Interrelationship of Bilateral and Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations

Proceedings of the Baku Conference
(2-4 June 1987)

Les relations entre les négociations bilatérales et multilatérales sur le désarmement

Actes de la Conférence de Bakou
(2-4 juin 1987)

New York, 1988
NOTE

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The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research - UNIDIR - which has been in existence since October 1, 1980, was established by the General Assembly as an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations to carry out independent research on disarmament and related international security issues.

The work of the Institute, which is based on the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, aims at:

- Providing the International community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the arms race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States, and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;

- Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;

- Assisting on-going negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

- Carrying out more in-depth, forward looking and long-term research on disarmament so as to provide a general insight to the problems involved and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

As an integral part of its research activities and its relations with other academic centres UNIDIR has, from time to time, organized Conferences and Seminars with a view to providing a forum for the exchange of ideas and discussion of proposals on various aspects of disarmament. Carefully structured and well prepared Conferences with balanced participation have proved to be of significant value in UNIDIR's contribution to disarmament research. These gatherings have provided useful opportunities for scholars and diplomats to view specific issues in disarmament and international security from different perspectives while appreciating their essential complementarity.

The rapid pace of bilateral negotiations between the USSR and USA since January 1985 raised the question of the role of
multilateral negotiations and the relationship between the two at the present juncture. The Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament recognized that, in accordance with the Charter, the United Nations "has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament" and that it "should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations". A thorough and comprehensive discussion of the inter-relationship between Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations on Disarmament was considered desirable and, accordingly, UNIDIR convened a Conference on this important issue from 2-4 June 1987 in Baku, USSR with the assistance of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations of the USSR (IMEO).

The Conference was attended by 50 participants - government officials, diplomats and scholars - from different parts of the world and representing different ideologies and approaches. The discussions were stimulating and extensive exchanges of views took place in an atmosphere of balanced and open debate. The success of the Conference has encouraged UNIDIR to publish the proceedings. I would like to take this opportunity of thanking the Conference participants for their contributions. Although UNIDIR customarily takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed by individual participants it does assume responsibility for determining that the transcript of the Conference proceedings merits publication. Hence we commend this publication to the attention of its readers.

Jayantha Dhanapala
Director, UNIDIR
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INTRODUCTION

La Conférence dont on va lire les travaux a été organisée par l'UNIDIR, avec l'assistance de l'IMEMO. L'UNIDIR tient à remercier les autorités de la République Soviétique d'Azerbaidjan, qui ont apporté à l'organisation du séjour des participants tout le concours et toute l'attention désirables.

Il ne saurait être ici question d'exprimer une position sur le fond des rapports et des discussions qui suivent. Ils ne débouchent au demeurant sur aucune conclusion, résolution ou texte final. Tel n'était pas leur objet. Ils constituent un libre échange de vues, une présentation éclairée d'analyses différentes, voire opposées. Nos travaux se sont conformés à la morale de Flaubert qui écrivait que la sottise est de vouloir conclure, et, en ce sens, ils ont été sages.

D'autant plus sages qu'ils ont embrassé un grand nombre de sujets, et de sujets complexes. En un lieu unique, en un temps restreint, les questions les plus graves et les plus diverses pour le désarmement et la limitation des armements, mais aussi pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité, ont été rassemblées, questions qui sont traitées par ailleurs, dans des endroits et dans des instances très variées. Il n'est guère que la liaison désarmement-développement qui ait échappé à la boulimie des participants. Notre conférence a donc constitué une sorte de modèle réduit de la réflexion de la communauté internationale en la matière. Cet effet de concentration permet de mieux mesurer la difficulté et la densité des problèmes, et, naturellement, leur interdépendance. A Bakou nous aurions pu dire avec le poète : "Toutes les joies, tous les soucis des amours qui durent toujours, on les trouve en raccourci dans nos petites amours d'un jour".

L'UNIDIR remercie les participants d'avoir consacré une partie de leur temps à cette conférence, et d'avoir amplement contribué à son succès grâce à la qualité de leurs interventions. On en retrouvera la substance dans le présent volume, qui contient la transcription des rapports présentés et des discussions orales. Les intervenants se sont exprimés à titre personnel, et c'est ainsi qu'ils avaient été invités, en dépit des importantes responsabilités officielles qu'assument nombre d'entre eux. On constatera cependant que, bien souvent, les prises de position des uns et des autres sont très proches de celles de leurs gouvernements. Volonté ou habitude? Citons cette fois l'auteur du Diable au Corps, Raymond Radiguet : "Ce n'est pas dans la nouveauté mais dans l'habitude que nous trouvons nos plus grands plaisirs".
Cette formule ne vise pas du tout la dialectique entre la "pensée ancienne" et la "nouvelle pensée", dont on trouvera plus loin quelques échos. Elle pourrait en revanche constituer une charte de l'amour conjugal, charte qui prend tout son sens lorsqu'on se souvient que les relations américano-soviétiques sont souvent présentées comme celle d'un couple, aux relations difficiles mais en définitive fidèles. On a encore une fois pu le constater à Bakou, et dresser un diagnostic plutôt positif de l'état de ces relations. Le couple américano-soviétique se porte bien. Faut-il en retirer quelque amertume pour le multilatéralisme? Oui, si l'on constate que le bilatéralisme le tient toujours en état; non, si l'on observe qu'il est bien rare que les progrès des négociations bilatérales n'aient pas eu de suites heureuses pour la conclusion d'accords multilatéraux.

Serge Sur
Directeur adjoint
UNIDIR
First/Première Session

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS:
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES/LES NEGOCIATIONS BILATERALES
ET MULTILATERALES SUR LE DESARMEMENT : DIFFERENCES ET SIMILITUDES

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Siccama, Ednan Agaev, Thomas Barthélemy

Chairman/Président:

Alexander Kislov
Alexander Kislov

Today we begin the work of the International Conference devoted to the Interrelationship of Bilateral and Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations. We have met here, in the beautiful city of Baku, to discuss this exceptionally important topic at a complex and crucial moment in history.

Mankind today stands at an unique crossroad. The question of its preservation as a biological entity is exceptionally acute, yet at the same time we cannot but recognize that the present situation carries within it great possibilities for détente and cooperation. Our understanding of the fact that in a nuclear war there can be no victors - an understanding reflected in a number of exceptionally important international documents - proves that mankind is capable of rising to the challenge of the age.

The programme of ensuring security through disarmament advanced by the Soviet Union on 15 January 1986, the summit meeting in Reykjavik as a result of which, it seemed, only one more step remained to the conclusion of truly historic, truly epoch-making agreements in the nuclear disarmament sphere. The subsequent Soviet initiatives have given a new dimension, a fresh impetus to the problem of reduction of military arsenals and have made it possible to sketch out the contours of a world free from nuclear weapons. But in order for these contours to assume real shape, to become reality, there is need for a new thinking, a new approach to issues of war and peace, disarmament and other complex, global problems of our indivisible, interdependent world.

While speaking of new thinking I should like at the same time to emphasize that so far as our country and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are concerned, the struggle for peace, for the prevention of war has always been one of the most important tenets of our foreign policy. In this connection may I take the liberty of recalling a statement by V.I. Lenin made as far back as in 1918. It was in 1918, less than a year after the victory of the October Revolution, when V.I. Lenin wrote: "...The development of technology will lead to a situation in which war between the leading countries will not only be the greatest crime, will not only mean a complete breakdown of the process of acquisition of civilization and culture, but will also lead to savagery, famine, the utter decline of all productive forces, and thus undermining of the very conditions for the existence of human society".

This fact is becoming more and more widely understood throughout the world, but in order for the contours of a world free from nuclear weapons to become reality, to be translated
into real life, many things are still needed. What is needed is an understanding of the new problems rising up ever more acutely before mankind. In particular, what is needed is an understanding of the apparently simple yet exceptionally important fact that there cannot be security of single States. Security in our interdependent, indivisible world can only be universal. The solution to all these problems, problems of universal security, problems of disarmament, can be found only by political means. The only reasonable, sensible approach to the global problems of our time is summed up in the well-known formula: "disarmament and development". This formula reflects the new political thinking which rejects militarism and the cult of force in the international arena and is oriented towards co-operation.

Hence the need for united efforts by all States, for the strengthening of confidence among States, especially those belonging to different social systems, for a correct understanding of each other's concerns, aims and intentions, above all in the military sphere. And the way to such understanding lies above all, first and foremost through negotiations. It is precisely to this theme that our Conference is devoted.

The dialectical unity of bilateral and multilateral negotiations is, I believe, sufficiently clear and evident. Everyone knows that more than 90 per cent - estimates vary, but all the figures are of the order of 95 per cent, in any case over 90 per cent - of nuclear weapons are concentrated in the arsenals of only two Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. It might seem that all nuclear issues could be solved at the bilateral negotiating table, but that would be an over-simplified view of the situation, an over-simplified approach to the reality which daily confronts us. Each of these two countries - I have in mind both the Soviet Union and the United States - has its own allies with their own interests, their own aims, political, economic and other. That is why all States, and first among them the members of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty, must actively contribute towards the process of nuclear disarmament. Then there are the other nuclear and near-nuclear States, the relative weight of whose arsenals - I mean apart from the Soviet Union and the United States - will become the greater, the further the reduction of Soviet and United States armaments may advance.

At the same time I should like to stress another idea, the idea that it is necessary to improve the effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms, and in the first place of mechanisms connected with the United Nations, which must actively contribute towards all stages in the reduction of military potentials, must become transformed into a guarantor of the security of States, a kind of regulator for maintaining a
balance at a level of reasonable sufficiency with a constant trend towards the lowering of that level of sufficiency. The role of the same already concluded international treaties is also exceptionally important. If for instance a reduction of existing nuclear arsenals takes place on the one hand and, on the other hand, there begins a process of proliferation of nuclear weapons, of the spread of nuclear weapons across the Earth, then the danger will by no means diminish.

All these are matters we are to discuss at our present conference. It would be difficult, therefore, to overestimate the significance and topicality of our Conference. After all, the problem of the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race on the Earth and the prevention of its extension to outer space is, in the last analysis, the problem of the contemporary world. And the way to that goal lies through negotiations. That is precisely the topic we are going to discuss today and in the next few days at our Conference.
Multilateral approaches to the process of arms limitation and disarmament did not begin with the establishment of the United Nations. They have an earlier history going back to the end of the last century, when the industrial revolution yielded new weapons of warfare in response to the demands of imperialist rivalries and competing military alliances. The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the first multilateral attempts to declare as their objective the limitation of the progressive development of armaments. The immensely destructive potential of weapons of modern warfare had alerted nation States to the need for control and limitation of armaments, and to formulate rules of war for reducing the scale and extent of destruction. The other objective was the avoidance of war through institutions and procedures for peaceful settlement of international disputes. There was to have been a third Hague Conference in 1915 to continue the process but it was unfortunately overtaken by the war in Europe of 1914, a war which was deplored by Winston Churchill as "entirely unnecessary and avoidable".

At the end of that war the League of Nations resumed the multilateral efforts for arms limitation and disarmament. Three naval conferences fixed the ratios of the navies of the leading powers, froze naval bases and fortifications, and limited the tonnage of capital ships. The League also drafted two important treaties - one for collective security through a Treaty of Mutual Assistance and another for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. These two instruments were designed to facilitate the reduction and limitation of armaments. Two others, intended to build confidence among States, were a set of non-aggression pacts known as the Locarno Agreements, and a Treaty renouncing war as an instrument of national policy known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The League was also able to conclude a Convention in 1925 (which is still in force) banning the use of chemical weapons in war.

In 1932 after seven years of preparatory work the League convened in Geneva a Conference for the reduction and limitation of armaments. It was high water mark of the League's efforts but it ended in total failure. The major powers of that time, having disarmed Germany, refused themselves to disarm, preferring to retain their military superiority for safeguarding their security. Germany under Hitler then withdrew from the League, embarked on a rearmament programme that led eventually to the second world war, which ended with the advent of the atomic bomb and the dawn of the present nuclear age. It is
against this historical background that one should view the multilateral efforts being made under the UN's auspices to negotiate arms control agreements. They are in fact the continuation of a persistent process that had been disrupted by two wars and may well be in danger of similar disruption again.

The Security Council of the UN is responsible in terms of article 26 of the UN Charter for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments. Unfortunately it has been unable to do so, because of differences of opinion between the Great Powers about the establishment of a collective security system and the peaceful resolution of several international disputes. In such circumstances the General Assembly's role in relation to disarmament assumed an importance far beyond its limited powers under article 11 of the Charter, which authorises it to make only recommendations regarding principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. The paralysis of the Security Council induced the General Assembly to concern itself also with negotiations on all aspects of disarmament.

The very first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1946 established a Commission on Atomic Energy whose purpose was to secure the elimination of atomic weapons and to ensure that atomic energy was used only for peaceful purposes, subject to effective international inspection. The USA proposed an international authority to control, inspect and licence all atomic activities. At that time the USA alone had the atomic bomb, and its proposal was seen by the USSR as an attempt to subject it to inspection. Its counter proposal was an international treaty banning the atomic bomb - its use, and the destruction of all existing atomic bombs. The practical effect of the Soviet proposal would have been to destroy US stockpiles of atomic weapons and to prevent their further production. Neither proposal was acceptable to the other side, but the negotiations dragged on for three years until the Soviet Union withdrew from the Commission after its first atomic bomb explosion in July 1949.

The General Assembly adopted another resolution during its first session in 1946 on the regulation and reduction of conventional armaments. But the multilateral negotiations that followed also proved fruitless. The Soviet Union proposed that atomic and conventional weapons should be taken together in the consideration of any plan for disarmament. The USA's views were that confidence among States should be restored, international disputes should be settled, a collective security system should be established and there should be international control of atomic energy before disarmament. There was no convergence of views either on approaches to or measures of disarmament, although there was general agreement on principles and goals.
The negotiations came to a halt in 1950 when the Soviet Union withdrew from them.

However, the General Assembly persevered in its efforts and set up in 1952 a Disarmament Commission consisting of the members of the Security Council and Canada as a new forum for the negotiation of comprehensive and integrated disarmament measures. The same old proposals were revived and submitted to that forum, and during their consideration the USA exploded its first thermonuclear bomb in November 1952, which was followed by a similar event in USSR in August 1953. A sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission was set up in May 1954 consisting of 5 members - USA, USSR, UK, France and Canada - to consider in depth the various pending proposals.

The Korean war had ended, Stalin had departed from the scene, both the USA and USSR had the H-bomb and the atmosphere of apparent parity seemed full of hope. The British and French Governments proposed that the nuclear weapon should be banned, conventional forces and arms substantially reduced and a control machinery established for verifying compliance. The Soviet Union presented a detailed disarmament programme that appeared to go so far to meet western concerns about verification that Jules Moch, the French representative said "The whole thing looks too good to be true".

The Great Powers met in Geneva in July 1955 to consider the various proposals and the USSR agreed to locate foreign inspectors in its territory at key points for purposes of verification. The U.K. suggested a trial inspection zone in central Europe. France proposed reductions in military budgets for increasing development activities. The USA suggested that there should be aerial reconnaissance of one another's territory to prevent surprise attacks. Two months later the US delegate Harold Stassen declared that the USA was not prepared to negotiate any of the substantive proposals for disarmament, "pending the outcome of its studies of inspection methods and control arrangements". The practical effect of this reservation on the negotiations was disastrous.

The negotiations were somehow kept going with each side revising its own proposals in response to the proposals of others. The General Assembly then expanded the Disarmament Commission in 1958 to include all Member States of the UN. The following year a small negotiating organ of ten States was set up, five belonging to NATO and five to WTO. It met in March 1960 only to find that it was faced with all the old differences in approach, perception, priorities and control machinery.

A spy plane of USA was shot down over the Soviet Union in May 1960 and that event caused the socialist members of the negotiating group to withdraw. Relations between the USA and
USSR reached a dangerously low level. At the General Assembly session in 1960 the Indian Prime Minister Nehru moved a resolution declaring that the two superpowers had a very special responsibility for safeguarding future of mankind and called on them to meet together and formulate principles governing disarmament negotiations. The resolution was unanimously adopted and in September 1961 USA and USSR announced their agreement on a set of principles, which came to be known by the names of the two chief negotiators McCloy and Zorin.

Agreement on principles was no more than a beginning, and their application in practice was left to the 10-nation negotiating body, which had been expanded to include for the first time 8 non-aligned States and to function under the co-chairmanship of the USA and the USSR. To this new forum the USSR presented in March 1962 a draft treaty for disarmament in three stages over a four year period. The USA submitted an outline for a draft treaty providing for disarmament in three stages over an unspecified period that was later clarified as nine years. Although the two proposals had many common ideas, there continued to be serious differences over priorities, measures and stages. The USA continued to insist on strict verification of compliance and an agreement on control prior to disarmament. It was criticised by Mr. Khrushchev in these words - "The kind of control proposed by the USA is a control that would precede disarmament and we would have every reason to regard it as espionage". Once again, as in 1955, differences over control and verification were the ostensible reasons for the breakdown in 1962 of the negotiations for a comprehensive Disarmament Treaty.

The year 1962 was a sort of watershed in the negotiations, for it was then realised that while a general disarmament plan could not be agreed on, it might be feasible to reach agreement on some aspects of it, especially partial and collateral disarmament measures. The superpowers' confrontation over the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 certainly had a sobering effect on them, and they began seriously to explore areas of agreement thereafter. Their negotiations entered a qualitatively new phase that came to be known as detente. During that phase they negotiated bilaterally and presented to the 18-nation forum agreed drafts of several treaties for general adoption. The following is a list of such Treaties:

1. Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963 banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water;

2. Outer Space Treaty 1967 prohibiting nuclear weapons in earth's orbit and in celestial bodies;

3. Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty;
4. Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968;
5. Sea-Bed Treaty 1971 banning nuclear weapons on the sea-bed;
7. Threshold Test Ban Treaty 1974 limiting underground nuclear weapons tests to explosions with a yield of 150 kilotons;
8. Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 1976 limiting explosions to a yield of 150 kilotons;

On examination one finds that these Treaties are not really disarmament measures, nor could they be considered as arms limitation agreements. However, they do respond to some matters of general concern, but they contain loopholes for the arms race to go forward along directions of interest to the two Superpowers.

During the phase of detente other bilateral negotiations between USA and USSR also yielded some eight agreements. There was the Hot Line Agreement that established special and speedy communications links between the superpowers for use in emergencies, as well as an Agreement for dealing with accidents. There was also an Agreement for prevention of nuclear war, which provided for consultations in times of crisis, and stipulated that removal of the danger of the use of nuclear weapons was the common objective of the policies of the USA and USSR. Another agreement of this period set out the basic principles of US-Soviet relations, which recognised that with regard to their awesome responsibility for mankind's future, there was no alternative to peaceful co-existence. It pre-supposed restraint in their international conduct and the preservation of peace by refraining from the threat or use of force.

Bilateral talks between the USA and USSR were necessary, because the multilateral forum was unsuitable for negotiations on matters of direct and special concern to them (e.g. strategic equation in arms; arms limitation to reduce the risks of nuclear war; and reduction of the costs involved in the arms race). Among the important bilateral agreements in this field are the SALT I, the ABM Treaty, its Protocol and Interim Agreement, which sought to limit the competition in offensive strategic weapons. These were followed by the SALT II agreements, which
provided for limits on delivery vehicles, launchers and warheads and equal ceilings on strategic arsenals. A joint Statement of Principles established the basis for the next round of SALT III talks, which were expected to yield substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons and further qualitative limitations and measures for enhancing strategic stability and reducing the danger of nuclear war.

The SALT process was stopped in 1980 by the Reagan administration, which felt that it was unequal in meeting the threat from the Soviet Union's military strength, deployment and capability. After a break of some three years the talks were resumed in 1982 to encompass strategic weapons and intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe. The talks have now been broadened to include space-based weapons and anti-satellite weapons. So many proposals and counter proposals have been made, some including the British and French nuclear forces as well as weapons deployed in the Asian theatre, that it is not useful to recall them here; even more so because the negotiating situation is still fluid.

The multilateral negotiating body in Geneva created in 1962 was broadly representative of the two major military alliances and the non-aligned movement. It began with a membership of 18 States and was later expanded to 26 and then 31 members. It continued to function under the co-chairmanship of the USA and USSR till the end of 1978. Following the decision of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, its membership was increased to 40 States, with the chairmanship rotating monthly among the member States. It began operating in 1979 on the basis of the rule of consensus, and is now known as the Conference on Disarmament.

As mentioned earlier, it had adopted nine treaties during the period of detente, and the last one was in May 1977 - the Convention banning environmental modification for military purposes. Since then it has not been able to reach agreement on another treaty, although it has been continually engaged in negotiations and discussions on a variety of matters related to disarmament. There was a time in 1981 when there was near agreement among the principal negotiators on a Treaty banning underground nuclear testing and on a Convention banning the production of chemical weapons. But a change took place in the US administration and the new Reagan Government re-opened the two questions for fresh negotiation. As a result the negotiating process has been set back by almost a decade, while the arms race has now reached the point of soaring into outer space.

The Conference on Disarmament has been slow in probing for opportunities to break through deadlocks, keeping issues alive and waiting for a change for the better in the political climate.
Concerning a nuclear test ban, a 17-month long moratorium observed by the Soviet Union unilaterally did not evoke a similar response by the USA, and on February 5, 1987 after the latest US test the USSR announced that its moratorium had come to an end. Talks at the expert level between the USA and USSR on nuclear testing are reported to have commenced, and one may assume they are about the methods and mechanisms of verification of compliance. Sweden, which has the technology and the means of such verification, has offered to help along with other neutral and non-aligned countries, but evidently adequacy of verification is not just a technical question but has become a matter for political decision.

In regard to negotiations for banning production of chemical weapons, the main stumbling block appears to be absence of consensus on several proposals for verification, although there are reports of a race in chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons. This is a matter that concerns not only the superpowers, but also countries that have well developed chemical and pharmaceutical industries and hold strong views on the danger of commercial espionage through international inspection. It should not be beyond the wit and wisdom of the negotiators to devise procedures and formulate principles for on-site inspections, which though falling short of 100 per cent verification nevertheless constitute an adequate measure of reassurance that chemical weapons, whose use was banned in 1925, are not being produced. Where there are doubts, they could be resolved through consultations, clarifications and verification.

There have been several proposals for nuclear disarmament before the Conference on Disarmament, but it has been deprived of the opportunity to commence negotiations. The position of the western States is that in the first instance, negotiations should take place between the USA and USSR on nuclear arms limitations and reductions. The same argument is used to prevent multilateral negotiations on measures for avoidance of nuclear war and for keeping outer space free of weapons and conflict. This diminution of the responsibility and competence of the Conference on Disarmament in relation to situations that could pose a general danger to all countries and peoples is deplorable, especially when bilateral talks between the USA and USSR have failed to produce positive results so far.

Talks between NATO and WTO have been going on at Vienna since 1973 about mutual and balanced reduction of conventional arms and forces in Europe, which are closely linked to the negotiations on the nuclear equation. NATO has claimed that the Soviet bloc has a distinct advantage over it, but the USSR has contended that there is in fact approximate parity. The two sides have been discussing common ceilings for ground troops and air force personnel as well as arrangements for verification,
on-site inspection, observation posts etc, and progressive reductions to equal lower levels.

I have attempted to set out briefly the salient aspects of both the multilateral and bilateral approaches to arms limitation and disarmament. The results of the negotiations have been far from satisfactory. The present stockpiles of nuclear arms and delivery systems, their capabilities and deployment postures enhance the risks of war. The arms race continues keeping pace with the progress of science and technology. Security perceptions seem related to weapons capabilities which are seen as evidence of the adversary's aggressive intentions; counter measures escalate the arms race. Military parity is not good enough for some military minds, which seek effective deterrence in maintenance of military superiority. Arms control negotiations tend to get bogged down in conflicting views over adequacy of verification measures.

A question that has haunted the negotiations from the beginning is -- which comes first: security, or disarmament? The answer is clear enough from the behaviour of the negotiating parties -- security. Human societies have got so used to living in a state of armed peace that a condition of disarmament would make them feel exposed and extremely vulnerable.

If disarmament is to be the ultimate goal, then disarmament negotiations should be undertaken simultaneously with negotiating processes for two other goals, viz, peaceful resolution of international disputes and conflicts, and effective arrangements for collective security and maintenance of peace. This was explicitly mentioned in the statement of principles for disarmament negotiations agreed to by MsCloy and Zorin, but virtually nothing has been done to implement them.

Another pre-condition for successful negotiations is the existence of a climate of mutual confidence, and unfortunately little progress has been made through dialogues designed for removal of misunderstandings and misperceptions at the military, political and ideological levels.

Although both sides have jointly acknowledged that there is no alternative to peaceful co-existence, there is as yet no agreed blueprint for it. In its absence, peaceful coexistence is being interpreted as a condition short of war, in which the arms race for security may proceed, the ideological competition for peoples' hearts and minds may continue, and rivalry for influence, strategic locations and access to vital resources is unavoidable. The result is that disarmament negotiations seem to address themselves more to threat control than to arms control.
Furthermore, negotiations in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion, fear of surprise attacks and the arms race in full swing acquire certain unique tactical postures. Proposals for inspection and control invariably reflect the depth and extent of each side's distrust of the other. The side that has a military disadvantage is naturally inclined to delay the negotiations until it has caught up with the other side, whereas neither side appears willing to surrender any existing advantage which it considers as crucial for its security. The general tendency is to negotiate from a position of strength, with bargaining chips, for a military equilibrium that has proved to be elusive because of the asymmetric situation of the two sides weapons systems. The proposals of one side appear aimed at weakening the other side, while retaining one's own advantages.

Security is thus perceived in a comfortable margin of military superiority. Ideological attitudes have become increasingly self-righteous, and security doctrine more and more self-centered, the result being a polarisation of international morality and an apparent insensitivity to the fate of mankind. The dynamics of the arms race has so far prevailed over the dialectics of disarmament.

But today an opportunity presents itself to change from the old habits of thought and action into new uncharted ways of begetting trust for trust and tolerance for tolerance in a diverse world. For US-USSR relations seem to be entering a qualitatively new stage marked by an unusually large number of far-reaching proposals by both for implementation in stages and within time-frames. The proposals include elimination of nuclear weapons, prohibition of space-strike weapons, substantial reductions of strategic, medium range, short range and tactical weapons as well as conventional arms and forces, and unexpected concession on verification requirements. The seriousness and sincerity of these proposals is beyond doubt, and there also appears to be a great deal of negotiating flexibility both sides. It remains to be seen how far the two superpowers will go towards meeting each other in the cause of international peace.

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Rikhi Jaipal - (Oral presentation of report)

I have given a general outline in my report of the important multilateral and bilateral negotiations that have taken place since the beginning of the century. It is, I think, useful to have this historical perspective for a proper understanding of the complex problems of contemporary negotiations. In this introductory statement, I propose to
refer to these problems in the context of the risks inherent in the present situation. The main problem, of course, is the halting and reversing of the nuclear arms race, which has reached the absurd point of imperilling the survival of humankind in the event of nuclear war and thus exposed the futility of war itself in the nuclear age. But negotiations for stopping the arms race have been unsuccessful so far.

Nation States have been so used for centuries to fighting wars as a last resort for settling their disputes that they are still firm believers in safeguarding their security by military means in the absence of alternatives. The League of Nations looked for non-military alternatives in the form of legal instruments outlawing war, guaranteeing collective security, providing for peaceful resolution of disputes and arms limitations leading eventually to general disarmament. Those noble efforts of the League failed, because ultimately the great powers of that time preferred their own military strength for their security to the collective security system of the League. The United Nations has fared no better. Its Charter provides for its own collective security arrangements which have not yet materialized. Prescriptions for peaceful settlement of disputes have remained unused so far. In the current situation, Nation States are obliged to rely on their own military strength for self defence or to form military alliances to protect themselves.

The dramatic advent of the nuclear weapon with annicidal consequences in the event of its use has brought Nation States to agree that nuclear war should be avoided. There is no State that is not in favour of nuclear disarmament in principle. But there is no agreement among nuclear-weapon States on the ways and means of getting rid of their nuclear arms without endangering their security. Apparently, they are exploring the feasibility of military alternatives for safeguarding peace and security. Such negotiations as have taken place so far have yielded arms limitation agreements concerning strategic weapons but their continued validity is now in question. There were also some other agreements of a preventive character that are generally regarded as partial and limited measures of no direct bearing on disarmament.

I do not wish to minimize their intrinsic merits but the fact is that they have not stopped or controlled the arms race, which proceeds as if it were totally impervious to on-going negotiations, to détente or to crisis situations. It maintains a momentum that is set by the escalating demand made by the march of science and technology. Unfortunately it seems to be the widely accepted view among many States that an arms race with an adversary is inevitable for the maintenance of national security. There are arms races going on in different regions of the world, and not only between the superpowers. What is most distressing is that peaceful settlement of disputes has come to
be regarded as impractical and unsatisfactory, because each disputant believes that in the name of some holy principle or other, his own cause is supremely just and non-negotiable. Europe, although free of territorial and such-like disputes, is apparently obsessed with some other profoundly sacred principle that has caused it to break up into two military alliances which are so heavily armed with the deadliest of nuclear weapons that war between them could destroy civilization and humankind as well.

Nuclear arms will clearly be counter-productive for dealing with matters of the mind such as ideologies. But it is in the nature of ideologies to resist accommodation and reconciliation, and the co-existence of ideologies in peace therefore is the only practical answer in the nuclear age. This is also explicitly recognized in the agreement regarding basic principles governing relations between the USA and the Soviet Union. With the passage of time even ideologies may become modified and less and less mutually hostile as circumstances change. There are, however, differences of opinion over the meaning of peaceful co-existence, which now mask the struggle for power and influence. It seems to me that an agreed upon political design for peaceful co-existence of diverse social systems would be of general international interest and should be subject of multilateral negotiations.

Two other matters mentioned in the McCloy-Zorin Agreement as likely to contribute to the success of disarmament negotiations are, firstly, effective arrangements for collective security and international peace and, secondly, peaceful methods for dispute settlement. These two could also be the subject of multilateral negotiations, and in this regard I feel that the lead must come from the superpowers. Exclusive reliance on arms for security as at present would not result in peaceful co-existence but rather in co-existence under threat of war.

A psychologist might say, "Man cannot live by dread alone", (it was actually said by a Christian clergyman) but military philosophers continue to advocate that the dread of nuclear war is a guaranteed inducement to the maintenance of peace. If I may say so, the doctrine of deterrence is really in the nature of a necessary fiction to justify the possession of nuclear weapons after agreeing that their use in war should be avoided. While one country may view it as a deterrent to aggression, its adversary may perceive it as a threat and provocation. Any policy of threat or force would be in violation of article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter. Besides, the philosophy that the necessary evil of the nuclear deterrent is actually a blessing in disguise is likely to appeal to all nation States that are in adversarial relations with one another.
With regard to military confrontation in Europe it seems that the Warsaw Treaty organization has pledged not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and it has also offered a pact on the non-use of any sort of force. And for its part NATO has reaffirmed its commitment under the UN Charter not to use force, including nuclear force, except in self-defence. Now, if these commitments and pledges are scrupulously honoured, war can be avoided in Europe. The only explanation then for the arms race in Europe is the fear that these commitments may not be honoured. It seems to me, however, that there is a political basis in these commitments and pledges for a legal instrument of the treaty type for reassuring one another and I feel that negotiations might be undertaken to explore that possibility.

It is surely unacceptable that there should continue to be a nuclear threat to the survival of mankind in order to ensure the good behaviour of either alliance. If such a monstrous threat to mankind is not wrong, then nothing is wrong. What then are the values of modern civilization? It raises fundamental questions of law and morality that have been deeply troubling our minds. To my way of thinking, the nuclear weapon underlines the urgency of universal recognition of and respect for the paramountcy of humanity's survival in the conditions ordained by nature. I have refrained from finding fault with, or putting the blame on, one side or the other, because I think that the situation today is much too serious for such a fruitless exercise. I have also avoided going into the finer points of similarities and differences between multilateral and bilateral negotiations which I think would only be of academic interest.

Multilateral negotiations that have produced treaties and conventions so far are about general goals that are shared also by the two principal actors in bilateral negotiations, the USA and the Soviet Union. Where multilateral negotiations have failed to result in agreement, it is mainly due to differnces between the USA and the Soviet Union that still remain unresolved. Bilateral negotiations have been chiefly on arms limitations and while they deal with the security of the superpowers and their allies, I believe that they also keep in mind the multilateral concerns. There is obviously a natural link between the two sets of negotiations, and I would say for myself that bilateral negotiations have the greater responsibility for the future of peace everywhere in the world, because they set the trend as well as the pace for the others to follow. I feel that bilateral negotiations should go beyond limiting and reducing arms and the threat they pose and deal also with the practical and political basis for co-existence in peace and mutual trust. For one without the other would be like the child of a barren woman; it is a Sanskrit saying which I am quoting.
The present moment is timely for political and ideological accommodation and understanding, because the arms race is on the verge of soaring into outer space. That is a typical example of how the arms race escalates. American interest in space weapons, we are told, reflects American concern over the threat from the capability of Soviet land-based ballistic missiles to destroy American ICBM silos. It is, I think, reasonable to presume that this Soviet posture is itself a response to the threat the Soviet Union perceives from American weapons and their deployment. There is, of course, a negotiated way to reduce this mutual threat but evidently under the challenging compulsions of science and technology, the USA desires to meet the threat by developing and deploying weapons in space that could destroy Soviet missiles in flight. Such a posture, it is claimed, would be defensive. Also the casualties would be missiles and not humans. So it is regarded as better than massive retaliation that would follow the failure of deterrence. I cannot help feeling that coping with one threat by creating an ever greater threat is what makes the arms race a gigantic tantrum.

It reflects in my view a dualism in military philosophy that produces what has been called the mirror image. If the negotiations have not been fruitful it is because they are rather like a man trying to shave his mirror image rather than shaving himself. In classical Greek tragedy the principal actors are the victims of their own virtues, and the tragic end is sometimes averted by the device of deus ex machina. Human nature has changed little since ancient Greece. In a nuclear war there will be no such contrived divine intervention as deus ex machina and the victims of course will be the entire human race. And therefore what is important for humanity is not so much the splendid virtues of the principal actors but to know whether they have the will and the capacity for reconciling the conflicts between their respective virtues.

I should like to end with the words uttered by Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India in his address to the United Nations in 1957. He said: "I believe that it is in the power of the USA and the Soviet Union to save humanity from the ultimate disaster". It is true, of course, that the USA and the Soviet Union have this power, and it would do us all a great deal of good to see much more of the manifestation of the will to use that power for the good of humanity's future. It is they who also have the responsibility to provide leadership and to set the trend and the pace for change for a more peaceful world that is free of fear and tension. To do this, we all expect them to sink their differences and co-operate for peace, if the rest of the nations are also to do the same.
In the nuclear space age the world has become too vulnerable for politics of force. Under conditions where colossal quantities of the most lethal weapons have been stockpiled, mankind finds itself faced with the problem of survival. A world war, and even more a nuclear world war, would have catastrophic consequences not only for the countries directly involved in the conflict, but also for life on the Earth itself.

The dilemma that arises today is the following: either political thinking will become adequate to the demands of our time, or civilization and life itself may vanish from the Earth. Today's dominant antithesis between war and peace, between being and non-being for mankind, must not be forgotten. To strive jointly to resolve this antithesis in favour of peace - and to resolve it in good time - is essential.

All the world's peoples obviously have the same interests in matters pertaining to the maintenance of peace and security, but approaches to the concept of security and to the means of ensuring it sometimes differ. The necessity therefore arises for close study of the positions of States, for a persistent search for points of contact and ways of finding mutually acceptable solutions. That would appear to be the principal purpose of disarmament negotiations, be they bilateral or multilateral.

All disputed international issues can and must be resolved only by peaceful means - by political means. We do not see our future as linked to a military solution of international problems. That is the approach adopted by the Soviet Union and other States of the socialist community. It is an approach which stems from the nature of the socialist system. This was emphasized very recently in the document on the military doctrine of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

The two opposing socio-political systems naturally engage in disarmament negotiations. A great deal separates those systems, but what unites us all is the fact that we live on one planet and that however contradictory our world may be, it represents an interconnected single whole. That is why we must seek ways of co-existence, must learn to live and work together for the sake of the further advancement of mankind. No other choice is open to us.
There is, as I see it, one very important condition without which disarmament negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, cannot succeed. It is that negotiations must not be used as means of trying to recreate the other side in one's own image and likeness. Neither side must seek to obtain any unilateral advantage - political or military - as a result of the negotiations. Differences between socio-economic systems are no reason for insisting on, for example, different approaches to the problem of verification. If the point at issue is, say, the banning of the manufacture of certain weapons - let us say chemical weapons - then verification must be applied in equal measure and must be carried out to the same degree in respect of both private and State enterprises. What I have just said applies, as I see it, to both bilateral and multilateral negotiations. It is what they have in common.

The security interests of all States everywhere in the world, of all peoples without exception, are bound up with the resolving of disarmament issues. This fact has found reflection in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That is where the foundations for the interrelation of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations were really laid. Let me take the liberty of referring to paragraph 28 of that document. In it we read: "All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament". The Final Document stresses that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

It seems to me that the levels of participation in disarmament negotiations are defined with great precision. Practice of international life and experience of negotiations show that it is possible to hold both bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the same problems. Sometimes they are held simultaneously. The two forms and the degree of their interdependence are determined by the subject of the negotiations and by the prospective number of parties to the agreements being elaborated at the negotiations.

In studying the interrelation between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations we must, it seems to me, consider the ways in which these negotiations interact with one another and also the role of the United Nations and other organizations, including non-governmental organizations, in the negotiating process.
As I have said, the form of the negotiations and the question as to who shall participate in them must be determined, in the first place, by the specific subject of the negotiations. One of the main areas of negotiations, I daresay the main area, is obviously the limitation and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. And while all States undoubtedly have an interest in achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament, the principal responsibility for achieving them lies with the nuclear Powers, first and foremost the Soviet Union and the United States. That is the objective reason for the fact that it is precisely between the Soviet Union and the United States that bilateral negotiations on this set of issues have been conducted for a number of years. At the same time we are far from believing that our bilateral negotiations are taking place in a vacuum. The broad international exchange of views which is taking place indisputably affects the development of the parties' positions. We are aware of the close attention which these negotiations are receiving from the United Nations.

The United Nations has played a positive role in the process of strategic arms limitation and is at present closely watching the progress of negotiations on nuclear and space weapons. The issue attracts the close attention of every session of the United Nations General Assembly. For its part, the Soviet Union, as a participant in the bilateral negotiations, is keeping other States closely informed about the progress of the negotiations, advances made and difficulties encountered. I refer to the periodic reports addressed by the Soviet Union to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to meetings between Soviet delegations to the bilateral talks and participants in the Conference on Disarmament.

At the same time we do not hold the view that nuclear disarmament is the domain of the USSR and the United States alone. Our concept of this issue was set out in a most detailed and specific manner in the programme of nuclear disarmament put forward on 15 January 1986, the Programme for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons by the Year 2000.

I will not dwell on this theme in detail since it appears as a separate topic for our consideration.

Another important subject on which bilateral negotiations are being held, trilateral negotiations have been held and multilateral negotiations ought, in our opinion, to be held is that of a complete nuclear test ban. May I recall that negotiations on this question were conducted between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom from 1977 to 1980 and that the same issue was considered in the Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating body was then called. The specific features of the interrelation between the two forums were determined by the fact that the treaty which was
being elaborated in the course of the trilateral negotiations was eventually to have a greater number of States parties, including non-nuclear States. The participants in the negotiations therefore not only submitted progress reports to international forums but also took account of results of the consideration of the nuclear test issue which was taking place in the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament. Thus, for example, the participants in the negotiations accepted as part of the system of verification of the observance of the treaty they were elaborating the recommendations, approved by the Committee on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Problems of the interrelation of bilateral negotiations on the same set of issues and a multilateral forum exist today as well. In the Conference on Disarmament the Soviet Union and many other States are advocating the start of multilateral negotiations on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. And at the same time, as you know, bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America are also taking place at present on the same subject.

