiated beginning first with CBMs, to be expanded gradually to include conventional weapons systems and eventually WMD.

The record of previous experiences at regional and global arms control contradicts the assumptions inherent in this approach. Suffice it to say that the Cold War did not prevent the establishment of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe process, nor the negotiation of the ABM, SALT, START, CFE or INF treaties, the latter having been signed at the height of superpower rivalry. Furthermore, the continuation of regional conflicts did not prevent negotiations over the various nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the treaties of Pelindaba (Africa), Bangkok (South East Asia), Rarotonga (South Pacific) and Tlatelolco (Latin America).

However, the major problem with the long corridor approach, beyond the fact that it goes against any form of arms control logic, is that it is inherently politically untenable. No state engaged in serious arms control can allow the process to be tailored according to the priorities of one country alone. Such a skewed approach would, in essence, result in the exact opposite of confidence building. The essential lesson of ACRS, therefore, is that a selective arms control approach, or one that is dictated by the security concerns of one country or a group of countries, is bound to founder on the political unacceptability inherent in any lop-sided security agenda. The Iraqi experience presents a good example of this. In addition to the humanitarian situation affecting the Iraqi people, one of the reasons behind Arab public resentment towards the international effort to disarm Iraq of its proscribed WMD programmes, is that this effort has been undertaken in complete isolation from any broader regional arms control initiative. Article 14 of Security Council resolution 687 calling for the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East remains unfulfilled. Without justifying Iraq’s proscribed programmes, initiating efforts to establish a WMD-free zone would have provided a more positive political context for the implementation of the said resolution.

The adoption of a comprehensive framework, however, need not preclude reliance on incremental or gradual approaches, nor does it mean ignoring the different security realities of the countries involved, so long as such measures are not divorced from the broader arms control context. CBMs can and should play an integral role in this process.

However, CBMs need not be confined only to search and rescue missions, notification of exercises and data exchange, but could also be broadened to include a more comprehensive approach. This would entail the adoption of measures of a political, legally binding and technical nature so as to instil the confidence necessary for the continuation of the overall process. For example, political CBMs could entail a series of declaratory measures which, among others, would reaffirm the commitment of the regional and international parties to the creation of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, a renewed commitment to ensure the universality of the NPT, and a declaration on the non-use of any type of WMD. These political CBMs should be complemented by legally binding disarmament commitments, such as submission of all nuclear facilities to IAEA safeguards,
together with adherence to the NPT. Finally, technical CBMs would entail measures that contribute to the physical security of states involved, such as limited force zones, data exchange and mutual monitoring, many of which have already been implemented in the context of Arab-Israeli disengagement agreements and peace treaties.

In short, any CBM process needs to be comprehensive in scope so as to constitute an integral component of the arms control process. Such measures should not, and cannot, be confined only to a specific class of weapons systems, but rather should be broad enough so as to deal with the overall arms build-up in the region. Such steps would instil the political confidence for deferring certain issues while dealing with others on a more immediate basis. Furthermore, all such CBMs cannot constitute stand-alone measures, but must be part of an ongoing and energetic process of disarmament.

The need for a comprehensive regional approach to arms control now presents itself with ever greater urgency. In the absence of a regional arms control process, WMD programmes in the Middle East have continued unchecked. Having mastered the rudiments of missile technology, regional missile programmes are on the verge of crossing new thresholds in terms of range and payload. The past decade has also seen the diversification and expansion of chemical and biological weapons programmes. And, if we are to believe Israeli and American analysts, the trend towards creeping nuclearization of the region may produce a multi-polar nuclear Middle East within the next decade.

If this proliferation trend continues unabated, it will inevitably trigger a re-evaluation on the part of regional states, prompting some to accelerate the development of their already existing WMD programmes, while forcing others to activate programmes that have so far remained dormant. More importantly, it might precipitate a rethinking by certain states of their security postures vis-à-vis the WMD threat. Perhaps the most visible sign of this is the gradual erosion of Israel’s ambiguity posture regarding its nuclear programme.

If such a scenario manifests itself, and security trends in the region certainly point towards this direction, we might be faced with consequences that prove to be irreversible, thus permanently closing the door on any efforts to reverse the proliferation trend in the Middle East. How, for example, could we restart ACRS in the context of a nuclear breakout in the region, or in the eventuality of an open (i.e. ‘non-ambiguous’) WMD deterrence relationship superimposed on the conflicts that already exist?

A selective approach to arms control will not forestall such a nightmare security scenario. Only a comprehensive framework for addressing the proliferation problem in the Middle East has the potential for stemming the proliferation trend in the region.

Nabil Fahmy
Ambassador of Egypt to the United States
Chairman of the Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
The article ‘Unilateral or Negotiated Arms Control?’ by Prof. Jozef Goldblat in issue 4 2000 of Disarmament Forum, page 51, specifically highlights the growing practice among states of announcing unilateral measures. These range from observing moratorium on nuclear tests to withdrawal of forces from disputed international borders. But why are unilateral measures adopted by states, rather than participating in bilateral or multilateral processes? Is it not a ploy or a bargaining chip used by states to skirt the real issues related to arms control? Unilateral measures are difficult to find credible, and there is really no mechanism for their scrutiny by the international community. As there is little accountability or compulsion to adhere to a self-imposed unilateral measure, can a unilateral measure ever be taken at face value?

One example is the announcement of unilateral measures by India. First, The Indian Government announced a cease-fire against terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir during Ramadan and later extended it twice, despite suffering several human casualties. This could be considered a ploy to entice terrorists towards negotiating table, or as an image-building exercise for the benefit of the world community. Such a unilateral declaration by India does not necessarily force Pakistan to reciprocate in gestures, although it may help to create ground for the two parties to resume talks on bilateral issues. A second example: India announced that it would observe a moratorium on nuclear tests after conducting its Pokhran II tests in 1998 instead of signing the CTBT.

Unilateral declarations are easily revoked. China agreed to abide by the MTCR Guidelines by signing a MOU, yet it went on supplying M-9 and M-11 missiles and related technologies to Pakistan. The United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) announced moratorium on nuclear tests on different occasions in the past to suit their purposes only. The sole intention was to gain technological superiority over their rival without compromising their national security — which is why a ‘moratorium on nuclear testing’ never bore fruit. Following the lead of the United States and Soviet Union, China and France did their own pre-announced nuclear testing to their own satisfactions. In 1998, India and Pakistan used this policy as an excuse to not adhere to nuclear non-proliferation treaties like the NPT and CTBT. Thus, it can be said that such a policy only provides an ‘escape route’ to the declaring state. Unilateral measures cannot be said to reflect a state’s behaviour with certainty. It is only an ad hoc arrangement before arriving to a mutually acceptable, internationally verifiable treaty through negotiations.

Today most of the arms control regimes are suffering from lack of universal acceptance and force majeure. Unilateral declarations do not build consensus, as their effects cannot be measured by intent but only through implementation.

Shailendra Kumar Dube
Research scholar
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
It has been over five years since the Middle East working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) held a formal activity. ACRS, one of five multilateral working groups launched in January 1992 to support the Middle East Peace Process that began three months earlier in Madrid, focuses exclusively on military stability and security enhancement in the region as a whole. This region-wide approach, sponsored jointly by the United States and the Russian Federation, was unprecedented for the Middle East. It was generally welcomed as a means for creating a political framework promoting security dialogue and co-operation, as well as reducing suspicions and misunderstandings, between Arabs and Israelis. So what has happened to ACRS since 1995, what became of the security and confidence-building measures (CBMs) the working group adopted, and what has filled the vacuum created by its absence?

From the beginning, no one expected the working group to take vast strides forward without significant progress in the ‘core’ peace talks directly between Israel and its immediate Arab neighbours, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians. After all, ACRS, like the other multilateral working groups, was set up to complement and support the bilateral talks, and not become a substitute for those bilateral negotiations. When progress slowed in the bilaterals in mid-1996 the pace of work in the multilateral working groups retarded and in some cases either halted altogether or resumed informally when the peace process advanced.

Formal ACRS activities, however, ceased in September 1995 at a time when the bilaterals were still blossoming and the other multilateral working groups were in full swing. ACRS was suspended over an internal dispute about how to proceed on the agenda of the working group in the absence of a comprehensive peace. It was a dispute that was four years in the making. At the first ACRS plenary in May 1992 in Washington, DC, the parties agreed that the working group should follow a limited set of guidelines that included operating by consensus, seeking an ambitious set of goals, dealing with the comprehensive list of concerns impacting on their security, and participation in agreed measures will be voluntary. The primacy of the bilateral talks reinforced the notion that the working group should proceed step-by-step, starting modestly and proceeding to more substantial measures as political conditions permit. According to this approach, after the parties become familiar with one another, conversant on arms control measures and establish a record of trust and compliance on the softer measures, then the ground would become fertile for confronting the more difficult elements related to arms control, disarmament and regional stability. As such, the group initially and successfully concentrated on a series of limited CBMs, refinement of declaratory positions, developing

Promoting arms control and regional security in the Middle East

Michael D. Yaffe

Dr Michael D. Yaffe is a Foreign Affairs Officer in the United States Department of State. He is a member of the United States delegation to the Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group and co-ordinates the American Government’s Track Two programme. Views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent those of the Government of the United States.
expertise in arms control, and establishing a structure to expedite the work of ACRS. However, this approach unwittingly sowed the seeds for the political context that would lead to the impasse in ACRS.

By December 1994, there was growing pressure within the working group to go beyond political confidence and security-building measures by also pursuing structural arms control. While CBMs were judged to be important to efforts to reduce tensions and prevent war by misunderstanding, miscalculation or surprise attack, structural arms control was viewed as necessary for scaling-down the forces of states to conduct military operations by limiting manpower, weapons, military equipment and deployments. The issue of central importance to most Arab parties was the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region, and particularly steps to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons. All ACRS parties agreed on the need to address this issue and, indeed, all supported establishing such a zone in principle. But there were divisions about whether the political conditions were ripe for approaching arms control of conventional and non-conventional weapons at that time and the need for joining global arms control treaties as a prerequisite for establishing a Middle Eastern WMD-free zone. Without an agreed agenda, a consensus for continuing the working group could not be obtained.

Several attempts have been made to resurrect ACRS. Most recently, in February 2000, after increased activity on the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Palestinian tracks, the Foreign Ministers of the Multilateral Track Steering Group met in Moscow to reinvigorate the working groups. This was the first Steering Group meeting since 1995. Plenary dates and venues were selected for the water, environment, refugees and economic development working groups. Parties also noted the importance of reaching an agreed comprehensive agenda for ACRS in order to get that working group underway again. But when momentum on the bilateral talks slowed a couple of months later, interest in rejuvenating the multilaterals also receded.

While regional governments have not been able to bridge the gap that separates them on the ACRS agenda to permit resumption of formal talks, there has been growing interest by individuals from the regional parties to meet and discuss regional security affairs. Stepping into the void created by the suspension of ACRS, a host of extra-regional governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have sponsored and organized nearly eighty workshops, courses, seminars and other events on Middle East security since 1995. This robust set of non-binding, unofficial activities is described collectively as ‘ACRS Track Two diplomacy’.

Track Two activities are likely to remain the central locus for region-wide discussions on Middle East security until a significant event (e.g., a breakthrough in the bilateral peace process, a regional war, a serious shift in the military balance, an open WMD arms race, etc.) engenders the regional parties to sit down again in formal ‘Track One’ negotiations. In the interim, Track Two is making an important contribution by laying the groundwork for resuming those official deliberations. Some activities have even made advancements on the same measures pursued in ACRS. But informal activities, by their very nature, cannot produce binding arms control and confidence-building agreements. The bottom line is that comprehensive security in the Middle East will not be greatly advanced without a formal process for negotiating the complex issues related to regional stability and arms control.

Where ACRS left off in 1995

The history and structure of ACRS have been described and assessed amply elsewhere, and, consequently, shall not be reviewed here. Instead, I will briefly recall the successes and shortcomings
of ACRS which may have a bearing on resumed ACRS working group activities, topics for discussion in Track Two fora on Middle East regional security, or the erection of a new regime of regional security negotiations when circumstances permit.

ACRS revealed that most regional parties wanted to meet together to not only discuss their various views on security problems and the ingredients for building a stable and effective regional security architecture, but also to negotiate certain multilateral arms control and CBMs helpful to the establishment of such a regime. Within the span of forty-five months, officials from fifteen regional parties (i.e., Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestinian Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen), together with representatives from a score of extra-regional states and the United Nations, met in six plenary sessions and thirty-one expert-level meetings. This unprecedented and intense schedule of meetings conveyed the seriousness and trenchant interest in advancing co-operative regional security in the Middle East. It also demonstrated a deep commitment to the peace process and a desire to address one another directly on issues of mutual concern even without normalized relations throughout the region. Although most of these meetings were convened in Canada, Europe, the Russian Federation and the United States, the parties evinced their growing sense of propriety of the issues by hosting meetings in Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Tunisia during ACRS’s final year. The parties were also volunteering to host certain newly created institutions to support the process. Regional hosting and institutionalization were significant achievements not only within the ACRS working group but also within the context of the overall peace process.

In addition to developing a structure for multilateral negotiations, ACRS made good progress in several areas of concern. In many ways, ACRS set new records relative to regional security talks in other parts of the world in terms of quickly negotiating and adopting transparency agreements to improve trust and reduce tensions. To be fair, Middle East parties modelled their efforts largely after security arrangements within Europe and agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, but adapting these measures to suit their own needs. After reviewing the long list of agreements pioneered by others, Middle East parties elected to devote their energies initially to the following initiatives.

**Communications**

The parties agreed to establish a communications network for conveying important information related to the ACRS process and implementing agreed measures. This ‘warm line’ was considered to be a first step towards creating a ‘hot line’ among parties for crisis management. The network became operational in March 1995 by temporarily using a portion of the communications network hub of the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe to get the network off the ground. End-user stations were set up in several capitals, operators partook in orientation classes, and operational guidelines and procedures were adopted. Parties also discussed configuring the network for rapid communications in support of search and rescue co-operation. Additionally, efforts were being directed to develop a databank for uniform storage of information related to ACRS. The parties also agreed to establish a permanent communications network hub in Cairo and requests for technical proposals to establish this hub were received from several private communications vendors. ACRS ended before the network reached a significant quorum of participants and the new hub could be established. The interim network formally ceased operations when the infrastructure and end-user stations became technically obsolete in 1999.
MILITARY INFORMATION EXCHANGE

Parties negotiated and adopted an agreement on pre-notification of certain military activities. This confidence-building measure included procedures for notifying other regional parties about certain military events such as the movement of at least 4,000 troops and 110 tanks. Parties also agreed on some types of non-sensitive military information that would be exchanged initially and the format for conveying this information. The agreements were never implemented.

MARITIME CBMs

Regional parties adopted an agreement on ‘Guidelines for Operating Procedures for Maritime Cooperation and Conduct in the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the Sea in the Middle East’ (INCSEA). Regional parties also concluded text for a ‘Framework for Maritime Search and Rescue’ (SAR). Subsequently, the parties observed INCSEA and SAR demonstrations in the Mediterranean off the coast of Italy. ACRS also held a symposium that brought together senior maritime officers from throughout the Middle East for the first time. Implementation of the agreements ceased when ACRS went into abeyance.

DECLARATORY CBMs

ACRS parties negotiated a declaration laying out the fundamental principles governing security relations among regional participants, guidelines for the negotiation process, and five objectives to be pursued within the working group in order to advance regional security. All but one paragraph (dealing with the establishment of a WMD-free zone) of the five-page ‘Statement on Arms Control and Regional Security’ were agreed when ACRS ended. In addition to the ACRS statement, six ACRS parties submitted national statements on their long-term security concerns and objectives. Based on these papers, the cosponsors drafted a paper identifying areas of commonality and differences in perspectives of the regional parties. Such an exercise was helpful to discussions within the working group, but more parties needed to submit their national statements.

REGIONAL SECURITY CENTRE

Parties agreed in principle to establish a regional security centre in Amman with associated centres in Tunis and Doha. A draft mandate covering objectives, structure, operations, immediate goals and division of labour between the centres was negotiated among experts and nearly ready for working group adoption when ACRS went into abeyance. Regional parties were more comfortable with the idea of initially establishing a centre for regional dialogue rather than a crisis prevention centre that would seek to resolve disputes.
TRANSPARENCY MEASURES

Regional parties were very interested in efforts to improve transparency between each other, and in this sense provide greater predictability. Parties made field visits to a Multilateral Force and Observers site in the Sinai, an air base in the United Kingdom and a NATO exercise in Denmark in order to see how such visits and observations are conducted. The working group did not advance to the point of negotiating regular site visits.

VERIFICATION MEASURES

In July 1993, regional parties attended a workshop in Cairo focusing extensively on verification techniques associated with a variety of arms control agreements, CBMs, and preventing the proliferation of WMD. Subsequently, the parties toured an Open Skies aircraft, visited a nuclear power plant in Germany to learn how a regional verification authority (EURATOM) interacts with a global verification authority (IAEA), observed a Chemical Weapons Convention inspectors’ training course in Finland, reviewed techniques employed by a Finnish institute for monitoring for the absence of nuclear testing, and toured a Chemical Weapons Convention verification laboratory in Switzerland.

OTHER ISSUES

The working group also held discussions on various conceptual issues such as the elements necessary for beginning arms control negotiations, definitions of weapon categories, force structure, delineation of the region for arms control purposes, guidelines for new parties to join the working group, threat perceptions, benefits and limits on the use of outer space, managed access and co-operative monitoring, and military doctrines. By December 1994, the group began generating ideas for a second generation of CBMs and co-operative activities, as well as new subjects for discussion. Parties expressed interest in topics such as non-military security threats, combating terrorism, co-operative civil defence, reciprocal port calls, instructor and student exchanges between general staff colleges, weapon-free zone arrangements in other regions, arms control training courses, maritime medicine, demining, military code of conduct, co-operative prosthetic medicine for victims of landmines, peaceful nuclear co-operation, feasibility of limitations on defence expenditures, joint hazard relief co-operation, registries on military manpower, unit holdings, arms acquisitions and defence expenditures, principles governing conventional arms transfers, consultations about unusual military activities, non-offensive defence doctrines, and seismic monitoring. ACRS was also beginning to grapple with defining issues that were more germane to sub-regional contexts of the Levant, the Gulf and the Maghreb than to the overall Arab-Israeli conflict.

This compendium of activities is not meant to paint a Pollyannish picture of a largely defunct process or to gloss over fundamental political problems and tensions within the working group. Rather, the history of the ACRS process and the set of agreements the working group adopted in such a short span of time adduce that some forms of multilateral security co-operation can be achieved in the right political context. At the same time, the process in the Middle East may be so fragile and full of endemic conflicts due to deep-seated mistrust and
long-standing regional rivalries that substantive arms control negotiation may have to wait until there is significant progress in the bilateral peace talks or a comprehensive peace is achieved.

ACRS limitations: implications for Track One and Track Two

Always brewing beneath ACRS’s surface were certain structural and substantive limitations that straightjacketed the process. These limitations should be reviewed when developing an agreeable and workable format for formal negotiations. Likewise, it is important to see if Track Two activities can redress some of the formal track’s limitations.

Foremost among the limitations, ACRS and the other multilateral working groups were at all times subordinated to the bilateral peace process, not a replacement for those core talks. As long as progress was being made in the bilateral talks, then there was general support for letting the multilateral groups continue. Some multilateral participants argued that the working groups should be more independent of Track One to ensure continuity in the peace process should the bilateral talks stall. But when the bilateral talks began to experience a series of setbacks in mid-1996, interest in continuing with the multilaterals waned. In the end, the multilaterals, which were intended, inter alia, to give ‘non-core’ Arab states to the Israeli-Arab conflict (outside the Levant) an active role in the peace process, became a weather vane for measuring support throughout the region for the bilateral negotiations.

A second limitation concerns the level of participation. Syria and Lebanon declined to join any multilateral working groups without a breakthrough in bilateral negotiations with Israel and Iran, Iraq and Libya were not invited to join. Each of these states has a bearing on factors related to regional security because of their composition of significant military holdings, pursuit of WMD, support for terrorism or unclear military intentions. Without the involvement of these parties, the working group could neither truly address the full range of security concerns nor conduct comprehensive arms control negotiations throughout the region. The decision to move ahead with ACRS anyway reflected the realistic notion that the working group had to start with the willing and hope that the political climate would change so that others would eventually participate in a productive manner. But this meant that at some point the group could not advance without taking into account the impact of the outside regional states and the need for their co-operation in order to establish a comprehensive regional security regime.

A related limitation of ACRS was that the working group remained the sole providence of senior government officials and did not try to build a regional constituency for regional security co-operation. Most of work and achievements of ACRS are not well known and remain outside public scrutiny except for a few official publications and articles by former delegates to the proceedings. ACRS activities did not involve academics or a new generation of experts. It was a top-down approach to regional security, which left many outside the ACRS working group longing for involvement and information on regional security and arms control. Some ACRS participants had become acutely aware of this shortcoming and wanted the working group to address the topic of public diplomacy.

A fourth limitation concerns the working group’s inability to obtain a meaningful consensus on the scope, sequencing and magnitude of arms control agreements to be pursued in order to mitigate security threat perceptions. While there was a lot of discussion on these issues, ACRS could not develop agreed practical steps to reduce concerns about military capabilities, strategic doctrines and political intentions. ACRS was only beginning to break down the walls of misunderstandings between the parties about each other’s long-term security concerns and the reasons for the asymmetries between each state’s force structure. But ACRS stopped before obtaining the confidence
and transparency necessary for tackling the hard and sensitive issues. In general, the parties continue to think of their security in terms of zero-sum gains and losses, rather than in terms of co-operation and non-hostile competition in which everyone’s security is enhanced.

A fifth limitation is the relative lack of expertise on arms control and CBMs. At the outset of ACRS, no regional party had a government office devoted strictly to arms control. Generally, the bureaucracies’ orientation to regional security was left to the province of the military and diplomats assigned to international organizations. Only a few skilled regional bureaucrats and academics had even studied the history and concepts of arms control and were conversant about the panoply of CBMs and arms limitations agreements. As a consequence, Middle Eastemers became reliant on the expertise of outsiders and ACRS, particularly in the beginning, often resembled an academic study group. But by 1995, a regional cadre of experts in security and arms control was beginning to emerge and some parties had set up offices to focus on arms control. This cadre of officials has now virtually disappeared in most regional states.

A sixth limitation relates to structural asymmetries and the general lack of understanding about the complexities related to arms control remedies for reducing the deleterious effects of these asymmetries. Strategic asymmetries between Middle East states are vast and not easily bridgeable. They go beyond simple military balances on force structure and holdings or ‘bean counts’. There are asymmetries in geography, culture, military training and doctrine, demographics, modernization and economics. In such a situation, arms control agreements limited to a single weapons category are not likely to work. Parties will need to address a general force reduction, including both conventional and non-conventional weapons, at the same time. Adoption of international means of verification is likely to be viewed as insufficient and must be augmented by mutually acceptable regional structures. Hence, when ACRS resumes the working group will face some very tough discussions and protracted negotiations.

**Track Two: filling the void?**

Despite ACRS’s continuing dormancy, interest in the subject of arms control and multilateral security co-operation by regional parties remains active and vibrant. In response to this interest over thirty Track Two projects have been initiated since 1995. The projects are oriented toward promoting comprehensive regional security as distinct from Track Two projects that focus narrowly on bilateral or trilateral relations in the Middle East. Collectively, these ACRS-related activities have brought together over 750 regional and extra-regional officials, military officers, security experts and other specialists for off-the-record discussions and limited co-operation on various issues related to regional arms control and security. Over 200 of these participants are from the military, forty of whom are general officer grade. Another 150 participants are from the diplomatic and civilian governmental community. Including workshops organized by NGOs between 1991 and 1995, over 100 Track Two events have been organized, averaging one activity per month.

