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Towards a National Framework on Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Nigeria

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Executive summary

The Federal Republic of Nigeria's Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM) held a series of consultative meetings and workshops on national frameworks for weapons and ammunition management (WAM) in Abuja from 14 to 18 November 2016, in collaboration with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC). Throughout this report, reference will be made to the "assessment team", which is comprised of representatives of the aforementioned institutions: UNIDIR, BICC and Conflict Armament Research (CAR).

The meetings brought together WAM experts from the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), Defence Headquarters (DHQ), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Nigerian Army (NA), the Nigerian Air Force (NAF), the Nigerian Navy (NN), the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS), the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the Department of State Services (DSS), the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, PRESCOM, as well as representatives and technical advisers from UNIDIR, the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA), CAR, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and BICC.

This process aims to draw together processes, institutions and actors for a comprehensive national WAM framework. This would harmonize the management of small arms, light weapons and their ammunition—state-held, legally civilian-held and illicit—through their full life cycle from import to disposal or destruction. The findings from the consultative meetings form the basis for this comprehensive report. These meetings also generated a series of "options" for action which were presented to the ONSA in draft form on 18 November 2016.

In contrast to some other countries in the region, Nigeria has a long history of codified weapons management policies and practices upon which to draw, particularly within its armed forces, and through its significant experience of collecting, seizing and destroying illicit weapons and ammunition in the Niger Delta and elsewhere. In addition to international standards, these existing national/regional policies and practices can contribute key elements to a comprehensive Nigerian WAM framework.

While Nigeria continues to strengthen its institutional framework for WAM and improve its implementation, various challenges remain. In particular, existing laws and regulations related to WAM in Nigeria do not adequately cover the commitments from relevant regional and international arms control instruments. For example, weapons management standards exist within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials ("ECOWAS Convention"). However, many of these commitments have yet to be domesticated into national regulations and procedures. At the operational level, Nigeria still lacks a formal national commission to coordinate WAM activities in the country. Furthermore, the country is yet to initiate a comprehensive marking programme

for its security forces. Within the ECOWAS context, Nigeria remains one of the few States yet to implement such initiatives.

The assessment team has made the following observations during the consultative process, examining 11 pillars of WAM and drawing on comments and priorities set out by participants:

NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK

- As PRESCOM and security agencies underlined, there is a strong need to update the national legal framework governing weapons management.
- Replacing the 1959 Firearms Act with a proposed new bill is a priority for at least four reasons: to meet the new reality since 1959 of the widespread illicit trafficking and possession of both military and non-military weapons; to close existing WAM gaps, particularly relating to security agencies' weapons management practices; to implement Nigeria's obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and ECOWAS Convention; and to encompass new technologies.

NATIONAL COORDINATING MECHANISM

- Nigeria is the only remaining ECOWAS Convention State Party that has yet to fulfil its obligation to form a National Commission on SALW.
- PRESCOM's coordinating role on WAM issues is vital but limited by the precarity of its Committee status.
- Establishing technical working groups (TWGs) under PRESCOM—bringing together experts from relevant security agencies on specific WAM issues—could help update the national WAM framework and ensure it keeps up with developing WAM challenges.

TRANSFER CONTROLS

- Arms transfer controls in Nigeria are procedurally robust, particularly through strict import surveillance and prohibitions on arms exports. However, they do not yet cover all types of transfers and types of weapons encompassed by the international instruments to which Nigeria is party, particularly the ECOWAS Convention and the ATT (in the latter of which Nigeria has played a major global role as President of the Conference of States Parties in 2016). Updating (i) control lists and (ii) controlled transfer types (particularly trans-shipment, transit and arms brokering) in the proposed new firearms bill is a priority.
- Participants mentioned several past mechanisms for security agencies to import weapons—including through the MOD, through the ONSA and through DHQ via Presidential authorization. UNIDIR understands that the system remains decentralized (by security forces) but that the procedures are expected to be harmonized. A published law or regulation setting out this harmonized import/procurement system might be valuable.
- Security agencies compile agency level data on arms imports and exports. The NCS also gathers such data, though official weapons imports are in some cases cleared through customs by the security agencies' own clearing agents. Centralizing arms transfer data

under a single agency might help Nigeria meet its ECOWAS Convention reporting obligations on imports/exports.

MARKING

- PRESCOM plans to initiate a programme to mark security agencies' and civilian-held weapons in conformity with the ECOWAS Convention. However, this has not yet begun.
- PRESCOM envisages that a national weapon marking programme will, at a minimum, require the following preparatory work: codifying a single harmonized marking system/format, connecting it to a comprehensive database of marked weapons, developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for marking, planning the marking programme in detail, and establishing a training programme on marking.
- This essential planning might usefully be done by establishing an interagency TWG for the process under PRESCOM, before the marking programme begins.

RECORDKEEPING

- There is not yet a unified, centralized database of all SALW held by security agencies and licensed civilians. This complicates management of the national stock and the identification of the origin of illicit weapons.
- The common practice of using painted butt numbers complicates recordkeeping; moreover, the painted numbers can easily be erased. Recordkeeping practices are not yet consistent across all security forces; some are recording weapons issued by butt number rather than (or in addition to) serial numbers, and not always consistently connecting individual officers to butt or serial numbers at the unit level.
- Many security agencies have strong recordkeeping and armoury audit practices. Recordkeeping is not yet harmonized across different security agencies or across headquarters (HQ), state commands and the unit level. Some records are kept in electronic format, others on paper, and the fields used in registers and inventories vary from agency to agency.
- At present, no security agency records ammunition lots (rather than just calibre/type/quantity) in ammunition recordkeeping, limiting the traceability and quality assurance of security forces' ammunition.

CAPTURED AND SEIZED WEAPONS

- Processing illicit weapons seized by any security agency is technically clear: they should, under existing regulations, be passed to the police for storage, documentation and processing although logistical challenges may prevent this from happening in a timely manner in some places. A separate procedure exists for processing weapons captured in army or joint operations.
- The police utilize the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) iArms and INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network systems to match illicit weapons against weapons lost in other countries, but would benefit from enhanced national weapons identification capacity. The number of times databases have been consulted and how useful they have been to tracing operations remains unclear.

- Other mechanisms to trace (particularly) military weapons seized in operations, such as the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) focal points and the ECOWAS Secretariat, are not yet in use. The Nigerian ITI focal point (at PRESCOM/DHQ) has not yet received any international requests to trace weapons, or domestic requests to send tracing requests.

PHYSICAL SECURITY AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT (PSSM)

- Nigerian security agencies are particularly aware of PSSM risks following the 2002 Ikeja armoury explosion—the most lethal unplanned munitions explosion recorded to date in the world.
- Since early 2016, PRESCOM, with the assistance of international partners, has begun substantial activities to train stockpile management personnel and rehabilitate armouries/magazines.
- In the future, PRESCOM intends to develop a coordinated national plan to prioritize PSSM work.
- The PSSM training currently being undertaken by PRESCOM/BICC/MAG could contribute to a national roster of trained PSSM experts, both for domestic and international deployment, which could also be used to conduct a training-of-trainers programme on PSSM in Nigeria.
- Training curricula on various aspects of PSSM also exist within military and police training institutions, including the Army Ordnance Corps School (Lagos), the Army Infantry Corps Centre (Jaji), the Nigerian Army School of Military Engineering (NASME) in Makurdi, and armament officer courses run by the NAF in Kaduna. Reviewing these curricula and sharing them between agencies would help ensure domestic provision of PSSM training is being fully utilized, and harmonized with regional and international standards.

WEAPON COLLECTIONS

- Nigeria has a recent history of weapons collections/amnesties, beginning at federal level with the 2009 Niger Delta amnesty programme. More recently, state level disarmament committees constituted by state governors have initiated state-wide amnesties linked to weapons collections in Benue State and Imo State during 2016; and similar committees have begun preparations in Kaduna State, Rivers State and elsewhere. In addition, the United Nations Development Programme and PRESCOM are supporting community sensitization activities in six northern states under a European Union–ECOWAS project as a prelude to eventual weapons collection.
- At present, no formal guidelines or SOPs exist for conducting state level collections, nor for integrating civil society and community safety, including community policing, into the planning of activities.
- Storage facilities for collected weapons vary, and not all personnel involved in collections are trained to handle explosive items such as grenades or light weapons munitions, though these are frequently handed in by civilians (and during 2016, destroyed at NASME).
- Inventories of collections in Benue State indicate that some 15–20 per cent of collected weapons are technically traceable, but no procedure exists yet to trace them to establish the origins and supply routes for illicit weapons. A package of training and

standardized documentation forms/procedures for future collection programmes would help Nigeria to take advantage of this potentially valuable information resource.

ARTISANAL WEAPONS

- Unlicensed production of firearms, including of craft revolvers and well-machined long guns, is prohibited under S.22 of the 1959 Firearms Act, but is widely practised to high levels of sophistication. These constituted approximately 80 per cent of weapons collected from civilians during 2016 in Benue State, for instance. PRESCOM is currently conducting a national SALW survey which will map the extent and nature of production and civilian possession.
- Participants in the consultations could not agree on the pros and cons of the regulated legalization of firearms production. All agreed on the need to find alternative livelihoods for skilled illicit firearms makers, including perhaps recruitment to the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON). In this regard, there would seem to be value in conducting national level consultations on this issue, with the aim of establishing a clear strategy to prevent the illicit production of SALW.

WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION DISPOSAL

- Security agencies rarely identify surplus (as opposed to defective) stocks of weapons or ammunition given widespread perceptions of stock shortages and import difficulties. Obsolete weapon types have previously been transferred from military to paramilitary agencies.
- The NA has the capacity to destroy weapons and ammunition through cutting, burning and open-pit detonation, which it has previously used for destroying collected Niger Delta and Benue State weapons at Enugu and NASME, respectively.
- The existing national framework establishes no current guidelines for destruction, domestic transfer or possible sale of stocks, collected or seized weapons. This is an area that merits further examination by the Government of Nigeria.

BORDER SECURITY/COUNTER-SMUGGLING

- Participants identified detection and interdiction of cross-border weapons trafficking as a major priority, particularly along vulnerable long northern borders and at maritime points of entry.
- NCS mandates 100 per cent inspection of pre-notified imports of arms and ammunition, and risk-based inspection of other cargoes via the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) customs system. Personnel cannot, however, cover all crossing points. NCS and NIS participants stressed the need to identify unapproved border crossing routes and authorize them as approved ones, to allow personnel to be deployed there.
- Nigeria is currently exploring technological enhancements to border management, including airborne border patrols and satellite surveillance, as well as joint operations with neighbouring countries.

1. Introduction

1.1. Security situation in relation to weapons and ammunition management (WAM)

The illicit availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Nigeria intensifies almost every major security challenge currently facing the country. Armed insurgencies in the Niger Delta and Nigeria's north-east have not only threatened economic and political targets, but also had a major effect on civilian safety, including mass kidnapping and the humanitarian impacts of significant population displacement. Perceptions of insecurity in Nigeria are currently dominated by the fight against Boko Haram (*Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād*) and its affiliates in the north-east. In reality, security challenges in many other parts of Nigeria are also connected to the availability of illicit weapons and ammunition.

Public data on Boko Haram's sources of weapons and ammunition are limited.¹ Clearly a substantial proportion of their weaponry derives from state stocks: Boko Haram forces have in the past successfully exploited the presence and insecurity of state forces' stockpiles to capture weapons and equipment during large-scale attacks on:

- military barracks in the Gwoza hills of Borno State in February 2014;
- the Giwa army barracks in Maiduguri in March 2014;
- an army base in Kolofata, Cameroon, as well as the HQ of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) in Baga, Nigeria, in January 2015;
- an undisclosed army base in Niger in April 2015; and
- other military and security installations in the Lake Chad Basin region.²

These events indicate the ongoing challenge of securing state stocks—both in Nigeria and in neighbouring countries—in a situation of armed conflict and incomplete territorial control. Yet Boko Haram's supplies from state pillaging may be decreasing. Anecdotally, Lake Chad region military personnel have reported a rise, since mid-2015, in the frequency and sophistication of Boko Haram's use of improvised explosive devices and improvised or artisanal munitions, suggesting that their supply lines for conventional weapons may be diminishing.³

Meanwhile, organized armed violence is prevalent and increasing in several other regions:

- **Armed attacks in Niger Delta states** against security personnel and oil infrastructure increased in 2016, particularly attacks by the Niger Delta Avengers (with whom the government reached a reported ceasefire in August 2016, although attacks persist) and other armed groups including the Niger Delta Greenland Justice Mandate. Though not at the level of the mid-2000s, persistent attacks against Delta oil

¹ Still less is known publicly about sources of weapons for the splinter group *Jamā'atu Anṣār al-Muslimīna fī Bilādīs Sūdān*.

² CAR interviews with and presentations by Multinational Joint Task Force officials, Lomé, 14 March 2016.

³ CAR interviews with and presentations by Multinational Joint Task Force officials, Lomé, 14 March 2016.

infrastructure and personnel contributed to Nigerian oil production dropping to a 30-year low in July 2016.⁴

- **Armed criminality and kidnapping** is also a significant threat in several areas, including in states along the Niger-Nigeria border, and across the Middle Belt around Kano and Kaduna.⁵

Finally, **communal armed clashes**, particularly between sedentary and pastoralist communities, remain endemic across a wide area of the Nigerian savannah from the centre to the north, reportedly claiming several hundred lives in 2016 alone,⁶ and reportedly sustained by (and sustaining) community arming activities in several regions.⁷

1.2. Specific WAM issues contributing to insecurity

Illicit weapons and ammunition held by armed groups, criminals and armed civilians in Nigeria have in the recent past come from at least five sources: (1) pillage/theft from state stocks; (2) deliberate diversion from those stocks, abetted by some serving or former security agency personnel; (3) the unlicensed craft production of rifles, shotguns and handguns; (4) illicit trafficking of both factory-manufactured and craft-produced weapons, particularly across Nigeria's northern and eastern borders; and (5) maritime smuggling. Assessing the relative contribution of each source is difficult without an analysis of significant samples of seized and captured weapons, some of which is presented on a small scale in section 6.1. Additionally, it is important to note that Nigeria has a history of large-scale explosive threats from state arsenals.

Pillage/theft from state stocks: Nigeria's President, Muhammadu Buhari, has stated that a large amount of Nigerian weaponry from looted military bases and police stations has been lost to Boko Haram.⁸ The spate of large-scale weapon thefts from military stocks in the north-east appears to have peaked during 2014–2015. Other Nigerian security forces, however, continue to experience smaller-scale thefts from armed groups and armed criminals.⁹ While rarely taking place at state-command or area-command level, smaller security agency posts remain vulnerable to attack and pillage. In response to the north-east crisis, the police force in particular has made efforts to secure rooms used as armouries in police posts, and to remove non-deployed weapons from those posts

⁴ "Nigeria Crude Oil Production Statistics", TradingEconomics.com, n.d., www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/crude-oil-production.

⁵ United States Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), *Nigeria Report*, OSAC, 2016.

⁶ Sola Tayo and Fulan Nasrullah, "Nigeria's Government Must Ensure a Balanced Response to the Pastoralist–Settler Crisis", *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 6 May 2016, www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/nigeria-s-government-must-ensure-balanced-response-pastoralist-settler-crisis.

⁷ BICC/CAR interviews with state security authorities and state security adviser, Makurdi State and Kaduna State, 7–17 October 2016; UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 14–18 November 2016.

⁸ Statements by President Buhari at the second Regional Security Summit, Abuja, reported 15 May 2016.

⁹ Goday Elejo, "Police Arrest Gunmen for Invading Station", *Naij.com*, 4 October 2016, www.naij.com/995967-ghastly-motor-accident-claims-8-lives-jigawa.html.

altogether.¹⁰ Despite such efforts, attacks and weapon thefts have been reported at police posts in Ja'amale (Bauchi State) and Igumale (Benue State) in 2016.¹¹

Deliberate diversion from state stocks: organized diversion has not been confined to the north-east, or other areas of widespread armed violence, but has included sites and personnel in the central belt, involving accusations of weapons trafficked across substantial distances—for instance, from the central army depot at Kaduna to Delta militants. This suggests that preventing diversion is a national weapons accounting issue, rather than a narrowly operational one about preventing weapons diversion in operations. During the height of Delta militancy in 2003–2007, several army officers and non-commissioned officers were reportedly court-martialled for the organized diversion of several thousand SALW from army depots in Kaduna and elsewhere, though it was unclear whether these weapons were stolen on behalf of Niger Delta militants.¹² Recent legal processes have generated similar allegations against air force and army personnel, though on a smaller scale. In September 2016, the Nigerian Air Force (NAF) accused six individuals in Adamawa, including former NAF personnel, of stealing assault rifles.¹³ Court martials for 16 Nigerian Army (NA) personnel in September 2016 for alleged misconduct during operations in the north-east reportedly included allegations that some personnel had sold arms and ammunition to militants (though since court martials are conducted *in camera*, it is difficult to confirm their details).¹⁴

Unlicensed craft production: artisanal small arms contribute significantly to the amount of unlawfully held weapons in Nigeria. According to figures published by PRESCOM, the NAF processed 2,703 “recovered” firearms (rifles, pistols and shotguns) between January and August 2015, of which 1,791 (over 60 per cent) were classified as “locally made guns”.¹⁵ Security agencies state that no licences have been issued for the production of such arms, making them effectively illegal under the 1959 Firearms Act, although their production is evidently widespread.¹⁶ Though lacking the power and precision of factory-made weapons, both civilian and military, such craft weapons pose a significant WAM challenge for prohibition or regulation. A national firearms survey commissioned by PRESCOM in mid-2016 should provide more detail in 2017 on the prevalence, nature and drivers of such production.

