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EDITOR'S NOTE

The relationship between disarmament and development has been discussed since the earliest days of the United Nations, starting with the explicit linkage in Article 26 of the UN Charter, which noted that armaments drain resources that could otherwise be used for human and economic concerns. UNIDIR has also had a long-standing interest in this subject—the first issue of the *UNIDIR Newsletter* (the predecessor of *Disarmament Forum*), published in 1988, was dedicated to this topic.

Interest in the disarmament-development relationship peaked during the Cold War; by the mid-1990s disappointment and disillusionment concerning the ‘missing’ peace dividend pushed disarmament-development thinking to the margins. In the past few years, new perspectives, including an emphasis on human development and security, have helped to bring discussions about the interaction between disarmament and development back to the centre.

This issue of *Disarmament Forum* explores the relationship between disarmament and development using the example of landmines. Demining and stockpile destruction, the ‘disarmament’ elements of mine action, are essential for the successful development of a mine-affected country. However, demining has traditionally been seen as a precursor to development—once the disarmament phase is complete, the development phase can begin. At current rates, some countries face years of demining activities—their development objectives cannot wait. Disarmament must be integrated into long-term development plans from their conception. This understanding is slowly taking hold, and has resulted in mine action being at the forefront of thinking on the practical implications of the relationship between disarmament and development.

The next issue of *Disarmament Forum* will examine the question of gender in relation to disarmament and security. Contributing authors explore gender aspects of early warning, the role of gender in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, ‘disarming masculinities’, as well as consider specific UN efforts concerning gender mainstreaming—including the Gender Action Plan of the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA).

Concerns about verification regimes for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the possible gaps in controls have led to increasing anxieties in the international community about the use or threat of use of WMD by non-state actors. On 5 September 2003 UNIDIR organized a one-day conference entitled *Weapons of Mass Destruction and Non-state Actors* to take stock of the current state of real or perceived threats, explore the connection between WMD and non-state actors, and compare past and present efforts by the international community to cope with this issue.

In cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme and DDA, UNIDIR held a workshop on *Capacity Development for Reporting to the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms* on 8–9 September. The workshop evaluated the quality and quantity of a selection of national reports for the 2003 First Biennial Meeting on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms

and how the UNDP, DDA and UNIDIR pilot assistance project contributed to the reporting. The next phase of the project is to strengthen and broaden the assistance and therefore the implementation of the Programme of Action.

Several new publications are available from the Institute. *Desarme nuclear: Regímenes internacional, latinoamericano y argentino de no proliferación*, by Marcelo F. Valle Fonrouge, addresses nuclear disarmament regimes in the context of Argentina and Latin America. *Disarming the Costs: Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Rearmament*, by Susan Willett, compares the costs and benefits of arms control with the costs and benefits of nuclear arms racing. Conference proceedings from the meeting *Outer Space and Global Security* (Geneva, 26–27 November 2002) address a variety of technical, political and legal issues regarding space use and space security. Two new publications focus on Africa: *Coopérer pour la paix en Afrique centrale*, by Mutoy Mubiala, and a training manual for security and armed forces, *Lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères en Afrique de l'Ouest*, edited by Anatole Ayissi and Ibrahima Sall. Lastly, *Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building*, by Steve Tulliu and Thomas Schmalberger, is now available in an English/Arabic version. Details and ordering information concerning these publications and others are available on our website.

On 19 August 2003, an explosion ripped apart the United Nations Headquarters in Baghdad. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and over twenty other colleagues from the UN family lost their lives and numerous others were injured. In remembrance of those fallen, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, 'If there is one way to honour the memory of colleagues murdered in the line of duty, it is to carry on with our work, determined and undaunted.' The core function of the United Nations is to prevent conflict. As part of that effort, the work of the United Nations—by those in the field, at headquarters or at UN offices, assists in mending conflict-torn societies. UNIDIR's commitment to promoting peace, disarmament and security is reaffirmed as we carry out our activities in collaboration with all people working toward the same end in the hope that the sacrifices of our colleagues were not in vain.

Kerstin Vignard

SPECIAL COMMENT

Previous discussions about the relationship between disarmament and development have predominantly focused on so-called ‘trade offs’ and ‘peace dividends’. This was based on an assumption that progress in disarmament would improve the security situation, which in turn would lead to reduced military expenditures. The money saved could then be used for development purposes. This notion, while true in principle, has proven to be incorrect. Although military expenditures fell—temporarily—after the end of the Cold War, this has not translated into higher development spending (by donor states) and military expenditure is once again on the rise.

It is therefore important to look beyond the macro/state level and to approach this topic in a broader and more comprehensive way. There exists a much more basic relationship between disarmament and development—not at the state level but at the level of communities and individuals. The problems posed by anti-personnel landmines are a prime example of the close interrelationship between disarmament and development.

Anti-personnel landmines kill and maim often long after a conflict has ended. They impede the return of refugees from armed conflicts and the reconstruction of normalcy of war-torn societies. They prevent land from being put to productive use and kill livestock, frequently destroying the economic foundations of communities. Moreover, by denying access to food and water, schools, hospitals and markets, anti-personnel landmines are often deliberately used in armed conflict to undermine basic services for the population.

These effects have very clear and negative repercussions on the development perspectives of affected individuals and communities. Hence, getting rid of anti-personnel landmines and preventing their further use has a positive development effect for such communities and often is a prerequisite for their development. In other words: disarmament of anti-personnel landmines creates ‘micro-peace-dividends’ for individuals and communities.

The Mine Ban Convention is at the core of this people-centred relationship between disarmament and development. The Ottawa Process, which led to the conclusion of the convention, started out in a disarmament context. As a convention that bans an inhumane weapon, it is clearly a disarmament instrument and in some capitals of States Parties it is still seen primarily from this angle.

However, in addition to banning a weapon, the convention also obliges States Parties to assist victims of anti-personnel landmines, to clear mined land and to destroy existing anti-personnel landmines. Hence, the implementation of the convention’s objectives is of great developmental importance for the populations of affected states.

In the last four years, impressive progress has been achieved in implementing the core aims of the convention. This was done in a true spirit of partnership amongst all parties that have an interest in

solving the anti-personnel landmine problem, such as governments of affected states and states that are in a position to provide assistance, as well as civil society and international organizations. These efforts have also contributed greatly to bringing the different communities—disarmament and development actors—to the same table, thereby fostering the understanding that anti-personnel landmines are a complex issue that needs to be approached in this manner. This was an important evolution that must continue and be further strengthened.

At the outset of the Ottawa Process, it was important to highlight anti-personnel landmines as a 'single issue' in order to create the necessary political momentum. As long as anti-personnel landmines continue to be used, this approach will remain valid. However, in the long run, and as political interests may shift to other issues, it will become increasingly important to focus on the multifaceted effects of and solutions to the anti-personnel landmine problem.

States that are in a position to provide assistance need to integrate mine action efforts into their development assistance programmes. States that are affected by anti-personnel landmines need to define the solution to this problem as a high development priority for their own societies. Such an approach, which puts the anti-personnel landmine issue within the wider developmental agenda, is necessary to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to comprehensively solve the problems caused by these weapons.

The convention's first Review Conference, to take place in Nairobi, Kenya in November 2004, will be an important milestone. We will need to take stock of what has been achieved so far in implementing the convention and what still needs to be done, as well as to renew the commitment of States Parties to eradicate the inhumane effects of anti-personnel landmines. Five years after entry into force and five years of intensive efforts of implementing the convention should also mark the point when the anti-personnel landmine problem is universally understood and addressed as a development issue.

Ambassador Wolfgang Petritsch

Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations Office Geneva

President Designate of the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention

Beyond the peace dividend— disarmament, development and security

Kerstin VIGNARD

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies in a final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, from those who are cold and are not clothed. The world in arms is not spending money alone. It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States, 16 April 1953

Throughout the history of the United Nations, the question of the relationship between disarmament and development has emerged and re-emerged under various guises: from the post-Second World War suggestions for funding development in the developing world, to concerns during the Cold War about the global arms race and high levels of military spending, to the post-Cold War expectation of a peace dividend. There has also been an ebb and flow of interest and expectations with respect to what such a relationship could deliver in terms of concrete results. A world in which global military expenditure is steadily rising and 1.2 billion people live on less than one dollar a day is a cruel reminder of the gap between prescription and reality.

In the past few years, the evolution of the concepts of human security and human development has led to a more holistic consideration of security that looks beyond the competitive relationship between military and development expenditure. Armed conflict affects nearly half of those countries with low levels of human development.¹ The development community believes armed conflict influences poverty, and the security community recognizes poverty as a threat to security. The disarmament-development relationship appears to be cyclical, and not a one-way redirection of spending from defence to social welfare or conversion of defence-related facilities to civilian purposes.

This article briefly reviews the evolution of the disarmament-development debate within the United Nations, and identifies some of the key elements of the relationship today as seen from a human security perspective.

From the establishment of the United Nations through the Cold War

From its origins, the United Nations has recognized that armaments drain essential resources from development. The link is implied in Article 26 of the UN Charter, which tasks the Security Council

Kerstin Vignard is editor in chief of *Disarmament Forum* and UNIDIR's focal point for disarmament and non-proliferation education. The comments of Christophe Carle were particularly helpful in the drafting of this article.

‘... to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources ...’. For over half a century the international community has struggled with how to achieve this goal.

Since the 1950s, General Assembly resolutions have repeatedly called for reductions in military expenditure and the reallocation of resources to development. There also have been various national proposals, such as the 1950 Indian suggestion to create a global peace fund and the 1955 proposal of French Prime Minister Edgar Faure to establish an International Fund for Development and Mutual Assistance (a proposal revived at the First Special Session on Disarmament over twenty years later). For the most part, such proposals have emphasized reducing military expenditure in industrialized countries to fund development projects in underdeveloped ones. Other schemes linking disarmament and development have focused on debt for disarmament ‘swaps’, voluntary contributions, and taxation of the defence industry or cross-border currency transactions.

The economic maxim of ‘guns versus butter’ characterized disarmament-development thinking during the Cold War. Development, be it economic or social, competes for the same resources as military expenditure. Therefore, reducing military spending would release valuable and much needed funds for development activities. The arms race that characterized the era, as well as the militarization of development aid, devoured scarce resources. It was hoped that the end of the Cold War would result in lower military expenditure—and the promise of an eventual peace dividend to be applied towards development goals.

The Second Development Decade of the United Nations and its First Disarmament Decade coincided in the 1970s, giving new impetus to examining the linkages between the two fields.² A 1971 expert report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race³ laid the foundation for informed discussion and future studies, particularly on the negative effects of arms expenditures on economic and human development.

The end of the decade saw the First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD I). Its final document⁴ highlighted the links between arms expenditure and economic and social development and requested that the Secretary-General convene an expert group to prepare a ‘forward-looking and policy-oriented’ report, examining the utilization of resources for military purposes, the economic and social consequences of the arms race, and conversion and deployment of resources released from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development.⁵

The expert group, chaired by Ambassador Inga Thorsson, submitted its report on 3 September 1981.⁶ It was the first attempt by the United Nations to ‘investigate systematically and in-depth’ the range of relationships between disarmament and development. Through the commissioning of forty reports on the topic, it also generated an enormous pool of early research.

The International Conference on Disarmament and Development in 1987 offered the international community the opportunity to review the relationship between disarmament and development, specifically examining military expenditure and considering ways of releasing additional resources through disarmament measures for development processes.⁷ The final document of the conference clearly and thoroughly explores the links between the two fields, noting that they although they are distinct processes, they have a ‘close and multidimensional’ relationship. It is a forward-looking text that foreshadows today’s discussions on non-military challenges to security, such as resource scarcity and the widening gap between developing and developed countries, as well as emphasizes the importance of multilateralism in both disarmament and development efforts. Proposals outlined in the final document underscored the essential role of the United Nations in both fields, the need for comprehensive data, transparency and research on military expenditures and conversion, and the necessity of international cooperation. While some criticized the action plan as weak, it is not surprising considering the divergent views held by the conference participants and the need to reach consensus on the text of the final document.

Human development and human security

The Security Council met for the first time in a Summit of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. On behalf of the Council, the President stated that the end of the Cold War had 'raised hopes for a safer, more equitable and more humane world' and recognized that 'the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.'⁸

As anticipated, military expenditure did fall in the years following the end of the Cold War (a trend that continued until 1996);⁹ however, Official Development Assistance decreased as well.¹⁰ The long-awaited peace dividend materialized in the sense that military expenditures were reduced, but in general the surplus was not applied towards development objectives. This has been attributed variously to a lack of political will, tax cuts, the high costs of conversion, deficit reduction, and emphasis on other aspects of government expenditure. Disappointment and disillusionment grew as it became clear that the peace dividend would not benefit development, and disarmament-development discussions faded to the margins.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the last decade of the millennium witnessed the explosion of a different type of conflict, one that overshadowed 'traditional' interstate wars. Terrorist activities, guerrilla warfare and internal violence typified these 'new' conflicts—many of which had their roots in economic deprivation rather than ideological or political differences—and left the international community struggling to determine strategies to manage them. It became increasingly clear that the role of individuals, not just states, demanded consideration in the security equation.

The 1994 United Nations Development Programme's *Human Development Report* was a milestone in linking security and development; the first sentence of the report states 'The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives.' As opposed to the traditional view of development defined as economic growth, *human development* places people at its centre, and insists that economic growth is not an end in itself.

The concept of putting people first in security discussions is known as *human security*. While there is not, as yet, a single accepted definition, human security is commonly described as 'freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives.'¹¹ A human security perspective incorporates non-military elements that can contribute to or reduce conflict, including poverty, human rights, migration and health issues. This perspective is both old and new: it revitalizes the founding principles of the United Nations and concepts enshrined in international humanitarian and human rights law, while at the same time acknowledges the 'new factors shaping the way people are affected' by insecurity.¹² While human development focuses on widening the choices available to individuals, human security permits the possibility to exercise those choices.

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Human security has enriched our thinking in two significant ways. It has forced us to *broaden* our notion of state security, from its traditional conception in military terms, to encompass other threats (including to health, to the environment, and to fundamental freedoms and human rights). It has also demanded that we *deepen* the concept of security, from the state down to the individual level and up to the regional and international levels.¹³ Increased focus on why individuals engage in conflict has highlighted that unmet needs—economic, social, political—are a contributing factor to conflict. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized this point in his Millennium Report, stressing the importance of 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' for peace and stability.¹⁴

It is interesting to note that thinking on human security emerged from the development sector, rather than from security policy decision-makers. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there were discussions on non-military aspects of security, such as food security and environmental security; however, these discussions remained at the fringes of mainstream security thinking, which was dominated by Cold War strategic nuclear issues.

As recognized in the final document of the 1987 international conference, disarmament and development are 'distinct processes' with a 'close and multidimensional relationship'. They are mutually reinforcing activities that can work synergistically to establish, foster and strengthen peace, security, and economic, social and human development. As evident at the end of the Cold War, it is possible to have disarmament without development. It is also possible to have development without disarmament—although the likelihood of it being stable and equitable, especially in a post-conflict society, is small. In sum, it is improbable that peace can be established or sustained without human development—and it is unlikely that human development can be encouraged and sustained in 'a climate dominated by war and the preparations for war'.¹⁵

Security has been called the 'third pillar' in the disarmament-development relationship. Security is 'a key element as much of development as disarmament, and a mandatory intermediary between them'.¹⁶ The notion of security is at the crux of the disarmament-development relationship, as disarmament contributes to greater security and security creates an environment conducive to development.

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In addition to new security thinking, several other factors helped to raise the profile of the disarmament-development relationship at the end of the twentieth century. International movements to control small arms and anti-personnel landmines brought new perspectives to bear on disarmament issues, taking into account the effect of these weapons not only on conflict, but also health, community security, threat perceptions, foreign aid, and local and national economies. The successful negotiation and entry into force of the Mine Ban Convention is partially credited to the fact that it was able to re-contextualize a disarmament issue as a humanitarian one. Recent international meetings, such as the Johannesburg Summit, and global commitment to the Millennium Development Goals have drawn attention to the fact that development will not move forward if conflict and insecurity are not addressed.

There is no single link between disarmament and development. The relationship is contextual. Some wealthy nations, for example, have low military expenditure, while other, less wealthy ones spend a disproportionate amount. Thinking on these relationships must encompass the diverse realities evident in different countries and regions, as well as the interplay between disarmament and development practices. A stable industrialized country with a large military sector might find it appropriate to focus on the costs of conversion of military bases and an examination of arms expenditures. In societies with poorly run or broken-down governments, struggling economies, or characterized by violence and inequalities, the disarmament-development relationship might manifest itself in different ways and have other implications—for example, the necessity of collecting surplus weapons that inhibit development and threaten a fragile peace.

