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SALW and Development Programmes: Issues and Priorities

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SUMMARY

It is recognized that the spread, possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) have negative social, humanitarian and developmental consequences. However, mainstream development programming has not always fully engaged with armed violence issues including SALW. This paper elaborates in detail the impacts of SALW on development drawing upon a series of recent studies conducted by the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), including 13 case studies, and makes suggestions as to how development programming can connect more with SALW issues, as well as identifies programming implications for the European Union (EU) and member states.

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INTRODUCTION

It is recognized that the spread, possession and use of small arms and light weapons (SALW) have negative social, humanitarian and developmental consequences. However, mainstream development programming has not always fully engaged with armed violence issues including SALW. This paper elaborates in detail the impacts of SALW on development drawing upon a series of recent studies conducted by the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS), including 13 case studies, and makes suggestions as to how development programming can connect more with SALW issues, as well as identifies programming implications for the European Union (EU) and member states.

The EU is a significant international actor in areas such as trade, aid and development and is increasingly an important player in conflict prevention, crisis management, security sector reform, arms control and disarmament. The EU, therefore, has a rationale to engage in the issues raised above in its programming, assistance, and policy. There are considerable opportunities for the EU and member states to become more engaged with some of the key shortfalls and opportunities in terms of alleviating the humanitarian, social and developmental consequences of SALW and connecting SALW with developmental programming.

Among the key areas of further potential engagement for the EU and member states that are explored in this paper are:

- Addressing the challenges of building partnerships among agencies and frameworks within the EU and member states in addressing SALW issues;
- Developing strategies to connect SALW programming and development, taking into account perspectives within member states;
- Integrating SALW considerations into conflict assessments and analysis of poverty reduction in an explicit fashion;
- Taking into account the transforming and often harmful impact of SALW on social capital and networks, and building provisions into programming to take this into consideration;
- Looking at whether SALW programming might benefit from being more directed at some of the root causes and motivations underpinning armed violence, such as exclusion, poverty and poor governance;
- A process of research and training on SALW–development issues, and planning and coordination among, for example, policy makers and programme officers that might be beneficial in terms of taking debates forward in the EU and among member states; and
- Mechanisms for establishing coordination between disparate SALW and development programming.

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: SALW AND THE DEVELOPMENT DEBATE

Definitions of security and development have undergone a transformation. Until recently "security" in effect meant state/military security. However, in the past few years, there has been a broadening of the concerns to encompass human rights, access to education and health care, and freedom from want and fear. This has been called "human security" by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Commission on Human Security. The development of these concerns has been reflected elsewhere. For example, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has developed the concept of "comprehensive security" which includes, in addition to the military/state dimension, the protection of the rule of law and minorities, economic security and environmental protection. It is generally recognized that security, or rather its lack, has the capacity to impinge on this objective.

Small arms have only been articulated as a mainstream priority since the late 1990s. In the mid-1990s, a body of thinking and literature reflecting these issues was emerging on SALW, much of it articulated by non-governmental organizations and the UN. Key milestones in formalizing the importance of SALW were the UN Secretary-General's adoption of the cause of light weapons and micro disarmament in 1995,[1] the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994, as well as work by organizations such as the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), which sought to draw attention to the consequences of SALW proliferation. During the latter half of the 1990s, there was an increased interest in the development and health implications of SALW. The development community began to re-think the complex relationship between armed conflict and social violence, and also small arms and development.[2]

Over the past four years or so, a broadly accepted framework and methodology for assessing the impacts of SALW on development and humanitarian issues has emerged through work undertaken in organizations such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Saferworld, Small Arms Survey (SAS) and UNDP. However, more generally, as the Small Arms Survey notes, researchers have attempted to measure the socio-economic effects of armed conflict, rather than small arms, on development.[3] Given the difficulty of disentangling SALW impacts from the impacts of armed conflict, this is not surprising. In addition, the causal relationship between the availability of SALW and violence is complex. Conflict and violence have many causes arising from political, socio-economic, cultural and ideological factors.

In the past few years, a number of reports and studies have attempted to assess the impact of SALW on development. The annual Small Arms Survey, particularly the 2003 edition, postulates that a number of impacts may be anticipated: a negative impact on social capital, particularly communal cohesion and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms; economic impacts such as infrastructure destruction and lost productivity; declines in local and foreign direct investment; declines in quality and access to social services; and the increase of armed criminality and corruption.[4] In addition, the 2002 UNDP "Development Held Hostage" study identified a number of key linkages between small arms and development. It suggested that in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, criminal violence perpetrated with widely available SALW has massive implications for the quality of life of citizens, costs of goods and services and property, and investment and tourism.[5]

Other reports have added to the damning evidence. In Oxfam's "Under Fire: the Human Cost of Small Arms in North-East Democratic Republic of the Congo", the impact of SALW in terms of health care (particularly on internally displaced persons), education and economic effects

is documented.[6] And in "Conflict's Children: the Human Costs of Small Arms in Kitgum and Kotido, Uganda", Oxfam argues that SALW have played a major role in helping armed groups to create the "devastating poverty and misery" experienced by the majority of civilians in these districts; armed groups there have deliberately engaged in activities, including killings, destruction of property, abductions, physical displacements and arson, that impoverish civilians and ruin lives.[7] Some writers have investigated the possibility that SALW might sometimes be a necessary instrument of protection in an insecure environment, and that certain groups might benefit from SALW possession in a number of ways including enriching themselves or securing access to development.[8]

These findings confirm the body of literature that examines the political economy of war, asking important questions relating to how violence shapes societal dynamics. A leading argument of this literature is that it is important to understand the economic causes of war to avoid a reconstruction of the pre-war economy, which might have had much to do with the origin of the conflict.[9]

