

RESEARCH PAPERS  
TRAVAUX DE RECHERCHE  
NE 36

**The Guardian Soldier:**  
On the Nature and  
Use of Future Armed Forces

UNIDIR  
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
Geneva

RESEARCH PAPER  
NE 36

**The Guardian Soldier:  
On the Nature and  
Use of Future Armed Forces**

*Gustav Däniker*

UNITED NATIONS  
New York and Geneva, 1995

## NOTE

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

\*  
\* \*

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.

UNIDIR/95/28
--------------

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION
<i>Sales No.</i> GV.E.95.0.19
ISBN 92-9045-105-X ISSN 1014-4013

# Table of Contents

	Page
Preface - <i>Sverre Lodgaard</i> .....	v
Preface - Major General (ret.) <i>Louis Geiger</i> .....	vi
About the Author .....	vii
Introduction .....	1
<b>Chapter 1 From Mass Destruction to "Surgical Strikes"</b> .....	<b>15</b>
Growing Horror of Hecatombs .....	15
Spread and Containment of Total Strategies .....	18
Nuclear Weapons as a Stabilising Factor .....	21
Increasing Virulence of Indirect Strategies .....	24
Renaissance of Operational Thinking .....	29
Progress in Disarmament and Weapons Precision .....	33
On the Verge of a "Humanisation" of Warfare? .....	38
<b>Chapter 2 The 1991 Gulf War as a Turning Point</b> .....	<b>43</b>
Brilliant Campaign, Unsatisfactory Outcome .....	44
Lessons for the Future .....	53
Desert Shield - Desert Storm - Provide Comfort .....	60
<b>Chapter 3 Military Power After the Year 2000</b> .....	<b>65</b>
Integration into Existential Preservation .....	67
"Greater Responsibility" of Military Leaders .....	73
From Warrior to Guardian Soldier .....	75
National Self-Defence and Supranational Peace Preservation .....	83

**Chapter 4 Seven Theses on the Use of Future Armed Forces . . . . . 91**

    Thesis 1 . . . . . 94

    Thesis 2 . . . . . 95

    Thesis 3 . . . . . 96

    Thesis 4 . . . . . 98

    Thesis 5 . . . . . 101

    Thesis 6 . . . . . 103

    Thesis 7 . . . . . 104

**Chapter 5 Chances of Realisation . . . . . 107**

    Increasing Demand for Collective Peace Preservation . . . . . 108

    Successes in Confidence-Building and Disarmament . . . . . 112

    Code of Conduct of Armed Forces . . . . . 114

    Best-Case Thinking and Preservation of Existence . . . . . 117

    Towards a "Sustainable Strategy" . . . . . 119

    Outlook . . . . . 123

Bibliography . . . . . 129

# Preface

The end of the century has seen great changes in military thinking and practice. Political contexts have been thoroughly transformed. Technological developments continue at great speed. Economic considerations make it increasingly hard for nations to develop, train and equip forces solely dedicated to confronting other, similar forces. The scope of the missions given to armed forces is widening to include disaster relief, conflict prevention and a broad range of peace operations conducted under the auspices of the United Nations or regional organizations. Accordingly, the goal of military operations is gradually evolving from destroying the enemy to creating a new political environment for peace with minimal losses on all sides.

More than ever before, armed forces will be called to support the political goals of their governments and to protect civilians. For this, they will need to be flexible and multifunctional. They will therefore have to be transformed from Cold War - type forces to adaptable forces capable of acting in very different environments.

Dr Gustav Däniker's book analyses the new requirements that armies should meet, and presents in seven theses an outline for the use of armed forces in the next century. It is a revised and up-dated version of a German-language book by the same author published some time ago. I gratefully acknowledge the cooperation and support of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and of Dr Brigitte Sauerwein, in processing and translating the present edition. First of all, however, I am indebted to Dr Däniker for submitting a topical and thought-provoking text.

As usual, UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed in the publication, but warmly recommends it for the attention of our readers.

*Sverre Lodgaard*  
Director, UNIDIR

# Preface

The law of war is becoming increasingly complicated, but also less credible among the armed forces. Often marginal, its teaching has little effect. Respect of the law of war is a matter of order and discipline. It is the military leaders' responsibility to put it into effect.

As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is actively involved in the development and promotion of the International Humanitarian Law, it also promotes the implementation of national training programmes in this field.

Major efforts will be made to encourage the armed forces to integrate key provisions of the law of armed conflicts into the general decision-making process.

This book underscores the need for armed forces to protect, rescue and help. It also provides the proof that this does not impair their capability of national defence.

The soldier has to develop ethics of behaviour in armed conflicts. It is the military leaders' task to achieve this. And this book addresses in particular military leaders.

Major General (ret.) Louis Geiger  
Advisor to the Armed Forces  
International Committee of the Red Cross

## About the Author

A public relations and communication consultant in his private career, Major General (ret.) Dr Gustav Däniker served in the Swiss general staff. He has authored several books (among others on Vietnam and the Six-Day War) and numerous articles published in the international press. He is an active council member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London and has lectured on strategy and the history of war. This book is the updated English-language version of "Wende Golfkrieg. Vom Wesen und Gebrauch künftiger Streitkräfte" Verlag Huber, Frauenfeld, 1992.



# Introduction

## Departure from past security-political thinking

*"One has to recognize the difference between the use of force in the past and during the Gulf crisis: Fundamentally it amounts to the difference between arbitrariness and lawfulness".*

*Edward Shevardnadze, former Soviet foreign minister.*

*"Hitherto security-political thinking was centered on national self-defence against power-politically motivated military dangers. One's own security was often ensured to the detriment of the security of others. Security in the 21st century will be contingent on the successful transition from a balance of forces or even the preponderance of one's own strength to a comprehensive contribution to a balance of vital interests of all nations."*

N.N.

On the verge of a new strategic era, some hindsight is essential for the comprehension of things to come. What were the behavioural patterns prevalent until the recent past? To what extent do they remain effective and what has replaced them? In lieu of the traditional preface, the purpose of this introduction is to recall the main strategic tendencies since 1945. At the same time, those challenges will be pointed out which have to be met if our security-political future is to be better than it would be if the past strategies of deterrence, threat and counter-threat were carried on.

ÈÈÈ

The first strategic turning point of the 20th century started with a tremendous, worldwide shock, triggered by the dropping of two nuclear bombs at the end of World War II. Although the destruction inflicted by conventional weapons during that confrontation had already surpassed any previous experience, it was as if mankind had realised that suddenly a new quantitative and qualitative dimension

))

of strategy and warfare had been reached. In light of such megathreats, it had become prohibitive, in the view of many, to resort to the use of weapons.

The half cynical and half anguished question whether war as a means of politics had any chance of survival in the new nuclear age was not only asked by representatives of the volatile public opinion, but also by eminent personalities of the 1950s and 1960s such as Maxwell Taylor, Edward Teller, Hermann Kahn, Henry Kissinger, William Kintner, Ferdinand Mische, Raymond Aron and Bertrand Russell. Most of them came to different conclusions. People unwilling to acknowledge that the dawning nuclear age was fundamentally different from any previous era were considered as potentially the greatest peril. Nonetheless the demise of the traditional concepts of war, attack and defence was obvious in their perception.

The philosopher Karl Jaspers held the view that politics and strategy had entered a "new state of aggregation". Without a radical change in thinking, without a "new logic", mankind would be incapable of mastering the possibility of self-annihilation. In Golo Mann's conclusion: "War as a rational instrument of politics, as an effort commensurate with its purpose, is utterly superseded. Academics should not make soldiers believe that war can be saved nor that they can rescue us or even themselves... It will be up to politics to prove that man, possessed with enough technical wits to make war impossible, is good enough for peace." (See Lindemann, Helmut (ed.): *Ist der Krieg noch zu retten?* Bern, 1963, p.200).

As we all know, events took a different turn. The awe of nuclear weapons did result in a hitherto unknown restraint, even on the part of the superpowers with regard to the slightest risk of an escalation beyond the nuclear threshold. Care was taken not to provoke or corner an opponent, in particular if he was armed with nuclear weapons. But it was soon realised that the threat of an annihilating nuclear strike, known as the strategy of massive retaliation and in fact the US strategy for nearly a decade, had lost its credibility from the very moment an annihilating counter-strike had become possible.

Subsequently, the US and the former Soviet Union became entangled for decades in the loftiest spheres of nuclear strategy. A delicate balance was achieved by a complicated and abstract system of a first-strike threat and a counter-strike capability. Stability was engendered by a both ingenious and dangerous combination of instability and of mega-risks. However, the world was far from pacified. Wars were waged in practically all parts of the globe -reportedly about 160 since 1945.



instance, the shield of deterrence and protection had been extended downward to the lower strategic levels for the benefit of the allies.

This resulted in zones of unequal security. Stability in Europe was achieved by an increased nuclear risk on the one hand and by a balance of strong conventional forces on the other hand. In Asia, Africa and Latin America, "wars by proxy" were quite often the order of the day. Even recognized experts were overwhelmed by this phenomenon. Some developed a medley of strategies in order to globally contain or neutralise expansionist forces whereas others made the equally futile attempt to eliminate the causes of war, if necessary by a unilateral renunciation of the use of force. Neither group found a solution for overcoming the ideological and power-political differences. Peace as a state of non-war, as the resultant vector of a balance of forces, was eventually considered as the ultimate achievable goal.



Even in brief outline, this retrospect leads to the following conclusion: The atom bomb has functioned as a "straitjacket" for half a century (Beaufre) because the fear of the bomb spared us another world war. And it has prevented an open confrontation between the superpowers until one of them collapsed due to its internal weakness. But the nuclear fear did not suffice to make man more reasonable, let alone better. On the contrary, means and methods were contrived which made armed confrontations hardly less horrible for the individual or for a particular nation than a nuclear disaster, but which confined them militarily and geographically. It was a heyday for indirect methods of warfare for ideological, social or ethnic reasons. Subversive warfare has been rightly defined as the strategy which can be successfully employed against an opponent who is superior in his equipment with weapons of all kinds, including nuclear weapons.

The system of three strategic levels which are interrelated in a multiple and complex manner although each one is ruled by different laws, as has been outlined above, is still in place. Even the spectacular unilateral reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and the withdrawal of short-range nuclear systems announced by President George Bush in September 1991 and the fact that the Soviets reciprocated by taking similar steps, have not abolished the system of deterrence, but only scaled it down quantitatively. No matter how the nuclear heritage of the former Soviet Union is settled - by a common high command within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or on a national basis, the laws of nuclear strategy will have to be respected.

))

The actual break in security-political terms is the radical change in the strategic environment which was brought about by the demise of one superpower actor as a constant source of provocation and threat. In its implications it is comparable to the introduction of atomic weapons.

What we are witnessing is not only a new spell of detente, like in the early 1970s, but also, at least for the time being, the end of an era of ideological and power-political confrontation that has practically determined every conflict on the globe since 1945. In the view of the philosopher Karl Jaspers the nuclear weapon and the totalitarian hegemony of Marxism-Leninism in the form of the expanding Soviet Empire were equally dangerous for mankind. While the first one was a threat to biological life, the second one endangered a life worth living. At present, we have been relieved of at least one of these pressures. The scenes of joy in east-central Europe, the noticeable relief at the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the deep breath of relief about the collapse of Communism in summer 1991 and the demise of the Soviet Empire in December of the same year were signs of a unique historical change which has become ever more obvious.

This change was undoubtedly triggered by Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" which set new standards - standards of which he eventually became a casualty himself. In strategic terms, the beginning of this change can be pinned down to Gorbachev's acceptance of a zero solution for intermediate-range nuclear missiles in 1987 and to his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 1988 when he announced - still in his capacity as secretary-general of the Communist Party and after months of preparatory summit diplomacy - unilateral Soviet disarmament measures which went far beyond Krushchev's deep cuts. His motives - as we know by now - were neither primarily humanitarian nor an abdication of Soviet power. He wanted to turn his country again into a normal state, in particular because he was already aware of the desperate state of its economy. Last but not least, he was driven by the realisation that Western resistance, especially by the US, against the expansion of Communism was not to be shaken, neither by psychological efforts, nor by swashbuckling, let alone by bluffing. Some of his advisors like Edvard Shevardnadze encouraged him in his conviction that the Soviet Union could only become a civilised state respected by the international community if internal reforms and the renunciation of untenable external positions credibly signalled the new course.

In his book "Tomorrow's War" Stefan Possony argues that the outcome of a conflict is determined even before its outbreak by the resources and the internal condition of a state, as was the case in both the Second World War and the Cold War. From this perspective, the US "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) was the





In conclusion: The 1991 Gulf War was typified by characteristics of two eras: Its goals were determined by a new type of strategic thinking and its outcome by classical military behaviour. Shortly after the war, the same troops were called upon to show, in the form of a spontaneous aid operation, what modern armed forces also have to be capable of doing: to protect people in need against sheer violence, to rescue and to help them by providing for their most elementary needs. The smooth transition from "Operation Desert Storm" for the liberation of Kuwait to "Operation Provide Comfort" for rescuing the people in need in northern Iraq is the most obvious symbol of a change significant enough to be analysed in all of its aspects.

ÈÈÈ

Generations of political and military leaders have attempted time and again, albeit in most cases with only moderate success, to envisage the "war to come" and its differences from the previous ones. In view of the strategic upheavals in the north-north context, the profound changes in the southern hemisphere and the mushrooming of sources of conflicts outside the sphere of the former east-west confrontation it seems particularly important to come intellectually to terms with the new era of the use of force. The attempt has to be made to determine its collateral conditions and rules and its implications for mankind. However, the analysis must not be an end in itself. Its aim will be to discern and further develop those elements which are conducive to a renunciation of the former atavistic tug of forces. The use of military force since 1991, from Kuwait to former Yugoslavia, provides enough practical material and justifies the effort.

The exacting goal of such considerations is the concept of an intellectual and material system of force control which enables nations to counter temptations to resort to the use of force in such a way that the potential peacebreaker has no margin of action or - if the worst comes to the worst - can be eliminated by the use of stabilising counter-force, however without precluding the possibility of a satisfactory and durable peace settlement. The temptation to resort to the use of force - which may arise in individual persons, power-hungry groups or an entire system - has to be addressed both by political and strategic means and by the spirit and the capabilities of the armed forces.

Or to put it differently: It is a fact that the international community, in reliance on the UN Charter, endorses the use of force under certain circumstances and is prepared to resort to the employment of armed forces if all other means have failed. However, a number of questions have remained largely unanswered so far:





))

The intention is by no means to downgrade former approaches which were justified in the light of former threats but have now become superseded. Without its constant military efforts and adequate armed forces which were permanently ready to defend its values the West would certainly have lost the Cold War. This is rather a contribution to recognising current chances of development and to the definition of future security-political needs.

ÈÈÈ

Therefore it is no coincidence that this book uses the 1991 Gulf War as a point of reference. From the military-technical point of view, it was a brilliant campaign, albeit anachronistic in its orientation which followed classical examples. It shows very clearly how things should not be done in the future. The follow-on rescue operations in northern and southern Iraq further provide an indication of the kind of requirements that modern armed forces and their commanders need to measure up to as well. In the future, generals will no longer be merely battlefield technicians, but decision-makers within the framework of an overarching system of securing the general existence of nations.

"Expeditions of the colonial times", as French defence minister Chevènement had not quite unduly termed the campaign by the Gulf War coalition, have to be ruled out and punitive actions of the North against an increasingly unruly South as well. The justification of such operations - as has been demonstrated quite clearly by the example of the 1991 Gulf War - can only be the stabilisation of a region of the world or the resistance against aggression from whatever quarters. Neither strategic considerations nor economic interests confer a sufficient legitimacy, which can only be derived from universal human values.

Of course, the pitfalls of such an approach must not be ignored. We are considering a domain that has always been a hotbed of barbarity in the broadest sense of the term, both due to human nature and historical complexities. An efficient combat plan leaves little room for ethical principles. We therefore have to remain aware of the risks of wishful thinking, of naive and consequently even harmful ideas. The fact that this risk exists and that it is a case in point for cementing superseded security structures must not be a pretext for renouncing changes for the better.

There is enough tangible proof of new and more comprehensive thinking in the area of security that it is no longer presumptuous to believe in the possibility of positive future development. We only have to recall the progress in arms control after years of agonising and the CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation





# Chapter 1

## From Mass Destruction to "Surgical Strikes"

*"Inhumanity in war is rarely of any use; there are only a few exceptions to this obvious truth. Another truth is that one should not exasperate one's enemy. One may win the war this way, but it will certainly be prolonged to one's own detriment."*

*J.C.F. Fuller, British military writer*

*"Careful targeting and expert use of technological superiority - including precision guided munitions - throughout the strategic air campaign minimized collateral damage and casualties to the civilian population."*

*Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict,  
Interim report to the US Congress*

In order to grasp the scope of the change which is currently taking place in military matters, it is useful to analyse those strategies, elements and trends which typified the wars and conflicts of the late 20th century. Not only regarding the organisation of the armed forces and weapons technology, but also in intellectual and moral terms, numerous influences from the last hundred years are still prevalent. They will be outlined, at least summarily, in those areas in which they have slowed down or speeded up the armed forces' transition from a "war machine" to a "multipurpose instrument", which has been diagnosed in the introduction.

### **Growing Horror of Hecatombs**

The 20th-century history of war starts with a cumulation of organisational, technical and operational problems. Thus the think tank of the Prussian-German general staff was trying to come to terms with the command and control and the employment of ever bigger masses of troops. Huge conscript armies were to be used to combat the equally huge armies of the enemy. The new railroads provided an ideal means of transportation; what was missing despite the first telegraphs were



))

have hardly succeeded because it was not in keeping with the modern battlefield situation - the fronts were frozen.

"Verdun" remains a symbol of the degeneration of warfare to mass slaughter in which literally hecatombs of soldiers died in combat which was mainly carried out with mortars and hand grenades from trench to trench, and in the fire of hitherto unknown artillery concentrations. When the assaults of German, but also of French infantrymen died down, already at the beginning of combat action, in machine-gun fire despite songs and hurrahs, no other procedure seemed possible for a long time. The slogans were "attrition" and "bleeding out" instead of the unsuccessful "out-maneuvering" and "encirclement".

The commanders thus continued to send fresh troops into the enemy fire, seemingly untouched or at least with utmost rigour. They knowingly accepted losses in their own ranks. They could do so because soldiers at the time considered death as their inevitable fate. Committed by their oath, the majority of them were convinced to die for the sake of their country. Commanders could dispose of their soldiers' lives because only scanty news about the atrocities trickled back home. From this it may be deduced that combats with loss rates like in World War One or during certain battles of World War Two would no longer be feasible over a longer period of time in the age of TV coverage. Today it seems that such losses would not even be acceptable in defence.

When unrest broke out in the Balkans in 1914 and the successor to the Hapsburg throne and his wife were murdered, the European powers attacked directly or on account of ample alliances. An ineffective security system and the automatism of war plans and mobilisation inevitably led to World War One. In 1991 the European Community and the CSCE (OSCE) made every effort to end the civil war in Yugoslavia without sending in outside troops. What lies in between is a century of most sanguine confrontations, but also a development towards growing restraint in the use of military force. This is due to several influences, among others, the memory of battles that had degenerated into slaughter.

World War One will go down in history as a war in which a soldier's life counted little or nothing. There is no record that commanders spared their own soldiers' lives for humanitarian reasons. If they did it was probably rather for ensuring a constant supply in cannon fodder. However, indications are rather to the contrary: The goal of victory justified as its means tens of thousands of casualties. War was becoming more and more ghastly. And it is not a coincidence that it was reconfigured to a total war with the use of all available resources by the high command of the German army and in particular by General Erich von

))

Ludendorff. Instead of a sense of futility or attempts to minimise losses, the mass casualties only prompted considerations how force could be intensified.