Renewed interest in disarmament and development beginning in the late 1990s reverberated throughout the United Nations system. For instance, the United Nations mechanism for Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) upon its creation underscored the disarmament-development link. In 1999 the Secretary-General established the High-Level Steering Group on Disarmament and Development, which takes its mandate from the action programme adopted at the 1987 international conference. In December 2002, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of governmental experts to reappraise the relationship between disarmament and development

'in the current international context, as well as the future role of the Organization in this connection'.¹⁷ The expert group's report and recommendations will be considered at the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly, in 2004.

In recent years, practical work on two specific issues, small arms and landmines, have helped to focus attention on the real connections between disarmament and development. This new thinking has emerged from innovative partnerships across the fields of security, development, public health and humanitarian affairs, along with the participation of civil society.

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SMALL ARMS

In many countries small arms play a critical role in conflict and creating insecurity. 'Besides taking a heavy toll in human life, small arms undermine development: where they proliferate, projects are obstructed, infrastructure damaged, materials looted, and workers endangered.'¹⁸ Moreover, communities live under threat, aid does not reach those who desperately wait in need, and reconstruction and investment are hampered.¹⁹ Reducing the number of weapons in circulation leads to more secure communities and opens the door to economic opportunities at the individual, community and national levels.

As conventional weapons fuel most of today's conflicts, any discussion of the disarmament-development relationship must address the demand for conventional weapons, not only their supply. Reducing small arms demand often requires the strengthening of institutions that offer security and support the rule of law. Development activities, including training for public officials, judges, police, military, and the wider question of security sector reform, are often a prerequisite for undertaking disarmament. To be successful, weapons collection must be accompanied by improvements in both the perceived and actual security situation.

The collection of surplus weapons in the post-conflict period has been attempted in different ways. In the past few years, thinking has favoured 'weapons for development' programmes, where communities are asked to give up their weapons in exchange for a development project. The collected weapons are usually destroyed in a public manner, thereby reassuring the community that they have been permanently removed from circulation and are not being transferred to government stockpiles. Research is currently underway to analyse whether and how linking physical disarmament measures to visible development goods or services in countries such as Cambodia and Albania can create a sort of 'virtuous circle' of disarmament, increased security and enhanced development.²⁰

LANDMINES

Landmines are a second example of how disarmament and development objectives are being addressed creatively through new partnerships. Landmines proscribe development in numerous insidious ways: land cannot be cultivated; refugees are prohibited from return; lives and livelihoods are destroyed; treatment and rehabilitation are costly and scarce; transportation and communications are obstructed. The international community's humanitarian response to the landmine crisis, collectively known as 'mine action', is undertaken with the goal of human development. In addition to the other activities that make up mine action, such as landmine awareness and victim assistance, a fundamental pillar of mine action is mine clearance and stockpile destruction—the actual disarmament components of mine action.

As early as 1977, the United Nations recognized that 'disarmament should be so designed that [the] close connexion between disarmament and development gets full recognition.'²¹ Yet it is often

It is often mistakenly assumed that disarmament and development are two separate, sequential phases in the post-conflict period.

mistakenly assumed that disarmament and development are two separate, sequential phases in the post-conflict period. Demining is an extremely costly and labour-intensive endeavour, and, above all else, it is an exceedingly slow process. As a consequence, mine-action activities must be integrated from the earliest point possible into the long-term development objectives and plans of mine-affected countries. Nations cannot simply wait to implement their development projects until the land is cleared.

The articles in this issue of *Disarmament Forum* will explore this disarmament-development nexus in greater detail, addressing how mine action fits into local and national development priorities, who is responsible for insuring the integration of mine action in development, and how the humanitarian and development communities, in cooperation with mine-affected countries, work together to decide the best course of action.

Disarmament and development through the human security lens

In order to make both disarmament and development more successful and cost-effective, while eliminating duplication or working at cross-purposes, the challenge today is to identify practical areas where disarmament and development are connected and encourage activities and policies that recognize and strengthen those links. A few critical issues are noted here.

Reduction of military expenditure and restructuring of security forces are two perennial recommendations concerning the disarmament and development relationship.²² They necessitate a 'reappraisal of the real security needs—and perhaps a reconsideration of the meaning of security'. A human security perspective can be useful in undertaking this sort of reflection.

Global military spending in 2001 topped US\$ 870 billion, approximately 2% higher than in 2000.²³ The United States, which comprises 40% of the world's military spending, increased its military expenditure by over 12% in 2002. The other four permanent members of the Security Council also raised their expenditures. In 2002 world military expenditure represented an average of US\$ 128 per capita, whereas Official Development Assistance per capita was less than US\$ 10 (2001).²⁴ Achieving the Millennium Development Goals by 2015 will be impossible if these trends are not significantly reversed.

Additionally, the costs of keeping up with the 'revolution in military affairs' (in terms of human as well as financial resources) are simply too high for many already indebted developing countries. In some countries, natural resources are being over-exploited and criminally plundered to pay for military expenditures. It is distressing to note that between 1993 and 2002 military expenditure in three conflict-torn regions soared: Africa, +30%, Asia, +23%, and the Middle East, +38%.²⁵ Even if a country's military expenditure is not rising, it might remain at an artificially high level unless security needs are reviewed.

A reduction of military expenditure will not result in enhanced development unless it is accompanied by both a reallocation of resources towards development activities and assurance that these resources are put to constructive use (through accountability and good governance). In some countries, those responsible for ensuring security pose the greatest threat to the population. In these cases, restructuring or transforming the security sector is of primary importance. Transparency and accountability throughout the government are essential to the success of both human development and human security.

For the past half century, overspending on military means of security and under-spending on non-military aspects of security has epitomized the national state-centred security approach. A concrete illustration is offered by the American nuclear programme. It has been estimated that ‘spending on the [American] nuclear arms programme over the 56-year period 1940–1996 exceeded the total federal spending on education, training, employment and social services, agriculture, natural resources, the environment, general sciences, space and technology, community and regional development (including disaster relief), law enforcement, energy production and regulation.’²⁶

The *arms trade* straddles the demand and supply dimensions of armaments. Members of the G-8 account for over 85% of global weapons exports.²⁷ Arms sales, military aid and military assistance to developing countries deprive nations of valuable financial and human resources and have high opportunity and economic costs. In the worst cases, these weapons serve as instruments for internal repression and violence.

International appeals persist for more responsibility in the arms trade. For instance, Oscar Arias and seventeen other Nobel Prize recipients have proposed the Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers²⁸ to end irresponsible arms exports, establish a core set of minimum standards, and to bring the arms trade in line with state obligations under existing international law.

In relation to *older proposals* for an international fund for development, limits on defence expenditure or a tax on the arms trade, not much has changed to make these option more attractive today than in the past. Despite years of discussion, consensus has never been reached on the political acceptability or technical modalities of such ideas, including the basic issues of determining an internationally accepted level of military expenditure or who would distribute the development funds and monitor their use. It has been suggested that a tax on the arms trade could fund development projects—yet this would have the perverse disadvantage of tying development to continuing—rather than reducing—the arms trade.

The question of *regional (in)security* must also be regarded as an essential component of the disarmament-development question. Regional instability, often exacerbated by *arms races*, has a detrimental effect on all aspects of development. ‘The social and cultural consequences of the arms race are visible in every country involved in it, affecting both the allocation of resources and the political atmosphere in their societies. The social effects are most deeply felt by the underprivileged, whose basic needs are not met because of the lack of adequate resources, some of which are absorbed by the arms race.’²⁹ Resolution of regional disputes can lead to more stable security situations that create environments conducive to reduction in military expenditure and individual insecurity. Efforts to encourage regional security structures, confidence-building measures and regional cooperation can help stabilize tense areas and strengthen peace, security and regional development.

There is also the question of the *costs* of disarmament. Conversion offers an opportunity to free resources for development. Yet it is an expensive (at least in the short term) and lengthy process—with the benefits accruing in the medium to long-term. Retooling, retraining, unemployment, base closures, and other aspects of conversion could be argued to have a negative effect on local and national economic development. Disarmament can also be expensive, although its cost is actually a part of the price of armament.³⁰ ‘Controversies over the cost of arms control have arisen, in part, because the expenditures have been viewed in isolation from the longer-term economic and security benefits of arms control, namely reduced military spending, improved security, enhanced mutual trust, improved confidence and reduced tensions.’³¹ The cost of arms control and conversion can be seen as an investment in security and development—a process with ‘initial costs and ultimate benefits’.³²

The cost of arms control and conversion can be seen as an investment in security and development—a process with ‘initial costs and ultimate benefits’.

The separate fields of disarmament and development need to learn from each other. For example, participatory monitoring and evaluation, a technique utilized by the development community to measure a project's impact on all of its stakeholders, is now being used to evaluate the effectiveness of disarmament projects involving small arms and landmines.³³

The arms control and disarmament community must welcome and encourage cooperation with the development community. Development agencies 'can foster disarmament and peacebuilding efforts, promote arms control standards, provide incentives and employment possibilities, and help build the confidence that makes peace and order possible.'³⁴ This cooperation must be cultivated and will take time to develop. The mine action community has perhaps been the most successful to-date in integrating disarmament into development planning. Yet, as one specialist has noted, 'although the concept of mine action as a humanitarian *and* a development activity now has gained acceptance within the mine action community, this does not automatically imply that the development community has embraced the notion simultaneously with reciprocal and sudden fervour.'³⁵ Relationships will need to be built and nurtured to ensure that disarmament and development can be reciprocal processes. This will require a commitment from both sides to set aside wrangling over mandates, budgets and 'turf', and to finding flexible and cooperative approaches to issues of common concern.

Lastly, it is essential that the disarmament and development sectors continue to reach out and build new partnerships. 'What ties these two processes together are people and their communities—the actors which play a central role in the success or failure of disarmament/development initiatives.'³⁶ Encouraging ownership of the problem and its solutions means that developing countries and affected communities must have a central role in these discussions.

Conclusions

Disarmament and development 'are widely viewed as separate problems, particularly at the national level.'³⁷ The United Nations and the international community will be unable to meet their development commitments, and notably the Millennium Development Goals, as long as they continue to address disarmament and development separately. 'Human security and human development are ... two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and leading to a conducive environment for each other.'³⁸ The compartmentalization of these issues has significant ramifications for long-term policy planning. It also effects the resources available to get the job done. Some funders, for example, refuse to support demining as they consider it a humanitarian activity, rather than one contributing to development.

As our security concepts are changing, the disarmament-development question must be revitalized to incorporate new perspectives and realities. Innovative security thinking in conjunction with recent

Innovative security thinking in conjunction with recent global commitments on development presents a unique opportunity to rejuvenate the disarmament-development debate.

global commitments on development presents a unique opportunity to rejuvenate the disarmament-development debate—on both the supply and demand side of armaments (especially in regards to conventional weapons), the question of resource allocation, the arms trade, regional stability and the synergistic relationship between disarmament and development in post-conflict societies. The Group

of Governmental Experts recently named by the Secretary-General to examine this issue could 're-launch' the disarmament-development dialogue within the United Nations and in Member States—and help all concerned think more creatively about disarmament, development and security.

Notes

1. See United Nations Development Programme, 2003, *Human Development Report 2003*, Oxford University Press.
2. See United Nations General Assembly resolutions A/RES/2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 and A/RES/2626 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.
3. United Nations, *Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security*, United Nations document A/8469 of 22 October 1971.
4. United Nations, *Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly*, United Nations document S-10/2 of 30 June 1978.
5. The mandate is contained in United Nations document A/S-10/9.
6. United Nations, *Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, document A/36/356 of 5 October 1981, available at <[http://disarmament2.un.org:8080/cab/exgr36.356\(Part%20One\).pdf](http://disarmament2.un.org:8080/cab/exgr36.356(Part%20One).pdf)>.
7. General Assembly resolution A/RES/39/160 of 17 December 1984.
8. United Nations, *Note by the President of the Security Council*, document S/23500 of 31 January 1992.
9. Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2003, *Conversion Survey 2003*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 152. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute identifies 1998 as the lowest year; see SIPRI, 2003, *SIPRI Yearbook 2003*, Oxford University Press, p. 335.
10. See United Nations Development Programme, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
11. For more information concerning the definition of human security, see the International Commission on Human Security at <<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/doc/fram.pdf>> and the Human Security Network at <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/>>.
12. David Atwood, unpublished, *Disarmament and Human Security: Back to Basics or a New Paradigm?*, presentation to the forty-first session of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, Geneva, 16 July 2003.
13. See interesting discussion in Björn Hagelin and Elisabeth Sköns, 2003, *The Military Sector in a Changing Context*, in SIPRI, 2003, *op. cit.*, ch. 9.
14. For the full report, see <<http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm>>.
15. Paraphrased from David Krieger, 2002, *Peace and Sustainable Development will Rise or Fall Together*, available at <http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/02.08/0815krieger_peacesus.htm>.
16. Serge Sur, *Disarmament-Development: The Time of Researchers*, *UNIDIR Newsletter*, 1988, no. 1, p. 3. The Thorsson Report of 1981 also stressed this triangular relationship. See United Nations, *Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, *op. cit.*, para. 398.
17. General Assembly resolution A/RES/57/65 of 30 December 2002.
18. A. Walter Dorn, *Small Arms, Human Security and Development*, *Development Express*, no. 5, 1999-2000, available at <http://www.rmc.ca/academic/gradrech/dorn7_e.html>.
19. The Small Arms Survey identifies direct and indirect effects of small arms. *Direct effects* included injury and death (including costs of treatment, lost productivity, psychological and psychosocial costs); *indirect effects* included armed crime, access to and quality of social services, economic activity, investment, savings and revenue collection, social capital, development interventions. See Small Arms Survey, 2003, *The Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied*, ch. 4. See also NISAT, 'Small Arms and Developing Countries', available at <<http://www.nisat.org>>.
20. It is with a view of answering these questions that UNIDIR has undertaken the *Weapons for Development Project: Lessons Learned from Weapons Collection Programmes*. Through evaluation of a number of weapons for development projects, the project will compile lessons learned and help to identify best practices. This information will make a valuable contribution to policy-makers, donor countries, United Nations agencies and NGOs, helping them to devise better strategies and incentives for weapons for development projects. For more information, see UNIDIR's website <<http://www.unidir.org>>.
21. United Nations, *Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, *op. cit.*, para. 18.
22. For a concise analysis of the costs of military expenditure, see the chapter "Averted Costs" in Susan Willett, 2002, *Costs of Disarmament—Rethinking the Price Tag: A Methodological Inquiry into the Costs and Benefits of Arms Control*, UNIDIR, pp. 33–60.
23. BICC, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
24. SIPRI, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 301; United Nations Development Programme, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 294. ODA was US\$ 9.8 per capita in 2001.
25. SIPRI, 'World and regional military expenditure estimates 1993–2002', available at <http://projects.sipri.org/milex/mex_wnr_table.html>.

26. Susan Willett, 2002, *op. cit.*, p. 51, based on the data of Stephen Swartz (ed.), 1998, *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of US Nuclear Weapons since 1940*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution.
27. United Nations Development Programme, 2003, *op. cit.*, p. 93.
28. See < <http://www.arias.or.cr/fundarias/cpr/armslaw/index.html>> .
29. United Nations, *Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security*, *op. cit.*
30. See Susan Willett, 2002, *op. cit.*
31. Susan Willett, 2002, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
32. Michael D. Intriligator, 1999, Interactions between Disarmament and Development, in ECAAR, *United Nations 1999 Symposium on Disarmament and Development*, p. 35, available at < <http://www.eaar.org/Articles/Disarm&Develop.PDF>> .
33. For example, see Susan Willett (ed.), 2003, *Participatory Monitoring of Humanitarian Mine Action: Giving Voice to Citizens of Nicaragua, Mozambique and Cambodia*, UNIDIR.
34. A. Walter Dorn, *op. cit.*
35. Judy Grayson, 2003, Mine action and development: merging strategies, *Disarmament Forum*, no. 3, p. 15.
36. Jill Sinclair, unpublished, *Discussion Paper on Disarmament and Development*, presentation to the fortieth session of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, New York, 5–7 February 2003.
37. United Nations, *Study on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development: Report of the Secretary-General*, *op. cit.*, para. 22.
38. Human Security Network, *A Perspective on Human Security: Chairman's Summary 1st Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network*, Lysøen, Norway, 20 May 1999, available at < <http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org>> .