One last example of interaction between bilateral and multilateral negotiations: the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Since this topic, too, is listed separately for discussion at our Conference, I shall refrain from commenting on it in detail. I should merely like to draw attention to the fact that the document being elaborated at the negotiations is also to be a multilateral one; a large number of States are to become parties to it, and for this reason it is quite natural that they should all, in some measure, take part in the negotiations. At the same time, here again the Soviet Union and the United States have held bilateral negotiations in the past, bilateral consultations are being held periodically at the present time, and of course the results of such bilateral interaction are assisting the progress of the multilateral negotiations.

We consider that disarmament negotiations can and must be held in parallel, both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis. They must complement and stimulate one another. Only then can full use be made of the possibilities inherent in the very concept of negotiations. As for the form of their interaction, it must, as I see it, be determined by the nature of the subject of the negotiations and by the prospective number of parties to the future agreement being elaborated. Of course the success or failure of negotiations depends primarily on the attitude of the States taking part, but the mechanism for holding disarmament negotiations determines the fate of the negotiations, their effectiveness in terms of results achieved. In our interdependent world there are and can be no States that
could abstract themselves from the surrounding reality, that could ignore it. The mechanism for holding negotiations and its interaction with non-negotiating forums are therefore of great importance from the point of view of making full use of existing opportunities for improving mutual understanding, bringing the respective positions closer to one another and finding solutions. That is why, in speaking about disarmament negotiations, I cannot help reverting once more to the Final Document of the first session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, where the importance of the role of the United Nations in this respect is emphasized. Paragraph 114 of the Final Document states: "The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament". The place and role of multilateral negotiations and bilateral negotiations are also determined in the Final Document. In paragraph 121 we read that "bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament".

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Manfred Müller

Understanding and agreement between the USSR and the USA are decisive for peace and reducing the military threat and the means of war. The strategic weapons of both powers, mainly directed against each other, can at the same time hit every corner of the planet. A continuing or even accelerating strategic arms race and intentions to extend the race into outer space endanger strategic stability and could bring the arms race out of control. To stop and reverse the strategic arms race is therefore the main task in international relations of our time. It seems that there are some prospects for progress now. Most people hope that an INF solution will open the window of opportunities and give a new impetus to the strategic and space negotiations but at the same time also for European disarmament.

There is growing understanding of the complexity of disarmament problems and of the fact, that the European situation plays a great role. It is in the interest of both sides in Europe, to reduce not only the strategic and nuclear confrontation but the conventional too. There is a certain interrelationship between nuclear and non-nuclear forces. But this interrelationship has not the degree of a condition. To create a linkage between them, i.e. to make one a precondition for the other, would not help either the bilateral negotiations nor the European ones. The fact should be respected that agreements between the two powers have priority but at the same time the endeavers for nuclear and conventional reductions in Europe must be intensified.

One argument says that imbalances in the conventional field in Europe would limit the western options in the strategic and nuclear field. However, with respect to conventional imbalances in Europe we have many variables to take into account: There are natural imbalances, for example differences in geography, in dimensions of operating options on land, air and oceans. These imbalances have led to different structures, options and concepts. It is obvious that those imbalances cannot be changed. But their role and consequences need rational reevaluation. To mention only one fact: Land traffic on railways and highways is easily to control and to interrupt. Ocean-traffic which has thousands of streets, is today fast and relatively secure.

Furthermore, there are imbalances in the level and in the structure of the armed forces, grown through the years and on the basis of past experiences. Such imbalances do exist on both sides. They should be discussed in negotiations with two objectives: to check the relevance of past experiences today and to change structures according to the actual security
requirements and to eliminate imbalances within a process of reductions. That side which has more should reduce to the level of the other side. This means, imbalances should no longer be mainly a subject for propaganda and fantasy, but a basic element of the European disarmament negotiations.

The results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and the prospects for new negotiations discussed at present in Vienna, seem to show readiness in all European States to search for new security concepts and structures of and within the continent. The understanding is growing that any military conflict on the continent, even if fought with so-called modern conventional weapons only, would lead to the destruction of the continent. By such a war nobody can hope to achieve any other aim than to destroy the other side but also himself. Under such circumstances war, military conflict of any kind, has to be prevented.

But this cannot be based on the policy and behaviour of one side or some States only. It is the responsibility of all European peoples. This is why the concept of common security finds more and more support. Nuclear deterrence cannot respond to the challenges of this situation. The deterrence posture is constructed on past situations and possibilities and since it does not reflect the requirements of our days it becomes more and more dangerous. But to substitute nuclear deterrence by common security means to bring common security to life, to make it a working security system. This demands basic changes. The Berlin summit of the Warsaw Treaty Member States last May has proposed such basic changes. It has reformulated the pacts' defense doctrine in underlining its defensive nature and eliminating all unrealistic and fear causing elements. The WTO has started a process of change in its military concept, training and structures, based on this new doctrinal thinking. And the members of the alliance have proposed a discussion with NATO on the respective military doctrines.

We are ready for far-reaching reductions of armed forces and conventional weapons on a whole-European-basis with regional and subregional elements. This should include the restructuring of armed forces in general and particularly in the border regions between the two military alliances to defensive options only and the withdrawal or elimination of mainly offensive-capable weapons from these zones.

All this shows the readiness of the socialist States to change the conventional military situation in Europe on the basis of equality. There is neither a need nor a reasonable purpose for nuclear or conventional rearmament and no convincing argument for further insistence on nuclear deterrence behaviour.
It is obvious the proposed developments in Europe would influence and improve the conditions for disarmament negotiations in the bilateral and in the global field. European hopes and expectations need progress in the complex negotiations on the other hand. The basic and central element for both is the readiness to respond to the needs and requirements of our time - to base concepts and strategies on realistic perceptions and to act in the primary interest of peace.

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Kurt Spillman

I was particularly grateful to Ambassador Jaipal and Ambassador Nazarkine for addressing the central issue of goals and values. But coming from a small and neutral European country, I would like to express my concern about the existing situation in international armaments first by mentioning just the possibilities of small neutral countries in the process of arms control and disarmament. Ambassador Jaipal is alluding, on page 10 of his excellent paper, to the possible role of Sweden in the process of verification of treaty compliance. I think it is very appropriate to think of the important contribution of neutral and non-aligned countries in the process of verification of treaty compliance. One such proposal has been advanced in Stockholm, offering to provide a plan for verification by the neutral countries for purposes that were entirely in the interests of the international community, an offer which to our regret has been turned down. Speaking for Switzerland itself, I think we have been trying to help the arms control and disarmament process in which we believe and which we observe very carefully by offering a neutral meeting ground for bilateral as well as multilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament. I think I don't have to repeat here that Switzerland has been interested in international co-operation and collaboration since very early times. We think of the Red Cross, the League of Nations, United Nations, and so on. Also I would think that a small neutral country like Switzerland has been trying to further the international arms control and disarmament process by signing the multilateral treaties and also by proposing a scheme for the peaceful settlement of disputes which, I think, will come up for further discussion soon.

I would also like to think that our concept of armed neutrality may provide a model of non-offensive, non-provocative force posture. But the basic compromises have to be found by the two leading nuclear Powers. There we are on a different level. I propose that we look harder at the inner workings of
our mind and not only at weapons and technical systems. "Perceived images" is the title of an important UNIDIR study by our colleague Professor Frei published in 1984. This study demonstrates with ample material how much our perceptions are coloured and often destroyed by preconceived ideas and value judgements that impair the process of mutual understanding which is so vitally important. Bilateral negotiations, as well as multilateral negotiations, should devote more time to identifying and defining as precisely as possible the mutual interests and the mutual goals to be achieved, as well as the basic assumption from which the different parties start. I am convinced that greater progress could be achieved if as much effort were devoted to these basic problems as is devoted to technical details. This process is certainly extremely difficult, as touching upon so-called non-negotiables, non-negotiable value assumptions, that is, but it has been for the defence of basic values that groups and nations have built up defences up to the present time, with their overwhelming nuclear capabilities. Therefore, we should no longer avoid the basic issues of perceptions and values, as hard and controversial as they might be. Let me give an example: is it possible to find a mutually acceptable definition of the term "peaceful co-existence", or is peaceful co-existence - as pointed out in the Soviet Military Encyclopaedia - just "a continuation of the class struggle", a definition which to Western nations sounds threatening. I am simply raising the issue and pointing to the importance of these questions because I am convinced that not nuclear warheads but human heads are going to decide the fate of human civilization.

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John Sullivan

We in Australia approach this question of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations with the conviction that, particularly in this nuclear age, every nation, even a small and distant nation such as Australia, has the right and the responsibility to play a full part in preventing war and in securing the elimination of nuclear weapons and working towards alternative arrangements to maintain peace.

At the same time, as both Ambassador Jaipal and Ambassador Nazarkine pointed out, and as was recognized in the Final Document of the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, the nuclear powers, and in particular the superpowers have a special responsibility for the reduction of nuclear arms. However, it has to be recognized that since the signing of the SALT-II Agreement no further arms control agreements have been concluded between the United States and the
Soviet Union, even though there have been virtually continuous negotiations going on in Geneva these long years, with one major break between 1980 and 1982. It has even been claimed by some that the bilateral arms negotiation process has come to facilitate or even institutionalize the arms race. If this is true, then the bilateral arms control process has failed. But I question whether the ground in Geneva has become so arid and so barren that it can no longer bear fruit. The possibility of eliminating intermediate range nuclear weapons from Europe seems to be getting closer in fact. While this issue is largely one for the superpowers and for the European countries, we hope and many other countries that are far from Europe also hope that agreement will soon be reached. We welcome the fact that both United States and the Soviet Union have both presented draft treaties on this question of intermediate-range nuclear forces. We also hope that it will be the first of many such agreements, which will include the elimination of these weapons, not only in Europe, but throughout the world and we hope that there will be further agreements in the future leading to deep reductions in strategic nuclear forces which at long last is being talked of as a goal by both superpowers.

Australia, of course, is not a direct participant in the bilateral process. However, we believe it is the role of the smaller powers, the smaller countries such as ours, to constantly remind the superpowers that security and the well-being of all people is at stake in their bilateral negotiations, and that they bear a high level of responsibility and accountability to the wider international community. I must say that it is not always easy for small countries such as mine to take issue with the superpowers on these vital questions. However, we feel that it is the duty of the small and medium countries to examine the available evidence on a particular question and if it is found to be persuasive or otherwise, then to say so frankly and directly. Such representations do not always make us popular, but if many small and medium countries do the same thing, then they may cumulatively assist in pushing the bilateral disarmament process forward.

I also believe, of course, that countries such as mine have a duty to do what they can to assist progress in the multilateral disarmament field. The key institution in this area is the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In my view the non-aligned countries which make up the largest group in the Conference have a particular role to play. Their support is often crucial to the success of any initiatives. But even this in itself can cause difficulties. The "all or nothing stance" taken by some of the non-aligned countries, for example, on the question of a full negotiating mandate for a committee to consider the question of a nuclear test ban is preventing any work being done on this issue. At the same time it is a small number of non-aligned countries which puts forward lack of
progress on nuclear disarmament, including lack of progress on
the nuclear test-ban, as an excuse not to adhere to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, the nuclear programmes
of some of these countries are a major cause of concern to those
of us who are committed to preventing the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by any additional countries.

Of course, it must also be said that aligned countries
share some of the responsibility for the lack of progress in the
Conference for Disarmament. Because they have often used this
forum and other multilateral forums to seek support for a
particular point of view without any real or genuine attempt to
seek consensus. In my view, it is in everyone's interest to
display flexibility, co-operation and the ability to compromise
in order to enhance the effectiveness of the Conference on
Disarmament and other multilateral disarmament fora, for
example, by minimizing procedural disputes that prevent real
work from being done, and, as Ambassador Nazarkine mentioned
earlier, so that the mutually-acceptable solutions can be found.

In my view, the multilateral process can also be assisted
by initiatives from individual countries. By this I do not mean
unilateral disarmament. What I am referring to is the fact that
there is already a considerable number of multilateral
agreements in existence. Whether they should really be
described as arms control agreements or as something less, as
suggested by Ambassador Jaipal, they constitute in my view a
solid body of effective measures which put real constraints on
the behaviour of Governments and they ought not to be
forgotten. Let me give you an example: while we complain about
the lack of progress on the chemical weapons convention, how
often do we remember that an international convention on
Chemical Weapons already exists? Of course I am referring to
the 1925 Geneva Protocol and while I do not wish to be accused
of looking backwards, I ask why doesn't it have every member
of the United Nations a party to it? Now, apart from those few
countries who have already chemical weapons, can it really be
that there are 30 or so countries which wish to reserve the
right to make chemical weapons a part of their defence forces?
Or is it simply the fact that they have not got around to taking
the necessary bureaucratic and legal steps to become parties to
the Protocol? The same could be said of a number of other arms
control agreements such as the Biological Weapons Convention,
the Inhumane Weapons Convention, the Environmental
Modifications Convention, and so on.

A special case is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
which in my view is perhaps the most successful arms control
treaty of modern times. And it has been a success because
countries have in effect chosen to do something by themselves:
that is, they have given up the right to acquire nuclear weapons
in the wider interests of mankind. Mr. Chairman, you indicated
earlier this morning that none of us want to see the emergence of any new nuclear arsenals. I agree. As the Palme Commission said, each additional nuclear power increases the risk that nuclear war will occur. Further adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would go a long way to preventing that from occuring.

Another way I suggest that we can work to promote the multilateral disarmament process is to promote regional measures, such as nuclear-free zones. Australia has been active in this regard in the development of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. Now, I know that the Zone has been criticized by some as not going far enough. But it demonstrates that even very small non-nuclear States can by their own initiative and in a multilateral context, ensure the absence of nuclear weapons from their territories, and distance themselves from the system of military competition which they believe does not serve the interests of peace.

A further measure which even small countries could consider taking by themselves or in association with their regional neighbours is the question of controlling more strictly conventional arms transfers. At the very least exporters of arms should strictly ensure that they will not wind up in countries where they will only serve to exacerbate tension. And similarly importers of weapons should be wary of buying arms which could be seen as threatening by their neighbours, and set off another stage in a regional arms race.

A greater degree of openness between countries could also assist in preventing the growth of tension, and promote that climate of mutual confidence that Ambassador Jaipal pointed to as a pre-condition for successful negotiation. And again, this is something that countries can do by themselves.

There also needs to be confidence that others have and will comply with existing arms control agreements. This is very important for the constraints they impose, as I mentioned earlier, as well as being the basis for new and more far-reaching agreements. As Mr. Jaipal and other speakers have pointed out, lack of agreement on this question has often been responsible for the lack of progress in multilateral disarmament negotiations. Fortunately, there are some signs that the old attitudes to verification and transparency are changing. This basic concept has already been recognized in the confidence building measures which were agreed to at the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament.

As I said at the beginning, disarmament is everyone's responsibility. In concluding, therefore, I would like all delegates to consider personally what opportunities they might have in their various countries, through their universities,
research institutions, foreign ministries to devise programmes, to make suggestions that could promote the disarmament process. I believe it needs this personal touch because too often the process does become rather impersonal, full of the rhetoric of Government statements, which all of us recognize make no real contribution to disarmament. I have tried to make a few suggestions today on ways in which we might advance the bilateral disarmament process; they may not be particularly new but I hope that you will consider them to be worth a new look.

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Gustave Zoula

Nous avons tous entendu dire ce matin qu'il n'y avait pratiquement pas de différence entre les négociations bilatérales et les négociations multilatérales ou que si différence il y a, celle-ci n'est qu'académique, voire théorique, l'essentiel étant d'abaisser le niveau de suspicion mutuelle et d'élérer le niveau de confiance mutuelle entre les différents partenaires. Je partage un peu cette idée mais je me demande dans quelle mesure une région comme l'Afrique peut jouer un rôle influent dans des négociations dites multilatérales. Ce n'est pas que l'Afrique n'est pas partie prenante au processus de désarmement ou qu'elle ne se sent pas concernée par la recherche de la sécurité internationale. Bien au contraire. Comme vous le savez 7 États africains participent aux négociations dans le cadre des Nations Unies, à la conférence du désarmement qui est la seule instance multilatérale dont dispose la communauté internationale pour les négociations sur le désarmement. Il est vrai également que pour les États africains, c'est-à-dire l'OUA, le désarmement constitue un souci majeur dans la mesure où nous avons voulu déclarer l'Afrique "Zone dénucléarisée". Il y a même un projet de convention qui date de 1964 et qui est toujours à l'étude. Mais si je me pose cette question de savoir si l'Afrique peut jouer un rôle, c'est qu'en 1985, nous avons tenu une conférence régionale sur le désarmement, la sécurité et le développement en Afrique et beaucoup d'États africains ont reconnu que même si l'Afrique devait s'intéresser à ces sujets ils constituaient plutôt une préoccupation majeure pour les États européens et autres de l'hémisphère Nord.

En réalité, les États africains adhèrent au concept général de désarmement et de l'interdépendance de la sécurité internationale. Mais ils reconnaissent également que le caractère universel des objectifs de sécurité et de désarmement doit d'abord tenir compte de ce qui se passe au niveau des super puissances, entre les États Unis et l'Union soviétique. Et c'est là où je voulais en venir en citant l'orateur qui nous a dit que
la différence entre négociations bilatérales et négociations multilatérales n'était qu'académique. Dans toutes ces négociations en effet on retrouve toujours face à face les deux blocs ou les deux super États, l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis. Dans le rapport présenté par M. Rikhi Jaipal, il est bien établi par exemple comment la Commission de l'Energie Atomique créée en 1946 a échoué à cause de la rivalité soviéto-américaine et il a également bien montré comment les négociations multilatérales sur les armes atomiques et conventionnelles n'ont pas abouti à cause des divergences d'approche entre américains et soviétiques. Et aussi comment en 55 et 58 et en 60 toutes les négociations de Genève ont subi le même sort, les américains insistant davantage sur les mécanismes de contrôle avant de proposer des mesures de désarmement. Par contre, et il l'a aussi montré, au moment de la période de la détente, il y a toute une série de traités qui ont été proposés, étudiés et qui ont été acceptés par les deux États sur une base bilatérale avant d'être proposés - j'allais presque dire imposés pour adoption - aux autres membres du Comité.

Je serais donc tenté de dire que toutes les négociations multilatérales se ramènent à une négociation bilatérale entre l'Union Soviétaire et les États-Unis et sur cela beaucoup d'orateurs ont insisté. Ces pays sont les plus concernés. Ils sont ceux, passez moi l'expression, qui recherchent l'hégémonie, la suprématie. Ils cachent cela sous un vocabulaire de parité ou ils appellent cela la sécurité au plus haut niveau ou ils revendiquent à eux seuls la responsabilité pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité globales. Et ce rôle malheureusement leur est presque reconnu expressément dans la Charte des Nations Unies. Les États africains eux-mêmes s'y réfèrent souvent lorsqu'ils lancent des appels aux grandes puissances pour négocier en vue de réduire la tension qui pèse sur le monde. Si je prends l'exemple de la Conférence de Lomé, organisée par les pays africains, il est dit que "la Conférence considère qu'un climat international en particulier dans les relations entre les grandes puissances, notamment les deux super puissances de même que dans les relations Nord/Sud, améliorerait les effectifs de sécurité, de désarmement et de développement". Parce que l'objectif avoué en ce moment par les États africains est effectivement de pouvoir construire un développement qui serait exempt de cette course aux armements que nous connaissons dans l'hémisphère nord.

Malheureusement encore, les États africains sont menacés, et vous le savez tous, par la capacité nucléaire de l'Afrique du Sud. Ce matin un orateur l'a d'ailleurs dit, à propos des zones dénucléarises. L'Afrique avait souhaité, comme je l'ai dit tout à l'heure, que cette zone restât une zone dénucléarisée. Malheureusement avec le concours de ces mêmes grandes puissances, l'Afrique du Sud est aujourd'hui en mesure de produire des armes nucléaires. Et cela constitue un souci de
plus pour les États africains qui en ont déjà beaucoup. Toute négociation multilatérale, se ramène à la négociation Nord/Sud. Nous l'avons également vu avec l'exemple de Reykjavik, à la Conférence du 11 au 12 octobre 1986 où deux États ont voulu en quelque sorte régler le problème de toute l'humanité entre eux deux. La réaction d'autre États, en particulier des États européens qui possèdent déjà des armes nucléaires, a été de s'opposer à cette tentative d'enréglementer le monde entre les deux grandes puissances, car tout en refusant de comptabiliser les armes anglaises et françaises à cette conférence, les deux super puissances en sont venues presque à les prendre en compte dans les négociations qui se passent en ce moment à Genève.

Du reste, quand on ne tient pas compte directement de ces États, on le fait à travers les blocs. Et là encore, comme vous le savez, l'OUA, tout comme les États non alignés, est opposée à la politique des blocs. L'OUA pense que c'est cette politique des blocs qui accroît régulièrement la tension. Parce que même si les deux champions s'appellent Union Soviétique et États-Unis, il n'en reste pas moins qu'ils doivent tenir compte des intérêts particuliers, des visées particulières, des objectifs particuliers des petites nations qui font partie de ces blocs. C'est pourquoi au sein de l'OUA nous pensons que cette politique des blocs devrait être abolie également comme un premier pas pour aller vers un désarmement. Il est peut être difficile de demander cela aux représentants de l'OTAN et du Pacte de Varsovie que vous êtes, mais ce serait peut être un premier pas pour réduire les tensions et arriver à un monde où les intérêts hégémonistes ne seraient plus vus en termes d'Est ou d'Ouest, comme c'est le cas aujourd'hui. Certes je ne dis pas que l'Union Soviétique et les États-Unis n'ont pas d'intérêts particuliers, ils veulent composer avec le reste des Nations petites ou grandes de façon à prendre en compte l'intérêt général qui seul serait susceptible de garantir le désarmement général qui est demandé aujourd'hui.

Je suis tenté en conclusion de dire avec l'Ambassadeur Jaipal que négociations multilatérales ou bilatérales, en ce moment, nous sommes tous, un peu comme les nègres de l'Union Soviétique et des États-Unis parce que c'est en définitive pour leurs intérêts que nous sommes en train de discuter.

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Michael Intriligator

The comment I would like to make builds upon the call for new thinking which I think does call for new procedures for disarmament. I would like to put on the table a specific proposal for consideration by this Conference. It is a new
multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, namely a five power forum consisting of all five nuclear powers. In other words we would add to the negotiating process the smaller nuclear powers of the UK, France and China. I would point out that no such forum now exists. These nations are, of course, the permanent members of the Security Council, but this is no place in which to conduct disarmament negotiations. I believe in the past we could ignore the smaller nuclear powers because of their small inventories of weapons, but this is not true now. Each of those powers has a complete triad of weapons, and they have planned substantial increases in their weapons. One must also recall the devastating potential of even small inventories of nuclear weapons, such as, for example the amount of destruction that could be wrought by simply one nuclear missiles carrying submarine. All five nuclear powers have such nuclear missile carrying submarines.

Now it is clear that such a forum would be unwieldy, it would be prone to political arguments, it would be more complicated in its functioning than the current bilateral forums that we have, but it would recognize the realities of the world situation, namely, the fact that we have at present five not two nuclear weapon states. All of those should be represented in disarmament negotiations. Excluding relevant parties such as the three smaller nuclear nations creates problems and tensions of its own which are themselves potential sources of instability.

I would point out, Mr. Chairman, that such a five nuclear weapon state forum has been proposed before, for example by former Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada and by the Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. But I think that one of the problems with their proposals is that they retain the traditional agenda, and I think that our new thinking should embrace not only a new procedure for disarmament but also a new agenda. I think we can retain disarmament as a long term goal of these negotiations, but, at the same time, I think we can consider certain current and intermediate objectives which would have the beneficial effect of reducing current and potential future areas of global strategic instability. I would particularly mention five items that could be part of that current and intermediate agenda:

1. Communications among the nuclear powers, for example by an expansion of the current type of bilateral hotline agreements that exists;

2. Accidents and inadvertent nuclear war. We have some valuable bilateral agreements, the Accidents Measures Agreements and the Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. I think it would be extremely beneficial to extend those two agreements to all five nuclear power states;
3. Nuclear crisis and nuclear threats. I think it would be extremely beneficial if we had agreements or understandings among the five nuclear weapon states on the procedures they would follow in case of a nuclear crisis or nuclear threats, before and not after the event has occurred.

4. Non-proliferation. I believe that the existence of such a new forum could in its functioning strengthen the Non-Proliferation Regime, particularly to deal with the threat of newly emerging nuclear supplier states and the potential nuclear role of non-nation states. Neither is now treated as part of current Non-Proliferation Regime.

5. Other weapons of mass destruction. Such a forum could also deal with chemical, biological and other such weapons.

Finally looking to the theme of this Conference, on the interrelationship between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations, I would propose that we start with parallel negotiations between the current fora that exist at both a bilateral and multilateral level and this proposed new forum, but with the idea eventually of shifting much of the responsibilities to this five power forum as it deals with global issues and as it reaches certain initial agreements, such as for example in the five areas I have mentioned before. Eventually, if we shift most of the global responsibilities for weapons of mass destruction to this five power forum, I would suggest that an ideal arrangement would be to have a parallel set of multilateral/regional negotiations, building on the examples we have in Europe of MBFR and CSCE but for several regions of the world with periodic consultations between the global forum I have suggested and the several regional multilateral fora that I think could be very beneficial. So I would like to propose this as a specific and concrete suggestion for the consideration of the Conference.

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Alexander Yankov

I would like to offer some brief comments on the interplay between bilateral and multilateral arms limitation and disarmament negotiations viewed from their legal aspects and legal implications as an interplay between bilateral and multilateral arrangements in this field.
Before doing so, I would like to make some observations on the introductory reports submitted by Ambassador Jaipal and Ambassador Nazarkine. I appreciate very much the historic background and analytical survey made by Ambassador Jaipal regarding the evolving process of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations throughout the last decade. May I point out, however, that looking backwards we have also to draw some conclusions which may be pertinent to the present and the future. I have in mind some important new factors which have had significant impact on international relations. It would be a too simplistic picture if we consider the process of disarmament negotiations per se and not whether there have been some new developments which have exercised certain influence on these negotiations. I do not want to argue with Ambassador Jaipal on what has happened until now but I would like to submit that perhaps this picture may be more accurate if we take into consideration certain new factors of political, social, or economic nature and that they are reflected in the international posture. For instance, if we go back and consider the record of the League of Nations and the frustrations felt in the field of disarmament, we will notice the absence of some political forces which now play an important role in international relations. We have in mind the emergence of the socialist States and the rise of the non-aligned movement. The global dimensions of the nuclear arms race is also a relatively new phenomenon.

Therefore, I think that, perhaps, it would be a much more realistic approach if we consider the interplay of all these factors. On this point I would like to express my agreement with Ambassador Nazarkine that although we recognize the special responsibilities of the major powers and especially the two greatest nuclear weapons powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, and their predominant influence in shaping the relationship between the different political and military alliances, such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it would be correct to consider also the place of other countries on regional and global basis, vis-à-vis the ongoing negotiations between these two great Powers. It is obvious that each of them has to take into account the implications and the consequences of its strategic doctrine and how they are accepted by the international community. Some writers admit, that the USSR and the USA occupy the centre of the international stage. They occupy the centre of the stage but not the whole stage, since there are many other actors which should not be overlooked. The international public opinion expressed through trade union, or youth and other political organizations, have also to be taken into consideration.

Now, turning to the main point of my few comments on the interplay between the bilateral and multilateral agreements, I would like to say at the outset that I agree with some of the
observations made by Mr. Sullivan on the broadening of the existing arms limitations agreements and their legal grounds. For there are some agreements which by their nature could be considered as bilateral, but may have broader significance with global dimensions. I take as an example, the hot-line agreement of 1963, the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce the risk of nuclear war, the agreement on the prevention of incidents on the high seas, or the basic statements of principles governing the relations between the USSR and the United Kingdom or between the USSR and France, etc. If we consider the 10 multilateral agreements which were negotiated and which are in force since the last decades, excluding the Geneva Protocol of 1925, we see that most of them, if not all of them, although they initially were contemplated as bilateral agreements or within the framework of bilateral negotiations, they acquired much more extensive global significance. Such agreements have either to be transformed into multilateral treaties or from the outset negotiated and signed as multilateral agreements. Thus, we cannot conceive today, for instance, the non-proliferation treaty, the outer space treaty, the sea-bed treaty or the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons within a bilateral framework of USA-USSR, or East-West relationship. These agreements which originally were negotiated through the mechanism of bilateral negotiations, have involved the large majority of States, including members of the non-aligned movement. These agreements by their scope and object have much larger field of application. They could go together with parallel, bilateral or regional arrangements, including the nuclear weapon-free-zone arrangements. In this connection special reference could be made to the suggestion to establish a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Balkans. Several governments in the region have stated that they attach great importance to such regional measures. In the case of regional arms limitation and disarmament agreements, such as nuclear weapon free zone in several parts of Europe, they could prove to be an important contribution to arms control and disarmament. In confidence building measures too the interplay between bilateral and multilateral arrangements could have particular significance. Those were the few comments I wanted to offer emphasizing the interrelation between bilateral and broader international negotiations and between bilateral, regional and global arms control and disarmament agreements.

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Jan Siccama

I would like to raise three elementary but, in my view, fundamental points in respect to what has been said and all.
three points are connected, in my view, with the policy that disarmament always serves the peace.

The first point has been expressed in various ways; that the world can no longer sustain a war, that military solutions are impossible, that only political solutions are possible, that war more or less would be abolished. I think it should be simply said this is not true if you look at Iran/Iraq or at Afghanistan or at other wars. You can see that military solutions are still attempted and are used. Perhaps it is wrong, but it is happening.

The second point concerns what has been said by several speakers that total nuclear disarmament is a desirable objective. I think it is not. A world without nuclear weapons was a world with a lot of wars. We know that countries, especially here in Europe fought each other many times. I think, if there were nuclear disarmament, total nuclear disarmament, the chance that a conventional war would break out would be large or larger again, and then one or both parties of course would know, or would remember that nuclear weapons existed so that they would start a race to acquire them again and they would be used. So I am convinced that the quickest way to a nuclear war is total nuclear disarmament. Therefore, I am not in favour of that objective.

My third point concerns some remarks by Dr. Müller. I think it should be said that I don't know of a substitute for nuclear deterrence as a means to avoid war. I don't know exactly what common security is. Dr. Müller has mentioned the word "conventional balance". I never use the words "conventional deterrence" because I think it does not exist. Conventional balances are not at all recipes for avoiding war as was made abundantly clear in 1914 and in 1939-1940. Then, there was almost a perfect equilibrium, a conventional balance between the warring parties. So I think if Europe wants to have a Third World War it should become nuclear free as soon as possible. If not, we should rely on a nuclear deterrence.

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Ednan Agaev

Je voudrais en quelques mots essayer de résumer la discussion qui a eu lieu ici. On a exprimé beaucoup d'idées sur le fait que tous les pourparlers au sujet du désarmement visent avant tout à assurer la sécurité générale et internationale et à prévenir l'éclatement d'un conflit armé qui détruirait tout.
Quand on parle du lien réciproque entre les pourparlers bilatéraux et multilatéraux sur le désarmement, de ce qui les unit et de ce qui les différencie, on peut dire avec certitude que ce qui les unit, c'est incontestablement la communauté des buts. Communauté de buts qui a un caractère universel et qui touche aux intérêts de tous les États; c'est pourquoi les pourparlers bilatéraux sur le désarmement eux-mêmes deviennent l'objet d'une constante attention et de discussions multilatérales. En allant plus loin et en développant cette idée, on peut dire que dans une certaine mesure les pourparlers bilatéraux ne sont bilatéraux que dans leur forme et que dans l'ensemble leur contenu et leur orientation présentent un caractère multilatéral. S'agissant de la forme bilatérale de ces pourparlers, elle est objectivement prédéterminée par un fait historique, dont on a déjà beaucoup parlé ici, à savoir que c'est sur l'URSS et les États-Unis - et c'est bien de ces deux pays qu'il s'agit quand il est question de pourparlers bilatéraux - que c'est sur ces deux pays que repose la responsabilité particulière du destin de l'humanité et que c'est à eux qu'incombe la lourde tâche d'ouvrir la voie qui affranchira le monde de la menace de la destruction. Une des caractéristiques distinctives de ces pourparlers bilatéraux, c'est qu'on y traite en profondeur et sous tous leurs aspects des problèmes très complexes, qui touchent aux intérêts de tous les États. Mais on peut dire aussi que le lien réciproque étroit entre pourparlers bilatéraux et multilatéraux est prédéterminé non seulement par l'objet de ces pourparlers, mais encore par les méthodes au moyen desquelles ils sont menés.

En fait, les pourparlers bilatéraux, bien que deux parties seulement y interviennent, ne sont quand même pas des pourparlers fermés et ne représentent pas une quelconque diplomatie secrète, celle qui se pratiquait aux temps de l'équilibre des forces; l'information concernant ces pourparlers est accessible à tous. Tout le monde est parfaitement au courant et l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis informent systématiquement et de la façon la plus complète le reste de la communauté internationale sur la façon dont se déroulent ces pourparlers, sur les progrès réalisés et aussi sur les complications et les obstacles qui se présentent en chemin. Il faut aussi souligner à ce sujet que la communauté mondiale ne se cantonne pas dans un rôle d'observateur passif des pourparlers bilatéraux. La discussion multilatérale qui se déroule autour des pourparlers bilatéraux donne lieu à l'expression de nombreuses recommandations et de diverses idées qui exercent incontestablement une influence et une action déterminées sur l'évolution de la position des deux protagonistes qui se produisent au cours de leurs pourparlers. Je voudrais citer, en signalant au passage la caractére assez remarquablement représentatif des collègues américains qui sont parmi nous, un éminent politologue américain, qui en fait a exposé tous les fondements de la diplomatie américaine d'aujourd'hui, le renommé Hans Morgenthau,
selon lequel la diplomatie est l'art de concentrer les efforts pour atteindre un objectif donné. Et l'on peut dire à ce propos, pour aller plus loin, que les pourparlers bilatéraux sont précisément dans une certaine mesure une concentration des efforts de toute la communauté internationale dans les directions les plus urgentes et que l'Union soviétique et les Etat-Unis, dès l'instant où ils engagent des pourparlers bilatéraux, deviennent en quelque sorte les porte-parole des intérêts de toute la communauté des États.

On a aussi souvent dit ici que les pourparlers bilatéraux et multilatéraux doivent être menés parallèlement. Et l'on pourrait dire aussi que ce parallélisme et l'interdépendance entre les deux modes de pourparlers aide à trouver en quelque sorte le juste milieu et à inscrire les décisions dans un cadre qui convient à tous. Le lien dialectique réciproque entre pourparlers bilatéraux et multilatéraux trouve là son expression dans le fait que, si les pourparlers bilatéraux concentrent la recherche, les multilatéraux en élargissent le format, ce qui produit, pour faire appel à une expression imagée, un effet de zoom; on saisit le but et on le fixe avec précision; ses paramètres fondamentaux se dégagent en gros plan; on introduit ensuite dans l'objectif les éléments constitutifs et les détails, ce qui donne enfin une composition entièrement achevée. C'est par exemple en vertu du même principe qu'on a travaillé sur le Traité de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires et sur la Convention d'interdiction de l'arme bactériologique ainsi que, dans une certaine mesure, sur la Convention sur la suppression des armes chimiques.

Quand on parle des pourparlers bilatéraux et multilatéraux, on ne peut certes pas ne pas rappeler le sens et le rôle de la Conférence du Désarmement, ce forum multilatéral de discussion unique en son genre. Et l'on pourrait dire à ce propos que ce forum possède le plus puissant des potentiels, qu'on utilise malheureusement fort peu. Certes il serait injuste de ne pas indiquer qu'il y a quand même une certaine animation et un certain mouvement dans les débats de la Conférence du Désarmement. Les diverses délégations apportent à l'appui de leurs positions des documents concernant la substance des questions débattues. Mais en même temps on ne peut pas ne pas être alarmé par le fait que nombre des documents présentés à la Conférence du Désarmement ne font pas l'objet d'un développement logique et d'une concrétisation matérielle, et que bien souvent l'activité réelle se métamorphose en paperrasse procédurière. On pense qu'à cet égard la Conférence du Désarmement pourrait jouer un rôle beaucoup plus actif. Et pour terminer, je voudrais avancer une idée imagée : quand on regarde l'ensemble du processus de pourparlers sur le désarmement, on est tenté de le comparer au jeu d'un grand orchestre symphonique. À certains moments, on entend surgir au premier plan un thème et des solistes qui mènent le jeu cependant que, loin de se taire, les
thèmes fondamentaux ne font que s'assourdir. Après quoi, il y a des moments où toutes les variations se fondent en un crescendo constructif. Tous les groupes d'instruments interviennent, les variations se rejoignent et l'œuvre aboutit à son finale. On peut alors se demander qui dirige vraiment cet orchestre. La meilleure réponse, c'est que le chef d'orchestre n'est autre que notre raison collective commune et c'est le meilleur régulateur de nos activités dans l'arène internationale.

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Thomas Barthelemy

I would like to make a comment or two on statements that have been given, particularly on the two formal presentations. But I would like to start by commending Professor Spillmann for his stress on the real and/or perceived conflicting attitudes and goals of Governments rather than on the bean counting exercise.

I think, really, it is very important for us to begin by addressing the roots of international tension, or at least to be very conscious of them when we discuss arms control and disarmament measures. Because arms are a reflection of the tensions and conflicts and aggression that occurs and not, in our view, the cause of them, we are not involved in an arms race which is somehow mechanistic and beyond the control of men. Of course when we speak of these sources of tension and insecurity in the world, we have to start at the beginning with violations of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.

Secondly, we have to deal with the intolerance of some in the community of States for the variety of societies and forms of Government that exist. And I think we need to think about how we can reach a climate of live and let live in this world of ours.

Third, I think we even have to be conscious of and recognize that it is important as an underlying factor in our work that there is a great deal of intolerance, even by Governments, for a variety of views, political ideology, religious views, and so on of their own citizens.

I believe that we have to start with the issue of security. Ambassador Jaipal described the goals of security and of disarmament as in conflict, in referring to the bilateral negotiations. It seemed to be that he was implicitly condemning the two great Powers for putting security first. But, after all, isn't security the first responsibility of every Government (If it does not provide security for its citizens then what
purpose does it serve for them). Obviously arms control and disarmament measures can, under certain circumstances, serve to advance this goal of security, of national and international security.

I noted that in Ambassador Nazarkine's statement he addressed the issue of bilateral and multilateral negotiations in a somewhat different way than I have heard it expressed in the past. Of course, it has long been said by the international community that the initial responsibility for nuclear arms control and disarmament belongs to the two Powers with the overwhelmingly largest arsenals. It is also widely known that the three other nuclear Powers (and by the way I regret that one of those is not represented at this meeting -, we miss them here -) but that those Powers, combined, possess approximately 5 per cent or less than 10 per cent of the world's nuclear forces. They have said there will come a time, once major reductions in the forces of the two major Powers have been achieved, for them to play a role; but that that time is not here now. And yet we have heard for many years in the Conference on Disarmament and in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly that somehow the Conference on Disarmament is prevented from performing its appropriate role in negotiating nuclear disarmament. Indeed, in my view, the Conference on Disarmament provides a tremendous opportunity for sustained dialogue on the issue of nuclear arms control and disarmament. That subject has been on the agenda of the Conference throughout its history. It particularly offers a good opportunity for the neutral and non-aligned States who are members of that body to present their views on the subject, and it is regrettable that a few neutral and non-aligned States (I should say, a few non-aligned States) have discouraged such a serious dialogue over the years but have insisted instead on immediate negotiation or nothing. Unfortunately, this small group of countries has been abetted by the Warsaw Treaty Organization States, who have called for negotiations immediately - without delay in the Conference on Disarmament to achieve nuclear disarmament. I think it really is widely understood that we do need to get beyond that kind of rhetoric. It seemed to me that the things that we heard this morning really reflected a new glassnost if not total candour, that the multilateral negotiating forum has a place - must have a place in its agenda for the nuclear disarmament issue but that, at this stage, it cannot realistically negotiate on that subject.

