NON-OFFENSIVE
DEFENSE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Bjørn Møller, Gustav Däniker
Shmuel Limone and Ioannis A. Stivachtis

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Preface

Ioannis A. Stivachtis

In his study concerning the control of the arms race in the Middle East, Geoffrey Kemp argues that the region is

> a dangerous neighbourhood. There are dozens of unresolved conflicts, some dating back thousands of years. Most of the countries face multiple threats to their security; many international boundaries remain in dispute; and improvements in power projection capabilities have made it more difficult to isolate the various conflicts into restricted geographical areas … Each of the key countries has reason to be nervous about its security, and in the last resort none feels it can rely on the international community or a new world order for protection.[1]

This situation has led Middle Eastern states to formulate competitive security strategies which although aimed at increasing their individual security, have instead increased their insecurity resulting from the workings of the security dilemma. As a response to this situation, new alternative security strategies have been proposed based on cooperation rather on competition.[2]

According to Sverre Lodgaard, the strategic principle of cooperative security is to enhance peace and security through institutionalized consent rather than confrontational relationships among national military establishments. The emphasis is less on preparations to counter threats than on the prevention of threats in the first place.[3] Politically, such a strategy can be implemented through the establishment and observance of confidence-building

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[1] Geoffrey Kemp, *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race*, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991, p. 15.

[2] See Janne E. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21ˢᵗ Century*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994.

[3] Sverre Lodgaard, "Confidence Building and Arms Control in the Middle East", unpublished paper, 1994, p. 1.

measures (CBMs) and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs).[4] Militarily, the essential ingredient of cooperative security is the idea of non-offensive defence (NOD). According to this idea, the basis for cooperation is the mutual acceptance and support for defence of home territory as the exclusive national military objective, and the subordination of power projection to the constraints of international consensus. Finally, a fully developed cooperative security framework would include collective security provisions as a guarantee in the event of aggression. The present volume focuses exclusively on the issue of NOD and of its applicability to the Middle East.

I. Aim and Structure of the Book

This volume examines whether and how NOD can apply to the Middle East. The volume is divided into two parts. The first part examines the way in which NOD principles can apply to the Middle East. The second part explores possible factors that may impede the application of NOD in the region. The two parts comprise one and three chapters respectively.

Chapter 1, "Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East", authored by Bjørn Møller, examines the different possible ways in which the principles of NOD could apply to the Middle East. The chapter first introduces the concept of NOD, the various forms that NOD may take when applied in practice, and the various ways in which NOD strategies might be implemented. Next, taking account of geographical and political conditions peculiar to the Middle East, the chapter examines which of the various NOD models identified best fits the needs of particular Middle Eastern states (namely Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and Syria), and identifies the way in which each specific model might be applied by the respective states. Finally, the chapter relates nuclear weapons and NOD strategies in the Middle East, and discusses the potential role of extraregional powers in Middle Eastern security arrangements.

Chapter 2, "Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East: Necessity versus Feasibility", authored by Ioannis Stivachtis, examines relevant strategic,

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[4] For the distinction between CBMs and CSBMs and more information about these instruments see Michael E. Krepon (ed.)*, A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security*, Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993, pp. 20-21.

systemic, sub-systemic, and intra-state factors that currently mitigate against the adoption of NOD policies in the Middle East. The chapter establishes linkages between the international system as a whole, the Middle Eastern regional security system and individual Middle Eastern states, and shows how and why various dynamics located within as well as across these, make the introduction of NOD policies in the Middle East difficult. In addition, the chapter discusses several issues related to the viability of NOD policies in general such as different aspects of the security dilemma and the arms dynamic.

Chapter 3, "Cooperative Security and Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East: A Swiss Perspective", by Gustav Däniker, critiques the value and viability of NOD policies by drawing on the Swiss experience with evaluating NOD strategies in the 1980s. The chapter argues that militarily, NOD policies are unworkable (and increasingly so), while politically, NOD policies fail to address the most pertinent contemporary security challenges. With respect to the Middle East, the application of NOD would be dangerous, or worse, a grave failing.

Chapter 4, "Non-Offensive Defence and its Applicability to the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective", by Shmuel Limone, focuses on the potential for NOD policies in the Middle East from an Israeli perspective. The chapter argues that, given prevailing political conditions in the Middle East, the only viable option for increasing security in the Middle East is the adoption of a less offensive defence (LOD) policy. Unlike NOD, LOD calls for a less radical restructuring of national defence postures in the region and places greater emphasis on political measures which might accompany national defence restructurings. LOD would include a reduction in the size and readiness of national defence forces in the Middle East, as well as political measures designed to increase the transparency of national defence establishments.

An adequate understanding of the security problem (in the Middle East) which NOD seeks to address requires an understanding of the concept of security itself. The remainder of this preface briefly introduces the concept of security and several related notions which are essential to grasping the scope of NOD, and on which the authors of this volume draw in presenting their arguments.

II. The Security Problem

According to Barry Buzan, security is a complex concept. In order to come

> to grips with it one needs to be aware of at least three things: the political context of the term; the several dimensions within which it operates; and the logical contradictions and ambiguities that are inherent in any attempt to apply the concept to international relations.[5]

The international political system is in the main a system of states. The principal feature of states is their sovereignty. Claiming ultimate governing authority within their territorial limits, states refuse to acknowledge any higher political authority. This essential character of states (sovereignty) thus defines the nature of the international system as anarchic.[6] The anarchic nature of the international system is highly durable. In taking action to maintain their sovereignty, states automatically maintain the anarchic nature of the international system, which in turn pushes states towards actions designed to maintain their sovereignty. In this sense then, the anarchic nature of the international system can be regarded as self-reproducing.

Under anarchy, states are responsible for assuring their sovereignty through their own efforts. Part of assuring sovereignty means guarding against actual or potential encroachments on one's sovereignty. To guard against military encroachments on their sovereignty, states arm themselves (i.e. create national armed forces), and because military encroachments on sovereignty usually take the form of military aggression by another state, states tend to keep careful watch on each others' armaments and military policies. The deployment of military instruments by states gives rise to two types of problem: (1) problems associated with the holding of military instruments themselves; and (2) problems associated with the fact that military instruments are however held by

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[5] Barry Buzan, "Is International Security Possible?," in Kenneth Booth (ed*.), New Thinking About Strategy and International Security*, London: Harper Collins, 1991, p. 31.

[6] In this context, anarchy means the absence of political authority higher than states themselves. Thus, in the international system, anarchy describes a form of decentralized political system. For a more detailed discussion of the structure of the international system as anarchic, see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1979.

all other states in the system.[7] The first type of problem is usually known as the "defence dilemma", while the second type is usually known as the "security dilemma". Both these two dilemmas and their relation to NOD are discussed below.

1. The Defence Dilemma

States acquire military means because such means are believed to be useful in the pursuit of desirable objectives (i.e. protection of sovereignty). The defence dilemma arises from the development and deployment of military instruments by states. Essentially, the defence dilemma revolves around the possible security implications associated with the holding of military means by states. Technological developments have made (and are increasingly making) modern military means more and more lethal and destructive. The contemporary use of modern military means on a large scale threatens to inflict unprecedented levels of destruction. This is especially true of military means of mass destruction, whose actual use threatens to devastate the environment in which they are employed far beyond any measure of recognizability or purpose. In this context in which the use of military means even for defensive purposes alone threatens to inflict intolerable levels of destruction, the defence dilemma arises in terms of a "trade-off" between the acquisition and deployment of military means adequate for ensuring defence, and the inherent risk associated with the possession and potential use of these means. In other words, in a context in which the possession and use of military means irrespective of purpose constitute a threat in themselves, the defence dilemma faces states with the choice between the risks associated with deploying the military means necessary for defence, and the risks associated with failing to do so (i.e. possibly inviting encroachment by others).

Another aspect of the defence dilemma has to do with the trade-off between the financial costs entailed by the acquisition of modern military means and the possible implications of this for the welfare of a state. Modern military means are becoming increasingly expensive and their development and acquisition demand substantial financial resources from states, resources which might otherwise have been used for other purposes. This resource allocation

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[7] Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, 2nd edition, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 271.

trade-off implied in the acquisition of military means faces states with a dilemma in that states are obliged to choose between the allocation of resources for the acquisition of military means necessary for defence and the possible consequences of failing to do so, and the allocation of these same resources for other purposes and the consequences of failing to do so.

2. The Security Dilemma

The security dilemma arises from the ambiguity of military means/postures and foreign policy intentions. In the international system, states keep careful watch of the military and foreign policies of others. According to Nicholas Wheeler and Ken Booth, a security dilemma exists when "the military preparations of one state create an unresolved uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for defensive purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage)."[8]

Underlying the concept of the security dilemma is the distinction between state military policies as either defensively motivated (i.e. status quo), and offensively motivated (i.e. revisionist). Defensively motivated military policies refer to the military preparations states undertake to preserve the status quo. Offensively motivated military policies refer to the military preparations states undertake to forcefully amend the status quo. Both defensively and offensively motivated military policies thus entail some sort of military preparations by states. The ability to determine the end of military preparations of others though, is crucial for states.

Wheeler and Booth observe that the security dilemma comprises two separate problems for states: (1) a problem of identifying the end of others' military preparations, and (2) a problem of how to respond to the military preparations of others.[9] Correctly identifying the end of military preparations of others matters because it has serious implications for the security of states. There is a substantive qualitative difference in the security relations between states when all pursue military preparations for defensive purposes and when

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[8] Nicholas J. Wheeler and Ken Booth, "The Security Dilemma," in John Baylis and N. J. Rengger (eds.), *Dilemmas of World Politics*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 31.
[9] *Ibid*.

some pursue military preparations for offensive purposes. When all are acknowledged to pursue military preparations for defensive purposes, in other words when no state is believed to contemplate military aggression, states can relax their national defence efforts, for the possibility of military encroachment is seen as low. When some states are believed to pursue military preparations for offensive purposes however, the national defence efforts of others (or at least some of the others) will be more substantial, for the possibility of military encroachment is deemed to be greater. More substantial national defence efforts and greater possibility of military encroachment, make for arms racing, tension and generally poorer security relations between states.[10] Distinguishing between the end of military preparations of others though, is no easy matter because military preparations by others as such tend to be viewed with alarm, and because there is no reliable means of distinguishing defensive military preparations from offensive military preparations. Military preparations deemed as defensive by one state may very well be deemed as offensive by others, and vice-versa.

Having observed the military preparations of others, states have to decide how to respond to these preparations. Deciding on a response is important because the nature of the response will influence the perceptions of others about the end of military preparations of the responding state, which in turn will affect the future military preparations of others, which in turn will affect future responses to those preparations, and so on. By overresponding to the military preparations of others, a state can trigger suspicions about the end of its own military preparations, while by underresponding to the military preparations of others, a state can leave itself open to aggression. Just like determining the end of military preparations of others, responding to the military preparations of others is thus a delicate matter fraught with the dangers of triggering escalating arms races and antagonism, or of inviting aggression.

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[10] Some analysts distinguish between a "security struggle" and a "power struggle," with the first describing a condition whereby all states pursue defensively motivated military preparations, and the second describing a condition whereby at least some states pursue offensively motivated military preparations. See Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 295.

III. Cooperative Security and NOD

The anarchic nature of the international system obliges states to protect their interests through their own efforts. In order to protect military security interests, states develop and acquire military means. In so doing, however, states create the security and defence dilemmas, which taken together, form the mainstay of the security problem facing states in the international system.

The security dilemma implies a great deal of interdependence between the security of states in the international system. The military policies of one state affect the military policies of other states and vice-versa. National security therefore, cannot be conceived in terms of national actions alone. This in turn implies that achieving national security requires at the very least the implicit "cooperation" of others, or what has been dubbed cooperative security. A major stumbling block to securing cooperative security, is the misgivings states have over each others' military preparations and the purpose of these preparations (i.e. the very essence of the security dilemma). NOD presents itself as an answer to these misgivings. By reorganizing national defence postures along certain lines (see chapter 1), NOD claims to make the ends of national military preparations transparent. NOD thus purports to allow states the military preparations necessary for defence while at the same time taking the danger (i.e. misperception of ends) out of these military preparations. Put slightly differently, NOD purports to solve the security and defence dilemmas (the defence dilemma is solved or at least mitigated because of the presumably lower incentive for armament entailed by solving the security dilemma), and open the way to cooperative security. Whether in fact NOD is an appropriate solution for the security problems facing states in the Middle East, is taken up by the remainder of this volume.

List of Acronyms

ACV   Armoured Combat Vehicle
APC   Armoured Personnel Carrier
ATBM   Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile
ATGW   Anti-tank Guided Weapons
C^3I Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence
CBD   Confidence-Building Defence
CBMs   Confidence-Building Measures
CFE   Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSBMs   Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCE   Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTBT   Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC   Chemical Weapons Convention
EW   Early Warning
GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council
GHQs   General Headquarters
GSFG   Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
GLONASS   Global Navigation System
GSP   Global Positioning System
IAEA   International Atomic Energy Agency
IDF   Israeli Defence Force
IFOR   Implementation Force
IISS   International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK)
LOD   Less Offensive Defence
MBT   Main Battle Tank
MIT   Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MTCR   Missile Technology Control Regime
NACC   North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NOD   Non-Offensive Defence
NPT   Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSPFs   Non-Soviet Pact Forces
NUPI   The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
NWFZ   Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

OSCE	Organization on Security and Confidence in Europe
PFP	Partnership for Peace
PKK	Partyia Karkere Kurdistan
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
PRIO	International Peace Research Institute
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
TLI	Treaty-limited Item
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

Part I

Chapter 1

Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East

Bjørn Møller[*]

The first part of the following paper is a general introduction to the concept of non-offensive defence (NOD), which readers familiar with the concept can safely skip. The second part deals more specifically with the possible application of the NOD principles to the Middle East, narrowly defined as Israel and the neighbouring states.

A caveat seems in order, especially when dealing with a conflict as complex as that of the Middle East: there is no military solution to the problems in the Middle East conflict, which are profoundly political. However, there may be military obstacles to a political solution, and there may be military ways of removing such obstacles. This is where the idea of NOD becomes relevant: as a precursor to or companion of, a political peace process. This, in its turn, presupposes that the parties to the conflict have tired of it and have come to want peace, in which case a change of military strategy and/or posture may facilitate "stepping down."

I. The Basic Idea of NOD

As a defence strategy NOD was originally designed for the Cold War environment. More specifically, it was designed with NATO in general, and Germany in particular, in mind.[1]

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[1] Bjørn Møller, *Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence*, London: Brassey's, 1991; Bjørn Møller, "Germany and NOD," in Bjørn Møller & Wiberg (eds.), *Non-Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century*, Boulder: Westview

1. NOD and Common Security

With the exception of a few authors who have come to endorse NOD for reasons of sheer military efficiency, the reasoning behind the advocacy of NOD has all along been political. It is based on the assumption that individual states are better off pursuing policies of "common security," and that the international system as a whole will become more stable and peaceful if all states do so.[2] "Common security" simply denotes the attempt to overcome the well-known security dilemma by taking one's respective adversary's legitimate security concerns into account.

To seek security at an adversary's expense is counterproductive, because it tends to activate malign security dilemma-type interactions,[3] thereby triggering an arms race and damaging crisis stability. If one state, for instance, increases its armaments to meet a perceived threat, this is likely to be perceived (correctly, regardless of intentions) by its adversary as a growing threat. The latter state will feel compelled to reciprocate with a rearmament that will only make the former state feel even more insecure, etc. The result may well be a spiralling arms race with no inherent saturation point, i.e. a very low degree of

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Press, 1994, pp. 153-165.

    [2] Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues), *Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982. See also Raimo Väyrynen (ed.), *Policies for Common Security*, London: Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, 1985; or Egon Bahr & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1986; Egon Bahr & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Disziplinen. Bd.2: Zu rechtlichen, ökonomischen, psychologischen und militärischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1987.

    [3] On the security dilemma, see John M. Hertz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities*, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1951, passim; John M. Hertz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1950), pp. 157-180; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976, pp. 58-93; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp. 294-327; Alan Collins, "The Security Dilemma," in Jane M. Davis (ed.), *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World,* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996, pp. 181-195.

arms race stability.[4] Crisis stability will likewise suffer if, in a political crisis, states respond to each other's moves without consideration for the security concerns motivating them. Mobilization and other defensive measures may thus be mistaken for attack preparations, which provide the respective adversary strong incentives for preventive war and/or pre-emptive attack.[5]

In the more austere and parsimonious interpretations, the principle of common security thus implies little more than taking the security dilemma into account, i.e. acknowledging that the security of an adversarial dyad needs to be viewed as a whole. No lasting security can be had at the expense of one's adversary. The post-Cold War version of this philosophy is better known as "cooperative security," which is largely synonymous with common security, only with a greater emphasis on intentional and institutionalized cooperation.[6]

The above maxims are directly applicable to defence policies, where it translates into NOD, conceived as a form of defence that provides security for

[4] On arms race stability, a classical statement of the theory of the "action-reaction phenomenon," is George Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," in Herbert York (ed.), *Arms Control. Readings from the Scientific American,* San Fransisco: Freeman, 1973, pp. 177-187. For a historical as well as theoretical analysis, see Grant T. Hammond, *Plowshares into Swords. Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993. For competing explanations of the armament dynamics, see Nils Petter Gleditsch & Olav Njølstad (eds.), *Arms Races. Technological and Political Dynamics*, London: Sage, 1990; and especially Håkan Wiberg, "Arms Races, Formal Models and Quantitative Tests," pp. 31-57.

[5] On crisis stability, see Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody & Robert C. North, "The Management of International Crisis: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations," in Dean G. Pruitt & Richard C. Snyder eds., *Theory and Research on the Causes of War*, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp. 62-79; Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crisis*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 7-13; Glenn H. Snyder & Paul Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations. Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977; Daniel Frei (with Christian Catrina), *Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War*, Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun/UNIDIR, 1983, pp. 31-36.

[6] Janne E. Nolan et. al., "The Concept of Cooperative Security," in Janne E. Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement. Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994, pp. 3-18.

its possessor without posing threats to adversaries.[7] The best known definition of NOD is that of Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker:

> The size, weapons, training, logistics, doctrine, operational manuals, war-games, manoeuvres, text books used in military academies, etc. of the armed forces are such that they are seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense without any reliance on the use of nuclear weapons, yet incapable of offense.[8]

However, the following definition is both simpler and more precise, in addition to taking into account that NOD is not an either/or, but a matter of degrees, i.e. that states can be or become more or less "NODish":

> NOD is a military strategy, expressed in a military posture, that maximizes defensive but minimizes offensive military options.

While there has never been any perfect real-life expression of the concept, some states come closer than others to the NOD ideal—perhaps (but not necessarily) because they have internalized the basic idea.[9]

While states may dispute the advisability of being strictly defensive themselves, every state prefers its adversaries to be as non-offensive as possible; and most tend to prefer a situation where nobody is offensive to one in which everybody is. They may thus be willing to "sacrifice" some offensive strength in exchange for their adversaries giving up more. The mandate for the

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[7] On the link between NOD and common security see Bjørn Møller, *Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992; Egon Bahr & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Konventionelle Stabilität. Bd. 3: Zu den militärischen Aspekten Struktureller Nichtangriffsfähigkeit im Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1988.

[8] Frank Barnaby & Egbert Boeker, "Non-Nuclear, Non-Provocative Defence for Europe," in P. Terrence Hopmann & Frank Barnaby (eds.), *Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988, pp. 135-145, quotation from p. 137.

[9] One could, for instance, see the security policies of the four Nordic countries in this light. See Bjørn Møller, "The Nordic Regional Security Complex. A Preliminary Analysis," in Leif Ohlson (ed.), *Case Studies on Regional Conflicts and Regional Conflict Resolution*, Gothenburg 1989: Padrigu Peace Studies, 1989; Bjørn Møller, "European Security Structures for the Nineties and Beyond: A Nordic Perspective," *AFES-PRESS Reports*, No. 40, Mosbach: AFES-PRESS (1991); Håkan Wiberg, "Security and Arms Control Policies of the Nordic Countries," *Working Papers*, No. 6, Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research (1991). See also Ciro Elliott Zoppo (ed.), *Nordic Security at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) negotiations reflected such an embryonic consensus about the need "to limit, as a matter of priority, capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action," which is as good a definition of NOD-type defensive restructuring as most.[10] NATO had to give up some weapons systems, but it gained more by the Warsaw Pact's (and especially the USSR's) obligation to build down even further.

If a state conforms, more or less precisely, to the above criterion, the two aforementioned problems, of arms racing and low crisis stability, may be avoided. First of all, a state's acquisition of strictly defensive armaments will not necessarily lead to reciprocation on the part of its adversaries, unless they happen to have aggressive intentions that are frustrated by the defensive improvement. If so, a switch to NOD will help unmask such would-be aggressors. If not, it will permit dyads of states with defensive intentions to reduce their level of armaments. In either case, something is gained for a defensive state, but nothing lost—unless, of course, a state were to give up defensive along with offensive strength (*vide infra*). Secondly, unmistakably defensive steps in a crisis situation will not invite pre-emption, simply because they cannot be mistaken for attack preparations. This not "only" mitigates or eliminates the risk of pre-emptive attacks and preventive war, but also allows states to defend themselves more effectively against a premeditated attack. Since they need no longer fear that their defensive precautions might provoke an otherwise avoidable war, states will have no reason to postpone mobilization, and hence will tend to be better prepared for any ensuing war.

These principled, but very abstract, observations immediately raise several questions: are there not other, perhaps even better, ways of signalling defensive intentions than to restructure one's armed forces? Is it really possible to distinguish reliably between offensive and defensive strategies and/or postures?

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[10] See Jane M.O. Sharp, "Conventional Arms Control in Europe," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 407-460, with appendices, including the treaty itself, on pp. 460-474. See also Sergey Koulik & Richard Kokoski, *Conventional Arms Control. Perspectives on Verification*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Rüdiger Hartmann, Wolfgang Heydrich & Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, *Der Vertrag über konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Vertragswerk, Verhandlungsgeschichte, Kommentar, Dokumentation*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags, 1994; Wolfgang Zellner, *Die Verhandlungen über Konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa. Konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle, die neue politische Lage in Europa und die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags, 1994; Stuart Croft (ed.), *The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. The Cold War Endgame*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994.

Will not the removal of offensive capabilities critically weaken the defence? Are there any universally applicable guidelines for the design of such a defence? Can such a defence stand alone, or does it require an underpinning, say in the form of nuclear deterrence, alliance security guarantees, and/or collective security? In what follows I shall venture tentative answers to these pertinent questions.

2. Alternatives to NOD?

What matters, according to the common security/NOD philosophy is that states are not perceived as threatening. A defensive restructuring of the armed forces is, of course, not the only possible means to this end.

- Democracy is another powerful inhibition against war, at least in the sense that democratic states rarely, if ever, attack other democracies. Hence, a democracy may have no reason to fear another democracy, regardless of the configuration and size of its armed forces. However, democratization is not irreversible, and democracies may develop into dictatorships,[11] in which case their neighbours will surely appreciate defensively structured armed forces. Also, dictatorships will tend to prefer democracies to be defensively armed, since (according to the theory) democracies may well attack non-democracies.

- Like Germany or Japan, states may be legally or even constitutionally debarred from aggression,[12] or they may be committed to neutrality, like

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[11] Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (November 1992), pp. 369-376; Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. For a more pessimistic assessment see Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38; Reinhard Wolf, Erich Weede, Andrew J. Enterline, Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, "Correspondence: Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security*, Vol. 20 , No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 176-207.

[12] Wakio Watanabe, "Japan's Postwar Constitution and Its Implications for Defense Policy: A Fresh Interpretation," in Ron Matthews & Keisuke Matsuyama (eds.), *Japan's Military Renaissance?*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, pp. 35-49; Dieter S. Lutz, "Zu den verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit nach dem Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in Egon Bahr & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.), *op. cit.* (1987) n. 2, pp. 85-104.

Switzerland and Austria.[13] If neighbouring countries feel certain that the implied constraints will hold, defensive restructuring will indeed be superfluous. If they are not completely sure, NOD will still be relevant, especially since it would be in perfect conformity with the constitutional provisions.

- Very small states with much larger neighbours will obviously not be seen as threats, regardless of the structure of their armed forces. Where the "potential threat threshold" is located, however, is uncertain. The size of Liechtenstein is, for instance, obviously below the threshold, while that of Israel is above it. Furthermore, that defensive restructuring may not be necessary is not the same as implying that it will do any harm. Being cheaper and more effective (*vide infra*) NOD may still be the best option for small states.[14]

3. The Offence/Defence Distinction

Many suggestions have been made for how to distinguish between offence and defence, yet most suffer from serious flaws and inconsistencies, above all

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[13] On neutrality see Bengt Sundelius (ed.), *The Neutral Democracies and the New Cold War*, Boulder: Westview, 1987; Joseph Kruzel & Michael H. Haltzel (eds.), *Between the Blocs. Problems and Prospects for Europe's Neutrals and Non-Aligned States*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Ephraim Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, London: Routledge, 1988; Harto Hakovirta, *East-West Conflict and European Neutrality*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1988; Nils Andrén, "On the Meaning and Uses of Neutrality," *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 67-84; Heinz Vetschera, "Neutrality and Defence: Legal Therory and Military Practice in the European Neutrals' Defence Policies," *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (March 1985), pp. 51-64; Allan Carton, *Les neutres, la neutralité et l'Europe*, Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, 1991; Josef Binter, "Neutrality in a Changing World: End or Renaissance of a Concept?," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 213-218. On Switzerland and Austria see Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, "Armed Neutrality: Its Application and Future," in Stephen J. Flanagan & Fen Osler Hampson (eds.), *Securing Europe's Future*, London: Croom Helm, 1986, pp. 242-279; H. R. Fuhrer, "Austia and Switzerland: the Defense Systems of Two Minor Powers," in L.H. Gann (ed.), *The Defense of Western Europe*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 95-125; Marko Miliovejic & Pierre Maurer (eds.), *Swiss Neutrality and Security. Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Policy*, New York: Berg, 1990; Heinz Vetschera, "Der Weg zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1985), pp. 223-228.

[14] Bjørn Møller, "Small States, Non-Offensive Defence and Collective Security," in Efraim Inbar & Gabriel Sheffer (eds.), *The National Security of Small States in a Changing World*, London: Frank Cass, 1997, pp. 127-154.

because distinctions of universal validity have been sought through generalization rather than abstraction. Also, analysts have looked for the answer at the wrong level of analysis. In the following, I shall try to shed some light on the subject by analysing the pros and cons of distinctions along a continuum of levels of analysis. They range from individual weapons to political intentions, via intermediate levels of military formations and total postures, and from tactical and operational to strategic and "grand strategic" conceptions.

The most common misunderstanding about NOD (to which a few NOD proponents have, admittedly, contributed) is that it envisages a ban on "offensive weapons" in favour of "defensive weapons."[15] Not only is such a distinction utterly meaningless, but to attempt it in practice may also be harmful. This was, for instance, the case with the League of Nations 1932 World Disarmament Conference, where states sought to conceal their quest for supremacy with proposals for banning "offensive weapons," which tended to be precisely those categories in which their opponents were superior.[16] Both offensive and defensive operations require a whole panoply of weapons categories, many of which are identical: tanks may, for instance, be very

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[15] An example is Johan Galtung, *There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security*, Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984, pp. 172-176. Galtung does, however, recognize the existence of "gray areas" and acknowledge that "it would be naive to believe that any component of a weapon system is inherently defensive or offensive: it depends on the total system" (p. 176), unfortunately without abandoning his suggested definition of "defensive weapons" as combining short range with small-radius impact area, as opposed to "offensive weapons," possessing the opposite characteristics. Another, less simplistic, yet still misleading, example is the definition of "offensive weapons" as such that reward striking first. See George Quester, "Security and Arms Control," in George Quester, *The Future of Nuclear Deterrence*, Lexington MA: John Wiley & Sons, 1986, pp. 1-25, definition p. 23. In the article "Avoiding Offensive Weapons and Strengthening the Defensive" (*ibid.*, pp. 229-250), the author does, however, modify this definition somewhat by adding terrain specialization and other factors to the defensive characteristics. See also Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691.

[16] See, Philip J. Noel-Baker, *The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932-33*, Oxford: Pergamon, 1979; Robert Neild, *An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting*, London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 137-144; Marliester Borg, "Reducing Offensive Capabilities—The Attempt of 1932," *Journal of Peace Research*," Vol. 29, No. 2 (May 1992), pp. 145-160; Vladislav Zubok & Andrei Kokoshin, "Opportunities Missed in 1932?," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 2 (1989), pp. 112-121. On the futile attempts at qualitative naval arms control in the inter-war period, see Robert Gordon Kaufman, *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era. The United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two World Wars*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

valuable for a defender,[17] just as anti-tank weapons are indispensable for an attacker. Mines may not only be of use to a defender, but also to an attacker (to say nothing of their other appalling features[18]). Indeed, even fortifications (such as the Great Wall of China or the Maginot Line) may facilitate attack, simply because they free forces for offensive use that would otherwise be required for defensive duties.

Weapons nevertheless matter. Under concrete historical and geographical circumstances, weapons are useful or indispensable to different degrees for attackers and defenders.[19] In a European context *anno* somewhere between 1945 and today, for instance, tanks were indispensable for prospective aggressors, whereas defenders could not do without anti-tank weapons. Military formations (i.e. divisions) may thus differ with respect to their offensive capabilities depending on their weapons mix. Soviet tank armies were thus more capable of offensive operations than their motorized rifle divisions, even though the latter were still too tank- and artillery-heavy for the West's taste. However, an attack not merely requires heavy, mechanized and armoured formations, suitable for breakthrough operations, but also infantry-heavy units by means of which to "mop up" bypassed pockets of defending forces, defend conquered ground, etc. Likewise, a defender needs some heavily armoured forces to forcefully evict an invader, only fewer of them (and perhaps slightly lighter) than an attacker. Also, a defender with international obligations (say,

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[17] The most tank-heavy country in Europe is Switzerland: not a country usually regarded as aggressive. On Swiss defence, see Gustav Däniker, "Die Armee des neutralen Kleinstaates als friedenssichernde Kraft," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1983), pp. 19-26; Gustav Däniker, *Dissuasion. Schweizerische Abhaltestrategie Heute und Morgen*, Frauenfeld: Huber, 1987.

[18] A very comprehensive work on landmines is: The Arms Project & Physicians for Human Rights: *Landmines. A Deadly Legacy*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. See also Paul Cornish, *Antipersonnel Mines. Controlling the Plague of 'Butterflies'*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, International Security Programme, 1994. On the attempts to ban anti-personnel landmines see Jim Wurst, "Land Mines: Inching Toward a Ban," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (March-April 1996), pp. 10-11.

[19] In 1974 the US Army thus assigned the following values to various weapons categories for offence and defence respectively: Tanks 64/55; Armoured personnel carriers 13/6; Anti-tank weapons 27/46; Artillery 72/85; Mortars 37/47; Armed helicopters 33/44. See William Mako, quoted in Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options," in Steven Miller & Sean Lynn-Jones (eds.), *Conventional Forces and American Defence Policy. An International Security Reader*, Revised Edition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989, p. 312.

for collective security obligations, *vide infra*) cannot dispense completely with offensive-capable forces or force components.

A meaningful offence/defence distinction can therefore only be made at the level of postures, i.e. by assessing the relative weight of predominantly offensive and largely defensive units. A relevant parameter is also the strategic reach provided by the totality of the armed forces (including logistics, etc.). An offensive posture is one with the longer reach, for the obvious reason that an attack is about conquering ground whereas defence takes place on the defender's home territory. However, what should count as "long" or "short" depends on context since distances are relative. Whereas only truly long-range mobility matters between, say, Russia and Ukraine, some countries in the "crowded" Middle East may well be concerned about their respective adversaries' ability to traverse much shorter distances. The strategic depth (measured in the distance between the frontier and the capital or major population centres) of Israel is, for instance, less than 50 km, whereas that of Russia is in the range of 1,000 km. But states differ even more than this geostrategically. Island states, for obvious reasons, only need to worry about enemies in possession of navies (and/or long range air forces), etc., whereas landlocked states such as Switzerland need not worry too much about naval powers.