It would be wrong to view Track Two as a continuation of or substitution for the ACRS working group. First, Track Two activities have been around for a long time and some precede Track One. What has changed significantly since ACRS was suspended is the focus of Track Two. Most Track Two projects that took place prior to September 1995 occurred during the period of 1991–1993 and concentrated on encouraging and initiating a formal regional security negotiation process. When ACRS negotiations took off like a jackrabbit after 1992, most Track Two projects were left in the dust and their organizers saw little value they could add to the formal process. Only a few projects convened between 1993 and 1995. Conversely, projects initiated after 1995 were organized mainly to keep the
parties engaged in regional security and arms control discussions and activities in the absence of a formal negotiation process.

Second, Track Two does not have official blessings to negotiate even non-binding agreements and lacks the co-ordination and uniform framework associated with a formal process. Governments generally do not draft the agendas for meetings, although many projects work with government officials in organizing workshops and seek suggestions from officials on workshop proceedings and participation. Most ACRS-related Track Two activities focus on long-term issues that are only approachable on a practical level when formal negotiations resume or when there is a comprehensive peace. Indeed, perhaps one reason regional parties, especially officials, feel comfortable participating in Track Two activities is because these activities are powerless to change the immediate situation. Otherwise, Track Two might be doomed to the same fate as ACRS.

Officials who participate in ACRS-related Track Two meetings do so ‘in their private capacities’. In this sense, Track Two offers additional opportunities for officials to discuss issues of concern directly with their counterparts either in the workshop or on the margins, without necessarily representing their governments (although most officials are acutely aware of their sensitive positions in the public format) and making commitments. It also offers them opportunities to conduct in-depth analysis of regional security issues. To help foster open discussion, most Track Two activities follow two common ground rules: discussions are off the record and participants are asked not to report on the meeting’s proceedings and participants to the press. Consequently, ACRS-related Track Two activities are not well publicized.

It should be recognized that each Track Two project has its own set of defined objectives and themes that it pursues. But most organizers of current projects want to obtain results that can be of assistance to ACRS. Some projects seek to move beyond the sensitive areas that restricted ACRS activities — for example, by directly addressing the WMD issue. In general, Track Two projects seek to achieve one or more of the following twelve goals:

- Keep regional parties, especially ACRS officials or officials who may become engaged in a resurrected ACRS, engaged in direct dialogue about arms control and regional security with the aim of reducing misunderstandings and misperceptions;
- Expand the cadre of experts on arms control and CBMs in regional foreign and defence ministries;
- Promote contacts and dialogue on security issues between a new generation of Middle East security experts and educators;
- Explore new ideas, second generation CBMs, improved proceeding formats, and long-term objectives that could be pursued in a resumed ACRS or in a new regional security forum;
- Conduct in-depth analysis on complex issues relevant to ACRS;
- Develop proposals that can resolve the impasse in ACRS negotiations;
- Increase Middle East civil society involvement in regional security diplomacy by broadening the constituency for regional security co-operation and arms control and civil society’s access to information about these issues;
- Consider alternative frameworks and structures to ACRS for regional security negotiations;
- Promote concrete co-operative projects and data exchange in scientific areas related to arms control and regional security;
- Develop training tools for teaching about arms control to Middle East representatives;
• Reach out to individuals from regional states outside ACRS (e.g., Syria, Lebanon, Iran) for involvement in Track Two activities; and

• Limit revisionism of ACRS history that could cloud the future work of ACRS.

Track Two regional security and arms control activities

The diversity of Middle East security Track Two activities defies easy classification. For this article, the projects are grouped into seven functional categories in order to make an assessment about the contributions of Track Two generally.

Security dialogue workshops

The most common Track Two projects are single workshops dedicated to engaging Arabs and Israelis in a general dialogue about the peace negotiations and regional security. Single workshops organized by universities generally have very limited objectives and are often tied to an academic agenda. Some of the more notable workshops were collaborations between NGOs from inside and outside the region as these involved a significant number of participants from the Middle East.

Numerous organizations have hosted security-related workshops, including the American Academy for the Advancement of Science, Brookings Institution, Burkle Center for International Relations at the University of California at Los Angeles, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Center for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University, Center for International Security Studies at Maryland, Center for Research and Consultancy in Oman, Center for Research in Arms Control and Security in Jordan, Center for Strategic Studies in Morocco, Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia National Laboratories, Department of Disarmament and Security Studies in Jordan, DePaul University, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies in the United Arab Emirates, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Georgia Tech University, Gulf/2000 Project, Henry L. Stimson Center, Institute for National Security Studies at the United States National Defense University, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Institute for Science and International Security, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Israel, Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies in Malta, Middle East Institute, Monash University in Australia, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Munk Centre for International Relations at University of Toronto, National Center for Middle East Studies in Egypt, Norwegian Institute on International Affairs, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Pugwash, Rand Corporation, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Science Applications International Corporation, Search for Common Ground, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Germany, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, United States Institute of Peace, University of California at Berkeley, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Wilton Park Conference Centre in the United Kingdom. Most of the workshops hosted by these organizations occurred during the period of 1991–1995, comprised single workshops, and rarely produced a tangible output such as a study or publication.

Since 1995, the most common format for Track Two projects has been serial meetings; that is, projects organized around several meetings that generally keep the same group of individuals engaged in structured dialogue or until the project’s goals have been achieved. Serial projects benefit from
maintaining a core group of individuals who become familiar with the perspectives and needs of their counterparts, somewhat resembling the format of official talks. Unlike most of the single workshops, serial projects generally have access to the official policy-making community. Experience also shows that serial meetings are productive venues for drafting studies and papers that can be disseminated to regional officials for consideration. Among the serial projects in this category, the following are noteworthy for their findings and ability to attract participation by a significant number of officials and representatives from throughout the region, including from non-ACRS states.

- Burkle Center for International Relations at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) has organized since 1995 a series of large annual conferences on various themes related to regional security, such as establishing a WMD-free zone and lessons learned from the Asia-Pacific security regime. This project tends to attract the greatest number of regional officials to its series of conferences, which have been hosted in Cyprus, Sweden, Norway, United Kingdom, Australia and Oman with local NGOs. Between 1992 and 1995, UCLA also helped organize large conferences in California, Greece and Jordan. The UCLA series has produced a pamphlet describing over 300 ideas for improving regional security relations and the ACRS process, including concrete CBMs. It is also publishing a collection of papers by regional experts that were presented in the conferences.

- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) organized a series of four workshops on establishing a co-operative regional security regime in the Middle East. The group researched lessons from other regional security regimes that might be applicable to the Middle East. The SIPRI report from these workshops reflects the general understandings of regional participants from most ACRS parties, Lebanon and Iran about the issues involved in setting up such a regime. The report was produced in English, Arabic and Farsi.

- The National Center for Middle East Studies (NCMES) in Egypt and UCLA jointly host three to four workshops yearly that bring together thirty regional and extra-regional officials and security experts. The group focuses on various agreed topics related to regional security and has created a loose association of strategic studies institutes in the region.

- Search for Common Ground sponsors several working groups that mirror the multilateral tracks. The Security Working Group has published an important collection of papers in English and Arabic about threat perceptions by representatives from Egypt, Syria, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Palestinian Authority and Turkey. The organization has also sponsored a workshop bringing together political editors to discuss the impact of news commentaries and political cartoons on public opinion about the peace process.

- Columbia University’s Gulf/2000 Project focuses strictly on issues related to the Gulf states and provides a forum to discuss and exchange information. The project organizes workshops, an electronic library, research facility and a bulletin board on the Internet. It also maintains private and public web sites. Several studies have been commissioned to examine long-term trends affecting the future stability and security of the Gulf region.

- Wilton Park Conference Centre, associated with the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, organizes three Middle East-related conferences annually dealing with various aspects related to the peace process, Gulf security and relations between Europeans and the Maghreb, Islam and the West.
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ORIENTED PROJECTS

Recognizing the importance of the military in regional security negotiations and their generally limited knowledge about arms control, three projects seek to engage military officers in discussions on these subjects. Like ACRS, some of the projects encourage exchanging non-sensitive information and conducting site visits to military installations. Some projects go beyond ACRS by bringing together for the first time senior military officers from throughout the region, including non-ACRS states. And one project has created a database of military holdings that could be valuable to beginning arms control and force reduction negotiations.

• Senior Military-to-Military Dialogue: The University of California’s Institute on Global Cooperation and Conflict has organized a project entitled ‘Arms Control and Security Improvement in the Middle East’. This ongoing series of workshops has achieved the unprecedented success of bringing together senior Arab and Israeli military officers responsible for strategic planning to exchange views and concerns about regional security issues and military doctrines. Over 100 active duty and retired senior officers, including many generals, from fifteen regional parties have participated in workshops held in Egypt, Jordan, Cyprus and the United States. Workshops have also included site visits to see de-mining activities in Jordan and the Green Line in Cyprus. The project has published research papers presented in the workshops including studies on the military balance in the region and maritime CBMs.

• War College Military Fellows Conferences: United States war colleges have begun organizing workshops on topics related to Middle East arms control and regional security in order to promote dialogue among the fellows from the Middle East on these topics.

• Maritime workshops: The Canadian Coast Guard College has conducted a series of maritime safety colloquia in which regional naval and civilian authorities from across the Middle East and North Africa discuss ways to enhance maritime safety and security, including on such diverse topics as vessel traffic services, coastal zone management, maritime distress and safety systems, and search and rescue. The Coast Guard is in the process of establishing a Maritime Safety Network to promote regular correspondence. The Canadians have also conducted courses on the peacekeeping dimension of maritime operations and hosted symposia for senior naval officers from throughout the world.

SCIENTIST-TO-SCIENTIST ORIENTED PROJECTS

Scientific co-operation on arms control verification was one of the last items ACRS began to explore before its suspension. Track Two has provided an opportunity to continue that exploration and to conduct actual co-operative projects. In the process, it has broadened the constituency for regional security by bringing together a set of individuals (scientists) who were not involved in the formal negotiations.

• Working with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United States Geological Survey and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory have helped spearhead a project promoting regional seismic monitoring co-operation. The project began in 1992 by focusing initially on earthquake hazards, and was entitled ‘Reduction of Earthquake Losses in the Eastern Mediterranean Region’. In 1995, the project’s objectives were broadened so that one of its principal goals, in addition to assisting parties in planning to minimize losses from
earthquakes, became the creation of a database of Middle East seismic events that will provide a baseline necessary for distinguishing between natural events such as earthquakes and man-made events such as nuclear weapons tests. Seismic experts from throughout the region meet two to three times annually for practical workshops dealing with seismic analysis, data exchange and archival, and conducting dedicated calibration experiments. Aside from its humanitarian objectives, the project may realize the first regional confidence-building measure dealing with WMD. Also, although the principal actors are scientists, the project sets a precedent for data exchange between states in the region. This is one of the few Track Two projects that have succeeded in fostering tangible regional co-operation, and, as such, some of the participants refer to the project as ‘Seismology for Peace’.

- The Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC) at Sandia National Laboratories has conducted a visiting scholars programme that has brought together select scholars from the region to conduct joint technical collaboration on verification issues relevant to Middle East security, such as border monitoring. The CMC also teamed up with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to bring together technical experts from the region to discuss the role of commercial satellite imagery in the Middle East peace process and propose co-operative projects in this area.

RESEARCH STUDIES AND ACRS-RELATED PROPOSALS

Several Track Two projects have been organized to produce studies on specific topics relevant to advancing co-operative security and ACRS. Over eighteen studies have been published on a variety of topics, including the use of commercial satellite imagery for arms control, the future agenda of arms control in the Middle East, a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, national threat perceptions, establishing a co-operative regional security regime, maritime aspects of security improvement in the Middle East, a future security architecture for the Middle East, and sources on arms control and disarmament in the Middle East on the Internet. These studies provide in-depth analysis on some of the topics originally raised in ACRS, suggest new co-operative activities and CBMs, or propose alternative regional security frameworks. Some of the studies result from direct collaboration between Arab and Israeli security experts and officials. In order to ensure that these studies are read widely, some Track Two projects distribute and review completed studies from other projects and use the studies as a means for generating discussion within workshops. Senior regional officials have been briefed on some of the findings from the studies. Collectively, these studies are important to both garnering support for regional security negotiations and the deliberations themselves. They provide valuable homework for Track One.

ARMS CONTROL EDUCATION

One of the primary functions being considered for the ACRS Regional Security Center was arms control training. Courses on arms control help expand regional expertise in this area and prepare regional parties for ongoing global arms control negotiations and resumed regional security talks. As noted earlier, one problem facing ACRS was the dearth of experts from the region on arms control matters. In this sense, arms control courses, regardless of whether they are organized by governments or NGOs, can have a direct bearing on formal proceedings. But this requires continuous
education. As with all skills, it is important to utilize what has been learned or else face losing those skills. And in the case of governments, individual diplomats are frequently changing positions so there is a continuous need to educate a new crop of experts. Several Track Two projects have provided arms control training:

- The former United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the United States State Department and Sandia National Laboratories’ Cooperative Monitoring Center have jointly organized a series of intensive two-week training courses on arms control and multilateral diplomacy for over fifty officials from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Oman and Qatar.
- The Geneva Center for Security Policy, occasionally working with a Finnish institute, also has sponsored training courses for Middle East parties.
- The United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency has conducted short orientation programmes on arms control verification techniques, including tours of an Open Skies aircraft, for Middle East visitors to its headquarters and in Track Two workshops.

ARMS CONTROL TRAINING TOOLS

One problem that became evident in ACRS was the lack of a single set of authoritative reference materials on arms control in Arabic. Several organizations have been developing such reference tools as well as software that can be employed by regional parties to prepare for arms control negotiations. These tools have been developed in consultation with Middle East parties and have been demonstrated or utilized in several Track Two projects and training courses.

- Recognizing the growing need for a uniform set of arms control definitions, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research is currently completing a handbook, entitled *Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building*, that will provide a short history and comprehensive glossary of arms control terms and treaties in both English and Arabic. UNIDIR’s next English/Arabic reference handbook will be a history and compilation of terms related to arms control verification and compliance.
- The United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency has developed a software program called ‘RIST’ to teach regional parties about conducting managed access inspections in a wide area facility.
- Sandia National Laboratories’ Cooperative Monitoring Center has also developed a software program called ‘ACE-IT’ for training in the conduct of a Chemical Weapons Conventional inspection in a contained building.

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKING

While the ACRS communications network had barely started before it ceased operations, the emergence of the Internet has provided new opportunities for cross-border contacts and engaging regional parties in discussions about regional security issues. It is also becoming a useful tool for Track Two projects to sustain collaboration work between meetings, organize meetings, and disseminate information and studies about regional security.
University of Toronto’s Munk Center for International Relations operates a discussion group on the Internet about regional security issues. This recently established group was built largely on the former network operated by SIPRI between 1995 and 1998. The Munk Center is also developing a web site that will include a Middle East regional security digital library posting links to and publications from other Track Two projects.

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies publishes an Internet newsletter entitled *Middle East Review of International Affairs* that reaches over 3,000 recipients, including individuals throughout the region.

Search for Common Ground publishes the *Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East*, which reports on recent Track Two activities, publications and has a calendar of upcoming events.

Gulf/2000 project operates an electronic forum on the Internet with 500 members that focuses on issues related to the Gulf region.

**Observations on Track Two**

Collectively, the various activities are achieving the twelve objectives for Track Two described above. What emerges from the list of activities is proof that Track Two can carry forward with many ideas, programmes and studies that were also broached in the formal negotiations. While not a continuation of ACRS, a few projects do resemble the activities of the working group. What was left undone in ACRS has indirectly helped to define what should be done in Track Two. But these projects have tended to focus on long-term security issues and less on immediate crises. Also, several Track Two projects have overcome one shortcoming of ACRS by reaching out and engaging Iranians, Syrians and Lebanese in regional security discussions.

One element that is not very obvious when reviewing the robust list of activities is that Track Two has emerged as a true public-private partnership. Until recently, governments tended to shy away from academic activities that mirrored formal talks or non-binding negotiations, favouring traditional diplomatic channels. Track Two back-channel success stories, such as the ‘Oslo Channel’ leading to the 1993 breakthrough in talks between the Palestinians and Israelis, have caught the attention of governments. There is now broader appreciation that greater civil society involvement can help advance formal initiatives and reduce tensions in regional conflicts around the world.

While most Track Two activities are organized and hosted by non-governmental organizations, governments are now the primary funding source for regional security-related Track Two projects. Based on their views of how Track Two can assist formal proceedings, government sponsors often generate the ideas for projects, seek out organizations to run them, provide assistance in planning events and, as needed, help make contacts with potential regional participants. Organizers of these projects consult with regional officials responsible for regional security as well as regional experts in order to ensure that the agendas for the workshops are relevant and that results from the workshop are reported. Indeed, there is some evidence that Track Two studies have shaped the thinking of some senior government officials about Middle East security issues, particularly on possible frameworks for a co-operative security regime.

Track One and Track Two security-related activities in the Middle East share at least two traits. Both are highly dependent upon the support of extra-regional governments for leadership and require extensive consultations with regional parties to be successful. In ACRS, the United States and the Russian Federation cosponsor the talks and take a leading role in organizing events. Other extra-
regional governments serve as mentors for various CBMs and host expert-level inter-sessional meetings. Likewise, without the support of extra-regional governments and NGOs it is highly doubtful that there would be a Track Two programme. Track Two is expensive and requires the consistent financial wherewithal and commitment of governments to support it. This is the case particularly for serial projects, which are the main focus of government sponsorship. Unlike the formal track, all expenses for travel and accommodations for Track Two meetings are provided by the host organization. A weeklong workshop in the Gulf for 100 people from throughout the Middle East and extra-regional countries, for example, can cost as much $300,000. Regional institutions have sponsored workshops on regional security issues but these tend to be very limited in scope and participation, often excluding Israelis.

The United States Government contributes approximately $1.5 million yearly to support Middle East security Track Two activities. This contribution comes from a variety of agencies including the State Department, the Department of Energy, the Department of Interior and the Department of Defense. Other extra-regional states, notably Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, collectively provide about $500,000 per annum. These contributions demonstrate an abiding interest in regional security co-operation in the Middle East. Only a few private foundations, such as the Ford Foundation, W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, have shown interest in supporting regional security Track Two activities, and their support has generally been limited to single workshops.

When multilateral negotiations do resume, regional participants will need to define clearly the relevancy and role of security-related Track Two initiatives to the formal talks, particularly if Track Two is to continue receiving financial support from sponsoring governments that might be more inclined to direct all funding towards Track One. In theory, current Track Two activities can assist and complement the proceedings of the formal talks. These activities are less restricted by the political sensitivities that often circumscribe freedom of action within the formal talks. Track Two provides an informal setting for maximizing exchange and devising bridging proposals to overcome difficulties in Track One. These talks can be an incubator for new ideas that may be too sensitive or premature to broach in the formal talks. In this sense, Track Two can take the pulse of regional parties about a certain idea to see if it is worth pursuing in the formal track. Track Two also has more latitude to invite individuals from regional states outside the formal process to join in regional security discussions, serving as a ‘half-way’ house for outside states until they join the formal talks. Ultimately, it will be important to sustain Track Two as a safety net for keeping regional parties engaged in direct communication should formal talks stall again. Based on these suggested contributions, Track Two organizers can make a convincing case for continuing their efforts.

**Conclusion**

It has been nearly ten years since the current round of the Middle East peace negotiations was launched in Madrid. Although there has been significant movement in the bilateral negotiations between Israel and its immediate neighbours, deliberations on co-operative regional security and arms control have moved glacially. No region-wide arms control agreements have been negotiated. No regional confidence- and security-building measures have been implemented. The only formal regional forum that has tried to address these issues, the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security, has not met in nearly six years. Meanwhile, concerns about the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, WMD, and ballistic missiles in the Middle East have increased.
While prospects for resuming ACRS or initiating a new regional forum in the near future remain dim, regional security-related Track Two activities have filled some of the void created by the abeyance of ACRS. A diverse and robust set of activities provides opportunities to press for resumption of the formal track, produce studies on issues relevant to the formal track, and expand the constituency for arms control and regional security. In some cases Track Two has moved beyond the limitations of ACRS and achieved more than the formal negotiations. For example, it has attracted representatives from regional states outside the ACRS process, brought together senior military officers, organized rigorous arms control training courses to expand the cadre of regional officials conversant on arms control, developed databases on military holdings and force structure asymmetries, established a broad-based communications network, produced arms control reference materials in Arabic, and exchanged and jointly analyzed complex regional data. Perhaps most importantly, Track Two has provided a constant stream of venues for regional officials and representatives to continue discussions on regional security and arms control while the formal talks are in abeyance. So far, Track Two has been immune from the political vagaries causing the ebb and flow in the formal negotiations.

But Track Two has its own set of limitations and challenges. Track Two cannot replace formal negotiations and, consequently, this constrains the agenda for Track Two meetings. It faces funding fatigue by sponsoring governments, especially if the peace process were to collapse. Also, some Arab parties may be less inclined to meet in the wake of recent difficulties in the Israeli-Palestinian track and calls to limit interaction with Israelis like the one by the Arab League in October 2000. Attracting new participants continues to be difficult, especially from cautious military organizations not accustomed to dealing with external NGOs.

Notwithstanding these challenges, Track Two is likely to remain the only venue for activities related to regional security for some time. It will continue building a broad base of individuals from Middle East countries who are informed about the elements for creating a stable co-operative regional security regime as an alternative to military conflict and rivalry. While dialogue and interaction do not immediately lead to agreement on the next steps to improve security, they help to mitigate misunderstandings and misperceptions that can get in the way of reaching agreement. Track Two can also lead to a common vision and language on security. Essentially, by the time formal negotiations resume, Track Two will have done most of the preparation and groundwork so those proceedings can move ahead swiftly. In addition to complementing and supporting ACRS, ultimately, one of the greatest contributions Track Two can make is the expansion of a culture of peace in the Middle East.

Notes
1. The other working groups focus on water, refugees, environment, and economic development.


4. For the Israeli version of the long-term objectives statement, the only statement to be made public, see Eytan Bentsur, Israel’s Vision on the Goals and Principles of the Regional Security and Arms Control Process, in: *Tanner*, op. cit., pp. 69–75.

5. See note 2.


7. The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was abolished in April 1999 and its functions were absorbed into the United States Department of State.

Since the Al Aksa Intifada began on 29 September 2000, many people have asked what happened between Israel and the Palestinians? In July, at Camp David, they seemed to be close to a comprehensive settlement. By October, they were in a near war. What went wrong? Was opposition leader Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount truly threatening to the Palestinians? Did the violence spin out of control? Was Camp David a mirage? Was the peace process itself a deception? Let’s look at the record.

The Israelis and Palestinians came together as a consequence of the Oslo negotiations in 1993 because both sides needed each other. The Palestinians were involved in a hopeless Intifada; they could gain international recognition galore, but Israel was the only party that counted for providing them a state and the hopes of a new economy and a new life as well as relief from their abysmal conditions and a mini-war with Israel. On the other hand, the Israelis too were in a hopeless situation. Since 9 December 1987, they had been fighting a war with the Palestinians, and they could not stop the uprising against them.

The Madrid Conference of October 1991 had established a framework for discussions involving meetings in Washington, DC between an Israeli and non-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Palestinian teams, but these too went nowhere (seemingly fruitless talks also proceeded with Israel and Syria, Lebanon and Jordan respectively).