I would like to say one or two more words about the statement of Ambassador Jaipal. Frankly, he presented a description of the negotiations, bilateral negotiations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, that was not recognizable to me. He said that the SALT process was stopped in 1980 by the Reagan Administration. Of course, we know that the Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began by emphasizing the
failure of the SALT process in not getting to the point of reducing nuclear warheads. Yet, as we see, particularly in the last year, that process has gotten to precisely that point now. And, of course, the bilateral negotiations on INF began in November 1981. They were broken off in 1983. I didn't see any notation of that by Ambassador Jaipal but, in any case, they were later resumed.

As far as the subject of the arms race soaring into space or on the verge of soaring into space, my recollection is that the arms race soared into space 30 years ago when ICBM's ballistic missiles began to be tested and deployed. I would like to say just one word in conclusion about the progress of chemical weapons negotiations. I think it should be borne in mind that the bilateral negotiations did go on from the beginning of 1977 until the end of that decade but that they did not reach a successful conclusion. I think it's now clear to all, as we are in 1987, if you go back and look at the 1982 Soviet draft convention, why those bilateral negotiations had come to a dead-end in the late 1970s. The United States Government chose not to resume those bilateral negotiations in the 1980s but preferred and pressed for the beginning of multilateral negotiation, which did begin in 1983. There is a reference in Ambassador Jaipal's report to reports of "a race in chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons". I think that is somewhat euphemistic. For what has happened, as you all recall, is that the United States ceased production of chemical weapons in 1969. One might describe that as a moratorium if he wished to. That has continued up until the present day, and the point now in the United States is the necessity that is seen by the United States Government and the United States Congress to do something to retain its deterrent capability in this area after these 18 years. Now it happens that those weapons will be binary in nature in order to provide greater protection for the users. I think a final point on chemical weapons needs to be made here. I refer to this question of verification, which is referred to in Ambassador Jaipal's paper. He urges a solution to the problem, i.e. an agreement, though falling short of 100 per cent verification, none the less constituting an adequate measure of assurance that chemical weapons are not being produced. Frankly, I think that that approach is somewhat overtaken by events. In the actual course of the negotiations we see now that the Soviet Union has joined the United States in calling for mandatory on-site challenge inspection in at least a number of circumstances, including use and when there may be doubt of production - illicit production. There has been a substantial narrowing of the differences. The real issue is not 'same' verification but verification that gives all parties to a treaty assurance that the weapons are not being produced, so that they can destroy whatever deterrent forces they may have and feel confident that their security has been strengthened and not weakened.
Second/Deuxième Session

NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION: BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PERSPECTIVES/LIMITATION ET REDUCTION DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES : PERSPECTIVES BILATERALES ET MULTILATERALES

Reports/Rapports:
Alexei Arbatov, David Emery, Pierre Le Guillouche

Discussion:
Viktor Karpov, Cesare Merlini,
Eberhard Schulz, Ednan Agaev, Edward Ifft, Pierre Morel,
Peter Davies, Genrikh Trofimenco, James Dougherty,
Nicholas Burakow, Alexei Arbatov, Pierre Le Guillouche

Chairman/Président:
Serge Sur
REPORT

NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION:
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PERSPECTIVES

Alexei Arbatov

I should like to begin my statement by noting that our discussions from the previous session have sufficed to convince us that there are different approaches to nuclear disarmament. It is not by chance that the problems of nuclear weapons and their place in war and policy have now become matters of sharp disagreement, and are widely discussed among politicians, specialists and the public. The point is that radical measures of nuclear disarmament are seriously on the agenda for the first time in the 40 years for which nuclear weapons have been in existence. What is being discussed is a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, and the complete elimination of medium-range and tactical missiles. The discussion on all these matters is no longer theoretical, but now has a practical meaning. We have, therefore, to consider with real urgency what we can achieve in the foreseeable period, whether there is a hope, whether there is point in giving serious consideration to the questions of a world without nuclear weapons.

In this connection, I should like to say that it is quite obvious that one view of the problem which is clearly expressed in the West, and will apparently be argued here by some later speakers, is that nuclear weapons are an integral element of the security of states. All that can be done is slightly to reduce excess numbers of nuclear weapons, and establish some regulation of new military programmes, without becoming too enthusiastic over nuclear disarmament.

I shall not seek to persuade the specialists here assembled of the merits of complete nuclear disarmament. The audience that I have the honour to address today is highly qualified, and I shall not therefore elaborate extensively on general and long-term concepts.

Instead, I would like to draw your attention to some aspects of the "nuclear deterrence" concept, which as some western representatives assert has been saving the world from war for 40 years. I should like, first, to point out the following: the assertion that nuclear weapons have prevented a third world war for the last 40 years is unproven, and evidently cannot be proved. It is a fact that, fortunately, there has not been a war, but it is now impossible to establish why we were so lucky, whether it was particularly the nuclear deterrence that was so effective, or whether the political reasons for a new world war were not sufficiently strong. History does not recognize a subjunctive mood. We do not know what might have
happened during those 40 years had nuclear weapons not been invented. There is, however, one circumstance that casts a most serious doubt on the thesis that it were nuclear weapons that saved us.

Obviously there is no need for a nuclear deterrent in routine times, in time of peace, in a calm situation. At such times it is as if the deterrent does not exist at all. When it comes into play is - in a serious crisis situation, when states are approaching armed conflict in which major nuclear powers may get involved.

It is of interest in that connection that according to the available information the United States has only twice placed its strategic nuclear forces on high rate of alert during the last 40 years: at the time of the Caribbean crisis in 1962 and during the Near Eastern crisis in 1973. Over that period, during the last 40 years, the Soviet Union has never placed its nuclear forces on generated alert status. Were deterrence really to work as a guarantee of peace, we should have had many examples of states that, on entering a conflict, placed their nuclear forces on high combat alert and after doing that were able to draw back from the brink of war. But history has practically no such example. Most importantly, it is absolutely unknown how events would have developed in 1962 and 1973, had not only one side, but both major powers, placed their nuclear forces on generated alert status.

As a scientist I am deeply concerned about this problem. I feel that the problem is one of the most dangerous, and I would say explosive, flaws of nuclear deterrence. The point is that the nuclear forces of East and West are vast organizations with extremely complex material resources, i.e. forces deployed with nuclear weapons known to total roughly 50,000 warheads and more than 10,000 delivery vehicles and launchers for the most varied purposes. Because of their growing complexity, these systems have to function in a strictly co-ordinated manner over the shortest periods of time and cover vast expanses of land, oceans, air space, many of them the whole globe and outer space. These systems are interlinked in the most intricate early warning, monitoring and command, control, and communications network. All this implies that, in a crisis situation, these systems may function only in accordance with previously devised, detailed procedures and previously approved operational plans. These plans are continuously used for staff training and exercise of the forces, but these plans are developed and continuously refined in time of peace and independently from each other by the Soviet Union and the United States, by East and West.

We know from history, however, that conflicts have never developed in accordance with previously devised plans, and at
the same time the functioning of military organizations has never before been so dependent on rigorous monitoring of pre-established procedures. Never before has there been so little time for the political leadership to take decisions. Time now is measured at best in hours, at worst in minutes. And never before has the functioning of these vast organizations been so overwhelmingly determined not by political considerations and common sense but by the technical characteristics, sheer numbers, disposition of the weapons and targeting priorities.

The conclusions to draw and extrapolate from this situation are very distressing for all of us. The point is that should nuclear deterrence really come into operation in some future crisis situation, an uncontrollable escalation of military activities is quite possible. The political leadership on both sides may find itself in the terrible dilemma of having either to follow previously laid down and developed plans and procedures for bringing the vast nuclear machinery into operation and generate it for the most efficient fulfillment of preprogrammed missions or to temporize, to improvise and reduce these organizations to a state of utter chaos since they can function only on the basis of detailed procedures. Escalation of the conflict - escalation of operations and counter-operations by both sides, and the placing of strategic and other nuclear forces on ever higher levels of combat alert may give a powerful stimulus towards a preemptive nuclear strike, or nuclear use even if only because some of the opponent's operations may be interpreted as commencement of the use of nuclear weapons. For example, the placing of strategic aircraft on aerial patrol; deployment of additional submarines with SLBMs in launch areas; placement of SSMNs and cruise missile submarines close to the opponent shores, which threatens short warning attack on C3I systems; distribution of tactical nuclear weapons for storage sites to combat troops; predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons out of fear of communications breakout; exercise of ASW operations which can endanger SSMNs and AAD operations against bombers and tanker aircraft, electronic warfare, interference with satellites, etc. On the other hand no one is certain how the monitoring and communications network will operate in the case of a nuclear strike by the opponent. Clearly, its capabilities may be seriously affected, which also gives a powerful stimulus towards a preemptive strike, or an attack on warning. The above mentioned problem is one of the most serious flaws of nuclear deterrence, but there are others.

One of the others is that deterrence is too abstract and broad a concept. No nuclear weapon system is being produced and developed purely for deterrence, nor is any operational plan. Deterrence does not provide any indications of the weapon systems to be developed and deployed or of the military plans to
be adopted for them. Each weapon system is produced for specific military missions under certain combat conditions. Only those missions and contingency plans may be regarded, in their turn, as conforming to deterrence or, conversely, as undermining it. The systems of one country are frequently interpreted by the other as undermining deterrence. Whether deterrence is strengthened or weakened by these weapons or by new ones is quite a subjective opinion, dependent on a number of assumptions by the person making the assessment.

There are two specific aspects of nuclear deterrence that call into question the very concept itself. First, when planners address themselves to the problem of deterrence, they have to make a number of specific assumptions concerning the adversary to be deterred, the particular acts and operations to be deterred, and plans and operations by which to exercise deterrence. Over the last quarter of the century, nuclear strategy has transformed significantly from plans of massive nuclear strikes in response to a massive nuclear attack in the sixties, to plans for limited nuclear strikes in response to limited nuclear attacks in the early seventies, then, in the late seventies, to plans for nuclear strikes against the opponent's command, control and communications system and plans for counter-force strikes against the opponent's strategic forces in a "protracted and limited nuclear war", and lastly, in essence, to the idea of "predominance" in a nuclear war through the reduction of one's own losses to an acceptable level by a combination of nuclear offensive weapons and wide scale anti-missile systems in space.

We see where the evolution of nuclear deterrence has led us towards the end of the eighties. The realities of nuclear planning and the means that it employs are by now strikingly different from the abstract aims of nuclear deterrence. What is at issue is that under the ambiguous notion of "deterrence" there are plans and weapons for actual nuclear war-fighting to finish the war "on favourable terms" which may prove fatal in a crisis situation.

One more flaw of nuclear deterrence is that those who, in contrast to theoreticians, are concerned with military planning in practice are always faced by the question of what to do if nuclear deterrence fails. No one practically involved in this area can leave out of account that nuclear deterrence may "catastrophically" fail and that war may begin. Here we find the quite obvious paradox that the forces and means best suited to deterrence are least suited to a situation in which deterrence might fail, and vice versa. What is needed for the most impressive nuclear deterrence is the probability of the most destructive nuclear strikes in response to even small nuclear or conventional attack, a rapid, almost automatic escalation of nuclear strikes, and the impossibility of limiting
damage — that's what is good for nuclear deterrence. But according to some theories what is needed for the case when nuclear deterrence might not work is, on the contrary, to rule out uncontrollable escalation, and to make possible flexible and measured use of nuclear weapons, and have capabilities for the limitation of damage. These two aspects of pre-deterrence and post-deterrence therefore emerge as deeply contradictory. However, those practically involved in military plans and programmes think by necessity of the situation in which deterrence might fail, and they attempt to envisage some ever so slightly expedient ways of actually using weapons. What they frequently do not understand — is that this approach in itself weakens deterrence by making nuclear war less unthinkable, more conceivable, and therefore more probable in a crisis situation. In large, bureaucratic organizations, moreover, nothing is more common than acting from inertia in pursuit of an end that may not even be approved of or agreed to by everyone, but which is pursued as a routine practice because no alternative goal have been put forward.

I have reasoned in the above manner to substantiate a single idea, namely that the concept of nuclear deterrence contains the seeds of its own destruction; the dialectics of deterrence are such that nuclear deterrence gradually comes increasingly to negate itself, as factors build up within it that may, one day, result in its catastrophic failure and nuclear war.

I shall not speak in detail on the combination of bilateral and multilateral measures of nuclear disarmament, to which reference has been made previously. I should like to confine myself to a few comments. First, the supplementing of bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament by multilateral discussion and multilateral agreements is not merely desirable or promising, but a vital necessity, in the absence of which a reduction of nuclear weapons by the USSR and the USA will simply reach deadlock at some, not very distant stage. After the 50 per cent reductions of strategic offensive weapons and after the elimination of medium range and tactical missiles in Europe, the time will very soon come when it will be impossible to proceed further along that road without the participation of the other nuclear powers. Furthermore, unless we take serious, rigorous measures to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the participation of the other nuclear powers may also quite quickly reach its natural limit.

The second comment is that the supplementing of heavy reductions in nuclear weapons by a radical cut in conventional armed forces and arms is not a concession by the Soviet Union to the West. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization as a whole are no less, and perhaps even more interested, in having nuclear disarmament supplemented by radical measures in the
sphere of the armed forces and conventional armaments. In the first place, it will be impossible in practical terms and technically to go very far on nuclear disarmament without considering and including conventional weapons, because conventional and nuclear weapons are very closely integrated together at the level of tactical nuclear weapon systems, and frequently employ the same delivery vehicles. This problem will have to be solved at the same time both for tactical nuclear means and for conventional means.

In the second place, it has to be borne in mind that there are a number of objective considerations why a conventional arms race in the case of radical reduction of nuclear armaments is not at all an attractive future for us. NATO has larger gross national product than the Warsaw Pact, larger population, and is superior in the total numbers of the armed forces personnel and in mobilization capabilities. The West has an even greater superiority if Japan is included in these estimates. Consideration must be given to the fact that the current investment of the West in conventional armaments is largely determined by the considerable strategic tasks assigned to nuclear weapons. In their absence those tasks would confront conventional armaments, and that may influence the efforts being made by the countries of the West in the sphere of conventional armaments and armed forces. Consequently, a reduction of conventional armaments on land, in the air and at sea, and their reorganization on defensive principles, are essentials for nuclear disarmament, and call for multilateral negotiations.

Third, and last, the existence of feedback between weapons and policy is frequently overlooked when considering the possible elimination of nuclear arms. Were we, for example, to reduce nuclear arsenals by 50%, and then reduce the remainder by 50%, and then again by 50%, we would return militarily and purely quantitatively to the situation as it perhaps existed in the middle or early fifties, but the world would not return to the fifties, to a situation when states were daily on the brink of an escalation of the cold war into real war, including nuclear war. In that context, it seems to me that an appreciable reduction of nuclear weapons, if paralleled by an appreciable reduction of conventional arms, would itself lead to such changes in international politics that the world would ultimately become quite different; that other, more civilised ways would be found for the settlement of international conflicts than those used by states at the present time.

In conclusion, I should like to recall a historical episode of the early fifties. When President Eisenhower came to power in the United States and the military approached him with the suggestion that resources be allocated for the production of 300 nuclear warheads, Eisenhower told them that they had gone mad. "Why do you need so many", he asked. Nowadays, world
stockpiles contain some 50,000 nuclear warheads. We really live in a mad world, but some people got used to it and consider it to be normal. They argue that a world without nuclear weapons will be mad, like mentally ill people view the outside world as illogical and mad.

Political relations between states are inseparable from their military relations and nowadays also from the state and prospects of the arms control and disarmament negotiations. Could we once again reduce the number of nuclear weapons to 300, 200, 100, we might witness so profound changes in the relations between states that even the remaining 100 would be unnecessary.

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The development of nuclear weapons has presented to mankind a challenge and a dilemma of profound gravity. The basic paradox of the nuclear weapons dilemma, as originally stated by Winston Churchill in 1955, is that we have reached a condition where safety is the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation. To restate that paradox more simply we must all recognize the stabilizing role which nuclear weapons have played in maintaining stability between the great powers while, at the same time, we need to reduce the potential risks should deterrence ultimately fail, or should nuclear weapons be used by misjudgement, miscalculation, accident, or terrorism. Until peaceful resolution of conflict becomes the norm rather than the exception, until nations accept and abide by the principles and provisions of the UN Charter, prudence dictates that armed forces for defense and deterrence must be maintained.

For reasons that should be obvious, nuclear weapons arms control has been conducted primarily, although not exclusively, by the USA and the USSR. There are, however, important multilateral considerations which have affected those negotiations in a number of ways. The structure of alliances in the world today, the growing voice of third world countries with respect to arms control issues in various international fora, and the ever-present danger of nuclear weapons proliferation all serve to highlight the interests of non-nuclear weapons states in today's security issues. None of these interests, however, can fundamentally alter the deep differences in the interests, objectives and strategies which the United States and Soviet Union pursue in negotiations.

Multilateral considerations, nonetheless, will continue to influence the conduct and the atmosphere of nuclear weapons negotiations. The reduction of nuclear arms, in this context, would improve global security in greater measure if such reductions were accompanied by the resolution of regional conflicts and the effective exercise of human rights and respect for fundamental freedoms, so that people everywhere can make basic choices and hold their governments accountable. Moreover, the military balance between East and West involves not only nuclear arms, but also conventional and chemical weapons. Reductions of nuclear arms which ignore or even exacerbate conventional force imbalances, or which magnify the threat from other categories of weapons such as chemical arms, may neither improve East-West mutual security nor reduce the risk of war.
On the other hand, these difficult multilateral issues need not, by any means, block genuine progress in bilateral negotiations. The balancing of competing interests between adversaries and alliances, as well as those within an alliance, in a way that will permit genuine progress in areas of critical common interest is the ultimate task of diplomacy.

Finally, although our most critical objective is preventing nuclear war, we must at the same time ensure that we also reduce the risk of all war, remembering that there have been over 150 wars since 1945, all of them using conventional arms. Indeed, any steps that we can take to prevent such wars will create improved conditions for reducing and eliminating the ultimate threat of nuclear weapons.

In the many years of nuclear weapons arms control talks, the failures have certainly out numbered the achievements. After a decade of bilateral negotiations during the 1970's, the USA and USSR accomplished no more than a codification of ceilings for strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which, rather than reduce the total number of weapons, permitted a further buildup. Not until October of last year, during the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, was there Soviet agreement in principle, for the first time, to genuine and deep cuts in strategic offensive arsenals. That was truly a historic occasion.

During the current round of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks, the United States tabled a Draft START Treaty Text which provided the basis for completing a Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement, hopefully this year. Fifty-percent reductions of strategic offensive arms over seven years, as proposed by the United States, represents a significant first step toward a world in which the nuclear threat would be greatly reduced. Like the Reykjavik Summit, this occasion also offers historic possibilities. In addition, the USA and USSR are near to reaching a final agreement on eliminating all intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Europe and, possibly, as we hope, on a global basis.

Clearly, these endeavours must be carefully planned, step-by-step processes. Nuclear disarmament, although an ultimate long-term objective long espoused by world leaders, cannot and should not be negotiated according to any predetermined timetable. It is necessary that one learns to crawl before walking, to walk before running. There are political conditions that must be met before we can seriously contemplate a world truly free of nuclear weapons.

A more realistic short-term goal is safer, more stable world. The United States believes that practical steps toward that goal should certainly include sharp reductions in offensive
nuclear arms and when feasible, movement to greater reliance on non-nuclear defenses for deterrence instead of total reliance on nuclear retaliation. Other prerequisites for nuclear disarmament which would contribute to a safer, more stable world include:

1. Correction of the conventional arms imbalance in Europe, achieving a chemical weapons ban worldwide, and strengthening and increasing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime;

2. Cessation of using and threatening use of force to solve international disputes, and peaceful resolution of conflicts that permit peoples to freely determine their own destiny without outside interference;

3. An improved arms control climate, including greater Soviet compliance with their arms control commitments, past and future, and expanding contacts and communications through such concepts as the improved hotline and the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers;

4. Adherence to international commitments to respect human rights - an important condition for peace - and progress in alleviating the many regional conflicts which continue to plague the efforts toward genuine peace in many places throughout the world.

Nuclear arms reductions, and their ultimate elimination, are our ultimate goals; but no one can predict if, or when, the conditions just mentioned can all be satisfied. Nor can we agree to set artificial deadlines for later stages before agreement is reached on the first stages. Grandiose plans for nuclear disarmament may be good public relations and/or usable propaganda material, but they cannot provide a basis for realistic negotiations on matters critical to national and international security.

Aside from the question of disarmament, there are interrelationships among various categories and numbers of armament, and respective proposals for their limitation and reduction, which also have multilateral dimensions. For example, in the INF negotiation, the USA has insisted that shorter-range INF (SRINF) missiles also be subject to limitations. The USA must have the right to match Soviet levels of SRINF which, if fully-deployed, can target some of the Western European targets that Soviet lower-range INF (LRINF) missiles currently target, thereby circumventing the intent of the LRINF proposal.
On the other hand, artificial linkages intended to impede progress or gain unilateral military advantage are unacceptable to the United States. It would not be an overstatement to say that years of bilateral and multilateral arms control negotiations have been frustrated and wasted with the periodic introduction of one-sided proposals, or proposals aimed not at serious negotiation, but rather, aimed at audiences and media in third countries, especially in Western Europe.

For its part, the United States has never - and will never - accept proposals which undermine NATO's security as long as world conditions require the Alliance to deter and defend against aggression. Both bilateral and multilateral negotiations with discrete and well-defined topics, and conducted in an equitable fashion to attain limited but practical agreements, are the only way to serve both sides' interests.

When arms negotiations do directly involve broader multilateral interests, they may be conducted in diverse fora and with varied formats; there has been no single model for bilateral or multilateral arms negotiations over the years. Instead, each is tailored to fit the prevailing geopolitical and historical circumstances of the time. A survey of previous and existing arms control agreements suggests that no one formula has proven to be superior, either for reaching agreement or for resolving outstanding disputes. But when the great powers have found their interests to coincide, the probability of agreement has risen accordingly.

For example, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) was negotiated by the USA, UK and USSR in 10 days of three-power meetings after years of failed attempts to negotiate such an agreement through other multilateral channels. The LTBT was then opened for signature and accession by all states. In contrast, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated much more closely within the framework of the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Conference. The MBFR negotiation, to cite a completely different example, has been a multilateral negotiation with a bilateral framework, i.e., NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In other multilateral fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD) or the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDS), substantial internal cohesion and co-ordination goes on among like-minded states. Other significant arms control agreements such as the ABM Treaty of 1972 and the SALT agreements were negotiated through strictly bilateral channels.

During recent years, the INF and START talks began as separate negotiations only to be subsequently suspended due to the unilateral Soviet walkout in 1983. Nevertheless, once the Soviet Union decided to return to Geneva, a new type of format
for the Nuclear and Space Talks was arranged. This negotiation now consists of three separate negotiating groups which, nevertheless, still maintain internal coherence and logic.

Although the INF negotiation is bilateral, it deals with weapons which bear upon the security of many countries other than the US or the USSR. On the Western side, consultation and unity precede all major decisions, as they should, in an alliance of democratic sovereign states. The original decision of 1979 to deploy US LRINF missiles in Europe was in direct response to the earlier Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles. This, coupled with the expressed willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union on the limitation and elimination of LRINF missiles on both sides, was a joint NATO decision. As you know, we have continued to support the zero option, now agreed to by both sides. US positions in the INF negotiation have been, and continue to be, closely co-ordinated with the Allies. The United States also consults regularly with the Alliance concerning the status of, and allied interests in, the overall Nuclear and Space Talks. With US and Allied security inseparable, the United States must ensure that its arms control proposals and any resulting agreements with the Soviet Union enhance the security of both the United States and its Allies.

The INF negotiation has seen the most significant progress. It is the view of the United States that an effective, verifiable agreement should be completed, signed, and implemented as soon as possible. The US also believes that a separate START agreement could be within our grasp, as early as this year, if the Soviet side is as determined as the US to complete serious work in that negotiating group. I remind you that as long ago as 1982 the United States proposed a 50% cut in strategic missiles and a 1/3 cut in their warheads. And at the Reykjavik summit both sides agreed to a 50% cut in their strategic forces. Finally, the US continues to pursue discussion of strategic defenses in the Defense and Space negotiating group. We seek to consider jointly with the Soviet Union the possibility of a future transition, jointly managed by both sides, to a greater reliance on non-nuclear defenses and to a reduced reliance on nuclear retaliation for deterrence.

These steps will be particularly important in the years ahead. As you know, both the United States and the Soviet Union have long had major programmes and investments in strategic defense. Unfortunately, the problem of artificial linkages between negotiations has impeded the progress in the current Geneva talks. Nevertheless, where a legitimate interrelationship exists, the US has incorporated such concerns in its proposals - for example, in the US Defense and Space proposal to accept an ABM Treaty non-withdrawal commitment through 1994, contingent on implementation of 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms.
Where an illegitimate linkage has been imposed - such as when the Soviet Union announced the linkage of START and INF agreements to its own position in the Defense and Space negotiation - it has been categorically rejected by the United States. With respect to INF, the US is encouraged that General Secretary Gorbachev has apparently removed for the final time this Soviet imposed condition, thus opening the door further for the possible conclusion of an INF agreement.

A major concern of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states is the participation of third country nuclear weapons states in nuclear arms reduction negotiations. Indeed, this may at some point become feasible. But as sovereign states, only the governments concerned can decide when, and if, to join a process of disarmament. Those states, whether allies, friends, adversaries, or neutral countries, have their own security problems. Only when the nuclear arsenals of the US and USSR have been deeply reduced, and only when other conditions for a safer and more secure world are advanced, will we see, in my view, multilateral nuclear arms control talks. I might add here that this view is supported by the position of the other three nuclear weapons states.

In the meantime, we must guard against the euphoria of unrealistic expectations for nuclear disarmament, since these almost invariably will lead to political alienation. Only governments can disarm, therefore only governments can take the necessary initiatives to secure the peace. But, we must also avoid undue pessimism, lest this grows into an excuse for inaction. The United States and the Soviet Union have had a special responsibility in managing a sometimes unruly nuclear relationship while simultaneously pursuing very different ends. Today, as the nuclear arsenals become more sophisticated and as conventional wars increase in number and intensity and are hence more dangerous, that responsibility is weightier than ever.

The United States fully accepts the responsibility of leadership in trying to find a better path toward peace. The United States has also sought and continues to seek as its primary objective the preservation of both peace and freedom. President Reagan's four-point agenda for dealing with the Soviet Union is to pursue progress in the areas of bilateral relations, regional disputes settlement, arms control and human rights. Both he and his advisors have addressed this broad agenda consistently with the Soviet leadership at every opportunity.

Although the path to peace is usually seen as a step-by-step process, our policies, programmes and negotiations must also be aimed at broader goals beyond the confines of the negotiating table. The United States does not believe it productive to pursue unco-ordinated, unilateral, ad hoc steps. Our approach to nuclear arms reductions must be a part of a
larger long-range strategic concept involving several complementary goals. During the next 10 years, the US objective in arms control is a deep reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, plus the stabilization of the relationship between nuclear offensive and defensive arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. A world free of the threat of military aggression and free of the threat of nuclear war is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

Finally, let me close with reference to our host country, the Soviet Union, particularly with regard to the celebrated glasnost - or openness - policies as articulated by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. It is within this context that I feel the possibilities for progress might be brightest - presuming, of course, that glasnost is real and not ephemeral.

I conclude on this note because arms control is the one area where we could use a lot more glasnost. There is a direct and practical link between openness and progress in arms control. That link lies in the problem of verification. Verification has always defined the outer frontier of what we can effectively verify. But verification is often directly limited in turn by the degree of openness permitted by the states that subscribe to an arms control agreement.

There is, in short, almost no area of arms control in which greater openness would not pave the way to greater progress. In some of these areas, lack of openness is among the most crucial barriers to meaningful agreement. Thus, unless the Soviet Union moves forward toward the openness it now talks about, accomplishments will be limited, if not thwarted altogether. Only time will tell if glasnost in the international arena and specifically with respect to arms control is real or is simply a public relations gesture. Unless it is real, genuine and lasting progress, arms control will be very difficult to achieve.

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RAPPORT
LIMITATION ET REDUCTION DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES:
PERSPECTIVES BILATERALES ET MULTILATERALES
Pierre Lellouche

La période actuelle me semble caractérisée par une mutation fondamentale tant dans le ton que dans la teneur des négociations Est/Ouest sur la limitation des armements nucléaires. Cette mutation affecte déjà les relations Est/Ouest dans leur ensemble. Elle porte également en germe une transformation potentiellement radicale des systèmes de sécurité établis en Europe depuis 1945 et, par voie de conséquence, de l'ordre politique et même territorial sur le continent. Au cœur de cette mutation, une idée, jadis considérée comme utopique, en tout cas depuis l'échec du plan Baruch Lilienthal en 1946, mais qui semble aujourd'hui partagée par les dirigeants des deux plus grandes puissance nucléaires. Cette idée, c'est qu'il serait souhaitable d'éliminer toutes les armes nucléaires, à commencer par celles déployées en Europe; par implication, qu'il serait souhaitable aussi de remplacer le système de sécurité que nous connaissons, fondé sur la dissuasion nucléaire, par quelque chose d'autre, un nouvel ordre stratégique mondial. Les super puissances ne sont au demeurant ni d'accord entre elles, ni très précises - c'est le moins que l'on puisse dire - quant à la définition de son contenu. Tant que l'idéologie anti nucléaire n'animaït que des groupes minoritaires au sein de l'opinion publique occidentale ou faisait partie de la réthorique de certains pays opposés au traité de non prolifération, elle pouvait être considérée comme une retombée, somme toute naturelle, des systèmes stratégiques de dissuasion établis depuis la fin de la seconde guerre mondiale, mais sans grande conséquence sur l'avenir du système. La situation devient tout autre dès lors que le thème de la dénucléarisation de l'Europe - et au-delà de la planète toute entière - devient la base de référence de la politique de sécurité des deux super puissances. Ceci d'autant plus que cette prise de position commune, symbolisée par le sommet de Reykjavik d'octobre 1986, vient à la fois légitimer et amplifier le profond malaise anti nucléaire qui continue de persister dans les opinions publiques occidentales, et qu'elle trouve un premier point d'application dans le projet de traité soviético-américain sur l'élimination de tous les missiles nucléaires de 500 à 5000 km de portée déployés en Europe. Devant l'ampleur, potentiellement historique, d'un tel processus sur le système stratégique mondial, et à plus court terme sur le système de sécurité en Europe, il me semble tout-à-fait important d'échanger quelques idées sur ce qui est en train de se produire. Il convient de se demander en particulier si la voie du "désarmement nucléaire" qui semble animer les deux grands aujourd'hui, est bien celle qu'il faudrait continuer à choisir pour l'avenir, ou bien si cette
voie n'entrainera pas des conséquences plus néfastes encore, pour la paix et la sécurité de tous, que celles que l'on entendait éviter à l'origine. On peut se demander également si, au lieu de continuer à utiliser cette voie, il ne serait pas plus raisonnable d'utiliser une approche plus modeste, mais qui maintiendrait à un niveau minimum le principe de la dissuasion atomique. Le bon sens populaire en France, en France tout au moins, veut que le mieux est souvent l'ennemi du bien. Ce principe s'applique à mon avis aussi aux relations stratégiques entre les États, et c'est dans cette optique que, dans cette brève présentation, je vais tenter de faire le point sur ce courant anti nucléaire qui semble se dégager aussi bien à Washington qu'à Moscou, puis d'analyser les conséquences militaires et politiques du futur traité américain-soviétique sur les INF, ICBM INF, et enfin de tracer les grandes lignes de ce qui me semble à moi, en tant qu'analyste de ces questions, être une approche à mon sens plus prudente de ce qu'il conviendrait de faire.

Très brièvement, l'origine de cette nouvelle critique anti nucléaire et de ce regain d'intérêt pour la dénucléarisation. Le sommet de Reykjavik est en réalité le produit de trois courants. À l'origine, un malaise profond dans les opinions publiques occidentales, depuis une dizaine d'années à l'égard de tout ce qui est nucléaire, nucléaire civil ou militaire, malaise amplifié au fil de la querelle des euro-missiles. Le deuxième courant résulte du revirement de la position américaine sur la dissuasion, intervenu dans le fameux discours du 23 mars 1983 du président Reagan, discours dit de "la guerre des étoiles", et qui a vu le lancement de l'initiative de défense stratégique. Le troisième courant, très important, provient également d'un discours, mais cette fois de Mikhail Gorbachev, du 15 janvier 1986. Quelques brèves observations sur ces divers points.

En ce qui concerne les opinions publiques occidentales, les choses sont assez complexes. Je crois que si l'on veut comprendre le mouvement anti nucléaire en Europe et aux États-Unis dans les années 70-80, il faut faire appel à un certain nombre de facteurs. Des facteurs structurels d'abord, comme le renouvellement des générations et le fait qu'à chaque génération toute démocratie digne de ce nom va devoir expliquer pourquoi elle entend baser sa défense sur la menace de l'annihilation de la planète. Des facteurs conjoncturels ensuite, la rupture de la détente à la fin des années 70, l'affaire d'Afghanistan, la rupture du dialogue américain-soviétique, qui ont contribué à une diffusion de la crainte du péril nucléaire.

Enfin, l'évolution des doctrines stratégiques à laquelle a fait allusion tout à l'heure Alexei Arbatov - sur ce point je suis d'accord avec lui. Il en résulte qu'aujourd'hui, à cause de la révolution de la précision des missiles, la doctrine de dissuasion nucléaire a évolué d'une frappe abstraite et massive
à des plans de combat qui sont des plans de combat réels. À partir de là, toute démocratie doit faire face à une contradiction majeure qui est la suivante : si elle veut se défendre contre un adversaire qui lui-même dispose de toute une gamme d'options militaires, conventionnelles et nucléaires, elle aussi doit se doter d'options analogues. Mais à mesure que l'on augmente le nombre d'options on terrorise aussi l'opinion publique que l'on veut protéger. C'est ce dilemme, cette tension permanente entre la dimension technologique de la dissuasion et ce que Michael Howard a appelé la dimension sociale de la dissuasion, le fait de rassurer sa propre population, qui constitue le noeud du problème du courant anti nucléaire dans les démocraties.

J'ajoute un dernier point, à mon sens très important, à savoir la coloration de plus en plus nationale de ces contestations anti nucléaires. Malgré les apparences, elles n'ont rien à voir entre elles. Si l'on prend par exemple le courant anti nucléaire en Allemagne fédérale, ou le mouvement pour le gel "freeze" aux États-Unis, on s'aperçoit que dans le premier cas la réaction de l'opinion allemande est une réaction de peur devant une insécurité perçue comme croissante et des risques nucléaires également ressentis comme croissants. À l'inverse, les partisans du gel nucléaire aux États-Unis sont surtout inquiets de se voir entraînés dans un conflit nucléaire que les États-Unis ne contrôleraient pas. Mais encore une fois, ce qui change tout, c'est que ces arguments et ces courants sont à la fois religieux, éthiques et politiques.

Cette inquiétude diffuse a été reprise, utilisée, dans les discours officiels des deux plus grandes puissances du monde. Dans le premier cas, c'est le discours de la guerre des étoiles du Président Reagan où l'on trouve, exposée pour la première fois, par le Président américain, la vision d'un monde débarrassé des armes nucléaires. Quand le Président Reagan dit "je veux rendre les armes nucléaires impotantes et obsolètes", il donne à son peuple, comme à l'ensemble du monde, une vision qui est post-nucléaire. Derrière cette vision il y a aussi une politique stratégique que je caractériserais comme une sorte de néo-isolationnisme nucléaire, c'est-à-dire de non intervention nucléaire en cas de guerre à l'extérieur. Dans le discours de Mikhail Gorbatchev du 15 janvier 1986, on note tout d'abord, au-delà du schéma en trois phases de l'élimination de toutes les armes nucléaires, un élément fondamental à mon sens, un revirement à 180 degrés de la politique soviétique en la matière. Je me souviens et je crois que nous y aussi, qu'au lendemain du discours de Ronald Reagan sur la guerre des étoiles, la position soviétique était somme toute assez proche de la position franco-britannique : les américains sont en train de dangereusement mettre en cause le système de la dissuasion qui jusqu'ici assurait la paix. Puis du côté soviétique, à partir de janvier 1986, et encore aujourd'hui par la bouche même
d’Alexei Arbatov tout-à-l’heure, on voit que l’Union Soviétique adopte elle aussi comme politique de sécurité l’idée qu’il faut se débarasser de toutes les armes nucléaires. Le point culminant de cette tendance est évidemment le sommet de Reykjavik où, première concrétisation, un accord s’est fait tout de suite sur le zéro-zéro sur les armes nucléaires à moyenne portée en Europe. Cet accord n’était pas évident au départ, puisque le Président Reagan s’était engagé auprès de ses alliés à maintenir une centaine de missiles, et que M. Gorbatchev lui-même avait laissé entendre au cours de l’été 1986 qu’il n’était pas hostile à une formule intermédiaire. Mais ce qui est important c’est que vers la fin du sommet on a assisté à une véritable surenchère, à une sorte de fuite en avant vers, d’une part l’élimination complète des missiles balistiques, d’autre part l’élimination complète de toutes les armes nucléaires. Or je crois que c’est cela qu’il faut essayer de juger, à l’aune des seuls critères qui importent ici.

Je crois qu’il y a un point sur lequel tout le monde est d’accord, c’est qu’il nous faut préserver la paix et la sécurité. On peut cependant ne pas être d’accord avec les méthodes. Et c’est sur ce point maintenant que je voudrais insister, en partant tout d’abord de l’analyse du traité soviéto-américain sur les systèmes à moyenne et courte portée en Europe.

Première observation, cet accord ne concerne que l’Europe et non les deux super puissances elles-mêmes. Les INF et les SRINF ne représentent en effet qu’une toute petite fraction des deux arsenaux stratégiques des deux Grands. Dans le même temps on peut constater qu’autant bien aux États-Unis qu’en Union soviétique les programmes stratégiques nucléaires continuent. Il n’y a pas d’exemples, d’après la littérature publique en tout cas, de ralentissement ou d’arrêt volontaires de programmes nucléaires majeurs, qu’il s’agisse de bombardiers, de sous-marins où de missiles balistiques basés au sol. Il est peu probable qu’un accord puisse se faire entre américains et soviétiques sur les armes intercontinentales tant qu’eux-mêmes ne se seront pas mis d’accord sur les conditions de la défense antimissile, et sur ce point des désaccords importants persistent après Reykjavik. Il est peu probable aussi qu’on assiste à un véritable désarmement comparable à ce qui est en train de se passer en Europe, tant que Américains et Soviétiques n’auront pas redéfini ce que c’est que la puissance militaire à l’intérieur même de la notion de super puissance. Que deviendraient Américains et Soviétiques s’ils cessaient d’être des puissances nucléaires capables de frapper l’ensemble de la planète en n’importe quel point du globe comme il a été dit ce matin par mon collègue est-allemand? Là est la vraie question, et c’est pour cela que je pense que l’accord qui est en train de se faire sur l’Europe se fait sur l’Europe et non sur l’ensemble des arsenaux des deux grands.
Deuxième point, l'accord et la réthorique de Reykjavik sont en train d'affecter le sens même des négociations de limitation des armements. Tant, en effet, que l'on disait que la dissuasion était un mal nécessaire, il en résultait logiquement que le but de l'arms control était de limiter cette compétition nucléaire à des niveaux inférieurs, mais de préserver la dissuasion. Dès lors qu'américains et soviétiques disent aujourd'hui que tous deux veulent un monde dénucléarisé avec des moyens plus ou moins différents, le but de l'arms control devient le désarmement général et complet et l'on fait un saut en arrière, un retour si l'on veut au plan Baruch Lilienthal de 1946 - 49, avec les conséquences que l'on sait, c'est-à-dire une loudspeaker diplomacy.