THE IMPACT OF ARMED VIOLENCE ON DEVELOPMENT

In this section, the extent to which armed violence impoverishes individuals, households, communities, national economies and societies in various contexts is examined. Here "armed violence" is given a particular meaning—as a rubric to include SALW availability and the social and political environment in which they are used. In addition, the term "armed violence situations" is employed; this embraces more than simply the availability of arms and violent acts carried out with them, embracing rather the totality of a social situation in which armed violence is persistent and endemic. Different elements of an armed violence situation each have distinct implications for development and all may have immediate and long-term impacts.[10]

DIRECT IMPACTS OF ARMED VIOLENCE

Casualties and disability

The human cost of armed violence spreads far beyond combatants, criminals and state security forces. The deliberate targeting of civilians by rebel forces and the state security sector was witnessed to devastating effect in Algeria, Somalia and Southern Sudan. It continues to be men, particularly young men, who are the most common perpetrators and victims of armed violence. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for example, young men are 24 times more likely than women to be killed by armed violence, while men between the ages of 15 and 29 are twice as likely to die from armed violence as the rest of the male population.[11] In Colombia, men are 14 times more likely than women to die of gunshot wounds.

The removal of large numbers of men from the population has major effects on society as a whole. The development and poverty implications are many. Generally, it denies countries labour power and skills. In some situations, such as in the case of southern Sudan, the high number of male casualties has had a huge impact on gender demographics. In Bahr-el-Gazaal and Upper Nile, for example, there are more than two women to every male. The huge numbers of female-headed households in many countries (such as Algeria, Somalia, Southern Sudan and Sri Lanka) is the result of the over-representation of men in the casualty figures.

Armed violence not only creates widows, it also creates disability. This has an impact on the ability to earn a livelihood, and it also impacts on health and social services. In addition, medical costs can have an impact. In South Africa, a significant proportion of non-fatally injured patients go into debt to pay medical expenses resulting from firearms injuries.[12] The direct medical costs did not affect the victims as much as the indirect costs of closing down their businesses. All victims claimed that not only their health, but also their economic status, had been irrevocably damaged as a result of being shot.[13]

Direct impact: refugees and displacement

Apart from injury and fatality, the biggest direct impact of armed violence is the creation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) global figures for refugees stood at over 17 million as of 1 January 2004. In 2003, overall numbers of IDPs were estimated to have remained constant from the year before at around 24.6 million. While there are no disaggregated figures for conflict-induced displacement, agencies such as UNHCR regard armed violence as the key driving force behind most refugee flows. In some cases, displacement has been the outcome of people fleeing a violent situation, such as Sierra Leone and Somalia; on other occasions it has been the result of a deliberate policy by parties to the conflict, such as targeting and displacement along ethnic, religious or other fault lines, such as in Algeria, north-east India and Southern Sudan. The poverty impacts of violence-induced displacement are discussed below.

The most immediate and devastating impact of violence-induced displacement, whether cross-border or internal, in many countries (such as Algeria, Chechnya, northern Kenya, north-east India, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Sudan and Sri Lanka), was the consequent loss of access to land, property, jobs, assets and therefore means of livelihood. This impoverishment extends to lack of access to health services and education, food insecurity, and increased disease and mortality. In Somalia, IDPs account for over 50% of the Somali population identified as chronically food insecure. The displaced are also more vulnerable to infectious and communicable diseases. Amongst the Chechen displaced, for instance, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS have been spreading rapidly because of inadequate living conditions.

In refugee/IDP camps, employment opportunities are sporadic or non-existent and opportunities outside of camps depend on relations with the local community and whether their skills match local demand. IDPs and refugees living in host communities also often have limited economic opportunities. Overall, the experience of violence-induced displacement is impoverishment—in some cases this can be long term. There are many examples like the case of Southern Sudan where many returnees arrived home too late for the planting season or lacked seeds or tools. In some situations, for example because of ethnic cleansing, it was not possible for the displaced to return to their communities. The intensity or reversibility of the poverty experienced by the displaced will depend, to a large extent, on the length of displacement. In addition, refugees and IDPs fleeing from violence often experience further violence through abductions, killings and sexual assaults, particularly vulnerable groups such as women and children.

Vulnerable groups: the impact on children

Between 1990 and 2000, over two million children were killed in intra- or inter-state wars.[14] In addition, approximately six million have been wounded or disabled, and one million have been orphaned.[15] Many of these deaths and injuries have been caused by SALW. In the case

of Colombia, approximately 4,000 children are killed by small arms every year.[16] In addition, in northern Kenya, where cattle raiding once took place using traditional weapons in hand-to-hand fighting, the use of guns has meant that killing of humans is much more indiscriminate, and more children are being killed in the raids.

The continual threat of death and abuse of children at the hands of militias and security forces is common to both situations of armed violent conflict and violent organized criminality. In addition, children have become a popular recruiting pool for armed groups. Child soldiers face particular problems of reintegration after the conflict ends.

In situations of armed violent conflict (such as existed in Sierra Leone, Somalia and Southern Sudan), children are exposed to many dangers due to the breakdown of the social fabric. On occasions this has meant abduction or forced recruitment to militias. These experiences all have devastating poverty implications. In Southern Sudan, children (and women) were abducted for forced labour or as a commodity to be traded. Slave raiding was perpetrated by government-backed militias as a tool of war to terrorize the population.