**Spread and Containment of Total Strategies**

During the postwar period, Ludendorff consolidated the concept he had contrived toward the end of the war. With his thesis, the defeated commander put part of the blame on the civilians: "It is the most urgent task of the leaders of total war to request the leaders of total politics to enforce the solidarity of the people as it is the people's duty under total politics", as he wrote in his book "Der totale Krieg" (Total War, Munich, 1935, p.16).

The whole predicament of literally perverted military thinking which places ideological madness above the welfare of the people and above any humanitarian consideration is expressed in this sentence. And it is no coincidence that this spirit was adopted by the Nazis who developed it to perfection, fanaticising a whole nation. It was conjured up by Joseph Goebbels in 1943 when, in the face of an already obvious defeat, he put the rhetorical question: "Do you want the total war?" to his audience at the Berlin *Sportpalace*, unleashing a fanatical "Yes" by thousands of voices.

However, it should not be forgotten that total war was not a German monopoly. On 19 May 1942, Winston Churchill had already declared in his address to the US Congress: "... modern war is a total war" which was reflected by his postulates. The consequences of this conviction were the goal of an unconditional surrender, the increasingly cruel bomb attacks against the civilian population and eventually the dropping of two nuclear bombs over Japan.

Against this background, the moral basis of soldiery with its partly historical, partly artificial aura and its claims of chivalry which go beyond the law of war, had lost its justification. The shock-troop commanders and the fighter pilots of World War One were already an anachronism in 1940 although they continue to have emulators and admirers even today. The "levée en masse" (mass conscription), the democratisation not only of the political life, but also of warfare via general conscription, but above all the ideologisation of war goals were ruled by more brutal laws than for instance the armies of the 18th century.

Total war is not confined to the armed forces, but it is a confrontation between nations with all their resources. Terror attacks against the population, economic warfare with the aim of starving and decimating the population as well as its



))

psychological attrition are on the same footing as military operations. Any single section of this all-encompassing range of forces may become decisive for victory.

Not surprisingly, the international law of war was not spared. It was invoked when it was in a party's own interest and recklessly violated when its disregard held a greater promise of success. Nonetheless it had been attempted time and again to impose certain rules for military confrontations. Primitive tribes staked out certain areas beyond which it was forbidden to fight. The "cultivation of warfare" had become one of the big issues of occidental legal and cultural history. Armed conflict was no licence for doing anything and everything. However, international martial laws and covenants were not respected for exclusively humanitarian reasons. The fact that the use of chemical weapons was renounced during World War Two is to be attributed less to legal barriers than to the realisation that these agents with their limited effects would not be decisive for the outcome of the war, whereas the effects of chemical counter-strikes were highly undesirable.

Total warfare may thus renounce the use of existing means if their effect is counter-productive. However, total warfare unscrupulously ignores any moral or legal considerations if it is deemed advantageous to do so. The gradual inclusion of the civilian population in the range of resources that are to be destroyed is a classical example. But this was not an invention of World War Two. The possibility of breaking the adversary's resistance through the attrition of the people was too tempting to be overlooked. Blockades, economic warfare, incessant large-scale air raids, long-range strikes and a destabilisation by sabotage and seemingly arbitrary terror attacks are still as much part of the instruments of political and religious leaders as of the "total thinking" of classical military commanders.

However, there has been some restraint, not for ethical reasons, but for rational considerations which made it the more effective. Brutality does not necessarily cause the collapse of resistance. The population is generally capable of an incredible amount of suffering, often to a greater degree than its armed forces. Although even industrialised societies are vulnerable, they dispose of a great degree of redundancy, which means that the breakdown of individual sectors does not necessarily cause an overall collapse. And, perhaps most importantly, collective suffering welds people together. The will to resist often prevailed over defeatism. For instance, Nazi Germany did not capitulate because it was pounded by massive bombardments by the allies. It took a clear military defeat and, with the progressive invasion of the country, the general realisation that any hope of victory was illusory.



))

then, survival has become more than questionable. Although such an outcome has been and is being denied by quite a few people, words like apocalypse and doomsday have become part of the current vocabulary, even of serious strategists.

Although nuclear weapons have not abolished war, they put a physical and biological barrier on the total-war thinking. Proponents of the unthinkable like Herman Kahn, who maintained that even a hydrogen war could be survived, remained an exception. Mass destruction and existential threat, not only for the attacked and the defeated, but also for the victor or the whole of mankind, became a grim strategic reality that could no longer be ignored.

The restraint was twofold: On the one hand, the proponents of retaliation argued that no one would use a nuclear weapon if he runs the slightest risk of becoming himself the victim of a nuclear strike. Stability and peace, the so-called "pax atomica" could thus be achieved if either party possessed a second-strike capability. What was essential was to preclude a superiority of either opponent. Neither side was to be allowed the capability of launching a surprise first strike or of being able to survive a retaliatory strike with the remaining potential and to retain enough weapons for a credible threat of a "third strike".

On the other hand, the uncertainty about the outcome of a nuclear war was used as a stabilising factor at the conventional level. This speculation prompted the West, in view of its conventional inferiority, to field tactical nuclear weapons which would be used against the opposing armed forces. Their presence was intended to raise, from a certain threshold of time and space, the risk of an escalation to a big nuclear war to an extent which was not acceptable to the East. Understandably, this strategy was the object of constant and vigorous polemics by the former Soviet Union. With the advent of the "neutron bomb", a tactical nuclear weapon that could even be used against the enemy's tanks, the polemics became most virulent. It climaxed when the Soviets' advance in the form of the SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles was jeopardised by NATO's double-track decision.

However, the nature of the "Cold War" as a field of ideological expansion and of moral defence, of threat and of counter-threat, of armament and of arms modernisation has not yet been described in all of its aspects. What is still missing is the phenomenon of those who fostered the disease for fear of the remedy, i.e. groups which opposed the stabilisation strategy described above. What is being referred to is the "peace movement", which started in Europe, especially in the UK and in the Federal Republic of Germany and which pursued the abolition of all nuclear weapons. Although it did not succeed in the end, it played for decades an important role in the east-west interplay of forces.

It can be considered as a proven fact that the peace movement was launched by the Soviet propaganda apparatus with the Stockholm appeal in 1953 and that it was continuously fuelled until 1987 (the conclusion of the INF Treaty). Its main purpose was to compensate for the Soviets' backwardness in the nuclear field by mustering the understandable nuclear fear of people and by turning it into a psychological weapon. The attempts of eastern stage directors to spread defeatism in the western camp, were not devoid of success. The "peace movement" forced Western governments repeatedly to renounce the deployment or even the procurement of nuclear weapons systems although serious experts considered them as indispensable for the balance of forces and thus for the prevention of war.

The motives and the intentions of the different pacifist groups certainly ought not to be judged dismissively. However, two effects have to be mentioned: In the short- and the medium terms, they undoubtedly weakened NATO's defence posture. It is inconceivable what would have happened if they had succeeded in their effort to make the West renounce its nuclear weapons (the eastern ones, as may be recalled, were hardly ever at stake). An attack by the superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact armies would have become more likely. In retrospect, however, the peace movement had the merit of a constant contestation of the macabre strategy of permanent blackmail and the mutual threat of annihilation. It was a state incompatible with human dignity that should not be allowed to last for ever.

Two conclusions are relevant for our subject: On the one hand the realisation that the theoretical willingness to go to extremes, including the destruction of mankind, in order to avoid defeat and slavery, that is to say the nuclear strategy in its most abstract form, has reached its limit. It was reached when one of the parties had exhausted its material means and when the counter-threat became effective. The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I and II) were carried on by the START negotiations which were concluded by the signing of a treaty in Moscow in July 1991. For the first time, the L for "limitation" was rightly replaced by an "R" for "reduction".

However, this new premise for the development of modern strategies was soon overtaken by spectacular events. The implications of the reduction of strategic nuclear systems which was initiated by the US and confirmed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in June 1992, together with the withdrawal of most of the US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and Asia cannot yet be fully assessed. Quite soon it had become clear that this historical step was not motivated by the intention to gradually eliminate all nuclear weapons, but by a number of internal and external political constraints and above all by nuclear strategic security requirements. At





)))))))))))))

War, their combat organisations switched over to indirect warfare which they waged in an equally self-sacrificing, ingenious and unscrupulous manner. In order to draw the attention of the outside world to their region and their fate, they did not shrink from terror attacks on Western aircraft and on civilians in general. Hostage-taking and kidnapping were the order of the day. In a similar way, Israeli underground organisations had fought against the British mandate. Terror raids back-and-forth, strikes and retaliatory strikes were exchanged in rapid succession.

However, contrary to theoretical expectations, the escalation was always followed by steps in the opposite direction as well. There were alternating violent and non-violent phases of the combat. For years, the "Intifada" has been the mixed form of resistance of the weaker, best suited until now for the Palestinian goal of liberating those territories which were occupied by Israel in 1967, and to a create an independent state. For Israel, economic setbacks, especially in the touristic sector, are accompanied by international defamation. "Low-level violence" is intended to put a permanent psychological strain on the adversary. The short-term goal is the external political isolation of Israel and the gradual attrition of the political and social life in Israel, the long-term goal being a sovereign Palestine.

What we are encountering, albeit in an extremely limited context - both in terms of weapons and of space - are undoubtedly elements of total warfare. What is decisive is the intricate pattern of a broad indirect approach. The characteristics of a confrontation below the level of war are unmistakable - such as the maximisation of political and psychological pressure by the weaker party, with a sectorial use of force, while military action is minimised, at least for the time being, for lack of a military potential. It remains to be seen whether this is sufficient for bringing about a decision, but the factor "time" which is extremely important in that type of conflict seems to work in favour of the Palestinians. Unfortunately, these types of combat cannot be expected to die out even if the negotiations which were started in late 1991 have led to a number of stabilising measures.

However, the prototype of this kind of conflict deserves quite generally a close examination because it remains the only practicable type of combat of the materially inferior. In other terms, the more the nuclear and conventional threats can be banned, the more the guarantors of the new world order will be confronted with this type of conflict.

Of course, small-scale war as a strategic problem has many roots. It can be traced back to antiquity, it is to be found in the Middle Ages and later in connection with the French Revolution and in the colonial wars. However, the

))

combination of ideology and guerilla warfare is a product of the 20th century. For Lenin, partisan warfare was an integral part of the proletarian revolution.

Not unimportantly, it should be remembered that today's "offensive" type of revolutionary small-scale war has its origins in the Far East. Mao and his military epigones were champions in waging a total war against occupation forces, political rivals and Western protecting powers. Small-scale warfare and terrorism which did not spare its own population if it was a hindrance to the cause, combined with physical pressure and intensive international propaganda proved time and again superior to the opponent's primarily military warfare. "Guerilla wins if it does not lose; a regular army loses if it does not win", as Henry Kissinger once put it. However, his convincing wisecrack ignored the "hearts and souls" of the fighting people. It is only correct against the backdrop of a constant exposure to psychological and physical pressure.

In its goals, the Vietnam war - "liberation of the South and the spread of the communist ideology to the whole of Indochina" on the one hand and the "containment of communism" on the other hand - was of prime global strategic significance. With the help of TV which transmitted every night the most horrible combat pictures back to America, and the leftist liberal media which discerned no reason for a war and no Western interest in Vietnam, "Fortress America" was gradually made ready for surrender. As it has been often stated, the Vietnam war was fought in the rice fields and in the jungles of the country, but it was lost in Washington and at US universities, just as the French lost the war in Indochina not in Dien Bien Phu, but in Paris.

However, Vietnam was only a segment of the global confrontation which has to be taken into account in this context. Lin Piao, the Chinese defence minister who was reportedly killed when he attempted to flee to the Soviet Union, had developed a "both universal and novel global concept of the Chinese guerilla". According to Werner Hahlweg ("*Guerilla - Krieg ohne Fronten*", Stuttgart 1968, p. 184 ff.), he described a new type of war in his famous speech of 3 September 1965: "It has to be emphasized that the theory which was developed by comrade Mao Tse-Tung about the establishment of revolutionary strongholds in the countryside and the encirclement of the towns from the country, is of extraordinary, general and actual significance for all current combats of suppressed nations and popular masses, especially those of Asia, Africa and Latin America." "If, on a global scale, North America and Western Europe are towns of the world", he went on, "Asia, Africa and Latin America may be called the rural areas." The towns had in a way been encircled by the latter and the cause of the world revolution ultimately depended on them.



))

We are familiar with the effects which this kind of thinking - which is both absolutist and ideological in its approach - had practically in the whole world. It unmistakably lives on in certain aspects of the north-south conflict. Yet the question is what its future impetus will be after its source, Marxism-Leninism, has failed so obviously. Untenable social conditions, dire poverty and natural disasters will continue to be the causes of unrest and upheavals. But the driving forces of the world revolution are impaired, their ideology has failed. This applies in particular to the Third World countries because, as the most clearly and strongly felt consequence, they have been deprived of their former material support. Is there a chance for a de-ideologisation and hence for a limitation of future conflicts? It is conceivable if prudent behaviour on the part of the "victors" prepares the ground for a long-term pacification.

On the other hand it is also probable - and that concern is the reason why the phenomenon of the revolutionary small-scale war is dealt with so extensively - that religious fanaticism, the strife for national independence and for minority rights or simply the strife for survival by peoples who feel under-privileged, will continue to mobilise the masses. Even if the industrialised nations' efforts to fight the causes went far beyond the current level, a social stabilisation of the Third World is not in sight, not even in the medium term.

As long as an honest discussion of the population explosion is shunned, let alone effective measures for curbing it - on the contrary they are boycotted by the apparent highest moral authority of Christianity - upheavals and violence will remain preprogrammed. For Europe, the handwriting on the wall are the growing numbers of asylum seekers, the civil war in former Yugoslavia, and the dramatic climax of the desperate Albanian boat people to whom "the West" held the promise of Paradise. Migrations properly speaking from the centres of misery to the centres of wealth, similar to the rural exodus in the Third World, are probable at the latest after the year 2000.

Should some of those groups or whole peoples of the "South" join forces in a coordinated effort, the confrontation with the "North" would reach a hitherto unknown scope of irregular violence. As with the revolutionary small-scale war of the past, soldiers alone will be incapable of coping with that type of combat - a challenge which would vice versa enhance the soldier's role.

Any attempt to establish a new world order or to achieve even regional collective security should take into account the kind of scenarios which might strongly resemble those of Lin Piao, albeit with other motives. In case the "rural areas of the world" once make an uprising against the "towns" even the most sophisticated methods and possibilities of conflict settlement and of crisis

))

management will no longer suffice despite all the progress that has been made in the recent past. The industrial nations will need a capacity of strategic early warning of possible developments, they will have to develop interdisciplinary and multinational counter-strategies, ranging from the attempt of crisis prevention and from "helping to help oneself" to the categoric defence against violent raids and, of course, a consistent application of those strategies.

### **Renaissance of Operational Thinking**

After this digression to "indirect strategies", we will return to the "grand strategy". Despite the direct confrontation between the USA and the Soviet Union and their respective allies with tangible sources of conflict such as opposing ideologies, superpower rivalries, hegemonial claims of communism and a constantly kindled fear of the adversary, Europe was a surprisingly safe place between 1945 and 1989.

This was primarily due to the gradual build-up of a nuclear "balance of fear", the growing reality of NATO's defence capability and the resolution of Western peoples and governments not to simply yield. Slogans like "rather red than dead" did not even catch in times of upheavals or of national political erosion. The danger of a cold-war takeover of large parts of Europe by Euro-Communism, which was rampant in Italy, France and Spain, is hardly even remembered.

Meanwhile we have a much clearer idea of what such strategic factors meant for the Kremlin leadership. They did not trust their own military superiority, not even in the conventional field, despite the tremendous efforts that had been made for its build-up. They had to acknowledge that Western prosperity stifled revolutionary moods and that efforts to kindle them by "active measures" were to no avail. The route to Paris and to London was therefore via Asia, Africa and Latin America. A direct thrust right to the Atlantic seemed increasingly risky.

The external impetus was also slowed down by internal difficulties. Nikita Krushchev still believed that time worked in favour of the Soviet Union. His successors realised that the race with the US was a losing battle. On the other hand they could also depend on the US not to simply exploit this weakness. The balance of fear was complemented by a balance of coexistence. However, this did not eliminate the systemic competition nor spectacular attempts by the antagonists to outwit each other - whether politically, in the armament sector or in the form of incessant propaganda.

))

Over the years, it became a Western conviction that "the Russians will not come". After the danger had been exaggerated for some time, it was now increasingly underestimated. With a few exceptions, the media contributed their share to the impression that an attack of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact was neither planned nor even feasible. Meanwhile we know better. An intermittent fear of war, for instance at the time of the INF debate, gave way to a feeling of security that was strengthened when Gorbachev took office and nourished by measures that inspired confidence.

However, the Western military remained sceptical. On the one hand, they did not trust détente and on the other hand they were aware of the contradictions of the strategy of "flexible response". Especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, there was increasing opposition among military experts in addition to the "peace movement" already mentioned.

A number of German analysts, among others Horst Afheldt, Jochen Löser and Franz Uhle-Wettler, studied the possibilities of developing purely conventional, but highly effective forms of defence, in an effort to address what they considered an urgent need. Quite soon, attempts were made to exploit advances in weapons technology, especially in the field of precision-guided munitions whose field of application and precision was initially largely overestimated. The goal was to develop a doctrine and a capacity for stopping and neutralising even tremendous formations of eastern tanks with conventional means. The ground had been prepared already in the 1970s by an international group of authors, like Otto Mischke, Emil Spanocchi and Guy Brossolet, but also Americans like Stephen Canby, who wanted to give a new lease of life to a properly equipped infantry.

However interesting and important this search for alternatives to the nuclear strategy may have been, it was essentially flawed because it was based on erroneous reasoning. First, the belief that modern weapons technology is infallible; second, the disregard of the proven experience that only a whole system of combined weapons - and never a single weapon that will sooner or later be offset by another weapon - can guarantee success. Third, the fallacy that all the rules and arsenals of the nuclear age could simply be pushed aside and that it was possible to return to the pre-1945 era. The fourth shortcoming of those models was the utter lack of understanding of the operational art although its application in the form of force concentrations and bold leadership had brought about brilliant victories in a number of postwar conflicts.

Attention focused on the technical developments. In the 1973 Yom Kippur war, heavy losses were inflicted on advancing Israeli tanks when they encountered Egyptian and Syrian infantrymen who were equipped with great numbers of anti-



))

weapons, from modern aircraft to long-range area artillery. For the same reason, Western efforts should be mentioned to establish rapid-reaction forces which can operate with due force outside the NATO area. It was obvious that helicopter divisions alone could not be relied on for this task. Despite their proven performance in Vietnam, they were generally too lightly armed and too vulnerable. The pre-positioning of heavy material was not always possible. Therefore the basis of the air and sea transportability had to be reviewed. Last, but not least, logistics proved a major problem for the Gulf War deployment.

Not surprisingly, this renaissance of both the operational and the strategic mobility was interpreted in quite different manners. The Warsaw Pact stance that it was the preparation of an offensive, was readily adopted by the peace movement. But even serious critics apprehended that it was an attempt to make war again feasible. To many of them the solution seemed to be a new doctrine, especially if they also rejected the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The goal was the so-called "defensive defence", and armies were to be restructured for a "structural non-offensiveness" which was not to be achieved by reductions alone, but required utterly new approaches and solutions.

It was thus proposed to replace long-range weapons and units capable of area attacks by defence-oriented forces with a great firepower and only a limited, that is to say a tactical mobility. The argument was that this was the only type of armed forces capable of furthering détente and of creating a non-nuclear balance and thus a new, less fragile stability. Further, civilians would have a chance to remain outside the centre of combat action. These critics overlooked the necessity of powerful counter-attacks or even of effective interventions. They also paid little attention to the eastern "doctrine of offensive defence". In fact, as we then suspected and meanwhile know, the Western term of "defensive defence" had been adopted only for propaganda purposes, while the old offensive plans were maintained and continued to form the basis of training exercises until 1990!