Reste l'essentiel, à savoir la sécurité en Europe. Et permettez moi, en tant qu'Européen, de donner un point de vue qui n'est pas le point de vue américain et qui n'est pas le point de vue soviétique sur cette affaire. Je vais le faire avec franchise, au risque de choquer certains.

Regardons les choses d'abord du point de vue militaire. D'un point de vue européen si l'on compte large, les soviétiques vont retirer en gros 1300 ogives SS 20, SS 22 et SS 23, ce qui représente entre 1/10 et 1/15 de l'ensemble des armes nucléaires soviétiques capables d'atteindre le continent européen. Donc sur le plan militaire, relativisons. En revanche, les Européens, en acceptant le retrait des missiles américains à longue portée capables d'atteindre le sol soviétique vont perdre les seuls moyens de riposter à une frappe pour laquelle ils continueront d'être vulnérables. Ceci s'appelle le découplage stratégique, quand on est soi même vulnérable et qu'on ne peut plus riposter sur l'adversaire éventuel. Et d'un point de vue européen, on ne peut pas ne pas se demander si l'accord qui est en train d'être signé par les Américains et les Soviétiques n'est pas au fond un contrat de sanctuarisation mutuelle. Il en résulterait que si, par malheur, il devait y avoir une guerre en Europe, celle-ci resterait limitée sur le territoire européen, soit préférablement au niveau conventionnel, comme l'a dit Mr. Emery tout-à-l'heure, soit au niveau d'armes nucléaires tactiques à très courte portée. Ceci est évidemment inacceptable d'un point de vue de sécurité pour quiconque est européen.

Plus grave, sur le plan politique, à l'intérieur de cette zone de sécurité inégale que restera l'Europe, ouverte aux frappes de tout le monde et incapable de riposter, se trouvera une deuxième zone encore plus inégale représentée par le territoire de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne sur lequel resteront localisés tous les systèmes d'une portée inférieure à 500 km. Autrement dit, la RFA va se trouver à la fois le dépôttaire des armes tactiques et en même temps le principal centre du risque nucléaire. Et va se créer inévitablement à partir de là une situation politique extraordinairement
dangereuse et dangereuse pour tout le monde, aussi bien pour les Soviétiques que pour les Occidentaux. Cette situation dangereuse c'est que les allemands ne vont pas pouvoir accepter le dilemme suivant : ou bien servir de glacis nucléaire pour la protection des autres européens ou bien se débarrasser des armes nucléaires par la neutralisation. Il y a dans cette affaire, en gerne, un risque de désestabilisation de l'ordre politique et territorial en Europe qui est considérable et sur lequel il convient de s'interroger.

Mais me direz vous, toutes ces conséquences vous les voulez vous même puisque vous refusez la denucléarisation complète. La logique des propos de Mikhail Gorbatchev, à Prague notamment, était de dire : enlevons tout, denucléarisons complètement l'Europe. Cette logique, encore une fois peut être parfaitement acceptable pour les Américains et pour les Soviétiques. C'est même dans ce sens là que l'on voit évoluer les doctrines militaires des deux grands, vers la conventionnalisation de la guerre. Mais, d'un point de vue européen, les choses sont tout autres. Il ne suffit pas de dire sécurité commune; il ne suffit pas de dire, comme on l'a dit tout à l'heure, que le monde sera différent après la denucléarisation; il ne suffit pas de dire, comme je l'ai entendu dans certains discours prononcés à Prague, que tout cela sera remplacé par un nouveau système juridico-politique pour garantir la sécurité dans une Europe denucléarisée. En tant qu'Européen, je ne peux oublier que la 2ème guerre mondiale, conventionnelle, a fait plus de 40 millions de morts, qu'elle a valu à mon pays l'occupation, qu'elle a valu à ce pays des souffrances terribles. Je crois que le fond des choses c'est que, tant qu'il y aura des Etats et des oppositions de nature, politiques et autres, il n'y a pas d'alternative à la seule arme qui fasse suffisamment peur pour qu'on ne l'utilise pas, c'est à dire l'arme nucléaire. Si à l'inverse nous donnons aux militaires la garantie absolue qu'il n'y aura pas d'escalade nucléaire, ne nous y trompons pas, la guerre se reproduira comme elle s'est produite 150 fois depuis 1945. Donc, je crois qu'il faut garder cela en mémoire, garder en mémoire aussi les conséquences quant à l'ordre politique et territorial en Europe qui résulteraient d'une denucléarisation, quand l'on réfléchit sur l'avenir de ces négociations et sur la meilleure approche possible pour traiter ce genre de problème.

Alors, et ce sera ma conclusion, quelle serait, à mon sens, et tout à fait modestement, une approche souhaitable? Je ne vais pas vous surprendre, l'approche que j'aurais plutôt tendance à favoriser est une approche qui permettrait de conserver, mais à des niveaux très réduits, une dissuasion minima de part et d'autre. Plutôt que de saucissonner la dissuasion en fonction de la portée des missiles, pour finalement n'enlever qu'une toute petite fraction - encore une fois, le 15ème des armes capables d'atteindre l'Europe, ou
quelques 300 ogives américaines - il me semble beaucoup plus important de donner aux deux parties en Europe un plafond global. On pourrait le fixer très bas, 400 systèmes par exemple, à l'intérieur duquel chaque partie aurait tout loisir de choisir quels systèmes d'armes et quelles portées il pourrait conserver pour assurer la dissuasion minima en Europe. J'ai dit 400 systèmes, parce que c'est le niveau de dissuasion minima qu'on choisit dans les pays comme la France ou la Grande Bretagne pour se protéger dans les années 1990, et il me semble que c'est le niveau qui devrait être suffisant aussi bien pour les non nucléaires en Europe que pour l'Union soviétique face à ses voisins européens. Avec un tel système comme cela, vous n'aurez ni les inconvénients politiques dont je parlais tout à l'heure, ni les risques d'attaque surprise ou d'attaque préventive qui sont de toute façon liés à la prolifération des arsenaux actuels.

Pour ma part j'ai naturellement l'impression que cette proposition vient comme dans les carabiniers de l'histoire, bien après la fin de l'histoire. Je me permets de même de la faire ici, parce que je pense vraiment, en tant que citoyen européen, que l'accord qui va être signé, s'il n'est pas accompagné de réelles réductions, et rapidement, au niveau tant des forces classiques que des forces stratégiques intercontinentales, est potentiellement un accord qui sera désestabilisant pour l'Europe, et nullement un accord solide.

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DISCUSSION

Viktor Karpov

Let me begin by saying that the speakers who preceded me were able to operate with rather broad categories because they are principally concerned with science. My concerns are more with practical matters and I am therefore obliged to operate with categories that are practical and realistic. So that is the point of view from which I should like to approach the matters under discussion.

Some of the speakers have argued that, allegedly, nuclear weapons must be preserved; Mr. Lellouche has just been speaking of nuclear deterrence. I should like to approach the issue from the other end. You say you are a European and therefore in favour for the maintenance of nuclear deterrence in Europe. But let us look at this from the point of view of a European balance, inter alia in nuclear weapon matters. On the NATO side there are three nuclear Powers - the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom. On the Warsaw Treaty side, one nuclear Power, the Soviet Union. As a result of the balance you propose to establish, you want the presence in Europe of two nuclear Powers on the NATO side - if what we are talking about is that nuclear weapons of the United States should not be present - and on the side of the "eastern bloc", as you sometimes call it, nuclear weapons only of the Soviet Union. Where then is the balance, the nuclear balance you are talking about, that could be established at a minimum level? It seems to me that such a balance is simply unrealistic, it would not offer the possibility of establishing a just correlation, inter alia of nuclear forces, such as would guarantee the security of European countries both in the West and in the East of Europe.

But let us look at some other practical problems. The question of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe now arises at a really practical level. I cannot agree with the thesis that, allegedly, the solution of this problem concerns Europe alone and is unrelated to other global security problems. It seems to me that the point at issue is, precisely, a first practical step in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, and if this step could be taken it would have significance not only for Europe but would be a first step in the direction of global nuclear disarmament and, as such, its significance would of course go beyond the European framework. Precisely in speaking of the interrelation of multilateral and bilateral negotiations I should like to cite the example of intermediate nuclear forces as an issue which is both bilateral and multilateral - an issue whose multilateral nature cannot be separated from its bilateral nature. Take the question of how this problem is at present being considered in NATO. The consultations are multilateral. All the NATO countries are taking part in them. Within the Warsaw Treaty,
too, the question of intermediate nuclear forces was discussed quite recently at a session of the supreme leading political organ of that alliance. Therefore, it seems to me, we cannot say in this case that the issue is a bilateral one just because negotiations on it are being held between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those two countries are holding negotiations with the de facto participation of their allies, in as much as the issues under discussion have a direct bearing upon the security interests of both the West European NATO countries and the countries of eastern Europe which belong to the Warsaw Treaty.

But let us look at the problem from yet another angle: is there a difference between the adoption of a decision at the multilateral level and the implementation of such a decision - whether at the level of multilateral negotiations or of bilateral ones? I think there is a difference and a great one, between these two concepts. In 1979 the NATO countries adopted the so-called "dual option" - a decision which empowered the United States to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union on the subject of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. But now that the United States finds itself faced with the choice whether to accept or not to accept the double-zero option on European missiles, it turns out that the NATO decision which the United States accepted in 1979 has, in substance, been unilaterally reviewed. Secretary of State Shultz arrived in Moscow with a proposal to settle the issue with regard not only to intermediate nuclear forces but also to short-range intermediate nuclear forces. Although the NATO decision of 1979 said nothing of the kind. Now, a proposal has been made in Moscow to Secretary of State Shultz which goes in quite a different direction from the one with which he came to Moscow - for he came to Moscow with the proposal that short-range intermediate nuclear forces in Europe should be maintained, and, in substance, wanted to persuade the Soviet Union, not to withdraw its short-range intermediate nuclear forces from Europe, but to agree to the United States deploying its missiles of that category there. But the proposal he received was for the complete elimination of such missiles. Here, one might have thought, was a situation that reverted to the NATO decision of 1979, but look at what is happening now - the issue is being discussed in NATO as if anew, while at Geneva, in negotiating with us, the United States is nevertheless proceeding on the basis of its position as unilaterally adopted and not as decided by NATO in 1979. In this context, then, I think that the truly multilateral nature of the problem of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe calls for a multilateral approach - an approach that takes into account the security interests of all States. These security interests are taken into account by the Soviet proposal, which proceeds from the need for the complete elimination, not only of intermediate nuclear forces, but also of short-range intermediate nuclear forces as a major step
towards the denuclearization of Europe. It does not frighten me when people say that by adopting such a course we would weaken European security because we would destroy deterrence. We are not, after all, proposing - neither the Soviet Union nor any other Warsaw Treaty country is proposing - a return to the situation which existed in Europe before the Second World War. If you read closely the Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty countries on their military doctrine, if you read closely the Soviet Union's proposals on intermediate nuclear forces, on short-range intermediate nuclear forces and on conventional armed forces and weapons in Europe you are bound to conclude that we are proposing, on the basis not of pious wishes but of realistic, practical measures, the establishment of a new system of European security, a system that would be free from the threat of nuclear weapons and at the same time would eliminate the very possibility of waging war with conventional arms. Parallel with the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, we are proposing a reduction of conventional weapons to such levels as would preclude the conduct of offensive operations. To this end we are proposing that the most dangerous, offensive types of weapons should be the first to undergo reduction and elimination - that categories of which create an offensive potential should be eliminated. In this context, of course, we do not say that this can be done today, at once. But a start must be made. And the elimination of nuclear weapons, of short-range intermediate nuclear forces following the intermediate-range nuclear forces, could proceed in parallel with this, and that, then, is the proposed line of action leading to the establishment of a new European security system. On the basis, I repeat, of real disarmament, a disarmament that precludes the very possibility of starting a war in Europe.

As an intermediate step, if you wish to call it so, in this direction we are proposing, together with our friends from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, that with respect to Central Europe the problem should be solved in such a way as to relieve the tension that exists along the lines of the divide between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty. That is the proposal put forward by the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia concerning the establishment of a 300 km wide corridor from which all nuclear weapons would be withdrawn. Not only the nuclear charges themselves but also their means of delivery. All, I repeat, the dual-purpose ones as well. What does that mean? It means that despite what Mr. Lellouche was saying, the Federal Republic of Germany would not, as a result of such a decision, be transformed into some kind of special reserve where a nuclear war could be waged on, precisely, German territory. On the contrary, it is the establishment of such a zone that would preclude the possibility of the use of short-range intermediate nuclear forces and could strengthen security in the area.
But, as I have said, issues connected with the general security system are one thing and practical approaches to them another. Today we hear many, I might say, euphoric pronouncements to the effect that an agreement on intermediate nuclear forces in Europe could already be concluded tomorrow. But is that so in reality? If we look at the situation at the Geneva negotiations, matters there are not proceeding all that smoothly. When all is said and done, the United States position is still that intermediate nuclear forces in Europe should be maintained, only under a different shop-sign. The United States proposals put forward at Geneva are that the United States should have the right to maintain its whole ramified system for basing and servicing missiles which has already been established. The entire infrastructure is to remain. In addition to which the United States must have a right to maintain cruise missiles without nuclear charges in Europe, or else it must be given the possibility to switch cruise missiles to marine use, i.e. not to destroy them. And in addition to that the United States would like to have the right to convert its Pershing-2 missiles into shorter-range missiles, for practical purposes into Pershing-1B missiles, the Pershing-1B being a variant of the Pershing-2 without a second stage but, practically, with the same nuclear warhead. The conversion operation, the specialists tell us, takes 48 hours and reconversion approximately the same length of time. That is the most important feature of the United States position today. And to say that on such a basis a solution that meets the security interests of both sides can be found soon is simply laughable. Because in these same proposals the United States envisages a completely different solution for the Soviet Union. The SS-20 missiles are to be destroyed and the Soviet Union is to have no right to develop cruise missiles. There you have a double standard which in no way corresponds to the objective of the elimination of intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe. So it is not enough to speak about the interrelation of multilateral and bilateral negotiations and consultations. It is important that bilateral negotiations which have a bearing on multilateral problems should be conducted with, as their starting point, the objective of strengthening security. If they were conducted in this way, then the United States and the Soviet Union, which, basically, are today holding negotiations on the subject of nuclear weapons, could also, by so doing, come within reach of a solution to more general nuclear problems, both with regard to Europe and on a world scale.

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The dynamic course of the Soviet foreign policy has taken in the last year or two is a welcome development which opens up new avenues for East/West agreement of major importance in such different sectors as economic co-operation and arms control. This applies in particular to constraining the deployment and reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons. Let me say, 'en passant', that perhaps had this course been followed before, the decision to deploy long-range intermediate nuclear forces, the so-called SS-20's, in the midst of a phase of relaxation of tension may not have taken place. Nor would a similar decision concerning short range nuclear weapons, also a new fact, possibly have been made at the moment NATO had just started to reduce its short range and battle field nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. To come again to the subject of Soviet foreign policy, I would like in particular to underline that favourable prospects now exist to make substantive steps forward in the field of verification which is considerably important in order to give arms control more structure and more irreversibility. In this respect I would certainly support what Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev has declared to the Italian Communist Party, in the Daily Unità, in an interview which has been given much publicity also in the Soviet Union. "There should be created powerful legal and political mechanisms for regulating international relations". However, I fail to understand why such future achievements would only be brought into existence "in a nuclear free world" a condition likely to kill the entire process from the start. It is historic fact that the nuclear threat because of its nature and because of its dimension has had the consequence of not only preventing nuclear war between East and West but also discouraging conventional conflicts in Europe and containing them elsewhere.

I have listened with great interest to the comments of Alexei Arbatov and I regret they have not been put in the form of a written report for the benefit of those who have the role of discussant. I cannot resort, thus, but to my hasty notes from which I take in particular the list of "bottle-necks" he identifies in nuclear deterrence. I certainly agree with some of them, for instance the risks associated with the large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons, or I would say with too low a nuclear threshold. It is for these reasons that I would make reduction of these weapons a priority, reducing the risks of a nuclear exchange initiated by mistake. This has already been pointed out here. I would welcome indications that some progress is being made on this issue, a progress that cannot be made but bilaterally by the two superpowers. Without going any further into the many facets of the complicated set up of nuclear deterrence, may I suggest, that scholars and institutes devote further scrutiny and studies to them and, possibly, UNIDIR should choose this as a subject for future initiatives.
As for myself, I want only to say that negotiated bilateral or mutually respondent unilateral reductions can be performed in nuclear and non-nuclear weapons but they stand a better chance if they are performed so that mutual deterrence continues to exercise its inhibiting role. This remains valid at least until bilateral or multilateral instruments of verification of compliance and control of the sources of instability become effective. Reference has been made here to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. This reference is appropriate in two instances. First of all there exists a mutually reinforcing link between nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear deterrence in so far as the latter rests upon its quasi bi-polar nature and would be brought into question by the multiplication of new nuclear countries. And, on the other side, the attractiveness of nuclear weapons is reduced by their role which is confined to the political threat, and thus to deterrence. Secondly, the international verification provisions related to the non-proliferation régime are the most advanced in the present world and provide an excellent precedent and reference for new agreements in the field of nuclear arms control. In light of the remaining validity of nuclear deterrence must be seen the issue of withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe whether short and intermediate range missiles or "battlefield" nuclear warheads.

The Italian Government, I believe, (I am not an official), will not pose obstacles to an agreement which would bring down to zero the number of the INF on both sides, sticking thus to the so-called double track NATO decision. But it has to be kept in mind that the underlying concern common to practically all European countries is that arms control is not a matter of quantity only but also of quality, meaning by that, stability. Or to put it in Ambassador Jaipal's words, that negotiations continue to exert "threat control" while striving to achieve arms control. I am thus joining the Western European choir in favour of warning against the risks associated with giving away nuclear deterrence. I do not need to remind our Soviet hosts about the devastating consequences of a conventional war, nor have I to stimulate their imagination to anticipate what the consequences would be of a chemical or chemical-biological exchange in Europe. In concluding, I would like to say that, what is needed is more than a nuclear free world.

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Eberhard Schulz

I should first of all address myself to a few observations on wording and thinking. Professor Spillmann impressed me when he made the observation that political thinking is sometimes of
great importance also in the field of disarmament. But sometimes what is missing is clearness of wording. Let me give one example. Sometimes people are speaking about total elimination of nuclear forces. That may be desirable but it is hardly to be expected that a total elimination of nuclear weapons which are so dangerous to mankind can be effected as long as there is no replacement. Replacement might be a new weapons system which is still more effective but perhaps less dangerous. This is not visible and as long as it is not visible it would be highly unrealistic to assume that nuclear weapons will disappear. On the other hand, it seems to me that it is not at all urgent to dismiss nuclear weapons. We had some 40 years of peace in central Europe and why should we dispose of it in an easy way? We cannot, by disposing of nuclear weapons, without any risk enhance our security. We will not have financial advantage from giving up nuclear weapons and we should abstain from empty propaganda which hardly increases the credibility of Governments speaking on disarmament. A second example. It was said that it might be useful to restructure armed forces in a way such as to remove the offensive capabilities of armed forces. It seems to me that the West is not at present in a position to engage in an offensive war and I have serious doubts that the East, the Warsaw Pact, is in a position to engage in an offensive war against West Germany without serious risks and, on the other hand, I don’t see any weapons system in the world which can be characterized as purely defensive. What is the difference between defensive and offensive weapons? Let us be cautious in using such wording.

Another observation on thinking. For the first time after World War II, perhaps for the first time in history, we are in a situation where serious reductions of arms forces, in this case of INF, seems possible within a relatively short period. The reason for the readiness of the two major Powers to engage in an agreement on the elimination of long-range INF may be largely domestic. Anyway, the very fact that there is a real chance of removing those weapons systems indicates some change of political thinking. At least it shows that there is a change in priorities. Some time ago, no American President and no Secretary General in the Soviet Union would have dared to say that an agreement on such a sharp reduction of very important weapons is possible. Second, it shows that there is a certain demilitarization of political thinking. In fact, it should be clear that in the present situation in central Europe, that is in the central strategic area between the two blocs, a continuation of a certain policy by intervention of force isn’t possible any more, or at least doesn’t lead to a certain political purpose any more. War in central Europe has become extremely unlikely. In this respect, perhaps I am, very optimistic but it is my true opinion and I do not share the various scenarios which are constructed by the strategic community in many countries. It was already mentioned that the
theory of escalation, for instance, is unrealistic. It seems to me that any premeditated escalation under war-fighting conditions is hardly to be expected.

And the last point in this context. It was said that there is a danger of West Germany drifting into neutrality. It seems to me that this assumption is very unrealistic for various reasons. The first reason is that I expect an agreement on the long-range INF to be effective this fall. I do not see any chance to expand agreement on further areas such as short-range INF or tactical weapons or conventional weapons which are so closely linked. The process is so complicated that to finish an agreement on all these problems within the term of the present American President seems to me unrealistic. Second, the Federal Republic of Germany is firmly integrated in the Atlantic Alliance. It is simply not true that the Federal Republic would have a chance, if she wished, to leave that Alliance. In the present time all States are equal but some States are a little more equal and some a little less. The Federal Republic belongs clearly to those who are a little less equal but, and this is my third point in this respect, the domestic situation in the Federal Republic of Germany is grossly misrepresented if one feels that West Germany is one large peace movement and that the population is aiming at leaving the Alliance. On the contrary, all we know shows, or polls we know show that the population is firmly committed to protection by the Western Alliance and that there is no majority wishing to leave the Alliance. And I can only warn people not to rush into concerns which are not founded.

At the end I should like to make a few remarks on the very substance of this Conference, on the problem of, to what extent it is possible to deal with disarmament problems on a multilateral or a bilateral basis. Much has been said in this respect and I agree with most of it. In my mind reductions of nuclear arms between the two superpowers are hardly achievable in a multilateral framework. In multilateral negotiations there is too much diplomatic wording and the results normally are very weak compromises. If an agreement is achieved, punitive actions against violation in a multilateral framework sometimes are unrealistic. But, on the other hand, a multilateral enforcement of agreements in terms of verification and control is not only possible but is helpful. So the proper order of indulging in bilateral or multilateral negotiation in my view would be to begin by unilateral concessions in order to facilitate bilateral agreements which are in force and verified by multilateral processes such as the CSCE.

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Ednan Agaev

J'ai jugé impossible de laisser sans réponse l'intervention de l'honorable M. Emery. Il faut dire que cette intervention m'a passablement attristé. Il a malheureusement déclaré une fois de plus qu'aux États-Unis, la pensée nouvelle ne se faisaient que très péniblement et très lentement un chemin tout au moins dans les milieux de l'administration actuelle. Je voudrais notamment m'étendre sur les théses suivantes, avancées dans l'intervention de M. Emery. Il a beaucoup parlé de ce qu'on appelle les liaisons et les rattachements. Mais les liaisons auxquelles il a pensé ont déjà trouvé une réponse très précise, très logique et argumentée dans l'intervention de l'Ambassadeur Karpov. Et les liaisons que M. Emery a évoquées sont vraiment de nature à créer l'impression qu'à Washington on cherche simplement à attraper et à entortiller dans un complexe le problème du désarmement. Il faudrait paraît-il s'entendre sur la façon de sauvegarder la sécurité des États. Je dois dire à ce propos que M. Emery enonce vigoureusement une porte ouverte. Je voudrais attirer son attention sur la lettre récemment publiée dans la presse que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères de l'Union Soviétique a adressée au Secrétaire général de l'ONU au sujet de la convocation d'une Troisième session spéciale de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU consacrée au désarmement, lettre où il est dit expressément que l'Union Soviétique est en faveur d'une conception large du désarmement, présenté comme un ensemble de problèmes de désarmement et de sauvegarde de la sécurité liés entre eux. Il a ensuite été question de problèmes qui seraient liés à celui du désarmement, à savoir qu'avant de procéder au désarmement il faudrait - je répète la thèse de M. Emery - assurer à tous les pays la possibilité de régler librement leurs problèmes intérieurs. A cet égard je voudrais encore une fois de plus attirer son attention sur le récent document soviétique que j'ai déjà mentionné, où il est dit expressément que la réalisation du désarmement contribuera à la diffusion de la compréhension réciproque et à une large coopération internationale entre pays libres et démocratiques. Enfin un dernier point : M. Emery a une fois de plus soulévé une question rebattue, alors que nous espérions tous qu'on avait enfin renoncé aux États-Unis à cette association d'idées, à cet article de propagande qu'est la liaison entre désarmement et droits de l'homme. Je ne vais pas polémiquer ici à ce sujet. Je pense que le problème des droits de l'homme exige encore une conférence particulière et des experts spécialisés. Mais je voudrais rappeler à ce sujet que quelques jours après la rencontre soviéto-américaine de Reykjavik a paru dans l'"International Herald Tribune" une caricature très expressive représentant le Président Reagan, très déprimé et se posant la question "Que faire maintenant? Les Russes acceptent toutes nos propositions. Qu'est ce qu'on peut encore leur demander?" Alors une idée lui vient et il dit : "Je vais leur demander de restaurer le tsarisme".
Edward Ifft

I would like to make some brief remarks about the major bilateral negotiation which is now in progress. That is, of course, the Nuclear and Space Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva. In as much as the Soviet Delegation in Geneva does not have a representative here, perhaps it falls to me to represent both Delegations. To the extent that that's true, I will try to be even more fair and objective than I would usually be.

The picture I would like to paint is more optimistic one than has been painted thus far about these important negotiations. The three Negotiating Groups which are at work there - that is the INF group, the strategic offensive arms group and the defense and space group - are all accelerating their work and I believe we are entering a decisive period in these negotiations. The Reykjavik discussions between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev provided an important impetus to the negotiations by resolving a number of substantive problems which had been blocking progress for some time.

First of all, in the INF group, as has already been mentioned, both sides have tabled draft treaties which are based upon the general understanding reached at Reykjavik. Working groups have been formed which are meeting at an intensive pace to achieve agreement on treaty language. I believe it is realistic to think in terms of an agreement on INF this year. Now important problems do remain and Ambassador Karpov has called attention to that fact, and I do no wish to underestimate the work which remains to be done. But I think the picture which has been painted about the United States revising its position is really backwards. On the question of constraints on shorter range INF systems, the United States made clear from the very beginning of these negotiations in 1981 that there must be some constraints on the shorter range systems as part of a general agreement on the longer range INF systems, so this is not a new development. However, the United States, in consultation with its Allies, has revised its position in INF in one important
respect - that is, with regard to the long range INF missiles. We did this in order to meet the Soviet desire to retain 100 warheads in this category. Thus it was the flexibility displayed by the United States and its Allies which allowed a breakthrough to be made in Reykjavik which has brought us as close as we are presently to an agreement.

Regarding the START negotiating group - that is, the strategic offensive arms - I would like to say the following. Although the media has given a great deal of attention, and rightly so, to the INF negotiations, and although that negotiation deals with a very important problem, it is true, I believe, that the question of strategic offensive arms remains the central and most important problem between the United States and the Soviet Union. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have both recently made statements which make this clear. The goal in this part of the negotiations, of course, is to achieve roughly a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms. The United States has put this aspect of the negotiations on the fast track, if I may put it that way. The United States tabled a draft treaty reducing strategic offensive arms last May, and we expect that the Soviet side will be tabling its own draft treaty sometime in the near future. We hope to establish working groups very soon, if possible, to begin to work out agreed treaty language in much the same way that working groups are proceeding in the INF negotiations. With a vigorous effort by both sides - and one might even say, a heroic effort - I think it is possible to think in terms of an agreement even this year in START.

Now turning to the third negotiating group - that is Defence and Space - the situation is more complicated. I think one could fairly say that this group is not as far advanced as the other two negotiating groups, but here as well positions are being clarified. There has been some narrowing of differences and the negotiations are proceeding in a businesslike fashion. Now we have heard a lot of discussion today on the important question of whether we should be moving toward a nuclear free world and, if so, at what pace. On that question, I think it is interesting to note that both sides made very ambitious proposals at the Reykjavik Summit regarding what the world should look like in the year 1996 - that is, what kind of reductions they would like to see by 1996. These proposals, as I said, were very ambitious on both sides and they have proved too difficult to negotiate at this time and so the sides have set them aside in favour of the 50 percent reductions which had been agreed in principle earlier. Now if I might make a personal comment at this point, it seems to me in arms control it is a problem to avoid two extremes or two temptations. One might say the problem is to steer the ship of arms control between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand there is the temptation to have goals which are so modest that the agreements...
which are achieved are merely cosmetic. We have had such agreements in the past. On the other hand, there is also the temptation to have goals which are so ambitious that they become almost utopian. These lend themselves to beautiful speeches but not to negotiating specific agreements, and nations have fallen prey to this temptation in the past as well. It seems to me that the agreements which are emerging in Geneva strike a good balance between these two temptations - that is, the agreements which are emerging there would be really significant. They involve significant reductions and constraints, but are not so ambitious as to be utopian and impossible to achieve in a reasonable time period.

In conclusion let me just say that the work is accelerating in Geneva. We do not underestimate the problems which remain. Much difficult negotiating lies ahead but there is a good possibility for significant developments within the near future and I think that that should come as good news to all the participants in this conference.

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Pierre Morel

Je voudrais, en prolongement de l'intervention de M. Lellouche, essayer d'expliciter ce qu'il a évoqué, c'est-à-dire un certain mouvement, assez répandu chez beaucoup d'Européens, de scepticisme quand il est question d'un nouveau système de sécurité, ou de nouvelle pensée politique. Je crois, en effet, que ce scepticisme vient d'un sentiment assez profond que l'on ne change pas de système de sécurité par décret. Cela tient à la mémoire de beaucoup d'Européens, même s'ils n'ont pas vécu l'époque de l'entre-deux guerres. Je voudrais en donner un exemple en citant une phrase qui a été prononcée à peu près de la façon suivante: "arrière les mitrailleuses, arrière les canons, place à la négociation et place à la paix". Ceci a été dit, si je me souviens bien, par Aristide Briand vers 1928. Si je l'évoque, ce n'est pas pour en conclure que Briand a commis une erreur d'appréciation personnelle, parce qu'il est bien évident que l'aspiration qu'il traduisait à l'époque était largement répandue, et reposait sur le sentiment que l'on pouvait justement changer de système de sécurité par décret ou par traité. Aujourd'hui, quand on entend ou quand on risque d'entendre "arrière les forces nucléaires intermédiaires, arrière la dissuasion, place à la nouvelle pensée, place au nouveau système de sécurité", il y a un réflexe d'interrogation, pour le moins, qui renvoie à ces expériences douloureuses, partagées par beaucoup de pays européens, et pas seulement par les pays européens. Ce type de basculement comporte ou peut comporter énormément de risques. Quand on veut précisément
s'appuyer sur des concepts et en quelque sorte anticiper un système par la voie déclaratoire, on retrouve la difficulté qu'il y a dans nombre de prises de positions soviétiques, récentes ou anciennes; elles donnent l'impression que dès lors que l'on a fait une déclaration, dès lors que l'on a fait une proposition, le monde a changé, le monde est différent. Malheureusement, l'expérience du 20ème siècle est là pour nous démontrer le contraire et obliger à une très grande prudence. Non pas pour être pessimistes; il faut négocier, il est indispensable de négocier. Mais il y a incontestablement une multitude de précautions à observer et d'abord la nécessité de gagner tout mouvement politique sur des données aussi stables et aussi confirmées que possible.

Je crois que c'est là le vrai problème qu'essaie de décrire M. Lellouche dans son exposé, à savoir le sentiment que l'on assiste actuellement à la tentative, pour les deux plus grandes puissances, d'organiser en Europe, en se référant au concept de dénuclearisation, une situation définitive, irréversible, un changement fondamental, alors que ces mêmes puissances ne mettent en jeu, pour leur part, que des moyens secondaires, temporaires, réversibles. Il y a dans ce décalage un vrai problème et une raison profonde et durable de scepticisme et de réserve de la part des pays européens.

Je me réfère à un exemple qu'on a souvent cité, qui est celui de Reykjavik. Il y a là un inversion de priorités assez troublante, en moins de six mois. Quel est l'élément le plus frappant de Reykjavik? C'est l'accord des deux plus grandes puissances pour reconnaître la nécessité de réduire de 50% leurs armements stratégiques. Tout analyste objectif doit reconnaître qu'il y a là l'élément principal de cette rencontre, la perspective la plus intéressante en matière de maîtrise des armements. Six mois après, que voyons-nous? Que tout court à un accord INF, non pas précipité, nous venons de vérifier par les échos de M. Ift que tout ceci est préparé sérieusement, mais enfin il y a changement de priorité: comme par hasard, après avoir annoncé un objectif ambitieux, central, essentiel, on revient vers un autre aspect, qui affecte directement les pays européens.

Ce changement de priorité est très instructif. En fait, tous les propos sur la nouvelle sécurité, sur le nouveau système de sécurité, auront une autre crédibilité le jour où nous aurons assisté effectivement à cette réduction de moitié d'armements stratégiques manifestements redondants. On entrera alors dans un débat politique gagné sur des réalités stratégiques. Je crains que, pour le moment, les choses ne se présentent pas ainsi, et c'est pour une bonne part ce qui explique le scepticisme exprimé dans l'intervention de M. Lellouche.
Négocions partout où cela est possible, mais avec la prudence, le réalisme nécessaire, tel est je crois le message qui viendra au cours des prochaines années de beaucoup d'euroêens.

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Peter Davies

The implication seems to be contained in some of the remarks made earlier that arms control and reductions can take place independently of other aspects of international relations and that the arms control process can automatically lead to improvements in those international relations. I would put forward the view that arms control cannot in fact bear the whole weight of international relations in the East/West context and that they do not have a separate existence, they are not a separate compartment. There also has to be improvement in a level of confidence that undertakings will be respected and that promises will be kept. In other words, one is looking outside the immediate confines of the arms control context. It follows that in the area of arms control that full and effective means of verification are necessary if confidence is to be created and maintained in agreements reached and quite obviously ambiguous or indistinct and unverifiable agreements will not enhance common security but undermine it.

There was a further proposal made by a speaker earlier for a wider nuclear forum outside the bilateral talks taking place in Geneva to include also the United Kingdom, France and China, I believe. Now of course, as everybody knows, the United States and the Soviet Union have some 95 percent of the world's nuclear stocks and from that point of view, in my own personal view, I would not see such expanded nuclear talks as an alternative to the bilateral process. We should also bear in mind what we have heard many times, what the two superpowers have in view. They are currently discussing a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons as well as the separate point of the INF agreement so I personally would not favour at this time wider nuclear forum talks cutting across possibly and complicating what appears to be in some regards a very promising process in Geneva.

Finally, I just want to refer in relation to the question of confidence, to the communiqué issued a few days ago at the end of the NATO Defence Planning Committee on the 27 May which, in referring to the developments which there have been in the field of arms control in Europe, recalled the realities of growing Soviet military power as well as the variety and offensive capabilities of Warsaw Pact forces. Given this situation the NATO strategy of flexible response and forward
defence which is defensive in nature remains both valid and necessary and continues as the basis for NATO's defence planning. In other words, as I see it, we should give full credit for good intentions and new thinking but also to have to take account of the continuing military capabilities of the groups.

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Genrikh Trofimenko

In the process of developing weapons and of responding to those developments, by virtue of a certain logic of the arms race, our countries, and above all the United States and the Soviet Union - I do not wish to speak here about who is right and who is wrong - have reached a stage where, in the event of a nuclear conflict, they can really destroy each other. This was not done through planning of any kind but by virtue of that same logic of the arms race which has placed us in a situation where a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union can lead to the destruction of the whole world. That is precisely why the bilateral negotiations taking place on these issues between the United States and the Soviet Union are not simply of bilateral but of global significance. Both sides, admittedly, accept the logic that this situation is intolerable and must be changed, but the conclusions they draw from the premise that the situation is intolerable and must be changed are not the same. The Soviet Union considers that it is necessary to renounce the old stereotypes, to stop replacing one form of the arms race by another; it considers that the concept of emulation between the two systems as being exclusively an emulation in building up arms must be scrapped. That is what dictates all the Soviet Union's proposals. But the United States, while agreeing that a situation of mutual destruction is unthinkable, is again looking for solutions along the stereotype path, the path of embarking on a new arms race, an arms race in outer space. It is in this that the Soviet Union's approach differs from that of the United States. And the Americans keep telling us - the same note was sounded yet again in Mr. Emery's remarks - that we should, so to speak, ensure a smooth transition to a world dominated by strategic defence. Yet the very idea of strategic defence was advanced by the Americans as a challenge to the Soviet Union, as an attempt to tell us: look, here is an even higher technological level, a level on which you will not catch up with us, and that is why we are throwing out a challenge to you in this area. But, in such a case, can the State which has received such a challenge consciously assist the United States in once more taking the lead in the arms race and, by so doing, once again provide itself with a reason for racing to catch up the United States and starting yet again a fresh round of the
arms race? We are trying to get the basic idea across to the American side that this insane race must not be allowed to continue, although for the time being the United States side does not accept this idea. Of course it would be naive to hope that in a situation where SDI is regarded by the United States leadership as a challenge to the Soviet Union it will be possible to reach agreement on any radical reductions of strategic offensive weapons, because the one contradicts the other. And incidentally this position of the United States even contradicts the logic of the President of the United States, who, in criticizing the SALT-2 treaty, said that all the agreements reached thus far were, in a sense, a de facto legalization of the arms race and that this course should be abandoned. And yet, while adopting such a position, the United States is trying to continue the arms race in the area of strategic defence, a subject which we are still to discuss and one which should be discussed more concretely in due course.

In a certain area, however, that of intermediate nuclear forces, there exists at present a definite convergence of the Soviet and United States positions and there exists a possibility of agreement. It has to be said that in order to reach such agreement the Soviet Union has made very considerable concessions. You know for yourselves that at first we linked agreement on intermediate nuclear forces very firmly with the intermediate nuclear forces of the United Kingdom, France and so forth. For the sake of reaching agreement we gave up this linkage. We untied the Reykjavik package and we extracted the problem of intermediate nuclear forces from the whole set of other problems. Incidentally, as I understand, this was done largely after the Moscow forum, where representatives of the West European powers had argued very strongly for such an approach to the issue. But as soon as the package was untied some kind of counter-movements began to take place in Western Europe, and today it turns out that despite NATO's "double option" decision of 1979, when the whole of Western Europe was in favour of negotiations, of the negotiating channel, unlike the United States which, in principle, favoured deployment - today the roles have, so to speak, been reversed and western Europe now appears in the role of a restraining factor upon the successful solution of this problem.

It is said that such a solution would create a threat to the security of the Federal Republic of Germany. But would the security of the Federal Republic of Germany be more assured if the Federal Republic of Germany were saturated with United States nuclear weapons and, from that point of view, represented for the Soviet Union one of the principal targets? Of course not. That is why this latest logic, this note we heard sounded in the statement of Mr. Pierre Lellouche, is not altogether comprehensible, because on the one hand it was precisely the West Europeans, starting with Schmidt's well-known declaration,
who used to insist on stabilizing the situation in Europe, but as soon as the conditions are created for stabilization at a far lower level of nuclear confrontation, there are these incomprehensible objections on the part of the West European States. And in this context the proposal made at the Warsaw Treaty session which has just ended concerning the need for real talks, for starting consultations between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries about the concept of military doctrines is, of course, highly important. The military doctrine of each bloc is, of course, a personal matter for NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, but there are many misunderstandings, much incomprehension. For example, we have been operating with the term "deterrence" for many years but its translation into Russian varies, sometimes it comes across as "ustrashenje" which means "intimidation" and sometimes as "razubezhdenje" which means "dissuasion". In principle a great deal depends on this and there is obviously a real need for talks, a need for a modicum of mutual understanding of what is meant by various strategic terms so that more balanced and mutually acceptable decisions can be taken on so complex a matter as nuclear weapons.

