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The United Nations, Disarmament and Security

Evolution and Prospects

Edited by

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NOTE

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UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which has been in existence since 1 October 1980, was established by the General Assembly as an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations to carry out independent research on disarmament and related international security issues.

The Institute's work, which is based on the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly, aims at:

1. Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States, and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;

2. Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;

3. Assisting ongoing negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts being made to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

4. Carrying out more in-depth, forward looking and long-term research on disarmament so as to provide a general insight to the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

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Preface

Research in the field of disarmament is neither an ivory-tower exercise nor a purely individualistic effort. As a United Nations Institute devoted to policy-oriented research UNIDIR has long believed that research is optimally a social process involving interaction amongst policy-makers, diplomatic practitioners, the academic community and researchers. One way in which this testing of ideas and conclusions in a collective setting is achieved is through conferences.

Thus, in December 1990, UNIDIR organized an international conference on "The United Nations in Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects". Despite the shadow cast by the Gulf crisis, the high-level attendance and the liveliness of the discussion signified the timeliness and relevance of the subject. The basis for the success of the Conference was laid by the papers that were presented. These papers have now been edited for publication and UNIDIR believes that this volume will be of widespread interest.

As happens invariably with publications in the field of international security, it is not possible to keep pace with contemporary events - least of all in this era of accelerated change. Consequently, the papers presented in this publication, while referring to the Gulf crisis, do not examine the January-March 1991 Gulf War and its implications for the United Nations in disarmament and security. Nevertheless, the papers and the conclusions reached in them are not invalidated or rendered obsolete by subsequent events.
indeed they help to view these events in perspective and some of the innovative proposals made are likely to attract additional interest.

I would like to thank the various authors of this volume for their contribution. The views expressed are, of course, their own and do not reflect those of UNIDIR. UNIDIR received a special grant from the Government of the USSR to finance the Conference for which we express our gratitude. We also acknowledge the support and cooperation of the United Nations Association of the USSR in the organization of the Conference.

Jayantha Dhanapala,
Director

June 1991

List of Abbreviations

ABM Anti-ballistic Missile
ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASSRC South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation

BW Biological Weapons

CD Conference on Disarmament (Geneva)
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
CSBMs Confidence-and-Security-Building Measures
CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CTB Comprehensive Test Ban
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention

GCC Gulf Co-operation Council
GNP Gross National Product

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ILO International Labour Organisation
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

MTCR Missile Technology Control R£gime

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Management (United States of America)
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

OAS Organization of American States
ODA Official Development Assistance

PRC People's Republic of China

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

UNDC United Nations Disarmament Commission
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
USAF United States Air Force

Introduction

Jayantha Dhanapala

In December 1990 UNIDIR organized a major conference in Moscow. The theme of the Conference was "The United Nations in Disarmament and Security Evolution and Prospects". It was both a timely and relevant topic for discussion. It is now axiomatic that disarmament is a means towards achieving security. On that premise alone the real achievement of disarmament since the INF Treaty of 1987, the CFE Treaty of November 1990 and the prospect of START - despite the uncertainty surrounding the date of its signature - augurs well for global security. President Bush's statement of 13 May 1991 will undoubtedly act as a catalyst in the negotiations for a Chemical Weapons Convention.

The percentage of actual arms reductions that have been achieved may be disputed but there is no gainsaying the fact that a long awaited process of disarmament involving the verifiable destruction of weapons has begun. It is a process that will be difficult to roll back. Whether it can be consolidated and accelerated is arguable. The Gulf War at the beginning of 1991, however, has dissipated the optimism of the recent past and the present situation is fraught with complexity having both positive and negative elements intertwined.

The prospects for security have been greatly strengthened by fundamental changes in international politics. The Paris Summit in November 1990 certainly symbolized the end of the cold war era replacing the confrontation of a bipolar world with the conciliation of a concert of nations. We have all begun to search for architectural metaphors as we contemplate the construction of a brave new world in a post-cold war era. But eras in history do not separate themselves in clearly demarcated segments. There is inevitably a phasing out of one era as the new one emerges. Elements of both eras coexist in the transitional period. We are still in this period of transition. The use of force has not been exorcized from global politics although one can perceive that global war is less likely today.

Central to this era is the role of the United Nations now greatly reinvigorated by its Member States in the discharge of its Charter obligations. Forty-five years on, the United Nations finally appears to being ceded the power - and hopefully the finances - that are necessary to implement the concept of collective security embodied in the Charter. It is a time of new challenges and new opportunities to fulfil old hopes and old aspirations inspired by the Charter. The United Nations is being increasingly looked upon to consolidate and manage the accelerated change we have witnessed and to direct it towards commonly desired goals.

The impact of this change on disarmament is incomplete. The world continues to spend an estimated $1.9 million a minute on arms while more than 1 billion people live below the poverty line. Even after CFE, Europe remains overarmed while other regions through practically unrestrained arms transfers continue with an arms build-up. Common regional homes must coexist on a common planet with vital links among its inhabitants, who share a common environment and common resources which are both fragile and finite. It has been remarked that the dismantling of the Iron Curtain still leaves the Poverty Curtain as a divider. In a world where dissidents have become presidents the indigent remain in stark contrast to the affluent. Environmental concerns, economic underdevelopment, regional conflicts and the continuing violation of human rights in various parts of the world continue to demand global solutions.

The invasion of Kuwait punctured the balloon of complacency that began to float when the East-West conflict ended. We were reminded of the harsh reality that the threat and use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of States remains a basic cause of global insecurity. Arms transfers in the past have fuelled aggression but we are condemned to repeating past mistakes. The silver lining in the cloud over the Gulf was the rare unanimity achieved in the United Nations in condemning this act of aggression. The forum for discussion and decision-making in the Gulf crisis has been and remains the United Nations Security Council. This is as it should be - and not for this crisis alone.

In this critical situation it is appropriate that we should reflect on how the role of the United Nations in disarmament and security has evolved and what its prospects are. In the field of disarmament the aim of the United Nations includes the prevention of war and achieving the least diversion of the world's resources for armaments. The General Assembly was empowered to consider principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and to make recommendations thereon. The Security Council was mandated with the task of formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. In terms of maintaining international peace and security the Charter has of course a number of provisions. At this point I would like to quote Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar who has said in his 1990 Report on the Work of the Organization that:

> "The larger - and saner - concept of security, encompassing all its dimensions, which has begun to emerge is precisely the one the United Nations has been expounding all through the years. It has been a stable theme at the United Nations that an obsession with military security results in a self-perpetuating arms race, distorts priorities, hampers social and economic progress, constrains political dialogue, affects the institutions of the State to their long-term detriment, and aggravates the sense of insecurity in all nations."[1]

It has been reaffirmed at the 1978 First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD I) that the United Nations has "a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament". A great deal of work has been accomplished in discharging this responsibility. The deliberative machinery for disarmament within the United Nations system has a number of successes to its credit most notable being the Final Document of SSOD I. At the same time it is a fact that a number of agreements have been negotiated outside the framework of the United Nations. In a vastly changed political environment we need to assess what prospects there are for the United Nations to facilitate more advances in disarmament and to exert a more decisive role in disarmament and security. Would such a role be desirable and would Member States welcome it? If so, is the existing machinery adequate to achieve the tasks and responsibilities before the United Nations? We are at a point of history when the opportunities for multilateralism have never been better. The pattern of international relations as we enter the twenty-first century will largely be determined by what use we make of these opportunities.

This book attempts a fresh consideration of these issues. They are analysed in the papers presented at the UNIDIR Conference in December 1990 edited for publication. Written before the outbreak of the Gulf War between the United States coalition and Iraq the authors have had no opportunity of discussing the far-reaching implications of these events for the role of the United Nations in disarmament and security. Nevertheless some of the issues

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[1] Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, A/45/1, 16 September 1990.

discussed are relevant to the post-Gulf War situation. A new world order without the United Nations is unthinkable.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I is the new challenges confronting the United Nations; Part II analyses the positions of Member States; and Part III focuses on the role of the United Nations in regional disarmament and security. Inevitably, however, some issues are discussed in more than one part indicating the difficulty of isolating subjects in a highly complex and interrelated debate. A lively discussion took place at the UNIDIR Moscow Conference on the basis of these papers. The discussions were chaired by Ambassadors Leon Bouvier, Ignac Golob and Amada Segarra, who reported to the plenary on the views expressed. Some of these views are reflected in the Conclusion written by Serge Sur.

The six chapters in the first part of this book represent different and sometimes conflicting points of view on the challenges facing the United Nations but a number of interwoven themes can be identified. It must be borne in mind that these chapters were written before the Gulf War.

There is certainly an all-pervasive sense that change - fundamental and structural change - is in the air of international politics affecting the United Nations, disarmament and security. At the same time there is obviously no consensus that the disarmament agreements we have witnessed since the 1987 INF Treaty are as significant as they have been hailed to be. The expectations of the United Nations fluctuate from hortatory demands for fresh and bold initiatives to a realistic appraisal of the limitations placed on the world body by the nation-States who comprise it. The need to translate the successes in bilateral United States-USSR disarmament negotiations into the multilateral sphere is clearly recognized. However precise modalities for this are not easy to agree on. Nor are the benefits of this "parliamentarization" or multilateralization so obvious to everyone.

A common theme seems to be the need for the United Nations to place regional security firmly on its agenda. A close collaboration between existing regional organization and the United Nations is suggested. "Federalization" of the United Nations system through the creation of regional Commissions of Security and Confidence Building is one proposal that is presented. Another proposal is the creation of a centre for crisis prevention, conflict resolution and disarmament. Generally, however, it is true to say that the identification of the issues that have to be dealt with in multilateral forums is accomplished to a greater extent than the examination of how the United Nations could actually respond to the challenges.

The problems of poverty in the South, global issues like arms transfers, non-military threats to security and the danger of a growing North-South divide, not only in economic terms but also in politico-security terms, are identified. What can the United Nations do within the constitutional limits of the Charter to ameliorate this situation? There is a recognition that the advances made in disarmament have largely been achieved outside the framework of the United Nations. And yet the United Nations has played a most important facilitating task creating the ambience for such concrete achievements.

Military power has not ceased to be the valid currency of modern realpolitik. Indeed with the diminution of the ideological factor in world politics some observers see a return to traditional nineteenth century balance-of-power politics. That being the case the United Nations is unlikely to be given more than a limited role in disarmament and security. Of course, proposals to activate dormant elements of the Charter like the Military Staff Committee and to give new life to Chapter VII continue to be made. A new dimension of the peace-making and peace-building role of the United Nations was seen in Namibia in 1989, and is likely to be repeated in the Western Sahara in 1992. That is, the supervision of

democratic elections and the decolonization process giving birth to new nations in a peaceful transition. But the United Nations role in disarmament remains largely dependent on the willingness of Member States to cede the United Nations with the power to play a role beyond what is formally stipulated in the Charter.

This leads us logically to the second part of the book which examines the attitudes of the Member States to the United Nations role in disarmament and security. The chapters here affirm the value of multilateralism albeit with some reservations in the case of some authors. Member States do not want the United States and USSR alone to negotiate disarmament and security. At the same time, negotiations involving the entire United Nations membership is commonly regarded as unwieldy and impractical. What then is the optimum modality given the consensus that bilateral and multilateral negotiations are complementary? Pressures for expanding the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have led to an agreement in principle that four new members should be admitted but the implementation of this remains overdue.

But it is not just the number of delegations around the negotiating table that will guarantee a more effective and durable disarmament agreement under the aegis of the United Nations. The circumstances must be right, so that all States are convinced that it is in their national interest to forge the agreements. Thus, for example, France in 1978 found that the time was propitious to re-enter the multilateral disarmament forums. The improvement in United States-Soviet relations has altered the atmosphere in the multilateral forums and, as one author points out, in the First Committee of the General Assembly more resolutions are now adopted without a vote than before.

Despite this, a number of "hardy perennials" are repeated as resolutions and calls are made on nuclear-weapons States to disarm, to cease the nuclear arms race and to halt testing. The United Nations role beyond providing forums for discussion and negotiation is essentially attenuated by the pursuit of the national interest of some States who have the capacity to do so. The fact that dialogue takes place at all is obviously a positive development. A re-ordering of priorities in the disarmament agenda cannot be undertaken by the United Nations unless there is consensus among the Member States. A shift to regional disarmament and conventional disarmament is still viewed with suspicion by some States who maintain that the agenda of global and nuclear disarmament has not been implemented.

A point frequently made is that all nations want to safeguard their national security. The "realist" school would argue that national interests and not high moral principles dictate the actions of Governments. Indeed, we may find fresh evidence of this in recent events. But national security does rest on the common acceptance of certain principles such as compliance with international law and the non-use of force. These and other principles in the United Nations Charter ensure an orderly world of civilized international behaviour. National interests cannot dictate that the accepted principles be observed on some occasions only and not on others or that they be selectively applied with respect to some nations. The role of the United Nations in implementing the Charter principles consistently and without discrimination is therefore paramount.

The third and final part of the book deals with the role of the United Nations in regional disarmament. Interestingly this aspect of the Conference attracted great attention. The United States-Soviet rapprochement and the ending of the cold war has led to a revised interest in achieving regional disarmament and security. It arises from a conviction that the cold war transmitted malefic influences to regions exacerbating regional conflicts and even triggering off "proxy wars". It also arises from the recognition that insecurity and arms races in one region can have an impact on the rest of the global system. Many useful suggestions and

proposals have been made, including the need for more regional consultations on global disarmament issues, such as chemical disarmament. The existing Charter provisions for regional arrangements can be utilized to ensure a close harmonious working relationship between the United Nations and the regional organizations. Successes achieved in some regions should not lead to the assumption that the world body is no longer directly relevant to the needs of those regions. Attempts to by-pass the United Nations would have the cumulative effect of rendering the Organization impotent to carry out its Charter functions when called upon to do so.

A United Nations role as a "*deus ex machina*" is obviously unrealistic. Despite the great relaxation of tension internationally and the proclaimed end of the cold war, United States, USSR and Great Power influences continue to hold sway. The vast majority of Member States are conscious of this and have reservations about welcoming the unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council or the non-use of the veto. The United States emerged as the leader of a coalition upholding Charter principles and reinforced by the legitimacy conferred on their actions by Security Council resolutions. One may regret that the Security Council was not able to undertake, or at least to control, the military operations instead of simply authorizing, in general and implicit terms, the use of force by Member States. Among the questions asked therefore are whether similar action would be taken when Charter principles are violated and whether a United Nations directed operation would not have been more desirable.

In the wake of the Gulf War Security Council resolution 687 adds a new dimension to the disarmament process. On the basis of Chapter VII it imposes some specific obligations on Iraq, establishes a mechanism for their implementation and provides for their verification. Will that constitute a precedent? Adding to the fact-finding tasks undertaken by the Secretary-General during the Iran-Iraq war, will it be a nucleus for a verification function within the United Nations? In fact this remains doubtful. Firstly, the legal basis is Chapter VII which concerns "the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (Article 39) and not disarmament. In this respect the resolution has a coercive aspect linked with sanctions against a State which having violated the Charter has to be prevented from aggressive behaviour in future. Secondly, the circumstances surrounding the Gulf War were, of course, unique and are unlikely, fortunately, to be repeated. Nevertheless the Security Council, on the basis of Article 26 of the Charter, is entitled to intervene in the disarmament process in cooperation with Member States. But such an action can only be efficient and durable if it is undertaken on a balanced and non-discriminatory basis. The dismantling of the Iraqi weapons arsenal could thus be seen as a Security Council decision aimed at a vanquished State which had been universally condemned as a blatant aggressor. It may not therefore be a pointer to a future role for the United Nations in disarmament and security in normal situations.

Lessons and Prospects

Yasushi Akashi

There is a shared conviction that multilateral arms limitation and disarmament offers a gateway to a more peaceful, secure world. Very few of the enduring security problems of the past and emerging ones facing the world today can be solved without the coordinated actions of large numbers of States. Thus, multilateralism is not some lofty utopian goal; it is not a favour that strong States offer to weak ones; and, above all, it cannot be regarded as an option that we pursue at our leisure. Rather, multilateralism has become an urgent necessity - one that must engage the creative energies of all States.

It is a truism to say that we live in a period of unprecedented change. The events of the past year in Europe, and more recently the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, continue to reverberate through the United Nations. The Organization is being called upon as never before to act collectively against aggression; to mediate disputes; to keep the peace; to promote democracy; to defend human rights; and to fight poverty, underdevelopment, and environmental decay. Throughout the United Nations there is a renewed sense of pride and purpose. The question we need to address here is how to find the proper "fit" between disarmament diplomacy and these other security-related activities that will define the United Nations role in the next decade and beyond.

Speaking frankly, the task of forging collective global action on disarmament in this new era is going to put our strength and our wits to a severe test. While the end of the cold war is an immensely promising development, it has not ushered in the millennium; the road ahead is still strewn with obstacles. Regional instability, ethnic violence and religious strife are obvious factors for continuing discord; so too is the hitherto unparalleled militarization of many societies which has become a central characteristic of our age. Given these challenges, it is imperative that we re-examine both the ends and means of the United Nations disarmament activities from a fresh perspective.

In this spirit I should like to address two related questions: first, what are the proper lessons to be drawn from past experience? Secondly, what kind of steps do we need to take to achieve progress in the future?

Lessons of the Past

The path of global arms limitation and disarmament negotiations over the past three decades is so familiar to all of you that it scarcely requires even a brief summary. From the early 1960s to the mid-1970s - that is about one half of the past 30 years - an impressive number of multilateral agreements were brought into force. The major milestones are well known - they include the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Sea-Bed Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and other agreements.

Looking back, many observers regard these years as something of a *belle époque* for multilateral disarmament diplomacy in the United Nations system. The work was substantive and wide-ranging; global forums were the centre of worldwide attention; and everyone sensed that the stakes were high. Perhaps most importantly, the governing concepts for global diplomacy were clear and compelling: wherever weapons of mass destruction are not yet deployed, do not deploy them; and whoever does not yet possess such weapons, do not

acquire them. These were the goals of global diplomacy; and formal agreements were the primary means.

From the mid-1970s through the late 1980s the pattern of diplomacy was starkly different. Bilateral diplomacy between the two major Powers and European arms control negotiations moved to centre stage, leaving multilateral forums in the shadows. The momentum toward new global agreements slackened noticeably, and criticisms were heard that the multilateral agenda was being skewed toward grandiose or over-ambitious goals and away from longstanding priorities such as a halt to nuclear testing and chemical disarmament. Moreover - and this is important - the character of the diplomacy itself was changing. From the number of review conferences and the outcome of the last two special sessions, it would seem that while our agendas and our forums were growing in size, our workload seemed ever more managerial and procedural in nature.

Amidst all of these changes - indeed perhaps in part because of them - multilateral disarmament diplomacy lost its clear conceptual focus. Comprehensive prohibitions and truly preclusive agreements have not proved to be very practical outside the category of weapons of mass destruction. It is one thing to preclude the stationing of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed or in orbit, but quite another thing *even to agree* on whether or how to address a broader range of military activities occurring in international domains like space or the high seas. Furthermore, because of problems that scarcely need elaboration here, the idea of using the NPT as a model for future agreements has not proved very attractive to a substantial part of the international community, notwithstanding the impressive number of States that now are parties to that agreement.

I would like to think that we have left the frustrations of this previous era behind. In the next few years, we have a new opportunity to reinvigorate multilateral diplomacy; to get it back on track; and to give it a clear direction. Fortunately, the dissolution of tensions between East and West will help matters considerably; we have seen already a marked improvement in the atmosphere of our debates. At the same time, to seize the opportunities that may exist, I think we are well advised to heed several important lessons of the past.

First, we must be more discerning in the way we define success or failure in our multilateral disarmament endeavours. If experience teaches anything, it is that progress cannot be measured solely by the number and frequency of new agreements or conventions. Treaties are not like trophies; we do not mount them on walls or put them up on shelves where they gather dust. Rather, treaties require constant vigilance to ensure their compliance and they represent but one step - albeit an important one - in a continuous process of activity.

Indeed, what we sometimes casually refer to as the miltilateral process deals as much with identification of issues, determination of priorities and choice of mechanisms as with reaching agreements. In the field of disarmament, this "process" may go through several phases. *It often starts with an in-depth study of the issue by small groups of experts*, where problems are identified and alternative approaches are suggested and clarified. It then moves to a *second, wider deliberative stage*, where consensus among States is forged on the need for active negotiation. Should consensus be reached, active negotiations then are conducted in a *third stage*, which is crowned by the completion of an agreement.

A *fourth stage* occurs when an agreement is implemented. Here, the initial institutional arrangements for reductions and data-exchange are carried out. A *fifth stage* involves monitoring and the verification of compliance. Problems which arise may be dealt with through consultation among parties and, if necessary, enforcement activity aimed at offsetting

violations. *Finally, in a sixth stage*, an agreement may be modified, amended, or extended as appropriate, through a periodic review process.

I am not suggesting that the disarmament process is always this neat or orderly. The essential point I wish to make is that in charting our future efforts, we should measure progress by the kinds of improvements and innovations we can make in *each* of these steps. Activities such as expert studies and keeping treaties up to date are not nearly as glamorous as negotiating new agreements; but they are vital from the standpoint of keeping the disarmament process attuned to changing political realities.

Another important lesson is that multilateralism in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament requires a dynamic and effective bilateral process. Many observers tend to see bilateral and multilateral endeavours as being competitive rather than complementary. But the kind of bilateralism to which I refer is quite different from that which we have seen in the past 15 years or so. Concretely, it means that the two major Powers must reach accord on two principal issues.

The *first* concerns the scope for future global negotiations, be they on outer space, on navies, on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, on arms transfers, on advanced weapons technology, or the many other current issues. Most existing agreements would not have been completed without a degree of prior consensus at the bilateral level on basic objectives and on a strategy for assuring the active participation of key States in such multilateral negotiations. I wish I could say that such a strategy exists now, but, to be frank, I see little evidence of it apart from the notable exception of chemical disarmament.

The *second* dimension of bilateralism concerns the conduct of North-South relations. The major Powers must be able to agree on the types of compromises that they are prepared to make with the larger community of States, including other developed countries, in the interests of obtaining fair and workable global agreements. As I noted earlier, it is often argued that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is fatally flawed as a model for future negotiations because it divides the world into "have" and "have not" States. While I understand the reasoning behind this criticism, I do question its implications for policy.

To my mind, the appropriate lesson of the NPT experience is *not* that restrictions aimed at non-proliferation cannot work *a priori* but rather that obligations undertaken by nuclear-weapon States in order to balance the basic inequality accepted by "have not" States were prone to differing interpretations. Thus, we have endured numerous and at times confrontational debates over what actions would constitute a minimum level of compliance with Article VI of the NPT as it pertains to good faith efforts to halt the nuclear arms race and to proceed with disarmament.

In the future, global régimes based on the principle of *offsetting inequalities* may well be necessary in addressing certain global insecurities. But they cannot work without clear understandings on how to apportion the burdens and benefits of agreements - and such understandings, I submit, cannot be reached without effective and mutually beneficial interactions between bilateral and multilateral realms.

A *third* lesson to be drawn from recent history pertains to the machinery of disarmament. *It is that institutional adjustments and fixes should not be allowed to divert our creative energies away from the truly hard issues of gaining agreement on substantive matters.* Granted, steps to streamline and rationalize the work of our various forums should be carefully considered and vigorously pursued where appropriate. And we should always be conscious of the need to review the mandates and procedures of existing bodies to keep them focused and relevant. However, there is a clear distinction between these kinds of pursuits

and more far-reaching restructuring activity that can be costly in terms of time, effort and financial resources.

One of the unheralded accomplishments of the past decade is the degree to which the machinery within the United Nations system has become well integrated and robust. There is a logical correspondence between our existing mechanisms and the six phases of the disarmament process that I mentioned earlier. Bodies such as UNIDIR, the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, groups of governmental experts and the Secretariat can contribute in different ways to the research and analytical phases; the First Committee, the special sessions, and of course the General Assembly, act as our deliberative "agenda-setting" bodies; and the Disarmament Commission is becoming a useful place to deal with selected issues that are worthy of special attention but do not as yet lend themselves to formal negotiation.

In the "treaty-making" phase of the process, the Conference on Disarmament retains its unique character as the sole multilateral negotiating body with a representative membership, including the five permanent members of the Security Council. And of course within the ambit of particular agreements we have achieved well-developed procedures and mechanisms for review, consultation and amendment.

The one phase of the process that still lacks a clear institutional focus is monitoring and verification. The trend in this area has been to utilize or create institutions for treaty-specific verification purposes, such as the IAEA and the prospective organization for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Because monitoring is a highly technical activity that is performed for the benefit of the parties to a treaty, there is inherent logic in the idea of relying upon single-mission institutions. This is not, of course, to exclude the longer-term possibility of a centralized verification institution within the United Nations system. But such an organization would of course have to prove itself effective on legal, political, cost-effectiveness, and perhaps even technical grounds, and as our recent Group of Experts on Verification concluded, such a development is best seen as an evolutionary process.

In the meantime, the United Nations can work in concert with interested States in alleviating verification concerns and setting priorities. As our Group of Experts noted, valuable experience has been gained from the Secretary-General's fact-finding activities that may be applied selectively to various agreements, as and when parties deem it appropriate. In addition, the Secretariat is taking steps to strengthen the United Nations disarmament database, especially in the arms expenditure area as well as in the chemical weapons area. Practical steps such as these can help to deepen the knowledge of Member States regarding the intricacies of monitoring and verification, and thereby enable them to participate more effectively in the operation of treaties to which they are a party.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

How might the United Nations role in disarmament evolve in the future? One of our most distinguished Secretaries-General, Dag Hammarksjöld, once said: the United Nations is "part of the great pattern of change in our time. It functions as a tool in the hands of Governments and peoples and individuals, in their effort to give that change a constructive direction".

In this post-cold war era, Hammarskjöld's words capture the essence of our future endeavours. The rapid changes that are now occurring are simply too pervasive and all-encompassing to be met with a "business as usual" attitude. Together, we must truly take steps to give change a constructive direction. This task requires that we adapt and adjust

multilateral diplomacy to the current sources of conflict and tension in the world, and that we be open to new methods and techniques for achieving our common goals of peace and security at the lowest possible levels of armament.

By virtue of its universal character, the United Nations is the most appropriate and the only place where global consensus on key security and disarmament issues can be forged. Yet the Organization's precise roles cannot be summed up in short phrases or "sound-bites" that appear on the evening news. They involve aspects of a global sounding-board, agenda-setting, coordination, research, expert study and evaluation, fact-finding, mediation, and active negotiation, as well as information and education. Moreover, the job of strengthening these functions requires that we exercise judicious judgement on how to allocate fairly our time and resources among a growing number of priorities that vie for attention each year.

Let me briefly touch upon *two critical areas* where such judgements are needed.

First, we need to become more adept at managing the increasingly complex interrelationships between global negotiations and regional peace and stability. The great virtue of global multilateralism is that it offers all States, in every region, a chance to speak out on those issues that confront humanity as a whole. But there is also growing recognition of the fact that security problems are region-specific and are often best addressed with region-specific solutions. This applies increasingly to conventional armaments, ballistic missiles and arms transfers.

The United Nations has a responsibility to promote the principles of restraint and reciprocity in all regions. Obviously, we must be sensitive to the characteristics that differentiate one region from another; the kinds of techniques for disarmament and confidence building that apply in one area may not be appropriate elsewhere. Nevertheless, the United Nations could help to strengthen peace and security:

- By formulating general guidelines for regional negotiation;
- By examining the lessons of existing regional approaches, for instance in Europe, and their applicability elsewhere;
- By promoting regional dialogues within forums which are already in existence at the global level; and
- By applying the methodology of arms limitation and disarmament to selected peace-keeping and peace-making activities, such as in Central America and other areas.

In all these endeavours, I regard the regional and global forms of multilateralism as complementary and mutually-reinforcing. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that one could exist without the other.

Another choice that is pivotal from the standpoint of future prospects involves the question of formal agreements on the one hand, and that of coordinated, unilateral measures on the other. Quite obviously, not every issue that comes before Member States at the United Nations will have as its ultimate solution the entry into force of a formal treaty. Negotiations are often slow and painstaking; and at times it is simply easier for countries to take sensible unilateral actions in a multilateral context than to hammer out every last detail of negotiated agreements that have the same effect.

Using the tools of transparency, such as data exchange and standardized reporting formats, some of which are already available at the United Nations, Member States can take

useful steps to clarify intentions and build confidence as a first step toward harmonizing national policies in the interests of restraint. This approach applies most clearly to military expenditures, defence conversion, arms transfers, and other issues where the rationales and justification for specific actions may vary widely among Member States.

Time has permitted me to touch upon only a few of the many issues that bear upon the question of future directions in disarmament and arms limitation. As I said at the outset, the challenges that lie ahead are substantial ones. No one can ignore the very real threat of conflict that looms over certain parts of the world. Over the longer term, however, I am optimistic about our prospects for success. The futility of over-armament and the logic of restraint are now more widely understood in the world than ever before in human history. We at the United Nations have both a duty to act and, I believe, the will to succeed.

Part I

New Challenges for the United Nations

Chapter 1
Challenges Facing the United Nations in a Disarming World

Vladimir Petrovsky

It appears that the time and subject of our discussion have been chosen quite aptly. Today, literally, in the wake of the Paris summit, on the eve of a new Soviet-United States top level meeting and, last but not least, in the 45th year of the United Nations' existence the problems concerning multi-dimensional approaches to disarmament and international security are topical as never before.

A Disarming World

The concept of a disarming world is a new notion which has been made current by new political thinking. Some three or four years ago it would have been regarded as a utopia. Today it is a political reality. This is a reality because the world has entered a post-confrontation period and because the Cold War is over.

We view the disarming world as a mode of transition to the next century free from theories and activities of the twentieth century world which has been split into opposing camps. The world is moving away from the balance of forces and reliance on arms to the balance of interests and collective structures of security as pillars of stability. Therefore, at this juncture point of two eras, it is important that stability be maintained and given a new meaning.

The overriding goal of modern politics is to make irreversible the choice in favour of dialogue and cooperation. To those in whose minds the deterrence philosophy is deeply ingrained we see fit to recall the Kantian thought that if each State starts seeking superiority over the others through the accumulation of unlimited amounts of weaponry, then in the long run - because of the costs involved - peace becomes more burdensome than a short war. So the same States seeking to cast off that burden trigger offensive wars. In the nuclear and space age - and this has been already proven that would be a suicidal policy.

To make positive transformations irreversible, persistent efforts are needed to expand this margin of safety and to establish reliable guarantees. What is the present situation as regards this crucial problem on which the future of our civilization hinges?

Recent developments suggest that the Soviet-United States relationship is not only ceasing to generate threats to peace but, on the contrary, is evolving into a factor for international stability. And a broader East-West concept is gradually dissolving in a new coherent girth of security stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

The past year witnessed the political landscape of our planet change beyond recognition. Stone walls, iron and bamboo curtains which alienated and separated peoples from each other came crumbling down. The world starts to see itself as a single family which is up to most daring accomplishments in the name of freedom and human dignity.

A system of peace, security and cooperation resting on the United Nations Charter starts functioning. Disarmament and settlement of regional conflicts provide leverage for applying a multi-dimensional approach to ensuring security in all of its aspects.

MULTILATERALISM

Stability in a world that disarms is to be maintained through a set of global, regional, as well as unilateral and bilateral measures with emphasis *visibly shifting towards the multilateral approach.* Multilateralism today is not merely a frame for the mosaic of international politics, but forms a distinct and multi-dimensional area of activities. Multilateralism now signals that new internationalism is burgeoning in the consciousness of the world community, which presupposes reliance on consensus, collective endeavours to maintain security, and the primacy of international law.

Enhanced multilateralism puts an end to the unilateral arbitrariness of force. However, it does not detract from the significance of positive bilateral and unilateral efforts. On the contrary, the formation of a diversified infrastructure for multilateral action will increase the effectiveness of steps taken at all levels for the sake of universal security.

At a global level, multilateralism manifested itself in the actions taken by the world community to counter the unprovoked aggression by Iraq against Kuwait. The United Nations strongly denounced the violation of sovereign freedoms of one of its equal members. Life shows that the unity of the Security Council can turn this body into a reliable instrument for resolving conflicts by political means and into the central control desk of international security.

At a regional level, multilaterialism can be seen in the development of the CSCE process which is a harbinger of new relationships between States. It is not accidental that Europe attracts attention of all other continents. Here a unique experiment is being staged to build a common European house whose architecture would combine common legal, humanitarian, informational, economic and environmental areas. It is here that stereotypes of disunity are resolutely discarded and new terms of common human life are being developed on the basis of non-violence, solidarity and cooperation. Truly historic transformations occur in Europe which at the same time strengthen stability in the world at large.

Thus multilateral approaches are becoming ever more prominent symbolizing the unity of the present-day world. Leaving behind the period of national egotisms and military rivalry, mankind is actively fostering cooperative structures of security which allow all nations to rely on the primacy of law rather than force, and on the principal "weapon of peace", which is the United Nations Charter.

This means that State-to-State relations in the disarming world are gradually forfeiting the feature of deterrence through military force. Increasing reliance on multilateralism and each new disarmament agreement bring the world community closer to a qualitatively new *political-legal, verifiable and transparent deterrence* with a pattern of positive co-development of nations replacing the model of negative interdependence. Let me quote here President Mikhail S. Gorbachev who said at the Paris meeting that much started moving in the world. The direction of this movement is towards a more secure and civilized world order based not on military force but on equal dialogue and balance of interests, on sovereignty combined with the integrity of modern humankind.

Of course universal peace is yet to become an irrevocable reality. Civilization is not yet insured against "small wars", against clashes of ambitions or misconceived national priorities. This is why there is an imperative need for internationalizing cooperation, making joint efforts to establish a reliable structure of security for all, in all areas, and at all levels of international interaction.

All this raises new *challenges in the area of disarmament for the 1990s and the beginning of the next century.* The treasure repository of the new world contains the Soviet-United States treaties on INF and on nuclear tests, agreements of unprecedented scope on the reduction of armed forces and armaments, and on further confidence-building measures in Europe. Disarmament problems for the post-confrontation period are already coming into view on the horizon.

The modern concept of disarmament is a concept of cooperation among States, providing for consensus on key problems of global defence sufficiency and ensuring balance of interests. It is primarily from this perspective that we invite you to approach the role of the United Nations.

We are convinced that the time has come to add a global dimension to disarmament and demilitarization of international relations with the help of the United Nations. Deliberations in the First (Political) Committee of the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly have fully reflected the vital need for engaging each State in this process and for extending the scope of multilateral negotiations to cover all types of arms.

Let it be stressed straightaway that our idea of globalization of disarmament implies the participation of all nations - whether big or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, industrial or developing - in curtailing military arsenals. Involvement in arms reductions on the universal basis is an imperative requirement of our time, which, on the other hand, brings into sharp focus the interrelationship between disarmament and development. Indeed, the initiation of an actual arms destruction has highlighted new possibilities of speeding up processes of development through efforts either of each individual State or a group of States. After all, it is not possible to accept a situation that would perpetuate neighbouring regions evolving in different directions where some will be disarming and developing and others continuing the arms race and aggravating their economic backwardness.

Releasing funds for peaceful purposes is a noble and urgent task that can be accomplished only at the global scale. On the other hand, it emphasizes again that nuclear nations which are permanent members of the Security Council bear a special responsibility for international developments. These States should, above all, act in a realistic and balanced manner and make their collective efforts resultative. But what is the most important is that they should be prepared to resolutely renounce outlived stereotypes for an innovative and dimensional thinking.

The USSR and the United States which are trailblazers in disarmament are already demonstrating such approach. The next task is to give an impeptus to the global process.

Therefore today the United Nations should resolutely focus on *priority issues* that are long overdue for *multilateral discussion and decision.*

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Nuclear disarmament tops the agenda. The emerging global awareness of its ultimate aim which is to completely eliminate nuclear weapons has not resolved but rather exacerbated the problem of gradual reduction of arsenals. Clearly, against the backdrop of today's realities the unwillingness of some countries to disband the "Nuclear Club" must be correlated somehow with the growing potential for drastically lowering the level of nuclear face-off. Consequently, at present, nuclear deterrence at the minimum possible level might be the most likely stepping stone on the way to ensuring security without reliance on force. Its form, as well as time and quantitative framework should be apparently addressed at negotiations and

in the most profound scientific studies.

The question also arises as to how the meaning of deterrence will change as four out of five nuclear Powers have declared that they do not consider each other enemies; military alliances are being transformed, strategies changed, troops withdrawn, and even conventional, let alone nuclear, conflicts in Europe become impossible and unthinkable. It is evident that in the post-confrontation world the role of nuclear arms as a political instrument will dramatically decrease in the East-West relationship.

The same effect is produced by another factor which is a dense network of nuclear power stations and chemical plants whose destruction would have disastrous consequences which might prevent starting hostilities.

Another fact is equally evident. The world must prevent the threat of nuclear weapons being involved in so-called "small" conflicts. Provided that all nuclear Powers declare that they will never support any form of aggression, nuclear arms would become more and more isolated from the world into their eventual extinction. This is also important in terms of all non-nuclear States' security.

Humanity will never get free of its nuclear syndrome without banning completely *nuclear tests*. We are prepared to continue bilateral negotiations, intensify multilateral efforts at the Conference on Disarmament and do meaningful work at the forthcoming Conference to consider amendments to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space, and under Water. The Soviet Union would be prepared to stop nuclear testing already tomorrow if other nuclear States agree to do the same. However, if the other party is not prepared to do it, steps should at least be taken to gradually reduce - on a reciprocal basis - the frequency and yield of such tests. We believe that minimum deterrence could be best served if scientists authoritatively express their competent opinion with regard to the possibility of transition from full-scale nuclear testing to checking individual components of weapons, computerized mathematical modelling of tests, etc., without detonating nuclear devices.