However, the dynamics of the ending Cold War was not the foreboding of a new "prewar period". On the contrary, it offered a whole panoply of positive development chances. Last but not least, the Gulf War was so far history's verdict in favour of mobile armed forces which are capable of offensive operations. Whether this will be the last word, will have to be examined later on. Meanwhile another decisive strategic factor of the 20th century has to be dealt with.

### **Progress in Disarmament and Weapons Precision**

))

The efforts to rehabilitate the defensive which have been described above were of course linked in manifold ways to the conventional disarmament efforts in Europe which had been seriously relaunched after 1989. They were intended as a quite concrete complement to the confidence- and security-building measures within the framework of the CSCE. In fact, a breakthrough was achieved at the strategic level. For the first time, both sides provided figures that had been verified. Massive reductions were agreed upon in Paris in autumn 1990. Considerably reduced ceilings were fixed for the major weapons systems, and a zoning pattern with clearly defined lower armament levels was adopted. What had remained a utopia for 13 years during the MBFR (Mutually Balanced Force Reductions) negotiations, had suddenly materialised. The internal collapse of the Soviet Union as an imperialist superpower and the consistent concessions which were concurrently made by Gorbachev, also in the field of arms control, enabled virtually breath-taking progress. The "new strategic reason" which had long been postulated, began to prevail all of a sudden.

Only a few years before, in 1987, a "zero solution" had been achieved in the field of nuclear medium-range missiles. The Soviet SS-20 missiles which had been fielded in the second half of the 1970s and constituted an extreme threat to Europe, had to be scrapped. In return, the Pershing missiles which were deployed in Germany and the ground-launched cruise missiles were destroyed. A Cold-War battle which had been fought with great efforts in terms of material and propaganda, had ended in favour of the West. However, this outcome was also due to the fact that reason had prevailed on the other side. In a mutual effort, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev had worked hard to achieve an optimum solution which surpassed even the boldest proposals of the opposition parties in the Western camp and which not even the peace activists had considered feasible.

The fact that progress in the field of strategic arms reductions was painfully slow mattered less in view of such progress. President Carter's goal to abolish all nuclear weapons worldwide by the year 2000 had been both utopian and unwise. Mutual deterrence retains its weight especially during periods of transition to new methods of securing peace. It serves as a watchdog and as a reassurance against potentates who are keen on procuring that weapons category *à tout prix*. Saddam Hussein who tenaciously clung to his nuclear dream even after his devastating defeat in February 1991, in defiance of the whole world, is a telling example of the perseverance, shrewdness and criminal energy that are still being invested into such projects.

Therefore there is a continued need for a nuclear weapons potential in the hands of responsible governments. The quantity is arguable, and, expectedly, the

))

level of reductions under START by one third has meanwhile been exceeded, as the mutual arsenals are roughly reduced by two thirds under the START II Treaty which was signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in Moscow on 3 January 1993. Meanwhile, the problems of missile defence which had become acute on account of the Gulf War experience, are gaining pre-eminence. Not surprisingly, the idea of SDI has been reactivated as GPALS (Global Protection Against Limited Strikes) and is endorsed even by Russia.

However, the issues of disarmament and of arms control must not be limited to the actual agreements. What has to be taken into account is the thinking which underlies the whole process. In our century it was initially rather tentative and exploratory than efficient, but it has become more concrete since the 1970s due to an increasing convergence of strategic concepts. By way of contrast, the disarmament efforts between the two world wars should be recalled. At the time, the definitions were already an insurmountable hurdle: What is an offensive weapon that has to be banned and what is a defensive weapon to which all peoples are entitled?

Today it has become obvious that this premise is too narrow and unwieldy for many other reasons as well, apart from the factor of the operational use. At first, the connections between armament, proliferation and destabilisation had to be examined more closely. The comprehensive postwar literature on the subject was not only an asset, but it was also often misleading or it conveyed ephemeral ideas which were not constructive, but created on the contrary new insecurities.

"Arms control", as defined by Schwarz/Hadik (Strategic Terminology, Düsseldorf, 1966, p.34) is a process "which limits either the number of weapons or the effectiveness of certain weapons". On this basis, the following agreements were reached over the years: the Test Ban Treaty (1963), the agreement on the "hot wire" (1963), the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty (1972), SALT I on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons (1972) and the SALT 2 agreements (1979) which were never ratified, but complied with until 1986, the INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) Treaty (1987), START I (1991) and START II (1993).

The "arms control" issue was dealt with in hundreds of meetings and negotiations, in thousands of drafts which would fill entire libraries. New doctrines were developed like the one of co-operative arms control, but up to the above mentioned INF Treaty, not a single missile was dismantled, let alone scrapped. On the contrary, the arms race in which practically all states participated actively or reactively in some form or another continued unabated and was accelerated both in terms of quantity and of quality.





))

one's own security and as few as possible so as not to overstrain the national budget.

This positive development is also reflected by the change in the strategic concepts of both sides. In the global nuclear context, the US rationale was initially based on the need for an absolute "superiority". This was the era of the strategy of "massive retaliation". After the 1962 Cuba crisis and the following Soviet missile armament, they had learned that such a goal was neither achievable nor necessary. The consequences were the principle of "parity" and the strategy of "flexible response". The previously mentioned theory of mutual hostage-taking by means of sufficient "second-strike" capacities already contained the seeds of the third stage. The "sufficiency" of armed forces and weapons was being defined. If this was possible in a convincing manner, it should also be possible to revert the armament spiral downward.

However, unilateral concepts like the freezing of potentials which had been propounded for a long time by the United Kingdom and the USA, were not a solution to the problem. In the last consequence, "sufficiency" depends on the attitude of the adversary and of the world's other power centres. It was decisive that these ideas were taken up by the moderate forces in the former Soviet Union. Initially a slogan for safeguarding the Soviet interests in the disarmament poker game, "sufficiency" became gradually a guideline for their approach. In view of the advanced reduction measures and control mechanisms it has to be assumed that both sides will continue in that direction.

However, the fallacy of a world without weapons has to be dispelled. Although there was a worldwide drop in armament production in 1990, many armament factories are kept operating at full capacity. Both the US and the former Soviet Union reached new records in their 1990/91 weapons exports. They were fuelled by the Gulf War and the requirement to replace spent weapons systems and ammunition. It had also spurred the demand for weapons systems of top quality. Another driving factor behind the armament business is the fact that the Gulf War has demonstrated, once again, the superiority of Western technology over Eastern mass goods. Most armies are keen on procuring that proven technology; the utterly specific constellation of that war is hardly taken into account.

It is at least somewhat reassuring that the world's five leading weapons exporters, all of them permanent members of the UN Security Council and frightened by their "fall of man" in the form of the weapons buildup which they had caused in Iraq, decided on more transparency in 1991 and promised restrictions of their exports to certain countries. The problem of the arms buildup in the Third World which neither can afford its acquisitions nor make a



))

which will inevitably entail high civilian and military losses if the resistance cannot be broken quickly and with a lasting effect. But there is a clear tendency to concentrate on the opponent's power apparatus and to spare the population as much as possible. Needless to say that this is difficult and at times even impossible even if the principle of sparing civilians is rigorously applied. However, the willingness and the efforts deserve recognition.

The attempt has been made to point out trends in warfare which increasingly focus on military targets. However, the cautiously positive conclusions of the trend have to be complemented by some additional elements which are indispensable for progress. First of all, there is a change in values, noticeable in many other spheres of life, especially in the industrialised democracies of the northern hemisphere. What may be lamented on the one hand as a disintegration of internal cohesion and as the loss of the traditional, mainly positive values, serves on the other hand as a brake for excesses. The understanding of the need for sacrifices, especially of sacrificing one's life for a cause, as just as it may be, has declined. The resistance grows as soon as a trace of arbitrariness or of an abuse of power is - even unjustly - apprehended or claimed. At times it may be muted by patriotic spells like during the Falklands war and 1991 in the Gulf. However, this resistance had not yet been put to the test. With few losses among one's own troops and a short combat duration, the opposition was hard pressed in view of the public consent to those wars. In Indochina and in Vietnam, the French and the Americans were confronted with the opposite situation. Even during the Israelis' 1982 campaign in Lebanon which had the goal of pacifying Galilee, the internal front started to crumble. The times of "*credere, obediare, combattere*" as the Duce had demanded from his reluctant Italians, seem to be a thing of the past.

Last, but not least, this is due to the practically ubiquitous presence of the media. It is one thing to approve of a war for good reasons; however, it is a quite different matter to stick to this attitude if the horrors of war are projected into one's own living room and if one starts to realise that even a "just war" is a barbarian act from which no one will be acquitted without guilt or complicity.

The media can either rouse or lull public opinion. Much depends on the tone. The media cannot prevent a war that the people considers as just, but they cannot achieve the contrary either. The media often create moods, but more often they reflect them. However, they have been increasingly successful and will probably continue to be so in rousing the people against cruelty and the abuse of defenseless people. Although the sensitivity may become blunted, the awareness of injustice is becoming more and more acute. This is a decisive element of the process which is being investigated here.



))

despair of discriminated persons or peoples. They all resort to direct and indirect strategies which, in the short run, can only be countered by an adequate counter-force. In the long run, the causes will have to be addressed which is a problem of definition and of execution. Local and regional solutions which take into account all the relevant factors of influence are more readily achievable than global solutions which are not adapted to the particular characteristics of individual hotspots.

Mankind is thus still far away from a satisfactory state in the form of a generally recognised order of peace. However, if a trend is discernible to at least gradually renounce senseless wars and unnecessary cruelty, it should not be underestimated. It takes some intensive and thought to find out what measures have to be taken to promote that trend.

## Chapter 2

# The 1991 Gulf War as a Turning Point

*"Do whatever you have to [do] to assemble the force and make certain that in the final analysis we can prevail at the lowest possible cost."*

*US President George Bush to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney*

*"US-led forces dominated every area of warfare with a brilliantly orchestrated campaign against a combat-hardened army that bristled with world-class equipment. This victory was neither easy nor certain, although in hindsight it may have come to seem both."*

*Dick Cheney, US Secretary of Defense*

*"The Gulf War was an oldfashioned continuation of a legacy that has not yet been overcome."*

*Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, physicist and philosopher.*

The 1991 Gulf War has been repeatedly referred to as a turning point in military history in this book because of the exemplary clarity with which old and new elements were apparent in its preliminaries, its execution and its aftermath. As for its planning and conduct, it was influenced by both the development trends of the 20th century which were pointed out in Chapter 1, and by the change in the strategic environment and in the military principles and values of democratic societies. These have to be taken into account if we want to understand the Gulf War and draw conclusions from it for the future.

However, for that purpose, the Gulf War also has to be related to a number of American experiences, especially in Vietnam. Its anachronism can be partly explained by the fact that the "pendulum has swung back": What went wrong in Vietnam was not to be repeated. Understandably, this resulted in some over-compensation, but it also blinded the responsible leaders' comprehension for some requirements of a timely conduct of war. The "categorical imperative" of those requirements was grasped only at a later date.

Therefore the 1991 Gulf War must not be examined as an isolated event. The strategic context, its conceptual background, its operational course and its consequences form indispensable elements for the deduction of future-oriented lessons. They will be analysed and assessed in the following.

The demise of the Soviet threat to which Western Europe had been directly exposed, the upheavals in the states of the strategic glacis of the former Soviet Union, the fall of the wall and the process of German unification have left vivid images in our memory. Insecurity and a lack of understanding for power-political and military needs had characterised the climate until Saddam Hussein's blatant aggression dealt a shock that prompted new considerations. Perceptions began to change. While most of the Western armed forces still had doubts about their *raison d'être* and were exposed to sustained fire from political quarters, sheer pacifism was losing its popular support. By and large, there was a consensus that violations of international law and atrocities as they were committed by the Iraqi ruler must not be tolerated with impunity. Although not really prepared to assume the hard job of the necessary punitive action, people welcomed the fact that someone else was willing to do so. On the verge of combat action in the Gulf, there was a medley of opinions: In Europe, pacifist agitation and a resurgent anti-Americanism were to be found side by side with a tendency to endorse *realpolitik*. In the United States and among most of its allies, there was an impressive determination. The looming war which eventually seemed to become inevitable, was no longer the apprehended confrontation between gigantic military machines which might even degenerate into a nuclear war. It was a war that had also become necessary in the light of the catastrophic consequences of the western democracies' reluctance to act in the 1930s. There was a widespread feeling of the dawn of a new era. Everything seemed to depend on the nature of its strategic and military implementation.

**Brilliant Campaign, Unsatisfactory Outcome**

Under US command, the coalition forces liberated Kuwait in a short and brilliant operation. Nonetheless, the question has to be asked whether that classical campaign took into account all the peripheral conditions and measured up to the modern strategic requirements for a mission of restoring the *status quo ante* and of regional stabilisation.

Defense secretary Dick Cheney, general Colin Powell, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and general Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander-in-chief





))

achieved by a mass of mechanised troops, supported by the leapfrogging advance of airborne units.

It would have been impossible without the preceding air offensive, which was remarkable also from an organisational point of view, and without the subsequent complete air superiority. It was the latter which enabled the unnoticed flank movement, practically without enemy contact. Without air superiority, it would not have been possible to air-transport logistical goods to the front nor to forward-deploy light mechanised units, virtually without support, such as the French "Daguet" division or the air assault units of the 101 and 82 divisions.

Underestimated by many analysts, the combat area or "space" in military language, had been duly assessed and generously exploited by the Americans from the very beginning. Clearly, Montgomery's procedure at El Alamein served as an example to general Schwarzkopf. Like him, he convincingly demonstrated how an enemy position can be outflanked over a big distance across the desert.

However, it has to be mentioned that the coalition forces were strongly favoured by the lack of combativeness and the psychological weakness of the enemy forces. Even soldiers better conditioned for a dogged resistance than the Iraqi ones would not have withstood weeks of practically incessant pounding by the air force and the artillery, under constantly deteriorating logistical conditions and without any possibility for a counter-attack.

In view of the continuous losses of their main weapons systems which they could not prevent, even the officers of the Iraqi guards divisions came to realise that a regular resistance was no longer feasible, last but not least because they knew virtually nothing about the coalition forces' offensive plans, but a lot about their technical superiority in practically all areas. If water and food supplies are interrupted for days, if sand turns from a protective camouflage into a hostile element which affects the functioning of all weapons systems and impedes even tactical movements, morale will inevitably break down.

Nonetheless the Iraqis' combat capability seems to have been overestimated by the Americans, apart from a few exceptions, until the end. They overestimated especially the number of enemy troops in the Kuwait Theatre of Operations (KTO) about which the information has remained inconclusive. Instead of the 435,000 troops mentioned by general Schwarzkopf in his final media conference of 27 February 1991 and the figure of 350,000 estimated by experts in December 1990, the number of Iraqis in the KTO seems to have dropped to about 200,000 by the beginning of the ground offensive, of whom at the most 150,000 were actually on Kuwaiti territory. (See Anthony H. Cordesman. *Rushing to Judgment on the Gulf War*. *Armed Forces Journal International* 6/91).



their coalition partners did not only have the UN-sanctioned goal of liberating a country which had been invaded. Their claimed mission, within the framework of a new world order, was also to punish a violator of international law and of regional stability. This should have led, from the beginning, to the definition of new criteria for success and to new types of solutions even in the military field.

The first issue that has to be addressed is the extent of psychological warfare. Has it really been fully exploited for an optimum result? Was it enough to use the common methods of loudspeakers and leaflets for making several thousands of defectors and prisoners and to otherwise implement the pre-conceived plan of encirclement and destruction, the "cut off and kill" with about 40,000 casualties among the Iraqis according to the actual figures? Should one not have thought beyond the tactical success?

The fact that this kind of question was not asked seems to be due to the method applied. Although the "battle damage assessment" (BDA) was the object of endless discussions, the qualitative and psychological component was obviously neglected. In order to minimise one's own losses, the mathematical calculation was preferred to an overall assessment of relevant factors.

Should the staffs really have ignored - despite the advanced aerial and satellite reconnaissance - that much of the defence capability which had been played up by the Iraqi propaganda, was sheer exaggeration? Should they not have known that a "Saddam line" properly speaking has never existed at any time despite extensive local fortifications and mine belts? Should they further have failed to notice that the Iraqi soldier as a capable combatant determined and skilled in the use his weapons and equipment was out of action?

If the staffs were confused, as hinted by general Schwarzkopf, by the contradictory information of the competent authorities, one has to ask why the intelligence services failed. The same applies to the "special forces" which had been infiltrated behind the enemy lines for extensive missions of reconnaissance and destruction. Is it a sufficient excuse for exaggerated and hence wrong information about the enemy that the services preferred to be cautious in their assessment? In either case, it is difficult to believe that a more adequate evaluation of the situation would not have been possible since even the critical media consumer had a rather clear picture of the increasing weakness of the Iraqis. Why did Israeli and Arab warnings, among the coalition forces' own ranks, that Iraqi military power was a colossus on feet of clay, go unheeded? Why then was the ground operation not adapted or at least speeded up? Why was it protracted until the scheduled end of the operation in mid-February?



of war can often bring about a quick moral breakdown, even of well equipped armies. Such a turning point was to be expected at an early stage of the Gulf War and it could have been calculated as easily as the number of probable tank kills.

But there is another problem of a special type which the allied high command should perhaps have recognised and countered within the framework of its preventive actions. An analysis of the Iraqi dictator's personality would have revealed that he would not hesitate to carry out his dire threats of terror and environmental crimes. Already on the 11th day of the war (29 January 1991), Saddam had started to use oil as an ecological weapon for polluting the waters of the Gulf on a large scale. When the ground offensive started, he set the Kuwaiti oil wells on fire - as he had threatened at a rate of 70 to 100 wells per day. There was also an increasing number of reports from Kuwait about lootings, hostage taking and torture.

Was it sufficient to use the only operational flexibility that had been provided for and to accelerate the advance of the ground forces by 16 hours when the advance was quicker than expected and the full scope of the catastrophe was finally recognised? Was there not a case for forming and using (airmobile) reserves much earlier in order to preclude the atrocities and the environmental damage? These crimes of vengeance obviously counted less in the eyes of the allies than possible counter-strikes with chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Firmly intent on keeping the initiative this time, in contrast to Vietnam, the Americans refrained from overall strategic counter-measures as warranted by the situation. Especially the environmental preventive measures were obviously insufficient although a mixed military and ecological working group tackled the matter at an early date. General Schwarzkopf hardly took any notice of this ("It doesn't take a Hero", p. 481-82).

By the time the last of the 659 blazing oil wells was extinguished in October 1991, unimaginable quantities of oil were wasted, and the aftermath of that man-made disaster cost the Kuwaitis dozens of billions of dollars. However, money will not suffice for remedying the pollution of the air and the water, quite apart from damage in the desert due to about 200 oil lakes. "For about eight months", as the Kuwaiti cancer specialist Asaar pointed out, "we have breathed oil, we have drunk oil and we have eaten oil". (Der Spiegel, 48/91, p. 2093).

This short analysis of Operation Desert Storm shows quite clearly that even a brilliant victory over a totalitarian adversary is not sufficient in today's difficult strategic environment. The politician's and the soldier's responsibilities go further. The Americans have learned many lessons since Vietnam and they have achieved a great performance in the Gulf. However, they overemphasised the military



requirements of intervention for the enforcement of international law or to punitive actions against peacebreakers. Consequences for the organisation, equipment and training, at least of certain units, are inevitable. And the proven weapons precision will be an asset for such cases as it enables to spare human lives.

Those military personnel who may consider this too revolutionary an approach should turn to "their Beaufre" for an endorsement of the timeless truth that war is only a dialectic of opposing wills, while procedures and weapons have to be adapted to the situation in each case. And even Clausewitz wrote in the early 19th century: "The fighting forces (of the opponent) must be destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight. Whenever we use the phrase "destruction of the enemy's forces", this is alone what we mean." (On War, op.cit., p.90). Clausewitz' recommendations had the goal of forcing the enemy to give in. There is no mention of confining the action to the physical elimination of the opponent and to renouncing all kinds of indirect measures as we know them for instance, from the Chinese art of war. The battle of annihilation was made a dogma only by Clausewitz' epigones.