Mine action and development: merging strategies

Judy GRAYSON

In February 2001 I watched as a team of deminers in northern Chad worked under the desert sun to open a road between Faya Largeau, a northern oasis, and the capital city of N'Djamena. It looked like an unimportant wasteland with no inhabitants close by, but the Team Leader explained that it was a priority. The task might have appeared minor—only a small portion of narrow track on the outskirts of Faya Largeau was suspected to be mined and then the rest of the road was clear. And the impact of this blockage might also appear to have been insignificant. In the twenty years since this section of road had been closed, local inhabitants had carved a detour through the dunes that added thirty kilometres to the Faya Largeau–N'Djamena trip.

What is the cost of a thirty-kilometre detour? In many countries it is no more than minutes on the highway; it would have been an annoyance. Yet in Chad, the implications of an extra thirty kilometres are huge. For a truck in the rainy season the detour translates into at least an additional eight hours' slog through the dunes. In a country with little refrigeration, eight hours of additional transport time means that certain produce is not viable for sale from one village to another. It means that transported livestock needs to be fed another day or arrive at market thinner and therefore less valuable and less nutritious. For Faya Largeau it meant that in the years since the road fell into disuse because of suspicion and fear of mines, certain crops were no longer worth growing because they could not make it to a wider market and it meant that other perishables that the inhabitants of Faya Largeau enjoyed receiving from farther south no longer made it to the oasis.

Raising funds for clearance activities such as this can be difficult. Although these activities have a serious impact on people's lives and are, therefore, 'humanitarian', they do not fall easily within the definition of humanitarian aid for many donors. In recent years the boundary of what constitutes humanitarian aid with respect to mine action has been liberally and, in my view, accurately stretched to encompass land interdiction and many other activities where, technically, lives are not immediately jeopardized. This is a significant evolution in the international community's outlook, which initially considered landmines simply a military issue.

Yet it is a relatively recent phenomenon. Only in the late 1980s, in Afghanistan, did the international community begin to recognize the humanitarian implications of landmines. Gradually this has progressed to the point where the socio-economic impact of mines (primarily interdiction to land and other resources) has gained general acceptance as the second most important factor—after the number of casualties—in determining how scarce resources should be prioritized and allocated to mine action.

After five years as the Deputy Director of the United Nations Development Programme's Mine Action Unit in New York, in August 2003 Judy Grayson took up a new post in Sri Lanka as UNDP Chief Advisor for Mine Action.

In its outline of key principles, the UN Strategy for Mine Action 2001–2005¹ contained the following statement under the heading ‘Humanitarian Imperative’: ‘Landmines are first and foremost a humanitarian concern and must be addressed from this perspective.’ After some debate, a sentence referring to their impact on development was added. The revised strategy endorsed by the Inter-agency Coordination Group on Mine Action in July 2003 contains a new paragraph outlining an additional key principle, ‘Development perspective’:

The presence of landmines and UXO [unexploded ordnance] is frequently an obstacle to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals² through preventing participation by affected communities in economic development. In countries where this is the case, the UN will encourage governments to include a mine-action impact assessment in all development planning, and to incorporate a strategic plan for mine action in the national development plan and poverty reduction strategies.

For many countries, integrating mine action into broader development strategies and budgets may well prove to be the most promising path toward a sustainable response to the obstacles caused

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by mines and UXOs. This should not replace humanitarian funding—it should supplement it. Nor does this mean that countries should diminish the prominence given to the most immediate impact of mines on human lives in favour of purely economic assessments. Rather this should be an enhancement of existing activities and an attempt to distribute the burden of response, financial and non-financial, more even-handedly. If it is roads that are mined, then the ministry of transportation and the funding streams that support it—domestic and foreign—should be activated. If it is private industry that is thwarted by mine contamination then countries could attempt to design a burden-sharing scheme where a portion of future revenues are channelled back into mine action once the obstacles are cleared, the industry is established, and profits are realized. In Mauritania, for example, the mined areas are vast tracts of desert where few people live and hardly any casualties are sustained. However, mineral exploration companies do sometimes request assistance when suspected minefields hinder their ability to prospect for new exploitation sites. With mineral export a major source of foreign exchange for the government and a source of revenue for the entire country, who should foot this mine action bill? Should it be funded from humanitarian, development or even private sources? Ultimately it is the Government of Mauritania that will need to make this decision, either by levying a fee on private enterprise or requesting foreign assistance for clearance. And at that point it will be for donor countries or lending institutions to decide from which account the funding might flow. (One further question: do most mine action staff really have the mindset and experience to advise them on creative, yet practical, solutions to such a problem?)

To date, action and discussion on mine action and development have fallen into two general categories: factoring the effects of mine contamination into all applicable sectors (agriculture, health, transportation, etc.) and factoring the costs of mine action into specific development project that are affected by the presence of mines (roads, bridges, etc.). Recent years have seen some key advances in both categories and predominantly in the second. The large-scale reconstruction projects in Afghanistan are a case in point. After considerable negotiation, all the major funders of road works in Afghanistan (the World Bank, European Commission, Asian Development Bank, USAID and Japan) did incorporate the true costs of mine-related activities into their budgets—even central services provided by the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA). Moreover, for the most part they are contracting local NGOs to do the work and thereby adding to the development of Afghanistan’s own management and staff

capacities. There are important lessons in this for Angola, Lao and Sri Lanka, among other countries, where the budgets of roads and reconstruction projects generally have not incorporated the projected costs of mine survey and clearance to international standards.

Integrating mine action costs into development budgets requires early consultation with local mine action actors. Otherwise the budget will be set in a donor capital or lending institution and the 'add on' of mine action will come as a surprise. Most often, the United Nations and NGOs then scramble together for humanitarian funds to support the project, drawing assets away from other tasks. The average figure quoted for the costs of mine action associated with development projects is 10%. This is a good enough starting point, but it is abstract and bears little resemblance to reality. Ten percent of a US\$ 200 million infrastructure project should be excessive. The reckoning becomes even more difficult in smaller projects where the cost of mine action associated with its achievement may be far greater than the project's budget itself. If it costs US\$1,000 to dig a bore hole and irrigate some fields, and the fields are mined, then the corresponding clearance could cost ten times the amount. Should these funds come from the project's source as for the reconstructed roads, or from a separate humanitarian budget?

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The role of the multilateral institutions

Within the broad boundaries of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the two actors most directly concerned are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. The UN Policy on Mine Action³ assigns UNDP the primary responsibility within the UN system of assisting countries to address the socio-economic consequences of mine and UXO contamination. Over twenty-one countries—as varied as Chad, Yemen, Croatia, Lao and Angola—are currently receiving some level of support. The frontline in this effort are the advisors who work with national and local authorities, mine-affected communities, NGOs, donors, and other UN and multilateral agencies at the country level. At UNDP headquarters, a small team of specialists provides policy guidance, advice and technical support for these programmes. The team also advocates both within UNDP for inclusion of mine action as a development issue in affected countries, and among external actors for financial support and a place at the table.

Although even the UNDP mine action community has been guilty of sometimes forgetting this, UNDP itself has a much broader development role. A typical country portfolio will address such issues as governance, poverty alleviation or micro-finance, all of which can have direct or indirect links to mine action. The UN Resident Coordinator—frequently the UNDP Resident Representative—will coordinate the formulation of various overarching documents by the entire Country Team and the host government: the Common Country Assessment (CCA), the Common Country Framework (CCF) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). These documents, developed in consultation with the government, outline a sectoral strategy for the entire country and apportion lead roles for various actors in assisting the country to meet its development objectives. UNDP also manages a resource mobilization mechanism known as 'Roundtables' and assists governments to prepare the supporting budgets, documents and presentations for the international donor community.

The World Bank has a comparable set-up. Its Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit based in Washington, DC is the nominal focal point for mine action although, given a decentralized system of Regional Vice-Presidencies that rival UNDP's Regional Bureaux for their independence, it does not aspire to control mine action for the World Bank globally. The unit was involved, however, in the drafting of guidelines concerning the financing of mine clearance, the development of a handbook and, for some time, it also employed a mine action consultant.

Projects are designed at the country level, with varying degrees of input from the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. For many countries the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is the most prominent document, drafted jointly by the government and the international community to guide development strategies and international support, particularly that of the World Bank itself. And, outside of a handful of countries in Africa and Asia, Roundtables have given way to the World Bank's Consultative Group (CG) as the preferred resource mobilization mechanism. The CG, PRSP and its precursor, the Interim PRSP (I-PSRP), therefore should be prime targets for any mine action programme seeking to integrate itself into a country's overall development strategy.

The World Bank guidelines, issued on 7 February 1997, are entitled 'Guidelines for Financing Land Mine Clearance', although they embrace many facets of what we now commonly refer to as mine action. The guidelines are quite broad and state that 'to be eligible for Bank financing, land-mine clearance must be an integral part of a development project or a prelude to a future development project or program to be adopted by the borrower.' The guidelines go on to describe three examples of activities that could be eligible for financing:

- a) *Capacity building*: support for the development of national or local demining centers to create or expand capacity to implement the demining components of projects in priority sectors;
- b) *Area demining programs*: financing of a demining programme in particular areas of a country as a component or first phase of a development project or programme that aims to reintegrate displaced populations and reactivate the local economy and carry out additional development activities;
- c) *Sector demining programs*: support for demining programs targeted at specific sectors; for example, demining of agricultural land as part of a larger agricultural rehabilitation program or demining of roads and bridges as part of a transport project.

For the most part, the World Bank has been most active and most successful in the third category, sector demining (with a few notable exceptions such as a substantial grant to kick-start UNDP's support to Sri Lanka's mine action programme and some research funds to UNDP for a study it conducted with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on socio-economic approaches to mine action).⁴ This does not take full advantage of its potential in part because when we think of technical assistance in mine action we think in too narrow terms. In the example given earlier of financing mine survey and clearance to permit exploration of Mauritania's mineral resources, the World Bank and similar agencies would be the ideal institutions to provide support. If the goal is to develop a financing mechanism whereby the costs of mine action can be recouped if a company discovers and exploits mineral resources, it must be done with care so that it does not inadvertently provide a disincentive to investment and mineral exploration in the first place. Irrespective of any knowledge of landmines, development and financial staff are far more likely to have the relevant expertise than your average mine actioneer if only someone would ask them, and provided they have a broad enough outlook to accept.

Where we are now

In spite of the liberal expansion of the definition of humanitarian mine action to encompass areas well within the development sector, and in spite of increased discussion of the topic at mine action meetings, action is lagging behind the rhetoric.

This is not surprising for several reasons. First, although the concept of mine action as a humanitarian *and* a development activity now has gained acceptance within the mine action community, this does not automatically imply that the development community has embraced the notion simultaneously with reciprocal and sudden fervour. It took years of debate and persuasion for this concept to take hold within the mine action community, and reciprocity also will require similar effort. It is interesting to reflect back on the strong opposition to any involvement by UNDP in mine action as recently as 1997. The opposition came from other UN agencies that felt that only the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the humanitarian agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) need bother. Resistance also emerged from members of UNDP's Executive Board—particularly those from the more developed countries—who felt that this would dilute UNDP's attention to economic and development issues. And opposition came from within UNDP itself as many managers wondered why a development agency should involve itself with something apparently so far removed from its core agenda and that could entail involvement with militaries.

Second, the mine action community has traditionally kept itself quite separate from the development community for a variety of reasons. One enduring factor is the distinct cultural differences between the broad groups that tend to work in the two fields (this also holds true for humanitarian aid workers.) With the exception of mine risk education and advocacy staff, mine action personnel come primarily from military backgrounds, and are new to some of the basic concepts (and frustrations) of development work. This is equally true amongst mine action NGOs, commercial companies and UN staff. The latter also are often unfamiliar with their role as advisors and facilitators of government and local management. Even the language used by the two groups, and the donors who support them, is different. If only the participants of Retired Colonel X's 'Joined Up Mine Action Exercise Group' could be persuaded to join NGO Y's 'Participatory Workshop for Holistic Planning in the Transition Environment' (or vice versa) we would all be spared one more seminar. ('Translators' from both camps have informed me that these are indeed the same thing.)

The cultural divide can be equally large between staff of the affected countries themselves. Whether or not the national mine action staff come from military backgrounds—and many do—most are not experienced in the activities of other ministries. Where the army has the lead role in mine action the gulf often is widest, yet these often are the countries farthest past the humanitarian emergency phase of mine action and well along the development spectrum, such as Thailand. The ministry of finance, key to the funds of the international financial institutions, usually is far at the periphery. While some form of inter-ministerial consultative body exists in most mine-affected countries and, theoretically, would be the forum to rectify this situation, the fact that the problem is so pervasive would indicate that many are not operating at their full potential. The legitimate emphasis on operations during the first, emergency years of a programme can translate into neglect for the development of these bodies in favour of the proper functioning of a mine action centre (the generic 'MAC'). However understandable this might be, it is clear that some country programmes suffer in the long term as a result.

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Further cultural misunderstandings exist amongst staff from donor countries who deal with the major international lending institutions (the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, etc.). In their home capitals, relations with these institutions are handled by finance ministries, as opposed to the mostly foreign ministry staff who attend international mine action meetings or administer development assistance funds. In mine-affected countries themselves, many embassies

will have economic officers to interact with one group while a political or development officer will interact with the mine action actors. And they, in turn, deal with local counterparts at different ministries, often with insufficient communication between them.

A third reason is a simple lack of knowledge. Whether it is staff from UNDP, the World Bank or a donor country, development officers typically spend their time in countries such as Ghana and Chile where, even if a landmine problem does exist (as it does in Chile) they probably would not encounter it because the military is the predominant actor. A transfer to Lao or Angola will put them suddenly in charge of a portfolio with which they are not familiar and which—unless they are persuaded otherwise—might not strike them as an important development issue.

A fourth reason, simply put, is turf. Although each institution claims that it would have never engaged in turf battles if only the others hadn't started it first, in this war there are no innocent parties.

Scarce resources inspire competition. Competition leads to misunderstandings and these lead to compartmentalization of information and protection of 'territory'.

Scarce resources inspire competition. Competition leads to misunderstandings and these lead to compartmentalization of information and protection of 'territory'. The end result is an erosion of the collaborative processes and cross-fertilization of ideas that should generate progress.

Fifth, and last, is that this is a lot more complicated than it sounds. These obstacles are very real, as is the reticence by entrenched communities to change.

A way forward

Mine action's admission into the development world should not require a revolution; gradual infiltration will be sufficient. Often, the best way to gain acceptance in new territory is to learn the local language and customs. Mine action has begun this already by incorporating methodologies common to the development world to analyse the social and economic impact of mines on local populations. The relative impact of mines on communities now is calculated primarily through Landmine Impact Surveys⁵ and similar methods. The mine action community has made other inroads toward adopting the vocabulary and approach of sociologists and economists, primarily through the GICHD/UNDP study *Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action* and follow-on operational handbook. This was an important step and a good product; the logjam has been in transmitting the concepts to staff in the field and inducing modifications to their traditional approaches. NGOs, particularly Norwegian People's Aid, have taken the subject on board as well and incorporated socio-economic analysis into their tasking and planning. It is indeed a long way from the days when 'output' was measured by the number of mines cleared.

Cost-benefit analysis is the most recent vogue among donors and mine action academics. It is not unfamiliar territory for mine action—all programmes use it, although its application is varied and certainly not scientific. Two studies were conducted in Afghanistan in the 1990s to compare the value of land post-clearance with the cost of mine action (by all standards, the benefits far outweighed the costs) and most countries conduct some degree of so-called Level Four survey to assess the value of their work. But cost-benefit analysis has not yet been applied systematically in mine action and many operators are unfamiliar with its use in a formal sense. Benefits are calculated in terms of impact, average costs generally are known, and one is weighed against the other to determine priorities. (Then the following factors come into play: weather, terrain, available assets, proximity to other high priority tasks, politics, security, and donor earmarking, to name a few.) Cost-benefit analysis will definitely have some relevant applications however, particularly in taking snapshot post-clearance surveys to double-

check that the land is being used productively (and taking steps to ensure that it is). Work currently underway, for instance, by James Madison University's Mine Action Information Center, may provide some answers as to where cost-benefit analysis can be relevant and practical.