Global efforts to maintain and consolidate the non-proliferation régime undoubtedly top the agenda. The Fourth Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference held in 1990 is further proof. It has shown that participants in the Treaty are interested in maintaining it. Moreover, there have been evident shifts in the attitude to the Treaty on the part of countries which are not parties to it.

It is important that the danger of nuclear terrorism not be neglected, particularly as the situation in some regions becomes less stable. On its part the USSR recognizes its responsibility as a nuclear Power for non-proliferation of, and reliable prevention of unauthorized access to nuclear weapons. The Soviet leadership has alrady declared that under no circumstances would the spread of nuclear weapons be allowed. Such weapons have always been and will continue to be in the hands of the united Armed Forces of the USSR.

Developments in the Persian Gulf have spotlighted the danger of spreading *chemical and missile weapons* and of uncontrolled *flows of conventional arms*. Some approaches towards neutralizing these threats have been already identified: consensus has emerged in favour of an early conclusion of a convention on the destruction and prohibition of production of all types of chemical weapons, and an international régime has been established to control missile technology. As to restricting the arms trade, this issue is yet to become a subject matter of international negotiations. First, serious efforts should be taken to agree on the parameters of international transparency. We hope that the United Nations study of this subject which will be concluded in 1991, will provide important recommendations. We

believe that a register of weapon shipments drawn up under the auspices of the United Nations would be a significant and concrete step which would pave the road for endeavours to put things in order as regards weapon shipments, particularly to areas of crises.

The Soviet Union thus favours an *all-embracing approach to non-proliferation.* We believe that the United Nations should focus its substantive work on this problem whose significance is growing each day.

In general, a balance should be reached between the States realizing their right to defence and the prevention of weapons concentrations that could be a material prerequisite for launching an aggression.

REGIONAL ISSUES

Today, the relationship between the enhancement of the non-proliferation régime and the *settlement of regional conflicts* clearly comes to the fore. Particularly inadmissible is the precarious situation where new holders of nuclear weaponry could emerge in hotbeds of tension. Another substantial cause of the persisting danger of proliferation is the fact that excessive amounts of non-nuclear armaments have been accumulated in various regions of the world, which generates a destabilizing potential there. Consequently, the settling of regional conflicts, as well as the promotion of a comprehensive approach to non-proliferation means nowadays a more stable world order and prevents the dangerous spread of arms.

As the Soviet Union and the United States move from confrontation to cooperation and partnership, new prospects open in these areas. The interests of great Powers lie in maintaining stability and security in the world and stem from the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter. However such interests are no longer met by limited, unilateral action, but are fulfilled through multilateral cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, its Security Council, as well as on a regional level. Let me emphasize that this is what we regard as a budding new type of deterrence which is increasingly effected by multilateral and political and legal means.

To be sure, the United Nations Charter was born amid the global conflagration as an outcome of cooperation among the Great Powers. It is toward their cooperation that the Charter has always been oriented since agreement machinery is helpless when hostile nuclear giants are uncompromising. Only today, after the Cold War has been buried for good, the world sees the coming to life of the hope for, and confidence in, a system of collective security as envisaged by the Charter that will be able to effectively safeguard the rights of each member of the Organization.

This means that to be effective in maintaining peace, the United Nations should have at its disposal means to suppress aggression as well as means of persuasion. Taking this into account, *the Military Staff Committee* in the future needs to be turned into an efficient body for cooperation. The initial experience gained through consultations of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council with the participation of military experts engenders some optimism.

We continue to believe it necessary *to put an end to foreign military presences* in the world and we have ourselves resolutely embarked on this course. The withdrawal of troops to within their national boundaries is an integral part of the global disarmament process. It is essential to couple it with the enhancement of the entire range of the Organization's peace-making capacities.

It is no secret that a presence intended to ward off threats to peace on a unilateral basis

meets today with a mixed reaction. At the same time the very existence of a United Nations international force ready to fight any aggression could have a tremendous psychological effect.

I should like to reiterate that we do not rule out the use of force in some cases as defined by the Charter. But this may occur only by virtue of a United Nations decision, with the consent of the Security Council and within the framework of international law. The inescapability of punishment for any aggression should serve as a strong disincentive for any claims to armed hegemony. That would forbid unilateral arbitrary action or the recurrence of power politics.

Structures of regional security need to be strengthened considerably. Developments in Europe have demonstrated their effectiveness in maintaining peace.

Here we have always to remember that Europe is only a part of the world, and its future is being determined by developments transcending its boundaries. It was not accidental that the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" appealed to all countries of the world to demonstrate their solidarity and to join their efforts in advancing common human values.

Fears that the European house is supposedly isolating itself from the rest of the world are groundless. On the contrary, the system of security now being built in Europe is an integral component as well as a prototype of a worldwide system of collective security envisaged by the United Nations Charter. Cooperation in Europe - for the benefit of all and not at somebody's expense - is the only sound logic that is supported by real deeds.

Strengthened stability in Europe means strengthened security on a global scale as well. The moulding of truly civilized relations in Europe that lead toward a "common house" will, we believe, serve as an attractive example for the other regions of the world provided, of course, that relevant States take the initiative and regional peculiarities are taken into account. Finally, Europe's ability to contribute to the solution of global problems is directly linked to progress in cementing the division and organizing an all-embracing interaction on the continent.

To think globally and to act locally is an approach applicable in the civic society of any nation and is quite promising from the viewpoint of regional good-neighbourly relations. *Regional organizations* should also play an essential role in a world being renovated. Their potential still waits to be discovered and their cooperation with the United Nations needs to be further strengthened. To give an example, the Arab factor could have and should have contributed to curbing Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

Upon instructions of the Soviet leadership I went recently on a mission to a number of Arab States. I saw for myself that all of them were concerned, above all, with short-term prospects for a settlement of the Persian Gulf crisis. At the same time some consideration was being given to the future and to regional structures of post-crisis security. These are envisaged as a set of measures to ensure a gradual transition to reasonable defence sufficiency, to transform the region into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons, and to strengthen mutual confidence.

I believe that a future-oriented approach in this particular case and, for that matter, in other situations, lays the groundwork for realistic decision-making. As you may recall, the initial plans for a post-war organization of universal security were discussed in 1943 in Tehran when fierce battles were still raging on the war fronts. Today we need to muster no smaller degree of historical perspicacity.

The "coupling" of the United Nations with regional organizations provides a powerful tool for strengthening security on a really multi-dimensional and comprehensive basis. We

subscribe to the idea of undertaking an *ad hoc study on regional aspects of strengthening security with the United Nations playing the central role.*

An all-embracing, multi-dimensional approach to security predetermines common interest in *arrangements to combat new threats*: terrorism, illicit drug trafficking, environmental disasters. After all, whether we want it or not, security can only be universal - peace and tranquility in our big house called the planet Earth cannot be divided among individual national apartments.

Our world that is now in the process of disarmament and renewal calls for a diplomacy of crisis prevention rather than crisis management. The United Nations should be bolder in using the available means of "early warning" of prospective conflicts and contain them through joint effort. What is more, with a view to *strengthening the preventive potential of multilateralism*, we need to discuss already at this stage the idea of putting into operation under the United Nations auspices a full-fledged network of conflict warning and prevention.

A role is to be played in this context by the new world outlook and a corresponding *modern interpretation of the principles of State sovereignty and non-interference* in internal affairs. Sovereignty and non-interference grant no right to impose an iron curtain. What they do grant is a right to independent management of one's affairs, which is conditioned however by the interdependence of the world, is increasingly exercised through the participation in international agreements and organizations, and amplified by mutual responsibility. After all, such things as human rights monitoring, observation of elections, inspections of military facilities, humanitarian assistance in case of nationalist or ethnic conflicts are already becoming part of common practice. This means that a new type of reaction is needed in a world that disarms itself: the sufferings of one country are the sufferings of the entire international community.

The strengthening of the United Nations authority in a world that disarms also presupposes a *post-confrontation reading* of the United Nations Charter. It is because the Charter was conceived as a set of guidelines for establishing relations of peace and cooperation between democratic States united by a common goal that it has proved so viable. Everyone should learn to read it non-selectively, correlating one's rights with one's obligations. Then the collective wisdom of our civilization will be effective in its primary function of maintaining international peace and security.

To lay down, with the help of the United Nations, the foundations for global interaction we have to allocate adequate resources for the strengthening of multilateral mechanisms. Yes, indeed, peace is worth being paid for.

Therefore strict *compliance by all the United Nations Member States with their financial obligations* under the Charter is indispensable. On the other hand, rational use of available material and human resources, better coordination within both the United Nations itself and its specialized agencies and the avoidance of overlaps in their programmes are becoming an important political task.

The United Nations' ties with the intellectual and scientific communities have always shaped the image of this Organization. I am pleased to note that this rapport gets stronger and more fruitful with every passing year.

Chapter 2
Negotiations, Palavers and Surgical Strikes

Lothar Brock

INTRODUCTION

Looking back from the future to the present, from the year 2000 to the beginning of the 1990s, what will we see? Will 19 November 1990, the day on which the Paris Charter was signed, be remembered as the date at which a new era of international relations was formally ushered in or will it be seen as the climax of a short interlude of confidence-building and cooperation which quickly gave way again to the familiar patterns of threat and confrontation?

Will the decisions of the Security Council to invoke economic sanctions against Iraq and to allow the use of force in order to free Kuwait be understood to have opened up a new chapter in the history of the United Nations, a chapter of collective action for the restoration and preservation of peace, or will these decisions turn out to have been the beginning of the end of those hopeful developments which took shape in the fabulous year of 1988, when we witnessed an outright scramble for peace?

It seems that we are standing at the threshhold of a new era of international relations and at the brink of an abyss, into which the hopes and expectations which went along with the ending of the Cold War could soon disappear. In post World-War-Two history, there seldom has been a moment as precarious as this one. I am afraid we are just beginning to realize how much is at stake.

It is upon this background that we have to address the question what the United Nations has been doing for arms limitation and disarmament in the past and what it can do today in order to brighten the prospects for the peaceful resolution of international conflict in the future. In a historic moment like the present one, every potential actor merits renewed attention because he may acquire a hitherto unforeseen importance.

FROM NEGOTIATIONS TO PALAVER? EARLY PROGRESS AND ENSUING FRUSTRATIONS IN GLOBAL ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT

Let us have a look into the abyss, before raising our heads again for a more invigorating view of the possibilities ahead.

The institutionalization of global arms limitation and disarmament negotiations in the early 1960s reflected the special responsibility of the highly armed industrialized countries and particularly of the two world Powers in this issue area. During the 1960s, this arrangement went largely unchallenged, though there already was an enlargement of membership from the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee of 1962 to the 26 Nations Committee of 1969 which then became the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

During the 1970s, within the context of the growing North-South polarization, the non-aligned countries began to press for a democratization or parliamentarization of global arms limitation and disarmament activities. This policy confronted the hitherto dominant principle of the special responsibility of the super-Powers with the counter-claim that the

negotiations should follow the principle of universality and that the United Nations should play the central role in the permanent deliberations and negotiations on the global level.

The Non-Aligned were successful to the extent that deliberations on arms limitation and disarmament on the United Nations level were substantially expanded through the convocation of the Special Sessions on Disarmament and the founding of the Disarmament Commission while membership of the Committee on Disarmament was further extended to the number of 40 and the super-Powers lost their privileged position in the negotiating body through the introduction of a rotating chairmanship of the CD. The change of its name to Conference on Disarmament in 1984, expressed these developments.

Thus, from the viewpoint of the Third World countries, some progress was achieved on the institutional and procedural level. However, as is well known this progress was not matched by an increase in output of arms control and disarmament agreements. To the contrary, while quite a few agreements were reached during the 1960s and in the first half of the 1970s (Partial Test Ban, Outer Space, Non-Proliferation and Seabed Treaties, Biological Weapons Convention), after the Convention on the prohibition of environmental modifications for hostile purposes in 1977, no further treaty has been signed. Negotiations on chemical weapons have been lingering on for more than a decade, the comprehensive test ban has not materialized, and even progress in the negotiations on radiological weapons, which would actually be of little practical importance as yet, has been extremely slow.

Thus, it would follow that the parliamentarization of disarmament negotiations and the strengthening of the influence of the General Assembly in this context was accompanied by a loss of effectiveness of the negotiation-process and the degeneration of the overall activities into a general palaver especially between North and South.

A recent report on "The United Nations and Nuclear Disarmament" states that:[1]

> "The huge membership of the CD together with the expanded agenda have made the CD a replica of the General Assembly and it has, in consequence, been unable to function as a negotiating body.(...) The only achievement of the CD since its reconstruction in 1978 as far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, has been the intensive care with which it has fulfilled its bureaucratic obligation concerning the agenda requirement to consider and adopt an annual report.(...) It is somewhat surprising to find that the negotiating body spends substantially longer on considering its annual report than it does on the more substantive issues of the agenda.(...) Bureaucratic and extensive procedural arrangements have been given priority over negotiation of disarmament agreements."

The comment of Jones and Bourantonis on the special sessions of the General Assembly is just as critical:

> "Ten years after the First Special Session, the United Nations Organization has proved once again unable to facilitate or promote disarmament. The special sessions, which were originally understood to serve as a particular instrument in the hands of the United Nations intended to give impetus to the United Nations's role by entrusting the General Assembly with more regulating power, have turned into a ritual exercise."[2]

In accord with such observations it has become quite common by now to criticize the global negotiations and deliberations on arms limitation and disarmament along the following lines:

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[1] Jones, Peter and Demetris Bourantonis (1990): The United Nations and Nuclear Disarmament: A Case Study in Failure?, in: *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, (1), p. 3.

[2] *Idem*, p. 12.

- global negotiations and debates on disarmament (be it in the General Assembly, its First Committee and in the Disarmament Commission or in the CD) have devoted too much time and energy to procedural and organizational matters in comparison to the work done on substantial matters,
- the conceptual amplification of the debate by linking disarmament and development issues and by broadening the understanding of security through the inclusion of economic aspects (economic security), has led to a more or less ritualized exchange of contradictory points of view between North and South and did more to slow down negotiations than to enlighten them;
- the multilateral negotiations and deliberations during the 1970s and 1980s were in themselves contradictory inasmuch as the privileged position of the super-Powers in the negotiating body was curtailed while at the same time the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers were considered to constitute the core of the arms limitation and disarmament task. Compared with the importance attributed to nuclear disarmament, the conventional arms race in the Third World, which gained considerable momentum during the 1970s, was neglected.

A Worst Case Scenario for the Global Approach to Arms Limitation and Disarmament

In contrast to the frustrations of global arms limitation and disarmament activities, regional negotiations in Europe and bilateral negotiations between the super-Powers in the second half of the 1980s, led to stunning results if viewed against the anxieties which prevailed in Europe in the first half of the 1980s. Moving from arms control to disarmament, agreement was reached to scrap the INF and to reduce conventional forces in Europe substantially. In addition, the super-Powers finally resolved their long-standing deadlock over chemical weapons and opened the prospect for deep cuts in strategic weapons.

In viewing both aspects together, the slow-down of multilateral negotiations on the one hand, the (recent) productivity of the regional and bilateral approach of the Northern countries and the continuing reluctance of many Third World countries to take note of these achievements on the other, one could extrapolate the following worst case scenario for the future of global activities in the field of arms limitation and disarmament:

Negotiations on the regional and bilateral level continue in the Northern Hemisphere though with decreasing productivity due to the misgivings and conflicts arising out of the problems of transition in the former group of socialist countries. Global negotiations are being further stalled because of the continuing conflict between the "haves" and the "have-nots" of weapons of mass destruction. This conflict is aggravated by the Gulf crisis which posed a fundamental challenge to Western concepts of international law and diplomacy. Under the impact of increased North-South disagreement on the basic principles of world order, the authority of the United Nations, which was strengthened in the late 1980s by its peace-keeping activities in Africa, Central America, the Middle East as well as West, South and East Asia, is being questioned once again by the member countries.

Meanwhile the arms build-up in the Third World continues - i.e. because the industrialized countries are unable or unwilling for political and economic reasons to stop the flow of arms to the Third World. Thus the number of Newly Militarizing Countries (MICs) which are acquiring the ability to upset regional or even interregional power balances increases. In the resulting atmosphere of distrust and fear, the global level of arms limitation

and disarmament is slowly marginalized. Instead an interregional approach to arms limitation and disarmament gains the upper hand by which the Northern countries, in acute crises, undertake to control armament processes in the MICs through the application of military force directed at impeding and or destroying the production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction in the Third World.

Since the MICs try to outwit the dominance of the old military powers by hardening their military installations against "surgical strikes" or against any other outside attempt to interfere with their respective military ambitions, a new interregional arms race comes about reducing the chances for an effective agreement on chemical and nuclear weapons (continuation of the NPT) to nil. On top of this, existing agreements on other indiscriminate weapons (biological weapons, environmental modification) are being questioned. In general, the importance attributed to military power as a symbol of status and an instrument for the pursuit of national interests mounts. These developments increasingly have adverse repercussions on the regional approaches to arms control and disarmament thus closing the circle of the mutually reinforcing expectation, accumulation and exertion of military power.

Under these conditions, the "peace dividend" of the East-West rapprochement would be lost completely and new militant conflict would arise over the failure to make any substantial progress in cooperative arms control and disarmament on an interregional or global level.

Is this vision too far-fetched? Perhaps not. First of all, as far as military strikes are concerned, there is the precedent of Israel's air-raid on a nuclear power installation in Iraq which aimed at keeping that country from acquiring a nuclear warfare capacity. In the Gulf crisis, President Bush publicly referred to the incipient nuclear warfare capacity of Iraq in connection with his efforts to get United Nations authorization for military action against Iraq. Thus it would seem that uncooperative arms control of the type referred to above is already being practised. Of course, one country will not attack another for the sole purpose of pre-empting or obstructing a military build-up of the latter. However, in situations of severe confrontation, the possibility of demolishing the military machine of the adversary may serve as an additional motivation to go to war before all possibilities of non-military crisis management and conflict resolution are being put to a full test.

Secondly, with a view to the future role of the United Nations, it is doubtful whether the Organization can retain the authority which it acquired during the recent peace-keeping activities. In the initial phase of the Gulf crisis, the United Nations certainly lived up to its new role in regional conflict resolution by taking a firm stand against Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. However, by authorizing, in rather vague and imprecise terms, the application of military force in order to end the occupation of Kuwait, the Security Council set the stage for a quick transformation of peace-keeping into war-fighting without being able to retain control over the military action. A substantial prolongation of this state of affairs may split the international community and thereby impede the future role of the United Nations in international conflicts. Thus, we may end up with a situation resembling the stalemate which resulted from the Cold War and which hampered the role of the United Nations for the larger part of its existence. Already, the authority of the United Nations, in large parts of the Arab world, suffers from the dominant role played by the United States, a national actor, in the international response to the invasion of Kuwait and by the inability of the Organization to enforce its decisions on the Palestine question.

Thirdly, there are already some indications that the activities in the field of arms limitation and disarmament in the European region may be adversely affected by mounting extra-regional tensions. The Gulf crisis complicated confidence-building between the Western

countries and the Soviet Union and it may strengthen the role of military considerations in the future organization of East-West relations. Of course, the misgivings which have arisen over the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area affected by the Vienna Agreement on Conventional Forces Reductions (CFE) are not a result of the Gulf crisis. However, the Gulf crisis lends this controversy additional weight and certainly does not help to attain a common understanding of the situation. In addition, continuous conflict resolution in Europe is hampered by the concentration of Western politics on the Gulf crisis. Thus, we witness the accumulation of a large potential for renewed East-West tensions which will come to the fore once the acute crisis in the Gulf area abates.

INCREMENTAL PROGRESS

The worst case scenario delineated above exaggerates the dangers inherent in present developments for the sake of drawing attention to the fact that the peaceful transformation of international relations in the wake of the rapprochement between East and West will run into more difficulties than were anticipated or spelled out at the Paris Summit in November 1990. Is Europe really primed for peace?[3] The whole transformation process may slow down considerably and it may even break down altogether.

Hence it is all the more important to look at the prospects of global activities in the field of arms limitation and disarmament and of a constructive interaction between the global and the regional levels of politics in this issue area.

In doing so, we may realize that the record of global activities is not quite as bad as would appear from the above critique.

First of all, one has to note that the super-Powers were just as much responsible for the slow-down of negotiations during the 1970s and 1980s as the parliamentarization of these negotiations under the influence of the General Assembly. Probably the controversy between the super-Powers over principles of verification was the single most important factor for the obstruction of the chemical weapons talks in the mid-1980s.[4]

Secondly, the slow-down of negotiations was partly the result of the fact that they had reached a certain threshhold. Up to the mid-1970s, there was an "easy phase" of arms control and disarmament. Concessions could be made which really did not hurt because they did not make a big difference to the existing international power hierarchy. Progress was achieved by giving up military options which were not relevant yet for strategic thinking and planning. All this changed during the mid-1970s, when substantial concessions were called for. This refers to the comprehensive test-ban and chemical weapons as well as verification.

Thirdly, while we may criticize the adverse effects that went along with the parliamentarization of arms limitations and disarmament talks on the global level, we should keep in mind that it does not suffice to count the number of treaties signed in order to measure the success of these talks. Arms limitation and disarmament have to be understood as a continuous process which involves not only treaty-making as such but also agenda setting, confidence building, monitoring and reviewing of existing instruments with a view to their continuation, perfection or termination. These functions cannot be fulfilled without a substantial amount of debate which would help to:

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[3] Evera, Stephen van (1990/1991): Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War, in: *International Security*, Vol. 15, (3), pp. 58-91.

[4] Carter, April (1989): *Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations*, Oxford New York.

- arouse public attention and to allow public scrutiny *vis-à-vis* the various governmental activities to grow,
- transfer expertise and disseminate information on multilateral arms limitation and disarmament,
- clarify the broader political and economic contexts in which arms control negotiations take place,
- spell out conflicts of interest which may impede or block arms control and disarmament negotiations,
- and to agree on priorities of arms control and disarmament activities.

There can be no doubt that the various United Nations activities including the World Disarmament Campaign of the Secretary-General have served these functions. Thus, it is important not to overlook the *indirect* contribution of the United Nations to regional and interregional activities in the field of arms control and disarmament.

In the early 1980s, United Nations activities also complemented the CSCE to a certain degree in helping to keep up East-West communication at the height of the renewed confrontation. Therefore, the United Nations, too, has a certain, though minor part, in the turn of events which led to the spectacular breakthrough in East-West negotiations in the second half of the 1980s.

Apart from these considerations, we should remind ourselves that the short-term inefficiencies of democracy in comparison to a well organized dictatorship would not convince us that we should do away with democracy. In the long run, in spite of, or perhaps because of, its inherent complications, democracy has been proven to be more viable than any dictatorship. This may well apply to global arms limitations and disarmament activities as well if it is permissible to interpret broader participation in these activities as a form of democratization.

Fourthly, while the regional or bilateral approaches to arms control and disarmament because of their very success have led to a loss of relative importance of global activities in this field, the regional approach has functioned more as a challenge than as a stumbling block for the global level talks. Thus, work in the First Committee and in the UNDC have recently been streamlined in order to cut down on procedural waste of time and to focus the talks on a workable agenda. This way, the 1989-crisis of the UNDC was overcome and the Geneva talks on chemical weapons in the CD received a new impetus from the bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1990. In general, lamentation over global-level activities has given room to a more optimistic view of the possibilities ahead.

Under this perspective we may also feel a little easier about the failure of the fourth NPT review conference to agree on a final document. A closer look will reveal that the group of countries critical of the NPT is actually losing in influence. At the conference, the Mexican delegation, which insisted on more substantial concessions on the part of the nuclear States, may just have missed the right moment to accept a compromise. The Mexicans, and their counterparts for that matter, may not want to miss this moment again at the upcoming 1995 conference at which the future status of the Treaty has to be decided upon. So with a view to NPT, the present situation may be contradictory but it is certainly not altogether hopeless. As the danger of proliferation increases, so may interest in making the global

non-proliferation régime more effective through more substantial compromise than could be attained so far.[5]

Fifthly, after the dissolution of the old East-West conflict, North-South issues, together with the problems arising from internal conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, will gain automatically in importance. Thus the strengthening of views from the South in multilateral deliberations on arms control and disarmament during the past decade may turn out to amount to an advance adjustment to the task of the coming decade, which will include reconsideration of the disarmament and development complex.[6]

New Tasks of Global Arms Control and Disarmament

The dismantling of the old East-West confrontation will bring North-South issues to the fore. In this context new challenges will arise which will almost automatically call for a strengthening of United Nations activities in the field of disarmament and of conflict resolution in general.

In addition to situations of acute confrontation, the international community faces grave economic problems which are exacerbated by growing environmental degradation. Thus there are new non-military threats to the life and well-being of societies which have to be addressed by the international community at large. Furthermore, the centrifugal tendencies and increasing ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union call for international attention. There is the acute danger of civil strife which may lead to outright civil or perhaps transnational wars.

Another danger arises from the fact that non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction becomes a task of rapidly increasing complexity as more and more countries will acquire the capacity to handle new technologies in the field of nuclear, chemical and biological armament. This process may be speeded up by some of the specialists who will lose their jobs due to disarmament in the North or who are simply being offered more money in the South.

The increasing importance of North-South issues and of economic as well as ecological threats to the life and well-being of societies, the centrifugal tendencies in the old socialist countries and the growing complexity of the task of non-proliferation - all of these factors will call for more initiative and action on the part of the United Nations.

The international community may also be confronted with entirely new situations calling for new concepts and modes of action. For instance, there may soon arise the need to deal with the question of nuclear proliferation in the context of a restructuring of the Soviet Union. If the Republics should become sovereign political entities, can centralized control of the military be kept up? What if certain republics on the Southern rim with nuclear installations should align themselves with third countries? President Gorbachov has recently addressed this problem stating that a break-up of the Soviet Union and the resulting fragmentation of the Soviet military including the nuclear arsenals may lead to a world-wide catastrophe.

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[5] Müller, Harald (1990): Atomarer Dammbruch? Der Nukleare Nichtweiterverbreitungsvertrag nach der gescheiterten Uberprüfungskonferenz, in: *Friedensforschung Aktuell* (Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung), Frankfurt, 27 October 1990.

[6] Brauer, Jürgen (1990): Reviving or Revamping the Disarmament-for-Development Thesis?, in: *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 21, (3). pp. 307-319.

Furthermore, if domestic and ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and or the Soviet Union should lead to civil war this may constitute a grave threat to the international community to the extent that nuclear power installations might be damaged or destroyed or to the extent that their destruction may be threatened by any of the conflicting parties. Because of the potential global repercussions of such developments, the international community would certainly be called upon to deal with the situation.

But even with a view to non-nuclear industrial installations and to the danger of leakages and malfunctions of such installations, the international community is confronted with a new task: the task of civil disarmament designed to cope with the threats to the life and well-being of societies inherent in certain technological developments. These dangers result not only from dual-use attributes of genetic engineering or chemical industry in addition to nuclear power installations, but also from the civil side of these technological developments proper. Seveso, Chernobyl, Sandoz, Bhopal - these names illustrate the case for civil disarmament. The United Nations may have an important role to play in this respect by arousing public attention, defining the problem, working out concepts for dealing with it, providing channels of communication between industry, NGOs and governmental agencies, etc.

Strengthening Regions and the United Nations

In his 1990 Report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General of the United Nations states:[7]

> "The turn for the better in the field of arms limitation provides an impetus and a fresh sense of purpose to the disarmament machinery within the framework of the Organization. The United Nations Disarmament Commission has been reinvigorated by the recent rationalization of its work. The time is ripe to consider streamlining the work of other disarmament bodies as well. This is necessary for enabling the Organization to cope with issues requiring a concerted international effort."

A concerted effort should not be understood to imply centralization of the respective international problem-solving activities. Instead, the United Nations should play down the potential rivalry between a global and a regional or bilateral approach to arms control and disarmament as to conflict-resolution in general. As regional and bilateral activities in the Northern Hemisphere have demonstrated, there is a good potential for what may be called constructive regionalism. The latter does not marginalize global approaches but rather allows for mutual support and reinforcement of the pertinent activities on all levels. Positive interaction between the bilateral and the multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons may illustrate and support this point. Likewise, the CSCE-process and the resulting East-West détente have strengthened the role of the United Nations in international conflict resolution. This was most impressively illustrated by the "scramble for peace" in 1988.

In general, the United Nations should follow the principle of subsidiarity: what can be done on the bilateral or regional level in a proper way, i.e. in accord with the Charter, should not be done by the United Nations. This would avoid interorganizational friction and enhance problem-solving activities. In other words, the United Nations should work towards an

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[7] Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier (1990): *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, 1990, New York, p. 24.

effective regionalization of conflict resolution in all its aspects to the extent that the problems are essentially of a regional nature or that the regionalization of conflict resolution may help to solve the problems (by playing down the role of outside actors). But even *global* problems do not necessarily call for a centralization of problem-solving activities at the global level. Sometimes global problems can best be dealt with when they are broken down into their regional components. To a certain extent, this pertains also to disarmament. In this context, the United Nations, in addition to supporting regional activities, would have to work towards a positive interaction among regions. So we would actually have to consider three levels of action: the regional, the interregional and the global.

On the other hand, pursuing a regional approach to conflict resolution, conflict prevention or the transformation of conflict behaviour does not imply that there is no need for strengthening the capacities of the United Nations in these issue areas. Constructive regionalism, if it is to endure, depends on a strong United Nations which has the authority to address regional problems or to mobilize and aid regional forces for the preservation or restoration of peace. Here regional conflict resolution in Central America may serve as a good example (cooperation between the Esquipulas states, the OAS and the United Nations). In this respect, the United Nations can also help to prevent one region from turning its back on others or from working towards intraregional integration at the expense of interregional cooperation ("Fortress Europe").

Strengthening the role of the United Nations in this context, makes some institution-building inevitable. Such institution-building could include the creation of a Centre for Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Disarmament as an auxiliary organ of the General Secretariat. Through the Secretary-General the Centre could serve and integrate the tasks of:

- early warning,
- facilitating peace-keeping missions,
- providing expertise for peace-making activities,
- facilitating regional and interregional conflict resolution (including arms limitation and disarmament),
- training of experts for conflict resolution, disarmament negotiations and verification régimes,
- expanding existing forms of exchange of information on scientific and technological developments which may be pertinent to the production of weapons or which may create "civil" hazards and evaluation of such developments,
- following up the findings of the Group of Experts on International Arms Transfer Transparency,
- operationalizing the concept of common security and defining its scope with a view to economic and ecological aspects of security, etc.

As far as actual verification and monitoring of specific arms control and disarmament agreements is concerned, as suggested by the Group of Experts on Verification,[8] this task for the time being would probably be better met within the framework of the various

[8] *Verification in All Its Aspects*, Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of Verification, A/45/372.

agreements to which verification pertains - pending the eventual evolution of more centralized approaches in the future.

The Centre could also strengthen the role of the Secretary-General in the Conference on Disarmament and help to build an international lobby for the extension and improvement of existing arms control and disarmament agreements or the conclusion of new ones. Whether this would be possible would depend on the willingness of the negotiating bodies to accept a stronger role of the Secretary-General and it would depend on the willingness of the international community to accept a stronger Secretary-General as such. A political Secretary-General who would have the competence to take the initiative in conflict resolution and to take part in international conferences in his own right, could use the Centre in order to give substance to such a new role.

The Centre, while directly working for the Secretary-General, could also function as a service institution for the Security Council and regional activities.

The Centre would function in cooperation with the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, which could be reorganized to become a Consultative Committee for the Centre. Reflection on the establishment of such a Centre could profit from the project to set up a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) within the CSCE.

Concluding Remarks

Institution-building is fascinating and easily acquires a dynamic which gets out of tune with realities. So we should not waste any energy in the attempt to replace state-centred authority in the international system by a world authority. Institutions should only be as big as is absolutely necessary to fulfil the task assigned to them. On the other hand, institutional innovation can have a mobilizing effect and it can help to create or uphold the confidence that progress in international relations towards more cooperation and less confrontation is possible after all.

As April Carter has observed, "The standard postwar response to competing national security interests has been to build up arms, while attending numerous conferences to curtail or eliminate them". (Carter 1989, p.36). Before the Gulf crisis, there was some evidence that the international community was moving away from this practice thus overcoming the "conscious hypocrisy" or "genuine schizophrenia" (Carter, *ibid.*) which it involved. Great efforts will be necessary to keep these hopeful developments going and to carry them further. The United Nations will have a most important role to play in this endeavour.

Chapter 3
Removing the Scourge of War

Jasjit Singh

The political architecture of the international system has been subjected to accelerated change in the recent past. Problems of accurate and objective assessment of the implications and perhaps even of the nature of this change arise partly because we are in the midst of that change, and partly because the rate of change is so high. However accelerated change in political relationships, in spite of a predominantly positive direction, inevitably contains potential instabilities. The greatest challenge for the international community - the combined will of which represents the United Nations Organization - thus, is the management of this change. Management of the turbulence and potential instabilities intrinsic to such change, and management of the direction of change may perhaps be the two most crucial elements in this challenge.

International Security and Disarmament

The old framework of security based on the logic of a bipolar military alliance-based concepts and structures sustaining the Cold War has all but disappeared. And a new one has yet to replace the old one. The Cold War has formally ended but most of its instrumentalities are still in place and would take time to be dismantled. What is perhaps of greater significance is that there appears, to a certain degree, an unwillingness to give up in some quarters the underlying assumptions of the military power-based Cold War security structures. The resistance to move away from the concept of nuclear deterrence and the continued reliance on military power for strategic stability even if at lower levels of armaments are typical examples. In this period of transition, therefore, many predictable and more unpredictable factors and actions by States could increase tension and potential for conflict and instability. Uncertainty and unpredictability - both a direct product of the accelerated change of the international political architecture - pose the greatest challenge to international stability, security and peace. And if proof of this was needed, Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait in gross violation of international law provides it. This crisis in fact points towards many of the challenges the United Nations is likely to face in the years ahead.

At another fundamental level, challenges arise out of many structural problems. Not the least of these is the one resulting from the relative decline in the efficacy of the United Nations over the years in relation to issues of peace, security and disarmament. The end of the Cold War is also witnessing a renewal and resuscitation of faith in the United Nations. A more cooperative East-West relationship is bound to produce such a positive effect on the United Nations. However, durability and consistency of member States' policies to rely on the United Nations and to accomplish the aims of the United Nations Charter have yet to be adequately established. It is not merely the question of some States being in arrears to sustain the United Nations financially, but the issue really involves the degree of faith and support States, especially the more powerful ones, are willing to display and to implement policies through and under the United Nations. The contradictions that arise out of the enthusiastic search for unanimity in United Nations, for example, for an economic embargo on one side and the reluctance to place deployed military forces under United Nations mandate and

control are hardly conducive to the strengthening of the United Nations. And yet it is necessary that the United Nations be strengthened to meet the challenges of the future.

Another structural problem has been the shift away from management of international security under United Nations auspices. The basic concept of collective security has remained unaddressed so far. In fact the whole process, by and large, was reduced to a focus on arms control as the means to disarmament and through it, international security. This no doubt was the direct result of an international system dominated by the centrality of East-West relations, which were themselves governed by confrontationist bipolar alliance blocs drawing their strength - and the power to confront - from military power. The inevitable result was the tremendous militarization of Europe, North-East Asia and long-range strategic weapons - the areas where East-West confrontation came face to face more directly, and the militarization of foreign policies. The military power competition extended beyond the alliance blocs primary area of deployments and confrontation, and into the territories of the third world, the oceans and outer space itself. Conceptually, of course, this represented an effort to *manage* the arms race rather than a search for disarmament. Peace was more in the nature of an armed truce where "strategic stability" inevitably emerged as the key element. The process progressively became heavily weighted in favour of arms control where in the labyrinthian diplomatic parleys and bureaucratic formulations it appeared at times to have been sought as an end in itself rather than just the means to the real objective - of disarmament, security and peace. In the process the role the United Nations could possibly play was restricted to a deliberative advisory one while the real issues were managed outside the United Nations framework. Almost all major arms control/disarmament agreements from SALT I, the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty to the START and CFE agreements were negotiated and concluded outside the United Nations framework although the United Nations continued to provide strong support and encouragement to the processes. The trend really seems to have started with the NPT. It may be recalled that on 19 November 1965 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution (2028/XX) moved by India and seven other States calling for an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A treaty was concluded in 1968 but it was not framed on and in fact contradicted, the principles approved by the United Nations General Assembly in 1965. What is even more significant is that from then on disarmament negotiations moved into an essentially bilateral framework between the two super-Powers. The result of disarmament processes moving out of the United Nations framework has been to diffuse any international pressure that the combined efforts of the United Nations could possibly bring to bear on the most heavily armed States. At the same time the arms control approach on bilateral basis provided legitimacy for other States to remain outside any commitments to arms reduction. The classical example, of course, has been that of the United Kingdom and France seeking to "compensate" western capabilities for the loss under the INF Treaty! The effect is noticeable in the very outcome of the United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament when at the last (Third) session in 1988, in spite of a more accommodating approach amongst the majority of the States and a more relaxed international climate, it was not possible to arrive at a final document.

Now that the underlying factors have changed, the question that remains is whether arms control/disarmament will continue to be the methodology for the management of an arms race no longer credible, or will it assume its proper role as one (of the many) means to the larger end? There are signs of a shift towards a more progressive approach; and the challenge ahead will be to reinforce this shift. For example, on 15 December 1989 the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution (44/126) entitled "Review of the

implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security" which re-emphasized the context for international security and disarmament.

The context is perhaps most clearly observed in the eighth preambular and the sixth operative paragraphs which respectively state that:

> "Stressing that disarmament, the relaxation of international tension, respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially the principles of the sovereign equality of States, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the injunction to refrain from the use or threat of use of force in international relations; respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, economic and social development, the complete eradication of colonialism, apartheid and all other forms of racism and racial discrimination, aggression and occupation; the respect for human rights and the strengthening of international peace and security be closely related to each other".

