Seventy-eighth session
Item 103 of the provisional agenda*
Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session

Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters
Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report on the work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters contains an urgent call to action on an issue of strategic importance. In a bleak international peace and security environment often characterized by a lack of trust and respect for international laws and institutions and in which global military spending is at a record high of $2.24 trillion, a fresh perspective and recommendations are offered to secure greater human security and achieve the decades-old objective of Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, namely, the least diversion of the world’s economic and human resources to armaments.

At the request of the Secretary-General, and following two years of deliberations, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters has developed three pathways and related actions which it believes, when pursued in tandem, could contribute to a transformative shift to a more holistic conception of security that would see fewer resources allocated to competitive arms acquisition and more to actions that meet the needs of peoples and the planet, such as mitigating climate change and reducing socio-economic inequalities. The pathways are centred around measures that (a) encourage critical, innovative and transformative thinking on military spending; (b) contribute to the lessening of threat perceptions and risk escalation and to a reduction of military spending; and (c) strengthen analysis, data collection and public awareness on military spending.

The ideas contained in the pathways could deliver immediate, medium- and longer-term impacts. They target Member States, the United Nations system, regional and civil society actors, researchers and other stakeholders. Crucially, dialogue and diplomacy are given primacy, as are respect for international law, a recommitment to the elements that make up the contemporary peace and security architecture, and the design of new strategies, as means to improve the wider security climate and to slow
the upward cycle of military expenditures at a time when new insights and energy are sorely needed.

In its capacity as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the Board reviewed and provided strategic advice on the Institute’s consolidated programme of work, activities and finances. The Institute’s unique position as a bridge-builder and convenor in the field of disarmament led to several achievements in 2023, notably (a) a substantial increase in events and publications; (b) new digital policy portals on artificial intelligence and space security; and (c) influential expert technical support to States, regional organizations and multilateral bodies, including through signature events on innovation, outer space and cyberstability. The Board was briefed on the evolving global disarmament research network, the UNIDIR Academy and improvements made to the website and research dissemination that enabled cost optimization and should enhance outreach. The Board approved the report of the Director on the activities of the Institute for the period from January to December 2022 and the proposed programme of work and financial plan for 2023 and 2024.
I. Introduction

1. At the request of the Secretary-General, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters undertook a two-year programme of work to consider the topic of global military spending. The objective was to recommend actions that could revive a long-standing objective, anchored in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, of achieving the least diversion of resources towards arms, thereby reversing the current upward trend in military spending since 1998, and to encourage States to reimagine security, not only in military terms, but for the benefit of economic, environmental and social development. Specifically, the Secretary-General requested the Board to reflect on three main questions: (a) what opportunities exist to reinforce transparency, confidence-building and practical dialogue as alternatives to stockpiling weapons; (b) how to build effective and durable cooperation-based security architectures; and (c) how to facilitate new and transformative thinking on military spending. The timing of the Board’s work meant that it was able to contribute to the development by the Secretary-General of A New Agenda for Peace, which is aimed at addressing a myriad of global challenges and strengthening global governance for the sake of present and coming generations.

2. In 2022, following an initial two sessions, the Advisory Board produced an interim report on the topic (A/77/263). It resumed discussion in 2023, holding its seventy-ninth session from 1 to 3 February in Geneva and its eightieth session from 21 to 23 June in New York. It convened for informal intersessional meetings in October 2022 and in January, April and May 2023. Elissa Golberg of Canada presided as Chair of the Board for all sessions.

3. The present report, submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 38/183 (O), captures the Board’s substantive discussions and presents its specific recommendations. It also details its work as the Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), including its approval of the report of the Director of the Institute (A/78/163).

II. Substantive discussions

A. Context and background

4. The founding objective of the United Nations, as captured in the preamble of the Charter, is to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to ensure that, save in the common interest, armed force shall not be used. The obligations under the Charter thus include a prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, but acknowledge the right of Member States to individual or collective self-defence where this is not respected, including through regional arrangements, which has also been interpreted by the Security Council and the General Assembly to include peacekeeping operations and action to protect civilians who may be at risk. The Charter also requires the regulation of armaments and the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources.¹

5. Regrettably, the momentum towards this last goal of least diversion, which has always been irregular, has slowed if not reversed in the past two decades. Global military spending is now at its highest since the end of the cold war, and arms competition is largely unconstrained. According to April 2023 data from the

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¹ See preamble and articles 26 and 43–54.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global military spending grew by 19 per cent over the decade from 2013 to 2022, rising every year since 2015, and is now at a record high of $2.24 trillion dollars. Although the almost continuous increase in military spending prevails on a global scale, it does not apply equally. There are vast differences in spending levels between regions, individual States, groups of States and political-military alliances, both in absolute figures and relative to a country’s gross domestic product (GDP). While this spending generates notable implications for resource allocation for domestic purposes in both developed and developing countries, the existential impacts may be even more dire for low-income countries. Most recently, and for multifaceted reasons, many States have committed to continuing increases in military spending, reflecting, for some, concern at acute and emerging uncertainties in their security environments.

Figure I
World military expenditure, by region, 1988–2022
(Billions of United States dollars)


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6. The Board was mindful that for several decades, various initiatives of limited or uneven impact had been developed at the United Nations with the aims of constraining and promoting transparency on military spending. This included general appeals to all States to exercise self-restraint in military expenditure with a view to reallocating saved funds to economic and social development; specific proposals for States with large militaries to reduce expenditures to free up funds for development aid; the long-established commitment to achieve general and complete disarmament; and the creation of the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures to share and compare information on military spending among States. The Board was also aware that the Security Council had failed to meet its obligations under Article 26 to formulate, with the aid of the Military Staff Committee, plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments, in part because the latter had not given priority to that duty in its programme of work.