The loss of a parent often means destitution and a life on the street. In Mogadishu, Somalia, a 2003 UNICEF survey found that 19% of children or their siblings had, at some stage, been living on the streets. These children were forced to make a living from guarding cars, collecting garbage and engaging in small-scale sales of cigarettes and foodstuffs. These activities yielded barely enough to meet their basic needs.[17] In addition, children living on the streets of cities often become the targets of "social cleansing", a disturbingly neutral term for what is, in fact, the killing of "undesirable" children by vigilantes, police and shopkeepers. In Altos de Cazuca, a district in southern Bogota, Colombia, there were reportedly over 150 deaths of children and young people in the first nine months of 2003.[18]

In addition to these devastating direct impacts of armed violence on children, there are a number of indirect impacts likely to have long-term development and poverty implications. In many situations of armed violent conflict, schooling is frequently disrupted through the closure of schools, curfews and displacement. Very often schools are destroyed during a conflict. In East Timor, for instance, during the Indonesian repression in 1999, 90% of school buildings were destroyed or badly damaged.[19] In situations of long-term chronic conflict and insecurity, consistent investment in schooling is not a priority.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF ARMED VIOLENCE

The disruption of economic activity through either direct attacks by armed groups and/or the state security sector (in the case of armed violent conflict) or through the general climate of insecurity and fear (in both cases of armed violent conflict and violent armed criminality) has had a number of negative impacts on the economy and society.[20]

Macro-economic impacts

In general, armed violence is an overall drain on the economy. In cases of violent armed criminality, the negative impacts on macro-economic performance are largely due to the indirect impact of the climate of insecurity. For instance, figures for 2002 show that Brazil spent 10% of its GDP on combating criminal violence;[21] the 1997 figure for El Salvador is a staggering 25% of GDP. Brazil expressed concerns in 2004 about the impact of the climate of insecurity on tourism. The general climate of insecurity deters investment and generally disrupts socio-economic activity. In

many of the case studies, the impact of insecurity contributed to the decline of business confidence and the flight of capital. For example, in Nagaland, northeast India, a recent study showed that the private sector does not fully invest its profit back into the country but diverts it to businesses elsewhere as a fallback if violence increases.

Economic growth is almost always negatively affected. In Sierra Leone, declines in economic performance can be directly traced to periods when armed violence was at its height and to specific conflict incidents, such as when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) seized mines in 1995 and again when it invaded Freetown in January 1999. SALW-armed combatants were able to close down or divert production in diamond mining areas, which led directly to economic growth plummeting in Sierra Leone. The shrinkage of economic activities and its subsequent effects has significant impoverishing impacts for large sections of the population. In situations of armed violent conflict, consumption and GDP per capita invariably fall. In Somalia, for example, annual GDP per capita dropped in the period of civil strife from US$ 280 in 1989 to US$ 226 in 2002.[22] In countries which suffered massive displacement and the destruction of lives and property due to armed violent conflict (such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Somalia), this limited the ability of people to earn a living and thus save and invest. In Sierra Leone, figures for 1999 show an estimated 70% of the population were unemployed, of which 55% were youth, and the majority of industry was closed down.[23]

Trade, exports and exchange

Trade, exports and exchange are invariably affected. In many situations of armed violent conflict, supplies and transportation are severely disrupted. On occasions, as in Sierra Leone and Somalia, regional trading patterns were altered as alternative avenues for trade were sought. In the Great Lakes region of Africa, violence has decreased commercial activity along the Congo River, a primary transport network, over the past five years.[24] Armed insecurity has effectively obstructed local and national trading systems and infrastructure, and contributed to a reduction in investment over the past decade. The dramatic falls in tourism and foreign direct investment are testament to the declines in security.

Diminished social expenditure and increased social needs

The heavy financial cost of armed violence means that the share of government expenditure going to the security sector invariably rises, and the public provision of social services falls. The provision of social and public services is negatively affected by armed violence. In the case of armed violent conflict, wholesale destruction of medical facilities and schools is likely to have a long-term impact, particularly on the poor and vulnerable who are more dependent on state provision. Two decades of armed violent conflict in Sudan has meant that many have grown up with little or no access to formal education. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, it is estimated that 50% of health facilities were lost due to armed rebels deliberately destroying them and displacing staff as part of their strategy to create chaos and undermine the state.[25]

The financial costs of rebuilding these facilities are huge. However, the health costs, in particular, are incalculable. Severely diminished medical facilities in the most violence-prone areas will be called upon to cope with health demands heightened by the violence itself. Casualties have to be treated as long as the armed violence persists; however, these also leave a legacy. Large numbers of disabled people, particularly in countries such as Sierra Leone, where there has been deliberate maiming, will require long-term medical treatment as well as livelihood support. However, they are unlikely to receive this given the scarcity of resources that often exist

in post-conflict situations. Evidence shows how armed violence may be associated with the intensification of malaria, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other illness, and an increase in infant and adult mortality rates.

Loss/depletion of livelihoods

In Algeria, northern Kenya, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Southern Sudan, armed violent conflict has had a massive impact on the rural asset base and on other factors of production in agriculture. Access to arable land has been lost due to forced removals, appropriation, landmines or despoliation; livestock, implements, and seeds have been lost, stolen or sold off to survive; and irrigation systems have been destroyed or neglected. In these and other countries, there have been further effects on agriculture from curtailed trade and mobility and other impacts listed in the sub-sections above.

In Somalia, there is a direct correlation between poverty and persistent armed violence: of its 18 regions, the eight with incomes lower than the national average are all insecure areas of the centre and south of the country. These regions also have higher rates of malnutrition and higher levels of infant and child mortality. However, the loss of livestock assets is not universal; herders in more secure areas have more livestock. In Sierra Leone and parts of Nigeria agricultural activities have been severely disrupted as a result of looting of crops, the destruction of agricultural tools and rural infrastructure by armed groups and soldiers, and the forced abandonment of land by farmers fleeing to more secure areas. In the case of Sierra Leone, production of rice, the main food staple in the pre-war period, fell drastically to only 20% of pre-war levels. Agricultural production did, however, continue in some areas where the RUF was dependent on local communities for food supplies, and in some areas held by the Civil Defence Force (CDF) where agriculture was maintained to feed both fighters and civilians.

Restrictions on mobility

Restrictions on mobility have a major—if indirect—impact on people's lives and livelihoods. In northern Kenya, for example, insecurity in Turkana has had a highly negative impact on the mobility of livestock and access to some of the best grazing lands. This is most acute in drought years, and can have a devastating impact on livestock productivity and mortality. Access to livestock markets is equally disrupted by insecurity, with the consequence that pastoralists have to sell at much reduced prices, often to itinerant traders.