Under US leadership, the coalition forces have won a clear victory. President Bush's order to liberate Kuwait in a short time and to destroy Iraqi military power was carried out in a nearly perfect military-technical performance. However, the coalition forces failed to take into account the strategic requirements of the new world order which they had set out to defend. They failed to bring the campaign to a satisfactory end and they failed to sufficiently prevent or minimise psychological, physical and environmental long-term damage. These facts are not only the politicians' fault, but are also attributable to traditional military thinking. The legacy of the 1991 Gulf War thus is less a call to emulate its brilliant performance in military-technical terms, but rather an appeal to the "strategic community" to recognise the new peripheral circumstances and to find out all the possibilities of a future stabilisation and promotion of peace.

### **Lessons for the Future**

For the objective of this book, the assessment of the Gulf War in the light of modern strategic requirements has to be complemented by a comparison with other modern wars. Could it be possible that the Americans were obsessed with the idea never to let another Vietnam happen and that they resorted to the other extreme of returning to a classical behaviour that was superseded? An in-depth





President Bush was as successful domestically. He was helped by the fact that Saddam Hussein's clear act of aggression roused a wave of moral protest in America (and much of the rest of the world), and he succeeded in making himself the exponent of that mood. Shortly before the expiry of the ultimatum, on 12 January 1991, he obtained "the authority to go to war". The US Senate voted with 52 to 47, and the House of Representatives with 250 to 183 votes in his favour. The majority of the negative votes were not against the war as such, but against the timing. They wanted to give more time to a peaceful solution, i.e. to allow the sanctions to take effect, but the need to counter Saddam's aggression was undisputed.

Thus an intervention of that scope had been unequivocally legitimised. In the future, any democratic state that is about to go to war will have to seek and obtain that kind of legitimacy. This was also the case in France and in the UK, in accordance with the legal procedures. Due to particular circumstances, the situation was different in Germany. The opposition party succeeded in blocking participation of German aid units, let alone combat troops, on the grounds of alleged constitutional restrictions which were claimed to rule out out-of-area (OOA) operations, i.e. outside NATO territory. The opposition was supported by a nationwide anti-war sentiment of large parts of the population. This is another important clue to future behaviour. The freedom of manoeuvre of democracies in implementing punitive actions will always be problematic. It depends on a number of circumstances, and last but not least on convincing (war) goals. If public opinion cannot be won and groomed, interventions which are not clearly in a nation's interest risk being thwarted by the fickleness of public opinion or due to a lack of interest.

This is exactly the point which might have jeopardised the whole operation: Like in 1939 when the question "mourir pour Danzig?" was answered in the negative by a majority of the French, it proved difficult to react to the question: "mourir pour Kuwait?" What was at stake was not only the liberation of a peaceful and innocent people, but also of a ruling family which had few sympathizers. Was it really the task of the USA, the defender of freedom and democracy, to come to the rescue of a regime which was despotic and medieval in many respects? The old American "sin" of supporting rulers independently of the backing by their population - which had disastrous consequences in Vietnam, in the Philippines and elsewhere - nearly proved fatal in the Gulf War as well.

So was the issue "mourir pour Ryadh?" or "to die for oil?" Neither one. To put it simply: the tedious question of convincing war goals had to be answered unequivocally. Countering the aggression, fine. The international community

))

could not tolerate that, at the end of the 20th century, a small state was invaded by a bigger neighbour and wiped out. The protection of Saudi-Arabia (and of its oil wells!) against a similar fate was also imperative.

But the forceful expulsion of the Iraqis from Kuwait? This was already an appended war goal that was not endorsed unanimously in the USA although it was at least plausible. And was not the elimination of Saddam Hussein's tremendous war potential at stake - and eventually his expulsion from the political scene altogether? By autumn 1990, not even the American leadership seemed to know what the ultimate destination of the journey was. In any event the question to what extent the use of force was necessary and adequate was controversial, even in the Pentagon.

The disastrous effects of poorly or controversially defined war goals were looming once again. The nearly unanimous approval of the "handling" of the Gulf crisis by the Americans dropped from more than 80 % to about 50 % towards the end of the year. It had to be boosted by the UN and by the US Congress and in particular by the initial success of mid-January.

Another indispensable condition for future interventions on behalf of a new world order should therefore be noted: the goals of such operations have to be fixed as early and as definitely as possible. Their determination is the most important aspect of strategy making. In case these goals have to be subsequently modified, a new assessment of the situation will be necessary and a convincing presentation with the use of all modern means of communication. The US President's shift in direction, from defending (Saudi-Arabia) to reconquering (Kuwait), which was hardly perceptible in the beginning as not even his closest collaborators seemed to be aware of it, understandably resulted in uncertainty in 1990.

On the other hand, Washington was from the beginning consistently determined not to bind the military's hands this time! President Bush reserved the strategic decisions for himself, especially the orders for the protection of Saudi-Arabia and for the planning and launch of the operation to reconquer Kuwait. He checked the military plans and made certain corrections, on the whole, however, he largely accepted his defense secretary's and his generals' proposals. He did not interfere with details. The outward impression of unity of the political and military leadership (Bush, Baker, Cheney, Powell, Schwarzkopf) represented, in comparison with the leadership during the Vietnam War, an advantage which must not be underestimated. Nonconformity by one or the other general was immediately nipped in the bud by Cheney and Powell.

))

The case of the air force chief, general Dugan, was particularly spectacular. Regardless of his merits, he was sacked in September 1990 when he was too outspoken and inconsiderate in his statements about how the war should be conducted. On the whole, the "mission tactics", i.e. the determination of goals and the assignment of means with the largest possible freedom of action in the execution, seems to have worked down to the lowest level of the hierarchy.

In Vietnam the military's freedom of action was still limited. Not only the Pentagon, but also the White House and numerous other government authorities interfered daily in events that took place on a 18,000 km distant battlefield. The plans for the next day's air attacks were wired to Washington every evening where President Johnson bent over the map and cleared or cancelled target plans, depending on information on expected collateral damage and losses among the civilian population.

In the Gulf War, general Powell had obtained more freedom of action for the military. A sort of relapse occurred nonetheless when the Amiriah shelter in a Baghdad suburb was destroyed with utmost precision, but caused about 400 civilian casualties due to insufficient reconnaissance. Saddam Hussein's exploitation of that error for propaganda purposes, in which he was vociferously joined by the media, seems to have been the reason why targets in Iraq had to be approved by the Pentagon, albeit not by the President himself, after that event. Some major installations were later cancelled from the list of enemy targets because of the risk of too many civilian casualties, or for psychological reasons, such as a war memorial and (wisely enough) a statue of Saddam Hussein. At the first major difficulty, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff thus returned from the "mission tactics" to the "command tactics" which must have been regrettable from the front commanders' point of view. But the ball was thrown back: general Schwarzkopf seems to have cold-shouldered the Pentagon's liaison officers to his headquarters in Saudi-Arabia as much as possible.

However, this kind of haggling among the highest levels of command will have to be avoided in the future. The issue is not to stick doggedly to one or another principle. The times of pro-consuls who acted as proxy rulers on foreign battlefields and took all the decisions, has long and definitely become a thing of the past. The modern possibilities of an instantaneous communication over the longest distances, may tempt faraway command centres to unduly interfere with decisions on the spot. However, it is also the welcome technical prerequisite for the increasing requirement of an integrated command, albeit adapted to the command levels. The reason for the need of strategic and operational flexibility is the increasing complexity, interdependence and linkage of a diversity of factors

))

that have to be taken into account for decision making. Only close cooperation between political and military decision makers will measure up to the complicated tasks of the future.

However, there seems to have been a perfect concurrence between politicians and the military regarding the obvious effort to minimise their own losses. This principle which has always been preponderant in the US conduct of war has become a real obsession. Humanitarian principles notwithstanding, the pressure of US public opinion seems to have been the determining factor. High losses in the Korean War, more than 50,000 casualties and about 200,000 wounded in the Vietnam War, have created a "never again" trauma. Since then, American interventions abroad had to be clearly motivated, as short as possible and with a minimum of losses. In that sense, former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger had already defined his rules for the employment of US forces abroad on 28 November 1984. Governed by Thukydidies' (470-400 B.C.) sentence: "restraint is what impresses people most in the use of power", general Colin Powell reminded his troops time and again of the principle of loss minimisation.

The US tendency towards "overkill", and an overwhelming use of material which has often surprised the European military, seems to have its commendable origin in such convictions. With a clear reference to Vietnam with its opposite order of events, a long and careful deployment leading to a quick victory after a short combat was given preference over a quick deployment and a long, difficult combat without a result.

Undoubtedly a both life-saving and ultimately cost-effective principle which will nonetheless have to be examined in each case. Weinberger's above mentioned rules also include the following injunction: "The commitment of forces to combat overseas must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary." It is an endorsement of strategic flexibility which applies also to the operational level. And for that purpose, different approaches will have to be chosen, depending on the circumstances. This can be done. The Israeli army, for instance, has the axiom: "The best way to limit bloodshed is the shortest way to the enemy position." The pertinence of this view can hardly be denied in the case of a conflict with an opponent who is inferior in combat skills and capabilities.

However, back to the lessons from Vietnam: They were drawn very rigorously regarding the media. War correspondents were no longer free to choose a unit and to accompany it during combat as in Indochina. Some of the military briefings at the Pentagon, at Ryadh and Dharan were directly transmitted via TV, probably in order to preclude the collective formation of legends which had flourished in the 1960s on the terrace of the Continental Hotel in Saigon, with partly disastrous

consequences. Only selected journalists who had been checked for their physical fitness, the so-called "pool journalists" were taken along to the troops. Combat and horror scenes were to be avoided. For the first time, a "clinical war" by means of "surgical strikes" had become technically feasible. It was most welcome, also for psychological reasons, to preserve its image.

Like "air superiority", a sort of "media superiority", which was necessary for deceiving the enemy and for the morale in the USA, was aimed at from the beginning and achieved to a large extent.

The strategy of well-controlled information proved successful beyond the campaign. This allowed the opponent to score some successes by showing time and again the few hits in residential areas and the outbursts of anger of civilians - which had been well practised for Western TV cameras. Typically enough, he rounded off the picture by some destruction of his own. Due to the lack of instant information, even the peace movement was able to launch arbitrary speculations about hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties. The news was eagerly passed on by the media which was angry about the way it was treated. However, the war was too short for these attempts to become really effective. Whatever loss figures or severe shortcomings that might become public in the future, neither would affect the course of the war nor its public perception. The Gulf War went down in history as a brilliant and short campaign that spared human lives.

Whether this was an inadmissible manipulation or an expedient handling of information that was justifiable from a security point of view, is a question that will not be answered here. In any case, the media felt outmanoeuvred. With a few exceptions, they were no longer primadonnas. Their assertion that facts were adulterated this way to the detriment of truth, which was true, implied on the other hand that the media spread the truth in a war which is, as clearly, untrue. Last but not least, the Vietnam war provided the proof that only the most horrible aspects constitute the "truth of war", regardless of how exceptional it is. It is to be hoped that the - inexcusable - My Lai incident which inspired the media and the film makers and thus falsified the image of US behaviour in Vietnam in the perception of entire generations, will be the subject of a thorough investigation and assessment one day.

However, the consistently restrictive information policy of the coalition forces only partly explains the media problem in the Gulf War. The fact that a high-tech war is not well suited for following people to the battle scene and observing their reactions, was not taken into account. On the other hand, that information policy failed to stress that such a war makes it possible to minimise losses. Thanks to modern weapons technology, a fatal trend has been halted: In most of the conflicts

))

since World War Two, the number of civilian casualties was superior to the number of soldiers killed. This will no longer be the rule for operations to counter violations of international law, the most likely form of conflict to be anticipated for the future. The return to barbarity in Chechnya in 1994/95 will hopefully remain an exception.

Last, but not least, the live reports from the hotspots of the Gulf War, from Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Saudi-Arabia and Washington, also have to be mentioned in this context. They were convincing, both from a technical and in most cases also from the information point of view. They were by no means helpful for the opponent only, but the coalition forces also benefitted from CNN, HSKY and Super Channel. The weapons effect in the target area of the Iraqi capital or of SCUD attacks in Israel could thus be directly evaluated. Both at the Pentagon and at general Schwarzkopf's headquarters, these channels were watched around the clock. The increasingly dense network for the transmission of information via satellite from any point of the globe, is a factor that has to be taken into account for future wars.

**Desert Shield - Desert Storm - Provide Comfort**

In summary: The Vietnam experience impacted on the 1991 Gulf War in practically all classical military areas, i.e. in strategic, operational, tactical and technical terms. In all areas, the Americans were keen to avoid the mistakes they had made in Indochina. They were helped in their effort by the "desert theatre of war". It extended over a larger area than in Vietnam and the geographical and tectonic characteristics of the terrain enabled an operational manoeuvre warfare as it had been prepared for in view of a possible confrontation with the former Soviet Union in Europe.

In addition, an excellent orchestration of operations from shore bases and six carrier battle groups in the adjacent seas enabled an optimum employment of the air force. The largest ever air offensive so far eliminated in thousands of sorties the opponent's command and control system, his air combat systems - to the extent they were employed - his military potential and, drawing closer and closer to the battlefield properly speaking, the KTO - the operational reserves of the guards and finally the tactical intervention forces. The ground operation was thus not only prepared to a large extent, but practically decided in advance.

The successes which were achieved at the home front as well proved as durable as the difficult coalition. Although international public opinion was divided,

people were impressed by the convincing military performance. For once, the forces which were hostile to the US came off as losers. Hardly ever before had the US had such a shining image as the victorious nation. Who would have dared to counter the aggressor if not the USA and who else would have been capable of such a victory? The only partially comparable achievement, the reconquering of the Falkland Islands by the British, was on a much smaller scale despite the tremendous distance between the battlefield and the home country. As defense secretary Cheney had rightly put it: "The US-led forces dominated all areas of warfare with a brilliantly orchestrated campaign."

However, the analysis of this war must not be concluded without stressing even more emphatically its nature as a turning point in military history. Its successful conduct was the anachronistic application of classical military principles of the past, whereas the strategic framework and the high technology used were already clear signs of a new era. It can also be discerned from the triad: defensive, offensive and rescue. By the time the coalition was powerful enough, Operation Desert Storm logically replaced Desert Shield. And when the military success proved incomplete, Operation Provide Comfort had to be launched for the rescue of the Kurds who had fled by the thousands to the mountainous area in northern Iraq and across the Turkish and the Iranian borders because they feared, for good reason, Saddam Hussein's revenge. The Shiite refugees in the initially occupied areas of Iraq also had to be helped with a great effort in terms of human and material resources.

Significantly enough, the first two operations had been meticulously planned, and their smooth execution was possible due to the available military apparatus, thorough training and constantly improved equipment, whereas Operation Provide Comfort had to be largely improvised. It had not been planned, but it was the consequence of political-strategic miscalculations by the US and of operational mistakes at the end of the Gulf War. When Saddam Hussein, contrary to expectations, was not defeated by the rebels in the north and south of his country, but crushed the Kurdish and Shiite resistance in his habitual ruthless manner with the remainder of his troops, there was a worldwide uproar of public opinion: something had to be done. During a phase of contradictory policy in the wake of the battle for Kuwait, President Bush had initially renounced another military intervention in the Iraqi "civil war". On 13 April 1991, he declared that, in the absence of a UN mandate, he was not prepared to risk the life of one single US soldier in a conflict that had already lasted for decades. He obviously wanted to repatriate US troops, if only for domestic reasons, and he did not want to become entangled in a Lebanon-like adventure, a sort of neo-colonial police operation.





security and trained a Kurdish militia for the same purpose. (See Weiss and Campbell, op.cit, p.456).

The motivation of the troops involved was excellent: Being able to help instead of having to kill and destroy, lent them special strength. The (surviving) Kurds had been saved, at least temporarily. What was less positive was the fact that the Shi-ites in the south of Iraq, who had been treated at least as cruelly as the Kurds, had not been succoured in the same way. As their plight was not shown in daily TV images, they were more easily forgotten. A fact which lends bitter topicality to the project of the International Red Cross to send its own TV reports from all disaster areas. The Americans have to be given credit for the fact that they tried to protect the population of those parts of Iraq which they had occupied, even after their withdrawal. Parts of the population were evacuated, others were entrusted to UN troops which quickly moved in as the Americans pulled out. Only a short time later, another Operation Provide Comfort II, of an entirely different nature, had been launched. The provision of combat units in Turkey which would be available for punitive actions in case Saddam Hussein continued to circumvent UN resolutions or if he used force against his minorities again, served not an exclusively, but indirectly also a humanitarian purpose. The concept of a subsequent limitation of damage revealed quite obviously the dilemma of strategic operations for the establishment of law and order, which is a dilemma between an open intervention and diplomatic pressure, between supra-national stabilisation efforts and claims of national sovereignty which have hardly been affected so far. Once again, humanitarian issues were secondary.

A new world order is bound to remain wishful thinking as long dictatorial rules regardless of their brutality open violations of human rights, the bloody suppression of minorities and threats of neighbouring states will not be recognized as legitimate grounds of intervention by the international community and as long as neither the UN nor the big powers are prepared to risk bloodshed and the blame of "neocolonialism".

Isolated operations like Provide Comfort will not solve the problem. However, they alleviate the suffering - which might have been avoided in the first place. And they open our eyes for the need for future preventive actions on a large scale. The joint Franco-German planning of the coordination of humanitarian air transports with integrated operational commands and organisational preparations at certain air fields in July 1991 is an encouraging sign. This is also reflected by the triple mission of the Franco-German-Belgian-Spanish Eurocorps: defence, securing peace and disaster relief.



## Chapter 3

# Military Power After the Year 2000

*"The Gulf War brought about a change in the collective attitude towards peace. The indignation against war was increasingly eroded by the realisation that an aggressor had to be countered with force. The struggle for independence of the Slovenes and the Croats, the determination of Balts and Russians to risk a civil war for their liberation from the Soviet dictatorship have reinforced that trend. In the subconscious of collective conscience, war and the preparedness for war have regained some of the meaning they had lost already during the two world wars and in Vietnam, but altogether in view of a possible nuclear inferno."*

Prof. Karl Otto Hondrich, German sociologist

*"For the foreseeable future, two types of soldiers will thus coexist: While both share the primary goal of preserving peace, one will be legitimised to act by his people, the other one by the international community."*

R. Vogel, officer of the Austrian general staff.

As we look at the future, we assume - despite some dangerous developments in the east and in the south - that the new world order outlined by President Bush in 1990 in the form of a peaceful solution to conflicts and of solidarity against aggression, will remain the goal of a war- and crisis-ridden mankind beyond the year 2000. It will be based on the cooperation between the major powers which was initiated in 1987 and which will also have to be pursued willy-nilly by the Soviet successor states. The UN Security Council, possibly in a new composition, will continue to denounce violations of the UN Charter and to condemn peacebreakers. In serious cases, like in the 1991 Gulf War, it would not only impose sanctions, but also authorise a state or a group of states to use all necessary means, including force, in order to check the aggressor. By then, the Security Council might even dispose of a more efficient system for the early warning and management of crises.



unmatched contribution to stabilisation. They are the necessary conditions for a prompt and durable pacification.

Since neither states, nor peoples nor societies have the option of renouncing the use of force altogether as a cheap way out, it has become particularly urgent to redefine the power apparatus of states and to determine its future role. It should have become clear already from the preceding chapters that this cannot simply be a linear extrapolation, but that principles are as much at stake as practical skills. Here some additional important questions have to be raised. They relate to: the security concept, the responsibility of the military commander, the mission and the posture of the future soldier and his tasks from national self-defence to a supra-national protective function. In the last instance, the question will have to be answered whether the dual nature of the security apparatus, which can be used both defensively and offensively, for defence as well as for aggression, as a means of protection or as an instrument of threat, can be overcome in the future due to the armed forces' own positive conception of values.