7. More recently, all Member States endorsed the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which presented an opportunity to foster a new, common understanding of the relationship between disarmament and sustainable and inclusive development. In its resolution 77/45, the General Assembly stressed the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development and the important role of security in that connection and expressed concern at increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs.
In addition to Member States, the Secretary-General and various United Nations agencies, the research community has also increasingly encouraged rethinking security to protect and manage “the global public good of peace” (A/75/982, para. 89), which could involve commitments to reduce excessive military budgets and enable adequate social spending, address root causes of conflict and uphold human rights and link disarmament to development opportunities. One such perspective sees military and human security as a “single security space” whereby financial claims are balanced against all vital risks and threats, regardless of their cause. This would involve an evaluation of military spending in relation to other means of protecting people’s security, including addressing concerns related to climate change, inequality and poverty reduction. It could potentially lead to a reallocation of funds among the different dimensions of security to improve human well-being, without leading to a reduction in overall security, broadly defined, and even enhance security by addressing non-military threats and reducing the risks of intemperate armament.

B. Considerations and reflections of the Board

Aware of this context and its strategic importance, the Board welcomed the opportunity to reflect in a sustained manner on the topic of rising military spending and means to limit it. It saw the value in offering a fresh perspective on ways in which States could be encouraged to pursue pathways that reinforced the principle of least diversion. Such an approach, the Board considered, might foster a constructive global conversation that animated a transformative shift to a broader, holistic conception of security, one that saw fewer resources allocated over time to competitive arms acquisition and more to actions that might make people feel safer in response to twenty-first century threats such as climate change and pandemics, gender inequality, extreme poverty and crime. The Board sought to understand the obstacles to past efforts to reduce military spending as a basis for determining what pre-existing initiatives might remain relevant and what new avenues could be explored. It saw its task as especially timely, not least given the rising military spending in a current international security environment characterized by antagonistic inter-State relations and hostile rhetoric, a resort to armed aggression in violation of international law, arms-race-like dynamics, and mutual suspicions and trust deficits between States in many regions.

Indeed, it must be said that the two years during which it deliberated on the subject were tumultuous for arms control and disarmament. There were some declarations and commitments related to nuclear weapons, such as the January 2022 reaffirmation by the leaders of the Permanent Five countries that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and the June 2022 statement by parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons condemning all nuclear threats in any circumstance and calling any use or threat of use of these weapons a violation of international law. But overall, the picture was bleak, reflecting a steady attrition in respect for international laws and institutions, including, as some members variously noted, the war in Ukraine and the violation of the Charter of the United Nations in

3 Including in his 2018 Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament, recent reports to the Security Council on women and peace and security and the 2021 report “Our Common Agenda”, in which the Secretary-General called for efforts to rethink unconstrained military spending, advocating for people-centred policies and reductions in military spending.

that context,\textsuperscript{5} and continued brutal armed violence elsewhere, such as in the Sahel region, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. There has been shockingly inflammatory rhetoric about the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, a further erosion and abandonment of the implementation of valued treaties and agreements that comprise the global disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation architecture,\textsuperscript{6} and an inability to reach consensus on an outcome document at the tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This sombre landscape spurred the Board to work collaboratively to develop the set of practical ideas outlined below that seek to address the request of the Secretary-General, including by considering what more the United Nations could do to promote cooperative responses to reverse these negative trends.

11. In so doing, the Board put a premium on dialogue and diplomacy, which are paramount in a context where trust is lacking; treaties, practices and bodies that were meant to shore up international security appear more vulnerable than anticipated, including the Security Council; significant challenges, notably with respect to climate change and gender and economic inequalities, persist; military spending and arms build-ups are on the rise; and many brutal wars and situations of armed violence are unresolved. The world is at a pivotal moment, and the Board was unequivocal in considering that there must be respect for international law and a recommitment to the treaties, agreements and instruments that make up the contemporary international peace and security architecture, including the Charter of the United Nations, and to fulfilling their ultimate vision of cooperation among States in the interests of all peoples and the planet. Dialogue and diplomatic action were seen as invaluable both to improving the broader security climate and as an enabler in slowing the current upward cycle of military expenditures.

12. Given the period in which it conducted its work, the Board had meaningful and robust debates about the current war in Ukraine and its origins. There was shared concern at its human consequences, the risks of wider conflict, and the global implications of a deepening and protracted crisis, including for food and nuclear safety and security. There was also discussion on some of the effects of a Security Council member brazenly violating the Charter. Several Board members underscored the conflict’s relationship to and impact on military spending in Europe and some other regions. The Board encouraged the Secretary-General to continue his urgent and vital diplomatic efforts to reduce escalation, diminish risks to global food security and radiological security, identify a peaceful and sustainable resolution of the conflict and, in due course, support efforts to identify and put in place a revitalized pan-European security architecture that would mitigate the likelihood of such events occurring again.

13. Driven by an unrelenting commitment to peace, the Board sought to strike a balance in its discussions on a need for creative vision and an appreciation of the pragmatic limits imposed by today’s context. The sense of urgency that has informed its work and resulting recommendations should motivate all Member States, decision makers, researchers and civil society actors, who must now decide whether and how to carry forward its proposals.

\textsuperscript{5} Remarks by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Ukraine of 2 March 2022 and 23 and 24 February 2023.

\textsuperscript{6} Including with regard to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty) and the Treaty on Open Skies.
Current drivers and implications of military spending

14. The Board recognized that there could be no one-size-fits-all approach given the complex factors that influenced military spending and noted that absolute numbers offered only a partial picture. Therefore, it examined the political, economic, institutional and social factors driving military spending, in particular with regard to regional or global security concerns. It also considered the impacts of military spending, both direct and in terms of opportunity costs limiting resources for other economic, social and global purposes, and additional negative externalities, including on the environment. Understanding the underlying factors that drive today’s military spending and identifying ways to address them may make it possible to shift resources not simply to domestic State purposes but also to urgent shared global priorities. The Board’s discussions on the above were informed by experts of various regions, genders and disciplines. A full list with summaries of their presentations is included in annex I.