Indeed, for members of alliances, the appropriate level of analysis may be that of the alliance. Here (as well as on lower levels of analysis) various factors other than the weapons mix determine the overall offensive capabilities. NATO's organizational structure, as well as the intermingling of different national force contingents along the Central Front, thus undoubtedly detracted from the Alliance's offensive capability—as does the post-Cold War emphasis on multinationality.[20] The structure of the Warsaw Pact was more suitable for offensive operations: with the Non-Soviet Pact Forces (NSPFs) tightly

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[20] On NATO's "layer-cake" deployment during the Cold War see Jochen Löser, *Weder rot noch tot. Überleben ohne Atomkrieg: Eine Sicherheitspolitische Alternative*, München: Olzog Verlag, 1981, pp. 259-266. On present multinationalism see David Miller, "Multinationality: Implications of NATO's Evolving Strategy," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (March 1991), pp. 211-213; Karl Lowe & Thomas-Durell Young, "Multinational Corps in NATO," *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January-February 1991), pp. 66-77; John Mackinlay, "Improving Multifunctional Forces," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 149-173; Charles Barry, "NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 81-97.

integrated with, and clearly subordinated to, the Soviet armed forces, deployed well forward, etc.[21]

These analytical complexities notwithstanding, complete agnosticism is not warranted, and "everything is *not* in the eyes of the beholder." For a particular region at a particular point in time, informed expert opinion will generally have no trouble reaching agreement on at least the basic criteria. Hence, for instance, the consensus among the states participating in the CFE negotiations on a focus on reductions of main battle tanks (MBTs), armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, subsequently also combat aircraft and helicopters,[22] a focus that may, but need not, be appropriate for other regions, such as the Middle East (*vide infra*).

What ultimately matters is, of course, what states do with their military might, i.e. whether they have offensive or defensive intentions and political ambitions. So long as states feel confident that their neighbours are peaceful and defensively minded, they will not care about their armaments at all—just as, for instance, Denmark does not care about Sweden's military superiority, or Canada about that of the US. Except for such "security communities,"[23] however, states tend to worry about their neighbours' intentions and to be much more comfortable when their neighbours are saturated and status quo-oriented (i.e. defensive) than if they are "revisionist," irredentist, or expansionist. Intentions, however, are not immediately observable, but have to be inferred from circumstantial, but tangible, evidence. One manifestation of whether states

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[21] See David Holloway & Jane M.O. Sharp (eds.), *The Warsaw Pact. Alliance in Transition*, London: Macmillan, 1984, especially Christopher D. Jones, "National Armies and National Sovereignty," pp. 87-110. See also Alfred Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean & Alexander Alexiev, *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1980; Douglas MacGregor, *The Soviet-East German Military Alliance*, Cambridge: University Press, 1989.

[22] For a very detailed analysis of the implications of Soviet unilateral reductions in these weapons categories, as well as of the envisaged CFE reductions, see Joshua M. Epstein, *Conventional Force Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990.

[23] On the concept of "security community," the seminal work was Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. See also Volker Rittberger, Manfred Efinger & Martin Mendler, "Toward an East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 1990), pp. 55-74.

are politically defensive or offensive is their definition of "vital national interests," in defence of which their military power is envisaged to be used.

One might rank such definitions spatially, i.e. according to the required military reach. The longer the reach, the more offensive the intentions. The most defensive level of ambition is to defend only territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Slightly more offensive is the inclusion of overseas possessions (such as colonies), the defence of which may require global reach. The same is the case for a defence of nationals abroad, even though their defence (or rescue) will usually call for, at most, long-range expeditionary forces. It is even more offensive to envisage a defence also of overseas "economic interests" (such as oil), to which states may have no legal entitlement, but the defence of which may require global reach of substantial proportions. Equally offensive is it to envisage what might (euphemistically) be called an "extended perimeter defence," which encompasses a "buffer zone" comprising other states (like the Russian "near abroad"). Very offensive are, of course, ambitions of territorial aggrandizement, such as those of the Third Reich or of Iraq vis-à-vis Kuwait.

Table 1.1: Defensive and Offensive Ambitions

Levels of ambition	Spatial continuum	Temporal continuum
Strictly defensive	Defence of – National territory	Reactive defence
Rather defensive	– Overseas possessions – Nationals abroad	Direct defence
Moderately offensive	– Overseas economic interests	Pre-emption
Rather offensive	Extended defence perimeter	Preventive war
Strictly offensive	Expansion	Aggression

Security political intentions might also be rank-ordered temporally, i.e. according to the envisaged timing of military operations. It is thus clearly more

offensive to launch a premeditated attack than to defend oneself, but the intermediate stages also matter. Preventive war should thus be reckoned as offensive, no matter how defensively motivated. Likewise, it is more offensive to defend oneself in an anticipatory mode (i.e. by pre-empting an attack, as has been Israeli policy until recently) than to merely respond to an attack *ex post facto*. An active, direct defence commencing at the border, however, is entirely defensive, but one might even go one step further in the defensive direction: to a reactive defence that only responds to the attacker's actions at each successive step of the war.

Important though they certainly are, neither political ambitions nor grand strategies are ever completely transparent. States therefore prefer more tangible evidence of the goals of other states, say in the form of strategies and operational concepts. Such evidence is available in different forms. Military postures may, for instance, be seen as "frozen strategies:" they reflect how states intend to fight a future war, or rather (because of the considerable differential time-lag[24]) how they intended to do so, at some point(s) in the past when the choice(s) resulting in the present posture was (were) made. When the USSR, for instance, created the Group of Soviet Forces, and Germany (GSFG) as a very offensive-capable formation, this must have reflected an intention to fight a future war offensively, i.e. by "carrying the war to the enemy" as swiftly as possible.[25] And when their shipyards began constructing aircraft carriers, this must have reflected "blue water" ambitions.[26] Fortunately, because of the

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[24] For excellent analyses of Soviet strategy based on this methodology, see Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987; MccGwire, *Perestroika and Soviet National Security*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991.

[25] John G. Hines & Phillip A. Petersen, "The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe," *Military Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (April 1984), pp. 2-29. Philip A. Petersen, "Soviet Offensive Operations in Central Europe," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 20, No. 8 (August 1987), pp. 26-32. For an alleged empirical validation of the hypothesis, based on archves from the ex-GDR, see Lothar Rühl, "Offensive Defence in the Warsaw Pact," *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 5 (September-October 1991), pp. 442-450.

[26] Robert B. Bathurst, "The Soviet Navy Through Western Eyes," in Philip S. Gillette & William C. Frank, Jr. (eds.), *The Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990, pp. 59-80; Jürgen Rohwer, "Alternating Russian and Soviet Naval Strategies," Philip S. Gillette & William C. Frank, Jr. (eds.), *The Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990, pp. 95-120; Donald C.F. Daniel, "Alternate Models of Soviet Naval Behaviour," Philip S. Gillette & William C. Frank, Jr. (eds.), *The Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990, pp. 237-248. The most

revolutionary progress in information technologies, postures are already today clearly observable by various "national technical means." They will become even more transparent as a result of the recent arms control accomplishments, above all the Open Skies Treaty.[27]

Another reflection of strategies is the pattern of exercises. A state that, for instance, never trains its forces for breakthrough operations probably does not plan to be on the offensive in a future war, and it will almost surely not succeed with improvising such operations in the "fog of war." Hence the rationale for making military manoeuvres transparent, as intended by various confidence-building measures (CBMs) that have been negotiated under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).[28]

Finally, states may willingly reveal their military doctrines and war plans, as was the very purpose of the Vienna Seminars held under the auspices of the CSCE.[29] Such revelations do, of course, lend themselves to deception. If a state

outspoken advocacy of such a naval strategy for the USSR was S.G. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State*, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979; see also Michael MccGwire, "Soviet Naval Doctrine and Strategy," in Derek Leebaert (ed.), *Soviet Military Thinking*, London: George Allan & Unwin, 1981, pp. 125-184; Michael MccGwire, "Gorshkov's Navy," I-II, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 115, No. 8 (August 1989), pp. 44-51, and No. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42-47.

[27] Richard Kokoski, "The Treaty on Open Skies," *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 632-634. The treaty itself is appended in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 653-671.

[28] Among the best analyses of CBMs are still two classics: Jonathan Alford, "Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 149 (1979), pp. 4-13; and Johan Jørgen Holst, "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January-February 1983), pp. 2-15. See also John Borawski, *From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference*, Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1988; John Borawski, *Security for a New Europe. The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures 1989-90, and Beyond*, London: Brassey's, 1992; John Borawski (ed.), *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age. Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability*, Boulder: Westview, 1986; Hans Günter Brauch (ed.), *Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und Europäische Abrüstungskonferenz. Analysen, Dokumente und Vorschläge*, Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1987; Dieter S. Lutz & Erwin Müller (eds.), *Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen. Zur Theorie und Praxis einer sicherheitspolitischen Strategie*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1982; Victor-Yves Ghebaldi, *Confidence-Building Measures Within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes*, UNIDIR Research Paper No. 3, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1989.

[29] Axel Krohn, "The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar," *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 501-511; Zdzislaw Lachowski, "The Second Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrine," *SIPRI Yearbook 1992*, pp. 496-505. See also Manfred R. Hamm & Hartmut Pohlman, "Military Strategy and

has plans to attack others, it will try hard to conceal this, i.e. by claiming to have a strictly defensive military doctrine. However, it will surely be unmasked if the "pieces" do not fit together, i.e. if its posture and/or its manoeuvre practices appear to contradict the proclaimed intentions. It was thus precisely because the pieces *did* fit together, i.e. formed a coherent pattern, that the West eventually came to believe that the USSR had in fact adopted a defensive doctrine.[30]

It is thus possible to discern (the outline of) the war plans of other states, with the implication that a distinction between offensive and defensive strategies, operational concepts and tactics is possible. This leaves us with the question of where to "draw the line," i.e. at which level to demand strict defensiveness.

"Pure defence," i.e. a renunciation of even tactically offensive operations, is close to a contradiction in terms, and in any case unlikely to be effective. However, this is not at all what is being suggested by NOD advocates. On the contrary, in the tactical sense of initiating a greater number of individual engagements, an NOD strategy and posture may allow the defenders to fight *more* rather than less offensively. By taking advantage of shielded positions, well-prepared defenders will be able to gain the upper hand in the concealment-versus-detection contest, also because the attacker cannot possibly renounce movement but has to expose himself by traversing open ground.[31]

Doctrine: Why They Matter to Conventional Arms Control," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 185-198.

[30] On the Soviet defensive doctrine, see Gerald Holden, *Soviet Military Reform. Conventional Disarmament and the Crisis of Militarized Socialism*, London: Pluto, 1991; Raymond Garthoff, *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990; MccGwire, *op. cit.* (1991) n. 24; Gerard Snel, *From the Atlantic to the Urals. The Reorientation of Soviet Military Strategy, 1981-1990*, Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1996; Christoph Bluth, *The Collapse of Soviet Military Power*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995. Much more sceptical, yet reluctantly convinced, is Gerhard Wettig, *Changes in Soviet Policy Towards the West*, London: Pinter, 1991; see also Ole Diehl, *Die Strategiediskussion in der Sowjetunion. Zum Wandel der sowjetischen Kriegsführungskonzeption in den achtziger Jahren*, Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 1993.

[31] See Robert Neild, "The Implications of the Increasing Accuracy of Non-Nuclear Weapons," in Joseph Rotblat & Ubiratan d'Ambrosio (eds.), *World Peace and the Developing Countries. Annals of Pugwash 1985*, London: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 93-106.

Defensiveness is largely a matter of the timing and scale of counter-offensive operations.[32] Here, a very clear line of demarcation recommends itself to distinguish between offensive and defensive levels of ambition, namely the international border. Strictly defensive, NOD-type defence needs the ability to forcefully evict an invader (presupposing that the forward defence has been penetrated) and restore the *status quo ante bellum*. Also, it may require capabilities for occasional "hot pursuits" across the border. However, it does surely not need the ability to pursue the invader onto his own territory in order to enforce an unconditional surrender. Large-scale ("strategic") counter-offensives should thus be ruled out, both for this purpose and for punitive reasons. "Punishment" as a strategic objective is neither defensive, nor likely to achieve other objectives than revenge, which one may, of course, regard as a form of "justice." The present author, however, does not. Whatever "punishment" may be required should be administered by international authorities in accordance with international law, and would usually consist of reparations.[33] Even though a few NOD proponents have flirted with the notion of "counter-invasions" (couched in terms of "conditional offensive superiority"[34]) this is both unwarranted and entirely incompatible with NOD, above all because the "counter" would tend to be invisible, and the required capabilities hence indistinguishable from genuine offensive ones.

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[32] See Andrei A. Kokoshin & Valentin Larionov, "Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic Interrelations," in Marlies ter Borg & Wim Smit (eds.), *Non-provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies*, Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989, pp. 35-44. For a terminological clarification see Brian Holden Reid, "The Counter-Offensive: a Theoretical and Historical Perspective," in Brian Holden Reid & Michael Dewar (eds.), *Military Strategy in a Changing Europe*, London: Brassey's, 1991, pp. 143-160; J.J.G. Mackenzie, "The Counter-Offensive," Brian Holden Reid & Michael Dewar (eds.), *Military Strategy in a Changing Europe*, London: Brassey's, 1991, pp. 161-180.

[33] On the distinction between deterrence by punishment and denial see Glenn Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

[34] Albrecht A.C. von Müller, "Structural Stability at the Central Front," in Anders Boserup, Ludvig Christensen & Ove Nathan (eds.), *The Challenge of Nuclear Armaments, Essays Dedicated to Niels Bohr and His Appeal for an Open World*, Copenhagen: Rhodos International Publishers, 1986, pp. 239-256, especially pp. 253-254. This notion is very reminiscent of, probably inspired by, the proposals in Samuel Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," in Steven E. Miller (ed.), *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy. An International Security Reader*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 251-275. The latter was criticized as beyond NATO's means in Keith A. Dunn & William O. Staudenmaier, "The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO," *Survival*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (May-June 1985), pp. 108-118.

4. Defensive Strength

Even though meaningful distinctions can thus be made between offensive and defensive strategies and postures, it does not follow that the two can actually be disentangled without detrimental effects on defence efficiency. Moreover, if the relinquishment of offensive capabilities inevitably comes at the expense of defensive strength many states will be well-advised *not* to adopt NOD as their guideline.

Fortunately, as a general rule (with allowance for possible exceptions), it is in fact possible to strengthen one's defences while building down offensive capabilities, simply because the defensive form of combat is inherently the strongest, as already pointed out by Clausewitz.[35] To make it actually stronger requires skills and specialization, which is what NOD is all about:

• There are capabilities which a "pure" defender no longer needs, or at least needs much less. To relinquish them will (in the medium-to-long term, at least) allow for savings that may be utilized for enhancing defensive strength. Examples of such largely superfluous capabilities are long-range mobility (including logistics), the ability to move about under enemy fire (requiring armour, mobile air defence, etc.), and long-range striking power (including Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence, C^3I, systems, etc.). Since such capabilities happen to be among the most costly, quite a lot of defensive strength (anti-tank and air defence weapons, for instance) may be purchased from the savings.

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[35] Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Ungekürzter Text nach der Erstauflage (1832-1834), Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1980, pp. 360-371 (Book VI.1-3), especially p. 361; pp. 357-366/358 in the English translation: *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. See also Azar Gat, "Clausewitz on Defence and Attack," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 20-26; Raymond Aron, *Clausewitz. Philosopher of War*, London: Routledge, 1983, pp. 144-171. The point about defensive supremacy has occasionally been couched in terms of a presumed "Three-to-One rule," according to which an attacker will need a superiority in excess of 3:1 in order to break through prepared defences. See John J. Mearsheimer, "Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance," *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185; John J. Mearsheimer, "Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; Joshua M. Epstein, "The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 90-127; Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen & John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment," *International Security*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 128-179.

• A number of material "force multipliers" will be available to a defender, representing "home ground advantages:" interior lines of communications and supply; the options of relying on distributed depots for munitions, etc., of building various types of fortifications and of constructing barriers, and even of a certain landscaping.[36]

• The "moral" advantages are also considerable. The defenders will enjoy the support (morally, materially and otherwise) of the population. In many countries, this support may be personified in militia-type home guard forces, which will add considerably to the available manpower pool.[37] However, the implied "arming of the population" may not be advisable under all circumstances, especially not in countries torn by internal strife.

• Defenders are able to exercise under more realistic conditions, since they know exactly where they will have to fight.

• Command structures may be decentralized, thereby made more robust than the very hierarchical ones that an aggressor tends to rely on.[38]

• Certain trends in the development of modern weapons technologies tend to benefit the defender disproportionately: the revolutionary development

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[36] On the effect of barriers, see Epstein: *op. cit.* n. 22, pp. 67-72; William W. Kaufmann, "Non-nuclear Deterrence," in John D. Steinbruner & Leon V. Sigal (eds.), *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question,* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983, pp. 43-90, especially p. 68; Richard E. Simpkin, *Race to the Swift. Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare*, London: Brassey's, 1986, pp. 57-77; Raj Gupta, *Defense Positioning and Geometry. Rules for a World with Low Force Levels*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993. On landscaping, i.e. terrain modification for defence purposes, see, Philip Webber, *New Defence Strategies for the 1990s. From Confrontation to Coexistence*, London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 197, 211; James M. Garrett, *The Tenuous Balance. Conventional Forces in Central Europe*, Boulder: Westview, 1989, pp. 213-230.

[37] On the Swiss militia, see Benedict Cramer, "Dissuassion infra-nucléaire. L'armée de milice suisse: mythes et réalités stratégiques," *Cahiers d'Etudes Stratégiques*, No. 4, Paris: CIRPES, (1984). On proposals for German militias, see Detlef Bald (ed.), *Militz als Vorbild? Zum Reservistenkonzept der Bundeswehr*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1987; Detlef Bald & Paul Klein (eds.), *Wehrstruktur der neunziger Jahre. Reservistenarmee, Miliz oder . . . ?*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1988.

[38] John Grin, *Military-Technological Choices and Political Implications. Command and Control in Established NATO Posture and a Non-Provocative Defence*, Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990.

in micro-electronics, for instance, allows for miniaturization which, in its turn, may render the large weapons platforms superfluous for defensive purposes, while they remain indispensable for offensive operations. Even though it is certainly premature to write off the tank or the major surface combatants as obsolete, they may nevertheless be facing obsolescence (in the sense of declining cost-effectiveness) in the coming decades.[39]

5. The Span of Models

How effective NOD will be depends, of course, on which particular model (or mixture of models) is selected for implementation. Just as they are not equally defensive, NOD models are also not equally effective,[40] and their suitability is context-dependent (*vide infra*). The variety of NOD models is

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[39] It was, in fact, the good performance of anti-tank PGMs in the 1973 Yom Kippur war that spurred interest in NOD in the mid-1970s. See, James Digby, "Precision-Guided Munitions," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 118 (1975). See also Gunilla Herolf, "Anti-tank Missiles," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1983*, pp. 245-266; Gunilla Herolf "New Technology Favours Defence," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 44, No. 7 (September 1988), pp. 42-45; Steven L. Canby, "New Conventional Force Technology and the NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance: Part 1," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 188 (1985), pp. 7-24; Steven L. Canby, "Conventional Weapon Technologies," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1987*, pp. 85-95; Steven L. Canby, "Weapons for Land Warfare," in Møller & Wiberg (eds.) *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 74-84; Otfried Ischebeck, "Der Kampfpanzer der Zukunft," in Erwin Müller & Götz Neuneck (eds.), *Rüstungsmodernisierung und Rüstungskontrolle. Neue Technologien, Rüstungsdynamik und Stabilität*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1991, pp. 233-248; Otfried Ischebeck, "Evolution of Tanks and Anti-Tank Weapons: Assessment of Offence-Defence Dynamics and Arms Control Options," in Wim A. Smit, John Grin & Lev Voronkov (eds.), *Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a Changing World. Politically Assessing and Influencing Weapon Innovation and Military Research and Development*, Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992, pp. 177-196. For an only slightly less sanguine view, see Richard E. Simpkin, "Tank Warfare. The Last Decades of the Dinosaurs," in Ken Perkins (ed.), *Weapons and Warfare. Conventional Weapons and Their Role in Battle*, London: Brassey's, 1987, pp. 165-192.

[40] For a comparison of various NOD-type force components with traditional military units, see Hans W. Hofmann, Reiner K. Huber & Karl Steiger, "On Reactive Defense Options. A Comparative Systems Analysis of Alternatives for the Initial Defense against the First Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe," in Reiner K. Huber (ed.), *Modelling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe. Assessment of Improvement Options*, New York: Plenum, 1986, pp. 97-140; Reiner K. Huber & Hans Hofmann, "The Defence Efficiency Hypothesis and Conventional Stability in Europe: Implications for Arms Control," in Anders Boserup & Robert Neild (eds.), *The Foundations of Defensive Defence*, London: Macmillan, 1990, pp. 109-132.

large, even though most deal with one particular country, namely Germany.[41]
There are three archetypal models as well as a plethora of combinations:

1. Area-covering territorial defence as in the seminal proposal of Horst
Afheldt,[42] or the more effective "spider and web" concept of the SAS
(Study Group Alternative Security Policy, to which the present author
belongs). The latter envisages a combination of an area-covering defence
web with mobile forces ("spiders"), including tanks and other armoured
vehicles. Even though the latter are *per se* suitable for offensive operations,
they are made dependent on the web, hence very mobile within, but
virtually not beyond it, i.e. on enemy ground.[43]

2. Stronghold defence (also known as "selective area defence" or "bastion-
type defence"), as suggested by members of the SAS group for the Middle
East and other regions with low force-to-space ratios and/or long borders.[44]
This implies concentrating the defence on certain areas that are politically
important (typically the approaches to the national capital or other major
populations centres) and/or which allow for a cohesive defence. The fire

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[41] The most comprehensive account of NOD, in the form of a reference work, is Bjørn
Møller, *Dictionary of Alternative Defense*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995. For an analysis of all
the German models (which remain the majority of all available proposals), see Bjørn Møller, *op.
cit.* n. 1.

[42] Horst Afheldt, *Verteidigung und Frieden: Politik mit militärischen Mitteln*,
München/Wien: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1976; Horst Afheldt, *Defensive Verteidigung*, Reinbek:
Rowohlt, 1983.

[43] SAS (Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik), *Strukturwandel der Verteidigung:
Entwürfe für eine konsequente Defensive*, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984; SAS
Vertrauensbildende Verteidigung. Reform deutscher Sicherheitspolitik, Gerlingen: Bleicher
Verlag, 1989. Good introductions to the SAS model, written by its chairman, are Lutz
Unterseher, "Defending Europe: Toward a Stable Conventional Deterrent," in Henry Shue (ed.),
Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, Critical Choices for American Strategy, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 293-342; John Grin & Lutz Unterseher "The Spiderweb
Defense," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 44, No. 7 (September 1988), pp. 28-31. The
most recent version, applied to the former Warsaw Pact States is SAS & PDA (Project on
Defense Alternatives), *Confidence-building Defense. A Comprehensive Approach to Security and
Stability in the New Era. Application to the Newly Sovereign States of Europe*, Cambridge, MA:
PDA, Commonwealth Institute, 1994.

[44] Carl Conetta, Charles Knight & Lutz Unterseher, "Toward Defensive Restructuring in
the Middle East," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 115-134.

coverage afforded by the units in the strongholds will, at least, channel the attack, thereby making it more manageable for the mobile forces.

3. Forward defence, for instance by means of a "fire barrier," as suggested by Norbert Hannig[45] and/or by means of fortifications and fixed obstacles along the border. Without mobile ground forces that are capable of taking and holding ground, such a defence may be entirely non-offensive even if long-range striking power (aircraft, missiles) is included.

Besides these, we have what might be called an approach rather than a model, because it says nothing—not even in abstract terms—about the configuration or deployment of forces, but only about their inherent synergies:

4. The "inverted synergy" (or "missing link") approach, according to which an otherwise offensive force posture may become strictly defensive by the absence of one or several components, for instance long-range and/or mobile air defence capability, mobile anti-tank defence, or river-crossing equipment.[46]

All three-and-a-half models have their strengths and weaknesses, hence the attraction of combining elements of them into, hopefully, more effective conglomerates. The mode of combination that has attracted the greatest attention in Europe has been the following, which may also prove most immediately relevant for the Middle East.

5. Disengagement, implying the withdrawal of certain forces (usually the most offensive-capable ones) from the border area to rearward locations, combined with a forward defence by strictly defensive means: typically

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[45] Norbert Hannig, *Abschreckung durch konventionelle Waffen: Das David-und-Goliath Prinzip*, Berlin: Berlin-Verlag Arno Spitz, 1984.

[46] Erwin Müller, "Dilemma Sicherheitspolitik. Tradierte Muster westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik und Alternativoptionen: Ein Problem- und Leistungsvergleich," in Erwin Müller (ed.), *Dilemma Sicherheit. Beiträge zur Diskussion über militärische Alternativkonzepte*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1984, pp. 53-170; Erwin Müller, "Konventionelle Stabilität durch Strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit," in Erwin Müller & Götz Neuneck (eds.), *Abrüstung und Konventionelle Stabilität in Europa*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990, pp. 75-80.

tantamount to a tank-free zone in the border region, to be defended by infantry armed with anti-tank weaponry, or otherwise.[47]

The attractions of disengagement derive from the fact that it eliminates options of surprise attack and contributes to confidence-building. The depletion zone simply provides early warning, since one side's deployment of proscribed weapons and forces into the zone will alert the other, allowing him to mobilize and prepare for combat. The same logic might suggest the following, that might be called:

> 6. "Stepping down," implying that the general level of readiness should be reduced: forces should be cadred (i.e. through a shift to a reserve army system) or otherwise prevented from launching surprise attacks, say by a separation of munitions from weapons.

However, the advantages resulting from disengagement as well as from "stepping down" have to be weighed against the risk of malign interactions in a crisis period. If the forces withdrawn from the forward line are those with the greatest offensive capability (as in most proposals), to redeploy them into the zone for defensive purposes in an intense political crisis could easily be misinterpreted as preparations for an attack. Counter-intuitive though it may seem, stability may thus require offensive-capable forces to be stationed close to their planned combat positions in a high state of readiness, while the defensive forces may safely be cadred and stationed in the rear.

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[47] Examples of such disengagement models are Eckhardt Afheldt, "Verteidigung ohne Selbstmord. Vorschlag für den Einsatz einer leichten Infanterie," in Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (ed.), *Die Praxis der defensiven Verteidigung*, Hameln: Sponholz, 1984, pp. 41-88; Andreas Bülow, "Defensive Entanglement: An Alternative Strategy for NATO," in Andrew J. Pierre (ed.), *The Conventional Defense of Europe: New Technologies and New Strategies*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 112-151; Andreas Bülow, "Vorschlag für eine Bundeswehrstruktur der 90er Jahre. Auf dem Weg zur konventionellen Stabilität," in Andreas Bülow, Helmut Funk & Albrecht A.C. von Müller, *Sicherheit für Europa*, Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1988, pp. 95-110; Jochen Löser, *Weder rot noch tot. Überleben ohne Atomkrieg: Eine Sicherheitspolitische Alternative*, München: Olzog Verlag, 1981; Barnaby & Boeker, *loc. cit.* n. 8; Albrecht A.C. von Müller, "Integrated Forward Defence. Outline of a Modified Conventional Defence for Central Europe," in Hylke W. Tromp (ed.), *Non-Nuclear War in Europe. Alternatives for Nuclear Defence*, Groningen: Polemological Institute, 1986, pp. 201-224; Sverre Lodgaard & Per Berg, "Disengagement in Central Europe," in Joseph Rotblat & Sven Hellman (eds.), *Nuclear Strategy and World Security. The Annals of Pugwash 1984*, London: Macmillan, 1985, pp. 242-259.

The present author's experience with debates on NOD suggests that a caveat is in order at this point: most of the models above have either been designed for a particular context, or remain very abstract. Were one to simply transpose them to quite a different setting (as has occasionally been done by NOD critics) one is bound to arrive at absurd results. As all abstract defence models, NOD models are not to be confused with actual defence planning, for which they are merely conceived as politico-military guidelines. Also, whereas modelling is a legitimate task for "armchair strategists," actual defence planning should remain the prerogative of professionals, i.e. General Staffs, albeit under political control.

Table 1.2: Concepts, Terms and Models

NOD and common security	Philosophy			Strategy			
Terms	Common security	Mutual security	Cooperative security	NOD: non-offensive defence	CBD: confidence-building defence	Defensive defence	SIA: Structural inability to attack
Concept		Common security				NOD	
Models (pure)	Non-military applications			Territorial defence	Stronghold defence	Forward defence	Inverted synergy
Blends					Disen-gagement	Stepping down	
Defence Plans				Country A	Country B	Country C	Country N

6. Nuclear Weapons and/or Collective Security

While some NOD advocates have portrayed their proposals as "alternatives to deterrence," others (including the present author) see NOD as a means of making the best of a situation of general or "existential" deterrence, which will never disappear. The nuclear genie is out of its bottle for good and can never be reliably put back again, since the knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons is readily available. Recent experience with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) controls (Iraq and North Korea, for instance) also does

not exactly warrant complacency about the detection of clandestine nuclear weapons programmes in the future.

States therefore have to reckon with the possibility that their respective adversaries (or the friends and allies of the latter) just might have some nuclear weapons, by means of which they might "snatch mutual annihilation from the claws of defeat." Hence, wars can no longer be won in quite the same sense as in the "Clausewitzian era" of "absolute war." Henceforth, limited wars fought in the "shadow" of nuclear weapons, i.e. in a "subnuclear setting," are the name of the game.[48]

Deterrence is thus a "a fact," from which observation some have drawn the conclusion that nuclear disarmament is impractical. This is, however, a *non sequitur*: If the *fact* of deterrence remains, no matter what, then states will have a considerable margin of choice with regard to the doctrine and expression of deterrence (an observation with implications for Israel, *vide infra*). Some argue that "minimum deterrence," accompanied by policies of no-first-use, suffice for "existential deterrence." Others (including the present author) are prepared to go even further, namely to a weaponless "blueprint deterrence," i.e. a deterrence based entirely on the potential of nuclear weapons, yet without their actual deployment or existence.[49] Whether to opt for one or the other is probably a matter of conjecture, since there is no empirical evidence of either one or the other. As succinctly pointed out by Bruce Russett: "When deterrence fails, you

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[48] Neild, *op. cit.* n. 16, pp. 46-73.

[49] On "existential deterrence," see McGeorge Bundy, "Existential Deterrence and its Consequences," in Douglas Maclean (ed.), *The Security Gamble*, Totowa N. J.: Rowman & Allanhead, 1986, pp. 3-13. See also Bruce M. Russett, "Between General and Immediate Deterrence," in Aharon Klieman & Ariel Levite (eds.), *Deterrence in the Middle East. Where Theory and Practice Converge*, Boulder: Westview, 1993, pp. 34-44. On existential deterrence without nuclear weapons, i.e. "blueprint deterrence," see Jonathan Schell, *The Abolition*, London: Picador, 1984, p. 119. See also James N. Miller, "Zero and Minimal Nuclear Weapons," in Joseph S. Nye Jr., Graham T. Allison & Albert Carnesale (eds.), *Fateful Visions. Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe*, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988, pp. 11-32; and Ken Booth & Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Beyond Nuclearism," in Regina Owen Karp (ed.), *Security Without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 21-55.

know it; when deterrence succeeds, you may not know why it succeeded, and you may not even know that it succeeded."[50]

Be that as it may, neither under minimum nor "blueprint" deterrence is there any need for nuclear weapons for military, i.e. war-fighting purposes, implying that conventional forces should be seen as "stand-alone" forces. Whatever underpinning the conventional power of a small state might need vis-à-vis larger states would have to be provided by other means, say in the form of alliances and/or collective security arrangements.

Alliances, however, are either directed against somebody else (often for good reasons), i.e. adversarial; or they are superfluous; or they may, finally, be something completely different *in embryo*, namely collective security arrangements.[51] There is nothing wrong with adversarial alliances as such, but they tend to simply transpose the problems providing their *raison d'être* to a higher level, because alignment breeds counter-alignment. Instead of malign security dilemma-type interactions between states, we tend to end up with the same type of interactions, accompanied by the same type of risks and costs, only between alliances. This may well be a short-term solution for individual states, but it is hardly a long-term solution for either the international system as such or for any of its regional subsystems.

Non-adversarial alliances directed against no serious external threat are utterly superfluous, which does not mean that they will automatically wither away, because of institutional inertia. Such alliances face the choice between finding another credible threat against whom (or which) to direct the common effort of their members, or of undergoing a profound metamorphosis: from alliances to collective security arrangements. The latter should preferably incorporate former adversaries and ideally be all-encompassing, if only within a region. This would seem to be a rather accurate description of the choices the

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[50] Russett, *loc. cit.* n. 49, p. 38.