So Israel and the PLO came together at Oslo and eventually reached an agreement that reflected the facts on the ground. The extended Oslo process was an attempt to produce a five-year confidence-building, phased process. It reflected Israeli preferences for caution and circumspection. On the other hand, Israel had to pay a price for its inability to quash the Intifada. It recognized the PLO and the Palestinian national aspirations with the implication — though not the commitment — that a Palestinian state would eventually emerge from the agreement it was accepting.

However, once the process began, the parties discovered that it could include not only confidence-building measures but confidence-destroying actions as well. Sceptics on both sides did not accept the fundamental idea of a settlement. There were Israelis who did not trust the Palestinians and who rejected a process in which Israel would gradually withdraw from all or much of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There were also Palestinians, particularly represented by Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who were not prepared to give up the objective of destroying Israel.

At critical moments, both sides delivered violence and lethal blows to the confidence-building process envisioned by the authors of the Oslo Agreement.

Steven L. Spiegel is Professor of Political Science and Associate Director of the Center for International Relations at UCLA.
In March 1994, an Israeli rightist killed twenty-nine Palestinians praying at a mosque in Hebron, and in November 1995 another killed Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had by then become the critical Israeli partner of Yasser Arafat in efforts to advance peace. On the other hand, Palestinian opponents of both the peace process and of Arafat engaged in a series of suicide bombings between 1994 and 1996 which terrorized the Israeli populace, killed Israelis at a much higher rate than had been the case during the Intifada, and as a consequence served to disillusion many in Israel with the process itself.

In 1996 in response to terrorist incidents, the Israeli public elected Benyamin Netanyahu by the tiniest of margins over Shimon Peres. Netanyahu’s scepticism concerning the Oslo process was well known but he ran on a platform of peace reached through security. Although Netanyahu became the first Likud Prime Minister to relinquish territory on the West Bank, his tough policies also served to disillusion Palestinians and other Arab states, especially because under Netanyahu’s leadership the process slowed to a crawl. The Arab response was to limit the normalization process with Israel that had never recovered — even when Ehud Barak became Prime Minister in 1999.

The process of a series of interim agreements built into Oslo turned out to be deeply controversial. Many Israelis worried that they were giving up too much too soon. At various points, negotiations dragged on for months with many diplomatic crises along the way, leading to a variety of agreements, which were often reached only after intense acrimony that robbed them of the confidence-building service they should have performed.

- The first such agreement was the 4 May 1994 arrangement by which Israel withdrew from parts of Gaza and Jericho, an agreement which permitted Arafat to come to Gaza in June 1994;
- The Oslo II Accord in September 1995, which passed the Israeli Knesset by only one vote and which represented a plan for Israeli withdrawal from major towns on the West Bank and the temporary division of the West Bank into three types of areas: Zone A — Palestinian control, Zone B — Palestinian civilian control but Israeli security control, and Zone C — Israeli control;
- The Hebron Agreement of January 1997, which called for Israeli withdrawal from the most controversial and divided town of the West Bank;
- The October 1998 Wye River Agreement, which attempted to reinvigorate the process that was by then long stalled between Netanyahu and Arafat; and
- The Sharm el Sheikh Agreement of September 1999 with its Barak-inspired focus on a final status comprehensive settlement which set the stage for the Camp David meeting in July 2000.

The very process of attempting to settle these interim disputes served frequently to erode confidence on both sides. Palestinians saw a continued occupation, a substantial number of expanding Israeli settlements, an increase in the number of settlers, missed diplomatic deadlines, a declining economy (caused only in part by the series of closures imposed by successive Israeli governments in response to Palestinian terrorist attacks), a corrupt Palestinian regime that did not bring them prosperity or democracy, a tough and ungenerous Israeli negotiating stance in trade negotiations, and miserable lives seemingly unaided by the peace process. By 2000, according to polls most Palestinians saw themselves as worse off than they had been in 1993.

Israelis, for their part, saw the Palestinian Authority presiding over continuing violence, hostile rhetoric, a Palestinian educational system and a media devoted to incitement against them in an anti-Semitic atmosphere, and a Palestinian clergy deeply hostile to Israel, the lack of progress with other Arab states (including Egypt), and a Palestinian negotiating stance that seemed to indicate an unwillingness or inability to compromise. Indeed, many Israelis still thought by 2000 that the Palestinians would not accept a final settlement but rather that their true objective was the destruction of the State of Israel.
There were, of course, major achievements by the Oslo process. By mid-2000 Israel had withdrawn from the territories in which most Palestinians resided and therefore only ruled a small minority of Palestinians. For their part, the Palestinians had engaged with the United States and Israel in a process of security co-operation that had made the year and a half before the Al Aksa Intifada a period in which terrorism had almost terminated. Fewer Israelis were killed at the hands of Palestinians that at any time in over thirty-three years. Indeed, 1999 became a record year because two Israelis were killed by Palestinian terrorists — the lowest in Israel’s history.

The surface represented a record of achievement, promise and potential, but the underlying misgivings on both sides were profound and even growing. One of the worst deficiencies of the Oslo process was that it was largely private. Negotiators, administrators and security officials might conduct productive — even amicable — relations, but these were not translated into public events. Thus the silent majorities in both societies remained confused — even sceptical. They did not see the camaraderie established between diplomats, soldiers and even businessmen, but rather the violence, hostile rhetoric and disappointment were more prominent to the public. The symbol of the Palestinians to many Israelis became the terrorists, or the transmission of harsh anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish rhetoric by the media, educators, politicians and the clergy. The symbol of Israel to most Palestinians became the humiliations of daily life under occupation from checkpoints to settlers.

Thus Camp David occurred in the wake of this contradictory and even schizophrenic process. Ehud Barak, himself sceptical of Oslo but unlike his predecessor strongly committed to the process, believed in a comprehensive approach in which the conflict itself would be ended. He feared that the gradual phases inherent in Oslo originally would lead to Israel reaching final status without any negotiating carrots left.

He was also concerned that the departure of President Clinton in January 2001 would leave him without an effective mediator with Arafat. Barak had never developed the relationship with the Palestinian leader which both Rabin and Peres had had. He was also prone to deal with negotiations at the highest level. Barak is not someone who delegates, and sought to conduct the negotiations himself as he had done earlier in the year with Syria.

Arafat, by contrast, preferred to have issues prepared and negotiations handled by underlings as had been done in the Oslo process itself. He worried that a meeting at Camp David would fail with explosive results. Arafat undercut his position by frequently threatening a Unilateral Declaration of Independence — feared by American and Israeli leaders as well as many Europeans and even Arabs as a possible trigger for Israeli-Palestinian war with the possibility of its spreading throughout the region.

Faced with Barak’s entreaties and Arafat’s threats, Clinton had little choice but to call a Camp David summit with the intention of a sweeping conflict-settling agreement. There were three possibilities at Camp David: a major breakthrough, a major breakdown, or some kind of interim accord that would move the process forward but not solve all issues remaining in conflict.

At the meeting, committees met and issues were discussed, including security, borders, refugees, Jerusalem, and economic/structural factors such as water and economy. Much progress was made, but the parties stalled on the two critical issues (refugees and Jerusalem). On the one hand, this was the first time they had ever seriously addressed these issues, and that itself represented progress. On the other hand, a summit is almost never a proper occasion for discussing issues for the first time. Whatever the progress achieved, it was not enough and in retrospect the preparatory meetings were inadequate and the background work, especially by the Israelis and Palestinians, too primitive.
Because Barak was more forthcoming during the meeting, Clinton publicly blamed Arafat for the failure. While these accusations may have accurately reflected the progress of the meeting and were made in part to protect Barak in a deteriorating domestic political situation, it also weakened Arafat and left many doubts and criticisms in the Arab world about the even-handed role of the United States. To Arafat these concerns were intensified when he found that many European and even Arab leaders did not sympathize with his scepticism about the Camp David approach. Many urged him back to the negotiating table. Indeed, discussions continued behind the scenes in August and September to seek a resolution of the remaining outstanding issues at Camp David, and progress was being made. Expectations of another summit meeting to seal a deal were high.

However, in the two months following the end of the Camp David meeting, domestic pressures developed in both societies. Barak was further weakened as relentless criticism against him continued from the secular and religious right, and as his coalition continued to collapse. All engaged parties were fully aware that when the Knesset began its full session at the end of October, it might well call early elections. Arafat faced mounting frustration and impatience on the Palestinian side, which accelerated when the Palestine Council decided not to declare a state unilaterally on 13 September. The Palestinians believed they received no credit for this restraint from either Israel or the West. They were also unhappy that after Camp David Barak had cut down on fulfilling previous commitments such as the release of particular political prisoners and the initiation of a northern safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank. However understandable from an Israeli perspective, these actions intensified the frustration among Palestinians.

Into this unhappy caldron, poised between a possible breakthrough and chaos, the Israeli opposition leader, Ariel Sharon, suddenly decided to visit the Temple Mount with a large contingent of supporters of Israeli rights and sovereignty on this most critical of all plateaux in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite warnings of danger, the weakened Israeli Prime Minister felt he could not stop the opposition leader from visiting the Temple Mount. Sharon’s action itself was in part a political ploy designed to upstage his Likud rival, Netanyahu. Barak, too, had no interest in the return of the former Prime Minister whose standing in the polls had been steadily rising.

On the Palestinian side, the pot boiled over the next day when worshipers at the Al Aksa mosque on the mount at Harem al Sherif (Temple Mount) were encouraged by vituperative sermons to express their anger at Sharon’s visit. When the Israeli police killed seven in the ensuing riots, the Al Aksa Intifada had begun.

Arafat intensified the violence by encouraging the nationalistic tone mixed with religious fervour that dominated Palestinian politics and media over the weeks that ensued.

Indeed, one dangerous and totally unanticipated impact of Camp David was to intensify the meshing of religious and nationalist factors in Israeli-Palestinian relations. Barak’s discussion at Camp David of Jerusalem led to wild rumours and conspiracy theories throughout the Arab world that the Jews wished to take over Harem al Server, destroy the mosques, rebuild the Jewish Temple destroyed 2000 years ago, and to sacrifice Muslim rights. Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount seemed to confirm Jewish imperial designs. The Prime Minister’s curious suggestion (later withdrawn) that a synagogue be built on the Mount further added to the confusion. The fact that these fears were fantasy made them no less real to many Palestinians who thought they were preventing the Jews from destroying their holy rights in Jerusalem. Arafat did nothing to reassure his people. The Barak government also failed after Camp David to provide assurances to the Palestinians because of its own domestic political pressures (assurances to the
Palestinians might have been used against it by the Israeli right), and because one of the Barak government’s weaknesses has been its difficulties in explaining its positions both at home and abroad.

Arafat for his part chose to ride the tiger rather than seek an end to the violence. Lacking the courage and the skill to confront the mob, he sought to manipulate the crisis to bolster his domestic position. Attempting to combine violence and negotiations is his favourite mode of operation. He had tried this approach in Jordan in 1970 and in Lebanon in the early 1980s when he had similarly achieved control, only to overreach and lose badly. He retained his position as symbol of the Palestinian cause, but Camp David had also weakened him because he appeared unable to produce positive results for the Palestinians, even as Clinton was blaming him for its failure. Arafat now understood more clearly than ever the limits of what the Palestinians could expect from Israel in a final status agreement. Fantasies and dreams were now confronted by the pressure of reality, and Arafat seems to have feared retribution from his opponents at home more than the uncertain consequences of violence. Instead, he sought to wait out the crisis until new international developments or moves by Israel or the United States would enable him to claim some gains as the excuse for an end of the uprising. Yet for Israelis, any evidence that violence pays would be a serious blow indeed.

Where do we go from here?

First, we must review the lessons of Oslo very carefully. It is not the agreements themselves that were flawed, but their implementation. Missed deadlines, expansion of settlements, continued violence, the incitement inherent in Palestinian media and education against Israel all produced an atmosphere in which this explosion could occur. Compliance with the Oslo agreements and with present and future agreements will have to be monitored more carefully. When Palestinians smuggle into their territory more guns than is acceptable under agreements or increase the number of policemen beyond those who have been permitted, these violations cannot be allowed to stand indefinitely. Nor can the expansion of Israeli settlements or the number of settlers. Agreements cannot work if fundamental portions of signed documents are ignored. Even violations of the spirit rather than the letter of agreements clearly can have a lethal effect.

Second, violence must end as part of a package. It is inadequate only to conclude a simple cease-fire that likely will not be adhered to in any case, as we have seen in violated agreements since the crisis began on 29 September. Rather, in the short term we should have a more ambitious goal. We need a reciprocal set of measures that involve complying with past agreements, thereby effectively leading to a new cycle of confidence building. Unilateral actions, especially by the stronger party, Israel, may result in reversing the escalation of the Al Aksa Intifada if they are quickly matched by comparable confidence-building steps by the Palestinians.

Third, the violence must end by an act that provides hope for both sides. Thus, although the search for the comprehensive type of accord embodied by Camp David must continue, the final status package is difficult indeed to achieve, especially because of Barak’s justifiable insistence on an end of conflict clause. Unfortunately, most likely it will be necessary to go back to interim arrangements on the way to comprehensiveness if the process is to be revised. Both peoples must have a sign that the process is back on track, and therefore even routine confidence-building measures are more important than ever.
The pursuit of the following four principles is therefore essential to de-escalation:

- commitment to compliance with all past agreements;
- some kind of moratorium on violence, either unilaterally initiated or a consequence of parallel actions;
- confidence-building measures and even interim steps during the months while a comprehensive agreement is being negotiated; and
- greater attention to informing and educating 'the street' on both sides.

If these four policies are pursued, it is still not too late to reverse course and salvage the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Each party has major and fundamental misperceptions of the other; the process described here would work to convince the many sceptics on both sides that their counterpart does deeply want a settlement. Indeed, the prospects of success are enhanced because both parties are so clearly interlocked that they have no viable alternatives. Without the peace process, the Palestinians will never reach independence or rid themselves of the Israeli military occupation. Without the process, the Israelis will be doomed to constant conflicts. They have other dangers looming: threat of weapons of mass destruction in the region, deterioration of several Arab societies with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, the constant danger of Arab terrorism. The best means to thwart all of these activities is to move on the peace process.

As the current crisis illustrates only too vividly, the vital interest of both sides is no guarantee of success — but it is a guarantee that they will not be able to avoid negotiations indefinitely. The sooner the four principles indicated above are adopted, the sooner a successful peace process will resume. The parties will then be able together to seek to repair the damage which the Al Aksa Intifada precipitated.
In recent years policy-makers have focused on the Middle East peace process and on the potential rewards of peace, particularly in terms of economic opportunities, but also of political stability and social development. However, peace processes can be destabilizing as well, partly because they are aimed at removing the *raison d’être* of economic, social and political systems based for decades on the need, assumed or real, to prepare for war. When a peace process occurs at the same time as globalizing forces are challenging state control over domestic economies and sources of legitimacy, there is even greater potential for new types of struggles over resources and power and hence over communal relations and identity.

This paper looks ‘beyond’ the peace process to a number of potential threats to stability in the Middle East with a view to policy recommendations. The starting point is that the ‘West’ (meaning the United States and Europe in particular) will retain an interest in the region, whether out of close ties with Israel, or concern over peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf beyond. While recent events in the region suggest that ‘real peace’ is a long way off, the issues discussed here are also relevant to making peace work if and when it is secured. In this sense too the ‘beyond peace’ thrust of this article is appropriate. The focus is on Jordan, Israel and Palestine partly for reasons of space and partly because these countries have a lot in common, including signed peace agreements, common frontiers and large Palestinian communities. They face similar problems and what happens in one country has knock-on effects in the others.

There are three inter-linked political dynamics at work in these countries: globalization and economic restructuring, political restructuring and the peace process. The first involves the huge shift from public to private sectors in a rapidly changing world dominated by the ‘e’ economy. It is characterized by, among other things, growing economic disparities between and within countries in the competition for economic power. This interacts with the second dynamic, political restructuring and the contest between democratic, authoritarian and patrimonial governments and opposition forces calling for greater democracy and other more communal forms of politics based on religion, ethnicity, family and so forth. Of particular importance in each of the three countries is the sharp rise in identity politics in recent years, notably the political status of Palestinians in Israel and Jordan. However, similar processes are at work among Jewish Israelis, ‘East Bank’ Jordanians and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The third dynamic is the peace process that influences and is influenced by the dynamics outlined here.

Paul Lalor is Lecturer in Contemporary Arab Studies at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland. He is currently on secondment to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London where he is a Research Fellow. This is part of the author’s work in progress at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
These dynamics converge in ways that can produce positive or negative change. The former would include more democratic governments and greater openness across frontiers. The latter would involve hostile competition for scarce resources in a context of ethno-national and religious-national polarization.

This paper explores these dynamics in Jordan, Israel and Palestine and suggests how outside powers can limit the destructiveness of these forces and enhance the prospects for positive change.

Jordan

There is widespread agreement in Western policy-making circles that economic reform is the most pressing concern in the Hashemite Kingdom. Since the early 1980s the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have been pressing Jordan hard. In 1999, a report by the influential Washington Institute about the transition to King Abdullah condemned the economy bequeathed to him by his father, King Hussein, as a ‘shambles’. It pointed out that the bureaucracy, army and intelligence services are huge for a country of Jordan’s size and wealth, and that Jordanians produce only a fraction of what is necessary to pay for their upkeep. The report identified corruption, a lack of accountability and nepotism as major problems. Unemployment in Jordan is officially estimated at 27% but is probably higher. In Southern Jordan, where ‘East Bankers’ (the bedrock of the King’s support) predominate, poverty is acute and people have demonstrated their discontent with government policy over the years.1

The democratization process launched in 1989 was partly a response to these pressures. The decision was taken in the wake of riots in the South triggered by lifting subsidies on petrol prices in April 1989. Since then, however, there have been setbacks to political liberalization. These have included the rewriting of electoral and press laws, dismissing municipal councils, banning rallies and rounding up subversives. The most important reason for these reversals has been the regime’s determination to secure the success of the peace process despite popular and parliamentary opposition. The links between Jordan and Palestine are strong, partly because at least 50% of the population in Jordan are of Palestinian origin. What happens in the West Bank and Gaza has direct implications for Jordan’s domestic politics. This point has been demonstrated again by popular and regime support for the Palestinians and their intifada towards the end of 2000.

Other reasons for setbacks in the democratization process in Jordan include King Hussein’s pursuit of an unpopular pro-Western policy in Iraq. More recently, in a potentially dangerous period of transition, King Abdullah has shown little sign of getting the democratization process back on track.2

Against this background, the balance between Transjordanians and Palestinians within Jordan has come under strain. The rupture dividing the two communities has its roots in the conflict between the Palestinian National Movement and Jordanian forces in 1970–1971, known as Black September by Palestinians and as White September by Transjordanians. The result was the emergence of Transjordanian nationalism and a stronger if hushed sense of Palestinian nationalism in Jordan. The rift was exacerbated by the development of a division of labour, with Palestinians dominating the private sector and Transjordanians dominating the public sector. IMF and World Bank pressures have undercut job security in the state sector and led to widespread and vocal Transjordanian resentment of Palestinian dominance in the private sector. To some extent this division was evident before 1967 and had to do with the nature of the state and how it was set up. However, the division became much clearer after 1970–1971 for a number of reasons.
The first reason was that after 1970–1971 the Palestinians were considered suspect and there was a reduction of those in the security services and the government bureaucracy as part of a policy of ‘reorganizing the Jordanian house and the instruments of self-protection’. This process was given added impetus and importance as a result of hostile PLO policy towards Jordan in the early 1970s and the Rabat summit resolution of 1974, which recognized the PLO as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of the Palestinians. The second reason was the propagation of the notion that ‘Jordan is Palestine’ by the Israeli right and the election victory of the Likud in 1977. This increased the drive towards ‘Transjordanizing’ the public sector and the security services and reducing the public profile of Palestinian-Jordanians. The third reason for the division of labour is that Palestinians were able to take advantage of employment opportunities in the Gulf. Remittances poured back into Jordan from the middle of the 1970s and heightened the public-private sector divide.

By 1996, a study conducted by Jordan University’s Centre for Strategic Studies on the level of capital participation in the country’s economy showed that Palestinian participation amounted to 82.6% of the capital, while Transjordanian participation amounted to 11%.

The divisions between Palestinians and Jordanians in Jordan were manageable at a time of economic boom. However, they became much more difficult in the 1980s and 1990s for several reasons. First, with the downturn in the economy in the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank advocated restructuring programmes that threatened cuts in the public sector and the expansion of the private sector, leading to Transjordanian resentment and Palestinian fears. Second, while the Gulf Crisis of 1991 at first transcended divisions, its effects deepened them. In particular, the expulsion from the Gulf and return to Jordan of more than 200,000 Palestinians heightened Transjordanian fears. They saw themselves as losing out to successive waves of Palestinian refugees and increasingly feared that the Palestinians would take power in Jordan. A third reason why the division between Palestinians and Transjordanians emerged more forcefully was King Hussein’s decision to disengage from the West Bank in 1988 and the beginnings of democratization in the following year. This focused the debate on the East Bank and allowed the issue to be discussed more openly. The fourth reason was the Oslo agreement and the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in October 1994. This meant that it was no longer unpatriotic to discuss these issues and articles on the subject began to appear in the press.

By 1996 there were four main lines to the debate. First, there was the Transjordanian nationalist position that to varying degrees supported the notion of removing Jordanian citizenship from Palestinians. This position is characterized by calls for a much more equal share of the private sector cake. It also calls for the establishment of two distinct entities, Jordan and Palestine. Secondly, in the wake of the peace process, and in expectation of the creation of a Palestinian state, many Palestinians in Jordan were calling for full citizenship and an end to discrimination against them in the public sector. Some also called for a confederal arrangement with the Palestinian state. A third line in this debate was put forward by what one analyst called the ‘deferrers’, meaning those who call for the suspension of discussion until the question of Palestine is settled. Lastly, there are the Pan Arabists and Pan Islamists who still support the notion of national unity between Palestinians and Jordanians.\(^3\)

This review of developments in Jordan is not meant to suggest that the democratization process in Jordan has been irretrievably reversed or that conflict between Palestinians and Jordanians is imminent. In fact, there is probably greater freedom of movement and expression in Jordan today than there was before democratization began in 1989. But it is not at the levels of 1991. By the same token, while there are signs of Palestinian-Jordanian tension, they are not at the point of conflict and are less visible at the end of 2000 because of solidarity towards the Palestinian intifada.
solidarity towards the Palestinian intifada. However, both Palestine and Jordan are poor in natural resources and dependent on neighbours or narrow coastlines for land and sea access to external markets and aid. In a context of hostile competition, however unlikely it may seem at the moment, communal tensions could recur. Forced repatriation of Palestinians from Jordan would have obvious implications for peace and security and relations between Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel as well as the wider region.

Israel

Prior to the 1980s, Israel had one of the most centralized economic and political systems in the world. However, there has been a huge shift from public to private in recent years, from what was presented as a ‘kibbutz culture’ to the globalizing forces of the ‘Big Mac’.

Economic liberalization posed a growing challenge to the state model of socialism in Israel in the 1970s and 1980s. Political parties on the Left and the Right increasingly endorsed privatization and other elements of the market economy. This was not just a reaction to international trends and the failure of the centralized economy. It also reflected the fact that the socialist values promoted in the early days of the state had lost their attraction. Nowadays Israel is increasingly characterized by high-tech industry and the ‘e’ economy. In a more open society, individual concerns and rights are asserted over those of the state. There have been corruption scandals, allegations of nepotism and demands for transparency in public spending, even on the military. While there has been a rise in the general level of material prosperity, there has also been a widening of the gap between rich and poor. This has inevitably resulted in new struggles for economic and political power.