15. A central observation by the Board was that there are a range of complex and interlocking geostrategic, domestic (social, political, cultural) and institutional factors that determine the choices and decisions being made with respect to military spending and procurement. Depending on the context, State security considerations and threat assessments, alliance and partnership requirements, regional and global prestige, bureaucratic competition, industrial pressure and processes of decision-making on defence, as well as political and electoral considerations, may all play a part. A lack of global leadership by vital bodies such as the Security Council, whose ability to mitigate specific crises has been hindered in recent times, may also play a part. Crucially, the Board saw mutually reinforcing relationships today among the strained, and in some instances crumbling, disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation regimes, the tense and conflictual international environment, attempts to erode international law and institutions, and increasing military spending including on modernization and development of new weapons systems.

16. Members reflected on how, under certain conditions, decisions related to military spending may not accurately reflect the threat environment or sufficiently consider how such spending may be misperceived by adversaries or contribute to insecurity and instability. It was noted that military spending choices might be in tension with spending to address other, non-military threats, or in some instances lead to other adverse effects such as on the environment or inequality. Examples were cited of procurement decisions that were unduly shaped by industry and/or other lobbying, procurement decisions that involved corruption, projects that cost significantly more than what was projected and resulted in significant wasted spending, and difficulties with eliminating military facilities that no longer had strategic value. The Board also considered the impact of emerging technologies as a factor driving up military spending. Concern was expressed that the pursuit and use of such technologies for warfare in new domains such as space and cyberspace and in areas such as hypersonic and artificial intelligence technologies risked arms-race-like dynamics. Its discussions also included consideration of whether an emphasis on defensive systems could be encouraged, but the blurred lines between offensive and defensive systems, with a great deal depending on how they were used, risked undermining efforts to do so.

C. Proposed pathways forward

17. This section presents three separate but complementary pathways for action by States, the United Nations system, civil society, academia and other stakeholders, in line with the request of the Secretary-General. The three pathways are centred around measures that (a) encourage critical, innovative and transformative thinking on
military spending; (b) contribute to lessening threat perceptions and risk escalation and reducing military spending; and (c) strengthen analysis, data collection and public awareness on military spending. All the pathways need to be pursued even if progress on one may be more feasible at a given moment than others.

18. The Board considers that the following recommendations could contribute to a cultural shift in thinking about peace and security that puts people and planet at the core. This could result in a strategic and calibrated approach to reducing arms spending and have tangible impacts in the immediate, medium and longer terms, including in creating an international context conducive to fostering inclusive sustainable development for the benefit of all.

Pathway I: Encouraging more critical, innovative and transformative thinking on military spending

19. While the Board strongly believes that the immediate priority of the international community must be actions to halt current conflicts and reduce the military dimension of contemporary geopolitical competition, significant progress towards meeting the injunction under the Charter of the United Nations of the least possible diversion for arms of the world’s human and economic resources will require a transformative approach to security. In that regard, the Secretary-General and the United Nations system can contribute to stimulating and promoting multilateral and multi-stakeholder discussions, including with civil society, to enable such a shift.

20. It is the responsibility of Member States to determine the level of their military spending; however the Board considers that the Secretary-General and the Secretariat can help to refocus attention on the Charter’s vision of the least possible diversion of resources to military spending, the factors that may determine and distort military spending decisions, and the consequences of military spending. In that way, Governments from all regions might be supported to balance different priorities and account for the relative contribution of military spending compared with other uses of State resources.

21. The Board considers that regional forums, where they exist, are another valuable venue for States to discuss, evaluate and assess military spending. As noted above, each region is faced with a unique security environment and challenges that are also influenced by transnational drivers and domestic considerations. Regional approaches may allow neighbouring States to address their concerns in a cooperative forum that can contribute to an improved security climate and shifts in security approaches. There may also be burden-sharing opportunities to reduce individual country procurements (e.g. early-warning technologies and research on natural hazards) and to alleviate budgetary pressures, especially for low-income countries facing major security threats.

22. The Board also sees potential for strengthened exchanges and new initiatives between the United Nations and regional organizations to facilitate exchanges that promote transparency and dialogue. Such exchanges could leverage best practices and lessons learned from current and past regional cooperation, including on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as the Board heard with respect to South-East Asia.

23. Lastly, the Board noted that, to the extent that they exist, institutionalized checks and balances and a whole-of-society approach that engages civil society on military budgeting could help to minimize waste and misuse of funds. In some countries, however, military budgeting is still primarily the preserve of the military establishment or a very small group of non-elected officials, often shrouded in secrecy. Enabling better oversight by legislative bodies also could help to reduce wasteful expenditures and lessen possible corruption. That would require national
institutions to become more participatory and responsive to public opinion to enhance transparency and accountability.

**Recommendations**

(a) The Secretary-General should convene States, eminent persons and civil society for a special event during a high-level week or another significant opportunity to identify and develop concrete actions that support a more comprehensive approach to security that focuses not only on the security of States but also of societies and individual citizens. In order to achieve greater human security, such an event would need to consider non-military threats, such as climate change, inequalities or pandemics, and should consider the implications that a transformative approach might have for realigning financial allocations of military spending, and solutions for overcoming obstacles to such an approach;

(b) During the above discussions, consideration could be given to establishing a regular forum of government representatives, regional representatives and experts as an institutional framework to further mainstream a human-centred approach to security within the United Nations system and explore, as appropriate, a new generation of confidence-building measures to deal with non-traditional threats and constructively tackle twenty-first century global strategic and technological challenges;

(c) The Secretary-General should mandate a future Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters to examine the impact of new technologies on conflict and conflict resolution;

(d) Regional organizations should organize multi-stakeholder dialogues to enhance knowledge and understanding of military spending, its opportunity costs, and means to reduce it, all of which can contribute to achieving the goal of Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Secretariat should strengthen its collaboration with regional organizations on those issues, tailored to their dynamics, and encourage interaction among regional organizations to share lessons learned and best practices and to encourage efforts to reduce the role of the use of force among States;

(e) The Office for Disarmament Affairs should continue to offer practical assistance to States for their annual submission to the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures, including through training programmes, high-level dialogues and meaningful engagement with civil society organizations. All States could be encouraged to integrate and strengthen impact assessments by governmental oversight bodies for planned military procurement, such as auditors and evaluation teams, to identify potential risks, counter distortions and help to ensure efficient use of national resources.