[51] On the theory of alliances, see George Liska, *Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence*, Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962; Riker, William H., *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962; Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1987; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (1984), pp. 461-495; Thomas J. Christensen & Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," *International Organization*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is presently facing after the dissolution of the USSR. With the establishment of first the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and subsequently the Partnership for Peace (PFP), NATO seems (according to a benevolent interpretation at least) to be slowly transforming itself into a future pan-European collective security arrangement.[52]

This has also been the solution recommended by most NOD advocates, including the present author. It allows all states parties to the system to feel secure with much less military power than if they were to field a "stand alone" defence, something that is prohibitively demanding for most states under conditions of multipolarity.[53] A collective security arrangement consists of two elements: an obligation to refrain from the use of military force against other member states; and a binding commitment to assist members who are nevertheless victims of aggression, whether from the outside (i.e. non-members) or the inside, i.e. from member states, in violation of the former obligation.

Since this is a very attractive arrangement, measured by almost any standards, disputes have tended to focus on whether or not it is politically

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[52] Guido Gerosa, "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council," *European Security*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 273-294; John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and Beyond," *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April 1995), pp. 233-246; Nick Williams, "Partnership for Peace: Permanent Fixture or Declining Asset?," *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 98-110; Hugh De Santis, "Romancing NATO: Partnership for Peace and East European Stability," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (December 1994), pp. 61-81; P.J.F. Scofield, "Partnership for Peace: The NATO Initiative of January 1994. A View from the Partnership Coordination Cell," *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 141, No. 2 (April 1996), pp. 8-15.

[53] See Bjørn Møller, "What is Defensive Security? Non-Offensive Defence and Stability in a Post-Bipolar World," *Working Papers*, No. 10, Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, (1992); Reiner K. Huber, "Military Stability of Multipolar International Systems: An Analysis of Military Potentials in Post-Cold War Europe," Neubiberg: Institut für Angewandte Systemforschung und Operations Research. Fakultät für Informatik. Universität der Bundeswehr München (June 1993); Reiner K. Huber & Rudolf Avenhaus, "Problems of Multipolar International Stability," in Reiner K. Huber & Rudolf Avenhaus (eds.) *International Stability in a Multipolar World: Issues and Models for Analysis*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993, pp. 11-20. For an interesting analysis of multipolarity in the former eastern bloc, see Reiner K. Huber & Otto Schindler, "Military Stability of Multipolar Power Systems: An Analytical Concept for Its Assessment, exemplified for the Case of Poland, Byelarus, the Ukraine and Russia," Reiner K. Huber & Rudolf Avenhaus (eds.) *International Stability in a Multipolar World: Issues and Models for Analysis*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993, pp. 155-180.

feasible,[54] a profoundly political question that I shall bypass at this stage. However, whether global or regional, and regardless of its political nature, such a collective security system needs armed forces at its disposal. Such "collective security forces" might consist, first of all, of a standing contingent of truly multinational rapid deployment forces, above all for "flag-waving missions." However, it does not appear realistic, for the near future, to envisage such multinational forces numbering more than tens of thousands. Such forces might still prove valuable, especially if deployed preventively in areas threatened by impending attack.

As far as militarily more demanding operations are concerned, such as the restoration of the territorial integrity of a state under attack, the system would probably have to rely on larger forces that are under national command in peacetime, but earmarked and trained for multinational operations.[55] Preferably

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[54] For a historical account see Inis L. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organization*, New York: Random House, 1984, pp. 21-40; LeRoy A. Bennett, *International Organizations. Principles and Issues*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1995, pp. 8-14; George W. Downs, "Beyond the Debate on Collective Security," in George W. Downs (ed.), *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994, pp. 1-13; Charles Lipson, "Is the Future of Collective Security Like the Past?," in George W. Downs (ed.), *Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994, pp. 105-131; Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe,"*International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, "The Promise of Collective Security," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 52-61; Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Collective Security in a Changing World*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1993; Andrew Butfoy, Themes "Within the Collective Security Idea," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1993), pp. 490-510; Thomas R. Cusack & Richard J. Stoll, "Collective Security and State Survival in the Interstate System," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 33-59; George W. Downs (ed.),*Collective Security Beyond the Cold War*, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1994; Espen Gullikstad, "Collective Security in Post-Cold War Europe," *NUPI Report*, No. 176, Oslo: NUPI (1994). For a more sceptical view, see Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Mark T. Clark, "The Trouble with Collective Security," *Orbis*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 237-258.

[55] On "peacekeeping plus" and peace-making, the central document is the report of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (17 June 1992), "An Agenda for Peace," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 66-80. See also Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "*An Agenda for Peace*: One Year Later," *Orbis*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 323-332; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5 (1992/93), pp. 89-102; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to An Agenda For Peace. Report of the Secretary-general

these forces should be placed under direct UN command and their deployment should be planned in advance, e.g. by a reinvigorated UN Military Staff Committee.[56] As far as the near future is concerned, however, it may be more realistic to envisage regional organizations such as NATO operating on behalf of the UN (as in the ex-Yugoslavia).

One problem with pragmatic solutions such as this is that countries cannot possibly come to each other's rescue by means of only defensive forces, specialized in fighting from prepared positions on their home territory. On the contrary, they need long-range mobility, the ability to repulse an aggressor and reconquer lost territory so as to restore the *status quo ante bellum*. These offensive capabilities have to be substantial, also because an aggressor will enjoy some of the aforementioned advantages: after the invasion, the attacker may assume defensive positions on the conquered piece of land, lay minefields, etc., thereby forcing the "real defender" to operate offensively, i.e. at a disadvantage.[57]

The paradox that stability and peace thus requires, at the same time, a thorough defensive restructuring and significant offensive capabilities represents a real dilemma. Moreover, no obvious solution is to be found in either qualitative or quantitative terms: it is not enough to have "just a little offensive capability," when the liberation of conquered territory may require a lot, and when even a little may frighten one's small neighbours. Nor is it adequate to limit oneself to "only slightly offensive" forces, which might well be so offensive as to constitute a threat to one's immediate neighbours, yet insufficiently so to liberate more distant collective security partners.

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on the Work of the Organization," 3 January 1995, *UN Documents*, A/50/60-S/1995/1; Roger Hill, "Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping," *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 45-65; Daniel Warner (ed.), *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995; Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping. Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War*, New York: St. Martin's Press and Council of Foreign Relations, 1995.

[56] Eric Grove, "UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee. A Look Back," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 172-182; Jane Boulden, "Prometheus Unborn: The History of the Military Staff Committee," *Aurora Papers*, No. 19, Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Centre for Global Security, (1993).

[57] See the entries on "Offensive-Turned-Defensive," "Defence Dominance" and "Three-to-One-Rule" in Møller, *op. cit.* (1995) n. 41; or John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 134-164.

The answer to this dilemma lies in the political framework: collective security does not presuppose that states possess offensive capabilities individually, only that they do so collectively. Furthermore, offensive capabilities are a reflection of synergies: tanks, for instance (often erroneously regarded as "offensive weapons" *par excellence*), are not offensive if operating on their own, since they need air cover, shielding infantry, a functioning C³I system, a logistic "tail" to provide them with fuel and ammunition, bridge-building equipment to cross water obstacles, etc. Combat aircraft, even fighter bombers, are unable to "consummate" a victory, hence (according to many analysts, at least) constitute no offensive capability unless combined with land forces able to take and hold ground. Navies are even less in a position to invade and conquer ground, unless they contain amphibious forces and are followed by real land forces that are able to exploit a bridgehead for a full-scale invasion, etc.

If all states were to abandon one or several elements of what would otherwise be tantamount to an offensive capability, they would be defensive for all practical purposes (cf. above on the "inverted synergy approach"). They might, on the other hand, contribute to a multinational offensive capability by providing indispensable elements thereof, as illustrated in Table 1.3. The teaming up of, individually defensive, forces from several nations for offensive-capable joint task forces will, of course, require planning and drill.

Table 1.3: NOD and Common Security

STATE A		REGIONAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY	State B	
National defence	CS contribution		CS contribution	National defence
Defensive forces	*Offensive component I*	*Offensive-capable Task Force*	*Offensive component II*	*Defensive forces*
Defensive forces	*Offensive component III*		*Offensive component IV*	*Defensive forces*
National defence	CS contribution	*Offensive-capable Task Force*	CS contribution	National defence
STATE C		GLOBAL COLLECTIVE SECURITY	STATE D	

However, the required exercises might come to replace those of the former alliances, thus not involving "new" expenses. Indeed, they might constitute "confidence-building measures" in their own right, since they would force former adversaries to collaborate. Finally, the force contingent from each state will tend to be rather small, and hence not prohibitively costly.

7. The Mode of Implementation

If a state reaches the conclusion that NOD (*cum* collective security) is worth implementing, it faces a choice between several possible modes of implementing it. In principle, there are three different modes of voluntary implementation, besides that of enforced defensive restructuring, as occasionally seen in the aftermath of major wars.[58] These three modes are: negotiated arms control, strict unilateralism, and what might be called "informal arms control."

NOD proponents have traditionally been sceptical (to say the least) about negotiated arms control, because of the many pitfalls inherent in this approach, above all the unwarranted emphasis on "balance."[59] Even in a bipolar environment, a balance is hard to define, *inter alia* because of the incommensurability between different types of forces and weapons, the often asymmetrical structure of the two sides compared, and the importance of unquantifiable factors such as the quality of weapons, the morale of troops and the reliability of allies. Balance will be even harder to recognize than to define, because of the propensity for worst-case analysis and "double standards." states, for instance, tend to compare their own standing forces with an opponent's mobilizable potential, etc. Finally, even if it were to be definable and recognizable, balance would constitute both too little and too much for all concerned. Too little, because a surprise attack might still overwhelm any defence, also in the case of evenly matched forces; too much, because a well-prepared defender could do with less than parity, by virtue of the intrinsic advantages of the defence.

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58   Fred Tanner (ed.), *From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament Control of Defeated States*, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1992.

59   See Møller, *op. cit.* (1992) n. 7, pp. 79-84; Robert Neild, "The Case Against Arms Negotiations and for a Reconsideration of Strategy," in Hylke Tromp (ed.), *War in Europe. Nuclear and Conventional Perspectives*, Aldershot: Gower, 1989, pp. 119-140.

Until around 1987, this theoretically founded scepticism about the prospects of arms control seemed to receive empirical support from the meagre accomplishments of East-West arms control negotiations,[60] hence the attraction of strict unilateralsm. NOD proponents have thus urged states to simply adopt an NOD strategy without further ado, simply because it is the most effective. Regardless of the respective adversary's response, the situation would be stabilized because incentives for pre-emptive attack would be removed. The main problem with such suggestions was, however, that they were addressed to the wrong side, namely NATO, i.e. the clearly more defensively oriented of the two opposing alliances. What would have really improved the situation in Europe however, would have been a Soviet abandonment of its very offensive strategy.[61]

Nevertheless, in light of the Soviet intransigence until Gorbachev's takeover, it seemed futile to directly urge the Soviet Union to change strategy, hence the attraction of option three. Modest but unconditional conciliatory overtures (say in the form of a limited arms "build-down") should be accompanied by an invitation to the respective adversary to reciprocate, and a promise to reward such reciprocation. In the East-West conflict, NOD might presumably have been one element in such a gradualist strategy of confidence-building, tension reduction and disarmament. By abandoning certain offensive elements in its own strategy and posture, NATO might have presumably induced the USSR to reciprocate in the form of a gradual abandonment of its offensive strategy.[62]

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[60] See April Carter, *Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1989.

[61] Stephan Tiedtke, "Alternative Military Defence Strategies as a Component of Detente and Ostpolitik," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January 1984), pp. 13-24; Stephan Tiedtke, "Abschreckung und ihre Alternativen. Die sowjettische Sicht einer westlichen Debatte," *Texte und Materialien der Forschungsstätte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft*, Reihe A, 20, Heidelberg: F.E. St., 1986.

[62] On gradualism, see Charles E. Osgood, *An Alternative to War or Surrender*, Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1962; Amitai Etzioni, *The Hard Way to Peace. A New Strategy*, New York: Collier Books, 1962; Volker Böge & Peter Wilke, *Sicherheitspolitische Alternativen. Bestandaufnahme und Vorschläge zur Diskussion*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1984, pp. 19-56; Alexander L. George, "Strategies for Facilitating Cooperation," in Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley & Alexander Dallin (eds.), *U.S.—Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 692-711; Robert C. Johansen, "Unilateral Initiatives," in Richard Dean Burns (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, Vol. 1-3, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993, Vol. 1, pp. 507-519;

II. The Middle East and Europe Compared

Having by now provided a fairly elaborate account of the general concept of NOD, the question remains whether it is applicable (*mutatis mutandis*) to the Middle East, and more precisely to the Arab-Israeli conflict, even though it was originally conceived for quite a different setting, namely Europe during the Cold War. I shall approach this question via a comparison of the two regions along several dimensions: the political, the geographical, the economical, the cultural and the military dimension. Even though Europe and the Middle East have something in common, the differences between the two are equally obvious.

Politically, during the Cold War the European countries were saturated and had acquiesced in the territorial status quo, codified *inter alia* in the German *Ostverträge* and in the Helsinki document of 1975, and manifested in the policies of détente pursued by all significant states through the 1970s and 1980s. In the Middle East, however "status quo" has remained "an essentially contested concept:"

•   When should one start "counting?" In 1947, 1948, 1967, or at some other juncture. The choice has profound territorial implications, above all for Israel and the Palestinians, but also for Syria, Egypt and Jordan.

•   It is far from obvious to its neighbours that Israel is territorially saturated, even within the post-1967 borders, because of the Likud's and orthodox and/or extremist groupings' continuous talk about a "Eretz Israel."[63]

Joshua S. Goldstein & John R. Freeman, *Three-Way Street. Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics*, Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1990.

[63] See the excellent work by Shmuel Sandler, *The State of Israel, the Land of Israel. The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993; or Boas Evron, *Jewish State or Israeli Nation?*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995; Ian S. Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands. Britain and Ireland, France and Algerie, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 352-384; David Newman, "Overcoming the Psychological Barrier: The Role of Images in War and Peace," in Nurit Kliot & Stanley Waterman (eds.), *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace*, London: Belhaven Press, 1991, pp. 201-216; Baruch A. Kipnis, "Geographical Perspectives of Peace Alternatives for the Land of Israel," in Nurit Kliot & Stanley Waterman (eds.), *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace*, London: Belhaven Press, 1991, pp. 217-228; Julian Walter, "Boundaries in the Middle East," in M. Jane Davis (ed.), *Politics and International*

- The stateless Palestinians are also committed to overturning the status quo, by establishing either a Palestinian state or, at a minimum, some state-like political structure. In either case, it will almost inevitably be at the expense of Israel[64] (see Table 1.4 for a comparison of different "Israels" and "Palestines").

Table 1.4: Israeli and Palestinian States

Compatibility between "Israels" and "Palestines"	*The* Palestine	*A* Palestine	Palestinian autonomy in:		
			Israel	Confe-deration	"Interna-tional"
"Greater Israel"	No	No	?	n.a.	No
Post-1967 Israel	No	No	?	?	?
Pre-1967 Israel	No	?	No	Yes	Yes
Jewish auto-nomy Palestine	No	Yes	No	n.a.	n.a.
Confederation	?	n.a.	?	Yes	n.a.
"International"	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes

- This is not merely a question of *realpolitik*, but also of rights and entitlements. Palestinians and Jews have conflicting historical and/or religious "rights" to the same territory (not the least of which is Jerusalem).[65] The predominance of "rights" over mere interests tends to

Relations in the Middle East. Continuity and Change, Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1995, pp. 61-72.

[64] See, Johan Galtung, *Solving Conflicts. A Peace Research Perspective*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989, pp. 37-57; Johan Galtung, *Nonviolence and Israel/Palestine*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989; Johan Galtung, "The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict," in Johan Galtung, *Peace Problems: Some Case Studies. Essays in Peace Research. Vol. V*, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1980, pp. 77-116; Valerie Yorke, "Imagining a Palestinian State: an International Security Plan," *International Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 1990), pp. 115-136.

[65] See Edward W. "Said, Projecting Jerusalem," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 5-14; Helena Cobban, "Redefining Justice: Hopes for a Lasting Peace in Jerusalem," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, No. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 60-70; Ian S. Lustick, "Zankapfel Jerusalem. Plädoyer für einen neuen Status," *Europa-Archiv*, No. 24 (1993), pp. 701-

hamper conflict resolution, since the usual compromise formulas such as "splitting the difference" are inapplicable. It may even make war more likely and/or more intense.[66]

- Furthermore, "rights" are a function of time. Historical entitlements aside, the right of inhabitants change gradually, reflecting generational change. It was clearly (in the present author's eyes, at least) the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their home,[67] say in 1970 or 1980, even if this might have entailed an eviction of settlers. However, it is less obvious that their children (who may never have set foot on the lost territory) have the same right to expel Jewish settlers who may have lived there all their lives. As far as the grandchildren (etc.) are concerned, the question of rights becomes increasingly "metaphysical." Still, it should be kept in mind that the settlement policy of successive Israeli governments relating to the occupied territories constitutes a clear violation of international law.[68]

- It is thus less obvious than in Europe that a policy of common security makes sense, since the conflict is, at least *prima facie*, more of a zero-sum game than the East-West conflict ever was.

710; Adnan Abu Odeh (Chief of the Royal Court in Jordan), "Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (1992), pp. 183-188.

[66] For a theoretical and historical analysis, see David A. Welch, *Justice and the Genesis of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

[67] For an elaborate analysis of the situation of the refugees, see Don Peretz, *Palestinians, Refugees, and the Middle East Peace Process*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1993.

[68] Art. 49 of the Geneva Convention IV on the Protection of Civilians in Times of War (1949) clearly states that "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies." See Richard Falk, "World Order Conceptions and the Peace Process in the Middle East," in Elise Boulding (ed.), *Building Peace in the Middle East. Challenges for States and Civil Society*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, pp. 189-196 (quote from p. 196). See also H. McCoubrey & N.D. White, *International Law and Armed Conflict*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992, pp. 279-294; L.C. Green, *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993, pp. 246-257. On the Israeli settlement policy, see Mark Tessler & Ann Mosley Lesch, "Israel's Drive into the West Bank and Gaza," in Ann Mosley Lesch & Mark Tessler (eds.), *Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians. From Camp David to Intifada*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989, pp. 194-222. For some interesting historical parallels, including the Assyrian occupation of territories in the Middle East, see Eric Carlton, *Occupation. The Policies and Practices of Military Conquerors*, London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 123-133.

• It may nevertheless be the case that a mutually acceptable solution could be found by "upgrading common interest," say in the form of confederation between Israel, Jordan and a Palestinean state (or an even larger one, comprising Syria and Lebanon as well) or *via* other forms of internationalization.[69]

Europe and the Middle East appeared to resemble each other structurally, both of them being bipolar (Arab states versus Israel, East versus West). However, on closer analysis, bipolarity (in Europe and even more so in the Middle East) was merely an "overlay" concealing a latent multipolar security complex, consisting of "ties of amity and enmity," often with a very long history.[70]

In fact, the Middle Eastern security complex was concealed beneath a "dual overlay," which was not even internally consistent. Some, but not all, Arab states were (informally) aligned with the Eastern superpower, whereas Israel was (at least since around 1960) an ally of the US, whose regional clients, however, also included states very hostile to Israel. Whereas the lifting of the "single overlay" in Europe produced fairly predictable results,[71] International Relations theory really has no answer to what happens after the successive lifting (or perhaps only transformation) of two overlays. What happened, for instance, to Iraqi-Syrian relations when the East-West conflict was resolved?

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[69] In an editorial in *The Jerusalem Post*, 8 April 1994, the present Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu thus mentions the possibility of "association with Jordan" as an alternative to the Rabin government's alleged plans for 'the establishment of a PLO state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza' that would quickly "topple the Hashemite regime in Jordan," thereby creating a Palestinian-Islamic state that would, in its turn, "inexorably lead to the formation of an emboldened Arab Eastern Front, stretching from Teheran to Israel's coastal plain."

[70] On the concept, see Buzan, *op. cit.* n. 3, pp. 186-229; Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Ole Wæver et al., *The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Pinter, 1990, pp. 31-44.

[71] See however, the debate spurred by an article by John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-52; Stanley Hoffman, Robert O. Keohane & John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Fall 1990), pp. 216-222; Bruce M. Russett, Thomas Risse-Kappen & John J. Mearsheimer, "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-91), pp. 216-222; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990-91), pp. 7-57.

Did this merely strengthen the effect of the second overlay of Arabs versus Israel? Or did it reinvigorate the contest between the two Arab rivals? And what will happen if the Arab-Israeli conflict is finally resolved?

Politically, Europe was also divided between democracies and totalitarian regimes, a division that coincided almost perfectly with the fault line between East and West. According to the aforementioned liberal "democracies do not fight other democracies" theory, democratic forms of government in the West served as an inhibition against aggressive war—and totally precluded West-West wars—with the exception of the two least democratic countries, namely Greece and Turkey. The further implication, according to liberal theory, was that the spread of democracy to the whole of Europe in the wake of the 1989/1991 revolutions should render wars between European states nearly inconceivable.

The situation in the Middle East is very different, with Israel standing out as the only strong democracy in a region of more or less authoritarian regimes and weak democracies. Some progress has nevertheless been made, as a result of which the Middle East contains several dyads of democratic states, among which war should be very unlikely.[72] Still, domestic structure-type inhibitions against aggressive war are much weaker in the Middle East than in Europe, hence the higher saliency of other means of war prevention, for instance in the form of NOD-type military reforms (*vide infra*).

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[72] On the "democracies do not fight each other" theory, see note 11 above; and James Lee Ray, "The Future of International War: Global Trends and Middle Eastern Implications," in David Garnham & Mark Tessler (eds.), *Democracy, War and Peace in the Middle East*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, pp. 3-33. On Israel see Avner Yaniv (ed.), *National Security and Democracy in Israel*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993. On public opinion in Israel see Asher Arian, *Security Threatened. Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Tel Aviv: Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, 1995. On the inhibitions against peace (*sic!*), see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process, 1977-1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994. On the Arab states see Charles Amjad-Ali, "Democratization in the Middle East from an Islamic Perspective," pp. 69-77, Sanàa Osseiran, "The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East," pp. 79-90, Emile A. Nakhleh, "The Arab World After the Gulf War: Challenges and Prospects," pp. 111-120 in Boulding (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 68; Shukri B Abed, "Islam and Democracy," pp. 116-132, Mark Tessler & Marilyn Grobschmidt, "Democracy in the Arab World and the Arab-Israeli Conflict," pp. 135-169 and Gabriel Scheffer, "Israel and the Liberalization of Arab Regimes," pp. 268-286 in Tessler & Garnham, *op. cit.*

Institutionally, Europe was far ahead of the Middle East, even during the Cold War. Although institutional links tended to follow the East-West fault line and the density of institutions (personifying functional cooperation in numerous fields) was highest in the West, several pan-European institutions also existed along with a plethora of negotiation forums. Among the latter, the CSCE stood out as the most prominent and elaborate, starting out as a mere process, but subsequently institutionalized to become the present Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).[73] Furthermore, after the Cold War, many of the previously Western institutions have been opened up for newcomers, and new ones have been established on the fringes of the old ones, with NACC and PFP as merely two examples. More will undoubtedly follow in due course. There was thus never any shortage of institutional frameworks for whatever collaborative ventures states might comtemplate. The CSCE was, for instance, available for the NOD-like arms reductions such as those of the CFE (*vide supra*), the moment the parties were ready for this.

Not so in the Middle East, where collaboration between the Arab and/or Islamic states is very weak institutionally,[74] and where no pan-regional institutions are in existence that might provide the auspices under which an NOD (or any other arms control) regime can be established—hence the numerous suggestions for establishing, for instance, a Middle Eastern counterpart of the CSCE (*vide infra*). Such an endeavour is, however, hampered by the weakness of actual interdependence, economically and otherwise.

Geographically, the Middle East is more spacious than the crowded Europe. However, since most of the territory consists of deserts, the inhabited and/or cultivated space represents only a small part of the total space, implying that the effective population density is actually comparable. Indeed the population density of Israel is higher than that of most European countries (216 inhabitants per square kilometer, as compared with Germany's 223). Also, even

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[73] Michael R. Lucas (ed.), *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993.

[74] See Muhammad Faour, *The Arab World After Desert Storm*, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1993, pp. 55-97. On the Arab League, see Volker Perthes, "Innerarabische Ordnungsansätze," in Albrecht Zunker (ed.), *Weltordnung oder Chaos? Beiträge zur internationalen Politik*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993, pp. 347-360. On the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), see William T. Tow, *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990, pp. 45-56 *et passim*.

though distances may, at first glance, seem longer, the central areas "cluster," and the distances between the capitals of Israel, Syria and Jordan are thus short, and all three capitals lie within 60 km from the border[75]—a position not so different from that of Hamburg or Frankfurt during the Cold War in Europe. The abundance of space notwithstanding, most countries in the Middle East may thus be in no better position to "trade space for time" in a future war than was West Germany.

On the other hand, the existence of wide spaces of uninhabited territory may well make a difference for military operations, say by rendering manoeuvre-type warfare less destructive than it would have been in Europe. Let us recall the description of T. E. Lawrence ("of Arabia") of the "battleground" and its suitability for guerilla warfare, i.e. "small-scale manoeuvre warfare," almost similar to a terrestrial *guerre de course:*

> Ours should be a war of detachment. We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves till we attacked. The attack might be nominal, directed not against him, but against his stuff; so it would not seek either his strength or his weakness, but his most accessible material. In railway-cutting it would be usually an empty stretch of rail; and the more empty, the greater the tactical success. We might turn our average into a rule (...) and develop a habit of never engaging the enemy.[76]

However, even uninhabited territory may possess intrinsic value in today's Middle East for other reasons, above all because it may contain (or otherwise provide control over) the region's two most precious resources: oil and water.

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[75] Geoffrey Kemp, (with Shelley A. Stahl), *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race*, New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991, p. 2.

[76] Thomas Edward Lawrence, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1935, p. 194. See also the apt comparison between desert and naval warfare, i.e. between the self-contained camel raiding parties and warships,Thomas Edward Lawrence, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1935, p. 337. On Lawrence of Arabia as a strategist, see Basil Lidell Hart, *T.E. Lawrence—in Arabia and After*, London: Faber, 1934. On *guerre de course*, see Theodore Ropp, "Continental Doctrines of Sea Power," in Edward Mead Earle (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy. Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler*, 1941, reprint New York: Atheneum, 1970. pp. 446-456; Hervé Coutau-Bégarie, "Réflections sur l'école française de stratégie navale," in Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (ed.), *L'Evolution de la pensée navale*, Vol. 1, *Dossiers*, No. 41, Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, (1991), pp. 31-56; C.F. Ceillier, (1928), "Les idées stratégiques en France de 1870 à 1914. La Jeune Ecole," Hervé Coutau-Bégarie (ed.), *L'Evolution de la pensée navale*, Vol. 1, *Dossiers*, No. 41, Paris: Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, (1991), pp. 195-231.

One reason for Israel's clinging on to the Golan Heights may thus be the need for an ensured supply of water. Since her neighbours have precisely the same requirement, however, there is no long-term alternative to a joint water management regime, covering the entire region (including Turkey).[77]

Economically, the East-West demarcation line in Europe nearly coincided with that between the poor and the rich, and the side least likely to start a war (the West) was also the richest. This had positive as well as negative implications. Positively, it meant that the West had considerable "staying power," both in the sense that it would be sure to ultimately prevail in a protracted war of attrition where mobilization potential would be decisive;[78] and that arms racing for the sake of exhausting its means was no viable substitute for "hot war" for the East. Negatively, it might provide the East with a spur to launch an aggressive war for the sake of conquest, according to (not very realistic) worst-case analyses.

The situation in the Middle East is the exact opposite. Even though wealth is very unevenly distributed among the Arab states, as a whole they are clearly more prosperous than Israel, not because of a superior economic system, but due to nature (oil). Hence, Israel would almost surely be economically exhausted by a protracted "real" war of attrition, as opposed to the War of Attrition, which was more a substitute for "real war," even though the costs were considerable.[79] The only comfort for the economically inferior party in this respect would be that it would surely enjoy the support of most of the rich world, and above all the US.

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[77] Natasha Beschorner, "Water and Instability in the Middle East," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 273 (1992/93), pp. 8-26; IISS, "Water Resources: Scarcity and Conflict," in *Strategic Survey 1991-1992*, pp. 219-230; Maher F. Abu-Taleb, "Regional Cooperation in Water Resource Management," in Boulding (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 68, pp. 251-264; Peter H. Gleick, "Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 79-112; Miriam R. Lowi, "Bridging the Divide: Transboundary Resource Disputes and the Case of West Bank Water," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 113-138; Greg Shapland, "Water and Politics in the Middle East," in M.J. Davis (ed.), *op. cit.* (1995) n. 63, pp. 73-89.

[78] Hence the Soviet need for a swift and decisive victory. See Peter Vigor, *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983; and Mearsheimer: *op. cit.* (1983) n. 57.

[79] David A. Korn, *Stalemate. The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

Economically, the links between East and West in Europe (underdeveloped though they were) had a certain dampening effect on the conflict throughout the Cold War.[80] Furthermore, an end to the Cold War in Europe promised great returns in the form of a "peace dividend," if only in the medium-to-long run.[81] In the Middle East, by comparison, the economic links between Israel and the Arab states have always been very weak, thus doing very little to dampen the conflict. An end to the conflict might, on the other hand, hold considerable promise, both in the negative sense of escaping from an economically damaging arms race, and in the positive sense of opening possibilities for economic collaboration, pointing forward to a gradual integration.[82] Also, it may represent the only escape from otherwise unavoidable conflicts over water supplies.

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[80] On interdependence as an inhibition against war see Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence. World Politics in Transition*, Boston: Little Brown, 1977; Jaap de Wilde, *Saved From Oblivion: Interdependence Theory in the First Half of the 20th Century. A Study on the Causality Between War and Complex Interdependence*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991.

[81] See for instance Lawrence R. Klein, Fu-Chen Lo & Warwick J. McKibbin (eds.), *Arms Reduction. Economic Implications in the Post-Cold War Era*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995.

[82] Said El-Naggar & Mahamed El-Erian, "The Economic Implications of a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East," in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik & Elias Tuma (eds.), *The Economics of Middle East Peace. Views from the Region*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 205-226; Ishac Diwan & Nick Papandreou, "The Peace Process and Economic Reforms in the Middle East," Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik & Elias Tuma (eds.), *The Economics of Middle East Peace. Views from the Region*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 227-255; Patrick Clawson, "The Limited Scope for Economic Cooperation in the Contemporary Levant," in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.), *The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 81-101; Gideon Fischelson, "Regional Economic Cooperation in the Middle East," Steven L. Spiegel (ed.), *The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 103-120; Jawad Anani, "Areas of Potential Economic Cooperation in the Context of the Middle East Peace Process," Steven L. Spiegel (ed.), *The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 121-125; Hervé Gaymard, "Pax economica? L'économie de la paix au Moyen-Orient," *Politique Étrangère*, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 1023-1044; Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Assessing the Mideast Peace Economic Dividend," *Security and Policy Studies*, No. 15, Ramat Gan, Israel: BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University (1994); Jim Lederman, "Economics of the Arab-Israeli Peace," *Orbis*, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Fall 1995), pp. 549-566; Looney, Robert E. & David Winterford: *Economic Causes and Consequences of Defense Expenditures in the Middle East and South Asia*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, pp. 135-160 (on Iran), 161-176 (on Iraq) and 177-192 (on Saudi Arabia); Yahya M. Sadowski, *SCUDs or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1993; Dirk Vandewalle, "The Middle East Peace Process and Regional Economic Integration," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 21-34.

Culturally, Europe was relatively homogeneous, in the sense of almost entirely belonging to the Christian culture, the only exceptions being the Muslim enclave in Bosnia, certain ex-Soviet states and Turkey (the status of which as an European state is even disputed). Moreover, this was a rather secular culture, with only very sporadic instances of fundamentalism, even though the ideological fervour with which the Cold War was occasionally "fought" made up for this "deficiency" to some extent. As a general rule, however, culture and religion/ideology rarely stood in the way of pragmatic solutions serving national interests.

The Middle East is far more heterogeneous, with Islam, Judaism and Christianity cohabiting the region, and with more widespread fundamentalism, among Muslims as well as Jews. This author does not believe in the inherent supremacy of one religion over the others, nor accepts that some are, by their very nature, bellicose.[83] Nevertheless, the higher saliency of the religious factor may well serve to cement conflicts and to make wars more ferocious by imbuing war aims with other-worldly significance. This was the case of the medieval Christian crusades,[84] and one might envision modern versions thereof in the shape of Islamic *Jihads* or Zionist wars for the survival or aggrandizement of "the promised land."