To continue the infiltration, a methodical approach by many players will be required, as will patience. The key to success lies at the country level, not in international meetings, and this is where the focus should shift. A few suggestions:

FOR THE NATIONAL DIRECTORS OF MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES

- Make sure that you know well in advance of a Consultative Group or Roundtable, and work to get mine action recognized. It need not be a specific agenda item—in fact its integration may be more persuasive if it is not. If mines affect roads, then this should be mentioned in the transportation section. If they affect arable land, then the minister of agriculture should present statistics on the amount of land that is denied to farmers because of landmine contamination, the estimated cost of clearance, and the estimated benefit of increased agricultural productivity.
- Get to know your counterparts in other ministries. Cultivate colleagues in the ministry of finance to bring them on board. Work early in the PRSP or I-PRSP process to identify mine action as a cross-cutting issue and participate in drafting the document.
- Do the same for the CCA, CCF and UNDAF
- If you have technical advisors from the United Nations make sure they know that you expect them to be responsible for advising you on mine action. Include these activities in your own annual workplan and those of relevant staff in your office.
- Think through the information available in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) or comparable database from the point of view of other development sectors without waiting for them to come to the MAC. Extract what would be useful to your colleagues in other ministries and government offices and take it to them, or have the minister to whom you report deliver it to his/her counterparts. Maps and data that clearly show the relationship between mine contamination and various sectors can be very persuasive once in the hands of the right people.
- Hold special briefings on mine action for the economic counsellors attached to the embassies of donor countries if they are different from the officers with whom you interact on a regular basis.
- Work to improve the functioning of the inter-ministerial body that provides oversight and coordination to mine action in your country, if one exists. Internally review its terms of reference, frequency of meetings, level of representation and agenda annually to see if these still correspond to the needs of your programme or if you should propose changes.
- Conduct post-clearance surveys to assess the benefits of mine action. The results will help you check whether or not your prioritization system is functioning well and whether or not the links to sequential development projects are being made where necessary. Post-clearance surveys are a good resource mobilization tool provided they substantiate the positive effects of your programme.
- Approach the representatives of the international financial institutions with a description of how mine contamination affects development and/or investment. Most likely, this will be a slow education process. If possible, ask a representative of the ministry of finance or other staff who deal with them on a regular basis to facilitate the meeting.

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

- At the country level the mine action technical advisors should assist their counterparts in all of the above.
- Technical advisors should take time out to study development literature and learn more about the culture and economic and social factors of the country in which they work.
- The advisors should meet frequently with representatives of other development institutions, attend their meetings and remain informed of all projects planned in mine-affected areas.
- The Resident Coordinator should recognize mine action as a cross-cutting issue and include the technical advisor and/or government counterpart in all relevant meetings, particularly the drafting of strategy documents.
- Programme Officers in country offices, who tend to work on many other portfolios beyond mine action, should advise the technical staff of other relevant factors and considerations outside the narrow sphere of mine action, and assist in the integration process.
- UN-supported programmes should seek funding for and encourage post-clearance surveys and a snapshot use of cost-benefit analysis to double-check priorities and demonstrate impact.
- Headquarters-level mine action staff should organize an outreach programme with GICHD to apply the findings of the *Study on Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action* and other relevant work.
- Headquarters-level mine action staff should remember to meet with representatives of the international financial institutions (particularly the World Bank and relevant regional development banks) when they visit mine-affected countries on mission.
- UN Headquarters, particularly UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, should redouble its efforts to engage the World Bank on this topic and seek guidance on how to further the agenda in the field.
- UNDP should develop and disseminate a list of suggested actions and interventions—including these—to its staff in the field and compile a guide to UNDP's many relevant, non-mine action resources such as lessons learned on the PRSP in post-conflict countries.⁶ The target audience should be mine action staff but it should be disseminated more broadly.

FOR INTERNATIONAL DONORS

- Work to integrate mine action within your own government and even within your own ministry and agency first. It is not uncommon for two members of the same foreign ministry of the same country to hold opposing views on whether or not mine action should be considered a development issue, and even to express both views at different meetings of, for example, UNDP.
- If a mine-affected country approaches you for funding, and you have none available, put them in touch with the relevant country desk officer and see if assistance cannot be obtained this way.
- Meet with your country's representatives to the World Bank and the regional development banks and advocate for the integration of mine action into their programming and budgeting processes.
- Write to the government representatives of mine-affected countries who are stationed in your own country, and organize meetings between them and representatives of development institutions.

- When you visit your own embassy in a mine-affected country, brief not only the ambassador and mine-action officer but also the economic counsellors and other staff who deal with the international development institutions if it is not the same person.
- Meet with the country director of the World Bank and of the regional development banks when travelling on mission to mine-affected countries.

This list is by no means exhaustive. But it does represent some practical steps to move the process forward and continue the expansion of the mine action community.

As mine action moves farther into this realm, however, care must be taken not to embrace the tools of development indiscriminately. There are some risks. When Ethiopia requested a window for mine action of *up to 10%* of its US \$300 million reconstruction loan (hoping to use as little as possible) the government and UNDP found it extremely difficult to raise needed funds for its humanitarian mine action programme since donors felt it was blessed with a US \$30 million bounty.

Mine action should seek to incorporate development tools and seek development financing only where it assists in raising the human profile of the problem. To reiterate the UN policy, landmines are first and foremost a humanitarian concern and must be addressed from that perspective. Most governments, NGOs and the citizens of mine-affected countries would agree. So, for example, while there are some viable applications of traditional cost-benefit analysis in mine action, there are some very real dangers in relying on it heavily for prioritization. This is true especially with respect to assessing the value of land, post-clearance, by its economic output. A significant problem for many post-conflict countries is the marginalization of certain groups and this often can be exacerbated by the presence of mines. Economic output certainly can be an important indicator but it is crucial not to end up favouring more advantaged groups in the process. Afghanistan provides one good illustration. If you do a cost-benefit example of the output of clearing valleys in the west, lush with vineyards and apricot trees, versus the tough desert in the south then the west will always win. Yet in one case, the additional output from the orchard might bring enough cash to build a new section to the family compound. In the other, there may barely be no quantifiable economic output at all. People will grow just enough subsistence crops to live at a pitiful level, but at least they will live.

What is the value of a family's livelihood versus a cash crop? The debate is specific to each country and even each village. Theoretically one could also calculate the marginal rate of improvement in the living standard or nutritional intake of the orchard owner versus the desert dweller, however a cost-benefit analysis of the process required to arrive at a clear answer might argue against it. In the end it likely would not merit the additional time required by overburdened mine action managers. Should this reality activate the modern world's instinct to reach for automation, spreadsheets and easy formulas, the end result could be even worse. New techniques are counterproductive when they reduce analysis and thoughtfulness rather than spur new approaches. Yes, mine action is about development as measured by economic output and it also is about reducing vulnerability and permitting resettlement and many incalculable benefits. The point is to use discernment and sound judgement in deciding which approach will help people most.

Mine action is about development as measured by economic output and it also is about reducing vulnerability and permitting resettlement and many incalculable benefits. The point is to use discernment and sound judgement in deciding which approach will help people most.

As for the teams of deminers in northern Chad, they still are clearing seemingly valueless areas that, once restored, will have significant value for the local population. They still are working in a financial situation familiar to many such mine action programmes, lurching from temporary stand-down to productivity with each new infusion of donor funding. Soon they hope not to be completely

dependent on foreign humanitarian aid as their government has agreed at long last to integrate mine action into its overall development plan, including its request to the World Bank, and to contribute funds from its own development budget as well.

Notes

1. United Nations, *United Nations Mine Action: a Strategy for 2001–2005*, A/56/448/Add.1 of 16 October 2001.
2. By the year 2015, all 191 Member States of the United Nations have pledged to reach the eight Millennium Development Goals. For a detailed description of the goals, see < <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.shtml>> .
3. *United Nations Policy on Mine Action*, annex II, para. 10, United Nations document A/RES/53/26, of 31 December 1998.
4. GICHD and UNDP, 2001, *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*, and its follow-on *Operational Handbook* published in 2002, both available on the page < <http://www.gichd.org/publications/index.htm>> .
5. This particular type of survey is conducted according to protocols established by a consortium of NGOs and UN agencies known as the Survey Working Group. A Landmine Impact Survey is a costly and time-consuming undertaking but should return benefits by helping mine action programmes target their resources more effectively and ultimately save time and money.
6. To name a few that are readily available on the web, *UNDP Support for Poverty Reduction Strategies in the PRSP Countries (2001)*, available at < http://www.undp.org/poverty/publications/docs/Poverty_UNDP_Support_to_PRS_Sep2001.pdf> ; *Policy Note: UNDP's Engagement in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*, < <http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/ADR/standard-documentation/policy%20notes/prsp.pdf>> ; Alison Scott, *Poverty Reduction Strategies In Conflict Countries: How Are They Different?*, < <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/review/semseries/scott.pdf>> and many others on the World Bank's site.

Determining disarmament and development priorities— the case of mine action

Sara M. SEKKENES

Mine action¹ achieves numerous objectives in a country emerging from conflict. Agreement concerning the need for mine action is symbolic of the desire for peace. Mine action can unify former adversaries around a common goal, thereby building confidence in the transition to peace. 'Mine action may be particularly important in relation to peace-building: it depends on the negotiations of access by parties to the conflict; it is addressing an instrument of war; and it is freeing up essential resources, which may also be disputed ones'.² There is, of course, the immediate safety and disarmament aspect of mine action—the physical removal and destruction of weapons from the community. Lastly, mine action enables development (of land, human resources, the economy and peace).

Mine action—a prerequisite for peace and development in mine-affected countries

Mine action is a long-term endeavour, beginning in the immediate post-conflict phase and continuing through the return to normality and peace. It meets different needs in these different phases. The phases marking the transition from conflict to normalcy do not necessarily occur in a linear way, but often simultaneously and at different rates. In this way, the disarmament and development objectives of mine action are mutually reinforcing, each one assisting the objectives of the other.

Mine action requires cooperation at all levels of society, from that of the highest government representatives to that of stakeholders in local communities. The desire for, and confidence in, peace can often be measured by the level of cooperation and willingness to facilitate the fulfilment of the required steps for mine action operations.³

As peace accords are slowly implemented, other aspects of life and livelihood become priorities. Also here, in the more long-term developmental phases of post-conflict regions, mine action can play an important role in the consolidation of peace and development. Ex-combatants are demobilized and reintegrated into society. Civilians confront the potential for normalization of life and, in many cases, the opportunity to return to pre-war activities for income generation.

If an environment conducive to the normalization of life and livelihood and the potential for social and economic development cannot be created in the post-conflict period, frustration levels will increase, distrust will poison any attempts at further reconciliation and peace can easily be undermined.

Sara M. Sekkenes is the Landmine Policy Advisor of Norwegian People's Aid, a NGO active in mine action worldwide. She has several years of field experience from mine action programmes in Africa and Europe and represents NPA in the international efforts to promote the Mine Ban Convention and humanitarian mine action.

Unemployment, inability to support one's family, the absence of needs satisfaction and the psychological distress this entails are fertile grounds for uprisings, which can quickly escalate into hostilities.

Mine action actors and their roles

An understanding and appreciation of the unique roles of mine action actors and stakeholders would probably improve cooperation, national ownership and effectiveness, and hence the ability of mine action to function as a vehicle for peace and development.

OPERATIVE ACTORS

Mine action operators are those who actually undertake demining. In the case of humanitarian mine action, this includes the United Nations and NGOs, as well as some commercial operators working on tenders who are paid through, for example, the International Trust Fund (ITF) or the UN Trust Fund. Mine action operators are tasked (or, in the absence of a mine action authority, task themselves) to clear mines in specific areas. These operators are ideally represented by national mine action centres (MACs)—the national authority designated to coordinate mine action. Depending on the specific situation of the country, MACs can be an entirely national entity, or managed by, or operated in cooperation with, the United Nations, with cooperation partners such as national and international NGOs and commercial companies.⁴

The *United Nations* works bilaterally with governments and national authorities in supporting, co-operating and even managing MACs. Together with national stakeholders they draft strategic national mine action plans, support the authorities in the drafting of national legislation, guidelines and criteria for accreditation, and create national standards for mine action based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The United Nations also works at the inter-agency and inter-ministerial levels promoting the coordination of national mine action plans with those of other sectors such as health, education, infrastructure, industry and agriculture. The United Nations plays a much greater role at the national and international levels than at the community level.

In mine action, *NGOs* tend to work at the local level, targeting the needs of less vocal and otherwise marginalized groups. NGOs are generally perceived as operating above self-interests and on a non-profit basis. Although often largely funded by governments, it is widely understood as well as accepted that NGOs must remain independent and critical to maintain their credibility and ability to act efficiently and effectively.

NON-OPERATIVE STAKEHOLDERS

The *mine-affected communities* are extremely important stakeholders. Not only do they live under the threat of mines—and hence would be well qualified to set priorities—they often have significant information concerning the scope of the problem.

The local community's confidence in and willingness to use cleared areas differentiates useful from useless mine action.

They also play an essential role in gauging the success of mine clearance. The local community's confidence in and willingness to use cleared areas differentiates useful from useless mine action.

National authorities have the ultimate responsibility to successfully address the country's mine problem. If the country is a signatory to the Mine Ban Convention, the national authority also has the duty to act in accordance with the international norm set by the convention.⁵ In relation to mine clearance, States Parties are obliged to (amongst other things):

- Undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of *all* anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of the Convention for that State Party, and
- Make every effort to identify *all* areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed [emphasis by author].⁶

These provisions are significant in that they ultimately leave the authorities with no other option than to address the mine problem in its entirety—at all levels of society.

Donors play a major role in mine action, providing the largest portion of funds necessary to carry out mine action operations. The range of donors involved in mine action is vast—including countries, international funds, NGOs and international humanitarian organizations. Over the last decade over US\$ 1 billion has been given to mine action. Donors would probably (and rightfully so) claim that they should play no operational role in setting mine action priorities. Obviously and indirectly, they do. It cannot be overlooked that donors have their own interests and therefore approach mine action from different perspectives—that of humanitarian aid, shared economic interest, promoting national interests, etc.

Local and national priorities for development

LOCAL NEEDS—LOCAL PRIORITIES

Obvious mine action priorities at the local level include access to water, firewood, local markets, construction material, hunting and grazing grounds, and land for cultivation as well as creating a safe neighbourhood where the fear of stepping on a landmine is absent. By addressing such needs, the initial stability is established that is necessary to build confidence for further peace-building.

Experience has shown that to obtain full confidence in clearance, the local community has to be consulted and involved, with the goal of popular participation in setting clearance priorities, evaluation of land cleared and identifying post-clearance activities. It can also be concluded that an environment conducive to the consolidation of peace and development is more easily established when there is local ownership of the problem, as well as the problem's solution.

In the initial phase of deployment, mine action programmes by NGOs usually employ a number of technically and managerially experienced international staff. This expatriate staff recruits and trains additional national staff to form the bulk of the human resources of the programme. In this way mine clearance programmes can promote the national capacity and capability to deal with the mine problem.

An environment conducive to the consolidation of peace and development is more easily established when there is local ownership of the problem, as well as the problem's solution.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) has, as often as possible and appropriate, made an effort to recruit staff in cooperation and coordination with demobilization programmes. Offering former combatants employment is beneficial to the employer, who capitalizes on the former combatant's knowledge concerning mines, and the employee, who has an opportunity to work and be reintegrated into society. When working to de-mine as opposed to mine, it might even assist former combatants in overcoming trauma and psychological stigma as they gradually come to realize the effects of war and landmines upon themselves, their families and communities as well as former foes.⁷

In the initial post-conflict phases, the link between success in addressing the local needs and the success of the peace process is quite evident. However, as time passes and peace is consolidated, a mine-affected community's needs will change. The more needs that are met, the more a community is able to involve itself in the improvement of its living conditions, community development and activities beyond that of pure survival, such as diversification of income, popular participation in decision-making, democratization and perhaps even nation-building. The further down this road a mine-affected community travels, the easier it is to engage in constructive discussions about local and national development priorities, their interlinkages, and the need for both.

NATIONAL NEEDS—NATIONAL PRIORITIES

Ideally, national mine action priorities would be those of the people of that particular country, but this is a simplification that neither brings much clarity nor does it illustrate reality. As national development often relates directly to the notion of an output or return in conventional and real economic terms, national priorities frequently have a more macro-economic focus. Regrettably, national priorities sometimes reflect the desires of a few well-situated decision-makers rather than the outcome of a transparent procedure in line with set objectives and policies.

National economic priorities serve an extremely important role in the prospects for sustainable development in mine-affected countries. National needs and priorities often target the reconstruction and rehabilitation (and hence demining) of a country's physical and commercial infrastructures, such as power plants, railroads, airports, harbours, road networks, bridges, factories, commercially viable agricultural land, mineral deposits and oil installations.

In practice, this economic focus tends to be the general emphasis of national authorities and hence influences the selection of priorities by national mine action authorities—regardless of politically elaborated criteria and policy statements focusing on other, non-economic, needs (such as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees).