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James Dougherty

Before I start with the main point I would enter a demurrer to something that Ambassador Karpov has said. He suggested that the United States unilaterally altered NATO's December 1979 decision which was, as he has correctly stated, limited to INF but the situation did undergo a significant change after that. The Soviet Union announced more than three years later that it was going to place SS-21s, 22s and 23s into East Germany and Czechoslovakia and it was only later that the allies became increasingly concerned when the United States appeared ready to negotiate a zero option on INF. It was the significant change in the situation which led to bringing the question of short range missiles into the picture and it was the West European allies, who insisted that we do bring them into the picture.

On the larger subject of the relationship between nuclear deterrence and conventional defence, I agree with what Alexei Arbatov said: Nobody can prove a negative; nobody can prove that it is nuclear deterrence which has prevented war in Europe for the past 40 years. We do not know what might have been, but we do know that the existence of nuclear weapons has made Governments more cautious than ever before about getting themselves into risky situations. It has made it incumbent upon the nuclear weapon Powers to avoid coming into critical confrontations and if they do get into them to act with
consummate caution in those confrontations. If we remove nuclear deterrence entirely from the European scene, I think that the propensity to take risks will probably rise regardless of how frightful modern conventional war will be and we know that it will be. Nevertheless the inhibition to undertake it will be weakened for reasons given by the classical strategists of deterrence, namely, that Governments think that they can calculate more easily the costs of taking a risk through the use of military force. They may not be able to calculate it correctly but they think that it is easier to calculate the cost of conventional aggression in which the worst outcome would be denial of the objective but not escalation to the nuclear level with its unpredictable consequences. National passions which have been held in check by the spectre of nuclear war could again become unleashed; there are plenty of nationalist passions in Europe, the most war-prone region known to historians.

Can there be conventional deterrence in Europe? We must pay attention to what Jan Siccama said earlier. If you look at the literature of the last five years there have been many proposals on how to shift from reliance on nuclear to a greater reliance on conventional defence, in order to reduce the disparity between Western European conventional inferiority and Warsaw Pact superiority. There has been a lively debate about reinforcement capabilities, the extension of conscription, the build-up of conventional forces and arms levels, building an intra-German boundary fortification (which would be very undesirable and politically unacceptable). Some have talked about a "strategy of manoeuvre" and Sam Huntington has suggested a conventional retaliatory strike into Eastern Europe in response to a Warsaw Pact attack. NATO planners have considered going to high-tech "smart weapons", deep-strike interdiction and follow-on-forces-attack against second and third echelon forces. All of these concepts are part of the debate about shifting from nuclear to conventional deterrence. If you deploy new conventional weapons in forward positions - missiles able to shoot a 150 kilometres or so eastward - to replace nuclear capabilities, this will not really improve the political-military stability of Europe in my estimation. If Europe tries to shift from mutual nuclear deterrence to a reliance on conventional defence capabilities, it will probably increase security apprehensions in Europe, at first in Western Europe and eventually in Eastern Europe. It will move our thinking from war deterrence to war fighting strategies. It will heighten nervousness and lead to temptations to pre-empt in crisis. It will raise the probability of a war that has hitherto been deterred. We certainly want to reduce the risk of catastrophe in the low probability of deterrent failure by substantially lowering the levels of nuclear weapons on both sides, but we have to recognize that the substitution of conventional for nuclear deterrence will not necessarily enhance
the security of nations either in western Europe or in eastern Europe. We ought to remember the old Chinese proverb "he who rides a tiger should be afraid to dismount".

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Nicholas Burakow

I would just like to comment briefly on the comment made by Mr. Agaev. It is difficult for me to understand what precisely Mr. Agaev was objecting to in Mr. Emery's statement. As I understand it, the theme of Mr. Emery's statement is one that we should all welcome. It is precisely that substantial progress has been made in Geneva and that we are very close to an agreement on INF. As to linkages to human rights in other areas I am afraid that Mr. Agaev perhaps missed the point that Mr. Emery was trying to make. Mr. Emery did not say that progress in nuclear arms reduction must be predicated on progress in human rights or in other areas. What he did say, however, was that to the extent that we can make accompanying progress in human rights or resolving regional conflicts in progress in other areas, then global security will be enhanced that much more, and that's something that this type of conference should not lose sight of. As to the question of propaganda, I do believe as well that it's unproductive to debate who was attempting to employ what type of propaganda to embellish its own position, whether directed at its own audience or at direct countries. But from my perspective I would say quite firmly that to the extent that one side or the other does employ demagogic characterizations of the other's position as appeared in today's Pravda's political cartoon for example, the day of our reaching a durable arms control agreement will in fact be put off that much further.

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Alexei Arbatov

Instead of a concluding statement I should like to make a few comments on the issues discussed during this session. First, on a few specific points. In his statement Mr. Emery said that the United States would prefer to deploy a certain quantity of short-range intermediate nuclear forces in Europe in order to ensure the security of its allies, above all of the Federal Republic of Germany - in order to equilibrate the threat from the East's nuclear forces which allegedly will exist for the Federal Republic of Germany when the longer-range nuclear forces, intermediate nuclear forces, have been withdrawn from
Europe. In this context I should like to associate myself with the point made by Professor Trofimenko that nuclear weapons in Europe, and particularly on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, can in no way ensure the security of that State. Since we are proposing a zero option for short-range intermediate nuclear forces, real security would consist, precisely, in no missiles with a range of between 500 and 1000 km remaining either on the East or on the West side. The United States proposal that the United States should keep the right - more correctly, that it should be permitted - to modernize Pershing-2 missiles by converting them into Pershing-1B missiles cannot in any measure enhance the security of the Federal Republic of Germany.

And it seems to me that, purely technical grounds aside, we cannot agree to such a scenario on political grounds, either. If, after the elimination of Pershing-2 missiles, Pershing-1 missiles were deployed on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, that would mean, would it not, that the Soviet Union had traded off the security of its allies or its own security. Such an exchange, such a trade-off is completely unacceptable to us. A reduction of the nuclear threat directly on the territory of the Soviet Union with the simultaneous build-up of a similar nuclear threat to the territory of our Warsaw Treaty allies does not suit us.

I should also like to raise a few points of disagreement with Professor Dougherty, whom I have known for a long time and for whom I have great esteem both professionally and personally. It seems to me that to object to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament as the idea being proposed by the Soviet Union is to substitute something that would really be utopian for the Soviet Union's actual proposal. The Soviet Union is far from proposing nuclear disarmament today, tomorrow or in the next few years. So rapid an advance towards such a goal is clearly not possible from either the political or the practical point of view. The Soviet Union is proposing nuclear disarmament as the ultimate objective which both politicians and nations would see before them and for the sake of which it would be worth while to hold negotiations on the step by step reduction of nuclear weapons.

Otherwise, if we do not see such an end goal before us, then - as the experience of the 1970s has shown - negotiations are doomed to follow blindly in the wake of advances in military technology, to utilize the by-products of military programmes, to pick up the old junk left over from nuclear arsenals which are earmarked for scrapping in any case. In substance, the idea of nuclear disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union means that already now, in our current negotiations, the approach of both sides should not be to regulate the arms race, not to adapt agreements to military programmes, but to formulate clear and well-defined goals for the gradual reduction and limitation of
strategic and other nuclear forces with the object of reducing the probability of an outbreak of war.

Then the limitation of weapons as a goal will come before military programmes, then it will not be agreements that are adapted to military programmes but, on the contrary, the goals of reduction and stabilization of forces and, in the final analysis, of their complete elimination will stand in the forefront. That, it seems to me, is the significance, at the present juncture, of the adoption of the ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament or, on the contrary, the non-adoption of such an ultimate objective.

And in this context no one thinks we can reduce nuclear weapons and return to a situation of conflicts, of a mad conventional arms race - I spoke about this earlier on. It is assumed - and without such an assumption radical nuclear disarmament is essentially impossible - that relations between States will undergo fundamental changes which will enable international contradictions to be resolved by other means. That is an interconnected dialectical process. The further we advance along the path of nuclear and conventional disarmament - and these, too, are inseparable aspects of a single process - the more the methods we shall employ in politics will not be methods of force but completely different ones. It seems to me that in his statement Professor Dougherty approached the issue of nuclear disarmament not dialectically but, somehow, very mechanistically; he, as it were, singled out nuclear weapons and tried to imagine what the world would be like now, today, if nuclear weapons were suddenly eliminated. Such an approach is not well-founded either from the practical or from the theoretical point of view.

And while we are on the subject, the examples Professor Dougherty cited concerning conventional weapons, concepts currently being elaborated of a strike against the opponent's deep rear - I am referring to FOFA ("follow on forces attack") or "air-land battle" - these are highly characteristic, highly graphic examples but they do not support the idea expressed by Professor Dougherty. They support the exactly opposite idea, namely, that even under conditions of super-saturation with nuclear weapons there is no stability whatsoever. Don't you see, all these concepts in the sphere of conventional arms, in the sphere of anti-missile defence, in the sphere of space weapons systems - they are not based on the premise of the elimination of nuclear weapons, on the contrary, they exist in parallel with vast arsenals of nuclear weapons, with programmes for the further refinement of nuclear arsenals. Under the conditions of a nuclearized world there is no stability. That is why intensive development is taking place not only in the field of nuclear weapons. Just look, there is SDI, there is the
European defence initiative, there is the European conventional programme Professor Dougherty mentioned. That is what the world is moving towards. That is not a stable situation at all.

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Pierre Lellouche

Je voudrais réagir aux propos de l'Ambassadeur Karpov sur deux points:

Le premier est son résumé de ma position, que j'ai trouvé un petit peu caricatural lorsque j'ai proposé une approche alternative à ce qui se faisait en ce moment. M. Karpov a dit : "l'accord sur les armes intermédiaires est un premier pas vers le désarmement". Je le répète, ce n'est pas le cas. Le retrait des ogives SS 20, 22 et 23 soviétiques ne représente, encore une fois, qu'environ 1/15ème des forces soviétiques capables d'atteindre l'Europe. De même, le retrait des 300 ogives Pershing II et cruise missiles basés en Europe ne représente qu'un 20ème des forces nucléaires tactiques et à moyenne portée chargées de défendre l'Europe. Si on voulait vraiment désarmer en maintenant la stabilité, il serait infiniment préférable de se débarrasser des milliers d'armes nucléaires tactiques qui sont déployées de part et d'autre. C'est pour cela que je disais tout-à-l'heure qu'un plafond de l'ordre de 400 systèmes de part et d'autre serait vraiment du désarmement. Alors on se débarrasserait d'au moins 90% des systèmes déployés. Cela créerait en même temps une stabilité politique et militaire suffisante des deux côtés. M. Karpov ajoute : Mais l'OTAN a trois puissances nucléaires, le Pacte de Varsovie une puissance nucléaire seulement. Je répondrai que l'OTAN n'a pas trois puissances nucléaires. Les États-Unis sont censés étendre leur dissuasion sur les pays non nucléaires d'Europe de l'Ouest, tandis que la France et la Grande Bretagne n'ont qu'une dissuasion d'ultime recours national. Ce que j'ai à l'esprit n'est pas de demander à l'Union soviétique de réduire ses armements à 400 systèmes face à ces trois puissances. C'est simplement de demander aux deux grands, s'ils veulent vraiment désarmer, de réduire d'abord leurs propres armes, ce qui augmenterait leur crédibilité, ensuite, de réduire à un niveau de dissuasion minima limité en Europe, leur propre présence, quitte pour les deux grands d'établir au niveau qui leur convient leur propre dissuasion nucléaire. Voilà ce que j'avais à l'esprit.

J'en viens maintenant à un deuxième point, sur lequel je voudrais que Mr. Karpov réponde. Vous avez dit, M. l'Ambassadeur que vous ne proposiez pas de revenir à l'Europe de 1939. C'est là un propos très important. Maintenant vous dites aussi qu'il
faut éliminer tout ce qui est offensif et rendre la guerre impossible en Europe. Mais la vraie question est : comment faire? Est-ce-que vous pensez vraiment que la dénuclearisation de l'Europe que vous souhaitez et la démilitarisation de l'Europe centrale que vous semblez proposer dans cette affaire de couloir entre les deux Allemagnes est la bonne méthode? Qu'est-ce-que cela veut dire "trouver un autre système de sécurité qui rendrait la guerre impossible en Europe"? C'est là-dessus, je crois qu'il faudrait que nous ayons dans ce forum, ou dans d'autres, de vraies conversations. Il est inutile, je pense, d'échanger des arguments théoriques sur : Pourquoi la dissuasion est un bien, pourquoi est elle un mal. Si vous avez réellement une solution alternative à apporter au système de sécurité en Europe, alors expliquez la nous et discutons en. Mais je crois que ce qu'il faudrait éviter, c'est un débat théologique sur la dissuasion, tout simplement parce que nos intérêts de sécurité évidents, notre mémoire collective aussi, font que nous avons besoin de la dissuasion, à moins que vous ne nous prouviez le contraire.

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Third/Troisième Session

PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE: BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PERSPECTIVES/PREVENTION D'UNE COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS DANS L'ESPACE : PERSPECTIVES BILATERALES ET MULTILATERALES

Reports/Rapports:

James Dougherty, Pierre Morel, Stanislav Rodionov

Discussion:


Chairman/Président:

Saad Alfarargi
Ever since the mid-1970s, spokesmen on each side have recurringly accused the other Power of seeking military superiority while denying that their own Government has such a goal. But few strategic analysts either in the Soviet Union or in the United States seem really to believe that the current robust nuclear balance can easily be upset by one side before the other could react appropriately. Each side has made it clear that it is determined and that it possesses the means to prevent the other from gaining a decisive strategic advantage, and these declarations of intent have a ring of credibility to them. Each side must be willing to grant formal recognition to the fundamental rationality of the other side's strategic decision-making processes and to admit that a technological quest for a first strike superiority will prove futile, whether based primarily on strategic offensive capabilities or on a defensive/offensive mix, so long as the level of offensive weapons is high. We all realize that no one can predict with confidence what is going to happen but if the level of offensive weapons should become substantially lower as we hope it will, it will then be highly desirable to arrange a jointly managed transition to some sort of parity in the offensive/defensive mix on both sides as both parties co-operate to move in parallel towards a more defence dominant regime.

That is the gist and the conclusion of my paper.

Governments have long professed to realize that any deliberate choice for strategic nuclear war that is distinct from a defensive first use by NATO against aggression could serve no rationally conceivable political or military purpose but would be extremely absurd and immoral. We should keep this fundamental reality in mind when we hear either side accusing the other of harbouring a desire to plan a strategic first strike, because with that kind of thinking all meaningful arms control agreements, I fear, would continue to lie beyond our reach. The danger of unintentional war remains real and both sides must continue to strive and, where necessary, cooperate to reduce the chances of error, uncertainty and misinterpretation in the handling of our command and control systems. In this context, the establishment of jointly staffed nuclear risk reduction centres would be a positive development. The agreement reached on September 15, 1987 goes part of the way but not far enough.

Now to SDI.
Although many artists have drawn their conception of "Star Wars" as the media always call it, no one can say for sure what strategic defence will look like if it ever emerges. SDI is a research programme designed to explore several possible avenues in an effort to see whether strategic defence will be, from a technical and economic standpoint, significantly more feasible as an option in the mid-1990s or beyond 2000 than it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Architecture of strategic defence are now being studied by both sides. The Soviet Union has been keenly interested in strategic defense longer and more consistently than the United States. Beyond the terminal defense systems (interceptor rockets and phased array radars) which are permissible under the ABM Treaty, several new technologies have been discussed since President Reagan's speech of March 23, 1983. These include weapons which destroy oncoming missiles with kinetic energy (including pellet-projecting satellites and electromagnetic rail guns), a variety of laser weapons (chemical, X-ray, free electron and excimer) which are either space-based, pop-up, or ground-based, with mirrors in space to redirect their beams, and particle-beam weapons whose most useful purpose may be not to destroy warheads but to distinguish them from other "countermeasure objects" and to disrupt the delicate electronic circuitry in their guidance or detonator systems. In our fascination with the newer exotic technologies, we should not ignore those terminal defence systems which are not only permitted under the ABM Treaty but also capable of technological modernization which could vastly extend their effective range into outer space.

The fact that the Soviet Union has been modernizing its system around Moscow is one indication that it does perceive the importance of strategic defence. In the United States no decisions have yet been taken concerning technological choices. Some technologies may be considered more or less promising within specified time frames of 10, 15 or 20 years. But the research is far from completed. It is much too early to begin choosing technologies or to estimate the cost of futuristic strategic defence systems. On 23 April 1987, a panel of the American Physical Society rendered its opinion that so many breakthroughs will be required in lasers and particle beams for an effective anti-missile system, that it will probably take a decade or more for responsible policy-makers to determine whether the job can actually be done. That panel, of course, did not deal with nearer-term kinetic energy systems. Some advocates of SDI would like to speed up the decision-making process for the development and testing of such systems before the Reagan Administration departs office so that a commitment will be set in motion that will later be difficult to reverse even by a President who does not fully share President Reagan's vision. Naturally many people in Congress are wary of such an option and are hostile to it. Administration officials regard the American Physical Society reports as unduly pessimistic but
I think that they will be taken into serious consideration. When the scientific and engineering communities are divided on these matters of military technology, we "softer" scientists, including political scientists like myself would do well to seek for probable truth somewhere in the middle between extremes. In my own opinion, it will not be possible to shut off completely the faucets of space technology in the next 10 or 20 years, perhaps never, but if we act intelligently and prudently, we can control the pace and direction of this type of technological development in space. What is not feasible in the 1990s might become feasible by the year 2010. Even though President Reagan is a man of 76, he might still have a 20-20 vision.

There has been debate in my country and in Europe as to whether the purpose of SDI should be ultimately to strengthen deterrence by protecting retaliatory capabilities and thereby compounding the difficulty of calculation in the mind of any potential first strike attacker, or whether it should be to replace deterrence by something totally different, that is, by substituting an effective shield over the nation and its population. These are not perfectly compatible. Whatever technological choices the United States makes, its ultimate purpose will be to strengthen deterrence. President Reagan wants to move away from deterrence based upon assured destruction aimed at populations and civilizational structures to assured protection of population and civilizational structures as the best way to prevent war between East and West. This is a very new idea and it may take many years to penetrate into the thinking of all relevant policy-makers but as Vice-President Bush said recently, the whole idea behind SDI is to put weapons at risk, not people. A deterrent strategy based on strategic defence, coupled with deep reductions in offensive forces, could offer us the most stable and secure environment of all. We do not know for sure that this is possible, but it is certainly a vision eminently worth exploring.

Now, if the Soviet Union should be absolutely determined to defeat SDI and the vision which underlines it, it may very well be able to do so by adopting the so-called McNamara solution based upon the premise that it would be easier and cheaper to overcome an adversary's defences by saturating them with additional offensive capabilities, additional warheads. To my way of thinking, that would be the worst course for the Soviet Union to pursue. It would be worse for the United States, worse for the Soviet Union and worse for the entire world, for it would offer no hope at all for the future. It would lead, I fear, to a futile offence/defence race, the most destabilizing of all possible outcomes. If I might be so bold as to give advice, a vastly preferable course for the Soviet Union to adopt as a rejoinder to SDI would be to explore the technological possibilities of coping with it by choosing technologies other than offensive strategic weapons, attempting
to meet it on a different strategic, political and technological level. At least that would shift the competition from building capabilities for annihilating societies and their civilizational achievements toward competition for balancing defence with defence, by reducing the levels of destructive capability as the potentialities for effective increase.

Both American and Soviet scientists in recent years have suggested a large number of countermeasures that could be looked into and deployed against space based strategic deterrence. Among those most commonly cited are the following:

1. Launching dummy rockets along with the real missiles to foil boost-phase attacks;

2. Developing faster-burning fuels in order to reduce to a minute or two the time when missiles in the boost phase would be vulnerable to attack before the warheads separate and go into their separate trajectories;

3. Rotating missiles in flight to make them less vulnerable to laser beams or coating them with protective or deflecting substances;

4. Using chaff, decoys and balloons to confuse the defense;

5. Attacking space-based defense with direct-ascent missiles and/or "space mines";

6. Designing offensive warheads to detonate upon contact with defense devices, thereby producing electromagnetic pulse (EMP) disruption of unshielded circuitry and otherwise distorting reception, communication and fire directives in defensive systems. It must be conceded that any object in orbit (if unprotected) is vulnerable to attack, and that any object launchable into space has a potential to attack objects in orbit. (That incidentally, is one major reason why the United States contends that the verification problems of an ASAT ban are virtually insuperable, because it is so difficult to define with any precision an ASAT weapon).

Some of the countermeasures mentioned may be cheaper to produce than additional offensive warheads and missiles with self-protecting and deceptive capabilities. Some of the other countermeasures which can be theoretically conjured up may be both difficult and expensive when it comes to the actual engineering. This would be especially true if each layer in a multi-tiered defensive system, say seven layers, were to consist
of a different type of defensive weapons technology. Paul Nitze and other Reagan Administration spokesmen have often said that it would make no sense for any country to deploy a strategic defence system unless it is survivable in view of possible countermeasures and also cost-effective at the margin. If it doesn't meet these criteria the American Congress will not support it. As you know, both before and after Reykjavik, Congress, especially the House of Representatives, had sought to apply severe cuts to Administration requests for SDI funds - cuts that usually came out to be on the order of one-third below what the Administration requested.

Since this Conference deals with multilateral as well as bilateral approaches, I should say something about the views of the NATO allies from an American perspective. Initially, their reactions to SDI were quite cool for several reasons: They had not been consulted in advance; they feared "decoupling" and a revival of "Fortress America" thinking; they deemed that new initiatives poorly timed, coming at the height of their domestic debates over INF deployment; they were worried that a programme aimed at strategic defense against ICBMs would not address European concerns over medium and short-range missiles; they had misgivings that SDI would worsen the international political climate and doom the prospects for arms control by undermining the ABM Treaty. French and British strategic planners were dismayed at the thought that a new arms race for space defense would degrade the effectiveness of their own national strategic nuclear deterrent forces. West European governments, however, as distinct from anti-nuclear groups, as well as segments of the public and the media, did not really fear SDI would necessarily be destabilizing and increase the risk of war. They were willing to explore the possibility that strategic defense could enhance deterrence and that certain forms of participation in SDI research could improve Europe's hi-tech capabilities both for defensive and commercial purposes. Moreover, West European defense elites, convinced that the Soviet Union has been vigorously pursuing anti-missile defense technologies for many years, were unwilling to forfeit to the USSR a monopoly right to conduct research in such a strategically important area. The NATO Defense Ministers (in whose meetings France does not take part) expressed support for the SDI research programme in 1985. In that same year, however, at the North Atlantic Council meeting, the Foreign Ministers of France, Denmark, Greece and Norway blocked any mention of support for SDI in their communique. During the last eighteen months, Britain, the Federal German Republic and Italy, as well as Japan (principal non-NATO ally of the United States) have agreed to participate in various ways in the SDI programme. The governments of Canada, France and Norway, while refraining from formal Memoranda of Understanding, allow their private firms to participate. Generally, the allies wish to make sure that their own security interests are taken into consideration in the R & D phases of space defense and that they will be able to exercise
some influence over future U.S. decisions with regard to development, testing and deployment.

It should be emphasized that when the United States signed the ABM Treaty, Gerard Smith clearly linked U.S. adherence to the expectation that the threat of offensive strategic missiles would be reduced in SALT II - something that never happened. Since then we have argued about the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar; the Soviet ASAT system; and Soviet research into and prototype testing of laser and particle-beam weapons at Sary Shagan. More and more of the non-aligned States are lending credence to reports of Soviet efforts. Perhaps both sides are becoming mature enough to admit that they are keenly interested in the possibilities of strategic defense. There is not time in this brief presentation of delve into the technical subtleties of the legal debate over the interpretations to be placed upon the ABM treaty except to say that both Parties seemed willing to tolerate ambiguity concerning future ABM developments based on "other physical principles" rather than delay the negotiation of the Treaty. The United States wanted to spell out the prohibition clearly; the Soviet Union wanted to keep the revisions general.

In my own country, the debate between advocates of the "strict interpretation" and those of the "broader interpretation" turn to the text of the ABM Treaty and Agreed Statement "D", the negotiating record, the record of the Senate ratification hearings and the record of actual practice. In the debate, the international law of treaties and the constitutional relationship between the President and the Congress sometimes become confused.

Many Western analysts both in Europe and the United States are convinced that President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative has aroused within the Soviet Union a greater willingness than heretofore to contemplate substantial cuts in existing levels of offensive strategic weapons. This becomes immediately clear if we recall the history of the SALT negotiations, and especially the Soviet reaction to President Carter's proposal in March 1977 for significant reductions. If we compare that to the Soviet negotiating positions since September 1985 at Geneva and Reykjavik, we can see radical changes, with both sides oscillating between realistic and utopian plans for nuclear arms reduction and limitation. SDI has ushered in an entirely new phase in the history of arms control. It has introduced a novel element into the picture and led to a "sea change" in our thinking. Right now it may seem to complicate the problems facing us, but it could eventually provide us with the key to resolve our dilemma.

As a political-strategic analyst who is not a physicist but who has tried for decades to cope with the physical reality
of the arms problem, I am not at all certain that there will be a scientific-technological breakthrough which will make strategic, space-based defense economically affordable and militarily effective beyond enhancing an already "robust" deterrent. Perhaps the "superconductivity revolution" which now excites the world of physicists will someday make strategic defense much cheaper and more workable than offensive weapons. It is difficult to predict. At present I am inclined to think that strategic space defense, conceived as a "leakproof" shield to render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete against populations and civilizational structures, will not be technically and economically feasible at the high levels of offensive armaments now existing. My own mind boggles at the thought of a computerized defense system, dependent on perhaps a hundred million lines of software code, deployed to blunt an attack by one or two thousand missiles carrying ten or twenty thousand or more nuclear warheads. This is always the scenario which figures in media models of "Star Wars". President Reagan may have had that in mind when he launched SDI. He may have thought that it could be effective against a massive attack. But since then he has frequently indicated that strategic defense must be linked to drastic cuts in offensive nuclear arms. In other words, there has to be a carefully managed transition through joint action from an offense-dominant to a defense-dominant regime, carried out over a long period of time to prevent destabilizing consequences, especially fears of a preemptive first strike. There is reason to think that each of the two principal space powers are moving toward a more realistic position with regard to exotic defense technologies - their interest in them, their cost, what kind of agreements might be reached on the AEM Treaty to clarify permissible research, development and testing activities while postponing deployment decisions well into the future.

Almost everyone seems willing to admit that our offensive arsenals are much larger than necessary for mutual deterrence. Even at 50% or 40% or 30% of current levels, space defense might still not prove very effective. But if we were ever to negotiate downward to 20% or lower, strategic defense at much more finite levels of deterrent capabilities will become not only more credible but also more politically desirable and strategically essential, to provide a guarantee of security in a disarming environment. As the point is approached at which the surprise attack which had been deterred at higher offensive weapons levels might once again become "thinkable", governments and their peoples will demand defense. It was precisely that fear of reintroducing the incentive for aggression at low armaments levels which made plans for general and complete disarmament in the period 1959-1962 stillborn. If progress is to be made toward total nuclear disarmament in the next century - and there are plenty of causes for doubt and skepticism - strategic defense will be an absolute prerequisite hedge against
the possibility of cheating on a disarmament agreement or of breaking out of its constraints and embarking upon a course of rearmament. Thus whether we like it or not, the World's desire and demand for disarmament will fuel the drive in a growing number of countries for strategic defense as an imperative of national security.

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RAPPORT

PREVENTION D'UNE COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS DANS L'ESPACE:
PERSPECTIVES BILATERALES ET MULTILATERALES

Pierre Morel

Je voudrais d'abord prier les participants de bien vouloir m'excuser de n'avoir pas préparé de texte rédigé. J'essaierai de présenter mon exposé de façon aussi claire que possible.

Il s'agit d'un exercice et d'un thème difficile. Son intérêt particulier tient au fait que la course aux armements dans l'espace est dominée, je dirais, à la fois par l'incertitude et par l'appréhension, pour ne pas dire par la peur. J'essayerai de mettre les choses en perspective, pour commencer, avant de proposer quelques orientations pour les prochaines années.

Le sujet est nécessairement ambigu. Dès l'origine, l'espace combine à la fois le civil et le militaire. Contrairement au nucléaire, très nettement identifié par l'explosion d'Hiroshima, et ensuite par le développement des capacités militaires ayant un caractère très spécifique, lié à la survie même des sociétés, intégré dans un commandement central au sein des dispositifs militaires des deux plus grandes puissances, l'espace est un domaine infiniment moins facile à circonscrire et à analyser dans son rôle militaire.

Rappelons nous l'irruption de la dimension spatiale, il y a quasiment trente ans, à partir du lancement, à quelques centaines ou milliers de kilomètres d'ici, le 4 octobre 1957, d'une fusée soviétique mettant en place le premier satellite, le Spoutnik. Les phénomènes d'inquiétude et d'interrogation ont alors été comparables dans une certaine mesure à ce qui s'est passé récemment autour de l'IDS, parce qu'il n'y avait pas que le satellite; l'aspect le plus déstabilisant de cette ouverture de l'ère spatiale, c'était la fusée qui avait mis en place le satellite. Cette fusée a ouvert, dans sa dimension de missile intercontinental, un très vaste débat sur l'équilibre stratégique. C'est à partir de là que s'est développé tout le débat du "missile gap", avec ce qu'il comportait d'erroné, d'irrationel, mais aussi avec ses énormes conséquences dans la mise en place des dispositifs stratégiques actuels.

L'espace a déjà 30 ans, au moins sous cette forme là, dans les différents aspects de l'équilibre stratégique. Même si les choses ne se répètent jamais de façon identique, il y a une espèce de "space gap" autour de l'IDS, autour du développement des défenses, qui a chargé de passion les débats sur l'évolution des systèmes stratégiques. Il faut rappeler ce phénomène non pas pour développer un parallèle rigoureux, mais pour montrer à
quel point ces sauts technologiques peuvent conduire à des projections hâtives, extrêmes, et, on s'en aperçoit évidemment après coup, parfois mal fondées.

On en revient ainsi à une question assez simple et essentielle, à savoir: que faire de l'espace aujourd'hui? A bien des égards, il me semble que c'est la question qui est posée. Jusqu'à maintenant, dans le domaine de l'exploration du développement spatial, les buts ont été assez simples, aussi bien dans le domaine civil que dans le domaine militaire.

Dans le domaine civil, depuis 30 ans, on a identifié un certain nombre de segments rentables qui ont abouti à des développements tout-à-fait spectaculaires en matière de communications, en matière de transmission de données, de télédétection, de météorologie. Le critère a été celui de la rentabilité. La question est aujourd'hui: jusqu'où va-t-on du point de vue civil? Faut-il avoir recours à la présence de l'homme dans l'espace? Faut-il prévoir une certaine forme de production dans l'espace? Jusqu'où faut-il développer le recours aux systèmes de communication installés dans l'espace, ou avec un relai spatial? Du côté militaire, le critère est celui de la stabilité; jusqu'à maintenant on a identifié le rôle relativement stabilisateur des systèmes militaires installés dans l'espace. Ce n'est pas la peine de développer, il y a l'observation, la navigation, etc... Mais là aussi, la même question se pose aujourd'hui, que faire des développements ultérieurs? Faut-il de même avoir recours à l'homme dans l'espace, faut-il installer, pour reprendre le vocabulaire soviétique, des "systèmes de frappe" ou tout autre système offensif à partir de l'espace? C'est la question qui se pose aujourd'hui. Elle rappelle l'image assez parlante du savant français Henri Poincaré soulignant que lorsque le cercle des connaissances s'accroît, le cercle de l'inconnu s'accroît d'autant. Le saut technologique multiplie les interrogations et oblige à une révision et à un certain nombre de choix en matière d'objectifs. On constate aujourd'hui le besoin, la nécessité d'un inventaire du connu et de l'inconnu dans le domaine spatial, et en particulier dans le domaine militaire.

Une bonne partie du débat autour de l'IDS tourne autour de cet enjeu. Je rappelle une analyse qui était présentée dans un document français de 1983 concernant l'espace, et qui s'interrogeait sur la fonction de l'espace, en envisageant trois possibilités:

1. Faire de l'espace un "sanctuaire", c'est-à-dire exclure catégoriquement toute utilisation militaire de l'espace; c'est désormais impossible; il y a des utilisations militaires passives de l'espace, et elle sont reconnues aujourd'hui comme étant stabilisantes;
2. Faire de l'espace un "grand arrière". C'était la formule que nous avions utilisée, consistant à reconnaître qu'à bien des égards c'est par l'espace qu'est assuré aujourd'hui le fonctionnement des grands systèmes stratégiques. Qu'il s'agisse du respect des accords, de l'observation, et surtout - je crois que ce point est souvent sous estimé dans les analyses - de la navigation et de la précision, les systèmes spatiaux actuels non offensifs jouent un rôle déterminant dans le fonctionnement des systèmes terrestres stratégiques offensifs. Je crois qu'il y a là une donnée irréversible. L'espace est d'ores et déjà, et d'une certaine façon depuis longtemps, le "grand arrière" des systèmes stratégiques.

3. L'espace sera-t-il, peut-il être, doit-il être un "champ de bataille"? C'est à partir de cette dimension-là que se pose la question de l'extension ou non, pour reprendre le vocabulaire actuel, de la course aux armements dans l'espace. Mais seulement sous cet angle là. Pour le reste, l'espace militaire existe déjà.

Autrement dit, je voudrais souligner qu'il s'agit aujourd'hui d'un changement de degré beaucoup plus que d'un changement de nature. On ne bascule pas d'un domaine dans l'autre.

Ce débat, cet effort d'inventaire est d'autant plus souhaitable aujourd'hui et urgent que les instruments politiques et juridiques définissant, encadrant les activités spatiales sont insuffisants et bien des égards inégalitaires.

Je ne vais pas en faire ici l'inventaire, qui apparaît dans de nombreuses publications. Mais il est vrai qu'aujourd'hui bien le traité sur l'espace de 1967, que, d'une certaine façon le traité ABM, sont caractérisés par des insuffisances et qu'actuellement il y a un manque d'ordre juridique, de références communes en matière d'activité spatiale.

Jusqu'à maintenant en fait, la réflexion ou l'interrogation sur les nouvelles dimensions de l'utilisation de l'espace, y compris dans le domaine militaire, ont été largement commandées par des considérations assez irrationnelles, et ceci s'est accentué autour du débat sur l'IDS. On a examiné des hypothèses extrêmes, lointaines; c'est nécessaire, cela fait partie du débat, c'est même inévitable. Mais on a négligé l'examen d'hypothèses plus rapprochées de rivalités ou de crises liées à l'utilisation militaire de l'espace. L'image du "bouclier", de la "bataille spatiale", a conduit à sous estimer les hypothèses intermédiaires qui, me semble-t-il, mériteraient tout autant l'examen au cours des prochaines années, qu'il
s'agisse de développement de défenses partielles, non pas le bouclier absolu, mais la mise en place de capacités de défense plus spécifiques sur certaines zones, sur certains types d'armements stratégiques, qu'il s'agisse aussi des hypothèses évoquées parfois d'attaque ou d'annihilation ou d'entrave au fonctionnement de systèmes spatiaux, sans signature, pour reprendre le terme habituellement employé, c'est-à-dire l'agression non identifiable, à cause des contraintes liées aux systèmes dans l'espace où l'identification peut être, ou pourrait être, beaucoup plus difficile. Sans vouloir du tout encourager des scénarios pessimistes, mais par souci de rigueur dans la réflexion et de prévisibilité plus grande dans le domaine spatial, il me semble qu'il faut s'interroger sur un certain nombre de scénarios intermédiaires par rapport à ces images de "la guerre en 100 secondes" pour reprendre le titre d'un ouvrage du Général Gallois. C'est bien dans ces phases de transition qu'il faut aussi pousser la réflexion et je lance, à titre illustratif et non pas démonstratif, l'idée d'une sorte de "crise de Cuba spatiale", qui d'une certaine façon est possible dès aujourd'hui, c'est-à-dire le risque d'interrogation sur les développements chez l'un des deux grands partenaires suscitant une crise politique et stratégique majeure, avec la mise en oeuvre de décisions centrales quant aux systèmes de défenses. Je ne dis pas que ceci est probable, je dis que ce n'est pas impossible; plutôt que de se polariser exclusivement sur le scénario d'un équilibre spatial de systèmes défensifs parfaits, il faut aussi s'interroger sur les hypothèses intermédiaires.

Je tire de ces rapides réflexions sur les perspectives de l'utilisation militaire de l'espace la conclusion que nous avons à faire à une période de transition d'environ une dizaine d'années. Non pas une transition inexorable, au sens technologique et stratégique du terme, vers un système défensif (ceci reste ouvert), mais en tout cas une période pendant laquelle il sera nécessaire d'accentuer le travail de réflexion et d'inventaire, mais aussi d'édification juridique. Nous allons vers une intégration accrue du spatial et du terrestre; l'espace ne se développera pas de façon distincte, il ne s'est jamais développé de façon séparée, et il faudra aller vers une définition plus précise des fonctions que remplissent les systèmes spatiaux aussi bien dans le domaine civil que dans le domaine militaire, et vers la définition de seuils, de normes, qui vont se révéler de plus en plus indispensables. Toute la question est de savoir si ces phases de transition politique, intellectuelle, et d'une certaine façon, peut être, stratégique, se déroulera dans un contexte de rivalité intense entre les deux plus grandes puissances, ou dans un climat de coopération relative. C'est évidemment l'enjeu sur lequel tout le monde s'interroge, à propos du débat sur l'IDS.

Dans la deuxième partie de mon exposé, j'essaierai de proposer quelques orientations possibles pour ces dix prochaines années.
Au risque de sembler trop catégorique, je commencerai par dire qu'il faut impérativement maintenir le traité ABM comme élément central de la stabilité stratégique. Je pense que c'est un point de départ fondamental, c'est en tout cas celui que je défendrai ici. Il faut considérer en effet le traité ABM au-delà de ses caractéristiques propres, historiques, comme une base irréversible et d'une certaine façon un modèle pour l'avenir. Si je puis me permettre de m'exprimer ainsi familièrement en direction des deux plus grandes puissances, je crois qu'il faut leur dire qu'ils sont mariés, qu'ils n'ont pas le choix, qu'ils peuvent à la rigueur réviser leur régime matrimonial, mais qu'ils ne peuvent pas se séparer. Je simplifie pour les besoins de la démonstration: s'ils doivent avoir des modifications au traité ABM elles doivent se faire par consentement mutuel. Il y a là un élément fondamental du système. Pour reprendre l'expression de Pascal, je serais tenté de dire: "vous êtes embarqués". Il n'y a en fin de compte, par rapport au critère fondamental de la stabilité stratégique, pas de choix possible dans ce domaine, quant au comportement relatif entre les deux plus grandes puissances. Ceci renvoie à une notion que je crois tout à fait centrale et qui décrit assez bien ce qu'a fait tant bien que mal, ou ce que pourrait faire plus encore l'équivalent du traité ABM dans l'avenir, pour rester très prudent quant aux modalités précises; il s'agit de la fonction de prévision et de prévention par les deux plus grands partenaires des interactions les plus déstabilisantes.