### **Integration into Existential Preservation**

Security is one of man's most fundamental concerns. Initially, security meant the protection of small communities against hostile neighbouring tribes. Later, the state took charge of its citizens' security. Globally, the UN Security Council is now the guarantor of security. But given its previous failure to do so, each state has continued to pursue its own "security policy", either alone or jointly with other states.

Internal security is also a task of the state. The citizens want to be protected against all kinds of crimes. Legal security primarily means that people can rely on laws being binding for others as well.

Today there is a quest for security in all areas of life. Its conceptual inflation seems to be unlimited. And contradictions seem to be inevitable. In terms of nuclear power plants, security means that they have to be safe - and shut down if necessary - although the power supply should also be guaranteed. Job security is being jeopardised by demands for more and more security in social terms. Money deposits are expected to be secure - and to yield interest - whereas the necessary risk-taking part is left to the banks. National security is to be safeguarded while defence expenditures should be kept down to a minimum.

Even in the area of strategy, security has become a multi-faceted and partly contradictory term. In the past, every state had a "ministry of war". The attitude



experts of the Worldwatch Institute and of polemological research centres have taken the place of strategists who dealt with power-political issues.

They set new values and provided new behavioural patterns, and they achieved, at least in the Western world, a number of new consensus which were declared indispensable for mankind.

It was tempting - especially for politicians with their professional acumen for "winds of change" - to declare the former dangers as dead and to dramatise the new ones. Instead of "gigantic" military expenditures, public funds ought to be spent on countering the real existential threats and on eliminating the causes of violence and war. It was not easy to resist the temptation of requesting money for more popular issues than the military while showing one's own far-sightedness.

Last but not least, the expansion of the security concept was due to the insistence of critical peace and conflict researchers. They argued that the limitation to power-political trouble spots was too narrow, and that security had to encompass everything that could be perceived as threatening. This was a welcome opportunity to relegate all strategic-military matters - for long a thorn in their side - definitely to the second rank. Besides the end of the Cold War seemed to justify such a step. Why should one take security measures against a threat which actually no longer existed? Even the most alarming developments and relapses to old forms of conflict were dutifully played down, trouble spots were simply ignored.

But in some instances, the reasons were fathomed more deeply. The definition of security policy as defensive measures against all threats caused in a "hostile intention" by third parties, soon proved to be too narrow. For a system of "comprehensive defence" as opposed to a purely military defence, the indirect effects of crises, wars and warlike actions had to be included as well. Economic provisions could not just be provisions for blockades in the event of war. Supply shortages of a different nature also had to be taken into account. It was suggested to shift the emphasis from a "causal" to an "effects" approach. What really mattered was the effect, not who had caused it apart from being hardly identifiable in some instances. Besides, natural disasters may cause as much damage as large-scale bombardments.

Another aspect has been pointed out. The interdependence of modern industrial nations also requires an integration of strategic thinking. Industrial nations have become by and large more vulnerable and they are incapable of coping by themselves with a number of new existential threats. The radioactive fallout from Chernobyl, to use the most common example, was not stopped by national borders.







))))))

environmentally compatible during times of peace. The legacy of the Soviet troops which were stationed in East-Central Europe until the early 1990s is a drastic example of the consequences if these aspects are neglected. However, it is not yet generally understood that an important limit is reached at the encounter of two opposing protection requirements and that priorities have to be set because the risks which loom beyond that limit go beyond ecological damages in terms of quality and effects.

On the one hand it is prudent that governments stick to their traditional and narrower security concept which relates primarily to power-political and military threats. If it were freely expanded to include all existential threats, such as social, economic and demographic risks and hazards due to nature or civilisation, a modern Sparta or a "virtue terror" à la Robespierre would be inevitable. Moreover it would be counter-productive to discharge those authorities of their responsibilities which have been specialising in such problems for a long time.

On the other hand, it is far-sighted and mandatory to integrate traditional security policy as part of politics in an overall policy of preserving existence. Dangers and risks which jeopardise the survival of the people and of the state have to be continuously assessed in their complexity and interdependence. And as the means and methods which are currently available are as yet insufficient, a wholistic approach is necessary, with the introduction of corresponding parameters in the strategic decision-making process. It is for the experts to show the interrelation, but it is up to the governments and parliaments to determine priorities and to allocate funds.

### **"Greater Responsibility" of Military Leaders**

However, this is not only the politicians' responsibility, but it is shared to a considerable extent by the top brass of the military. They also have to take into account the described interdependence. They have to recognize the overall framework of securing existence - not only the ecological one - and they have to include it in the peripheral military conditions, in war as well as in peace, to the extent this is feasible on account of the information available, or required in compliance with national or international rules. For a "Grand Strategy" in view of long-term strategic goals, at least three aspects have to be continuously assessed: First, the positive and negative spiritual and material consequences of military training for the people, the society and the environment; second the possibilities and the effects of the use of environmental weapons by a potential adversary, and

))

third the prevention of possible environmental damages by taking them specifically into account in one's own combat planning.

The first problem has been known for a long time and may be considered as settled - although the positive consequences of a military education and of a soldierly attitude tend to be overlooked, whereas the second and the third aspects have to be examined more closely and more extensively. It is advocated that the responsibility of the armed forces has to extend to a new area which may considerably impede the classical tactics which would be optimal from a military-technical point of view. At least in densely populated areas with a high degree of industrialisation, but also in ecological risk zones, new and more flexible methods of deployment and of combat have to be provided for. Factors that have been taken into account for a long time in the officers' training of armies which would defend from their own territory - i.e. the need to spare the civilian population and the neutralisation of sources of dangers due to civilisation, i.e. the shutdown of nuclear power plants, the draining of water reservoirs, the evacuation of dangerous goods from risk areas etc. will also have to be analysed with particular care in the future for the assessment of the situation in the adversary's country.

However, modern methods of preserving existence go far beyond this military-technical level. The change in thinking has to be reflected by a re-orientation to include new values and behavioural patterns. Generals and all higher commanders will have to realise that not only operational doctrines and weapons are changing, but also the posture and the role of the soldier. Although traditional elements may continue to have a decisive influence, the underlying business principles of the military have changed and so have the nature, the identity and the functions of the armed forces. The extent to which this change is opportunistically and passively assumed or actively influenced, will be a yardstick for future military leaders. This will be necessary in order to preclude excesses, or even the spread of defeatism. The fulfillment of the military mission is a clear priority. The question is not whether, but "how" it ought to be fulfilled.

An international comparative study would be necessary to find out to what extent this extra responsibility is already accepted and promoted at military academies. However, it may be assumed that it has been basically acknowledged and taken into account in some courses. At least one example is known which points in the direction outlined above. It relates to an area which has been part of the soldier's spiritual and moral luggage for a long time: the courses organised by the International Red Cross at San Remo for the commanders of armed forces from all over the world. The subject matter taught is the operational application of The Hague Covenant on ground war and of the Geneva Protocols. The exercises are



the capability to defeat the adversary if necessary with all the means that have been made available to him and to force the enemy to comply with his will.

Before this question can be answered, another example from the history of war and warfare is revealing. The dilemma between having or wanting to kill and of restoring peace by means of force, has never been overcome, but some progress in terms of restraining excesses is unmistakable. Whenever the fury of war was beyond control, there were efforts to contain it.

Whether war started as a sports competition or as a man hunt, can remain unanswered in our context. However, it is highly interesting that "war as a game" (Huizinga) has always been a significant element which can be discerned up to the present day in the biggest and bloodiest confrontations. What is exemplary in this respect, is the attitude of the officers of the monarchies of the 18th and 19th centuries. They changed sides upon their king's order, without hatred or animosity against their comrades. The respect of rules and chivalry in combat was not an exception in those days.

The "metaphysics of the soldier" outlined by Werner Picht (*Vom Wesen des Krieges*, Stuttgart 1952) - which will not be entered upon in greater detail here - culminates in the statement that the soldier's ultimate destination is sacrifice, i.e. the readiness to die for a cause deemed more important than his own survival. In that sacrifice, the soldier's destination coincides with the ultimate destination of man. However, Picht is also aware of the fact that there can never be an utterly clear separation between "warrior" and "soldier". "Wherever weapons are taken up, the layer in which the warriorlike essence of man has survived over the millennia is touched upon, independently from all changes in the appearance of the combatant. This addresses the ultimate difference between warrior and soldier: The soldier is a product of history, i.e. a product of his time. The warrior does not always embody the historically effective form of the combatant; but he represents an archetype which is not contingent on history. He may be metamorphosed, but he will endure." (op.cit., p. 224).

Good news and bad news at the same time, one is tempted to say. If Picht's reasoning is assumed to reflect the truth, the soldier of the 20th century will be able to change to meet the requirement arising at the turn of the millennium for a soldier as an element of law and order without foregoing those combative instincts which he needs to be able to fulfill his task. On the other hand, it must not be overlooked that the timeless warrior always needs to be checked and disciplined. The knowledge when and how a weapon is to be used or not to be used, the rule of the adequacy of the means employed in a violent confrontation, and the conviction that the final goal cannot be a tactical victory, but strategic



))

Discreetly "victorious", the Western armed forces are also confronted with the question of the sense of continued military efforts. "No more war" is not just the postulate of pacifists. Until recently, it was the credo of all West European nations and hence to a large extent also of their soldiers. With the end of the Cold War, the protective function of the soldier clearly seemed to decline. This was reflected in some instances by a slackening of the acceptance of national defence and of sacrifices. In late 1989, for example, about one third of the traditionally militant Swiss people believed they could do without their army and voted for its abolition.

Since then, a series of events have triggered certain counter-currents. The utter insouciance is curbed by a number of warnings that have flared up - in the bloody confrontations with minorities in the former Soviet Union, the August 1991 coup which showed that the old "tank philosophy" still prevails, and the slaughter in the former Yugoslavia. Polls have shown that the necessity of armed forces is again increasingly endorsed, and the soldier himself has gained assurance. The need of a protective function against any kind of violence has become obvious and is largely accepted.

This revalorisation is not limited to the national armed forces. It also applies to troops in the framework of alliances, to intervention forces as in the Gulf and, last but not least, to the blue helmets of the United Nations. The havoc which can be wrought by military power in the hands of despots in the absence of a counterforce or its impotence has been demonstrated clearly enough and has again entered the collective awareness.

It has become just as clear that aid operations on a large scale are not possible without the participation of soldiers and their equipment. Whether a disaster was caused by power-political and military events, by human-technical factors or by nature, the masses of refugees, the starving and the wounded need medical help, food, a minimum of vital supplies and in extreme cases they need to be protected from violence. Civilian aid organisations (non-governmental organisations) will never measure up to that task or be condemned to idleness in combat areas.

The argument that this is by no means new is beside the point. It is true that all modern armies have assisted in one way or another civilian populations in need. They helped to harvest crops which otherwise would have been left rotting in the fields, they constructed dams against floods and they distributed food to the hungry, especially in the Third World. The US units in Vietnam invested hundreds of thousands of man days in aid programmes for the inhabitants of their operational areas. And Red Army personnel risked their lives on board of helicopters when they provisionally sealed off the blazing reactor of Chernobyl by dropping cement on it. This is pertinent, nonetheless these situations were





and countering any use of force from any quarters, who will punish peacebreakers and restore peace, but who can intervene with the same efficiency in order to help and rescue when it is needed. A soldier who will be increasingly involved in preventive peacekeeping measures and in missions of conflict settlement. This new soldier will gradually take the place of the old concept of a heroic warrior and sole protector of the home country, but also of the noncommittal "homo faber" of combat.

Those who still consider the armed forces only as a weapon against a lurching enemy and question their *raison d'être* as the enemy image is fading, are nostalgic for something that has become superseded. Due to his multifunctionality, the guardian soldier, together with his comrades from other armed forces, can make a contribution to stability, confidence-building and protection which is of utmost significance in view of a future fraught with uncertainty and change.

However, what will happen if the "protecting soldier" is confronted with a combatant whose motive is hatred kindled by reckless leaders, a combatant who does not feel committed by international law nor by a soldier's ethics, but whose only loyalty is to his chief and the camaraderie within his troop? What will happen if one side aims at a cease-fire as soon as possible and at ultimately peaceful solutions which are acceptable to all parties, whereas claims for power, the defence of historical privileges, "ethnic cleansing", the change of frontiers, or in short, gain and the maltreatment of others are the driving forces on the other side of the front? In other terms, can a "cultivation" of war be justified if the opponent will not shun any war crime for achieving his goals? Is there any other solution than a return to retribution with counter-terror, a renunciation of all peace and humanitarian efforts and ultimately a retreat which will amount to a defeat or - even worse - to resignation?

Recent examples illustrating this dilemma are to be found in nearly all parts of the globe. The 1993 "humanitarian intervention" of the USA in Somalia was particularly telling. Launched as an undertaking to save virtually hundreds of thousands of people from starvation - once again as a result of moving TV reports, the operation degenerated into a small war against local "warlords" who could not be countered with the classical military means. The local faction leaders made the Americans leave, revealing at the same time the intrinsic problems of humanitarian operations when helpers are helpless in zones of great threat and would in turn need protection themselves, but are in the long run more efficient with a more lasting effect than armed humanitarian personnel. A clear defeat for the "guardian soldier"?



"Today's first major challenge is command and coordination. In today's dangerous settings, member states and regional organisations have been cautious about placing their forces solely under UN command. But unity of command is essential. Nothing can lower the risk in the field like working together - and nothing can increase it like the failure to do so. For a UN operation to proceed safely and effectively, it must coherently orchestrate civil, humanitarian and political efforts, under the protection of a unified military force.

The second challenge is simultaneously fielding successful multiple operations by multiple actors. In Bosnia, the Security Council has mandated peacemaking, which means negotiation, as well as peacekeeping. Too often in the past three years, there has been little peace, but these concepts can work effectively at the same time. If, however, peace enforcement were added to the mix, the other efforts would be undercut and the entire mission endangered. Realistically, no operation can use force in one part of the theatre of conflict while serving as a neutral mission and impartial partner to agreements in another.

This quotation addresses a number of - hard-won - experiences. First, that the will and unity, in particular of the members of the UN Security Council, are decisive for the potential success or failure of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations. Second, that a development of the kind which has taken place in former Yugoslavia in summer 1995, i.e. the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and then back to peacekeeping, is indeed arduous to cope with. The precedent of creating a rapid reaction force for the protection of blue helmets and of employing it along with NATO forces for punitive actions against one warring party, turned out to be a necessary albeit highly risky undertaking in view of a permanent peace settlement in Bosnia. As this book went to press, the outcome was as yet open. However, what can be deduced indirectly and also from the above quotation is that such interventions will be indispensable for ethical and security reasons. The community of nations has to improve its performance in managing new and challenging crises. It cannot simply close its eyes to aggression, terror, ethnic cleansing and large-scale suffering. Hence the necessity of the "guardian soldier"! Although he has suffered severe setbacks, he has also scored numerous successes and he will undoubtedly improve the way he handles his tasks in the future.

**National Self-Defence and  
Supranational Peace Preservation**



step to overall defensive structures. The so-called "structural non-offensiveness", a favourite term of the critics of the official NATO doctrine of the 1980s, seems to be a security-political "egg of Columbus", however, unfortunately it also involves the risk of not only making offensives impossible, but effective defence as well. This sobering conclusion soon had to be admitted even by the former Soviet army which had quickly adopted this doctrinal change for propaganda reasons.

The fewer soldiers an army possesses and the larger the territory it has to protect, the more mobile and combat capable in terms of firepower it has to be, or, to put it simply, the more flexible it has to be in all areas. How else but with (counter-) offensives can an aggressor be expelled from one's own territory? From the command and control principles down to the training of offensive tactics in the smallest units, everything has to be prepared accordingly. That the defensive cannot be ensured with firepower alone - regardless of all the theories and the quantitative and qualitative progress in armament - is meanwhile common knowledge. The alternative is a mobile conduct of operations which combines firepower and mobility and is suitable for both the offensive and the defensive. Hence a fixation on the defensive for all military tasks is pure theory. Defence does not have to be defensive, but effective and the latter also presupposes offensive qualities.

Of course, there are armies, especially those of neutral and non-aligned small countries which have found an easy way out of this seeming contradiction. Their doctrine is "strategic defensive". It is credible despite the capability of their armed forces to offensively counter an aggressor who has invaded their country because the army structure, the command and control training, the armament and above all the small-scale logistics are all verifiably tailored to a combat on one's own territory.

National states will be confronted with questions of that type well into the new millennium. With the continuing reduction of military potentials, they will become all in all less acute, but not irrelevant. Even if arms reductions are carried out proportionally, the dilemma of disarmament efforts will not have been overcome: How can one make states forego their offensiveness without depriving them of their defensive capabilities? And is not the gist of the problem the necessary ambivalence of armed forces during a period of transition of which we can neither calculate the course nor the end?

The second issue, i.e. the question to what extent national defence can be ensured by an individual state alone, is related - although not exclusively - to the above mentioned offensive/defensive dilemma because of the continued existence





))))))))))

militarily important key positions for the rapid-reaction forces. They also liaise with the civilian defence and rescue services by ensuring a close coordination with a flexible order of priorities.

The next level above this military logistical infrastructure is the one of tactical-operational *rapid-reaction forces*. With their combat capability, which is derived from high mobility together with firepower and the necessary aerial and naval support, they can secure the operational area, and counter incursions by counter-operations. Whether such rapid reaction units also have to be under national command, as is considered necessary by the majority of states at present, or whether they can come under a supranational command is secondary and depends on the development or stagnation of a credible international stabilisation. What matters is the availability behind or above the necessarily mainly static territorial forces of a first echelon of highly mobile and combat-capable intervention forces.

The third category is comprised of *operational troops*. These are either uniform units from one country, which may for instance be requested by the UN, or mixed units under a supranational command. They form the military spearheads of the alliances or the cooperative security organisations and the especially demanding special branches of air support, air defence, the navy (without the coastal defence as such) and of long-haul air and sea transports.

The "peacekeeping forces" (blue helmets) of the UN properly speaking, are a special category. Although in principle rapid-reaction forces, they constitute a special sub-category because of their exclusively humanitarian mission, their specific organisation and light armament. Although their battalions are mainly formed by soldiers from one nation, they could also be multinational in the future.

This armed forces structure coincides largely with the current NATO armed forces structures. But there is a fundamental difference: in case a supranational cooperative security order materializes, it will also comprise armed forces of non-member nations. In addition - and that is what is new and desirable in its essence - the armed forces of such a system can be adapted, in their nature, their equipment and organisational details to those modern protective functions and additional tasks which are indispensable for a more secure world.

Even with our eyes fixed on a distant horizon, we must not lose firm ground underneath our feet. And no realistic outlook on the next century can ignore the test case of the Yugoslav civil war in the 1990s. Why have neither the EC/EU nor the CSCE/OSCE nor the UN been able to stop that senseless and barbarian bloodshed within reasonable time? Why was it not possible to credibly signal to the parties that there would be a military intervention (i.e. by naval and air force units) in order to separate the combatants? The answer may be that the system



))

described above was not yet operational, that there was neither a sufficient political consensus nor a proven crisis mechanism and that the old principle of international law which rules out interference with internal matters of states was as yet too dominant. In the face of such intrinsically hostile parties, peacekeeping procedures had to fail, and despite some attempts, peace enforcement was not yet ready.

In concluding this vision of military power after the year 2000, it has to be stated emphatically that such power can only be organised, equipped, trained and employed in keeping with its tasks if one succeeds in convincing governments and their electorates that the right question is neither "Blood for Oil?" nor "Die for Sarajevo?" The right questions to be asked by the civilised people of tomorrow - beyond self-defence and the safeguard of vital national interests - should be: Do we wish to ensure in the 21st century, with coordinated action and the use of all available and if necessary also military means that aggression and open violence will pay less and less? Do we commit ourselves that the perpetrator of such violence has no chance, neither internally nor internationally to remain successful and escape unscathed? Are we prepared to make the necessary sacrifices and to accept among our (voluntary) intervention forces those casualties which will be inevitable when all non-violent efforts to restore peace have remained without avail?