Cross-border trafficking (land): The assessment team was unable to obtain comprehensive figures for seizures of weapons and ammunition at Nigeria's borders. Security agencies

¹⁰ See section 4.7.2 on the current status of the physical security and stockpile management pillar.

¹¹ BICC/CAR interview with NPF armament officers, Abuja, 5 October 2016.

¹² “Army Officers Who Sold Weapons to Militants”, *Nigerian Tribune*, 15 January 2008.

¹³ “Nigerian Air Force parades six for arms theft in Adamawa”, *Olisa*, 17 September 2016.

¹⁴ Michelle Faul, “Nigerian military: Some officers selling arms to Boko Haram”, *Associated Press*, 4 September 2016, <<http://bigstory.ap.org/article/5f0cd12343154ec9bb4a4dafae7dc879/nigerian-military-some-officers-selling-arms-boko-haram>>.

¹⁵ Government of Nigeria, *2016 Report to UNPOA*, 2016, www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2016@146@2016%20-%20PoA%20-%20Nigeria%20-%20E.pdf.

¹⁶ UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 14–18 November 2016.

consulted by the assessment team indicated that border trafficking is of significant concern, particularly across Nigeria's long northern border with Niger and its porous eastern borders with Cameroon and Chad. Nigerian Customs Service (NCS) figures published by Nigerian news sources suggest that at least 17 seizures of some 60,000 rounds of ammunition and dozens of weapons were made by NCS personnel from 2012 to 2016, though these figures were not verified by the assessment team.¹⁷

A comprehensive analysis of seized and collected weapons would be needed to establish cross-border trends with greater certainty. Certainly, the presence, among weapons handed in during state level amnesties, of military weapons unlike those in Nigerian security agencies' stocks—for example, Manurhin SG542 assault rifles with semi-sequential serial numbers to those captured in neighbouring countries—support the thesis that cross-border trafficking may have involved not only civilian and craft weapons but also military weapons. Similarly, in July 2016 the NA seized rifles from suspected Boko Haram members in Borno State which bore Chadian Army markings, though it is also possible that such rifles were seized or lost by Chadian Army personnel fighting in Nigeria as part of the Multinational Joint Task Force. However, these scattered observations can in no way be representative.¹⁸

Nigeria's western borders may also face trafficking risks. Ghana's questionnaire responses to a 2015 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study indicate that 37 per cent of trafficked firearms seized in Ghana in 2012 were destined for Nigeria—presumably via Togo and Benin—including 29 shotguns seized in a soft drink truck along with 155,500 packs of 25 cartridges.¹⁹ Ghana and Benin also reported arresting Nigerian nationals engaged in firearms trafficking from 2010 to 2013.²⁰

Maritime trafficking: Perceptions of maritime arms trafficking in Nigeria are dominated by allegations of offshore arms supplies to Niger Delta militants, and by the 2010 seizure at Apapa Port in Lagos of 13 containers containing 107 mm rockets, 60, 80 and 120 mm mortar bombs, grenades, and 7.62 x 54R mm Iranian-manufactured ammunition—though in fact shipping documents indicate that these containers were destined not for Nigeria but for Gambia.²¹ Large-scale shipments into Nigeria itself are difficult to substantiate; however smaller-scale smuggling certainly does occur. In February 2016, the NCS seized a

¹⁷ "Customs Impound Over 60,000 Rounds of Ammunition", *Punch*, 7 August 2016, <http://punchng.com/customs-impound-60000-rounds-ammunition/>.

¹⁸ CAR examination of collected weapons, Benue State, October 2016, and comparison with iTrace dataset; Nigerian Army, "Troops Conduct Clearance Operations", press release, 19 July 2016, <www.Army.mil.ng/troops-conduct-clearance-operations/>. This Nigerian Army press release lists FN rifles carrying the marking "ANT 015", which indicates that they originally came from the stocks of the *Armée Nationale Tchadienne*, though there is no suggestion that the Chadian Army was responsible for such trafficking.

¹⁹ UNODC, *Study on Firearms 2015*, UNODC, 2015, <<https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/global-firearms-trafficking-study.html>>.

²⁰ UNODC, *UNODC Study on Firearms 2015*, UNODC, 2015, passim, www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/global-firearms-trafficking-study.html.

²¹ CAR, *The Distribution of Iranian Ammunition in Africa*, CAR, December 2012, pp. 34–35.

40 foot container at Tin Can Island, which had arrived from the United States of America (US), containing goods including 980 rounds of 9 mm type live ammunition and a pistol.

Explosive risks: As well as the impacts of armed violence using illicit arms and ammunition, unstable and poorly managed munitions stockpiles pose a major risk to human life in many countries. In 2002, the Ikeja barracks in Lagos witnessed the largest number of deaths and casualties from a single depot explosion on record anywhere in the world.²² No such large-scale unplanned explosive event has occurred since then; however, armoury and magazine inspections indicate fire risks and poorly accounted stocks in stockpile facilities of several security agencies, including at HQ level.²³

²² E. Berman and P. Reina (eds), *Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites: Excess Stockpiles as Liabilities rather than Assets*, Small Arms Survey, 2014, p. 29 Table 4.

²³ PSSM specialists' comments and presentations at UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 14–18 November 2016.

2. International, regional and national instruments

This section provides information on regional and international instruments relevant to WAM in Nigeria, as of November 2016. At the time of drafting this report, there remained several opportunities for enhancement as regards an ongoing national review process, commitments under existing regional and international instruments, and the alignment and harmonization of the national legal framework to such instruments. The Nigerian Government is encouraged to maintain active and sustained participation in international arms control forums, and to continuously participate in reporting exercises under relevant instruments, in order to foster and further increase international confidence in its commitment to regional and global arms control norms.

2.1. International conventions and agreements (arms control)

Since the inception of the United Nations (UN) Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA) in 1991 and the inclusion of SALW in 2006, Nigeria has yet to report to this instrument.²⁴ As regards the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPOA), which was adopted in 2001, Nigeria has submitted three reports on its relevant national control measures, initiatives, programmes, and implementation: in 2005, 2008, and 2016.²⁵ At the same time, Nigeria has also reported on its implementation of the International Tracing Instrument (ITI).²⁶ Nigeria also signed (13 November 2001) and ratified (3 March 2006) the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (“UN Firearms Protocol”).²⁷ Moreover, Nigeria was the African continental leader and remained actively involved in the international negotiation process which led to the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) at the UN General Assembly in April 2013. Nigeria became the third State to ratify the ATT on 12 August 2013.²⁸

²⁴ According to UNROCA, Nigeria has not declared its small arms exports in one or more annual National Reports on Arms Exports (which were included in the scope of the register and requested starting in 2006). See <https://www.unroca.org/>.

²⁵ United Nations, *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, UN document A/CONF.192/15. 2001. All national reports of Nigeria on the PoA are available here: <http://www.poa-iss.org/NationalReport/NationalReports.aspx>.

²⁶ *International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons*, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 2005, <http://www.poa-iss.org/InternationalTracing/InternationalTracing.aspx>.

²⁷ General Assembly, *Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*, UN document A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001 (the Protocol was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001 and entered into force on 3 June 2005), https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-c&chapter=18&clang=en.

²⁸ See https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter=26&clang=en.

With regard to other relevant international conventions, Nigeria is a signatory of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (signed on 26 January 1982), but has not yet acceded to it.²⁹ In September 2001, Nigeria acceded to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (“Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention”, also known as the “Ottawa Convention”), which entered into force for Nigeria on 1 March 2002.³⁰ While Nigeria signed (12 June 2009) the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the Government has yet to ratify it.³¹ International conventions, agreements and relevant instruments are shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Nigeria’s status in relation to relevant international conventions and agreements

Legislation / agreement	State Party		Details	
	Yes	No		
Extant conventions and protocols				
Arms Trade Treaty	X		Signatory date: Ratification date:	3 June 2013 26 February 2015
Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention	X		Accession date: Entry into force:	27 September 2001 1 March 2002
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons		X	Signature date: Accession date:	26 January 1982
Convention on Cluster Munitions		X	Signatory date: Ratification date:	12 June 2009
UN Firearms Protocol	X		Signatory date: Ratification date:	13 November 2001 3 March 2006

International instrument	Reported		Details	
	Yes	No		
Extant international agreements				
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms		X	Submission years	
International Tracing Instrument	X		Submission years	2016
United Nations Programme of Action	X		Submission years	2005, 2008, 2016

²⁹ *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects* (as amended on 21 December 2001). The list of States parties and signatories is available at [http://www.unog.ch/_80256ee600585943.nsf/\(httpPages\)/3ce7cfc0aa4a7548c12571c00039cb0c?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=2#_Section1](http://www.unog.ch/_80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/3ce7cfc0aa4a7548c12571c00039cb0c?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=2#_Section1).

³⁰ *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*, adopted on 18 September 1997. For further information, see <http://www.apminebanconvention.org/states-parties-to-the-convention/nigeria/>.

³¹ *Convention on Cluster Munitions*, concluded on 30 May 2008, entered onto force on 1 August 2010. For more information, see [http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/67DC5063EB530E02C12574F8002E9E49?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/67DC5063EB530E02C12574F8002E9E49?OpenDocument).

2.2. Regional conventions and agreements (arms control)

At the regional level, as the host country for and member of ECOWAS, Nigeria is a State party to the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (“ECOWAS Convention”), which was adopted on 14 June 2006.³²

Table 2. Nigeria’s status in relation to relevant regional conventions and agreements

Legislation / agreement	State Party		Details	
	Yes	No		
ECOWAS Convention	X		Adoption Date:	14 June 2006

³² *ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials* (adopted 14 June 2006, entered into force 29 September 2009), United Nations Programme of Action Implementation Support System: Regional Organisations. See <http://www.poa-iss.org/RegionalOrganizations/ECOWAS/ECOWAS%20Convention%202006.pdf>.

3. Introduction to the baseline assessment and methodology

WAM is conceived as a system to ensure safe, secure and accountable management of weapons and ammunition from reception to distribution, and where relevant, disposal, in line with international and regional guidelines and standards. WAM thus goes well beyond the management and security of national stockpiles alone, though stockpile management is a key element of WAM. All WAM planning should be owned and led by the government of each country, with regional and international support, where needed. The establishment of a national WAM framework also serves as a tool for resource mobilization, including from international donors, and for the coordination of national and international resources on WAM.

A comprehensive WAM system—covering the full life cycle management of weapons and ammunition of all categories—includes at least 10 key “pillars”:

1. National legal framework governing weapons, ammunition and their management.
2. Institutional arrangements to coordinate WAM policy and activities.
3. Transfer controls on weapons and ammunition, including their import, export, brokering, transit and trans-shipment.
4. Marking of weapons and ammunition in the country.
5. Recordkeeping of weapons and ammunition in the country.
6. Processing and management of seized and captured weapons.
7. Physical security and stockpile management.
8. Weapons/ammunition collections and amnesties.
9. Policies and practices to deal with artisan-produced weapons.
10. Weapons and ammunition disposal.

Participants at the UNIDIR/Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC)-led national WAM consultations stressed the significant quantity of illicit weapons and ammunition that are smuggled or trafficked into Nigeria across the country’s long borders and through its seaports. Therefore, border security was exceptionally added as a standalone eleventh WAM pillar during the consultations.

Each pillar will be explained in detail throughout this report. Each includes a list of options formulated by the stakeholder participants in the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations which form the basis for this report. They are not intended to be prescriptive, but rather possible areas of work for the Nigerian Government to consider prioritizing. Each pillar section contains a list of options drawn up in the same way. All the options generated by the consultations are consolidated in a full list in the Annex at the end of this report. These options for policy and action are not exhaustive. The “time frame” classifications are as follows: “Immediate” indicates within six months; “short-term” indicates within 18 months; and “medium term” indicates within three years.

A national WAM framework requires initial and periodic follow-up assessments of these pillars to establish current policies and practices and formulate options for enhancement. In November 2016, UNIDIR, in collaboration with PRESCOM, convened a consultative process in Abuja to assist PRESCOM in setting out comprehensive options for improving Nigeria’s WAM framework. This process aimed to build on initiatives that PRESCOM had already begun, including improvements to national legislation governing SALW, a national

SALW action plan, initiatives on Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) capacity-building and infrastructure improvement, community sensitization on SALW, and plans for a national marking programme.

The consultations were hosted by PRESCOM and took place from 14 to 18 November 2016 in Abuja. They brought together representatives from the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), the Department of State Services (DSS), the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the NA, the NAF, the Nigerian Navy (NN), Defence Headquarters (DHQ), the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the NCS, the (NPF), the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), the Nigerian Prisons Service (NPS), the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), and the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation. Representatives from the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and WAANSA also attended as WAM subject specialists and key partners of PRESCOM. The consultations and this report were jointly facilitated by UNIDIR and BICC, with support from Conflict Armament Research (CAR). Throughout this report, reference will be made to the “assessment team” which is comprised of representatives of UNIDIR, BICC and CAR. Reference will also be made to the “UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations” or “WAM consultations” which are abbreviated phrases for the 14–18 November 2016 consultations.

The consultation participants worked to map current policies and practices in each of the 11 pillars, both in plenary sessions and in topic-specific working groups. They then assembled a draft set of options for improvements and future actions. This draft set of options (see the Annex of this report) was presented on the final day to a senior representative of the ONSA.

The consultation discussions and subsequent options form the basis for this report. The report also draws upon insights from PRESCOM, BICC and the MAG programming in the area of PSSM and weapons collection, and upon a PSSM training needs assessment conducted during October 2016 by BICC with assistance from CAR.

4. Baseline assessment, pillar-by-pillar

4.1. National legal framework

4.1.1. General

Nigeria has already committed to putting into effect a range of regional and international systems and standards in the field of WAM (as demonstrated in section 2 of this report). Nigeria has played a leading global role in developing such standards, particularly within the ECOWAS Convention, the UNPOA³³ and the ATT processes.³⁴ Ensuring that national legislation encodes and domesticates these standards is the foundation for authorizing and supporting WAM action across all pillars.

4.1.2. Current status

All participants at the WAM consultations acknowledged that the legal framework governing arms and ammunition in Nigeria was extremely outdated, and supported the need for ongoing parliamentary efforts to update it.

The 1959 Firearms Act and its subsidiary legislation established the overarching legal framework for WAM in Nigeria. Related issues were also covered by the 1964 Defence Industries Corporation Act (which established Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) and governs Nigeria's state arms and ammunition manufacturing facilities) and the 1967 Explosives Act (which governs the import, production, possession and storage of explosive materials) though the latter's application to Nigeria's military and security forces is unclear.

A full review of these legal instruments is beyond the scope of this report. However, there are some notable strengths and gaps.

Strengths and gaps: Nigerian legislation provides clear prohibitions and licensing requirements as regards civilian possession, production, import and export of arms and ammunition. In these areas, the prevalence of craft-produced weapons, cross-border trafficking, and both civilian and military weapons under civilian control, are partly problems of enforcement (though there are also key legal deficiencies in the relevant legislation, including common categories of weapons not covered by legislation, and an outdated penalty regime: non-custodial penalties for some violations of the Firearms Act and its subsidiary legislation range from 100 to 1000 Naira, which are no longer financially dissuasive).³⁵

³³ Nigeria was the president of the Second Review Conference on the UNPOA in 2012.

³⁴ Nigeria was the Chair of the Second Conference of States Parties to the ATT in 2016.

³⁵ *Firearms Act*, 1959, s.27; *Firearms Regulations*, 1959, s.48.

Table 3. Nigerian legislation relating to WAM

Legislation (<i>secondary legislation in italics</i>)	Date of entry into force	Topics												
		Arms	Ammunition	Civilian possession	Security agencies possession	Domestic dealing	Civilian storage	Security forces storage	Marking	Recordkeeping	Import	Export	Brokering	Transit/trans-shipment
Firearms Act (L.N. 32 of 1959)	1 Feb 1959	X	X	X		X			X		X	X		X
<i>Firearms Regulations (L.N. 33 of 1959)</i>	1 Feb 1959	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X		X
<i>Public Armouries and Charge Officers Notice (L.N. 147 of 1961)</i>	16 Nov 1961	X	X				X							
<i>Firearms (Public Armouries) Notice (L.N. 46 of 1968)</i>	1 Apr 1968	X	X				X							
<i>Firearms (Delegation of Powers of Inspector-General) Notice (L.N. 47 of 1968)</i>		X	X	X		X	X			X				X
Defence Industries Corporation Act	1 Aug 1964	X	X											X
Explosives Act (L.N. 34 of 1967)	1 Jan 1967		X											
<i>Explosives Regulations</i>	1 Jan 1967		X	X		X	X			X	X			X

4.1.3. Opportunities for enhancement

None of this legislation explicitly covers the import, export, management and possession of weapons and ammunition by state security agencies. The Firearms Act explicitly exempts the armed forces and the police³⁶ from its provisions, but provides no alternative provisions for their weaponry. It is unclear how this exemption applies to other state security agencies which have more recently been granted the right to carry weapons, including the NIS and NSCDC. The right of these institutions to carry arms was granted by law in 2007, with the authorization activated in 2011.³⁷

Similarly, the only legislation providing detailed requirements for the storage and management of explosive items (the 1967 Explosives Act and its subsidiary legislation) makes no explicit mention of its application to the armed forces and other security agencies nor to military explosives and explosive ordnance.³⁸

Moreover, the list of weaponry controlled by the 1959 Firearms Act has not been updated since 1959. It does not include: (1) many types of weapons falling under categories of

³⁶ *Firearms Act*, 1959, s.38

³⁷ The *Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (Amendment) Act*, 2007, authorizes an “armed squad” within NSCDC to “bear fire arms” and to be deployed by the Commandant-General. Since at least 2011, most NSCDC personnel have been armed throughout Nigeria.