Militarily, both regions were highly militarized. Tables 1.5-1.7 give a rough idea of the degree to which the Middle East is militarized, in terms of the military share of available resources, Military Expenditure/Gross National Product (Milex/GNP), and of the share of armed forces (active plus reserves) of the total population—in both cases compared with West Germany prior to

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[83] On the attitudes of the different religions to war, see, for instance, David R. Smock (ed.), *Religious Perspectives on War. Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force After the Gulf War*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992; Bassam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," in Terry Nardin (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace. Religious and Secular Perspectives*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 128-145; Sohail H. Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace," in Terry Nardin (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace. Religious and Secular Perspectives*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996, pp. 146-166.

[84] Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World*, London: Harrap, 1988, pp. 134-141; J.F.C. Fuller, "From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto," *Military History of the Western World*, Vol. 1, 1954, reprinted in New York: Da Capo Press, 1987, pp. 406-436; Eric Carlton, *War and Ideology*, London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 95-109.

unification (the "setting" of most NOD proposals).[85] Another measure of the degree of militarization is the "force-to-space ratio," i.e. the number of army troops (active and total) per square kilometer, where the average is lower than pre-unification West Germany (a very high standard), but some states surpass it. Finally, one might compare the "hardware density," measured by the number of MBTs and other ground force "TLIs" (treaty-limited items, a neologism stemming from the CFE, signifying MBTs, ACVs and artillery) per square kilometre.

Table 1.5: Degree of "Militarization"

	AF/Pop %	Milex/GDP %
Israel	12	11
Jordan	3	11
Syria	6	8
Egypt	1	7
Iraq	6	21
Lebanon	1	5
Average	3	12
FRG (pre-unification)	2	3

Table 1.6: Force-to-Space Ratios

Force-to-space	Act. Army/sq km	Army/Sq km
Israel	6.45	24.03
Jordan	0.98	1.31
Syria	1.62	3.24
Egypt	0.31	0.51
Iraq	0.80	2.30
Lebanon	3.85	3.85
Average	0.7	1.59
FRG (pre-unification)	1.24	4.12

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[85] Calculated on the basis of IISS, *The Military Balance 1993-1994*, London: Brassey's/IISS, 1994, pp. 107-133.

These yardsticks, moreover, underestimate the actual density, because of the aforementioned large tracts of desert. They also show the wide spread, with Israel standing out as by far the most "militarized" of the states in the region in most respects.

Table 1.7: Hardware Density

	MBT/sq km	TLI/sq km	MBT/Active army
Israel	0.191	0.709	0.030
Jordan	0.012	0.030	0.013
Syria	0.024	0.055	0.015
Egypt	0.003	0.009	0.010
Iraq	0.005	0.015	0.006
Lebanon	0.034	0.104	0.009
Average	0.009	0.025	0.013
FRG (pre-unification)	0.02	0.042	0.016

In both regions, the same categories of weapons systems have been regarded as especially important: MBTs, ACVs, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters, i.e. those singled out for limitation in the mandate for the CFE negotiations. In fact, the entire Middle East, but especially Israel, is very "tank-heavy," both in terms of MBTs per square kilometre and of the ratio between tanks and anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs). However, force disparities are greater between Israel and the Arab states than they were between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, with Israel being outnumbered in most respects, albeit only quantitatively.

Table 1.8: Scenario-Dependent Force Comparison

Scenarios	Milex	Active AF	Total AF	MBT
Israel: Syria	6.091	0.431	0.750	0.880
Israel: Syria + Egypt	1.871	0.210	0.393	0.516
Israel: Syria + Egypt + Jordan + Iraq	0.563	0.133	0.224	0.360

Table 1.8 also shows that mobilization schedules will be of the utmost importance, since the Israeli inferiority would become much more manageable upon a call-up of the reserves. Also, the importance of alignments is striking, as Israeli inferiority would only materialize in the (very unlikely) case of a joint attack against it by all neighbouring states. Neither in the (perhaps most likely) case of a war against Syria alone, nor if the latter were to be joined by Egypt, would Israel be seriously outnumbered. Only in a war against all neighbours would this be the case, implying that Israel may be reasonably secure until the UN Security Council Resolution 687 ("the mother of all Resolutions") is abrogated and Iraq allowed to rebuild its military strength.[86]

In fact, since the Gulf War, the region has seen quite profound changes in its balance of power, even though the impact is not entirely clear:

•   The military power of Iraq has been (temporarily) neutralized, and its nuclear ambitions curtailed by the UN sanctions imposed on the country.[87]

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[86] For the term see Paul Taylor, *International Organization in the Modern World. The Regional and Global Process*, London: Pinter, 1992, pp. 228-237. On the resolution see Johan Molander, "The United Nations and the Elimination of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Implementation of a Cease-Fire Condition," in Tanner (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 58, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1992, pp. 137-158; Serge Sur, *Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair: Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace*, UNIDIR Research Papers, No. 12, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1992; Serge Sur (ed.), *Disarmament and Arms Limitation Obligations. Problems of Compliance and Enforcement*, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994, pp. 63-80; M. Weller (ed.), *Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their Aftermath*, Cambridge International Documents, Vol. 3 Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1993, pp. 8-12, 494-536.

[87] Gary Samore, "Iraq," in Mitchell Reiss & Robert S. Litwak, *Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994, pp. 15-32; Frank Barnaby, *How Nuclear Weapons Spread. Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s*, London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 86-93; David Fischer, *Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The Past of the Prospects*, London: Routledge, 1992, pp. 66-67; David Fischer, Wolfgang Köttner & Harald Müller, *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Order*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 132-136; Kathleen C. Bailey, *Strengthening Nuclear Nonproliferation*, Boulder: Westview, 1993, pp. 28-35; Michael Klare, *Rogue States and Nuclear Outlaws. America's Search for a New Foreign Policy*, New York: Hill and Wang, 1995, pp. 41-51; Richard Kokoski, *Technology and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 97-146; Leonard S. Spector, "Neo-Nonproliferation," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85; Robert E. Kelley, "The Iraqi and South African Nuclear Weapon Programs. The Importance of Management," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 27-38.

- Iran may be trying to re-establish itself as a regional great power, perhaps even with nuclear weapons.[88]

- For a number of years, Turkey has been undertaking a relentless arms build-up as a result of NATO's "cascading" of large quantities of CFE-limited equipment. The build-up has also included an extension of national service. Most of the build-up may be directed against domestic threats (the Kurds, above all) as well as against Greece and Russia, the rival in the struggle for hegemony in Central Asia. However, the acquired military power is also usable against the Middle East, as demonstrated by the small-scale invasion of Iraq on 20 March 1995.[89]

- Several countries, including Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states, have embarked on a dramatic arms build-up with a wide range of purchases of advanced weaponry, especially from the US.[90] One may, however, doubt

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[88] Sharam Chubin, *Iran's National Security Policy. Capabilities, Intentions and Impact*, Washington, D.C: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994; Anthony H. Cordesman, *After the Storm. The Changing Military Balance in the Middle East*, Boulder: Westview/London: Mansell, 1993, pp. 386-427; Anopushiravan Ehteshami, "Iran's National Strategy. Striving for Regional Parity or Supremacy?," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (April 1994), pp. 29-37; Philip L. Ritcheson, "Iranian Military Resurgence: Scope, Motivations, and Implications for Regional Security," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 573-592. On the possible nuclear ambitions of Iran, see David Albright, "An Iranian Bomb?," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (July-August 1995), pp. 21-26; Marianne van Leeuwen, "Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East," in Marianne van Leeuwen (ed.), *The Future of the International Non-Proliferation Regime*, Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, pp. 125-154, especially pp. 136-141; Barnaby, *op. cit.* n. 87, pp. 114-117.

[89] *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (14 January 1995), p. 8; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, No. 13 (1 April 1995), p. 3; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, No. 15 (15 April 1995), p. 18; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 24, No. 11 (16 September 1995), pp. 25-26, 30. See also George M. Georgiou, Panayotis T. Kapopoulos & Sophia Lazaretou, "Modelling Greek-Turkish Rivalry: An Empirical Investigation of Defence Spending Dynamics," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (May 1996), pp. 229-239; Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East*, London: Pinter 1991; Graham E. Fuller & Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geopolitics. From the Balkans to Western China*, Boulder: Westview, 1993; Gareth Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995.

[90] "Register of the Trade in and Licenced Production of Major Conventional Weapons in Industrialized and Developing Countries, 1993," *SIPRI Yearbook 1994*, pp. 513-548. It lists major US sales to Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia (enormous purchases), Turkey (likewise enormous), and the UAE. See also Anthony Cordesman, "Current

whether this provides effective military strength commensurate with the investments (which takes more than hardware). It might, however.

On the one hand, the situation may thus have become intrinsically more militarily unstable, implying that major political upheavals (such as fundamentalist victories in Egypt or Saudi Arabia) could produce quite unpredictable consequences. On the other hand, the changing balance of power has benefited at least one country in the region, namely Israel, which no longer has to reckon with the worst case scenario of a joint Arab onslaught.

Considerations of "balance" are complicated by the presence of non-conventional weapons. Just like in Europe, conventional forces in the Middle East would operate in an environment featuring weapons of mass destruction, albeit in a significantly different distribution. Whereas there was a nuclear "balance" of sorts in Europe, Israel is the only country in the Middle East in possession of nuclear weapons.[91] Chemical weapons are more widely distributed, intelligence sources having it that Israel, Iran, Iraq (until 1991), Syria and Libya hold stocks. Furthermore, some sources have conjectured that Syria may have biological weapons in its inventory, as Iraq seems to have had them "in the pipeline" prior to its defeat in 1991.[92]

Furthermore, in addition to aircraft, several countries possess other suitable means of delivery for such weapons of mass destruction in the shape of long-range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs): Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq (until 1991), Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.[93] It remains disputed how serious a

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Trends in Arms Sales in the Middle East," in Shai Feldman & Ariel Levite (eds.), *Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 19-60. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (22 July 1995), pp. 19-20.

[91] Yair Evron, "Israel," in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.), *Security With Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security*, London: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1991, pp. 277-297; Yair Evron, *Israel's Nuclear Dilemma*, London: Routledge, 1994; Walter Schilling, "Israel's Nuclear Strategy in Transition," *Aussenpolitik. English Edition*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (1995), pp. 319-326.

[92] *Jane' Defence Weekly*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (22 July 1995), p. 18; *Jane' Defence Weekly*, Vol. 24, No. 6 (12 August 1995), p. 11.

[93] Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 71-88, 186-189. See also Seth W. Carus, "Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Threat and Response," *The Washington Papers*, No. 146, New York: Praeger & The Center for Strategic and International Studies (1990); Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1989*, pp. 287-318; Janne E. Nolan,

threat such missiles pose. Some analysts (including the present author) hold that they should be regarded more as psychological terror weapons than as actual military weapons. In the former capacity they have the ability to appear "out of nowhere" and without warning, thus causing panic, similar to the World War II "V2 scare." Without nuclear (or perhaps biological) warheads, however, the actual destruction they can wreak (even with chemical weapons) is clearly inferior to that of aircraft, because of the latter's greater payload and capability of multiple sorties.

While there are thus several question marks in any Middle Eastern force comparison, there can be little doubt that Israel's military security has improved significantly. This provides the Jewish state with a "margin of error" that it did not previously enjoy (or feel it did). A "window of opportunity" has thus opened, which will remain open for some time, but not indefinitely. Defensive restructuring and NOD-type arms control may be appropriate means of exploiting these opportunities. Before proceeding to this topic, however, some ideas will be advanced concerning the political aspects of a common or cooperative security regime for the region.

III. Common Security and NOD for the Middle East?

1. Common Security in the Middle East: Political Aspects

Whereas in other parts of the world, the time may be approaching for transcending sovereignty in favour of a supranational governance of sorts,[94] in

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Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991; Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5-42; Martin Navias, *Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East*, London: Brassey's, 1993; Götz Neuneck & Otfried Ischebeck (eds.), *Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Arms Control*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1992.

[94] Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood. Report of the Commission on Global Governance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Examples from academia of the (re)emerging debate on sovereignty versus global governance are J.A. Camilleri & Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World*, London: Edward Elgar, 1992; R.B.J. Walker, *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993; and Mihaly Simai, *The Future of Global Governance*, Washington, D.C.: US Institute for Peace, 1994; Daniele Archibugi & David Held

the Middle East the need may be for strengthening sovereignty, i.e. for creating a system of states similar to that established in Europe through the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Under this system, states acknowledged each other as equals and renounced their right to interfere in each other's internal affairs,[95] principles that are, incidentally, also unequivocally codified in the UN Charter.

Such mutual recognition may be a logical precondition for applying a Common Security approach to security thinking and policy. It only makes sense to acknowledge the respective other's equal right to security once one acknowledges him/her/it as an entity of equal standing.[96] Elsewhere (for instance in Central America) mutual recognition has, likewise, proved to be both a precondition for peace among states and a factor facilitating pacification within states.[97]

Such mutual recognition would imply that all states in the Middle East should sign peace treaties and establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel, and that Israel should have to reciprocate by recognizing "The Republic of Palestine" as a sovereign state. This would go a long way towards making the Middle East a "normal" international (sub)system, comprising states with both conflicting and converging interests, i.e. a system where "cooperation under

(eds.), *Cosmopolitan Democracy: an Agenda for a New World Order*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995; Gene M. Lyons & Michael Mastanduno (eds.), *Beyond Westphalia? National Sovereignty and International Intervention*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1995; Richard Falk, *On Humane Governance. Toward a New Global Politics*, University Park: Penn State Press, 1995.

[95] On the problems of state-making in the Third World, see Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995. On the European path to the Westphalian system see Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

[96] See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992.

[97] On the Arias Plan to this effect, see Dario Moreno, *The Struggle for Peace in Central America*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994. On the German experience with cross-recognition, see Egon Bahr, "Die Chancen der Geschichte in der Teilung suchen," *S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden*, No. 2 (1985), pp. 70-72. On the two Koreas, see the special section on cross-recognition in *The Korean Journal of National Unification*, Vol. 3, Seoul: Research Institute for National Unification, 1994. See also Volker Perthes, "Integration oder Trennung? Die Logiken des nahöstlichen Friedensprozesses," *Internationale Politik*, Vol. 50, No. 7 (July 1995), pp. 55-60.

anarchy" would be a distinct possibility, albeit not one where it would emerge automatically.[98] The recent peace treaty between Israel and Jordan is a significant contribution to such normalization,[99] and so are the openings towards Israel by some of the "peripheral" Arab states, in the form of a termination of their secondary blockade.

Of course, it has been a long time since Israel and Jordan were really at war. In fact Israel seems to have counted on Jordan as a "silent partner" in several respects: in 1970 as an ally in the onslaught against the Palestinian Liberation Organization, PLO, ("Black September"), and subsequently as a buffer zone "by default," providing Israel with (much needed) additional strategic depth. Nevertheless, the signing of the formal peace treaty was highly significant. It was followed by a symbolic dismantling of fences along the border. Understandable though this may be, in the present author's opinion it may have been unwise. Much preferable to regarding and treating one's neighbour as an extended *glacis* (as Israel apparently does) is it to prepare for defending oneself against any threat from that direction (i.e. from or *via* the neighbour in question) while allowing one's neighbour a similar defence against attacks from both directions. Hence, boundaries should be well-defined, clearly demarcated and (for some time yet, albeit not forever) adequately defended.[100]

Even more significant was, of course, the reciprocal recognition by Israel and the PLO entailed by the Oslo Declaration of Principles, followed by the

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[98] See, for instance, Helen Milner, "Review Article: International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1992), pp. 466-496; Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York: Basic Books, 1984; Arthur A. Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate. Circumstance and Choice in International Relations*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990; Robert Axelrod & Robert A. Keohane "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The Contemporary Debate*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 85-115.

[99] "Full Text of the Treaty of Peace Between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as Approved by the Knesset, October 25, 1994," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 123-128.

[100] On the boundaries in the Middle East, see Moshe Brawer, "The Boundaries of Peace," in Efraim Karsh (ed.), *Peace in the Middle East. The Challenge for Israel*, London: Frank Cass, 1994, pp. 41-63.

Cairo Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area.[101] This apparent reconciliation of the two most irreconcilable contestants in the Middle East effectively allows all Arab states to proceed with normalization without risk of ostracism. Unfortunately, the reconciliation was, from the very beginning, skewed in favour of Israel, which had been negotiating from a position of strength with a PLO that had been weakened as a result of having sided with the losing party in the Gulf War.[102] However, whilst being clearly the stronger side, Israel also had to find a *modus vivendi* with the increasingly unruly Palestinian population of the occupied territories. To defeat the Intifada with military

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[101] For the 13 September 1993 agreement, see "Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangement," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 119-124. For the 4 May 1994 Cairo agreement, see "Agreement On the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 3, (September 1994), pp. 359-364. The entire process leading up to the Israel-PLO peace is described in John King, *Handshake in Washington. The Beginning of Middle East Peace*, Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1994; and Jane Corbin, *The Norway Channel. The Secret Talks that Led to the Middle East Peace Accord*, New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994; David Makovsky, *Making Peace With the PLO. The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accords*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1996; Abdel Monem Said Aly, "The Road to Oslo and Beyond. Prospects for an Arab-Israeli Peace," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1994), pp. 37-50. On the numerous outstanding problems see Ann Mosley Lesch, *Transition to Palestinian Self-Government. Practical Steps toward Israeli-Palestinian Peace*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press/AAAS, 1992; Jeffrey Boutwell & Everett Mendelsohn: *Israeli-Palestinian Security: Issues in the Permanent Status Negotiations*, Cambridge, MA: American Academy of the Arts and Sciences, 1995; Shebonti Ray Dadwal, "Oslo II: Self-Rule Comes to the West Bank," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 18, No. 8 (November 1995), pp. 1123-1140; Hans-Peter Gasser, "The Geneva Conventions and the Autonomous Territories in the Middle East," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1995), pp. 173-180; Raja Shehadeh, "The Geneva Convention and the Autonomous Territories. A Rejoinder," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (June 1995), pp. 181-184; Martin Hoch, "Peace in the Near East After the Gaza-Jericho Accord," *Aussenpolitik. English Edition*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (3rd Quarter 1994), pp. 279-288; A.S. Khaldi, "Points of Tension in the New Israeli-Palestinian Nexus," *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 139, No. 3 (June 1994), pp. 51-55.

[102] See Helena Cobban, "The Palestinians and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," in Robert O. Freedman (ed.), *The Middle East after Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993, pp. 253-275; Cheryl A. Rubenberg, "The Gulf War, the Palestinians and the New World Order," in Tareq Y. Ismael & Jacqueline S. Ismael (eds.), *The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations in the Middle East*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994, pp. 317-346. The history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is described in Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994; Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Third Edition*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996; and (with a special view to the attitude of the US) Donald Neff, *Fallen Pillars. U.S. Policy towards Palestine and Israel since 1945*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies/London: I. B. Tauris, 1995.

means was impossible, and to attempt it undermined the morale of Israeli soldiers.[103]

Unfortunately, subsequent to the Oslo agreement, neither Israel nor the PLO have been able to prevent violence from within their own ranks. Terrorist attacks have occurred against both Israeli soldiers, settlers and civilians, as well as against Palestinians (with the Hebron massacre standing out as the most serious incident).[104] This has, among other things, postponed the promised Israeli withdrawal from all urban areas in the "Jericho area," except Hebron. The withdrawal has, however, proceeded gradually.

It seems that the PLO has been placed in a "Catch 22 situation." According to (some) Israelis, the PLO should first "get its act together" and demonstrate its ability to maintain peace. Only then would the Palestinian "entity" be eligible for statehood, i.e. sovereignty. However, sovereignty may be a precondition for legitimacy, and hence for establishing order.[105] Also, it may be

[103] Tamar Liebes & Shoshana Blum-Kulka, "Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Fall 1994), pp. 45-68; Zachary Lockman & Jopel Beinin (eds.), *Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1990; F. Robert Hunter, *The Palestinian Uprising. A War By Other Means*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991; Tessler, *op. cit.* n. 102, pp. 677-752; Lesch & Tessler (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 68; Zachary Lockman & Jopel Beinin (eds.), *Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1990; David McDowall, *Palestine and Israel. The Uprising and Beyond*, London: I. B. Tauris, 1989.

[104] Graham Usher, "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 21-34. On the Palestinian diaspora see Rosemary Sayigh, "Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 37-53. On the economic background, i.e. the appalling conditions, especially in the Gaza Strip, see Sara Roy, *The Gaza Strip. The Political Economy of De-Development*, Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies and London: I. B. Tauris, 1995. On the attitudes of the Jewish settlers see Daniel Bar-Tal, Dan Jacobsen & Tali Freund, "Security Feelings among Jewish Settlers in the Occupied Territories: A Study of Communal and Personal Antecedents," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (June 1995), pp. 353-377.

[105] Hussein Sirriyeh, "Is a Palestinian State Politically Possible?," Efraim Karsh (ed.), *Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security*, London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 46-58; Yezid Sayigh, "Redefining the Basics: Sovereignty and Security of the Palestinian State," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-19; Emile F. Sahliyeh, "Democracy Among the Palestinians," in Garnham & Tessler (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 72, pp. 244-267. For Israeli views, see Amos Perlmutter, "The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3 (1995), pp. 59-68; Rex Brynen, "The Palestinians and Confidence Building Measures

very unwise of Israel not to give Arafat all the help he needs for gaining control, since whatever may come after Arafat's rule (i.e. Hamas) is bound to be worse, seen from an Israeli point of view.

In the present author's opinion, the wisest policy on the part of Israel would be to promote a "Finlandization" of Palestine, i.e. to recognize a Palestine comprising the whole West Bank and Gaza as a sovereign state. Also it would have to be recognized that this state would have security needs that deserve to be taken just as seriously as those of Israel.[106] However, a precondition for such recognition would have to be a Palestinian commitment not to threaten Israel. By implication, the new state should commit itself to permanent neutrality and accept certain limitations on its military deployments, the purpose of which would be to ensure Israel against a threat from the east: both from Palestine itself and from other states *via* Palestine. I shall return to the military implications thereof in due course.

Lasting peace between Israelis and Arabs, including Palestinians, also presupposes a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of Jerusalem. The Israeli expropriations of land in the city for Jewish settlements do nothing at all to solve the problems, indeed should the authorities proceed with this policy, it will undoubtedly play into the hands of the Hamas. In the present author's opinion, the notion of a "*corpus separatum*" has merit, say in the shape of a "Vaticanization" of Jerusalem.[107] It would imply that Jerusalem would not be the capital of any of the states in the region, but that Tel Aviv and Amman would remain capitals, and Jericho be made the capital of Palestine. Jerusalem would be a religious site that should be accessible to all three Mosaic religions,

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in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Implications of Statelessness," in Gabriel Ben-Dor & David B. Dewitt (eds.), *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, pp. 33-70. For contrasting views see "Prerequisites for Peace in the Middle East. An Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue. Proceedings of the United Nations Department of Public Information's International Encounter for European Journalists on the Question of Palestine, 15-17 June 1994, Elsinore, Denmark," New York: United Nations, Sales No. E.95.I.6.

[106] On Palestinian security concerns, see the excellent article by Ahmad S. Khalidi, "Security in a Final Middle East Settlement: Some Components of Palestinian National Security," *International Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (January 1995), pp. 1-18.

[107] Jan Prawitz,: "A Vatican Solution for Jerusalem," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (March 1994), pp. 355-356. On other areas beyond national sovereignty (*sui generis* territorial entities), according to international law see Malcolm N. Shaw, *International Law*, Third Edition, Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1991, pp. 156-166.

and administered by an ecumenical council of sorts, for instance operating under the auspices of the United Nations.

Most observers seem to believe that peace with Syria is likely to be achieved within a few years,[108] in conformity with the "land for peace" formula. The implication is, of course, that Israel will have to relinquish the occupied Golan Heights, something Israel is unlikely to do at its peril.[109] I shall return to this question in due course.

There remains the even more complicated matter of Lebanon. There seem to be four possible alternatives to the untenable present situation.

• Both Israel and Syria could withdraw completely and pledge to respect the sovereignty and territorial inviolability of Lebanon, as they are obliged to, according to international law. However, it strains the imagination to envision Israel enduring the continuing harassment by (or more serious attacks by) the Hezbollah indefinitely.

• Israel and Syria might divide Lebanon up between themselves *de jure*, as they have already done *de facto*.

• Lebanon might be granted actual sovereignty, only embedded in a larger confederation encompassing Israel, Syria, Palestine and Jordan.

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[108] Muhammad Muslih, "Dateline Damascus: Asad Is Ready," *Foreign Policy*, No. 96 (Fall 1994), pp. 145-163; Shebonti Ray Dadwai, "Syria Continues to Hold the Key to Peace in West Asia," *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (April 1995), pp. 127-140; Gregor M. Manousakis, "Syrien und der Frieden im Nahen Osten," *Europäische Sicherheit*, Vol. 44, No. 10 (October 1995), pp. 25-26.

[109] Andrew Duncan, "Land for Peace: Israel's Choices," in Karsh (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 105, pp. 59-72. On the importance of the Golan, see "Israelische Kommentare zur strategischen Bedeutung des Südlibanons und der Golanhöhen," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 32, No. 5 (September-October 1994), pp. 544-553; MM, "Die Bedeutung der Golanhöhen für die Sicherheit Israels," *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, Vol. 32, No. 6 (November-December 1994), pp. 670-674. On the Israeli-Syrinan negotiations see James Bruce,: "Security Tops Golan Agenda," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 16 (22 April 1995), pp. 24-25.

- Lebanon might be treated as a "failed state," and placed under some form of UN administration.[110]

While neither of these "solutions" is satisfactory, some of them may be preferable to the present situation, where Lebanon simply provides a battleground for a continuing Israeli-Syrian (proxy and actual) war, as illustrated by the "Grapes of Wrath" campaign.[111]

2. NOD Models Applied to the Middle East

As already mentioned, the bulk of NOD literature has dealt with Europe, and only very few authors have tried to apply the same principles to the Arab-Israeli conflict.[112] Let us therefore begin the analysis of the potential application of NOD to the Middle East by simply transposing the archetypal models mentioned above to the Middle East of today. This preliminary and tentative ("armchair") assessment should be made, at least, according to the following criteria:

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[110] On Israel's goals in Lebanon see Shai Feldman, "Israel's Involvement in Lebanon: 1975-1985," in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson & Larry Berman (eds.), *Foreign Military Intervention. The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 95-128; Don Peretz, "Israel's Foreign Policy Objectives in Lebanon: A Historical Overview," in Deirdre Collings (ed.), *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, pp. 102-122. On Syria's role see As'ad Abukhali, "Determinants and Characteristics of Syrian Policy in Lebanon," in Deirdre Collings (ed.), *Peace for Lebanon? From War to Reconstruction*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, pp. 123-136. On failed or collapsed states see William I. Zartmann (ed.), *Collapsed States. The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

[111] Israel Shahak, "Strategic Aims behind 'Operation Grapes of Wrath'," *Middle East International*, No. 525 (10 May 1996), pp. 18-19; "Israel and Lebanon. Two Eyes for an Eye," *The Economist*, 20 April 1996, pp. 19-21.

[112] In addition to the article by Conetta, Knight & Unterseher (n. 44), examples are Alex Glicksman, "Defensive Defence in the Middle East," in UNIDIR (ed.), *Nonoffensive Defense. A Global Perspective*, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990, pp. 145-151; "Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East," in Boulding (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 68, pp. 7-66, pp. 49-50 *et passim*; Håkan Wiberg, "The Dynamics of Disarmament in the Middle East," in Judit Balazs & Håkan Wiberg (eds.), *Peace Research for the 1990s*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, pp. 181-195. For a moderately NOD-like analysis of Israeli defence options see Ariel Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

A. The envisaged defence restructuring should leave a state's adversaries with at least undiminished security, preferably make them more secure: what might be called "the common security criterion."
B. It should not necessitate additional military expenditures and ideally allow for a transfer of resources from military to civilian consumption: "the affordability criterion."
C. It should combine a high likelihood of war prevention with the ability to wage a non-suicidal war of defence in case of a war: "the deterrence and defence criterion."

Since there is no *a priori* reason why all states in the Middle East (if any) should adopt the same NOD model, I shall tentatively apply each of the models to the central states in the Arab-Israeli conflict: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the "Palestine" yet to be:

1. Area-covering territorial defence, in the SAS's "spider and web" version.
2. Stronghold defences, i.e. a "selective area defence."
3. Strictly defensive forward defence, i.e. by means of fire barriers or of fortifications and fixed obstacles.
4. Defence postures with one or several "missing links," without which they are incapable of offensive use by virtue of "inverted synergies."
5. Disengagement.
6. Stepping down, either by shifting to a greater reliance on reserves or by otherwise reducing the capability for surprise attack.

I shall contrast these with the following:

0. Offensive defence, much like the present postures extrapolated into the future according to "conservative," i.e. pessimistic assumptions.

In order to escape the "fallacy of unwarranted precision," I have merely assigned the values Y, N and ?, implying compatibility, incompatibility and uncertainty, respectively, with asterisks signifying various qualifications, elaborated upon in the text. The table should be read as indicating what the results would be if, for instance, Israel were to adopt either of the 6+1 models. Would it improve her neighbours' security (A)? Would it be affordable for Israel itself (B)? And would it provide adequate war prevention as well as defensive capability for Israel (C)?

Table 1.9: NOD Models and the Middle Eastern States

NOD Models	Israel			Egypt			Syria			Jordan			"Pal."			Iraq		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
Terr. Defence	Y	Y	?	Y*	N*	Y	Y*	Y*	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y*	Y
Stronghold Defence	N	Y	N*	Y	Y	Y	Y*	Y	Y*	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	Y*	Y	Y*
Forward Defence	N*	Y*	Y*	Y*	Y	Y*	Y*	Y	Y*	Y*	N*	N	N	N	N	N*	N*	N*
Inv. Synergy	Y	Y	Y	Y*	Y	Y	Y*	Y	Y	Y*	Y	Y	Y*	Y	Y	Y*	Y	Y
Disengagement	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Stepping Down	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Off. D.	N	?	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

"Offensive defence" is pretty much what is being practised at the moment, with certain qualifications (*vide infra*). The fact that the region has already seen, at least, one war launched with a pre-emptive strike (the Six Day War in 1967) seems to imply that neither criterion A nor C is met. Israel struck against the Arab states because she feared an attack was impending, and would probably do so again under similar circumstances. This clearly indicates that the security of everybody does indeed suffer from the predominance of offensive strategies. The N under criterion A for Palestine is perhaps even more emphatic than the others, since it would seem to be a precondition for the actual establishment of this state (on the West Bank as well as in Gaza) that it would constitute no military threat to Israel (*vide supra*).

The rather dire economic straits of all regional countries seem to indicate that the present level of military expenditures is unsustainable in the long run (depending, of course, on the future oil prices, especially as far as Iraq is concerned). Hence, criterion B is not met by the offensive strategy either, also because it tends to perpetuate the conflict, thereby causing cumulative deficit spending and growing public debt. The only question mark indicates that nuclear weapons, at least according to Israeli assumptions, provide a "bigger bang for the buck," thus perhaps allowing Israel to "make ends meet" with less.

Still, even Israel's defence expenditures are shrinking, as are those of its adversaries.[113]

Coming to the alternatives, an NOD-type **territorial defence** would, by virtue of its incapability of border-crossing operations, clearly meet criterion A, regardless of which states were to adopt it. The only qualification would be that it should not envisage "trading space for time" (as in some German models), since neither Israel, nor Jordan, Syria or the future Palestine will have space to trade away because of the short distances from the border to their capitals. Egypt, on the other hand, has such space (the Sinai) as does Iraq at the border facing Jordan—yet not at that facing Iran. In order to make it clear to a would-be aggressor that there would be no "easy grab," all states (with the possible exception of Egypt) would therefore have to combine territorial defence with, at least elements of, forward defence (*vide infra*) in order to meet criterion C.

As will be apparent from Table 1.10, the manpower requirements of territorial defence schemes such as that of the SAS would not be prohibitive for any state (except perhaps Egypt), but the same force densities could be achieved without expansion of the total number of armed forces. This is, of course, not a very realistic comparison, since differences of terrain and of the distribution of the population would have to be taken into account. However, because population density is much more uneven in the Middle East than in pre-unification West Germany, to factor in these features will, if anything, tend to lower force requirements. There simply is no need to defend large tracts of uninhabited and uncultivable desert, unless it contains either oil or water.

Criterion B may thus be satisfied, especially if a reserve force system similar to that of Israel is adopted by the other states. This may, however, go against the requirements of "internal security," as the rulers in Damascus and Bagdhad see them. Furthermore, the need for large quantities of weapons to arm the reserves when called up may require states to go for rather primitive, or at most "bronze-plate," technologies.

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[113] On Israel's defence budget see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 24, No. 19 (11 November 1995), p. 18. On the Syrian reductions see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 26 (1 July 1995), p. 13. On Jordan's failure to find funds to modernize its armed forces, see *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 26 (1 July 1995), p. 19.