By addressing the need for mine action in the planning and formulation of national development and poverty reduction strategies there are clear prospects for inclusion of both local and national priorities. However, in the end it is also a matter of resources, coordination of post-clearance activities and operational planning that ultimately form the work plans and gives clearance priority to some minefields above others.

Setting priorities—clash of interests or balanced approach?

Although it might help provide food for local communities and certainly decrease the number of new mine victims in the immediate post-conflict period, clearing land exclusively for subsistence farming will probably not develop the national economy. Prioritizing clearance for subsistence farming will

most likely leave primary and secondary road networks disrupted, making it difficult to govern, provide social services and consolidate security throughout the territory. It may even slow down or hinder a diversification of the economy that could otherwise be achieved through mechanizing farming, developing the food processing industry, promoting micro-enterprises, et cetera. The flow of money and goods and access to markets may also be hindered because transportation networks remain mined.

Yet what happens if one prioritizes only national needs and interests? Experience indicates that the famous 'trickle-down effect' often proves to be unbearably slow at improving the lives of the poor—if it does so at all. This is similar to what has been seen in other sectors: in many developing countries, large power plants built decades ago still fail to provide electricity to rural villages within sight of the power lines. Subsistence farmers are unlikely to ever enter the formal economy or receive the benefits of commercially obtained profit, and yet they are the ones who are forced to cultivate fields sown with deadly weapons.

Many argue that priority setting in mine action is particularly difficult and that it inevitably leads to clashes of interest. There are as many opinions as there are stakeholders. Some mine action authorities go so far as to claim that national sovereignty is at stake if supra- or sub-national interests are considered. Some in mine action feel that there is only one correct way of approaching priority setting—that only one stakeholder can lead and that all others must follow. Yet the various operative and non-operative stakeholders in mine action have different roles to play and it may be the full spectrum of mandates that could bring about the desired results. If we acknowledge that there will be more minefields than the combined mine action community's ability to deal with for some time to come, there is no reason why there couldn't be multiple priority lists to be dealt with simultaneously by the various actors that have clearly defined roles.

The various operative and non-operative stakeholders in mine action have different roles to play and it may be the full spectrum of mandates that could bring about the desired results.

To promote development in all of its aspects—human, social, economic—at the local and national levels, a balanced approach to national and local needs (and thus priorities for mine action) is probably the most promising. Only if all parties feel involved and actually participate in the development process will improvements take place at the national level as well as in the mine-affected villages and ultimately promote the consolidation of peace and reconciliation.

A balanced approach to priority setting

In light of the multitude of stakeholders, the various approaches to and opinions about development priorities, and the various levels at which the different actors can play their roles successfully, the priority-setting procedures are perhaps more important than the priorities themselves. Not only do the procedures need to be transparent and follow agreed-upon policies, the objective of or justification for clearance must be clearly identified (i.e. what is the planned post-clearance activity and how does it correspond to national and or local needs and development plans).

This approach to priority setting, however, requires the appreciation and acknowledgement of the various roles of mine action actors. It also entails much more sophisticated priority-setting procedures than currently used, if they are used at all. It necessitates that mine action, as an activity in emergency as well as in development contexts, is fully integrated into the planning and coordination of other humanitarian and development activities.

Humanitarian mine action is a comparatively young discipline within humanitarian emergency and development work. In the 1990s mine action programmes primarily engaged military-trained

personnel possessing the necessary skills and experience to conduct mine clearance and safe disposal of explosive ordnance. Military mine clearance has vastly different methodologies, objectives, standards and priorities than humanitarian mine action. In the past few years, voices within the mine action community have begun to call for a more comprehensive and holistic view of mine action. Humanitarian mine action is not only about the safe disposal of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO)—what one might consider its disarmament aspect in the strictest sense of the term. In addition to the essential technical knowledge that the military can bring to mine action, other backgrounds and skills among mine action actors can help to focus priority setting, community integration and linkages to other sectors of society, thereby contributing to the long-term success and effectiveness of mine action.

The difficulty in priority setting is determining how you justify in which order you clear the minefields. The fields that have the heaviest impact on lives and livelihood should be cleared first. It is necessary to ensure that beneficiaries of mine action activities correspond to identified target groups and that mine clearance has a positive impact directly or indirectly on society and the economy (whether at the national or local level) and hence, in accordance with set development and poverty

Elaborating the objectives of mine action, tying costs to desired results and development outputs rather than the number of square metres cleared, provides the argument and justification for a balance between efficiency and effectiveness and also gives a more realistic evaluation of mine action activities as a supporting tool for development.

reduction strategies, improves living conditions for target groups. Additionally, mine action is—by its nature—a very cost-intensive activity. Elaborating the objectives of mine action, tying costs to desired results and development outputs rather than the number of square metres cleared, provides the argument and justification for a balance between efficiency and effectiveness and also gives a more realistic evaluation of mine action activities as a supporting tool for development.

Although NGOs are considered ‘implementing partners’ of MACs and the United Nations, in that they support the development of national MACs and ideally would operate under their coordination, MACs and NGOs often have two different and quite distinct approaches to mine action—perhaps best described as that of a top-down approach versus that of bottom-up. When needs assessments are undertaken by the MAC at the national level, too often national interests predominate and there is no integration of local needs and priorities. At the level of a MAC, often the criteria for priority setting are economic, i.e. prioritizing clearance where the land will provide a substantial economic profit or gain in the national interest, not for the mine-affected communities as such. When undertaken by NGOs, priority setting is often integrated with or, in the best cases, done by the local community. Ideally a MAC should have the coordinating role of ensuring that priorities are made in accordance with agreed standards but not ultimately define what these priorities are. As both national and local priorities must be met when tasking mine clearance, MACs might be better suited to concentrating on national-level priorities, while NGOs could together with local administrations and communities oversee local priorities.

NPA’s focus on community participation and evaluation

NPA’s overall objective is to enhance the ability and opportunity of disadvantaged groups to control their own lives and together develop a society that respects and secures political, economic and social rights for all. In the mine action context, participation of rights-based organizations and partnership with civil society form the basis of sound priority setting and resource allocation. However, alleviating the threat of landmines and promoting the right to security and welfare require active cooperation with national and local authorities.

As the ultimate goal of mine action must be to achieve sustainable stability in politics, the economy, and social life, and the progressive devolution of aid and dependency from donors, outside institutions

and organizations, reinforcing and/or establishing national and local authorities' ownership of the landmine problem is considered crucial. Therefore, NPA's objective is to support the development of national institutional competence capable of addressing the landmine problem. This includes participating in the development of national plans, national priority-setting mechanisms, and a well-functioning national coordinating body. Within this context NPA also operates as an implementing partner directly involved in mine action with the objective to transfer competence and build a sustainable national mine action capacity while improving living conditions for identified target groups in accordance with identified needs.

NPA responds to the immediate post-conflict as well as developmental needs of a community through implementation of sound methodologies on priority setting and socio-economic aspects of mine action, and further enhancement of methods to improve humanitarian mine action along the lines of quality, cost-efficiency and impact. Its longer term objectives focus on the sustainable improvement of socio-economic living conditions for target populations in mine-affected areas and promoting the universalization of the Mine Ban Convention.

To meet these objectives, NPA promotes the implementation and use of transparent procedures and priority-setting methodologies. Using its Task Impact Assessment⁸ tool, local needs are identified in an assessment carried out with community representatives. This tool promotes local community involvement in planning operations and significantly increases two-way communication between NPA and the mine-affected community.

Whether tasked by a national MAC or local authorities, a NPA needs assessment focuses on three aspects. It verifies with the community affected by the mined area that:

- the task is a priority;
- that clearance will have a positive effect on the community's ability to improve its situation; and
- that a post-clearance activity or land use is identified, including who will actually implement the activity and if the necessary resources exist to carry it out.

The last point is an essential element in the disarmament-development relationship. Once the disarmament aspect of mine action is completed, are there individuals, local actors, NGOs or even authorities who will step in and provide other essential resources in order to be able to utilize the cleared area? A classic example is the clearance of fields for cultivation. In many cases in rural farming communities, there are no seeds or tools left after years of fighting. Even if the land is demined, the community will still not be able to cultivate it due to the lack of other essentials.

Once the disarmament aspect of mine action is completed, are there individuals, local actors, NGOs or even authorities who will step in and provide other essential resources in order to be able to utilize the cleared area?

An often overlooked part of mine action is evaluation. Clearing land that people are not confident enough to utilize is useless. In conducting its evaluations in Kosovo, NPA found that the confidence among local people in demining increased over time as local participation increased. The first minefields that were cleared in 1999 were more often still laying idle whilst fields cleared later were being cultivated and fully utilized. This could possibly be explained by the fact that in its initial phase, the project was set up in coordination with other external actors as a rapid response to the mine problem as soon as the security situation allowed. As can be expected, the various organizations drew on existing capacities in other programmes; NPA brought in several mine action staff from its programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There is no doubt this had implications in terms of distrust and the lack of involvement on the part of the mine-affected population. Perhaps bringing staff from an entirely different region would have been better.

In order to address the issue of cleared land not being utilized in Kosovo, the mine clearance supervisors ploughed the fields together with local farmers to build confidence in the clearance work and prepare the fields for the planting season. The need for such confidence-building measures decreased over time with the introduction of two-way communication procedures with the mine-affected populations. The same trend can be found in programmes elsewhere, for example in Mozambique⁹ and in Angola.

Concluding remarks

‘The total is greater than the sum of its parts’ is a maxim that comes to mind when trying to summarize how mine action integrates with disarmament and development. Mine action will enhance stability and prospects for development if the activities are coordinated with other non-mine action activities in a mutually reinforcing manner. All actors’ roles must be well defined, including their approach to development and in which way they can and will contribute to the mine action effort.

Divorcing the disarmament aspect of mine action from its development aspect has significant implications on the resources available for this activity. For example, the World Bank has traditionally been minimally involved in mine action, considering it a humanitarian activity (i.e. disarmament), and stated recently that it had no plans to alter this policy.¹⁰ Yet planning and financial support to the (re)construction and rehabilitation of a country’s infrastructure are classic World Bank issues. Some countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and others, have attracted World Bank funds for overall reconstruction and rehabilitation, of which a small part has been designated to mine action because it was a prerequisite for a development project (such as building a pipeline or a power plant). Increasing awareness that disarmament and development are two inseparable, interdependent aspects of mine action might encourage a shift in donors’ perspectives.

Experience shows that as mine action transitions from the emergency phase to longer-term development plans, the importance of mine action methodologies increases. Not only is the objective to clear mines, it is to ensure that the right mines are cleared first. Minefields that cause casualties and

Not only is the objective to clear mines, it is to ensure that the right mines are cleared first.

create obstacles for subsistence living and the potential for development must be prioritized. This, however, entails a much more thorough analysis of the local mine-affected environment, community needs and the longer-term plans for meeting these needs.

Notes

1. Disarmament is a component of mine action. Therefore, from this point forward, the article will refer to mine action and not specifically to disarmament .
2. Kristian Berg Harpviken, *Humanitarian Mine Action and Peacebuilding*, presentation at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness and Related Technologies of the Landmine Convention, 14 May 2003, Geneva, Switzerland.
3. Throughout the article, the term 'landmine' as well as the phenomenon 'mine action' will refer to both landmines and UXO and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Furthermore, the article deals with the issue of mine action as regards to clearance, survey, mapping and marking since its point of discussion is mine action in support of development more than the otherwise equally important objective, that of saving lives.
4. As companies usually follow terms of reference, their role in priority setting is minor as they take on tenders on already prioritized tasks.
5. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, which entered into force 1 March 1999. As of 1 July 2003, 134 States had formally agreed to

be bound by the convention, a process that includes domestic measures to 'ratify', 'accept', 'approve' or 'accede to' the convention and the deposit of a declaration with the United Nations Secretary-General indicating adherence to the convention.

6. Based on Article 5 of the convention. For full text, see < <http://www.icbl.org/treaty/text> > .
7. While this form of recruitment clearly has its advantages, it also brings with it a cause for caution. If not carefully conceived, mine action can have detrimental effects on deminers as well as on the communities in which they live or work. Psycho-social debrief and other forms of follow-up may be necessary for former soldiers to be able to 'normalize' fully. Mine action deals with geographically dispersed minefields and suspected areas; mine action operators move from one clearance task to the next in the process of clearing landmines, covering substantial geographical distances. This implies a roaming existence for expatriate staff and national deminers, who often live in the bush and are given little or no chance to settle down. While this might leave expatriates with a feeling of adventure, national deminers might face a feeling of rootlessness caused by never finding a home. The nomadic demining life can also contribute to broken relationships, an endless line of loose encounters and frustration of never belonging to anyone or anywhere. It takes little to imagine the potential consequences this can have on the spread of HIV, a disease that undermines development. In this way, the structure and organization of mine action programmes can have secondary impacts on peace-building, consolidation and development, and should be further examined.
8. NPA's *Task Impact Assessment* is priority-setting procedure developed for mine action and is used to assess the potential impact of mine clearance operations prior to, during and after deployment as basis for decision-making in mine action programmes.
9. For more information, see Ananda S. Millard and Kristian Berg Harpviken, 2000, *Reassessing the Impact of Humanitarian Landmine Action: Illustrations from Mozambique*, PRIO report 1/2000, Oslo, Norway.
10. Statement by the World Bank to the Contact Group on Resource Mobilisation within the framework of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, second Session of the Standing Committee, 12–16 May, 2003, Geneva, Switzerland. For more information, see < http://www.gichd.ch/pdf/mbc/SC_may03/SCGS%20Detailed%20Report%2012_16%20May%202003.pdf > .

The role of the military in mine action

Ian MANSFIELD

Over fifty countries in the world today suffer from one particularly long-lasting legacy of conflict—anti-personnel landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). In countries like Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Iraq, the presence of landmines represents a major threat to lives, and hinders reconstruction and development efforts. Regardless if the landmine threat is the result of a long-past conflict or restricted to a particular geographic region, it still causes unwarranted social and economic problems. Landmines affect the wider economic and social fabric of an affected society.

Mine clearance was once seen as a ‘military problem’ and troops were often assigned to mine clearance duties before demobilization, such as at the end of the Second World War. Though this may be consistent with the obligations under international law of parties to a conflict to be responsible for mines, booby-traps and other explosive devices laid by those parties, it does not necessarily lead to substantial remediation of the problem in humanitarian terms. With the increased use of anti-personnel landmines in a random and indiscriminate way (as a guerrilla warfare weapon) and the increase in internal conflicts, millions of landmines have just been left behind at the end of conflicts.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 spawned a new sector in the relief and development world—that of ‘humanitarian demining’ or mine action, where civilian organizations took the lead in dealing with the landmine threat. However, at first glance it seems that the military would still have a leading role to play in the issue. Military actors have a knowledge of mines and explosives, are trained and equipped for the task, and are used to working in a controlled and disciplined environment. However, addressing the problem of landmines involves more than just removing them from the ground. Due to the slow nature of mine clearance, public safety education campaigns are needed, surveys are required to locate unmapped mined areas, suspect areas must be marked, and the needs of mine victims addressed.

The definition of mine action

According to the International Standards for Mine Action (IMAS),¹ ‘mine action’ refers to ‘activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and UXO’. It is noted

Since July 2002 Ian Mansfield has been the Operations Director at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), responsible for all operational, technical and research activities carried out by the Centre. Prior to this appointment, he was the Mine Action Team Leader at UNDP headquarters in New York. His field experience includes being the programme manager for the United Nations mine action programmes in Afghanistan, Lao and Bosnia. Before joining the United Nations, he served as an engineer officer in the Australian Army for twenty years, and had worked in Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Canada and the United States, as well as held a variety of command, regimental and training postings in Australia. This article is drawn from *A Study of the Role of the Military in Mine Action*, conducted by the GICHD and published in September 2003.

that mine action 'is not just about demining; it is also about people and societies, and how they are affected by landmine contamination. The objective of mine action is to reduce the risk from landmines to a level where people can live safely; in which economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination, and in which the victims' needs can be addressed'.

Mine action comprises five complementary groups of activities:

- mine risk education;
- humanitarian demining, that is, mine and UXO survey, mapping, marking and (if necessary) clearance;
- victim assistance, including rehabilitation and reintegration;
- stockpile destruction; and
- advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines.

A number of other enabling activities are required to support these five components of mine action, including: assessment and planning, mobilization and prioritization of resources, information management, human skills development, management training, quality management and the application of effective, appropriate and safe equipment.