³⁸ Some other security agencies have some explosive ordnance: for instance, the NSCDC maintains Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams equipped with flash-bang grenades and other less-lethal items.

SALW established by international instruments such as the ECOWAS Convention; (2) many other categories of military equipment covered by the UNROCA or the ATT; (3) types of munitions other than firearms ammunition such as grenades, mines and other items; nor (4) new forms of weaponry including public order/less-lethal weapons.³⁹

Figure 1. Schedule (control lists) to the 1959 Firearms Act

<p style="text-align: center;">SCHEDULE [Sections 2,3-5.8,23-25.33.]</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;">PART I</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Prohibited firearms</i></p>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Artillery. 2. Apparatus for the discharge of any explosive or gas diffusing projectile. 3. Rocket weapons. 4. Bombs and grenades. 5. Machine-guns and machine-pistols. 6. Military rifles, namely those of calibres 7.62 mm, 9 mm, .300 inches and .303 inches. 7. Revolvers and pistols whether rifled or unrifled (including flint-lock pistols and cap pistols). [1966 No. 31, 1966 No. 68.] 8. Any other firearm not specified in Part II or Part III of this Schedule. 	
<p style="text-align: center;">PART II</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Personal firearms</i></p>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Shotguns other than- <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (a) automatic and semi-automatic shotguns; and (b) shotguns provided with any kind of mechanical reloading device. 2. Sporting rifles, namely rifles of calibres other than those specified in item 6 of Part I. 3. Air-guns, air-rifles or air-pistols. 4. Humane killers of the captive bolt type. 	
<p style="text-align: center;">PART III</p>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Muzzle-loading firearms</i></p>	
1. Dane-guns	all being unrifled and muzzle-loading.
2. Flint-lock guns	all being unrifled and muzzle-loading.
3. Cap-guns	all being unrifled and muzzle-loading.

Lastly, this legislation has not domesticated many of the provisions of the ECOWAS Convention (2006) and the ATT (2014) to which Nigeria is a State Party. These treaties include a wide range of WAM provisions not reflected in Nigerian legislation, including on the storage and management of SALW; on marking, recordkeeping and tracing; on the scope of weaponry to be controlled under domestic law; and on the scope of transactions (import, export, transit, trans-shipment and international brokering) to be controlled under domestic law.

Since 2007, a legislative reform process has been under way to repeal and replace the 1959 Firearms Act.⁴⁰ A 2009 review in conjunction with the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and external stakeholders produced a new draft repeal bill⁴¹ which was then redrafted to integrate, in particular, the provisions of the UNPOA. In October 2014, an expert round-table with external legal specialists provided further edits. The draft legislation has now

³⁹ *Firearms Act*, 1959, Schedule Parts I, II, III.

⁴⁰ *Draft Firearms Amendment Act*, 2007,
<http://unrec.org/docs/harm/Nigeria/Acts/Draft%20firearms%20amendment.pdf>.

⁴¹ *Firearms Control Act (Repeal and Re-Enactment) Bill*, 2009,
<http://nass.gov.ng/document/download/1201>.

been submitted to the MOJ. This final version has not yet been put to the National Assembly.⁴²

4.1.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) adopt the proposed new firearms bill;
- 2) develop a plan to operationalize the new firearms bill at a practical level;
- 3) domesticate the ECOWAS Convention and ATT provisions into regulations for each security agency;
- 4) sensitize high level national authorities on the legal provisions related to arms and ammunition; and
- 5) sensitize civilians on the new firearms bill.

4.2. National coordinating mechanism

4.2.1. General

The coordination of policy, strategy and WAM operations is key to an effective national WAM system. Nigeria has at least 13 security agencies concerned with WAM at the strategic and operational levels (see Figures 2 and 3), and many others at the federal and state level involved in developing and approving WAM-related policy, as well as implementing WAM-related activities.

4.2.2. Current status

The coordination of WAM issues is undertaken by two bodies within the Federal Government: PRESCOM and ONSA. Both undertake strategic and operational roles and responsibilities, and neither has complete control over the full gamut of WAM issues.

The Presidential Committee on SALW: The ECOWAS Convention (2006) requires all ECOWAS Member States to establish a national SALW commission to coordinate efforts against the illicit proliferation and circulation of SALW. Nigeria has yet to do so. Instead, a non-permanent Presidential Committee was inaugurated in April 2013 with representatives from all security agencies responsible for/or equipped with SALW, and ONSA. PRESCOM also serves as the focal point for the implementation of the UNPOA, and its representative from DHQ serves as the focal point for the ITI.⁴³

The Office of the National Security Adviser: ONSA is a ministerial level department responsible for a broad range of security, defence and intelligence functions and authorizations, including a range of inter-agency decision-making bodies and working

⁴² Presentation by PRESCOM, UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 15 November 2016.

⁴³ Government of Nigeria, *2016 report to UNPOA*, 2016, www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2016@146@2016%20-%20PoA%20-%20Nigeria%20-%20E.pdf.


groups. While there is no such body specifically dedicated to WAM issues, the Joint Intelligence Board—with representatives from defence, security and intelligence agencies—is responsible for responding to strategic security threats, including illicit weapons.⁴⁴ ONSA is also responsible for authorizing all imports and end-user certifications (EUCs) of all controlled goods including arms and ammunition, both civilian- and military-held.

Figure 2. Agencies represented within PRESCOM

	Agency represented	Competent department/ministry
Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons	Office of the National Security Adviser	Office of the National Security Adviser
	Department of State Services	
	National Intelligence Agency	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Nigerian Army	Ministry of Defence
	Nigerian Air Force	
	Nigerian Navy	
	Defence Headquarters	
	Defence Intelligence Agency	
	Nigerian Customs Service	Ministry of Finance
	Nigerian Police Force	Ministry of Interior
	Nigerian Immigration Service	
	Nigerian Prisons Service	
	National Security and Civil Defence Corps	
	Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation	

⁴⁴ UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 14 November 2016.

Figure 3. WAM/SALW responsibilities of Nigerian national security institutions



Both the ONSA and PRESCOM have a mixture of strategic- and operational level functions. At a strategic level, the ONSA and the inter-agency bodies under it undertake strategic planning for WAM challenges and SALW threats, but also operational/administrative level functions, including collating information on weapons trafficking, reviewing import/export applications, and issuing EUCs.⁴⁵ Likewise, PRESCOM has a range of strategic and operational functions: see Table 4.

Meanwhile, other WAM functions, both strategic and operational, are dealt with separately within each security agency without overall coordination. These include:

- systems to procure and import weapons and ammunition, though these are now being harmonized;
- regulations and standard operating procedures (SOPs) for stockpile management and weapons/ammunition storage;
- recordkeeping for security agencies' own weapons and ammunition;
- the management and processing of seized weapons and ammunition (the processing of seized weapons follows two separate procedures according to whether they are seized by civilian/paramilitary security agencies, or in military or joint-civilian/military operations; that of collected weapons varies across different state level and federally-mandated collection processes);
- the management and processing of voluntarily surrendered weapons and ammunition, for which no harmonized system or protocol exists, and for which different procedures exist among different state level and federally-mandated collection efforts.

⁴⁵ For the EUC function of the ONSA, see <http://euc.nsa.gov.ng/bg/home>.

Table 4. PRESCOM functions (current) and future priority areas, identified in 2016⁴⁶

PRESCOM priority area	Timescale	Strategic/operational
National SALW action plan (draft) ⁴⁷	2016–2018	Strategic
National SALW survey	2016–2017	Operational
National weapons marking programme	2017	Operational
Establishment of a national database on SALW	2017	Operational
Information and advocacy, including election-related advocacy (ballots without bullets)	Jan–Feb 2015 (ballot without bullets)	Operational
Training and capacity-building	Ongoing	Operational
Collection and destruction of weapons	2016 onwards	Operational
Assisting in drafting and reviewing legislation	2013 onwards	Operational
Point of contact for tracing requests under the ITI (coordinated by DHQ representative to PRESCOM)	2013 onwards	Operational

4.2.3. Opportunities for enhancement

Upgrading PRESCOM to a permanent National Commission would not only fulfil Nigeria's ECOWAS Convention obligations, but also ensure the entity's access to federal funding and allow for the longer-term planning of its coordinating activities. The National Assembly passed the second reading of a non-executive bill to establish a full National Commission with its own budget in March 2013, which has been under consideration at the committee level since.⁴⁸

For operational areas of WAM, for which oversight is currently siloed within each security agency, national actors recognized that it could be useful to coordinate activities through interagency technical working groups (TWGs) convened either by the ONSA or PRESCOM, according to subject matter.

4.2.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) transform PRESCOM into a national commission in line with the ECOWAS Convention (adopt bill);

⁴⁶ PRESCOM presentation to UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 15 November 2016.

⁴⁷ As required under the *ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials*, 2006, Article 24.4.

⁴⁸ Presentation by PRESCOM to UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 15 November 2016; *Nigeria National Commission Against the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons Bill*, 2013.

- 2) establish an interagency TWG on WAM;
- 3) develop a roadmap for the implementation of existing international and national projects on SALW;
- 4) review, adopt and disseminate a national action plan on SALW;
- 5) involve relevant state and local entities in design and review of national action plan; and
- 6) adequately resource PRESCOM for its coordinating role.

4.3. Transfer controls

4.3.1. General

Regulating and accounting for weapons and ammunition moving in and out of Nigeria is the first step in ensuring that weapons and ammunition within the country are adequately managed, including prevention of weapons diversion. This requires national laws, regulations and control systems on the import, export, re-export, brokering, transit, and trans-shipment of weapons and ammunition.

4.3.2. Current status

The Nigerian legislation listed under section 4.1, “National legal framework”, is primarily concerned with ensuring that arms and ammunition moving into and out of the country are held by or destined for users which have the requisite permits to hold them. The legislation:

- requires import/export licences only for “prohibited firearms” and their ammunition. The import and export of controlled firearms (shotguns, sporting rifles and muzzle-loading firearms) do not require specific licences. Instead the weapons must simply be declared to customs and proper authorization for possessing such weapons must be shown;
- does not control international brokering, transit or trans-shipment of weapons or ammunition, as required under the ECOWAS Convention⁴⁹ and the ATT;⁵⁰
- does not cover many types of SALW whose control is required by the ECOWAS Convention, and many other types of military and paramilitary weapons and weapons platforms whose control is required by States parties to the ATT;
- does not cover any import or export of weapons and ammunition for Nigerian defence or security forces.

In practice, some of these “scope” gaps in controlled items or controlled types of transfer are filled by other regulatory processes. None of these regulatory processes, however,

⁴⁹ ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials, 2006, Chapter II.

⁵⁰ Arms Trade Treaty, 2013, Articles 7, 8, 9, 10.

establish a process of assessing arms transfers against risks of misuse or diversion, the core control mechanism envisaged by both the ECOWAS Convention and the ATT.

4.3.2.1. Exports

There have been no reported authorized exports of weapons or ammunition from Nigeria to non-Nigerian end-users. Customs service representatives state that exports of personal firearms are in practice also prohibited despite being technically permitted under the 1959 Firearms Act on the condition of a customs declaration and proof of (possession) licence.⁵¹ In practice, therefore, exports of weapons and ammunition are limited to those for Nigerian armed forces or police personnel deployed on peacekeeping or joint overseas missions, whose authorization and accounting is the responsibility of the Nigerian DHQ and the Armament Section of the NPF.

Nigeria is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa to manufacture small arms ammunition, and to manufacture or assemble some small arms under licence. A regulatory framework for governing possible exports in the future is thus more urgent than in some other countries.

In relation to possession licencing for weapons and ammunition physically carried out of Nigeria, certain categories or entities are exempt from inspection by the NCS, and thus a potential vector for arms exports. These include diplomatic bodyguard personnel as well as diplomatic cargoes.

4.3.2.2. Imports

EUCs for all imports of weapons and ammunition are issued centrally by the ONSA, with applications screened by the DSS.⁵² The assessment team was unable to establish whether the ONSA issues import notifications/requests for import exemptions to the ECOWAS Secretariat, as required under the ECOWAS Convention.

While the requirement to obtain EUCs through the ONSA introduces central oversight of intended arms/ammunition imports, the authorization itself for security agencies to procure weapons/ammunition has occurred in recent years through at least three channels: the ONSA, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) (for armed forces branches), and though presidential authorization via police HQ (for NPF weapons). The procurement process for all defence and security agencies was reportedly being centralized through ONSA during 2016. The assessment team was unable to determine from participants' responses whether all security agencies now have the right to import weapons independently (with ONSA authorization), or whether they continue the practice of procuring weapons from those imported by the armed forces.


Records of procurement and imports are therefore maintained only at the level of the individual headquarters of the concerned security agencies, and are not centralized.

⁵¹ *Firearms Act*, 1959, Part V s.21.

⁵² "End-User Certificate Issuance & Management System", Office of the National Security Adviser of Nigeria, 2015, <http://euc.nsa.gov.ng/bg/home>.

Physically, weapons imports are also consigned directly to the security agencies concerned. In the case of the armed forces, they are cleared through ports of entry by their own Logistics Corps clearing agents, and in the case of all security agencies are stored immediately after import at each security agency's central storage facilities.⁵³ Some weaponry imported for security agencies is also consigned to DICON (Kaduna).⁵⁴ There is thus no comprehensive customs or other third party oversight of weapons and ammunition imports, either at the procurement, physical import or distribution stages.

Figure 4. Processes for requesting weapons/ammunition procurement and obtaining EUCs, reported by participants at UNIDIR/BICC-led consultations, Abuja, 14–18 November 2016



4.3.2.3. Transit/trans-shipment

The transit/trans-shipment of weapons through Nigerian territory is neither controlled under the 1959 Firearms Act nor does it require a specific licence. In practice, Lagos is a significant point of entry for cargoes destined to other landlocked West African countries. The NCS requires pre-notification from the customs authority of the country of origin of all arrivals of arms and ammunition, which is done through the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA++) system operated by Nigeria and most of its neighbours. NCS representatives noted that all incoming goods are physically inspected at the point of entry, with sensitive cargoes such as arms and ammunition compared against shipping

⁵³ These include the central customs armoury in Abuja; the central NPF store at Obalende, Lagos; the NSCDC training college at Sauka, Abuja; and Nigerian Army central ordnance depots at Yaba (Lagos) and Kaduna.

⁵⁴ BICC/CAR examination of NSCDC weapons stocks and armoury, Kaduna, 12 October 2016.

documentation and transfer authorizations. The assessment team was unable to confirm these procedures.

4.3.2.4. International brokering

Part III of the 1959 Firearms Act regulates domestic sales and dealing in firearms. However, it is unclear whether this regulates intermediation for the international transfer of arms and ammunition from one country to another, including when this intermediation is carried out by Nigerian companies or individuals to move weapons to and from countries outside Nigeria. Security agencies reported to the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations that there had not been significant instances of Nigerian private individuals or companies acting as intermediaries for arms transfers in this way. That said, controls on such international brokering are recommended by the UNPOA, in which Nigeria has played a major role.

4.3.2.5. Reporting

The assessment team was unable to verify whether the required details of SALW imports are notified to the ECOWAS Secretariat prior to import, as required under Article 5 of the ECOWAS Convention. Likewise, in the absence of a nationwide arms register, it is unclear whether Nigeria transmits details of registered SALW to the ECOWAS Secretariat for inclusion in a regional register, as required under Article 10 of the ECOWAS Convention.

4.3.3. Opportunities for enhancement

4.3.3.1. Regulatory gaps

As detailed in Table 3, Nigerian legislation regulating weapons and ammunition transfers has gaps in the scope of its: (i) controlled weapons categories; and (ii) controlled transfer/transaction types. Updating this legislation is already under way via the draft Firearms Act repeal bill, though PRESCOM representatives stated that this draft bill was still expected to cover only civilian- rather than state-held weapons.

4.3.3.2. Information collection and reporting

Reporting on imports in compliance with the ECOWAS Convention would require centralized recordkeeping on weapons and ammunition imports. Records of authorizations for imports of arms and ammunition are centralized within the ONSA, which issues EUCs for imports by all security agencies and civilians, though EUCs generally contain authorizations for quantities of weapon types rather than detailed records of the quantities actually imported, and will not contain weapons' serial or lot numbers. In addition, customs do not retain records of all weapon imports since some security agencies use their own internal clearing agents at ports of entry (see section 4.3, "Transfer controls"). Records of actual imports are therefore only maintained at security agency HQ level through inventories made after import. Centralizing such information would assist the ONSA with full oversight of actual imports, in order to match them to authorizations and demonstrate/validate that no unauthorized procurement took place.

4.3.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) review national definitions and categories for the national control list (prohibited and controlled items);
- 2) review national regulations of all security agencies to include all activities controlled within the ECOWAS Convention and the ATT including brokering, import, export, transit, trans-shipment and measures to prevent diversion;
- 3) collate information on Nigerian arms transfers to allow reporting according to national, regional and international instruments; and
- 4) harmonize procedures for procurement and import for all security agencies in line with revised national regulations.