Table 1.10: Manpower Requirements

State	Area (km^2)	Act. AF	Res.	Total AF	SAS Act.	SAS Total	Diff. A (%)	Diff. B (%)
FRG	248,580	308	717	900	265	800	-14	-11.1
Israel	20,770	176	430	606	22	67	-87.4	-89
Jordan	91,880	101	35	136	98	296	-3	+117.4
Egypt	1,001,449	430	304	734	1,068	3,223	+148.3	+339.1
Syria	185,180	408	400	808	197	596	-51.6	-26.2
Iraq	434,924	382	650	1,032	464	1,400	+21.4	+35.6

Legend:	FRG: Federal Republic of Germany pre-unification (army only)
	Act. AF: Active armed forces (thousands)
	Res.: Reserves (thousands)
	Total AF: Total armed forces (thousands)
	SAS: SAS army forces per km^2 for FRG x area of country in question
	Diff. A: SAS Act. - Active AF
	Diff. B: Total SAS - Total AF

A **stronghold defence**, such as suggested by members of the SAS group for Saudi Arabia,[114] is strictly defensive, thus posing no threat to other states in the region. Also, it would tend to be rather inexpensive (the less territory one defends, the cheaper), thereby meeting criterion B in all instances. However, the implied "selective area defence" would not be satisfactory seen from an Israeli point of view because of geography. The strategic depth of pre-1967 Israel was much too shallow to allow this type of defence to meet criterion C, also because of the shortage of natural defence lines.[115] Israel's security would suffer, and the war prevention effects might well be insufficient. It may be another matter with post-1967 Israel, however, which enjoys a "shield" in the form of the disengagement arrangements in Sinai and the Golan (as well as in Lebanon),[116]

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[114] See above, n. 36.

[115] As illustrated by the three-dimensional maps of Israel's strategic geography in Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 203-214.

[116] William B. Quandt, *Peace Process. American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution/Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 183-222 (on the 1974 disengagement), and pp. 255-283 on the Camp David treaty. See also Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 158-159; Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Strategic Balance and Disarmament in the Middle East," in Boulding (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 68, pp. 197-203, especially pp.

and which can count (as it, almost officially, does) on Jordan to provide additional strategic depth. However, even if criterion C might be met in this manner, it clearly violates criterion A to treat other states (Jordan and the Palestine yet to be) as constituting an extended *glacis*.[117] Neither of these countries would, furthermore, seem to be in a position to rely on a stronghold defence, because their strategic depth is comparable with that of Israel, that of Palestine being probably even shallower.

As far as Egypt is concerned, however, there seems to be no reason why this type of defence should not meet criteria A as well as C, and the same may be true for Iraq in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria, however, may be a slightly different matter because of the exposed location of Damascus, implying that a stronghold defence around the capital would be nearly tantamount to a forward defence along the border facing Israel.

Strictly defensive **forward defence** is an imperative for Israel because of its shallow strategic depth. Within the present boundaries, this problem is largely solved by the command of the mountain ridges in the Golan and of the West Bank. Here quite effective (and very cheap, cf. criterion B) fences have thus been erected along the "border" with the Hashemite Kingdom, making up for the fact that the Jordan really is not much of a river, obstaclewise.[118] That these fences have been removed as a result of the Israel-Jordan peace is understandable for the symbolic value, yet unfortunate from a narrow defence point of view. Such arrangements are largely defensive in themselves, and might actually allow Israel to considerably reduce, ideally abandon, her offensive-capable ground forces without further ado, whereby criterion C would be met. Criterion A, however, would clearly require Israel to withdraw behind the pre-1967 lines, which would be an entirely different matter: no strong

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199-200; and the entries on "Israel-Egypt Disengagement of Forces Agreement (1974)," "Israel-Syria Disengagement of Forces Agreement (1974)," "Red Line (Lebanon)" and "Red Line Agreement," in Bernard Reich (ed.), *An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, London: Aldwych Press, 1996, pp. 250-251, 256, 429-433.

[117] Joseph Alpher, "Security Arrangements for a Palestinian Settlement," *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 49-67.

[118] Based on personal observations along the border, as well as a briefing by an Israeli intelligence officer in the Golan, 7 April 1994. See also Hans-Dieter Lemke, Volker Peres & Annette van Edig, "Der Golan und der israelisch-syrische Friedensprozess. Politische, militärische und wirtschaftliche Aspekte," SWP-AP, Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, No. 2958 (1996).

natural defence lines, and no obvious possibilities of erecting an (ideally impenetrable) wall along the eastern border, as has actually been suggested.[119] Also, completely turning over the Golan Heights to a hostile Syria would severely weaken the north-eastern front, a problem that might, however, be solved by an elaborate disengagement arrangement (*vide infra*). Along its southern front, on the other hand, Israel seems to face no major problems, presupposing that the Sinai is not used as a stationing area for Egyptian forces, which seems highly unlikely and which would violate the Camp David agreements.[120]

To the extent that Israel were to withdraw, the frontiers might be strengthened in a non-offensive manner (consistent with criteria A and C) by proceeding with fencing, combined with the laying of anti-tank minefields and the emplacement of demolition charges along the (very few and easily blocked) roads to the central parts of Israel that would be passable to tanks. Also, the idea of a wall might be taken seriously and materialize in the emplacement of various concrete tank obstacles and the digging of tank ditches. However, behind the defence line thus created, there would be a need for mobile forces able to meet whatever enemy concentrations might break through. No linear defence is impenetrable. This might, in turn, call for the construction of roads along the border suitable for lateral reinforcement. This may, however, prove to be very costly, thereby perhaps violating criterion B.

As far as the Arab states are concerned, Egypt is reasonably secure behind the present borders, i.e. as long as the Sinai is not remilitarized by Israel. Syria is not in quite as fortunate a position, however, but might still be secure with forward defences shielding Damascus against an Israeli attack, yet only on the precondition of a demilitarization of the Golan Heights. Jordan enjoys some protection by the Jordan river, its narrow width notwithstanding. Moreover, there seems to be no reason why it should not follow the Israeli example and establish fences and other barriers as a further insurance, *in casu* as a protection against the future Palestine itself as well as against an Israeli attack *via* this country. Palestine would in any case be in a very awkward position, squeezed between two, not entirely friendly, states who just might end up at war with

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[119] Oral communication to the author by Professor Martin Van Creveld (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), 8 April 1994.

[120] "Camp David Accords," in Reich (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 116, pp. 95-96; Quandt, *op. cit.* n. 116, pp. 255-307.

each other. Forward defence against Israel would appear nearly impossible, whereas it might be feasible *vis-à-vis* Jordan. In either case, it would probably be economically far beyond the meagre means of a newly created state. Iraq, finally, may well need a forward defence, but the length of her borders would make a complete coverage prohibitively costly, in which case she might have to decide against whom to defend the country. Neither Syria nor Jordan would probably be Saddam Hussein's first choice, since the Iraqi regime would probably worry more about Iran or Turkey, as well as about domestic threats, above all the Kurdish resistance.

The creation of an **inverted synergy** clearly implies doing less than before, hence is automatically cheaper, thus meeting criterion B for all states concerned. Also, as far as Israel is concerned it would clearly improve the security of her neighbours if she were to make herself deliberately incapable of offensive operations onto their territories. This should, by definition, be done without damaging her own defence capability, thus satisfying criteria A as well as C. The same would hold true for the Arab states, only with the qualification that theirs would need to be a "joint missing link." They would have to take into account that Israel's worst fears are, of course, an attack by an Arab coalition, rather than by individual states (*vide supra*). Moreover, history shows these fears to be far from groundless, albeit perhaps overblown.

The question remains what "links" might be omitted without thereby seriously eroding defensive capabilities. It strains the imagination to envisage Israel abandoning her air power, in which she has achieved such excellence. And to wave goodbye to the Israeli navy really would not make enough of a difference. Hence we have to look at ground forces, where such capabilities as anti-tank defence beyond Israeli borders might be a relevant limitation. The Arab states might, for instance, reciprocate by scaling down their offensive-capable air forces and SSMs in favour of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), - thereby making it clear that they would not enjoy command of the air beyond Arab airspace. In neither case would defensive capabilities necessarily suffer, and war prevention might even be improved, thus meeting criterion C.

The last two NOD "models," **disengagement** and **stepping down**, are both fairly unproblematic when applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as is apparent from the many Ys in Table 1.9. In fact, the former has already been applied in practice in the disengagement agreements reached between Israel and Egypt as well as Syria, and in the Camp David agreement of 1978 (*vide supra*).

An Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory in the Golan would undoubtedly have to be accompanied by a more elaborate disengagement arrangement, say in the form of a complete demilitarization, to be supervised and monitored by UN forces. The interposition of impartial forces would ensure both sides against surprise attacks launched by the respective other much more reliably than would the creation of a military vacuum in an area of such centrality to both sides (not only militarily, but also because of its water resources). Because of the importance of the mountain ridges for surveillance purposes, Israel might have to be further "compensated" for her withdrawal by some kind of "open skies" arrangement.

Disengagement would also have to accompany the Israeli withdrawal from the Western Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state. This arrangement would have to be agreed upon during the present "self-government phase". Indeed, the aforementioned "Finlandization" of Palestine would be a form of political disengagement, committing Palestine to permanent neutrality, prohibiting her from launching an attack against Israel, and obliging her to prevent (to the best of her abilities, of course) an attack against Israel *via* her territory or airspace.

Just like disengagement, **stepping down** would hamper surprise attack, thereby making especially Israel more secure (see Table 1.8). One manifestation thereof might be a shift from large standing armed forces to a reserve army, as far as the Arab states are concerned. An Israeli reciprocal concession might be a shortening of the term of conscription, which should certainly be possible in view of the much improved balance of power created by the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War.

3. The Nuclear Factor

Having by now, hopefully, established that NOD-like arrangements, albeit of different sorts, might be suitable for the Middle East, we are left with the same vexing question as in the introductory account of NOD as such: what about nuclear weapons? Or more bluntly put: would arrangements such as those sketched above allow, or perhaps even require, Israel to relinquish her nuclear capability? And what are the implications in this respect of the disappearance of the bipolar nuclear stalemate between the two superpowers? The answer to these questions, however, will inevitably be based more on speculation than on

hard facts and empirical evidence, since nuclear deterrence thinking is a nebulous realm of uncertainty, speculation and conjecture (*vide supra*).

On the one hand, it must be acknowledged that nuclear weapons are not excluded *per se* from any NOD-type arrangement. They "only" represent offensive capability in the sense of being able to inflict harm on an opponent, whereas they cannot defeat him militarily. What they can do, however, is to negate any conventional victory over a nuclear-armed (or otherwise nuclear-protected) victim of attack. This is probably precisely why Israel has "gone nuclear:" because this seemed to offer a way out of its "existential predicament."

On the other hand, there are several drawbacks to nuclear weapons. Generally, the present author remains unconvinced of their stabilizing effects, the allegations of which are largely based on conjecture and unwarranted extrapolations from Cold War Europe to other regions in the post-Cold War era.[121] Also, the assumed Israeli possession of nuclear weapons did *not* deter the Arab states from launching an attack in 1973, and they may even have motivated (*sic!*) the Iraqi Scud attacks during the Gulf War.[122] Furthermore, a war between two contestants armed with nuclear weapons will either be a tie (because of mutual deterrence) or lead to reciprocal annihilation. Finally, one state's possession of nuclear weapons is likely to constitute a spur to its opponents to likewise gain possession of them. If unavailable, they may seek

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[121] An example of such extrapolation is Louis René Beres, Israel, "Palestine and Regional Nuclear War," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (June 1991), pp. 227-234; and Seth W. Carus, "Weapons Technology and Regional Stability," in Shelley A. Stahl & Geoffrey Kemp (eds.), *Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia*, New York: St. Martin's Press & the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992, pp. 9-16. The classical example of the belief in the stabilizing effect of nuclear power is Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 171 (1981). For a debate on the pros and cons see Scott D. Sagan, & Kenneth N. Waltz *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. A Debate*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1995. On the adequacy of other stabilizers, above all the general war-weariness, see John Mueller, "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," in Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller & Stephen Van Evera (eds.), *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management. An* International Security *Reader*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990, pp. 3-27.

[122] Yair Evron, "Deterrence Experience in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Klieman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 49, pp. 98-121, especially pp. 113-116. The logic was, of course, that the missile attacks would force Israel to strike back (most likely with nuclear weapons), which would force Egypt and Syria (perhaps also Saudi Arabia) to shift sides.

to acquire comparable means of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological weapons, which are almost as destructive, and at least equally accident-prone. Moreover, nuclear proliferation "in the making" carries serious risks of preventive war (illustrated by the Israeli attack against Iraq's Osiraq reactor in 1981), as well as of setting in motion chain reactions. Since "controlled proliferation" is thus unlikely, the world is probably better off with a less than with a more nuclearized military environment,[123] especially if alternative "stabilizers" should be available. Also, even a post-proliferation Middle East might be very unstable, because predictability is notoriously low in this region where miscalculations have been frequent, on the part of both regional states and external powers, and where "rationality" is a very ambiguous notion.[124] Finally, let us not forget that most countries feel entirely comfortable without nuclear weapons,[125] and that a number of former nuclear powers have recently chosen to "go conventional," namely South Africa, Kazakstan, Belarus and (somewhat reluctantly) Ukraine.

Even if a state were to value the benign deterrent effect of nuclear capability over the malign side-effects, it does not automatically follow that it should seek to acquire its own independent nuclear force, since adequate protection might perhaps be had under the "umbrella" of another state's

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[123] Booth & Wheeler: *loc. cit.* n. 49; Joseph Rotblat, Jack Steinberger & Bhalachandra Udgaonkar (eds.), *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. Desirable? Feasible?*, A Pugwash Monograph, Boulder: Westview, 1993.

[124] Richard B. Parker, *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993; and Thaza Varkey Paul, *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 126-145. On "rationality," see e.g. Michael Nicholson, *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. On the ambiguity when applied to the Gulf conflict, see Stanley A. Renshon (ed.), *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993; Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Arab Rationality and Deterrence," in Klieman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 49, pp. 87-97.

[125] On the "almost" nuclear states, i.e. states that have at some stage seriously contemplated going nuclear, but chosen not to, see e.g. George Quester, "Unilateral Self-Restraint on Nuclear Proliferation: Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany," in Bennett Ramberg (ed.), *Arms Control Without Negotiation. From the Cold War to the New World Order*, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1993, pp. 141-157; Lars B. Wallin, "Sweden," in R.O. Karp (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 91, pp. 360-381.

extended nuclear deterrence.[126] The credibility of the US' extended deterrence was probably reduced by the nuclear stalemate, hence extended deterrence tended to be more effective in deterring than in compelling action. This was, for instance, the case with the only known instance of US brandishment of its nuclear threat in defence of Israel: during the 1973 War, when the Soviet Union was about to come to the aid of Egypt.[127]

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, one may hope (or fear) that the US will be less constrained in these respects, hence that the credibility of its extended deterrence will be greater, at least *vis-à-vis* non-nuclear opponents. If so, Israel will surely be among the beneficiaries thereof, since it strains the imagination to envisage the US sitting idly by while the Jewish state is wiped off the face of the earth. On the other hand, since the Arab states have now been deprived of their nuclear "patron," one might fear a more determined effort on their part to gain possession of nuclear weapons with which to neutralize the Israeli and/or US nuclear deterrence.

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[126] On extended deterrence, see e.g. Paul K. Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988; Earl C. Ravenal, "Coupling and Decoupling: The Prospects for Extended Deterrence," in P. Hopmann & Barnaby (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 8, pp. 59-70; Barry Buzan, "The Evolution of Deterrence Theory: Lessons for Israel," in Klieman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 49, pp. 19-33; Stephen J. Cimbala, *NATO Strategies and Nuclear Weapons*, London: Pinter, 1989; Ivo H. Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1991; Robert Jervis, *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984; Robert Jervis, "The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World," in Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller & Stephen Van Evera (eds.), *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management. An International Security Reader*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990, pp. 28-38; Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989; Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence," *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1989), pp. 183-207. On the post-Cold War situation, see Matthias Dembinski, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons after the End of the East-West Conflict: the Concept of Minimized Extended Deterrence," in Vilho Harle & Pekka Sivonen (eds.), *Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Europe*, London: Pinter, 1991, pp. 98-128; Carl Kaysen, Robert S. McNamara & George W. Rathjens, "Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (1991), pp. 95-110; McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 4 (1991), pp. 83-94; Charles L. Glaser "Nuclear Policy Without an Adversary: U.S. Planning for the Post-Soviet Era," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 34-78.

[127] Barry M. Blechman & Douglas M. Hart, "The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons. The 1973 Middle East Crisis," in Steven E. Miller (ed.), *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence. An International Security Reader*, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 273-297.

Fortunately, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely at the 1995 review conference, and the Egyptian threats of not signing in case of Israeli recalcitrance did not materialize.[128] Nevertheless, the present situation is not stable, and it is at least conceivable that proliferation will occur (with Iran being the most likely candidate in the short term, perhaps later to be followed by a resurgent Iraq).

A situation where one or several of its adversaries acquired nuclear weapons would clearly be worse for Israel's security than one in which nobody possessed nuclear weapons. The present author sees no justification whatsoever for the Israeli nuclear deterrent. Israel has won every war it has ever faught, using only conventional means. It will be even more sure to do so in the present, much improved, security environment. Also, the much debated "opacity" (i.e. the "neither confirm nor deny" policy with regard to Israeli nuclear weapons)[129] goes against the universal trend of enhanced transparency of military matters. Since Israel is (albeit perhaps mostly as a matter of propaganda) supportive of the idea of a regional Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ), such an arrangement seems to hold the greatest promise.[130] However,

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[128]   James Bruce, "To Sign or Not to Sign: Israel Embattled Over NPT Refusal," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 23, No. 12 (25 March 1995), pp. 20-21; Shai Feldman, "L'extension du TNP et la maîtrise des armements nucléaires au Moyen-Orient," *Politique Étrangère*, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 609-619; Shai Feldman, "Is There a Proliferation Debate," *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 787-792; Sharon Sadeh, "No Agreement to NPT Until Peace," *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 13 (1 April 1995), p. 3. On Egypt's attitude, see Jim Walsh, "The Riddle of the Sphinx: Egypt's Failure to Balance the Israeli Nuclear Threat," *Breakthroughs*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Cambridge, MA: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program of the MIT (Spring 1994), pp. 12-16.

[129]   On Israel's improved security situation see Dore Gold, "Evaluating the Threat to Israel in an Era of Change," in Feldman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 90, pp. 95-108. On opacity see Shlomo Aronson & Oded Brosh, *The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East. Opacity, Theory, and Reality, 1960-1991. An Israeli Perspective*, Albany: State University of New York, 1992; Avner Cohen, "Nuclear Weapons, Opacity, and Israeli Democracy," in Yaniv (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 72, pp. 197-226; Avner Cohen, "Stumbling into Opacity: The United States, Israel, and the Atom, 1960-63," *Security Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Winter 1994-95), pp. 195-241; Louis René Beres, "Israel's Bomb in the Basement: A Second Look," in Karsh (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 105, pp. 112-136; Evron, *op. cit.* n. 91; Etel Solingen, "The Domestic Sources of Regional Regimes: The Evolution of Nuclear Ambiguity in the Middle East," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 305-337.

[130]   See e.g. Shalheveth Freier, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East and Effective Verification," *Disarmament*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1993), pp. 66-91; Jan Prawitz & James F. Leonard, *A Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, UNIDIR Research

in the present author's opinion, the most solid guarantee against proliferation is to remove the incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons by making conventional armed force postures stable, i.e. non-offensive.

4. NOD and Middle Eastern Arms Control

As mentioned above, NOD was not originally envisioned for implementation *via* arms control. Furthermore, some of the inherent flaws in the arms control approach that stood in the way of progress in Europe, apply *a fortiori* to the Middle East.

"Balance," for instance, makes even less sense when applied here than it ever did in Europe, because the environment is more multipolar. Geoffrey Kemp is probably right in his rather sombre view of the conflict environment of the Middle East:

> Most of the key countries in the region believe they are surrounded by enemies, facing a military threat from virtually every direction, and thus, must arm accordingly. Second, the resultant arms races that have evolved from this perspective interact with one another, in part because of the extended range and lethality of modern weapon systems.[131]

This leaves us with several unanswered questions of central importance. Who should negotiate with whom? What should be the agenda? And what might be the formula for a mutually acceptable outcome: "balance"? If so, then in the sense of equitable reductions or of equal ceilings? In both cases: between whom? Or an imbalance or asymmetry of sorts? If so, in which force categories, between whom and how large?

Report, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1996; United Nations, "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East. Summary of a United Nations Study," *Disarmament Facts* No. 76, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1991. On Israel's attitudes to other counter-proliferation strategies, see Gerald M. Steinberg, "Israel and the Changing Global Non-Proliferation Regime: The NPT Extension, CTBT and Fissile Cut-Off," in Efraim Inbar & Shmuel Sandler (eds.), *Middle East Security: Prospects for an Arms Control Regime*, London: Frank Cass, 1995, pp. 70-83; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Non-Proliferation. Time for Regional Approaches?," *Orbis*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 409-423.

[131] Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 15-16. See also Wiberg, *op. cit.* n. 112; "Commission Document," *loc. cit.* n 112, pp. 22-26; Shlomo Gazit, "After the Gulf War: The Arab World and the Peace Process," in Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 17-25.

There is unquestionably a need for asymmetrical solutions (the magic formula of the CFE negotiations). A "package deal" is also called for because the threat perceptions of the parties involved differ widely:[132]

- Israel is primarily concerned about the prospects of a joint Arab attack, as well as about the *Intifada*, i.e. internal security, both of which pose truly existential treats to the survival of the state.

- The Palestinian nation is, above all, concerned about the prospects of never achieving statehood.

- Syria and Iraq may be concerned about an Israeli pre-emptive strike, just as they may be concerned about Israel's crossing the nuclear threshold in some future war. Furthermore, Syria feels (and is) under constant Israeli surveillance. Whereas this may be motivated by the Israeli need of detecting Syrian attack reparations, it can probably also be used for target acquisition purposes, i.e. in preparation of an air or missile strike against Damascus.

- All Arab states, furthermore, fear domestic instability, for instance in the shape of fundamentalist revolt.[133]

In the narrow military sphere, the best available solution to these intricacies may be to couch the final solution in terms of a "balance of incapabilities," such as suggested by various NOD advocates. Rather than comparing capabilities which are really incommensurable, it might be possible to define a condition of "mutual defensive superiority." This would be a formula according to which neither Israel nor the Arab states would stand to lose a war unless they were to start it themselves. A shorthand formulation of this highly stable condition is

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[132] On the CFE as a model see Jérôme Paolini, "CFE as a Model for Arms Control in the Middle East," in Feldman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 90, pp. 145-153. Threat perceptions have been a central topic of the UNIDIR Expert Group on Confidence-Building in the Middle East (to which the present author belongs). See, for instance, James Leonard et al., *National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East,* UNIDIR Research Paper No. 37, New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1995. On Arab threat perceptions see Ephraim Kam, "The Threat Perception of the Arab States," in Feldman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 90, pp. 81-94.

[133] See, for instance, Gilles Kepel, "Islamists versus the State in Egypt and Algeria," *Daedalus*, Vol. 124, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 109-127; Lawrence Tal, "Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan," *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Autumn 1995), pp. 139-156.

the following, suggested by the late Anders Boserup, inspired by André Glucksmann and C. F. von Weizsäcker[134] (where O stands for offensive and D for defensive power, I for Israel and A for the Arab states):

$$D^A > O^I \ \& \ D^I > O^A$$

This simply describes a situation where either side's ability to defend itself surpasses the other's ability to attack. To define such a condition in abstract terms is, however, much easier than to operationalize its variables. Also, to apply the same formula to a multipolar setting raises numerous problems, - indeed may be tantamount to squaring the circle. Syria should, for instance, be strong enough (defensively) to defend itself against Israel, Iraq or some unspecified coalition, yet not so strong (offensively) as to be able to defeat Jordan or Lebanon. Hence the need for an underpinning of the indigenous defence efforts with collective security guarantees.

The problem is, however, even more complicated than this, because the military sphere is so tightly interwoven with the political one. The present format of the Madrid Talks pays tribute to these intricacies by the conduct of several parallel and separate yet linked sets of negotiations.[135] One of the problems is that of timing. The Arab preference seems to be to take the nuclear and withdrawal issues first, followed by the signing of a peace treaty and some conventional disarmament, whereas the Israeli preferences are almost the exact

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[134] Anders Boserup, "Non-offensive Defence in Europe," in Derek Paul (ed.), *Defending Europe. Options for Security*, London: Taylor & Francis, 1985, pp. 194-209. The same idea is to be found in André Glucksmann, *Le Discours de la Guerre*, Paris: L'Herne, 1967, pp. 42-43; and in Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, *Wege in der Gefahr. Eine Studie über Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kriegsverhütung*, (1976), München: dtv, 1979, pp. 150, 116, 165-166. See also Møller, *op. cit.* (1992) n. 7, pp. 84-89.

[135] Good overviews are Geoffrey Kemp & Geremy Pressman, "The Middle East: Continuation of the Peace Process," in *SIPRI Yearbook 1995*, pp. 171-196, with appendix: "Documents on the Middle East Peace Process," pp. 197-210; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 126-141; IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1991-1992*, London: IISS/Brassey's, 1992, pp. 84-94; IISS, *Strategic Survey, 1992-1993*, pp. 109-119. See also Martin Indyk, "Watershed in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 1 (1991/92), pp. 70-93; M. Graeme Bannerman, "Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Toward Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 1 (1992/93), pp. 142-157; Shenbonti Ray Dadwal, "The Middle East Peace Process," *Asian Strategic Review 1994-95*, New Delhi: IDSA, 1995, pp. 9-38; Avi Shalim, "The Significance of the Madrid Peace Conference," in Davis, *op. cit.* n. 63, pp. 133-147.

opposite: peace first, followed by withdrawal (the "land for peace" formula); CBMs, Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) and conventional disarmament first, nukes later; and everything subject to very rigid and intrusive verification (with which the Arab states are far from happy). The only way out of the impasse may be to "wrap" the entire "package" from the beginning, fine-tune the successive steps later, and make sure that there is "something in it" for everybody at each stage, albeit not necessarily equally much and almost inevitably different types of benefits.[136] Table 1.11 shows some of the main ingredients of such a "package" in which there would indeed be something for everybody, and in which most elements are continua that might be implemented in a piecemeal fashion, thus allowing for some degree of synchrony between the asymmetrical concessions of the two sides.

Table 1.11: An Arab-Israeli Peace and Arms Control "Package"

Israeli Concessions	Joint Measures	Arab Concessions
Withdrawal from the Golan, Gaza and the West Bank	International control of the Golan Internationalization of Jerusalem	Peace treaties Demilitarization of the Golan Finlandization of Palestine
Nuclear disarmament	Ratification of the NPT and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Regional NWFZ	Conventional force reductions: tank limits, reserve system
(More) defensive strategy: No pre-emption	Open Skies regime Doctrine seminars	CSBMs: Transparency, manoeuvre constraints
Limitations on aircraft		SSM Constraints
Shared Benefits		
Economic Cooperation -> Greater Prosperity		
Water Management Regime -> Averting Disaster		

[136] Steinberg, *loc. cit.* (1994) n. 135; Galia Golan, "Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Israeli Perspective," in Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 37-47; Mark Heller, "Middle East Security and Arms Control," in Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 129-137.

I shall, briefly and superficially, go through the rationale for the various elements.

The Israeli withdrawal from territory conquered in the 1967 war is a matter of principle: general respect for international law suffers from the blatant and long-lasting violation thereof represented by the continued occupation. On the other hand, Israel holds on to the territories for a reason, namely in order to ensure itself against an Arab attack, hence the need for combining the withdrawal with reciprocal steps on the Arab side. One such step, especially on the part of Syria, would be the signing of formal peace treaties, wherein Israel's right to exist (within its pre-1967 borders) should be unequivocally acknowledged. Pending that, a set of non-aggression treaties (in conformity with the UN definition of "aggression")[137] might constitute a significant first step. There is, incidentally, a very ancient regional precedent for such treaties, namely the peace and non-aggression treaty between Ramses II of Egypt and the Hittite ruler Hattusilis III, dated 1280 B.C.[138]

As far as the Golan is concerned, Israel obviously needs some insurance against a Syrian surprise attack, which might take the form of a complete demilitarization of the area, except for the interpositioning of UN forces. Syria should thus be prohibited from deploying more than light forces in the entire Golan, which should, on the other hand, be returned in its entirety to Syria. This is a matter of principle since to allow a conqueror to hold on to even a small piece of occupied territory would establish a dangerous precedent. Of course, the (limited number of) Jewish settlers would resent such an arrangement, but they should have known all along that their presence constituted a violation of international law. Even though Israel is thus legally obliged to return the Golan to Syria, to actually do so would, admittedly, be a rather one-sided concession, which Israel is unlikely to make unless somehow "compensated" for it. The most obvious concession Syria could make would be in the coinage of

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[137] "UN General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggression," in Jozef Goldblat, *Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements*, London: SAGE Publications/Oslo: PRIO, 1994, pp. 398-402. This definition explicitly outlaws, *inter alia*, "bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapon by a State against the territory of another State" (art. 3b).

[138] See Stanley M. Burstein, "Arms Control in Antiquity," in Burns (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 62, Vol. 2, pp. 551-561, especially p. 552.

CSBMs,[139] i.e. by allowing Israeli (and UN) to challenge on-site inspections of military deployments in the Golan, combined with a local Open Skies Regime and a regional crisis prevention centre. The purpose of the latter should be to prevent "innocent" violations of the deployment constraints from triggering political crises. Such measures would go a long way towards ruling out the kind of surprise attack that may be Israel's only "Achilles' heel" (because of her reliance on reserves, requiring a certain call-up period).[140] However, for such CSBMs to really serve their purpose, their area of application might have to be expanded to include the entire territory of both countries, which would represent a disproportionate Syrian concession, both because of the larger size of this country and because of its lesser "political transparency."

The question of the future military status of the West Bank and Gaza is, of course, central, yet more complicated. It is inconceivable that Israel would acquiesce in the emergence of a hostile military presence here. However, it is probably also in the best interest of the Palestinians themselves not to be perceived as a military threat by the (inevitably superior) Israel. As argued above, an "Austrian-style" neutralization, or even the aforementioned "Finlandization" of Palestine would contribute to this end (*vide supra*). This would, however, rule out complete demilitarization[141] and rather point in the direction of NOD-type armed forces, that should emphasize counter-mobility operations and air defence. Hence, the Palestinian armed forces should be strictly defensive, armed, deployed and trained for defensive (counter-mobility) operations that would both protect Palestine against an Israeli reoccupation and against an attack from, e.g. Syria. Also, it would shield Israel against attack by an Arab coalition *via* the West Bank. This would further entail a complete (albeit perhaps phased) withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) from the entire West Bank territory, as well as a disarming of all non-state forces: Jewish settlers as well as Palestinian civilians. As all other "modern" states, the

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[139] Gideon Gera, "Israel and Syria: The Problems of Confidence," in Ben-Dor & Dewitt (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 105, pp. 165-178. On CBMs for the Middle East in general see Shai Feldman (ed.), *Confidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle East*,. JSSS Study No. 25, Boulder: Westview Press (1994).

[140] See e.g. Dore Gold, "Evaluating the Threat to Israel in an Era of Change," in Feldman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 90, pp. 95-108.

[141] Suggested by Alpher, *loc. cit.* n. 117, p. 54. For a critique, see M.Z. Diab, "A Proposed Security Regime for an Arab-Israeli Settlement," in Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 159-172, especially p. 169.

Palestinian state should enjoy a monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force. Should the settlers prefer to leave, then so be it. Their presence is anyhow a violation of international law and the product of unscrupulous policies on the part of the previous Likud government (that the Labour government, unfortunately, did not entirely renounce while in office).[142]

The deal could be "sweetened" for Israel with a range of CSBMs such as reciprocal observance of military exercises, manoeuvre constraints in border areas, etc. However, these should be equitable by assigning the same rights and obligations to both sides. This might, on the other hand, be made to appear more "fair" to Israel by extending the area of application to Jordan as well.[143] An even stronger guarantee for Israel's security would be democratic rule in Palestine (even though Israeli democracy has not really helped the Palestinians). Hence, the future "Republic of Palestine" should be "born" with a democratic constitution, not merely but also with a view to enhancing Israeli security.[144] Since this would be quite compatible with an extensive reliance on reserve forces, it might also be the most cost-saving solution. However, because of the serious risk of internecine violence, an all-the-way militia structure (with weapons distributed among the general population) would seem an unwise choice, also because it would legitimate the reciprocal arming of the Jewish settlers.