Economic liberalization has been accompanied by political liberalization. One aspect of this has been the rise in identity politics, characterized by the strengthening of religious and local interest parties. The Shas party, which has a religious leadership and represents Moroccan-Jewish voters in particular, entered the Knesset with four seats in 1984 and by the 1999 elections was the third largest party with seventeen seats. By 1999, in the wake of massive immigration from the former Soviet Union, two parties promoted the interests of Russian Jews in the elections. One of the main reasons for these trends was the breakdown in the national consensus of the pre-1967 period and declining faith in the traditional parties, Likud and Labour. The process was facilitated by Israel’s system of proportional representation and electoral reform in the 1990s that gave citizens two votes, one for prime minister and one for the party of their choice. Intended to strengthen the hand of the prime minister and overcome some of the problems of the proportional representation system, the reform backfired badly. Voters were now able to vote for the prime minister of their choice and the political party that most accurately reflected the interests of their particular identities. As a result, fifteen parties were represented in the Knesset election in 1999, the highest number ever.

A particular fault line in Israel is the division between Israeli Jews and Israeli Palestinians, sometimes called Israeli Arabs. Israeli Palestinians, who make up 18% of the population, have suffered numerous forms of discrimination from the earliest days of the state. In the first weeks of the Palestinian intifada of late 2000 in the West Bank and Gaza, Israeli Palestinians demonstrated in solidarity. Thirteen were shot dead by the Israeli army inside Israel. This incident has increased Israeli Palestinians’ anger and strengthened the hand of Jewish Israeli right wingers who claim that they are the enemy within.

One view is that identification with the state is strong and that Israeli democracy can weather coming storms. Another is that there is a danger of intolerance and fragmentation. Much depends
on the threats and opportunities offered by the peace process. One possibility, however, involves a ‘neo-Zionist’ alliance between political right wingers and hard-line religious Jews. This would be fundamentalist and inward looking and would have implications for policy internally (and in particular for Israel’s Palestinian minority) and for Israel’s immediate neighbours and beyond. One potential scenario involves the ‘transfer’ or expulsion of Israeli Palestinians into the West Bank and Gaza, which would undermine the emerging Palestinian state and potentially set a precedent for other countries like Jordan.

**Palestine**

The difference between Palestine and neighbouring states is that they are established states while Palestine is a state in the making. It follows that policies pursued by Palestine’s neighbours will have a direct impact on future directions in Palestine. It also follows that it is in the interests of both Israel and Jordan to encourage democratic and tolerant forces in Palestine, because alternatives will effect them negatively.

The legacy of occupation and a process of what one analyst has called ‘de-development’ means that the Palestinians are starting from a very poor base. However, the situation has been made even more difficult by the style of rule of the Palestinian leadership. The neo-patrimonial system introduced by Arafat in 1994 has taken hold in the West Bank and Gaza. Corruption and a lack of accountability characterize the system. There are few institutions and competing centres of power. Monopolies held by people close to the leadership prevent the emergence of the private sector and weaken what already exists. Contrary to claims that the economic situation would improve as a result of peace, it has in fact worsened. Israel’s policy of closure and the economic blockade used against the most recent Palestinian intifada means that it continues to deteriorate. Meanwhile the donors are making more demands of the Palestinians and making it clear that they are getting tired of the current situation.

The prospects for democracy are poor given current trends. There is a constitutional vacuum, the human rights record is bad, institutions are weak (informal processes are more important than formal ones), there is little accountability on the part of the security services and there are serious restrictions on various freedoms, including freedom of the press. This is due to Arafat’s leadership style and other aspects of the PLO legacy, coupled with the concentration of Israel and the international community on security and the notion that peace requires strong leaders.

Optimists point to the pluralism of the PLO, the strength of civil society organizations in the West Bank and Gaza, and polls that show widespread support for democratic values in both places. Pessimists point to the competing legacies of revolution and popular mandate. They say that elements of the PLO elite are finding it hard to make the transition. Arafat’s leadership style is a particular problem. He controls the Palestinian Authority like he controlled the PLO, by dividing and ruling and keeping power in his own hands. They point out that much of the PLO elite was politically socialized in the Soviet Union and the Arab states. They argue that the PLO developed in much the same way as an Arab state and acts like one. Pessimists expect little positive change and point to a wider context characterized by the Israeli focus on security rather than democratization and Western diplomatic views to the effect that strong leaders are required to make peace happen. In other words, an autocratic Arafat (or a less democratic Abdullah) will be able to force through an unpopular peace and that this is a price worth paying.
Projecting into the future, optimists say that the PLO legacy will be weakened and that the successor to Arafat will be forced to democratize because he will not have the authority and stature to force through unpopular decisions. Optimists argue that there will be a weakening of the security argument. Stability will be the issue and this will require a more sound political system. There will be an increasing realization that democracy and an agreement mandated and accepted by the people will make peace stronger.

Pessimists counter by arguing that the neo-patrimonial system is in place and will be difficult to replace. They say that security will continue to be the preoccupation of the Western powers. They also argue that Arafat’s successor is likely to be more hard-line because of the need to establish himself and because of the preoccupations of outside powers.

The main threat to stability is the numerous divisions, visible and potential, opening up within and between the West Bank and Gaza. These include the relatively low-key rivalry between the North and South West Bank, growing unease in the hitherto relaxed relationship between Muslims and Christians and between insiders and outsiders (returnees). However, a far greater threat is the difference between the West Bank and Gaza. These differences are likely to come into sharper focus as time passes and freedom of movement between the two regions comes into being. The greatest long-term challenge comes from the refugees both within the West Bank and Gaza and scattered throughout the Arab world. How many will return and how they will be incorporated into Palestine are crucial questions. Demographic issues like these have the potential to bring together the other factors in destabilizing combinations and to reveal the shortcomings of any peace treaty in the most threatening manner.6

It is premature to draw conclusions. However, there are pointers. Conditions of social and economic deprivation and political alienation exist in Palestine; similar conditions have generated militant forms of political Islam in other Arab countries. Prospects for confronting these challenges from within are not promising at present. Arafat’s patrimonial style coupled with his tendency to ignore planners and institutions make it difficult to deal with present problems, never mind anticipate future ones. In the absence of institutions that reinforce common identity and attract loyalty, there is real danger of fragmentation and violence. This would have negative implications for Palestine’s neighbours — both of whom have large Palestinian communities that would be effected by these developments.

The international role

This paper tends towards pessimism by suggesting that the most likely short-term prospects for Israel, Jordan and Palestine are negative change, involving ethno-nationalist and religious polarization between and within these three countries. The role of the United States and Europe are crucial if there is to be positive movement in the future.

The West needs to develop policies that encourage a shift from a focus on security towards a concentration on stability involving more democratic governments and greater openness across borders. It needs to develop policies encouraging tolerance and accountability in all three states on the understanding that what happens in one country will have a direct impact on the others. This implies a refocusing of energies away from debates about forcing the Palestinian state to comply with perceived norms towards a recognition that the politics of its neighbours will have an even
greater impact on the direction taken by the Palestinian state. The objective should be to encourage all three countries to create a context more likely to lead to positive change.

The conclusion of a permanent status Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement, the establishment of a Palestinian state and a settlement of the refugee question are keys to easing inter-communal tensions in Israel and Jordan in the long term. This will mean financial and other help to compensate and settle refugees and ‘kick start’ a Palestinian state. It may also involve observers and peacekeepers as part of security arrangements. In turn, this means that although there are clear signs of donor fatigue since Oslo, the West will have to invest in long-term aid and trade flows with a view to establishing a framework of peace and security between Israel, Jordan and Palestine. ‘The alternative’, as one analyst points out, ‘could be a Palestinian state that is unstable, and as such a long-term challenge to the West’s preferred outcomes for the region’.

Notes

3. For a discussion of these issues, see Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, 1999.
If one looks only at regional trends in military spending and arms transfers, the trends in the Middle East seem positive. Middle Eastern military expenditures declined from 6.8% of all world expenditures in 1987 to 6.2% in 1997. They occurred largely because of the sanctioning of Iran, Iraq and Libya and because the former Soviet Union ceased to provide massive arms transfers at little or no cost. This latter development has largely crippled Syria’s conventional military forces and helped to secure the Arab-Israeli balance.

In fact, estimates from the United States Government indicate that Middle Eastern military expenditures dropped by 6.7% in real terms during the decade 1987–1997, in spite of the Gulf War. Middle Eastern military expenditures also dropped from 17.6% of the region’s total Gross National Product in 1987 to only 7.6% in 1997, and they dropped from 45.1% of all central government expenditures to only 22.7% during the same period. This was the first sustained drop in the regional military effort since 1948, although total military expenditures still totalled $52.4 billion in 1997, plus another $5.5 billion for North Africa.

Arms sales showed similar trends. The regional total dropped from $30.0 billion in 1987 to $19.9 billion in 1997, as measured in constant 1997 US dollars. Arms sales also dropped from an extraordinarily high 27% of all regional imports to only 12.3%. Other unclassified American intelligence estimates provide equally positive trends.

The actual delivery of arms did increase slightly in current dollars when a comparison is made of the four-year period between 1992–1995, and the period between 1996–1999. The total increased from $54.3 billion to $60.8 billion, or by about 12%. This increase, however, was largely a result of purchases made after the Gulf War and which involved long delivery times. In contrast, total spending on new arms agreements, which are the key factor shaping the future military balance, dropped from $48.1 billion during 1992–1995 to $34.3 billion in 1996–1999, or by nearly 30%.

Seen purely in terms of the macroeconomics of conflict, these figures do not reflect the kind of ‘tragedy of arms’ that burdened the region in the 1970s, 1980s and first half of the 1990s. Equally important, the flow of major weapons also dropped. If one again compares the period 1992–1995 to the period 1996–1999, the total number of new tank and self-propelled gun deliveries dropped from...
2,319 to 1,073. The number of major towed artillery weapons dropped from 1,221 to 234. The number of surface combatants dropped from 76 to 31, although the number of new guided missile patrol boats dropped only from 14 to 13. The number of fixed wing combat aircraft dropped from 329 to 181, and the number of surface-to-air missiles dropped from 2,367 to 1,289.

Whatever harm sanctions may have done in an economic and social sense — and the harm has often been all too real — they have had a major impact in limiting the efforts of some of the region’s most aggressive states. In fact, this movement away from militarism is one of the few areas where the Middle East has kept pace with the positive trends in ‘globalism’. At the same time, there are a number of reasons why such figures are not reassuring, either in terms of regional stability or arms control.

Factors of concern

The first such reason is that military expenditures and arms transfers still add to the region’s economic problems. A total of 11.1 men are under arms in the Middle East for every 1,000 people in the population — the highest percentage in the world. Regional military expenditures total well over $55 billion annually in the Middle East and well over $60 billion in the entire Middle East and North Africa region.

The second reason is that no further arms transfers are necessary to support prolonged conflicts in the region. The fighting in the Western Sahara can go on indefinitely without them, and any of the border conflicts in North Africa could result in a major war without additional shipments. Bloody internal wars like that in Algeria have not depended on conventional arms transfers to regular military forces. The cumulative build-up of weapons in the hands of the Arab-Israeli confrontation states leaves Israel, Syria, Jordan and Egypt as ready for war as they were in 1973 or 1982. Arms transfers do not affect conflicts like the struggle between Israel and the Hizbollah or the outbreak of fighting between Israel and Palestinians.

Although Iran took massive equipment losses at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and lost some 40–60% of its land order of battle, Iraq’s similar losses during the Gulf War have left both sides with the capability to resume fighting in a state of near parity. Iran has built up a carefully focused military capability to attack shipping and targets in the Gulf, and Iraq still has a decisive military edge over Kuwait and Saudi Arabia if a United Nations coalition and outside states like the United States and Britain do not intervene.

In fact, there are considerable indications that transfers of high cost platforms and precision weapons tend to reduce casualties, and lead combatants to focus on a limited number of high value targets. In contrast, lingering low-level wars like the conflict in the Western Sahara, the Algerian civil war, the fighting between Israel and the Hizbollah, and the Iran-Iraq War can produce high cumulative civilian casualties and collateral damage, as well as have lasting economic and social consequences.

The third reason is that many of the trends that led to a drop in military expenditures and arms transfers were the function of unique conditions, and have already proved to be cyclical. They are the result of the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the outcome of the Gulf War, movement towards a full Arab-Israeli peace settlement, the termination of Soviet concessionary arms transfers following the end of the Cold War, a focus on internal security issues in countries like Algeria, and various sanctions affecting Iran, Iraq and Libya.
Military spending and arms imports have rebounded in North Africa since 1997, and there are strong indications that the massive increase in oil revenues since 1999 means a major rise may take place in Gulf arms imports as well. According to United States Government estimates, North African military expenditures reached a low of $4.3 billion in 1993 in constant 1997 dollars. They are now back to levels well over $5.5 billion. Similarly, arms imports reached a record recent low of only $130 million in 1993, versus $2.6 billion in 1998, largely because of a recovery of Algerian purchases after the Algerian Government began to defeat the Islamist uprising. They rose back to $685 million in 1997 and now seem close to $1 billion. These trends do not yet reflect any major increase in military spending or arms imports by Libya, which has a major potential backlog of modernization expenditures, and may soon be free of sanctions.

Military expenditures in the Middle East (Egypt, the Arab-Israeli states and the Gulf) are still far below their peak of some $101 billion in constant 1997 dollars in 1990, but they have risen back from a record low of $50.4 billion in 1994, in constant 1997 dollars, to a total closer to $60 billion. Arms imports dropped from $31.0 billion in 1987 to a low of $15.0 billion in 1994, but rose to $19.9 billion in 1997. They may be well over $20 billion in 2001. These rises do not reflect the full impact of the increase in oil revenues since mid-1999, the flow of money into Iraq and the erosion of sanctions, and the impact of the tensions and conflicts between Israel and Palestinians.

The fourth reason is the emergence of new forms of conflict and threats to security. The Middle East has become a major net importer of drugs, and while no statistics are available, it has joined other regions in seeing an increase in organized crime and cybercrime — particularly in the Southern Gulf, Israel and Egypt.

Recent patterns in revolutionary war, ideological conflict, conflicts between non-state actors and terrorism are more mixed. The United States State Department and United States intelligence services report that many such groups and their state sponsors continue to plan, train for and carry out acts of violence at levels comparable to those in recent years. At the same time, the State Department has reported that recent casualty levels have been relatively low, and there have been few major incidents that might have caused high numbers of fatalities.

The State Department reports that there were no deaths in Egypt related to such forms of conflict in 1999 — for the first time in years — due in large measure to successful counterterrorist efforts by the Egyptian Government and a cease-fire declared by the Gama’at al-Islamiyya, Egypt’s largest terrorist group. The Algerian Government has also made progress in combating domestic violence during the year, undertaking aggressive counterinsurgency operations against the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), weakening the GIA’s campaign of indiscriminate violence against civilians. The pace of killings has slowed, although suspected GIA militants still carry out massacres.

Similar progress took place elsewhere in the Middle East. The conflict between Israel and the Hizbollah came to an apparent end in mid-2000, and Israeli-Palestinian violence declined. Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority scored successes in their efforts to disrupt these groups’ operation. Jordanian authorities in December arrested a group of terrorists associated with Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization, and overall security conditions in Lebanon continued to improve.

Nonetheless, important international groups remained active and continued to try to mount lethal attacks. These included the multinational al-Qaida organization as well as the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), both of which receive support from Iran. There was continuing internal violence in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and many other states. The new outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian violence on 29 September 2000 may lead to a radical increase in such violence, and possibly to a renewal of conflict on the Israeli-Lebanese border.
It is also important to note that arms transfers are only one source of outside violence. Europe and the United States are important sources of funding for extremist and terrorist movements inside the region. Afghanistan and Pakistan have become sanctuaries or sources of funding for movements like al-Qaida; Afghanistan has also become a massive source of narcotics and narcoterrorism inside Iran.

The fifth reason is asymmetric warfare. Hostile states have found two major counters to the kind of technological advantages that moderate regional states and American power projection forces can now exploit in conventional warfare. One is the use of asymmetric warfare and the other proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

There is nothing new about asymmetric warfare per se, or about the fact it poses a threat in the Middle East, as well as in the rest of the world. Chinese experts, for example, have written a significant amount of new literature on ways in which states and movements can attack a power with modern conventional arms and still win a conflict. The United States Department of Defense report on the lessons of the war in Kosovo notes in relation to Operation Allied Force:

Milosevic was unable to challenge superior allied military capabilities directly. [...] Therefore, he chose to fight chiefly through asymmetric means: terror tactics and repression directed against Kosovar civilians; attempts to exploit the premium the alliance placed on minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage; creation of enormous refugee flows to create a humanitarian crisis, including in neighbouring countries; and the conduct of disinformation and propaganda campaigns.

These tactics created several serious challenges for our forces, all of which we were able to overcome thanks to excellent training, leadership, equipment and motivation. Nevertheless, these challenges underscored the continued need to develop new operational concepts and capabilities to anticipate and counter similar asymmetric challenges in the future. Simply put, adversaries will use unconventional approaches to circumvent or undermine U.S. and allied strengths and exploit vulnerabilities. Milosevic illustrated very clearly his propensity for pursuing asymmetric approaches. He chose his tactics in the hope of exploiting the NATO nations’ legitimate political concerns about target selection, collateral damage, and conducting military operations against enemy forces that are intentionally intermingled with civilian refugees.

In the case of refugee flow, the time-scale was so rapid and the numbers so great that it initially overwhelmed the neighbouring countries, particularly the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania. The humanitarian crisis created by Milosevic appeared to be an attempt to end NATO’s operation by ‘cleansing’ Kosovo of ethnic Albanians, overtaxing bordering nations’ infrastructures, and fracturing alliance cohesion. He failed, despite all these efforts, principally because NATO adapted to the changing circumstances. One general lesson learned is that similar attempts at asymmetric challenges should be anticipated in future conflicts as well.

It is important to note that Serbia had at least some aid from Iraq in planning asymmetric operations during the Kosovo conflict. The Hizbollah effectively defeated Israel and the South Lebanon Army with only limited deliveries of modern weapons. Iran has shown considerable originality in using submarines, mines, unconventional forces and anti-ship missiles to create a tailored asymmetric threat to naval movement through the lower Gulf.

As a result, the Middle East is shifting to asymmetric forms of warfare in ways that can sharply reduce the importance of arms transfers.
• **Sudden or surprise attack:** Power projection is dependent on strategic warning, timely decision-making, and effective mobilization and redeployment for much of its military effectiveness.

• **Saturation:** There is no precise way to determine the point at which mass, or force quantity, overcomes superior effectiveness, or force quality — historically, efforts to emphasize mass have been far less successful than military experts predicted at the time. Even the best force, however, reaches the point where it cannot maintain its edge in battle management, air combat or manoeuvre warfare in the face of superior numbers or multiple threats. Further, saturation may produce a sudden catalytic collapse of effectiveness, rather than a gradual degeneration from which the higher quality force could recover. This affects forward deployment, reliance on mobilization and reliance on defensive land tactics versus pre-emption and ‘offensive defence’.

• **Taking casualties:** War fighting is not measured simply in terms of whether a given side can win a battle or conflict, but how well it can absorb the damage inflicted upon it. Many powers are highly sensitive to casualties and losses. This sensitivity may limit its operational flexibility in taking risks, and in sustaining some kinds of combat if casualties become serious relative to the apparent value of the immediate objective.

• **Inflicting casualties:** Dependence on world opinion and outside support means some nations increasingly must plan to fight at least low and mid-intensity conflicts in ways that limit enemy casualties and collateral damage to its opponents, and show that they are actively attempting to fight in a ‘humanitarian’ style of combat.

• **Low-intensity combat:** Low-intensity conflict makes it much harder to use advanced weapons. It is difficult to exploit most technical advantages in combat — because low-intensity wars are largely fought against people, not things. Low-intensity wars are also highly political. The battle for public opinion is as much a condition of victory as killing the enemy. The outcome of such a battle will be highly dependent on the specific political conditions under which it is fought, rather than the strength of each side’s conventional forces.

• **Hostage-taking and terrorism:** Like low-intensity warfare, hostage-taking and terrorism present the problem that advanced technology powers cannot exploit their conventional strengths, and must fight a low-level battle primarily on the basis of infantry combat. Human intelligence is more important than conventional military intelligence, and much of the fight against terrorism may take place in urban or heavily populated areas.

• **Urban and built-up area warfare:** Advanced military powers are still challenged by the problem of urban warfare. Most western forces are not trained or equipped to deal with sustained urban warfare in populated areas during regional combat — particularly when the fighting may affect large civilian populations on friendly soil.

• **Extended conflict and occupation warfare:** Not all wars can be quickly terminated, and many forms of warfare — particularly those involving peace-keeping and peace-enforcement — require prolonged military occupations.

• **Weapons of mass destruction:** The threat or actual use of such weapons can compensate for conventional weakness in some cases and deter military action in others.

Finally, the regionalization of proliferation is an ongoing process that relies largely on the transfer of dual-use technology, and has little to do with either conventional arms transfers or efforts to control them. This regionalization arguably begins in Algeria and sweeps east through Libya, Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iran and Iraq. In addition, Yemen may have vestigial missile delivery capabilities and some minor stocks of mustard gas, and Sudan is increasingly cited as a possible producer of chemical weapons.
Middle Eastern proliferators are heavily influenced by the actions of proliferators outside the region and they scarcely need to look as far as North Korea. India and Pakistan clearly gained influence, prestige and leverage from testing nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Iranian officials have often used Pakistani proliferation as an example of the ‘legitimacy’ of proliferation and have less publicly cited Pakistan as a potential threat. Missile rattling across the Taiwan Straits also scarcely goes unnoticed in the Middle East, and the American focus on National Missile Defence and covert or terrorist chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attacks has had the side effect of dramatizing the impact of proliferating.

There is little present prospect of the effective globalization or regionalization of arms control, and there is a near certain prospect that current Middle Eastern proliferators will acquire more sophisticated and lethal weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems. In the process, they will seek weapons that they can use to strike with precision at critical strategic targets like oil shipments, desalination plants, etc. At the same time, the spread of biotechnology, petrochemical technology, food processing technology, fermenters and pharmaceutical technology will steadily increase regional capabilities to produce advanced biological weapons that are storable, resistant to heat and light, and have nuclear-scale lethalities.

Trends

In many cases, the regional powers that proliferate face international sanctions, or are signatories to arms control agreements that have such sanctions. The irony is that the ‘globalism’ of arms control provides a strong incentive to keep their efforts covert. The good news is that such constraints have often reduced their rate of activity and success, and have sharply increased the cost of acquiring and deploying key threats like nuclear weapons. The bad news is that nations like India and Pakistan have shown such barriers do not block military change, and nations like Iran and Iraq continue to acquire the new technology necessary to improve their capabilities.

In practice, this means that the Middle East faces problems that are far more important than conventional arms transfers.

• Making weapons of mass destruction an international norm: As the Iran-Iraq War has shown, the present political barriers to the use of weapons of mass destruction are tenuous and can vanish under the pressure of war. The Gulf War showed that missile attacks against population centres and ‘horizontal escalation’ are very real threats, and the course of the Gulf War might well have led to the widespread use of weapons of mass destruction if it had occurred several years later. There is a serious risk that a new conflict using weapons of mass destruction — such as a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan — could suddenly ‘legitimize’ both proliferation and the use of weapons of mass destruction in the sense that it could become a new ‘norm’ for many developing countries.