**Pathway II: Measures that contribute to reducing threat perceptions and the risk of military escalation: the need to bolster dialogue and diplomacy, including confidence-building, transparency and disarmament and arms control**

24. In this dangerous period, it is essential that States return to dialogue and diplomacy to (re)build trust and confidence, manage conflicts of interest, reinforce multilateral action, cooperation and collective measures as foreseen in the Charter and lessen the risks of crisis escalation. This necessitates a central role for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation measures, including operational transparency and confidence-building measures centred around the notion of cooperative security. These measures can be unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral in nature. Taken together, they can help to address perceptions and misunderstandings about military actions and policies, avert escalation and lessen military spending pressures, facilitating a shift in approaches to international peace.
and security. The Board underlines that all Member States share an interest in such efforts, including as means of mitigating regional rivalries and avoiding arms racing, and in doing so, containing the growth of military spending. In addition, the Board stresses the need to urgently sustain and bolster existing agreements in this field and foster new strategies and imaginative thinking that address twenty-first century challenges, including the role of new and emerging technologies.

25. The Board considers that transparency can foster increased security by reducing uncertainties about respective capabilities and dispositions that contribute to competition, thereby helping to build needed trust between States. Transparency measures can also enhance accountability and be part of an effort to promote serious re-engagement within and between States on their security concerns. As such, the Board sees scope to better position the United Nations as a relevant, neutral and accessible hub for data and information. It notes the utility and potential of the United Nations military expenditures database and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, which could be better leveraged as vehicles to accurately inform the military spending decisions of States and debates among policy experts, disarmament practitioners and the public alike. The Board expresses concern at the diminished number of States reporting to these databases, believing that participation in both should be prioritized. Moreover, fostering information exchange on national policies on emerging technologies and potential new domains of conflict, and their corresponding military spending, might be pursued. All these actions can have corresponding benefits to potentially reduce the growth of military spending. In that regard, the Board also suggests that the time may be ripe for a review of the military expenditures database, given that it was last assessed by a group of governmental experts in 2017.

26. Lastly, and crucially, in a context of heightened nuclear risk, the Board reaffirms that the international community must not lose sight of achieving the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. It expresses deep concern about the dangers inherent in the very existence of nuclear weapons, the increased arms racing arising from their modernization and the expansion of existing arsenals, as well as proliferation risks, potential escalatory dynamics and rhetoric about the use of nuclear weapons. It urges that cooperative action be taken to mitigate such dynamics and to put the world back on track towards their total elimination. It also underscores the relevance of its past recommendations, including in its 2020–2021 report, aimed at securing nuclear disarmament and arms control (A/76/183).

Recommendations

(a) The Secretary-General should continue to use his good offices to help bring about a resolution to various significant geostrategic conflicts and situations of armed violence, including the conflict in Ukraine. More broadly, the Secretary-General and the United Nations Secretariat should continue to promote regional confidence-building and conflict resolution measures to reduce today’s tensions, encourage restraint, decelerate military build-ups and lessen the role of military force as a means of security. Both bilateral engagement and engagement with regional organizations and by multilateral bodies could offer opportunities to do so;

(b) States, notably and urgently those in possession of nuclear weapons, should establish, deepen and/or reinvigorate dialogue at all levels, including bilateral strategic dialogues, military-to-military exchanges, and exchanges among politicians and civil society. Their purpose should be, inter alia, to enhance mutual understanding, identify confidence-building measures, mitigate threat perceptions that drive military spending, and address questions related to doctrine, posture and policies. Given their specific responsibilities in relation to article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, exchanges among the nuclear-weapon
States must continue to be pursued. Owing to their potential strategic implications, States involved in nuclear-sharing arrangements should also undertake relevant actions in accordance with the above;

(c) States and military alliances should regularly reassess their military postures and doctrines. Particular attention should focus on whether those postures and doctrines, as well as their procurement strategies, directly or indirectly increase security concerns for other States and populations, fuel escalatory dynamics, contribute to accumulation of excessive or redundant capabilities, are ill-suited to the threat environment or jeopardize efforts to advance human security for societies, communities and individuals and to protect nature, and if so, they should be amended accordingly;

(d) At the multilateral level, States should carry forward their efforts to identify and implement transparency and confidence-building measures in emerging fields such as outer space, cyberspace, artificial intelligence and life sciences to encourage the development of such technologies within the framework of a cooperative human-centred security policy and to help lessen the extent to which they are contributing to perceptions of heightened military threats. To that end, the Security Council should request the Secretary-General to prepare an annual review of such developments, as well as of how military competition is developing in new ways across scientific and economic domains, independent of specific treaty regimes. Such an approach could facilitate anticipatory norm-setting and treaty-making. An annual Security Council debate could be organized on receipt of the report;

(e) All States should submit their reports to the United Nations military expenditures database and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and, for the former, include disaggregated spending figures in their reports, including on the different branches of service of the military and on functional categories of spending; and the General Assembly, through its biennial resolution entitled “Objective information on military matters, including transparency of military expenditures”, should seek to further strengthen the military expenditures database so that it is well positioned to address contemporary issues;

(f) The Office for Disarmament Affairs should continue to improve the accessibility and comparability of official data on military spending submitted to the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures, including by seeking to render that data comparable between States and over time, making use of standards for accounting for currency exchange rates and inflation.

Pathway III: Strengthening analysis and data collection on military spending

27. The Board considers that analysis is needed on the practical policy and operational implications of implementing a more comprehensive approach to security for levels and types of military spending and calls for new academic and policy-based research to be encouraged on the topic of military spending. Indeed, some three decades have passed since the General Assembly last mandated studies exploring the interlinkages between disarmament and development or on the wider consequences of military spending. New research would increase readily available expertise, bring greater prominence to the issue and, ideally, generate increased domestic and international public attention and oversight. A twenty-first century analysis that offers a more current understanding of the political, socioeconomic and environmental consequences of military expenditures and accounts for contemporary priorities, including in relation to gender equality, climate change, conflict prevention (including early warning and action), protracted crises and democratic oversight and institutional capacity, would be invaluable.
The Board is concerned that broad public awareness of the need and value of actions in support of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation has waned. It also considers that there is insufficient recognition of the trade-offs between military spending and socioeconomic investments and between such State spending and dealing with global threats. It recognizes that sophisticated and differentiated approaches to raising awareness would be needed given the vastly different levels of public debate, sentiment and civic engagement across the globe. In both past and present, United Nations entities and civil society groups have played an indispensable role in raising awareness and mobilizing support around important global issues. For instance, the world’s youth have collectively rallied around the issue of climate change, advocating urgent political leadership, systemic shifts and decisive action to enable a better, safer and more secure future for all.