Mine action actors include a wide range of organizations. A number of international, specialist demining NGOs were formed in the late 1980s, and some existing NGOs such as Norwegian People's Aid and Save The Children, took on mine action projects in addition to their traditional roles. Local mine action NGOs have been established as well, particularly in Afghanistan. In some countries, like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, commercial companies play a large role, particularly with mine clearance and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) contracts. In other countries, such as Cambodia and Lao, mine action programmes were established with the responsible government body hiring its own demining staff. Finally, the military, both local and visiting, has played a role in mine action.

A number of states have significant military mine action capacities. Indeed, many armed forces possess considerable expertise in managing and overseeing humanitarian demining and EOD programmes, especially in emergency situations. Despite the involvement of military personnel in many mine action programmes (in some of which they represent the core assets), military units have not been deployed consistently within national programmes. Furthermore, organizations such as the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank, as well as many individual donor

The full potential of military or joint military-civilian mine action programmes has not been appreciated—either by the programme organizers or the donor community.

governments, have policies that do not readily support military capability in mine action, humanitarian or not. The funding policies of major donors and many donor governments may even have been a key factor in the marginalization of military mine action efforts. It is possible, therefore, that the full potential of military or joint military-civilian mine action programmes has not been appreciated—either by the programme organizers or the donor community.

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has recently completed a study examining the role of the military in mine action.² The study was commissioned by the United Nations, and sought to address issues such as the suitability, appropriateness and capability of the military to undertake mine action. The findings show that while using military actors in mine action is not always appropriate, militaries can play a positive role in some aspects.

The use of the military in humanitarian mine action

Two main types of military personnel have the potential to carry out mine action tasks: the members of the national armed forces of the mine-affected country ('local military forces') and military units or individuals from armed forces other than those of the affected state ('visiting military forces'). Local military forces may be carrying out a national mine action programme, either acting as the national authority or as a component of a national programme, or may be providing soldiers to be trained as deminers under a 'military to military' training scheme. These schemes normally involve a visiting military force assisting the local military of a developing nation.

Visiting military forces may be composed of military units and individuals deployed under a UN or other peacekeeping mission, on a landmine-specific assignment, or under some other arrangement. Visiting military forces may include individual instructors or technical advisers assisting in UN-sponsored mine action programmes, instructor teams under bilateral 'train-the-trainer' programmes, or specialists in support of specific parts of national programmes (such as teams establishing mine dog detection projects, mine risk education projects, or information management systems). Assistance may also include the provision of equipment, but experience has shown that heavy military minefield breaching equipment (usually based on a battle tank) is not suitable for humanitarian demining. These sixty-tonne vehicles are designed for military minefield breaching (that is, just punching lanes through a minefield during a battle) and it cannot be guaranteed that all mines will be cleared.

A number of bodies and institutions have looked at the broader role of the military in humanitarian affairs over the past decade. In January 1994, for instance, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (now the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs—OCHA) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) jointly hosted a conference on the use of military assets in humanitarian operations. This conference produced a set of guidelines for when and under what conditions these assets should be used:

- Military assets should be used for life-saving and life-supporting operations;
- They should be used only at the request of the government of an affected state, or at the request of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs with the agreement of that state;
- The assets should integrate with and support existing disaster relief response;
- They should operate under an integrated civilian management;
- They should be at no cost to the receiving state; and
- They should be, in principle, unarmed.

In 1999, a set of guidelines³ concerning UN involvement with the militaries of mine contaminated countries for mine action activities were developed to complement the UN mine action policy⁴ adopted the previous year. The original UN policy stated that 'training or support for mine action will not, in principle, be provided to the militaries of mine contaminated countries'. One of the reasons for this decision was that at the time the policy was developed in the mid-1990s, the UN experience with mine action programmes involved Angola, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia and Mozambique. In these countries, it was argued that the 'military' had been part of the problem and not the solution.

However, as the United Nations role in assisting mine-affected states grew, countries like Thailand, Jordan and Nicaragua were establishing mine action programmes based around, or with heavy

involvement of, the military. Many of these countries had signed the Mine Ban Convention and were seeking support from the United Nations. It was argued that the militaries of these type of countries were well organized, disciplined and under civilian government control, and thus should play a role in the national landmine response. As a result, the UN policy was revised and the new guidelines were approved by the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action during a meeting chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on 25 January 1999.

The revised guidelines stressed the UN principle of neutrality and impartiality, but recognized 'nonetheless that the militaries of mine contaminated countries could contribute to humanitarian

Priorities for mine action should be established in the context of the humanitarian, reconstruction and development requirements.

mine action'. It was acknowledged that the military often have the necessary technical knowledge and expertise, particularly in the area of mine clearance. The guidelines also recognized that the primary responsibility for taking action against the presence of landmines remains with the affected state, which has a right to determine which implementing mechanisms and arrangements should be established. It was agreed that the United Nations would look at providing assistance on a case by case basis, but a strong preference was given to situations where the overall coordination, control and priority setting for mine action was the responsibility of civilian authorities. In particular, priorities for mine action should be established in the context of the humanitarian, reconstruction and development requirements.

Select findings from the GICHD study

USE OF LOCAL MILITARIES

Local armed forces begin with some advantages in mine clearance. They typically have experience with landmines and other UXO, their salaries are already paid, they possess a logistics support system, including communication and medical back-up, and are organized to operate as a team. Local military forces may have the necessary equipment for demining, but if not, this can be provided by visiting forces bilaterally or multilaterally.

In many contexts, military forces have been widely used in mine action, including humanitarian demining, although with varying degrees of success. In Nicaragua, for instance, the Nicaraguan army has carried out all demining. Its effectiveness has been greatly enhanced by support from visiting military forces operating under the auspices of the Organization of American States. On the other hand, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the use of Entity Armed Forces in demining has been expensive and demining accidents unacceptably high in the initial phases when compared to commercial companies and NGOs. The armed forces in Cambodia have made a relatively limited contribution to humanitarian demining to date, though the GICHD study recommends that their role and contribution be reviewed, due to the recent improvements in organization, training and equipment of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and the declining donor funds available for civilian mine action structures in-country.

Military forces often operate in environments where information is restricted and controlled, and may be reluctant to provide data and information to others. This makes coordination difficult, if not impossible, and duplication and gaps likely. In many contexts, local military forces are reluctant to accept coordination or instruction from a civilian authority. This appears to be the case in Cambodia, for example. In Lebanon, the military has seemed reluctant to accept external advice on mine action, although information sharing has reportedly improved. Similarly, in Nicaragua, after early difficulties, coordination with the National Demining Commission and visiting military forces seems to have significantly improved.

Clearing mines for humanitarian purposes demands specific expertise, which may not be gained as a result of ordinary military training or experience. This has been noted in such places as Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia. Also, morale among deminers serving in local military forces may be low, depending on salary and conditions, and conscripts do not make the best deminers. It should not be forgotten that military deminers are first and foremost soldiers and as such will be used as combat engineers if hostilities re-emerge. Similarly, in the aftermath of an internal armed conflict, the national army may not be perceived as neutral and may not be welcomed by affected communities. In these situations it is better not to use the military, or to assign them tasks that do not bring them into contact with a community, like the clearance of military barracks or airfields.

The GICHD study did not find much evidence of the use of the military in areas of mine action beyond mine clearance. While the military may be able to provide warnings about the technical dangers of landmines and UXO, it is not suited to undertake community-based mine risk education programmes, where social issues and helping to develop alternative coping mechanisms are important. In a few cases the local military may have provided immediate medical care to a civilian mine victim, but it does not become involved in the provision of prosthetics or rehabilitation activities. Very few militaries anywhere in the world have played an active role in calling for a ban on anti-personnel landmines. The one other area where the local military has been seen to play a significant role is in stockpile destruction in those countries that have signed the Mine Ban Convention. Destroying stockpiles requires logistic support, such as inventory control, transport and unpacking prior to destruction. The local military can undertake these labour-intensive tasks.

VISITING MILITARY FORCES

Many armed forces possess considerable expertise in mine action, including managing and overseeing humanitarian demining and EOD programmes, especially in emergency situations. The positive elements they may bring are experience, knowledge of techniques and advanced EOD skills, and in a number of cases familiarity with the International Mine Action Standards. A number of the case studies in the GICHD study, notably Bosnia and Herzegovina and Nicaragua, show that demining accidents have been reduced due to training and oversight from visiting military forces.

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However, in mine-affected countries where there is both military and civilian involvement in the mine action processes, visiting military forces tend to view their mission as fulfilling a rather narrow service. Cooperation and coordination with civilian structures are not always accorded adequate priority, which can lead to compartmentalization of the assets being delivered. Certain missions may even be undertaken without any direct knowledge of the civilian organizations operating in the same theatre.

Bilateral arrangements between militaries can often be appropriate when the local military is largely or entirely in charge of a country's mine action programme. Such agreements, however, may not provide an adequate planning and programming framework when there are multiple local and international actors involved, as programming complexity increases exponentially as the number of actors increases. As an example, it is possible that a National Mine Action Authority or a UN Mine Action Centre may be working in conformity with its locally adapted standards, but a visiting military force may be trained on a different interpretation. The IMAS represent an international set of standards that may be adapted and interpreted differently by each host country, making no two countries' technical procedures or standing operating procedures exactly alike. Often, such disparities will become evident only late in the programme cycle as an increasing amount of operational responsibility is assumed by the national authority. The implications of this may involve duplication, unnecessary cost

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or the need to re-clear land. Again, the need for a strong, central national coordination body established early in the life of a programme is seen as important in avoiding these situations.

UN peacekeepers have rarely engaged in large-scale humanitarian demining or EOD tasks (Kosovo being a notable exception). Thus, although UN peacekeepers have been present in Lebanon for more than two decades, they have typically conducted only mine clearance to support their own operations, and according to their national military procedures. In fact, throughout the more than twenty-year existence of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), as seemingly simple a task as the handover of records concerning mine clearance work between incoming and outgoing contingents appears not to have been accomplished.

USE OF MILITARY TECHNICAL ADVISERS

Visiting militaries often assign military personnel to serve as technical advisers (TAs) to the various mine action centres and project implementation units. Many of these have performed admirably, and the secondment of active military personnel appears to have been a successful strategy for getting a mine action programme up and running in an emergency phase and in highly specialized roles, such as EOD.

However, the overall contribution of these secondment programmes has been modest in the longer term. There have been criticisms of the role played by some TAs, on the basis of unclear chains of command and reporting lines, and confused terms of reference. Nor are TAs necessarily experienced in building local capacities through advising their local counterparts. It has also been claimed that coordinating authorities have sometimes failed to exploit fully their skills and potential contributions to the programme. A number of the case studies contained within the GICHD study, while acknowledging an important role for in-kind military advisors at the outset of a mine action programme, express concern about their contribution over the longer term in a development context. This is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cambodia in particular, where TAs may not necessarily have been equipped with the skills needed to sustain mine action.

In 1999, for instance, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre hosted seventy-six TAs, both military and civilian. A review by UNDP concluded that, 'while the military has made an impressive contribution in developing capacity within the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), particularly technical capacity, in general military advisers are less suited to meet the training needs and capacity demands CMAC now faces'. Indeed, TAs may end up learning more about mine action than do their national counterparts. These difficulties are compounded by tours of duty—typically six months—that are often too short for the individuals to make an effective contribution to the programme.

TAs can represent a very high cost for a mine action programme. The incremental costs associated with any foreign duty assignment of personnel from visiting military forces may be at least as high as the full cost of engaging equally well-qualified civilian personnel for the same assignment. In addition, a different framework for employment would allow for the termination of the assignment of an employee whose performance proved to be unsatisfactory—something that cannot readily be done with personnel seconded on a temporary basis from a visiting military force.

PEACE AGREEMENTS

Whenever the impact of mines and UXO justify a mine action programme, ceasefire agreements and peace accords should consider and address mine contamination and mine action activities, including measures for their enforcement. Although the timely provision of military minefield records following the cessation of hostilities contributes positively to humanitarian demining, too often essential mine-related issues have either not been addressed at all in ceasefire agreements and peace accords, or addressed too late and inadequately.⁵ The issues that must be covered in a peace agreement include exchange of technical information between parties to the conflict, minefield marking and mine and UXO clearance, an end to the use of anti-personnel mines, stockpile destruction, and international cooperation and coordination. As soon as a civilian coordinating authority has been established, it should take over responsibility for mine action. In the interim, it is preferable for the United Nations to assume the coordination role as a stopgap measure (most likely during a peacekeeping operation), rather than use either of the militaries of the former warring parties.

The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has called for mine action activities to be implemented during the peacekeeping phase ‘in such a manner that their viable continuity is guaranteed to the maximum extent possible’, and has specifically recommended that troop-contributing countries follow national and international standards for mine action.⁶

ENHANCING COMBAT CAPACITY

The provision of assistance to local military forces for mine action purposes, in the form of training and/or equipment, has sometimes been controversial as these can also enhance combat capacity. The nation providing military assistance must carefully consider the potential ramifications of supplying training or equipment to a military force. The historical evolution of the conflict, the current peace and reconciliation developments as well as the nature of the military structure and deployment must all be weighed against the potential benefits of military support for mine action prior to the provision of assistance. There is no set mechanism to decide this, as most military to military assistance is provided on a bilateral basis.

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DEMOBILIZATION

Finally, the linkages between demobilization and the creation of a long-term mine action capacity have been insufficiently studied. The GICHD study found that the idea of using demobilized soldiers as deminers is often discussed at the end of a conflict, but in reality this has not occurred in any organized fashion. Ex-combatants may often end up working as deminers in either government programmes or with NGOs, but this has happened more by chance and on an informal basis rather than as part of a deliberate programme. It would seem that demobilized soldiers would have some knowledge of explosives, are used to working in a disciplined environment, and that social benefits may derive from former combatants working together. On the other hand, the transient lifestyle of a deminer does not help with reintegration, former combatants may not have been sufficiently trained during their military service, or the local people may not trust former soldiers to demine their land.

Conclusion

The GICHD study on the role of the military in mine action found that the military has played a significant role in a number of national mine action programmes. This includes through involvement by the local military forces, or with support from a visiting military force. Invariably, at the end of a conflict, local militaries will need training and equipment to enable them to undertake humanitarian demining tasks according to international standards. The decision to provide such support needs to be carefully weighed against the risk of enhancing their war fighting capabilities and what phase of the post-conflict period it is. The study was unable to determine if it was cheaper to use the military for demining tasks, as productivity and cost-effectiveness are areas that require further research in the whole mine action sector. The use of visiting military forces, on the other hand, has been found to be most effective in the emergency or start-up phase of a national mine action programme.

Wherever there is a mine or UXO problem, humanitarian and developmental initiatives necessarily involve a high degree of contact and interaction between military personnel, non-military mine action

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personnel and local communities. Military capabilities, if properly directed and controlled, can bring important skills and organizational assets to complement many mine action activities, particularly in the emergency or start-up phase of a programme. Military organizations are normally trained to be mission-oriented and to complete these missions as quickly and efficiently as possible. This works well for almost all military problems, and

indeed for many humanitarian problems like infrastructure repair, but establishing national mine action programmes under post-conflict conditions normally requires a longer-term approach than a military, 'task oriented' one. Military actors are unlikely to have the best idea how mine clearance fits into the larger mine action picture.

The component activities of mine action have to be closely coordinated if they are to work at all and military staff are well versed in the concept of how numerous interlocking components make up a whole. Mine action planning has to take place with a number of different agencies, both military and non-military, which often have different perspectives and agendas. All the actors must be prepared to submit to overall coordination and direction. This does not mean interfering in the established military 'chain of command', but that the broader issues like national strategies and priority setting for all aspects of mine action are developed in a consultative manner with the full range of actors.

Notes

1. *International Mine Action Standards*, 04.10, second edition, 1 January 2003, available at <<http://www.mineactionstandards.org/imas.htm>>.
2. Available at <<http://www.gichd.ch>>.
3. *United Nations Mine Action and the Use of the Militaries*, approved by the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action during a meeting chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on 25 January 1999, available at <<http://www.undp.org/erd/devinitiatives/mineaction/militari.pdf>>.
4. *Assistance in Mine Clearance—Report of the Secretary-General*, United Nations document A/53/496 of 14 October 1998, Mine Action and Effective Coordination—United Nations Policy, Annex II, p. 31, available at <http://www.mineaction.org/unmas/_refdocs.cfm?doc_ID=280>.
5. See Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action, 2003, *Mine Action Guidelines for Ceasefire and Peace Agreements*, available at <http://www.mineaction.org/countries/_refdocs.cfm?doc_ID=1461>.
6. *Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects*, United Nations document A/57/767 of 28 March 2003, available at <<http://www.un.dk/doc/A.57.767.pdf>>.