> "Urges all States, in particular the nuclear weapon States and other militarily significant States, to take immediate steps aimed at promoting and using effectively the system of collective security as envisaged in the Charter, as well as halting effectively the arms race with the aim of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and implementing the recommendations and decisions contained in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament".

While 128 States voted for the resolution, unfortunately the United States opposed it, while 24 States (including all other NATO member States) abstained. The challenge for the United Nations is how to maintain the primary focus on security issues where disarmament is but one of the means to the end, no doubt a very important one. At the same time serious consideration will have to be given to the issue of moving from deliberative resolutions (which indicates the agreement in principle to act) to executive action in terms of negotiations, treaties and their implementation.

In looking at the whole issue of security and disarmament, the primary focus will have to be shifted to security rather than disarmament *per se*. The very concept of security encompasses much more than mere quantities of weapons and military force levels. Weapons and force levels do not generate insecurity (or security) by themselves. It is ideas and belief systems which guide the concepts and doctrines for the use and usability of weapons and forces which generate (and even fuel) perceptions of threats and security. In the ultimate analysis, weapons and forces are instrumentalities for political ideas and actions. This indeed has been the underlying principle in the classical Clausewitzean concept of war being an extension of politics by other means. The concept of primacy of political relations in arms control and disarmament process has been reinforced by recent events. While negotiations for START and CFE agreements had been going on for more than 15-20 years, real progress became possible only after some fundamental changes in the political relations between the two blocs emerged. We need to remind ourselves that the Cold War has not come to an end because of arms reduction agreements; but that these agreements have been made possible by the erosion of the Cold War. In fact, as of today, hardly any *actual* reduction has taken place though significant reductions will take place in the coming years. But what has changed is the very framework of political relations. Much of the debate and negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons for example, has been rendered obsolete by the political changes in Europe, especially by the unification of Germany. Even on the Sino-Soviet borders reductions of forces were preceded by changes in political relations and lessening of tensions. It is in this context that such arms reductions reinforce the overall improvement in security environment.

What is, perhaps, even more important is the role of confidence and security building measures in contributing to the improvement of political relations, reduction in mistrust and tensions, and thereby making arms reduction feasible and viable. It is in this context that the proposal for a convention to outlaw the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons adopted by the United Nations General Assembly every year since 1978 and now supported by 138 nations assumes importance.

It is also important to recognize that lower levels of armaments, desirable from every point of view, do not necessarily mean higher potential or level of security. After all, historically, past wars and conflicts have been fought at lower levels of armaments, at least in quality if not quantity also. Pursuit of mere arms reduction, therefore, is no guarantee for enhanced security. In fact, a strong case can be made for increased potential for instability and insecurity once weapons and armament start reducing below certain levels because marginal qualitative/quantitative shifts then have a disproportionately higher impact on the relative balance of military power. This is one of the strong arguments used against the total elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons. Two factors need to be noted. Firstly, regardless of the level of armaments and militarization, alternative approaches to security, as compared to the military power-based strategic stability paradigm that has been in existence for four decades, have become necessary. This has become so as much because of the nature of weaponry (ranging from weapons of mass destruction to long-range precision strike high technology weapons which mostly favour pre-emption) and warfare (which has made society itself inclusive to the war and conflict paradigm), as due to the increasing vulnerabilities of modern societies and States to armed conflict, as well as the increasing prospects of the spread of such weaponry in the world. The second aspect is that if and when any significant progress in the reduction of armaments and forces takes place, corresponding adjustments to politico-military doctrines and the establishment of alternative security paradigms based on altered political frameworks would be necessary for ensuring durability of stability and security. It is against this broad framework of security and disarmament that the challenges for the United Nations in a disarming world have to be identified in more definitive terms.

THE DISARMING WORLD

One of the greatest, and perhaps the most urgent challenge for the United Nations is to undertake an objective and accurate assessment of the phenomenon (which in reality may be the myth) of a "disarming world". Undoubtedly some historic landmark decisions on the reduction of weapons and forces have been taken, unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally. These might have been really significant achievements five or ten years earlier. At this stage political events seem to have overtaken these issues and blurred the reality, the salient aspects of which are briefly outlined below.

The reduction in weapons and forces is taking place only in some of the States of the developed "North". The developing world, on the other hand, appears to be adding to its arsenals. It needs to be noted that the heavy militarization in the North resulted from the arms race consequent to the Cold War. The Cold War was a phenomenon essentially of the North (as much as its precursor, the Second World War was) and the South had remained peripheral except as the object and battlefield of this confrontation. The reduction of conventional forces and military expenditures in the North, though a positive phenomenon to be greatly welcomed, are likely to generate some negative influences too. The CFE agreement alone would mean removal of nearly 70,000 tanks and armoured vehicles and

30,000 pieces of artillery besides thousands of combat aircraft and helicopters. These are to be destroyed or converted to civil application and comprehensive verification procedures are being worked out. However, significant diversion has already taken place pre-empting the CFE treaty. For example, the United States transferred 700 tanks to Egypt and another 350 to Thailand during the past year. What is even more worrisome is that the process of force reductions would render surplus phenomenal quantities of "minor" weapons and military combat systems - tens of thousands of missiles, mortars, radars, C^3I systems and perhaps millions of small arms. These are likely to find their way into the Third World raising the level of mistrust and potential for conflict. As it is, a new spurt in high-technology weapons systems sale to Third World is in evidence - nearly $30 billion United States arms deal with Saudi Arabia, proposed United States sale of 120 F/A-18 aircraft worth $6 billion to South Korea, and high pressure Soviet salesmanship for military aircraft at Farnborough and other shows are but some examples in a global boost being given to arms sales. At the same time significant retrenchment of scientific/technological manpower in the defence industries is inevitable which may seek employment where possible. The infusion of such "technological mercenaries" would have far-reaching consequences for stability and security in the Third World.

The CFE agreements would still leave Europe as the most heavily militarized region of the world and subsequent phases of disarmament would be necessary. However, it is the area of nuclear disarmament where little progress is visible in spite of the START agreements. As it is, a significant part of the aim of INF Treaty as a disarmament measure was defeated by the diversion of INF warheads to create additional nuclear warheads rather than convert the fissile material for non-military purposes. The details of the START agreement are not fully clear as yet and a great deal depends upon the method adopted for counting purposes. The picture that emerges from available data (see table) would indicate that the super-Powers have not even reached the first base camp to the high moral ground they are assuming in relation to nuclear force reductions. The agreement to reduce to 6,000 "accountable"

	Missile Warheads	Bomber Warheads	SLCM	Total
The United States	7 474 4 900 (+ 576 SLBM)*	5 280 4 600	800 350	12 424 11 636
The USSR	10 172 4 900 (+ 528 SLBM)*	3 350 1 040	880 0	11 212 9 658

* Under overhaul.

warheads on either side hides the stark reality that the START would involve an overall reduction of 2,352 warheads (out of 23,636 held by the United States and the Soviet Union) - that is, *less* than a 10 per cent cut overall in strategic warheads as compared to the stated objective of a 50 per cent reduction. What should be of greater concern is the *increase* in nuclear warheads except those deployed on land-based missiles. This is reminiscent of the earlier SALT-I - the first treaty to limit strategic weapons which in reality was an agreement

to build up (instead of building down as indeed required under the provisions of the NPT) weapons systems to mutually agreed levels well beyond what were existing at the time in some cases. Present START agreement also indicates an agreement to build up (rather than force reduction) the level of nuclear warheads on bombers and SLCMs (Sea Launched Cruise Missiles) - in one case starting from a zero base. In the overall context, the START agreement may finally represent around 4 per cent reduction in total nuclear warheads in the world. When this is seen along with the absence of progress in working out a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing, an inescapable conclusion emerges: the nuclear weapon powers may make cosmetic changes in nuclear forces, but major reduction in forces (not to talk of the earlier stated goal of elimination of nuclear weapons) remains a distant dream.

The START agreement indicates a significant shift in favour of "survivable" weapons. This may support stability among the two super-Powers, but the nature of the delivery systems which would carry 4,400 more nuclear warheads would generate enormous uncertainties in crisis conditions because of the dual-capable nature of the delivery systems. In many respects the START agreement, while representing some progress in nuclear force reductions, points to a shift towards qualitative emphasis in the arms race where the role of the heavy land-based ICBM is retained even if at lower levels. This must be noted in the context of the massive arsenals with tremendous overkill capabilities that exist at present. Reduction of these ICBMs would have amounted to rationalization of the requirements to support nuclear strategies. But the concurrent *increase* in nuclear forces - both maritime and air power-based represents a continuing reliance on nuclear forces and their utility. Coming as it does after the end of the Cold War, one cannot help but restate the earlier unstated role of nuclear forces - political coercion and military threat to non-nuclear weapon States. It needs to be recalled here that during the Cold War period, besides the all-pervasive threat of nuclear forces implicit in their very existence, more explicit threats have been noticeable in relation to at least 41 crisis situations in the world, mostly in the territories of the developing world and in situations of adverse asymmetry in the target country. Even as the Cold War winds down "new threats" are being articulated in the North (especially by the United Kingdom and the United States of America) to justify the continuation and even expansion of nuclear forces for possible use in the Third World. Meanwhile the United Kingdom and People's Republic of China plan to *increase* capability and number of warheads. The United Kingdom is building four new Vanguard-class submarines and are purchasing United States Trident II missiles for them. The Chinese are working on more modern and accurate ICBMs incorporating solid fuel propellant and MIRV capability. The new strike aircraft, the H-7, may also be made nuclear-capable.

At the same time there is little indication of any shift in the conceptual reliance on nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon States. The United States (and the United Kingdom and France) are firmly committed to nuclear deterrence and warfighting strategies. Leading United States strategists recommending long-term strategies include the use of nuclear weapons in the Third World. This is reinforced by the actual deployments. For example, by mid-September, United States warships deployed in West Asia were reportedly carrying 300-odd nuclear bombers depth charges on three aircraft carriers, and 50 (out of 200) Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles on board the surface ships were nuclear armed, besides a half-dozen of Tomahawk-equipped attack submarines with 10-20 nuclear missiles, and about 125 nuclear bombs stored at Incirlik airbase in Turkey (where USAF F-111s have been deployed). The Soviet Union and China have been supporting the United Nations resolution calling for a convention to ban the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. In

fact President Mikhail Gorbachev had clearly called (jointly with India in the 1986 Delhi Declaration) for such a convention. However, no progress has taken place in implementing the United Nations resolutions seeking to delegitimize nuclear weapons.

PROLIFERATION ISSUES

The proliferation of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction, continues to be a serious cause of concern. The NPT is believed to have served some useful purpose in controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it has been, in reality, totally inadequate as an effective non-proliferation régime. Its fundamental framework was a denial of the principles outlined by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution of 19 November 1965. During the period of more than two decades that it has been in force, the nuclear weapon States have proliferated their arsenals forces, and infrastructures vertically, spatially and horizontally (see figure 1). The NPT has failed to stop States (like Israel, Pakistan and South Africa) from acquiring nuclear weapons once they acquired the will to do so. It is inconsequential for countries exercising self-restraint like India. It is irrelevant for the large number of States in the world who either do not have the means to acquire the capability or where these weapons are not perceived to have a role in the national security calculus. And yet the dangers of proliferation are increasing, and the need for an effective non-proliferation régime greater than even before. At the same time an effective chemical weapons non-proliferation régime must remain high on the agenda of the international community.

At the same time, developments of the past two decades require a fresh look at the whole issue of proliferation. New linkages in proliferation have developed with increasing coupling of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, longer-range delivery vehicles (ballistic and cruise missiles) and new technologies. Some of the countries in the Middle East have tried to construct a deterrent equation between chemical weapons and (Israeli) nuclear weapons. In the past chemical weapons have been perceived essentially in military and counter-force terms, and hence "manageable" through deterrence and protection. The very concept of substituting nuclear with chemical weapons, especially with missile delivery, would lay open centres of population to such dangers. It may be noted that it might need just one missile warhead (not necessarily attracting the provisions of MTCR) to create the level of death and destruction we experienced in the gas-leak tragedy in the Bhopal accident in December 1984.

From all accounts all the developed and at least 17 developing countries will have ballistic missiles of significant ranges by the end of this decade. With growing accuracy such systems would be militarily usable even with conventional warheads. The extensive use of missiles against cities in the Iran-Iraq war in 1988 and the successful defence of Jalalabad by Afghan forces in 1989 have increased perceptions of the efficacy of missiles even with conventional warheads. Development of cruise missiles by a larger number of countries in future would appear to be an inevitable process. Such triple-capable systems and their proliferation is likely to create new and serious threats to stability and security at the global, regional and national levels. The problem would not be manageable through control mechanisms like the MTCR. What is needed is a universal ban on missiles with ranges in excess of 30-50 km. This would serve even the interests of the countries of the North better in the long run. The international community must seriously address itself to the problem of missile proliferation, and the United Nations should take the lead in the matter.

FIGURE 1: STRATEGIC WARHEADS



THE NEW ARMS RACE

There is a serious risk that the optimism bordering on euphoria generated by the drastic alteration in East-West political and security paradigm may tend to diffuse focus from the dangers of the new emerging arms race. New, emerging, and frontier technologies are being developed by the great powers (especially the United States of America and the Soviet Union) and when applied to military uses would have a major impact on the very nature of warfare, strategic stability and international security. These technologies involve new types of hypervelocity and hypersonic vehicles and delivery systems, new range of weapons using kinetic and/or directed energy, and reconnaissance surveillance and target acquisition systems. Distinction must be drawn in the qualitative improvement of existing types of weapons and the new range of weaponry possible with emerging frontier technologies of which the single stage to orbit space plane is but one example. The United States NASA project was redesignated in 1985 as the X-30 programme guided by United States military with obvious military implications. Although the issue has been brought on the agenda of the United Nations since 1988, it appears that this distinction has not been adequately recognized and the focus is still on what may be termed as incremental modernization processes rather than the qualitative jump implicit in the emerging frontier technologies and their military application. The fact that these are civilian applications in itself justifies their development. The problem lies in their application for military purposes which threatens a new arms race. The United Nations must address, on priority, the issue of containment and prevention of this new arms race. Just as the time to really prevent the current nuclear arms race was the early 1940s (when nuclear weapons, strategic bombers, and ballistic missiles were in the realm of new emerging technologies), so too the opportunities to contain a future qualitative arms race rest in the present.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS

The winding down of the Cold War may give rise to new inter- and intra-State tensions in the North, but one can expect, for various reasons, peace and security to generally prevail there. However, the rest of the world - the South - is likely to continue experiencing tension, disputes and conflicts, both at inter- and intra-State levels. In fact, besides the traditional causes of conflicts, new elements - like those generated by transnational ideologies, religious fundamentalism, ethnic conflicts and subnational separatism are likely to increase the potential for conflict. Tensions and conflicts in the South would inevitably have an adverse impact on international security. At the same time a large number of issues are likely to increase North-South tensions thus complicating management of international security issues.

At a fundamental level, most of the States of the South are still in the process of trying to build and consolidate their nation States. (In fact some countries in the North, like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia face problems too). One of the crucial elements in this process is the socio-economic development and the problem of sustaining adequate growth rates. Given the general slowing down of global economy, prospects of economic growth in the South face serious problems. At the same time, these countries face the revolution of rising expectations creating a volatile situation with serious potential for instability. This in itself tends to bring the South in a state of dissonance, if not actual tension with the North. There are apprehensions in many parts of the South that with the easing of East-West tensions, cooperation amongst the States in the North may operate to the detriment of the

developmental interests of the South. The United Nations possesses great potential in addressing these issues to minimize sources of friction and enhance stability and therefore security throughout the world.

There are a large number of indigenous causes of local regional tensions, dispute and conflict mostly in the South. However, one thing is clear: *all the regional conflicts are region-specific*, and their prevention and resolution must take this region-specificity into account. The heavy infusion of arms, especially high technology weapons, tends to exacerbate these tensions and conflicts. High levels of military expenditures and militarization of States aggravate the situation. While the North indicates signs of disarming, there is very little evidence of this process even starting in the South. On the other hand, if the Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait and the subsequent crisis was any sign, the trend is the reverse of that in the North. At the same time, the crisis and conflict in West Asia represents the nature of instability and insecurity the world may face in the post-Cold War period. It is perhaps representative of the nature and type of challenges for the United Nations in the post-Cold War era.

As we enter the post-Cold War era, three significant characteristics of the inter-State political landscape stand out which invalidate many of the assumptions held dear so far. Firstly, the increasing erosion of military power and "war as an instrument of policy" places higher premium on political and economic power as instruments of policy. This, however, does not make military power and use of force totally obsolete. While risk of misuse of force would remain, it is certain that new methods and mechanisms would be needed to resolve conflicts and regulate the use of force. The other two flow from the first: the need for strengthening the United Nations; and multilateral/bilateral *political (as against military alliance)* dominated arrangements to manage stability and security in an increasingly interdependent multipolar/multiplex world. International community is likely to face new threats and challenges as the crisis in West Asia indicates. The United Nations Charter has an even greater relevance in the changing landscape. However, adjustments to the United Nations *structure* may be necessary to meet the requirements of today and tomorrow.

It is in this context that the concept of collective security needs to be given concrete shape. India has always stood by this concept; and its opposition to military pacts (and even to the idea of common security) was based on the fact that they undermined the concept of collective security which is the cornerstone of the United Nations. It is, therefore, necessary to seek regional collective security arrangements. The major source of insecurity in most regions is mistrust and perceptions of threat. Collective security arrangements would need to start with political issues, especially of confidence-building among nations of the region concerned, and between them and other regions. Till now the major stumbling-block for such an arrangement was the Cold War rivalry. With the end of the Cold War greater cooperation should be forthcoming to institute collective security arrangements.

The actual form and substance of the collective security arrangements will have to evolve out of debate, discussion and consensus. At this stage only broad tentative framework can be suggested. Before we discuss what the mechanism should be it needs to be emphasized *what it must not be*: that is, it must not be a military alliance, and it must not be based on a narrow restricted geographical region with a small number of contiguous States of what essentially would be a subregion. The primary task would be the establishment and sustaining of confidence-building and collective security measures.

The bulk of the problems the world is likely to face in future would be *region specific* and the Security Council and/or General Assembly of the United Nations are not best

equipped to handle them at least at the embryonic stage where, optimally, solutions should be sought. However many of the regional disputes/conflicts have an impact on the security of States beyond the immediate region, some (like the current West Asian crisis) with global implications. A collective security mechanism capable of dealing with the real issues and drawing inspiration from United Nations instrumentalities like the ESCAP (Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific), CD (Conference on Disarmament) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) would provide a suitable model.

Serious consideration needs to be given to the establishment of Commissions for Security and Confidence-Building (CSC) at the continental level, as well as regional levels, preferably within the framework of the United Nations Organization. This would strengthen the United Nations through a process of *federalization* which would reinforce the role of the Security Council and General Assembly. Thus a CSC for Asia and the adjoining oceans should be established in this context. Asia itself has three distinct regions with their own characteristics influencing security and stability in each of the regions: North-East Asia; South/South-East Asia-South Pacific; and Southern and West Asia, with contiguous oceans and island States in each case. Thus three regional CSCs would be called for.

The primary role of the CSCs would be to identify potential sources of disputes/conflicts in the region and alert the United Nations systems and member States; evolve cooperative approaches to avert conflicts; work actively to resolve conflicts; and evolve/negotiate/put in place confidence-building measures both in multilateral as well as bilateral frameworks. Maintaining sanctity of borders, agreements for non-use of force, norms for the use of force where it becomes inescapable are but some of the examples of the issues of security and confidence-building measures on which durable collective security could be constructed. Security of small States would naturally receive a high priority and hence insecurity, real or otherwise, arising out of perceptions of hegemony of larger Powers would be largely attenuated. Such mechanisms would not seek to supplant existing regional/subregional cooperative instrumentalities like the ASEAN, SAARC, or GCC, etc., but to build with them greater trans- and interregional cooperative framework. CSC measures also must not seek to replace bilateral agreements for security and confidence-building where they exist or are established in future.

Seen in this context, a CSC for Southern and West Asia (and Indian Ocean) would include countries of the region extending from Egypt to Myanmar, and Turkey to Seychelles. Participation by the leading extra-regional Powers - the United States of America, the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, Japan and Western Europe, would be necessary to increase the effectiveness of the Commission. Such participation to enhance political and collective security cooperation by, say, the United States would be more welcome and *effective* as compared to extra-regional military deployments. Such an arrangement would ensure that great and major power interventions do not take place on unilateral decisions, and if they do they will expose the intervenors. Secondly, by involving all great significant Powers and the States of the region in the arrangement it should be possible to deal with attempts at local destabilization. Thirdly, there would be a sense of security in regard to strategic raw materials (like oil) and stability of the socio-economic development processes. Fourthly, such a collective security arrangement should lead to constructive control over the flow of arms into the area. Fifthly, it would contribute to ensure that militarism is not perpetuated and orderly change towards democracy and pluralism proceeds forward within the framework of established nation States. Sixthly, the sense of threat posed by covert nuclear arsenals and chemical/missile threats can be attenuated. Seventhly, it would provide

a framework to deal with international narcotics flow and terrorism. Eighthly, it would provide the forum for definitive negotiating processes to reduce weapons and forces and truly provide the impetus for a disarming world with alternative security arrangements in place to ensure stability. And finally, such region-wise collective security arrangements would be building blocks to an international comprehensive security system essential to the replacement of the bipolar military-alliance structured system which has dominated the world for more than four decades but which has been rendered irrelevant in the changing parameters of international strategic environment and the end of the Cold War.

The hope of establishing a more secure world order lies in the United Nations being able to meet the challenges ahead. The major challenge for the United Nations is its own strengthening through evolution. The federalization of United Nations with a cellular supporting structure for collective security emphasizing political cooperation and confidence-building for greater security would seem to offer the best solution in removing the scourge of war and conflict.

Chapter 4
Keeping, Making and Building Peace

Maj Britt Theorin

This past year Europe has witnessed a series of stunning events, culminating in the unification of Germany - Germany, the mirror of the Cold War, the focal point of the arms race, the epitome of Europe's division.

In November 1990, a summit meeting of epochal importance was held in Paris to seal the birth of a new security order in Europe.

For Europe, the summit in Paris was a solemn confirmation of the promising and rapid developments on the continent and in relations between the great powers which have been taking place in recent years.

But, above all, we regard the summit as the start of a new era in European history and in great-power relationships - an era of *common security.*

This is the start of a period of constructive work for a new European peace and security order, for disarmament and for cooperation.

As a result of the developments of the last few years, the kind of great-power conflict which we feared in the past - that is to say an armed conflict which could be deliberately escalated into a nuclear war - has now become virtually impossible.

Increasing mutual confidence on the part of the great powers has meant that the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war at this level has diminished appreciably.

The world community now has a unique opportunity to intensify its quest for *common security.*

* * *

A recent report from the United Nations estimates that the growth rate in the industrialized nations will exceed 3 per cent per year in the 1990s.

But for developing countries, growth will not match the increase in population.

More people will have less to share.

Heavy debt burdens will aggravate the problems.

Unemployment will grow.

Illiteracy will spread.

This is another warning of possible future global confrontations between rich and poor. It could indicate that there may be ground for a future bitter struggle between industrialized developed countries on the one hand, and the poorer countries on the other.

This is what *could* happen. But it does not *have* to happen. And it cannot be *allowed* to happen.

We can learn from history, but we need not repeat history.

It *is* possible to steer events in another direction. The richer countries must show that we take the problems of the poorer nations seriously - that we respect the rights, the culture and the individuality of other nations and regions.

We must show that the basic values of justice and solidarity, freedom and self-determination, do not just apply to one half of the world - they apply to all nations, all over the world.

If justice and solidarity do not have global relevance, then gaps will widen and confrontations will happen - economically and politically, culturally and socially.

This is why we must take action.

Otherise, we run the risk of seeing many more violent conflicts in the years to come. And worst of all, this will endanger the future of the world's children.

The social and economic conditions in the world today can have awesome consequences for the younger generation.

During this decade we will witness the birth of the largest generation in the history of the planet - with some 1-5 billion children being born.

But millions of these children will only be permitted to spend a short time on Earth.

Each day, 40,000 children die - many of them from diseases which could easily be prevented.

The world now has the means to protect the lives of all children - to ensure their survival, to promote their development. We know how to do it. What we now need is the commitment to take action.

At this very moment, we have a special opportunity to fulfil that goal.

Right now, we have a unique chance to take a bold initiative for improving North-South relations.

This is a matter of basic solidarity with people in other countries in difficult circumstances.

But it is also an issue which is decisive for our common security.

* * *

In an increasingly interdependent world, political, economic and social issues are tightly interlinked. And they tend to cut across both ideological and geographical boundaries.

The international community can never turn away from the global problems which threaten the very existence of many millions of people on other continents and their prospects of a life in dignity.

In the United Nations we have a unique institution for promoting international peace and security, as well as social welfare and economic prosperity. The work of this organization in conflict resolution lately has given rise to great hopes.

Industrialized countries have a special responsibility.

In material standards, in the health of our children, in educational systems, in social services, in the quality of life - the industrialized countries are far more privileged than most other nations of the world. Accordingly, it is particularly essential that these countries give the United Nations their full support in these endeavours.

We now need to make a global attack on *poverty*. We need to save the lives of the thousands of children who die unnecessarily each day, from sickness and disease, from famine and malnutrition. And we must avoid a future global confrontation between developing nations and the richer industrial countries.

The new climate of cooperation makes all this possible.

On the other hand, in the past couple of months the world community has also had to contend with a new grave threat to international peace and security.

The Iraq-Kuwait crisis reminds us every day that peace is very fragile in many areas of the world.

This case of unprovoked aggression, this flagrant violation of national sovereignty has been universally condemned.

There are lots of lessons to be learned from that crisis. Not least for those countries who have supplied Iraq with the most sophisticated weapons. The trade in weapons has to be limited. International control of all arms trade is urgently called for. All States, both arms exporters and importers, must comply with such control. As a starting point, a register of the weapons trade may be established under the auspices of the United Nations.

This crisis must not be allowed to escalate into war.

The role of the United Nations must be to work for *peace*, not to prepare for *war*.

The United Nations must be at the centre of continued efforts to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.

The United Nations must play the role that the Charter provides for in ensuring international security.

A peaceful solution of the crisis in the Gulf would be a breakthrough for the application of the basic principle of collective security.

As Albert Einstein once said: "Peace cannot be kept by force. It can only be achieved by understanding".

* * *

The world's expectations of the United Nations have varied over the years. The United Nations role in recent efforts for peace has once again raised expectations.

The United Nations has contributed to creating new opportunities of solving conflicts and restoring peace. Strong support for the United Nations work for peace is called for. Such support would also contribute to making the United Nations the strong and effective organization that is needed if we are to meet the global challenges of the 1990s: halting the arms race, protecting the environment, safeguarding our resources and promoting development.

The threats to our survival are coming from various directions. We are becoming increasingly dependent on global cooperation.

It is the United Nations that must organize and direct this cooperation.

The recent successes of the United Nations towards the settlement of several regional conflicts have added new dimensions to the concept of collective responsibility and security.

The general improvement in East-West relations has paved the way for these positive developments.

But it is also clear that an important factor has been patient and quiet diplomacy under United Nations auspices.

Yet, as long as war and conflict are still a reality in many parts of the world, the United Nations has the obligation to continue to ensure peaceful solutions, based on the principles of international law.

* * *

Peace-keeping, *peace-making* and *peace-building* are the tools which the United Nations uses in its task of serving peace.

United Nations *peace-keeping* activities help conflicting parties avoid continued violence.

United Nations *peace-making* efforts help conflicting parties to reach lasting solutions.

United Nations *peace-building* helps create conditions which may remove causes of war and conflict altogether.

The task of peace-building involves formidable challenges:

We must take action to eradicate world poverty.

We must fight starvation and disease.

And - we must rapidly reverse the trend of environmental destruction which fatally threatens our planet and the future of our children.

* * *

The need to halt and reverse environmental degradation is a key challenge to the United Nations.

Together with preventing nuclear war, this is the most pressing challenge. Catastrophe is closing in on us, as we blindly cross ecological thresholds which we should never even have come near. Unless we now act collectively and decisively, we will all march into a poisoned wasteland.

In less than two years time, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development will be meeting in Brazil. That Conference will have to make a number of important decisions.

In 1972, the first United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, under the motto "Only One Earth". It endorsed the principle of joint action in a field of global concern. But that was not enough.

The scale of the problems has vastly outpaced the fragmented measures taken so far.

We now know with certainty that the climate of the Earth is changing.

We are facing the tragedy of advancing deserts and retreating and dying forests.

We are confronted with an ever-increasing loss of species, ever scarcer fresh water resources, destructive living conditions in urban areas, and pressures of over-population.

These problems jeopardize the livelihood, prosperity and security of present and future generations. They have come to actually threaten the entire global life-support system of our planet.

Effective strategies are now needed - at the national, regional and global level. We who belong to the affluent minority, which consumes the majority of our common resources, will have to take the lead. But nobody will escape responsibility to act.

We will all have to work together closely, to avert economic and environmental disaster.

We must now translate the concept of sustainable development into reality. To do this, we need specific action on key issues.

We need important *structural* changes, within our countries.

We must agree on modalities for efficient *transfers* of environmentally sound technologies.

And we must agree on how to provide additional *financial* resources to developing countries.

Against this background, the potential for utilizing human resources allocated to military activities to protect the environment, in both developing and industrialized countries, merits further exploration, particularly in the present international climate.

It stands to reason that the military sector is well equipped for solving certain categories of environmental problems, including both natural catastrophes and other types of large-scale

disasters, or the handling and disposal of highly toxic, radioactive, or otherwise harmful substances.

Sweden has proposed that the United Nations should examine if and how military resources might be utilized for the protection of the environment.

* * *

We live in an age when the basic challenge to the United Nations and the only viable course for the international community is to seek security *together* - common security.

The time is past when each State could independently realize its goals and dreams, within its own national boundaries. We want to work together to prevent conflicts, under joint responsibility. We do not want them to be handled by great powers on their own.

More clearly than ever before, we see the need for an effective system of collective security.

Our goal is a system where we all help *protect* each other, where we feel secure in the knowledge that an attack on any one of us will not be tolerated by any one else.

Our goal is a system which has effective institutions for *solving* conflicts, and for handling new threats to our security - before these threats develop into violent confrontations.

Our goal is a system, which builds on a *common* interest. That interest is already clearly defined in the Charter - to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

Our goal is a system which can deal also with *underlying causes of conflict* - with economic misery and social injustice, denial of human rights and environmental degradation.

Our goal, finally, is a system which is built on respect for *international law* and which gives freedom and justice to all.

This is what the United Nations *should* be.

This is what it *can* be. And now this important goal is beginning to be realized.

A dream has started to come true - the dream that, united together in this world organization, we can protect the security of each and every one of us. We have vested part of our sovereignty in the Security Council, in order to allow the United Nations to act forcefully in a crisis.

Our organization has achieved impressive results in recent years. It has also expanded its scope.

What we see now taking shape is an effective United Nations system for ensuring our common security.

In *peace-keeping* the traditional tasks remain, while new functions are being developed. Troops and military observers still form the back-bone of peace-keeping operations. But the civilian component is growing, with an increasing role for the United Nations in election supervision and the build-up of democratic structures.

In *peace-making*, the United Nations has proved its value in a number of regional conflicts. Other important and difficult tasks lie ahead.

In *peace-building*, the United Nations has to develop a coordinated strategy for dealing with the fundamental economic and social problems confronting the world of today.

That is why Sweden welcomes the revitalized role of the United Nations as an organization for our collective security. It offers a machinery for cooperation between the large and the many smaller states in the world. And it gives every nation a chance to participate in the work for peace and a better future.

The United Nations has a tremendous potential for *keeping* the peace, for *making* peace and for *building* peace.

Safeguarding our common security is the challenge for the United Nations in today's world.

Chapter 5
The Agenda for Multilateral Disarmament

Archelaus R. Turrentine

As we approach the major symbolic milestone in history that the year 2000 represents, a new millennium, we may have the best opportunity for a genuine, lasting peace that mankind has ever had. If this genuine peace is to be realized and to endure, it must be institutionalized in a system that settles disputes justly and fairly, and commands the respect and support of the world community. The United Nations is emerging as an institution that might play this role - finally fulfilling the promise envisioned by those who drafted its Charter 45 years ago.

The current international agenda in the fields of security and disarmament is extensive. Naked aggression in the Persian Gulf is being countered, bilateral and multilateral arms limitation and disarmament agreements are being concluded and further measures are under negotiation, and human rights violations are being recognized as a degradation of humankind that the world community will not condone. There are both opportunities and barriers to using the United Nations to promote this agenda. At the same time, the United Nations can play, and indeed has already played, a constructive role in preserving and protecting the gains that have been made in the fields of security and disarmament. I would like to comment on some of these issues and suggest why certain courses of action may be successful while others may not.

Wider recognition of the relationship between security and disarmament is being promoted. It is important to increase public awareness that arms limitations and disarmament are not and cannot be pursued in a vacuum. Rather they must be pursued as part of the greater strategy of improving security internationally, enhancing the security of each participating nation by reducing the risk of war, or, if war cannot be averted, mitigating the suffering and unnecessary damage.

We are being stimulated, each of us, to think anew, in global terms, on what security really is. It has forced us to rethink not only the role military defenses of national territory play, but also how the ever growing interdpendence of economic, health and environmental interests worldwide can work to bring us closer together, or create new frictions and disputes that must be resolved, hopefully with equity and by peaceful means.

Today, the Cold War is over. It is not surprising, therefore, that there is so much confusion right now about how the new and changing military and economic components of security will interact with the national policies and objectives of individual countries. A case in point of interest to everyone here, of course, is disarmament, where negotiations in a variety of areas are finally making real progress. In November 1990 we witnessed the leaders of Europe, Canada, and the United States meeting in Paris to sign the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and associated confidence and security building measures. The process of military reductions in Europe has already begun. After the CFE Treaty is implemented fully and the confidence and security building measures are functioning, the possibilities for armed conflict among the nations of Europe will be greatly reduced, if not virtually eliminated.

While the CFE negotiations were organized and carried out by the States having a direct interest, the United Nations played a positive role, providing encouragement and recognition in various UNGA resolutions and providing a forum for the participants to explain their hopes

and aspirations to the world community. Other regions of the world have their own unique character and problems that make it inappropriate for them to use CFE as an exact model to copy. Nevertheless, CFE does provide a number of valuable lessons and serves as an inspiration to countries in other regions to continue seeking solutions on a regional basis to their security problems.

The successful implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty also has contributed greatly to improving the security situation in Europe, and elsewhere. Soon we can anticipate further progress in dealing with Short-Range Nuclear Forces, although the trend already underway to remove such systems due to the improved security environment may end up making SNF negotiations moot.

The end of the Cold War and the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements do not mean that all of the problems in the European region have been solved. The economic situation, particularly in Eastern Europe, requires immediate attention and help from the West. Additionally, with the movement away from an adversarial relationship between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Alliance to a cooperative relationship, some of the old disputes between States and among various ethnic groups within States, that had been submerged during the Cold War, have again arisen. It will be important to address these problems head-on and settle any disputes peacefully, in a fair and just manner, if we are to avoid sowing the seeds today for new conflicts tomorrow.

However, it is important that the East and West not become Eurocentric. The problems in other regions also require attention and can have a direct impact on European security and interests. Today, the most urgent threat to the security and economic interests of East and West and the world is the crisis in the Persian Gulf. This is one of the most important challenges that the United Nations has faced and is the first test of the United Nations security system since the end of World War II that is devoid of major power rivalries. It is critical for its future that the United Nations prevail. Aggression cannot be rewarded, and must be punished. For only by defending the principles of the Charter and keeping faith with the rights of the individual member States will the United Nations endure beyond the present century as a credible force for peace and international security.

All Kuwaiti territory must be returned to the legitimate Government of Kuwait and all Iraqi forces and other Iraqi intruders withdrawn. There must be appropriate restitution for the damage inflicted on the people and property in Kuwait to help rebuild this ravished country. The threat of use of force must not be permitted to hang over the heads of the people of Kuwait. There must be no lingering Iraqi perception that it has the option or will ever have the opportunity for a repeat of this brutal invasion. The clear preference of the world community is to accomplish the objectives spelled out in the United Nations Security Council resolutions without resorting to direct military action. However, there is broad support for using armed force operating under a United Nations Security Council mandate, any time after 15 January 1991, to defeat the aggression against Kuwait, if the current sanctions do not produce their intended results.

A number of the disarmament challenges recognized by the United Nations are being actively pursued on the bilateral front. The United States and the Soviet Union are in the last lap of prolonged negotiations on a treaty aimed at reducing and constraining strategic offensive nuclear arms. The START Treaty is expected to be completed and ready for signature in the first part of 1991 in Moscow. It may take a few months beyond the target date the two sides set for themselves simply because the final, difficult provisions require special attention to detail. It is important that the Treaty operate in an effective and efficient

manner, and that it avoid creating unnecessary friction in the process. Both sides will be living with it for many years to come.

The United Nations, other international fora, and various individual countries have been actively pursuing arms limitation and disarmament measures in the chemical weapons area. The United States and Soviet Union, in particular, have been working intensively on bilateral arrangements that would contribute to a significant, but partial solution to removing the CW threat. We expect the inspection protocol to the bilateral chemical weapons destruction agreement to be completed soon. It is hoped, in fact, that it will be ready in time for the Moscow summit meeting. However, a new area of cooperation between the United States and Soviet Union is being forged in this agreement which is taking time as we grapple with how best to carry out the destruction of vast quantities of highly toxic materials associated with chemical weapons stockpiles in a safe and environmentally sound and acceptable manner.