However, once people consent to all this, they have to be able to assume that their armed forces are capable of mastering the resulting dual function - i.e. national self-defence plus supranational peace securing - with all the necessary responsibility, both intellectually and materially.

## Chapter 4

### Seven Theses on the Use of Future Armed Forces

*"Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine it is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst."*

*Carl von Clausewitz, On War.*

*"21st-century peace policy can no longer be implemented according to the superseded principles and with the brutal instruments of imperialist and nationalist politics of power."*

*N.N.*

The previous findings will be summed up in a number of theses which will form a sort of interim balance. These axiomatic statements are intended to convey what the author has in mind when he refers to the most radical turning point in military history since the nuclear dimension was introduced into strategy. This fundamental change affects not only the moral basis of the soldier's mission, but also his operational doctrine, his training and equipment.

The introductory warning by Clausewitz is quoted to show that the author is perfectly aware of the risks inherent in his postulates. The reason why he advances them all the same is quite simple: It is utterly inconceivable to him that the emerging peace policy of the 21st century can be implemented by instruments which were shaped by the military thinking of the past. Such instruments have to be fundamentally renewed and they have to be in keeping with the overall development of mankind towards "open communication, economic co-operation, the rediscovery of a cultural commonality, friendly mutual criticism and co-operation in tackling the problems of the world" (Weizsäcker). Otherwise they will constantly forestall this development.

Any simplification of complex subject matters is dangerous. Some readers may not be willing to follow the logical structure of this book. Perhaps intrigued by the

wording of the theses and the related comments, they may want to find out what speaks against them and what contradictions the arguments may harbour. Counter-arguments can be developed more easily this way.

This risk is taken for the sake of the clarity of the message. Besides, it provides a chance for spurring an in-depth discussion. The following theses will characterise the strategic-military turning point, which we are witnessing and which is exemplified by single elements of increasing impressiveness. The goal is to analyse why a change is necessary and what needs to be done, according to the author, to depart from the previous military thinking which was mainly based on power and on victory and to take into account, at least in the democratic West, the new strategic requirements and facts.

All the following theses relating to armed forces are derived from one **basic assumption**:

**Governments must be able to depend on armed forces as a flexible tool which is committed, even in war, not only to short-term military success, but to the strategy of a long-term political concept.**

*Reasoning:* With the end of the superpower confrontation as a result of the implosion of the Soviet empire, with the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the unification of Germany within the framework of a changing NATO and the recreation of sovereign states in east-central Europe, politics and strategy have entered, for the second time in this century, an entirely new state of aggregation.

This new state affects Europe, but it also has global consequences. It is characterised by the fact that the West does not short-sightedly exploit its windfall victory, but uses a whole panoply of diplomatic, economic and military instruments to ward off a relapse into confrontation. The aim is to achieve a durable, long-term stability in all parts of the globe. The "balance of terror" is to be replaced by the system of a new world order which is essentially characterised by Western values like humanity, democracy, constitutionality and the market economy.

The military machinery of the "Cold War" will therefore be gradually dismantled. The remaining armed forces are no longer instruments for pursuing power policy with other means, like in the 19th and in the ending 20th centuries, but they have become the guarantors of a foreign policy primarily aimed at stability and peacemaking, which is pursued by states, alliances and the UN. They assume by and large the protection of existing borders and defence against any kind of use of force. Their mission is essentially to keep, enforce and promote

))

peace and to safeguard the geostrategic changes and the transition from the era of confrontation and of strategic bipolarity to a more co-operative multipolar world. They are no longer solely an instrument for countering enemy power, but increasingly an instrument for building and cementing a new era of inter-state relations.

This calls for a paradigmatic change in strategic thinking. Although it has already started to a certain extent, it will have to become more encompassing. Even if all peaceful means of dispute settlement have failed, the "case" must not simply be relegated to the military while politicians wait for the outcome. They must not content themselves with setting political targets and sitting back. They have to make sure and if necessary impose that the military mission is carried out according to principles and rules which are not simply in line with the so-called "logics of war". They also have to enable the achievement of an ultimate political goal. Warfare, albeit successful, that obstructs access to an enduring peace is not worth the effort.

This is best illustrated by an example: If a surgeon has to remove a tumour he cannot neglect the body that has to survive. He cannot pursue a logic that is purely surgical, but one that will enable, if possible, the patient's survival.

Analogous thinking and action in the military field would result in what is reflected by the following seven theses which are at first listed for an overview:

*Thesis 1:* Armed forces must be able to assume the functions of war prevention, intervention and defence; their deterrent and combat functions will become secondary.

*Thesis 2:* Military victory increasingly becomes a tactical goal. The strategic goal is the creation of favourable conditions for new, more comprehensive and sustainable peace settlements that involve the former adversary.

*Thesis 3:* The ultimate goal of future military doctrine is neither "annihilation" nor "attrition"; it is the "elimination of the enemy's resistance", it may be "punishment", "undermining of the enemy's combat morale", "neutralisation" or "disarming" of the opposing armed forces, but eventually "reconciliation".

*Thesis 4:* Every combat plan (therefore) has to be commensurate, i.e. it must endeavour, among other things, to minimise losses, not only one's own, but also those of the adversary.





use of force, adapted to the circumstances which have to be determined on a case-by-case basis or, to put it differently, by a commensurate use of force.

In the long run, today's enemies will be linked by common interests tomorrow. It is perhaps the most noble task of modern military leaders not to obstruct or delay this process while they are still engaged in an ongoing open conflict.

**Thesis 3: The ultimate goal of future military doctrine is neither "annihilation" nor "attrition"; it is the "elimination of the enemy's resistance", it may be "punishment", "undermining of the enemy's combat morale", "neutralisation" or "disarming" of the opposing armed forces, but eventually "reconciliation".**

*Reasoning:* The endorsement of Thesis 2 implies accepting the necessity that military thinking has to change fundamentally. This will only succeed if the tactical and operational training of future generals and admirals includes the whole range of responsibilities of the higher-ranking military leader. He will have to be taught how to enforce, with the necessary resolve dictated by the circumstances, the combat success and the successful conclusion of an operation, by using the whole panoply of basic military principles. However, he will keep in mind the long-term strategic goal which goes beyond the end of the war and has to be developed together with the political leadership. Equally, all non-military means for achieving that goal will have to be examined before engaging in any military action. Therefore his campaign planning cannot concentrate on such simple alternatives as whether the destruction or the attrition of the enemy would be preferable in a given case.

If a lasting peace, i.e. reconciliation, is what is ultimately at stake, other purposes of military operations come to the fore. They will increasingly turn into "punitive actions" which are taken when all diplomatic and economic means have been exhausted without bringing the troublemaker to reason. Therefore a direct strike should be targeted primarily against the enemy's centre of power in order to bring about a change in policy, or otherwise eliminate the latter. If that fails, the next question should be how the enemy forces can be neutralised in the shortest time and with the least effort. The subversion of the enemy's combat morale, the outmanoeuvring, disarming and neutralising of the opposing forces will have priority over their physical elimination.

It may be necessary to defeat the enemy, but not beyond the point of psychological breakdown. The insistence on "unconditional surrender" has pushed more than one army into dogged resistance. It has to be made clear that the





Communists) prevailed. Both approaches have been successful during the course of the history of war.

It should rather be formally stated that modern conflicts can be decided, more than ever, by a variety of means of pressure and by a whole range of instruments without reviving the anachronism of "annihilation". Military strategy has been traditionally defined as the art of using military power for achieving political goals (Liddell Hart, Raymond Aron). The modern definition can be much more comprehensive.

According to General Beaufre, it is essentially the art of the dialectics of wills to resort to power for the resolution of conflicts. "The goal of strategy may therefore be described as the optimum use of the available means for reaching the goals fixed by politics." Also: "Within the framework of this dialectics of wills, decisions become a psychological reaction which one wants to rouse in the enemy: He is to be convinced of the futility of initiating or continuing the combat."

However, if the tasks set due to a new awareness are no longer a military interim target, but from the very beginning the ultimate goal of stabilisation, pacification and finally of reconciliation, the military strategy will no longer be entirely free in choosing its instruments. It must not confine itself to an application of the contemporary rules of the art of war, not even the respect of the current international humanitarian law and the Geneva Protocols. Neither can it simply resort to the Asian school of indirect, particularly resourceful, but also casualty-minimising methods of warfare. What is at stake is primarily the upgrading and extension of the loss-minimising principle. It has priority with one's own population and ranks second with one's own armed forces. It ranks third, without being secondary, with the enemy's population as it is extremely important for the acceptance of the consequences of war, and, as far as this can still be considered a priority, with the enemy's armed forces.

As hatred and hostile feelings between former "arch enemies" in Europe are gradually being overcome, although the mutual wounds are difficult and slow to heal, the conclusion for future military thinking obviously is: The best and most successful long-term combat plan is the one which will minimise the casualties and the long-term damage on both sides. Combat procedures in line with this concept have to be worked out with the same amount of imagination and precision as the former classical plans of offence and defence.

Of course, the armed forces cannot make up for the shortcomings and misunderstandings of the overall strategy. But it will be part of their future responsibilities to consider and recommend to the competent national leadership measures which ensure success without massacres, without terror attacks and

))

without the total annihilation of the opposing troops. The models are neither Cannae nor Verdun, but rather a "blitzkrieg" which outmanoeuvres the enemy by means of bold leadership and quick strikes against crucial targets.

Does this mean that the military thinking of generations of soldiers is being questioned? Even here, changes have started a long time ago. For some armies, the aspect of loss minimisation has become such a natural parameter of the combat plan that the order "without regard to losses" has to be expressly given when the stake is extraordinary and must be gained under any circumstances. For the target planning of air strikes - viz. by the American side (in contrast to World War II) in Vietnam and even more clearly in the Gulf - it has become increasingly important to spare the civilian population. Now this principle can be extended as a final, but important element of operational planning also to the opposing troops.

Enemy propaganda which tends to immediately exaggerate every miss and all collateral damages, will have to be disregarded. There will be a continued need for military destruction which cannot be achieved by "surgical strikes" and there will be inevitable losses among the civilian population. Nor will it be easy to decide in the heat of combat action for how long concentrations of fire have to be maintained for breaking the enemy's resistance and when the "overkill" threshold is reached. However, sooner or later it will be possible to disclose and verify the final result. Sooner or later the former adversary will be grateful for the victor's lifesaving style of warfare.

This is not "just" a matter of emotions. For instance, it may be assumed that the Israelis benefited during the subsequent peace negotiations from the fact that the second Egyptian army which was encircled at the Suez Canal during the Yom Kippur war was spared although it had not been planned initially. The fact that Hitler's expectations were not fulfilled when he let the British expeditionary corps escape across the Channel, probably for similar reasons, is not a proof to the contrary, but due to the fact that he was a dictator who had to be eliminated. He did not deserve to be given credit for his gestures even though they were for once positive.

It would clearly be an exaggeration to pretend that war is gradually becoming more "humane" - war can never be humane, but its cruelty can be increasingly curtailed. What must not be forgotten is the fact that the problem is not only a human, but also a technical one. Having to spare an opponent with a weapon in his hand in a face-to-face encounter is not only unreasonable, but also extremely dangerous and therefore quite unacceptable to combatants. However, in modern warfare which is waged with highly technological means over greater distances, it is easier for the stronger side to show clemency. On the battlefield, the combat

))

morale of the opposing units has to be undermined with high concentrations of fire which will inevitably cause a great number of casualties, whereas precision-guided munitions can be directed primarily against the enemy's war machinery and his military installations. They cause fewer casualties, but thwart the enemy's hopes of victory. The growing certainty to be utterly defenseless can bring about a capitulation.

Indirect methods which have such effects, ought to be examined by all means - also in the external strategic environment. Even at the risk of overstressing analogies, the extreme case of the former East German People's Army ought to be mentioned here. It was utterly defeated without the firing of a single shot because the totalitarian system which it served had entirely collapsed under the political and economic pressure stemming from the comparison with its Western counterpart, and under the massive pressure of its own population.

**Thesis 5:** **In the future, the military must no longer think and act according to purely military categories. Even in details, the main goal of an extensive and sustainable (national and international) preservation of existence has to be taken into account.**

*Reasoning:* With the gradual decrease of power-politically motivated threats between industrialised nations, public attention has focused on what seems to be an incomparably greater liability: The dangers and risks which are not motivated by power policy, i.e. particularly pressing social, economic, demographic and ecological developments. There is also a fear of natural or of man-made disasters caused by civilisation.

Hence the general dispute between the partisans of hope and the proponents of prudence but also those who have global fears or those who want to ensure security, as in the past, by military alliances or even by the sole reliance on national armies. The "culture of fear" (*Kultur der Angst - Karl Kaiser*) which has been cultivated for decades in the West, and in particular in the German-speaking area, absurdly turns against the very defensive mechanism which has been put in place for the people's protection. Armed forces, it is argued, constitute a threat by their sheer existence, due to their insufficient social and environmental compatibility, their undemocratic structures and the numerous risks for the lives of its members. Theoretically, surrender is given preference to a combat for timeless values since the latter would undoubtedly cause casualties which one hopes to avoid by capitulation.

))

This "culture" goes far beyond the old slogan "rather red than dead". Security policy is no longer understood in the traditional sense of a survival strategy which is claimed to have become by and large obsolete, but as a concept for coping with all kinds of risks and dangers. According to this definition, the threat is what causes the greatest fear, i.e. the dying forests today, or an epidemic disease like AIDS tomorrow, the ozone depletion the day after tomorrow and perhaps a wave of refugees in a week from now.

While the "old school" of security politicians rightly warns that such an expansion of the security concept will cause a generalisation which will eventually lead to a militarisation of the whole life and even to a new type of totalitarianism, the "new school" warns just as rightly of the risk that a strict organisational separation and the former approach of splitting responsibilities does not take into account the growing interdependence of all risks. Especially in the field of security policy, it is argued, thinking has to be interrelated and comprehensive. Global or at least regional defence strategies are needed. An integrated warning system would be instrumental for detecting existential dangers early enough for effective counter-measures.

No matter how this dispute will be resolved in detail, it is undisputed that no country will be able to do without an overall assessment of all existential dangers in the future. Short of an overarching concept, security policy thus inevitably becomes an essential part of securing the existence of peoples and countries. The systems of total defence which are already in place can no longer concentrate exclusively on power-political dangers. Depending on their size and their means they have to partake in the effort of coping with all the other existential risks as well.

This applies also and in particular to the armed forces. Their restructuring in keeping with their manifold additional tasks becomes decisively important. The employment of the armed forces as the preponderant instrument of state power will be indispensable in every instance of the use of force. With the growing range of threats, an enlargement of the armed forces' field of action will be inevitable.

Even today, contributions to peacekeeping or to the preservation of existence are already officially or *de facto* part of the armed forces' missions. However, what can and must be done in the future in these two areas beyond the current initial level still remains to be defined. This requires both a thorough examination of historical precedents and an idea of future challenges and their consequences. Militarily trained precise thinking, from mission and situation analyses, and from the elaboration of a plan to the execution of different measures will certainly be conducive to the process.

))

**Thesis 6: Flexibility and multifunctionality (hence) are as important as firepower and battlefield mobility.**

*Reasoning:* In preparation for an expected confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact or, more generally, of a Third World War, military armament has been increasingly perfected, also in the conventional field. In all armed confrontations between roughly equivalent armies since World War II, quality has outrated quantity.

Formerly a slogan of ambitious armament engineers, the affirmation: "Whatever appears in the battlefield can be seen; whatever can be seen, can be hit and whatever can be hit can be destroyed", has largely become a reality today. An adversary without an equivalent technology has no chance to survive in combat unless he succeeds in subverting his opposing forces with guerilla tactics.

Not only the firepower and the sighting accuracy, but also the deployment and combat mobility of troops has increased dramatically. The technical progress in this area enables a renaissance of the operational element which, once again, overrides the purely defensive element. The 1991 Gulf War was an indication of what is feasible today in a skilful manoeuvre in terms of the interplay between firepower and mobility.

But here, too, one has to think beyond the purely military success. Armed forces have to be able not only to strike, but also to deploy in a dissuasive intention and to force back opposing forces, shield allies, secure positions, protect strategically important objects and industrial plants. They have to keep passages open and they must be generally prepared for any exceptional task. They now have to be able to co-operate in a co-ordinated way with all branches of the civilian defence and even with relief workers of NGOs.

This requires not only a maximum of flexibility, both of the command and of the troops, but also a multifunctionality which cannot simply be improvised, but for which one has to be trained and equipped. In a contingency, combat troops can carry out aid missions, but technical or logistics units would be better qualified. It would be even better to train in advance for such missions. Armed forces which will be equally well prepared for combat, protection, aid and rescue missions - apart from a certain degree of specialization which is indispensable - will be best suited to measure up to the variety of challenges which may arise. Even in the past, armed forces had to comply, for different non-military reasons, with various and costly regulations which were sometimes contrary to their combat missions. Therefore it should be possible in the future, in the light of clear requirements, to



))

with all kinds of civilian efforts, restraint in the exercise of power and the correlation with humanitarian logistics.

The terms "aid" and "rescue" are self-explanatory and need no further definition. One can rightly speak of an important complementary mission only if the armed forces are capable of providing "aid" and "rescue" to a sufficient degree because they are the only ones to dispose of the required number of personnel which is quickly available, rigorously organized, trained for this type of operation and equipped with heavy materiel. It will depend on the size of the otherwise available rescue services and how soon the armed forces will be asked to intervene, but no country is known not to have resorted to the armed forces in the event of crises or disasters. What has been indispensable as sporadic standby functions in extraordinary contingencies in the past, is gradually becoming part of the ordinary activities of the soldier and should be prepared for preventively.

How closely related protection, aid and rescue operations can be and how tightly they are interrelated was exemplified by the events in the wake of the military end of the 1991 Gulf War when aid operations for the Kurdish and Shi-ite populations were undertaken in defeated Iraq. Further proof is provided by the long and eventful history of UN peacekeeping operations. First-aid kits and shovels are often strategically as important as guns.

It does not take any special foresight to point out the dual role of the armed forces for the maintenance of order and for providing humanitarian aid on the verge of an era of new massive migrations, probably from the east to the west and from the south to the north. This has nothing to do with the often conjured spectre of "soldiers against refugees", but with the prevention of chaos and the relief of suffering. In situations of turmoil brought about by desperate people who do not shrink back from anything in which the traditional humanitarian organisations fail to help, the intervention by a body with a law enforcement capability is necessary. This will be the role of the armed forces which, in their new triple mission, should perhaps be more appropriately called "intervention forces".

ÈÈÈ

"The mistakes which come from kindness" of which Clausewitz had rightly warned in his days look different from today's perspective. The instruments of power, their nature, their operational principles and their employment have to change since their purpose has changed fundamentally. They will no longer be a means for enforcing imperialist or nationalist politics of power as in the past but

))

for implementing politics of stabilisation and peace protection. Or perhaps in a different, more realistic wording: We should strive for a new and better world order, but we should also dispose of adequate means for coping with the disorder which is to be expected.

Wanting to civilise or domesticise the armed forces would be the wrong approach. It would render them useless. They need to be given new guidelines which comprise both extremes, the use of force on the one hand and help or rescue on the other hand. This has to be pursued consistently. It is the only approach acceptable for peoples committed to the constitutionality of modern democracies and to humanitarian principles.



## Chapter 5

### Chances of Realisation

*"No one knows what the future will be like. Apart from great hopes, the situation is characterised by uncertainty and instability. However, it would be wrong, to adopt an attitude of fearful defensiveness. It is rather the task of forward-looking politics to define a desirable development goal and to make every possible effort in order to achieve that goal."*

Swiss Federal Council:  
Report '90 on the Swiss Security Policy.