Noting that it has been some 40 years since the World Disarmament Campaign was launched, the Board sees scope for the Secretary-General, the United Nations Secretariat and relevant agencies, funds or programmes to expand on current efforts to heighten global public understanding and awareness. It was underscored that a participatory and inclusive approach was vital – bringing in voices, experiences and perspectives that did not always find space or footing in international security discussions and where the United Nations was uniquely positioned.

Recommendations

(a) The General Assembly, through its Disarmament and International Security Committee, should urgently request that a group of independent international experts carry out the following studies:

(i) An updated study on the social, cultural, economic and environmental consequences of military spending, including the costs of war and arms races, informed by a wide range of stakeholders;

(ii) A study of the elements of a more comprehensive and cooperative approach to global, State and human security, obstacles to its pursuit and ways to overcome those obstacles, and the implications of such a transformative shift for levels and types of military spending;

(b) Additional, more specialized studies could be undertaken by the Office for Disarmament Affairs, UNIDIR, other international bodies, academic institutions or civil society organizations. Examples of such studies include:

(i) A study analysing all the factors that determine and increase military spending and procurement, and their relationship to resource allocation. Such a study would also account for different military postures and strategies and the implications of the development and deployment of new and emerging technologies with military applications, such as artificial intelligence, as well as capabilities in potential domains of conflict, such as cyberspace and outer space;

(ii) A virtual compendium or toolbox of effective measures and best practices in the public and parliamentary oversight of military procurement, their effectiveness, the implications for reducing wasteful military spending and how to encourage the adoption of such practices to help foster transparency as part of a whole-of-society approach to military budgeting. Such a compendium could also include a focus on, inter alia, corporate lobbying, the hiring of former military personnel in military industry positions and corruption;
(iii) In conjunction with the next report on human security of the United Nations Development Programme, a study that outlines ways to undertake integrated security needs and impact assessments in relevant budgetary and planning processes, similar to environmental impact assessments. This should include methodologies to quantify potential financial savings that can be realized from the implementation of disarmament agreements and how a portion of any such savings could be used to support sustainable development and further efforts in the field of disarmament;

(iv) A study of the implications of reductions in military spending for industrial capacity and personnel and how international support could be provided for the conversion of defence industrial capacity to socially useful production (for example, through loans or technical support) and the reintegration of military personnel into civilian life. Such recommendations could contribute to mitigating the consequences of reductions in and reduce pressure for sustained levels of military spending. This study could benefit from the cooperation among international and regional economic institutions, the United Nations and other stakeholders;

(v) A comprehensive assessment on the past, current and possible future costs of nuclear weapons programmes, including their economic, health and environmental consequences, their relationship to the structure and drivers of military budgets, and the opportunity costs of withdrawal from arms control agreements;

(c) A twenty-first century World Disarmament Campaign should be launched by the Secretary-General. Coordinated by the Office for Disarmament Affairs and pursued in conjunction with other relevant United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the Campaign would strengthen global public understanding, education and support for disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation and peace. It should include increasing the awareness of young people of the implications of rising military spending and the catastrophic consequences of modern war, with a special focus on nuclear war;

(d) Military spending could be the theme for a forthcoming International Day for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Awareness and Disarmament Week.

Conclusion

30. At the outset of its work, the Advisory Board knew that it had been given a singular challenge by the Secretary-General, namely, to bring new energy and insights to a commitment made more than seven decades ago at the creation of the United Nations. It knew that there would be no magic formula, no single solution to reverse the rise in military spending. It does believe, however, that active diplomacy, dialogue and research can offer a pathway back to the goal of enabling the least diversion of the world’s financial resources away from social and economic development and environmental sustainability. A less conventional, more holistic appreciation of security can be embraced, which would see more resources spent on climate action, social and economic justice and gender equality and less on weapons. The “golden nuggets” in the present report are actionable and must urgently be put to work for people, planet and prosperity.

III. Board of Trustees of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

31. The Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, acting in its role as the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR, met twice in 2023, on 31 January and 20 June, to review the Institute’s programmes, funding and operations.

Results and impact

32. During the first meeting, the Director of UNIDIR outlined the Institute’s activities and strategic impact in 2022, illustrated by means of case studies of its contributions to the ninth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, its work on the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the project on managing exits from armed conflict and the UNIDIR Academy, and programme priorities for 2023. In that context, the Director updated Trustees on his efforts to further strengthen impact measurement and reporting. It was suggested that UNIDIR continue to refine its various impact narratives, streamlining further as appropriate, and to develop them into a coherent overarching narrative that outlines the Institute’s value proposition.

33. Trustees expressed satisfaction that notwithstanding the challenging international geostrategic environment, including setbacks on disarmament and arms control, UNIDIR had reinforced its position as a bridge-builder and convenor by providing necessary spaces for difficult but vital reflections on a range of peace and security matters and enabling expert and inter-State interactions, including through signature initiatives such as its Outer Space Security Conference, Innovations Dialogue and Cyberstability Conference, and by supporting multilateral processes. Moreover, Trustees welcomed the Institute’s meaningful work on youth engagement in 2022, including a model United Nations exercise, an essay competition with applicants from 38 countries and a self-paced e-learning course and related video interviews with young UNIDIR professionals. Trustees expressed regret that a lack of funding might hinder the project’s continuation and suggested that more entities and countries be approached as potential future funders, including those from which young people had participated in previous activities.