The challenge of meeting different safety and environmental concerns in a variety of areas, including in the destruction and conversion of arms, must be faced by the United Nations and other international bodies. How successfully the United Nations and the individual member States are today in managing this challenge will help to determine what the world will be like for many generations to come.

Also on the bilateral front, the two sides are moving ahead to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, and the two associated verification protocols. As part of the step-by-step process to which both sides have agreed, we subsequently may anticipate negotiations on further measures to constrain nuclear testing. However, there has been no announcement of agreement on which further measures might make sense or when further negotiations might take place.

The hope has been expressed that the January 1991 Conference that has been called to consider an amendment to the Partial Test Ban Treaty will be successful. It is important to have a clear understanding of the definition of success in this regard. There should be no illusions. The United States will not support the proposed amendment that would convert the Partial Test Ban Treaty into a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Therefore, under the terms of the Treaty, the effort to amend it in this way will not be successful. However, if success is defined as a thorough exchange of views on the issue of nuclear testing and arms control, the United States will listen carefully to the views of others and will be prepared to explain its position on the issue. For continued consideration and discussion of the nuclear test ban issues, the Conference on Disarmament would provide a more appropriate forum.

On the multilateral front, negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a Chemical Weapons Convention remain the top priority and toughest challenge. While some have suggested that it is likely that a CWC will be concluded in 1991, I am not sure, in view of the difficult and complex issues that remain, how realistic this is. I do believe, however, that there is likely to be real progress in the negotiations in 1991. In fact by December 1991. I believe that the conclusion of a CWC will be in sight, and that it will be possible then to predict with greater accuracy when, at long last, negotiations will be completed.

We should not forget that conclusion of a basic agreement prohibiting radiological weapons remains on the international agenda. After achieving a CWC, it will be especially important not to leave radiological weapons unconstrained, weapons that are defined as weapons of mass destruction. In addition to radiological weapons, other weapons of mass destruction include chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to nuclear weapons or the other designated weapons.

The situation in the Gulf has focused more attention on the importance of renewing efforts for resolving regional problems outside of Europe. One case in point is the growing recognition of the importance to prevent further nuclear proliferation, and to ensure the future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the same time, as tensions rise in the Gulf there is a deepening appreciation of the need not to ignore chemical weapons proliferation and the strategic and regional implications of missile proliferation as well. The acquisition of new missile capabilities by certain countries, particularly when coupled with chemical and nuclear proliferation concerns by their neighbours, can have a dramatic destabilizing effect on regional security. Such sudden shifts in countries' threat assessments and their related security calculations enhance instabilities and fuel arms races - or worse yet - make pre-emptive attacks or other armed conflict more likely. This leads to another challenge in which the United Nations will find itself involved in the years ahead - promoting cooperation in the sharing of peaceful technology while controlling the dangerous aspects of certain technologies. It must be recognized that it is neither possible nor desirable, in the name of international security and disarmament, to fence off the fruits of basic science and discovery, or to prevent technological breakthroughs from occurring. Rather we must develop appropriate institutional mechanisms and practices to help manage cooperation in and exchanges of technology, as well as to settle problems peacefully in a world where technical capabilities increasingly come with both peaceful and military potential. It will be interesting to see what additional roles the member States create for the United Nations in managing the security implications of technology. One role that the United Nations already is playing in this regard, and which certainly will continue to be particularly important is in encouraging and facilitating greater transparency of military programmes, budgets and doctrines in order to avoid misinterpretations and mistakes.

An important challenge for the United Nations member States is to understand the limits under the Charter on what the United Nations can and should be called upon to do. In making use of the United Nations or other international fora, it is important for States to recognize when the time is right for progress on an issue, and when it is not. In the various multilateral arenas, there have been many proposals for arms limitation and disarmament negotiations on issues such as naval arms, outer space and laser weapons, where there is no agreed basis for negotiations or even consensus on whether negotiations are needed at all. Pressing to engage in such negotiations in the absence of an agreed mandate and a common perception of the desired outcome strains relations and resources and squanders time that could be better used.

Where, then, does this leave the role of the United Nations in the field of arms limitations, disarmament and security?

The United Nations Charter defines clearly what the United Nations role is with regard to the peacekeeping function. In addition, the good offices of the Secretary-General have been used to avoid imminent conflict and to terminate conflict that is already underway. However, with respect to arms limitations and disarmament, the role of the United Nations is less clearly defined. Responsibility for implementing and overseeing arms limitation and disarmament agreements essentially rests with the parties concerned. There is no inherent or omnibus United Nations role or responsibility for facilitating treaty operations or monitoring compliance. Nor should there be. Countries without a stake or vested interest in an agreement should not be allowed a voice in matters which concern the commitments and obligations of others under that agreement. However, the parties to an agreement, if they wish, may request that the United Nations undertake some specified task with respect to the

agreement. An example of this is the request that the Secretary-General develop procedures to investigate allegations of CW use contrary to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and customary international law. Subsequently, the Secretary-General was requested to investigate allegations of CW use during the Iran-Iraq War, and confirmed that Iraq had used chemical weapons.

Some have suggested that the United Nations be assigned the central role for verification of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements. There is no basis for assigning the United Nations such a generic role. The parties to an agreement can request that the United Nations undertake a verification mission. However, the United Nations does not have the capability to undertake significant responsibilities in this area at this time and I would not advocate that it be assigned such responsibilities.

In one area CW - it is time to begin giving some thought to the relationship between the United Nations and the organization of States parties that will be established to manage the implementation of the future CWC. Should it be modeled along the lines of the United Nations relationship with the IAEA or should it develop its own unique ties?

At this time, the United Nations is gaining in credibility and esteem. Without the full support of all member States, it could be damaging to the institution if it were to take on, or seek to take on, additional contentious responsibilities with major budgetary implications.

One of the most constructive roles that the United Nations has served, and should continue to serve, is as the sounding board for new ideas in the field of disarmament. The General Assembly serves as a "bully pulpit" - to borrow from an analogy used by Theodore Roosevelt to describe the United States presidency - for member States to make proposals to the rest of the world. Many good ideas first expressed at the United Nations have produced tangible results contributing to international security and disarmament. Other proposals have been flawed or propagandistic and have languished for lack of support or broad interest. Still others simply have been ahead of their time. Approaches, for example, that were not feasible in the confrontational environment of the Cold War may be possible in the new era of cooperation. Perhaps UNIDIR might make a contribution by sifting the sands of United Nations history to identify some of the earlier arms limitation and disarmament ideas put forward in the United Nations, or in the related literature that may deserve reconsideration in the current environment. Consideration also might be given to making this the topic of a future UNIDIR conference.

Arms limitation and disarmament measures that are carefully conceived and faithfully executed can make a substantial contribution in enhancing international security. The United Nations can and has played an important role in promoting stability and supporting and encouraging disarmament. It has left, however, the basic responsibility for working out and implementing arms limitation and disarmament agreements with the States parties to those agreements. And this is as it should be. With respect to specific arms limitation and disarmament agreements, the United Nations role in areas such as verification, data collection and resolution of compliance disputes is limited to those responsibilities assigned by the respective States parties. Whether there will be an evolutionary accretion of United Nations responsibilities and any decisions for new institutional arrangements will depend in large part on how much progress is made in disarmament and how impartially, efficiently and economically the United Nations manages its current treaty support tasks.

Chapter 6
The United Nations in the Creation of a Disarming World

Peggy Mason

"Challenge" is a word that slips easily into our vocabularies when we are faced with a problem we are not quite certain how to resolve. It is often coupled with "opportunity", which is a way of trying to convince ourselves that the problem can, in fact, be resolved.

"Challenge" has been a particularly popular word during the past decade. In an odd way, I think that we tend to flatter ourselves by believing that we face more challenges now than people have at any time in the past. It is useful to recall that our forebears had no shortage of challenges - particularly of the natural variety - and fewer means at their disposal to deal with them. Having said this, I do believe that the rapid growth of world population, the increased interaction among people due to advances in transportation and communications and the progress in the understanding and application of science - which has not necessarily been matched by progress in the fields of moral and human understanding - have resulted in a tremendous and complex set of modern challenges. These include an ailing environment, the trade in illegal drugs, the spread of AIDS, a massive flow of refugees and the persistence of poverty throughout much of the globe. These are challenges that no country can solve in isolation. These are challenges with implications for security. In short, these are challenges for the United Nations in a disarming world.

But there are others far more qualified than I to speak on these topics. My position and experience is in the disarmament field and that is the perspective from which I wish to approach this discussion. I am going to focus on the challenges faced by the United Nations in the realm of arms control and disarmament, and in that context my thesis is a simple one. The *world* is not disarming. That remains the challenge for the United Nations.

A Disarming World?

It is true that East and West are disarming. This is something we should be, and rightly are, pleased about. When we add together the effects of the Stockholm Document, the INF Treaty, the United States-Soviet bilateral agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons, the CFE Treaty, the latest package of CSBMs and soon, we hope a START agreement, we are left with a truly impressive sum. These agreements, in conjunction with the political rapprochement that has accompanied and been enhanced by them, have dramatically reduced the risk of war in Europe and increased the security of all the parties involved. Moreover, this roster will continue to grow. We have just seen the opening of the CFE follow-on negotiations; we look forward to the beginning of negotiations on short-range nuclear forces and eventually, we anticipate, START II negotiations. There can be no doubt that East and West are disarming. As Soviet Ambassador Grinevski put it during the plenary prior to signature of the CFE agreement: "No battle in the history of warfare has resulted in the destruction of as much weaponry as CFE negotiations disposed of in the past few days."

But East and West do not constitute the world, and we have seen highlighted during these past months the consequences for the world of the virtually unrestrained build-up of arms in a country outside of Europe and North America.

The United Nations has responded salutarily and beyond expectations to the Gulf crisis. This response will set a precedent for international action in the 1990s. But one cannot help but wonder whether the course of events might have run differently had the international community been able to achieve effective restrictions on the level and types of armaments in the region before the crisis. Given the traditional purposes of arms control - namely to reduce the liklihood of war, to reduce the costs of legitimate defence requirements, and to limit the destructiveness of war should it occur - one suspects we could have benefited a great deal.

THE SITUATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT FORUM

If you have been following Canada's work in United Nations disarmament forum over the past few years, you will have noticed that one of our great concerns has been that developments in these forum have not kept pace with East-West developments. In the First Committee and in the Disarmament Commission, there has been a reluctance among some States to recognize the great progress in disarmament in the East-West context - which has led to the realization of many of our goals - and to re-focus their efforts on the unabated arms races in other regions. In the Conference on Disarmament, we are still without a global chemical weapons convention, despite the clear willingness of the super-Powers to take real steps in the direction of chemical weapons' disarmament. Despite the fact that over 140 States have joined the NPT, several so-called "threshold" States continue to refuse to become parties. This lag has troubled Canada, because of our deep and long-standing commitment to the global multilateral disarmament process.

We were therefore greatly heartened by developments at the First Committee in 1990, where it appeared that the trends that we - and many other delegations - have been trying to encourage now seem to be materializing. The Canadian delegation was struck by the fact that there no longer seems to be a disinclination to deal with issues lying outside the East-West context. There is a greater willingness to allow the consideration of regional arms control and disarmament measures. I would cite, as an exmaple, the resolution put forward by Belgium on regional disarmament, which received widespread support, including from States in conflict-prone regions. Regional disarmament will also figure on the UNDC agenda next May, where Canada hopes it will receive thorough and constructive attention.

This move away from a narrow East-West focus echoes other encouraging developments at the United Nations. We are encouraged by the positive results of UNDC reform. We welcome the results of the recent Group of Experts' Study on the Role of the United Nations in Verification and look forward to the implementation of its recommendations. We are looking forward, as well, to studying the conclusions of the United Nations Group of Experts on International Arms Transfer Transparency when they are presented to UNGA 46 in 1991. We believe that increased transparency and openness in arms transfers would help to build confidence and could thus contribute to the easing of international and regional tensions. The United Nations has a potentially important role to play in facilitating such transparency measures. Agreement on transparency measures is a first step towards the goal of agreed international measures to restrict such transfers.

To an important degree, then, the challenge no longer centres on the United Nations willingness to attempt to match East-West developments with progress in other areas, but rather, on its ability to do so. In lagging behind other disarmament forum, have the United Nations forum become irrelevant? What, in practical terms, can the United Nations disarmament forum now do?

REGIONAL APPROACHES

States are placing increasing emphasis on arms control, disarmament and confidence-building in forum outside of the United Nations. In a way, this is as it should be. The parties with the greatest stake in a negotiation should be the ones participating in it. At the General Assembly in 1990, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Clark, called for a new focus on regional approaches to security. He noted that the end of the Cold War "frees countries and regions to pursue solutions to local problems on local terms." He proposed an approach to cooperative security that would see countries of a specific region work among themselves on issues ranging from the environment to military security. Canada is thus a strong supporter of regional confidence-building and disarmament. We recognize, however, that there are limits to this approach.

First, some problems do not admit of purely bilateral or regional solutions. The spread of weapons of mass destruction - as well as conventional weapons - into areas of high tension is a continuing worrying development. The proliferation of nuclear weapons, the real and potential proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, the proliferation of missile technology, and the excesses of the arms trade are global problems that require a global response. They are problems, as well, on which hinge many regional disarmament measures. States will be hesitant to sign agreements limiting conventional arms unless they know that parties to those agreements will be inhibited from acquiring chemical and nuclear weapons by strong non-proliferation régimes. Regional disarmament can proceed only so far if neighbouring regions remain heavily armed. It is a question of balancing the progress that can be made on a regional level with the need for global negotiations on particular weapons and systems. The latter are the disarmament issues in which the United Nations has traditionally played a role.

A second limitation to the strictly regional approach is that there remains regions in which the parties themselves are not making an effort to resolve their conflicts and limit their arms acquisitions. The effects spill over beyond those particular regions. In these cases, it is useful to have a body that can assert the interests of States not directly involved, as well as the interests of the international community as a whole in global peace, stability and security.

The challenge for the United Nations, then is two-fold. The United Nations must continue and redouble its efforts to encourage global solutions to the problems that require them. This means supporting and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation régime. It means furthering the efforts in Geneva to achieve a global chemical weapons convention. It means focusing on the consequences of excessive arms transfers and of destabilizing technologies.

Similarly, the United Nations must encourage regional arms control and disarmament efforts. When considering regional issues, discussions in United Nations fora have tended to concentrate on the East-West arms build-up. The United Nations should continue to promote East-West disarmament, but it must also turn its attention to curbing and reversing arms races in other regions. Non-East-West issues should be addressed fairly and sincerely, with a sense of urgency and an emphasis on concrete measures as opposed to broad political and declaratory approaches. These measures must, of course, complement United Nations efforts to reduce the tensions and conflicts that prompt arms acquisitions in the first place.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations has recently assisted in the amelioration of many regional conflicts: Iran-Iraq; Afghanistan; Namibia; Central America. It is working towards solutions in Cambodia and the Western Sahara. Obviously, the United Nations must continue to play this very important role in regional conflict management, without which attempts at serious disarmament would be futile. It must also, however, go beyond this role and find ways in which it can turn temporary solutions to conflicts into permanent ones that include reductions in, and restrictions on, weapons. In addition, it must also encourage the reduction of tensions and armaments in areas where war has not yet broken out but remains an ever-present threat. An effective United Nations role in building a world of cooperative security will involve a combination of peacekeeping, conflict resolution, confidence-building and disarmament measures.

The measures are not always obvious and are limited, of course, by the degree to which parties in the region are willing to cooperate. Nonetheless, there is much that the United Nations can do. It can act as a repository for expertise on arms control principles and techniques, so that knowledge and experience gained in one region can be shared with others. It can coordinate regional meetings, such as the successful seminar on "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Asia" held in January 1990 in Katmandu. A greater role for the United Nations in furthering regional confidence-building and disarmament may well mandate increased use of bodies that promote research and dialogue, such as UNIDIR and the Regional Centres.

The United Nations disarmament forum themselves have a unique and important role to play in exploring common ground and in providing direction to the international community, both in the global and regional disarmament contexts. This is particularly important given that lack of consensus in United Nations forum can be used as an excuse for those States that are not interested in the serious pursuit of disarmament to continue their own course of arms build-up. The recently completed experts' study on the Role of the United Nations in Verification provides an example of the sort of practical, achievable, concrete steps that the United Nations can take. The fact that the First Committee adopted by consensus a resolution welcoming the study and calling on the Secretariat to implement its recommendations is a source of great encouragement to Canada.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

When we turn to the issue of regional disarmament, one of the questions that invariably arises is the degree to which the CSCE confidence-building model used in Europe can be applied in other areas of the world. The CSBMs agreed in the CSCE context have been designed for the European political, military and geographic context and can probably not be adopted wholesale into other regions. Rather, it is a question of learning from the European example and modifying it to take account of local conditions and requirements. There are non-European models to consider as well, such as the Sinai disengagement accords and the CSBMs incorporated in the peace process for Central America. In most regions, an incremental, step-by-step approach to CSBMs is likely to be more feasible than an all-embracing one.

Several regions might benefit from such an approach to confidence-building particularly those characterized by chronic tension and high levels of armament. This does not have to

involve at the outset a complete range of Stockholm Document-type measures. Rather, States could begin with a dialogue on security cooperation, which need not have a fixed agenda nor address all issues. The priority should be to develop a habit of open and free discussion. At some stage the dialogue could be accompanied by agreement on actual measures which could seek the modest, yet important and certainly attainable goal of enhanced military transparency.

In this context, it is often noted that the Helsinki process began during an era when efforts were already underway to lessen East-West tensions - a condition that is not currently replicated in certain other troubled regions of the globe. The relationship between specific confidence-building mesures and the actual, psychological process of confidence-building is an imperfectly understood one, akin to the dilemma of "which came first - the chicken or the egg?" I will say, however, that while it is true that the Helsinki process started in the mid-70s, the Stockholm Conference itself opened in January 1984, which, you may recall, followed on the heels of one of the darkest periods in recent East-West relations. The lessons to be drawn from this are by no means clear. One can surmise, though, that since confidence-building on the military side is taking place in a context where confidence, almost by definition, does not exist, it is possible to begin with a relatively minimal level of trust and cooperation. Obviously, one can only build military confidence to a certain point without it being accompanied by political rapprochement. It is my conviction, though, that confidence-building in the security field can begin under adverse conditions and then help to create the necessary conditions for political rapprochement. What we have learned from the Stockholm experience is that much can be done to encourage confidence during the preliminary stages of an improving political relationship.

Even in Europe, there is still much to learn about confidence-building. The CSCE process is by no means finished, and the proposed Centre for the Prevention of Conflict will be another useful stage in our education. I was pleased to note during the First Committee discussions in November 1990 that countries were evincing a greater willingness to focus on intermediate steps towards confidence-building and disarmament. This is something we can perhaps explore in more detail in the UNDC. In addition, the Regional Centres could usefully assess various proposed measures for their appropriateness and timeliness for their respective regions.

In looking at the potential role for the United Nations in all of this, I would return to my original point about challenges: namely, we are not really certain what to do. Arms control experts have tended to focus on problems of East-West arms control, because that is where most of the weapons have been concentrated. Regional specialists have tended to chronicle regional security problems and to suggest elements of political solutions, but they, too, have not looked closely at the potential for regional arms control and disarmament. What we need, I believe, is a marrying of the two: greater study of the potential application of East-West arms control measures in non-East-West contexts. This is where organizations such as UNIDIR can play an invaluable role. It is in developing regional approaches within a global framework of cooperative security that the United Nations's challenge is clearly defined.

As a result of East-West rapproachement, we are in a time of great hope that offers tremendous challenge and opportunity. In these last few months the United Nations has moved, in the security field, much closer to what its framers intended it to be. It must continue to move in that direction. The world is not yet disarmed, nor is it even truly disarming. There remains much to be done, and a world where the United Nations becomes irrelevant to disarmament is not likely to become a disarmed world. The challenge is not for

the United Nations *in* a disarming world. The challenge is for the United Nations *to help* create a disarming world.

Part II

Positions of Member States

Chapter 1
The Attitude of France

Gilles Andreani

In order to understand French policy in United Nations disarmament forums, we must look back at the past.

France's decision to rejoin disarmament forums is relatively recent (1978). It marked the end of a long period of French grievances about United Nations disarmament aims and methods. Also in 1978, France took a number of steps to remedy what it regarded as the shortcomings of the United Nations in this area and to place United Nations disarmament activities on a more solid footing.

Some of these measures were crowned with success, while others were possibly premature. Ten years later, France's disarmament policy record in the United Nations is mixed. This will be dealt with in the second part of this chapter.

Finally, the period from 1987 to 1990 saw a number of notable achievements in the area of disarmament, including the Stockholm Agreement, the Agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Weapons, the Soviet-American bilateral agreements on the elimination of chemical weapons and the series of agreements concluded at the CSCE Summit in Paris last month (on conventional forces in Europe and on a new set of confidence-building and security measures). All of these agreements were negotiated and concluded outside the United Nations framework. What does this mean for the United Nations? How can these disarmament achievements be extended to the multilateral framework of the United Nations? How does France intend to contribute? I shall take up these questions at the end of this chapter.

I - France and Disarmament in the United Nations: From Abstention to Participation

Abstention

In retrospect, France's absence from major multilateral disarmament forums during the 1960s and 1970s may seem difficult to justify. It may have stemmed from reservations regarding multilateral diplomatic undertakings in general. However, those reservations warrant some clarification. Gaullist diplomacy chose to distance itself, not from the United Nations framework as such, but from the perversion of United Nations disarmament machinery, which at the time was seen in France as having been commandeered by the two super-Powers for their exclusive dialogue. That dialogue appeared at the time to be incompatible with the real aim of general and complete disarmament - never rejected by France - and inconsistent with a genuinely multilateral approach, with each party speaking for itself. In addition to these criticisms of disarmament initiatives, a specific grievance voiced by France was that their effect was to codify the excessive armament of the most heavily armed Powers and organize the disarmament of everyone else. In short, General de Gaulle's France regarded the disarmament process as inefficient and discriminatory. This is illustrated clearly by two observations. Firstly, General de Gaulle explained France's refusal to sit on the Committee of 18 in the following terms: "We see no point in adding to the volume of hot air generated in striving to put forward irreconcilable plans and producing only groans, like the chorus of

old men in a Greek tragedy: an insoluble problem. What is to be done? ... Of course, if one day the opportunity arises to hold a meeting of States genuinely wishing to organize disarmament - and, in our view, any such meeting should include the four nuclear Powers - France will participate wholeheartedly. Until then, it sees no need to be associated with such bodies, which will inevitably end in disillusionment".

Secondly, in 1967, Georges Pompidou, referring to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, said "Let the major nuclear Powers demonstrate that they are ready for simultaneous disarmament and France will put its deterrent on the disarmament table. But let no one ask us to approve a system whereby the two major overarmed nuclear Powers would organize the disarmament of everyone else, for that is firstly a mockery of disarmament and secondly a fundamental threat to peace. Such a system would compel all the disarmed countries to divide into two blocs, each cowering under its chosen protective wing. Sooner or later, such a situation would lead to confrontation, which would be disastrous and fatal for mankind".

1978: France's Return to Disarmament Forums

France's return took place in an international situation different from that of the 1960s, it had not altered its basic position on the need to rescue disarmament from the bloc mentality and from the grips of the super-Powers. This predominant idea was expressed by President Giscard d'Estaing in the following terms in his statement at the SSOD-I: "Disarmament is not the monopoly of a few, but must become the concern of all ... Most disarmament forums were created at a time dominated by bloc confrontation. Despite the changes which they have undergone, they still bear the marks of that period".

All the proposals made by France on that occasion bear the stamp of this analysis. The five main proposals were:

- Expansion of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, and elimination of its United States-Soviet Union co-chairmanship;
- Reconsideration of the proposal made in 1955 by Mr. Edgard Faure for the establishment of a special disarmament for development fund;
- Creation of a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, which was to become UNIDIR;
- Creation of an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA) which would make space facilities available to the international community as a whole, for disarmament verification, *inter alia*;
- Opening of a conference on disarmament in Europe comprising the 35 States participating in the CSCE process.

These proposals contained a high degree of intellectual consistency. If the French goal of equal participation of all in disarmament, without the constraints of the alliance systems, was to be achieved, the Committee on Disarmament would have to be enlarged for the purposes of multilateral disarmament, and all European States would have to be involved in conventional disarmament in Europe; the entire international community would have to have equal access to disarmament expertise (UNIDIR) and means of verification (ISMA); and the developing countries would have to be allocated the resources which could be saved by progress towards disarmament.

To a large extent, these ideas continue to dominate French disarmament policy. However, intellectual consistency is not the only requisite for success. Twelve years later, France's record is, on balance, a positive one, although offset somewhat by its action in United Nations disarmament forums.

II - A Positive Balance

Involvement of the International Community as a Whole in the Disarmament Debate is now a Reality

The United Nations has found its own disarmament instruments. At the organizational level, there are the First Committee, which deals with disarmament and related international security questions, and the Disarmament Commission, which is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly.

Outside the organizational sphere, the Conference on Disarmament is the international community's multilateral body for the negotiation of universal disarmament agreements. Its membership, agenda and rules of procedure (in particular with regard to observations and reports to the General Assembly) must reflect the disarmament concerns of the international community, while at the same time preserving the independence of negotiations. Finally, in the area of research, UNIDIR, whose tenth anniversary we are celebrating this year, and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies complete this structure by contributing their expertise to the activities of the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament. So much for the machinery set up after the First Special Session on Disarmament. Ten years later, it is not in question: the efforts to rationalize the work of the Disarmament Commissiom, as well as the work of the First Committee, demonstrate that the adjustments and reforms, if there are any, will be more concerned with the operation of those bodies than with the structure of the system itself.

Collectively, these various bodies have had the indisputable advantage of affording all United Nations Members the opportunity to debate disarmament questions, to provide political support and technical expertise and to have a voice in forging the position of the international community. This is a significant achievement, which France is bound to welcome. France is particularly gratified to see that, ten years after its establishment, the role of UNIDIR in implementing a United Nations General Assembly resolution 45 629 sponsored jointly by the USSR and France, enjoys the consensus of the international community.

On Substance, the Hopes Raised by SSOD-1 Have Not Been Borne Out

In 1987, France was instrumental in designing the architecture of the multilateral disarmament bodies. It has also continued to be committed to the proposals it made on that occasion, including the plan for an international satellite monitoring agency and the idea of a special disarmament for development fund. This idea was revived in 1983 in the United Nations General Assembly by President Mitterand, who proposed that a conference should be convened on the problems raised by the relationship between disarmament and development and the establishment of an international fund envisaged by the United Nations General Assembly. The Conference was to end as a semi-success in the summer of 1987: it was a success in that it was possible to conclude the conference on a note of agreement and a

semi-success in that the practical extensions of the disarmament-development concept remain undefined. Likewise, the idea of a satellite monitoring agency was welcomed by the international community, although no action has been taken on it thus far.

The distance between an idea, even a generous idea, and a negotiable proposition is no doubt considerable. In the event, the tendencies towards universality and abstraction which were the hallmark of these two French initiatives did not simply reflect our national temperament but also, to some extent, the United Nations disarmament process itself. Deliberative organs such as the First Committee or the Disarmament Commission have a spontaneous tendency to define all-embracing concepts, whose political impact appears greater the more remote their implementation. Although our proposals did not extend to all aspects of overall systems for peace and international security or of comprehensive disarmament programmes, they were probably not entirely free of this defect.

We have also endeavoured to draw the inferences from this, by proposing:

- As a step towards the creation of the ISMA, the establishment of a satellite image processing agency and the formation of a group of United Nations experts on monitoring (statement by Foreign Minister Dumas at SSOD-3);
- In order to place any subsequent phase of disarmament-development on more solid factual bases, the establishment of a United Nations unit for the evaluation of military expenditures (incidentally, France has high expectations of the forthcoming UNIDIR study on the economic consequences of disarmament).

The gap between statements and reality is not our only reason for disappointment at the process conducted in the United Nations context. There are also the statements themselves, in other words, the tendency of the deliberations to focus on particular topics, especially such topics as nuclear disarmament and the nuclear test ban. France appreciates the international community's legitimate concern about the danger of nuclear war. Accordingly, it was before the United Nations General Assembly in 1983 that President Mitterand explained the conditions under which France would agree when the time was ripe, to join in the nuclear disarmament process. During SSOD-3, Foreign Minister Dumas explained the policy of transparency that we have undertaken to follow in respect of nuclear testing, including the decision by France to give notification of tests.

France, however, is compelled to point out that the deliberations within the United Nations have for too long focused the attention and energy of the international community on sweeping proposals - by definition unlikely to obtain a consensus - aiming at the elimination of nuclear weapons or tests, rather than on ways and means of limiting conventional weapons and conflicts.

That does not mean that France rejects any debate on nuclear weapons and disarmament. The recent study by the Group of Experts chaired by Mrs. Maj Britt Theorin, in which a French Government expert took part, shows that it is possible and useful to have balanced discussions on that topic in the United Nations context. However, if the debate on disarmament in the United Nations is to be credible, it must as far as possible reflect the military realities and the security interests of all parties concerned. On both these grounds, we consider that equal attention should be given to all aspects of disarmament.

III - What Lessons Can the United Nations Draw from the Recent Progress Achieved in Disarmament in an East-West Context?

The Progress in the East-West Climate Should be Grounds for Encouragement rather than Disillusionment for the International Community

At first glance, dates are cruel. The failure of the SSOD-3 occurred in 1988, amid the most formidable crop of disarmament agreements since the post-war period. After the Stockholm Agreement came the INF Treaty, followed by the Soviet-American bilateral agreements on chemical weapons and the protocols ratifying the 1974 and 1976 agreements on the limitation of nuclear tests and, finally, the agreements concluded in the context of the CSCE Paris Summit, i.e. the 22-party treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe and the 34-party agreement on a new set of confidence-building and security-building measures. There is hope that this list will soon include a START agreement on the reduction of the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the USSR, three years after the Washington Summit breakthrough, when it seemed that the main substantive problems had been settled.

Before considering the implications of these agreements for the multilateral disarmament process in the United Nations, some thought must be given to what made them possible. It seems to me that these successes can be attributed to three main factors.

The agreements were tailored to the security conditions of the participating countries: no party was confronted, in the negotiations, with an insurmountable security choice; the political options and the independence of each party were respected by these agreements, particularly, in the agreements on disarmament in Europe, through reference to the body of principles constituted by the CSCE.

A consensus was achieved fairly quickly on the objective of the negotiations: this analysis, which is relatively true of the Stockholm Agreement and the INF Treaty, applies fully to the CFE negotiations where, in a few weeks, a consensus was achieved on the four main concepts (parity, stability, sufficiency and transparency), governing the Treaty.

Finally, the improvement in political relations among the participants and, in 1989-1990 a spectacular improvement, preceded and accompanied the advances in disarmament. Up until 1987, disarmament had, not without difficulty, succeeded in overcoming mistrust. In 1990, trust made disarmament entirely possible.

What lessons should be drawn for other disarmament initiatives? A priori, there are two:

The first is that no arrangement has been discovered in Europe or between Americans and Soviets that can simply be transposed to other regions or other spheres of disarmament. Each agreement has its own objectives, its methods, its monitoring system. Neither the CSCE nor the CFE Treaty can be applied elsewhere as they stand. The synergy between political dialogue and enhanced confidence, on one hand, and the identification of the security conditions of the parties and the objective of negotiations, on the other, must be redefined in each regional context and in each individual domain.

There is Enormous Scope for Multilateral Disarmament in the United Nations Context

In the light of recent developments in disarmament, France considers that three avenues should be explored further in the United Nations context.

Preparing and strengthening disarmament

What is needed is to meet the conditions for transparency in respect of the military realities, particularly budgets, which are a prerequisite for disarmament. It is also necessary to involve the international community in monitoring, by studying criteria and guidelines, until the United Nations can assume an operational role in this sphere. Finally, it is necessary to strengthen the international consensus on non-proliferation.

Encouraging and coordinating regional disarmament efforts

The international community ought to encourage disarmament at the regional level. As the President of the Republic of France stressed on 24 September 1990 at the General Assembly: "... disarmament (is) an area in which Europe has provided the first actual proving-ground. But as all present here today are aware, disarmament is a world-wide necessity". The Paris Agreements are not a model. Each régime, in accordance with its specific characteristics, has to find the way to political dialogue and disarmament. It is also the role of the international community to encourage the accession of all to agreements that are universal in scope, following the example set by the CSCE countries on 21 November 1990 in Paris when they undertook to accede *ab initio* to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Asserting, through disarmament, solidarity among States

The semi-failure of the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development occurred before the series of agreements I have just mentioned. The current progress achieved on disarmament issues ought to encourage us to reconsider the disarmament-development concept and, if possible, to give it fresh impetus in the United Nations.

All in all, disarmament in the United Nations context is at a crossroads. One of these roads is that of ideology: some will invoke the disarmament agreements they have concluded, proposing them as models to others and arguing that it is for everyone to make an effort; others will reply that these agreements fall far short of the objective of general and comprehensive disarmament and that the real priorities have been disregarded. Past differences will be superseded by others. The other road is to respect the security choices of each party and the specific conditions in which they fit and to endeavour, while respecting this diversity of situations, to discern the common themes capable of mobilizing the attention of the international community as a whole. In another sphere, that of peace-keeping, the United Nations is on the way to demonstrating its ability to overcome ideological differences and to organize an authentic consensus by the international community. In France's view, any other approach to disarmament would be unthinkable.

Chapter 2
The First Committee of the General Assembly

Sohrab Kheradi

I - INTRODUCTION

To examine the issue "The United Nations and Disarmament: Attitudes of Member States" is no small task, as disarmament[1] remains one of the most vital, yet complex and often divisive, issues on the world's agenda.

As a product of concerns touching upon a State's security, disarmament was provided a significant place in the United Nations Charter. Through the years, in response to new developments and repeated challenges, the role of the United Nations in this field has expanded. Increasingly, disarmament has come to be viewed as standing at the centre of any long-term solution to the problem of international peace and security. Today, at a time of change as well as opportunity for the world, it is important to assess concretely how disarmament can in the near term contribute to the strengthening of world security and the maintenance of peace.

Over the past five years, and in particular since 1989, we have witnessed extraordinary changes in the world scene, especially in Europe. Deep and wide-ranging political developments have finally brought to an end the adversarial strategies of the cold war. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has been transformed. International cooperation has been strengthened. An embryonic multi-polarity can be seen at work in increasingly assertive and responsive regional groupings. Efforts are being made to build up effective systems of confidence-building measures which, as the Secretary-General of the United Nations has recently stated, are indispensable in removing the mistrust and misjudgements that have been the root cause of the arms race. The commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms is gaining new ground in many areas of the world. In this new environment, the opportunities for disarmament have multiplied.

II - TOWARDS A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE TREND IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Nineteen-ninety has been particularly eventful. As the former Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, so fittingly stated at the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

> "Politically, this was not just a calendar year, but a light year in the history of the world.
>
> The 'cold war', with its accompanying stress, psychoses and anticipation of disaster, is no longer a part of our life. Gone is the strain of daily confrontation, propaganda squabbles and reciprocal threats ...

[1] Following United Nations practice, the word "disarmament" is used here as a general term embracing all aspects of the overall subject of arms regulation, arms control or arms limitation, as well as the actual reduction or elimination of arms or military forces as a result of international agreements or unilateral measures.

> Almost imperceptibly, the military blocs have lost their enemies. They are beginning to build their relations on a new basis, moving away from confrontation, which is being eroded by disarmament, by reductions in defence spending, by the expansion of confidence-building measures and by the emergence of collective and cooperative security structures".[2]

Indeed, it is now increasingly recognized that the problems of security, even when seemingly national or regional, must be viewed in the larger context of global security in order to be adequately and peacefully addressed.

The progress being made in this direction must, of course, be broadened and consolidated. As Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar pointed out in his 1990 Report on the Work of the Organization:

> "The period we have entered is Janus-faced. It wears both the aspect of hope and the countenance of dangerous unrestraint. In one major segment of world affairs, we have witnessed political change of a phenomenal character. In large parts of the globe, however, the scene continues to be one of simmering resentments, violent collisions and at best precarious peace. The question whether the more beneficial developments of 1989-1990 will have a healthy impact on the totality of the world situation is still unanswered".[3]

Undoubtedly, much remains to be done in order to facilitate further positive changes internationally and to cultivate a new post-cold war order globally.

The United Nations has been a necessary and useful instrument in the positive international evolution of the last 45 years, notwithstanding the fact that it has not always been able to live up fully to the high goal of being a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of common ends. The conditions now exist, however, for making the Organization not only a useful but also an effective instrument for the attainment of that goal, if the present, unparalleled opportunities for peace, security and justice are pursued with a real sense of purpose.

In a similar vein, President George Bush of the United States, in addressing the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session, spoke of:

> "... A vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the cold war - a partnership based on consultation, cooperation and collective action, especially through international and regional organizations; a partnership united by principle and the rule of law, and supported by an equitable sharing of both cost and commitment; a partnership whose goals are to increase democracy, increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce arms."[4]

These words remind me of the saying that, in history *opportunity* is as powerful as *purpose.* And when the two are brought together, we might add, history is made.

III - Disarmament Issues

Since 1985, in the bilateral sphere, the international community has observed for the first time the signature and ratification of agreements on the actual destruction of certain types of nuclear and chemical weapons. In the nuclear field, in particular, the 1987 Treaty between

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[2] A/45/PV.6.

[3] *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization*, A/45/1, 16 September/1990.

[4] A/45/PV.14.

the Soviet Union and the United States on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (the INF Treaty) constituted an historic turning point in the process of strategic arms reduction. Further, noteworthy advances have been made since the INF Treaty went into effect. Indeed, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) may be ready for signature by the two major Powers early in 1991.

These accords, although bilateral, have so broad a scope as to affect the security of the whole world. They have global dimensions and as such are in the interest of all States. This has been reflected in a number of General Assembly resolutions.