• Proliferating global ‘breakout capabilities’: Proliferation has been slowed down in the past by the difficulties in acquiring nuclear weapons, and in weaponizing chemical and biological weapons with real effectiveness. Some of these trends may continue. While most powers can now design fission and boosted weapons, there has been only limited progress in the technology needed to develop fissile material. This situation seems likely to continue, although the acquisition of high speed centrifuge technology, the technology needed to build small reactors designed to produce plutonium, or fissile material from the former Soviet Union present continuing risks. It would take the collapse of the political restraints enforced by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and a major increase in supplier willingness to sell relevant technologies to radically change the present mix of risks the United States faces.
• Similar constraints do not apply, however, to chemical and biological weapons. The global spread of biotechnology, more food processing facilities, fertilizer plants and petrochemical plants is slowly giving a wide range of nations the ability to manufacture advanced chemical and biological weapons. In fact, far more countries have already begun such research efforts. The American intelligence community estimates a total of some twenty-five to thirty-five countries, although any list is classified. Moreover, the spread of missile warhead, cluster munition, sprayer and unmanned aerial vehicle technology is simplifying the weaponization of such weapons.

• The risk posed by biotechnology: Modern biological weapons can easily be as lethal as fission and boosted weapons. They can also be used to attack in ways that incapacitate or threaten the agricultural sector, or can be modified — with or without genetic engineering — to defeat current vaccines and medical treatment. Globalization is making such weapons steadily cheaper and more accessible, and is creating a wide range of national research and production capabilities that can mass produce such weapons with only a limited chance of detection. There is a high probability that the threat of nuclear proliferation, which dominated the ‘globalism’ of the last half of the twentieth century, will be matched or surpassed by the threat posed by the globalization of biotechnology.

• Long-range strike systems: Nations like North Korea, Iran and Iraq are demonstrating that developing states can acquire the technology to produce missile boosters capable of launching weapons of mass destruction with enough accuracy to hit city-sized targets at ranges of more than 1,000 miles (1,600 km), and eventually to intercontinental ranges. At the same time, the proliferation of GPS guidance systems and specialized commercial jet engines is greatly reducing the cost of developing and producing cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 miles (960 km).

• Weapons of mass destruction and asymmetric warfare: The technologies and weapons necessary to carry out covert and proxy attacks using weapons of mass destruction are far cheaper than those required to use ballistic and cruise missiles. They are also becoming available to non-state actors like terrorists and extremists, and such attacks offer the potential ability to attack without attribution.

• Homeland and allied defence: All of these risks combine to create a need for homeland defence that most states have not seriously contemplated since the early days of the thermonuclear era. It is far from clear that emerging proliferators will have the kind of political leadership that is as subject to rational deterrence as Russia. Certainly, Iraq and North Korea have been erratic enough in the past to create serious concerns about their conduct, and even a ‘rational’ developing state might become involved in a process of escalation that ended in little restraint. The practical problem is that there are many forms of attack that could be used that do not require an overt declaration of war or clearly identify the attacker, and that the most costly form of defence — national and theatre missile defences — deal with only the most costly and overt form of attack. As a result, effective counter-proliferation may require a global shift to a broad mix of costly homeland defence measures ranging from missile defence and counter-proliferation to response measures designed to limit damage and deal with its effects.

Conclusion

There are no certainties involved in any of these trends. It is impossible to assign reliable probabilities to their nature, timing or effectiveness, and it is possible that diplomacy, political change and economic development may reduce them, roll them back or at least prevent the emergence of
major paradigm shifts. It is equally possible, however, that they will interact to create a far more tense and threatening environment in the Middle East.

High oil revenues, proliferation, the fighting between Israel and the Palestinians, the ageing of existing weapons inventories, and growing fears that Iraq may break out of sanctions are not a good recipe for regional stability. As a result, the odds favour significant increases in arms expenditures over the next few years — although many of these expenditures could be on imports of dual-use technology and national efforts to develop missiles and weapons of mass destruction, rather than arms imports.

It is also a grim fact of life that this mix of trends and changing threats can interact disastrously with the world’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy exports, and with the growth of far more lethal forms of asymmetric warfare and terrorism. The energy facilities of the Middle East are already often highly lucrative targets. The hyperurbanization of the Middle East, usually with one key urban area that defines the political structure of each country, makes most nations ‘one-bomb states’. The use of such weapons would also force the near or total collapse of most regional economies. The end result is that proliferating states may be able to conduct ‘wars of intimidation’ against those states that cannot retaliate or which are not supported by defences and outside deterrents.

The message for arms control is also clear. Undesirable as conventional arms transfers may be, and no one can endorse massive spending on arms in a region whose people so badly need peace and development, they are not the key problem. Conflict resolution and efforts to control proliferation have a far higher priority. Moreover, outside pressures to sell arms, however undesirable, are not as important a problem as the transfer of dual-use equipment and technology. This in no sense means that the region and the world should not try to limit the flow of conventional arms transfers. It does mean that arms control has more important priorities.
Two conflicting trends have shaped the security environment of the Middle East in the last ten years. The first trend has been characterized by the region's pursuit of peace and stability through determined movement towards conflict resolution, enhanced trust and tension control. The second trend has been a product of deeply rooted threat perceptions among the countries of the region, which has led to continuing plans for arms modernization, acquisition and defence preparations. Perhaps in no field is this trend more evident than in missile proliferation.

The Gulf War of 1991 was a turning point in the security environment of the Middle East. The intense political and military energy focused during the war was high enough to reveal the multitude of social and security risks in the area. The Arab-Israeli conflict, though important, seemed no longer to be the dominant confrontation in the region. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles appeared considerable. The war also tested the fragile stability of the region and the urgent need to deal with its flash points.

The Gulf War was a real demonstration of a 'missile war'. It showed fundamental changes in the art of fighting and the dominant role of air and missile power. Between 17 January and 26 February 1991, Iraq fired some ninety modified Scud ballistic missiles at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. The United States and the United Kingdom launched a total of 288 Tomahawk cruise missiles at targets in Iraq. Of these, 276 were launched from surface ships and twelve from submarines in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. In the opening hours of the war, the heavy strategic bombers of the United States Air Force delivered a further thirty-five conventional air-launched cruise missiles.1

This missile demonstration was not the first in the Gulf. It was preceded by the 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War. The two countries fired more than 600 Scuds and modified Scuds at each other's cities.2 The heaviest of these exchanges, the so called 'War of the Cities', took place between February and April 1988, during which Iraq fired a total of 189 modified Scuds at Iranian cities. The psychological effect of the Iraqi missile attacks was a major factor in Iran's acceptance of the ceasefire. The new 'missile factor' in the region was also behind Saudi Arabia's purchase from China of a number of CSS-2 ballistic missiles. The Iran-Iraq War marked an important transition in the role of ballistic missiles in the Middle East — from acquisition for deterrence to actual use in the battlefield for deep fire projection. It also showed how these weapons could strike fear and uncertainty among civilians and place extreme political pressure on governments.

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Dr Mohamed Kadry Said is Head of the Military Studies Unit and Technology Advisor at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (Cairo), Professor of Missile Flight Mechanics at the Military Technical College (Cairo), and member of the committee for strategic planning in the Egyptian Council for Space Research, Science and Technology.
Another massive use of missile power was performed in the Balkans during the NATO air campaign. The crisis generated security concerns not only throughout Europe but also in the southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The countries of the South feared that similar actions could take place against them (as against Libya in June 1981, January 1983 and in March 1986; Sudan and Afghanistan in August 1998; and for the past decade against Iraq). The 1991 Gulf War and the Kosovo air campaign convinced many developing countries that the United States possesses capabilities for which they have no response. The further proliferation of these capabilities and technologies to its allies in Europe and to Israel has strengthened this perception of imbalance, and will be considered in any future balance of power calculations or arms control negotiations.

Ballistic missiles and WMD proliferation in the Middle East offer the means for the countries of the region to pursue asymmetric strategies in confrontation with greater powers. There is also an economic incentive to acquiring ballistic missiles because they are often less expensive than acquiring and sustaining large conventional forces. The new defence strategies of NATO, Europe and its close allies, added to their monopoly of modern attack systems, make the issue of proliferation a shared risk not only flowing from South to North but also from North to South.

Defense against ballistic missiles is a growing issue in South-South, South-North security relations. During the Gulf War, the Patriot air-defence missile system was introduced for the first time to the Middle East. The system is now deployed in Israel, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. New defence systems have been developed and are ready to be fielded. The offense-defense missile race has already started in the Middle East. From the North-South dimension, missile proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa can affect Europe’s security and constrains NATO’s freedom of action in the Mediterranean. Building regional defence architectures against missiles in Europe and in the Middle East continues to be a controversial issue.

The aim of this paper is to show the high magnitude of risks and dangers the Middle East region would face if the peace efforts failed to reach their goals. The paper portrays the growing trends in the acquisition of both offensive and defensive missile systems. This includes ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other unmanned vehicles used for land attack missions. The paper also touches upon the new trends in missile acquisition, the dynamics of technology transfer, and the impact of defence co-operation programmes on the proliferation of missile technologies.

The genesis and rise of missile proliferation in the Middle East

Missile and WMD proliferation in the Middle East were initially generated late in the 1950s as a response to the Suez Crisis and Israel’s plans to build an independent nuclear and missile arsenal. In late 1956, France and Britain had agreed with Israel to launch a war against Egypt to provide the two European nations with the pretext to attack Egypt and occupy the Suez Canal zone. In the same period of time, France agreed to provide Israel with a twenty-four megawatt reactor and a chemical processing plant in Dimona, which became the backbone of the Israeli project for nuclear armament. Intelligence communities and experts estimate the Israeli stockpile as consisting of 100–200 nuclear devices including warheads for its mobile Jericho-1 and Jericho-2 ballistic missiles as well as bombs for aircraft and other tactical applications. The first Israeli ballistic missile, Jericho-1, was also French-designed, developed and deployed during the 1960s.

By the mid-1960s, Israel’s strategic alliance with France had gradually deteriorated until it was finally dissolved by President de Gaulle on the eve of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. By contrast, American Presidents Kennedy and Johnson started to demonstrate increased sensitivity to Israel’s defence requirements. Since then, the growing American-Israeli strategic co-operation has been
forged in a series of agreements for technology transfer and joint development defence projects like the Lavi combat aircraft, the remotely piloted vehicles series, and the Arrow anti-tactical ballistic missile system. Israel also bought several MGM-52 Lance short-range ballistic missiles from the United States in the 1970s. The same missile was supplied to Iran by the United States in 1974.

Israel’s supremacy in the Middle East has considerably decreased with time due to missile technology proliferation in the region. It is now relatively easy for any government seeking to initiate a missile programme to acquire the needed technology from states such as North Korea, Russia, China, India and Pakistan. By doing so, the countries can avoid much of the basic research by simply buying the expertise and technology. The acquisition of basic Scud technology — the system favoured by most of the Arab states — from North Korea or Russia eliminates the need for continuous testing since most components have already been tested by others.

The reasons behind missile proliferation in the Middle East are numerous and diverse. Unresolved conflicts, regional competition between rival states, and the unrestrained supply of missile technology from external powers are significant factors. There are also other reasons that make states of the Middle East seek missile weaponry, such as evolution in the art of war, the desire to threaten the projection options of those outside the region, as compensation for weaknesses in conventional assets, beside the motivations of national prestige and deterrence.

The threat perceived by some Arab and non-Arab countries due to the Israeli conventional and non-conventional build-up was behind the initiation of counter-programmes. The scope of such programmes is generally limited in size and capabilities compared to already deployed Israeli systems. The Arab and Islamic countries are actually subjected to severe measures by the international regimes prohibiting missile and advanced technology proliferation on selective bases. Facing difficulties for financing their conventional arms procurements, some of these countries have chosen to acquire various kinds of WMD to compensate for the unfavourable conventional weapons balance and deter outside intervention.

In the following sections, the current status of ballistic missile capabilities and development programmes in Middle Eastern states is reviewed. The data is derived from several sources and summarized in Table 1.


EGYPT

The Egyptian response to the Israeli missile and nuclear activities early in the 1960s was a counter development programme with the assistance of German scientists. By 1965, two configurations were tested: Al Kahir and Al Zafir. The programme was cancelled in 1967. Early in the 1970s Egypt imported Frog-7 unguided rockets and Scud-B ballistic missiles from the former Soviet Union. Reports suggest that in the mid-1980s Egypt participated with Iraq and Argentina in the development of a two-stage ballistic missile system. It is believed that Egypt terminated this programme in 1989.5

Table 1. Ballistic missile capabilities in the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>System name</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Payload (kg)</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Jericho-1</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>I/France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jericho-2</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>I/France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jericho-2+</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jericho-3</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lance (MGM-52)</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shavit (SLV)</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>150–250</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Possibly withdrawn from service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Scud-B</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>I/North Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scud-C</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>I/North Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shehab-3</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>1,300–1,500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>I/North Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shehab-4</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>I/Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Scud-B</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>I/North Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scud-C</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>I/North Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS-21</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>70–120</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-11?</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>I/China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M-9?</td>
<td>O?</td>
<td>600–800</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>I/China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Scud-B</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>I/North Korea</td>
<td>A few dozen missiles remain after the Gulf War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Al Hussein</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>600</td>
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Key: D = in development, O = operational, I = indigenous
IRAQ

Iraq imported Scud-B missiles from the former Soviet Union in the mid-1980s and used some of them in its war with Iran. The Al Hussein programme was based on the Scud-B design with a reduced warhead and increased liquid propellant to obtain a range of 600km. Around 190 Al Huseins were fired against Iran in 1988. Some eighty to ninety missiles were fired against Saudi Arabia and Israel during the Gulf War. A 2,000km-range missile was developed and tested in 1989, described by Iraq as a satellite launch vehicle. The missile was called ‘Al Aabed’ and used a cluster of five rocket motors as a first stage.

Since 1991 Iraq has been prohibited from developing or testing ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150km. Some reports indicate that 250 technicians are working on the Ababil-100 short-range ballistic missile at the Al Mamoun factory 40km south-west of Baghdad. The Ababil-100 has a range in compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. Iraq may still retain the technology it acquired before the war, and the fact that the resolutions allow Iraq to continue producing and testing short-range missiles means that it can easily continue its missile development activities when circumstances permit.

SYRIA

Syria imported Scud-B missiles from the former Soviet Union in the early 1980s, followed by some SS-21 missiles with a 70–120km range. Scud-B and Scud-C variants were imported from North Korea in the early 1990s with ranges of 300km and 500km respectively. It is believed that in 1993 a production facility was established in Syria for both missile types. It is also reported that a production facility has been set up to produce both Chinese M-11 and M-9 missiles with ranges of 280km and 600–800km respectively.

IRAN

Iran started its missile development activities by developing solid-propellant, unguided rockets in the late 1970s with the Nazeat, which had ranges from 90 to 150km. In the mid-1980s Iran imported Scud-B ballistic missiles from the former Soviet Union and North Korea. These missiles were used during the War of the Cities in 1988. The Scud-B and Scud-C variants (probably provided by North Korea) have been assembled in Iran since 1987 and 1991 respectively. The Shehab-3 system has been in development since 1992 and was first tested in July 1998. It is similar to the North Korean Nodong-1 and has a range between 1,300 and 1,500km.

According to American and Israeli intelligence sources, Iran’s next ballistic missile, the Shehab-4, is largely derived from the 1950s Soviet SS-4 ‘Sandel’ medium-range (2,000km range) ballistic missile. The Shehab-4 was probably tested successfully on 21 September 2000. According to Admiral Shamkhani, Defense Minister of Iran, the test was the first of a new variant of the missile called ‘Shehab-3D’, which he said was a space launch vehicle. Iran’s defence minister announced in February 2000 that ‘Shehab-3 will remain Iran’s latest and last military missile’.
SAUDI ARABIA

As a response to the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia secretly bought from China a limited number of the CSS-2 ballistic missile at an estimated cost of $3–3.5 billion. The missile has a maximum range of around 2,400km and carries a high-explosive warhead of up to 2,150kg. Riyadh pledged it would never arm the CSS-2 missiles with nuclear or chemical warheads.

LIBYA

Libya imported Scud-C missiles from the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s. A Scud-C variant is believed to have been imported from North Korea in the early 1990s. Some reports suggest that Libya has been developing the ‘Al Fatih’ ballistic missile since the early 1980s. It is believed that the programme is proceeding slowly, with the aim of producing liquid- or solid-propellant missiles with a range of around 750km. In response to the American attack on Libya in March-April 1986, Libya launched two Scud-B missiles at an American Navy base on the Italian island of Lampedusa, which put the Italian armed forces on alert. Libya is still a target of Western accusations of initiating ballistic missile development projects with the help of China and North Korea. Libya’s plans are very much affected by the international sanctions imposed in April 1992.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND YEMEN

Both the United Arab Emirates and Yemen are reported to have purchased some Scud-B missiles in the early 1990s. Yemen may also have acquired from the former Soviet Union some SS-21 short-range ballistic missiles. A small number of Scud-B missiles were used in Yemen during the war of 1994.

Revolution in military affairs and missile proliferation

One of the important factors driving the proliferation of missile systems and unmanned vehicles is the fundamental change in military strategies and doctrines of war. Early in the 1980s, the United States initiated new forms of ‘conventional deterrence’ based on concepts such as ‘extending the battlefield’, ‘the deep attack’ and ‘distance warfare’. These ideas were soon translated to a long list of new weapon systems, including long-range attack missiles, precision guided ammunitions supported by ground and space target detection and surveillance. Most of these weapon systems became available to the American allies in Europe and their technological building blocks soon came into the hands of Israel through technology transfer programmes. Ironically, these advanced systems — originally developed to defend Europe against a Soviet conventional attack — were used for the first time in the Middle East theatre during the Gulf War.

Late in the 1990s, military thinking was again affected by an even deeper transformation known as the revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA would introduce fundamental changes in weapons
technology, in military doctrine and in military organization. This new paradigm is basically dominated by precision deep strike weapons networked with ground and space sensors. An example of how these concepts are to be translated into reality in the United States is the idea of a monstrous ‘arsenal ship’ envisaged by the United States Navy as a low-manned, remotely tasked vessel with up to 500 vertical launch cells. The missile culture associated with the temptation of deep fire projection against economically-valued assets is now spreading after its ‘live demonstration’ in the Gulf and in the Balkans. One of the important characteristics of the new military organization in terms of arms control options is the difficulty of isolating any of its interconnected elements. Space assets coupled with sensor and information technology are performance multipliers for ballistic and cruise missile systems.

As a result of the Gulf War, most Middle Eastern countries became engaged in military modernization and defence technological readiness programmes. New weapons, such as modern attack submarines and theatre anti-ballistic missile systems, have been introduced for the first time. Israel’s nuclear arsenal and its expanding space-based surveillance system have a profound impact not only on the strategic balance between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries, but also between Israel and other countries in the Mediterranean. Israel has a sophisticated nuclear military capability, and some reports indicate an active chemical weapons programme and biological warfare activities reportedly conducted at the Biological Research Institute in Ness Ziona.

Israel started launching its Ofek series of high resolution satellites in 19 September 1988. In 1997 a joint venture satellite company (ImageSat International) was established as a consortium of leading satellite, sensor and information management companies, which include Israel Aircraft Industries, Electro Optics Industries and Core Software Technology, to build an eight-satellite constellation based on Ofek technology. The ground resolution of each satellite will be around 1.5 meters, which means the ability to identify military valued objects. The first satellite of the series ‘Eros-1’ was launched successfully on 5 December 2000. The space lobby in Israel’s defence establishment is supporting the project ‘Star-460’ for the development of a powerful space launch vehicle that could give Israel a significant share of the expanding global satellite industry; the vehicle could also have a military role.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria are now ‘thinking space’ for peaceful applications. They focus on small and micro satellites to gain experience and transfer foreign technology. The Council for Space Research, Science and Technology was first established in Egypt in 1998. The Space Research Institute in Saudi Arabia was established in 1983. The Saudi institute launched two micro satellites (10kg each) onboard a Russian launcher on 25 September 2000.

Defense against ballistic missiles

Defense against ballistic missiles is an increasingly important issue in the Middle East and in South-North security relations in general. From the perspective of NATO and the United States, missile proliferation in the Middle East and North Africa can affect Europe’s security and constrain it freedom in the Mediterranean. The potential exposure of European population centres to retaliation could complicate the prospects for American and NATO access to southern Europe. Initiating a regional anti-missile defence project in Europe might also raise security concerns among the southern Mediterranean countries if they feel that their modest response capabilities are eroding.
Area missile defence projects

American concern regarding the threat of ballistic missiles has run high over the last two years compared to the calm and easy-going approach of the European Union and Middle Eastern countries. The Clinton Administration proposed to the Gulf Cooperation Council and Egypt to join the United States in developing an area defence system against ballistic missiles. Similar defence architectures are also proposed for Europe. So far, the Gulf States and Egypt have shown little enthusiasm for such a project because of financial constraints. A feasibility study has indicated that in the cases of the Gulf and Europe, the number of anti-ballistic missile batteries needed are considerably reduced if the batteries are interconnected into one regional system rather than working autonomously.

National projects

As previously mentioned, the Patriot air-defence missile system is now deployed in Israel, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Israel has made ballistic missile defence a national priority. In the framework of the ‘HOMA’ [the Wall] project, Israel is aiming to deploy a nation-wide missile defence network consisting of its Arrow-2 system combined with the Patriot PAC-3 and the future point-target, rapid-firing defence guns. Interoperability with the United States between the Arrow and the Patriot includes communication between the two systems and sharing early warning information.

Israel is the first country in the world to use new physical concepts to destroy attacking missiles. The American-Israeli High-Energy Laser (THEL) anti-missile system succeeded to destroy a two-rocket salvo on 28 August 2000 at the White Sand Missile Range in New Mexico. The target rockets were flying a 16km-range trajectory and were moving at 330 meters per second when the laser beam destroyed them.

The transfer of advanced defence technologies could be used easily for offensive systems. The massive deployment of defence systems against ballistic missiles could oblige other countries in the region to further enhance their offensive capabilities in order to ‘saturate’ their adversaries’ capabilities. The potential use by Israel of the high energy laser technology for intercepting missiles in their boost phase will be seen by its neighbours as destabilizing and highly provocative.

Proliferation of cruise missiles

The missile proliferation threat has traditionally been seen predominantly in terms of ballistic missiles. But ballistic missiles are far from representing the totality of the missile threat. Modern cruise missiles carry a similar size warhead as a ballistic missile over a similar range, but deliver it with far greater accuracy and at a fraction of a ballistic missile’s cost. Moreover, the means to develop advanced cruise missiles can increasingly be obtained in the open market. Cruise missiles can carry and deliver biological or chemical agents in a more controllable manner than ballistic missiles. They are small, with low signatures at launch and during flight, fly at low levels, and can hide in terrain by exploiting masking and ground clutter. One cannot derive missile’s launch and impact sites simply by measuring their trajectory.
Cruise missiles were used extensively in the Kosovo campaign. Six ships and three submarines from two United States Navy battle groups and one British submarine (HMS Splendid) launched 218 missiles against military and infrastructure targets in Yugoslavia. The conventional air-launched cruise missiles with conventional fragmentation warheads were delivered by B-52 strategic bombers from forward bases in England.23

The key suppliers of cruise missiles to both the developed and developing world have been France, Italy, the former USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States and China. No sales to the developing world from these exporting states are known to include land-attack systems. Most sales have been of relatively short-range anti-ship cruise missiles. Sales of such systems are not susceptible to export control restrictions as outlined in the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) because they do not exceed 300km in range. However, anti-ship systems can easily be transformed into land-attack systems. China reverse-engineered the Russian SS-N-2 ‘Styx’ to develop its Silkworm and Taiwan used the Israeli Gabriel-1 to develop the Hsiung-Feng I.