As argued above, Israel would need to follow the example of South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan by getting rid of its undeclared, but effectively undisputed, nuclear "bombs in the basement." In reciprocation, the Arab states might abandon their, so far unsatisfied, nuclear ambitions along with their chemical weapons potential. These reciprocal concessions might be tied up in

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[142] On the settlements, see Elisha Efrat, "Jewish Settlements in the West Bank: Past, Present and Future," in Karsh (ed.), *op. cit.* (1994) n. 100, pp. 135-148.

[143] Joseph Alpher, "CBMs in the Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Security Context," in Feldman (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 139, pp. 222-236.

[144] Khalil Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Winter 1996), pp. 5-20. See also William B. Quandt, "The Urge for Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4 (1994), pp. 2-7. For a more pessimistic view see Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4 (1994), pp. 8-11.

a simultaneous accession by all states in the region to the NPT and CWC regimes.[145]

A parallel road to the same goal might be the establishment of an NWFZ, as first proposed by the Shah of Iran in 1974. It was subsequently endorsed by Egypt and other regional powers. Egypt took a new initiative to the same effect in the wake of the Gulf War (4 July 1991), and resolutions have been passed by the UN General Assembly in 1991 and 1993 endorsing the concept. Indeed, it was even mentioned in Security Council Resolution SC-687 on Iraq. It thus appears that there are no real opponents of the idea *per se*, not even the traditional "spoil-sport," the US who has also lent its support to the notion, albeit with certain qualifications. Israel is also, in principle, in favour of the idea, albeit with the rather curious reservation that it should encompass all weapons of mass destruction, including conventional weapons in large quantities (*sic*).[146]

Even though to simultaneously establish an NPT regime and an NWFZ might be regarded as "overkill," the latter would add some limitations on external powers operating in the region or its vicinity, which might be appreciated, especially by the Arab states. The unfortunate link between vertical

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[145] On the CWC, see e.g. Julian Perry Robinson, Thomas Stock & Ronald G. Sutherland, "The Chemical Weapons Convention: the Success of Chemical Disarmament Negotiations," *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 705-734. The convention itself is appended on pp. 734-756. See also Trevor Findlay, "Peace Through Chemistry. The New Chemical Weapons Convention," *Pacific Research*, Vol. 6, No. 1, Canberra: Peace Research Centre, ANU (February 1993), pp. 3-7; Christoph Müller, "Das Chemiewaffen-Übereinkommen vom 13. Januar 1993. Endpunkt oder Neubeginn multilateraler Rüstungskontrolle?," *Europa-Archiv*, Vol. 48, No. 11 (10 June 1993), pp. 327-337; Oliver Thraenert, "The International Chemical Weapons Convention—Problems Involved," *Aussenpolitik. English Edition*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (1993), pp. 222-231.

[146] *The Arms Control Reporter*, 1-94, 453.A.1-4. Resolution 387 is reprinted in Burns, *op. cit.* n. 62, Vol. 3, pp. 1403-1406. See also Abdel Mohem Said Aly, "Arms Control and the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Arab Perspective," in Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 151-158; Gerald M. Steinberg, "The Middle East," in Burns (ed.), *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 169-186, especially pp. 182-183; Gerald M. Steinberg, *op. cit.* n. 135, pp. 131-133; John R. Redick, "Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones," in Burns (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 62, Vol. 2, pp. 1079-1091, especially pp. 1085-1086. The central documents are reprinted in Avi Beker (ed.), *Arms Control Without Glasnost:Building Confidence in the Middle East*, Jerusalem: Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 1993, pp. 199-250. See also Avi Beker, "Denuclearization Without Glasnost," Avi Beker (ed.), *Arms Control Without Glasnost:Building Confidence in the Middle East*, Jerusalem: Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 1993, pp. 161-196.

and horizontal proliferation might thus be severed, i.e. between, on the one side, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region or its immediate surroundings by the nuclear powers, and the drive for horizontal proliferation among the regional states themselves.[147] An additional reason for establishing an NWFZ would be to provide for more reliable safeguards than presently offered by the (understaffed and underfunded) IAEA. By explicitly linking up with the NPT, the NWFZ might even contribute to strengthening the latter.

The proposed bargain would still be somewhat uneven, since Israel is presently the region's only nuclear power, hence the need for some additional reciprocal Arab measures. The most obvious one would be to accept limitations on conventional forces, especially tank and artillery holdings, as well as a build-down of the standing armies in favour of a greater reliance on reserve forces. The implications thereof would be a reduced capability for surprise attack.[148] As a step in this direction, serving the same goal, the Arab states might accept some constraints on their deployment, in the form of a disengagement regime. Informal agreements to the same effect already exist, in the form of the "red lines" regulating the deployment of forces on the border between Israel and Syria (also in Lebanon) as well as Jordan.[149] This, in combination with the availability of an increased strategic depth in Jordan and the future Palestine,[150] should provide Israel with the "margin of security" it might need for it to feel secure without its nuclear potential. It might also allow Israel to abandon its unfortunate doctrine of "taking the war to the enemy" as well as of pre-emption[151] (in blatant violation of international law). Forward defence could

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[147]   Sverre Lodgaard, "Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation in the Middle East/Persian Gulf," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 3-10.

[148]   Heller, *loc. cit.* n. 136, p. 132.

[149]   Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 157-158.

[150]   Alpher, *loc. cit.* n. 117. For all its merits, and the perfectly legitimate concern for Israeli security notwithstanding, the author probably goes too far when he suggests to prohibit the new Palestinian state from taking measures to prevent an Israeli reoccupation in an emergency.

[151]   Louis René Beres, "Striking Preemptively: Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under International Law," in Beker (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 146, pp. 129-160; Levite, *op. cit.* n. 112, *passim*; Shimon Naveh, "The Cult of Offensive Preemption and the Future Challenges for Israeli Operational Thought," in Karsh (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 105, pp. 168-187; Avi Kober, "A Paradigm in Crisis? Israel's Doctrine of Military Decision," in Karsh (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 105, pp. 188-214. See also the May 1991 speech by Yitzhak Rabin "Deterrence in an Israeli Security Context," in Klieman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 49, pp. 6-15, in which he *expressis verbis* rules out pre-emption, albeit on pragmatic grounds (p. 8), while maintaining the need for an offensive strategy

still remain the guideline, in which context Israel might place greater emphasis on defensive measures, such as air defence (*vide infra*), barriers and "landscaping," for instance similar to the Bar Lev line.[152]

However, one of the main reasons for the offensive doctrine of Israel is, of course, uncertainty about the intentions of its neighbours, whose closed and authoritarian regimes provide for very little transparency with regard to military measures. One of the most important reciprocations that the Arab states might offer would therefore be democratization. Pending that, however, they might accept a set of CSBMs to bridge the transparency gap. There is, for instance, no reason why they should be unable to accept the same type of obligations that the USSR and other communist regimes accepted in the context of the CSCE, including rules about prior notification of, and invitation of observers to, military manoeuvres. This might be complemented by an Open Skies regime for the entire region, that would also partly compensate Israel for relinquishing the Golan. One might also think of establishing a Crisis Prevention Centre where "unusual military activities" might be investigated and discussed, with the modest (yet perhaps significant) purpose of avoiding inadvertent war.[153]

A side-effect of such a centre would be that it would provide a venue for day-to-day contacts between the military staffs of both sides, thereby probably promoting mutual trust, at least in the sense of removing misperceptions. The same purpose would be solved by the establishment, preferably on a regular (say, biannual) basis, of a doctrine seminar along the lines of the Vienna Seminars between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.[154]

Most of the above would concern the land forces, which may seem paradoxical considering that the last major wars in the region have been decided

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(p. 10).

[152] See e.g. Anthony H. Cordesman & Abraham R. Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War*,Vol. 1, London: Mansell, 1990, pp. 37-44; "Bar-Lev Line," in Reich (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 116, pp. 60-61; Ian Smart, "Untangling the Priorities: Weapons, Vehicles, and the Objectives of Arms Control," in Stahl & Kemp (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 121, pp. 145-164, especially pp. 149-151.

[153] Diab, *loc. cit.* n. 141, p. 166.

[154] On the Vienna Seminars, see note 29 above. No such discussions have taken place between the states in the Middle East, although the Multinational Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security established under the auspices of the Peace Talks, might be an approximation. See e.g. Steinberg, *loc. cit.* (1994) n. 135, pp. 135-136.

by air forces. Also, the threat that looms the largest in the press as well as in the academic literature is that of ballistic missiles. This is, indeed, a problem, especially in view of the short ranges between borders and capitals in the entire region. Everybody is within reach of everybody else's ballistic missiles. However, presupposing that the above constraints on the development of weapons of mass destruction are enforced, it is the present author's sincere opinion that the missile threat is vastly exaggerated. Aircraft are what really need to be limited for the sake of military stability, since they are the most suitable means of conventional surprise attack with military significance.

Nevertheless, warranted or not, the missile scare is a fact that has to be reckoned with, and it was amplified by the (largely unsuccessful) Iraqi Scud attacks during the Gulf War.[155] Israel might thus appreciate (for psychological reasons) what would "really" be a poor bargain, namely between Arab constraints on "long-range" ballistic missiles on the one hand, and Israeli limitation on aircraft (especially fighter-bombers) on the other. The former might imply much more stringent limitations of range than under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), say as low as 100 kms, combined with deployment constraints that should bring them beyond striking range of the national capitals of the respective adversaries. This would also remove the rationale (if there is any) for Israel's development of the "Arrow" (an indigenous Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile, ATBM) and/or the purchase of US Patriot missiles with an aggressively advertised, yet very dubious ATBM capability.[156]

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[155] See e.g. Indyk, *loc. cit.* n. 135, pp. 80-82; Christophe Carle, "Mayhem or Deterrence? Regional and Global Security from Non-Proliferation to Post-Proliferation," in Stahl & Kemp (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 121, pp. 45-57. For an analysis that takes the real threat posed by the *Scuds* more seriously: Jeffrey McCausland, "The Gulf Conflict: A Military Analysis," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 282 (1993), pp. 33-36; Harald Hellwig, "Rolle und Bedeutung balllistischer Flugkörpersysteme," in Hartmut Zehrer (ed.), *Der Golfkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse und Auswertung aus militärischer Sicht*, Herford: Mittler, 1992, pp. 363-389; Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 26, 106-107.

[156] Reuven Pedatzur, "The Israeli ATBM: The Errant Arrow," *Breakthroughs*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Cambridge, MA: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program of the MIT (Spring 1994), pp. 17-22. On Patriot see Theodore A. Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot," *International Security*, Vol.16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 119-171; Klare, *op. cit.* n. 87, pp. 73-75; Shai Feldman, "Security and Arms Control in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective," in Stahl & Kemp (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 121, pp. 75-91, especially pp. 82-83; Jürgen Altmann, "Abwehrsysteme gegen Kurz-und Mittelstreckenraketen," in Müller & Neuneck (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 46, pp. 249-263; John Pike, Eric Stambler & Chris Bolkcom, "The Role of Land-Based

The outlined arms control package would benefit everybody, albeit not necessarily to the same extent. Even though it would not create peace, it should at least remove some of the obstacles in the way of a genuine peace. By so doing, it would, hopefully, also open some doors for regional cooperation in the non-military spheres which alone can make a peace arrangement durable and dependable.

An obstacle may, however, be that peace would impact on the "social contract" in the affected countries, who have been geared towards war ever since the 1940s.[157] Likewise, it would create problems in the quite sizeable arms industries of some of the countries involved in the process.[158] These problems should, of course, not be accepted as valid grounds for stopping the process before take-off. They do, however, point to the need for a determined conversion effort to accompany the arms control and peace process.

IV. The Role of External Powers

Even though peace in the Middle East will inevitably be the primary responsibility of the regional states, external powers have always been deeply involved in the region, and their continued participation in the peace process will remain essential for some time yet.

Missile Defense," in Neuneck & Ischebeck (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 93, pp. 125-145; André Dumoulin, "Du syndrome Scud à la renaissance des ATBM," *Stratégique*, No. 51/52 (1991), pp. 319-344. On the resurgent interest in NATO, see e.g. William D. Smith, "Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence for Europe," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Vol. 38, No. 5/6 (1993), pp. 45-51.

[157] See the excellent study by Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War. Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992. See also Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. 401-418.

[158] On Israel's arms industry see Zeev Bonen, "The Israeli Defence Industry: Past and Future," *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 139, No. 3 (June 1994), pp. 56-59; Ruth Kaminer, "Israeli Defense Industry Revamps," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (June 1995), pp. 81-83; P.R. Kumaraswamy, "Recession in lsrael's Military Industries," *Middle East International*, No. 504 (7 July 1995), pp. 17-18; "Israeli Firms Win Home Orders," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 24, No. 19 (11 November 1995), pp. 18-19; Yesid Sayigh, *Arab Military Industry. Capability, Performance and Impact*, London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1992; Sadowski, *op. cit.* n. 82; Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 71-100. For a more theoretical analysis of the spurs to develop indigenous arms industries, see Keith Krause, *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

It remains to be seen whether the elimination of the East-West conflict will facilitate or hamper conflict resolution, but the available evidence seems to point to the former. Even though there have been some instances of US-Soviet cooperation in the Middle East,[159] competition between the two superpowers has been much more frequent, and usually not at all helpful. Furthermore, the remaining superpower has all along had a clear propensity to "go it alone."[160] Also, it has had quite some success in this endeavour, with the Camp David agreement standing out as the most impressive accomplishment.[161] The present US sponsorship of the peace talks is thus in direct continuity with the past.

One important contribution which extraregional powers can make is to establish effective arms trade regulations.[162] One might even argue that they

[159] See e.g. Harold H. Saunders, "Regulating Soviet-U.S. Competition and Cooperation in the Arab-Israeli Arena, 1967-86," in George et al. (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 62, pp. 540-580; Galia Golan, "Superpower Cooperation in the Middle East," in Roger E. Kanet & Edward A. Kolodziej (eds.), *The Cold War as Cooperation. Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict Management*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991, pp. 121-146.

[160] For a rather critical view of US policy, see Raymond Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985, pp. 360-409 (on Kissinger's post-October War diplomacy). On the US plans for forceful intervention, see e.g. Michael Klare, *Beyond the 'Vietnam Syndrome'. US Interventionism in the 1980s*, Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1981; Deborah J. Gerner, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), *Intervention into the 1990s. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992, pp. 361-382. On the ill-fated Soviet attempts at getting a foothold in the region (which was so geostrategically important to them), see e.g. Fred Halliday, *Threat from the East? Soviet Policy from Afghanistan and Iran to the Horn of Africa*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982, pp. 63-80; Robert O. Freedman, "The Superpowers and the Middle East," in Roy Allison & Phil Williams (eds.), *Superpower Competition and Crisis Prevention in the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 121-143. On the eventual Soviet acquiescence of US dominance, see Carol R. Saivetz, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East: Gorbachev's Imprint," in Roger E. Kanet, Tamara J. Resler & Deborah N. Miner (eds.), *Soviet Foreign Policy in Transition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 196-216.

[161] Quandt, *op. cit.* n. 116, pp. 255-335. See also Tony Armstrong, *Breaking the Ice. Rapprochement Between East and West Germany, the United States and China, and Israel and Egypt*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1993, pp. 52-65, 84-94, 120-131; Louis Kriesberg, *International Conflict Resolution. The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992.

[162] On arms trade regulations in general, see e.g. Ian Anthony (ed.), *Arms Export Regulations*, Oxford: Oxford U.P./SIPRI, 1991; Keith R. Krause, "Controlling the Arms Trade Since 1945," in Burns (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 62, Vol. 2, pp. 1021-1039; Trevor Taylor & Ryukichi Imai, *The Defence Trade. Demand, Supply and Control*, London: Royal Institute of International

have a special responsibility for doing so, since they are partly to blame for the high intensity and destructiveness of past wars in the region (not least the horrendously bloody Iran-Iraq war) which was a result of unconstrained and massive arms transfers to the region.[163] In belated recognition thereof there has recently come a new awareness of the need to curtail, or at least regulate, the arms trade. The attempt at doing so is, however, up against some important "structural" obstacles.

First of all, an arms transfer control regime involving merely the exporting countries will be faced with the familiar problems characteristic of such collaboration regimes. If an arms supplier imposes a ban on its arms exports to the region while other supplier(s) do not, then that ban will have no significant effect on regional stability. The other(s) will be able to simply take over its market share leaving the supplier observing the ban at an economic disadvantage. If the other supplier(s) impose a ban on arms exports as well, they too will lose market shares unless the ban is 100 per cent effective, since any one supplier "cheating" by not actually observing the ban is able to step in and appropriate the entire market. If everybody continues to sell, neither will stability improve, nor will anybody be able to increase its market share.

Even if everybody were to agree on, and actually comply with, a ban on exports, the outcome would still be uncertain. The vulnerability to arms embargoes differs considerably between the states in the region. Countries with easy access to hard currency and/or indigenous skills (Iran, Iraq, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) are generally less vulnerable than countries lacking these assets (such as Syria, Jordan, Yemen). Furthermore, in the entire region there is quite a large indigenous production which would undoubtedly be strengthened by a supplier-imposed embargo. This would not necessarily improve stability significantly, indeed it might even damage it through a proliferation of "dirty bombs" and various unsafe

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Affairs/IIPS Institute for International Policy Studies, 1994; William D. Hartung, "Curbing the Arms Trade: From Rhetoric to Restraint," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 219-247; Michael Brzoska, "Prospects for a Common Arms Transfer Policy from the European Union to the Middle East," in Inbar & Sandler (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 130, pp. 14-33; Saferworld, *Proliferation and Export Controls. An Analysis of Sensitive Technologies and Countries of Concern*, Chertsey Surrey: Deltac Limited, 1996.

[163] Michael Klare, "Fueling the Fire: How We Armed the Middle East," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 1 (January-February. 1991), pp. 19-26; Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 54-62.

technologies. Moreover, the former suppliers would clearly lose lucrative foreign sales, without much prospect of making up for this in terms of civilian exports, since militarization would continue. Since everybody would stand to lose, and nobody to gain, such a supplier-imposed arms export ban is probably a non-starter.

The picture would, however, be significantly different if a long-term supplier-plus-recipient arms trade control regime (i.e. a regime regulating not merely exports, the supply side, but also imports, the demand side), were to be put in place. Everybody (but more than anybody else the regional states) would stand to gain from the improved stability. The former suppliers would, of course, lose their arms exports, but they would not have to worry about losing shares in a no longer existent market. Moreover, a replacement of the revenues from arms sales with those from civilian exports for development purposes would be a distinct possibility.

Arms trade regulations, even in the context of a combined supplier and recipient regime, must be based on a consensus about what to limit and to what extent. Here, the desirability of limiting arms transfers has to be weighed against respect for the legitimate need of states to defend themselves. Logically, there are two main approaches to arms transfer regulations: the discriminatory and the non-discriminatory.

Discriminatory arms trade regulations might, for instance, consist of a ban on the trade in weapons of mass destruction, such as already implied by the NPT and the Australia Group's regulations.[164] A similar regime already exists for long-range and high payload SSMs in the form of the MTCR, pertaining to missile systems with a payload exceeding 500 kg and a range over 300 km.[165]

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[164] Julian Perry Robinson, "The Australia Group: A Description and Assessment," in Hans Günter Brauch, Henny J. van der Graaf, John Grin & Wim A. Smit (eds.), *Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology. Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the 1990s*, Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992, pp. 157-176; Brad Roberts, "The Strategic Implications of Chemical Weapons Proliferation," in Stahl & Kemp (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 121, pp. 27-44; Brad Roberts, "Chemical and Biological Weapons and Regional Arms Control," Stahl & Kemp (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 121, pp. 187-196.

[165] The central documents are reprinted in Burns (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 62, Vol. 3, pp. 1474-1480. See also Ian Anthony, "The Missile Technology Control Regime," in Ian Anthony (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 162, pp. 219-227; Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation and the MTCR," in Neuneck & Ischebeck (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 93, pp. 171-184; N. Kniest, "Export Controls and the Missile

The latter might, for instance, be extended to an integrated "transfer regime" covering both ballistic missiles and advanced strike aircraft.[166] It has also been suggested to use the CFE's categorization of tanks, artillery, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), combat aircraft and helicopters as the matrix for arms trade regulations.[167] The curtailment of the trade in such especially destabilizing weapons might go hand-in-hand with unconstrained supplies of more defensive types of armaments, such as anti-tank and sea mines, ATGMs, air defence weapons and the like.

Pessimists have questioned the practicality of such regulations, and recommended more "blunt instruments," such as an across-the-board moratorium on arms transfers to the entire region.[168] There are, however, certain precedents for discriminatory regulations, such as the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 between the US, France and the UK to the effect that they would only supply arms for self-defence purposes.[169] Also, there seems to be a growing recognition among the major suppliers of, first of all, the need for curtailing the arms trade and, secondly, for giving first priority to such weapons as contribute to offensive capabilities.[170] Not much has actually been accomplished, however,

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Technology Control Regime," Neuneck & Ischebeck (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 93, pp. 185-196; Peter D. Zimmerman, "Bronze Medal Technology and Demand-Side Controls on Missile Proliferation," Neuneck & Ischebeck (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 93, pp. 19-29; Andrew Mack, "Beyond MTCR: Additional Responses to the Missile Proliferation Problem," in Trevor Findlay (ed.), *Chemical Weapon and Missile Proliferation. With Implications for the Asia/Pacific Region*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991, pp. 123-131; John Pike & Eric Stambler, "Constraints on the R&D and Transfer of Ballistic Missiles Defence Technology," in Brauch et al. (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 164, pp. 61-74; Robert Shuey, "Assessment of the Missile Technology Control Regime," Brauch et al. (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 164, pp. 177-190; Janne E. Nolan, "Stemming the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment of Arms Control Options," in Stahl & Kemp (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 121, pp. 171-186.

[166] See e.g. John R. Harvey, "Regional Ballistic Missiles and Advanced Strike Aircraft: Comparing Military Effectiveness," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 41-83.

[167] Kemp, *op. cit.* n. 75, pp. 140-142, 178-182; Alan Platt, "Arms Control in the Middle East," in Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 139-150, especially pp. 144-146.

[168] Heller, *loc. cit.* n. 136, pp. 135-136.

[169] "Tripartite Arms Declaration (1950)," in Burns (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 62, Vol. 3, p. 1432.

[170] In the "P-5 Initiative" of 1991 it was, for instance, stated that "the transfer of conventional weapons, conducted in a responsible manner, should contribute to the ability of States to meet their legitimate defence, security and national sovereignty requirements . . . They recognized that indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability . . . They also recognize that a long term solution to this problem should be

and the main constraint on the arms trade still seems to be the limited purchasing power of the would-be recipients. One modest achievement is, however, the conventional arms register which will promote enhanced transparence.[171]

The role of the great powers, above all the US, has been very ambiguous, to say the least. If taken at face value, the "counter-proliferation initiative" and the declared policy of regulating the arms flow to the Middle East,[172] are very much to be applauded. However, this policy should almost certainly *not* be taken at face value. Indeed, one might see it as mainly a way of removing competition for the lucrative arms market in the Middle East, to which the US continues to be the main exporter. This export drive is, of course, spurred by the need to make up for a receding domestic demand for arms by exports, so as to keep (most of) the US arms industry intact and in business.

The sales campaign has been underpinned by the dissemination of two myths: the myth of a "military-technological revolution" (it even has an acronym: the MTR), and the myth of an "Islamic threat" (the "Green peril").

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found in close consultation with the recipient countries." In the subsequent communiqué from the meeting in London, 18 October 1991, the Five singled out the following categories of weapons as requiring mutual information: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, military aircraft and helicopters, naval vessels and certain missile systems. More generally, they pledged to "avoid transfers which would be likely to . . . be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient state." See "Big Five Initiative on Arms Transfer and Proliferation Restraints (1991)," in Burns (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 62, Vol. 3, pp. 1481-1483; Mark Kramer, "The Global Arms Trade After the Persian Gulf War," *Security Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Winter 1992), pp. 260-309.

[171] Malcolm Chalmers & Owen Greene, "Implementing and Developing the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms," *Peace Research Reports*, No. 32, Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford (1993); Herbert Wulf, "The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms," *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 533-544; Edward J. Laurance, Siemon T. Wezeman & Herbert Wulf, "Arms Watch. SIPRI Report on the First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms," *SIPRI Research Report*, No. 6, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1993); Ian Anthony, "Assessing the UN Register of Conventional Arms," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1993), pp. 113-129.

[172] Geoffrey Kemp, "The Bush Administration's Arms Control Agenda for the Middle East," in Feldman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 90, pp. 183-191.

- The myth of the MTR is based on the alleged lessons of the Gulf War:[173] that air power and high technology are decisive, hence that old-style (and especially Soviet-produced) weapons had better be replaced with new ones (labelled "Made in the USA"). However, the Gulf War probably taught only one lesson, namely that a crushing superiority will always suffice for victory, especially if the inferior party does not fight back.[174]

- The myth of the Green peril has been promulgated by, among others, prominent academics such as Samuel Huntington.[175] Even though this was probably not Huntington's intention, the myth serves the function of providing the West with a new, much needed, main enemy to replace the Soviet Union. It thus helps prevent (or at least slow down) reductions in military expenditures that would also negatively affect US arms sales. Unfortunately (for everybody except the arms producers), a rallying cry

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[173] See e.g. Les Aspin & William Dickinson, *Defense for a New Era. Lessons of the Persian Gulf War*, Washington, D.C.: Brassey's US, 1992; Lawrence Freedman & Efraim Karsh, "How Kuwait Was Won: Strategy in the Gulf War," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Autumn 1991), pp. 5-41; McCausland, *loc. cit.* n. 155. On US force planning in the light of the "lessons," see Davis, Paul (ed.), *New Challenges for Defense Planning. Rethinking How Much is Enough*, Santa Monica: RAND, 1994; Benjamin Ederington & Michael J. Mazarr (eds.), *Turning Point. The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994; Thomas A. Keaney & Eliot A. Cohen, *Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf*, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1995. On the Soviet reading, see Charles C. Petersen, "Lessons of the Persian Gulf War: The View from Moscow," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (June 1994), pp. 238-254. For a more sober analysis, see Carl Conetta & Charles Knight, "After Desert Storm: Rethinking US Defense Requirements," *Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Report*, No. 2, Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute (1991); Alan Bloomgarden & Carl Conetta, "Air Power Promises and US Modernization Trends After Operation Desert Storm," Cambridge, MA: Commonwealth Institute, 1994; Jeffrey Record, *Hollow Victory. A Contrary View of the Gulf War*, Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, US, 1993; Barry R. Posen, "Military Lessons of the Gulf War-Implications for Middle East Arms Control," in Feldman & Levite (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 90, pp. 61-77.

[174] John Mueller, "The Perfect Enemy: Assessing the Gulf War," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 77-117.

[175] Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," (*Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993), here quoted from the slightly more "academic" version in Armand Clesse, Richard Cooper & Yoshikazu Sakamoto (eds.), *The International Systems After the Collapse of the East-West Order*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994, pp. 7-27. See also the ensuing debate on whether or not there is an "islamic threat," Leon T. Hadar, "What Green Peril?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (1993), pp. 27-42; and Judith Miller, "The Challenge of Radical Islam," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (1993), pp. 43-56.

such as Huntington's "the West against the rest!" may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The two myths are sometimes combined, providing the convenient (for the arms producers) myth of particular dangers stemming from a proliferation of ballistic missiles to Muslim countries. This may support a sales campaign for Patriot missiles with alleged ATBM capabilities.[176]

V. Perspectives

One might argue that the midwife of peace in the Middle East may turn out to have been Saddam Hussein, because the Gulf War acted as a catalyst in several respects. By effectively rendering the largest and strongest anti-Israeli force unusable, the Gulf War significantly improved the regional balance of power, seen from an Israeli point of view, and hence afforded the requisite "margin of security" for new initiatives. It also resulted in deep cracks in Arab unity, with Egypt and Syria siding with the "Western" coalition against Iraq (which also included Israel and Saudi Arabia), while the PLO and most of the Maghreb took the opposite position, whereas the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was caught in the middle. On the other hand, it resulted in a certain *rapprochement* between the two (or three) leading Arab states, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia.[177]

Internally as well, circumstances may be favourable. Above all, war-weariness seems to be spreading, also because of the economic exhaustion caused by the several decades of "virtual war." This holds true for both Israel (where defence budgets are shrinking because of the perennial "guns or butter"

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[176] Aaron Karp, "Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East: Realities, Omens and Arms Control Options," in Inbar & Sandler (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 130, pp. 111-129.

[177] Anoushiravan Ehtestami, "The Arab States and the Middle East Balance of Power," in James Gow (ed.), *Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community*, London: Brassey's, 1993, pp. 55-73; Shahram Chubin, "Post-War Gulf Security," *Survival*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (March-April 1991), pp. 140-157; Roland Dannreuther, "The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 264 (1991/92).

struggle), and the Arab states.[178] Whereas these are "negative" inducements, there are also more "positive" ones at work, however, such as the promises of peace, *inter alia* in the form of the perspectives of economic gains from a comprehensive peace-*cum*-economic reform. Also, the need for joint management of the scarce water resources may act as a spur for the peace process.

We may therefore now be facing an unprecedented "window of opportunity," which may be exploited by the peace process that has been under way since October 1991 (the Madrid Conference), and the Israel-PLO agreement on self-government in the Gaza and Jericho of September 1993. In view of this, the time may have come to analyse the more long-term perspectives, i.e. the question: what would peace in the Middle East be like, if it were possible, say ten or twenty years from now?

One of the most attractive prospects would be that of a "security community" (i.e. a regional subsystem, between the members of which war has become, for all practical intents and purposes, inconceivable) such as suggested by authors such as Efraim Karsh and others. This may well be worth pursuing, hopelessly utopian though it may seem today. However, the associated notion of neutrality has, in the present author's opinion, better be discarded, if only because of its very fuzzy implications as applied to a community of states, as opposed to individual states.[179] Rather, some thought had perhaps better be given to the opportunities of collective security arrangements for the region (the

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[178] Nadav Halevi, "Economic Implications of Peace: The Israeli Perspective," in Fischer et. al. (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 87-116; Heba Handoussa & Nemat Shafik, "The Economics of Peace: The Egyptian Case," Fischer et. al. (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 19-54; Rizkallah Hilan, "The Effects on Economic Development of Syria of a Just and Long-Lasting Peace," Fischer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 55-79; Amer Bisat & Mohamad L. Hammour, "Economic Prospects for a Postwar Lebanon," Fischer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 155-180; Hani Abu-Jabarah, The Economics of Peace: Jordan," Fischer et al. (eds.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 181-199; Robert E. Looney, "The Economics of Middle East Military Expenditures: Implications for Arms Reductions in the Region," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 407-417.

[179] Efraim Karsh, "Neutralization: The Key to Arab-Israeli Peace," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 11-24; Efraim Karsh & M. Zuhiar Diab, "A Road to Arab-Israeli Peace?," in Centre for Defence Studies (ed.), *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1993*, London: Brassey's, pp. 315-334; Efraim Karsh & Yezid Sayigh, "A Cooperative Approach to Arab-Israeli Security," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 114-125. For a similar idea, see Hassan Mahamadi Nejad, "The Middle East—Building a Community of Nations," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (June 1992), pp. 159-167.

diametrical opposite of neutrality),[180] which alone could provide security for states such as Jordan, Lebanon and the future Palestine. A very modest, but not insignificant, step in this direction was the formation of Egyptian and Syrian peace-keeping units in the wake of the Gulf War.

One subregional manifestation of such a security community might be an Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, representing an intermediary stage in the process from pluralism to "amalgamation." Such an arrangement might solve several sets of problems for all three founding parties: the Palestinians would enjoy a statehood of sorts; Israel would be relieved of the fear of Arab irredentism and of the "internal," yet existential, threat represented by the *Intifada* (which is surely going to continue otherwise); the Hashemite Kingdom, finally, would be relieved of its present fears of an odd Israeli-Palestinian *rapprochement* that would put the very survival of Jordan at serious risk. In the confederation, domestic policy, including control of the police force, would remain the prerogative of the three constituent parts, while foreign and defence policy should be that of the confederate authorities. In addition, the control of the water resources would perhaps be best managed by the confederation. Such a confederation might come to be seen as the nucleus of something larger, especially if it were to become (as seems likely) the economically most developed subregion in the entire Middle East. We might therefore (as a rather long-term perspective) envisage a "concentric circles" institutional "architecture" in the Middle East, similar to that apparently in the making in Europe.