In the multilateral arena, the progress made has been also very encouraging. The Treaty on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 is a great achievement both for Europe and for world peace. A major aspect of the accord is its institutionalization of security arrangements in Europe, with mechanisms for conflict resolution and dispute settlement. This regional accord contains features that could be applied to building confidence in other regions of the world, taking into account particular regional characteristics, and thus enhancing their stability and security.

At Geneva, in the sole multilateral negotiating body - the Conference on Disarmament - much progress has been made on a convention banning chemical weapons globally. To overcome the remaining obstacles, the negotiating parties need to be supported to the very end with a firm political will.

As the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized in the Final Document of its first special session on disarmament, in 1978, disarmament measures can be unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, and the United Nations, which "has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament", should facilitate and encourage all such measures, as they all contribute to disarmament efforts.

In this connection, it needs to be recalled that the predecessor bodies of the present Conference on Disarmament succeeded over the years in negotiating several significant multilateral disarmament and arms-limitation agreements, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Sea-Bed Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Another multilateral agreement in the field of arms regulation is the Convention on excessively injurious weapons whose tenth anniversary of its opening for signature is coming up shortly (10 April 1991).

Multilateral negotiation is not advocated, of course, as a measure that would supplant bilateral negotiations. The stark realities prevalent in the world dictate otherwise. It is advocated simply because the two approaches are not only complementary, but can also reinforce each other. Furthermore, in a world where interdependence at various levels and in different spheres, be they military, political or economic, is no longer a mere shibboleth, but a resonant fact of the present-day human condition, the multilateral process is likely to provide an increasingly meaningful and necessary approach.

Fortunately, the international community already has in the United Nations a unique and universal forum for carrying out deliberations and negotiations in the field of disarmament, even though the instrumentality so readily available has not not always been fully utilized.

As far as disarmament is concerned, the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly closely reflected current developments and concerns. The resolutions that the First Committee recommended for adoption by the General Assembly, and which the Assembly is expected to adopt in fact today, though not all of them unanimously, provide clear images of the many-sided ongoing efforts towards a more secure world. In their totality, they seem to

affirm once again that a variety of complementary approaches to disarmament agreements is available to us and that the international community must continue to patiently try to weave together all the elements that can lead to agreement. Allow me to review some of the recommendations contained in those resolutions.

Significantly, the First Committee welcomed the prospect, in the near future, of an agreement on the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), and further welcomed the commitment between the two major Powers to pursue new negotiations on nuclear and space arms (START II) and on further enhancing strategic stability following the signature of START I. In another resolution on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations, the Committee considered that the achievement of a START I treaty should be part of a process leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to the conclusion of agreements in other areas, in particular, in the area of the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions and that of outer space, which should be kept free of all weapons.

Specifically, on cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, the First Committee reaffirmed that a treaty to achieve such a prohibition, to be accepted by all States for all time, was a matter of the highest priority and would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear arms race. To that end, negotiations should be expedited. Furthermore, in a separate resolution, the First Committee, *inter alia*, noted with satisfaction that the Amendment Conference of the States Parties to the partial test-ban Treaty would be held at the United Nations early in 1991; reiterated its conviction that, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the nuclear-weapon States should suspend all nuclear test explosions through an agreed moratorium or unilateral moratoria; and recommended that arrangements be made to ensure that intensive efforts continued, under the auspices of the Amendment Conference, until a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty was achieved. Then, in a third draft resolution the First Committee once again urged the Conference on Disarmament to continue to pursue the goal of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty as a matter of fundamental importance.

On the subject of chemical and biological weapons, the First Committee urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of highest priority, to intensify during its 1991 session its efforts to resolve outstanding issues and to conclude its negotiations on a convention and, to that end, to re-establish its *Ad Hoc* Committee on Chemical Weapons. In another resolution, the First Committee renewed its call to all States to observe strictly the principles and objectives of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and reaffirmed the vital necessity of upholding its provisions.

Similarly, the First Committee recommended that the Conference on Disarmament intensify its consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects, building upon areas of convergence and taking into account relevant proposals and initiatives. In a separate resolution, the First Committee dealt with the question of confidence-building measures in outer space and requested the Secretary-General to carry out, with the assistance of government experts, a study on the subject.

Two resolutions on conventional disarmament were adopted. Substantially, both resolutions reaffirmed the need to continue to actively pursue this issue, i.e., to promote the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament.

Two resolutions were adopted on regional disarmament. A common feature of the two texts was to emphasize the complementarity of regional and global disarmament. On a closely related subject, namely, confidence- and security-building measures and conventional

disarmament in Europe, the First Committee welcomed the progress achieved so far, reaffirming the need for continued efforts to build confidence, to lessen the risk of military confrontation and to enhance mutual security. It reaffirmed also the great importance of increasing security and stability in Europe through the establishment of a stable, secure and verifiable balance of conventional armed forces at lower levels, as well as through increased openness and predictability of military activities.

A resolution was adopted by the First Committee on defensive security concepts and policies. According to the resolution, the development of an international dialogue on such concepts and policies would be of great importance for progress on disarmament and the strengthening of international security. Consequently, the resolution requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, to undertake a study on the subject.

On the overall question of verification of disarmament agreements, the First Committee adopted a resolution which, noting that recent developments in international relations have underscored the importance of effective verification of existing and future arms limitation and disarmament agreements, welcomes the United Nations expert study completed in 1990 under the guidance of the Secretary-General and makes specific recommendations for future action by Member States and the Secretary-General.

Of course, I can refer to only a small fraction of the total number of disarmament resolutions adopted by the First Committee at its forty-fifth session. I would like to emphasize, however, that as usual the Committee, in its deliberations, dealt with the subject of disarmament in a very comprehensive manner. Its resolutions address practically every aspect of the question. As soon as they are adopted by the General Assembly, they will become a source of recommendations to Member States and, in particular, the two major Powers, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament, the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his disarmament secretariat. For instance, the resolution on verification to which I have made reference requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on actions "taken by Member States and by the United Nations Secretariat" to implement the resolution's recommendations.

IV - THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE

From what I have said so far, it should be evident that, even at a time of change, there is a very important element of continuity in the work of the Committee. This element has decisively contributed to making it the focal point for multilateral deliberations on disarmament.

The General Assembly decided in 1978, at its first special session on disarmament, that the First Committee would deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions. Accordingly, the Committee has made disarmament and security its exclusive field of activity. Of course, deliberations on disarmament by the Committee continue to take place in a political context. As a consequence, at a time of deep and rapid change, like the present one, the Committee is trying to adjust as quickly as possible to the new situation. The process of adjustment, as a matter of fact, has been going on all the time between 1946 and 1990.

When the First Committee met for the first time on 11 January 1946, it had only one disarmament item on its agenda: the establishment of a Commission to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy. Forty five years later, at the current

session of the General Assembly, the First Committee had a total of 28 items - 24 on disarmament, 1 on the question of Antarctica, and 3 on international security - on its agenda. Among those disarmament items were 3 omnibus or "umbrella" items (general and complete disarmament; review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session; review and implementation of the concluding Document of the twelfth special session of the General Assembly) which together subsumed 30 additional sub-items. This abundance of items on the international disarmament agenda is a reflection of the diversification of the security concerns of Member States.

Actually, this expansion of First Committee agenda items can be traced back at least to the late 1950s. In 1957, for instance, the question of the discontinuance of tests of atomic and hydrogen weapons was added to the agenda. In 1959, the item "General and complete disarmament", as well as the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, were also added. In the 1960s, the burgeoning of the Committee's agenda intensified.

The first two special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978 and 1982 respectively, and the two omnibus disarmament agenda items which were generated by those sessions contributed further to this process.

When, during the early part of the 1980s, international tension increased, the situation was reflected in the deliberations of the First Committee. During that period, they had scant tangible results. For example, the First Committee held deliberations covering a broad agenda, yet substantial differences remained in such areas of fundamental importance as the relationship between the priority question of nuclear disarmament and efforts for conventional disarmament. Outside the United Nations, hopes for the ratification of SALT II collapsed.

These pervasive differences affected the First Committee deliberations at least until its 1985 session, which opened up against a backdrop not terribly different from that of 1980, but for one positive event: the announcement by the United States and the Soviet Union, on 22 November 1984, that in early 1985 they would enter into negotiations on "a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms - both strategic and intermediate-range - with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." As a result, the First Committee met during its fortieth session, in 1985, in the light of breaking clouds which signalled the last season of the cold war.

That year, the General Assembly allocated 27 items and some 41 sub-items to the First Committee. It was evident from the Committee's debate, however, that in the areas of traditional divergence in the attitudes of Member States regarding the most vital substantive disarmament matters, whether concerning nuclear issues or other disarmament items, there was very little narrowing of differences and no meaningful convergence of views.

As the Committee was concluding its consideration and deliberation on disarmament matters in November 1985, the long-awaited and hoped-for summit meeting between General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan was scheduled to take place shortly thereafter, thus raising expectations. In this atmosphere, a resolution on bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations was also adopted by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the First Committee. When the summit took place from 19 to 21 November, the joint statement issued by the two leaders revealed a clearer, less antagonistic understanding between the two Powers on a wide range of bilateral and global issues. It also declared the intention of the two leaders to meet again.

These positive developments in bilateral negotiations between the two major Powers began to profoundly affect the international political climate in general and to bear positively, if only slowly, on the work of the First Committee.

The work of the Committee's forty-first and forty-second sessions witnessed movement towards adopting more resolutions without a vote towards a merging, whenever possible, of tabled draft resolutions, and efforts to adjust to the emerging new relationship between the two major Powers.

On 8 December 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty, an achievement that concluded years of work and efforts, consistently supported by the First Committee and the General Assembly at a time when it was only too evident that concrete actions did not necessarily follow the adoption of decisions which were not unanimous.

The forty-third and forty-fourth sessions of the First Committee saw the trend towards rationalization of the Committee's work gain new ground. For the first time in over a decade, there was a significant reduction in the numbers of resolutions and, for the first time since 1981, the percentage of resolutions adopted without a vote to resolutions adopted by a vote reached almost 40 per cent. In 1985, this figure was only 30 per cent.

The positive changes in the international atmosphere influenced the consideration of these draft resolutions in several important ways. On the whole, the language and substance contained in them tended to be less ideological and less confrontational. There was a greater willingness to work out compromise formulations and reduce the number of competitive drafts dealing with the same subject matter. Although the results of these efforts fell short of complete success, one consequence of the attempts to find mutual accommodation was to bring the differing positions appreciably closer.

In 1990, the First Committee adopted 52 proposals, including 4 draft decisions, of which 26 were adopted without a vote. This represents the *lowest* number of draft resolutions adopted by the Committee in the past 8 years, but the *highest* ever proportion - 50 per cent of the total - adopted without a vote.

These new and important trends in the work of the Committee could be attributed to several factors. Previous understandings on the rationalization of its work, including biennial rather than annual inclusion of some items on the Committee's agenda, have certainly played a role in the decrease of the draft resolutions tabled this year. Progress in this direction has also been made thanks to concrete efforts in merging draft resolutions addressing the same subject. Even more important for the impact on the overall work of the Committee were the political considerations reflecting current changes in international relations. Thus, in general, quite a few resolutions with usually strong political and ideological undertones were either not tabled this year or were considerably toned down, enabling the Committee, for the first time, to adopt them without a vote or with much stronger support. This spirit of cooperation and flexibility was, by and large, displayed across the spectrum of political and regional groups, though not necessarily on all major issues.

V - CONCLUSION

The 1990 deliberations of the First Committee of the General Assembly, no less than the general debate in plenary meetings of the Assembly itself, which preceded those deliberations, have made abundantly clear that Member States remain deeply involved in the issues of arms limitation and disarmament. There is also a universal feeling among Governments that the opportunities offered by the current profound changes in international affairs should be fully used, with a view to consolidating and expanding the areas of agreement.

Efforts, it is widely felt, should continue to focus on nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction and at the same time, speed up progress in the area of conventional

armaments. In that connection, ways should be found to make sure that conventional arms reductions in Europe or elsewhere do not become a source of increased arms trade or other international arms transfers to other areas of the world. Furthermore, new scientific and technological developments should not be allowed to increase the already redundant destructive potential accumulated in the present weapon stockpiles. Greater efforts, on the other hand, should be devoted to strengthening the whole area of collective and cooperative security structures.

This difficult goal can certainly not be achieved without developing a new sense of responsibility among all the nations of the world, a theme that the United States and the Soviet Union developed into a formal document of the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

In the document, the two major Powers show full awareness of the fact that the challenges before the international community and the United Nations are great but so, too, are the opportunities for more and better multilateral cooperation to confront and master the problems of our time. They also unconditionally recognize that the United Nations can play a leading role on issues of global concern.[5]

Undoubtedly, disarmament is such an issue. The need to make real progress in the field of disarmament is no longer one of choice or convenience. It is a moral imperative of our time. While the lexicon of the arms race often sounds coldly clinical with its many dry acronyms and formulas, at its core we find a deadly struggle whose outcome involves the very survival of this planet.

Under these circumstances, it becomes extremely dangerous for mankind to accept the potential destructiveness of the nuclear age as a natural and permanent element of world security.

The way to security can only be based, on the contrary, on a process designed to reinvigorate and strengthen the institutions of peace, on the creative interaction of bilateral, regional and global disarmament efforts, and tireless efforts to defuse tension and build consensus.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has once again stated, with great timeliness, what is expected of the international community at this historical juncture. "The early 1990s", he has said, "provide an opportunity for arms limitation and disarmament that we cannot afford to squander".[6] He has also pointed out that the end of the era of sterile confrontation is a positive assumption which needs to be continually confirmed in the light of actual events.[7]

[5] A/45/589.
[6] A/45/1.
[7] A/44/1.

Chapter 3
Strengthening the United Nations Role

Tan Han

Disarmament has been an important issue on the agenda of the United Nations since its founding. The first resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 called for the destruction of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The United Nations, in accordance with its Charter and the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, has the primary responsibility for realizing disarmament.

As is well known, the two biggest military powers, the United States and the USSR launched a fierce arms race, and in particular a nuclear arms race, lasting for a long period of time after the end of the Second World War.

Since the middle of the 1980s, however, progress has been made in the United States-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of their nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty was signed at the end of 1987. An agreement was reached in principle on partial reduction of their strategic nuclear arms and a treaty is expected to be signed in the near future. Both countries have also agreed to reduce their chemical weapons. A treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe was signed by NATO and Warsaw Pact in November 1990. Disarmament in Europe will be conducive not only to détente in Europe but also to stability in the world at large. All these results in disarmament are welcomed by the international community.

The progress in disarmament is by no means accidental. It is the result of the efforts made by the peoples of the whole world who have been consistently striving for world disarmament. Many governmental and non-governmental organizations have taken an active part in extensive discussions and the settlement of disarmament issues. World public opinion has also played an important role in calling for disarmament.

I - The Achievement of the United Nations

The United Nations has done enormous work in the field of disarmament. Many positive resolutions and documents on disarmament have been adopted at successive United Nations General Assembly sessions, SSODs and other international conferences, which have defined the orientation of and measures for disarmament. The World Disarmament Campaign and many special studies on arms reduction issues, initiated and sponsored by the United Nations, have helped promote disarmament efforts of all Governments and peoples. The contribution made by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs and UNIDIR, which are under the leadership of Mr. Yashushi Akashi and Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala respectively, is also well known to us.

II - Bilateral Disarmament

The progress made in the United States-Soviet bilateral arms reduction negotiations over the past few years, of course, is also closely related to their own political, economic and military necessities. The post-war history has proved that the policy of power politics, based on military force, has not been working. The spiralling arms race between the two major

military powers has imposed to varying extents a heavy burden on their respective economies, hindering their economic development. The over-saturated nuclear arsenals have not improved their security. The leaders of the United States and the USSR have recognized in their joint statement that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought", because there will be no winner in a nuclear war.

The world today is undergoing profound changes. The Soviet Union and some countries in Eastern Europe are experiencing radical transformation. Germany has been reunited, and multipolarization is developing. As a whole, the international situation is easing. But in some regions, the contradictions in the political, economic and ethnic areas between some countries and within certain countries, are becoming more outstanding. Various destabilizing factors make the international situation more unpredictable. The current Gulf crisis is serious and complicated. This shows that the world is far from being tranquil.

Although considerable progress has been made in disarmament in the past few years, we should not fail to see the task ahead remains arduous. Though the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed in their START talks to reduce their strategic arsenal, the actual cut envisaged is far less than 50 per cent of the total. What makes people most concerned is that the two sides have not stopped their competition in improving the quality of their weapons. They are continuing to modernize old-type nuclear weapons and to develop and manufacture new generations of nuclear weapons, outer-space weapons and conventional weapons. They should stop their qualitative arms race and slash further the number of all types of their nuclear armaments. By doing so, they will create favourable conditions for convening an international conference on nuclear disarmament with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States. So long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, the danger of a nuclear war cannot be completely ruled out. In order to prevent a nuclear war, all nuclear-weapon States should sign a treaty of non-first-use of nuclear weapons before the goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons can be achieved. And this will help strengthen world peace and security. A good opportunity has emerged for signing such a treaty since the end of Second World War. The nuclear-weapon States should seize this good opportunity, start negotiations as soon as possible and reach an agreement.

III - Multilateral Disarmament

In the field of multilateral disarmament talks, the Conference on Disarmament is playing a unique role as the sole global multilateral negotiating body. In recent years, progress has been registered in the negotiations regarding a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. What is noteworthy, however, is that in the multilateral negotiations, progress on a number of important disarmament issues is not satisfactory, and on some issues, the negotiations have simply been in stalemate. Many of the reasonable wishes and demands of small and medium-sized countries have not been given due attention by the two major Powers on the question of disarmament, and multilateral disarmament efforts seem to have been neglected. This has been unfavourable to disarmament. Bilateral and multilateral disarmament efforts should promote and reinforce each other.

As the practice in disarmament shows the correct way and approach to the realization of disarmament is that countries with the largest arsenals should be the first to take practical actions in all fields of disarmament and carry out their special responsibility for it, which is the key to the success of disarmament. Besides, military powers should respect and carefully consider reasonable wishes and demands of the vast number of medium-sized and small

countries. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, have the right to discuss and resolve disarmament issues on the basis of equality and can play an active part. The United Nations and other multilateral disarmament organizations are the main forums for such endeavours, and their functions should be strengthened.

With the interaction and development of the international community in political, economic and cultural lives, the relationship of countries is increasingly close, and the United Nations is playing a more and more important role in international life. In the past several years, the United Nations has been playing a significant role in resolving regional conflicts, which has attracted worldwide attention, and therefore its prestige has risen unprecedentedly. Moreover, the United Nations will play a greater role in the field of disarmament. Even in the years when the international situation was very serious, some treaties on arms control and reduction were signed in the United Nations, such as The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, etc.

In recent years, in order to promote arms reduction, many member countries of the United Nations have put forward a lot of constructive and worthwhile proposals to the First Committee of the United Nations, the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament, and those that are reasonable and feasible should be adopted so that the United Nations can act more effectively in the field of disarmament.

Chapter 4
The Limitations and Possibilities of Multilateral Disarmament

Henning Wegener

The United Nations Charter hardly speaks of disarmament. It is more readily couched in terms of avoidance of war and preservation of peace. But the relationship between arms control and peace is evident, as is the relevance of arms control to the larger purposes of the Charter. I would also highlight the overall title which underlines the indispensable relationship of disarmament and security. There is no disarmament worthy of the name which does not make its contribution to the security of States. The unique contribution of the United Nations disarmament process towards security is that it enables the participation of all members of the international community, highlighting the right of all to share in a dialogue on security. This is particularly valuable for those States which have not chosen - or have no possibility - to belong to a collective security arrangement or military alliance. For them the United Nations is the principal venue where they can share in the worldwide security debate and voice concerns of their own.

Security is the central contribution States make to the well-being of their own citizens. Security and protection from intimidation and war is the very basis upon which the life of a national community can unfold and upon which citizens can plan and optimize their lives. This fact underlines the importance for all States not to be left out when security is at stake. The universal nature of the United Nations disarmament process must always be borne in mind, even when individual States proceed to arms control negotiations of their own or the elaboration of regional security arrangements among themselves. Bilateral arms control, or arms control among the members of the two major military alliances, has been the driving force of disarmament in the last few years - an aspect to which I will return - but this must not deflect our attention from the important fact that multilateral endeavours and the worldwide quest for security become ever more important in an era of heightened interdependence and vulnerability of States. In a way, security worldwide becomes less and less divisible, and we cannot rest assured that our own security will remain unaffected if war and conflict flare up elsewhere on this globe. Bilateral and United Nations-wide arms control must thus be set on a course of constructive parallelism. The successes of bilateral arms control must not arrest the multilateral process and freeze it in frustration and outdated thinking patterns. The novel opportunities which the evolving, more cooperative East-West relationship opens up must increasingly give forceful momentum to disarmament and security pursuits at the United Nations.

I would like to explore these prospects in a triple mental operation. In a first section I will attempt to capture and characterize the process of United Nations disarmament and to explore its institutional potential. In a second part I would like to draw the larger picture of current world developments and trends, in order to derive a clearer grasp of what substantive scope United Nations disarmament activities have, where its limits are to be found and where its priorities ought to be shifting. In the third and concluding part I would like to speak about these very priorities as I see them.

- I -

The fundamental constraint inherent in United Nations disarmament activities is obvious. Despite its new promise and revival, the United Nations cannot function as a global legislator issuing and enforcing global prescriptions for peace and disarmament. Not a single weapon will disappear from the face of the earth because of action by any of its organs. The multilateral disarmament process cannot command disarmament, but merely facilitate it. In reality, it is a mere promotional process, with several distinct stages that build upon one another: dialogue, conceptualizing, recommending and mobilizing, and finally treaty-making, with the effectiveness of treaties depending on subsequent independent actions by sovereign States. Specifically in the General Assembly and its organs, the multilateral disarmament process fulfils a dialogue function, involving all nations in a learning process that heightens the awareness of global security problems and mutual security concerns. This learning process increasingly reveals the interdependence of security issues and the need to take the legitimate security interests of each individual State into account. This is particularly important with regard to regional contexts, where conflicting security perspectives in the regions must be reconciled through knowledge and understanding. It is equally important in the general North-South perspective, where the security concerns of developing countries and the security and defence concepts of the industrialized partners must fuse in a process of better mutual understanding.

By the second function, conceptualizing, I refer to the progress from such mere exchange of views and mutual understanding to the stage where increasingly a common focus of debate is reached, where nations think about security, threats, the function of armed forces etc. in identical or comparable terms. There is no doubt that, both in the dialogue and the conceptualizing function, substantial achievement must be noted over the last 25 years, as evidenced by increasingly larger bodies of consensus resolutions and the higher degree of articulativeness and knowledge characterizing the contributions from all participants in the process.

There is only one step from this analytical, conceptual progress - however modest, if measured against standards of desirability and feasibility - to the more operational aspects of the multilateral disarmament process. The United Nations General Assembly and its organs issue recommendations without legally binding effect. And yet, the United Nations decidedly has a task in the progressive development of international law, or at least in moving collective consciousness forward in preparation of later legal prescription. In this sense it is a legitimate function of the multilateral disarmament process to formulate guidelines for disarmament negotiations, to define and, where necessary, suggest limits to the basically unrestricted freedom of States to produce, transfer and deploy weapons, as well as for State behaviour with regard to war and peace in the nuclear age.

Yet, however important, these three functions, which are the field of action of the United Nations disarmament organs, remain very much verbal and mental exercises. The Conference on Disarmament is the only organ where negotiating powers are lodged. I do not need to belabour this point nor the varied history of the Conference over the many years of its existence. We all know about the difficulties in seeing a single negotiation through to a successful end. The chemical weapons ban to which I will revert later is the primary example.

The first lesson one should draw from this brief analysis of how the United Nations disarmament machinery is structured is that it should be used well; there would be no value

in maintaining such complicated and costly institutional framework if it is not optimized. But my impression is that, despite some recent improvements, we are far from exploiting the potential of these institutional settings appropriately.

Obviously, a multilateral body with a huge membership cannot be expected to generate the efficiency of a homogenous national government - or a business enterprise. In addition, security is of overriding importance for the existence and sovereignty of States, and no decision in this field can be taken lightly or hastily. But even with these impediments in mind, compared to other multilateral bodies the institutional inertia which seems to characterize the processes both in New York and Geneva is relatively appalling, and I do not think that complacency is the right approach to this evident deficiency. Ingrained behaviour, repetitious resolutions and speeches, and unwillingness of delegations to adjust to major new events continue to be the sad realities of United Nations work and affect the disarmament machinery particularly. It appears that the virtual disappearance of the East-West antagonism and a more purposeful dialogue on nuclear and conventional arms control matters have made for considerable improvements in the last few years; but they have hardly influenced the static, reiterative nature of resolution-making and debate.

There is also a confusion of functions which leads to waste. While the negotiating potential of the Conference on Disarmament is decidedly underused, the New York bodies are often mistaken for places where substantive negotiations can be held. Available debating time is wasted on drafting exercises, applied to often meaningless position papers, while the analytical tasks are left half-finished. The distinction between dialogue and exchange of views on the larger arms control issues and the much more focused processes of prenegotiation and negotiation are not kept apart, and waste of effort and loss of audience are often the results.

The worst deficiency of the process, however, seems to be the manifest disingenuousness which many participants reveal. They clamour relentlessly for disarmament by others, pointing the accusing finger at certain powers without drawing the right conclusions for themselves, indeed with an assidious effort to keep all possible armament options open for themselves. Somehow the conditions are never right for them to also make a contribution to world security by accepting constraints. Nuclear disarmament appears to be fine when it affects other holders of these weapons; but those who clamour for it believe that they can with impunity embark on the constitution of a nuclear capacity of their own with or without violation of the non-proliferation treaty and without regard to essential considerations of regional stability. Some of these countries relentlessly screen the world market for sensitive nuclear imports, apparently unimpressed by the eloquent description of nuclear horror and the alleged profound immorality of nuclear weapons of which their own delegates so readily speak in debate. Confidence-building and transparency promoting measures are a good thing, but can unfortunately not be practised by themselves or in their region. Arms exports and high military expenditure must be castigated as destabilizing and as a waste of resources; but the very countries that denounce these activities do not hesitate to turn into major Third World arms exporters or to claim positions of regional military superiority.

- II -

Let me now attempt to insert the United Nations disarmament process into the larger trend picture of world events. There is no doubt that our own world is undergoing a particularly rapid transformation. One can conceptualize about the new rapid shifts in terms of several

large and indeed global trends. The first one of these is the logic of economics and technology that increasingly make for global interdependence, prying open closed societies. This logic has convincingly revealed the deficiencies of centrally administered economies and closed societies. The huge benefits from economic and technological progress culminating in the growth potential of the information society can be reaped only by open societies based on free, individual and collective choice. They are best realized in political settings of democracy and liberalism. The current crisis of the Soviet system has come about because these increasingly self-evident truths were not heeded.

The logic of economic and technological interdependence strengthens cooperation, peaceful behaviour and democracy. We can now observe this process throughout the continents, with the few remaining exceptions reconfirming the main thesis.

The second major world trend is the devaluation, tendentially at least, of military power. The destructiveness of modern weaponry and the increasingly evident fact that the price of lost peace is structurally higher than the potential gain from victorious war are now deeply impressed on peoples' minds. In almost half a century no war has in real terms been won, and chances are that the only remaining specimen in present-day world affairs, Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, will eventually lead to a catastrophic long-term weakening of the aggressor. The obsolescence of major war can thus finally be a dream come true.

I find considerable heuristic value in the thesis of the changing paradigm of world power which maintains that large-scale power ambitions can no longer be underpinned by military might alone and that the Soviet Union's failure as a supreme hegemonial power - to cite the prime example - is due mainly to its having placed its bets on the wrong form of power articulation. New components of power, principally economic and technological prowess, come to the fore. This has led to an almost universal perception in the world that war and conquest are unacceptable ways to vie for power positions. Without this shift in paradigm and in perception the worldwide revolt against Iraq would have been inconceivable. The recent outbreak of war in the Gulf exemplifies that the world has ceased to tolerate its exercise. International action against Iraq is rightly seen as the test case for the prevalence of a new world order, as much as a test case for the United Nations themselves. The re-emergence of the United Nations and the general perception of its future role confirm these changes. Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar has been an eloquent spokesman of the United Nations new functions: elimination of the germs of war, a broadening of the spirit of world cooperation, and vigilance to ensure the primacy of law.

The shift away from military power is perhaps the most momentous transformation of our State system. Both the exercise of military power and recourse to war may, in the longer run, have lost their century-old magic of determining power positions. That is not to say that weapons and military might will not continue to demand our vigilance and to influence our security priorities; nor that military potentials will not be required to offset military potentials, in a search for balance at requisite lower levels.

While - apart from events in the Gulf - the world is now uniquely free from international military conflicts, and most of the military threats that have been the characteristic of the Cold War era are rapidly receding, our concept of security also becomes broader. We now see more clearly that political action to reduce conflicts and to change the behaviour and modes of interaction of States must be an integral part of security policy. We also recognize that security, even military security, does not consist only of its inherent antagonistic component, but that there is a cooperative dimension to security from which mutual reassurance and a decreasing likelihood of the use of weapons can flow.

I would like specifically to refer to the recent development of what used to be called the East-West conflict. The dramatic dimensions of the arms control agreement signed in Paris in November 1990 have not yet been sufficiently recognized worldwide. It is indicative of a huge shift in the military landscape across the Eurasian continent where the potential for great war has now been virtually removed and even limited conflict has been attenuated, pending implementation of the Paris accords and the planned further rounds of conventional arms control. The build-down of conventional weapons along the East-West axis and the removal of the traditional threat are at least tendentially accompanied by a process of close and trustful cooperation and by an additional comprehensive set of confidence-building measures that are ambitiously designed to lay the erstwhile opponents in the East-West conflict open to one another like a book. Over the next few years we will see a vast scheme of mutual inspections and common endeavours for the maintenance of the peace unfolding in the very areas that had so long generated hostilities, suspicion, huge arms build-ups, and gigantic armies poised for immediate conflict. In the recent Joint Declaration of the 22 States that used to form the two military alliances of the Cold War period, the signatories have undertaken to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence. This vastly reshaped perception of the worth and role of armed forces will increasingly come to the fore in new, more defence-dominant force structures and in newly conceived roles for the residual military forces in peace-time endeavours and in graduated crisis responses. At the same time, weapons procurement will substantially level off, with a downward tendency in both East and West. These developments are already being echoed in many other parts of the world, where whole regions are now exploring more cooperative ways of conflict-solving.

The events in nuclear arms control are equally momentous. The START agreement, likely to be signed in 1991, is only the beginning of a new approach to nuclear weapons. The Atlantic Alliance has already gone on record to state that in the new, less threatening environment, the reliance on nuclear weapons can be diminished, that especially the existing short-range nuclear systems can be phased out and in part entirely eliminated. As the Western countries now define the nuclear factor in their strategy, the political element will come to the fore even more strongly. Not only are the much smaller nuclear arsenals now officially designated as means of "last resort", as an ultimate guarantee of peace - in practice they always served that role - but new major steps of nuclear arms control are almost unavoidable. There are already commitments on the part of the major powers to embark on START II negotiations. There is also agreement to commence in 1991 with a negotiation on short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. One could safely predict that these impending arms control moves are only the precursors of an even more radical rethinking of the nuclear equation. The signs are now set in the direction of what many call minimum deterrence, to be attained through dramatically reduced nuclear arsenals conceived in a mutually compatible and stabilizing manner. Many definitional issues of this approach are still untackled, and the negotiating challenges formidable. But erstwhile fears of a nuclear conflict that have emanated from the huge nuclear arsenals along the East-West axis during the Cold War era are already now devoid of any real meaning. This is pertinently reflected by the rapid receding of the saliency of the nuclear issue in public opinion in Western countries, where the peace marches of the early eighties and the hysterical preoccupation of the public with nuclear issues have now become at best a remote and curious souvenir.

Despite these welcome developments, however, the picture worldwide is not rosy; it is, in addition, highly contradictory.

Especially the following phenomena cut across the positive tendencies:

- New technologies rear their head. I do not have to rehearse the dangers that stem from the fact that by the end of the century about 20 States are expected to possess an operational capability in long-range missiles, with the ranges progressively growing. These new capabilities have the potential to pose a direct threat to a large number of adjacent countries, to disrupt regional stability, and to stultify the very notion of defence by national means at the borders of Third World countries, indeed national defence as such. The point I want to make is that the increasing spread of long-range missile technology has a tendency to become destabilizing as such, even though individual holders of these technologies may be peaceful in their intentions and policies.
- A general arms build-down, specifically along the East-West axis, makes the remaining arsenals in individual States that continue to overarm particularly menacing. Iraq is a monstrous example of a medium-sized State with weapons arsenals that are threatening and destabilizing by themselves and have indeed spelt aggression of the worst kind. Joe Nye has fittingly spoken of "the new leverage of weak States". A more cooperative world environment requires that all players abide by the rules, lest there be grave disturbances.
- A whole new threat spectrum emerges, often on the subnational level. Growing wealth differentials and population pressures, non-cooperative trade practices, explosive societal crisis potentials, as for instance unresolved ethnic and religious tensions, State and group terrorism, and threats to the global ecosystem or world health must be cited among this broad range of newly emerging conflict potentials, which are not only disruptive in an increasingly fragile world but contain a world potential for new violence and may indeed turn into military confrontation at unpredictable times. Large waves of migration, which are likely both in the East-West and in the South-North direction, may drive this point home within the very near future.

These newly emerging threats are at present being analysed in more detail in many quarters. They reinforce the analysis that the global security environment today offers a contradictory picture. Regional events around us are caught in the dialectics of cooperation and potential chaos. The emerging perspective of a new more peaceful world order, under the influence of a cooperative East-West relationship and the disappearance of the main ideological antagonisms in the world, develops a powerful impetus, reducing tensions and military conflicts. At the moment, these positive tendencies appear dominant. They contain the promise that the instruments of world order, mainly the United Nations, are being strengthened and that the cooperative approach increasingly prevails. On the other hand, there are new instabilities, as residual military conflict potentials of the current era take on a relatively more important role and as the conflict potentials of the dawning twenty-first century take clearer shape.

What are the implications of this highly diversified world environment for arms control and specifically the United Nations disarmament process?

- In the first place, we can conclude that traditional arms control will certainly retain an important role and can indeed benefit from some of the trends described

above. Much of the current arms build-down and of the perceptional shift away from warfare and military conflict will proceed on its own dynamics. Yet, arms control agreements, bilateral and multilateral, will retain their importance to redimension and redefine the military factor in State relationships, to steady arms control developments through juridicial fixation, thus preventing break-out, to reduce mutual threat perceptions and thus to put a break on temptations towards competitive arms build-up. There is another important element involved in the visible move of States towards arms control: arms control can fight the delegitimization of defence efforts that more and more accompanies the devaluation of military power, and may thus lead to a more sensible, justifiable and stabilizing defence effort on the part of States engaged in disarmament negotiations.

- The larger trend picture shows, however, that, despite these new chances and beneficial effects, arms control is increasingly insufficient to stem the whole range of old and new threats. With the promise of a more cooperative era, appropriate policies arriving at the preservation of peace must shift to new, non-arms related means. Commensurate with a widening security notion, this implies a new emphasis on preventive political measures and the cooperative dimension of security. Multilateral activities for peace should thus increasingly be placed under the following new accents:

  - the establishment of early warning networks to sensitize States to facets of the new threat spectrum;
  - political support for economic and social reform;
  - multilateral efforts designed to fight the root causes of specific conflicts; the establishment of cooperative structures including regional security arrangements;
  - mechanisms of crisis prevention and crisis settlement.

On the whole, the new emphasis must increasingly be less on war itself and its impending outbreak, but rather on the broad spectrum of developments between peace and war, where political rules and cooperative techniques can best be brought to bear.

- III -

The preceding reflections should guide us in reviewing past United Nations disarmament activities and in establishing new priorities. On these, I have the following remarks to make.

My first inquiry concerns the role of nuclear matters in both the New York United Nations bodies and the Conference on Disarmament. While the almost obsessive attention given to nuclear weapons in the past decades is now declining, this shift needs to be accentuated much more. As the two principal military power systems of the Cold War era move to intensive nuclear disarmament and a more cooperative relationship, it becomes increasingly pointless to decry the dangers of nuclear conflagration that could arise from their relationship. Encouragement for the progress of nuclear arms control and an appeal for the inclusion of all nuclear weapons States into this ongoing process is desirable and may be helpful, but the issue has been artificially inflated and should now be reduced to a proportion that corresponds to the real residual threats or risks that might flow from the role assigned

to these weapons in the management of the East-West relationship. My own view is that the residual level of nuclear weapons to which the two major muclear weapons holders are aspiring will become increasingly stable and will shake off the less desirable features of nuclear deterrence of the past. Especially at a time when the nuclear proliferation outside of the East-West relationship is an as yet uncontained danger - and I will revert to this aspect - the war-preventing capabilities of the perhaps very small holdings of nuclear weapons by the major powers will exercise a beneficial effect far beyond the relationship between the powers more immediately concerned.