4.4. Marking

4.4.1. General

Accounting for weapons and ammunition stocks, and tracking their disposition, movements and diversion, relies on being able to uniquely identify each weapon and batch of ammunition, primarily through its markings.

Almost all factory-made weapons—including those made by DICON—already carry some kind of uniquely distinguishing marking or serial number at the point of manufacture (though some factories may duplicate serial numbers already used by other factories, meaning that both factory/manufacturer marks and serial numbers must be registered to ensure that recorded markings are unique to the weapon). Thus almost all weapons in security agencies' stocks already carry distinguishing markings which can be recorded and inventoried. A uniform and comprehensive marking programme is not necessarily a prerequisite for assuring the accountability and traceability of security agencies' weapons. Nonetheless, placing additional, uniform, country-specific or agency-specific markings on a weapon would make it quicker to trace to its original authorized user, if lost or diverted.

By contrast, craft-made weapons, which are in wide civilian circulation in Nigeria, are often entirely unmarked, making them effectively untraceable. This was the case with the majority (78 per cent) of the craft-made weapons collected, for instance, in the recent Benue State arms amnesty.⁵⁵

4.4.2. Current status

4.4.2.1 Weapons

The 1959 Firearms Regulations stipulate that civilian-held firearms, and all firearms manufactured in Nigeria, should be marked with some kind of distinguishing mark or letter/number sequence, but do not prescribe the content of such a mark/sequence.

There is no similar prescription in Nigerian law for security agency-held weapons. The ECOWAS Convention requires all small arms and light weapons imported into a Member

⁵⁵ CAR examination of collected weapons in Benue State, Makurdi, 9 October 2016.

State's territory to have markings applied either by the manufacturer or else after import as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Marking requirements for SALW under the ECOWAS Convention (Article 18)

MARKING TYPE	"Classic marking"	<i>Practice for Nigerian security agency weapons?</i>	"security marking"	<i>Practice for Nigerian security agency weapons?</i>
WHICH SALW?	All imported weapons		All imported weapons manufactured after 2006	
MARKING CONTENT	Unique serial number	Yes	Unique identifier	
	Manufacturer code	Some		
	Country of manufacture	Some		
	Year of manufacture	Some		
	Purchaser code <i>If known at time of manufacture</i>			
	Country of destination <i>If known at time of manufacture</i>			
	Importing State <i>Marked at import if not known at time of manufacture</i>			
	Year of import <i>Marked at import if not known at time of manufacture</i>			
MARKED WHERE?	Maximum number of main weapon parts <i>At a minimum: one essential component and one other part</i>	Receiver only	Component parts <i>In case "classic marking" is erased from main parts or falsified</i>	

There is no common system or SOP for the permanent marking of Nigerian security agencies' weapons, either to an ECOWAS or common standard, despite this being a legally-binding requirement of the ECOWAS Convention for all weapons imported into ECOWAS Member States. Previously, some imported weapons had user markings applied by the manufacturer (for instance, police pistols marked "NPF") but this has never been a universal practice and has reportedly been discontinued in recent years, even for the police. NSCDC and NIS weapons observed in their armouries, including those imported as recently as 2014, did not have import/user markings applied by the manufacturer, though some manufactured since 2005 are marked with manufacturer markings in accordance with the politically binding ITI.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ BICC, observations of weapons in NSCDC and NIS stocks, 8–18 October 2016.

Figure 5. Example of manufacturer markings in compliance with the ITI, including calibre (7.62 mm), weapon type (Type 81-1), year of manufacture ((20)12), country of manufacture (CN=China), manufacturer logo (Chinese State Factory 26) and unique serial number (partially obscured for security reasons)



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Several Nigerian security agencies use a system of non-permanent “butt marking”, a practice carried over from British colonial weapons accounting systems in which the butts of handguns and rifles are marked with: (1) a security agency alphanumeric code; (2) a unit level alphanumeric code; and (3) a butt number assigned by the security agency HQ (not always the same as the rifle’s serial number). Butt numbers are marked in different colours of paint assigned to different security agencies to aid visual identification. Originally practised by the armed forces, this system has, in theory, been adopted by other security agencies which have been armed more recently, including the NSCDC (armed since 2007). However, in several armouries recently upgraded by PRESCOM and its partners, butt numbering was not visible on the rifles and handguns present.⁵⁷

Such butt numbering may help with weapons accounting at the unit level, yet may also introduce obstacles to weapons’ accountability and traceability because:

- some security agencies record issue and receipt of weapons by butt number and some by serial number;
- butt numbers may be duplicated if assigned by different security agencies without coordination; and
- painted markings can be easily removed or effaced.

⁵⁷ MAG, Armoury Risk Assessment of NSCDC HQ armouries, conducted in Makurdi and Kaduna, October 2016.

4.4.2.2. Ammunition

Almost uniquely among international instruments, the ECOWAS Convention mandates marking of ammunition imported since 2006 on both individual cartridge cases and on the smallest unit of packaging. The marking procedure is as shown in Table 6.

Table 6. Marking requirements for SALW under ECOWAS Convention (Article 18.3)

MARKING TYPE	Individual rounds	Packaging	Current practice in Nigeria?
WHICH AMMUNITION?	All ammunition imported since entry into force of ECOWAS Convention		
MARKING CONTENT	Unique lot number		
	Manufacturer code		X
	Country of manufacture		
	Year of manufacture		X
	Purchaser code <i>If known at time of manufacture</i>		
	Country of destination <i>If known at time of manufacture</i>		
MARKED WHERE?	Jacket (cartridge) containing explosive powder or liquid	Smallest unit of packaging	

In practice, marking unique lot numbers on individual ammunition rounds remains uncommon among ammunition manufacturers worldwide. None of the small arms ammunition examined in security agencies armouries was marked with any cartridge markings except manufacturer codes and, in some cases, year of manufacture. The assessment team was unable to confirm the marking practices of DICON, which reportedly manufactures small arms ammunition at its plant in Kaduna.

More problematically, unique lot numbers of ammunition in bulk are not retained on packaging within armouries nor recorded in any ammunition records maintained by security agencies which MAG and BICC have observed. PRESCOM's armed forces representatives stated that ammunition lot numbers are recorded and different lots stored in separate stacks in military armouries. The assessment team was unable to confirm this directly. In most cases at area-command level, ammunition was stored without its original packaging, contrary to the recommendations of International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG) for depots, both at unit level and in field storage.⁵⁸ Instead, small arms ammunition at unit level and in field storage are generally either kept loaded in magazines

⁵⁸ UNODA, *IATG 03.10 (Inventory Management)*, UNODA, 2015, sections 9, 10, 14.2, 14.5; UNODA, *IATG 03.20 (Lotting and Batching)*, UNODA, 2015, passim; UNODA, *IATG 04.10 (Field Storage)*, UNODA, 2015, section 6.4.1.

or in buckets and repurposed munitions crates for all security agencies (NSCDC, NIS and NCS) whose storage facilities MAG and/or BICC have examined.

Figure 6. 7.62 x 39 mm and 7.62 x 51 mm ammunition kept stored in magazines and buckets at two area command level security agency armouries



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Such practices limit the accountability and traceability of ammunition distributed to security agency units. At central depot level, managing ammunition by lot or batch number is also essential for quality control, for identifying faulty or dangerous stocks, and for ensuring the usability of ammunition distributed to security agencies.

4.4.3. Opportunities for enhancement

One priority area of PRESCOM's work plan is to institute a national marking programme. PRESCOM has entered into discussions with relevant regional organizations to seek support in this area, including from the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa and the Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States. Assistance discussions include support for the acquisition of marking machines and software for the recordkeeping of marked weapons. Marking activities with international partners are planned for 2017.

Such activities will require considerable preparatory work to ensure consistency across security agencies, and alignment with international standards. There is not yet an HQ level agreement by all security agencies on participation in such a national marking programme, nor agreement on a common marking protocol or format. Plans advanced by PRESCOM and MAG do not yet appear to include packaging marking of security forces' ammunition stocks in line with the ECOWAS Convention.

As present, there is also no provision for national level recordkeeping or registration of security agency weapons—either newly marked or through their existing markings—without which marking systems cannot help to identify the unit or individual that has lost or diverted a given weapon. Establishing a national weapons database is also a priority area in PRESCOM's work plan.

Many security agency representatives participating in the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations were also supportive of requiring suppliers of weapons to Nigeria's security agencies to mark in compliance with the ECOWAS Convention at the point of manufacture as a contractual condition.

4.4.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) establish a legal requirement for the marking of all weapons, both arms in circulation and newly acquired;
- 2) develop marking standards that are applied across all security agencies;
- 3) design a marking format in conformity with regional and international standards;
- 4) utilize interagency TWGs for marking procedures and standards;
- 5) develop a pilot project plan for marking, including requirements for equipment/machines, logistics, personnel and relevant sensitization activities;
- 6) develop written SOPs for marking (to be used by all relevant security agencies);
- 7) develop a training plan for interagency training on marking SOPs; and
- 8) where applicable, develop an assistance proposal to support the marking programme, including the acquisition of technical equipment.

4.5. Recordkeeping

4.5.1. General

Key to managing state stocks, regulating civilian possession, and identifying points of theft or diversion, is the maintenance of comprehensive and up-to-date records of all weapons and ammunition present in the country, as well as their movements. Comprehensive and uniform marking of weapons and ammunition brings little benefit without comprehensive and up-to-date recordkeeping.

4.5.2. Current status

In general, Nigeria's security agencies maintain centralized "vertical" recordkeeping. This refers to recording the issue, receipt and distribution of weapons from import to HQ, and then to unit and sometimes individual level; and recording civilian weapons whose possession is authorized by security agencies and/or stored within their own armouries.

EXAMPLE: Registers mandated by NPF force orders to be kept in all NPF armouries

1. Arms and ammunition movement register
2. Arms and ammunition safe-keeping register
3. Index register or master list register
4. Expended ammunition register
5. Armoury store ledger
6. Store issue register
7. Store received vouchers

However, there is limited integration of these records "horizontally" across different security agencies and civilian stocks, and no national registry of either civilian- or state-held weapons, as recommended by International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS) and IATG (ISACS 05.30 clause 6.2 and IATG 03.10), and required by the ECOWAS Convention Article 9. This limits the ability of national authorities to identify the original location and users of a recovered or seized weapon through searching across the stocks of all security agencies and civilians.

Beyond the need for an integrated, national level weapons register, WAM recordkeeping in all security agencies lacks:

- standardized procedures, forms, registers and SOPs for WAM recordkeeping across all security agencies (some already have such SOPs—see section 4.5.2.2—which could form the starting point for such standardization);
- accounting and inventory management of ammunition by lot/batch number.

4.5.2.1. Civilian-held weapons and ammunition

The 1959 Firearms Act requires the Inspector-General of Police (IGP) to maintain a register of all firearms for which civilians have obtained (possession) licences in each licensing area. The assessment team was unable to confirm whether this register is maintained centrally, or only by the state level commands to which issuing and registering firearms licences has

been delegated.⁵⁹ The Act does not specify recordkeeping of ammunition in civilian possession.⁶⁰

4.5.2.2 State-held weapons

All security agencies stated that they maintain central registers to record weapons received and issued by HQ down to the individual weapon level: some computerized, some on paper.⁶¹ The assessment team was unable to verify this with all agencies and at all levels, but some registration to the individual level is certainly evident at least at area-command level in armouries visited by MAG and BICC in 2016.

However, the format of both weapon registers/inventories, and records of the issue and receipt of weapons vary widely at state/area-command level, even within the various security agencies. Some agencies, including NSCDC, have well-organized and standardized registers. Others (including NIS state commands and some army units) mainly use improvised registers (Figure 7) whose data fields are not always standardized. In particular, there are various recording styles for serial numbers and additional butt numbers, and the precise weapons model needed for tracing to ITI standards is generally not recorded in registers at all levels; instead there is a reliance on generic typologies like “AK” or “SMG” for sub-machine gun. This diversity of practice is sustained by the absence of standardized recordkeeping protocols across all security agencies. The armed forces and the NPF have SOPs for weapons recordkeeping, defined in force orders inherited partly from British colonial practice (e.g. Force Order 254 on the audit of police armouries). The assessment team was unable to compare these force orders/SOPs with international standards as defined in the IATG and ISACS. Other security agencies report using NPF recordkeeping and weapons accounting procedures. However, area-command and unit level actors often do not have standardized registers nor forms to report inventories to HQ.

Internal auditing appears strong. However, the assessment team was unable to verify how internal inventory and audit reports were recorded at HQ level. Area and unit level commands of all agencies transmit regular inventory reports to their force HQ, listing weapons by type/serial number, and ammunition by quantity/calibre (see Figure 7). These reports are generally transmitted in soft copy. The assessment team was unable to verify how or whether these documents were integrated into searchable HQ level databases, or used to update HQ level registers.

In addition, personnel from the force HQ armaments offices of each agency are required to visit all the agency’s armouries quarterly or annually to verify inventories against force HQ records.

⁵⁹ *Firearms (Delegation of Powers of Inspector-General) Notice* (L.N. 47), 1968.

⁶⁰ *Firearms Regulations*, 1969, Part II s.4, Form I.

⁶¹ BICC/Conflict Armament Research interviews with HQ armament staff from NPF, NCS, NIS, NSCDC, Abuja, various dates, October 2016; BICC/CAR interviews with NA divisional armoury manager and division commander, Makurdi, 7–8 October 2016.

Figure 7. Top: Daily weapons issue register (improvised), NIS HQ, Kaduna State; Bottom: Daily weapons issue register (centrally designed and issued), NSCDC HQ, Kaduna State

Top Register (NIS HQ, Kaduna State):

Name	Weapon	Quantity	Date
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8

Bottom Register (NSCDC HQ, Kaduna State):

Name	Weapon	Quantity	Date
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8
Abdullahi Shale	AK	10x1676350	8

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**NIGERIA SECURITY AND CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS
MOVEMENT OF ARMS REGISTER**

DATE OF ISSUE	QUANTITY	TYPE OF WEAPON	SIGNATURE OF RECIPIENT	DATE WEAPON RETURNED	BY WHOM WEAPON RECEIVED	REMARKS
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	
10/10/16	10	AK	[Signature]	10/10/16	[Signature]	

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Table 7. Examples of frequency of inventory reporting to force HQ⁶²

Security agency	Area-command level (state or zonal command)	Unit level
NA	Not known	Quarterly
NSCDC	Monthly	Not known
NPF	Monthly	Quarterly
NIS	Monthly	Not known

Figure 8. Monthly armoury inventory report from NIS state level armoury to force HQ, NIS Command Kaduna

SINO	TYPE OF CALLER	LOCATION	CONDITION
1	Home	PRESIDENTIAL SECURED MANUFACTURE IND. WAY KADUNA	SERVICEABLE
2	Home	SAFE KADUNA STATE COMMAND	SERVICEABLE
3	Home	CORE LTD LAGOS/ABUJA	SERVICEABLE
4	Home	SAFE KADUNA STATE C COMMAND	SERVICEABLE
5	Home	SAFE KADUNA STATE COMMAND	SERVICEABLE
6	Home	SAFE KADUNA STATE COMMAND	SERVICEABLE
7	Home	BIRTH ALISA VEP SHS (HS DRAWOP)	SERVICEABLE
8	Home	SAFE KADUNA STATE COMMAND	SERVICEABLE

TOTAL NUMBER OF ... IN-4,400

6 Page

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⁶² Responses from participants in UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 16 November 2016; BICC/CAR visits to NSCDC and NIS state level armouries, various dates and locations, October 2016.

Ammunition accounting is done through standardized store issue vouchers and armoury quantity registers used by all security agencies. It is verified through regular quantity stock-checks by armourers at HQ, area-command and unit levels.

At all levels below HQ, and in all security agencies, ammunition accounting is only done by quantity/calibre. The assessment team found no examples of ammunition management by lot/batch number either for the purposes of accountability/tracing, or stock management as recommended by IATG 03.10. The armed forces reported that they use lotting/batching and stack tally cards in ammunition depots. The assessment team was unable to view or verify these.

Figure 9. Store issue voucher, NIS force HQ armoury to state command armoury, NIS state command, Kaduna State

Store BK 4

NIGERIA

STORE ISSUE VOUCHER

To the Storekeeper Sgt. Amin Date 04-08-16 No. 16/1615/125

I am hereby AUTHORIZED to issue the undermentioned articles to ANKE SI Department/District Kaduna

COMMAND [Redacted] Department SCAF

PPNL/SM	Description of Quantity	Quantity to be Issued	Price as Issuing Ledger (a)	Price as Receiving Ledger (b)	Rate	N	Amount	REMARKS
	(1) 7.62x39mm (LIVE)						1,500 rounds	
	(2) 9x19mm (LIVE)						500 rounds	
	(3) BARRIETEC VEST						10 pieces	
	(4) BARRIETEC PLATE						20 pieces	
	(5) BARRIETEC HELMET						10 pieces	
	NAME	ORIGINAL Yusuf						
	No.	18093						
	R	[Redacted]						
	C	STATK Common						
	Suf.	[Redacted]						
	Date	9/6/16						

RECEIVED the above mentioned [Redacted]

Issued WAMBAR [Redacted]

1. The Issuing Storekeeper will insert against each article the number of the folio of his Store Ledger upon which is entered.

2. The Receiving Storekeeper will insert against each article the number of the folio of his Store Ledger upon which is entered.