An intermediary stage towards this end might be that of a regional "security regime," resting not so much on formal agreements as on the powerful "reciprocity principle," which makes it rational for states to observe self-imposed restraints in the expectation of (and presupposing) reciprocal behaviour on the part of their adversaries (likely to become less and less so with the passage of time).[181] Whereas such an arrangement need not necessarily be institutionalized at all, it would certainly be facilitated by the availability of

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[180] Some preliminary suggestions can be found in Michael Harbottle, "Collective Security Under Subregional Arrangements: A Cooperative Approach," in Boulding (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 68, pp. 213-221.

[181] Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378; Kurt Gottfried, et al., *Towards a Cooperative Security Regime in Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Peace Studies Program, 1989.

appropriate institutions, which might be a precondition for proceeding beyond the (inherently fragile) security regime stage.[182] There is a long way to go yet, because the region of today is clearly underdeveloped institutionally, both on the regional and subregional level (with the Arab League, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) constituting the few, and not really impressive, exceptions). A first step in the direction of a security community might be the institutional one of establishing a Middle Eastern counterpart of the CSCE,[183] in the framework of which the various collaborative arrangements might conveniently be both negotiated and implemented, preferably under the UN auspices.[184]

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[182] For a theoretical analysis of the role of institutions, see Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye & Stanley Hoffman (eds.), *After the Cold War. International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989-1991*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.

[183] Frank Schimmelfennig, "The CSCE as a Model for the Third World? The Middle East and African Cases," in Lucas (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 73, pp. 319-334. See also John Marks, "A Helsinki-Type Process for the Middle East," in Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 71-77; I. William Zartmann, "The Negotiation Process in the Middle East," Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 63-70, especially pp. 68-69; Harald Müller, "Arms Control in the Middle East: A European Perspective," Spiegel (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 82, pp. 173-179; "Commission Document," *loc. cit.* n. 112, pp. 27-28; Aly, *loc. cit.* (1991) n. 146, pp. 156-157.

[184] See e.g. Juergen Dedring, "The Role of the United Nations in the Middle East," in Boulding (ed.), *op. cit.* n. 68, pp. 223-233.

Part II

Chapter 1

Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East: Necessity versus Feasibility

Ioannis A. Stivachtis[*]

This chapter examines the strengths, weaknesses and dynamics of non-offensive defence (NOD) in light of its possible application to the Middle East. The chapter seeks to answer questions like: what is NOD? What forms can NOD take? What purposes does NOD serve in general, and what purposes could it serve in the Middle East in particular? Is the adoption of NOD in the Middle East feasible?

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part defines NOD and discusses the forms NOD can take as well as the various strategies related to its implementation. Focusing on the Middle East, the second part analyses the aims of NOD. Here, emphasis is placed on the way in which NOD deals with the arms dynamic and the security dilemma. The third part identifies and discusses strategic, systemic/international, regional, and intra-state factors that make the adoption of NOD in the Middle East currently problematic.

I. NOD and Related Concepts

Defence strategy can take various forms, all of which however aim at providing adequate security for the state. According to Johan Galtung, the word defence has two meanings: (1) any reaction to an attack, and (2) a limited

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reaction (defensive defence).[1] This resembles the double meaning given to the word deterrence: deterring an attack through the threat of effective retaliation (deterrence by retaliation), or deterring an attack through the promise of effective resistance (deterrence by denial).[2] The former involves the infliction of punishment on an opponent in response to attack, though the particulars of the punishment need not necessarily correspond to the particulars of the attack that provoked it. Deterrence by retaliation aims to inflict reciprocal cost on an aggressor. The threat of a conventional or nuclear attack on the aggressor's home territory is a clear example of retaliatory policy. In contrast, deterrence by denial involves the interdiction of aggression through armed resistance. The essence of denial is the blocking of an attack through armed opposition.

NOD is premised on the logic of deterrence by denial. According to NOD, a state ought to possess enough defensive capabilities so as to make itself difficult to attack, expensive to invade, and hard to occupy. These defensive capabilities however, must be so configured that they do not reach beyond the span of national territory. In other words, these capabilities must be such that they are unable to operate on the territory of the opponent.

Because NOD requires that a state's denial forces must not themselves be suitable for long-range offensive operations and that military capability should be confined as much as possible to one's own territory, NOD makes the distinction between offensive and defensive military capabilities crucial. Although clear in theory however, this distinction has proved difficult to pin down in practice. With few exceptions, like long-range strategic bombers and missiles, almost any weapon can be applied for defensive as well as offensive purposes. Mobile weapon platforms, like tanks, are just as suitable for offence as they are for defence, and even apparently defensive capabilities like fixed fortifications such as mines and air artillery can be used to support offensive operations. This corresponds to Sverre Lodgaard's observation that weapons are neither offensive nor defensive, and that they can be turned to both ends,

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[1] Johan Galtung, "Transarmament: From Offensive to Defensive Defense," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 21,1984, p. 128.

[2] See Glenn Snyder, "Deterrence: A Theoretical Introduction" and Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence" both in John Garnett (ed.), *Theories of Peace and Security*, London: Macmillan, 1970 and Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations* London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 135-138, 163-167, 193-195 and 197-210.

although they may not be equally well-suited for offensive and defensive operations.[3]

If separating offensive from defensive military weapons is so difficult, if not virtually impossible, then, how can offensive and defensive military capabilities be distinguished? According to Lodgaard, the distinction between offensive and defensive is not a matter of weapons, but of mode of combat. By looking at the totality of a military posture (deployment pattern, armaments and equipment, infrastructure and logistics, training and doctrine, etc.) the degree of offence and defence implied in the posture can be determined.[4] The notion of scope of military postures and the degree of offence and defence implied in different postures, are at the basis of NOD.

1. NOD

As a military policy NOD can assume different configurations (see chapter 1), all of which however are premised on the notion of defensive defence. According to NOD, the most important cut in the range of possible reactions to an attack is not between weapons of mass destruction and conventional defence, nor between military and non-military defence, but between offensive and defensive means of defence.[5] This distinction emphasizes the objective capabilities of defence systems and not the subjective motivations that may be attached to them. In other words, the question is not whether a defence system is to be used for attack, but whether such a system is capable of being used for attack. Hence, according to Galtung, the best judge as to whether a weapon system is defensive or offensive is a possible target of the system, not the subjective intentions behind it. As he puts it,

> Thoughts and words come and go, actions depend on what is objectively possible. The adversary is the best judge, just as we, in our self-defence, are the best judges of the adversary.[6]

According to Galtung, the offensive/defensive distinction is located in geographical space. In other words, can a weapon system be effectively used

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[3] Sverre Lodgaard, "Confidence Building and Arms Control in the Middle East," unpublished paper, 1994.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] Galtung, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 127-128.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

beyond national borders, or can it only be used within one's own territory? If a system can be used beyond national borders, then it is offensive. If it can only be used within national territory, then the system is defensive. Using a spatial scale makes it possible for Galtung to measure how offensive weapon systems may be in terms of two variables: range and impact area.[7] Range divides into immobile, short and long, and impact area divides into local, limited and extensive. Defensive weapon systems have a limited range and destruction area, and can only be used on one's own territory. All other weapon systems are offensive.[8]

There are however, two important problems with Galtung's argument.[9] First, how to establish the borderline between short and long range, and between limited and extensive impact areas. This problem is particularly complicated by the fact that the range of many weapon systems is generally becoming increasingly larger, and that the range as well as power of many weapon systems can be radically adjusted with minor technical modifications. Secondly, how to deal with potentially peculiar geographical factors. A country may be so small that almost any weapon system would reach beyond national borders. Such geographic factors are obvious in the Middle East and especially in the case of Israel which lacks territorial depth. The ability of NOD to effectively address these two problems is crucial for the would-be operational viability of NOD strategies (especially in the Middle East).

2. Strategies of NOD

Implementation of NOD can be achieved through various strategies.[10] Some of these strategies could be non-military, along the lines of civilian resistance to occupation as advocated by Adam Roberts and Gene Sharp.[11]

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[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Long-range weapons with limited impact areas are classified as offensive

[9] Galtung, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 128-129.

[10] Galtung, *op. cit.* n. 1; and Dietrich Fischer "Invulnerability without Threat: The Swiss Concept of General Defence," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 19, No. 3, (1982), pp. 205-225 and *Preventing War: Towards a Realistic Strategy for Peace in the Nuclear Age*, London: Groom Helm, 1984.

[11] Adam Roberts (ed.), *The Strategy of Civilian Defence: Non-Violent Resistance to Aggression*, London: Faber & Faber, 1967 and Gene Sharp, *Making Europe Unconquerable: The Potential of Civilian-based Deterrence and Defence*, London: Taylor & Francis, 1985.

Others could be more conventionally military comprising regular military units, paramilitary units in the form of broadly-based militia organizations, and special task units in the form of formations charged with specific tasks such as coastal, border and air defence, military engineering and training.[12] Finally, some professional military units might be required to take advantage of high-technology systems, such as the many varieties of short-range precision-guided munitions that can be used against attacking aircraft, ships, armoured vehicles and even missiles.[13]

According to Buzan, NOD envisages a high level of mass participation in defensive defence that extends not only throughout the whole territory of a state, but also throughout its society.[14] As Stan Windass points out, conventional military resistance to attack would begin at the border with static defences like mines, tank traps, fixed fortifications, and professional armed forces, and would continue through militia resistance and civilian resistance even in the face of successful military occupation.[15] This image of NOD combines conventional military defence, paramilitary defence, and non-military defence.

Implementation of different NOD strategies requires different defence structures and degrees of resources. Most NOD strategies operate on the assumption of small, local, autonomous, dispersed military/paramilitary units. Two reasons underlie this: (1) not to offer an opponent a concentration of defence potential worthy of extensive conventional or nuclear attack, and (2) to be able to resist simultaneous attacks from several directions. In terms of non-military defence, NOD envisions a "social defence" which denies any kind of cooperation to aggressors.

The main argument in favour of NOD is that a defence of this kind both ensures national defence, and is not provocative to others. Through deterrence by denial, NOD provides national security by reducing the chance of successful aggression and thereby by reducing the incentives for aggression altogether.

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[12] Adam Roberts, *Nations in Arms*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986.

[13] Buzan, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 280.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Stan Windass (ed.)*, Avoiding Nuclear War: Common Security as a Strategy for the Defence of the West*, London: Brasseys, 1985, pp. 212-123.

Because the components of NOD cannot be used in committing aggression however, NOD poses no threat to others, and is therefore not provocative. NOD thus makes it possible for states to ensure national security without threatening each other. In addition NOD could also encourage increased cooperation between national defence establishments, thus opening the way towards cooperative security.

3. NOD Aims

NOD has four main aims: (1) to dampen the operation of the security dilemma; (2) to positively affect the workings of the action-reaction part of the arms dynamic; (3) to restructure the domestic component of the arms dynamic; and (4) to provide a way out from the politics-first or arms-first dilemma.[16]

3.1 NOD and the Security Dilemma

The first objective of NOD is to dampen the operation of the security dilemma as much as possible, while still retaining the security benefits of a strong national defence.[17] The security dilemma refers to the uncertainty of purpose created by the military preparations of individual states (see Introduction and chapter 1). NOD aims at reducing states' fear of attack by lowering the offensive potential of military capabilities that are designed for defence. States adopting NOD should renounce the military means for aggression, and also should structure their military forces so as to make a clear political statement that no aggressive intentions are entertained.

When all states pursue NOD, the security dilemma should cease operating (or at least diminish greatly). Because, given NOD, the military preparations of states are non-threatening, when all states pursue NOD fear of aggression should subside, and military relations among states should improve. In particular, given NOD, fear of military confrontation between states should disappear or at least be reduced to a marginal issue.

In the Middle East, war remains a perennial danger. To the traditional threat of war between Israel and its Arab neighbours, new threats of, or actual,

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[16] Buzan, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 278.

[17] *Ibid.*

violent conflict have been added: between Arab states themselves, as in the case of war between Iraq and Kuwait, or between Middle Eastern states and states that are geographically situated on the periphery of the Middle East region, as in the case of Syria and Turkey. The mutual hatreds, prejudices and historical grievances that exist in the region intensify the security dilemma that Middle Eastern States face and make war a steady threat. In such an environment, progress towards a peace settlement is vital. In this context, the adoption of NOD strategies could be of great help. But is the adoption of NOD in the Middle East feasible? This question will be addressed below.

Even if currently the potential for war in the Middle East in the short term appears to have receded somewhat, the consequences of such a future war have been multiplied by the Middle East's regional arms race which since the late 1980s has escalated and shows no signs of slowing down.[18] There are no controls on the sale of conventional weapons to states in the region, and Middle Eastern countries have come to acquire increasingly sophisticated weapon systems. By far the most dangerous development in the regional arms race however, is the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by several states. states such as Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya and Syria, are all reported to have weapons of mass destruction capabilities and/or research programmes. The result of all this has been an unrestrained arms race and an enhanced security dilemma that not only perpetuates the possibility of war in the Middle East, but also drastically increases the potential destructiveness of such a war. Because the second objective of NOD is to dampen the operation of the arms dynamic, NOD could be useful in dealing with the arms race in the Middle East.

3.2 NOD and the Action-Reaction Process in the Arms Dynamic

The action-reaction process in the arms dynamic is part of the security dilemma which dictates that states watch and respond to each other's armament efforts. To understand the impact of NOD on the action-reaction process, one needs to examine this process in more detail.

The main claim of the action-reaction model of the arms dynamic is that states strengthen their armaments because of the threats they perceive from

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[18] See Geoffrey Kemp, *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race*, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991. See also Congressional Quarterly, *The Middle East*, 7th edition, Washington, DC, 1991, pp. 69-86.

other states. Actions by a state to increase its military strength, even for defensive purposes, will raise the level of threat perceived by other states and cause them to react by increasing their own level of armament.[19] For example, in the Middle East, an effort by either Israel or Syria to increase its military strength for defensive purposes, will probably be perceived by the other as threatening, and will therefore lead it to react by buttressing its own military strength.

States arm themselves either to seek security against the threats posed by others, or to increase their ability to achieve political objectives against the will of others. The latter case may be called a power struggle. Power struggles usually reflect an attempt by one or more states to increase their influence and control in the international system at the expense of others. Power struggles thus are likely to produce arms races in which the revisionist states hope to change their status either by winning without fighting, or by defeating others in war.[20] Examples of power struggles are observable in the Middle East where several political boundaries are in dispute.

According to Buzan, even when there is no power struggle, or only a weak one, the action-reaction process of an arms race can still obtain.[21] This is because states usually have some sense of who the potential aggressor(s) might be even when the probability of aggression is considered as low. This perception of potential aggressor(s) will tend to mitigate towards the action-reaction process in arms racing.

The action-reaction model applies to the arms dynamic as a whole. It can be seen working in specific cases, such as that of the Middle East, where political rivalry generates a power struggle and an arms race.[22] But it can also be seen working more generally in the international system, where states usually maintain armed forces at a level largely influenced by the armament level of other states. This means that even if a power struggle did not exist in the Middle East, the action-reaction part of the arms dynamic would still be

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[19] See George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of Arms Race," in Herbert York (ed.), *Arms Control*, San Francisco: Freeman, 1973.

[20] Buzan, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 77.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

[22] See Geoffrey Kemp, "Cooperative Security," in Janne Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement*: *Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century*, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994.

operating. The arms race can only be resolved if states are aware of each other's status quo motives.

In practice, there is a considerable mixture of power and security motives in the behaviour of states. Most weapons can be used for defensive as well as offensive purposes. It is therefore difficult for any state to distinguish between measures other states take to defend themselves and measures they may take to increase their capability for aggression. Because no state can afford to be wrong in its assessment of the motives of others, it is considered prudent to adjust national military strength in response to the military measures taken by others. Since each adjustment in national military strength is seen by other states as a possible threats however, even an environment in which all states seek only their own defence will tend to produce competitive accumulations of arms.

This is the problem that NOD seeks to address. Since NOD has no offensive potential, it is neither threatening nor provocative to others. The adoption of NOD in the Middle East thus, could solve the problem of arms racing. But are the conflicts in the Middle East a reflection of a power or a security struggle? And how well can NOD respond to a revisionist environment? This question will also be addressed later.

3.3 NOD and the Domestic Component of the Arms Dynamic

NOD also aims at restructuring the domestic component of the arms dynamic. According to the domestic sources model of the arms dynamic, national armament efforts are advanced by forces within the state.[23] Such forces are related to military production, bureaucratic politics, economic management, domestic politics and most importantly to the institutionalization of military research and development. The latter is closely linked to the logic of technological imperative.[24] Since military technology is important and takes long to develop, states need to create or encourage a research and development establishment. Because technological improvement is a continuous process, the

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[23] Buzan, *op. cit.* n. 2, pp. 94 and 96-102.

[24] See Marek Thee, *Military Technology, Military Strategy and the Arms Race*, London: Groom Helm, 1986. See also Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race*, Westmead: Saxon House, pp. 39-43; Miroslav Nincic, *The Arms Race: The Political Economy of Military Growth*, New York: Praeger, 1982, pp. 19-25; and William H. Baugh, *The Politics of the Nuclear Balance*, New York: Longman, 1984, pp. 86-93 and 107-15.

establishments that support it necessarily become institutionalized. Thus while research and development establishments are created because the complex and expensive nature of technology requires them, they become mechanisms that "set ever higher standards of expense and complexity, increase the pace of technological advance, and work to make their own products obsolete."[25] Thus what begins as a response to a problem, becomes part of the process by which the problem is continuously re-created. Once the process of research and development is institutionalized, a mechanism is created within the state that not only responds to technological advancement, but also pulls it along. In so doing, it drives the qualitative element of the arms dynamic by a logic that is distinct from the logic of conflict between states.

The rationale driving military production is quite similar to that of research and development. Since states need military capabilities to defend themselves, this requires governments to support military production capabilities.[26] The most elementary feature of this support is the promotion of military industries by governments. In this context, rivalry between states is generated by the qualitative and quantitative levels of their military production. This process cannot be easily controlled unless the research and development establishments related to military production are also controlled. Such control, however, is difficult due to the presence of political, economic, social and other interests and considerations.

If the domestic structure component of the arms dynamic is difficult to manage, this means that weapons will always be an important element in the security calculations of states. The only possible way to manage security relations between states then, is to design weapons so that, on the one hand they provide adequate security for states, and, on the other hand, do not pose threats to other states. One of the elementary functions of NOD is related to this possibility.

NOD aims at restructuring, but not eliminating, the domestic component of the arms dynamic. States pursuing NOD still need weapons and armed forces. Since self-reliance is a central theme of NOD, some increase in the

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[25] Buzan, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 96.

[26] See Bruce Russett, *The Prisoners of Insecurity*, San Francisco: Freeman, pp. 80-86. See also Gautam Sen, *The Military Origins of Industrialization and International Trade Rivalry*, London: Frances Pinter, 1984.

military production/acquisition of some states, might even be required. High-technology weapons would still be important in order to support defence tasks. NOD does not follow disarmament in seeking to resist or ignore technological change. Instead, NOD tries to steer and exploit technological change in pursuit of defensive strength. Under NOD, arms industries would be oriented away from the production of offensive arms, and towards the production of defensive arms.

3.4 NOD and the Resolution of the Problem of Military Means

There are four basic approaches to solving the problem of the holding of military means by states in the international system: (1) the tensions-first approach; (2) the political settlement approach; (3) the arms-first approach; and (4) the cooperative security approach. According to the tensions-first approach, the resolution of military tensions between states requires contact between rival states so that these have an opportunity to understand and learn about each other.[27] Contact between rival states is expected to lead to increased tolerance, understanding and respect, and consequently, to a reduction in tensions. The reduction in tensions, in turn, is expected to remove the need for the maintenance of extensive armaments, which is then expected to open the way for disarmament negotiations. Successful disarmament negotiations (due to decreased tensions) are expected to contribute to a further reduction in tensions, which are then expected to lead to further disarmament efforts and so on, setting in motion a spiral of tension reduction and disarmament.

The tensions-first approach relies heavily on the benign influence of popular attitudes on national decision-making.[28] Such a reliance, however, may be unjustified, first because popular attitudes may not always have significant effect on national foreign policy, and second, because popular attitudes may not be easily mobilized on behalf of tension-reduction measures. Both these impediments to the tensions-first approach are present in the Middle East, where popular opinion is often excluded from national decision-making, and where in certain cases, popular opinion tends to be more belligerent than official national policy.

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[27] See Hadley Cantril (ed.), *Tensions That Cause Wars*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1950 and Jessie Bernhard, T. H. Pear, Raymond Aron and Robert C. Angell, *The Nature of Conflict*, Paris: UNESCO, 1957.

[28] See Frederick S. Dunn, *War and the Minds of Men*, New York: Harper, 1950.

According to the political settlement approach, resolving military disputes is impossible as long as political issues regarded as vital by states remain unresolved.[29] In resolving military disputes amongst states, the political settlement approach suggests three steps: (1) identification of areas of political dispute; (2) identification of vital interests; and (3) negotiation of a compromise around vital interests. The political settlement approach expects states to defend their concerns, through military means if necessary, and does not expect that a military dispute between states can be resolved unless the political disagreements underlying the military dispute are removed first.

The political settlement approach however, faces two problems. First, the approach cannot get around the fact that military means are often useful tools in reaching political settlements, and second, the approach assumes a sharp and identifiable distinction between political settlements and the resolution of military disputes. Both these problems are very much evident in the Middle East, where military means are used as leverage in political negotiations, and where political and military disputes cannot be easily disentangled. The present fate of negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel on the implementation of the Oslo Agreements, as well as the recent failure of the Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security Talks (ACRS), can be seen as indicative examples.

The armaments-first approach emphasizes the tension which high levels of armament introduce even in relations between states already in dispute. Existing high levels of armaments make political disputes more intractable and thereby more difficult to resolve. Reducing armament levels, as an initial step, can therefore help in the resolution of political conflict. The basic criticism of this approach comes from those who argue that military factors are not a principal determinant of political relations.[30]

The cooperative security approach seeks to resolve military disputes amongst states by clarifying the ends of national military preparations.

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[29] See Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*; George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, New York: Mentor, 1952 and Barbara Tuchman, "The Alternative to Arms Control," in Roman Kolkowicz and Niel Joeck (eds.), *Arms Control and International Security*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

[30] See Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961, pp. 8-12.

Cooperative security arrangements are thus based on the enhanced transparency and monitoring of national defence establishments and military postures. Significant improvements in space-based surveillance technologies allow states using national technical means to observe each other's military dispositions and behaviour much more accurately than ever before. Where there is the political will, these national technical means can be bolstered by agreed confidence-building measures (CBMs) and confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs). CBMs and CSBMs increase transparency by a system of agreed reporting and inspection measures that give each state the ability to reassure itself about the other's military deployments. The technologies and arrangements that support greater transparency do not eliminate the security dilemma. But by reducing uncertainties and increasing warning times, they reduce the intensity and fear of military threats that states pose to each other. In so doing, they lower the salience of the security dilemma in security relations between states.

In a way, NOD strategies can also be considered a kind of CSBM, in that NOD removes the threat to others usually implied in national defence postures. NOD can open the way towards the cooperative security route of reducing tensions without either making states feel vulnerable, as in the case of disarmament, or requiring agreement with other states, as in the case of arms control. By dampening the security dilemma, NOD creates the necessary military conditions for the resolution of political tensions and disputes. Moreover, NOD does not require the political consensus of others, and it avoids the dependence of arms control on the prior resolution of political disputes. Because NOD can be pursued unilaterally, it is politically flexible. It allows any state to take the lead, and thus bypass the problem of agreement that characterizes disarmament and arms control measures that are heavily based on multilateral implementation.[31]

Cooperative security arrangements and especially the adoption of NOD can be regarded as potentially useful in addressing security problems and standing military disputes in the Middle East. The question however, is whether cooperative security and NOD can be made to function in the Middle East.

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[31] Buzan, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 285.

II. NOD in the Middle East: Is it Feasible?

The notions of cooperative security and NOD were initially developed in response to the changing character of European security.[32] The question, however, is whether these notions are applicable to the Middle East where the political conditions are very different from those prevailing in Europe in the 1980s/1990s. Lodgaard for instance, argues that policies of NOD may be difficult to adopt in the Middle East because the European experience shows that three basic conditions should be initially met. First, the states must have "no ambition of changing the political status quo with military means; second, they must have approximately the same amount of resources available for military purposes, for in the relationship between a small and a big power, even a minor big power deviation from the predominantly defence posture may be of great concern to the small power; and third, the geography should be advantageous to the defender."[33] In the Middle East however, political revisionism has not disappeared from the strategic considerations of states, and the relative distribution of resources between disputing states is not at all similar to the one that existed in Europe. At the same time, the Middle Eastern geography is militarily less advantageous for a number of states.

These however, are only a few of the reasons that make the application of NOD in the Middle East currently doubtful. This section identifies and discusses the various factors that cast doubts on the applicability of NOD in the Middle East. Specifically, there are four sets of considerations that make the adoption of NOD policies in the region problematic: (1) strategic considerations; (2) international/systemic considerations; (3) regional considerations; and (4) intra-state considerations.

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[32] See B. H. Weston (ed.), *Alternative Security: Living Without Nuclear Deterrence*, Boulder: Westview, 1990; Ken Booth and John Baylis, *Britain, NATO and Nuclear Weapons: Alternative –Defence versus Alliance Reform*, London: Macmillan, 1989; H. W. Tromp (ed.)*, War in Europe: Nuclear and Conventional Perspectives*, Gower: Aldershot, 1989; Alternative Defence Commission, *The Politics of Alternative Defence*, London: Paladin, 1987; J. Dean*, Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation*, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987; Stan Windass and E. Grove, *The Crucible Peace: Common Security in Europe*, Oxford: Brassey's, 1986; Frank Barnaby, *The Automated Battlefield*, New York: Free Press, 1986; R. Vayrynen (ed.)*, Policies of Common Security*, London: Taylor & Francis, 1985 and Nolan (ed.), *Global Engagement*.

[33] Lodgaard, *op. cit.* n. 3, p. 13.

1. Strategic Considerations

In military terms, significant problems with NOD arise in situations where some states have adopted NOD while others have not. Although one advantage of NOD is that it can be implemented unilaterally, this means that states adopting NOD must coexist with offensively armed neighbours. This condition engenders four problems: (1) NOD states are vulnerable to strategic attack; (2) NOD states cannot easily form alliances; (3) NOD states will have little or no capability to defend security interests that may be remote from national territory; and (4) NOD states cannot use offensive means either to deter attack, or as part of expelling an invader.

Even a state well prepared for defence is vulnerable to strategic (long-range) attack. It is thus reasonable to suppose that NOD might have to be supplemented by some sort of strategic interdiction capabilities to guard against the possibility of strategic attack. The acquisition of strategic interdiction capabilities, however, violates the basic principles of NOD and re-opens the security dilemma. To the extent that an NOD state forgoes strategic interdiction capabilities, the security of this state is dependent on the goodwill of its neighbours (assuming these have strategic attack capabilities). Given that in military disputes goodwill between disputants usually tends to be in short supply, a state vulnerable to strategic attack would either have to renounce NOD, or renounce any pretensions of being able to defend itself. In the Middle East for instance, the adoption of NOD and therefore renunciation of strategic interdiction capabilities by Israel, would mean a renunciation by Israel of the ability to defend itself against possible strategic military action, which is tantamount to basing Israel's military security on the goodwill of its neighbours. Given past and present relations between Israel and its neighbours, such a situation is difficult to conceive.

Under NOD, the possibility for military alliances which usually require some strategic reach capabilities by members, is highly limited. NOD makes alliances difficult for two reasons: (1) the principle of self-reliance is inherently contradictory to alliances,[34] and (2) a military capability confined to national

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[34] See Fischer, *op. cit.* n. 10, pp. 205-225 and Galtung, *op. cit.* n. 1, p. 135.

territory greatly reduces the scope for mutual military support.[35] As already discussed, NOD strategies require and presume high levels of self-reliance ranging from the production/acquisition of military means, to the disposition of these means, to the operational planning for the employment of these means. This self-reliance principle implied in NOD, however, runs counter to the military policy coordination often required in alliances where different national contingencies and concerns usually have to be mutually accommodated by the members of the alliance.

Military alliances usually imply the exchange of pledges of mutual military support by members. Pledges of mutual military support require allies to have the ability to militarily intervene on behalf of one another, which in turn demands that allies possess at least some capacities for military operations beyond national frontiers. The possession of capacities for military operations beyond national frontiers, however, violates the principles of NOD which explicitly prohibit the holding of such capacities. This means that NOD states which lack the ability of military intervention beyond national frontiers, do not make for terribly attractive allies (they cannot offer military support in time of need), which in turn means that the range of alliance possibilities for NOD states is highly limited.

In the Middle East, military alliances between neighbours have traditionally played an important role, especially in the foreign and military policies of Arab states. If Arab states in the Middle East, however, were to adopt NOD, their capacity to form military alliances would be greatly reduced because of their inability to offer military support to one another. Given Israel's military superiority in the Middle East, it is unlikely that Arab states would be willing to forgo the possibility of military alliance and adopt NOD.

The problem of defending geographically remote security interests arises most obviously in the case of states dependent for their economic welfare/military security on distant areas. Defending geographically remote areas obviously requires capabilities for military operations beyond national borders. NOD states which by virtue of their military policy lack capabilities for military operations beyond national borders, cannot defend geographically

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[35] Buzan, *op. cit.* n. 2, p. 283.

remote areas. States with geographically remote interests are thus unable to adopt NOD, or if they do so, they are obliged to abandon their distant interests.

Abandoning offensive military capabilities from one's defence posture as prescribed by NOD, is both difficult and potentially costly.[36] It is difficult because the boundary between offensive and defensive capabilities is hard to define. It is potentially costly because the loss of offensive options for defence imposes some serious limitations and vulnerabilities on national defence policy. The renunciation of offensive military options reduces the threats available to support deterrence and narrows the military choices available to the defender in a military confrontation. It is therefore possible that an NOD strategy might attract instead of deter a motivated aggressor.

In addition to the four problems discussed above, three further strategic considerations hinder the adoption of NOD by states: (1) the high costs of self-reliance; (2) operational difficulties;[37] and (3) geographical/material asymmetries. As already mentioned, NOD policies presuppose a high level of self-reliance. High levels of self-reliance, however, imply a significant burden on national economic and societal resources. Therefore it may be that not all states can afford to adopt NOD. With respect to the Middle East, the resource scarcity and domestic political problems of some states, make the adoption of NOD difficult if not impossible.

Implementation of NOD must ensure that the different possible components of NOD do not work at cross-purposes. In practice, several possibilities for combining different NOD components exist. NOD components can be combined spatially: conventional defence along the borders and in certain valuable areas, and paramilitary and non-military defence elsewhere. They can be combined in time: conventional defence followed by other types of defence. Or they can be combined functionally: conventional defence for geographic and specific assets, and the other types of defence for more diffused and dispersed assets. Irrespective of how they are combined, however, NOD components must work in tandem with one another, which requires intricate planning and high reliability of each component. In the Middle East, not all states have the planning capacity required by the implementation of NOD, and

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[36] *Ibid*., p. 284.

[37] Galtung, *op. cit.* n. 1, pp. 135 and 137.

more importantly, not all states can regard the different components of their would-be NOD strategies as equally reliable.

Geographic and material resource bases matter in the adoption of NOD policies because certain bases are better suited to the demands entailed by the adoption of NOD than others. In terms of geography, territorial depth and specific physical terrain features can greatly affect the effectiveness of NOD. In material resource terms, factors such as demographic features and access to high levels of technology also affect the prospects for NOD. In the Middle East, a country such as Israel which lacks territorial depth, has a very flat terrain and a small population base, would be hard pressed to adopt NOD.

2. Systemic/International Considerations

Efforts to introduce NOD policies in any one region should take account of two basic systemic considerations: (1) the role played by extraregional powers, and (2) the pattern of relations between the states in the region concerned. Relations between states within a region are often affected by the role played by extraregional powers. Alliances between regional states and extraregional powers can radically shift patterns of military relations in a region and affect the military calculations of all other states in the region. A regional state contemplating the adoption of NOD strategies must consider the possibility of military intervention in time of need by an extraregional power on or against its behalf. Military intervention by an extraregional power on one's behalf may facilitate the adoption of NOD to the extent that such support could be expected to compensate for some of the shortcomings of NOD (see above). On the other hand, military intervention by an extraregional power against one's behalf may make the adoption of NOD more difficult by magnifying the shortcomings of NOD (i.e. greater burden on national resources, greater exposure to strategic attack, etc.). In the Middle East, the possibility of military support by extraregional powers in case of military confrontation could make the expected recipients of such support more favourable towards the adoption of NOD, but have a contrary effect on everyone else.