In reviewing disarmament priorities, the vastly exaggerated place allotted to nuclear testing issues must be a matter of urgent review. This debate has somehow become stuck in the technological world of the 50s and 60s, when no reliable nuclear weapons could be built without extensive testing. The test ban issue rose to prominence as part of a suffocation scenario whose thrust was to phase out nuclear weapons altogether through the elimination of one vital point in the chain of events in nuclear weapons development. I am personally convinced that in the long run nuclear testing could be starkly reduced or perhaps in the even longer run disappear. But the truth to which States must face up is that nuclear weapons development is now possible without testing - whatever the trade-offs in terms of refinement, responsiveness, reliability - and that the emergence of new, open or disguised, nuclear weapons holders including those that shroud their activities in deliberate ambiguity has taken place without testing. Of course, there is a theological issue involved. If one believes in the stabilizing value of a low level of compatible, well-conceived weapons arsenals underpinning a cooperative East-West relationship, with larger stability effects on the world at large, then testing as a means of keeping this residual stockpile reliable and responsive has a valuable function to fulfil. The fewer nuclear weapons there are in such a nuclear equation, the higher the demands that must be placed on them in reliability and accuracy. The development of nuclear weapons without testing leads to uncertainties about their functioning and effectiveness to deter, and can foment the urge to produce *more* weapons in order to make up for the doubts of those who cannot certify the reliability of their stockpile. A complete test ban may thus have counterproductive effects, diminishing the desired stability effect as much as weapons safety, and increasing the potential number of weapons.

Indeed, attention should move away from the endless belabouring of the CTB issue. For some, it has become an instrument to exempt oneself from any realistic disarmament step and, moreover, to block reasonable steps by others; the wilful sabotage of the recent NPT Review Conference is a striking case in point.

It would be infinitely more important at this juncture to face up to the newly arising questions of nuclear proliferation *outside* of the established power equation. The real problem as I see it, lies in the destabilization of whole regions through the surreptitious acquisition of nuclear capabilities by some individual players; I have yet to meet a strategic analyst who would rejoice in the prospect of having Iraqi nuclear weapons thrown into the current groping for a more stable and balanced power formula in the Middle East. While the nuclear test ban should rapidly become a side-show, the harnessing of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, along with other weapons of mass destruction, should move to centre stage.

Nobody can refute the argument that the Non-Proliferation Treaty has traits of discrimination. Had it been possible in the immediate post-war period to construct a better worldwide régime for nuclear holdings, we might all be better off. But the NPT certainly was the best solution for the preservation of world stability at the time of its negotiation and will continue to play that role. In my mind, it would be an important challenge to the United

Nations disarmament community to give more thought to the elaboration of a new comprehensive deal on nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation, before the background of a continued nuclear arms control process that should soon involve all holders of such weapons. Such a new deal could conceivably comprise the following elements:

- a determined effort to finalize the chemical weapons ban and attain its early entry into force, in order to cut short any notion of trade-off between these categories of weapons of mass destruction;
- the adoption of legally binding negative security guarantees, underwritten by all nuclear weapon States on the basis of the successful United Nations resolution of the current General Assembly that should lead to a "common formula";
- a voluntary but binding commitment to freeze nuclear build-ups or the perfection of incipient nuclear weapons by all countries that have avowed, or are suspected of, building such capabilities, including Iraq, Israel, Pakistan and India;
- where adhesion to the NPT is not acceptable to individual States, bilateral or regional agreements on nuclear non-proliferation with mutual inspection clauses following the example of the most welcome recent Argentinian and Brazilian accord;
- confidence-building measures in bilateral or regional contexts with mutual information on, and inspections of, nuclear activities, civilian and otherwise, beyond the inspection modalities of the IAEA;
- enhancement of the IAEA safeguards which, the quality of work and diligence of the Agency notwithstanding, increasingly suffer from the fact that real nuclear developments are taking place outside the nuclear power installations regularly inspected;
- a new, more rigorous scheme of export controls in the nuclear field based on the London Suppliers' Club, but with additional countries, both suppliers and purchasers, joining on a voluntary basis and with specific encouragements and privileges for those countries who give tangible assurances on non-proliferation;
- beyond such mechanisms a more elaborate system of rewards for behaviour in non-proliferation matters, especially in terms of civil nuclear cooperation, promotion of civilian nuclear power generation etc.

Nothing particular needs to be said to underline the urgency and indispensability of an early conclusion of the chemical weapons negotiations in Geneva, but the momentum generated by the 1988 Paris Conference seems to be fading away, and the negotiators are increasingly involved in a maze of technical details that, however important and useful, detract from the overall purpose. It should be seriously examined whether many of these technical arrangements could not be left to the Joint Consultative Committee of the impending convention, with the convention itself opened for signature on the basis of the ***principal*** rights and obligations of parties. No State could be harmed by this procedure which would allow early recruitment of signatories and uphold the momentum of the treaty as such: States could make the completion of the ratification process and the deposition of their ratification instruments dependent upon the satisfactory conclusion of these technical preparatory talks in the treaty organ. It might well be possible to save a year or more of precious implementation time for the ban. Such a move could help to bridge the present stark contrast between the slow motion of work at Geneva and the seeming indifference some delegations

display at the conference table on the one hand, and the sense of urgency and commitment which is conveyed by public utterances of high-ranking governmental representatives, on the other.

A meeting of the Conference on Disarmament at Ministerial level to introduce and adopt such an approach could be highly useful. It could also motivate the earliest possible signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention by the greatest possible number of States. The momentum that could flow from such a conference and the likelihood of an accelerated conclusion of the Convention should be enhanced by more stringent collective embargo policies in the area of chemical materials and appropriate measures of penalization for those who breach the embargo. The chemical industry should be involved even more than in the past, and should in pursuance of the Canberra Conference be motivated to provide standardized layouts for modern chemical processing plants which would have built-in verification features, making tamper-proof instrument-based verification of modern chemical batch-production an inexpensive feature of new production facilities. A Ministerial conference could also - and finally - put to rest the lingering ideas about the possible retention of residual holdings by some signatories of the convention until late into the life of the treaty. It must by now be recognized that the idea of a convention, where some can arm while others disarm, is not a viable option.

The area of work, however, which needs considerable and even decisive strengthening would be the whole domain of cooperative security and conflict management. The work on confidence-building measures which has found expression in a series of welcome and persuasive resolutions should be built upon by way of practical application, in appropriate regional contexts, especially between India and Pakistan and in the Middle East. The new package of confidence-building measures which the member States of the CSCE have added to their previous Stockholm package should also give a new impulse.

Detailed exchanges of views on military doctrines which have taken place in the CSCE framework and which are now approaching a second round, should also be practised in other regional frameworks. Military contacts which would flow from such doctrinal talks can defuse tension and bring mutual recognition of peaceful intentions.

Conventional arms control has entered the scene at last at the General Assembly and at the UNDC. But the rich dividends which the Vienna force reduction talks can yield for other regions have not yet been cashed in upon. The convenient excuse for high conventional armament in many parts of the world that the participants in the East-West relationship were sitting upon such enormous piles of weapons that everything beneath these levels was legitimate, has now disappeared and the criteria for what armament is compatible with regional security and the economic priorities of various developing countries should now be considerably tightened.

The absurd example of Iraq shows where excessive arms trade is leading. The current additional danger is that arms producers which are affected by the levelling off of procurement in NATO and WTO countries will embark on an even more aggressive sales strategy in Third World countries in order to maintain or regain economies of scale. Such a movement, if indeed it is afoot, must be stemmed and the control of arms trade according to criteria that need to be worked out in the wider international arena must become a prime subject of multilateral arms control. Registers of arms exports are only a first step; the statistics so produced must be submitted to a critical review and arms transactions must be drawn rigorously into the open and not allowed to produce destabilizing effects behind the veil of State secrecy.

The missile technology control régime, to which a number of exporting countries belong, must be substantially strengthened and here again the widest possible adhesion to such a scheme must be sought without, however, any possibility for reluctant partners to dilute the scheme or to pursue parochial export interests.

* * *

I have attempted to make a number of points across a range of areas, but would like in summary to stress that, while disarmament at the United Nations will remain important and fertile, a broad range of other security policies for conflict settlement and the preservation of peace, fitting both the more cooperative component of world environment and the newly emerging threat spectrum, must be pursued with equal vigour.

Chapter 5
An Agenda for the United Nations in Disarmament

Tessa Solesby

I should like to start with something on which I think we all agree, that this discussion has been remarkably well timed. It is taking place in a period of astonishing progress in bilateral relations and bilateral disarmament between the Soviet Union and United States and within Europe as a whole. It is also a period of a renaissance in the United Nations role of peace-keeping and peace-making. Viewed from a longer term perspective it is a period of fundamental changes in the global distribution of power, the move from a bipolar into a multi-polar world. It is therefore timely to ask ourselves what opportunities are opening up for the United Nations in arms control and disarmament. My comments are of course offered on a personal basis.

It is no coincidence that the greatest successes in disarmament have been at the bilateral and regional levels. This is where the main tensions lie and where the main solutions need to be found. Successful arms control and disarmament after all is about national security first and foremost - to maintain and enhance national security at lower levels of armaments. That can most often be best done on a bilateral or regional basis. It is true in all regions.

But the international community can make an important contribution, and Member States are united in believing it must do so. I should like to examine the nature of this contribution under a number of headings.

I - Disarmament Agreements

First through the negotiation of disarmament agreements. Certain types of disarmament require a global approach. A bilateral or regional basis would either be a poor second best or in some cases not feasible at all. I think this is common ground among all Member States. The differences come over the length and content of the negotiating list.

I believe in the saying "nothing succeeds like success". And nothing fails like failure. The current negotiations for a total ban on chemical weapons are not only extremely important in their own right - most Governments would share this view. They are also something of a test of the feasibility of global disarmament agreements. The successful conclusion of an effective Chemical Weapons Convention would give a huge boost to the standing of global disarmament.

The same is true in a different way for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has played a major part in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons over the last 20 years. A Conference is to be held to extend it in 1995. All the evidence suggests that there will be overwhelming support for indefinite or very long-term extension. Whether this proves to be so will be another vital test for global disarmament.

Assuming all goes well for these two agreements, what next? Some Member States would say nuclear disarmament, some would want immediate global negotiations in this field, in particular for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. I do not think things will happen quite in this way. A CTB over the long term, yes. But not an immediate goal for those nuclear powers relying on a nuclear deterrence as part of their national defences. Progress towards a CTB will be on a step-by-step basis, in the first place between the United States and Soviet

Union. The western nuclear powers give higher priority to the reduction of actual nuclear weapons, and the process is well on its way, with every prospect for further advances. Cutting nuclear stocks is above all an East West task and is best tackled within that context.

If not nuclear disarmament, at least in the near future, what negotiating fields are suitable for the United Nations? A new Chemical Weapons Convention of course. But we need to consider not only negotiating new agreements: existing agreements also have to be maintained and strengthened. I have already underlined the importance of the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. Another issue likely to be high in the minds of Governments in the near future is the Biological Weapons Convention. Strengthening the authority of the Treaty will be an important objective for States parties. We shall need to learn from experience in negotiating a Chemical Weapons Convention.

There are several other items on the list, and other speakers have mentioned them, but none yet commands the sort of broad support necessary to launch negotiations.

II - Pre-Negotiation Studies

The stage of pre-negotiation study, if handled seriously, can help to prepare subjects not yet ripe for negotiation for the day when their time arrives. CTB and outer space are two examples where under United Nations auspices pre-negotiation discussion and studies are mapping out the ground for more distant possible negotiation.

The pace at which issues become mature for negotiation has to reflect the judgements of Member States about their national security. Attempts to force the pace cannot succeed.

But, you might say, part of the task of the United Nations is to change perceptions, and I would agree. The bilateral and regional perspective may often be the most important, but in varying degrees we are all affected by disarmament everywhere. Those States not involved in bilateral and regional negotiations have a right to voice their views and attempt to persuade others, and they often wish to exercise this right. There is no better place to do so than the United Nations.

And opinions do evolve, as the overall political and security context changes. In the last few years new concepts have spread, for example the importance of confidence-building measures, of transparency, of effective verification, of conventional as well as nuclear arms control. The United Nations has played its part in this, through debate, through studies, through seminars, through setting guidelines. Horizons have been broadened, and old moulds of thinking broken. I think all Member States want this process to continue.

But it is a delicate process. It has to be undertaken with a realistic understanding of the security concerns of others. The sledge-hammer technique tends to rebound on those who wield it. Unrealistic aims and unrealistic timetables do not carry conviction and only do harm to the image of the United Nations as a serious forum.

III - Regional Disarmament

I come now to what I believe is the area with most opportunity for growth in United Nations activity. One of the most interesting aspects of this year's General Assembly First Committee was the degree of emphasis on the importance of regional disarmament in all regions of the world, and the importance of conventional arms control in that context. This is hardly surprising. Proliferation of arms into regions of high political tensions is one of the most

worrying developments of recent years. Huge standing armies, equipped with sophisticated weaponry, can be found in virtually every region.

The United Nations has barely begun to face up to this problem. All sorts of sensitivities exist. But a tide of opinion among Member States is now flowing in favour of the United Nations doing significantly more.

On obvious case in point is where the United Nations itself is involved in peace-making and peace-keeping operations. The possibility of confidence-building measures and arms reductions should be on the agenda in all such situations. These aspects are already integrated in certain situations, but there may be scope for a more automatic inclusion of arms control and confidence-building measures on the standard checklist of potential action.

Even in situations where the United Nations is not directly involved, the United Nations Disarmament Secretariat can still play a useful facilitating role, especially at the early stages of moves towards regional or subregional negotiations. This has to be handled in a sensitive and discreet manner, in close liaison with the countries concerned. But much can be done by organizing the right seminar at the right time, by responding to requests for information on negotiating methodology, and by providing a requesting State with quiet advice on specific local problems. I know this is already taking place, and I would venture to prophesy that it will expand. I believe such a role is viewed favourably by a wide cross section of Member States, though on the understanding that the Secretariat acts strictly in response to the wishes of the countries most involved.

As part of this facilitating role, the United Nations can help as a centre for information at the disposal of those wanting to work for arms reductions in their own region. A wealth of experience is accumulating from a number of quarters, including recent negotiations between East and West. The sort of lessons I have in mind range from general principles of arms control to detailed techniques which have been successfully applied. Of course techniques must differ to fit the circumstances of each case. Nevertheless negotiators should not have to reinvent the wheel every time. They should be able to draw on the experience of others and adapt it as they see fit. Several delegations made this point during this year's General Assembly First Committee, and the United Kingdom proposed that the United Nations should compile information on multilateral and bilateral arms control and disarmament agreements, with the aim of providing an easily available source of texts and measures used in such agreements. I am glad to say that this idea was adopted by consensus.

IV - ARMS TRANSFERS

The issue of arms transfers is another area where the United Nations can fruitfully engage its energies. Weapons, including the most sophisticated, are traded between countries on a vast scale. This trade unfortunately can fuel an arms race in an area of tension. The easy availability of armaments can enable a State to build up its arsenals beyond the need of defence, to levels more consistent with aggressive ambitions. However the situation is not as straightforward as that. Countries do need arms for defence, and it is each country's sovereign right to judge what it requires. Any action by the United Nations therefore has to be carefully considered, and evidence from recent debates on the subject in the First Committee suggests the need for caution is widely accepted. It was therefore wise as a preliminary step to establish a United Nations study on ways and means to promote transparency in international transfers. The main idea likely to emerge is a proposal for a United Nations register of arms transfers, and I would expect this to commend itself to a large

number of countries. However to be acceptable such a register would have to be universal and non-discriminatory, and it remains to be seen whether this can be achieved.

V - VERIFICATION

Another possible form of United Nations activity is verification. Here there is some difference of emphasis among Member States. Some have a vision of a grand centralized United Nations verification agency, a big brother for all arms control and disarmament agreements, or at least for global ones. Others emphasize that arms limitation and disarmament verification are agreement specific, and are the responsibility of States Parties to each agreement. This point was empasized in a United Nations study endorsed by the 1990 First Committee. But at the same time that study successfully identified ground which could be shared in common by the protagonists of each of these schools. Namely a carefully defined information gathering and disseminating activity for the United Nations on verification techniques and procedures. We shall I am sure see this being put into practice in the near future.

I have said little about the structure of organs within the United Nations or under United Nations auspices dealing with arms control and disarmament. That is because generally speaking the present structure seems to be about right: the First Committee as a sounding board, the United Nations Disarmament Commission for in-depth study and discussion, the Conference on Disarmament for negotiation and pre-negotiation, small regional centres for local contact, and *ad hoc* governmental organs and technical secretariats for each disarmament agreement. Recent attempts at rationalization have shown that, while small improvements in organization are desirable and possible, by and large the right structure and procedures are in place. What is needed is to learn to apply them more constructively to the opportunities for arms control and disarmament in our changing world.

Chapter 6
A Japanese Perspective

Takahiro Shinyo

I - Japanese Commitment to the United Nations Disarmament Activities

1. What characterizes Japan's post-war security policy is its exclusively defense-orientation maintained under the Peace Constitution of Japan. This has been reflected in the organization and size of the Japanese defense mechanism as well as its Three Non-Nuclear and Arms Export Control Principles. Being administered under strict civilian control, military affairs are kept as open as possible to the public in the form of official publications including various government statistics, budgetary documents and white papers.

Japan currently produces approximately 15 per cent of the world's total GNP, supplied the largest amount of ODA (Official Development Aid) to the developing countries in 1989 (Japan: $8.96 billion, United States of America: $7.66 billion), and pays its assessed contribution (as much as 11 per cent) to the United Nations. Such economic stature by no means coincides with the military profile of Japan, which for all its demographic size and industrial and financial strength, possesses total personnel of only 240,000 in the Self Defense Force. Accordingly, Japan's contribution to the international community has been virtually limited to the non-military field. The active participation by Japan in the disarmament efforts at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and at the various United Nations forums is an important part of our foreign policy. Let me briefly enumerate some instances of Japan's cooperation with these international organizations.

2. The Japanese Government has unfailingly advocated the lofty principle of respect for the United Nations ever since Japan joined the world organization, making that principle one of the pillars of our foreign policy. Our cooperation with United Nations disarmament activities is no exception. Indeed, Japan has been an active participant at United Nations forums such as the General Assembly's First Committee, the Disarmament Commission, and Special Sessions of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, working hard in coordinating different opinions among participating States on important issues including the nuclear test-ban question.

As for the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies or disarmament study groups established on an *ad hoc* basis under the auspices of the United Nations, I am proud that our senior colleagues with disarmament expertise have been able to contribute to the deliberations at these meetings. Former Ambassador of Japan to Mexico, Mr. Imai, has chaired the Advisory Board for the 1990 session. Former Ambassador to New Zealand, Mr. Otsuka, is now a member of the United Nations study group on the theme of "arms transfers" while our Ambassador to Egypt, Mr. Yamada, has contributed to the completion of the report of the "verification" study group. Ambassador Yamada also served as a chairman of the Third Committee covering peaceful uses of nuclear energy at the NPT Fourth Review Conference this summer.

Disarmament Conferences organized by the United Nations in different places apart from at United Nations headquarters in New York provide valuable opportunities for the

participants to be exposed to wide-ranging discussions at those symposia, in which eminent experts in various fields as well as government officials gather to exchange their views. The Government of Japan considers it a great honour for the country to have been the venue of two such United Nations Disarmament Conferences; the Kyoto Conference held in April 1989 following the proposal of Mr. Takeshita, Former Prime Minister of Japan, and the Sendai Conference held in April this year with unstinted cooperation from the local authorities and business circles. Our Government has also supported the holding of these conferences on organizational aspects including, for example, the suggestion to put on the agenda the question of how Japanese industrial technologies are to be applied so as to improve the effectiveness of disarmament agreements.

Furthermore, we have supported the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) in acting as a secretariat for the above conferences. In this connection, the idea of establishing the database system in DDA for information service designed mainly to meet the needs of the developing countries is highly pertinent. This is particularly so when arms control and disarmament issues have now become increasingly technical, which is the reason for our recent decision to make a financial contribution to the project.

3. The Government of Japan, together with other member countries, has deeply committed itself to the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament issues, where, in the light of keen interest expressed by the participating States and now that the pace of discussions has accelerated momentum, the issues of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) and Chemical Weapons Convention are two of the most important.

As regards the former, we have asserted the necessity for both the other members of the Western Group and the Non-Aligned States to show flexibility concerning the re-establishment of the Nuclear Test Ban *Ad Hoc* Committee, taking into consideration the possible impact of discontinuance of nuclear test explosions on the security interests of the countries concerned. Japan is of the view that for the CD to have initiated substantive work on this, the CTB issue has been a significant step forward. Naturally, it was indeed a great honour for my country that Ambassador Donowaki of Japan was elected to the chairmanship of the *Ad Hoc* Committee.

We believe that establishing a nuclear testing verification system based upon international seismological data exchange is an essential prerequisite for a nuclear test-ban treaty. Making the fullest possible use of its know-how and technology, Japan has always participated actively in this undertaking at the CD.

The Government of Japan is also an active participant in the ongoing negotiations on Chemical Weapons Convention at the CD.

4. Although we admire for the most part the present activities of the United Nations in the field of arms control and disarmament, certain elements cause us some concern. Before raising this question in greater detail, let me explain first the basic stance of Japan concerning the issues of arms control and disarmament.

II - The Basic Stance of Japan on Arms Control and Disarmament

1. To begin with, we should avoid the common fallacy of viewing disarmament measures as a panacea for the security question as a whole. Whereas arms control and disarmament are an important means to ensure world peace and security, it should be borne in mind that it is only part of the process of solving the problem of war and peace. It is also a fact that deterrence based upon a balance of power serves as the basis for peace and stability in the world today. With this in mind, I would like to summarize some of the principles we believe to be essential in considering disarmament issues.

First, while the alleviation of political disputes makes the atmosphere much more conducive to disarmament agreements, there still remains a danger of armed conflict arising after the implementation of disarmament measures and continuing until the cause of the political dispute has been eliminated.

Secondly, arms control and disarmament should be negotiated and implemented with the view to achieving a balance of forces at lower levels. Failing the stable balance of force, the disarmament measures in question may make the use of force a more attractive option for an aggressor.

Thirdly, any arms control and disarmament agreements should be verifiable if they are to generate confidence among the parties concerned, and thus to function smoothly. Indeed, disarmament agreements which cause doubt and concern could be worse than no agreement at all.

Finally, it should also be pointed out that, in promoting regional disarmament, specific conditions and characteristics prevailing in each region have to be taken into account. The Government of Japan cannot but express serious doubt on the wisdom of applying what has been achieved in Europe to other regions instantly and without any modification.

It goes without saying that these qualifications are applicable to nuclear disarmament as well.

2. Recent positive developments in the field of arms control and disarmament, such as the INF Treaty being smoothly implemented and the START negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union moving toward a successful conclusion, and the CFE Treaty having been signed at the CSCE Summit Meeting in Paris last month, have all satisfied these criteria. On the other hand, some discussions at the United Nations do not appear so firmly based on these principles.

III - Some Concerns about Disarmament Discussions at each Forum in the United Nations System

1. The First Committee

The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to be an important forum for frank and serious discussion, where international public opinion can be mobilized for the creation of a favourable atmosphere for disarmament. Some of the members, however, seem to be almost obsessed with sponsoring resolutions repetitiously, almost all of which have been adopted without much effort on the side of the sponsoring countries being made to accommodate different opinions regarding the content of the resolutions. Some even describe

the procedure of the adoption of such resolutions as "ritualization". Several resolutions representing different opinions have long been introduced and adopted on a single issue without much effort to bridge the split of the opinions. Regrettably, some countries, disregarding the necessity for all States to recognize and fulfil their own responsibilities under the present international situation, behave as if only certain States had to bear responsibilities for disarmament.

Yet there are few countries that mention the needs for concerted effort to redress such situations. Nor do the members of the bureau of the Committee itself.

In sum, the First Committee, unless undergoing a rationalization of its work, is not expected to fully discharge the tasks entrusted to it.

2. Disarmament Commission (UNDC)

Although the Disarmament Commission is a unique forum which deliberates several current disarmament-related topics, it is not free from problem. The results achieved at the deliberations of the UNDC are not well reflected in the works of the First Committee or the CD. The session of the UNDC seems simply too long and not to be managed in an efficient manner. (The rationalization programme agreed upon, which will be put into practice at the next session, marks a valuable improvement on the procedures and should be implemented in good faith.)

3. The Special Session of the UNGA Devoted to Disarmament (SSOD)

The SSOD, being held, at least in part with the aim to break a stalemate in disarmament discussions at Ordinary Sessons of the General Assembly, could easily become a place of unfruitful confrontation between participating States. Furthermore, the said flaws of the First Committee proceedings are generally applicable to the SSOD.

IV - New Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament

It would be beyond my capacity to propose concrete ways and means to radically reform the activities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. However, if we take the problems mentioned above into consideration, the following points could serve as a starting point for the future role of United Nations disarmament activities.

1. Response to the Recent Changes in the Political Situation

There is an impression that the United Nations, placing too much priority on multilateral disarmament, has not paid due attention in the past to the important developments in arms control and disarmament at bilateral and regional levels (some of the United Nations resolutions appear to fail to recognize this). Such an attitude can hardly be deemed as a fair one and it does not contribute to an objective and constructive discussion on disarmament within the United Nations either. Especially, viewed from those participants in the START and CFE talks, this could be interpreted for them as nothing other than yet another detractor from the United Nations.

Therefore, as an example, having evaluated such positive results as the recent CSCE process and the progress in the United States-Soviet talks, the United Nations should pursue the possibilities, desirabilities, ways and means to extend these desirable developments to other States and regions.

2. Restraints on Arms Control and Disarmament Derived from their Technicality and Regional Specifics

Disarmament is a complicated process in which parties concerned have to accommodate various, often mutually contradicting security interests and do various difficult tasks such as the comparison of armaments among the States concerned, definition of the types and quantities of armaments to be reduced, preparation of verification methods and so on. In addition, the strategic and geopolitical conditions in which the States concerned find themselves vary significantly and there is, thus, no universal rule applicable to all regions, all the time.

Therefore, to conduct arms control and disarmament negotiations and to implement their results, it could turn out to be more effective to prefer the CD, where the membership is limited, or to adopt bilateral or regional approaches such as CFE, rather than to rely on the United Nations, which encompasses many States with different strategic situations. In such a case, the role expected of the United Nations shall be to promote the mutual understanding of one another's thinking on arms control and disarmament. It is more important for the United Nations to play an ice-breaking role toward constructive dialogues in the future through such activities as organizing symposia and various study groups on specific issues and preparing for a database to facilitate the consideration of disarmament issues, rather than being trapped in a battle of exchanging confrontational resolutions. (As for the second point, those past United Nations activities such as the promotion of transparency in military information and the database project are truly useful.)

3. At the same time, it is absolutely necessary to rationalize existing activities in order for the United Nations to play such a role in an effective manner with its limited resources. For example, the rationalization of the activities of the First Committee of the General Assembly along with the example of the UNDC (including review of those resolutions which have been put forward in a routine manner, curtailing the duration of the whole session - however trivial these measures might appear) is essential.

V - Conclusion

1. Not to mention the present Gulf Crisis, we can be sure that the role of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security will continue to become ever greater in the future. We also have a very strong expectation for its role as a source of political momentum in negotiating and implementing disarmament accords. In addition, we expect that the United Nations will play a pioneering role in getting rid of the misunderstanding of regarding disarmament as a self-purpose, all-too-common loophole into which we tend to fall, and in urging all nations to locate disarmament in a correct perspective within the whole spectrum of security questions.

2. Such a United Nations role is indeed far from pompous and time-consuming. Meanwhile, one should strictly refrain from such actions as to undo all past achievements like NPT and PTBT, however critical one might be about the lack of progress in multilateral disarmament compared to that in the bilateral dimension.

Part III

Role of the United Nations in Regional Disarmament and Security

Chapter 1
The Scope for Regional Organizations

Omran El-Shafei

Until recently, the overriding security concern in the world was, and still remains to a certain extent, the arms race. In many countries outside Europe and North America, there existed apprehensions over the potential use of nuclear weapons, as the numbers of ships, submarines and bombers equipped with such weapons increased in the oceans and skies of the world. The global projection of power necessitated the establishment of bases and staging facilities in various regions of the world. The military presence of extra-regional powers introduced a delicate security equation in those regions, thereby upsetting the regional balance of power and leading to new fears and mistrust among neighbouring States.

Rivalry over global influence among big Powers invariably led to involvement in, and manipulation of, localized, Third World conflicts. Under the Cold War, super-Power competition was a major factor that directly influenced and affected the outcome of regional conflicts. In addition, the possibility of the emergence of regional nuclear powers increased the likelihood of escalating the nuclear arms race worldwide.

Over the last few years, since the launching of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, there has been tremendous change within and between East and West. Developments have far surpassed expectations. The Cold War appears to have come to an end, and there has been a noticeable shift from aggressive postures to a willingness and acceptance to coexist. East-West perceptions have become more positive, and new vistas for cooperation have become possible.

Observers believe that economic strains due to expansive military overspending have resulted in the emergence of vocal and expressive grass-roots movements that were largely responsible for bringing about recent and dramatic changes. It is worth noting that these changes have been taking place in the context of an economic decline in the Eastern bloc and Third World countries.

For the latter, the crushing debt burden is beginning to force a restructuring of the process of formulating military priorities and budgets. Yet there continues to be the risk that too great a number of these countries might become the dumping ground for surplus and/or outdated arms produced by the developed world. More recently, there is concern over the potential diversion of developmental assistance offered by the West to the newly emerging Eastern European democracies.

On the other hand, there appears to be a conscious effort by the leaders of the two nuclear super-Powers to downgrade the utility and value of the acquisition of offensive nuclear weapons systems. The leadership in both of these nations has challenged the validity and the morality of the prevailing doctrine of deterrence through mutually assured destruction, which was the accepted basis of bipolar strategic relations over the past three decades. Progress towards reducing Soviet and American nuclear arsenals has already begun to refocus attention on the importance of multilateral efforts to limit non-nuclear forces and conflicts.

There is also a growing recognition among developing countries that they have as much stake in limiting the spread of nuclear, chemical and advanced conventional weapons, and in preventing the escalation of regional conflicts as do the global powers. As the limits of Soviet and American military might in the Third World have become increasingly evident,

the need, and the possibilities, of bolstering multilateral institutions and arrangements have become more and more obvious.

The possibilities for building a stronger and broader base for more stable East-West relations will depend in part on bolstering global and regional mechanisms for mediating and controlling global as well as regional conflicts. The transformation currently underway necessarily represents interesting challenges as well as opportunities. The transitional process will arouse different sorts of anxieties as the world community witnesses the possible resurgence of old social, political, ethnic and military rivalries in responses to the new circumstances. The major problems will be the determination of ways in which these potential conflicts of interest will be addressed and resolved by the protagonists themselves in the first instance, and by regional and multilateral organizations in the second instance. In the light of all these developments, attention should be focused on ways in which a new system of international order may be constructed.

The end of the Cold War has made possible many opportunities for the resolution of global and regional conflicts, as well as the creation of a more peaceful world. However, the dangers of subregional destabilization could become apparent if global security arrangements and peace-keeping mechanisms are not in place. The reality of international politics shows that the easing of tension in one region of the world does not necessarily gurantee and safeguard peace and security in other areas.

In addition, the fact that all nations are becoming more vulnerable to attack by ballistic missiles, the chances are slim that any conflict will remain totally localized or regionalized. This new interdependence demands new responsibilities and new awareness of why certain conflicts are globalized and others retain their local character.

The Gulf crisis, for example, is a useful reminder that in the final analysis the globalization of conflicts is more a consequence of perceived national/international interests, rather than a primarily principled reaction to an act of aggression.

There are other ongoing conflicts which do not provoke the same level and magnitude of international response as the Gulf crisis has, because they are considered marginal to the major interests of the world's dominant powers. Thus, any new formulation of peace and security arrangements need to take into consideration national interests in ways that ensure that there is an equal response to all challenges to international stability and security. All acts of aggression, all infringements of borders, and all violations of basic human rights pose equal problems facing the creation of a new world order; new concepts of security have to acknowledge and address this fact.

In this context, it is possible - and indeed imperative - to envisage an emerging United Nations role as the institutional catalyst for a series of steps that would render the world safe enough for substantive reductions in nuclear arsenals. As the debate over the treaty to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces indicates, there will continue to be resistance to deep cuts in nuclear weapons systems until issues relating to conventional forces and regional conflicts are satisfactorily addressed. One of these issues is the development of alternative institutions, procedures and norms of a multilateral character to provide greater reassurance during the proposed transition to a less nuclear-armed world.

In many cases, as in Europe presently, the primary burden for the implementation of disarmament and security measures may fall to regional institutions and arrangements, as stated in the United Nations Charter. The United Nations, however, can play a critical role in the development and propagation of the norms and principles that would be part of a process of confidence-building, enhanced communications, and ongoing contact.

United Nations concepts of interpositional peace-keeping forces, fact-finding, monitoring, good offices, mediation and arbitration would, of course, have their analogue on a regional basis if steps towards military disengagement could be negotiated. Likewise, limitations or control over the acquisition of arms could be the subject of treaties negotiated between the parties concerned through regional organizations.

We should also realize that global security cannot be imposed on regions, but must flow from them. That means that new collective security arrangements must be embedded in regional realities. In regions which still suffer from instability, there is an urgent need to begin focusing on ways in which internal processes can lead towards the creation of mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes. This will require a willingness to subordinate, to a certain degree, to broader regional interests. It also will require assistance from multilateral institutions with experience in enhancing these processes.

For the first time since the Cold War paralysed the effective operation of the United Nations, it looks as though the time is ripe for the inclusion of a revitalized United Nations organization in the promotion of these regional processes. Here again, the end of the Cold War has generated possibilities that did not exist five years ago. The détente between the super-Powers and the new spirit of cooperation between the other three permanent members of the Security Council should be built upon to effect the rapid realization of regional collective security arrangements.

As the United Nations moves to reassert its utility for providing practical services to the international community, its realization as an instrument for problem-solving will become a more attractive option to national leaders concerned with the domestic credibility of their Governments in terms of honouring disarmament and security-related commitments. To strengthen its role in regional disarmament and security, the United Nations should build on those functions in which the organization has a comparative advantage. This should enable the United Nations to attract and retain the support of a large section of its membership, as well as to formulate a coherent strategy for its future role in this crucial area.

The Security Council should turn to regional organizations to carry the initial burden, with the political and logistical support of the United Nations wherever feasible and needed. More equitable burden sharing in this area might give regional organizations, over time, the incentive to engage in a constructive and effective approach to the solution of regional disputes.

The Council's credibility has also suffered from its total inability to enforce its decisions. National officials question the utility of seeking Security Council resolutions when no effective corrective or punitive action follows. The current embargo mandated by the Council against Iraq indicates a visible enhancement of its authority.

More generally, the current situation in the Gulf ought to stimulate a reconsideration by States and publics of the need for stronger and more reliable regional and global security structures. These structures should include new attitudes and mechanisms that will provide consistent responses to aggression as a matter of principle, rather than a function of the aggression's particular connection to the dominant powers. It is essential to find ways and means to increase the authority of, and respect for, international law and the institutions that dispense it. The rule of law does not, and cannot, prevail if powerful States invoke it only when it suits their immediate interests.

If the present trend towards a world system of multi-polarity and regional groupings continues and expands, then it follows that regional organizations dealing with the issues of disarmament and security will assume a more central role. It is incumbent upon all of us to

give them a serious chance to succeed. For in their success lies the promise of a more stable and productive world.

Chapter 2
Specific Tasks for the United Nations

Roberto Garcia Moritan

I - The Role of the United Nations in Regional Disarmament and Security

Since a new leadership took over in Moscow, some five years ago, opening the way to unexpected opportunities of cooperation between super-Powers in the international arena, détente has made a resounding reappearance in the international scene as a leading if not the single most important theme policy-makers and analysts cite when they engage in an exercise of reflection upon the shape of the emerging security order.

Détente, cooperation and the definitive overcoming of a confrontational past are undoubtedly comfortable notions to lean on, but they cannot by themselves guarantee a smooth and trouble-free transition from here to there, as recent developments clearly prove.

The warming of the bilateral relations between the two military hegemons undeniably plays a central role in the present situation, and as far as the multilateral system is concerned, creates encouraging conditions to - finally - make fully operative the international organization that emerged after the Second World War.

Who, for example would have dared to imagine, just some months ago, that the seemingly eternally dormant Military Staff Committee would meet to exchange views on the situation in the Gulf region and the implementation of the various Security Council resolutions?

Examples like this could be multiplied. The signs are indeed encouraging. But the importance of what is at stake and the need to assess in an as sober way as possible the consequences and opportunities of these days of sea changes are inescapable limitations to the temptations of over-optimistic scenarios.

Many aspects of this analysis are thus bound to be heavily conditioned by the guarded tone that our diplomatic reflexes impose on us. This cautious approach, however, seems justified as the essence of our reflection could be dramatically altered by still evolving situations.

One could venture to start this analysis by supposing that the improved international atmosphere will, within a relatively short time enable the implementation of the collective security system envisaged by the drafters of the Charter.

Were this to happen, the sense of this exercise would be completely different. Cooperative structures would still have to be precisely defined, but would benefit anyway from a fundamental agreement.

Unfortunately, this is for the time being not the case, therefore we have to content ourselves with the assumption that in spite of the improvement of international conditions and the cooling down of the big Powers' quest for global predominance, the collective security system will continue, for the foreseeable future, to be a desideratum, an orientation, not a reality.

Accepting this premise, one has to proceed from the second, and derived notion, which implies the need to continue to pursue, through a complex exercise of constant diplomacy in

search of an agreed and feasible role for the United Nations on matters related to security and disarmament.

II - Existing Functions, Future Possibilities

The immediate and inevitable reference to the concept of peace-keeping comes to the fore when dealing with the multilateral tools that already exist.

In the institution of peace-keeping operations we can see, in a clear and unambiguous way one of the main options of multilateral involvement in criis management and resolution.

Much could be said about peace-keeping, both on its legal foundations and practical implementation as well as on the past experiences of the United Nations in this kind of exercise. In the limited context of these remarks, let us simply recall the existence of the institution.

Peace-keeping forces of the United Nations are an invaluable tool that has played a major role in many circumstances under different legal, political and even budgetary constraints.