Paving the bridge between disarmament and development: resources generated by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

Kerry BRINKERT

The United Nations 1987 International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development reported that while disarmament and development ‘have a close and multidimensional relationship’, the two are ‘distinct processes’.¹ The matter of anti-personnel mines undoubtedly underscores the former point, but it does so in a way that suggests an interrelationship, rather than distinction, between disarmament and development processes. This close connection was foreshadowed in the early 1990s when organizations like Human Rights Watch highlighted that while anti-personnel mines are arms, they are also barriers to development in that ‘the presence of mined regions can seriously cripple the ability to build a post-war economy, through, for example, disabling transport and communication systems, and preventing agricultural endeavours.’²

Given how anti-personnel mines imply an interrelationship between disarmament and development, it logically follows that the international instrument of choice for those wishing to address the totality of the matter was one incorporating characteristics of both disarmament and development. The desire for such an instrument was realized on 18 September 1997 when the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction was adopted.³ This instrument obliges its member states to disarm—requiring them to forever surrender the use of anti-personnel mines and to destroy existing stockpiles. But it also commits states to take action to address the fact that anti-personnel mines ‘obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.’⁴ The convention requires that mined areas be marked, monitored, fenced and cleared, that mine risk education be provided to populations in affected areas, and that steps be taken to provide for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine victims.

In essence, the convention’s potential has been that of a bridge between the disarmament and development processes. However, the convention cannot live up to its full potential in connecting these two destinations without one important element: the resources that are necessary to pave this bridge and hence truly complete the project of conclusively resolving the concerns related to anti-personnel mines. To date, two important characteristics of the convention have lent themselves to ensuring that the necessary resources have been generated. On one hand, individual *state responsibility*—in the sense that no supranational authority exists to oversee implementation and enforce compliance—means that individual mine-affected states must take full ownership over identifying their landmine problems, developing plans to address these problems and reaching out for assistance

Kerry Brinkert is the Manager of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). This paper is based largely upon data collected and reports drafted by the ISU in the context of the support provided to the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group Coordinator.

if necessary. On the other hand, *partnership*—as articulated in Article 6 of the convention—makes it clear that a variety of actors stand ready to help.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate that the convention truly is living up to its promise in large part because state responsibility and partnership have interrelated in such a way that significant resources have been generated since the convention's entry into force. This paper aims to highlight *what* has been generated (although acknowledging that what is also at stake is *how* this has been used). While money and the traditional donor community are certainly key elements, the matter of resources to ensure the implementation of the convention is not as simplistic as a one-way flow of money from relatively wealthy, unaffected countries to relatively poor, mine-affected counterparts, nor is it about money alone. Finally, this paper suggests various means to ensure a sustainability of resources with a view to ensuring that the convention fulfils its true potential as a bridge between development and disarmament.

Resources provided by donor states to mine-affected states

Article 6 of the convention states that 'each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance'—assistance for mine clearance and related activities, mine risk education, the care and rehabilitation of landmine victims, and the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. An overview of available information on the resources provided by the convention's States Parties to mine-affected countries indicates that both sizeable contributions have been made in the context of the convention and that a broad range of countries have defined themselves as 'in a position to do so'. Between 1997 and 2002, over US\$ 800 million in contributions has been recorded on the part the convention's States Parties that have supported mine action efforts in other countries. What is equally remarkable is that those countries that have defined themselves as 'in a position to do so' extend beyond traditional donor states to include a total of thirty-six States Parties, including countries from all regions of the world.⁵

In addition to contributions flowing directly from the national budgets of States Parties, between 1997 and 2002 over US\$ 160 million in support of mine action has been provided by the European Commission, an organization of which all but one of its members is a signatory to the convention. During the same period, nine states that have not yet joined the convention contributed over US\$ 425 million. Thus, in addition to a vast majority of states not party to the convention having exhibited behaviour that indicates a certain level of respect for the convention's disarmament objectives (e.g., by not using or producing anti-personnel mines), many of these states are acting in a manner consistent with the convention's development objectives by allocating sizeable funds for mine action.

In total over the last six years, approximately US\$ 1.4 billion has been spent by states and the European Commission in support of mine action being undertaken in other states. This fact on its own is remarkable, but equally so is the fact that the annual total amount of recorded resources provided by these actors has remained relatively constant over the last several years.

Although the amount of funds generated in the context of the fulfilment of the aims of the convention is no doubt impressive, money should not be considered analogous to a broader conceptualization of resources. Some States Parties to the convention that are not considered to be

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traditional donors have made meaningful contributions to this effort. For example, Argentine military personnel have carried out demining and explosive ordnance disposal operations in Kuwait as part of a UN peacekeeping mission. Experts from Brazil have participated in mine action efforts in Central America and Angola. Malaysia's Defence Cooperation Programme includes a component to help train developing countries in demining and mine destruction.

Mexico has been a long-standing participant in the Pan American Health Organization's Tri-Partite Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration programme. And, peacekeepers from Uruguay have cleared vast tracks of mined land in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁶

Resources provided by mine-affected states

Often overlooked is the fact that the mine-affected States Parties themselves have made substantial contributions to addressing the humanitarian impact of landmines within their borders. While many of these states are relatively poor and include some of the world's least developed economies, they have acted in a manner consistent with the convention's emphasis on state responsibility, demonstrating full ownership over their development issues related to anti-personnel mines by allocating sizeable domestic resources.

In 2002 and 2003, twenty-one of the mine-affected States Parties responded to a questionnaire on mine action resources.⁷ The information contained in their responses indicates that these states have applied more than US\$ 180 million in mine action funding and in-kind resources since 1997. Indeed, in many of these countries the annual financial commitment to mine action has grown over time to the point when in 2002 these twenty-one States Parties dedicated resources to mine action valued at more than US\$ 41 million.

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A variety of domestic resources for mine action exist. In addition to funds having been allocated to mine action programmes and mine action centres in state budgets, the armed forces in many instances have made significant contributions to mine action. Nicaragua is an important case in point, having dedicated to its mine action effort the equivalent of over US\$ 15 million in military salaries, equipment and transportation between 1997 and 2002.⁸ State-owned enterprises also can play a significant role in providing resources for mine action. In Peru, for example, state-owned electrical utilities have contributed to the mine action effort by investing funds in clearing mined areas where high-tension electrical towers are located.⁹ In Croatia, public companies allocated 5.8 million euro in funding for mine action between 1998 and 2002.¹⁰

Resources obtained by mine-affected states from development banks

In acting upon their responsibility to pursue the disarmament and development aims of the convention within their own countries, some mine-affected States Parties also have recognized that the World Bank and the regional development banks should be considered important means of acquiring resources. This is logical, when one considers that the World Bank is one of the world's largest sources of development assistance.

According to the World Bank, resources in 2003 were being provided by it to forty 'conflict-affected countries' with a view to supporting efforts 'to assist war-torn populations, resume peaceful development, and prevent relapse into violence.'¹¹ Many of these war-torn countries are mine-affected States Parties and some of them have already accessed World Bank loans in support of their mine action efforts. Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the first cases. On 31 July 1996 approval was granted for US\$ 7.5 million in financing from the World Bank Group's International Development

Association for a mine action programme, which the World Bank noted needed to be understood as part of, and closely coordinated with, the overall reconstruction and economic recovery programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹²

Another South-Eastern European state that experienced war in the 1990s, Croatia, also has made extensive use of World Bank lending opportunities to clear landmines in the context of development. In at least two instances, Croatia has incorporated mine action into larger World Bank supported development projects. For example, the 37.8 million euro loan for the Reconstruction Project for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem includes a 3.2 million euro mine clearance component, which is necessary to achieve the other flood control, waste water management and nature protection objectives of the project.¹³ In addition, the approximate 100 million euros received by Croatia in World Bank financing for its Emergency Transport Project included over 20 million euros to clear landmines, which the World Bank noted was 'an essential first step in the repair and reconstruction of infrastructure networks.'¹⁴

In addition to its lending activities, some World Bank programmes provide grants. Afghanistan, for example, benefited from a US\$ 350,000 grant from the World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund, which supported the production of a detailed cost-benefit analysis on the socio-economic impact of mine action in that country.¹⁵

Resources shared between mine-affected states

Another sometimes overlooked resource is the capacity that has been developed in some mine-affected countries, which logically could be of benefit to other mine-affected states. In fact, in many cases this capacity already has been shared by mine-affected States Parties.

For example, both Honduras and Nicaragua have indicated that they have contributed to the mine action effort in Peru. For its part, Peru has stated that it has the capacity to participate in demining as part of peacekeeping operations. Yemen has stated that it is having discussions regarding how it could apply its extensive experience, knowledge and capacity to tackle the landmine problem in Lebanon. Chad has indicated that other African countries have expressed an interest in learning from its experience.¹⁶

Recently, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlighted its active involvement in facilitating cooperation amongst mine-affected states. Through its Mine Action Exchange Programme—or MAX—the UNDP has provided a practical means of fostering cooperation between mine-affected countries with a view to building relationships, sharing lessons learned and hopefully avoiding costly mistakes. To date Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Croatia and Mozambique have benefited from this programme and planned beneficiaries include Albania, Cambodia, Somalia and Yemen.¹⁷

Resources provided by the private sector

In addition to the resources provided by donor states, or allocated, borrowed or shared by mine-affected states themselves, another important source of mine action funding is the private sector. While information on this support to mine action is more difficult to obtain, it is possible to account for more than US\$ 11 million in contributions to mine action by private sector actors over the past six years. What is most remarkable about private sector contributors is the diversity of actors involved in supporting mine action.¹⁸

Three kinds of actors stand out. The first type includes those humanitarian and development organizations that both raise and use private sector funds. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an important example. Through its Special Appeal for Mine Action, between 1999 and 2001 the ICRC raised over CHF 7 million from sources other than national governments or national Red Cross societies—approximately 12% of the funds generated by the Appeal.¹⁹

The second type of actor that plays a key role in generating private sector funds includes those actors who exist primarily to raise or channel funds for the use of others in the field. One of the first and most successful examples is the Adopt-a-Minefield programme. This programme provides a means for individuals, communities and corporations to ‘adopt’ minefields in various mine-affected countries, thereby ensuring their clearance and return to productive use. To date this programme, in part with the support of matching government funds, has raised US\$ 8.38 million.²⁰ Working in partnership with Adopt-A-Minefield and other initiatives is the Canadian Landmine Foundation, which similarly provides the private sector an avenue to direct funds in support of the aims of the convention. The Canadian Landmine Foundation has raised, again with the backing of matching funds from the public sector, over CDN\$ 2 million since 1999.²¹

The third type of actor in this field is probably the most important as it includes the private sector actors which provide funds directly to mine action programmes or organizations like the ICRC, or which channel the funds through mechanisms like Adopt-A-Minefield. Global networks of service-minded volunteers, like Rotary International and the Soroptimist International, have contributed millions of dollars to mine action since the convention’s establishment.²² Roots-of-Peace has tapped into the philanthropic spirit of the California wine industry, which has resulted in several American vintners and other corporations contributing sizeable sums to turn ‘mines to vines’.²³ Numerous private sector actors, including diverse organizations such as Daewoo, the Girl Scouts, UEFA and Diners Club Adriatic, have also contributed to global mine action.²⁴

International institutional development

Another somewhat overlooked resource is the breadth of international institutional developments that have been made since the convention’s establishment. One such type of development is the establishment of multilateral funding channels, which in many cases greatly facilitates the flow of funds from donor to mine-affected state. The Organization of American States (OAS) has played—and continues to play—an important role in both raising funds and ensuring that they make a difference in the mine-affected countries of Central and South America. This has been particularly indispensable in a region where direct funding of mine action operations would not be possible for many donors given that mine action often is conducted by the military. In South-Eastern Europe, the International Trust Fund established by Slovenia has channelled significant funds to mine action programmes. In addition, the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action has served to channel over US\$ 78 million in mine action funding since its establishment.²⁵

The States Parties themselves have also led the way in institutional development with a view to supporting both the fulfilment of their individual responsibilities and the convention’s emphasis on partnership and cooperation. While Article 6 of the convention provides a sound basis for cooperation, at an early stage the States Parties agreed that something more was needed to bring the words of this article to life. At their first annual meeting in 1999, the States Parties established the Intersessional Work Programme, which involves Standing Committees serving as forums ‘to engage a broad international community for the purpose of advancing the achievement of the humanitarian aims of the Convention.’²⁶ One year later the States Parties established the Coordinating Committee to more

effectively coordinate the Intersessional Work Programme. And in 2001, the States Parties mandated the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit, which was created in part based upon the notion that 'by relieving the [States] Parties of administrative and routine functions, a small dedicated support unit should enable a more efficient allocation of resources while contributing to the effective implementation of the Convention.'²⁷

Another type of institutional development relates to emergence of tools to enable mine action to be undertaken more effectively and efficiently. For example the Landmine Impact Survey has been developed as the first-rate means of assisting the most mine-affected states in defining their landmine problem, improving national planning and priority setting, and establishing baseline data for measuring progress. The Information Management System for Mine Action has been developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining as the state-of-the-art data management tool designed to assist with the management of the information needed to implement efficient and effective field programmes in mine action. In addition, the International Mine Action Standards, created 'to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, by establishing principles and, in some cases, by defining international requirements and specifications', have assisted in professionalizing mine action.²⁸

Sustaining the effort

The resources generated to date have been impressive, but much more needs to be done. This fact was recognized by Norway when, in September 2002, it presented a non-paper proposing a set of actions to be undertaken in advance of the convention's First Review Conference in 2004 in order to 'address all aspects of how to secure sufficient funding for reaching the aims of the Convention.'²⁹

As was noted in the Norwegian paper, an important element in sustaining the effort rests with current donor countries renewing their financial commitments. A week before it presented its paper, Norway already had turned its words into action in that it pledged to maintain the same level of funding in coming years as it had contributed in the past to mine action. In making this announcement, it was noted that 'predictable funding levels are the only way in which to ensure that the momentum gained by the Convention over the past five years is not lost, and forms the cornerstone for designing and implementing (mine action) programmes.'³⁰ Three months later, Canada joined Norway in renewing its commitment when its foreign minister announced a CD\$ 72 million, five-year replenishment of the Canadian Landmine Fund.³¹

While mine action-specific funding commitments remain important at this early stage in the life of the convention, States Parties have recognized that mine action funding should be part of, not distinct from, overall development programming. As Canada stated in February 2003: 'Development

Development is a multi-faceted and increasingly inclusive notion The real question, then, is not where does the landmines issue fit into the development context, but where doesn't it?

is a multi-faceted and increasingly inclusive notion The real question, then, is not where does the landmines issue fit into the development context, but *where doesn't it?*³² Increasingly, donors—as well as funding channels like the United Nations—are talking in terms of mainstreaming or integrating mine action into ongoing, normal operations.

Mine-affected states are being encouraged to integrate mine action into broader national development plans and poverty reduction strategies. 'Integrating mine action into national development programmes or national strategies for poverty eradication would demonstrate that mine-affected countries are giving mine action programmes high priority [and hence] such a priority setting may lead

to increased funding to mine action programmes from bilateral development partners and multilateral institutions.’³³ Some mine-affected states already have picked up on this point. For example, in an annex to its draft Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) prepared for the World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina has included a detailed strategy on demining as a sector priority.³⁴

Incorporating mine action into PRSPs signals to donors the importance that a mine-affected state attaches to addressing the development challenges posed by mines. The responsibility rests with the mine-affected state in question to consider where mine action fits into its poverty reduction plans and to what extent. However, given the leading role played by the World Bank in working with states to develop PRSPs, the World Bank perhaps could do more to advise mine-affected countries of the importance of mainstreaming and integration in the aim of ensuring the sustainability of their mine action efforts. It was noted at the May 2003 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that such matters are the domain of in-country World Bank officials.³⁵ This may therefore suggest a lack of a policy imperative from headquarters to ensure that mine action is given full consideration by relevant states in developing and implementing poverty reduction strategies.

The responsibility rests with the mine-affected state in question to consider where mine action fits into its poverty reduction plans and to what extent.

In response to any criticism that the World Bank is not doing enough, though, it has been pointed out that the institution can only be as effective in any particular areas as its member countries direct it to be. Therefore, if the convention’s States Parties—128 of which are members of the World Bank Group—wish for the World Bank to place a greater emphasis on mine action, ultimate power rests with them.