A significant number of non-Western countries (i.e. outside Europe, the United States and Russia) possess or produce indigenous cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicle. Most of these systems are used for anti-ship operations, but some of them are developed to perform long-range land-attack missions. Examples from the Middle East include the Israeli Popeye (100km) and Delilah (400–500km), the Iranian Kilter (50km) and Kyle (90km), and the Iraqi Kitchen (400km) and Kelt (400km).

Early in January 2000, Israel asked the United States for a supply of cruise missiles. The ‘wish list’ delivered by Amos Yaron, the director-general of the Israeli Defense Ministry, included the Tomahawk cruise missile, which can be launched from submarines, and therefore less vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes. Israel claims that it needs a long-range missile to compensate for its withdrawal from the Golan Heights in case of a peace agreement with Syria. No Middle Eastern state currently possesses a weapon system like Tomahawk. Providing Israel with Tomahawk would violate the MTCR and would create political complications.24

_A significant number of non-Western countries (i.e. outside Europe, the United States and Russia) possess or produce indigenous cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicle. Most of these systems are used for anti-ship operations, but some of them are developed to perform long-range land-attack missions._

**Threat of sea-launched ballistic missiles**

The idea of using the sea to launch ballistic and cruise missiles has been limited to a small club of developed countries, but recently has started to attract the attention of some regional powers like Israel, India and China. The Rumsfeld Commission to ‘Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States’ concluded that the American intelligence community needs to pay more attention to launch configurations that were feasible but not employed by the United States and Russia.25 The launch of ballistic missiles from surface ships was cited as a specific example. Although the United States and the former Soviet Union have preferred using submarines,26 launching ballistic missiles from surface ships is still an attractive idea since it gives the country autonomy from foreign bases and lower risks in technical terms.

The primary attraction of surface-ship basing, when efficiently camouflaged, would be its ability to extend a nation’s missile capability to intercontinental ranges using relatively simple technology. Most of the world’s cities and military bases are within 1,500km of the ocean, putting much of the globe within range of such systems. This option represents a level of attainable ballistic missile technology for developing countries.27
Israel has recently obtained three modern submarines built in Germany. Some reports suggest that the submarines have four large (25.5 inch diameter) torpedo tubes that could be used to launch long-range nuclear capable cruise missiles.\textsuperscript{28} According to some reports the submarines may be capable of carrying nuclear-armed Popeye Turbo cruise missiles to offer Israel a second strike capability. Under a system of rotation, two of the vessels would remain at sea: one in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, the other in the Mediterranean. A third would remain on standby.

In May 2000, Israel is reported to have secretly carried out its first launches from two submarines of cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. The missiles, launched near Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, are said to have hit a target at a range of 1,500km.\textsuperscript{29}

Converted surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are also another potent alternative to ballistic missiles. The republics of the former Soviet Union are retiring a large number of the S-200 surface-to-air missile system, which are suitable for conversion. This missile is already in use in North Korea, Syria and Iran. The use of SAMs as ballistic missiles is not new. China has sold versions of its locally manufactured SAM as the M-7 ballistic missile. It is in use in Iran under the name of 'Tamdar'.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{Missile technology transfer}

While much attention has focused on the prospect of missile and WMD proliferation, little notice has been given to technology transfer programmes and the scientific and technical community that supports them. Critical technologies are transformed through joint development programmes. Western technologies proliferate to Israel and from Israel to other countries to gain extra technological or economic benefits. The same pattern exists with other countries receiving support from China, North Korea or Russia.

Concerns about Soviet weapons scientists seeking opportunities elsewhere began in 1991. For example, the Ukrainian Southern Machine Building Plant, which built the SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles, lost 5,000 personnel between 1991 and 1996. While many of the emigrating scientists went to Western Europe and the United States, others have gone to Israel, China, Iran, Iraq and North Korea.

Today, Israel is enjoying transfer of sensitive technologies from the two superpowers of the Cold War era. It has worked to bring key scientists out of the former Soviet Union to participate in several weapons and space technology programmes.\textsuperscript{31} At the same time, Israel also succeeded to enhance its strategic ties with the United States and to remove many stumbling blocks facing this relation. In March 2000, Israel and the United States signed an energy co-operation accord that gives Israeli scientists limited access to United States Department of Energy laboratories. The accord will increase co-operation between the two countries in twenty-five ‘civilian’ nuclear and non-nuclear areas, including halting the leakage of WMD technologies and know-how from the countries of the former Soviet Union. The two sides also pledged to co-operate in the detection of underground nuclear tests, which are prohibited under the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.\textsuperscript{32}

\textit{The outer circle}

A discussion on missile proliferation in the Middle East would not be complete without addressing relevant developments in the ‘outer circle’, basically India, Pakistan and Turkey. The multiple nuclear tests of both India and Pakistan in May 1998 coupled with their advanced missile and space
programmes have resounded in the nearby Gulf countries and elsewhere in the Middle East. India had already tested the Agni and Agni-2 ballistic missile systems, with ranges of 1,500 and 2,000km respectively. Pakistan is testing the Ghauri ballistic missile system, with ranges of 1,300–2,000km. The Gulf is a sensitive confrontation area not far from the Indian and Pakistani nuclear and missile threats. A large number of Egyptians, Pakistanis and Indians work in the Gulf States. For strategic and economic reasons, India considers the security of the Gulf important for its national security.

In March 1999, India sent its aircraft carrier INS Viraat to the Gulf for the first time as part of its continuing ‘military diplomacy’ to increase New Delhi’s influence in the region. The Indian Navy held its first naval exercises with Kuwait and Iran and conducted one-day manoeuvres with the navies of Saudi Arabia and Oman as part of its strategic thrust in the area. India also has growing technology transfer cooperation programmes with Israel. Turkey, a NATO member exposed to ballistic missile risks from its Middle Eastern neighbours, is striving to acquire missile defence systems from Israel or the United States.

Conclusions

The Middle East’s experience with ballistic missiles is unique compared to other regions in the world. Missiles in the Middle East are not only acquired for deterrence or as a weapon of last resort, but are actually used in the battlefield. Most of the important wars in the Middle East since 1970 had included missile exchanges with ranges far beyond the front line. Important capitals and large cities in the area, like Baghdad, Riyadh, Tel Aviv, Tehran and Khartoum, remember the fear and uncertainty caused by ballistic missile strikes. The nature of the problem in the Middle East is not limited to confining missile proliferation in its material sense, but to fighting the proliferation of a ‘missile culture’ and the temptation to use such lethal weapons against population centres and the civilian infrastructure.

For historical reasons the Middle East has failed to build security structures or dialogue forums to handle global changes in military technology and its impact on regional security. The absence of rules and constraints has led to further searching for new missile capabilities and basing options to guarantee security. The rapid spread of information, know-how and technology will soon put these weapons in the hands of more countries as well as enhance their lethal capabilities.

The growing proliferation of missiles in the Middle East increases the potential for long-range missile exchange in any future regional war. This has produced a major shift in military thinking and gives threat perceptions generated by missile acquisition new strategic dimensions. The dangers of a miscalculation leading to conflict with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads will increase.

The problem of ballistic missiles and WMD in the Middle East broadly defined should be considered in the two security contexts of South-South and North-South relations. It should be also seen from its future perspective, not only in its present status. Although missiles may not decide a war today, in the future, sophisticated missiles will be far more accurate and could be directed against strategic targets. Less accurate and cheaper types will continue to be used against population centres.

Any potential security regime hoping to address the missile proliferation dilemma must examine the larger framework of eliminating all types of WMD, and freeing the Middle East from their disastrous
consequences. This should cover all types of missile delivery systems, ground- and sea-based. The regime should not limit its obligations to the countries of the Middle East, but should be extended to other external powers sharing in its security responsibilities. Negotiated control or cuts in the numbers of missiles deployed regionally does not seem to be a feasible option in the near future. This is only possible after improving the security environment and establishing a framework for regional conflict resolution. It is important that the countries of the North show a desire to co-operate to stem missile acquisition and technology proliferation. As far as the countries of the region are concerned, confidence-building measures might be devised — at least at the beginning — to include pre-notification of launches, range limitations, capping of stocks and transparency measures.

Notes
5. Blanche and Lennox, op. cit., p. 60.
16. S. Shaban, 2000, An Arabic and Islamic Space Revolution, National Guard Magazine [in Arabic], no. 222, December.
26. The Soviet Navy explored the idea of surface-launched ballistic missiles in the early 1960s with the project ‘Scorpion’, and then returned to the ground silos option. The Scorpion project was cancelled in 1965.
When you go after honey with a balloon, the great thing is not to let the bees know you are coming.
Winnie the Pooh, A.A. Milne

There is a simple reason why UNSCOM was a success. The success was due to the quality of the people and to the political element. So that is how it worked: the combination of high-quality practice methods, high technology, wonderful personnel and science. What in the end created problems was not the professional quality of UNSCOM but problems on the political side. That is the single, dominant and only reason it failed.
Ambassador Rolf Ekeus, Arms Control Today, March 2000

UNSCOM, the United Nations Special Commission set up in 1991 to verify the destruction of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, was never intended to continue for as long as it did. Following the end of the Gulf War, most states and analysts believed — naively perhaps — that following Iraqi declarations and some minor cat and mouse play, the work would be all but over within one to two years. In the end UNSCOM collapsed in 1998 having learned most, but not all, of what there was to know about Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and medium-range missile programmes. Despite gaps in the UNSCOM knowledge, particularly on biological weapons and aspects of the missile programme, much of the information had been pieced together. Although Iraq still maintained the capability to re-establish its WMD development programme, the material and technologies required had been destroyed and were, to a large extent, still being denied by supplier states.

Therefore, in technical terms UNSCOM was successful. However the price paid for that success was high and it was paid by ordinary Iraqi men, women and children. Because Iraq still had not fully complied with Security Council resolution 687 (1991), economic sanctions were still being imposed on Iraq even after UNSCOM collapsed. Since the implementation of the Oil for Food Programme, the blame for starving children and lack of medical supplies ought to have fallen more squarely at the Iraqi Government’s door. Instead, the blame increasingly fell on UNSCOM and those states supporting the sanctions and UNSCOM. It is true to say that few people could have envisaged the sanctions being applied for so long — that was never the intention of the drafters of resolution 687.

The political effect of continuing sanctions was to split the permanent five members of the Security Council. Once split over the most effective way forward and over self-interest (trade),

Dr Patricia Lewis is Director of UNIDIR.
reconciliation proved impossible. The timing of the split more or less coincided with allegations of how UNSCOM was used by the United States to carry out activities not connected with UNSCOM’s mandate — spying for the United States. It was also alleged that UNSCOM’s Chairman was aware of these activities — an allegation that was denied and never verified.

UNSCOM carried out what was to be its last set of inspections in Iraq between 8 and 15 December 1998. There were many impediments to the inspections and UNSCOM inspectors left Iraq on 16 December. That same day, following the report of UNSCOM’s Chairman, Richard Butler, to the Security Council outlining continuing Iraqi non-compliance, the United States and the United Kingdom began bombing Iraq in Operation Desert Fox.

Following Desert Fox, Iraq refused to co-operate at even the most basic level with UNSCOM and no inspections of Iraqi facilities have taken place since the end of 1998. This has left the United Nations with two very real problems: first, how to make sure that Iraq cannot once again develop WMD, and second, how to re-establish the authority of the Security Council over this issue, particularly since its statement in 1992 that proliferation was a threat to international peace and security.

**Amorin Panel and Report**

*If the string breaks, try another piece of string.*

Winnie the Pooh, A.A. Milne

When it became clear that Iraq was no longer going to allow UNSCOM inspections and the erosion of confidence in UNSCOM was not reversed, the United Nations established a panel headed by Ambassador Amorin of Brazil to report on disarmament and current and future ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) issues and also to deal with humanitarian issues, prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property. Experts on this panel formed a wide range of political and technical representation (including UNSCOM and IAEA experts) and they met in February and March 1999.

The Amorin Panel reported on 30 March 1999 to the Security Council. Annex 1 dealt with disarmament and current and future OMV issues. The OMV Panel identified priority issues still to be resolved, such as the missing remnants of fifty conventional warheads for missiles, missing missile propellants, seven indigenously produced missiles and parts of missiles (nozzle assemblies and combustion chambers), the 550 mustard gas shells declared lost, 500 R-400 bombs, information on VX production, its weaponization and chemical weapon production equipment, and major gaps in knowledge and understanding of the whole biological weapons programme.

The Amorin Panel pursued the ‘integrated approach’ and proposed a ‘reinforced OMV system’ (following Security Council resolution 715, October 1991 that first agreed to this approach) to ‘certify that present activities are in accordance with Security Council resolutions’ and ‘also to address unresolved issues’ and, importantly, to re-establish baselines since the inspection hiatus. The Amorin Panel stressed that their report was building on all of the previous relevant Security Council resolutions on Iraq, specifically 687 (April 1991), 707 (August 1991), 715 (October 1991) and 1051 (March 1996). In other words, the Amorin Report was not recommending a supplanting of previous resolutions, but rather a building on those resolution so that they still apply.

Following the Amorin Report, Security Council resolution 1284 was adopted on 17 December 1999 and thus established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC. Of the permanent members of the Security Council, the United Kingdom and the
United States voted in favour of 1284 whereas the Russian Federation, China and France abstained. Despite their abstentions however, all three states have expressed their support for UNMOVIC now that it is established.

Like the Amorin Report, resolution 1284 reaffirms resolutions 687, 699, 707, 1051, 1154 and all other relevant resolutions, and thus established that the United Nations was building on its experience, not reversing its previous policies. In particular, 1284 reaffirms inspectors’ rights to full, unconditional and unrestricted access to sites and facilities in Iraq.

Significantly, Iraq pays for UNMOVIC through oil sales via an escrow account (0.8% of oil revenues). This allows financial control over Iraqi assets for UNMOVIC, and thus gives the United Nations another set of dentures in its dealings with Iraq.

The money from Iraq’s oil sales also enables UNMOVIC to employ all of its staff, inspectors and technical experts on United Nations contracts (one-year or six-month duration). In so doing, 1284 deals with one of the main criticisms of UNSCOM, that staff were paid for by their governments and thus may have felt beholden to their individual governments rather than to the United Nations. This criticism was refuted by many involved in UNSCOM but the worry still persisted. Directly employing UNSCOM staff allows the United Nations to impose its rules on employee loyalty and significantly Article 100 of the United Nations Charter, which instructs staff not to seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority and charges Member States not to seek to influence staff in the discharge of their responsibilities.

There are several significant developments in the thinking on how to conduct the inspections in Iraq. For example, UNMOVIC and the IAEA are tasked with setting up a joint unit on export and import mechanisms in order to better co-ordinate and integrate information. In particular, the lifting of sanctions is not exclusively linked to full compliance with 687. While the lifting of sanctions remains available under full compliance with that resolution (eradication of Iraq’s WMD programme), 1284 opens the possibility of a suspension of sanctions in return for full co-operation with UNMOVIC, including progress on key disarmament issues. If Iraq co-operates in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA for 120 days after UNMOVIC has reported that it is ‘fully operational’ in Iraq, then sanctions could be suspended for a renewable period of 120 days. Resolution 1284 expresses the intention to consider action in accordance with the clause on suspension of sanctions within twelve months of the adoption of the resolution, if the necessary conditions are satisfied. (That twelve-month deadline passed without any co-operation from Iraq.) The suspension of sanctions could thus be continually renewed unless vetoed or unless the Executive Chairman reports to the Security Council that Iraq is no longer co-operating, then after five working days the Security Council would automatically reimpose sanctions (unless the Security Council decides otherwise). In comparison, resolution 687 (para. 22) has provision only to lift sanctions once compliance is demonstrated.

Resolution 1284 requests the United Nations Secretary-General to appoint an Executive Chairman for UNMOVIC and to appoint a College of Commissioners. The appointment of Dr Hans Blix as Executive Chairman has got UNMOVIC off to a good start. Due to his previous role as Director General of the IAEA (held between 1981 and 1997), Dr Blix not only has the required experience in directing an international inspection regime, but he encouraged radical changes to the Agency’s safeguards regime following the discovery of an advanced nuclear weapons programme in Iraq. In steering through the Additional Protocol (INFIRC 540) Dr Blix demonstrated an ability to effect change when many in the IAEA and in key Member States resisted any shift in direction. In addition, Iraq co-operated with the IAEA before and since the Gulf War and thus there is a hope that Iraq will find it hard to demonize the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC in the way it attempted to do with both the UNSCOM chairmen.
Since its establishment UNMOVIC has set up its infrastructure, worked out its basic organization, employed core staff and equipped the offices. Three meetings of the College of Commissioners have been held and training courses have oriented staff to their tasks.

The College of Commissioners meets every three months, following which the Executive Chair reports to the Security Council. The Commissioners are drawn from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, India, Japan, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, Senegal, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

UNMOVIC has set up co-operative management structures so that there are organization-wide discussions, whilst respecting the need for high security on sensitive issues. There is an emphasis on cohesion within the divisions and co-operation between them. The divisions of UNMOVIC are: Administration; Technical and Training; Planning and Operations; Analysis and Assessment; and Information. The OMV centre in Baghdad comes under the Planning and Operations Division and the Information Division contains the UNMOVIC side of the joint export/import unit with the IAEA. A strong emphasis is placed on analysis and assessment across the biological weapons, chemical weapons, missile and (with the IAEA) nuclear fields. Multidisciplinary inspections and their analysis will assist this process of information integration. Monitoring the performance of UNMOVIC is an Activity Evaluation section in the Office of the Executive Chairman.

Hans Blix has reported to the Security Council that UNMOVIC is ‘ready to go’. However, is Iraq ready to let UNMOVIC in?

Possible courses of action in the near future

Iraq is still rejecting inspections. But Hans Blix is reported as being ‘hopeful’ and ‘optimistic’ (Pamela Hess, United Press International, 6 December 2000). Iraq is said to be discussing the meaning and terms of 1284 with United Nations officials and members of the Security Council. In June 2000, the Iraqi Government presented a detailed analysis of res. 1284 at the Organization of the Islamic Conference. There are continuing talks in the United Nations, with a strong push for resolution by March 2001, coinciding with the first anniversary of Hans Blix’s appointment.

There is continuing pressure for the lifting of sanctions particularly from the Russian Federation, France and China. Even Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering said on 29 November 2000 that ‘Time marches on and circumstances require us to adapt’ (Pamela Hess, United Press International, 6 December 2000). There have been a number of commercial flights made into Iraq in defiance of sanctions with little response from the United States or the United Kingdom.

If by March 2001 the impasse is not resolved and UNMOVIC is still barred from carrying out its job in Iraq, what will happen? It seems to be generally felt that the first anniversary of UNMOVIC is ‘crunch time’. While it is true that funding is not an issue — UNMOVIC is not reliant on the generosity and patience of Member States for its financing — morale is. How much longer can UNMOVIC staff go on preparing for something that may never happen? It is true to say that the hiatus, whilst detrimental to the need to discover all that has taken place in Iraq since late 1998, has given UNMOVIC the space and time necessary to set up and train. However, continuing delay with no clear signals of change could lead to a haemorrhaging of people away from UNMOVIC.
It is clear that P5 unity is needed in order to obtain Iraq’s co-operation. Only if all the P5 were seriously putting pressure on Iraq would there be a likelihood of significant shifts in positions. Indeed, the carrot of suspending sanctions ought to be attractive to Iraq.

In order for Iraq to be deemed to be co-operating under 1284, they would need to:

- allow UNMOVIC access for baseline data collection and OMV;
- declare the current and updated status of sites and any changes; and
- respond to the list of unresolved disarmament issues.

Iraq would not have to demonstrate full compliance as before, merely co-operation in all respects (including progress in the resolution of key disarmament issues) and then sanctions could be suspended. Continuing co-operation would mean that sanctions could remain suspended. On the other hand, lack of co-operation could, for example, be defined by no access for inspections and no security for the inspectors.

One of the biggest problems facing UNMOVIC, should Iraq grant access, is that the information gap since 1998 is big and there are large uncertainties as to what might have occurred in that period. The so-called ‘re-baselining’ where inspections are designed to fill in the information gap, is expected to take at least three months — a highly intensive all-out effort that would then allow UNMOVIC to start drawing up a work programme.

Completion of the baseline inspections and the installation of OMV equipment could fulfill the ‘fully operational’ clause, which could then receive the Security Council’s green light for the UNMOVIC work programme. This process would then lead to the 120 day renewable suspension of sanctions — hence the whole process, should Iraq co-operate, need not take very long. Unless Iraq has something to hide (a fear articulated by many analysts) then it would be in their interests and in the interests of all the P5 states to co-operate and quickly get the sanctions regime suspended.

However, even if UNMOVIC manages to restart inspections in Iraq there are real fears that the suspension of sanctions could lead to a new arms build-up in Iraq. And despite UNMOVIC being a new creation, the burden of UNSCOM’s history will mean that the organization’s credibility will constantly be scrutinized.

Confidence in the Security Council’s determination will continue to be questioned. What if, following the suspension of sanctions, UNMOVIC declares that Iraq is again no longer co-operating, will the Security Council act as it states in res. 1284 and wait five days and automatically re-impose sanctions? Will that be politically possible once sanctions have been suspended? Judging by past performance, it seems likely that if sanctions are ever suspended, Iraq will test the resolve of the Security Council by forcing them to go ahead with this process and take the necessary financial steps.

Another point for discussion is how the Security Council might act if evidence came to light that suggested another country was making WMD or components of WMD or missiles for Iraq. Can res. 1284 be applied to other Member States and provide the legal basis for an inspection by UNMOVIC on another state’s territory?
Longer-term lessons

Sometimes the more you think, the more there is no real answer.

Winnie the Pooh, A.A. Milne

Although it is true that the Iraqi regime is primarily responsible for the humanitarian disaster that is now Iraq and the regime leaders may well be called to account in an international court, it is worth repeating that the Security Council never intended for sanctions to be imposed for nearly ten years.

Perhaps the Security Council would not have been so eager to have imposed the types of sanctions agreed in 1991 if the members could have seen what Iraq’s response was to be and for how long this situation would endure.

It has been said that the situation with Iraq is more like a hostage siege than a confrontation and just like in a hostage siege, the police and politicians do all they can to protect the hostages and at the same time to get the terrorists. Perhaps the Security Council could begin to think in this way rather than keep on railing against a regime that is prepared to wait out the hardships caused by sanctions and prepared to sacrifice the hostages.

When it comes to sanctions on authoritarian regimes, ‘those who bear the pain have no power; those who have the power bear no pain’ and so it has often been suggested to consider the use of so-called ‘smart sanctions’ such as targeting the elite of a state by, for example, freezing the foreign assets of regime individuals or prohibiting foreign travel for a named list of individuals and so on. Would they have an effect? In the last ten or so years, the United Nations has imposed twelve sanctions regimes (most not enforced, however). Between 1945 and 1990, the United Nations imposed only two regimes (Rhodesia, 1966 and South Africa, 1977). These last ten years are known at United Nations Headquarters as ‘the sanctions decade’.

As a result of increasing disquiet over the efficacy of sanctions regimes, the Security Council now includes a humanitarian impact assessment in relevant resolutions and has been studying the potential of smart sanctions.

As a result of increasing disquiet over the efficacy of sanctions regimes, the Security Council now includes a humanitarian impact assessment in relevant resolutions and has been studying the potential of smart sanctions. In addition, Canada has launched a campaign in the Security Council to create a permanent monitoring group to track sanctions busters.