The availability of the Secretary-General as "an impartial honest broker with whom Governments in conflict can negotiate without losing face" in Brian Urquhart's[1] brilliantly concise definition complements the scheme of what we could perhaps label as the "traditional" framework for the United Nations involvement in regional security.

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Turning our attention away from the concrete and courageous contribution of the Blue Helmet forces and focusing now on the more familiar setting of the United Nations activities - conference rooms and paperwork - we cannot fail to mention the role of multilateral legal instruments (treaties, agreements, etc.) emanating from the United Nations or its specialized agencies. These include existing treaties as well as those which are in the process of, or will eventually be, negotiated.

They include some treaties, unfortunately not enough of them, that have at least some impact at the regional scale. Here it is necessary to note that I am considering the United Nations in a large sense, including notably the Conference on Disarmament, a multilateral body whose legal status *vis-à-vis* the United Nations is in itself the object of different interpretations.

In any case, the present situation shows the existence of some degree of United Nations involvement at the regional level through the expression of Member States as reflected in various legally binding commitments, but perhaps more importantly also the existence of a vast and frequently unexplored path for further action.

Existing treaties like the Biological Weapons Convention, regional ones like the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in well-defined geographical zones, other efforts like those related to the establishment of zones of peace (South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, etc.) attest to the variety of existing initiatives. They also prove that fertile ground is available for multilateral efforts in this vein.

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[1] Urquhart, Brian: Conflict Resolution in 1988: The Role of the United Nations in *SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament*, p. 445, Oxford University Press, 1989.

An interesting example of what could be done at present as a concrete contribution to an ongoing negotiating process from a regional perspective has to do with the Chemical Weapons Convention being drafted in Geneva. The possible alternative here, in order to provide a link between the global negotiation and its regional implementation could perhaps find expression through regionally organized consultations and conferences with the participation of all States concerned, in particular those who do not participate directly in the negotiations underway, but whose participation in the régime to be established is as essential as any other to ensure the universality and efficacy of the new instrument. In this sense, a good example can be found in the upcoming Regional Seminar on the Chemical Weapons Convention to be organized in the first half of 1991 in Venezuela. The exercise aims at spreading among the countries of Latin America the details of the negotiation, its modalities and implications, as well as a general overview of the negotiating process from a regional perspective. It will also gather the impressions and suggestions of relevant countries that, notwithstanding their absence from the negotiating table in Geneva, should be aware of what is expected from each State and thus be fully prepared to join the international community in the CW Convention.

It goes without saying that much more can and should be done, and that even the above-mentioned efforts could be criticized for doing too much or too little for the security of those concerned. The point we intend to make here is simply that legislative activity of the United Nations in the field is a central aspect to look at when assessing the scope of action of the international organization in its regional dimension.

Additionally, as the preceding paragraphs have pointed out, auxiliary mechanisms of consultation within each region must be explored so as to ensure that the international instruments supposed to bring stability and strengthen national security will precisely do that.

Before turning in more detail to the question of the regional sphere a closing reflection on the general philosophy under which all the existing treaties have been elaborated may be warranted.

A crucial factor to be taken into consideration when national negotiators go down on their business to hammer out new legal schemes in the field of disarmament and international security should be that the general parameters that guide international relations in the last portion of this century will clearly be different from those that have so far prevailed. An emerging order based on cooperation and mutual trust is gradually taking shape before our eyes and it would be simply irrational to continue negotiating under outdated assumptions that corresponded to an era of suspicion and mistrust, as has been the case for more than 40 years.

The treaties and agreements in the field of security and disarmament elaborated throughout the period of the Cold War, bear almost without exception the imprints of scepticism that the signs of the times imposed. That has to change.

A special effort of readaptation to the new atmosphere - easier said than done - is required and to this effect, the United Nations, as the single truly universal assembly should generate an impetus based on fresh approaches.

III - The Regional Sphere

References to some form of regional arrangement in the security and/or disarmament fields date as far back as the Covenant of the League of Nations. There, specific mention of

regional understandings, "... like the Monroe Doctrine ..."[2] for securing the maintenance of peace were noted. This shows that from the very origins of the concept of an international organization, the need to harmonize the way in which the multilateral and regional layers in this area would interact in order to mutually respect their competences and jurisdiction, was duly recognized. It was also important, at that time and later on, to ensure that this interplay would be carried out without affecting the legitimate right of the international community to get involved in an appropriate manner in situations that albeit regional in their form and expression, could seriously endanger global security.

The issue of what we can describe as the "regional versus the global" approaches became apparent in the different blueprints for an international post-war organization that were discussed, mainly between the American and the British diplomats, as they correctly saw in one or the other not only the definition of what kind of an organization they were seeking, but also the actual degree of involvement in distant geographical areas they would concede to it.

Finally, as it is well known, a compromise was possible around the terms of article 52 of the Charter, which encourages Member States to "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements". Here, let me briefly pause to recall that the specific mentioning of the regional alternative is due in no small measure to the insistence of the Latin American delegates, who very clearly recognized the relevance for the continued validity of regional arrangements of the provisions being negotiated and decided upon in their absence by the Allied Powers throughout the series of interrelated conferences and notably at Dumbarton Oaks.

Clearly the language of the provisions contained in article 52 must be read in conjunction with those of the Security Council, to which these disputes should eventually have to be referred at a subsequent stage.

Nevertheless, there is an unequivocal basis in the existing multilateral legal infrastructure that allows for an assertive role of the United Nations in regional disarmament and security, carried out in a harmonic and sequential stage whose steps and scope are clearly spelled out in the Charter.

Such provisions, as we have shown, rest on a carefully defined balance between the regional and the global spheres which call for some form of sequential approach and to the extent possible, harmonization of the "umbrella organization" (the United Nations) and the various regional agencies.

The Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament recognized the need to pursue disarmament measures at the multilateral, bilateral and regional levels taking into account this concept, or in the words of that Document: "... taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States ..."[3]

In the case of my continent, in the Americas, we can see in concrete terms an example of that interplay.

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[2] Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

[3] *Ibid.*

The Organization of American States (OAS) formally established in 1948 as the institutional follower of the Pan-American Union and the Inter-American System (a loose network of regular meetings and conferences at high level between the political authorities of the American States) defined itself as one of "the regional arrangements or agencies" described in article 51 of the Charter.[4]

My mentioning of the OAS is due not only to my familiarity with the Inter-American System as a whole, but also because of the interesting insights the Latin American case may provide in the context of the subject under consideration.

In the case of the Americas, the presence as one of the actors of one of the two great Powers undoubtedly influenced the operation and efficacy of the OAS as a result of the Cold War. In more than one opportunity, the regional agency got involved in regional crises in such a way that afterwards gave ample space to polemics on its legitimacy and opportunity. Without getting into those inevitably polemical considerations, the lesson that those difficult experiences could probably teach us go in the direction of the need to very clearly define the multilateral involvement to questions unambiguously linked to international security and disarmament.

There are of course other forms of existing and already disappeared entities with regional responsibilities, some of them linked in one form or another with broader legal structures, some more autonomous in nature, but by and large the legitimacy for the United Nations involvement at the regional scale must be noted as an asset that needs to be filled with practical content and a sense of purpose, but in the absence of which the possibilities for any constructive multilateral involvement in the regional context would have to be ruled out altogether.

An important element that emerges after examination of the concept of region, in its disarmament/security dimension, is that this is one of the notions that have significantly evolved in the last few years. Disarmament measures in a regional framework, were, for the most part of the past decades, complementary or auxiliary figures limited to well specified categories of armaments. Hence regional disarmament was always identified with some form of self-contained action in areas such as conventional weapons and forces.

Weapons and systems of mass destruction were the object of negotiations at higher levels, in spite of the fact that their deployment in different parts of the world, as well as their presence in submarines and vessels, was leading to situations where the dividing lines between what was part and parcel of the global confrontation and what fell into the regional cadre were blurred.

Regional disarmament, as reality shows, can no longer be taken as a separate, and to that extent less urgent subcategory of the security dilemma.

The need to address the complexities of regional disarmament and security problems in conjunction with the global issues appears as a requirement of an increasingly interrelated security agenda.

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[4] The explicit recognition of the Charter in the Act of Bogota was a logical consequence of an arduous fight the Latin American delegates waged in San Francisco to obtain some form of guarantee that the Inter-American System would be respected by the newly established global procedures.

Having briefly examined the oft referred to, examples of the peace-keeping operations, and the legal basis for multilateral action, we can turn now to more technical aspects of the disarmament mechanisms.

They constitute, in our view, the most auspicious areas for an increased role of the organization in this field.

IV - Verification of Compliance

One of the predominant schools of thought has identified the area of verification as one of the most promising areas of multilateral participation (including through United Nations) in disarmament and regional conflicts.

In the same sense, some have proposed the setting up of agencies under different forms and modalities within the United Nations system, charged with specific responsibilities in the field of verification of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

They range from the all encompassing, or omnibus verification system, like the one proposed some three years ago by the leaders of the Five Continent Peace Initiative, to more limited ones, in this case responding to the principle of treaty specificity of any institution/body to be created. In the case of the initiative put forward by Sweden, Tanzania, Mexico, Greece, India and Argentina, the gist of that approach was the setting up of an integrated system, meaning by that one that could encompass already existing institutions, thus profiting from available experience and structures (the IAEA is a case in point) developed throughout many years of successful operation, with new ones, to be created as appropriate, under the aegis of the United Nations.[5]

Yet another approach advocates a more functional profile that the United Nations could provide in terms of a sort of *ad hoc* technical advice or data bases to support the work of national negotiators.

The area of verification appears at the focal point of an ongoing debate that in a final analysis, sees in the multilateral (United Nations) involvement in monitoring of compliances of disarmament agreement a plausible guarantee of compliance when national security interests are concerned.

As we said earlier when we referred to the need to give a practical content to the existing legitimacy of United Nations involvement in regional security issues, any attempt to enlarge the international community's role in regional questions, in this specific case through participation in verification activities will require a considerable amount of realism and sense of timing.

V - Fact-Finding, Special Assignments

Existing practice and mechanisms also provide interesting possibilities that could be expanded as appropriate.

In this sense, we can mention the institution of the fact-finding missions carried out by the Secretary-General, and some other assignments organized by the United Nations on special request, as has been the case in Central America.

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[5] For an accurate account of existing initiatives see the recently issued study on verification (A/45/372).

Fact-finding missions are currently organized in one crucial area of disarmament, the allegations of use of chemical weapons.

The experience gained by the Secretary-General and the United Nations thanks to these fact-finding missions clearly point out in this direction as one of formidable potential in the future, particularly at the regional level.

The "honest broker" effects referred to previously could be exploited at a maximum by, for example, empowering the Secretary-General to engage much more regularly in such endeavours. By doing so, as was the case in the chemical weapons field, we would gain invaluable experience of a technical nature that could be of further use in different contexts.[6]

Fact-finding, seen under this light, could provide a subtle though very pragmatic form of gradual multilateral involvement, in a process that could eventually prepare the ground to "good offices", mediation or any other form of peaceful settlement and third-party participation.

Possible areas for future action could then include unusual force manoeuvres (in the absence of other arrangements like confidence-building measures), troop deployment, exchanges of inspectors, visits to sites, etc.

The same applies to what we have called "special assignments", in the absence of a more precise designation. An example of this kind of activity could be found in the short lived experience of the International Verification Commission (CIVS) in which the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Contadora Group[7] joined forces to monitor the compliance of one of the accords reached within the Central American scenario.

The United Nations has continued since then a process of consultations with the Governments of the region, thus showing its continuing availability, which could again materialize in a more concrete way, as was the case with the CIVS, or any other form duly agreed by the States concerned.

VI - Conclusion

These reflections have merely tried to show that the possibilities for an increased role of the United Nations at the regional scale in a matter as crucial as that of the security of States, are based on solid legal foundations and practice that could well be amplified.

In addition to crisis specific efforts like peace-keeping, other means can be explored and/or expanded, as we indicated when dealing with verification, fact-finding, or for that matter any other confidence-building measure that could be facilitated if carried out under the aegis of the international organization.

In international politics it is perhaps not the best thing to do to prescribe ready-made formulas adaptable to every situation.

Crises and their resolution necessarily differ by nature, circumstances and history, not to mention the ultimate and maybe most important element, the human factor. However, it seems to me that the present international atmosphere allows for a more optimistic outlook

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[6] It is important to note that the reports carried out by the Secretary-General have contributed in a very concrete way to develop new criteria, practices, lists of laboratories and professionals available in the States concerned, etc.

[7] Regional grouping of States that has proposed channelling different diplomatic initiatives to find a peaceful and regionally negotiated solution to the Central American crisis. Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela are its original members.

for the next few years that should encourage us to be more imaginative and daring in the exercise of diplomacy.

The easing of tensions at the highest point of the global strategic confrontation should lead to a deliberate effort to bring stability to those geographical zones where tension still prevails.

The United Nations, in other words, our nations, have an irreplaceable role to play. Let us make full use of its potential.

Chapter 3
Options for the United Nations

Victor-Yves Ghebali

Following in the wake of the Second World War, the Cold War had Europe as its political epicentre, the other continents as military battlefields and the United Nations as a forum for symbolic imprecations. The new foreign policy of the USSR, put into effect when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, has completely changed the situation. By ending the ideological confrontation between East and West - Manichean *par excellence* - it enabled the United Nations, from 1987 onwards, to experience a political revival illustrated mainly by the cessation of the hostilities in the Iran/Iraq war, the signing of the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan, the independence of Namibia and the sanctions against Iraq.[1] Despite the disappearance of the East-West "mega-conflict", however, the post-Cold War period is less than idyllic: long-standing threats and qualitatively new ones - all genuinely serious - are clouding the political sky of the 1990s.

I - Post-Cold War Threats

The post-Cold War world faces three main threats.

First, there are the *"regional" conflicts*, generally the result of war-producing factors of a regional nature that are magnified and aggravated by external stakes relating to the super-Powers' rivalry for control of the planet. The disappearance of this rivalry is a necessary, but in no way sufficient, prerequisite for the political settlement of these conflicts, which have been and still are the source of recurrent wars (Middle East, Cyprus) and ongoing violence (Lebanon, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Western Sahara, Central America). Because of their persistence over four decades for the conflict in the Middle East and nearly three for the conflict in Cyprus, they are helping to destroy regional peace, destabilizing the global international system and discrediting the United Nations.

Special mention should be made of the conflict caused by Iraq's annexation of Kuwait. At first glance, it appears to be a standard type of aggression, i.e. an act committed in violation of certain basic principles of international law such as the non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the territorial integrity of States and the self-determination of peoples. In actual fact, the scope of this act is much broader. Iraq has taken its unlawfulness to the limit by violating one of the few taboos of the unwritten code of post-1945 international relations: the annexation of a sovereign Member State of the United Nations. Annexation had certainly not disappeared from international practice, but, since 1945, it had concerned only non-self-governing territories (Western Sahara, Timor) or more or less extensive parts of territory (Golan, Aouzou Strip) belonging to sovereign States whose existence as such was not challenged. Never in the history of the United Nations had one of its Members been purely and simply wiped off the map of the world by the direct use of force. In addition, there were large-scale systematic violations of humanitarian law (use of foreign civilians as "human shields"), human rights (serious abuses of the Kuwaiti population,

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[1] See Ghebali, Victor-Yves: "L'USSR de Gorbatchev et les Nations Unies", *International Geneva Yearbook*, 1989, pp. 26-36, and "Les Nations Unies entre l'Est et l'Ouest", *Le Trimestre du Monde*, No. 7, 1989, III, pp. 21-35.

detention of innocent foreign nationals) and consular and diplomatic relations (constraints on consular and embassy operations in Kuwait).[2] In short, Iraq has undermined the very foundations of the most minimally civilized international community. In so doing, it has laid down a challenge of unprecedented seriousness - and one that is all the more unacceptable because the annexation of Kuwait has affected the world balance (change in the situation of the petrol market) and the balance of the most explosive part of the world.

Secondly, there is the threat of the *regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* (nuclear, chemical, biological) and of medium and long-range weapons systems (missiles). Such proliferation is already the most serious threat to security in the 1990s. This possibility is becoming less and less remote, as shown by the recent use of chemical weapons by Iraq in the conflict with Iran and in its repression of its own Kurdish population, not to mention the Iraqi threat to use chemical weapons in the event of military intervention to liberate Kuwait. In the general interest, the only possible point of view is that of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, who considers unacceptable "the emergence of any new nuclear-weapon State, potential or undeclared": the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional States would be "as dangerous as the continuation of the nuclear-arms race among the nuclear-weapon States".[3]

The risk here is the possible use of weapons of mass destruction as an extension of conventional weapons systems, i.e. as *actual* means of combat and no longer only as a deterrent. Thus, paradoxically, the seriousness of an international conflict can increase significantly when it ceases to be conducted by "proxy" (on behalf of the super-Powers) and becomes more authentically "regional". Although the increase in proliferation in the third world is not the result of a single factor, it nevertheless often has the same source: the arms trade.

The third threat is that of *global transnational problems* such as terrorism, drug trafficking, environmental deterioration, large-scale migration flows, over-population and hunger. These evils, which in fact strike *societies*, beyond the States whose human populations they represent, are indicative of a twofold trend. First, security is no longer limited to military matters; it has become inseparable from the development of economic, ecological, humanitarian and social relations. Secondly, security no longer stops at the political boundaries (by definition artificial) of the nation-State: national security and international security go hand in hand. When he spoke before the Paris Summit Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar rightly said: "The arc of developed nations currently crossing the northern hemisphere should not stop at a line separating North and South; it should go further and form a circle within which North and South may prosper together (...). The North will be on shaky ground as long as the South does not enjoy a minimum of well-being".[4]

To what extent is the United Nations equipped, from the conceptual, institutional and operational point of view, to respond appropriately to all these threats?

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[2] See Ghebali, Victor-Yves: "Les Nations Unies face au conflit Irak Koweit: un directoire en action", *Le Trimestre du Monde*, No. 12, 1990, IV, p. 156.

[3] Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization (A/45/1).

[4] Text of Secretary-General's statement at the opening ceremony of the CSCE Summit Meeting (Paris, 19 November 1990), p. 11.

II - The Conceptual Approach of the United Nations

The conceptual approach of the United Nations to security matters has two main weaknesses.

First, it is *basically a political-military approach.* The Charter of the United Nations, which was drafted in 1945, is based on the traditional view that "security" is linked to "peace".[5] As its Preamble indicates in the clearest possible terms, the security system was designed in function of the "scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind"[6] and is aimed at any "threat to the peace", "breach of the peace" or "act of aggression".[7] Whether in the case of "disputes" or "situations",[8] the problem of security comes down to the prevention of international political conflicts and the settlement of such conflicts, either peacefully (bilaterally or within the Security Council) or by determined coercive action by the United Nations itself. In short, security is understood as the protection of the territory of nation-States (thus considered sacred) against the use of force in the unlawful and particularly detestable form of "aggression".[9]

Secondly, it is an *unintegrated,* not to say splintered, approach. Although the system established by the Charter includes both disarmament and economic and social cooperation and although the United Nations has been devoting most of its efforts to these issues for years, these two areas are not directly related to the problem of world security.

The Charter initially provided that the Assembly might consider "the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments"[10] and that the Security Council would formulate (non-compulsory) plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments with a view to the least diversion for armaments of the human and economic resources of the Member States.[11] In practice, however, disarmament problems are and always have been allocated to a number of different bodies and the United Nations does not have the largest share. The role of the United Nations thus involves mainly discussions in various bodies (First Committee of the General Assembly, Disarmament Commission, *ad hoc* committees of the Conference on Disarmament, special sessions of the General Assembly) and think-tank and research functions (Department for Disarmament Affairs (New York) and UNIDIR (Geneva)). Negotiation is not the function of the United Nations. It is performed by the Conference on Disarmament (CD), which is a world body independent of the United Nations (although it is financed by the United Nations and regularly reports to it) and by the Vienna Conference on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which is composed of the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, as well as by bilateral United States/USSR bodies (SALT and, now, START).

Economic and social cooperation is also divided up among several United Nations bodies and a number of specialized agencies. In any event, it is beyond the control of the nerve centre that the Security Council should normally be. The Charter of the United Nations

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5 And also to "justice". The idea of justice was put forward in the light of the historical precedent of Munich in 1938 when peace was temporarily safeguarded at the cost of an injustice: the attachment of the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany.

6 First paragraph of the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.

7 Articles 1 (para. 1) and 39 of the Charter of the United Nations.

8 Distinction made in Chapter VI of the Charter.

9 Along these lines, see articles 3 and 5 of the Definition of Aggression adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.

10 Article 11, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

11 Article 26 of the Charter.

states that such cooperation can create "conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations"[12] and makes it subordinate to the security function,[13] without ever considering that the issues it encompasses may be a *direct* source of threats to security.

As the 1990s begin, the adoption of a more comprehensive approach to security is essential. The concept of security appears to lend itself to being expanded to take account of three elements: the threat that must be prepared for, what has to be protected and the ultimate purpose of such protection. A global security system would thus be intended to deal with any indirect (and not only direct) breach of the peace, i.e. with the *deep-seated and potential*, as well as immediate and actual, causes of such a breach. It would also be intended for the protection of *the community of nations as a specific global entity* and not only of nation-States considered as sovereign political-territorial entities. Lastly, it would focus on bringing about *peaceful change* rather than on maintaining the status quo.

III - United Nations Institutional Machinery

From the institutional point of view, the problem of the United Nations response to the challenges of the 1990s raises two basic questions relating to the representativeness of the Security Council and the scope of its mandate.

With regard to the first point, it is obvious that the composition of the permanent nucleus of the Security Council is not representative of the centres of power in the modern-day world. The permanent non-representation of economic giants (and former "enemy States" within the meaning of Art. 53, para. 2, of the Charter), the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan, is an anomaly that does not date from yesterday. At present, however, there is no longer any justification for it in view of the conclusion of the "2 + 4" Treaty authorizing the external unification of the two German States and the signature of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (21 November 1990) symbolically marking the end of the Second World War and the Cold War. From a purely theoretical point of view, there are three possible options.

The first would be to do what the League of Nations did in a rather comparable situation and increase the number of permanent seats from five to seven.[14] Politically, such an arrangement would not be very felicitous. It would provoke an outcry by many third world countries which condemn any non-elective representation as being contrary to the principle of the equality of States. It would also open Pandora's box by encouraging some regional powers to claim a permanent seat for themselves or on behalf of the interests of the third world. The latter possibility is not merely hypothetical: Germany's accession to the Council of the League of Nations as a permanent member resulted in protests which led to Brazil's full withdrawal from the international organizations in Geneva.

The option which would keep the same statutory number of permanent seats would be more original and more elegant. It would involve assigning the seats now held by France and the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community as such (thus including Germany)

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[12] Article 55 of the Charter.

[13] The Charter provides that the Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request (Art. 65).

[14] The League of Nations gave permanent seats to Germany (1926) and the USSR (1934).

and to Japan.[15] The obstacles to such an approach also would not be negligible. In the first place, the Charter does not provide for the collective representation of Member States in United Nations bodies. Secondly, there is little chance that France and the United Kingdom will give up the symbolically and politically appreciable privilege of the right of veto to which they are entitled as permanent members. Lastly, the possibility of a joint EEC foreign policy is still quite remote.

The third option would be to follow the model of the reform adopted by the ILO Governing Body in 1986 and eliminate the distinction between permanent and non-permanent members: seats in the Security Council would all become elective, increase in number and be filled on a regional basis. Such an option, which would involve genuine political abnegation on the part of the five permanent members, is obviously just as unfeasible as the others.

In any event, the crisis which has been tearing the Gulf apart since 2 August 1990 has demonstrated that the constraints preventing Germany and Japan from playing an international role commensurate with their real political weight are not only internal in nature. Their non-representation in the Security Council reflects an anachronistic situation whose continued existence will be a growing political liability for the United Nations.

The Security Council's mandate does not by any means cover the wide range of problems that threaten the security of the modern world. Although it has broad powers, the Security Council could, in the best of cases, be only a "security" body in the strictly political sense of the term. As pointed out above, the non-political dimensions of security are not within its jurisdiction, but within that of a variety of bodies and agencies (General Assembly, UNCTAD, FAO) working in a disorganized manner without any really overall joint approach.

The reasons for this situation are primarily historical. It should be recalled that the Council of the League of Nations was responsible for economic and social matters, as well as for security matters. That formula was ultimately considered inappropriate and even harmful: in 1939, with the failure of the political undertakings of the League of Nations and the accompanying increase in its experience of economic and social cooperation, a famous group of experts (the Bruce Committee) recommended the separation of the two types of activities and the establishment of a non-political council, the Central Committee on Economic and Social Questions.[16] The outbreak of the Second World War prevented the reform from being implemented, but the authors of the Charter of the United Nations would draw direct inspiration from it: hence the 1945 division between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council.

Although the balance sheet for the period between the two wars showed a need for a nearly watertight separation between political activities, on the one hand, and economic and social activities, on the other, that of the period which began in the 1970s shows the exact opposite. Consequently, the time seems to have come to reconsider the institutional infrastructure of the United Nations in the light of the concept of *global security*. From this point of view, consideration might *theoretically* be given to the possibility either of going back to a single larger Council with integrated powers (an option little to the liking of the countries of the third world and all the more unacceptable to them in that it would imply the introduction of a veto in the management of economic and social problems) or of adopting

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[15] This idea was put forward by Mr. Giulio Andreotti, Italian Prime Minister and president of the EEC Council (*Le Monde*, 20 September 1990).

[16] See document A.23.1939, 22 August 1939.

far-reaching reforms which would have the effect of making the Economic and Social Council an *economic and social security council* (an option which also seems highly unlikely in view of the failure of all the attempts made thus far to reform the Economic and Social Council).

IV - United Nations Operational Machinery

From the operational point of view, the United Nations has the legal resources provided for by Chapter VII of the Charter and the pragmatic solutions developed as a result of peace-keeping operations. In the context of its political revival, which has been obvious since the late 1980s, the United Nations has undergone two types of positive changes in security matters (in the traditional and narrow sense of the term) involving the reactivation of the provisions of the Charter governing collective action and a qualitative change in functions relating to peace-keeping operations.

The Iraq-Kuwait conflict gave the United Nations an opportunity to reactivate Chapter VII of the Charter, which was considered to have fallen into abeyance forever. From August to November 1990, the Security Council proved that it was fully - and as never before - equal to its task. First of all, it distinguished itself by its extremely rapid initial reactions: it condemned the invasion of Kuwait only a few hours after it had taken place and called for the unconditional withdrawal of the Iraqi troops;[17] when its demand went unheeded, it ordered non-military sanctions[18] supported by 10 additional resolutions which provided, *inter alia*, for a naval blockade[19] and an air blockade,[20] as well as a grace period (until 15 January 1991) prior to the possible use of force.[21] It also demonstrated unprecedented political cohesion by adopting all its resolutions either unanimously or nearly unanimously.[22] In the grand tradition of classical collective security, the resolutions in question condemned the aggressor country in particularly categorical terms and gave the victim country (the State and Government of Kuwait) unreserved political legitimacy. In short, the Security Council became both the conscience and the secular arm of the international community.

The Gulf crisis, the first cloud in what had looked like a clear post-Cold War sky, is still unresolved after four months of extreme firmness by the Security Council in terms of acts and principles. Its outcome will be a kind of litmus test for United Nations possibilities of guaranteeing the minimum amount of world order on the basis of the collective security ideal, which until now has been regarded as a myth.

In addition to this (uncertain) return to the paradise lost of Chapter VII of the Charter, peace-keeping operations have followed an unexpected direction. As an emergency solution improvised by the Canadian Prime Minister during the Suez crisis (1956) and cleverly and imaginatively implemented by Secretary-General Dag Hammarksjöld, the operations involving the dispatch of "blue helmets" initially had only a modest goal, namely, that of keeping peace, not of making it. The blue helmets, which were neutral and non-combatant forces, were not

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[17] S/RES/660 of 2 August 1990.

[18] S/RES/661 of 6 August 1990.

[19] S/RES/666 of 25 August 1990.

[20] S/RES/670 of 25 September 1990.

[21] S/RES/678 of 29 November 1990.

[22] Resolutions 662, 664, 667, 669 and 677: unanimity. Resolution/660: 1 absence (Yemen); resolutions 661, 665 and 674: 2 abstentions (Yemen, Cuba). Resolutions 666 and 678: 2 votes against (Yemen, Cuba). Resolution 670: 1 vote against (Cuba). In addition, China abstained in the vote on resolution 678.

so much like policemen sent in to make an aggressor see reason as like firemen whose purpose is to bring a fire under control and prevent it from breaking out again.

Since 1990, however, and as the United Nations Secretary-General has recently emphasized, the United Nations has been called upon to conduct "a variety of operations aimed at managing peaceful transitions in societies which were the scenes of conflicts or had suffered upheavals. Given such a purpose, these operations have so many different facets and have so combined elements of peace-keeping and peace-making as to have radically altered traditional concepts of the arrangement between the two".[23] The United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) and the United Nations Observer Mission for the Verifications of the Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) are specific examples of these second-generation operations. The Member States of the United Nations are now considering the possibility of giving these missions new functions, such as the monitoring of free elections, the administration of a sovereign State, the monitoring of the implementation of multilateral agreements, the prevention of nuclear piracy, action to combat terrorism and drug trafficking and assistance to disaster-stricken countries.[24]

The strengthening of the United Nations thus seems to involve the use of the still undeveloped potential of bodies such as the Military Staff Committee and the institutionalization of peace-keeping operations under what might constitute "Chapter VI *bis*" of the Charter.

V - Conclusion: UN CSCE Relations

However real or durable its political revival may be, the United Nations must face the fact that an entire set of modern-day international relations are beyond its reach: since the Cold War and, paradoxically, even more so since the détente of the 1970s, East-West relations have been outside its jurisdiction. The management of these relations is the exclusive domain of the two super-Powers, on the one hand, and of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), on the other. CSCE has, it is true, never claimed to be competing with the world Organization: it has always made it a point to proclaim the commitment of its participating States to the purposes and principles of the Charter and to involve the United Nations system in its own activities. CSCE is not a regional alliance like NATO or the Warsaw Pact or a regional cooperational organization like OAU or OAS. It is a one-of-a-kind institution which nevertheless has 34 member countries, including the richest States in the world, except Japan, and four of the five permanent members of the Security Council. Like that of the United Nations, moreover, its programme of work goes from disarmament to human rights, with ecology, trade and culture in between.[25] Following the Summit Meeting of Heads of State and Government held in Paris in November 1990, CSCE, which had so far been pragmatic, without any standing secretariat or regularly programmed meetings, became institutionalized and now has a secretariat (small), a Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and a Conflict Prevention Centre. This is probably a modest beginning, but it does foreshadow the possible establishment of a new kind of North-North security organization

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[23] Document A/45/1, p. 4.

[24] See the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, document A/45/330, 12 July 1990, pp. 19-20.

[25] For further details, see Ghebali, Victor-Yves: *La diplomatie de la détente. La CSCE, d'Helsinki à Vienne (1973-1989)*. Brussels, Bruylant, 1989, xvii-444 pp.

whose development would restrict the United Nations political jurisdiction to North-South and South-South relations.

Chapter 4
North-South Relations

Oluyemi Adeniji

The aftermath of the rapprochement between the United States and the USSR has brightened the image of the United Nations. However it has not been lost on informed observers that the United Nations had not been an active player either in the disarmament agreements reached INF, or CFE nor in the CSCE process which culminated in the Charter of Paris. That Charter in its opening lines aptly described the present era of the new Europe (with which it is concerned) as one of profound change and historic expectations. "The era of confrontation and of division of Europe has ended ... henceforth, European relations would be based on respect and cooperation". It is clear that such an assertion cannot be made of other regions and therefore the United Nations cannot assume an equally passive role in the hope that events would arrange themselves. Besides the Gulf, there are other crises in Africa especially the tragic developments in Liberia, the problem in the Horn of Africa: in South-East Asia, the problem of Kampuchea remains unresolved, as is Afghanistan and Kashmir, apartheid in South Africa. Throughout the developing parts of the world instability provoked by deteriorating economic and social conditions abound.

With the resolution of the European problem, the pervading influence of the East/West ideological conflict has been removed. The current state of international relations provides the opportunity to construct a new multilateral structure based on the force of a world law with appropriate sanctions which should be applicable to all States, strong and weak alike. For that new structure to be effective, however, it will have to be constructed on clear principles of universal consensus, irrespective of the impingement of specific developments on the national interests of States. The role of the key actors on the multilateral stage, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, will continue to be important inasmuch as sanctions and enforcement action will depend on their concurrence. The credibility of any new structure, however, will depend on their ability to interpret consensus not on national but on global security interest. The mechanism that should symbolize and propel the new era of multilateral maintenance of international peace and security should be based on an automaticity that does not distinguish between those regional crises and conflicts that are to be ignored and those to be globalized.

The present transitional period between the end of the bipolar world and the emergence of a multipolar world presents the appearance of a unipolar situation. The degree of global multilateral concern in a regional crisis may thus depend on its perceived impingement on national or multinational interests rather than a response based on the enforcement of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. No dispute that triggers human tragedy of immense proportions should be considered marginal simply because vital interests of the strong and powerful States are not directly touched. Yet this is the reality of the simultaneous breakout of the crisis in the Gulf which has attracted the undivided attention of the Security Council, and the crisis in Liberia which has been largely ignored. Both cases threaten the existence of sovereign States, Members of the United Nations, and the peace and stability of the respective regions - the Gulf on the one hand and West Africa on the other. While the global impact of the situations differ, their effect on the respective regions are profound.

In the post Cold War era, the promotion and preservation of regional security has to be related more closely to regional situations. A credible multilateral collective security arrangement based in the United Nations will need to be sensitive to the conditions and realities of the different regions. In the Third World regions that are prone to frequent conflicts, the United Nations mechanism must be capable of not only responding to the challenges posed by the unstable situation but must include measures for promoting the development of ways and means for peaceful resolution of disputes and for confidence-building purposes. Active support by the United Nations must be available to back up regional initiatives for the preservation of peace. The present system of insistence on a Security Council authorization as a condition for supporting regional initiative of a consensual nature inhibits rather than encourages such initiatives.

I - Regional Disarmament

More than in the areas of stable peace, the correlation between arms accumulation and incidence of armed conflicts is direct in the Third World, even if there are underlying reasons that tend to provoke conflicts nation building, border problems, racism or apartheid, economic problems. The availability of weapons make early resort to their use very real. The level of weapons in Third World countries do create insecurity; disarmament and development in their interrelationship is real in these countries. Arms trade has created in some instances such military capabilities in areas of tension that the outbreak of war in some of these areas may assume a global dimension. The current crisis in the Gulf is a patent example of why collective security as envisaged in the Charter became inoperative, the stronger the military capability of certain States grew. Years of concentrated transfer of weapons and weapons technologies for political influence, for ideological reasons and for profit have created pockets of military powers whose capabilities extend beyond regional dimensions. The issue of regional disarmament had to begin to feature prominently on the multilateral disarmament agenda. There is need for agreed actions on monitoring interregional transfer of arms as well as intraregional transfer. Increasingly, the role of regional powers that have accumulated huge stockpiles provoking and exacerbating conflicts by supplying to elements within the region is creating problems in Africa. The Liberian carnage was sustained by such transfer; Chad, Rwanda are other examples.

Arms production as well has to be equally closely monitored as a means of checking ultimate transfer and also as an effective confidence- and security-building measure in a region.

II - Non-Military Dimension

The recognition of the role the non-military aspects in the perception and building of security will have to be translated into concrete action in the revitalization of a multilateral system. Marginalization within States and of States within the global structure is a potent factor of insecurity. The structural dualism in the world economy that has created pockets of prosperity in the North amidst the sea of misery mainly in the South will need to be corrected. The most critical underlying problem at the present is the burden of debt and the continued pauperization of the poor for the benefit of the rich. There is net transfer of resources from poor to rich in form of debt repayment. The refusal to adopt a global strategy to confront the debt issue is symptomatic of the general indifference to the development of

the South. Europe has reacted with immediate concern to the realisation of the immense problem of the underdevelopment of the economies of the Eastern European countries. The same urgency has not been found in response to the critical economic situation in Africa, for example. Democracy and multipartism whose development in Africa are being encouraged cannot thrive in the present conditions of abject poverty and daily uncertainties.

The end of the Cold War which had evoked the hope of global benefit of the expected peace dividend has turned out to be a disappointment. Instead there is developing at worst a neglect, at best a repartition of economic spheres of influence between three major economic powers: the United States, Japan and Europe. A good part of the world does not fit directly into any of the spheres.

To avoid the formalization of the ever-worsening economic conditions with the inherent tension and conflict the United Nations, in assuming its revitalized role, must embody in it an economic strategy for the revival and sustenance of the economies of the developing countries. Security cannot be achieved by the poor countries unless the regulation of international economic exchanges is democratized such that it takes account of the interests of all. In this connection, the new multilateralism should seek to encourage regional economic security structures as vital elements in global economic security. Greater importance needs to be attached to the economic and financial arms of the United Nations.

Chapter 5
Implementing Charter Principles

Zhuang Maocheng

I - Introduction

Peace and security are the common aspiration of all mankind. As a world organization which has the largest membership, the most extensive representation and the greatest influence in handling international affairs of the international community, the United Nations has played an extremely important part in promoting and maintaining world peace and security. In recent years, the tremendous changes in mutual relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the East and the West as well as the successive "cooling down" of conflicts in many "hotspot" areas of the world have led to the development of the world situation as a whole in the direction of détente. This achievement is partly owed to the United Nations and has also offered good opportunities for it to play a greater role in world affairs. The adoption of the resolution of imposing unprecedentedly quick and extensive sanction against Iraq by the United Nations in handling the Gulf crisis is a convincing proof of such "good opportunities".