The siege of towns (such as Bo Town in Sierra Leone and Ruweng in southern Sudan) by rebels or militias cut town populations off from trade with neighbouring areas preventing people from accessing food and other essential supplies, and denying farmers of a market for their produce. Elsewhere, for example in north-east India, fear of rape by security forces has forced women to reduce the time they work outside of the home to daylight hours. Similarly, in El Salvador and Nairobi the overall climate of insecurity resulting from random criminal violence and highly visible gang activity has severely hampered people's mobility.

The political economy of armed violence

In the absence of state capacity, armed groups and armed criminals use the opportunity to engage in illicit economic activities. There are many warlords, political operators, arms traders, drug dealers and other "businessmen", plus foreign companies, who stand to gain from this kind of political economy and who may have a stake in reinforcing the armed violence situation. In

virtually all of the situations of armed violent conflict observed, armed criminality flourished under cover of the chaos and breakdown in social order. In Sierra Leone, for example, many individuals lost their homes and possessions through armed robbery, while in Southern Sudan and Somalia widespread looting and destruction had a devastating impact on livelihoods. The breakdown of law and order reinforced the desire of the wider population to possess a gun for protection. In El Salvador, for example, in a UNDP survey, 92% of respondents who possessed SALW said that it was for protection of themselves and their families.[26]

In situations of violent criminality, even where violence appears to be random and individual, it can often be highly organized—it becomes a "business". In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the rise in armed criminality is mainly due to the growth of criminal organizations associated with the illegal commerce of drugs and firearms. Most of these criminal economic activities are of a nature that impoverishes or bypasses the many while benefiting the few. Many armed violence situations exhibit a substantial criminalization of politics. State corruption can be a significant factor, both as a trigger of armed violence and as an obstacle to an ending to it. For example, in north-east India there is overwhelming evidence of a complex web of collusion between insurgent groups and various political parties and politicians, and in Nairobi criminal acts are carried out by organized gangs with links to groups in business and/or politics.

Counterinsurgency operations and the climate of impunity

A largely neglected dimension of the debate on the connections between armed violence and development is the thorny issue of state brutality, which on occasion helps fuel armed violence and has a devastating impact on development. Heavy-handed counter-insurgency operations can help deepen insecurity and create a culture of impunity. In the case of Nepal, the government's assault on the Maoist rebellion since 2001 has increased the intensity of the violence. The state security service in Nigeria sometimes use their legal possession of SALW to instil fear and secure compliance with extra-legal demands, not least the collection of illegal taxes (*kola*) at check-points and for extra-judicial arrests. In Rio de Janeiro and El Salvador, the police are one of the sources of violence, and while changes are afoot (including attempts at community policing), the police continue to be feared by many people. In El Salvador, as elsewhere, continuing impunity and violence have contributed to the erosion of democratic expectations.

Impacts on family structures

Armed violence has some fundamental, long-term, indirect impacts, which reshape whole societies and communities. In particular, armed violence changes family membership patterns, particularly increases in the number of women-headed households; and in some extreme cases, such as Rwanda, the emergence of child-headed households. Many families in countries affected by armed violent conflict and violent organized criminality cannot, therefore, rely on two adult livelihood earners and are denied the role model and contribution of adult males. The impoverishing effects of these changes in family structure are considerable, such as restricted access to land, unemployment and social exclusion. In all of the case studies dealing with armed violent conflict there has been a dramatic increase in the number of households headed by women. Women heads of households are particularly disadvantaged. Not only do they face the increased burden of meeting the subsistence and other basic needs of dependents, but they are also often among the poorest groups.

Changes in the demographic and social composition of households and communities have resulted in shifts in gender and age allocations of labour, with women bearing a disproportionate

share of the workload. In Northern Kenya, this appears to have had a positive effect on women's decision-making power within the household: women enjoy greater control over deciding the use of returns from their economic activities. In Nepal, women have found themselves less bound by traditional structures, although this is clearly also the outcome of a deliberate policy by the Maoist rebels. For some women this has had a potentially liberating and empowering effect (e.g. Sierra Leone and Nepal), while in others this expansion in women's economic roles merely served to increase their domestic burden. The added responsibilities women have are often transferred to younger girls within the family thereby disrupting their schooling. In Chechnya and Somalia, for example, children, and young girls in particular, are forced to substitute for the loss of women's domestic labour.

Impact on social capital

Social capital refers to those networks and norms that provide cohesion and mutual cooperation in society. These can either enhance development (such as inclusive support networks, civil society organizations, and traditional means of conflict resolution) or stunt development (such as traditional gender and generational hierarchies, and community spirit organized around violence, e.g. "gang culture"). Social capital can be a mechanism for maintaining order within and among communities, which has the potential for managing violence, or a mechanism for mutual help, which can contribute to "coping strategies" in emergency. In most situations of armed violence, these mechanisms have received major disruption. Prolonged armed violence promotes a change in basic attitudes, most clearly seen in an erosion of trust, which has an impact on development and poverty in a number of ways. The norms whereby kin or community members provided the means to survive in emergencies have generally been weakened.

In some armed violence situations, fear of armed reprisal can work to destroy familial and neighbourly relations. In Nepal, for example, the spontaneity with which people used to help those in trouble appears to be vanishing because of a fear of being victimized by either the Maoists or the state security forces. Nevertheless, on occasion, the experience of armed violence prompted a community spirit to ensure community security, build peace and provide support for those in need. This was evident in northern Kenya and north-east India. In both Manipur and Nagaland, north-east India, vibrant women's movements campaign against army atrocities as well as awareness campaigns for women to protect themselves against crime and violence.