34. Following the briefing in June 2022 on the Institute’s four-year strategic research framework, Trustees were given further details on the priorities for 2023, notably, the global disarmament research network, the UNIDIR Academy and the roll-out of the multi-pillar programme structure. On the research network, Trustees recommended a gradual approach, linked with UNIDIR priorities, and underlined the importance of inclusivity and flexibility. Concerning the Academy, Trustees requested that UNIDIR engage in a strategic discussion with the Office for Disarmament Affairs to clarify their respective priorities and offerings related to capacity-building. Lastly, the Board took note of the Director’s plan to begin work on the next strategic plan in 2024, which was planned to cover the period from 2025 to 2030.

Finances

35. The ability of UNIDIR to showcase a strong value proposition resulted in a record number of donors (33) from all continents in 2022 and record revenue generation (close to $8 million), which was expected to be sustained into 2023. Trustees were pleased that all five permanent members of the Security Council had financially supported the Institute, for the first time since 2010. As it continued to consolidate its resource mobilization strategy, UNIDIR was exploring potential private capital and philanthropic partners. The Director indicated how UNIDIR had used the subvention allocated by the General Assembly, which had increased to


$683,500 from $280,700 in 2021 and had enabled quarterly disarmament briefings for all United Nations regional groupings, the convening of seminars in three non-Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries and the hiring of an Executive Officer to enhance efficiency and oversight.

36. While considering priorities and budget scenarios for 2023, the Board was also briefed on the Institute’s financial constraints, including a restricted interpretation of official development assistance definitions by some OECD Development Assistance Committee donors and a high degree of earmarking (having risen to 92 per cent in 2022 from 75 per cent in 2018), with concomitant risks related to medium-term financial stability and operational capacity to respond quickly to emerging themes or issues.

37. Trustees discussed potential mitigation measures, encouraging UNIDIR to continue to diversify its resources, to assess the benefits and risks of requesting a re-evaluation of the Institute’s official development assistance coefficient and to engage the Chair of the Development Assistance Committee on the matter. Furthermore, Trustees asked that UNIDIR present a refined set of principles for engagement with the private sector/private capital, which was subsequently presented and endorsed at the June meeting.

38. Trustees noted that while the subvention increase from the United Nations regular budget had provided some additional predictability, it fell short of what Trustees had recommended. Given that the subvention is not budgeted on the basis of standard United Nations staff costs each year, in future, it will be insufficient to cover actual staff costs of the positions it supports. In view of that and the growing importance of the Institute’s mandate and activities for all United Nations members, the Board requested the Director to develop a draft business case for a further subvention increase to safeguard the Institute’s independence, stability and sustainability, which was presented to the Board in June 2023. The Board agreed that an application for a further subvention increase was warranted and should aim to cover, at a minimum, the research programmes and the Deputy Director to provide substantive leadership, quality control and coordination of all research and activities. Further discussion was needed on the scope, scale and timing of a request (2024 or 2025), and the Director was requested to further develop the proposal and its rationale in order to present it to the Trustees at their next meeting, in January 2024.

Interim 2023 achievements and 2024 programme of work

39. During its June 2023 session, the Board considered and adopted the Institute’s annual work programme for 2024 and the proposed annual budget estimates, acknowledging recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the draft report of the Director. Trustees requested that the programme of work and financial estimates for the following year be included as a separate agenda item in the June meetings of the Board. Work will also be done to enhance onboarding for Trustees related to sequencing of decision-making.

40. The Director presented the Institute’s recent growth and key achievements, noting the substantial increase in events and publications, which were two thirds higher in 2022 than in 2021, new digital policy portals on artificial intelligence and space security, and expert technical support provided to States, regional organizations and multilateral bodies. To support the increased workload, full-time staff grew from 41 in 2022 to 61 in June 2023. As also suggested by the Advisory Committee, the Board recommended an evaluation of staffing requirements to sustain the delivery of high-quality, timely research in line with the Institute’s mandate. Trustees also requested that a standing agenda item on human resources be included for future Board meetings.
41. UNIDIR reported that a high-level retreat with the Office for Disarmament Affairs was planned for later in 2023, which would provide the opportunity to discuss respective priorities and offerings, including related to education. Cooperation between the two will therefore be reviewed at the next meeting of the Trustees.

42. Trustees were briefed on the constructive impact of the New York liaison office and its role in supporting Member States, strengthening links between research, events and activities in Geneva and New York and supporting programmatic action. Trustees and the Director discussed various options for filling this currently vacant position. In future meetings, reports on the New York liaison presence will be included in the general update.

43. Lastly, Trustees were briefed on quality and cost-efficiency improvements across the website, research dissemination and brand consistency, before going on to explore the Institute's work on artificial intelligence and its conventional arms and ammunition programme.

IV. Future work and other matters

44. The Board of Trustees proposed possible future topics for focus by the Advisory Board. It referred in the first instance to the recommendation contained in the present report under Pathway I to examine the impact of new and emerging technologies on conflict and conflict prevention. Particular focus could be given to the military applications of artificial intelligence and their impact on arms control and disarmament efforts. Other potential topics for discussions included the following:

   (a) “Maintaining the nuclear taboo” – reducing nuclear threats, crafting practical measures for risk reduction and forging an attainable path towards a world free of nuclear weapons, notably in view of the upcoming 100th anniversary of their invention and use;

   (b) Implications of the threat of use of nuclear weapons;

   (c) Application of early-warning systems in conflict prevention and their utility for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation;

   (d) Strengthening the United Nations disarmament education efforts by drawing on current global best practices and exploring means to operationalize the most recent strategy of the Office for Disarmament Affairs;

   (e) Implications for disarmament of the growing role of private armies, paramilitary forces and private technology companies engaging on the battlefield.

45. To support future Boards in undertaking their work both in serving the Secretary-General and as UNIDIR Trustees, it was suggested that an enhanced onboarding process be developed, including providing all new Members with a comprehensive briefing package that included an overview of recent discussion topics and reports, a detailed description of responsibilities, meeting processes and expected outputs, and a notional plan for the year ahead.
Summary of expert presentations at the seventy-ninth session of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

1. Over its two-year mandate, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, seeking gender-balanced panels, benefited from presentations and question-and-answer sessions with diverse external speakers from various geographical locations and disciplines, including conflict management, defence economics, disarmament and arms control, regional cooperation, sustainable development, human security and gender equality.