3. Should the Store be for immediate consumption and not for charge, the words "For immediate consumption" should be written by the Officer authority the issue, and also by the recipient, immediately below the last item authorized.

4. The authorizing Officer must write his initials in the article column of the Voucher, and also by the recipient, immediately below the last item authorized.

5. The original to be received in full (in ink if possible) and returned to the Officer who will file it as an Issue Voucher.

6. Duplicate to be retained by the Receiving Officer and filed as a Voucher, Triplicate to remain in the book.

4.5.2.4. Records of lost or stolen weapons

There is no central nationwide register of lost or stolen weapons, with lost or stolen weapons records retained within each security agency. Each loss or theft of a weapon triggers a report to the division or area command of each security agency to initiate the appropriate investigation, and is reported to the national HQ of each agency. However, these reports are not always linked to the maintenance of accurate registers at HQ level. Armaments staff of several security agencies noted that the investigative or disciplinary bodies which receive such reports do not always pass them to those maintaining central registers of inventory or registers of recovered weapons. For instance, for the NPF and NSCDC, all lost weapons should be notified to force HQ (under Force Order 48 for the NPF, within the Provost Unit for NIS). The NA, by contrast, only constitutes a Board of Inquiry at the division level. An NCS HQ armaments representative stated that lost/stolen weapons reports did not come to him for weapons accounting purposes, but to HQ investigators.⁶³

4.5.3. Opportunities for enhancement

The findings from the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations suggest two key opportunities for enhancement:

- “Horizontal” integration of WAM records which could be done through implementing existing plans for a national database/registry. This would require all relevant security agencies to consent to sharing their records and participating in the database programme.
- A unified national database would also require security agencies to harmonize their recordkeeping formats, and the data fields recorded at each level. This would also help to extend existing recordkeeping good practices and formats to those security agencies which have been armed more recently.

4.5.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) implement a plan for a national database/registry, including records from marking programme;
- 2) codify unified guidelines for recordkeeping within security agencies and harmonize across security agencies at all levels; and
- 3) train all relevant security agencies on the new marking procedure, and on harmonized ammunition recordkeeping and inventory management.

4.6. Captured and seized weapons

4.6.1. General

Weapons captured and seized by Nigerian security agencies present management, accounting, storage and disposal needs. They also constitute the primary source of

⁶³ BICC/CAR interviews with HQ level armaments officers, Abuja, various dates, October 2016.


information on points of diversion and sources (both domestic and cross-border) of illicit weapons and ammunition in the country. This information is crucial to targeting WAM activities and preventing weapons diversion under all WAM pillars. This information is obtained primarily through domestic and international tracing, which relies heavily upon adequate documentation and identification of captured and seized weapons/ammunition.

4.6.2. Current status

Processing captured or seized weapons and ammunition occurs through two distinct channels.

If civilian or paramilitary security agencies (NSCDC, NCS, NIS, NPS) seize weapons and ammunition, they have standing orders to physically pass the weapons to the NPF: either to local NPF units, or to the NPF's Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit in the case of explosive items such as grenades. Explosive items in practice are also sometimes passed to the NA for handling and storage by their EOD personnel.⁶⁴ NPF units in turn report seizures to the Armament Department at NPF HQ, and record details of the seized weapons in their own armoury's records.⁶⁵ The Armament Department, in theory, also passes the information to the NPF's Criminal Investigation Department (CID) (Figure 10).

**Figure 10. Processing of seized and captured weapons
(physical custody and information flow)**



⁶⁴ BICC/CAR interviews, Nigerian Army 72 Battalion armament personnel and NASME personnel, Makurdi, 8 October 2016.

⁶⁵ This procedure is set out in NPF, Force Order 87, which covers arms and ammunition coming into the possession of the Police.

In theory, such weapons are considered under criminal investigation until they are attributed to a lawful user, either civilian or military. If no such user is identified, they are sometimes reintegrated into security forces stocks, but only with the authorization of the IGP. Police or army EOD may dispose of explosive items, likewise with the authorization of the IGP.

The assessment team was unable to verify the extent to which this practice is followed. Some security agencies' armouries at state-command level contain seized hunting rifles or artisanal weapons which have not yet been passed to the NPF.⁶⁶

Exact figures for weapons recovered by all security agencies are not available,⁶⁷ but Nigeria's 2016 report to the UNPOA provides a snapshot of weapons recovered by the NPF alone from January to August 2015 (Table 8).

Table 8. weapons and ammunition recovered by NPF, 1 January–24 August 2015⁶⁸

Weapon/ammunition type	Quantity
Locally made gun	1,791
Rifles	475
Pistols	196
Pump action	241
Cartridges	22,665
Ammunition	19,696

An entirely separate procedure is followed for weapons seized by the armed forces or in joint security agency operations, which are coordinated by DHQ and ONSA. It is not known how these weapons are processed nor how/whether they are documented and traced.

4.6.2.1. Documentation and tracing

Tracing illicit weapons either domestically or internationally is essential not only to establish the facts of the criminal activities leading to a weapon's diversion to the illicit sphere, but also to identify and prevent future diversion or trafficking. The NPF CID is responsible for sending messages to the HQ armament offices of other security agencies to verify whether a seized or found weapon originated from a Nigerian security agency's stocks—a procedure which would be accelerated and facilitated by a national level SALW database (see section 4.5 "Recordkeeping"). The International Criminal Police Organization

⁶⁶ BICC/CAR examination of armoury practices, various dates, October 2016; presentation by MAG at UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM Consultations, Abuja, 15 November 2016.

⁶⁷ Government of Nigeria, 2016 report to UNPOA, 2016, www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2016@146@2016%20-%20PoA%20-%20Nigeria%20-%20E.pdf.

⁶⁸ Government of Nigeria, 2016 report to UNPOA, 2016, www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2016@146@2016%20-%20PoA%20-%20Nigeria%20-%20E.pdf, p. 17

(INTERPOL) National Central Bureau also sits within NPF CID, and is responsible for using INTERPOL tools such as iArms to launch international tracing requests for illicit weapons. The assessment team was unable to verify the frequency or success rate of such tracing requests. In 2016, Nigeria reported to the UNPOA that it had never launched or received an international tracing request (though it is unclear whether this relates only to direct diplomatic tracing requests under the ITI rather than via INTERPOL) and had no record of tracing collaboration with INTERPOL.⁶⁹

INTERPOL's tracing tools are primarily related to stolen firearms and guns used in crimes rather than weapons seized in conflict. Conflict weapons tracing can also be done through diplomatic channels under the ITI. The DHQ's representative to PRESCOM is the designated point of contact for the ITI. It has never received a tracing request from another country.

4.6.3. Opportunities for enhancement

The procedures for physically processing seized and captured weapons seem to be harmonized across all security forces, though as noted in section 4.6.2, they vary between civilian security agencies and military operations. Opportunities exist for better utilizing the information gathered from these weapons.

The "recovered weapons" statistics cited in Table 8 (assuming that all rifles and pump-action shotguns not classified as "locally made" are factory-made) suggest that up to a quarter of seized or recovered weapons—several hundred weapons a year—may be technically traceable either internally or internationally. The apparent lack of usage of either diplomatic/ITI or INTERPOL channels to trace such weapons suggests that much valuable information and criminal intelligence may be unused or in some cases, lost. Successful tracing depends, critically, on correct protocols for the documentation of weapons so that they can be correctly identified and the right information transmitted to tracing counterparts—misidentification or incomplete documentation being one of the primary reasons for the failure of tracing requests.

PSSM training under the aegis of PRESCOM/MAG in 2016 included a basic weapons identification component. However, it has not yet specifically covered documentation of weapons for the purposes of weapons tracing. Security agencies might also benefit from simple, standardized forms or simple protocols for documenting weapons to ITI or INTERPOL standards, particularly since at present such weapons remain in unit or area-command level custody and are not physically passed to CID for documentation. Thus, they rely on personnel at unit or area-command level to document the weapons accurately and pass sufficient information to CID. Similar simple reporting/documentation forms are currently being instituted, with the assistance of international partners, for security forces' documentation of improvised explosive devices.

⁶⁹ Government of Nigeria, 2016 report to UNPOA, 2016, www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2016@146@2016%20-%20PoA%20-%20Nigeria%20-%20E.pdf.

4.6.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) develop written SOPs for identification and recordkeeping of captured and seized weapons for all relevant security agencies;
- 2) conduct training on identification and recordkeeping of weapons for all relevant security agencies;
- 3) establish standard data collection criteria for captured/seized weapons across all relevant security agencies;
- 4) utilize additional facilities for international tracing of captured and seized weapons, including ITI;
- 5) conduct training on international tracing, with a particular focus on providing adequate information and correct identification; and
- 6) centralize documentation of captured and seized weapons.

4.7. Physical security and stockpile management

4.7.1. General

PSSM is the set of practices to ensure (1) the safety and control of ammunition in order to prevent unplanned explosions at munitions sites (UEMS), and (2) the secure and accountable storage of arms and ammunition in order to prevent diversion from government and other stocks to unauthorized users.

PSSM is a wide field which encompasses:

- adequate physical storage infrastructure;
- improvements in stockpile management and accounting—ranging from protocols governing the access of personnel to stocks, through to the physical separation and storage quantity limits of different types of explosive materiel.

4.7.2. Current status

A full survey of PSSM policies, procedures and infrastructure in Nigeria is beyond the scope of this report and indeed such a survey, with the participation of all security agencies, would be a prerequisite for coordinated PSSM action in Nigeria. It is, however, clear that PSSM needs have increased over the last 10–15 years as increasing numbers of Nigerian security agencies have been armed. More recently-armed agencies (NIS, NSCDC, NCS, NPS) have taken on significant weapon and ammunition stocks—at least of small arms and of non-explosive 1.4S small arms ammunition—without pre-existing dedicated storage facilities, and without an internal history of stockpile management protocols or procedures. They have primarily adopted police and army PSSM standards and procedures, having also received some armourer training from these agencies (and weapons from

police and armed forces stocks).⁷⁰ As the examples in sections 4.1 and 5.1 indicate, these agencies have also relied on the initiative of HQ level and area-command level armourers for audit procedures and recordkeeping standards, which has led to differences in weapons accounting and recordkeeping practices.⁷¹

It is possible that the number of armed personnel may continue to expand. In November 2016, for instance, the Federal Minister of Aviation told journalists that Aviation Security (AVSEC) personnel under the Federal Airports Authority, previously responsible for baggage screening and airport security duties and intended to be increased to some 2,000 personnel, may eventually carry firearms, though the proportion of AVSEC personnel to be armed remains unclear.⁷²

4.7.2.1. Physical infrastructure

While the assessment team did not observe the physical condition of armouries and depots used by the armed forces and police during the consultations, it did obtain findings from armoury inspections conducted by MAG, BICC and CAR representatives in 2016.

Based on this information, it appears as if some of the more recently-armed security agencies lack dedicated armouries/depots, even at HQ level:

- The NSCDC, most of whose nearly 60,000 personnel have been authorized to carry firearms only since 2011, has no dedicated armoury at HQ level. One has been under construction since 2014 at the NSCDC training academy at Sauka, near Abuja (see Box 1). However, it remains partially flooded and unfit for purpose. Many NSCDC area commands are using repurposed money safes and strong rooms to store weapons and ammunition which are, in the cases examined in Makurdi and Kaduna, adequately secured from external attack but lacking secured weapons racks and dedicated ammunition storage.
- The Prisons Service also lacks standard armouries below HQ level, although, in addition to its own weapons and ammunition, it also stores ammunition for other security agencies' area level commands, including NIS, due to the perceived security of prison facilities.⁷³

The physical security standards of NIS and NSCDC armouries at HQ and state-command level examined by BICC and MAG may not be aligned with ISACS/IATG specifications but

⁷⁰ For instance, the Immigration Service, armed since 2012, is equipped primarily with surplus G3 rifles from Nigerian Army stocks; the NSCDC, armed since 2011 and with a far larger number of armed personnel, received its first stocks of AK-pattern and G3-pattern weapons from army surplus stocks and from weapons newly procured through the Nigerian Army.

⁷¹ Comments by participants in UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 14–18 November 2016.

⁷² Comments of Senator Hadi Sirika at stakeholders meeting, Lagos, reported in "Arming Aviation Security with Guns", *This Day (Nigeria)*, 18 November 2016, www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2016/11/18/arming-aviation-security-with-guns/.

⁷³ BICC/CAR interviews and armoury inspection, NIS state command HQ, Kaduna, 12 October 2016; comments by participants in UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM Consultations, Abuja, 14–18 November 2016.

they were adequate to prevent looting other than via armed attack, due to the resourceful adaption of existing facilities and 24-hour guards.⁷⁴ Across all security agencies, however, physical security infrastructure is reportedly much less effective below state command level, with weapons and ammunition generally kept in non-specialized storage rooms in small, poorly secured posts, and, in the case of NIS, NPF, NCS and NSCDC, often managed by non-specialist staff.⁷⁵ This anecdotal assessment is supported by an official NPF HQ assessment of PSSM weaknesses;⁷⁶ and by reports of weapons thefts which (with the exception of large-scale pillaging of army stocks in the north-east) generally involve lower level police posts or border posts.⁷⁷

Thus far, remedial actions have tended to concentrate on physically removing arms and ammunition from these unit level facilities—at the expense of operational readiness—rather than on improving physical infrastructure or security procedures. For instance:

- ammunition has been removed from the NSCDC depot at Sauka to NSCDC HQ in Abuja while a dedicated armoury is under construction;
- ammunition has been removed from Kaduna State NIS (temporarily housed in state government buildings) to the NPS armoury inside Kaduna prison;
- since the rise of the Boko Haram threat, weapon racks have been removed from some NPF posts (under the force-wide slogan, “If you don’t need it, store it”) and weapons placed in division HQ unless they are needed in operations.

4.7.2.2. Policies and SOPs

The increase of armed security agencies has resulted in PSSM practices developing within those agencies without initial reference to standard PSSM policies or SOPs. Both policies

⁷⁴ All three were within larger well-guarded compounds with at least two rings of perimeter barriers; those at state level were either in 24 hour-guarded rooms (Makurdi NIS) or in fortified storage facilities originally designed for local government cash storage (Makurdi NSCDC and Kaduna NSCDC). All had at least some form of “anti-burglary” ironwork or reinforcement, and multiple locks.

⁷⁵ BICC/CAR interviews with NSCDC, NIS, NCS and NPF staff, Abuja, Kaduna and Makurdi, various dates, 2016.

⁷⁶ NPF written briefing to IGP on PSSM strengths/weaknesses, October 2016: *“At these [state command] levels it can be safely adduced that the physical security and stockpile management of arms and ammunition on charge the Force may not meet with international best practices but they are relatively safe and secured. While most commands/Formations and Institution armouries are well guarded and secured, same cannot be said of those for Division/Stations located in the outskirts of the town or within the township but not fenced without standard armouries or those located along major roads have been vulnerable to attacks by criminal elements. Therefore, the source of most arms and ammunition loss to hoodlums, armed militants and Boko Haram have largely come from the above.”*

⁷⁷ For instance, the attack on the Police post in the Igumale area of Ado LGA, Benue State, on 3 October 2016; or the NCS Madagali border post which was reportedly overrun in Borno State in 2013 (BICC/CAR interview with NCS armament staff, Abuja, 4 October 2016). The assessment team was not able to obtain weapon theft/loss statistics for individual security forces. In theory, all forces maintain centralized lost weapons registers with reports received at HQ level, but in practice lost weapons reporting is consolidated at state or divisional command level in most services (see section 5 on weapons accounting).

and practices have subsequently been borrowed, primarily from the armed forces and police, some of which have themselves not been updated since colonial-era force orders.⁷⁸

**Box 1. The need for policies and SOPs prior to PSSM interventions
at the new NSCDC central armoury, Sauka**

The NSCDC is a nearly 60,000-strong paramilitary agency under the Ministry of Interior. Though it has a core disaster management mandate, its personnel increasingly take part in paramilitary and internal security operations from destroying illegal oil refineries to countering violent protests.⁷⁹ Since 2011, a large proportion of NSCDC personnel have been armed (primarily with Avtomat Kalashnikova (AK)-pattern and G3-pattern assault rifles).

A four-person HQ armoury team receives arms and ammunition centrally in Abuja from the Nigerian armed forces, which are then distributed to state level armouries at all 36 state commands. At present, NSCDC arms received from the army are stored prior to distribution in a temporary armoury within a secured area of an office building at the NSCDC Academy at Sauka, near Abuja airport. Ammunition is provisionally stored at the NSCDC HQ in central Abuja. A new dedicated armoury is under construction at Sauka which will eventually serve as the central NSCDC depot for both arms and ammunition.

The new armoury has been under construction for two years, but its use has been delayed by serious structural problems, including flooding of the intended arms and ammunition storage rooms, which were built below ground level. While the physical security of the facility from attack/looting is likely to be adequate (behind a class-three perimeter wall within a secure, patrolled compound), the layout and physical fabric includes key design deficiencies which potentially undermine access security, including:

- large unsecured ventilation openings;⁸⁰
- unsecured water courses and electricity pylons both inside the site and around its perimeter;⁸¹

The flooding risk is worsened by the construction of arms and ammunition storage bunkers below ground level, which was done in order to accommodate a firing range on the ground floor—itself a non-standard facility to construct in the same building as a dedicated central armoury/depot (see photograph). The presence of live-firing exercises by numerous visiting personnel within the armoury building may make it difficult for the armoury

⁷⁸ Comments by participants at UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM Consultations, 16 November 2016.