Quels en sont les points d'application ? J'en vois deux, en particulier. D'abord celui de la recherche, c'est évident. L'objectif du traité ABM, même s'il remplit très imparfaitement cette fonction jusqu'à maintenant, on le voit bien dans les débats qui se développent à ce sujet, c'est malgré tout d'assurer une certaine prévisibilité de la recherche. L'exercice est difficile, et je me garderai bien d'être prescriptif en ce domaine. Il s'agit, de définir un mélange, toujours délicat, de concertation et de liberté. On ne peut pas orienter, planifier la recherche, par définition. Dans le même temps, une concertation quasi permanente entre les plus grands partenaires quant à la recherche et sur les systèmes et sur les développements technologiques est essentielle pour l'équilibre stratégique.

L'autre aspect de cette fonction centrale de prévision et de prévention des interactions les plus déstabilisantes entre les deux systèmes stratégiques concerne la poursuite des recherches et des réflexions sur le développement de la composante défensive. Là aussi, à partir de l'opposition initiale entre le oui américain à la défense stratégique et le non soviétique, je crois qu'il faudra indubitablement aller vers une sorte de débat plus approfondi permettant d'élaborer sinon des analyses communes, du moins des points de référence communs. Il est très possible que la divergence continue.
indéfiniment sur la valeur respective des systèmes offensifs et défensifs, mais le dialogue est indispensable et devra inévitablement s'organiser ne serait-ce qu'avec le développement des nouvelles propositions de négociation qui visent à des réductions effectives et drastiques.

Je suis donc parti du traité ABM tel qu'il existe, pour souligner qu'il correspond à un élément central de la relation stratégique, que les systèmes spatiaux vont tendre à accentuer. Plus généralement je crois qu'à partir du développement éventuel des défenses stratégiques et en tout cas à partir du développement des systèmes spatiaux, nous allons probablement, ou nous devrions évoluer vers une relation plus complexe de dissuasion et non pas vers un bouleversement complet des systèmes de défense et de sécurité au cours des 10 prochaines années. Nous passerons d'un système déjà complexe, juxtaposant le nucléaire et le conventionnel, à un système encore plus complexe, ajoutant de plus en plus la composante spatiale qui existe déjà, mais qui sera de plus en plus développée. Mais on devrait rester selon toute evidence dans un contexte de dissuasion, renvoyant en fin de compte, à la survie des sociétés. Je reprends l'expression du Vice-President Bush cité par M. Dougherty: bien sûr on peut prévoir toutes sortes de développement sur la mise en jeu des systèmes d'armes plutôt que des populations; mais à la fin des fins, je ne vois pas comment dans les 10 prochaines années et même au-delà on pourra abandonner la mise en jeu des populations. On restera dans un contexte de survie, et donc de dissuasion.

La deuxième composante des orientations pour l'avenir concerne l'aspect multilatéral, c'est par là que je voudrais terminer. Il faudra organiser de plus en plus une synergie entre l'aspect bilatéral et l'aspect multilatéral. J'ai évoqué déjà assez largement l'aspect bilatéral avec l'exemple du traité ABM. Je crois qu'il faudra y ajouter l'interdiction ou la prévention du développement des armes anti-satellites, qui appelle, au moins au départ, la reprise d'un exercice bilatéral, puisqu'il y a eu des conversations assez développées entre Soviétiques et Américains en 1977, 1978 et 1979 sur la prévention de la mise en place des armes antisatellites, négociations interrompues par les événements de l'Afghanistan. Il me paraît indispensable que ceci reprenne d'une façon ou d'une autre et débouche ensuite sur le terrain multilatéral.

En ce qui concerne ce dernier proprement dit, on constate déjà le rôle croissant de ce que l'on a appelé le groupe des
puissances spatiales, qu'il ne s'agit pas de dénombrer ici, sans doute une dizaine, une douzaine d'Etats qui, du fait de leur capacités technologiques, sont déjà appelés à participer activement à la mise en oeuvre et au perfectionnement du régime juridique de l'espace. Je rappelle à cet égard le débat un peu artificiel dans lequel on pourrait s'enfermer: faut-il un nouveau traité sur l'espace ou faut-il un perfectionnement des traités actuels sur l'espace ? Je crois que ce débat est un peu gratuit et qu'il faut le dépasser. Il y a urgence, et on peut au moins être certain qu'on n'aura pas à faire à une grande conférence comme la Conférence sur le droit de la mer; mais il faut d'une façon ou d'une autre apporter un certain nombre de compléments au régime actuel de l'espace.

Je rappelle d'abord les idées lancées par la France en ce qui concerne les ASAT, l'idée d'une sanctuarisation de l'orbite haute puisque l'on sait d'ores et déjà que l'orbite basse est utilisable pour des armes antisatellites et que dès lors toute interdiction garde un côté invérifiable, donc précaire, on ne pourrait jamais être certains de l'interdiction définitive et complète et totalement garantie de systèmes anti satellites pour l'orbite basse. En revanche, en l'absence d'essais enregistrés jusqu'à maintenant, la sanctuarisation de l'orbite haute reste possible.

Autre proposition, celle d'une interdiction des armes laser de la terre vers l'espace pour une période de 5 années renouvelable, afin de réserver la possibilité de tester l'état des connaissances et des capacités à intervalles réguliers. Je souligne ce point parce que souvent, dans les propositions du côté soviétique quant à la définition des armes spatiales, on met en avant la capacité espace-espace ou espace-terre, mais il me semble que l'on néglige trop la composante terre-espace, qui fait également partie de la prévention de la course aux armements dans l'espace.

Troisième proposition faite par la France: l'amélioration de la Convention de 1975 sur l'enregistrement des objets spatiaux. De l'avis général, un régime plus ouvert, plus précis de déclaration est possible et souhaitable à partir de cette convention. Je rappelle aussi l'idée de l'extension aux puissances tierces de l'immunité garantie mutuellement aux satellites des deux grandes puissances, qui apparait aussi bien dans le traité SALT I de 1972 que dans le traité ABM. Il s'agirait donc d'une garantie de non agression des systèmes spatiaux d'observation des autres puissances, telle qu'elle existe déjà entre les deux plus grandes puissances.

Pour terminer j'évoquera un thème souvent débattu et qui faisait partie des propositions françaises de 1978, à savoir l'idée d'agence internationale de satellites de contrôle, "AISC" ou "ISVA" selon le sigle anglo-saxon. Il y a là un besoin
croissant qui a été constaté d'un point de vue politique par la communauté internationale, à partir de propositions faites par la France, et qui s'est heurté à de très fortes objections américaines et soviétiques. Cette convergence est révélatrice et à certains égards symbolique. Mais au moment où l'on constate de plus en plus le besoin de vérification, le rôle et l'intérêt de toutes les puissances pour cette question, la question d'une agence internationale est posée de façon de plus en plus évidente. Il faut compter aussi avec l'apparition de capacités d'observation et de télédétection dans un certain nombre de pays autres que les deux grands.

On va, en effet, vers le développement d'une sorte de zone grise entre la télédétection civile et l'observation militaire précise, et c'est sans doute dans cette zone grise qu'une certaine fonction internationale de vérification par satellites se révèlera possible. A cet égard, les propositions canadiennes récentes rejoignent tout-à-fait l'idée lancée par la France il y a 10 ans et montrent à nouveau l'actualité d'une formule d'agence, qui peut avoir un caractère progressif et se faire par étapes. La mise en place d'une fonction internationale de contrôle ne doit pas se faire contre les deux plus grandes puissances. Elle n'a pas été conçue pour cela et ce sont les deux grandes puissances qui ont choisi de marquer leur hostilité et leur réserve. C'est dommage; il faut dépasser cette première réaction, pour essayer de trouver un mode de coopération, et je reprend l'idée de synergie entre le bilatéral et le multilatéral.

Pour conclure, je m'arrêterai à une idée simple, à savoir que l'espace tel qu'on l'évoque dans les débats n'est pas un "ailleurs" et ne relève pas d'une sorte de régime à part. Nous assistons à une accélération, à une expansion du développement des capacités spatiales, mais après 30 ans d'expérience déjà acquise, qu'il ne faut pas oublier, et qui donnent déjà un certain recul par rapport à l'ampleur des questions qui se posent aujourd'hui. Ce n'est pas la première fois que de grandes questions se posent par rapport à l'espace. L'espace n'est pas une "terra incognita". Ce qu'il faut aujourd'hui, c'est développer en quelque sorte la cartographie, mettre au point des procédures, développer des pratiques, aussi contractuelles que possible. Il faut en quelque sorte dépasser la dimension quelque peu magique et irrationnelle qui s'attache à l'espace; elle ne disparaîtra pas, il ne faut pas qu'elle disparaîsse. Comme dans toute grande découverte humaine il y a une composante irrationnelle. Mais le moment est dépassé de ces visions qui consistent à rattacher à l'espace l'idée d'un homme nouveau ou d'un monde nouveau. Je dirai que, de Gagarine au Président Reagan, il y a la perception d'un ailleurs, d'un autre monde possible à travers l'espace. C'est précisément ce stade qu'il faut dépasser pour appliquer tout simplement plus de
raison, et toujours plus de raison, au domaine de l'espace, à commencer par la raison stratégique, et pour terminer je dirai que l'espace n'est pas un autre monde, c'est notre monde.

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I should like to touch upon a slightly different aspect of the matter raised here, the scientific and technical one. When we speak on prohibiting the deployment of weapons in space, we have to realize that the question is one that has become especially important at this time for various reasons, among which we should include attempts to modify somehow the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty), attempts connected with the Strategic Defence Initiative programme under way in the United States of America. That is one circumstance; another is that the level of activity in space, activity not of a military nature, has increased very markedly in the fifteen years since the ABM Treaty was signed. It is against the background of this activity in space that many systems regarded as civilian ones are beginning to acquire an ABM potential, and that is a circumstance which obliges us to examine very attentively at this time the possibility of finding parameters or criteria in order to distinguish between permissible and prohibited activity in space. During the last half year or so I have participated in five meetings at which this matter has been discussed by representative Soviet and United States scientists along with scientists from other countries, and the picture is gradually becoming clearer. We realize that in many instances we may even identify quantitative criteria, that we could use to distinguish activity prohibited under the ABM Treaty from activity of a different nature not directed against ballistic missiles. We do, unfortunately, still have to use some technical terms and speak technically, because weapons in space are a technical matter, so that we often have to use terms such as laser brightness to make a qualitative assessment of the military potential of this type of weapon. I should not like to give figures, although I do think it is necessary to do so, because I am certain that they will shortly come to be very widely discussed and we shall have to be familiar with them. Last week, for example, a Soviet-American conference of lawyers against nuclear weapons was held in Moscow, and technical experts from the USSR and the United States of America were invited to tell the lawyers what these figures mean and how to handle them. I shall try to give a succinct account. Each type of weapon that can be put into space - be it a laser, a particle-beam, or a kinetic weapon - has a typical parameter, its kill range, i.e. the distance over which it is effective as a weapon. To create a system in space for the purposes of the SDI, all the elements of the system should have a kill range of at least 1000 km, or even greater. Consequently, a kill range of 1000 km could serve as a dividing
line between military and non-military activity in space. If we
decide to permit some systems in space with a potential kill
range of, for example, 100 km, or even less, 30 km, or less
still, 10 km, we can say that, in that sense, the one with the
shortest effective kill range is a non-military system, while
the one with a longer effective kill range, of between 100 and
1000 km is in a grey area, and attention must be paid to it.
One that has an effective kill range of more than 1000 km is
definitely a weapon that should clearly be banned. The
effective kill range is a parameter that can very easily be
expressed in terms of ordinary parameters.

For lasers, for example, it may be expressed in terms of
mirror size, wave length, and the laser power. Consideration
must also be given to the energy needed to destroy the target.
The kill range, i.e. the effective kill range, is arrived at by
combining four parameters. Similar calculations may be made for
a particle-beam weapon or a kinetic weapon. Should political
negotiations lead the parties to an agreement as to reasonable
limits on activity in space, expressed as numerical threshold
values, the question of how to achieve certainty over
verification will, no doubt, always arise. Although question
relating to verification are undoubtedly complex, absolute
importance ought not to be attached to them. I shall take the
liberty of referring to one item recently discussed in the
American Senate in connection with the "broad" interpretation of
the ABM Treaty. I refer to the evidence given to a Senate
Committee by General Palmer in 1972 who stated that the chiefs
of staff had communicated their conclusion on quantitative
limits under the Treaty, and that they were in agreement with
those limits, and in reply to a query from Senator Jackson on
the impossibility of verifying these limits, Palmer replied that
yes, they, i.e. the chiefs of staff, had come round to that;
i.e. even when the Treaty was signed in 1972, the importance
attached to the question of such very rigid verification was not
overriding. It seems to me that to lay special stress on very
rigid verification merely emphasizes a clear desire to wreck the
question completely, because it is technically very difficult to
talk about 100% verification. There is, moreover, clearly no
need for such total verification to resolve the matter. It is
the general opinion of scientists and technicians that the risk
is not in an isolated case, some single violation, but in the
setting up of a specific system in space, a system is per se
militarily most terrifying. A system, which consists of many
elements, simply cannot be set up all at once and therefore
cannot be created in secret. Minor violations are, moreover,
potentially a great danger, even to the one guilty of the
violation, whose good name and reputation are harmed.

Returning to the verification of quantitative threshold
values, it is appropriate to point out that the parties cannot
know very much about the intentions and aims of a rival unless
the political climate is right, or in the absence of mutual confidence. A common approach to verification is needed. What may a common approach involve? It may involve permission for the inspection of satellites in space to verify, let us assume, whether a satellite is carrying a nuclear weapon, or merely whether there are stocks of uranium or plutonium. A satellite may be irradiated with X-rays, as is done in the baggage checking procedure in airports; a satellite may be approached and irradiated to obtain a picture and find out what it consists of, what it contains. These measures are feasible only if the parties agree to the carrying out of such acts. There is a negative point here. The technology needed for such examination and verification is extremely complex. A second SDI will be needed to verify the absence of the first one. The control of satellites before they are launched seems more promising, provided, of course, that the parties will take such a political step.

Co-operation in space seems of even greater interest. I do not mean co-operation over the SDI, since we do not intend to verify military satellites alone, but to verify all activity because, I reiterate, some non-military satellites have very great anti-missile potential. In that sense, joint work on many major missions is of great interest. In that sense, co-operation in space is, per se, a reliable step towards verification. Here I should like to draw attention to a case that has recently arisen. Next summer our country is to launch a space vehicle to visit Phobus, one of the satellites of Mars. We intend to investigate Phobus. Our vehicle will fly slowly over the surface of Phobus at a height of 50 metres. We intend to use a small laser to give us some idea of the chemical composition of the surface; using that laser we shall irradiate parts of the surface, to heat and vaporize it. The vapours that rise from the surface of Phobus will be trapped by instruments on board of our space vehicle. In this way we shall learn about the chemical composition of Phobus. Unfortunately, this step has been somewhat differently understood in the United States. I have here a copy of the "Los Angeles Times", which states, with a reference to Paul Nitze, that the Russians are conducting SDI tests, that they have concealed in the region of Phobus, at some distance from the Earth, so that nobody can check up on them.

From the technical point of view, I can assert that the parameter of this laser, i.e. its kill range, is, no more than 100 m. It is in no sense a weapon. The important point, however, is that representatives of seven countries, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Austria, France, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR, are taking part in this experiment and know all about it. That fact alone shows that there is no real sense in such talks. The participation of these countries in the project speaks for itself. There cannot be any secrets here.
Now a few words on the types of peaceful activity in space that seem to us to have an anti-missile potential. We have examined several options. Well, it is common knowledge that lasers are now being used in space for communication purposes, but those systems do not have any anti-ballistic missile potential by virtue of the parameters currently in use for communications. Their effective kill range is estimated as no more than one kilometer. Such systems are clearly non-military in nature.

Some ten years ago, however, there was talk of constructing vast space-based solar power stations with an area of several tens of square kilometres and of transmitting power from them to Earth as a microwave beam. Estimates indicate that such systems may have an effective kill range of the order of hundreds of thousands of kilometres. Such a microwave beam, which is especially broadened on approaching the Earth for reception on a vast mirror, may readily be made narrow and directional, with a very high energy density, and may serve as a weapon against targets in space. Consequently, a very special attitude must be adopted towards such projects. In our view, such projects cannot be carried out by a single country, but must be the co-operative effort of many countries, and special measures must be taken to prevent the use of such things against targets in space.

I have just looked at today's paper, and have read a speech by our General Secretary, Mr. Gorbachev, in which he says (I shall simply quote a few lines): "Now is a very crucial moment. It is difficult to say when such a chance will again rise. At this moment we are able to break with the dangerous tendency being created by the war party and not allow the arms race to be carried into space. It is proper that space should become another sphere for rapprochement and mutual understanding, and not the source of a new threat for people. We must overcome the ideology of nuclear deterrence". Is not this a difference of political approach between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the establishment of equilibrium in the world? The aim of the SDI is to raise the level of confrontation, while that of our proposals is, of course, to lower it. Instead of creating shields against nuclear weapons, it is better simply to renounce nuclear weapons and not have any shields. This is something that must not be forgotten at a time when there are tens of thousands of warheads in the world; we must not forget that there is the possibility of a nuclear war arising accidentally, which is something to which we are now paying great attention in our Committee of Soviet scientists, something that we are attempting to examine very thoroughly. Reduction, and only reduction and the total elimination of nuclear weapons, is capable of removing a possibility as dangerous as the accidental occurrence of a nuclear war.
Although I have tried to speak on the scientific and technical aspect of the question, I should like to include a few general points on strategic stability in my brief statement. It is not enough to have a military and political equilibrium, unless it be a stable equilibrium. That is quite obvious to a physicist. An equilibrium has to be stable. Is the SDI and, in general, the whole idea of introducing weapons into space, of assistance in increasing the stability? Reference has been made here to McNamara's concept of instability, which is connected with the fact that every increase in defensive systems inevitably prompts an increase in offensive systems. There is no escaping this instability. The very attempt to create a shield upsets stability, giving rise to very serious instability of unpredictable extent. What is the American Administration talking about? It is inviting both sides to have defensive systems in space. Superficially there is a sort of balance of forces, is such a system a stable one? It is completely unstable, and this instability is connected with the fact that when there are two defensive systems in space, the expenditure of only an insignificant proportion of the potential of one of them will suffice completely to destroy the system of the adversary. Then there will be only one system instead of two, and no longer any balance in the world. This is also a very important circumstance. We are now being told "you Russians are afraid of SDI, and that is a good thing for the Western world. Let us carry out the SDI, given that the Russians are afraid". Such talks makes me think of a situation in which the partners are standing in a petrol-filled pit, with petrol vapour all round, and one of them gets out some matches and says: "I shall now strike them". The other says: "That would be dangerous. Don't do that". The reply is: "Ah, you're scared, so I shall do it for that very reason". The result will be an explosion and both will perish. I should like to end on that note.

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La prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace est le thème de notre discussion et je vais essayer d'aborder le sujet pour ainsi dire au vif et formuler quelques remarques d'ordre général en ce qui concerne son aspect politique bilatéral et multilatéral.

Je voudrais tout d'abord souligner que la première session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement a demandé que de nouvelles mesures soient prises et des négociations internationales appropriées soient engagées conformément à l'esprit du traité de 1967 sur l'espace, pour empêcher la course aux armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique. On se rappelle des résolutions successives de l'Assemblée générale, dont la dernière en date est la résolution 41/53, qui ont réitéré cet appel en demandant à tous les Etats, en particulier à ceux qui sont dotés de moyens puissants dans le domaine spatial d'œuvrer activement pour que l'espace soit utilisé à des fins pacifiques et de prendre immédiatement des mesures afin de prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationale et promouvoir la coopération et la compréhension internationales. Et ces résolutions ont réaffirmé que la Conférence du désarmement, seule instance multilatérale de négociation sur le désarmement, a un rôle primordial à jouer dans la négociation d'un ou de plusieurs accords multilatéraux selon qu'il conviendra, visant à prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace sous tous ses aspects. En outre, ces mêmes résolutions ont reconnu l'importance des négociations bilatérales qui se poursuivent depuis 1985 entre l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis d'Amérique sur un ensemble de questions concernant les armes spatiales et nucléaires et ont prié ces deux pays de poursuivre intensivement leurs négociations bilatérales en vue de s'entendre sans délai pour prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace.

Mais aujourd'hui on ne saurait ignorer le danger d'extension de la course aux armements à l'espace. Et ce danger reste imminent, compte tenu du développement d'un vaste programme, l'initiative de défense stratégique. Elle constitue aujourd'hui le seul programme qui se fixe pour objectif et s'efforce de réaliser rapidement le déploiement d'une nouvelle catégorie d'armes dans l'espace. Il est considéré par la grande majorité des États comme étant une grave escalade de la course aux armements et comme donnant à celle-ci des dimensions entièrement nouvelles avec toutes les conséquences dangereuses qui en découlent. Des armes de frappe spatiales, si elles sont un jour déployées, peuvent avoir comme cibles, parmi d'autres, les satellites en orbite qui, de l'avis général remplissent des...
fonctions importantes d'observation, de surveillance et d'alerte avancées, contribuant ainsi au maintien de la stabilité stratégique.

En d'autres termes, dans les circonstances actuelles, l'aspect plus important du problème est de prévenir l'introduction d'armes dans l'espace par l'interdiction des armes spatiales de frappe. Ayant en vue cet objectif global, on peut envisager la réalisation des mesures partielles qui consisteraient à conclure des accords visant à assurer l'immunité des objets spatiaux et à interdire le développement de nouveaux types de systèmes anti-satellites et à éliminer les systèmes existants. Dans le cas contraire, n'importe quelle défaillance technique d'un satellite en orbite peut, en cas de déploiement d'armes dans l'espace, être interprétée à tort comme un signal d'attaque. Il est facile de comprendre que les conséquences d'une telle erreur seraient évidemment une catastrophe. Prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique est à coup sûr, et par excellence, une tâche qui doit se mener à l'échelon aussi bien multilatéral que bilatéral. Aussi la solution doit-elle être recherchée parallèlement à ces deux niveaux, qui conformément à une opinion très largement acceptée, ne s'excluent pas mais bien au contraire se complètent et se renforcent les uns les autres. Je ne suis pas de l'avis que des négociations dites sérieuses ne doivent se dérouler qu'à l'échelon bilatéral. Je reconnais que l'Union soviétique et les États-Unis d'Amérique ont une responsabilité particulière en ce qui concerne la recherche d'accords sur la prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace. Rappelons-nous que le sujet et les objectifs de leurs négociations sont bien connus. Les deux parties sont convenues les 7 et 8 janvier 1985 de prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace et d'y mettre un terme sur la terre, et que ces deux questions seront examinées et réglées en corrélation mutuelle. Cela a été confirmé par les dirigeants des deux pays lors de leur réunion à Genève en novembre 1985. Donc nous considérons cela comme un engagement ferme pris par ces deux principales puissances nucléaires.

À notre avis, cette entente représente deux aspects dont chacun est d'une importance exceptionnelle. Avant tout l'objet des négociations est de prévenir et d'empêcher la course aux armements dans l'espace et non de l'autoriser sous une forme ou sous une autre. De toute évidence il ne saurait y avoir d'ambiguïté. Il existe encore un autre élément important. L'accent est mis sur une corrélation organique équitable et positive entre les armements spatiaux et les armements nucléaires, deux problèmes objectivement indissociables, ce qui revient à dire que la réduction des armements stratégiques nucléaires est impossible sans que des mesures efficaces visant à prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace ne soient réalisées. Actuellement les négociations soviéto-américaines
bilatérales se poursuivent à Genève. Récemment de nouvelles initiatives ont été annoncées du côté soviétique. Notamment l'Union soviétique a donné son accord à ce que la recherche dans le domaine de la défense anti-missile soit limitée, pour ainsi dire, dans le cadre de laboratoires, c'est-à-dire que les recherches peuvent être menées aussi bien au polygone, dans des usines etc... Elle entrepris une démarche constructive visant à élaborer "des dispositions-clés des accords" sur nombre de problèmes du désarmement, y compris les armements stratégiques offensifs et le renforcement du régime du traité ABM et a présenté un projet de document y relatif. Ce traité demeure une des réalisations les plus importantes dans le domaine de la limitation des armements. Il est indispensable qu'il soit maintenu, que les dispositions soient strictement observées et que des mesures soient prises pour en empêcher l'érosion. A mon sens, ce traité a une portée universelle et nous le considérons comme - si je puis dire - l'épine dorsale du problème de la réduction des armements stratégiques offensifs et il n'admet aucune autre interprétation, ni étendue ni de quelque autre nature.

Du fait de la poursuite des négociations soviéto-américaines bilatérales, il ne s'ensuit pas pour autant que la Conférence du Désarmement reste pour ainsi dire les bras croisés à attendre des résultats. Au contraire, elle offre de bonnes perspectives pour un débat sérieux et concret sur le problème de la prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace. C'est un problème qui intéresse tous les États et à cet égard, la Conférence pourrait non seulement élaborer des concepts fort utiles mais aussi entreprendre des négociations concrètes sur certains de ses aspects. D'autant que sont représentés ici 40 États, y compris tous les États dotés d'armes nucléaires et d'un potentiel spatial. Le sort de l'espace patrimoine commun, ne peut être déterminé par qui que ce soit qui tenterait d'en tirer parti. La grande majorité des États représentés à la Conférence se prononcent résolument pour la réalisation de mesures efficaces visant à prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace, appelle à respecter strictement les accords existants tant bilatéraux que multilatéraux. En premier lieu, bien sûr, le traité soviéto-américain sur la limitation des systèmes de défense anti-missile, appuie l'idée portant sur l'élaboration des mesures partielles. Dans leur récente déclaration les Chefs d'États et de Gouvernements de six pays ont réaffirmé l'importance cruciale de la prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace.

Cependant, il faut dire que certains pays occidentaux, en premier lieu les États-Unis d'Amérique, continuent à s'opposer à l'engagement de négociations sur la mise au point d'accords dans le domaine de l'espace. C'est ainsi que les mandats donnés au Comité ad hoc, créé en 1985, sur la prévention d'une course aux armements dans l'espace restent de nos jours limités,
malheureusement, et ne permettent pas de commencer des négociations au sens propre de ce terme. Dans les conditions où il existe un danger d'extension de la course aux armements dans l'espace il est intolerable que les grandes possibilités de négociations de la Conférence du Désarmement ne soient pas pleinement mises à profit.

Je suis conscient que la tâche qui consiste à prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace est très complexe, mais cela n'est pas une raison pour le pessimisme. Il me semble que les débats qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à présent au sein de la Conférence du Désarmement se sont révélés utiles et ont permis de dégager nombre de domaines dans lesquels la Conférence pourrait mener des négociations axées sur une tâche concrète. D'ailleurs le Comité spécial de la Conférence comporte aujourd'hui toute une série de propositions et d'idées à cet effet. Divers pays ont avancé, parmi d'autres suggestions, des propositions portant sur l'élaboration d'un accord international visant à interdire le recours à la force dans l'espace et à partir de l'espace contre la terre, à assurer l'immunité des objets spatiaux, à interdire la mise au point de nouveaux systèmes anti satellites et à éliminer les systèmes existants.

L'ambassadeur Morel a évoqué des propositions concrètes avancées non seulement par son propre pays, mais aussi par d'autres pays membres de la Conférence du désarmement. L'Union soviétique a formulé récemment une nouvelle proposition concernant la création d'un système de contrôle international pour l'interdiction du déploiement dans l'espace d'armes de tout genre qui prévoit la mise en place d'un inspecteurat qui aurait accès à toutes les installations utilisées pour le lancement et le placement dans l'espace des engins spatiaux, ainsi qu'aux moyens de lancement correspondants.

Il me semble que la Conférence du désarmement dispose aujourd'hui de tout ce qui est nécessaire pour passer à l'étape fondamentale du commencement des négociations sur la conclusion d'un ou de plusieurs accords interdisant les armes spatiales. L'année dernière le Comité ad hoc a reconnu dans son rapport l'importance et l'urgence de prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace et s'est déclaré prêt à œuvrer dans ce sens. Je suis persuadé qu'il est possible de mettre en œuvre ce consensus, et l'objectif même de prévenir une course aux armements dans l'espace, si tous les Etats font preuve de la volonté politique indispensable, de la nouvelle approche et pensée conforme à la réalité d'aujourd'hui, à la réalité de l'ère nucléo-spatiale. Ainsi serait assurée la possibilité permettant à tous les Etats de conjuguer leurs efforts en vue de l'utilisation de l'espace à des fins pacifiques, créatives et non de destruction.

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I think already some interesting points have been made and I am not certain whether I am going to add to them. However, I would like to begin by a couple of quotes from Professor Dougherty's paper. I hope he will not mind my borrowing some of his words and then go on to make some comments which arise from these two quotes. In one he says: "SDI is a research programme designed to explore several possible avenues in an effort to determine whether strategic defence will be from a technical and economic point of view significantly more feasible as an option in the mid-1990s than it was in the late 1960s and early 1970s". The second statement I find interesting is: "There is reason to think that each of the two principal space Powers are moving towards a more realistic position with regard to exotic defensive technologies, their interest in them, their cost, what kind of agreements might be reached on the ABM Treaty to clarify permissible research, development and testing activities, while postponing deployment decisions well into the future". Together with this, Professor Dougherty says in his paper that with substantial reductions in offensive weapons, strategic defence becomes more credible. The implication here is that there will be vigorous research and even testing of defensive weapons. This can already be seen in the SDI programme of the United States. Although there is now a possibility of arms reduction, at least at the intermediate nuclear force level, I am not so certain about the conclusion he draws that strategic defence then becomes more politically desirable and strategically essential.

Also, from the Soviet side, there is a change in attitude towards the research and testing of strategic defence. The Soviet Union has begun to recognize and even suggested that research and testing could not only be carried out in laboratories but also outside, that is, field testing, provided these are conducted from fixed ground-based systems with certain characteristics. Two questions emerge from all of this in my mind. One, in the process of testing their ABM systems, the two Powers will certainly develop major sophisticated ASAT capabilities as many have already pointed out to us this morning. This would be of particular concern to satellites of other nations since they would not be able to defend them. Moreover, they may not be parties to any kind of bilateral agreement. Therefore, they would not even have any legal protection for their satellites. Secondly testing would generate considerable amount of debris or space junk in outer space. In the presence of ASAT capabilities, this may cause some concern to a lot of nations.

You might wonder how in that vast amount of space a few tests could cause problems. Let me illustrate this by an example that occurred early in 1987, when a spent rocket, that
put the French Spot satellite in orbit, exploded in outer space. This raised some concern in the United States, and I can understand that, particularly if such debris is caused in the vicinity of the US reconnaissance satellite that was orbiting at the time. We can track something like 5,600 objects today which are working satellites, spent rockets, dead satellites, belonging to the two Powers and others in outer space. However, it is estimated that there are over 40,000 pieces which we cannot see and yet some of them have caused problems. For example, some years back the window of the space shuttle was damaged by a flake of paint only a fraction of a millimetre in size. Such objects travelling at great speeds in outer space could easily penetrate the suit of an astronaut or a cosmonaut working outside a space laboratory and kill him instantly. Thus the existence of ASAT capabilities I cannot emphasize more, would introduce uncertainties in the operation of satellites for peaceful purposes in outer space.

I would like to make a comment on what Dr. Rodionov said when he mentioned his grey zones between 100 and 1,000 km. He did not point out that precisely in these orbits laser weapons will become very effective as ASAT weapons if they had the kind of energies that he is talking about. Also, it is in that type of orbit that many of the important satellites of the two Powers are found, and certainly where many of the civilian satellites, like the French "Spot", operate.

Thus I think this question of debris and the anxiety of the third nations of the safe operability of their space segments needs some close examination. Even the third parties ought to be looking at their own observation systems and other verification systems which could be used to see what is going on in outer space.

Yesterday, Ambassador Jaipal mentioned the verification of a nuclear test ban by for example Sweden. Now this is confined to one treaty. However, already it was suggested this morning that the Soviet Union in 1985 proposed to the United Nations the setting up of a World Space Organization which could not only co-ordinate the peaceful space activities of nations but also monitor past and future space-related arms control treaties. I see the suggestion as very similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency which does both promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as well as policing it. Perhaps one ought to look at the lessons that can be drawn from the operation of the IAEA and suggest how a WSO could be organized, if at all.

Also, Ambassador Morel suggested the revival of the old French idea of 1978, the idea of an international satellite monitoring agency (ISMA). One saw a tremendous amount of difficulties which made some of us suggest that perhaps one
could create a regional satellite monitoring agency. To begin with Europe could be the first region. The next one might be the Pacific area. With many such regional systems, we would be able to, eventually, establish an ISMA.

One can set up a regional satellite monitoring agency such as in Europe and I think the Canadian proposal PAXAT goes a long way towards that. Then select another region later on; from Europe to some other region and go region by region eventually converging to an ISMA idea. Another proposal was made by Sweden in 1985 in which it was suggested that there should be a neutral and non-aligned satellite operating in outer space for monitoring arms control treaties.

I will not dwell much on that, but merely put some ideas for our discussion and end by saying that such monitoring systems are thought to be confined not only to arms control monitoring but in my view to suggest and to emphasize, which hasn't been done so far is to use such systems for monitoring crisis areas with the hope of averting a build-up of crises into a conflict.

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**Javier Sanz**

I would like to address this distinguished Conference not only under the consideration of certain aspects of the arms race in outer space but also in the more general topic of disarmament as a whole. And this will be done of course from the viewpoint of a non-aligned and developing country with very limited capacity to influence world events in this field but nevertheless, ever preoccupied with the very existence of mankind which is threatened, if we consider the dangerous trend that vertical proliferation has taken. My country has always held that outer space is the common heritage of mankind and therefore its use cannot be linked to military theories that reflect particular points of view concerning national security of the superpowers. We understand that in this area it is absolutely necessary that a fundamental change of attitude takes place. It was said here yesterday that a military seizure of space started 30 years ago. The question now, is have we already reached a no-return point. In this sense we understand that the dynamic rhythm the development of events in outer space has taken, is very much out of proportion with the efforts made to give it an adequate legal frame. In fact, public opinion in the world is certainly aware that superpowers are progressively militarizing outer space and in the future, if not today, the situation could become unchangeable, if a radical modification
of policy does not take place. In this sense we are absolutely convinced that if we let time go by without any effective approach in this area, the diplomatic efforts will be soon, without any doubt, overrun by military reality. This subject certainly deserves a more serious and responsible treatment. Unfortunately, the progress in this issue since the Space Treaty some 20 years ago had been very poor indeed.

Nevertheless, it seems that in the past few years the international atmosphere to deal with events in outer space has somehow improved, and we can see positive signs of this in the Conference on Disarmament. That such an important problem is today at the table of negotiations is, by itself, a positive step.

It is certainly no secret that even with the best of wills discussions are hard and lengthy. A purely bilateral outlook to the issue, even if it involves both of the superpowers, is not enough because it affects directly or indirectly other States and the international community in general. Even though only two countries have acquired a substantial superiority in the field it does not mean they are the only ones affected. Multilateral perception is also necessary, and surely the work of the Conference on Disarmament could benefit if the Space Powers would facilitate information about their activities in outer space, and the progress of bilateral negotiations. For when the time comes to negotiate a multilateral agreement the contribution of bilateral negotiators will be of great help. Sometimes some specific subjects of negotiations are taken as only interesting the Powers involved. We believe that outer space implies also the whole international community because the modern process of arms race anywhere puts at stake the very future of mankind and it is within this spirit the six world leaders have made a "cri de coeur" on behalf of the world's people who sense that military reasons have lost all proportion and threaten human survival.

The Five Continent Initiative is emphatically calling for a halt to the deployment and use of all space weapons and a stop to the nuclear arms race. In fact, in the last three decades the task of protecting the world from nuclear war has been left largely in the hands of the nuclear Powers themselves. But instead of halting the production of more nuclear bombs or reducing existing stockpiles, agreements have tended to determine the types and numbers of additional weapons that might be produced. And so we find that today, after countless hours of negotiations, the nuclear Powers have amassed over 50,000 nuclear weapons. We believe that it is becoming increasingly clear that left to themselves, the Governments that are busy building several warheads every day are unlikely to lead in removing the threat. Of course, the difficulties are innumerable, but we believe that there are two main obstacles.
The first is the reliance on armas for security. This philosophy is based in the Latin adagio "Si vis pacem para bellum" and has one overriding weakness. That is, that endless preparations for war will end sooner or later in war. Since Hiroshima, the situation has changed radically. It has changed in its very nature and a new approach is necessary. Nevertheless, we are being told not to worry but we certainly do not believe that the evident escalation of militarization of outer space will succeed in providing the security that bombs and missiles have failed to provide. The second major obstacle is political. It seems that there is not a political will to attack the problem right at its roots. Even policies of accommodation appear weak to the parties involved. The result, is extreme caution and fear in both sides.

There appears to be a dead weight in the negotiation process. To the common man it seems that each superpower presumes, as a matter of course that their counterparts are truly prepared to unleash considerable horrors on the world.

They deal with each other as implacable foes, rather than different parties with different world visions but with a very serious common problem. That certainly makes it very difficult to make people understand that we do not live in the worst of all possible worlds. Designing a programme of disarmament acceptable to all nations will be long and hazardous, but we feel it is time to begin.

If the leaders of nuclear Powers, often with the best of intentions, are unable to solve this crucial arms problem, others must help them. Leaders of other nations can help. Great Power leaders and authorities can get sometimes locked into antagonistic positions and, trapped in their own rhetoric, can be swept along by the momentum of the arms race by forces much too strong for them to change. Other politicians can help them out, putting forth balanced reasonable suggestions which are not backed by military threats and which can therefore receive a positive hearing from both sides. Public and international pressure from other governments can provide a counterweight to the forces that drive the arms race. This attitude is what the Delhi Declaration calls a "universal demand in defence of our right to live".

I would like to make a brief comment, to end my exposition, on a very recent issue which I think is very much linked to the topic we are treating here.

Nowadays, and for many years to come, a few chosen States will have the necessary advanced technology to be able to explore and use outer space, and of course, they alone, will be in a position to profit from this activity. We, therefore, understand that when analysing proposals and methods concerning
international co-operation in outer space, specific care should be taken so that no discrimination in the access to space technology is applied to any State, unfortunately, as we see this, such discrimination could already have started to take place. I am referring specifically to a *prima facie* discriminatory decision that has been approved recently by a number of industrialized Western countries. These countries have just formulated, to be precise on the 16 April, a series of guidelines where they establish a common regime to control transfers and exports of missile equipment and technology. It even states that certain technologies described as "sensitive" will not be authorized for transfer, that is to say, that an embargo will fall upon them. It is said that the purpose of these guidelines is to limit the risk of nuclear proliferation, but we believe that national peaceful space programmes, and international co-operation in this field could be seriously threatened under the pretext of avoiding nuclear proliferation. We ask ourselves if this policy is not directed towards the perfection of a technological oligopoly institutionalized in the so-called London Club, in the sense of trying to enlarge the list established by nuclear suppliers and thus restraining the access of high technologies to developing countries. We fear that this issue will soon become another inevitable item in the North/South conflict.

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Onkar Narwah

This is a session devoted to the question of space, but what happens in space is very strongly connected with what exists on the ground. In our discussion yesterday there were a number of points that were not brought out in the preceding nexus. I will attempt to formulate them briefly in my comments.