"Peace dividends"

Situations where armed violent conflict has been substantially reduced offer some counterfactuals, i.e. what happens when armed violence is absent. Notably in Southern Sudan, the Wunlit peace covenant, which resolved fighting between the major tribal communities of the Nuer and the Dinka, had immediate effects: cross-border cattle rustling declined dramatically, internal and cross-border regional trade resumed, the relative security allowed for surplus grain production; hundreds of displaced returned to their old homes, several abducted women and children were returned, and Nuer fleeing from government bombardment around the oil areas even sought refuge in Dinka lands. In the case of Sri Lanka, the 2002 ceasefire in the 20-year conflict brought about a spontaneous return of displaced Tamils to the north and east and a building boom in those areas (although some of these have been devastated by the recent tsunami). These provide examples of immediate, almost automatic reversal of some of the negative impacts of armed violence. However, this is not true for all countries. In Sierra Leone, for example, although the improved security situation has stopped the killings and the experience of

armed violence has triggered a revulsion against SALW, there has not yet been a recovery of the production of the main staple food, rice, and in fact many civilians have since become poorer.

MAIN IMPACTS OF ARMED VIOLENCE

Some of the most important effects of armed violence which emerged in the analysis of the case studies and which are likely to have a long-term impact on poverty and development in the case studies are summarized below:

- The scale of casualties has often been enormous and leaves a legacy of orphans, widows and disabled persons requiring long-term care;
- Armed violence often leads to massive disruption of lives and significant proportions of national populations are displaced, internally or as refugees, especially where there has been ethnic or other forms of "cleansing";
- The targeting of women and children varied in the case studies but there is strong evidence of long-term trauma and social exclusion;
- There was considerable destruction of physical infrastructure. Social services were frequently destroyed or under-funded (for example in Somalia at one stage there were no secondary schools or universities operating) and key social services personnel fled areas of attack or even emigrated;
- Armed violence creates a pervasive climate of fear and insecurity and can seriously affect rural communities and city neighbourhoods, by directly decreasing the quality of life, but also indirectly undermining economic opportunities as, for example, people are often scared to travel to work or markets. It also undermines trust, coping strategies and social capital generally;
- As people take their own initiatives to adjust to the realities of armed violence, new livelihoods and economic activities evolve, but often they benefit the few through exploitation of the poor; and
- The combined consequences of disruption, destruction, insecurity and an economic system based on violence will have a considerable impact on poverty and development by inducing famine, malnourishment, the spread of disease, and unemployment.

ARMED VIOLENCE AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS[27]

The impacts of armed violence and armed violence situations on poverty and development charted in this report are considerable. The capacity of armed violence to curtail or hamper development and push large numbers of people further into poverty is clear. If the lives of the poor or impoverished are to be improved, it is unlikely that this can be achieved without considering insecurity, which is frequently caused or exacerbated by armed violence. The UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), created to address such concerns, are likewise threatened by armed violence:

- **Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.** The case studies reinforce the perception that this goal will be difficult to meet in the countries concerned due to the loss of livelihoods, unemployment, displacement and changes in household composition through the experience of armed violence.
- **Achieve universal primary education.** This goal is unlikely to be met in many of the countries in this study, in part due to the destruction of schools, disruption to schooling and diversion of state revenues from social expenditure to military spending.

- **Promote gender equality and empower women.** This goal is being challenged through the impoverishment of women, an expansion in their workload, an increase of women-headed households, and an increase in gender-based violence. However, some of the case studies showed that the removal of men from communities and homes and a decline in traditional structures, on occasion, allowed women greater freedom.
- **Reduce child mortality.** This goal is unlikely to be met in situations of armed violence where the indiscriminate killing of civilians, including children, has grown, and where armed violence has led to the closure or destruction of medical facilities and the impoverishment or killing of personnel working in the health sector. Further, the absence or short supply of certain drugs has meant that curable diseases have taken a heavy toll on children during periods of armed violence.
- **Improve maternal health.** This goal is likely to be severely hampered due to the destruction and disruption of the health infrastructure.
- **Combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases.** Many of the case studies showed that disruptions to health services and sanitation, poor living conditions for the displaced, and an increase in sexual violence and prostitution provide fertile ground for the spreading of malaria and HIV/AIDS. In addition, the introduction of infected combatants into some countries where HIV/AIDS was not previously prevalent has further damaged progress to combat it.
- **Ensure environmental sustainability.** The development of slums on the outskirts of large towns due to people fleeing violence in the countryside in many of the case studies will challenge this goal, as will the reduced access to safe drinking water and sanitation caused by widespread infrastructure destruction, mineral exploitation and deforestation.

SALW-REDUCTION PROGRAMMING AND DEVELOPMENT

Despite the fact that much SALW programming is described as developmental in character, or is ostensibly directed at alleviating poverty and promoting development, its impacts in these areas tend to be relatively limited. In fact, some working in mainstream development have resisted the notion that SALW programming can be thought of as essentially connected to development. Many weapons for development projects, for example, have offered insignificant add-on development elements, which seldom addressed the underlying issues of poverty and competition for inadequate livelihood assets.

This section looks at programming in Albania, Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Mali, Mozambique, the Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone and Uganda, and in particular at the difficulties of connecting SALW programming to substantive mainstream development. These projects offer different models of SALW programming: disarmament projects offering incentives to individuals, disarmament projects offering incentives to communities, multi-faceted programmes with disarmament as one component. Programming in these countries had the following characteristics and objectives:

- Sierra Leone's ongoing "Arms for Development Programme" is structured around voluntary SALW collection and the construction of weapons-free zones for which a development project was awarded, including the provision of funds for communities to determine development priorities.
- The "Ex-Combatants Reintegration and Small Arms Collection" project in the Republic of the Congo, which lasted from July 2000 to December 2002, was a disarmament and reintegration programme pursued through providing sustainable livelihoods to ex-combatants.