⁷⁹ BICC/CAR interview with NSCDC Commandant-General, Abuja, 12 October 2016; BICC/CAR interviews with NSCDC staff, Kaduna, 13 October 2016.

⁸⁰ Contrary to UNCASA, *International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 05:20 (Stockpile Management: Weapons)*, UNCASA, 2012, section 9.9.3.

⁸¹ UNCASA, *International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 05:20 (Stockpile Management: Weapons)*, UNCASA, 2012, section 9.10.1.7.

managers to impose adequate physical access controls. In addition, such exercises mean that there are significant numbers of weapons, equipped with magazines and in use, in the same building as the NSCDC's central ammunition depot.



© BICC/CAR, 12 October 2016. *Used with permission.*

The site shown below is some 80m from a sports hall regularly used by children, which may not pose a substantial UEMS threat if the storage facility is only used for hazard category 1.4S non-explosive small arms ammunition, but it does leave little leeway to safely store explosive materiel (either proprietary or captured) if a future need arises.⁸² Though the NSCDC Academy is fairly isolated compared to major NA depots in Lagos or Kaduna, for example, in the event explosives are stored at Sauka, it would still be challenging to safeguard/prevent encroachment due to the presence of a large informal settlement some 200m east of the new NSCDC armoury's chosen location.

⁸² Without knowing the inventory and planned contents of the armoury it is not possible to calculate likely Quantity-Distances, a distance to an inhabited building of 80 m should preclude the storage of explosive quantities greater than around 40 kg (hazard division 1.21), 687 kg (hazard division 1.22), 1953 kg (hazard division 1.31/1.32). Source: UNODA, "Create an Explosives Limit Licence", n.d., <https://www.un.org/disarmament/un-safeguard/explosives-limit-license/>. See also siting prescriptions in UNODA, IATG 02.20 (*Quantity and separation distances*), UNODA, 2015; and UNODA, IATG 04.10 (*Planning and siting of explosives facilities*), UNODA, 2015, section 4.2.

Figure 11. Location of NSCDC armoury, Sauka



Source: map data copyleft from Google and imagery from DigitalGlobal, modified by author.

This example shows how inadequacies in standards and SOPs may frustrate efforts to ensure that the full benefits are obtained from both training and physical armoury rehabilitation of the kind being undertaken as a priority activity by PRESCOM. Even with well-trained armoury personnel, without physical remedial action, these “designed-in” limitations in a brand-new facility may hinder those personnel from introducing (i) an adequate security plan, (ii) access controls and (iii) stockpile security practices to international standards. Agency-wide or nationwide standards/SOPs for armoury construction and stockpile management could avoid such impediments to putting PSSM training into practice and benefiting from new infrastructure.⁸³

The assessment team surveyed representatives of nine security agencies regarding the existence in their respective agency of formal PSSM policies and SOPs recommended in the IATG and ISACS (Table 9). As this table shows, the existence and awareness of PSSM policies and SOPs varies across agencies, with only the representatives from the armed forces and police referring to a full set of the policies and SOPs listed in the questionnaire. It is important to note that some of this variation could be accounted for by differing equipment levels, with agencies limited to 1.4S small-calibre ammunition generally lacking or being unaware of policies and protocols on managing explosives and ammunition. As

⁸³ This example is not intended as a full armoury risk assessment.

Box 1 suggests, through the example of the new NSCDC central armoury, where security agency representatives have stated that standards and SOPs exist to international standards, these may not be reflected consistently even in new infrastructure and HQ level PSSM practices.

Table 9. Responses to a questionnaire on formal PSSM policies and operating procedures (weapons)

		SECURITY AGENCY								
	Basis in International standards	NSCDC	NPS	NIA	NCS	DHQ (including NA, NAF, NN)	NIS	DSS	NPF	DIA
Written security regulations	<i>ISACS 05.20 Clause 9.4</i>	X	X ⁸⁴	X ⁸⁵	X	X	X	X	X	X
Storage facility risk assessment	<i>ISACS 05.20 Clause 8</i>	X		X		X	X	X	X	X
Standard template for armoury security plan	<i>ISACS 05.20 Clause 9.6</i>	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Standardized plan for the construction of new armouries	<i>Should reflect standards in ISACS 05.20 clauses 9.8, 9.9 and 10</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Force order or manual for assessing and auditing stockpiles	<i>Should reflect standards in ISACS 05.20 and IATG 06.70</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X
Standard procedures for weapons transport	<i>ISACS 05.20 clause 13 IATG 08.10</i>	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X

N.B. The assessment team was unable to verify these PSSM policies and SOPs, nor compare their provisions to the IATG, ISACS standards and/or minimum weapons management/storage standards required of ECOWAS Member States under Article 16 of the ECOWAS Convention.

4.7.2.3. Ammunition and explosive safety

The most lethal unplanned munitions explosion ever recorded in the world occurred in Nigeria at the Ikeja cantonment in Lagos on 27 January 2002. It killed at least 1,000 people and displaced over 20,000 others.⁸⁶ Many of the participants in the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations evoked this event, which has coloured Nigerian security

⁸⁴ Described in the questionnaire as “Custody of Arms and Ammunition regulations”.

⁸⁵ Described in the questionnaire as “Rules and regulations for the use of firearms”.

⁸⁶ UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team (UNDAC), *UNDAC Mission to Lagos, Nigeria, 31 January–7 February 2002. Report*, UNDAC, 2002.

agencies' perception of the importance of ammunition and explosive stockpile safety ever since.

The assessment team and MAG have not verified ammunition/explosive safety conditions and procedures within army, air force nor navy stocks—those most likely to contain significant quantities of explosive materials. Other security agencies may also have explosive items in their stocks, either permanently or temporarily: for instance, NSCDC and NPF maintain SWAT teams equipped with grenades and less-lethal explosive items; and personnel from several civilian security agencies have been involved in collecting and temporarily storing explosive items in weapons amnesty/collection programmes (see section 4.8.2) before handing them over to the NA for safe storage and destruction.

The siting of explosive storage facilities within or close to large population areas, and the encroachment of informal settlements into clear areas around explosive storage facilities, was a major contributing factor to the high casualties at Ikeja in 2002.⁸⁷ Systems of “safeguarding” to prevent the proximity of civilian settlements, and in particular vulnerable buildings and facilities, are politically, as well as logistically, challenging with several participants to the national WAM consultations citing ongoing disputes over access to land and roads between civilian populations and security agencies.

As Table 10 indicates, awareness of explosive storage safety techniques varies across different security agencies, particularly regarding explosives licensing to establish safe limits to quantities of explosive materiel stored in a given facility, the use of compatibility groups and hazard codes to separate dangerously incompatible explosives types, and the calculation of quantity distances to establish safe storage distances between explosives stocks and civilian infrastructure. In practice, the assessment team and MAG have not yet verified the compatibility of any application of these principles with international standards in practice in Nigeria, largely due to the fact that access to armed forces' storage facilities are restricted. In addition, as noted under the recordkeeping pillar (section 4.5), the assessment team was unable to verify within any security agency the practice of managing ammunition stocks by lot or batch number in order to identify faulty or unsafe lots and batches. The armed forces state that lotting and batching is used in their ammunition management systems.

⁸⁷ UNDAC, *UNDAC Mission to Lagos, Nigeria, 31 January – 7 February 2002. Report*, UNDAC, 2002.

Table 10. Responses to a questionnaire on formal PSSM policies and operating procedures (ammunition)

	Basis in international standards	NSCDC	NPS	NIA	NCS	DHQ (including NA, NAF, NN)	NIS	DSS	NPF	DIA
Use of explosive limits licences for all ammunition storage facilities	IATG 02.30	X		X	X				X	
External and internal safety distances established	IATG 02.20	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	
System to safeguard external danger areas	IATG 02.40	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	
Compatibility groups used to determine safe mixing of ammunition types	IATG 01.50	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Hazard division markings used	IATG 01.50	X			X	X	X		X	
Ammunition and explosives regulations	Should reflect standards in IATG 02-11				X	X		X	X	
Designated ammunition management authority with written roles and responsibilities	IATG 03.10 Clause 9	X			X	X			X	
Ammunition management policy	IATG 01.30 Clause 9.2 IATG 03.10 Clause 6.2.4 / Annex III	X	X		X	X	X		X	
Written risk assessments	IATG 02.10 Clause 7	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

4.7.2.4 PSSM training and capacity-building

National actors during the WAM consultations noted that Nigeria's domestic security training institutions deliver some PSSM-relevant training, though the assessment team was unable to verify any of their content or curricula nor to compare them to international standards. The list in Box 2 presents various existing training institutions and structures related to PSSM in Nigeria.

Box 2. Existing security training institutions and structures relevant to PSSM (non-exhaustive)

(I) Domestic institutions with existing PSSM-relevant course content

- The Army Ordnance Corps School in Lagos provides stockpile management training to the NA.
- DICON in Kaduna trains armourers from NCS and NSCDC, though it is unclear if this course includes weapons/ammunition accounting beyond stock management.
- The Army Infantry Corps Centre (Jaji) has also trained other NCS and NIS armourers.

Several armed forces institutions also have personnel trained in EOD and weapons destruction, particularly:

- The NASME in Makurdi;
- The initial armament officers course run at NAF Kaduna; and
- Central Army Depots in Enugu (where much of the weaponry collected in the Niger Delta has been destroyed) and Kaduna.

Military engineering personnel from NASME and the Army Ordnance Corps have also received more advanced PSSM-relevant training at Cranfield University in the United Kingdom.⁸⁸

(II) Domestic institutions providing basic training in weapons handling and accounting training but no dedicated PSSM content

All agencies' initial/basic training includes some training in weapons and ammunition handling, some of which includes basic weapons and ammunition accounting procedures with which personnel must be familiar (for instance, store issue and receipt vouchers for individual weapons and ammunition rounds). These include the NPF's "Care and Custody of Arms and Ammunition" course, NSCDC firearms handling courses and a range of NA and NAF weapons handling courses, at:

- the central NSCDC Academy at Sauka, Abuja;
- NSCDC School of Security Management in Aeokuto;
- NSCDC College of Peace and Security in Katsina;
- NCS basic training schools in Lagos, Kano and Abuja; and
- NIS Training School Kano and NIS Staff College, Sokoto.

Basic training for agencies with an investigative function (particularly NPF and NCS) also include training for basic incident reporting. For instance, all NPF personnel receive basic training on compiling a case file, which is currently the system used to report lost and seized weapons (Pillar VI) at:

⁸⁸ Comments by participants in round-table with armed forces representatives during UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM Consultations, Abuja, 17 October 2016.

- the Police Colleges at Kaduna, Lagos, Enugu and Maiduguri;
- the Police Staff College in Jos;
- the Police Academy in Kano; and
- the Detective College in Enugu.

International donors are currently using NPF and NA training institutions to deliver training in C-IED documentation.⁸⁹ Similar training to report and document illicit weapons to ISACS standards could be envisaged.

(III) Permanent or semi-permanent international training programmes relevant to PSSM

The longest-running permanent security assistance structure in Nigeria is the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) established during the 1970s. It has dramatically increased in size and budget since 2014.⁹⁰ Focused primarily on the NA, though with some role in prison security training as well, the BMATT has in the last two years undertaken some out-of-country training for quartermasters and logisticians as well as training 3–4 armourers on weapons repairs at Jaji and Buniyadi. On request, they can offer standard “off-the-shelf” British defence engagement “training packs” on magazine and weapons management. It is not known whether this training is ISACS/IATG compliant.

Several US security agencies, including the US Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), also have significant security training assistance in Nigeria focused on the NA (counter-terrorism) and NCS/NPF (drugs and trafficking interdiction). NA assistance tends to be focused on battalion level mentoring in the north-east and the Army School of Infantry training in Jaji. At the time of this report’s drafting, there was no specific PSSM component to this training.⁹¹

4.7.3. Opportunities for enhancement

In partnership with BICC and MAG, PSSM has been a major focus of PRESCOM’s operational work in 2016. PRESCOM/BICC/MAG have focused on three sub-areas:

- **Permanent physical infrastructure:** the ad hoc rehabilitation of some security agencies’ armouries at HQ and area-command level, beginning with NSCDC and NIS armouries;
- **Temporary physical infrastructure:** the provision of temporary containerized storage facilities for weapons collected during state level amnesties (see section 4.8, “Weapon collections”);

⁸⁹ BICC/CAR interview with European security assistance programme staff, Abuja, 8 October 2016.

⁹⁰ BMATT’s annual budget has risen from £1.3 m to £7 m, and its permanent staff from 2 to 15 people. It also near-continuously hosts temporary training teams of 2 to 48 staff. BICC/CAR interview with BMATT Land Forces Training staff, Abuja, 11 October 2016.

⁹¹ BICC/CAR interview with pol-mil liaison staff, US embassy, Abuja, 11 October 2016.

- **Training:** short (1-week) introductory training courses for armourers, armoury managers and mid-level officers on principles and practices of PSSM in Abuja, Makurdi (Benue State), Kaduna (Kaduna State) and Owerri (Imo State).⁹² This training and capacity-building has involved trainees from all security agencies represented in the PRESCOM.

4.7.3.1. Physical infrastructure

So far, PRESCOM/MAG have rehabilitated armouries and provided temporary storage facilities in response to security agency requests and contingent permissions to access storage facilities for risk assessment. In particular, PRESCOM/MAG have not yet accessed armed forces' storage facilities for risk assessments. A comprehensive nationwide assessment of all security agencies' stockpile facilities would allow resources to be better targeted on areas and facilities with the greatest need and vulnerability. Some of these high-risk facilities could benefit immediately from low-cost high-impact interventions of the kind identified in the IATG under Risk Reduction Process Level 1.⁹³

4.7.3.2. Training

PRESCOM-facilitated training is currently taking place outside existing Nigerian security training structures and institutions. The latter are comparatively well-resourced (particularly those of the armed forces) in comparison to some other countries in the region. WAM consultation participants noted that some of these existing domestic institutions and structures (see section 4.7.2.4) could be used to expand externally-funded PSSM training interventions to encompass the very large numbers of security forces personnel which lack any PSSM training, assuming such institutions' training courses and curricula could be validated against international PSSM standards. PSSM personnel already trained in these institutions and externally (for instance, at Cranfield University) could also act as trainers both domestically and internationally. PRESCOM/BICC also intend to focus training and sensitization efforts in 2017 on mid-level officers.

4.7.3.3. Policies and SOPs

As Box 1 above shows, policies and SOPs are a necessary precursor to improving both PSSM practices through training and PSSM infrastructure. Validating existing policies and SOPs in line with international standards and instruments is a key task, as is building on existing best practices within some Nigerian security agencies to harmonize PSSM policies and SOPs across the more recently armed security agencies.

A legislative project to repeal and update the 1967 Explosives Regulations has been before the National Assembly since 2009, and last came before the House of Representatives in October 2016.⁹⁴ Updated regulations for explosives storage and management are

⁹² PRESCOM, MAG and BICC presentations to UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM Consultations, Abuja, 15 November 2017.

⁹³ UNODA, *IATG 01:20, Index of risk reduction process levels (RRPL) within IATG*, UNODA, 2015.

⁹⁴ House of Representatives, *Order Paper, Monday 10 October 2016 – Friday 14 October 2016*, Nigerian House of Representatives, 2016, <http://placng.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/NOTICE-PAPER-10-14-October-2016.pdf>.

envisaged under this updated legislation,⁹⁵ but have not yet been elaborated. Moreover, neither the 1967 Explosives Act and Regulations, nor the new bill, contain provisions specific to ammunition and military explosives and do not specify whether they are to be applied to ammunition and explosives under the custody of the security agencies nor whether security agencies are to be exempted (as under the Firearms Act). This legislative project is therefore unlikely to replace the need for security agencies to promulgate and harmonize their own ammunition safety and security policies and SOPs.

4.7.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) develop a PSSM prioritization plan on storage facilities, armouries and depots, and on refurbishment as well as training courses, based on a nationwide assessment;
- 2) sensitize national authorities (high level and policy level) on their responsibility for risks related to arms, ammunition and explosives in storage;
- 3) utilize interagency TWGs to coordinate and oversee development of PSSM policies and SOPs, and the implementation of PSSM related activities;
- 4) conduct periodic reviews (through TWGs) of existing training curricula and harmonize training provision across relevant security agencies, including ISACS/IATG;
- 5) design training-of-trainers programmes on PSSM for trained personnel across all security agencies;
- 6) establish a roster of trained national experts on PSSM and make the list available based on need to all security agencies; and
- 7) where applicable, develop assistance proposals to strengthen the physical infrastructure of arms/ammunition storage at state and local levels for all security agencies in need of improved storage capacity.

4.8. Weapon collections

4.8.1. General

The voluntary disarmament of armed groups and civilians, and the collection of their weapons and ammunition, is the central activity through which existing stocks of illicit or unwanted weapons are removed from circulation.

Since 2004, Nigeria has undertaken some of the longest-running voluntary disarmament/weapons collection programmes in West Africa. In 2009, the Nigerian government established the Niger Delta Amnesty Programme (NDAP), intended as a fundamental shift in the federal government's approach to Niger Delta instability by

⁹⁵ *Explosives Act (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill (SB. 265)*, 2009, <http://nass.gov.ng/document/download/1163>.

offering around 30,000 militants a presidential pardon, stipends and training in return for disarmament.⁹⁶ Weapons amnesty programmes broadly following the NDAP pattern have proliferated at state level outside the Delta region.