Perhaps the ultimate irony that arises from the last decade of experience with Iraq, UNSCOM and now UNMOVIC is that in an attempt to prevent another major humanitarian disaster through Iraqi use of WMD, a different sort of humanitarian disaster was created. The call for disarmament arises out of deep concern for humanity and so perhaps with every new disarmament proposal, undertaking an impact assessment on the humanitarian aspects (along with environmental and security impact assessments) could be one way of obtaining some much needed hindsight in advance.
The development of significant regional security and arms control frameworks in the Middle East is a particularly complex and daunting task. The multipolar nature of this region, with many competing centres of power, and the number of cross-cutting, mutually reinforcing and deeply seated ethno-national and religious conflicts, have plagued the Middle East for decades. Instability was often the general rule, rather than the exception, and violent warfare and terrorism were and remain all too common. In addition to the vast armies and arsenals of weapons, this region is plagued by the presence of huge numbers of landmines and by a flood of small arms that continue to circulate, with tragic consequences that do not halt at international borders. Military spending is also disproportionately high, even among countries that do not face a significant external threat, and major weapons acquisitions divert resources from urgently needed economic development.

At the beginning of the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, the prospects for developing a foundation for regional security, and for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles in the Middle East, appeared to be enhanced. This optimism led to major investments in time and resources designed to promote the development of regional security and arms control frameworks. However, the stagnant political relationships in the region, the difficulties associated with major structural asymmetries, the failure to construct a foundation for co-operation based on confidence-building measures, and the increasing threat posed by WMD in Iraq, as well as other countries in the region, combined to produce meagre results. If this outcome is to change when the next window of opportunity opens, the lessons from the first round must be understood.

The initial basis for optimism

In the wake of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 1991 Gulf War, a high degree of optimism emerged with respect to reducing instability through regional security co-operation. The terms of the ceasefire, as embodied in United Nations Security Council resolution 687, included the verified destruction of Iraqi WMD, related technologies and facilities, delivery systems (ballistic missiles), and the creation of a long-term monitoring system to insure that Iraq stayed ‘WMD- and missile-free’. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) — an extraordinary institution with unprecedented powers to undertake highly intrusive on-site inspections — was created to implement the terms of resolution 687. Although UNSCOM’s work began more slowly than anticipated, and encountered Iraq’s consistent resistance, it seemed that within a few months all of the suspected facilities would be identified, and any remaining weapons would be destroyed.

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Professor Gerald M. Steinberg is the director of the Interdisciplinary Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel. His research focuses on Middle East regional security, arms control and verification issues.
At the same time, the convening of the Madrid Middle East peace conference (itself a consequence of the conditions that developed after the Gulf War) and the creation of the multilateral working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) seemed to mark a major step forward. For the first time, many of the key states in the region, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states from North Africa to the Persian Gulf, agreed to meet and discuss regional security and arms control issues and possible measures. This forum provided the basis for developing and implementing the type of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) that are always necessary for the transformation of conflictual zero-sum relationships into co-operative positive sum frameworks.¹

Furthermore, in contrast to the global arms limitation regimes, which address each type of weapon and technology independently (nuclear, chemical, biological and missiles) and generally do not incorporate conventional military forces, the ACRS process seemed to provide an integrated framework in which the interrelationships between the various threats and military capabilities could be considered. Even in the case of Egypt and Israel, which signed a peace treaty in 1979, the extent of CSBMs has been very limited, while the need for such measures is increasingly acute. The ACRS structure provided the basis for such CSBMs as the ground floor of a wider regional security and conflict transformation process. On this basis, a number of other states, led primarily by the United States, participated as facilitators, shepherds and hosts for various inter-sessional activities.

In Israel, the new environment and the accompanying activity led to fundamental changes in policy and also in the decision-making process with respect to security and arms control. Prior to 1991, the Israeli defence and security establishment kept away from global arms control initiatives and regimes, viewing them as unreliable and contrary to vital Israeli national interests. In this context, Israel kept a low profile in the discussions of the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, and did not participate in the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, including the negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). From Jerusalem, many international institutions were viewed as politically biased and not always reliable. (For example, in the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, Israel was, and still is, excluded from participation in the regional groupings, the Board of Governors and other institutions.) These assessments were reflected in the low priority and minimal resources assigned to arms control issues in the Foreign and Defense Ministries.

In conjunction with the global recognition of the need to strengthen verification procedures and systems following the discovery of Iraq’s violations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the beginning of the ACRS meetings, Israeli regional security and arms control went through a fundamental review. At the highest levels, the government began to consider and debate different approaches to these issues. Officials continued to believe that effective arms control in the Middle East required regional frameworks, with mutual verification among all the parties. At the same time, they began to consider the benefits of participation in some global regimes.

The policy was presented in January 1993, when Foreign Minister Shimon Peres signed the CWC, and presented a broad Israeli programme for advancing arms control in the region.² In the Foreign Ministry, the arms control office was expanded and given a high profile in decision-making. A similar position was created in the Ministry of Defense. Israeli representatives began to attend the Conference on Disarmament as observers (and in 1996 as full members), and played a central role in the negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, which Israel signed in 1996. The Israeli government became an adherent to the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, participates in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, ratified the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and halted the export of anti-personnel mines.³ This activity reflected the view that regional security mechanisms would become increasingly important for Israel, allowing for the gradual replacement of exclusive reliance on unilateral security measures.
What went wrong?

Events proved this optimism to be premature and, at the end of the 1990s, the potential for regional agreements and limitations in the Middle East seemed very small, at least in the immediate future. A combination of factors explain this disappointing outcome, including: 1) the failure to create the political and security environment that would allow for the development of co-operative security; 2) asymmetry and the limits of universality; 3) the absence of confidence-building measures; 4) the inconsistent implementation of the terms and undertakings with respect to disarming Iraq; and 5) the continued flow of WMD and missile technology in the region, thereby heightening threat perceptions. Each one of these deficiencies, in itself, was very costly to the process, and the combination proved fatal to this round of the regional security development efforts.

The need for a conducive political and security environment

While the 1990s began with a number of developments that pointed to the reshaping of the political environment in the Middle East, this optimism gradually dissipated. At the beginning of this process, Egypt was the only Arab state that had concluded a peace treaty with Israel. Many other states to varying degrees still supported violence, in the form of terrorism, against Israel and continued the policy, established in 1948, that rejected Israeli legitimacy. In contrast to the darkest days of the Cold War, in which the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged ambassadors and their leaders communicated directly, these conditions were and continue to be the exception, rather than the rule, in the Middle East. In some capitals, denunciations of ‘the Zionist entity’ and support for the most violent acts of terrorism are repeated officially on a daily basis.

Despite the initial hopes, including the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (the ‘Oslo Agreement’), efforts to negotiate a ‘permanent status agreement’ floundered. Syrian-Israeli negotiations did not produce tangible and lasting results, and the conflict in various venues, including Lebanon, continues. The only enduring breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict zone after 1993 was achieved in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994.

As the fortunes of the various negotiating tracks rose and fell, these changes had a direct impact on the efforts to develop regional security systems and promote arms control in the Middle East. The limited progress in the ACRS process was frozen in 1994–1995, and has not yet been revived. This lengthy pause was directly related to overarching political conditions and the fragile state of the Middle East negotiation process and Israeli-Egyptian relations. In turn, as ACRS and the multilateral workshops lost momentum, and differences sharpened regarding the Egyptian government’s insistence on focusing narrowly on the nuclear issue — these differences magnified the difficulties encountered in the bilateral tracks of the Middle East peace efforts.

Asymmetry and the limits of universality

In any region, efforts to develop a co-operative security framework must confront and overcome basic structural asymmetries in geography, demography, resources and political systems. Such
asymmetries played a major role in the shaping of the regional security system in Europe, including the conventional force reduction agreements.

In the Middle East, and particularly with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict zone, asymmetries in each of these dimensions are of major importance. In terms of both geography and demography, Israel is a very small state, with no strategic depth in which to absorb a first strike, whether based on conventional forces or using missiles and WMD. The ‘rough neighbourhood’ of the Middle East and the extreme violence and warfare compound the impact of these asymmetries.

Under these conditions of acute asymmetry, universal implementation of arms limitation agreements is very difficult to achieve. From the Israeli perspective, these factors, multiplied by the existential threats from various states in the region, have created an environment that is not comparable to that of Europe, North or South America, and other parts of the world.

Before the principles and norms that were developed in other contexts can be applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict zone, it is necessary to establish the fundamental conditions of mutual acceptance, diplomatic recognition, and an end to threats to national survival. Once such conditions are established, Israeli leaders have indicated that they will be prepared to enter into a regional zone free of WMD. Until that stage is reached, the asymmetries will require Israel to maintain a policy based on deterrence in response to existential threats.7

THE FAILURE TO CONSTRUCT A FOUNDATION BASED ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

In high-conflict environments, it is necessary to lay the foundation for regional security and the gradual transition from ‘zero-sum’ (in which one state’s limitations are seen as another’s opportunity to gain advantage) to co-operative non-zero-sum conceptions (in which co-operation and mutual self-restraint are understood to serve shared interests in stability and survival). In this process, the development and implementation of a wide range of confidence-building measures play important roles. Although the circumstances were very different, this broad pattern was followed in Europe during the transition at the end of the Cold War, and in American-Soviet relations prior to the negotiation of the first and relatively narrow arms limitation agreements. In the American-Soviet case, a series of CSBMs, including the installation of a direct communications system (the ‘hot line’) and agreements to prevent incidents at sea helped to pave the way for more ambitious agreements.

In the case of the Arab-Israeli regional security framework, the absence of significant CSBMs turned out to be a major flaw and cause of failure. The impressive list of CSBMs that were discussed and developed in the beginning of this process was gradually eroded. Egyptian officials viewed CSBMs involving Israel as rewards for ‘good behaviour’ rather than an essential element in the transformation from conflict to co-operation. The opposition to CSBM activities and functional co-operation reinforced the political barriers to peace-building, and suggested to Israelis that even with formal peace treaties, the transition to co-operative relations and mutual acceptance would occur very slowly, if at all.8

While the formal activities, including a number of small-scale CSBMs, were abandoned, an impressive number of informal ‘Track Two’ meetings continued.9 Some of these discussions provided important insights, particularly when a comparative perspective was presented, based on the regional security experiences in other conflict-intensive regions. However, in many other cases, the participants often seemed to go over the same ground, without measurable progress or the ability to translate some substantive discussions into the decision-making realm.
The ACRS efforts were also hampered by the absence of key actors. Syria, Lebanon and Iran boycotted the multilateral workshop meetings and activities for political and ideological reasons, and Iraq and Libya were not invited. Without these states, consideration of regional measures to restrict WMD and long-range ballistic missiles remained inherently limited. A number of CSBMs and regional security measures could have been implemented without the full participation of all states, particularly in areas such as co-operative search and rescue exercises, measures to prevent mutual fear of surprise attack, crisis prevention and communication centres, and landmine clearance. However, in most cases, the political factors cited above blocked these efforts.

Instead of contributing to the development of the foundation for regional security through support for CSBMs, a number of states, led by Egypt, sought to focus all the attention on Israel’s nuclear deterrence policy. The pattern that characterized the regional interaction was repeated with regularity in various other arms control frameworks, both formal and informal. This confrontation takes place in the annual United Nations General Assembly debates, the discussions and resolutions of the First Committee, PrepComs and review conferences for the NPT, meetings of the IAEA, activities and discussions related to the CWC, etc. From the Israeli perspective, the Egyptian government’s statements and resolutions are one-sided, distort the proliferation threat in the Middle East, and are counterproductive.

The slow realization that Iraq had violated the provisions of the NPT, and had eluded IAEA safeguards for a number of years, was a major blow to the integrity and viability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The creation of UNSCOM provided an opportunity to repair some of this damage, and restore credibility to the regime, while at the same time destroying Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons capabilities and related facilities, as well as ballistic missiles and launchers.

However, the UNSCOM experience demonstrated that even with the most intrusive inspection and verification systems in the history of arms control, closed states and totalitarian regimes are capable of concealing weapons and facilities for many years. In Iraq, UNSCOM’s inspections reached a dead end in 1998, and the sanctions regime has eroded, allowing Iraq to resume WMD development and deployment. Repeated reports to the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council from UNSCOM and the IAEA document both Iraqi non-compliance and the extensive deception mechanism. The creation of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) under Security Council resolution 1284 (December 1999) has not altered this situation. As noted in the final statement of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, and in many other sources, Iraq remains ‘non-compliant’ with respect to the terms of resolution 687.

These developments contributed to the erosion of the foundation for Middle Eastern arms control, and served to underline the concerns of Israel and other states regarding the implementation of global arms limitation treaties, regimes and technology export control policies in the region.

Accelerated proliferation of WMD and missile technology

In the past decade, a number of factors have combined to accelerate the rate of proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles in many countries in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. In addition to the threat perceptions, military/political objectives, and other factors that drive different states to
seek these types of capabilities, the failure to end the Iraq threat contributed to efforts to acquire comparable systems. The nuclear weapons tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998, and their de facto status as nuclear powers, also highlighted the perceived importance of this status for many states in the Persian Gulf and Middle East.

At the same time, there is growing evidence that participation in the network of global arms limitations regimes is not a sufficiently strong barrier against proliferation, as was demonstrated in the case of Iraq and the NPT. In some cases, there is a concern that states that are active members of such limitation regimes can use their access to information in order to promote their proliferation objectives, particularly when verification mechanisms and responses to violations are insufficient.

Similarly, despite their considerable accomplishments, the various supplier control regimes designed to control the export of WMD and missile technologies (including dual-use systems, in which technologies with civil and commercial applications can be used to develop and produce weapons) have not succeeded in halting proliferation in the Middle East.14

As a result of all of these factors, both structural and substantive, efforts to adopt the processes used to develop regional security frameworks and mechanisms in Europe at the end of the Cold War era have not produced results in the Middle East. Similarly, it is clear that the global ('universal') models and principles often require significant modification in order to fit the complex security environment of this region.

Breaking the impasse

When the political and military conditions in the region change enough to allow for the resumption of the diplomatic process, regional and co-operative security frameworks will again be on the agenda. In order to make progress, it will be necessary to avoid repeating the mistakes of the previous round.

Based on the experience and lessons of the 1990s, this will require:

- A major investment of political resources towards the transformation of political and cultural perceptions, and the development of relations based on mutual recognition and acceptance;
- Acknowledgement of fundamental asymmetries, their consequences in terms of national security requirements, and the role of mutual verification mechanisms;
- Step-by-step development beginning with CSBMs, and including co-operation on issues such as small arms, landmines and conventional weapons;
- Consistent, responsible and effective action by the international community to insure that signatories honour their commitments with respect to treaties such as the NPT, CWC and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; and
- Effective control over the export of technologies and expertise used in the proliferation of WMD and missile capabilities in the region.

As noted above, the informal ‘Track Two’ meetings continue to play an important role, but their scope needs to be expanded. Discussions on means to increase co-operation in the area of landmine
education, removal and victim rehabilitation would have an immediate and important impact on human security in the region, and would help to create the foundation for further development of a broad-based regional security structure. With increasing international focus on the human costs of illicit traffic in small arms, and the particular importance of co-operation to prevent the flow of small arms in the Middle East, this is another area that should receive attention in the context of regional discussions at different levels.

In a broader sense, any effective regional security and arms control framework must be based on a transition from a zero-sum perception to a positive sum approach. This transformation requires an understanding of the interdependent nature of security, and the process by which decisions by states to acquire new weapons or change deployments trigger responses that increase instability and harm the interests of the initiator of this process. For example, new missiles in one state are often matched by similar acquisitions by others, and/or deployment of missile defence systems. In this case, the overall impact of the ‘security dilemma’ is to increase crisis instability and mutual fears of a first strike.\textsuperscript{15}

During the Cold War, ‘worst case’ analyses and an overarching security dilemma contributed to the instability demonstrated during the Cuban missile crisis and on other occasions. A series of strategic discussions focusing on the dangerous instabilities of ballistic missile defences and growing arsenals of highly accurate ballistic missiles (useful for first strike scenarios) paved the way for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. While these treaties, and a number of CSBMs, did not end the Cold War or change the political relationships, they were successful in increasing stability and serving the vital security interests of both superpowers.

In regional deterrence situations, whether in South Asia or the Middle East, the analytic framework presented by the security dilemma model is also useful. By examining the opposing positions through this framework, and addressing each country’s major threat perceptions explicitly, it may be possible to discuss the conflicting views in depth, and to define arms limitation policies that minimize the common risks of accidental war, and maximize mutual interests. Indeed, this was the initial concept behind the ACRS framework, but was not maintained in later stages.

Substantively for this process to succeed, the key regional states — Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria — must be actively involved and must view mutual limitations as realistic means for enhancing national security and regional stability. Progress will depend on whether the political and military leaders in these countries perceive unilateral policies, including restrained acquisitions and deployments of advanced weapons, as ultimately dangerous to national security interests, and even, in some cases, regime survival. Fundamental changes in the perceptions of these leaders will be required before substantive agreements on regional security are likely.

Although general discussions have been conducted, the parameters are still being debated, and security negotiations in the Middle East have not really begun yet. To move to the next stage, including regional arms control measures, significant improvement in the political and security climate are necessary, involving Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. Continued terrorism and warfare are not conducive to confidence-building or security co-operation. In addition, to go beyond CSBMs and agreed limitations encompassing short-range conventional weapons, Iran, Iraq and Libya must also decide to join and contribute to this process, for the same reasons. This will take a long time and require fundamental political changes that are not even on the horizon.

Until these conditions develop, efforts to force the pace and skip stages are likely to be counterproductive. Without first building the infrastructure to support a credible regional security framework, and creating a foundation of stability and security, states facing major threats, including Israel, will not be willing to dismantle their basic defence and deterrence structures. Pressures to force premature disarmament, in the absence of reliable alternative security structures, will be seen
as efforts to gain unilateral advantage in a zero-sum context, rather than part of a broader approach towards co-operative security and stability. The road to regional security must be travelled one careful step at a time.

Notes


2 Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres, at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993, Jerusalem, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.


4 Many radical Arab and Islamic groups still call for the destruction of the Jewish state, and even ‘moderates’ portray acceptance of Israel as a temporary and reluctant recognition of strategic reality, while rejecting the legitimacy of the Jewish state. They continue to refer to Israel as an ‘infringement of Arab territory and rights’, thus suggesting that in the absence of Israeli military capabilities, these ‘rights’ could be reclaimed. Abdulhay Sayed, ‘The Future of the Israeli Nuclear Force and the Middle East Peace Process’, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 28 (March 1997), pp. 31–48.

5 Extensive official Israeli and Palestinian perspectives on the origins of this violence can be found in the presentations to the Fact-Finding Committee established at the Sharm-El Sheik Summit (the Mitchell Committee) at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFH0jcb0> and <http://www.pna.net/peace/preliminary_submission.htm>.


9 Michael D. Yaffe, ‘Promoting Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East’, in this volume of *Disarmament Forum*.

10 A number of cooperative search and rescue exercises in the Mediterranean have been held, with participation based on ‘a coalition of the willing’.

11 See the contribution (‘Special Comment’) by Ambassador Nabil Fahmy in this volume of *Disarmament Forum*.


13 Mohamed Kadry Said, ‘Missile Proliferation in the Middle East: a Regional Perspective’ in this volume of *Disarmament Forum*.


Micro-disarmament and peace-building: 
The European Union’s ASAC programme in Cambodia

After thirty years of civil war and fifty years of war along the Viet Nam–Cambodia frontier provoked by external forces, Cambodia finds itself in a state of precarious peace. The countryside is flooded with weapons of every description. The last serious fighting was stilled only in 1998, when the royalist Funcipec party (led by Prince Norodom Ranaridh, a son of King Norodom Sihanouk) was defeated by troops supporting the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) of Prime Minister Hun Sen. There is still power-sharing in the government. Each ministry is run by two co-ministers, but the influential ministers are mainly the CPP members. Meanwhile the Khmer Rouge — the party of the late Pol Pot, who ran the country from 1975–79 and who organized the Killing Fields — is quiet, save in a gambling-rich enclave on the Thai frontier.

Cambodia’s political structure remains fragile, under a monarch who is now elderly and in poor health. The uniformed forces are dominant factors in society, both politically and economically, and the elite appears able to carry firearms and to misbehave with impunity. For the wider Asian region, Cambodia is a worrying hub for racketeering, including the smuggling of arms, drugs, women and children, as well as sexual tourism. Although the government is trying to reinforce discipline and good governance, Cambodia is seen as a potential source of political instability. The EU micro-disarmament project, ‘Assistance for Curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons in Cambodia’ or ASAC, is a response to these perceptions.

Although it is premature to evaluate the project, which only started work in March 2000, the design of the project, and its early impact within Cambodia’s political, military and diplomatic communities, merit a description of its first year of operation. The project’s results will be reported in a future Disarmament Forum article. Meanwhile disarmament specialists will appreciate the concepts underlying the peace-building strategy described below.¹

The project gets off the ground

The ASAC project was created by an EU Council Decision² on 15 November 1999. The Project Manager, Brigadier General (ret.) Henny van der Graaf of the Royal Dutch Army, arrived in Cambodia at the end of March 2000. General van der Graaf has enormous disarmament field
ASAC has found it helpful — on occasion — to adopt a direct military approach to problem-solving. General van der Graaf has been adept at cutting through the ambiguities of diplomatic negotiation to push the project forward. He has also shown skill in securing support from donor agencies and EU Member States. It turns out to have been very helpful to have a general at the head of a disarmament programme in Cambodia — a country where the military is a key factor, where ministers are sometimes accorded the rank of army general even if they have a civilian administrative background. The EU badge also has been an advantage, with its diplomatic and financial weight.

The general had a limited budget of 500,000 Euros (and with that currency’s slide on the foreign exchange, it rapidly lost 10% of its value). But with these resources, General van der Graaf was able to mobilize the momentum of the EU for ASAC objectives. In November 2000, a further 1.3 million Euros were allocated by the EU Council of Ministers to the ASAC project as a twelve-month extension.

The political dimension

The project’s mandate comes from the EU Council of Ministers, as disarmament is a political affair. Accordingly, from the start the Project Manager worked closely with the EU political leadership. Regular meetings have been held with the ambassadors of EU countries in Phnom Penh and Bangkok. The French government, representing the Presidency of the EU, appeared to regard ASAC as a significant source of innovation for peace-building and disarmament in post-conflict Cambodia. In the Communiqué following the EU-Japan summit meetings of July 2000, collaboration on disarmament in Cambodia was specifically mentioned as an area of EU-Japanese collaboration. A substantial sum has been allocated by the Japanese government for a security sector project in Cambodia, which will work in collaboration with ASAC starting in 2001.3

While most staff of the EU delegations to Cambodia and Thailand have been very helpful, a few hurdles appeared which conform to the Commission’s unfortunate reputation for slowness in delivering EU overseas assistance. On the other hand, his mandate from the Council of Ministers gave General van der Graaf the latitude to take his own initiatives, and this allowed ASAC to move much faster than is the case with most bilateral projects.

Components of the ASAC project

Dr Owen Greene of Bradford University was asked by the EU to visit Cambodia in the summer of 1999 to design the project. His report and proposal posited a set of neatly interlocking components, including a new arms law, weapon collection and destruction, addressing storage of stocks and ammunition, and an awareness programme. The key to micro-disarmament will probably prove to be the collection and destruction of weapons.

The draft of an arms law was prepared during June-August 2000 by Irish lawyer Dennis Brennan, working in partnership with Ms. Kim Sathavy. Ms. Sathavy is the Legal Advisor to Sar Kheng, who serves as the Interior Minister and the Second Deputy Prime Minister. The partnership was not only helpful in terms of the cross-fertilization of ideas and skills — it also produced the draft law in three languages (Khmer, English and French).
The new text brings together into a single coherent law a number of existing statutes including the UNTAC\(^4\) 1993 anti-gun laws and the Prime Minister’s Sub-Decree 38 promulgated in 1998.\(^5\) The draft text of the law was discussed as it evolved, with representatives of the relevant ministries (Interior, Defence, Justice) often meeting in informal working sessions chaired by police Brigadier General Uu Kim Lek of the Ministry of Interior. The draft was then presented for comment to specialized civil society organizations (CSOs). ASAC staff participated in seminars with these various groups.