However, what merits our attention is that the stark reality of the current Gulf crisis has reminded us that the overall relaxation of the world situation does not mean a permanent peace. This has shown us that, on the one hand, the old world pattern formed in postwar years has been broken and this helps all countries in the world to shake off the control and influence of the super-Powers, thus contributing by and large to the efforts being made by all countries for world peace respectively; on the other, however, as a new world pattern has not been formed so far and the world system will be in a period of transition from the new to the old throughout the 1990s of this century and beyond, various unstable and uncertain factors will continue to exist, new contradictions of all kinds will arise constantly and disputes between States and armed conflicts in some areas will be inevitable. The outbreak of the Gulf crisis has indicated that mankind is still faced with the danger of war and the possibilities of local disputes leading to large-scale conflicts are far from being removed. Therefore, to settle regional conflicts peacefully and to work hard to promote regional security are the important task of all countries in the world for checking war and safeguarding peace and security. How the United Nations as an authoritative international organ with the aim of expressing the will of the world people can play a greater role in this connection is, beyond doubt, a question which needs serious discussion.

II - Factors Bearing on Regional Security

In reviewing the postwar history, it is not difficult for people to see that colonialism, imperialism, hegemonism and super-Powers were behind the scores of regional conflicts and local wars without any exception which occurred in the world over the past 45 years. Despite the fundamental changes in the world situation and in the balance of force up to now as compared with the past, these old factors leading to regional conflicts and instability continue to exist. In the meantime, as the world today is in a transitional period of great change with major realignment and regrouping, various new and complicated factors will have a great

bearing upon the security and stability of all regions pending the establishment of new international political and economic orders and of a new world pattern.

1. The Uncertainty in the Super-Power Relations

In recent years, the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and between the East and the West have been greatly improved. The frequent political contacts and dialogues between them have reduced their antagonism markedly. The progress made by both sides in the disarmament talks has started to lower the level of their military confrontation and especially that in Europe. The atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation among them has been reinforced accordingly, and the super-Powers have started to take some coordinative measures in resolving regional questions. Nevertheless, it has not been very long yet since the relaxation of East-West relations started to occur, and neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has abandoned completely the strategy and policy of regarding each other as rivals. The uncertainty in their relations makes the present détente quite fragile. With their massive military build-up, there still exists the shadow of confrontation between them in some areas, which will surely be a negative factor in maintaining regional stability.

2. Arms Race

As mentioned above, some headway has been made in the field of disarmament and arms control by the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the two major military blocs. In the wake of the INF Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union may possibly conclude the START Treaty soon. The two countries also signed on 1 June 1990 the bilateral treaty on the reduction of chemical weapons and the verification protocols to the two treaties in the 1970s on underground nuclear tests. The 22 Eastern and Western nations signed the CFE Treaty at the CSCE Summit Meeting on 19 November the same year. All this indicates that the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the two major military blocs have made an encouraging and praiseworthy step on the road of arms reduction. However, it should be noted at the same time that although the military strength of the super-Powers will be reduced numerically, their military capabilities will not be weakened substantively. On the contrary, their arms race in the quality of weapons has never ceased and, moreover, has shown signs of continued escalation. The arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two strongest military super-Powers in the world, is bound to provoke the arms development by other countries in the world, thereby giving impetus to the further intensification of the arms race among all regional countries. As a result, it is hard to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, biological and chemical weapons as well as other potential weapons. This cannot but constitute a grave challenge to future world and regional security and stability.

3. Contradictions between North and South

Up to now, no significant changes have been made in the international economic order formed in the postwar years in compliance with the old system of international relations. The absolute majority of developing countries in the world remain the source of raw materials, markets of goods and places of investment of the developed countries, and the economic relations between some of them are even still of a colonial nature. Developing countries have

suffered considerably even more from the trade protectionism and the policies of high profits and high interests practised by the developed countries. Shortage of funds and heavy debt burdens have become insurmountable obstacles to the development of technology and economy by most developing countries and have formed a vicious circle as well. In an era when the world is reaching a new high tide of scientific and technologicl revolution, the economic gap between the North and the South will inevitably be widened more and more on the basis of the current international economic order, and the contradictions in political and economic interests and on the debt question between both sides arising therefrom are bound to become more acute. The deterioration of North-South relations will then inevitably have a significant bearing on the relaxation and stability of the world and regional situation.

4. Expansionist Policy of Regional Hegemonism

The continued enhancement of military strength by some regional powers has provided soil for the growth of their ambitions of expansionism and regional hegemonism. These regional powers, relying on their relatively powerful military strength, always pose a threat to or put pressure on or even brazenly commit aggression against and conduct armed occupation of their neighbours under the pretext of establishing their own "secure boundary", or in an attempt to turn their small neighbours into vassal States, or for other political and economic purposes. The recent open annexation of Kuwait by Iraq marks the new development of regional hegemonism. This indicates that under conditions of future development of the overall international situation towards relaxation, regional hegemonism persists and may possibly gain greater momentum, thereby constituting a serious challenge to the security environment of regions concerned.

5. Disputes between Nations

In international relations, there are numerous causes for disputes between nations. Frictions may occur between States in political, military, economic, scientific and technological, cultural and diplomatic fields, and disputes may also arise over such specific problems as environmental protection, illegal immigration, refugees and crime, etc. These frictions and disputes, if handled improperly, may escalate into conflicts between nations. Furthermore, territoiral dispute, exploitation of resources and ethnic or religious contradictions between States are the easiest of causes for armed conflict. Quite a few instances of nations resorting to force against each other for various reasons mentioned above have occurred in the past. The harmful impact of the future occurrences is obvious.

6. Foreign Interference in Domestic Problems

In contemporary international relations where the colonialist system has been disintegrated, foreign interference is an act which is opposed by the international society but occurs continuously. Should a neighbouring country or a big power interfere in a domestic problem of an independent nation, such a problem would more often than not become a regional or international one. It will make the security situation in that region more complicated and, in some cases, it is hard to find a solution for a long time.

Some more factors bearing on regional security can be cited, such as the rampancy of terrorism and drug smuggling as well as the infiltration of ideology and concepts of values,

etc. As is indicated by all factors, we are still confronted with a quite severe situation on the road of striving for a world lasting peace. This requires unremitting joint efforts by the international society.

III - The Role the United Nations has played in Promoting Regional Security

The two world wars of this century and the Second World War, in particular, brought about an unheard of scourge to mankind. Founded with the maintenance of international peace and security as its fundmental purpose, the United Nations has engendered the hope of avoiding suffering from disaster of war once again among people all over the world. In the 45 years since its birth, the United Nations has made tremendous efforts and has played an active part in promoting world and regional security and stability and in settling peacefully disputes and conflicts between nations. The role of the United Nations in this respect may be summarized as follows:

1. Developing the code of conduct to be observed by all nations in international relations. The United Nations Charter which entered into force on the date of the founding of the United Nations and a series of declarations and resolutions adopted by the General Assembly subsequently have played a good role in putting right the most abnormal international relations before the War and in maintaining world peace for decades after the War. In accordance with the Charter, all nations in the world including non-member nations should observe the following principles: (1) sovereign equality among States; (2) fulfilment of obligations established by the Charter in good faith; (3) peaceful settlement of international disputes; (4) non-violation of territorial integrity or political independence of other countries by means of threat of force or use of force; (5) assistance to the United Nations in its actions; (6) guaranteeing the observance of the above-mentioned principles by non-member nations; (7) non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. To implement these principles, many documents adopted by the General Assembly since the founding of the United Nations have reaffirmed them time and again and made many specific provisions to this end. The Declaration of the General Assembly of 1965 stipulated that no country is permitted to interfere in the internal and foreign affairs of other countries, to carry out armed intervention or subversion, or to use terrorist or other indirect intervention means to change the existing system of another country. The Declaration of the General Assembly of 1975 laid down eight principles to be observed by all nations for the achievement of a just and lasting peace. Among them, there are the principles that people of all countries have their inherent right to live a peaceful life, that all countries have the obligation to promote their political, economic, social and cultural cooperation with other countries, and that respect must be had for the right to self-determination and territorial integrity of the peoples of all nations and for all forms of expression of their determination to strike blows at colonialism, racism, racial discrimination and apartheid. The Declaration of the General Assembly of 1981 stipulated that no nation should use assistance or other economic measures as a means of exerting political pressure or of coercing to disrupt the political, social and economic order of other countries. The principles set forth in the Charter and a series of specific provisions made by all previous sessions of the General Assembly have become rules of conduct governing relations between nations, which are generally acknowledged by the international society. This is conducive to the establishment and development of normal international relations and

also helps peace-loving nations and people to unite to wage a resolute struggle against all activities and acts in violation of these principles, so as to safeguard world and regional peace and security.

2. Mobilizing world public opinion to weaken and restrain factors for war. As an international organization which has the most extensive representation in the world, the United Nations plays a unique part in mobilizing world public opinion. The resolutions of the United Nations on all international questions must be adopted after serious discussion and consultation by all member States and with the approval of the majority. With the development of the times and the gradual increase in democratization of international politics, big powers have increasing difficulties in manipulating and controlling small nations. Therefore, the series of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly have reflected more and more the will and desire of the vast majority of peace-loving countries in the world. This plays an effective role in supporting international justice and isolating and striking blows at international evil forces. Although it is still difficult for the United Nations to pass resolutions or take actions on certain questions because of the stubborn obstruction and disruption by a few nations, the gigantic pressure of public opinion inevitably makes the erroneous policies to run into snags everywhere and exercises some restraint over them. Moreover, all the worldwide publicity and educational activities initiated by the United Nations such as "Decade of Disarmament" and "Year of Peace" are helpful to mobilizing world public opinion, supporting peace endeavours and promoting world and regional peace.

3. Helping ease and solve regional disputes and conflicts. The international situation has been versatile and incidents have occurred one after another since the end of the Second World War. The United Nations has made unremitting efforts to push forward the peaceful settlement of various disputes and conflicts, thus avoiding the occurrence of the worst situation and striving for the best results. Whenever an incident occurs in some area of the world, normally the United Nations can respond quickly by appealing to the parties concerned to exercise restraint, urging them to cease fire and withdraw troops immediately, or taking relevant actions. In compliance with the functions set forth in the Charter, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretary-General fulfil their respective duties of conducting investigations or mediating between the conflicting parties, putting foward solutions or adopting related resolutions. The United Nations has also provided places of negotiation and channels of quiet diplomacy for the settlement of many disputes. The International Court of Justice has handled and made decisions on many lawsuits of international diputes. On some major regional conflicts, in addition to including them in long-standing agenda of the General Assembly or the Security Council, the United Nations has convened various special international conferences to force the countries concerned to accept its resolutions so as to withdraw their troops completely and acheive a political settlement. Therefore, although the final settlement of many international disputes and especially the easing or settlement of some long-protracted regional conflicts is related to the voluntary change in policy by countries concerned, it is, to a large extent, the result of the long-term endeavour of the United Nations and the joint efforts of the international society.

4. Guaranteeing the peaceful transition in areas where a conflict or a turbulent situation exists by conducting peace-keeping operations. Since its founding, the United Nations has made peace-keeping efforts in many parts of the world. Starting from the dispatching of the

United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to the Middle East in June 1948, the United Nations has sent nine military observation groups and four peace-keeping forces to the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Central America, of which five observation groups and four peace-keeping forces are still performing their missions now. Although no explicit provisions are made in the Charter concerning these operations, practice has proven that most of them are effective. They play a positive role in preventing the situation from deteriorating and checking the renewal of hostilities pending the ultimate peaceful settlement of conflicts and turbulence in areas concerned.

5. Promoting the development of the situation of international arms control and disarmament. In compliance with the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly put forth the question of disarmament in the first resolution adopted in its session of 24 January 1946, immediately after the founding of the United Nations. The resolution called for the elimination of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the ensuring of the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The question of arms control and disarmament was mentioned repeatedly in numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in the subsequent 40-odd years. With the steady intensification of the arms race between the super-Powers and the increasingly great danger of war facing mankind since the mid-1960s, the United Nations has all the more included the halting of the arms race and the achievement of a comprehensive disarmament and especially nuclear disarmament as the most important item in the agenda of the successive sessions of its General Assembly. A great part of the many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly each year are related to the question of disarmament and the number of such resolutions has been increased considerably over the past few years. For example, of the 318 resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in 1987, 62 concerned the question of disarmament. In 1969, the General Assembly declared the 1970s as the first "Decades of Disarmament", and subsequently set the 1980s and 1990s as the second and the third "Decade of Disarmament". The General Assembly held three special sessions on disarmament in 1978, 1982 and 1988, respectively. The "Final Document" adopted by the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament has become the guide to all United Nations efforts for disarmament. This document also stressed that the United Nations should play a key role in international efforts for disarmament.

The special session of the General Assembly of 1978 decided to set up a "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum" of the international society, i.e. the "Conference on Disarmament" at Geneva to replace its predecessor. Since 1980, this Conference has worked earnestly on a series of important topics in the disarmament field and has made progress step by step on some topics and particularly on chemical weapons.

Propelled by the United Nations and with the joint efforts by all countries in the world, many international treaties, conventions and agreements on arms control have been concluded both inside and outside the United Nations since the late 1950s. In the 1970s, headway was made in the bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and a series of treaties and agreements on arms control were signed. New developments have emerged in the field of arms control and disarmament since the mid-1980s. Breakthroughs have been achieved in the disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union and between the East and the West, and some other countries have taken or will take some

unilateral or multilateral disarmament moves. All this is of positive significance to the relaxation of the international situation and the promotion of world and regional security.

In short, for a long time the United Nations has indeed made very great efforts and played a positive and valuable role in safeguarding international peace and security and pushing forward the peaceful settlement of regional issues. This is praiseworthy. However, people cannot but realize that the United Nations is far from playing its due role in many respects due to various reasons. The principles set forth in the Charter have not been observed by all nations and many resolutions and decisions of the United Nations have not been implemented strictly by countries concerned. The extent of disarmament, and nuclear disarmament in particular, carried out by the super-Powers is far smaller than expected and there is still a long way to go in international disarmament. The United Nations often seems to be powerless in settling some of the regional disputes and conflicts, thus resulting in long-standing stalemate without any progress. All facts mentioned above show that the tasks before us continue to be very arduous and require greater efforts to be made by the United Nations.

IV - To Strengthen the Role of the United Nations

As stated above, various factors bearing on regional security continue to exist while the current international situation develops in the direction of détente by and large. This is both a good opportunity and a grave challenge to the United Nations in fully playing its due role. We should sum up in earnest the experience of success and draw lessons from failure of the past, so that we can better grasp the opportunity and meet the challenge and enable the United Nations to make greater contributions to safeguarding world peace and promoting regional security.

1. To reinforce the worldwide publicity and education campaign and to mobilize international public opinion more extensively to make joint efforts to overcome factors for war and develop factors for peace. The United Nations should initiate more international educational activities such as "Year of Peace", "Year of Disarmament" and "Year of Development". It should strengthen its contacts with the governments and non-governmental organizations of all countries and conscientiously supervise and guide the conduct of various practical activities by all nations. It should encourage and support the conducting of such activities between nations and between regions, including all kinds of academic exchanges concerning international peace and security as well as the question of disarmament.

2. To initiate and push forward energetically the establishment of a new international political order. The United Nations should demand that all nations strictly abide by the principles set forth in its Charter and the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations. All nations, big or small, strong or weak, and regardless of their social system and ideology, should respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity, should not commit mutual aggression and interfere in each other's internal affairs, and should establish relations of friendly cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The United Nations should be opposed to power politics, hegemonism, the law of the jungle and the bullying of the small by the big. It should support international justice and wage a resolute struggle against violations of the principles set forth in the Charter and refusals to accept United

Nations resolutions. Wherever necessary, it may take appropriate sanction measures in accordance with the stipulations of the Charter.

3. To promote actively the establishment of a new international economic order so as to make a change in the unequal economic relations between the North and the South. The United Nations should initiate and hold North-South dialogues, encourage North-South and South-South economic cooperation, and help developing countries to develop education, technology and economy rapidly. It should urge the North to provide the South with all kinds of economic and technological assistance. The United Nations itself should also increase its disaster relief and development aids to developing countries for the purpose of stabilizing the situation in countries and regions concerned.

4. To promote and supervise international disarmament talks energetically. The United Nations should urge the United States and the Soviet Union to stop the arms race immediately and undertake genuinely the "special responsibilities" for taking the lead in carrying out significant disarmament. They should speed up their disarmament talks, further reduce their armaments, including the naval armaments, as well as their troops, and lower the level of their worldwide military confrontation to the maximum, so as to improve the security environment of all regions and countries and create necessary conditions for regional disarmament. The system of notifying the United Nations of all bilateral and multilateral disarmament talks in the world should be established and strengthened. The United Nations should increase its supervision of and guidance to all disarmament talks, so that it can really play the "key role" in the international efforts for disarmament. The multilateral disarmament talks within the framework of the United Nations should also be strengthened.

5. To continue to make efforts to strive for a peaceful settlement of various regional disputes. The United Nations, while trying hard to mediate between countries concerned, should maintain appropriate pressure (including the implementation of compulsory measures) on parties who refuse to take heed of advice so as to force them to change their policies. The United Nations should actively encourage relevant regional organizations or countries which maintain friendly relations with both of the two parties concerned to make mediatory efforts. The right to make decisions to impose sanctions (including military sanctions) on countries concerned should belong solely to the United Nations so as to prevent unauthorized actions taken by some countries for their own interests which would make the development of the situation more complicated.

6. To continue to give a play to the role of peace-keeping operations. The United Nations should appeal to all member nations to make joint efforts to solve the problems of military manpower and funds required by United Nations peace-keeping operations.

7. To improve the mechanism of the United Nations. The United Nations should strengthen the respective functions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretary-General. It should develop democracy further by listening fully to the views of the vast majority of member nations and should oppose the abuse of the veto right.

V - CONCLUSION

We are living in a world fraught with contradictions. We are living in a world which is both united and divided. Peace is always the lofty ideal pursued by mankind. In the nuclear era of today, the world people long for and cherish peace all the more. However, peace is inseparable. So long as regional conflicts and local wars continue to occur, it will be difficult to maintain the overall relaxation of the interntional situation and nothing can be spoken of the genuine realization of world peace. Therefore, the resolution of contradictions and conflicts among regional countries is of great importance to the preservation of world peace and stability. The United Nations on which people of all nations place high hopes should no doubt play a more significant and effective role in this regard, whereas the international community should make greater efforts to support and strengthen it.

Conclusions

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The term "conclusion" would no doubt be too ambitious and inappropriate.

Firstly, the events of the immediate present, which were evoked repeatedly and provided subject-matter for discussion, are still in progress. No one can prejudge how they will develop, still less bring out their full significance.

Secondly, those who participated in the discussions, who hold eminent positions or possess recognized expertise, do not need any assessment or summing-up from outside. Their comments stand in their own right, and it would hardly be useful either to reiterate or to contradict them.

The observations set out below may, however, be justified in terms of a dual privilege.

First, their author writes only in his personal capacity, without committing UNIDIR in any way to his views, and without the shadow of an external authority being cast over him. For it is well known that what gives value to certain positions at the same time marks their limits: many reflect unofficial government viewpoints, in keeping with well-established practice.

Furthermore, and by definition, these concluding remarks have the advantage of the last word - a formidable privilege which must not be abused.

* * *

"The United Nations, disarmament and security: evolution and prospects" was the general, and admittedly broad, theme of this Conference. Three points seem in this regard to have dominated the debate and, while not leading to a consensus, at least focused the reports and the discussions:

- The rise of security issues;
- The questioning of the ability of the United Nations to participate in the disarmament endeavour;
- The return to the United Nations Charter.

These three elements correspond to the three key topics of this book. Their initial order has, however, been appreciably modified.

I - The Rise of Security Issues

It will not come as a surprise to see security placed first. Security, as we know, fosters disarmament more than the converse, although it may be hoped that a synergetic relationship will develop between them. What is more, security cannot be improvised, but has to be prepared and organized. As Tacitus wrote: "The Gods are not concerned with our security but with our punishment".

In this regard, there was broad agreement both on the central role of these issues and on their current status. On the one hand, we are witnessing a resurgence of questions and attitudes which we might have thought belonged to the past and might have hoped were in the process of disappearing. This is especially true of policies of aggression and the

responses they are bound to elicit, responses which are a question primarily for the United Nations. On the other hand, new security problems are emerging, or more exactly the perception of these problems is broadening, so that it is the concept of security itself which needs to be reconsidered and no doubt enlarged.

The Resurgence of Issues from the Past

Two situations in particular drew attention.

First, the Arabian-Persian *Gulf affair*. This clearly poses a major challenge to the United Nations, and more widely to the international community as a whole.

It is a major challenge because a failure by the Organization on this matter would obviously have damaging, and probably irreparable, consequences for the United Nations collective security machinery. Until now this machinery has been paralysed, or has been capable of only limited effectiveness, for reasons that were extraneous to it. The division of the permanent members meant that the system was disconnected, marginalized, but could not be judged on its merits. In other words, while it lacked practical effectiveness, it retained potential effectiveness. While the hypothesis of agreement among the permanent members and among the other members remained unverified, there was also a need for it to be put to the test.

This crisis provides the opportunity for doing so, and allows the Security Council little room for manoeuvre. Either the aggression, which has been unanimously condemned, is punished in accordance with United Nations rules and the legal *status quo ante* restored, or else the Council's credibility is fatally undermined. Never have the conditions been so clearly met for the Council's machinery to operate effectively, notwithstanding the shortcomings in its organization, particularly as regards the Military Staff Committee.

It must be emphasized at this point that the crisis has a positive aspect for the United Nations. All States have agreed to work within the framework of the Organization and to take action on the basis of the Security Council resolutions. From this point of view, it may be said that as regards both the adoption of the resolutions and their implementation, the permanent members have as a whole fulfilled their special responsibilities under the Charter.

While the stakes are clear, the outcome remains uncertain, however, particularly in respect of the conditions for a final resolution of the conflict and the establishment of lasting security in the region. This last point, which will be decisive in the long term, is not the least of the challenges facing the Organization.

Second, the prospect of an *arms race* in what is - or was - conventionally known as the *third world*, an arms race which would take over from the erstwhile military competition between East and West. The prospects that the latter will end or be reversed are good; although, for the time being these are no more than prospects.

The development of a new form of competition among third world countries would be certain to have a threefold negative effect: in the South-South context, in the North-South context, and also in the East-West context since it could, even if indirectly, hold back or even upset the present trend towards arms reductions. However, it is too early to make any pronouncement in that regard.

The Broadening of the Concept of Security

This broadening relates to a growing perception of what are often termed "non-military aspects" of security. These problems are not new, but they are becoming more acute, thus facilitating their consideration in terms of security. This issue was discussed at length and excellently argued during the Conference. It will therefore be mentioned only briefly - which is not to diminish its importance and urgency.

The broader concept of security stems in particular from the implications of uncontrolled and exponential population growth; questions of public health, including the heightened risk of epidemics and pandemics; environmental concerns and problems of unequal development, standards of living and employment, international migrations, political equilibrium and social stability that affect many countries.

These various problems, which it would be senseless to attribute to a single determining cause, and which tend to intensify and aggravate one another, are first of all the responsibility of the individual State concerned. Beyond its political terms of reference, the State as an instrument or tool of organization and management derives its legitimacy from its ability to resolve the problems of the society it governs. It is consequently for the States in question to undertake, each on its own behalf, to deal with problems whose internal dimension precedes, and often determines, the international dimension.

At the same time these problems are increasingly taking on a dimension that is not only international but universal. Consequently they are a challenge to the Organization and to the entire United Nations system.

They also affect international security in the conventional and restricted sense of the term, in at least two ways. First, they are underlying causes of growing instability within the international system, of structural insecurity, to which military responses are likely to appear as a solution, even if they are a false solution. Second, they may at any time lead to violence, internal or international - although the difference is now quite relative - and to localized unrest which nonetheless poses a threat to the whole system. These problems also relate back, therefore, to the more conventional, politico-military aspects of security. While they illustrate the broadening of the concept, they also underline the interdependence of its various aspects.

II - Questioning of the Ability of the United Nations to Participate in the Disarmament Endeavour

Such a questioning is surprising at first glance, rather sacrilegious no doubt, and certainly provocative, since it contrasts with the Organization's long-standing efforts, the scale of the machinery it has brought to bear at least since 1978, and the force of the principles affirmed or reaffirmed by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is, however, based on a range of striking facts, which we may attempt to summarize here.

What is Important in Terms of Disarmament Has Taken Place Elsewhere than at the United Nations:

At the bilateral level, following a now long-established pattern, there exists the Washington Treaty of 7 December 1987 on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, the United States-Soviet accord on chemical weapons of 1 June 1990, or again the prospects opened up by the START negotiations, even if they seem rather drawn out. This bilateral approach, moreover, is not unique to the United States-Soviet partnership, as the joint statement by Argentina and Brazil on nuclear issues (28 November 1990) is also very significant.

At the regional level there is the accord on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and the developments it seems to call for in terms of reflection on a pan-European system of security, of which a significant element is the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Are the European bodies now about to compete effectively in this respect with the Conference on Disarmament, despite the latter's status ever since its birth as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum? At the very least they show the example and have priority, if only in terms of results.

At the unilateral level there is the evolution, albeit still fragile, of certain defence policies. The role of unilateral initiatives, policies and actions has always been somewhat neglected yet has appeared decisive in several instances, notably for the conclusion of multilateral agreements - as with the United States' initiative to renounce biological weapons which led to the BW Convention of 1972. It is important to emphasize this fact as there is often a tendency to visualize unilateral actions as the mainspring of the arms race. The reality is quite different, and one might almost be tempted to take the view that a treaty serves merely to frame, organize and channel a converging series of unilateral actions and policies.

The United Nations Has Achieved no Significant Results for a Long Time

This observation is unfortunately inevitable, both in respect of the elaboration of new conventions on disarmament and as regards the implementation of existing ones.

Concerning the elaboration of new rules, the major question of concluding a convention on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons cannot be avoided. Beyond security issues and the risks of an arms race which its failure or simply an excessive delay would entail, this endeavour represents a major challenge for the United Nations. The Conference on Disarmament is formally outside the United Nations framework, of course, but it is linked to the reshaping of the disarmament machinery which the General Assembly has pursued since 1978. Failure would be certain to have repercussions on the whole system and to raise the fundamental question of the performance of the Conference after more than 10 years of work.

Yet the negotiations are at a standstill, temporarily it must be hoped, and it would appear risky to gamble on their success. All the same, it is necessary to emphasize the danger of a policy of convenience whose strength would be only in appearance: concluding a convention that would be confined to establishing principles and leaving it to the institutions, bodies and machinery it would put in place to resolve the outstanding difficulties at a later stage. Such a convention would strongly resemble a phantom convention and would most likely be stillborn. This is a formula for postponing rather than avoiding failure. It is very probably

illusory to hope to obtain from a process of implementation what could not be achieved in a process of negotiation.

Regarding the implementation of existing rules, we may refer to the study which has just been completed on the role of the United Nations in the verification of disarmament agreements. Besides its analytical aspects and discussion of verification in general, the study focuses on evaluating, and considering the feasibility of, a multilateral system of verification linked to the United Nations.

We will not discuss the merits of this here. But it is striking that the conclusions of the study are very modest. We should note that the process of verification continues to be dominated by two aspects: it is the business of the States concerned; and it is specific to each treaty, relying on the particular machinery created by each, with a variety of degrees of elaboration. The prospects for genuine international verification which would give substance to the formula "*general and complete disarmament under effective international control*" remain uncertain.

The only innovative and positive, albeit very partial, measure regarding verification in fact dates back more than 10 years. It consists of investigations carried out by the Secretary-General at the request of a Member State in the event of the alleged use of chemical or biological weapons. These procedures have, of course, been tested - they showed their effectiveness at the time of the conflict between Iraq and Iran - and consolidated - since, after being challenged initially by some Member States in the context of General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, they were subsequently accepted and have been the subject of a consensus since resolution 42/37 C of 30 November 1987. Nonetheless, the technical, human and financial resources available for them remain insecure. Despite their merits, they have not been extended to other areas or given rise to a new general technique of inspection that would serve the United Nations. They cannot be said to constitute the embryo, which could be developed empirically, of multilateral and institutional verification machinery within the United Nations.

The Role of the United Nations Must, it Seems, Remain Limited

Limited means positive but restricted. The restriction evidently has to be based on two principles, the principle of subsidiarity and the principle of assistance.

The *principle of subsidiarity* here means that the United Nations cannot contemplate undertaking what the Member States do not wish to do or cannot do directly. In other words, and this observation goes well beyond disarmament and even security, the United Nations can do only what States leave it to do. Moreover, within the framework of its activities, it appears largely as an instrument of State policies.

All the same, this role must not be underestimated. It includes important functions which the United Nations alone can exercise.

One is the function of globalization or *universalization*: as a forum for interchange, discussion and debate, the Organization alone can play a role at the universal level. Thus, only it could have adopted and promoted an overall conception of disarmament such as that developed in the Final Document of 1978.

It also has the function of *conceptualization*, which relates in particular to the studies and research carried out by various bodies, to which UNIDIR endeavours to contribute. Going beyond national divergences, and without necessarily leading to practical conclusions, this

conceptualization helps to identify a common subject-matter and to create a homogeneous intellectual environment where everyone speaks the same language, as it were, even if they do not hold the same views.

In this regard, the role of the United Nations is not so much to settle problems as to formulate them. It is up to the Member States to resolve them. But formulating the problems is not a minor role if it can be done in a universal, objective and rational manner.

The *principle of assistance* means that the Organization is always dependent on the cooperation of the Member States. This is obviously the case when negotiating and concluding multilateral agreements on disarmament, but also when giving effect to confidence-building or implementing measures, receiving and disseminating information, promoting cooperation among the parties and possibly when participating in the verification process.

Conversely it means that the role of the United Nations is to provide whatever assistance it can to parties requesting it. A number of multilateral treaties thus provide for the possible involvement of United Nations organs, especially the Security Council, in their implementation. However, this has largely failed to happen in practice, a fact which may be welcomed because such involvement would in fact reflect a deficiency in the operation of the treaty itself.

To sum up, these limited functions of the United Nations, which contrast with its ambition to play a central role in the disarmament process, are less surprising than it appears at first glance. The Charter in fact contains few provisions on disarmament and nowhere mentions the objective of general and complete disarmament. Peace and security are certainly at the heart of the design of the United Nations system, but following a logic of collective security much more than of disarmament. The Organization's involvement in the endeavour is thus necessarily somewhat tangential in character.

III - The Return to the Charter

Reference was made in the discussions to the Bible. Speakers declared, citing excellent examples, that it was necessary to look to the past for ideas and proposals that would be fully applicable to our time. The League of Nations, despite its sad fate, in this respect constituted a source of suggestions and tentative solutions that it would be wrong to dismiss simply because of their lack of success historically.

But, for a man of the United Nations, the standard reference is the Charter. In this regard a tribute must be paid to the founding fathers of the Organization, the drafters of its fundamental text. For the Charter, even if in some respects it may appear out of step with the present world, it retains its full relevance, its virtues and its promises. It is even a visionary text, which looks to the future and is far from having as yet developed its full potentialities. This is demonstrated by the present evolution and enhanced status enjoyed today by the United Nations.

It is however necessary to identify several approaches, which correspond to several dimensions of the Charter. From this point of view, a distinction can be made between the principles of the Charter, its machinery and its dynamics.

The Principles

What is meant here are the basic rules laid down in the Charter concerning relations among States. These are general and abstract rules whose legal authority, based on the Charter, is broader now as most of them have acquired the status of customary rules to be applied universally. The evolution of international society underlines their permanent validity. It also highlights their necessary unity.

Permanent validity applies notably to the principles of Article 2 of the Charter, relating in particular to sovereign equality (Article 2, paragraph 1), and refraining from the threat or use of force (Article 2, paragraph 4) as well as the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful means (Article 2, paragraph 3). These principles are even better accepted today than originally, despite the fact that actual practice has sometimes called them into question - perhaps precisely because actual practice has called them into question. It is, for example, striking that a regional process such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which is unrelated to the United Nations, reaffirms and reinforces them.

The same is true for human rights, and more generally for the other principles relating to international economic and social cooperation formulated in Article 55. We will return to these later. The Charter easily persuades the reader not only that its text has not become outdated but that to a large extent it responds to current problems. With the crumbling of ideologies, the Charter remains the common heritage of obligations and values which mankind owes to itself, as well as the repository of the principles governing relations among States.

Unity of principles may also be applied to disarmament. The Charter clearly indicates that disarmament, or arms control, must be a technique, an instrument of security. The Charter is based on collective security, in the same way as the Final Document of 1978, which begins by reaffirming this linkage between disarmament and security, and goes on to recall expressly that collective security is the basic system on which the Organization is built.

After being largely eclipsed, collective security now appears able to function, albeit under conditions which are by no means perfectly defined. In addition, many very diverse actions can be tied in with this concept, which is in no way limited to a common forcible response to a breach of the peace or an act of aggression. It might be very useful to undertake a study of the dimensions of collective security, as well as, from a more practically oriented standpoint, the requisite ways and means to achieve it. But this is already to raise the question of machinery.

The Machinery

This offers us quite a different vision. While the principles testify to the convergence of the aspirations of the Charter, and the intellectual unity which dominates them, an examination of the machinery - bodies, powers, procedures - leads to a compartmentalized, administrative, concrete, ultimately bureaucratic vision of the United Nations.

In this regard, the Conference broadly underscored the inadequate development of machinery relating to Chapter VIII, on *regional arrangements* and the cooperation which should be established between them and the Security Council. International regionalism, to the extent that it would involve the decentralization of a universal system, particularly in security matters, still has to be invented. The growing interest in regional approaches to disarmament and security may perhaps lead to further developments shortly in this regard.

Meanwhile, one other aspect has been somewhat neglected, namely coordination between the Organization in the strict sense and the *specialized agencies.* This coordination is, however, doubly important. First, the specialized agencies are or should be extensions of the Organization, and their deficiencies are ultimately more serious than those of the United Nations in fields such as food, public health, refugees, education and economic and social matters in general. Second, if one adopts a broad conception of security, incorporating the non-military aspects, their importance is even greater.

Yet, each specialized agency has a tendency to behave like a small-scale United Nations, and coordination with the Organization is a constant problem, as witness the relative eclipse of the Economic and Social Council. An in-depth review of questions of international security no doubt implies a strengthening and intensification of links between the United Nations and these agencies, thereby benefiting the Organization as a whole.

The present inadequacy of this machinery - to limit ourselves here to relations which are in some way external to the United Nations - is apparent in horizontal as well as vertical terms. But the dynamics of the Charter may help to remedy this to some extent.

The Dynamics

To appreciate these dynamics, it will be necessary to look once again at both the principles and the machinery.

As regards the *principles*, despite already long-standing and very rich experience, the Charter is still a Sleeping Beauty. Some dormant articles are waiting for their Prince Charming, but they can always be awakened.

Thus, to consider only problems of security and disarmament, we should note Article 26 of the Charter. It entrusts the Security Council with responsibility "*for formulating ... plans ... for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments*". The Council should, of course, work with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, which has never really functioned. Few efforts have so far been made, however, to exploit this provision. Yet it is of great interest since the terms of Article 26 refer implicitly to a broad approach to security: these plans should "... *promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources*".

The same spirit inspires Article 55, which we should not fail to link up with Article 26: the object of economic and social cooperation, including "*universal respect for, and observance of*" human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the "creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for "*peaceful and friendly relations among nations*". These Articles comprise a very modern conception of security. They demand only to be put into effect.

With regard to the *machinery*, we will confine ourselves to the problems of the Security Council. The idea of revising its composition, and possibly its voting rules, is an old one. It takes on a new relevance with the recent transformations of international society, especially German unity and the new course of international relations, which has allowed the Council to function for the first time by consensus, or almost by consensus.

We may, indeed, ask ourselves what is the real substance of the problem.

First, let us consider the machinery of voting. Actual practice has already brought a relaxation of the permanent members' "right of veto", so that their abstention does not prevent the adoption of a resolution which would otherwise meet the requirements of a majority. As

to completely abolishing the right of veto, this would no doubt carry great risks for the Council and collective security. The significance of the veto after all is not only, and perhaps not essentially, to paralyse the Council. It is to prevent the Organization from being used by one or several permanent members against the others - a situation that would be very likely to aggravate conflicts instead of resolving them. Short-circuiting the Council, as it were, disconnecting it in the event of a conflict where the permanent members might associate themselves with opposing camps, is probably a lesser evil.

This question is, furthermore, closely linked with the composition of the Council, since it bears on the special responsibilities of the permanent members. We will simply note in this regard that any change would involve a revision of the Charter, which would presuppose the accord of all the permanent members and hence their consent, collectively and individually, to the modification of their current status. Is this the right time to break the instrument, now that the Council is beginning to demonstrate its effectiveness, its ability to function and to meet its responsibilities both under the Charter and towards the Member States? The likelihood, at least in the short term, is that more problems would be created than resolved. In other words, it is more important and easier now to apply the Charter than to revise it.

This is all the more true as the machinery created under the Charter is sufficiently flexible to be adapted to the circumstances and to new balances. The easing of the veto in practice is a good example of this. Another illustration has been the development of peace-keeping operations based on the principle of consent by the States concerned and on the instrumentality of the subsidiary bodies. Likewise, the entire machinery of disarmament was reshaped some 10 years ago, without affecting the Charter, by purely internal adjustments.

Now that collective security seems to be - or could be - undergoing a rebirth, why should the adaptability and flexibility of the Charter not be used to advantage? The Council might, for example, establish subsidiary bodies whose composition would be variable depending on the subject-matter dealt with, and which would involve a measure of regionalization. Permanent coordination could thus be developed with regional institutions or arrangements that already exist or might be set up on the initiative of the States of a region.

In any event, adaptations of this kind, which would not threaten the secure foundations but would permit their modernization, depend on the creativity and will of the Member States. It is up to them to learn how to play the instrument.

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