4.8.2. Current status

There are currently amnesty/weapons collection efforts ongoing or envisaged at three levels:

- The NDAP completed its third (and anticipated final) round of weapons collection in February 2016. However, renewed Delta violence during 2015–2016 has led to the NDAP programme as a whole being extended for another two years until January 2018. PRESCOM has stated plans to support the voluntary disarmament and reintegration of 400 armed individuals in the Niger Delta during 2017–2018.⁹⁷
- State level disarmament committees constituted by state governors have initiated state-wide amnesties linked to weapons collections in Benue State, Imo State and Rivers State during 2016; and similar committees have begun preparations in Kaduna State and Delta State.⁹⁸
- In addition, UNDP and PRESCOM are supporting community sensitization activities in five states (Kaduna, Kebbi, Zamfara, Cross River and Akwa Ibom States) under a European Union (EU)-ECOWAS project, the Nigerian component of which was launched in 2017.⁹⁹

The latter two (state level) initiatives are not federally funded nor fully coordinated with federal authorities,¹⁰⁰ but they are becoming a reality on the ground and are generating real WAM needs which must be managed. In several states, security authorities also intend such amnesties to be a prelude to stepping up forcible weapons seizures which will add to the numbers being seized in security operations in the north-east.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ Comments by security agency participants in UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM Consultations, Abuja, 16 November 2016; B.A. Okonofua, "The Niger Delta Amnesty Program: the challenges of transitioning from peace settlements to long-term peace", *Sage Open*, April–June 2016, pp. 1–16, <http://sgo.sagepub.com/content/spsgo/6/2/2158244016654522.full.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Comments by participants at UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM Consultations, Abuja, 17 November 2016.


⁹⁸ BICC/CAR interviews, Kaduna State security authorities, Kaduna, 12–13 October 2016; BICC/CAR interview, officials from Office of the Special Adviser to the President on the Niger Delta, Abuja, 5 October 2016.

⁹⁹ Presentation by UNDP representative to UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 15 November 2016.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, comments by the Federal Minister of Delta Affairs reported in "Niger Delta Minister berates governors over amnesty for militants", *The Nation*, 4 November 2016, <http://thenationonlineng.net/niger-delta-minister-berates-governors-amnesty-militants/>.

¹⁰¹ BICC/CAR interviews with Benue State and Kaduna State security authorities, Makurdi and Kaduna, 7–13 October 2016.

Figure 12. Planned and actual collection activities by state, as of November 2016



Source: map copyleft from Wikipedia, modified by author.

In contrast to weapons seized or recovered in security agency operations (see pillar 4.6, “Captured and seized weapons”) there is no legislation or national policy governing the processing of voluntarily collected weapons. The weapons collection initiative in Benue State since late 2015 (Box 3) exemplifies both the considerable initiative being shown by state staff, PRESCOM and its partners in the absence of national level policy and procedural guidance, as well as the needs these state level collection initiatives are generating. Such needs include, inter alia, capacity and training for explosive ordnance handling, weapons/ammunition accounting, secure storage and destruction.

Box 3. The Benue State weapons amnesty, 2016

Under a state-wide amnesty since January 2016, security forces have collected several hundred small arms and several thousand rounds of small arms ammunition, both from armed community members and alleged members of organized armed gangs, particularly those around Terwaze Akwaza.¹⁰²

Collection points have been staffed primarily by NSCDC personnel. Though they have a firearms handling course during basic training, none in Benue State were trained as ammunition technical officers or EOD officers. In several cases, personnel at collection points received hand grenades, at least one Protivotankoviy Granatomyot-7 round and artisanal explosives.¹⁰³ International collection standards mandate collection programmes that inform potential participants *not* to hand in such items at collection points but instead to report their locations to collection teams for removal by trained EOD experts.¹⁰⁴ Some of this explosive material was initially stored in NSCDC state command offices in the absence of dedicated facilities for storing them. It was subsequently placed under the custody of Army EOD personnel at NASME in Makurdi, and destroyed.

¹⁰² BICC/CAR interviews with Benue State security officials, Makurdi, 8 October 2016. Mr Akwaze himself surrendered weapons during the programme in return for amnesty, but in August 2016 the state government removed his amnesty and placed a bounty on his head. At the time of writing Mr Akwaze remains a fugitive. See governor's statement at www.benuestate.gov.ng/resources/news/the-stick-aspect-of-ortom%E2%80%99s-amnesty-program.html.

¹⁰³ BICC/CAR interview with NA EOD officer, NASME, Makurdi, 8 October 2016; BICC/CAR interview with technical manager, Mines Advisory Group, Makurdi, 8 October 2016.

¹⁰⁴ UNCASA, *International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 05.40 (Collection of Illicit and Unwanted Small Arms and Ammunition)*, UNCASA, 2012, sections 7.2 and 11.1.2.

Figure 13. AK-pattern, G3-pattern and SG542 assault rifles in secure container storage prior to destruction, Benue State House



© BICC/CAR, 9 October 2016. *Used with permission.*

The security of collected weapons and ammunition was greatly improved by the end of the process in Benue State by the provision of a dedicated secure container from PRESCOM/MAG (Figure 13) for storing the collected weapons next to the destruction site in the governor's compound. MAG also provided cutting equipment and training to support the destruction of collected weapons.

4.8.2.1. Processing and storage

Weapons collected previously under the NDAP were stored, mainly at 82 Division HQ in Enugu, and destroyed by the army primarily through burning and open-pit detonation. State level disarmament in Benue relied on ad hoc storage facilities provided at the State House, which were not suitable for the storage of explosive items. Only at the very end of the process (the week before destruction) were weapons moved to a dedicated secure container with chained weapon racks and ammunition lockers provided by PRESCOM/MAG.

4.8.2.2. Documentation and tracing

Individuals giving up weapons under NDAP were recorded biometrically to document their future entitlement to amnesty incentives and retraining, however it is unclear to what extent the weapons themselves were inventoried or documented. In the case of the Benue State amnesty in 2016, MAG inventoried the weapons and ammunition after they arrived

at the central storage site in the governor's residence in Makurdi, but the weapons and ammunition were not documented and inventoried at collection sites themselves. This absence of a full chain-of-custody record is understandable given the logistical and organizational challenges. However, it may have prevented the state government from responding fully to some media allegations of collected weapons being diverted or resold (for which there is no evidence); criticisms that amnesties were being offered for the provision of old unserviceable weapons while better weapons were retained within communities (despite evidence that some serviceable military weapons had been collected);¹⁰⁵ and unsubstantiated claims of inflated collection numbers from the state government's political critics.¹⁰⁶

No weapons collected in amnesties at the federal or state level have yet to be traced internationally.

4.8.2.3. Incentives and community relations

Nigeria has moved from monetary buy-back programme in 2004¹⁰⁷ to individual non-monetary incentives such as retraining (under the NDAP from 2009 onwards), through to weapons collection linked to community development projects, envisaged under the UNDP and state level amnesties in which PRESCOM is involved. A range of options for incentives (positive and negative) are currently under consideration by PRESCOM and UNDP for upcoming weapon collection programmes. In this regard, the assessment team recognized that PRESCOM may benefit from further specialized national consultations on this issue.

4.8.3. Opportunities for enhancement

4.8.3.1. Planning and standardization

The proliferation of state level weapons collection initiatives in 2016 and 2017 (see Figure 12) highlights common operational challenges and the need to harmonize planning and procedures for security service personnel in the areas of community relations, storage, documentation, tracing and disposal. While communities and weapons populations will be different in every place, some central oversight and development of SOPs will help with this harmonization.

4.8.3.2. Community relations and sensitization

Several of the WAM consultation participants noted the need to involve a wide range of stakeholders, including affected communities and community leaders, in designing and developing incentive-linked development projects even before the collection project commences. Such sensitization is envisaged for the planned EU-UNDP small arms

¹⁰⁵ "Niger Delta Minister berates governors over amnesty for militants", *The Nation*, 4 November 2016, <http://thenationonline.net/niger-delta-minister-berates-governors-amnesty-militants/>.

¹⁰⁶ "Gurgur Japhet rubbishes Ortom's exaggerated claims on amnesty", *Global Patriot*, 18 July 2016, <http://globalpatriotnews.com/gurgur-japhet-rubbishes-ortoms-exaggerated-claims-on-amnesty/>. State government officials have cited a figure of over 600 weapons collected; an aide speaking to media reportedly cited a lower figure of "over 400" in July, though more weapons may have been collected after this date. The central inventory taken by MAG in Makurdi comprises details of 519 individual weapons.

¹⁰⁷ Comments by participants in UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, 14–18 November 2016.

programmes in the northern states in 2017. At a wider level, several participants suggested that the Nigerian Orientation Agency—the government agency responsible for communicating government policy and activities—could be involved in sensitizing communities on small arms issues and the benefits of amnesties.

4.8.3.3. Storage

MAG has now produced several containerized mobile armouries, which it is making available to other states through PRESCOM. The provision for safe storage of ammunition and explosive items gathered, even inadvertently, during state level collection processes is a particularly urgent need (see Box 3).

4.8.3.4. Disposal

Participants at the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations discussed the merits of returning collected military weapons and/or their components to security agencies. However some felt that this would undermine community confidence in the collections and thereby reduce peoples' willingness to give up their weapons.

PRESCOM is also exploring partnerships with scrap metal companies to acquire firearm components after destruction, which may provide funding for future activities.

Training for destruction and use of destruction equipment is available from international partners and donors, and was, for example, provided by MAG to the Benue State collection/destruction in 2016.

As illustrated in Benue (Box 3), capacity for destroying ammunition or explosives is a particularly acute safety concern (international providers such as MAG do not currently have the capacity in Nigeria to destroy ammunition or explosives). In Benue State, the fortunate presence of the NASME in the state capital, Makurdi, allowed trained EOD personnel to collect and dispose of explosive items. Local EOD capacity should therefore be verified before collections commence.

4.8.3.5. Documentation/tracing

Taking inventories of weapons at the point of collection, and auditing this inventory through to the point of destruction, would allay community concerns and media accusations about diversion or inflation of weapons numbers.

Weapons collections also constitute a major potential source of information regarding the types, sources and supply routes of illicit arms and ammunition in Nigeria. Although many of the small arms collected under the Benue State amnesty during 2016 were formally untraceable craft-produced weapons, at least 14 per cent were both factory-produced by foreign manufacturers and technically traceable through domestic or international tracing mechanisms.¹⁰⁸ The various state level collection/amnesty exercises currently planned for 2017 can thus expect to gather at least several hundred such traceable weapons, and other traceable items such as grenades and munitions for light weapons. Weapons collected so far have included, for example, European-made assault rifles with serial

¹⁰⁸ CAR review of Benue State amnesty weapons inventory and physical inspection of weapons sample, Makurdi, 8 October 2016.

numbers semi-sequential to matching rifles seized from Boko Haram elsewhere in the Lake Chad Basin region in 2015.¹⁰⁹

Tracing weapons is permissible under international standards for weapon collections.¹¹⁰ It requires accurate documentation of precise weapons models, and full documentation of all weapons features and markings (see section 4.6, “Captured and seized weapons”), beyond the basic type/serial number inventories compiled in 2016 for state level disarmaments. Simple standardized weapons and ammunition documentation forms and basic documentation training would assist security personnel at collection points (see section 4.6).

The weapons collected in amnesties are not necessarily crime weapons, and may not necessarily all be traced through INTERPOL channels. The ITI point of contact within PRESCOM could be used to issue and manage tracing requests, instead.

4.8.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following actionable options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) establish and utilize interagency TWGs to oversee collection programmes, including drafting of its terms of reference (ToRs);
- 2) establish a national strategy for civil disarmament programmes in order to ensure that weapons collection has adequate planning and resources, and does not create a security vacuum or instability in the communities involved;
- 3) establish national guidelines on physical collection, documentation, storage and disposal of weapons and ammunition collected under amnesty programmes;
- 4) carry out a national mapping exercise to identify relevant actors at national, regional, state, and local levels that should be involved in the collection programme prior to implementation;
- 5) sensitize all relevant actors at all levels on the planning and implementation objectives and requirements of collection programmes;
- 6) conduct periodic sensitization and awareness programmes for all communities involved in a collection programme, including perception and distribution surveys;
- 7) draft guidelines, SOPs, and model data collection forms for the documentation of collected weapons and ammunition to ITI standard;
- 8) conduct domestic, and where relevant, international tracing of weapons recovered in collection programmes; and
- 9) integrate civil society and community safety, including community policing, into the planning of collection programmes for communities that have undertaken disarmament.

¹⁰⁹ “iTrace”, CAR, 2016, www.conflictarm.com.

¹¹⁰ UNCASA, *International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 05.40 (Collection of illicit and unwanted small arms and light weapons)*, UNCASA, 2012, section 11.3.5.

4.9. Artisanal weapons

4.9.1. General

The illegal manufacture of weapons, including craft production, contributes significantly to the availability, circulation and use of illicit weapons in many countries—but particularly in Nigeria. Of the firearms recovered by the NPF between January and August 2015, over 60 per cent were classified as “locally made”.¹¹¹ Likewise, 79 per cent of the weapons collected under the Benue State amnesty were craft-produced rather than factory-produced.¹¹² It is possible that this high proportion is due to more valuable factory-produced weapons being retained within communities, while less-valuable craft weapons are surrendered in amnesties. The wide variety and comparative sophistication of collected craft weapons nonetheless supports the view that they are prevalent and fairly widely used in armed and criminal violence in Nigeria.

The proportion of artisanally produced weapons made by Nigerians artisans is unclear, but anecdotal evidence suggests that Nigerian domestic craft production of weapons is widespread and sophisticated. WAM efforts must thus include either the prevention or regulation of such manufacture.

4.9.2. Current status

The unlicensed manufacture and repair of firearms is prohibited under the 1959 Firearms Act. According to the WAM consultation findings, PRESCOM is unaware of licences being granted to civilian gun makers.

The prevalence and distribution of craft firearms manufacture in Nigeria is clearly significant. However, concrete data remains scarce. The national survey planned by PRESCOM with international partners in 2017 intends to produce state-by-state data on artisanal firearms production. What is clear already from weapons collected during state level amnesties is that artisanal weapons in circulation in Nigeria include a wide range of single-shot pistols, semi-automatic pistols, revolvers, double-barrelled “pistols” designed for shotgun shells, single-shot hunting rifles and single-barrelled, break-action shotguns.¹¹³ Many are of sophisticated construction and designed to fire military ammunition including 7.62 x 39 mm (AK-pattern) rounds.¹¹⁴ In addition, weapons collected under the Benue State amnesty included a number of partly craft-modified Kalashnikov-pattern rifles built partly around artisanal parts and partly around factory Kalashnikov-pattern components.¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Government of Nigeria, *2016 report to UNPOA*, 2016, www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2016@146@2016%20-%20PoA%20-%20Nigeria%20-%20E.pdf, p. 17,

¹¹² By contrast, none of the ammunition gathered under the Benue State amnesty was craft-produced (artisanal ammunition is much more uncommon worldwide than artisanal firearms).

¹¹³ BICC/CAR examination of amnesty weapons, Makurdi, 8 October 2016.

¹¹⁴ BICC/CAR examination of amnesty weapons, Makurdi, 8 October 2016.

¹¹⁵ BICC/CAR examination of amnesty weapons, Makurdi, 8 October 2016.

4.9.3. Opportunities for enhancement

Participants at the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations agreed that a new strategy was required to address unauthorized firearms production which should be informed by the planned national survey. Participants at the WAM consultations extensively debated the merits and demerits of punitively enforcing the prohibition on unlicensed manufacture of firearms and/or bringing unlicensed manufacturers into a legal framework, perhaps through employing them at DICON. During the WAM consultations there was no immediate consensus on this question, which might benefit from further national level consultations.

4.9.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following options were identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) conduct further research on craft weapons distribution and production to develop counter policy; and
- 2) carry out consultations to develop a craft weapons conversion/counter-production policy, including methods to curb the illicit and unlicensed manufacturing of weapons.

4.10. Weapons and ammunition disposal

4.10.1. General

At the end of their lifecycle, surplus stocks or unwanted and obsolete arms and ammunition should be disposed of in order to reduce cost and risk associated with their storage; to mitigate safety risks to users; to prevent explosive risks in the case of obsolete or surplus ammunition; and to reduce the possibility of theft or diversion.

Disposal can cover (1) destruction, (2) transfer to another security agency (if still usable), or (3) sale or donation either internally or internationally (if still usable). After destruction, parts and components may still be recycled, or donated/sold as usable scrap.

Significantly, Nigeria lacks a clear regulation or policy across all security forces to provide guidance on how weapons and ammunition are to be identified for disposal, or what methods of disposal are to be used. International standards and guidelines (ISACS and IATG) recommend destruction as the preferred method of disposal in order to reduce the overall number of weapons available to find their way back onto the illicit market.¹¹⁶ The legally-binding ECOWAS Convention (Article 17) allows Member States to choose between

¹¹⁶ UNCASA, *International Small Arms Control Standard (ISACS) 05:50 (Destruction: Weapons)*, UNCASA, 2012, section 5; UNODA, *IATG 10.10 (Demilitarization and destruction of conventional ammunition)*, UNODA, 2015.

destruction or secure storage of surplus, obsolete, seized and collected SALW. However, it does not provide the option to sell on or donate such weapons.