The first thing we have to remember is that five years ago there were no medium-range missiles in Western Europe. Before 1976 there were also no Soviet medium-range missiles in Eastern Europe. Indeed, according to most analyses the SS-20s which created the whole problem were supposedly an aborted long-range missile which the Soviets decided, for reasons at that particular moment in time, to deploy in Eastern Europe, as an afterthought. The third fact which is also apparent from much of the literature on the subject is that few people either on the Eastern side or the Western side were much bothered about these SS-20s until 1977, when Chancellor Helmut Schmidt raised the issue at his speech at the IISS in London. The West eventually came through. As the discussions ensued the West eventually formulated the "zero option and the dual track" approach to negotiations on the issue with the Soviet Union.
We need to remind ourselves that this whole question of the proposal for having no medium-range missiles on either side was originally a Western proposal. There was almost, as we will recall, an agreement on this in the so-called famous walk-in-the-woods formula. That the Nitze-Kvitsinsky understanding did not occur in an agreement has, I think, much to do with certain domestic considerations which came up at that time within some of the countries involved in the discussions.

The next thing that we need to remind ourselves is that the substance of the proposal now being re-introduced by the Soviet side is a fairly modest step in arms reduction. What does it involve? It involves, at the present stage, the removal of 363 Western nuclear warheads against the dismantling of roughly 1,200 Soviet nuclear warheads. There is, thus, an almost three to one, positive bargain for the West if the proposal is accepted in an agreement by the NATO group of countries.

We are told that, that might lead to the denuclearization of Europe. This, again, seems hardly to be the case. There are something like 6,000 deliverable nuclear weapons which would still remain in Europe on either side. It is good to ponder on the results of an earlier study, which I remember seeing, prepared by a joint group at Harvard and MIT. It elucidated the fact that in both the United States and the Soviet Union there are approximately 200 targets on each side which, if attacked by nuclear weapons in a particular mode, would destroy 70 per cent of industrial structure and about 60 per cent of the population of either country.

Coming to the present situation, Mr. Helmut Schmidt, who is no longer the German Chancellor, appears to support the idea of an agreement between the two sides on the basis of the present negotiations. Lest he be considered as having gone soft in retirement, so does Mr. Richard Perle on the American side. It seems also that most of the NATO allies have come around to the idea of accepting, in principle, that there could be an agreement, albeit with some conditions.

Now we come to the question of "linkages". The first linkage relates medium-range missiles with shorter-range missiles. The Soviet Union has accepted that the two categories of missiles be considered jointly in reductions. The second concerns Soviet conventional superiority in Central Europe. On that too, it seems that the Warsaw Treaty States have agreed to discuss the deployment of offensive system in Central Europe with a view to limiting them. Third, on the question of battlefield nuclear weapons, there is a chance, at least a proposal, that a nuclear-free corridor be created through Central Europe.
While one understands that many clarifications would be needed, I think that we need to consider these Soviet proposals with an open mind and on their merits. An endless series of linkages can be pursued no doubt, since in the end one can show that everything is linked to everything else. We need to remind ourselves that what is on the table represents: (1) a very small step, not a big leap, (2) an actual Reduction of nuclear weapons for the first time, and (3) not the denuclearization of Europe.

It strikes us in the non-aligned world, - at least to one view from among the non-aligned states - that these proposals, if they are eventually accepted by the two sides, are framed within the yardstick of maintaining deterrence stability at a slightly lower level of nuclear weapons on the two sides. Number two, that they provide for the possibility of geographically separating the adversaries in that capability in the most heavily militarized region of the world. The preceding appears important on the context of a nuclear-war simulation exercise that was carried out in the United States a few years ago involving top decision makers. In this particular simulation exercise the participants were a number of the ex-Presidents of the United States, Secretaries of State, Defence, etc. The objective was to see how an actual situation which led to a crisis that could entail the possible use of nuclear weapons, would function. This exercise indicated that the decision makers resorted very quickly to the actual use of nuclear weapons in a devastating attack. I imagine that the results of a similar exercise on the Soviet side would be the same.

The question may be asked as to whether the removal of the medium-range missiles will lead to a qualitative change in the West's retaliatory capacity in the West European theatre. This also seems unlikely because (1) the British and French missiles remain intact, and after their current modernization phase, will each consist of over 1,000 nuclear warheads - hardly a trivial capacity; (2) the US sea-launched ballistic missiles will continue to remain in the vicinity of Europe.

There are, again, concerns that in the event of a US-Soviet deal on medium-range missiles, the US may, in a subsequent phase, disengage from the military defence of Europe. This is a valid concern, but it seems that 300,000 US troops would still remain in Europe. They, along with the 6,000 nuclear weapons, assuredly are a greater guarantee of US involvement in Europe than the removal of a few missiles which have been introduced only in the past few years; and on which the two sides almost agreed to removal a few years ago.

Coming to the question of the SDI, at least in its present mode it does not provide for any defence against either Cruise
missiles or sea-launched ballistic missiles. From what one can see, the SDI is for the moment, concerned only with the targeting of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The latter are, in strategic terms, relatively obsolete since both sides already possess the necessary accuracy-capability to destroy each others land-based missiles in a surprise attack. Indeed, it seems to me that, that was why the US itself stopped building its Minuteman missiles years ago, and went in instead for a larger sea-launched ballistic missile capability. Today 50 per cent of the US capability is at sea and it is for me puzzling that the Soviet Union has not done the same. Almost 60 per cent of the Soviet Union retaliatory capacity continues to exist as vulnerable hardened ICBMs.

Irrespective of the opinions I have expressed, I believe the current Soviet proposals have changed the negotiating environment, and the ground rules on which arms control efforts have so far been predicated. Having said that, it is still possible that an agreement will elude us because states in war alliances base their choices on so many other considerations apart from the logic of the situation. All that one could surmise is that, that would be a tragic situation, leading us again into another round of missed chances.

The question arises, for those of us who are not either from Europe or the US: what should we in the rest of the world learn from the preceding train of events? We have been lectured continuously that the proliferation of nuclear weapons is bad, especially if that probability arises in the case of countries in the non-aligned world. It may not be entirely ironic for us to see the same as an unacceptable contradiction in advice from the powerful states. We are told, for instance that nuclear deterrence has kept the peace in Europe, and that there is absolutely no way that nuclear deterrents can disappear from the world. If that is so, then perhaps other regions of the world should in the absence of any change in NATO/WTO doctrines follow the same path?

While rejecting nuclear proliferation, it is worth emphasizing that the ultimate choices in these matters by other countries - whether to go in for nuclear weapons or not - will certainly not depend on the advice, the experience, or indeed the example of Europe. There is nothing that persuades me, from our discussions, that that is the way in which we must assess our interests. It must be seen that the question of security, is as important to us as it may be to you.

The final question revolves around the theme of our whole conference: What is the link between bilateralism and multilateralism? In the reality of the situation we all understand that there are two superpowers, and then there are a host of other countries. I would, nonetheless, urge you to keep
in mind that the decisions made at a bilateral level should take into account changes in times and conditions. Many countries that do not at this moment appear to reckon in the scheme of things may do so in the future. Your obligation is to take into account this evolving situation because it is eminently in the interest of the world, since the larger the number of countries that you carry in your decisions, the larger the legitimacy of the choices that are made.

I will end by re-telling a little story from an ancient Indian classic on politics where the proponent is describing the state of the world. He says that the state of the world is akin to a snake eating a frog where the frog is still concerned that it did not have its lunch that particular morning. I suggest to you that, at the present stage at least, Europe is in that state of the frog. I think nuclear weapons are eating you up. It is time that the modest steps which have been proposed to stop that process are taken into account with some element of sincerity and, I hope, sustainability.

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Viktor Karpov

I should like to draw attention to the following aspect of today's discussion. In the course of the discussion the Soviet Union has been urged to consider a possible transition jointly with the United States from nuclear deterrence to reliance on defensive forces. I should like to say that we have also already heard this kind of proposal repeatedly from the American delegation in Geneva. Quite recently we listened to such a proposal from Secretary of State Shultz during his visit to Moscow. It has to be said, however, that we have not yet been fired with readiness to examine these proposals because, for all their seeming attractiveness and the reliance on being able to discuss the SDI in terms of the search for mutual understanding rather than for unilateral superiority, they can be considered, and are considered by us, as a kind of false-bottomed casket, with one thing above and something quite different in the secret compartment.

I should like to illustrate this with a few actual examples from the area of words and deeds in our relations with the United States. In the first place, the talk of the American SDI programme being merely a research programme is incorrect. The United States already plans to proceed to the testing of the components of anti-ballistic missile defence systems during the next three or four years so that those tests will no longer have to be confirmed within the broad framework that the United States is now trying to give to the Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

An indication that the United States Administration is itself aware of the incompatibility between the SDI programme and the Treaty is the fact that in Reykjavik President Reagan quite unequivocally proposed to Mr. Gorbachev that they should agree to replace the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which would have been tantamount to legalizing the SDI. It has to be stated that the proposal has been further developed in the position now being advanced by the American delegation in the negotiations on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva.

The formulation now being given to the proposal is as follows: the United States and the Soviet Union have already reached an agreement under which the United States could continue until 1994 to carry out any research and tests on the components of anti-ballistic missile system, including basing in space, which is prohibited by the Treaty, while after 1994 they would acquire the right to proceed to deploy large-scale anti-ballistic missile systems, which is also, naturally, in complete contradiction with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Systems.

We are, therefore, being asked to give our blessing to the SDI programme and to repudiate the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. That is what lies behind the discussion with the United States on an organized transition. What kind of an organized transition would it be if the United States is already planning, as they state openly, to proceed after 1994 with the limited deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems in space?

I should also like to draw attention to the following. In putting forward the SDI programme on 23 March 1983, President Reagan pointed out unambiguously that, were this programme to be combined with the simultaneous presence of strategic offensive armaments, it could be regarded as an indication of aggressive intentions, an aggressive policy. I am in full agreement with that assessment by President Reagan, and I should like to state that what the American Administration is doing in practice is tending towards that direction, furnishing proof that aggressive intentions are clearly present. There is the MK programme, the deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles, which the Americans, in any event the American representatives in the negotiations, have always declared to be a destabilizing weapon, a first-strike weapon, and the Trident-2, submarine-based missile system is being created to tactical and technological specifications that will give it the same capabilities as the MK system, i.e. a first-strike capability. Various cruise missiles are being created including air-based and sea-based variants, not to
mention the ground-based cruise missiles already stationed in Europe. We sometimes hear from American representatives, and not just sometimes, but often, that cruise missiles are, as they say, a means of retaliation. I, however, should like to refer anyone who may be interested in this matter to the testimony of Admiral Crowe, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Senate Armed Forces Committee in November of last year. Faced there with the direct question of whether the possibility of inflicting a first strike would be lost were all ballistic missiles to be scrapped, the Admiral replied that it would not, arguing that cruise missiles could be used for a first strike, especially if they were to be made supersonic.

Consequently, if we take the whole programme of perfecting and adding to the strategic offensive weapons of the United States in its entirety, we are bound to note that it is being given an even greater first-strike capability. It may be that the modernization programme is ever on the increase; expenditure on the modernization of the strategic offensive forces, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, rises by 17-20% annually. By 1990, some 51% of the strategic offensive weapons of the United States will have been renewed, replaced by new missiles.

In that connection, I should like to draw attention to what was said before me by Mr. Marwh to the effect that the SDI was a programme aimed at protection against intercontinental ballistic missiles, and that cruise missiles were an essentially different vehicle that the SDI was not being created to deal with. If, however, a first-strike capability is being built up with cruise missiles, we have to ponder why the United States needs the SDI when it is known that the Soviet Union bases its strategic forces, its retaliation, on intercontinental ballistic missiles which account for 70% of its nuclear potential. This should be thought about. Well, they may say that the question of strategic offensive weapons, as I have just described it, is a question of the moment, and that it will not be of general importance if agreement is reached on the need to reduce offensive strategic weapons. Both sides, they state, proceed from the assumption that a 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons is possible, and have made proposals accordingly.

Let us, however, look at how the United States proposes to effect that 50% reduction. The draft treaty tabled, to which Mr. Ilft referred yesterday, contains a provision that, in essence, legalizes continuation of the arms race, including the arms race over intercontinental ballistic missiles. That is achieved in the most elementary and simple manner. The United States draft treaty permits the construction of additional ICBM silos. What does that mean? It means an increase in capability concurrently with a reduction, an increase in capability to
deploy additional ICBM's i.e. the very missiles that the United States declares to be the most dangerous first-strike vehicles.

Turning to the second question, that of cruise missiles, the United States has not shown any willingness at all to place any limitations on sea-based cruise missiles, although agreement was reached in Reykjavik on the need to limit the numbers of this form of strategic offensive weapon. I very well remember the statements previously made by Mr. Nitze, to whom reference has also been made here today, to the effect that with sea-based cruise missiles the United States would surround the Soviet Union like a bear in a swamp. We should not like to be in the position of a bear in a swamp prodded on all sides by pitchforks in the form of cruise missiles. There you have the talk about the lofty aims that the SDI programme could pursue, and what is actually being done in the arms race in the United States and in the negotiations with us in Geneva. We consider that the present time is a unique moment for taking the opportunity that emerged at Reykjavik, and really setting about the reduction of strategic offensive weapons and the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe. For that, however, it is essential to guarantee the stability of the strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, which cannot be done if the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems is destroyed, as is projected by the United States.

I agree with those who have said today that this is the cornerstone of the whole system of the limitation and reduction of strategic and other nuclear weapons. If we destroy this basis, we shall destroy the very possibility of proceeding to the reduction and elimination of offensive weapons, as discussed here.

We are for a 50% reduction of strategic offensive weapons over the next 5 years. For that, however, we must agree that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems be observed precisely and in full for a minimum of at least 10 years. To that end we are prepared to reach agreement with the United States on a common approach, on a common understanding of the limits on work of various kinds in the area of anti-missile defence that could not be exceeded in observing the Treaty. We are prepared to discuss such a uniform interpretation and, as was stated today by Comrade Rodionov, we do have the opportunity here of determining precise and clear limits for the subsequent guidance of the parties. Consequently, we are proposing a concrete programme, and we hear in reply general arguments on the need to make the changeover from reliance on nuclear offensive weapons to reliance on defensive weapons. At the same time, however, we encounter negotiating positions that completely contradict that approach. We hope that these negotiating positions will be modified and that there will really be the possibility of
proceeding to the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

I should like to take this opportunity to briefly reply to the questions raised at the close of the second session by Mr. Lellouche. How can a new security system be created to replace the system in Europe based on nuclear weapons? This programme, a programme for the creation of European security, cannot, of course, be implemented in half a year or a year, but will obviously require several years. Nevertheless, an approach to this programme can be made if real interest is shown in the elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe because they constitute the main danger for Europeans. There is a substitute for security based on nuclear weapons, a security which I could only qualify by the use of inverted commas. It could be approached with the object of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe by a staged elimination, starting with the medium-range missiles of the USSR and the USA and with tactical missiles, going on to the elimination of tactical weapons in Europe, by now with the participation of the other European nuclear powers, and subsequently the elimination of what Great Britain and France call their strategic potential along with the elimination of the then remaining nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union. In a parallel approach conventional armaments and conventional forces would be reduced, leading to the situation that I described yesterday as one in which it would be impossible for NATO and the Warsaw Pact to mount offensive operations. We propose a programme of this kind, and we are prepared to proceed with it.

I should like to draw attention to one more factor, that of verification. We consider that verification acquires ever increasing significance, and becomes a guarantee of security when nuclear weapons are being heavily reduced, and even more so when they are being eliminated, and when conventional armaments are being reduced. This is a new and previously non-existent function, one that is emerging and should be strengthened. Through comprehensive and penetrating verification we can achieve a situation in which security can be guaranteed, even in the absence of the nuclear weapons that have been said here today to have guaranteed the security of Europe for 40 years, although I do not agree with that statement. I repeat even in the absence of nuclear weapons we could rely upon the security of every participant in the Europe-wide process being completely ensured.

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Michael Intriligator

I would like to point out with regard to SDI, that the concept of the Strategic Defence Initiative has several possible interpretations, and I would like to suggest four different interpretations.

The first interpretation comes from President Reagan's March 23, 1983 speech in which he talked about a type of national shield that would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete". It would provide complete protection of some sort. A second interpretation, what I might call SDI II, is protecting retaliatory capabilities, particularly ICBMs, given a possible "window of vulnerability", I might mention that that is even a more serious problem for the Soviet Union than it is for the United States. A third possible interpretation would be initiatives that would be allowed under the 1972 ABM Treaty under what is sometimes called in the US the strict interpretation (which I believe is the correct interpretation). Even under that strict interpretation it would be possible, for example, for the United States to revive its Grand Forks, North Dakota ABM system that protects part of its missile fields. The fourth and final interpretation of SDI, and the one that I would favour, would be a type of system that would allow for joint co-operative activities between the United States and the Soviet Union that would enable them to deal with a threat they both face, namely the threat of possible accidents, third parties, nuclear terrorism, and other such possibilities. If we could develop on a joint basis a way to deal with those contingencies through some kind of defensive system, I believe it could be an important confidence-building measure. Obviously such a system would require an appropriate amendment to the ABM Treaty but we've done that once before, and it could be done again within the framework of the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty. So I would like to suggest these different interpretations of SDI and a specific proposal for consideration with regard to SDI, namely, this joint co-operative way of looking at strategic defenses that would deal with certain contingencies that are not dealt with elsewhere.

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Steve Larrabee

Much of the discussion so far, and particularly the discussion in the United States, has tended to focus on the technological feasibility of SDI and the technologies involved rather than what I would consider to be the more important issues of the strategic and political implications. It seems to me it is useful and necessary to step back and recognize that
the fundamental issue is in fact one of political management. That is to say, how are both sides going to manage their competition - particularly in outer space - in the near and medium term? In my view, there needs to be a greater emphasis on this political dimension of working out a stable framework for relations. As Michael Intriligator has already mentioned, we are dealing, in fact, with two SDI's. SDI-I, which is President Reagan's vision, and deals with population defence, would replace deterrence and involve technologies which will not be ready for several decades. SDI-II, involves defense of missile silos; it is designed, at least by some of its theorists, to enhance deterrence and involves technologies which may be ready, and I emphasize may, within the next decade. What is needed is an agreed strategy on how to deal with the problem of strategic defence. This is quite different from an agreed strategy on deploying strategic defences, as the Reagan Administration has suggested in order to investigate and see whether some defensive technologies may help to enhance deterrence while at the same time avoiding a destabilizing offence/defence race. This will require a new approach on both sides. You can call it "New Thinking", "Common Security" or any other term you like, but the basic requirement is that both sides recognize that they are, as Pierre Morel said "married". That is, that the security of both sides is linked and that the two sides cannot resolve the security problems they face, especially those related to strategic defence, without greater mutual cooperation both implicit and explicit, both formal and informal. Both sides, in other words, need to develop a security regime which seeks to stabilize the competition. This will require greater cooperation and less unilateralism on both sides. This is as true for INF where co-operative methods for verification will be needed, as for SDI. This means that certain unilateral constraints will often be necessary and that in fact one side or the other will have to give up temporary and transitory advantages. The example of MIRV should serve as a lesson. In the SALT I negotiations the United States refused to put constraints on MIRV despite the warnings of the scientific community that any advantage would be temporary and probably be highly destabilizing. Four or five years later in the mid-70s the Soviet Union went forward with its own effort to MIRV its heavy missiles, which resulted in the growing invulnerability of America's land-based missile force. Had the United States looked ahead and recognized that any advantage would have only been temporary, and had it been willing to put constraints on MIRV, some of these problems could have been avoided. We are at somewhat the same crossroads today, and we need to recognize that whatever advantages are likely to come from SDI, if they are pursued unilaterally, they are likely to be only temporary. What is needed then is an agreed strategy, a political strategy, to deal with this problem. Let me suggest in the few seconds remaining some guidelines for such a strategy.
First, research on SDI should be continued - but within the framework of the ABM Treaty. At the same time both sides need to clarify certain grey areas within the ABM Treaty, particularly what constitutes a "component" and what are the boundaries between research and development. I welcome Dr. Rodionov's intervention, which I think made a useful contribution in this regard. Second, a moratorium on any kind of development and testing for 10 years. Third, that the issue of deployment be discussed at the end of the 10 year period. This is quite different, obviously, from the proposal made by the United States at Reykjavik. In other words, there would be no agreement to go forward, as proposed by the United States. Instead both sides would look at the experience of the 10 past years and at the end of that period decide jointly how to further proceed. This moratorium would not, I underline, inhibit the type of testing of SDI-I which involves technologies which will not be available for much longer than 10 years. It might affect technologies for SDI-II, although that is a matter of dispute, and as Jim Dougherty pointed out in his contribution, there is much debate about this in the United States. Secondly, it would provide a predictable framework for co-operation as well as competition. It would buy time for both countries to work out a political framework for dealing with SDI while allowing each to engage in research to see whether defensive technologies can in any way contribute to greater arms control stability. And finally, it would allow both sides to move forward with the important issue of deep cuts in strategic offensive forces. In other words, what one would be doing is postponing any major decisions on SDI, trying to work out further steps in joint co-operation and agreement while at the same time moving forward with cuts in offensive systems.

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Ellis Morris

In view of the previous interventions, some of my statements may be slightly repetitive but I will try to be brief.

First, I would like to thank Ambassador Morel and Mr. Jasani for their kind references to the Canadian PAXSAT concept. The Canadian PAXSAT concept will be introduced formally and more capably next week to the Conference on Disarmament, but I would like to say a few words concerning the topic. The PAXSAT concept is one of multilateral satellite verification; both space to space verification and space to Earth verification. There are significant differences between these concepts and the proposals made by France for an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA).
Specifically, the Canadian satellites were envisaged in the context of a future treaty on arms control. The space to space verification satellite would be used in the context of a treaty preventing the deployment of weapons in outer space. We felt that this space to space verification would be less intrusive and therefore more acceptable than the prelaunch inspection which was mentioned earlier in this session. The space to Earth verification was conceived in the context of a possible agreement for reduction of conventional forces in Europe or as a possible additional verification device for confidence and security-building measures in Europe. At the same time there are a number of problems which have arisen in the concept of the PAXSAT satellite which are similar to those which were raised in the debate concerning ISV R, more specifically, the problems of cost and the exceedingly difficult problem of access to and distribution of data procured by the satellites. These are issues to which we may devote more attention and more study both at this Conference and at the Conference on Disarmament.

I also would like to emphasize a point made by Ambassador Morel earlier in this session, that we do not allow debate over the possible space shield to overshadow or distract from more immediate multilateral concerns in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this context I would mention a few points. First, the need to strengthen the registration convention of 1975 and, more importantly, the need to provide for the protection of satellites of third parties. This protection should be both from the use of force and also protection from electronic or optical interference with the functioning of these satellites. An anti-satellite weapon ban is important in this context, but it is not the only issue which must be addressed.

Finally, I wish to address some remarks made by Ambassador Bayart who emphasized the need for new conventions and new efforts to be made in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In part I agree with this, but at the same time I feel that it is necessary to reach an agreed understanding or interpretation of the existing body of international law governing outer space so that we may determine what is in fact prohibited and what is in fact allowed under these conventions. There is a need for agreed definitions and this was highlighted by Ambassador Bayart's comments that the use of space must be reserved for peaceful and military purposes. Until we have a definition of what constitutes "military" use of space we can have no agreement on what will constitute "peaceful" uses of space and how we may appropriately legislate such use.
Edward Ifft

In this session we heard three thoughtful papers and a number of other interesting comments from various speakers. I would like to make a few remarks about the US position on this question, because it is sometimes misunderstood.

First of all, what is the SDI programme? As has been stated, it is a research programme to see whether a greater reliance on strategic defence would lead to greater stability and less risk of nuclear war. The US SDI programme is being conducted under the so-called narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. There has been no decision regarding deployment of elements of the SDI programme and the US Government has made clear that no such decision is possible this year or next year. Furthermore, I want to make clear that the United States does not seek military superiority through SDI. Second, the United States does not seek to develop offensive capabilities in the SDI programme. Thirdly, the United States does not seek an arms race in space, particularly not an offensive/defensive arms race which, as Professor Dougherty pointed out this morning, would be the worst kind of arms race. We have a mandate for the Geneva negotiations, which was agreed at the highest level, that our task is to terminate the arms race on Earth and avoid an arms race in space. How do we propose to avoid this arms race in space? There are several elements to the US proposals and approach. First of all, to meet Soviet concerns, we are offering not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying systems which would otherwise be prohibited by that Treaty until 1994, provided of course that there is agreement and implementation on 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms. We are proposing that there be a new treaty to take account of the new technologies which are emerging which could lead to a jointly managed transition to a greater reliance upon defences. Now we heard this morning that the Soviet Union is not prepared to engage in an effort to have such a joint transition. This is a difficult point, a serious disagreement between the two sides at the present time, and a mutually acceptable solution obviously will have to be found. Ambassador Morel proposed in his report, as I understand it, that we should use the ABM Treaty as our starting point and then develop further agreements to take account of new technologies and to bring us into future periods. If I understand correctly what Ambassador Morel was proposing, that is in fact the approach which we are taking in Geneva.

There are two other elements to the US approach which are intended to help avoid ambiguities and suspicions, and I ought to stress that such concerns are not at present only on one side. The United States also has concerns about what is going on in Soviet laboratories and at Soviet test ranges in this area of advanced strategic defence. The two ideas which we
have are first the idea of open laboratories whereby the two sides could visit relevant laboratories on each other's territory in order to understand better the purpose of the research which is going on. For example, to satisfy themselves that these activities are not directed at developing offensive capabilities. Secondly, we are offering what we call a predictability package in order to help the other side, to help each side be able to predict what the situation will be with regard to strategic defence in the future, and I think it is important that each side be able to do that. One of the purposes, one of the benefits, of the offensive agreements is to be able to predict the offensive environment in the future, and it is legitimate to want to also understand what the defensive environment will be. The predictability package could, for example, involve exchange of information about plans, it could also involve the opportunity to observe certain tests.

I would like to make three brief comments about the paper presented today by Dr. Rodionov. First of all regarding the technical parameters. It seems to me these are interesting from a scientific point of view, but at the present time the United States does not see a need for such parameters. There is already in existence an extensive body of international law governing activities in the area of ballistic missile defence. I have in mind, of course, the ABM Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The second comment is that I welcome the forthcoming attitude toward verification shown by Dr. Rodionov regarding both prelaunch and in-orbit forms of verification. It is conceivable that these ideas could eventually play some role in the solution to the problem we are discussing. But, perhaps they are somewhat premature at the present time. First, one must establish what it is that we are trying to limit and trying to allow and that, of course, is what we are doing in Geneva. After we have done that, then we can engage in the problem of how to verify those agreed constraints. The third comment relates to the idea that if there is no sword one does not need a shield. In other words, if one is somehow able to do away with all strategic ballistic missiles, why would one need to be interested in defence against ballistic missiles? It seems to me that this approach is a little bit too simple for two reasons. First of all it seems to me that a world free of nuclear weapons is a very long term goal and not the basis for any sort of rational current military planning. Secondly, even if such a goal could be achieved, I think that one would need some kind of insurance policy against the possibility of violations. After all, if you have a world of many hundreds of ballistic missiles, an extra 10 somewhere are not of great concern. But if you have a world in which there are supposed to be no ballistic missiles, then an extra 10 could make a very great difference indeed. Thus, even if there is an agreement to have no ballistic missiles at some time in the future, it would still be rational to think about strategic defence as a means of
enhancing confidence in compliance with that agreement. Now, of course, the kind of defence that one would want to think about would be quite different if you are talking about a world with thousands of ballistic missiles, or hundreds of ballistic missiles, or no ballistic missiles. I think that's obvious.

I just want to make one final comment to note that there is an angle to this question which I have never quite understood myself. There is a great deal of analysis about the offence/defense relationship as it applies to strategic ballistic missiles. Why do not the same considerations apply to heavy bombers and air defense? Or let me put it another way. The Soviet Union has an enormous system—an enormous investment—in air defences. Now if work in the United States to counter Soviet ballistic missiles is a cause for concern—if that is a problem for stability—why is not Soviet activity in the area of countering US heavy bombers also in the same category? After all heavy bombers are a very important part of the US retaliatory force—one important leg of the Triad—and I think an aspect of the Triad of growing importance to the Soviet side as well. So, that is a kind of theoretical problem which I wish someone would give some thought to in the course of the scholarly work that goes on in this area. There is a great deal I could say further, but I will stop here.

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Genrikh Trofimenko

I think that what Mr. Ifft has just said about needing to consider the relation between offensive and defensive systems, not only as between missiles and anti-missiles defences, but also as between bombers and anti-aircraft defences, is legitimate and should certainly be considered if we are to examine this whole range of questions. In principle, however, I am unable to agree with the American interpretation of their deployment of an anti-missile defence system in space, as the absence of an arms race. The point is that it is, of course, difficult to expect anything permanent in this world. Everything is temporary. When Dr. Larrabee says MIRVs were a temporary monopoly of the United States, it is obvious that the SDI will also be a temporary monopoly. This temporary monopoly is, however, the aim of the United States, the whole crux of the matter being to achieve a definite superiority. If we approach the problem philosophically, what does an attempt to pursue SDI mean? It is an attempt once again to break away and pursue superiority, an attempt that did not succeed for offensive weapons, the state of the art being such that outstripping is impossible. Therefore, let us try the defence approach. So we are now being told by Professor Dougherty and others that if
only the Soviet Union will follow the same line, i.e. will also turn to the defence approach, all will be well. Should, however, the Soviet Union compete in some other way, it will be bad for the Soviet Union, for the world and so on. No one, however, denies that this is military competition. What I want to ask is whether, given such a philosophy, the competition will cease if, let us assume, the Soviet Union encroaches on the American ground and also proceeds to deploy an anti-missile defence system in space. Will that be the end of the matter? When both sides have a system deployed will it all end there? Given the American philosophy, a further burst will then be necessary, because America must always be one stage ahead. It is not I who say that, but Dr. Kissinger. There is not, so he says, any final destination. I have only one thing to add to Dr. Kissinger, which is that there is undoubtedly a final destination, but it is reached after the end of civilization.

If we continue our rivalry with such a philosophy and fail to destroy the world in this round, we shall certainly do so in the next. Furthermore, if we do not destroy it militarily, we shall do so ecologically. We are told that things were bad before, that previously there was deterrence through mutual assured destruction, but that here there will be mutual assured survival or, as Mr. Bush puts it, what will be under threat will not be human lives, but missiles. What, however, is happening to reciprocity? Beginning in 1962, or even earlier, in the time of McNamara, the Americans lectured us that mutual assured destruction was a wonderfully stabilizing thing, deterrence through mutual assured destruction. The Soviet Union is able to destroy the United States, and the United States is able to destroy the Soviet Union, so consequently ideal stability ensues. All that reciprocity only existed, however, while there was no real reciprocity, while there was fictitious reciprocity. The United States could have destroyed the Soviet Union by a first strike, and there could no longer have been a Soviet retaliatory strike. As soon as the Soviet Union achieved that reciprocity in the seventies, the Americans lost interest in the concept. Now we are being tempted with mutual assured survival, but will it not be the same with mutual assured survival as it was with mutual assured destruction? As soon as the Soviet Union has developed its systems, the Americans will go further. But let us assume, let us make the hypothetical assumption that the two sides have deployed these impenetrable shields, and that even so there is a failure at some point in time and the offensive weapons begin to fire against each other, 20000 warheads, for example. They will, however, be impotent, powerless, and they will all be destroyed and fall to earth without detonating, all 20000 of them. What will happen to the world in such a scenario when all 20000 warheads have been neutralized by the blows of the opposing systems and have all fallen to earth? What will it be like? Since Chernobyl it is
easy to imagine what it will be like. It will be just the same, the death of the world by means of these very systems. It is this philosophy of an interminable race that we are opposing.

It is a "pretext" to say that it is defensive, it is offensive. For the 40 years up to the present we have also striven between the defensive and the offensive. Our so-called anti-aircraft systems have also been neutralized on several occasions by various American discoveries, and the latest American bomber, "Stealth", is another attempt to overcome the anti-aircraft system. It will be the same with the anti-missile defence system in space. Therefore, unless we reject this philosophy of overtaking each other, we shall be playing a very dangerous game with the world. In that respect, we have heard many statements here concerning the two superpowers. What I want to state is that one of the superpowers is now saying let us be done with this philosophy, let us proceed differently, while the other superpower is saying, on different grounds, no, we shall continue.

Naturally, Mr. Ifft says, we have to leave some systems intact in case terrorists should start to operate, and Professor Dougherty says the same. That, however, is a matter that can be agreed upon. We each have 100 anti-missiles at the present, and we might not remove them; to be on the safe side, we might leave them against terrorism; and so on. That is no problem, we can reach agreement on that. What we do have to reach agreement on, however, is the halting of the arms race. Furthermore, there must be an end to continuous one-sided interpretation, because God knows where such interpretations may lead. There is a clear mandate for Soviet-American negotiations to halt the arms race on the ground and to prevent it in space. The interpretation placed upon that by the American side is that we shall prevent an arms race in space if the Soviet Union and the United States together begin to construct an anti-missile defence system in space, so that there will not be any race. That is the American interpretation; it is against common sense, but nevertheless, it is the interpretation.

Well, we can go a very long way with such an interpretation, but I am afraid that if we now start out to arrive at all kinds of detailed definitions as to what can be done and what cannot, to what extent something can be done and what is impossible, we shall increasingly become involved again in competition in space, and even if it is now under more restricted rules, we shall nevertheless be involved. We shall once again be drawn imperceptibly into a new round of the arms race and we shall once again be interpreting what we wrote down and what we did not. There must, undoubtedly, be a role here for some sort of interpretation, perhaps in the manner referred to by Professor Rodionov, i.e. to define what is clearly military activity in space, and to establish some international
standard. This is military activity, and if you deploy this kind of laser or this kind of system you are committing an infringement. In short, and in conclusion, I want to say that we can halt the arms race on the ground and in space only if we act in co-operation and if we realize that neither side will succeed in tricking the other, that neither will succeed, to use a colloquial Russian word, in swindling, that the only course is to act honourably, agreeing on all steps and not permitting a further arms race. When President Reagan came out against the SALT-II Treaty he said that its main defect was that it legalized the arms race rather than prohibiting it. Therefore, he repudiated the Treaty; he infringed it. I do not want at this point to give an opinion as to whether the President was correct or incorrect. In practice, however, and I am finishing, what President Reagan said in Reykjavik was, let us insert the same fatal flaw into a new agreement, let us halt the arms race on the ground but permit it in space. Consequently, the American position is contrary to the position of President Reagan himself, if that position has been correctly interpreted.

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Jan Siccama

I would like to make a brief comment on Professor Dougherty's paper and in addition ask him a question. The comment is that his paper is rather ambiguous or perhaps I should say vague in its conclusions. On the one hand, and this would be in line with his advocacy of nuclear deterrence of the second session, he seems to support only terminal or point defences, improving the invulnerability of ICBM's, thus stabilizing mutual deterrence. On the other hand, however, today he said that space-based defences are worth exploring and he even did not rule out the desirability of President Reagan's dream to make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, although he said that it would take a very long time to convince people that this fully protective shield would be a desirable objective. Ideas about the desired offence/defence mix are important because they can stimulate or cut off some research on development in strategic defences in some directions. This is the reason why I am not very happy, in fact I am disappointed, about the attitude of several west European governments refusing to make an evaluation of the strategic setting which is desirable after introduction of strategic defences by one or both sides. Professor Dougherty likewise seems to leave all options, and in my view too many options, open in research and development. This seems to contradict his suggestion that he wants to restrict SDI to terminal defences, improving the invulnerability of ICBM's.
My question refers to the consistency, or perhaps it is the inconsistency, between his remarks on the instability of a non-nuclear world he made yesterday and his rather conciliatory attitude towards President Reagan's dream he presented this morning. I think he presented the most adverse consequences of President Reagan's dream this morning. I think the most adverse consequences of President Reagan's initiative for Europe are caused by the President's introduction of the norm of invulnerability. This is a very important requirement he has introduced. This is new in SDI. Perhaps for the United States a high degree of invulnerability is attainable. For Western Europe, however, that is impossible. The West European allies of the United States will always remain vulnerable to conventional warfare, to tanks and aircrafts. Those are a much greater threat to Western Europe than SS-20s, 21s, 22s and 23s. We will remain vulnerable to nuclear or conventional (non-nuclear) mass destruction and blackmail by the Soviet Union. The reason is simply that the Federal Republic and the Benelux do not possess nuclear weapons themselves. If Professor Dougherty remains convinced of the desirability of nuclear deterrence, coupling between American and West European security requires that ultimately American strategic nuclear forces should protect Western Europe, I would like to ask him whether the logic of his intervention of yesterday does not dictate that SDI should be restricted to strengthening instead of replacing deterrence, implying for example that the ABM Treaty should be maintained (at the maximum of strategic defences such that you protect some ICBM fields; furthermore for example ICBM's should be de-MIRV'ed). So the question is whether he still adheres to the traditional nuclear deterrence doctrine, requiring that retaliatory means are invulnerable but societies remain vulnerable, or that he supports Reagan's version of SDI.

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Alexei Arbatov

I should like to comment on some of the statements made at this session. Firstly, it was said that what the SDI programme was intended to be had changed; that previously astrodomes had been envisaged, but that now the defence of strategic forces is envisaged, or let us say that there are alternative tasks facing this programme. Analysis of the specific projects being developed shows that aims of this kind do not really significantly affect the programme, if we consider the appropriations and distribution of funds among separate blocks of programmes and experiments in the next eight years up to 1995. Most of the projects are still intended for means of surveillance in space, for target tracking and interception, to a large extent using space based new physical principles. In
1988, for example, only two of the 14 experiments that are to be carried out under the SDI programme can be classified as concerned with defence or hard point objects of the strategic forces. Greatly stretching the point a third may be included. Consequently, no more than three of the 14 are thus concerned; the others are intended to develop technology for large scale territorial multilayered defense with space elements.

Turning now to the statement of Mr. Ifft that the United States is opposed to the development of offensive space weapons. The point is that, should the arms race be carried into space, it would be very difficult, to all intents and purposes, to discriminate between an offensive and defensive weapon system, and even to discriminate between an anti-missile system and some others. I am no longer speaking about the underlying strategic reason for all this, about the fact that an anti-missile defensive system can be used for offensive purposes, to protect against a retaliatory strike of the other side. Even from the purely technical point of view, it will be very hard to differentiate.

Mr. Ifft went on to say that the United States was against an arms race in space, and for the joint development of anti-missile systems in space. Such a formulation of the question seems to me to be a very great simplification. It is difficult to believe that joint activity of this kind would be possible; first of all, there is no shareable secret in the sphere of anti-missile systems in space, nor in offensive strategic arms. What exists is the totality of a huge amount of varied technology and devices, and to share them with the other side would above all help that side to take countermeasures. In addition, I state that the Soviet Union does not need the United States to share secrets of that kind. Were we suddenly to decide to create such an anti-missile defence system, it would be quite a different one from that of the United States, if only because our strategic situation is quite different. The strategic forces of the United States differ quite appreciably from ours, and we are threatened not only by the strategic missiles of the United States but by other nuclear systems. We have to bear in mind that there cannot be a universal and ultimate anti-missile defence; such defence will be tailored to strictly determined weapon systems. There is a great difference even in whether you rely, let us say, on anti-missile system in space against ICBMs and SLBMs using a solid-fueled or liquid-fueled engines.

But the most important point is that the Soviet Union is resolutely taking a different approach. Should the United States create an anti-missile defence system with elements in space, our response will be asymmetrical. We do not intend to create an anti-missile system in space, and our response will be given more rapidly and at less cost. These are no idle words.
The point is that the SDI really does embody one fundamental paradox. The SDI seemingly contains the seeds of its own impotence, because most of the projects being developed under that programme, including weapons depend on new physical principles. If they are developed also by the other side, they can be used against elements of anti-missile defence in space. They may, however, be developed far more rapidly, at a lesser cost, and more effectively. In that context there are a number of objective facts in astrodynamics, in the functioning of a directed energy weapons, that favour the side wishing to counter anti-missile defence.