*"In the future, military power obviously will no longer be just the prime means of inter-state competition. The goal is no longer physical security, but stability, or more precisely: The chance of a long-term free and just, and development of our increasingly interdependent political, social and cultural systems."*

Ambassador Benedict von Tscharner,  
Swiss diplomat

The thinking which underlies the theses expounded in Chapter 4, may seem alien and unrealistic to some military experts. They might object that soldiers are overtasked and that a necessary function of the state is being discredited. Without discarding such objections nor ignoring the numerous setbacks, we are convinced that the strategic change in the direction outlined in this book, is irreversible. With an increasing number of visible and concrete signs, it remains to be seen how comprehensive it will be and how quickly it will materialise.

Some concrete, practical signs of this change will therefore be addressed at the end of this book. We will start with a look at the first truly supranational operational units, the blue helmets of the United Nations, and compare them to the intervention forces that will be necessary in the future. Second, previous efforts to keep peace in Europe by means of "soft" and "hard" methods will be examined. Third, new strategic concepts will be outlined, as they are illustrated by Switzerland's security policy of 1990, in which elements of the new strategic thinking which have been expounded in this book have become - to our





))))))))))

Here we are at the core of the problem. Undoubtedly, UN peacekeeping troops as the first truly supranational units have already ended bloody conflicts and provided a welcome amount of security to the population in their employment areas. Their aid and rescue operations are also commendable. However, blue helmets cannot prevent a party which is determined to make war, from using force. This is ruled out by their mission and their equipment which is designed only for self-protection. Thus they had to give way to the Egyptians in Sinai in 1967 and to the advancing Israelis in Lebanon.

Hence a "peace enforcement" properly speaking, i.e. the imposition of peace by strong law-enforcement troops will become more and more indispensable. Whether peace enforcement will really serve pacification or rather the self-interests of a state or a group of states, will depend on the legitimation of the operation, on the way it is performed and on the behaviour of all parties concerned once the mission is completed. However, it meets with increasing acceptance, both globally and regionally: Operations of UN troops or interventions by third parties pursuing similar goals may at least contain violent inter-state conflicts. The same applies to banditry of strategic dimensions. Perhaps this will lend weight to proposals to increase the UN Secretary General's powers for this type of mission. According to a particularly bold plan, a 5,000-man UN rapid-reaction force is to be created which can be augmented, if necessary, to 50,000 troops by contingents from various countries.

However, what will happen in the case of blatant domestic arbitrariness? For the time being, there is no right of intervention on purely humanitarian grounds. Such a right would amount to the right to interfere in the internal matters of a state. Such an interference is expressly ruled out by the UN Charter as otherwise it might have never materialised and, of course, also to preclude abuses. The acuteness of such a danger is historically proven: Hitler justified his attack on Poland, the beginning of World War Two, with the protection of harassed German minorities! Even the clearly humanitarian intervention to help the Kurds in 1991 was therefore legitimised on different grounds. It was based on Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) which dealt primarily with the "restoration of peace and security". While the repression of the Iraqi minorities was to be stopped forthwith, the humanitarian purpose as such was not stated *expressis verbis*. But at least Iraq was requested to provide immediate access to international aid organisations to needy people all over the country.

If the humanitarian purpose had been emphasised, the resolution would probably have been vetoed by China or perhaps by the Soviet Union. It is therefore interesting that the American UN ambassador Thomas Pickering stated

))

in the Foreign Relations Committee on 8 May 1991 that new ground had been broken with the international community's response to the humanitarian crisis in Iraq. For good reason, as he pointed out, article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter rules out any interference in internal matters as the alternative would be an invitation to anarchy and chaos. In view of the risk of genocide which is outlawed by international law and many agreements, a new approach had been sought. "While the world has seen the sovereign exercise of butchery before, this is the first time that a significant number of governments have rejected a state's right to do so and acted using military force to prevent it, providing humanitarian assistance and protection directly to the victims."

The change in international public opinion could not have been more obvious. What is at stake, as Pickering underscored, is striking a balance between sovereignty rights and extreme human suffering. Most probably, a practical humanitarian development has been launched which will impact on international law. Idi Amin and Pol Pot went unmolested in their savageries; reassuringly, it may be doubted whether this would be tolerated in the future. A signal to this effect is the political declaration of the G7 summit in London of July 1991. The leaders of the Western industrial nations welcomed the fact that Resolution 688 made it possible to counter flagrant violations of human rights with exceptional measures. The UN is encouraged to do the same in similar situations.

The doubts of specialists of international law and of statesmen - justified as they may be in view of the numerous risks involved in interventions for purely humanitarian reasons - therefore must not lead into a dead end. This is another area in which the change in the "strategic state of aggregation" calls for new thinking and new standards. (See also: Gardner, Richard. *International Law and the use of force*, manuscript, IISS, 1991). The poignancy of the matter was conveyed by the debates on the occasion of the Human Rights Conference which was held in Moscow in September 1991. Several foreign ministers pointed out that the containment of inter-state violence was no longer sufficient and that the international community also had to sort out domestic affairs if necessary. Their call for a review of the principle of non-interference was justified by the argument that interference is necessary in some cases. Of course, this is not only motivated by humanitarian considerations, but also by the increasing fear of a massive influx of refugees from countries with a low standard of living and a poor human rights record.

**Successes in Confidence-building and Disarmament**

))

Another indication of the positive change is the speed of progress in confidence-building and disarmament since 1989. The results of the 1990 Paris summit were a welcome breakthrough if one remembers the tedious and futile MBFR (Mutually-Balanced Force Reductions) negotiations or the initial Western scepticism regarding the Eastern idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Comparable in its impact to the INF Treaty in nuclear disarmament, the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) Treaty is a historical reorientation at the conventional level.

The "Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe" which was agreed at the CSCE follow-on meeting in Stockholm in 1983, had a checkered history, but ultimately achieved its goal. Greater transparency in the military field which has enhanced predictability, was the beginning. The obligation to announce large-scale manoeuvres, their attendance by international observers, the right of inspection in the case of suspected violations, increasingly improved verification, the establishment of a Conflict-Prevention Centre, the institutionalisation of contacts at the defence-minister level and expert talks among chiefs of staff form, among others, the basis for the growing confidence in the implementation of the agreed troop reductions and of a defensive orientation of all armed forces. Even the circumvention attempts of the then Soviet Army which transferred weapons systems and army units beyond the reduction zones, have not been able to subdue the optimism so far.

Together with the withdrawal of the former Soviet troops from their East-Central European glacis, this process has resulted in a considerable easing of tensions. The sigh of relief of those who are in charge of Western military security was justified. Much would need to happen to build up the military pressure again that has weighed on Europe until 1989.

An actual relief and détente - to a greater extent than at any time since World War Two - is evident, although it must be admitted that this attitude also favours unrealistic perceptions. There is a tendency in the West to mistake the decisive step towards the goal of a new peace order in which security is not contingent on an ever increasing military power, for the actual achievement. Realists continue to have a difficult position since they are equally suspect, both to illusionists and to pessimists. Especially if they try to keep up the positive momentum and to add new and qualitatively better agreements to the existing ones. In the view of illusionists who discard war and the military as a thing of the past, they are only a retarding element, whereas the latter consider them as irresponsible gamblers toying with their own nation's security.







))

instigators were let down by both the army and the special forces. The argument that they were not determined enough is wrong. It was the other way round: They realised that their determination was futile because no one was there to carry out their orders. Like General von Seeckt's slogan during the Kapp Putsch: "Troops do not fire on troops", the slogan "Troops do not fire on the population", a matter of course in civilised nations, seems to gain wider acceptance. In 1994, some Russian officers refused to fight against civilians in Chechnya; others unfortunately did not.

Far from encouraging disobedience, we consider such developments as a positive check against the unconditional and undiscerning use of force against political opponents as it still occurs or is being attempted. Army commanders would be well advised to study such examples. They have to take into account, as all extraordinary military commanders in history have that not only individual soldiers, but even the toughest troops possess a soul and a conscience which tells them what they are allowed to do and what not.

However, this "special type of co-determination" is not a one-way street. It can have either an accelerating or a retarding effect. The Israeli militia soldiers who had been deployed in the Negev desert in 1967 were impatient after several days and wanted to fight or to be dismissed and go home. Even the US professional soldiers had a similar reaction in the Gulf in 1990/91. The offensive could not have been postponed indefinitely. The German *Bundeswehr*, in contrast, shunned combat action. On the one hand, soldiers had been reassured time and again that they would never be deployed "out of area"; the "culture of fear" also seems to have had an impact. The argument of having to brave an aggressor on behalf of the international community, seemed to carry no weight with soldiers nor with officers. On the other hand, Germany was prepared in late 1994 to make available air force units for providing cover in the event of a withdrawal of UNPROFOR forces from ex-Yugoslavia; in 1995 it made available support elements for punitive NATO actions.

Hence we are witnessing an ambivalent development: On the one hand, and this has to be rated positively, even "standing armies" increasingly resist an arbitrary and disproportionate use of armed forces. This tendency which has been reinforced lately, will continue. Depending on how convincingly the modern criteria for the use of armed forces can be further elaborated and conveyed, a code of conduct will be established which will commit both officers and soldiers. Just like every soldier of a civilised nation knows today - at least theoretically - that prisoners have to be spared and that the wounded have to be looked after even if they are enemies, soldiers will have to accept and learn to apply the modern code



))

political-strategic wisdom. "Common security" presupposes some commonality of values with the other side. The readiness to make all kinds of concessions for the sake of peace may quickly prove counterproductive as the peaceloving side's "camaraderie" in putting up with all kinds of things may be interpreted as a sign of weakness - and exploited accordingly - by the other side.

In other terms, the time was not yet ripe for a security partnership because the presumptive "partner" lacked the prerequisites for a partnership. Today a similar attempt is feasible, however, only against the background of a clearly verifiable development in the new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) with regard to their dependability and their respect of common values, and within the solid framework of collective security, including the east, which has to be developed.

Modern "best-case thinking" is thus based on a vision of security which is satisfactory to all sides and which interpolates the intermediate steps. These are soberly determined without any illusions. However, it is no longer exclusively based on the definition of national interests which are determined once and for all and serve as a yardstick, but it proves flexible as soon as a change in the strategic environment permits another step with the perspective of even better peripheral circumstances.

Thus there has been, generally speaking, a change in thinking. This is corroborated by three examples: The first one is the NATO North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Since NATO had declared, at its 1990 London summit, the end of confrontation and a new era of cooperation with the then Soviet Union, this offer was to be extended to all of its successor states. Therefore a forum was created for getting acquainted with each other and for the discussion of common security concerns. NACC has meanwhile engaged in activities in line with this goal and granted an observer status to some states in addition to its 38 members. Thus strategic communication with its important security-psychological implications has been given a new venue.

NATO's January 1994 proposal of a "Partnership for Peace" (PFP) programme, is one step further towards practical cooperation. Initially launched as a compromise formula for east-central European states pending full NATO membership, which was put off in an effort not to exacerbate Russian sensitivities, it has already proved its merits. Troops from different countries have held joint exercises (the first joint manoeuvre was conducted in Poland in autumn 1994), efforts have been made in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and towards a concretisation of the previously described "guardian soldier" (*miles protector*). Although Russia has made its participation contingent on special conditions and



)))))))))))))

as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, general Powell reportedly said: "President Bush and Secretary Cheney have set the proper course - to take advantage of every opportunity while exercising prudence and caution. And if we are successful, the men and women of our armed forces will pay only the price of eternal readiness and not the tragic and precious price of life." (Woodward, op.cit., p. 126). Obviously he has abided by this principle. At the beginning of Desert Storm, he seems to have been obsessed by the question: "How many will not come back?"

Here the question is not to what extent this style is adequate for tough trials with many victims. Vietnam was clearly beyond that threshold. And the Germans' reaction during the Gulf War - way into the ranks of the *Bundeswehr* - has shown a - for many surprising - lack of preparedness for battle and solidarity even in a clear case of aggression. Whether this form of "highly armed pacifism", which has appeared off and on even during the Cold War, is admissible or warrants a thorough review of principles is a matter to decide for the army leadership of each country. However, one thing is certain: In the last instance, not even the "guardian soldier" will be able to do without personal sacrifice. Indulgence with the armed forces and undue consideration for the sensitivity of today's soldier may easily jeopardise their nations.

However, our concern is not a discussion of the principles of the modern soldier's education. It is assumed that a solution is found in the sense of an absolute preparedness for battle for undisputed values. We demand to drop the second part of Liddell Harts' axiom: "The purpose of war is a better peace - if only from one's own point of view" (op.cit, p.432), which has been largely unquestioned so far. General staff officers, generals and admirals should be taught in the future that the peace after a conflict is only better if it is better for both the victors and the defeated. This should be kept in mind by all those in charge of command and control in future conflicts. And every combatant in a future war should be able to rely on this criterion.

Of course, there are also priorities: In terms of defence, military self-defence is a clear priority. Survival comes first, morals are second. However, as soon as there is the smallest freedom of manoeuvre, the theses for the future use of armed forces, which have been defined in this book, should be the guiding principles. This applies in particular to punitive interventions against aggressors or to the stabilisation efforts in trouble spots.

It is obvious that the demand to exploit the strategic change as much as possible for progress in terms of a peaceful conflict settlement, goes far beyond the military field. The following draft outlines the necessary departure from the Cold-War strategy of mutual deterrence and the adoption of stabilisation as a basic





))

gunboat diplomacy of the past and with procedures which had been rightly prepared and trained for in the event of a decisive bloc-to-bloc confrontation.

The parallel with modern economic thinking is striking. In order to safeguard his company's prosperity, to create and secure jobs, a modern entrepreneur needs a circumspection which goes beyond his narrow economic concerns. The counterpart of "sustainable development" is a "sustainable strategy" which measures up to the most comprehensive and most remote long-term goals.

Another problem for the military institutions of Western nations? Another step from the unconditional fulfilment of military duties to the fulfilment of all kinds of extra wishes which are only a detraction? Another concession to contemporary trends? We do not think so. What about the soldier's often praised and sought moral force if he were not capable, from his point of view and in the field of his activities, to contribute as best as he can to efforts to use the current chances for securing a permanent peace for as many nations as possible?

## Outlook

Today much of the strategic-military postwar literature is interesting only from a historical point of view. Much is waste paper. Some writings are part of the history of the development of inter-state relations in the 20th century and deserve a closer analysis. What is most interesting is to know which ideas and patterns of former times have influenced the era of the Cold War, which ones occurred only between 1945 and 1989 and, most importantly, which intellectual trends will have a determining influence on the future.

Our answer cannot be exhaustive since our goal was narrowly limited from the very beginning. The issue was to gather and evaluate indications of both the possibility and the necessity of a fresh understanding of the role of the armed forces of democratic nations, of the change in their leadership and civic education and a new style in their use. The most suitable paraphrase is perhaps "strategic co-responsibility of the military leadership". A co-responsibility which goes beyond the combat capability of an army, beyond the victory in a campaign and even beyond the actual war goals of one's own state. The best future commander will not be the one who defeats his adversary most quickly, most ruthlessly and most definitely, but the one who takes into account the "world after" regardless of the toughness of the confrontation. He will think beyond the ceasefire, reparations and the destitution of the hostile regime. What he will also have in mind will be



))

the maintenance of decent conditions of living, both for his own *and* the defeated people, with the longterm goal of an eventual reconciliation.

Similar processes have taken place in Europe in the wake of World War Two - however, only after a tremendous amount of suffering and mass casualties. There is no reason to assume that the lasting improvement of relations between two states is contingent on such a prelude. On the contrary, chances are better than ever for young nations to become integrated into the community of democratic states without massacres and massive shelling.

With all due respect for the benevolent activities of the Red Cross and its succour to war victims, for other humanitarian organisations and individual initiatives, it is time now to shift the emphasis of efforts for peace and the wellbeing of as many people as possible clearly towards *prevention*. The following future work sharing is conceivable: trouble spots have to be contained and crises have to be controlled - a matter for the bodies of collective security and a flexible, but sufficient apparatus of power that has to be placed at their disposal; wars and open conflicts have to be possibly prevented - a task for the political leadership of all nations concerned, of the UN, of military alliances and regional groupings. If the worst comes to the worst, open aggression has to be countered by means of a skilful operational conduct, a well-controlled use of force and longterm strategic goals in such a way that a minimum loss of lives and material damage is caused - a matter for those who are responsible on the spot, i.e. the generals. If prevention has failed, the military intervention should at least be conducive to the restoration of a state of peace which is acceptable to all.

This is not to suggest an absence or lack of proposals in that sense, although they may not always have been sufficiently comprehensive or consistent. The so-called "strategic community" still bases much of its work on war and the conduct of war, on the seemingly unquestioned assumption that violent confrontations are inevitable. This will have to change. Not only in public discussions, but also in security-political training classes for the military decision makers, the above mentioned strategic co-responsibility of the military leadership will have to be underscored. The new generation will have to learn in due time that solid military knowledge will no longer suffice in the future, but that those strategic goals will have to be pursued - despite great pressure by the enemy and in seemingly hopeless situations - which promise lasting positive effects. The conduct of war will have to be governed by thinking in terms of a "sustainable strategy" - although it may temporarily become secondary during phases of self-defence in which sheer survival is the overriding concern. This change is not a matter of individual measures, but it has to be an ongoing process. Its momentum is kept up by fresh







## Bibliography

- Bächler, Günther, *Ökologie und Sicherheitspolitik*, ETH-Bulletin zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, 1991, S. 80 ff.
- Beres, Louis René, *Punishing Genocide and Crimes against Humanity after the Gulf War: Iraqi Crimes and International Law*, PSIS Occasional Papers 1/1992, Geneva.
- Bundesministerium für Verteidigung, *Handbuch Innere Führung*, Bonn, 1957.
- Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict*, An Interim Report to Congress, July 1991.
- Däniker, Gustav, *Strategie des Kleinstaats*, Huber, Frauenfeld 1966.
- Däniker, Gustav, *Israels Dreifrontenkrieg*, 3. Auflage Huber, Frauenfeld, 1967.
- Däniker, Gustav, *Warum sie nicht siegten, Der Vietnamkrieg 1965-1969*, 2. Auflage Huber, Frauenfeld, 1969.
- Däniker, Gustav, *Europas Zukunft sichern*, Seewald, Stuttgart, 1973.
- Däniker, Gustav, *Antiterror-Strategie*, 2. Auflage Huber, Frauenfeld, 1979.
- Däniker, Gustav, *Die Armee des neutralen Kleinstaats als friedens-sichernde Kraft*, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 1/1983.
- Däniker, Gustav, *Dissuasion*, 2. Auflage Huber, Frauenfeld, 1988.
- Dannreuther, Roland, *The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis*, Adelphi Papers 264, IISS, Winter 91/92.
- Danzmayr, Heinz, "Die Allianz der Gegensätze, Sicherheitspolitik zwischen Gewalt und Gewaltverzicht", *Herold*, Wien, 1984.
- Duffy, Brian with Cary, Peter, *Triumph Without Victory, The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf*, Random House, New York, 1992.
- Freedman, Lawrence and Karsh, Efraim, *The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991. Diplomacy and War in the New World Order*, taber and faber, London-Boston, 1993.
- Frei, Daniel, *Sicherheit, Grundfragen der Weltpolitik*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1977.
- Friedman, Norman, *Desert Victory. The War for Kuwait*, updated edition, US Naval Institute Annapolis, 1992.
- Gantzel, Klaus-Jürgen und Meyer-Stamer, Jörg, Hrsg. *Die Kriege nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis 1984, Daten und erste Analysen*, 1986.
- Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernhard E., *The Generals' War*, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, New York, 1995.
- Hondrich, Karl Otto, *Lehrmeister Krieg*, Rowohlt, Hamburg, 1992.
- Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, United Nations, New York, 1992.
- James, Alan, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, Macmillan, London, 1990.
- Ist der Krieg noch zu retten? Eine Anthologie militärpolitischer Meinungen, Scherz, Bern, 1963.
- Luttwak, Edward N. *Strategy, The Logic of War and Peace*, Belknap, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987.