4.10.2. Current status

4.10.2.1. Identifying surplus, obsolete or unusable weapons

During the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, only the armed forces and police indicated that they have or require comprehensive policies to identify surplus or obsolete weapons and ammunition. Authorization to dispose of such weapons is required from DHQ for the armed forces and the IGP for the police. Other agencies, many of which rely upon surplus weapons from the armed forces and police for their own weapons stocks in the first place, stated that they did not have any surplus or obsolete weapons.

Armourers at all levels and in all security agencies are responsible during inventory checks for identifying unusable weapons, which are then sent to HQ or DICON for repair. No entities reported destroying or otherwise disposing of unusable weapons except the NPS, which stated that several unusable Mk4 bolt-action rifles had been removed from its stocks subject to the authorization of the Controller-General of Prisons and following an inspection by a specially-constituted Board of Survey.

4.10.2.2. Destruction capacity and methods

The armed forces and the police have trained EOD and arms destruction personnel at force HQ level and within a range of armed forces units, including at central army depots in Lagos and Kaduna, at the central police depot at Obalende Lagos, at NASME in Makurdi, and at a number of NA division HQs. Most destruction of unusable or collected weapons and ammunition is conducted through burning or open-pit detonation.¹¹⁷ The assessment team was unable to verify provisions for destroying explosive ammunition or larger explosive munitions.

4.10.2.3. Other forms of disposal

There is no primary or secondary legislation governing the disposal of surplus, obsolete or unusable weapons which is subject to the authorization of the head of each security agency. In several cases the armed forces have donated surplus/obsolete weapons to more recently armed security agencies (for instance, G3-pattern rifles donated to NIS and NSCDC when the armed forces moved from 7.62 x 51 mm to 7.62 x 39 mm calibre). Participants at the WAM consultations were unaware of any international sale or donation of surplus or obsolete weapons or ammunition to other countries. Such retransfer might, in any case, violate original end-user agreements without the authorization of the original weapons supplying country (see section 4.3, “Transfer controls”).

4.10.3. Opportunities for enhancement

Security agencies did not express any needs for additional capacity to designate or dispose of surplus, obsolete or unusable weapons. However, it was clear that security services

¹¹⁷ Government of Nigeria, 2016 report to UNPOA, 2016, www.poa-iss.org/CASACountryProfile/PoANationalReports/2016@146@2016%20-%20PoA%20-%20Nigeria%20-%20E.pdf.

could benefit from national regulation, and strategic as well as operational guidance in managing surplus and obsolete weapons. Taking surplus or obsolete weapons out of state stocks might reduce the risk of theft or diversion, and would also reduce storage costs. Similarly, the 2002 Ikeja explosion powerfully underlined the need to systematically remove obsolete or unusable ammunition from state stocks. National level guidelines would assist with this task being carried out systematically across all agencies, including those more recently armed.

4.10.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following option was identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) develop national guidelines for surplus, obsolete, seized and collected arms and ammunition for destruction, domestic transfer or possible sale in line with national regulations on transfer control.

4.11. Border security/counter-smuggling

4.11.1. General

Effective controls to deter, detect and intercept illicit movements of SALW across borders involve elements of other WAM pillars, including national legislation (see section 4.1, “National legal framework”), inter-agency coordination (see section 4.2, “National coordinating mechanism”), the processing of seized weapons (see section 4.6, “Captured and seized weapons”), and the enforcement of arms transfer controls (see section 4.3, “Transfer controls”). Many participants at the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations saw the smuggling and trafficking of weapons and ammunition across the country’s long borders and through its seaports as being a significant contribution to the number of illicit weapons in Nigeria. Therefore, border security was exceptionally added as a standalone eleventh pillar in the course of the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations. Border security is a very large field in its own right, and the observations in section 4.11.2 only touch on the main themes relating to the interdiction of trafficked weapons.

4.11.2. Current status

4.11.2.1. Detecting smuggled weapons or ammunition

The NCS representatives to the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations stated that all cargoes moving across Nigeria’s land, sea and air borders are inspected. The assessment team was unable to confirm the modalities of this practice. NCS has also introduced scanners at airports and major seaports to scan containerized cargoes and luggage. Its customs software ASYCUDA++ also generates risk profiles to target inspections on particular cargoes, and manages advance notifications of e-manifests of cargoes at ports and airports. All shipments of arms and ammunition have to be pre-notified and inspected.

A major challenge is the adequacy of personnel to cover all of Nigeria’s long land borders. NCS representatives stated that there are around 100 officially approved land border

crossings manned by NCS and other security agency personnel, however there exists many more unofficial crossing points in practice particularly along Nigeria's long northern border with Niger and Chad, across which goods, people and cattle move in many places.

The NCS maintains intelligence personnel in all 31 of its commands to develop information and informants on smuggling.

4.11.2.2. Detection technology

NCS has introduced scanners at airports and major seaports to scan containerized cargoes and luggage, but not at most land border crossings. NCS also has an air patrol unit to detect unauthorized movements of people or vehicles, though its aircraft are currently not operational.¹¹⁸

4.11.2.3. Coordination

Border security relies upon adequate coordination, both operational and informational, externally between authorities on either side of a border, and internally between different security agencies responsible for crime control and the physical movement of goods and people. This is the principle behind modern Integrated Border Management.

Internally, liaison between Nigerian security agencies at its borders is both operational and informational. In the north, northeast and south-south, NCS undertakes joint operations with the armed forces, NIS and the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement Agency, the latter a significant agency which receives considerable donor support and technical assistance including from the US DEA. Like other seized and captured weapons (see section 4.6, "Captured and seized weapons"), border or smuggling seizures are handed over to the police. Reports are compiled by NCS personnel for CID on the circumstances of seizure, but without a specific reporting template for arms and ammunition behind the standard "Incident Report" template used for seizures of all types of smuggled goods. The assessment team was unable to establish whether NCS receives information back from the police on forensic examination or tracing of such weapons and ammunition, to inform its own interdiction and intelligence efforts.

Externally, the Strategic Research and International Relations Department of the NCS is responsible for the flow of information and operational coordination with its neighbours' border agencies, as well as with the World Customs Organization. Nigeria and Niger have in the past reportedly undertaken joint border operations to combat Boko Haram movements and trafficking. As early as 2002, Nigeria also reportedly discussed joint border patrols with Chad and Cameroon.¹¹⁹ The assessment team was unable to verify the extent or nature of such coordination, or whether it took place under formalized cooperation agreements or memorandums of understanding.

4.11.3. Opportunities for enhancement

The sheer size of Nigeria's borders poses a resource challenge for border security agencies. Identifying major unapproved crossing routes and converting them to approved routes so

¹¹⁸ Comments by participants to UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations, Abuja, 18 November 2016.

¹¹⁹ "Nigeria discusses joint border patrols with Chad, Cameroon", *IRIN News*, 13 May 2002.

that NCS and other security agency personnel can be deployed there would be a helpful step.

Interagency coordination takes place already in several regions, and could be enhanced through a national level interagency TWG on border security, particularly to share information, tactics and technologies. Participants also identified the need to review and identify emerging border control technologies, including, in particular, remote sensing, and enhanced scanning at border crossing points. Participants also noted the importance of information sharing among the security services, in particular of those weapons that have been seized at border crossing points.

Technological fixes will not solve all border control problems. Not every item and individual that crosses a border can be screened or scanned; therefore technology cannot be a replacement for adequate risk profiling of cargoes and crossings to prioritize physical inspections or scanning. It also cannot replace the consensual policing of borders with the help of the communities which live there, whose information and cooperation can supplant inadequacies of manpower and technology. Sensitization of border communities on the risks and dangers of SALW trafficking is planned under the UNDP/PRESCOM SALW programming in six northern states in 2017, beginning in Sokoto and Katsina. Such confidence-building and sensitization could be expanded and elaborated with the assistance of the national Border Communities Development Agency (BCDA).

4.11.4. Options for consideration by the Government of Nigeria

In moving forward, the following option was identified for consideration by the Nigerian Government:

- 1) utilize interagency TWGs to improve cooperation, coordination and information sharing on counter trafficking of SALW across borders with relevant security and border community agencies;
- 2) conduct confidence building and sensitization programmes on risk posed by arms and ammunition to human security in border communities;
- 3) conduct a needs assessment on integration of emerging technology and use of existing technical equipment in border management; and
- 4) identify and authorize changes of unapproved border crossing routes to approved border crossing routes.

Acronyms and abbreviations

AK	Avtomat Kalashnikova
ASYCUDA	Automated System for Customs Data
ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AVSEC	Aviation Security
BCDA	Border Communities Development Agency
BICC	Bonn International Center for Conversion
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CAR	Conflict Armament Research
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency (United States of America)
DHQ	Defence Headquarters
DIA	Defence Intelligence Agency
DICON	Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria
DSS	Department of State Services
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECOWAS Convention	ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EU	European Union
EUC	End User Certificate
FEC	Federal Executive Committee
HQ	Headquarters
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
IGP	Inspector-General of Police
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards
ITI	International Tracing Instrument
L.N.	Law Notes
MAG	Mines Advisory Group
MOD	Nigerian Ministry of Defence
MOJ	Nigerian Ministry of Justice
NA	Nigerian Army
NAF	Nigerian Air Force
NASME	Nigerian Army School of Military Engineering
NCS	Nigerian Customs Service
NDAP	Niger Delta Amnesty Programme
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIA	National Intelligence Agency
NIS	Nigerian Immigration Service
NN	Nigerian Navy
NOA	National Orientation Agency
NPF	Nigerian Police Force

NPS	Nigerian Prisons Service
NSCDC	National Security and Civil Defence Corps
ONSA	Office of the National Security Adviser
OSAC	Overseas Security Advisory Council
PRESCOM	Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons
PSSM	Physical Security and Stockpile Management
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
ToRs	Terms of Reference
TWG	Technical Working Group
UEMS	Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites
UN Firearms Protocol	United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition
UN	United Nations
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPOA	United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
UNROCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
US	United States of America
WAANSA	West African Action Network on Small Arms
WAM	Weapons and Ammunition Management

Annex. Consolidated list of options

In this report, each pillar of the WAM methodology includes a list of options formulated by the stakeholder participants in the UNIDIR/BICC-led national WAM consultations. They are not intended to be prescriptive, but rather areas of work for the Federal Government of Nigeria to consider prioritizing. All the options generated by the consultations have been consolidated here. These options for policy and action are not exhaustive.

The “time frame” classifications are as follows: “Immediate” indicates within 6 months; “short-term” indicates within 18 months; and “medium term” indicates within 3 years.

Functional areas	Options	Time frame	Actors
National legal framework	Adopt the proposed new firearms bill	Immediate	FEC National Assembly
	Develop a plan to operationalize the new firearms bill at a practical level	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Domesticate the ECOWAS Convention and ATT provisions into regulations for each security agency	Medium term	National Assembly Relevant ministries PRESCOM
	Sensitize high level national authorities on the legal provisions related to arms and ammunition	Immediate	PRESCOM Relevant ministries
	Sensitize civilians on the new firearms bill	Immediate	PRESCOM NOA Relevant NGOs
National coordinating mechanism	Transform PRESCOM into National Commission in line with ECOWAS Convention (adopt bill)	Immediate	FEC National Assembly
	Establish interagency TWG on WAM	Short term	PRESCOM

Functional areas	Options	Time frame	Actors
			Relevant security agencies
	Develop a roadmap for implementation of existing international and national projects on SALW	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM
	Review, adopt and disseminate national action plan on SALW	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM
	Involve relevant state and local entities in design and review of national action plan	Short term	ONSA PRESCOM MOJ MOD
	Adequately resource PRESCOM for its coordinating role	Immediate	FEC
Transfer Controls	Review national definitions and categories for national control list (prohibited and controlled items)	Short term	ONSA PRESCOM
	Review national regulations of all security agencies to include all activities controlled within ECOWAS Convention and ATT, including brokering, import, export, transit, trans-shipment and measures to prevent diversion	Medium term	ONSA Relevant security agencies Relevant ministries PRESCOM
	Collate information on Nigerian arms transfers to allow reporting according to national, regional and international instruments	Medium term	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Harmonize procedures for procurement and import for all security agencies in line with revised national regulations	Immediate	ONSA Relevant security agencies PRESCOM
Marking	Establish legal requirement for marking of all weapons, both arms in circulation and newly acquired	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant ministries DICON

Functional areas	Options	Time frame	Actors
	Develop marking standards applying across all security agencies	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies DICON
	Design marking format in conformity with regional and international standards	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies DICON
	Utilize interagency TWG for marking procedures and standards	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies DICON
	Develop pilot project plan for marking, including requirements for equipment/machines, logistics, personnel and relevant sensitization activities	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies DICON
	Develop written procedure for marking (SOP to be used by all relevant security agencies)	Short term	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies DICON
	Develop training plan for interagency training on marking procedure	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies DICON
	Where applicable, develop assistance proposal to support the marking programme, including acquisition of technical equipment	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM

Functional areas	Options	Time frame	Actors
Recordkeeping	Implement plan for national database/registry, including records from marking programme	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Codify unified guidelines for recordkeeping within security agencies and harmonize across security agencies at all levels	Short term	ONSA Relevant security agencies DICON
	Train all relevant security agencies on new marking procedure, and on harmonized ammunition recordkeeping and inventory management	Short term	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies International partners, as required
Captured and Seized Weapons	Develop written procedures (SOPs) for identification and recordkeeping of captured and seized weapons for all relevant security agencies	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies DICON
	Conduct training on identification and recordkeeping of weapons for all relevant security agencies	Immediate	PRESCOM International partners Relevant security agencies
	Establish standard data collection criteria for captured/seized weapons across all relevant security agencies	Immediate	PRESCOM International partners Relevant security agencies
	Utilize additional facilities for international tracing of captured and seized weapons, including ITI	Immediate	PRESCOM International partners Relevant security agencies
	Conduct training on international tracing, with particular focus on providing adequate information and correct identification	Immediate	PRESCOM International partners Relevant security agencies

Functional areas	Options	Time frame	Actors
	Centralize documentation of captured and seized weapons	Short term	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
Physical Security and Stockpile Management	Develop a PSSM prioritization plan on storage facilities, armouries and depots, and on refurbishment as well as trainings, based on nationwide assessment	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies International partners
	Sensitize national authorities (high level and policy level) on their responsibility for risks related to arms, ammunition and explosives in storage	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM
	Utilize interagency TWG to coordinate and oversee development of PSSM policies and SOPs, and implementation of PSSM related activities	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Periodic review (through TWG) of existing training curricula and harmonize training provision across relevant security agencies, including ISACS/IATG	Short/medium term	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Design training-of-trainers programmes on PSSM for trained personnel across all security agencies	Immediate	PRESCOM Relevant security agencies International technical partners
	Establish a roster of trained national experts on PSSM and make the list available based on need to all security agencies	Medium term	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Where applicable, develop assistance proposals to strengthen physical infrastructure of arms/ammunition storage at state and local levels for all security agencies in need of improved storage capacity	Short/medium term	PRESCOM

Functional areas	Options	Time frame	Actors
Weapon collections	Establish and utilize interagency TWG to oversee collection programmes, including drafting of its ToR	Short term	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Establish national strategy for civil disarmament programmes in order to ensure that weapons collection has adequate planning and resources, and does not create security vacuum or instability in communities involved	Short term	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Establish national guidelines on physical collection, documentation, storage and disposal of weapons and ammunition collected under amnesty programmes	Immediate	ONSA MOJ PRESCOM Relevant security agencies
	Carry out a national mapping exercise to identify relevant actors at national, regional, state, and local levels that should be involved in the collection programme prior to implementation	Short term	ONSA PRESCOM
	Sensitize all relevant actors at all levels on the planning and implementation objectives and requirements of collection programmes	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM NOA CSOs/NGOs
	Conduct periodic sensitization and awareness programmes for all communities to be involved in a collection programme, including perception and distribution surveys	Immediate	PRESCOM NOA CSOs/NGOs
	Draft SOPs and model data collection forms for documentation of collected weapons and ammunition to ITI standard	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies International technical partners, where relevant

Functional areas	Options	Time frame	Actors
	Conduct domestic, and where relevant, international tracing of weapons recovered in collection programmes	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM NPF (INTERPOL)
	Integrate civil society and community safety, including community policing, into the planning of collection programmes for communities that have undertaken disarmament	Immediate	PRESCOM Relevant security agencies CSOs/NGOs Community
Artisanal weapons	Conduct further research on craft weapons distribution and production to develop counter policy	Immediate	PRESCOM DICON
	Carry out consultation to develop craft weapons conversion/counter-production policy, including methods to curb illicit and unlicensed manufacturing of weapons	Short term	PRESCOM DICON Relevant security agencies
Weapons and ammunition disposal	Develop national guidelines for surplus, obsolete, seized and collected arms and ammunition for destruction, domestic transfer or possible sale in line with national regulations on transfer control	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM MOJ Relevant security agencies
Border security/ counter-smuggling	Utilize interagency TWG to improve cooperation, coordination and information sharing on counter trafficking of SALW across borders with relevant security and border community agencies	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies BCDA
	Conduct confidence building and sensitization programmes on risk posed by arms and ammunition to human security in border communities	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies BCDA
	Conduct needs assessment as it relates to integration of emerging technology and use of existing technical equipment in border management	Immediate	ONSA PRESCOM Relevant security agencies

Functional areas	Options	Time frame	Actors
			BCDA
	Identify and authorize change of unapproved border crossing routes to approved border crossing routes	Immediate	FEC ONSA Ministry of Interior National Boundary Commission PRESCOM

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