- The El Salvador "Strengthening Mechanisms for Small Arms Control" project has involved consciousness raising and changing attitudes towards violence and weapons possession through public debate and political advocacy.
- The "Reducing SALW impact: civil society participation in security sector reform within MERCOSUR" project has sought to assist in the reduction of SALW-related urban violence in Rio de Janeiro and the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) region through research, advocacy and the training of civil society organizations and security sector agencies. This is part of the programme of Viva Rio, which has broader aims of tackling armed violence and social exclusion in a coordinated manner.
- The Kenya/Uganda "National Action Plans on Arms Management and Disarmament" are recently formulated programmes aiming to provide a comprehensive and multi-faceted strategy for all aspects of arms management and reduction involving government, non-governmental organizations and civil society actors.
- The Cambodia "Weapons for Development" (WfD) project has focused on small-scale development in exchange for weapons, as well as public awareness and police reform.
- The Colombia "Armed Conflict Reduction in Colombia" project has sought to facilitate the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants as well as assistance to vulnerable groups such as children and the disabled.
- The "Small Arms and Light Weapons Control" project in Albania has instituted weapons-collection competitions with small development projects as prizes, with additional support for weapons control and awareness campaigns.
- A project entitled: "Exchanging Weapons for Development in Mali: Weapon collection programmes assessed by local people" has been put into effect in Mali.
- Mozambique's "Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares" project involved weapons collection and exchanges for tools.

THE IMPACT OF SALW-REDUCTION PROGRAMMING ON DEVELOPMENT

While some SALW projects do have broader development aims, in many SALW projects no such intention is explicitly built into the design. This is also evident where SALW projects are part of wider programmes which address issues of reintegration and thus in turn rehabilitation and long-term development. It would seem, therefore, that SALW programming in general has had only a limited impact in contributing to the achievement of the MDGs.

However, our research showed the most significant impacts that SALW-reduction projects have on poverty and development (including the MDGs) is indirect—as a result of improved security, good governance practice, progress on security sector reform, increased civic participation and empowerment and confidence building. By underpinning community security, SALW-reduction projects have the capacity to create the confidence for people to travel to markets, attend school, and make plans for the future—all of which potentially contribute to poverty reduction. Improved security and the gradual return of trust and mutual confidence can also breathe new life into reciprocal support mechanisms and other dimensions of social capital. In Sierra Leone, many individuals interviewed as part of the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) of CICS and the UK Department for International Development mentioned that no longer hearing constant gunshots in the communities has helped create an increased sense of safety. In the Republic of the Congo, many interviewed had expressed a perception of increased security as a result of the disarmament process and related disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities. Similar observations were also noted in desk research on Albania and Cambodia. One of the most commonly observed indirect impacts of SALW interventions, therefore, is a psychological, and perhaps symbolic, increase in an individual or community's sense of security,

and the shifts in behaviour this often triggered. In terms of developmental impact, the perception of security is vital for people to resume crucial livelihood activities.

Most SALW interventions, especially those implemented at the community level, bring people together to discuss problems beyond those related to armed violence. In the Sierra Leone WfD programme, men and women were participating together in public forums for the first time in many instances, and it put citizens in contact with local government to discuss their development needs. While the WfD process was designed to reward disarmament with a development project, it did not originally intend to empower people and provide them with greater access to local government structures. Similarly, in Albania, where one of the first WfD projects was implemented, there was no tradition of the population being involved in community or municipal affairs. The ability of the community to participate in public policy, particularly women, is a key to poverty reduction. The ability to participate openly in a public debate on an issue as controversial as weapons control is a good indicator of participation potential in society. SALW interventions may indirectly benefit long-term development when they can improve security in a sustained way.

LESSONS LEARNED AND GUIDELINES

The following lessons and guidelines in terms of linking SALW programming to development and bolstering their impact on poverty reduction can be distilled from recent experiences of SALW programming:

- SALW programming needs to be planned and scoped with mainstream development principles in mind;
- Stronger connections need to be made between mainstream development and SALW programming;
- In areas such as gender and environmental impacts, SALW programming is still relatively poorly developed, and these areas need to be strengthened if SALW programming is to contribute more fully to the MDGs;
- The confidence-building capacities of SALW programming, particularly at the community level, can create the conditions for poverty-reduction to take place. This needs to be recognized and exploited in mainstream development programming; and
- SALW programming sometimes tends to focus on the technical/security aspects of arms collection rather the human developmental aspects of recovery and development, to the detriment of poverty reduction.

OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES AND DIFFICULTIES
IN CONNECTING SALW TO DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

Linkages between SALW and development programming have tended to be weak or non-existent. Both strands of programming have tended to take place with little or only minimal reference to each other. Development programming, for example, that addresses root causes of armed violence such as social, employment, and educational exclusion, do not tend to be connected to SALW programming. Similarly, development programming often does not take into account the impacts of armed violence and SALW on development, tending to see development as something that takes place in isolation to armed violence. In addition, those working in development have tended to regard SALW and armed violence as a politically sensitive or risky

area of programming and therefore an area to be avoided. At the same time, SALW programming has often taken a somewhat technical view of the post-conflict phase and transitions to sustainable development, tending to regard the removal of arms from societies and communities as providing sufficient conditions for recovery.

However, there are potential opportunities for both forms of programming to be mutually reinforcing, although this has not as yet been fully realized in existing programming:

- Poverty-reduction programming, for example, can make a potentially large contribution to fully and sustainably reintegrating ex-combatants into communities, and to linking with SALW programming such as WfD. By connecting efforts to secure livelihoods for ex-combatants more explicitly to SALW programming, more sustainable and effective outcomes can be achieved.
- SALW programming needs to target more precisely the motivations that lead people, particularly young men, to acquire and use SALW and form linkages with development programming addressing these issues. In addition, SALW and development programming needs to address more effectively their livelihood options if key groups are not to return to armed violence.
- SALW programming can create the conditions for sustainable development to take place in communities by bolstering security, building confidence and encouraging the return of community members who fled during conflict and have been reluctant to return. Development initiatives directed at, for example, returnees' needs will need to take account of SALW-related insecurity issues if they are to make headway. SALW programming has been ineffective in building livelihoods that are appropriate to and sustainable in local conditions. Promoting and providing alternative livelihoods for those most likely to revert to armed violence and those taking part in the illicit economy should be a priority, and this element should be strengthened in SALW programmes, drawing upon mainstream development experience.
- The early integration of SALW programming considerations into development initiatives would be a positive development. For example, civilian arms collection programmes could be connected with development mandates.
- Training for those working on SALW and mainstream development to improve their understandings of the two types of programming would be a positive development.
- More research into the connections between SALW and mainstream development and how they can be integrated is required.
- Factoring SALW issues into conflict assessments that precede the initiation of developmental programming. Meaningful development is highly problematic when SALW is widely distributed in situations of violence or potential violence, hence the need for early SALW programming engagement on development issues. Even small quantities of SALW can empower groups, as with the emergence of youth gangs in El Salvador, to exert a disruptive influence out of proportion to their size, and often over extremely short timeframes, with drastic consequences for development.
- If the poverty impacts of SALW are to be minimized or reversed, donors and other actors engaged in poverty reduction may consider developing, for example, holistic "conflict, security and development" analyses that incorporate poverty, social exclusion and vulnerability assessment, "drivers of change" analysis, livelihoods analysis, anthropological analysis and the more traditional SALW reduction-focused assessments.
- A wider audience of donors, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and national governments need to be engaged in SALW and developmental issues.