Arguably the most important aspect of the law — as compared to existing statutes — is its definition of comparative responsibility and appropriate sanctions: thus members of the armed forces and the legally armed staff of registered security companies will be expected to see their right to carry arms as a privilege, and to exercise especial care. Punishment for misuse of firearms will be proportionally more severe for those who abuse the privilege. There are far fewer guns on the streets of Phnom Penh in the past few years, thanks to a strict application (including house-to-house searches for small arms) of the Prime Minister’s Sub-Decree 38 from 1998 by the governor of the city. But Cambodia still has a gun culture. Wealthy industrialists still travel with openly armed bodyguards. There are frequent reports of soldiers carrying their official weapons when off duty for illegal hunting or to threaten rivals in karaoke bars. If Cambodia is to obtain long-term peace and prosperity, the rule of law must replace the rule of the gun.

The draft law is currently undergoing broad review by government and by civil society; it is expected to progress through parliament during 2001. This is an important part of the edifice of peace-building: to ensure that guns are removed from the streets, and that similar rules apply to all citizens of a peaceful, weapon-free Cambodia.

Official stocks of weapons and ammunition become a source of concern when they are not well protected, and when record keeping does not allow for checks to ensure that arms and ammunition are not disappearing. Lt Colonel Alain Perigaud, a retired French officer with previous service in Cambodia, spent two months (August-September 2000) working with the Cambodian army to design a pilot project for better storage and record keeping.

It has been instructive and disturbing to observe the minimal security which exists around some of the weapons stores in Cambodia. In the better cases, rows of oiled Kalashnikovs rifles lean against the wall of a cement block building, with only the padlocked outer door to keep them safe. There are no numbered rows, no individual slots for each weapon, no padlocked chain to keep the rifles in their place in provincial armouries. It is difficult to know how many weapons there are in any armoury. Cambodia appears to have no central records, which means that each local police, gendarmerie and army garrison may possess an unknown and unverified quantity of arms and ammunition. It would seem that the armed forces of Cambodia have ample supplies of small arms and ammunition, and that no further purchases are needed. Claims that ammunition supplies are scarce and tightly controlled are not borne out by stories and field surveys in several provinces, where soldiers are often reported to lend government rifles for hunting and to provide free ammunition in exchange for a share of the kill.

Far worse are the conditions of storage for collected civilian weapons. Around 100,000 rifles have been collected by the Royal Cambodian Government. They are stored all over Cambodia, in police stations and army barracks, often with poor or scant security. We have found, for example: rifles stacked in unguarded wooden sheds behind the army barracks; rifles, ammunition, grenades and landmines piled together with boots and other stores; unexploded ordnance (such as grenades and mines) stacked around and under desks in police stations in the middle of provincial towns, where the risk of accidental explosion appears as great as the risk of theft. In no case did we find rifles immobilized by the removal of their moving parts. Often rifles and ammunition were stored together. None of these old firearms is useful for the armed forces, yet each is capable of killing or maiming.
Such stocks are a reservoir of potential violence. All of these old weapons and explosives should be destroyed. Discussions are in hand to encourage provincial governors to order the destruction of elderly firearms and unstable explosives. The ASAC initiative with the Cambodian military reinforces this—a pilot project incorporating guidelines for official weapons security and record-keeping should get underway in early 2001.

Meanwhile there remain hundreds of thousands of weapons to be collected from civilians. How is it possible to collect them, and why would people agree to give up their weapons in a climate of insecurity? Alongside the new law and the improved management of official weapons stores, an ASAC initiative has been launched to exchange illegal civilian weapons for community development projects. This innovative idea appears preferable to the concept of creating a gun market by trying to 'buy back' weapons with cash or individual incentives, and it has been tried on a small scale with some success in Albania, Mali and other countries.

The author joined the ASAC team as a Weapons for Development Advisor, and set off around villages in three selected provinces to persuade villagers to consider a swap: if they bring in their weapons for immediate destruction (which is important to build local confidence), ASAC will mobilize funds for development projects. This naturally raises important questions, such as how many weapons justify a road or a well? Here, the feasible and practical answer is: 'Enough to evidence the bona fides of the community and to reduce the risk of violence'.

It must be admitted that verification of hidden weapons is impossible. Only the community can know whether all firearms and explosives have been destroyed. As the weapons for development (WfD) process creates a climate of greater confidence and security, remaining weapons should be handed in for destruction as they lose their relevance. If all weapons are removed from circulation, the community will benefit twice over: individually from peace when there are no more illegal weapons to create violence, and no more hidden explosives to injure innocent children; collectively from the development project offered to the group in exchange for weapons surrendered and destroyed.

Other key questions include: 'What will happen to the weapons we hand in?', 'If we surrender illegal weapons, will we be punished?' and 'Who will provide security if we hand in our weapons?' Swift local weapon destruction emerges as an essential requirement for building confidence in peace and order. A commitment by the provincial authorities to an arms amnesty is the first condition for obtaining the voluntary surrender of arms. Meanwhile ASAC is studying ways to strengthen the capacity of the police to deliver security: better training and motivation; better deployment of resources; provision of motor bikes for quick response, and radio communications to ensure contact between outlying stations and the centre; improved dialogue and co-operation between the military and the police. The police must show the people that they are on the side of peace and order, and that they have the backing of the political authorities who will impose discipline and sanctions on members and ex-members of the uniformed armed forces who seem to be blamed for much of the crime in rural Cambodia.

A national awareness programme is essential to underpin each of these initiatives. A national workshop took place on 14 and 15 June 2000, which laid the basis for an expanding public information programme. In co-operation with the Working Group for Weapons Reduction (WGWR) and three other national CSOs, this is targeting both popular understanding of the new arms law and voluntary surrender of arms. WGWR had previously published the results of a detailed 1998 survey of Cambodian attitudes to arms control and peace-building, which was instrumental in the EU adopting the ASAC project concept. The importance of involving CSOs in the conception and execution of civilian arms control measures has been amply demonstrated during the ASAC experience throughout 2000. It is intended that the ASAC-sponsored public awareness programme should also improve civil-
military-police relations through work on joint codes of conduct, which will improve the behaviour of the security forces and their perception by the general public. Relations have sometimes been strained between the police and the army. Their common code of conduct was the focus of an important roundtable in November 2000 at which Second Deputy Prime Minister Sar Kheng gave his blessing to a code, which will be carried in the pocket of every Cambodian in uniform.

**Conclusion**

It is too early to judge whether the provincial political authorities will be able to deliver the conditions of security that will encourage the villagers to bring in their weapons. We found a positive sign in gestures of goodwill made by some community leaders, who delivered weapons and explosives caches during the ASAC sensitization tour in July and August 2000.

If we admit that we cannot easily count hidden weapons, we must nevertheless seek ways to measure the impact of a WfD initiative. This may be done through counting the numbers of weapons and unexploded ordnance that are destroyed thanks to the WfD programme; by evaluating the actual measurable decrease in accidents or acts of violence involving small arms; and by taking further opinion surveys to assess the degree to which local people have more or less confidence in lasting peace.

EU donor responses have been positive to the idea of funding a WfD pilot programme in Kracheh and Pursat provinces. ASAC has also been offered helpful support by the World Food Programme, by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP Seila project), and positive partnership noises have been heard from the Japanese government, as well as numerous CSOs and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs). From the first, the ASAC strategy was to prepare the WfD pilot projects in partnership with existing field development organizations. Indeed, one criterion for 'feasibility' is the availability of competent and willing partners who could carry out the 'development' component. Competent development organizations have been identified in both Kracheh Province and Pursat Province, where the pilot projects are expected to run during the 2001 dry season.

We do not wish to leave the impression that the small EU micro-disarmament project is the principal player in Cambodian peace-building. There are many actors in the field, among which we have highlighted EU-Japan collaboration. A significant quantity of landmines (150,000) and unexploded ordnance (650,000) have been destroyed since the end of the war. Around 10,000 soldiers were demobilized during 2000 as a part of the restructuring of the Cambodian armed forces. Other donors (notably United Nations agencies, the German Agency for Technical Co-operation, and a host of NGOs) are active in related areas such as de-mining, rehabilitation of victims, training and sensitization of official bodies, surveillance of and support for human rights and good governance, etc.

ASAC has been working in Cambodia for less than one year. The project’s design is exciting and the initial impact has been substantial. But this discussion of the project’s activities is not intended to suggest that ASAC has been in any way ‘successful’ in achieving its disarmament and peace-building objectives. The law has not yet been passed. So far no weapons have been placed in better storage, nor apparently has any weapons destruction taken place since Prime Minister Hun Sen launched his weapons destruction campaign at a ceremony in the national stadium in Phnom Penh in 1998.

The ASAC disarmament initiative has been extended for a second year. By the end of 2001 the new law should have been passed and signed; there will be new models in place for official weapons
storage and recording; old weapons will have been destroyed publicly in several provinces, and ageing explosives and ammunition will have been destroyed safely; a WfD dynamic will exist and reinforce peace in at least two provinces; security (and the security forces) will have improved in these provinces; the code of conduct for civil-military-police relations will be in the pocket of every Cambodian in uniform; a large-scale public awareness programme will be underway concerning the new law and in support of a weapon-free Cambodia; local CSOs will have been strengthened by their partnership with ASAC; and all of these measures will have improved the prospects for long-term peace and good governance in Cambodia.

Robin Edward Poulton
UNIDIR Senior Research Fellow and Weapons for Development Advisor in Cambodia

Notes
1. The author would like to thank Dennis Brennan for his devastating critiques which have greatly improved this article, and is grateful to Eric Berman and Henny van der Graaf for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2. See the Official Journal of the European Communities, L 294/5, 16.11.1999.
3. ‘Recognizing that an excessive and destabilizing accumulation of small arms and light weapons had been hampering social and economic development in Cambodia, the former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi informed Prime Minister Hun Sen last January that Japan would send a fact-finding mission on the issue. Japan had already agreed with the EU that both would consider possible concrete cooperation between them in addressing the issue in Cambodia. Based on the outcome of the survey by the mission, the Government of Japan will examine how it will contribute to solving the problems in Cambodia.’ Extract from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release announcing the July 2000 mission, led by Mr. Toshio Sano, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. The United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) ran the country from 1992 until 1993, when elections were organized and the administration of Cambodia was handed over to the newly elected government.
5. Sub-decree 38, signed by Prime Minister Hun Sen, aims to create a weapon-free Cambodia.
6. The Working Group on Weapons Reduction is a consortium of CSOs that achieved a certain reputation through their 1998 survey of weapons in ten provinces of Cambodia. The other CSOs with which ASAC is working to achieve greater national awareness of the weapons issue and the new law are: Cambodian Institute for Human Rights, Cambodian Institute for Democracy and Human Rights, and Adhoc—The Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association.
7. All credit to NGOs working in de-mining and to the Cambodian Mine Action Group (CMAG), which has had support from numerous bilateral donors. There has been a withdrawal of donor support from CMAG during 1999–2000, following allegations of serious financial corruption. Such unhappy cases of high-level mismanagement do much to undermine international confidence in other government agencies and NGOs working for peace, security and better governance in Cambodia.
MIDDLE EAST RESOURCE LIST

The Center for Nonproliferation Studies http://cns.miis.edu/research/mideast.htm
The CNS of the Monterey Institute of International Studies has wide range of resources on the Middle East, organized by category (general, CBW, missiles and nuclear).

CSIS is a public policy research institution dedicated to impact on global policy issues. Their Middle East Studies Program offers in-depth regional assessments as well as data on military balance.

Conventional Arms Transfer Project http://www.clw.org/cat/
The Conventional Arms Transfer Project at the Council for a Livable World provides concise information on the issue of weapon sales. Search the site for ‘Middle East’ to find topics such as ‘Human Rights and Weapons: Records of Selected U.S. Arms Clients’.

Search for Common Ground http://www.sfcg.org/locations.cfm?locus=SCGME&locid=6
Search for Common Ground works to foster non-violent, co-operative solutions to longstanding conflicts in the Middle East. Information on current programmes, conflict resolution activities, working groups, and an archive of Bulletin of Regional Cooperation in the Middle East.

Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/
The Jaffee Center conducts research on Israeli national security as well as Middle East regional and international affairs.

Institute for Palestine Studies http://www.ipsjps.org
Independent, non-profit research institute. The Journal of Palestine Studies on-line.

The Center for Middle Eastern Studies http://menic.utexas.edu/menic.html
The Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas at Austin has extensive links by subject and country, including art, history, economics, politics, maps, etc. Can search by subject or country.
The Middle East Policy Council

The Middle East Policy Council encourages public discussion and understanding of issues affecting American policy in the Middle East. Read Journal of Middle East Policy as well as tap into their directory of specialists.

Middle East Journals and Newspapers

Links to major Middle East and North African publications.
Strengthening the role of regional organizations in treaty implementation

UNIDIR, in collaboration with the Monterey Institute for International Studies (MIIS), has undertaken a project that focuses on strengthening the role of regional organizations in non-proliferation and arms control treaty implementation. Regional organizations could play a significant role in addressing questions of compliance related to WMD agreements.

The project will be launched with a small workshop in Geneva to discuss the existing verification system for WMD treaties and the gaps that regional organizations could potentially fill. Based on the findings from the workshop, authors will be selected and a series of consultations will take place with diplomats (in Geneva, Vienna and the Hague), academics, officials from multilateral treaty-implementing organizations (such as IAEA, CTBTO, OPCW), and experts in the field of verification. Interviews with key experts on the operational capabilities and roles of their regional organization will assist to round out the research.

The preliminary findings will be presented at an international meeting where academics, multilateral arms control and disarmament experts, non-governmental organizations, diplomats, and representatives from regional organizations and treaty-implementing organizations will be invited to discuss the papers. The Ploughshares Fund has generously contributed to the establishment of this project.

For more information, please contact:

Jackie Seck
Research Programme Manager
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 11 49
E-mail: jseck@unog.ch

Visiting Fellowship Programme

To better address issues of regional security and to help promote regional co-operation and development of indigenous research capacity, UNIDIR’s Visiting Fellowship Programme hosts four
researchers from a single region to work together at UNIDIR for four to six months per year. Researchers are chosen from different countries that form the region of study. The focus of their research is a particularly difficult aspect of regional security and it is hoped that the resulting research paper will feed into policy debates on the security of their region.

In November, UNIDIR welcomed the current Visiting Fellows from South Asia. They are Shiva Hari Dahal (Nepal, specialist in human rights), Haris Gazdar (Pakistan, political economy), Soosaipillai Keethaponcalan (Sri Lanka, ethnic relations and conflict resolution) and G. Padmaja (India, military and state security). The four fellows will be working together until April on a co-operative research project and jointly producing a monograph, as well as presenting their findings at a UNIDIR workshop in April.

The fellowships are allocated on a competitive basis, taking due care to obtain regional representation. The exact details of the research topic are collectively decided between UNIDIR and the four fellows. The current Fellowship Programme focuses on South Asia. In subsequent years, fellows will be attracted from other regions, such as West Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, North East Asia, Southern Africa, Central Europe, East Africa and so on.

For more information about UNIDIR’s Visiting Fellowship Programme, please contact:

Olivier Brenninkmeijer
Fellowship and Internship Coordinator
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 15 83
E-mail: obrenninkmeijer@unog.ch

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

To support efforts to address and curb the problem of TNWs, UNIDIR has launched a long-term project that includes a series of seminars, and publications as well as attempts to raise the problem of TNWs in the eyes of the wider public through the international media.

In March 2000, UNIDIR held a seminar in Geneva on TNWs. Experts from different institutions presented papers on various aspects of TNWs. Recommendations drawn from this seminar were distributed to policy-makers at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

UNIDIR recently published two research reports on TNWs: Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Perspective from Ukraine (see publications section). A press conference on TNWs was held in Geneva on 23 January, which resulted in a number of newspaper articles as well as television and radio interviews.

UNIDIR’s TNW project continues in 2001 with a study based on the recommendations presented in Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control. This report examines in detail and advances recommendations on codification as well as transparency and confidence-building measures related to the 1991 parallel unilateral declarations issued by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation. UNIDIR also plans to organize a seminar for the ten-year anniversary of the 1991 unilateral declarations. Various aspects of this project are carried out in co-operation with the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.
For more information, please contact:

Taina Susiluoto
Visiting Fellow
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 33 68
E-mail: tsusiluoto@unog.ch

**Handbook on Verification and Compliance**

Successful arms control in the Middle East — an essential component of the peace process — will require a thorough examination of the means to determine compliance and of the implications of regional verification mechanisms. In order to assist the process of ascertaining the necessary level and the approach to compliance monitoring in the Middle East, UNIDIR and VERTIC are producing a compendium of agreements and terms, in-depth analyses of approaches to verification, methods and technologies and practical experiences. The book will be published in English and Arabic in hard copy and electronic format (with hyperlink text).

For more information, please contact:

Steve Tulliu
Editor
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 15 98
E-mail: stulliu@unog.ch

**Fissile Materials**

In April 1999, UNIDIR published *Fissile Material Stocks: Characteristics, Measures and Policy Options* by William Walker and Frans Berkhout. The publication is intended to support the Conference on Disarmament in its thinking on the range of options available to deal with stocks of fissile material. Additionally, UNIDIR has commissioned a report on fissile material inventories to provide an up-to-date account of fissile materials, assess national policies related to the production, disposition and verification of fissile materials, and identify facilities and locations which might be subject to safeguards under a treaty.

For more information, please contact:

Jackie Seck
Research Programme Manager
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 11 49
E-mail: jseck@unog.ch
Participatory Approaches to Evaluating the Implementation of Humanitarian Landmine Action

Evaluating mine action programmes in terms of cost-effectiveness and efficiency has its merits in a donor community concerned with value for money in project implementation. But humanitarian mine action is by definition a qualitative process. It is designed to enhance human security, provide victim assistance and encourage ownership of mine action programmes in affected communities and regions. Traditional evaluation and monitoring techniques do not readily lend themselves to assessments of such qualitative goals and objectives. Participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques (PM&E) are more appropriate to this task. PM&E involves key stakeholders in identifying their needs and assessing the most appropriate options for meeting those needs. Experience has shown that participatory approaches improve the quality, effectiveness and sustainability of donor programmes’ actions and outcomes. By placing people at the centre of the monitoring and evaluation process, mine action efforts are guaranteed to empower local communities and encourage local ownership. The proposed pilot study is not only designed to pioneer PM&E approaches within the landmine community, but also to provide a unique opportunity for UNIDIR to help innovate bottom-up approaches to arms control implementation.

For more information, please contact:

Susan Willett
Senior Research Fellow
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 42 54
E-mail: swillett@unog.ch

The Costs of Disarmament

In order to present the cost-benefit analysis of disarmament, UNIDIR proposes to take key countries as examples and carefully research what their commitments to disarmament treaties mean to them in terms of financial and resource costs. In addition, the project will try to ascertain what each country perceives are the benefits brought to them through their participation in the agreements and whether there is consensus that there is a net gain to the state in question. The aim of the project is to achieve a better understanding of the costs and benefits of disarmament agreements with a view to assisting policy-makers decide how money is spent on such commitments, which budget lines are best structured to handle such spending and how states could approach this aspect of negotiations in the future.

For more information, please contact:

Susan Willett
Senior Research Fellow
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 42 54
E-mail: swillett@unog.ch
Peace-building and Practical Disarmament in West Africa

UNIDIR is currently running a project on peace-building and practical disarmament in West Africa. The project aims at strengthening the necessary participation of West African civil societies in the control of small arms and light weapons. The broad objective is to build grass-root capacities through research on peace and security issues and to empower ordinary citizens in such a way that civil society organizations become determinant constituencies for disarmament and arms control.

After several tours of the region by the Project Manager, a first collection of papers by selected authors from Sierra Leone has been published. A second set of papers focusing on Liberia has been commissioned.

For more information, please contact:

Anatole Ayissi
Project Manager
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 16 05
E-mail: aayissi@unog.ch

UNIDIR Handbook on Arms Control

UNIDIR is producing a handbook that will explain the major concepts and terms relating to arms control. The handbook will be used as both a primer for an audience with limited familiarity with arms control and as a reference for students, scholars, diplomats and journalists who are more experienced in arms control matters.

The handbook will be organized as a thematically structured glossary of approximately 400 terms relating to arms control. Each term is situated within its wider context so that, on the one hand, a specific term can be looked up quickly, and on the other hand, an entire issue can be covered. Cross-references to other terms and concepts will point the reader to relevant related issues. The researcher designing and drafting the handbook will be assisted by an editorial committee consisting of regional and arms control experts.

For more information, please contact:

Steve Tulliu
Editor
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 15 98
E-mail: stulliu@unog.ch
Geneva Forum


The Geneva Forum is an intellectual space in which expertise on a broad range of disarmament issues is shared among government delegates, United Nations personnel, NGOs and academics. Experts from various fields of disarmament are regularly invited to share their knowledge in briefings, seminars and workshops. Such meetings provide disarmament negotiators with valuable opportunities to benefit from in-depth research and to interact with one another in a relatively informal atmosphere. The issues dealt with in Geneva Forum meetings reflect the priorities of the disarmament agenda at any given time. The aim is to provide negotiators with relevant information that will assist them in their disarmament work.

Now in its third year, the Geneva Forum is expanding its work thanks to a generous grant from the Ford Foundation. New areas of activity will include increased networking between Geneva’s disarmament, human rights and humanitarian communities in order to discuss mutual interests in security and disarmament issues and to explore possibilities for coordination and collaboration. Also, in recognition of the important role that public opinion plays in advancing disarmament, the Geneva Forum will intensify its interaction with international media covering disarmament issues in Geneva.

In 1998 and 1999, the Geneva Forum focused mainly on the issue of small arms and light weapons. Recently, the first volume of collected Geneva Forum papers on this subject has been published (see the publications section).

For more information, please contact:

Patrick Mc Carthy
Network Coordinator
Tel.: (+41 22) 908 59 32
E-mail: mccarthy@hei.unige.ch

UNIDIR Disarmament Seminars

UNIDIR occasionally holds small, informal meetings on various topics related to disarmament, security and non-proliferation. These off-the-record gatherings allow members of the disarmament community, missions and NGOs to have an opportunity to discuss a specific topic with an expert. Recent topics covered include: verification of nuclear disarmament, restoring momentum to nuclear disarmament, missile defences, disarmament as humanitarian action, deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament, and fissile materials. Speakers at recent meetings have included: Trevor Findlay, Suzanna van Moyland, George Paloczi-Horvarth, Tom Milne, Jonathan Dean, Daryl Kimball, Soren Jessen-Petersen, Martin Griffiths, Randall Forsberg, Rebecca Johnson, Tariq Rauf, Mutiah Alagappa, Graham Andrew, Anatoli Diakov, Annette Schaper and Tom Shea.
For more information, please contact:

**Jackie Seck**  
Research Programme Manager  
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 11 49  
E-mail: jseck@unog.ch

**DATARIIs**

In cooperation with SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), UNIDIR has developed an online database of disarmament, arms control, security and peace research institutes and projects around the world. The database can be accessed through UNIDIR’s website and institutes can update their information via a password. A new feature allows the addition of the names of the director and research staff.

If you would like your institute to be included in DATARIIs, please contact:

**Anita Blétry**  
Publications Secretary  
Tel.: (+41 22) 917 42 63  
E-mail: abletry@unog.ch