))

- Nerlich, Uwe/Rendtorff Trutz (Hrsg.) *Nukleare Abschreckung - Politische und ethische Interpretationen einer neuen Realität*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1989.
- Klaus Schwab (ed.), *Overcoming Indifference. 10 Key Challenges in Today's Changing World*, New York University Press, 1994.
- Picht, Werner, *Vom Wesen des Krieges und vom Kriegswesen der Deutschen*, Stuttgart, 1952.
- Schneider, Wolf, *Das Buch vom Soldaten*, Econ, Düsseldorf 1964.
- Schweizerische Sicherheitspolitik im Wandel, Bericht 90 des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Sicherheitspolitik der Schweiz vom 1, Oktober 1990, EDMZ, Bern, 1990.
- Schwarzkopf, H. Norman, *It doesn't take a Hero. The Autobiography*, Linda Grey Bantam Books, New York, Toronto, 1992.
- Sifry, Micah and Cerf Christopher, *The Golf War Reader history, Documents, Opinions*, Random House, New York, 1991.
- Spillmann, Kurt R., Für eine ganzheitliche Sicherheitspolitik, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 April 1989.
- United Nations, *Die UNO-Studie Kernwaffen*, Beck, München, 1982.
- United Nations, *The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peace Keeping*, United Nations, 1990.
- Weiss, Thomas G. and Campbell Kurt M., "Military Humanitarianism", *Survival*, September/October 1991, p. 471.
- Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von, "Ich gebe zu, ich war verrückt," *Der Spiegel* 17/91, S. 238.
- Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von. *Die Zeit drängt*. 2. Auflage Hanser, München, 1986.
- Woodward, Bob, *The Commanders*, Simon & Schuster, London, 1991.

# UNIDIR Publications

The publications produced by UNIDIR are intended for publication and wide dissemination through free distribution to diplomatic missions, as well as research institutes, experts, academics and sales through the United Nations Sales Section and other outlets.

Under an arrangement concluded with the Dartmouth Publishing Company (UK), selected UNIDIR *Research Reports* are published by Dartmouth and are distributed through their sales network (books indicated by ●; see also at the end of the list *How to Obtain UNIDIR Publications*).

)))))))))

## Research Reports / Rapports de recherche

***La guerre des satellites: enjeux pour la communauté internationale***, par Pierre Lellouche (éd.) (IFRI), 1987, 42p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.87.0.1.

\* Also available in English: ***Satellite Warfare: A Challenge for the International Community***, by Pierre Lellouche (ed.) (IFRI), 1987, 39p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.1.

***The International Non-Proliferation Régime 1987***, by David A.V. Fischer, 1987, 81p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.2.

***La question de la vérification dans les négociations sur le désarmement aux Nations Unies***, par Ellis Morris, 1987, 230p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.87.0.4.

\* Also available in English: ***The Verification Issue in United Nations Disarmament Negotiations***, by Ellis Morris, 1987, 230p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.4.

***Confidence-Building Measures in Africa***, by Augustine P. Mahiga and Fidelis Nji, 1987, 16p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.5.

***Disarmament: Problems Related to Outer Space***, UNIDIR, 1987, 190p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.87.0.7.

\* Existe également en français: ***Désarmement: problèmes relatifs à l'espace extra-atmosphérique***, UNIDIR, 1987, 200p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.87.0.7.

***Interrelationship of Bilateral and Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations / Les relations entre les négociations bilatérales et multilatérales sur le désarmement***, Proceedings of the Baku Conference, 2-4 June 1987 / Actes de la Conférence de Bakou, 2-4 juin 1987, 1988, 258p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E/F.88.0.1, publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.E/F.88.0.1.

***Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990's / La recherche sur le désarmement: programme pour les années 90***, Proceedings of the Sochi Conference, 22-24 March

))

1988 / Actes de la Conférence de Sotchi, 22-24 mars 1988, Geneva, 1988, 165p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E./F.88.0.3, publication des Nations Unies: GV.E./F.88.0.3.

● **Conventional Disarmament in Europe**, by André Brie (IIB), Andrzej Karkoszka (PISM), Manfred Müller (IIB), Helga Schirmeister (IIB), 1988, 66p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.88.0.6.

\* Existe également en français: **Le désarmement classique en Europe**, par André Brie (IIB), Andrzej Karkoszka (PISM), Manfred Müller (IIB), Helga Schirmeister (IIB), 1989, 90p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.E.89.0.6.

● **Arms Transfers and Dependence**, by Christian Catrina, 1988, 409p., published for UNIDIR by Taylor & Francis (New York, London).

**Les forces classiques en Europe et la maîtrise des armements**, par Pierre Lellouche et Jérôme Paolini (éd.) (IFRI), 1989, 88p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.89.0.6.

\* Also available in English: **Conventional Forces and Arms Limitation in Europe**, by Pierre Lellouche and Jérôme Paolini (eds) (IFRI), 1989, 88p., United Nations publication: GV.E.89.0.6.

● **National Security Concepts of States: New Zealand**, by Kennedy Graham, 1989, 180p., published for UNIDIR by Taylor & Francis (New York, London).

● **Problems and Perspectives of Conventional Disarmament in Europe**, Proceedings of the Geneva Conference 23-25 January 1989, 1989, 140p., published for UNIDIR by Taylor & Francis (New York, London).

\* Existe également en français: **Désarmement classique en Europe: problèmes et perspectives**, 1990, 226p., publié pour l'UNIDIR par Masson (Paris).

**The Projected Chemical Weapons Convention: A Guide to the Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament**, by Thomas Bernauer, 1990, 328p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.90.0.3.

**Verification: The Soviet Stance, its Past, Present and Future**, by Mikhail Kokeev and Andrei Androssov, 1990, 131p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.90.0.6.

\* Existe également en français: **Vérification: la position soviétique - Passé, présent et avenir**, 1990, 145p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.90.0.6.

**UNIDIR Repertory of Disarmament Research: 1990**, by Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Péricles Gasparini Alves (eds), 1990, 402p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.90.0.10.

● **Nonoffensive Defense: A Global Perspective**, 1990, 194p., published for UNIDIR by Taylor & Francis (New York, London).



))

**Aerial Reconnaissance for Verification of Arms Limitation Agreements - An Introduction**, by Allan V. Banner, Keith W. Hall and Andrew J. Young, D.C.L., 1990, 166p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.90.0.11.

**Africa, Disarmament and Security / Afrique, désarmement et sécurité**, Proceedings of the Conference of African Research Institutes, 24-25 March 1990 / Actes de la Conférence des Instituts de recherche africains, 24-25 mars 1990, United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E/F.91.0.1, publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.E/F.91.0.1.

● **Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race**, by Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), 1991, 179p., published for UNIDIR by Taylor & Francis (New York, London).

**In Pursuit of a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Guide to the Debate in the Conference on Disarmament**, by Thomas Schmalberger, 1991, 132p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.91.0.4.

**Confidence-Building Measures and International Security: The Political and Military Aspect - A Soviet Approach**, by Igor Scherbak, 1991, 179p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.91.0.7.

● **Verification of Current Disarmament and Arms Limitation Agreements: Ways, Means and Practices**, by Serge Sur (ed.), 1991, 396p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).

\* Existe également en français: *La vérification des accords sur le désarmement et la limitation des armements: moyens, méthodes et pratiques*, 1991, 406p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.91.0.9.

**The United Nations, Disarmament and Security: Evolution and Prospects**, by Jayantha Dhanapala (ed.), 1991, 156p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.91.0.13.

● **Disarmament Agreements and Negotiations: The Economic Dimension**, by Serge Sur (ed.), 1991, 228p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).

\* Existe également en français: *Dimensions économiques des négociations et accords sur le désarmement*, par Serge Sur (éd.), 1991, 211p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.91.0.18.

**Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space: A Guide to the Discussions in the Conference on Disarmament**, by Péricles Gasparini Alves, 1991, 221p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.91.0.17.

**Nuclear Issues on the Agenda of the Conference on Disarmament**, by Thomas Bernauer, 1991, 108p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.91.0.16.

● **Economic Adjustment after the Cold War: Strategies for Conversion**, by Michael Renner, 1991, 262p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).

))

**Verification of Disarmament or Limitation of Armaments: Instruments, Negotiations, Proposals**, by Serge Sur (ed.), 1992, 267p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.92.0.10.

\* Existe également en français: **Vérification du désarmement ou de la limitation des armements: instruments, négociations, propositions**, par Serge Sur (éd.), 1994, 246p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.92.0.10.

**National Security Concepts of States: Argentina**, by Julio C. Carasales, 1992, 131p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.92.0.9.

\* Existe également en français: **Conceptions et politiques de la République argentine en matière de sécurité**, par Julio C. Carasales, 1992, 136p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.92.0.9.

**National Security Concepts of States: Sri Lanka**, by Vernon L. B. Mendis, 1992, 205p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.92.0.12.

● **Military Industrialization and Economic Development. Theory and Historical Case Studies**, by Raimo Väyrynen, 1992, 121p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).

**European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe**, Proceedings of the Rhodes (Greece) Conference, 6-7 September 1991, by Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (ed.) / **La sécurité européenne dans les années 90: Problèmes de l'Europe du Sud-Est**, Actes de la Conférence de Rhodes (Grèce), 6-7 septembre 1991, sous la direction de Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, 1992, 219p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E/F.92.0.14, publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.E/F.92.0.14.

**Disarmament and Limitation of Armaments: Unilateral Measures and Policies**, Proceedings of the Paris Conference, 24 January 1992, by Serge Sur (ed.), 1992, 94p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.92.0.23

\* Existe également en français: **Désarmement et limitation des armements: mesures et attitudes unilatérales**, Actes de la Conférence de Paris, 24 janvier 1992, sous la direction de Serge Sur, 1992, 103p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.92.0.23.

**Conference of Research Institutes in Asia and the Pacific**, Proceedings of the Beijing (China) Conference, 23-25 March 1992, 1992, United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.92.0.29.

**Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence**, by Jozef Goldblat (ed.), 1992, 163p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.92.0.31.

● **Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**, by David Fischer, 1992, 292p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).

**From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States**, by Fred Tanner (ed.), 1992, 264p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.92.0.26.

● **Security of Third World Countries**, by Jasjit Singh and Thomas Bernauer (eds), 1993, 168p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).

))

- **Regional Approaches to Disarmament, Security and Stability**, by Jayantha Dhanapala (ed.), 1993, 282p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).
- Economic Aspects of Disarmament: Disarmament as an Investment Process**, by Keith Hartley, 1993, 91p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.3.  
\* Existe également en français: **Aspects économiques du désarmement: le désarmement en tant qu'investissement**, par Keith Hartley, 1993, 104p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.93.0.3.
- **Nonmilitary Aspects of Security - A Systems Approach**, by Dietrich Fischer, 1993, 222p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).
- Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Research Institutes**, Proceedings of the São Paulo Conference, 2-3 December 1991, by Péricles Gasparini Alves (ed.), 1993, 202p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.8.
- **The Chemistry of Regime Formation: Explaining International Cooperation for a Comprehensive Ban on Chemical Weapons**, by Thomas Bernauer, 1993, 480p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).
- **Civil Space Systems: Implications for International Security**, by Stephen Doyle, 1994, 271p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot).
- Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990's**, by Serge Sur (ed.), 1993, 173p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.16.
- Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East**, Proceedings of the Cairo Conference, 18-19 April 1993, by Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (ed.), 1994, 132p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.13.
- **Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations: Problems of Compliance and Enforcement**, by Serge Sur (ed.), 1994, 296p., published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot)  
\* Existe également en français: **Obligations en matière de désarmement: problèmes de respect et mesures d'imposition**, sous la direction de Serge Sur, 1994, publication des Nations Unies (à paraître)
- European Security in the 1990s: Challenges and Perspectives**, by Victor-Yves Ghebali and Brigitte Sauerwein, Avant Propos by Serge Sur, 1995, 230p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.28.





))

- No. 15 - **Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security**, by Péricles Gasparini Alves, 1992, 160p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.92.0.30.
- No. 16 - **Regional Security and Confidence-Building Processes: The Case of Southern Africa in the 1990s**, by Solomon M. Nkiwane, 1993, United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.6.
- No. 17 - **Technical Problems in the Verification of a Ban on Space Weapons**, by Stanislav Rodionov, 1993, 104p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.12.
- No. 18 - **Index to the Chemical Weapons Convention**, by A. Walter Dorn, 1993, 59p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.13.
- No. 19 - **Migration and Population Change in Europe**, by John Salt, 1993, 86p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.14.
- No. 20 - **La sécurité européenne dans les années 90, défis et perspectives. La dimension écologique**, par Jean-Daniel Clavel, 1993, 40p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.93.0.15.
- No. 21 - **Les minorités nationales et le défi de la sécurité en Europe**, par Dominique Rosenberg, 1993, 45p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.93.0.21.
- No. 22 - **Crisis in the Balkans**, by Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, 1993, 22p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.93.0.22.
- No. 23 - **La transition vers l'économie de marché des pays "ex de l'Est"**, par Louis Pilandon, 1994, 90p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.94.0.3.
- No. 24 - **Le désarmement et la conversion de l'industrie militaire en Russie**, par Sonia Ben Ouagrham, 1993, 110p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.94.0.4.
- No. 25 - **Development of Russian National Security Policies: Military Reform**, by Andrei Raevsky, 1994, 48p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.5.
- No. 26 - **National Security and Defence Policy of the Lithuanian State**, by Gintaras Tamulaitis, 1994, 66p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.11.
- No. 27 - **Le défi de la sécurité régionale en Afrique après la guerre froide: vers la diplomatie préventive et la sécurité collective**, par Anatole N. Ayissi, 1994, 138p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.94.0.17.
- No. 28 - **Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations**, by A. Raevsky and I.N. Vorob'ev, 1994, 182p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.18.
- No. 29 - **Une approche coopérative de la non-prolifération nucléaire: l'exemple de l'Argentine et du Brésil**, par Thierry Riga, 1994, 100p., publication des Nations Unies, numéro de vente: GV.F.94.0.22.

))

- No. 30 - **The CTBT and Beyond**, by Herbert F. York, 1994, 21p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.27.
- No. 31 - **Halting the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons**, by Thérèse Delpech, Lewis A. Dunn, David Fischer and Rakesh Sood, 1994, 70p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.29.
- No. 32 - **Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from Space - A Preliminary Study**, by Bhupendra Jasani, 1994, 58p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.30.
- No. 33 - **Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in Northeast Asia**, by Yong-Sup Han, 1995, 83p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.3.
- No. 34 - **Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts**, by Swadesh Rana, 1995, 52p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.7.
- No. 35 - **The Missing Link? Nuclear Proliferation and the International Mobility of Russian Nuclear Experts**, by Dorothy S. Zinberg, 1995, 45p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.18.
- No. 36 - **Guardian Soldier: On the Future Role and Use of Armed Forces**, by Gustav Däniker, 1995, 141p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.19.
- No. 37 - **National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East**, by James Leonard, Shmuel Limone, Abdel Monem Said Aly, Yezid Sayigh, Center for Strategic Studies (University of Jordan), Abdulhay Sayed and Saleh Al-Mani, 1995, 109p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.95.0.24.

))

**UNIDIR Newsletter / Lettre de l'UNIDIR**  
(quarterly / trimestrielle)

- Vol. 1, No. 1, March/Mars 1988, **Disarmament-Development/Désarmement-Développement**, 16p.  
 No. 2, June/Juin 1988, **Research in Africa/La recherche en Afrique**, 28p.  
 No. 3, September/Septembre 1988, **Conventional Armaments Limitation and CBMs in Europe/Limitation des armements classiques et mesures de confiance en Europe**, 32p.  
 No. 4, December/Décembre 1988, **Research in Asia and the Pacific/La recherche en Asie et dans le Pacifique**, 40p.
- Vol. 2, No. 1, March/Mars 1989, **Chemical Weapons: Research Projects and Publications/Armes chimiques: projets de recherche et publications**, 24p.  
 No. 2, June/Juin 1989, **Research in Latin America and the Caribbean/La recherche en Amérique latine et dans les Caraïbes**, 32p.  
 No. 3, September/Septembre 1989, **Outer Space/L'espace extra-atmosphérique**, 32p.  
 No. 4, December/Décembre 1989, **Research in Eastern Europe/La recherche en Europe de l'Est**, 48p.
- Vol. 3, No. 1, March/Mars 1990, **Verification of Disarmament Agreements/La vérification des accords sur le désarmement**, 48p.  
 No. 2, June/Juin 1990, **Research in North America/La recherche en Amérique du Nord**, 72p.  
 No. 3, September/Septembre 1990, **Nuclear Non-Proliferation/La non-prolifération nucléaire**, 43p.  
 No. 4, December/Décembre 1990, **Research in Western and Northern Europe (I)/ La recherche en Europe de l'Ouest et en Europe du Nord (I)**, 72p.
- Vol. 4, No. 1, March/Mars 1991, **Research in Western and Northern Europe (II)/La recherche en Europe de l'Ouest et en Europe du Nord (II)**, 72p.  
 No. 2, June/Juin 1991, **Biological Weapons/Armes biologiques**, 40p.  
 No. 3, September/Septembre 1991, **Naval and Maritime Issues/Questions navales et maritimes**, 54p.  
 No. 4, December/Décembre 1991, **Bilateral (US-USSR) Agreements and Negotiations/Accords et négociations bilatéraux (EU-URSS)**, 52p.



))

- Vol. 5, No. 1, April/Avril 1992, **Conference on Disarmament/La Conférence du désarmement**, 63p.
- No. 18, June/Juin 1992, **Disarmament - Environment - Security/Désarmement - Environnement - Sécurité**, 52p.
- No. 19, September/Septembre 1992, **Economic Aspects of Disarmament/Aspects économiques du désarmement**, 66p.
- No. 20, December/Décembre 1992, **The Chemical Weapons Convention/La Convention sur les armes chimiques**, 100p.
- Vol. 6, No. 21, March/Mars 1993, **Research in the Middle East/La recherche au Moyen et Proche Orient**, 70p.
- No. 22-23, June-September/Juin-septembre 1993, **START and Nuclear Disarmament: Problems of Implementation/START et le désarmement nucléaire: problèmes d'exécution**, 101p.
- No. 24, December/Décembre 1993, **Peace-Keeping, Peace-Making and Peace Enforcement/Maintien, construction et imposition de la paix**, 88p.
- Vol. 7, No. 25, March-April/Mars-avril 1994, **Research in Eastern Europe and in the Newly Independent States/Recherche en Europe de l'Est et dans les nouveaux Etats indépendants**, 70p.
- No. 26/27, June-September/Juin-septembre 1994, **Non-Proliferation/Non-prolifération**, 91p.
- Vol. 8, No. 28/29, December 1994-May 1995/Décembre 1994-mai 1995, **Land Mines and the CCW Review Conference/Les mines terrestres et la Conférence d'examen de la Convention sur certaines armes classiques**

#### How to Obtain UNIDIR Publications

1. UNIDIR publications followed by a United Nations Sales Number (GV.E... or GV.F...) can be obtained from UNIDIR or from bookstores and distributors throughout the world. Consult your bookstore or write to United Nations, Sales Section, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland, Phone (41.22) 917.26.12, Fax (41.22) 740.09.31, or United Nations, Sales Section, UN Headquarters, New York, New York 10017, USA. The UNIDIR Newsletter is available at a voluntary subscription price of US \$ 25 a year.
2. UNIDIR publications published by Dartmouth can be obtained through Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, Gower House, Croft Road, Aldershot, Hampshire, GU11 3HR, England, Phone (0252) 33.15.51, Fax (0252) 34.44.05.
3. UNIDIR publications published by Taylor and Francis can be obtained through Taylor and Francis Ltd, Rankine Road, Basingstoke, Hants RG24 8PR, England, Phone (0256) 84.03.66, Fax (0256) 47.94.38.