2. The Board’s interim report (A/77/263) contains a summary of the discussions at its seventy-seventh and seventy-eighth sessions, as well as a detailed summary of experts’ presentations. The present annex includes summaries of the presentations that the Board heard at its seventy-ninth session in Geneva in February 2023. At its eightieth session in New York, the Board focused on private deliberations without external experts.

Seventy-ninth session

Panel 1
Opportunities for strengthening and promoting regional cooperation on military spending

3. Four peace and security specialists offered regional perspectives on the ways in which military spending was addressed in Latin America and the Caribbean, South-East Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

4. Patience Zanelie Chiradza, Director of Governance and Conflict Prevention at the African Union Commission, emphasized the centrality of Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want to the efforts of the African Union to address shared security threats on the continent and reduce incentives for arms racing. She noted that States members of the African Union face numerous threats, including from communal violence, rebel movements and insurgencies, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism, unconstitutional changes in government and the effects of climate change. As such, expenses related to building and maintaining national security architectures, including safeguarding borders, citizens and economies, also constitute necessary military and/or defence spending. Architectures such as the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the dedicated Peace Fund and the African Standby Force all contributed to enhancing the effectivenes of continental responses to security risks, conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, and facilitated burden-sharing to reduce military spending in individual African Union countries. The African Union Master Road Map of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2030 is aimed at tracking progress towards armed violence reduction. Ms. Chiradza underlined that the Commission was committed to working with the United Nations and other partners to support its members in effectively implementing commitments regarding defence and military cooperation as a strategy to reduce military spending.

5. Pier Angelli De Luca, Specialist of the Department of Public Security at the Organization of American States, outlined the Organization’s emphasis on limiting military spending, in accordance with a 2003 political commitment by leaders, and actions to promote the comprehensive implementation of global disarmament frameworks in the region, notably to address small arms and light weapons. She noted that, notwithstanding the disparity in absolute spending levels among member States (i.e. North America versus the rest of the region), military budgets in some parts of
Central America and the Caribbean constituted a relatively large part of national gross domestic products, reflecting a heightened prevalence of armed violence and organized crime in recent years, which had generated pressure for the military to be involved in security and law enforcement tasks. This dynamic raised a crucial question regarding the appropriate role(s) of the military versus law enforcement in addressing societal security threats, with consequences for budgetary allocations. The diversion of small arms and light weapons from national stockpiles for illicit purposes or by illicit actors was also of serious concern. Ms. De Luca advocated for a comprehensive approach to stockpile management to mitigate spiralling military spending and proliferation, including enhanced assessments and inventory control and storage, which the Organization sought to enhance by providing technical assistance to its members. The Inter-American Defense Board offered a venue to discuss military spending, and specific confidence-building measures related to military spending were in place and were tracked and discussed every two years. While the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions of 1999 was aimed at promoting regional transparency, until very recently it was hampered by low reporting rates and the absence of a technical secretariat and dialogue.

6. Robert Matheus Michael Tene, Deputy Secretary-General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the ASEAN Political-Security Community, noted that, while ASEAN did not have a specific mechanism to track or limit military spending, its emphasis on dialogue and confidence-building measures was aimed at mitigating threats and threat perceptions that could lead to excessive expenditures. Noting that the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia embodied the universal principles of peaceful coexistence and friendly cooperation among States in South-East Asia, ASEAN member States had agreed on specific areas for defence cooperation, including counter-terrorism, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster response (including mine action), peacekeeping operations and cybersecurity. Regional summits, forums and high-level meetings offered platforms encourage the engagement of relevant global and regional actors who played a role in maintaining peace and stability in South-East Asia at a time when other opportunities for such encounters were limited. The region had seen increased strategic competition and enhanced threat perceptions over the last five years, but it remained unclear whether that environment would result in a spike in military spending. It was also noted that ASEAN is waiting for the nuclear-weapon States to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, which was inhibiting confidence. In addition, a dialogue with China on a maritime code of conduct was under way.

7. Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Middle East Security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, spoke to sobering and complex security and military spending dynamics in the Middle East. He cited several reasons why expenditures were on the rise, including prestige, standing, regime and/or State security considerations, threat assessments, alliance and partnership requirements, and a disillusionment with regional disarmament processes that had either stagnated (e.g. the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction) or not resulted in accountability (e.g. chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic). Greater reliance on indigenous weapons and capabilities had also emerged as a phenomenon, in order to diversify economically, enhance self-reliance and foster deterrence in response to shifts in focus by key global allies. In that context, Mr. Hokayem referred to an increase of “mini-lateralism” in the region, defined by clusters of countries coming together to cooperate on certain issues, including defence, and tactical escalation on several fronts, notably the largely unrestrained use and export of missile systems and uncrewed aerial vehicles. Since a reversal of those trends was not
anticipated in the near term, he recommended actions that took a more holistic approach to regional security, beyond an arms control perspective (i.e. rather than focusing on what States were buying or spending on the military, examining why they were doing so). He also recommended greater transparency in arms transfers.

Panel 2
Opportunities for disarmament and arms control

8. Two high-level and experienced practitioners who had each negotiated practical disarmament and arms control measures and treaties were invited to offer reflections on how such processes could be pursued, even under the most strained geopolitical circumstances. They also exchanged views on the factors that had led to the current war in Ukraine and its consequences.

9. Grigory Berdennikov, Ambassador-in-Residence at the Center for Energy and Security Studies and former Russian negotiator of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, noted the value of discussions on military spending, which he expected would continue to rise for the foreseeable future. He recalled the initiative undertaken by the former Soviet Union in 1973 to pursue a resolution of the General Assembly seeking to reduce military budgets by 10 per cent and use a portion of the funds saved to provide assistance to developing countries. The disarmament and arms control architecture built in the last phase of the cold war and immediately following did result in a significant reduction of armaments, despite the direct or indirect involvement of the parties in ongoing armed conflicts at the time. That reduction, in turn, contributed to a decrease in military spending levels. Conversely, Mr. Berdennikov saw a direct link between the present-day erosion and near collapse of the disarmament and arms control regime (with the exception of the successful extension to 2026 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms), which, in his view, had begun more than 20 years ago, its negative impact on strategic stability and the increase in military spending in recent years. He also noted that the current dynamics hampered the ability to pursue future disarmament and arms control agreements. Preserving what remained of the arms control architecture should be the immediate and principal objective, including the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by those remaining States listed in annex II.