Of fundamental importance in ensuring the sustainability of efforts being undertaken in the context of the convention is to ensure the resources are spent effectively and increasingly efficiently. Examining the effectiveness of the application of the hundreds of millions of dollars generated for mine action is crucial to obtaining a full picture of the global response to the landmine problem, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in the context of discussing the sustainability of resources, it is important to note how productivity gains can be made and in many instances are being made.

With respect to making mine action more productive, it is known in Mozambique, for example, that the main factor that would increase productivity is more machinery for vegetation removal, followed by the use of more mine detection dogs.³⁶ Certainly this may imply an increased up-front investment, but with greater productivity returns in the future. One of the world’s leading demining organizations, Norwegian People’s Aid, has concurred that the procurement of dogs—as well as retraining to ensure mine detection and clearance are being undertaken in accordance with international standards—would increase costs in the short term, but would be necessary to make accelerated gains in the future.³⁷ In addition, both Norwegian People’s Aid and the HALO Trust have remarked that building local human resource capacity is essential to lower costs. As HALO’s Cambodia programme head has remarked: ‘Expats are expensive and keeping their numbers down is very important.’³⁸ Applying these sorts of lessons may be a crucial factor in maximizing existing and new resources, thus ensuring the sustainability of the effort.

Some resourceful conclusions

As noted above, one limitation of this paper is that it addresses only what resources have been raised and not how they have been used. Certainly another limitation is that while this paper has referred to resources being mobilized in the context of the convention, one cannot draw a cause-and-

effect relationship between the acceptance of the convention's obligations and the level of support being provided. What one cannot argue with, though, is the fact that 134 states—as of July 2003—have accepted the disarmament and development imperatives of the convention and that a sizeable number of them have defined themselves as in a position to provide assistance. In addition, a number of other actors—including states not party to the convention—have made significant contributions to the effort. When one considers the sum of all assistance generated since the convention's establishment, it is possible to account for resources totalling approximately US\$ 1.6 billion.

Certainly the vast majority of the funds raised have come from what one would consider traditional donors. This should not be surprising. After all, it is the traditional donor community which has the greatest ability to be in a position to provide assistance. However, focusing attention solely on money generated by donors masks the fact that ultimate responsibility rests with mine-affected states themselves and that these states are fulfilling their responsibility.

There has also been an inordinate focus on the sheer quantity of money generated. While money—and lots of it—is necessary, it will also be essential to ensure that funds get spent in the most effective way possible. The global level of funding has remained at a level much higher than one would

If it can be assumed that global funding levels will decline over time, these resources will need to be applied in an increasingly effective way.

have expected given that many years have passed since the apex of interest in the issue on the part of politicians and their electorates. Thus, if it can be assumed that global funding levels will decline over time, these resources will need to be applied in an increasingly effective way. In this regard, both the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its Landmine Monitor initiative may have a very important role to play in monitoring progress. While the ICBL has been very effective in focusing attention on the supply side of the resource issue (i.e., how much is generated), it perhaps could give increasing attention to better understanding the demand side of the equation (i.e., how much is required). In addition, while the Landmine Monitor has provided the global mine action community with comprehensive assessments of what the top donors have contributed to mine action, it too could enhance understanding by applying its unique research assets to assessments of the effectiveness of spending.

A final set of conclusions regarding the question of resources relates to offering words of caution about looking at this matter too simplistically. The international community is becoming more aware that resources to fulfil the aims of the convention relate to a multitude of sources and to more than simply money. In addition, as tempting as it may be to draw sweeping conclusions from a global overview of funding data, it must be pointed out that there are great risks in doing so. With respect to the demand side of the equation, each mine-affected country case is different—with different needs and capacities, different levels of productivity gains which have been made or can be expected, and different financial and economic factors such as changes in relative exchange rates, inflation rates and public and private sector investment capacity.

Limitations and cautions notwithstanding, one cannot diminish the fact that the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is a significant bridge between disarmament and development. While the points raised in this conclusion may suggest several additional avenues for research on the question of resources, it would be hard to argue with the fact that breadth of resources generated to date is paving this bridge and hopefully ensuring a timely arrival at both its disarmament and development objectives.

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compiled by Melissa MOTT

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Disarmament and development: a South African perspective

Contrary to the apartheid era, national security in the new South Africa is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. Since the establishment of a democratic government in 1994, South Africa's concept of national security has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of people. In this regard, the relationship between disarmament and development is particularly significant. The South African experience provides an example of developing transparent government policies that link disarmament, demilitarization and development. It also provides useful insights for other developing countries that have sizeable defence sectors and that are experiencing both social and economic development challenges.

Why has South Africa brought defence consideration into its development dialogue?

South Africa's defence policy has been motivated by dramatic developments in the country's strategic environment together with both external and internal political developments. The end of the Cold War era offered an opportunity to find security in nuclear disarmament rather than in proliferation. South Africa abandoned its policy of military aggression and regional destabilization and embarked on a programme of diplomatic and economic outreach in Africa.¹ The re-admission of South Africa as a Member of the United Nations in 1995, and increasing focus on the relationship between disarmament and development within the international community, have also influenced South Africa's security decisions.

In the 1980s, South Africa's military burden was over 4% of its gross domestic product (GDP)—Africa's largest military spender.² The economic impact of this high level of military spending was felt in a number of different ways. Significant military spending meant that fewer resources were available for other sectors, such as economic and social welfare.³

Since the late 1980s there have been considerable reductions in military spending in response to South Africa's changing strategic, political and economic environment. The cuts in military spending in 1989 were a consequence of a negotiated settlement involving many explicit and implicit compromises between the apartheid government and the African National Congress (ANC). The reduction in military expenditure resulted in the closure of several military bases, dramatic decrease in defence expenditure, the abolition of conscription, and downsizing of the military in order to conform to the notion of a 'core defence force'. A decision to dismantle the country's covert nuclear weapons programme also

marked this period of demilitarization. The negotiations between the government and the ANC paved the way for the transition to democracy between 1990 and 1994. Other factors influencing the considerable reduction in military expenditure in this period were the end of apartheid, the end of the Cold War as well as the South African elections in 1994.

Since 1994, there have been attempts to secure the subordination of the military to civilian control. In that regard, a Defence Secretariat was established to re-examine the mission, roles and tasks of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) through the 1996 White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review process. These commit the SANDF to a primarily defensive role. The South African government entrusted the Defence Secretariat with the tasks of monitoring developments within the SANDF and of formulating national policies based on international conventions and in accordance with international humanitarian law.

Since 1994 South Africa has developed sustainable policies on disarmament issues and has established itself as a respected and important player in all multilateral arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament fora. The South African government does not see disarmament as automatically leading to development or vice versa but rather believes in policies that can establish a positive relationship. Demilitarization and military downsizing permitted a drastic and comprehensive shift of resources away from the defence sector in order to address the real threats to South Africa's collective security—including poverty, inequality and unemployment.

Research has shown that in South Africa, feelings of insecurity arise from hunger, disease and deprivation rather than from an external military threat.⁴ To address this insecurity, the government elaborated a long-term national strategy, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), to promote the well-being and security of citizens—and as a consequence, national stability. The RDP strategy focuses on social improvement and poverty alleviation. For example, the government has prioritized rural development by extending services such as sanitation, electricity, water and social pension payment to the needy.

The RDP's objectives are outlined in the 1996 White Paper on Defence. This document has introduced major policy changes, perhaps most significantly as a consequence of its concentration on national security rooted in human security. This focus primarily seeks to meet the political, economic, social and cultural needs of South Africa and to promote and maintain regional security. The White Paper encourages a high level of political, economic, social and military cooperation with Southern African states and the African continent as a whole.⁵

The RDP demands that resources be reallocated from defence to social sectors—a clear link between disarmament and development. Although there is no established fund to collect the cuts in military expenditure, other government sectors have benefited from the decline in military spending. The resources released from the cuts in the defence budget are being used to restructure and revitalize the country's RDP.

In addressing the issue of reductions in military expenditure, it has been argued that during the apartheid era, South Africa's level of military expenditure sustained tremendous increases in absolute terms, as share of GDP and as a share of total government expenditure (see Table 1). Between 1989/90 and 1998/99, South Africa's defence budget was reduced by 57% in real terms, and declined by an average of nearly 9% per year. Military spending as a share of total government spending declined from 13% in 1989/90 to 5.1% in 1998/99. As a share of GDP it fell from 4.1% to 1.5% during the same period. According to one study, the total value of reductions in military spending between 1989/90 and 1998/99 amounted to 5.6 billion rand in constant 1990 prices.⁶

The budgets for education, health, social security and welfare, and the police have benefited from the reduction in the military budget (see Table 2). The government increased the percentage for education from 17.7% in 1989/90 to 22.4% in 1998/99, while social security and welfare increased its

Table 1. South Africa's defence budget, 1989/90–1998/99

Year	Budget (in million rand, constant 1990 prices)	% change from previous year	Defence as a % of GDP	Defence as a % of total government expenditure
1989/90	11,435		4.1	13.0
1990/91	10,071	-11.9	3.6	12.4
1991/92	8,094	-19.6	3.0	9.8
1992/93	7,605	-6.0	2.8	8.4
1993/94	6,589	-13.4	2.4	6.8
1994/95	7,812	18.6	2.6	8.8
1995/96	6,892	-11.8	2.2	7.7
1996/97	6,320	-8.3	1.9	6.2
1997/98	5,679	-10.1	1.8	5.9
1998/99	4,881	-14.0	1.5	5.1
average 1989–1998		-8.5	2.5	8.4

Source: South Africa, Department of Finance, *Budget Review*, various years, as quoted in P. Batchelor, J. Cock and P. Mackenzie, 2000, *Conversion in South Africa in the 1990s: Defence Downsizing and Human Development Challenges*, Cape Town.

of under-investment in people and of past discrimination. The changes made a significant contribution to the process of disarmament as part of South Africa's transition to democracy. Since its democratic transition, South Africa has become an active player in the international fora that seek to find security in disarmament rather than in weapons proliferation.

share from 6.3% to 9.3% during the same period. Health increased its share from 9.8% to 11.2%. These increases indicate the government's shift in spending priorities towards socio-economic needs. As an example, savings of 1.6 billion rand were released from the defence budget between fiscal years 1993/94 and 1995/96 to the housing, education, health and sanitation programmes of the RDP.⁷

Since coming to power in April 1994, the government has continued to cut the defence budget in conjunction with a wide variety of disarmament, demilitarization and development measures. The increase in shares in socio-economic sectors could be attributed to the government's recognition of a legacy

Table 2. Trends in shares as a percent of government expenditure, 1989/90–1998/99

Year	General government	Defence	Police	Education	Health	Social security and welfare	Economic services
1989/90	9.2	13.0	3.3	17.7	9.8	6.3	14.0
1994/95	7.6	8.8	6.9	22.0	10.2	9.3	11.7
1998/99	5.2	5.1	6.8	22.4	11.2	9.3	9.3
average 1989–1998	7.6	8.4	5.5	21.1	10.5	8.5	12.3

Sources: South African Reserve Bank, *Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics*, various issues, 1999, P. Batchelor, J. Cock and P. Mackenzie, 2000, *Conversion in South Africa in the 1990s: Defence Downsizing and Human Development Challenges*, Cape Town.

It must be acknowledged that cuts in the military budget may increase unemployment in the short term as the defence sector undergoes a process of conversion and downsizing. But there will be positive macro-economic effects in the long term as the government will be in position to create more job opportunities in the socio-economic sector.

Summary and conclusion

Although many in South Africa have not yet perceived the linkage between disarmament and the various governmental poverty alleviation initiatives and development programmes, attempts by the

government to achieve its goal are commendable when taking into consideration the short period that the government has been in place to address problems that have existed for decades.

The South African experience offers a new perspective on disarmament, demilitarization and development not only to developing countries, but to developed countries as well. The South African

The South African government's primary concern is human security and stresses improving national security by improving people's lives.

government's primary concern is human security and stresses improving national security by improving people's lives. The government is convinced that disarmament could make a major contribution to the peaceful management of the world's resources and to socio-economic development.

The South African experience provides an example of developing transparent government policies that link disarmament and development through, for example, the adoption of such promising policy approaches as the White Paper on Defence. Fulfilment of disarmament and development obligations by implementing decisions taken at the national, regional and international levels—such as United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/57/65 that urges the international community to devote part of the resources made available by the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements to economic and social development—could be a first step towards development for many countries.

C. Nontombi Makupula

First Secretary (Disarmament)

South African Permanent Mission to the United Nations and other International Organizations

Notes

1. P. Batchelor and S. Willett, 1998, *Disarmament and Defense Industrial Adjustment in South Africa*, New York, Oxford University Press, p. 51.
2. P. Batchelor, J. Cock and P. Mackenzie, 2000, *Conversion in South Africa in the 1990s: Defence Downsizing and Human Development Challenges*, Cape Town, p. 10.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
4. D. Collard, 1998, 'Limits to redistribution: an overview', in P. Batchelor and S. Willett, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
5. South Africa, 1996, *White Paper on Defence*; South Africa, Department of Defence, 1998, *South African Defence Review*, April, p. 3.
6. P. Batchelor, J. Cock and P. Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
7. P. Batchelor and S. Willett, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

Coming to Terms with Security: A Handbook on Verification and Compliance

There is general acceptance by the international community not only that verification of arms control and disarmament agreements can work technically, but that it can work politically. Good verification and compliance arrangements can significantly increase the confidence of parties to an agreement that giving up a type of weapon or other military capability will enhance rather than damage their security. The involvement of parties in monitoring activities and in the management of verification organizations also gives them a stake in the future of their treaty and further embeds them in the international community. While not without its costs, verification and compliance instruments are a security bargain compared to the costs of weaponry and armed forces and the damage they can wreak in armed conflict.

Jointly produced by UNIDIR and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), *Coming to Terms with Security: A Handbook on Verification and Compliance* provides a guide to the basics of verification and compliance in the field of arms control and disarmament. Specifically, the volume addresses a number of fundamental questions including what are verification and compliance, who performs verification and compliance, and how are verification and compliance carried out. Towards this end, it reviews the legal instruments, institutional arrangements, operational procedures and technologies currently in place to monitor the activities of parties to arms control and disarmament agreements that are subject to constraints, to determine whether or not parties are abiding by their agreement obligations, and to resolve disputes between parties over compliance with those obligations.

Intended as a companion to *Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building* published by UNIDIR in 2001, the volume is addressed to officials involved in arms control and disarmament activities, as well as students, researchers and journalists. Published in both English and Arabic back-to-back, the volume should be particularly useful to Arabic speakers who wish to gain or better their understanding of verification and compliance matters commonly related in English in their own language, or to enhance their knowledge of such concepts in English.

In each issue of *Disarmament Forum*, UNIDIR Focus highlights one activity of the Institute, outlining the project's methodology, recent developments in the research or its outcomes. UNIDIR Focus will also describe a new UNIDIR publication. You can find summaries and contact information for all of the Institute's present and past activities, as well as sample chapters of publications and ordering information, online at < <http://www.unidir.org> > .

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UNIDIR at the First Biennial Meeting of the Programme of Action on Small Arms

On 7–11 July 2003, the First Biennial Meeting of States to the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects took place in New York. The meeting offered states the opportunity to exchange experiences in coping with the problem of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), to stimulate both political will and professional competence to combat the problem, and to determine the best way forward.

UNIDIR contributed to the deliberations by presenting its research and analyses to the plenary of the First Biennial and by organizing events around recent publications and ongoing research projects on SALW.

On 9 July 2003, UNIDIR held a meeting on participatory assessment of weapons collection programmes. Geoffrey Mugumya, Project Leader, presented UNIDIR's Weapons for Development project, the preliminary findings of the project's field research in Mali, and emphasized the need for full participation of local people in the decision-making processes and in the collection of weapons.

On 10 July 2003, UNIDIR and the Small Arms Survey launched their joint publication *Destroying Surplus Weapons: An Assessment of Experience in South Africa and Lesotho* by Sarah Meek and Noel Stott. The publication demonstrated that when security forces, police and customs officials work together with ministry officials and donors, the destruction of surplus state-owned weapons can be carried out professionally, competently and cost-effectively.

The same day, UNIDIR Director Patricia Lewis made a presentation to the plenary of the Biennial Meeting of States and submitted a report on UNIDIR's activities to implement the Programme of Action, evaluating some of the lessons learned during research activities carried out in Western and Southern Africa, and highlighting the need for research—which, combined with the work done on the ground, can make a real difference in the lives of people living under the threat of violence.

For more information, please contact:

Nicolas Gérard

Programme Manager and Conference Organizer

Tel.: + 41 (0)22 917 11 49

Fax: + 41 (0)22 917 01 76

E-mail: ngerard@unog.ch