Regional military relations are heavily influenced by the ends which guide the different military policies of the various states comprising the region. The type of military relations prevailing between states in a region when all pursue military policies motivated by the preservation of the status quo, are highly different from the type of military relations prevailing when at least one state

in the region is pursuing military policies motivated by the overthrow of the status quo. One fundamental political indicator that military policies are motivated by the maintenance of the status quo, is the mutual recognition by the states in a region of each other's sovereignty and associated rights. In the Middle East such a mutual recognition of sovereignty between states in the region does not necessarily exist (Israel's right to existence is yet to be recognized by all its Arab neighbours). The potential presence of revisionist military policies in the Middle East, militate against the adoption of NOD by both the defenders of the status quo and revisionists in the region.

3. Regional Considerations

National military policies affect security relations within a region, and security relations within a region affect national military policies. The introduction of NOD policies at the national level holds the potential for transforming security relations within a region (see chapter 1), while prevailing security relations within a region in part determine the prospects for the introduction of NOD policies at the national level (see above).

If security relations within a region affect the prospects for the national adoption of NOD policies, then determining what constitutes a particular region is important because the type of regional security relations may change depending on who is counted as part of the region and who is not. Determining the boundaries of any one region, however, is no easy matter. Regions, especially when thought of in terms of security relations, are amorphous constructs whose composition changes according to national perspectives, issues in dispute, strategic reach, etc. Carving out a Middle Eastern region in terms of security relations is particularly problematic because opinion of what might comprise such a region is so diverse, and because different possible configurations of such a region can affect national military calculations so radically. For example, whether or not Turkey is included as part of a Middle Eastern region of security relations can have significant influence on the military policies of states such as Israel and Syria. Also, the taking into consideration of the increasing strategic reach of states such as Iran, and possibly Libya, can have a dramatic impact on the military policies of states such as Israel and the Gulf countries. Advocates of the adoption of NOD policies by selected states in the Middle East (usually Israel and surrounding neighbours; see chapter 1) fail to take account of the effect which different

conceptions of what constitutes Middle Eastern regional security relations can have on the decision of these states as to the suitability of NOD.

4. Intra-state Considerations

As mentioned several times above, NOD policies place a considerable burden on the material and societal resources of a country. Materially, the reorganization of national military postures and strategies along NOD lines requires the refurbishing of weapons inventories (switch to defensive weapons only), the possible construction of fixed defence structures and supporting networks, the training and retraining of significant portions of the population, the stockpiling of war supplies, the establishment of elaborate civil defence structures and supporting networks, the creation and/or support of at least some minimum national military production facilities, etc., plus of course the administrative, technical and financial means to sustain all of the above. Societally, NOD requires extensive participation of the masses in national defence efforts in different guises (i.e. regular military units, paramilitary units, militia, etc.), the political will to support the material costs associated with NOD, the determination to continue defence efforts even in the face of initial success by an aggressor, and of course the societal cohesion necessary to sustain all of the above.

A cursory review of the material and societal resources of Middle Eastern states suggests that many of these lack the necessary wherewithal to undertake and maintain NOD policies. Financial, administrative, and to some extent technical constraints, make it very difficult if not impossible for countries such as Egypt, Jordan and Syria to even contemplate the adoption of NOD. More significantly however, many states in the Middle East suffer from severe societal problems which make the societal mobilization implied in NOD unimaginable. In Egypt for instance, political conflict between secular, Christian, and Islamic fundamentalists makes for little societal cohesion. In Jordan, the divided loyalties of Palestinian Jordanians (who tend to consider themselves more as Palestinians than as Jordanians) make societal mobilization difficult. In Iran, Iraq and Syria, ethnic and political divisions, as well as the nature of present political regimes which maintain themselves through coercion more than anything else, preclude any kind of societal mobilization along the lines prescribed by NOD. In the Gulf states, the prevailing societal structure (weak monarchies and subjects) makes no allowance for societal mobilization.

III. Conclusion

Occasionally NOD policies are put forth as solutions to the military security problems facing states in their relations with one another. Military security problems are assumed by advocates of NOD to derive mainly from the security dilemma created by the widespread holding of military means by states, and by the ambiguous ends of these means. In pushing NOD as a generic answer to military security woes, NOD advocates overlook important strategic, systemic/international, regional and intra-state factors which challenge and impede the adoption of NOD policies by states. Such factors, as shown above, are particularly relevant in assessing the applicability of NOD in the Middle East.

Even the sketchiest review of prevailing conditions in the Middle East reveal the region to be highly inhospitable to conceptions of NOD. Before one can even begin to consider the prospects for NOD in the region at least four conditions ought to be satisfied: (1) all Middle Eastern states must be militarily status quo oriented; (2) all Middle Eastern states must recognize each other's sovereignty and associated privileges; (3) Middle Eastern states must have sufficient societal and material resources; (4) all extraregional powers must support the military status quo in the region. Until these four conditions are met any attempt to introduce NOD in the Middle East cannot be taken seriously.

Chapter 2

Cooperative Security and Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East

Gustav Däniker[*]

We are living in a time of rapid and momentous change. In the post-Cold War era, security has become a multidimensional concern involving economic, social, humanitarian and environmental issues in addition to the previously preponderant military dimension. The change from a confrontational approach to security, relying on military means and on nuclear deterrence as a last resort, to a co-operative approach has of course implications for military strategies, the role of the armed forces, force structures and equipment. We are in a period of transition in which the speed and the dynamics of change call above all for flexibility and the capability to react quickly, both politically and militarily. In such a context, an essentially stationary concept like non-offensive defence (NOD) looks singularly out of place. Is it really suitable for strengthening the peace process in the Middle East?

I. NOD and the Middle East Challenge

Despite the extraordinary progress in the Middle East peace process since the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestinians in 1993, the current situation is a delicate balance which is challenged both from the inside and the outside.

However, fragile as it may be, this process has become a reality, and the question is whether it can be consolidated by implementing NOD in the framework of a cooperative approach to security. Before pursuing this question,

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I would like to recall the definition of NOD. Dr Møller defined NOD as follows:

> NOD is a strategy, expressed in a posture that emphasizes defensive at the expense of offensive military operations.

At the same time, Dr Møller has cautioned that NOD is a matter of degrees, i.e. a continuum. He also gave a number of examples of NOD models, i.e.:

> An area-covering territorial defence along the lines of the "spider web" model proposed by Horst Afheldt. The essential idea is that offensive operations are dependent on and confined to a stationary system.
> Bastion-type defences with a concentration of forces in certain politically important areas. A strictly defensive forward defence of artillery fire barriers as suggested by Norbert Hannig in a number of publications in the early 1980s.

What these models have in common is that they are based on stationary concepts, they have never worked in the past, they do not take into account modern technologies and in my opinion they are not suited to current security needs, neither in Europe nor in the Middle East.

Put in a nutshell, my objections are the following: NOD presupposes a strategic territorial depth which is not always available (and direfully lacking in the case of Israel); NOD implies that the attacked party accepts the full damage of aggression while confining itself to defending within its own territory; and that by implementing NOD, a country would renounce all its possible deterrent capabilities.

Such a step would be premature in the present stage of the Middle East peace process given the disparity of forces and the population imbalance between Israel and its neighbours. Israel continues to be exposed to an "existential" threat by states like Iraq (which threatened to incinerate half of Israel in 1991), Iran and Libya. Abandoning its deterrent may be suicidal for any nation, but especially for small countries lacking the depth necessary for repelling an aggressor. Finally, any revival of outdated defence models is counter-productive, especially in the Middle East context. The NOD approach emphasizes military measures whereas progress has to be achieved on the political level first before it can be translated into force reductions and defensive deployment patterns.

Another concept mentioned in the discussion is "collective security" like the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which is being transformed from a former adversarial alliance into a collective security system in which the former adversary is loosely included in the form of programmes like the Partnership for Peace (PFP) or the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). It is obvious that the parameters in the Middle East are not yet compatible with such a concept. So far there has never been an adversarial alliance that has been transformed into a collective security system including the former adversary, although a cautious *rapprochement* seems to be under way between Israel and Jordan.

A far more flexible approach is needed in my opinion, such as the one provided by the concept of "cooperative security" as has been institutionalized in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This comprehensive concept is built on a broad basis of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) which are the indispensable first step. Once all the states involved have mutually recognized their right to national existence, further steps can be taken that could be modelled upon the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Agreements on arms control and verification will have to be complemented by accords on the transparency of military activities as laid down in the 1990 and 1992 Vienna Documents. As military requirements change, the role of the military will have to be redefined with a new emphasis on ensuring peace rather than on war fighting. Even the soldier's identity will no longer be confined to that of a combatant, but would be redefined in a more comprehensive way. Finally, the establishment of economic relations will prove an indispensable corollary to the peace process. And why should it not be possible to create, step by step, such a cooperative security system in the Middle East as well?

II. Swiss National Defence and NOD

Before I deal with the risks and challenges ahead, let me explain why we, in the Swiss Army, considered NOD as unsuitable.

In order to make the Swiss reaction to the idea of structural non-offensiveness comprehensible to you, I first have to provide you with some historical background. The main goal of the Swiss strategy during the Cold War

was again (as during the First and Second World Wars) not to become involved in an open conflict, that is to say a potential Third World War. It was so-to-say a "niche" strategy between the two major blocs. Switzerland's traditional armed neutrality, a strong army and the unwavering determination by the overwhelming majority of the population to resist aggression were to ensure this goal.

In military terms, we relied on the effectiveness of our philosophy of "dissuasion", i.e. conventional deterrence predicated on a visible and credible capability and readiness to defend our country. However, this implied that the possibility of aggression against Switzerland could not be ignored either. On the contrary, in order to achieve a credible dissuasion, it had to be anticipated in great detail and different scenarios had to be taken into account.

The most probable and at the same time the worst-case scenario was an attack by the Warsaw Pact thrusting westward with strong forces, and possibly supported by nuclear means, through central Switzerland. This assumption has been confirmed by the archives in the former East Germany which became accessible after the fall of the wall. Operational plans for crossing Swiss territory did in fact exist.

While an attack by NATO was not apprehended, violations of Swiss territory, also from that side, could not be ruled out. And depending on the development of operations in Central Europe, Switzerland could also have been exposed to incursions by NATO forces. Although neutrality would have been meaningless in the case of an attack and Switzerland would have been free to join an alliance, our conviction was that our country should be able to ensure its defence on its own to the largest possible extent in order to preserve our strategic freedom of action and to gain the necessary time for negotiating the best conditions in the case of a coalition.

For this reason, our efforts were focused on the best military preparations which would form an optimum basis for achieving this broad range of goals in the event of war. All defence models proposed as an alternative to the official NATO doctrine were therefore also carefully studied. We were familiar with the names of authors like Spannochi and Brossolet. I personally had discussions with other proponents of defensive concepts like Afheldt, Löser, von Müller, Schmähling and others, with some of them even several times. Last year, I

studied and commented on Lutz Unterseher's model of a defensive defence for Switzerland.

But initial reservations seemed always justified. The expectations of most of these authors in terms of new weapons technologies were premature by years if not by decades. It was not so easy to achieve the required kill numbers of thousands of battle tanks and of heavy infantry fighting vehicles by "alternative means".

Doubts remained regardless of the progress in the development of smart weapons which resulted in a boost of defensive capabilities by firepower. The goal of defending the integrity of one's own national territory cannot be achieved by simply adopting a defensive doctrine which implies that the defender accepts to be pushed back by sheer superiority or to be outmanoeuvred operationally. In order to sense opportunities on the battlefield and to exploit them or even to counter deep breakthroughs, strong offensive units were, in our view, needed at that time. Quite apart from the fact that the battle tank is the best anti-tank weapon in certain situations, it was the only weapon suitable for counter-attacks or for regaining ground in desperate situations.

Moreover the defence of the areas across the borders posed a problem for the Swiss Army. NATO was not able to provide an area coverage encompassing the southern part of the Federal Republic of Germany and the northern part of Italy. Thrusts along the Swiss borders and incursions on Swiss territory had to be reckoned with, and to be addressed. Although the Swiss defence strategy of that time, which was incidentally not questioned by anybody, coincides to some extent with Björn Möller's definition of NOD, we neither could nor wanted to adopt an operationally and tactically passive posture. An army has to be not primarily defensive, but operational, hard-hitting, dangerous, incalculable and capable of being used efficiently wherever necessary.

Let me stress this again: the doctrine of conventional dissuasion required the capability of signalling to a potential adversary that the price of aggression against Switzerland in terms of human lives, material, time and loss of prestige would be excessively high and that the adversary would be denied any certainty of ever achieving its operational goals by crossing Swiss soil. For that purpose, we needed "hard currency", i.e. combat aircraft and battle tanks and other high-performance weapons in sufficient numbers per area unit.

In other words, during the Cold War, the goal of the Swiss Army leadership was not merely attrition, which would have been insufficient in terms of dissuasion, nor only the defeat of enemy spearheads. The objective was to safeguard the integrity of the national territory which implies reconquering lost territory. For this purpose, cross-border operations up to a certain depth were also necessary.

Our evaluation of the experiences of other countries confirmed our concept. The admirable Finnish defence against the Red Army during the winter war, a kind of NOD, could not prevent considerable territorial losses. What was clearly missing was the force potential to launch a counter-attack. Israel, a small country in terms of territory, would have long disappeared from the map, had it not been capable of mounting an outright forward defence. Without the offensive successes of their armed forces, Egypt and Syria would never have been "uprated" politically as was the case after the Yom Kippur war.

In conclusion, the world's oldest democracy did not need to be "civilized by defensiveness" which sometimes has been and still is being praised as a by-product of NOD. There are other factors which more than credibly demonstrate Switzerland's peacefulness. However, we wanted to be able, whenever possible, not only to react, but also to act. The army as the sole instrument of power of the state had to be capable, together with political means, to safeguard Switzerland's national interests even during the most difficult times.

We did not think that such a goal would have been achievable with a "*défense pure*". And we remained suspicious when Mikhail Gorbachov announced in December 1988 that the Red Army would henceforth switch to a defensive defence. We did not exclude the possibility that his step was not only motivated by economic factors but that it was also used for deceptive purposes by the Soviet Marshals. We had already seen too much *maskirovka* and we were experts enough to know that such a defence would be inadequate in the vast eastern spaces of the former Soviet Union. In Second World War, the German armies would have besieged Moscow and Stalingrad for a long time if the Soviet forces had not been capable of an "offensive defence." The current Russian military doctrine is more honest and more realistic in this respect.

III. New Challenges and Dangers

After this retrospect of the Swiss defence concepts during the Cold War, I would now like to turn to the present and to the future. As we have seen, the concept of NOD was considered as inadequate for the Swiss Army's defence needs in the past. Is it possible however that NOD might answer the defence needs of the post-Cold War world?

Although some disillusionment has followed the euphoria which accompanied the end of the Cold War, a return to the *status quo ante* is not to be expected. On the contrary, for the foreseeable future, large-scale offensive military operations can reasonably be excluded from the European theatre. The East-West division has been overcome, and former enemies have become partners within the institutional framework of a new security architecture. The OSCE provides a vast framework of cooperative and consensual security, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The implementation of the arms reduction measures agreed under the CFE has resulted in some stability. Extensive verification has enhanced transparency and mutual confidence.

However, after 40 years of Cold-War freeze, war, although this time at the intra-state level, has again become a reality in Europe. States break apart, peacefully as in the case of Czechoslovakia or in appalling violence like the former Yugoslavia. Centrifugal tendencies of ethnic groups or minorities constitute a tremendous conflict potential.

This conflict potential has to be addressed by a broad range of preventive measures as provided for in the framework of the OSCE. The implementation of early-warning techniques is advocated to avoid any repetition of the Bosnian disaster when the international community failed to pay attention to the foreboding of a storm. If preventive measures fail and belligerents do not respond to the political efforts of the international community, "compellance" in the form of military interventions will become inevitable if conflicts are to be contained and ultimately quenched. In response to this need, all major European armies are restructuring and building up contingents of crisis-reaction forces which will be able to perform Implementation Force (IFOR)-like missions. NOD obviously is not suited for addressing this new type of challenge. Ironically, under a concept like NOD, other European nations would

have to wait for the crossfire to reach their doorsteps before they could legitimately react.

But apart from ethnic and irredentist conflicts, the security of highly industrialized societies is in jeopardy due to other kinds of military and non-military threats. Certain states may resort to terrorism or strategic blackmail in order to achieve regional hegemony. With increasing evidence that a country like Libya is building a new chemical weapons facility, Mediterranean rim states are vulnerable to attacks by missiles armed with chemical warheads. Iran is rumoured to be building up a nuclear capacity in order to achieve the status of regional power. Yet here again, and much to my regret, I cannot see any possibility of coping with these emerging threats by adopting NOD.

In addition, paradoxically, imported labour which contributed to the prosperity and wealth of European nations, may turn into an internal security risk, as in the case of the Partyia Karkere Kurdistan (PKK) in Germany. Apart from immigrants and refugees, there is another worldwide non-military security threat, namely, organized crime which has been termed the world's fastest growing business by some analysts. Worldwide alliances are being formed in every criminal field, from money laundering and currency counterfeiting to trafficking in drugs and nuclear materials. The international community is as yet at a loss to cope with this mushrooming problem which certainly cannot be addressed by traditional military concepts, let alone by NOD. Finally, water as a major source of future conflicts in areas like the Middle East should be mentioned in this context.

IV. New Technologies

The Gulf War marked a turning-point in military history. For the first time, new technologies were used to achieve victory without annihilating the enemy. But, as I pointed out in my book *The Guardian Soldier: On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces*, the technological potential already available has not yet been adequately translated into operational terms. For example, the tremendous amount of information was not used efficiently or rapidly enough in the Gulf War.

Information has always played a crucial role in organized warfare. However, some experts argue that information may become *the* preponderant

element of future warfare as it will allow an unprecedented precision in the use of firepower and manoeuvre. A military revolution is forecast in terms of the employment of microprocessors throughout military force structures, remote sensing technologies, advanced data-fusion software, interlinked but physically remote databases and high-speed, large-capacity communications networks.

This information technology is not inherently offensive. In itself, information technology does not destroy targets or transport troops or material. But it enables the precise application of force against vital targets. It is able to maximize the impact of the employment of forces while minimizing their own vulnerability.

This technological revolution is characterized by several features, including: (1) its basis, to a large extent, in dual-use technologies freely available on the global market-place; and (2) its availability to minor powers which will be able to acquire capabilities that will enable them to reach Western standards in the twenty-first century. And the new technology will have profound implications for the type of warfare we have to expect in the next century. Without wanting to go into too much detail, the capabilities that will be available on the global market-place comprise among others the following elements: precision guidance provided by the US Global Positioning System (GSP) or the Russian Global Navigation System (GLONASS) satellites, new missile technologies, upgrade packages for ageing weapons systems, high-resolution satellite imagery and sophisticated processing, and enabling techniques, all dual-use, for weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological and chemical).

While the full scope of these new technologies remains to be assessed, the following consequences are predicted by experts at this stage: firepower will be able to be effectively employed throughout the theatre of operations; the enemy will no longer have the time to recover from sequential attacks; and operations will be manoeuvre-dominated. As a result, the linear battlefield with its front, rear and flanks will dissolve into a non-linear battle space. In this environment, the distinction between offensive and defensive will become blurred, as it will be possible to carry out long-range precision strikes against vital targets which can inflict strategic damage on an attacker. Given such conditions, contrary to previous expectations, the military technology revolution will not provide a new lease on life for NOD.

V. Conclusion

I have recently learned that Mr. Lutz Unterseher, the already mentioned proponent of NOD, has worked out an NOD concept for Bosnia which is said to be similar to a model he had elaborated for Switzerland in 1995. I do not pretend to be able to judge whether Bosnia could be defended in this way should internal and external aggression become a reality again. However, I do know that Unterseher slogans like "space-controlling basic structures", "mobile intervention elements", "spider webs" and "highly reactive and cost-effective sources of fire" alone will not suffice for building an effective self-defence in real life. It is a fact that the infantry units of the Bosnian Muslims were not able to achieve any success against the Bosnian-Serb forces which had superiority in mobility and heavy weapons. It is further a fact that only the "punitive action" carried out by NATO aircraft, that is to say by high-performance systems, made possible the turn of events which led to the Dayton Agreement. Finally, in the Gulf War, Kuwait was also liberated by a highly modern and flexible mechanized army.

Whatever the arguments that speak in its favour, in my opinion, NOD is a concept which was justifiable during the era of the Cold War in so far as all possibilities, including alternative military approaches, had to be examined in order to avoid a large-scale and perhaps even nuclear confrontation. But even then it soon became clear that NOD was not suitable as an unilateral doctrine. In other words, NOD has been basically a political and psychological approach, but not an effective operational concept. If there is political confidence, NOD is feasible. If however there is no political confidence, NOD will actually cause distrust, insecurity and fear. For the Middle East, this implies that it is more important to press the peace process ahead and to create mutual trust than to try to convince entire nations that confidence-building has to start *via* the dismantling of a trusted and functioning defence system.

As a result of the OSCE and the implementation of the CFE, the military environment in Europe is quite different today. But what seems even more important to me is the far-reaching change in the European political environment. NOD relates primarily to inter-state conflicts or to conflicts between groups of states. What we need today are, on the one hand, specially equipped and trained territorial units to protect the population of the nation states and, on the other hand, intervention forces for the implementation of a

strategy of stabilization and "stability projection" (as in the case of peacemaking and humanitarian interventions) and in the worst case for the punishment of war crimes. Units which are suitable for such interventions are also capable of securing strategic partnerships and partnerships of peace. I doubt that the situation looks different in the Middle East. NOD is not suitable for any of these tasks. This is not a reproach, for NOD was not conceived for this type of mission. However, it seems to be hardly worthwhile to try obstinately to keep it alive.

It seems to me that one should admit that NOD, irrespective of how it is assessed, is an anachronism, a relic of the intellectual struggle of the Cold War which, for better or worse, should be relinquished today.

Chapter 3

Non-Offensive Defence and its Applicability to the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective

Shmuel Limone[*]

An attempt, any attempt, to seek a solution to the very complicated Arab-Israeli problems in the military field alone, necessarily addresses the symptoms, not the root causes of the conflict. A genuine, comprehensive treatment ought to deviate from the limiting contours of the non-offensive defence (NOD) approach, and deal with the broader dimensions of the issues. These include the need to improve economic conditions, the need to encourage the evolution of democracy and civil society, the need to change perceptions, myths and biases through teaching and education, and the need to create political and economic institutions and a new framework for regional cooperation. From an Israeli perspective we speak of a different political reality in which Israel is regarded not only as a tolerable, but, as Jim Leonard once put it, an *indispensable* member of the Middle East.

Dealing with the military manifestations of an acute political dispute can be beneficial to all parties concerned. From an Israeli point of view therefore, the vision of the NOD approach is sound and lofty. Indeed, on a conceptual level, few can object to it. The basic concept, as developed by Dr Möller, namely that the pursuit of national security by one party must be done in a way that does not create insecurity for other parties, is logical. The principles and components of NOD according to Dr Möller, i.e. the elimination of a zero-sum mentality in the foreign and security policies of countries belonging to the same region, the attainment of sufficient security at an affordable cost, the intention to create a regional security regime that preserves effective deterrence and

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defence against any potential aggression, must all be regarded as civilized goals worthy of universal support.

The problem, as with any other proposition aimed at the radical change of an entrenched strategic doctrine, especially one that is still considered to have weathered that test of time, is embedded in the political and strategic context and constraint in which NOD is meant to be applied. Allow me, for a moment, to explore this context.

Israel has always maintained that the solution of the core problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict—and NOD, which calls for fundamental revisions in military doctrines and force structures, is precisely such a core problem—must wait for the evolution of a different, more benign and accommodating Middle Eastern climate. The nature of the risks and the fragility of important aspects of the existing peace agreements, the depth of enmity and distrust, the differences between rich and poor, Jews and Muslims, large and small states, problems of demography, territory and water (especially these last two!), oil, foreign interests, etc., do not lend themselves to one unified theory of security and peaceful change. As I will now attempt to show, some of the possible solutions offered by the NOD concept stand, in Israel's view, at variance, not only with the circumstances presently obtaining between Israel and its neighbours, but also with an ultimate scenario in which Israel will dwell in peace even within a wider circle of Arab countries. I submit that between the ideal, in which it will be possible to institute measures fully commensurate with an NOD posture and today's *realpolitik* constraints, we need to seek a feasible middle ground. **Not an NOD, but a Less Offensive Defence (LOD)**.

Put in the proper context, such an approach translates into a cautious, proof-oriented mind-set. For Israelis that means that even when they recognize that the positive changes that have been taking place in the Middle East warrant a search for a substitute security package, they are guided by ongoing concerns, defined as follows:

a.   The high price of peace, that is, the widespread feeling among many in Israel that peace, to this date, has not produced even the minimal security dividends expected in light of Israel's concessions.

b.   The hostile position of important actors in the Middle East to the peace process and to the state of Israel itself.

c. The lack of democracy and openness, even among countries that have signed peace agreements with Israel, a state of affairs that bears directly on such political variables as continuity, predictability and commitment to agreements of successor regimes.

Let me put it in even more blatant terms. For a long transition period, an exchange of territories for peace does not accord with important elements of the NOD concept. From Israel's point of view, loss of territorial assets would, most probably, tend to strengthen those elements of its force structure designed to compensate for such a loss. The development of a strong, versatile airforce, the emphasis on mobility and accurate fire-power, the possession of long range reconnaissance and early warning measures, and the development of the capability to strike targets from longer distances, will thus still be needed for many years to come. While holding on to territories could permit Israel to be flexible on its traditional security principles (such as the need to pre-empt in the face of a perceived imminent attack), the hand-over of territories would tend, in effect, to rigidify Israel's security considerations.

In view of the above, can Israel move at all in the direction of a less offensive defence? Well here comes the good news. My answer is that it can, and that it can do so even to a relatively great extent. Three levels of activities may be subsumed under the rubric of NOD. **All are preconditioned on reciprocity**, but their nature may allow for less than full participation by all of Israel's perceived adversaries. A few measures could even be undertaken on an unilateral Israeli basis.

Specifically, I speak of the following set of measures:

a. Measures designed to signal intent of non-violence and good neighbourly relations.

b. Measures designed to minimize prospects for misunderstanding, increase predictability, and reduce inadvertent escalation.

c. Measures aimed at reducing the capabilities, and hence, the incentive, to launch a surprise attack.

Israel's overall posture in recent years falls in the first category. Israel has pursued a foreign and security policy designed to seek political solutions based on a commitment to the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes and the

furtherance of regional cooperation. Its engagement in the peace process, its willingness to sign and negotiate important arms control and non-proliferation agreements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) or the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) and its adherence to various suppliers' regimes, all attest to Israel's determination and intent to seek accommodation and peace with its neighbours.

The second set of measures, the need to increase understanding and decrease miscalculations, calls, first, for the introduction of various military confidence and security building measures. Members of this forum are familiar with the myriad suggestions submitted by Israel to the ACRS talks, so I will allow myself to dispense with the need to recount them now. I only wish to note that they represent a conscientious Israeli attempt to learn from international experience and to adapt to measures that stand to increase predictability, openness and stability and to reduce tension among states.

Israel can accommodate itself also to the third, the most demanding, set of parameters, those connected with the need to reduce capabilities to initiate sudden attack. In circumstances of regional peace and reciprocal commitments, and that, again, is *sine qua non* to any movement towards a less offensive defence regime, Israel may be ready, **without overhauling the mobility and technological capabilities of its armed forces**, to restructure them by reducing their size, to alter their dispositions by deploying them away from border areas, and to downgrade their level of readiness by moving them to reserve and storage status. Israel could also permit others to verify its compliance with such measures.

These measures and conclusions do not reflect my own personal opinion alone. They were incorporated in a formal document issued by the Planning Division of Israel's Defence Forces and disclosed in June 1995. The document defined and analysed the principles, goals and the desired arrangements for security in the negotiations with Syria, from a professional, apolitical viewpoint. It, therefore, represented what may be considered as a detailed, authoritative account of Israel's security needs as well as its margins of compromise. For the sake of accuracy, I chose to quote the following parts, which bear the most relevance to our discussion:

a. Israel's objective is to arrive at a reality in which both parties will enjoy equal levels of security at lower levels of military investments.

b. First priority must be given to devising arrangements that will reduce, if not altogether eliminate, the risk of a surprise attack. These arrangements must ensure that neither side will gain any advantage by launching an attack on the other side.

c. We wish to create a situation in which preparations for war by any side will require open and clear steps that, in turn, will provide sufficient time to mobilize reserves. This objective can be achieved by distancing the large concentrations of ground forces away from each other, and by further reducing their level of readiness. The security arrangements should, therefore, include buffer zones, a commitment not to restation military forces in the vacated areas, the establishment of a foreign military presence, the institution of demilitarized and diluted zones, etc. The depth of these security zones will facilitate the construction of defensive dispositions needed to protect the   vital interests of both sides.

d. Israel is aware of the importance that our Syrian colleagues place on the defence of Damascus. (Please take note: this is a direct translation of an internal Israeli army document, not meant for public consumption. It expressly recognizes the legitimacy of Syrian concerns and chooses to characterize the Syrians as "colleagues", not as enemies). On our part we need to ensure the defence of our population centers in the north.

e. In order to curtail each side's ability to strike the others side's territory at short notice with long-distance weapons requiring no prior ground movements, measures must be taken to make sure that weapons positioned in the zones of restricted armaments will have a range incapable of reaching the neighbouring country's territory.

f. As an indispensable component of the security arrangement, each side must possess independent means that will assure it that the other side fully complies with its security obligations, and will provide it with early warning capabilities to detect possible violations. We are therefore of the opinion that all arrangements must be supplemented by complementary and overlapping early-warning, verification and inspection measures. These should include independent and joint means, as well as third-party

means. It would be advisable to make use of all available technologies and all possible sensors, but there can be no substitute for an on-site presence and for the reliance on one's own eyes. The verification means should therefore include continuous coverage and a capability to perform spot inspections based on specific evidence of violation. This can be achieved by a combination of routine and special inspections of observers, aerial reconnaissance and electronic sensors.

g.   One way to make sure that any decision to go to war becomes an extremely difficult choice would be to reduce the size of the sides' armed forces and to create a reasonable, quantitative ratio between them. We should aim for a situation in which large standing forces will not face each other. Such forces increase perceptions of threat and hence tension between the states.

h.   Another component that must be addressed concerns the military relations between countries that are partners to the peace agreement and other regional countries. A peace agreement should prohibit hostile military cooperation against the other party to the agreement. It also means that a party's territory may not serve as a platform for hostile action taken by a third party.

i.   The army document concludes with the following remark: steps instituted with a view to forestall actions are insufficient. It will be necessary to create a new system of relations between both sides' armies that is based on trust. Trust must be built over time, but already at the beginning of the realization of the agreement (with the Syrians) mechanisms must be constructed to cultivate trust. We shall need to enhance transparency of our military activities in the border area in order to minimize misinterpretation by the other side. We therefore propose, already in the negotiation stage, to conclude steps to promote "socialization" (*sic*) between the armies, by inviting Syrian officers to accompany UN officers on their inspection visits on our side of the border.

To conclude, I wish to offer the following summary and observations:

a.   The overall regional political context, and Israel's proven willingness to make concessions for peace, have, up to a point, been conducive to Israel's adoption of a less offensive defence posture.

b. In order to improve predictability and understanding, both of which should be regarded as important precursors to NOD, Israel has offered a package of transparency measures in the form of pre-notification of exercises; forward presence of early-warning (EW) facilities and cooperative use of space for the purpose of verification. Israel has also offered to establish crisis management centres, hot-line communications between field commanders and General Headquarters (GHQs), and openness measures such as: seminars on threat perceptions and military doctrines, reciprocal visits to military facilities and industries and dialogues between military schools and staff colleges.

c. Israel has signalled its willingness to institute, on a reciprocal basis, structural limitations on military capabilities, budgets and manpower, and on the number and deployment of combat formations.

d. In Israel's view, its willingness has been tempered by a lack of a corresponding will on the part of Arab regimes to transform their own military posture in this direction. Without reciprocity, Israel may not be able to proceed much further on its own and may conceivably find itself even having to reverse course.

e. Even under a more cooperative security regime, Israel will need to maintain military capabilities to respond to sudden military challenges. To withstand a surprise attack Israel will therefore have to retain sufficient, offensive and advanced war fighting capabilities, needed to prepare an effective defence.

f. Therefore, even in a more favourable strategic environment, Israel will need to maintain a rapid response, a high-tech long-range military force with which to counter especially more remote threats to its security, now evolving. To come back to Dr Möller's paper, these capabilities do not fully accord with his espousal of the NOD concept.