10. Rose Gottemoeller, Steven C. Házy Lecturer at Stanford University and former lead for the United States of America on the negotiations of the New START Treaty with the Russian Federation, recalled that the transparency and confidence-building stemming from arms limitations and arms control agreements between the former Soviet Union and the United States were understood to be in the national interests of both parties. That understanding had resulted in a valued predictability in posture and approach, which enabled both parties to invest where most needed, rather than in additional nuclear weapons. If such predictability was lost, there could be pressure to increase spending on nuclear weapons with a concomitant risk of their deliberate or accidental use, even if the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed the adage that a nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought.

11. Ms. Gottemoeller noted that, while the New START Treaty currently faced, implementation issues that were, in large part, technical and reversible, both parties continued to abide by its central limitations and should negotiate its successor. She also stressed the need to involve China in efforts to impose restraints, since all three countries had modernized their arsenals, but there was more limited understanding of the intent and doctrine of China. In that regard, she noted an evolving debate in the United States about the prospect of having to engage two nuclear-capable peers. She
underscored the need to preserve existing arms control arrangements and the opportunity to pursue innovative initiatives, drawing lessons on verification from recent efforts led by the Secretary-General and Türkiye related to the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.

Panel 3
Encouraging innovative and transformative thinking on military spending

12. The third and last expert panel focused on avenues to encourage fresh thinking about military spending.

13. Robert Egnell, Vice-Chancellor of the Swedish Defence University and Professor of Leadership and Command and Control, suggested that the current fraught international security environment, which was notably due to the war on Ukraine, had led many States to conclude, in the words of the Secretary-General, that they could only find security in weapons rather than dialogue, with a consequential rise in military spending. The present security environment was not ripe for concrete and decisive action on disarmament. He therefore proposed a “defensive approach”, whereby arms control measures could be designed to reduce the most dangerous and urgent risks, sowing the seeds for a more robust re-engagement on disarmament at a later stage. In the short term, Mr. Egnell recommended the active management of armament processes by certain countries (e.g. Germany and Sweden), with a view to preventing escalation and arms races; the prioritization of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform in any post-conflict setting; the exploration of arms control regimes that accept post-conflict rearmament up to certain levels; the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation; and a strong emphasis on disarmament issues involving new and potentially harmful technologies and domains for war, such as artificial intelligence, quantum mechanics, hypersonic missiles, outer space and cyberspace. He also advocated for a new concept of security, one that was not centred on nuclear deterrence or viewed security exclusively through a lens of external threats. He suggested that the United Nations definition of human security could be appropriate, involving an array of stakeholders in civil society to preserve the interests of we the peoples. Such a definition would emphasize enhancing the resilience of societies to external shocks, whether from the effects of climate change or cybersecurity.

14. Neta C. Crawford, the Montague Burton Chair in International Relations at the University of Oxford, diagnosed two problem areas for military spending and militarization that, if addressed, could meaningfully transform some of its negative implications and externalities. She observed that, first, military spending routinely crowded out other priorities and was unmoored to true defence requirements and, second, there was an enduring misconception and socialization around the notion that military spending automatically resulted in military capabilities or power, while various armed conflicts suggested that such a correlation was not necessarily evident. Ms. Crawford outlined several incremental options that might mitigate some of those issues, which included pursuing spending caps, cuts or targeted reductions (e.g. in personnel and bases and by modernizing armaments), and seeking to decarbonize elements of the military and defence industries by transitioning to renewable energy and more efficient infrastructure, which could cut greenhouse gas emissions. She also proposed several transformative ideas that, taken together, could constitute more effective ways to reduce the risk of conflict escalation, military spending and, as a positive by-product, greenhouse gas emissions. The proposals included focusing the military on missions best suited to its value added (e.g. away from emergency response), shifting from offensive to defensive military doctrines and enhancing cooperative regional security arrangements to burden-share costs and reduce waste
spending. She recommended an in-depth analysis be prepared of successful defensive responses to violence (i.e. defense in depth), which included articulating the range of weapons seen as defensive and conducting a cost comparison between offensive and defensive strategies. Such scenarios would need to be war-gamed. Last, she agreed with Mr. Egnell that new technologies that were inherently provocative and escalatory should be addressed through arms control and confidence-building measures. Ms. Crawford also cautioned against allowing human security to be co-opted by the military to prevent the undesired expansion of its threat responses and concomitant increases in spending levels.
Annex II

Members of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters 2023

Leena Al-Hadid
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates of Jordan

Nabeela Abdulla Al-Mulla
Distinguished lecturer at the American University of Kuwait and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Kuwait College of Science and Technology
Kuwait City

Lewis Dunn
Former United States Ambassador to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Elissa Golberg (Chair)
Ambassador of Canada to the Republic of Italy, Ambassador designate to Albania, San Marino and Malta, and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Agencies based in Rome

Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Director of the Kent Global Leadership Program on Conflict Resolution and Professor of Practice at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University
New York

Mary Kaldor
Emeritus Professor of Global Governance and Director of the Conflict and Civciness Research Group of the London School of Economics and Political Science
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Marina Kaljurand
Member of the European Parliament
Brussels

Anton Khlopkov
Director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies
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Li Chijiang
Vice-President and Secretary-General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association
Beijing

Amina Mohamed
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kenya

Zia Mian
Senior Research Scholar and Co-Director of the Program on Science and Global Security at the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University
Princeton, New Jersey

Marty Natalegawa
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia

Eghosa Osaghae
Director-General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs
Lagos

Shorna-Kay Richards
Ambassador of Jamaica to Japan
Tokyo
Margot Wallström  
Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden  

Robin Geiss (ex officio member)  
Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
Geneva