- Both SALW and developmental programming need to be connected with security sector reform (SSR). The security sector has often proved weak or ineffectual, or has used SALW indiscriminately during conflict and sometimes during the post-conflict phase. Unaccountable, inappropriate, and ineffective security sectors have the capacity to hinder and undo development and impoverish people through violence, extortion and predatory behaviour, which themselves can become a source of grievance and a driver of armed violence. SALW programming which contributes to security sector reform can, therefore, help realize developmental goals.

- Arms collection under SALW programming has the potential to be destabilizing and threaten the livelihoods of many and undermine development. Thus, SALW programming and development may not be directly linked in certain contexts. Pastoralists in Northern Kenya, for example, in a cycle of expanding gun ownership, had no alternative but to resort to weapons, when available, for the protection of their herds and their very survival. Some disarmament and SALW collection programmes have actually endangered the capacity of pastoralists to survive and have further impoverished them.

- Joint planning and coordination mechanisms between SALW and developmental programming should be developed. SALW programming should seek to link more with mainstream development that addresses issues such as exclusion from political participation and formal job markets, stigmatization of certain groups, and the lack of economic and educational opportunities for many individuals and groups who have resorted to violence.

To fully realize the operational opportunities inherent in linking SALW and developmental programming an increased emphasis on certain issues should be considered in policy and programming terms. These are:

- Sensitization and community mobilization against SALW possession should be linked to developmental programming;
- Confidence building should be prioritized in SALW and developmental programming; Confidence building needs to be reinforced at the community level by measures such as weapons-free zones which have the capacity to create space for development to take place;
- The police need to be involved in maintaining low levels of SALW once peacekeepers leave and developmental programming gets underway; and
- Assessments of the extent to which SALW programming has development objectives and aims built into it, and the extent to which it links with broader developmental programming.

CONCLUSION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR EU POLICY

To date, EU policy and programming has not fully engaged in alleviating the impacts of SALW on development or connecting SALW programming and development assistance. However, the importance of security and development linkages, and the consequences of SALW possession and usage, have been emphasized and debated within EU frameworks, as has the strategic role of development cooperation in conflict. In addition, the EU recognizes the negative impact of SALW on conflict prevention, post-conflict recovery, conflict resolution, and humanitarian assistance.

EU policy and programming is engaging with many of the issues relevant to SALW and development. However, what appears to be lacking is a sense of strategic direction and a comprehensive approach on SALW programming including linking SALW and developmental programming. A central problem is the duplication of SALW projects and funding by the European Commission, Common Foreign and Security Policy and individual member states. As a

consequence of these factors, there has not been full follow-through in terms of maximising SALW and related programming impacts, which have tended to be dissipated by disparate programming.

There are considerable opportunities for the EU and member states to engage with some of the key shortfalls and opportunities in terms of alleviating the humanitarian, social and developmental consequences of SALW and connecting SALW with developmental programming. These opportunities include:

- Paying more attention to promoting SSR and its linkages with SALW programming, a policy area that some donors, such as UK Department for International Development, regard as central to developmental policy. By reforming the security sector, armed violence impacts can be considerably reduced;
- Connecting DDR to SALW programming and in turn to development. DDR has tended to be regarded as a separate activity to SALW programming and tends to miss out key elements that SALW action is targeted at, such as civilian weapons. The EU and member states have consistently put forward suggestions and proposals for advancing DDR, as in the Preparatory Meetings in the run-up to the UN Conference of July 2001. This could be built upon;
- Addressing the challenges of building partnerships between agencies and frameworks within the EU and member states in addressing SALW issues;
- Developing strategies to connect SALW programming and development, taking into account perspectives within member states; and
- Looking at shortfalls in the Code of Conduct and transfer linkages.

More specifically, in terms of linking SALW programming and development and alleviating the social, humanitarian, and developmental consequences of SALW, the case study work undertaken in the AVPI suggests that the following areas might be considered priorities:

- EU programming might target livelihoods in its mainstream development assistance, particularly with respect to ex-combatants, and link this to SALW programming.
- Building upon the EU member states' declarations that SALW problems should be tackled comprehensively and should not be removed from their broader context in conflict-prone and post-conflict situations and that such efforts should be broadened to include the promotion of safe and secure environments. A comprehensive approach suggests, among other things, taking into account the impact of SALW on development.
- It would be productive for EU security and development policy to recognize fully confidence-building and community security as precursors and supports to development.
- Integrate SALW considerations into conflict assessments and analysis of poverty reduction in an explicit fashion.
- Development assistance might benefit from taking into account the transforming and often harmful impact of SALW on social capital and networks, and building provision into programming to take account of this.
- SALW programming that the EU and member states undertake might benefit from being directed at some of the root causes and motivations of armed violence, such as exclusion, poverty and poor governance.
- A process of research, training on SALW-related issues and development, and planning and coordination among, for example, policy makers and programme officers might be beneficial in terms of taking debates forward in the EU and among member states.

- Mechanisms for establishing coordination between sometimes disparate EU SALW and development programming would be advantageous.
- SALW and developmental programming needs to be not only interconnected but linked with wider aspects of programming that the EU is engaged in such as conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction.
- Member states with competencies in programming areas of relevance to SALW and development (for example SSR and DDR), such as Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, might take a lead in contributing to EU policy and programming. Individual member states' efforts to integrate SALW considerations into development, humanitarian and post-conflict assistance could usefully be expanded and integrated. UK government backed initiatives, for example, such as the AVPI and the establishment of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool Small Arms and Light Weapons Programme are potentially useful developments. Germany has supported a number of programmes to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants and their families in the Great Lakes Region, while Belgium has supported community recovery and reintegration through a UNDP project in the Republic of the Congo.
- If the harmful impacts of SALW on development are to be mitigated, the EU needs to take further action on member states' arms exports. As a major supplier of SALW that are transferred widely outside the EU, the EU has recognized that loopholes exist in this field and that further action is needed.[28] Specifically, the EU has recognized the need for further substantive work on export controls and the possible elaboration of common national and international standards, with the aim of preventing legal trade from being diverted into illegal channels and limiting the excessive accumulation of arms in regions already affected by existing tensions or armed conflicts.
- Further EU coordinated action is also required in terms of brokering, the marking and tracing of SALW, and in transparency in terms of reporting, so that SALW are not introduced or re-emerge in the post-conflict phase hampering development.

Notes

[1]   See General Assembly, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, UN document A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, para. 60, p. 14.

[2]   Peter Batchelor and Robert Muggah, "Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects of Small Arms on Human Development: A Study of the Socio-Economic Impacts and Development Linkages of Small Arms Proliferation and Use", United Nations Development Programme, 2002, p. 12.

[3]   Small Arms Survey, "Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small Arms on Human Development," in *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied*, 2003, p. 130 (box).

[4]   Ibid., pp. 125–167.

[5]   Ibid.

[6]   Oxfam, "Under Fire: the Human Cost of Small Arms in North-East Democratic Republic of Congo", 2001.

[7]   Oxfam, "Conflict's Children: the Human Cost of Small Arms in Kitgum and Kotido, Uganda", 2001, p. 34.

[8]   See for example Robert Muggah and Eric Berman, *Humanitarianism Under Threat: The Humanitarian Impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Small Arms Survey, 2001 p. 30.

[9]   Mark Duffield, "The Political Economy of Internal War: Asset Transfer, Complex Emergencies and International Aid", in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi (eds), *War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to Complex Emergencies*, Zed Books, 1994; David Keen, "War, Crime and Access to Resources", in E. Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart and Raimo Väyrynen (eds), *War, Hunger*

and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies, vol. 1, 2000; Mats Berdal and David Malone (eds), *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, Lynne Rienner, 2000.

[10] Actual acts of direct violence (physical harm, rape, use of SALW to terrorize people) that have both direct (that is, loss of life) and indirect impacts (changes in household composition, for example); the climate of insecurity, fear and impunity (through the threat of use of SALW, restrictions on movement, and so on) that impact on people's ability to conduct livelihood activities; and the "political economy of violence" (including illicit economic activities such as extortion, production and smuggling of drugs, conflict minerals and natural resources, land grabbing, money laundering and corruption) that change the circumstances in which people and communities seek their livelihoods, bringing prosperity to some and impoverishment to others.

[11] Pablo Dreyfus, Carolina Iootty de Paiva Dias et al., "Small Arms Control in MERCOSUR", *Latin American Series*, no. 3, International Alert and Viva Rio, 2003.

[12] Small Arms Survey, "Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small Arms on Human Development," in *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied*, 2003, p. 132.

[13] Ibid., p. 218 (box).

[14] According to the Convention on the Rights of the Child—accepted by all but two countries (the United States and Somalia)—"a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, maturity is attained earlier."

[15] Adriana Valencia, "Child Refugees: Young and Vulnerable", *EarthTrends*, World Resources Institute, 2001.

[16] Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, "Colombia's War on Children", 2004, <http://www.watchlist.org/reports/colombia.report.pdf>.

[17] United Nations Children's Fund, *From Perception to Reality: A Study on Child Protection in Somalia*, 2003.

[18] Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict, "Colombia's War on Children", 2004, <http://www.watchlist.org/reports/colombia.report.pdf>.

[19] Maggie Black, "Growing Up Alone: Childhood Under Siege", United Nations Children's Fund, 2001.

[20] These negative impacts are also charted in Frances Stewart and Valpy Fitzgerald et al. (eds), *War and Underdevelopment*, vols 1 and 2, Oxford University Press, 2001, which remains one of the few systematic analyses of the macro-economic impact of civil wars.

[21] The figures for 1995 were 5%, representing a two-fold increase in just seven years.

[22] United Nations Development Programme, "UN Strategy to Support National Recovery and Peace-building in Sierra Leone, 2002–2003", 2002.

[23] International Labour Organization, "Sierra Leone: The Terrible Price of Poverty and Unemployment", *World of Work* no. 33, 2000

[24] Small Arms Survey, "Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small Arms on Human Development," in *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied*, 2003, p. 142.

[25] World Bank, Project Appraisal Document, Human Development II, Country Dept 10, Africa Regional Office, Report No. 24217-SL, 22 January 2003.

[26] United Nations Development Programme, *Armas de Fuego y Violencia*, 2003.

[27] The Millennium Development Goals were agreed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration in September 2000 and have become central objectives for international development assistance, to be reached by 2015.

[28] Statement by Ireland on behalf of the European Union to the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) to negotiate an international instrument to enable states to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons, New York, 14 June 2004.

ACRONYMS

AVPI	Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative
CDF	Civil Defence Force
CICS	Centre for International Cooperation and Security
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DfID	UK Department for International Development
EU	European Union
IANSA	International Action Network on Small Arms
IDPs	internally displaced persons
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SAS	Small Arms Survey
SSR	security sector reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WfD	weapons for development