In conclusion, I wish to comment on the idea that anti-missile defence in space would be needed even in a world from which ballistic missiles had been eliminated, i.e. in case of cheating, or against some other powers, or against terrorists. This seems to me the most improbable of all the myths thought up around the strategic defence initiative, because should the anti-missile systems of the two sides remain in space, even if they are very limited they will be, above all, powerful weapons against each other. Dr. Rodionov has already spoken about that here. Besides it is quite difficult to break an agreement and once again produce ballistic missiles against which the anti-missile defence is intended. Ballistic missiles are the most costly, capital intensive delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads. If somebody wanted to break such an agreement, or if terrorists decided to acquire nuclear weapons, the very last thing they would do, would be to develop or acquire ballistic missiles. It would be as difficult for terrorists to create ballistic missiles as to build an atomic power plant. It therefore seems to me that more sophisticated means of guarding against the violation of an agreement of that kind would be needed in a world without ballistic missiles, strategic forces and nuclear weapons.

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David Emery

There are a few points made by previous speakers during this session that I think need some rejoinder. First of all let me say, that although most of the presentations I found to be very interesting and very thoughtful, there have been a few comments and some tone which I personally feel somewhat less than helpful. First of all, we have heard a considerable amount of gloom and doom expressed by some including Ambassador Karpov to the extent that it is not likely that we will be able to achieve an agreement, that it is a long way off, that there are obstacles and the like and I think our side would prefer to be
optimistic. I think we would prefer to assume that the United States and the Soviet Union between them have enough goodwill and enough common sense to overcome even difficult philosophical and other obstacles which we all recognize stand in the way when there are disagreements of great importance. But for our part we believe that agreements in INF and START and even in space and defence are possible if we are willing to consider the ideas of each side and give them due consideration and reflect fully on the seriousness and the merit of the arguments themselves. Second, I must regret what I consider to be a rather frantic attack on US motives that we heard from Mr. Trofimenko. I am certain that he feels very strongly about the differences between his country and mine on the matter of deterrence, but I have to underscore that we have no intention of seeking military superiority over the Soviet Union. Those days are gone and I think that any reasonable person in the United States or in the Soviet Union recognizes that for either side to seek military superiority is to proceed down a very dangerous road. I think both the United States and the Soviet Union have overcome some old biases and some old inclinations and that I think has been very much underscored by the progress that General-Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan have made in recent meetings, and by the fact that both sides have been able to agree in principle on deep reductions to proceed as we have, quite a way down the road toward an INF agreement. It seems to me that we ought not to simply use a frantic statement and attacks of that kind on the motives and the intent in the purpose of either the strategy of the East or the strategy of the West when in fact we are closer now in my opinion than we have been in many years in putting many of these differences behind us and reaching out to that goal that has eluded us for real agreement that in fact can make the world safer. Well, enough of that. I do not want to dwell on the points of contention. But I would like to make a couple of points on specific issues which I think are important.

As I said we have no aggressive intentions towards the Soviet Union. We do not seek military superiority and we feel very strongly that both sides have proven the fact that they have been able to go beyond those old ideas with the willingness to sit down seriously in Geneva and Reykjavik and other places to discuss these matters. As Mr. Ift has mentioned, we do not intend to violate the ABM agreement in the process of developing our ideas on strategic defence. We are now following what we believe to be correct in the broadly understood interpretation or I should say a widely understood interpretation of the ABM Treaty, and we do not intend by slight of hand or by tricky words or clever interpretations to violate the purpose of that agreement at least until such time as we have had an opportunity to sit down with our Soviet colleagues and debate the whole matter of offence and defence and strategic defence very, very thoroughly. And that brings me to the final point which I want
to make. There has been a lot of toing and froing in discussions today about dire consequences and black motives attributed to the United States with respect to the strategic defence initiative. But we believe that the time has come for the United States and the Soviet Union to seriously discuss the questions of space and defence. We regret that that serious discussion has not happened today. We think there is every reasonable need for representatives at the expert level and political level in both countries to sit down and thoroughly understand where the future of this technology is going to lead us. As much as we may wish, this technology is not simply going to evaporate and fly away. It is with us, as nuclear weapons are with us and as we go into the 21st century and beyond there will be other technologies as well, that we as people in a technical age must learn to understand and manage. The best way to guarantee the survival of our society is not simply to rely on the old ideas of threat, of annihilation but instead to reach out beyond those threats to the possibility of using maybe for the first time in history our technological capabilities and our intellect to make the world safer. If we develop the means to manage the goal for strategic defence technology, if we have a way of understanding its implications for arms control and stability and military balance or deterrence, then I think we have a hope of turning that technology as it grows to our advantage rather than to our danger. And that is really the heart of President Reagan's concept of Strategic Defence Initiative. It is not some means to gain some temporary or ephemeral advantage in military matters, but instead to learn for the first time the managing of technology before it manages us. If we had taken that course of action in the late 1940s, with respect to nuclear weapons, and I am speaking of the Baruch Plan we may have found ourselves in a much different situation with respect to nuclear technologies than we are in today. But here is an opportunity for us to reach out beyond our fears and our biases to develop ways to manage our future rather than to allow these technologies to manage us as they evolve.

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Rikhi Jaipal

I am not going to speak about the American dream or the Russian nightmare, I am duly impressed by both, but I am going to speak about Indian scepticism. I seem to sense among the various participants two different attitudes of mind or two contradictory syndromes. One prefers to maintain peace through radical measures of disarmament subject to verification, while the other would rather maintain peace on the basis of nuclear deterrence. The former is regarded by some as utopian while the latter is considered by others as practical and in keeping with
the quest for further knowledge through science and technology.

To paraphrase T.S. Eliott, I hope that we shall not lose our wisdom in the pursuit of new knowledge. I am referring in particular to the SDI Programme which is at present a research programme. As I see it, we have so far had the sword of Damocles hanging over our heads and if the SDI becomes feasible, we may then acquire in addition the shield of Damocles. I am not sure whether this will increase the prospects of world peace or enhance the risks of war.

Professor Dougherty’s advice to the Soviet Union seems to be to balance defence with defence, which, if I am not mistaken would mean that the Soviet Union should also acquire its own shield of Damocles. Now if the objective of the current negotiations is to reduce substantially the nuclear arsenals of both during the remaining years of this century, why then develop an expensive shield against rapidly diminishing levels of missiles with nuclear weapons. Are shields to be used to deter other shields when there is nothing else to deter? What disturbs me particularly is the startling conclusion of Professor Dougherty in the last sentence of his paper, that the political campaign for disarmament will fuel the drive for the SDI. I was rather under the impression that the presence of large offensive missiles was the reason for the SDI programme, and not the campaign for nuclear disarmament.

But having said that, it seems to me, however, that in any case the SDI will go forward, because there is a fatal fascination with the challenges of science and the vision of peace through deterrence from space. There has been a good deal of support here for the policy of nuclear deterrence. I personally have no objection to deterrence as such. For that has been the law for the survival of man since the beginning of his history. But, when the means of deterrence threatens to wipe out mankind as a whole, is it not then time to look for other non-military means of preserving peace? I say this because the only occasion when the nuclear weapon was effective was when it was actually used against Japan. That ended the war and it also had the effect of making Japan renounce nuclear weapons. Since then the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence has not really been tested.

We may say and we have been saying so to ourselves that peace in Europe has been preserved by the nuclear deterrent. I should like to think that it is the good sense and wisdom of the peoples and leaders of eastern and western Europe that has preserved peace rather than the nuclear deterrent. In other words, like beauty deterrence is in the eyes of the beholder. And as you know, the beholder is never going to tell you what it is that will deter him. If deterrence is put to the test, I am
afraid that it may fail more often than not. For that is the
lesson that I learn from the history of mankind.

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James Dougherty

I thank Ambassador Jaipal for his calm words of wisdom to
us which we should take to heart. Coming to Professor
Trofimenko's remarks, it seems to me that he is not talking
about deterrence. I agree with some of your analysis, Henry,
but the two Superpowers (or at least each other and our allies)
did sell the world on deterrence, and now you seem to be talking
about something else. You are talking mainly not about
deterrence and the outbreak of war. The United States up to now
has relied upon offensive capabilities for deterrence, but the
American people have become increasingly morally repelled by the
concept of threatening populations in order to maintain peace.
The American people do not want to continue piling up arsenals
of offensive weapons and we have been slowing down the
development of offensive capabilities. We do not want to keep
threatening populations. We are becoming more interested in
shifting the basis of deterrence from the threat of assured
destruction to a more hopeful strategy of assured survival for
our own Society and for Yours as well. As I pointed out in my
report, SDI has had the effect of damping Congressional
enthusiasm both for MK and Midgetmen.

What will be needed in the future is a new type of
deterrence which would be strong at high levels of offensive
weapons and would become even stronger as you go down the ladder
of the offensive weapons capabilities into an
offensive/defensive mix. The United States certainly has no
intention of procuring strategic defence in order to go to war,
or to strive for any kind of superiority.

As for Professor Siccama's comment, I admit that my
ambiguity actually crossed my mind yesterday when I made that
intervention. The transition will be difficult. Ground based
and kinetic energy systems in the short term can enhance
deterrence by increasing the uncertainty in the minds of
potential aggressors as to which first-strike warheads could ever
penetrate to their targets. But the important point is to
convince ourselves that the move to the new regime should be
slow, gradual and non-provocative over a fairly long period of
time - 10 or 15 or 20 years. There must be no sudden unilateral
increment of capability on one side or the other which would
provide an occasion for a pre-emptive attack by either side,
either by one side thinking it could strike the adversary before
the latter could take advantage of its own defence or by the
latter thinking it could take advantage of its defence to strike first and blunt a retaliatory blow. As the level of offensive weapons goes down, the world political climate, we hope, would improve measurably. Disarmament might then begin to look politically feasible. I am not sure that defence will work at the present high levels of offensive weapons. I am not even sure it will work at 50 per cent, or 40 or 30 per cent. But if we could ever negotiate down to 20 per cent or an even lower level of finite deterrence then space defence against an all-out attack might begin to look more highly effective and feasible, militarily and economically. Strategic defence will become more politically desirable and strategically essential to provide a guarantee of security in a disarming environment. As the point is approached at which the surprise attack which has hitherto been deterred might once again become thinkable, governments and their peoples, not only in the United States but elsewhere, will begin to demand defence. It was precisely that fear of reintroducing the incentive for aggression at low arms levels which made the plans for general and complete disarmament in the period 1959-1962 stillborn. If progress is to be made toward total nuclear disarmament in the next century -- and there are causes for doubt and scepticism even about that, as expressed by the late Harrison Brown, who said that after building up our capabilities in offensive weapons for 40 years, perhaps it will take more than 10 or 15 years to get rid of them and to bring about the new political structures needed for security -- strategic defence will become a prerequisite hedge against the possibility of cheating on disarmament or of breaking out of its constraints and embarking upon a course of rearmament. It will also provide a hedge against both nuclear and conventional missiles, and against the danger of an accidental launch. The dangers of accident will not disappear once we begin the disarming process and the level of apprehension and fear might even become greater. Not the campaign for disarmament but the actual process of disarmament will fuel the drive for strategic defence among many nations as an imperative of national security in the year 2000 and beyond.

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Pierre Marel

Je ferai quelques remarques ponctuelles à partir de la discussion. D'abord je note que sur l'idée d'agence spatiale ou d'agence de satellites de contrôle, on peut tirer de la discussion l'idée qu'il y a plusieurs modèles possibles. Je ne l'avais pas citée ce matin, mais effectivement il y a aussi la proposition d'organisation mondiale de l'espace venant de l'Union soviétique. Il me semble que c'est un projet qui a une tout autre dimension, et qui pose un problème de répartition des
compétences: là, les choses sont encore loin d'être claires. J'avais essayé de partir d'un point de vue concret, d'une fonction limitée qui est celle de la vérification, parce que, manifestement, il y a un intérêt accru pour les problèmes de vérification. Il me semble certes difficile d'envisager déjà la moindre activité en matière d'agence de vérification sans un minimum de support juridique. Mais l'idée d'une organisation mondiale de l'espace présuppose a fortiori un ordre juridique qui est encore bien loin d'être à notre portée, me semble-t-il. Si nous arrivons déjà à faire quelques pas limités et bien définis, ce sera un premier succès. Il me semble donc que, pour les projets de type AIEA, l'expérience d'ailleurs le montre, il faut s'appuyer d'abord sur un cadre juridique suffisant, ce qui n'est pas le cas. C'est encore plus net pour l'idée d'un corps mondial d'inspecteurs en matière spatiale. Un certain nombre de préalables sont nécessaires. A cet égard, il me semble que l'idée d'une organisation mondiale de l'espace suppose a fortiori un ordre juridique qui est encore bien loin d'être à notre portée, me semble-t-il.

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Dans l'intervention de M. Intrigilator, j'ai noté la référence à une 4ème interprétation de l'IDS, cette idée d'une coopération soviéto-américaine contre les accidents, les attaques de pays tiers ou de terroristes. Je ne peux m'empêcher de rappeler qu'il y a à cela une sorte d'origine, à savoir l'accord Nixon-Brejnev de 1973, qui essayait de traiter un peu ce genre d'hypothèses dans une logique de stabilité nucléaire. Cela dit, c'est un accord qui a gardé un caractère essentiellement politique et assez conjoncturel, et qui a aussi soulevé un certain nombre d'inquiétudes, dans la mesure où il tendait à conférer aux États-Unis et à l'Union soviétique un rôle, je dirai de gendarme ou de tuteur: c'est ce qu'on a appelé le condominium. En tout cas, si l'on va vers une telle interprétation, il est bien évident que cela suppose de la part des deux grandes puissances un accord assez fondamental sur le fonctionnement de toute une logique, celle de la défense stratégique, et je crois que ce que nous avons entendu dans le débat montre bien qu'il y a des étapes encore considérables à franchir.

J'en viens à la remarque de M. Ifft disant que la position des États-Unis est bien de partir du traité ABM comme base pour arriver à un nouvel accord. Soit, telle est sans doute l'intention; mais je constate que si l'ambition d'arriver à un tel accord existe, les désaccords sur le fond restent tels que la seule possibilité, semble-t-il, pour les États-Unis et l'URSS, est pour le moment, de prêcher à l'autre sa propre vérité. Revenant à mon exposé initial, je plairai pour un dépassement de ces philosophies contradictoires, qui s'excluent mutuellement, et pour un traitement des problèmes concrets et
immédiats qui impliquent une réflexion sur les problèmes de défense spatiale, bien sûr, mais pas sur la seule philosophie de la défense spatiale. Tant qu'on en restera à la philosophie de la défense spatiale ou à la philosophie de la désénuclearisation, on sera d'accord pour faire un très beau communiqué, comme le communiqué de Genève de janvier 1985 ou de novembre 1985 ou le communiqué de Reykjavik d'octobre 1986, mais on n'ira pas au-delà. On reprendra ensuite ces débats philosophiques auxquels nous avons droit, qui ne mènent nulle part, en tous cas jusqu'à maintenant. Il y a des scénarios intermédiaires, des besoins concrets, des contraintes technologiques qui permettent, d'une façon ou d'une autre, et ce n'est évidemment pas à nous de donner le détail, le dépassement de ces querelles d'ordre théologique, puisqu'elles reposent sur l'exclusion des conceptions de l'autre et ne se réfèrent pas directement à la réalité.

S'agissant de cette dimension théorique qui a été utilisée à plusieurs reprises dans le débat, il est vrai que l'on constate une sorte de prise de conscience aux États-Unis, le Professeur Dougherty s'y référait, et de la part de la direction soviétique, plusieurs intervenants l'ont souligné. Mais toute la question est qu'il ne s'agit pas simplement d'une question de philosophie. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de s'en prendre à ce que l'on a appelé l'idéologie nucléaire. Qui défend "l'idéologie nucléaire"? Sûrement pas les Européens; ce qui les intéresse et ce qui les concerne, c'est le fait nucléaire, c'est que cette soi-disant idéologie nucléaire qui appartiendrait au passé, elle est dans les faits, dans les milliers de têtes nucléaires qui sont braquées, contre l'Europe, et braquées contre l'autre super puissance bien sûr, mais contre l'Europe aussi, qu'il y ait accord INFS ou pas. C'est là qu'est le vrai problème. Plutôt que de prendre l'Europe comme point d'application initial de l'idéologie anti-nucléaire, je crois qu'il y a un premier examen et un premier débat sur les systèmes des super puissances. C'est bien beau de dire que les déclarations et les ouvrages du Maréchal Sokolovsky, les déclarations du Maréchal Grechko, les déclarations du Maréchal Ustinov sont périmées, mais le système qu'ils ont mis en place est toujours là, sera là encore très longtemps, et à bien des égards, si je puis une fois de plus m'exprimer en tant qu'européen, c'est ce qui nous intéresse. Tant que les deux grandes puissances n'auront pas réglé le problème de leur sur-capacité, le problème de leur redondance, développer des concepts de désénuclearisation de l'Europe restera à mon avis une opération de pure et simple politique.

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I think that everything that we have heard in this session may be summed up very briefly. Almost all speakers have stressed the importance of retaining the ABM Treaty and that seems to me to be very significant. It is also important to eliminate the uncertainties and ambiguities that have persisted in the text of the Treaty itself, or rather not in the text, not in the letter but in the spirit of the Treaty. That was why I spoke about our activity, the activity of experts from various countries in an unofficial capacity looking for ways of eliminating these uncertainties. As you are all aware, Mr. Gorbachev proposed, in a meeting with Mr. Shultz and a group of American congressmen in April, that experts from our countries should meet and discuss what constitutes research, what is permitted in space and what is prohibited. However, the official American reply, as has been confirmed by the statement of Mr. Ifft, was that these matters would not be discussed, that the time was not thought to be right. Nevertheless, we Soviet scientists and our American colleagues will continue to meet and we shall work out a scientifically based point of view. The laws of physics are the same for the USSR and the USA, and there is no point in arguing against them. In the final analysis, I am convinced that our activity is necessary and useful both for the Soviet Union and for the United States of America.

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Fourth/Quatrième Session

CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS: BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PERSPECTIVES/ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES ET CHIMIQUES : PERSPECTIVES BILATÉRALES ET MULTILATÉRALES

Reports/Rapports:
Grigory Berdennikov, Jiri Matousek, Hendrik Wagenmakers

Discussion:
Asif Ezdi, Andrei Karkozska, Sten Lundbo, Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt, Klaus-Jürgen Citron, Thomas Barthelemy, Peter Davies, Derek Boothby, Anders Boserup, Michael Intriligator Grigory Berdennikov, Jiri Matousek, Hendrik Wagenmakers

Chairman/Président:
James Dougherty
The problem that is the subject of my statement – the prohibition of chemical weapons and negotiations to produce an appropriate international convention – attracts far less attention, for quite understandable reasons, that do, let us say, the problems of a reduction of strategic offensive armaments or the prevention of the arms race in space. In that context, I especially appreciate the fact that the prohibition of chemical weapons will be a subject of our conference.

Apart from the fact that the aim of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons is the universal prohibition and destruction of a whole class of weapons of mass destruction, they are also of importance because they are negotiations in which the first contemporary multilateral convention in the disarmament field with provision for strict and effective control over fulfillment is being worked out. Much pioneering work in the field of disarmament is being accomplished in the drafting of the convention. Ways of solving questions and handling problems are being found that I am confident may be beneficially employed in future negotiations on other aspects of the limitation of armaments and disarmament. History has so arranged things that the pattern for multilateral solution of the intricate problems of disarmament is being worked out in relation to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

With that in mind, I should like to acquaint you with the state of the negotiations, to give you our assessment of the stage now reached in the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and briefly to outline the problems still to be resolved in the negotiations.

In our judgement, a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons can be concluded in the near future (early 1988 is now the most frequently mentioned time), provided that all states taking part in the negotiations manifest the political will for agreement and do not create any artificial obstacles. Our view is based on an analysis of the state of the negotiations, what has already been achieved, and what still remains to be done.

What is the actual situation that has developed in the negotiations at this time? We support the widely-held view that the turning point in the negotiations came in 1986, when the Soviet Union proposed a series of initiatives one after the other in development of the programme that it had put forward on
the 15th of January 1986 to rid mankind of nuclear and chemical weapons before the end of the century.

The set of measures proposed in April 1986 provided for a rapid commencement to the destruction of chemical weapons, a halt to the operation of installations for their production, and their eradication under strict international control. Thereafter, in October of last year, the USSR made proposals in the negotiations to remove obstacles preventing solution of a complicated question impeding the course of the negotiations - the question of how to ensure that chemical weapons were not produced by private industry. The Soviet proposal made provision for different systems for monitoring the production of the different categories of chemical substances, depending on their threat to the purposes of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In February of this year, the Soviet Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament presented a number of new proposals and arguments. It was proposed that each state participating in the Conference should declare all its stocks of chemical weapons within 30 days from the date of entry into force of a convention, indicating their location and their contents, should ensure their closing, with the establishment of systematic international on-site inspection, inter alia by the continuous use of instruments, including telemonitoring, to monitor stocks of such weapons, and should not permit such stocks to be moved other than for the purpose of their destruction. Rapid agreement on the provisions of the convention dealing with stocks of chemical weapons, their declaration and their destruction has therefore become a possibility. In addition, we have declared it to be our premise that all chemical weapons should be subject to destruction, and not to reworking. There seems to be agreement on that question.

These steps have enabled the negotiations to be radically speeded up. During the spring 1987 session important agreements were reached on, inter alia, the monitoring of chemical weapon stockpiles and the liquidation of facilities for weapon manufacture. In addition, definition of what would be regarded under the convention as a facility producing chemical weapons is also a question that is close to solution, the means for the destruction of facilities have largely been agreed, and so on. Considerable progress has been made towards solution of the important problem of not allowing the production of chemical weapons under the guise of commercial activity. Concepts have been developed for the categories of chemicals to be subject to monitoring. Lists of the substances concerned, and systems for their restriction and control worked out. The approach adopted was to occasion the minimum inconvenience to the development of the chemical industry, while at the same time providing the participants in the convention with the confidence that it will be adhered to and that no one will produce chemical weapons.
Even so, we have to recognize that the attitude of some states that do not have chemical weapons, but do have a developed chemical industry, is causing difficulties for the negotiations. Those countries fear that a convention will restrict their commercial activity.

Their fears seem groundless, especially considering that the prohibition of chemical weapons will create better conditions for the development of chemistry for peaceful purposes, and for extensive international co-operation in that sphere. That seems to be understood by many of the participants in the negotiations. I have heard the opinion expressed by various people, including some from business circles, that the chemical industry is used to state regulation and to inspections, and that international inspections will not create new insurmountable obstacles. That seems a correct approach.

It is well understood in the Soviet Union that the fate of a convention is not decided exclusively at the negotiating table, but is largely dependent on the climate in which the negotiations take place and on the confidence of the participants in the negotiations regarding the intentions of the partners. Here we consider that quite a lot remains to be done. For our part, we are taking confidence-building steps aimed at dispelling the mistrust of the West towards us.

I recall that cessation of the manufacture of chemical weapons by the USSR was announced during Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Czechoslovakia. Our leader also reported that the erection of a special plant to destroy the stocks of chemical weapons had been commenced in the Soviet Union. When that plant is operational, rapid implementation of chemical disarmament will be possible once the convention has been concluded.

In that context I wish to point out that our actions deal with the material aspect of the matter. That reflects our assessment that there is a real prospect of a convention being concluded in the near future.

Although it is by no means my intention to use the platform of this conference for a controversy with American colleagues, I cannot refrain from the comment that we do not as yet see a reciprocal aspiration on the part of the United States to create the climate of confidence conducive to the most rapid agreement of the convention. The facts speak for themselves: we halt the production of chemical weapons; the United States, conversely, prepares for the full-scale production of a new kind of such a weapon. (That, however, is not quite accurate, because the United States is already producing a 155mm shell with a binary chemical charge, and is taking steps towards the manufacture of a chemical bomb for aircraft and a missile warhead). France has also recently announced plans to begin the
production of chemical weapons. That is, of course, bound to have an adverse effect on the climate in which the negotiations are taking place, making it difficult for the negotiating parties to reconcile their positions. The result of these plans is merely to increase suspicion and disbelief in the intentions of those countries regarding the banning of chemical weapons.

I want to note the following feature. When we say that the manufacture of chemical weapons should be halted before signature of the convention, the reply that we usually get (and we were reminded of this yesterday by Mr. Barthelemy) is that the United States halted the manufacture of chemical weapons back in 1969, but the USSR, which did not at that time follow the American example, went a long way ahead while chemical weapons were not being manufactured in the United States, and that now the United States needs to catch up with us, which is why it is developing the production of binary weapons.

We think that such logic overlooks the fact that the situation on the prohibition of chemical weapons has now changed radically. The conclusion of a convention is now a fully realistic proposition; the convention is, in fact, 70-80% ready. Only two or three major questions are still outstanding.

The plans for the production of binary weapons show that the policy of the countries that produce these plans is not an open one. Given that all chemical weapons would have to be destroyed under the convention, what is the point of expending considerable resources at this time on the development and manufacture of a new generation of chemical weapons, just to have to destroy them? Consequently, the pursuit of binary weapons is bound to raise doubts about the sincerity of those countries when they say that they wish to work out and conclude a convention.

I will go further, and assert that the pursuit of binary weapons is itself creating difficulties in the negotiations because of the need to block the possible development and manufacture of binary chemical weapons. One urgent question, for example, is how, under the convention, to prohibit reliably, not only QL and DF, the known key components of binary weapons, but also possible new, and as yet unknown components.

I wish to emphasize that the problem of binary weapons arising in the United States is one for all the participants in the negotiations, including the United States itself. Although the Soviet Union is not producing any chemical weapons, just see what is written in the well-known Pentagon publication "Soviet Military Power" for 1987, from which I quote: "The Soviets are investigating binary weapons systems.... This type of system, in addition to its inherent safe handling and storage characteristics, expands the possibilities for newer agent
conclusions". It is, however, permissible to ask why, if the American side fears the Soviet measures over binary weapons, will it initiate commencement of the manufacture of these weapons? Is it not better not to let the binary genie out of the bottle, but to seal it in securely, by making effective provision in the convention to prohibit known and new key components of binary weapons? That is the course that the Soviet Union favours.

Now let me dwell upon other, as yet unresolved matters in the preparation of the convention. First, there is the problem that the convention did not embody any discriminatory elements, but was applied equally to states with a planned economy and state ownership of the means of production, and to states retaining private ownership and a free-enterprise system. This is a key question for us, one that, unless resolved, will make it scarcely possible to agree a convention. During negotiations, the matter is being dealt with in terms of "jurisdiction and control". We are in favour of the inclusion in the convention of an obligation for each participating state to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures for observance of the ban on the manufacture and development of poisonous substances for military use. This should include the activity of all enterprises, corporate bodies and institutions without exception - both public and private - carried on within the territory of the state, under its jurisdiction and control, wheresoever it be. We are also in favour of participating states being obliged under the convention to inform the consultative committee of all measures taken by them.

In our opinion, a good start on the solution of this question was made during the spring session of the Disarmament Conference, when experts from three countries - the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary and Indonesia - prepared an unofficial working paper in which they examined how to treat the question of "jurisdiction and control" in various instances in the convention. Solution to this major problem should be found in the course of the summer session, taking that document as a starting point.

Nevertheless, the most basic of the unresolved questions in the negotiations is probably still the agreement of procedures for carrying out challenge inspections. The Soviet Union attaches prime importance to matters relating to the verification of compliance with agreements on disarmament. We have made a deep study of our approaches to and views on control in the context of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We feel, as noted today by Ambassador Karpov, that control is one of the most important means of ensuring the security of states when implementing real measures of disarmament. We have reached the firm conclusion that it is
essential to establish the most rigorous system of control, including international control, over the observance by participating states of their obligations under the convention. On that basis, the Soviet Union considers that challenge inspections are an essential element of the system of control under the convention. The challenge inspection procedure must be given the task of stopping possible violations of the convention, above all where there is no routine control.

It is quite obvious that routine control of, for example, the whole of the chemical industry is an impossibility. At the same time it is well known that multi-purpose technical processes are in use almost throughout the chemical industry and may also be employed at will for non-peaceful ends. What can be done in this connection, and how can states have confidence that chemical weapons are not being manufactured by other states in the absence of routine control? There seems to us to be only one way out - a rigorous system of challenge inspections, which would not only create a high degree of confidence in the observance of the convention, but would also be effective in deterring a possible transgressor. In that vein it is especially important not to have any exceptions to the scope of challenge inspections (naturally, with constitutional safeguards against unlawful searches of the place of residence). The Stockholm Agreement gives a good example of a solution to the problem of challenge inspections, but its provisions on "restricted areas" are scarcely applicable to the banning of chemical weapons. This convention should not have any localities or installations, be they public or private, closed to challenge inspections.

Here, however, there is the admissible question of how to safeguard oneself against abusive uses of inspections, against attempts to use them to penetrate commercial and other secrets, to harm a competitor and so on. A good balance between the effectiveness of inspections and guarantees against their misuse seems to have been given in the British proposal to the Disarmament Conference in summer 1986. We would be ready to reach agreement on its basis. Admittedly, that proposal does not deal with all the details of the inspection system; further work is needed on many questions, but the basis does seem to be there.

The British proposal is based on obliging the state that is challenged to prove that it is observing the convention, i.e. it is based on the presumption not of innocence, but of guilt. It is, of course, a new approach, but we feel that it may be of value in providing effective control machinery for the convention.

We cannot be other than satisfied that the British proposal has wide support in the Conference on Disarmament,
including support from west European countries. We are also satisfied that the United States, which was initially very sceptical of this proposal, has recently moved somewhat towards it, in particular in its willingness to discuss the central idea of the British proposal - the possibility of putting forward alternative measures. This is a step in the right direction. The idea of "managed inspections", i.e. agreement on an inspection procedure that would exclude use for military or industrial espionage, has received wide support recently. It seems to me that we are quite capable of devising such procedures in the negotiations. Naturally, procedures for challenge inspections must be to make it as difficult as possible to conceal traces of a violation of the convention. The achievement of 100% certainty is, of course, scarcely possible, but we ought, obviously, to agree on the shortest delay possible in practice, at all events for arrival of the inspectors at the inspection site.

At the same time, there is bound to be concern over the idea that has been suggested of having two challenge inspection regimes under the convention - a rigorous one for the USSR and the USA and another, milder one for other countries. We think that as an approach that would not be in accordance with the multilateral nature of the prohibition of chemical weapons. In addition, and I want to state this bluntly, we are interested in being quite certain that the convention is not being violated not only by the United States, but also by its allies, both in western Europe and in the Far East. We are for equally rigorous control of all participants of the future convention. Such control should not be confined to the articles of the convention dealing with chemical weapons and facilities for their manufacture, but should also extend to article VI, which regulates activity not prohibited under the convention, i.e. ensures the non-production of chemical weapons by private industry. In that connection I should like to refer to the Declaration made in March of this year by the Member States of the Warsaw Pact, in which it is stated: "The Member States of the Warsaw Pact, basing themselves on their position of principle, are for the establishment of the most rigid system of control, including international control, over observance by member states of their obligations under the convention. They confirm their readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions on this basis, to questions of the observance of the convention by all sides, and the strengthening of confidence among its participants".

Now a few words on a matter which, it had long been thought to have been settled, but which was not fully raised in negotiations until this spring. I refer to the international agencies that will have to be set up under the convention, their composition, and their decision-taking procedure.
We consider this to be a question to be solved in full awareness of the fact that the convention now being worked out deals with matters directly related to the security of states. It is, therefore, scarcely possible to take seriously hopes entertained by anyone of securing an advantage in representation on the main agencies under the convention, above all on the executive council, the technical secretariat and the inspectorate. We are for equal representation of the opposing military and political groupings on these agencies, since any other solution must be unfair.

In conclusion, I should like to comment that besides the points that I have already noted, the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons are further characterized by a fairly harmonious combination in the negotiations of the bilateral and multilateral approaches. The convention itself is being worked out in the multilateral forum of the Disarmament Conference, while specific bilateral questions are being dealt with in bilateral Soviet-American negotiations (in which agreement has already been reached on a number of points), and consideration is also being given to the more complex questions facing the multilateral forum, such as the definition of a facility for the production of chemical weapons.

I think that the combination of the bilateral and multilateral approaches that has been developed here could also be usefully employed in other areas of disarmament, for example in the nuclear area.

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REPORT

CHEMICAL NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS:
A REGIONAL APPROACH TO GLOBAL DISARMAMENT SOLUTIONS
Jiri Matousek

Interrelationship of the bilateral and the multilateral, the regional and the global arms control and disarmament negotiations

Current immense arsenals of mass destruction weapons could eradicate man as a species and totally destroy his environment. There can, therefore, be no alternative to the peaceful and humanistic programme of general comprehensive disarmament, the aims of which represent some of the strongest wishes of the majority of the inhabitants of earth. The road to reaching this goal is long and troublesome, requiring various approaches, including bilateral initiatives as well as partial and regional measures - urgent steps which can facilitate the attainment of more comprehensive global solutions to eliminate these terrible weapons or at least prevent their use.

Analysing the experience of arms-control and disarmament negotiations which have been already carried out, one cannot omit the importance of the contribution of successful bilateral talks and negotiations between the USSR and USA to the global stability.


Bilateral talks between the USSR and the USA have contributed many times to the significant shift of negotiations in the multilateral fora, like the Conference on Disarmament, on other disarmament issues. Let us recall some common documents, e.g. on chemical weapons 1/, or on radiological weapons 2/.

This positive course regrettably has ceased since the refusal by the US administration to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Further development has been endangered by the same side which will not observe the SALT II objectives and which is aiming at a

1/ CD/48 (1979)
2/ CD/31 (1979)
broader interpretation of ABM Treaty to facilitate its Star-Wars programme. The World has been witnessing also the lack of good political will even in accepting the generous offer of the USSR to stop nuclear testing and abolish the plans for militarization of outer space - the most sophisticated qualitative issue of the armaments helix.

Peoples have been waiting with hope to the reply to the recent Soviet proposal on the elimination of their own and US medium-range nuclear missiles from European soil which could thus become a key disarmament issue moving the arms race into the irreversible process of disarmament.

Besides the bilateral initiatives tackling especially strategic armaments, it is possible to make other ones with the aim of enhancing regional security. One such partial or regional measure which has been attracting more and more attention among nations is that of the creation of a zone free of certain types or categories of weaponry, defined either as a geographic territory or as a certain sector of the environment where testing and deployment of arms and weapon technologies are prohibited. Many successful examples of such partial and regional steps exist. The aim of these measures has been to prevent the spread of weapons, until now predominantly nuclear, and to contribute to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament.

Among those measures which cover a concrete geographical zone is the oldest of modern international legal documents, that is, the Antarctic Treaty (1959). Another is the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (1967) and the most recent South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (1985).

There are further important documents related to specific environmental sectors: The Outer Space Treaty (1967), the Sea-Bed Treaty (1971) and also the Environmental Modification Convention (1977) 3/.

It is clear why most of these legal tools address primarily nuclear weapons; it is also without any doubt that many of these documents with partial or regional character were initiated uni-or bilaterally or by a small group of countries willing to contribute to the regional security faced with strategic arms.

This paper refers to the problems connected with battlefield and theatre weapons and especially with the European continent, where these weapons have accumulated, making

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Central Europe a crucial key to global security. In this region, where the majority of forces of both military, political alliances have been concentrated, the regional approach is undoubtedly extremely significant for achieving the world-wide disarmament.

Regional approaches should encompass military, political, economic confidence-building and other humanitarian measures and must take into account current multilateral negotiations to facilitate reaching of their ultimate goals.

**Chemical weapon-free zone in Central Europe - a step to global chemical disarmament**

Chemical weapons can hardly be compared with nuclear armament from the point of view of their significance for strategic balance. Nevertheless, their importance has been growing since the introduction of extremely toxic nerve G-agents into chemical arsenals world-wide 

These agents cause a rapid development of intoxication symptoms and have a very low threshold of action. They are characterized by the absence of sensory warning signs except those which can be regarded as the symptoms of light intoxication, which already would have led to severe casualties. The situation has been aggravated seriously by the introduction of the highly toxic VX-agent, which possesses an extraordinary percutaneous toxicity (LD\textsubscript{50} about 15mg/man), into the chemical arsenals of the USA. The prospects for the future are still darker when one considers the US plans for production of an intermediate-volatility agent, IVA, which combines a high volatility similar to that of GB with the high percutaneous toxicity of VX thus making possible vapour penetration through clothing layers to the skin surface. These properties promise the achievement of a higher effectiveness in combat use. Corresponding means of delivery, to better utilize the toxic properties of nerve agents exist; among them are cluster and container bombs with improved area-coverage, artillery shells for extended range, rockets for multiple launchers, warheads for various types of missiles, many types of aerosol generators, spray tanks and other hardware. Contemporary chemical weaponry enables a surprise attack upon an adversary and thus the achievement of a high combat

effectiveness which will depend upon the protection level of the
troops in the target area 5/.

The new, highly sophisticated binary technology, which is
said to be safer, promises to throw mankind into pernicious
chemical war more easily than classic unitary chemical
armaments. Binary technology bears a clear contradiction: its
greater safety in terms of production and the environment
brings, simultaneously, an increased danger to those against
whom binary weapons may be used. Improvements in the safety of
binary munitions from production to firing (i.e. production,
storage, transport, handling, inspection and destruction) pose,
at the same time, more difficulties in verification of the
non-production of pre-ursors or components (which can be
produced outside of military or state-owned factories), more
difficulties in following all possible means of transport of
binary components and more difficulties in the detection of the
filling of such components into munition units. Generally, they
pose a much higher risk associated with a higher preparedness
for use, compared to unitary chemical weaponry.

Many factors contribute to the strong conviction of the
need for the earliest possible general and comprehensive
elimination of chemical weapons on a global scale 6/. Among
these factors are: the negative experiences of nations,
especially of those whose soldiers and civilians were affected
by today's obsolete chemicals; the effectiveness of new chemical
weapons, especially used against civilians; the danger of
further vertical, and nowadays also horizontal, proliferation to
even the Third World; the folly of modernization of US chemical
 arsenals for the production of binary nerve weapons; the absurd
logic of the justification by President Reagan of such
production as being in the national interests of the USA 7/; and
the efforts to gain a military advantage in-kind, motivated by
the US administration as a deterrence factor.

It is perhaps unnecessary to argue that Europe and
particularly the territory of the two German States and of
Czechoslovakia, is the zone of the borderline between NATO and
the WTO states, a zone with a maximum concentration of the armed

zbrojení v USA (A new round of chemical armaments in the US).
6/ R. Stöhr, J. Matousek, Chemische Abrüstung: Geschichte
und Perspektiven, Urania, Berlin 1986.
7/ R. Stöhr, J. Matousek, Jak zduvodňuje Pentagon nové kolo
chemického zbrojení (How the Pentagon justifies a new round of
chemical armaments). Obrana vlasti, vol.16, no.1 (1984),
pp.32-35.
forces of both pacts. Central Europe is thus the most suitable and also the most effective area for the creation of a weapon-free zone, free of all weapons of mass destruction with an agreed-upon level of conventional arms and forces. The first proposal along these lines dealt with nuclear weapons and was made by the Foreign Minister of Poland, Adam Rapacki, as early in the 1950s. The zone approach is the matter of various modern proposals, among them those which have been made recently by the representatives of the USSR and the WTO 8/.

A number of reasons can be given for establishing a zone free of chemical weapons in Central Europe:

1. This area is the most vulnerable point because it is the line of contact between the armed forces of both antagonistic pacts, the place of potential conflict. Therefore this territory is very sensitive to any impulse which could evoke a crisis. Such crisis could arise, inter alia, due to the unauthorized use of stored arms.

2. Chemical weapons are stored in Central Europe. As is well known, the Czechoslovak People's Army and the National People's Army of the GDR do not possess any chemical weapons. The same is true of the Bundeswehr of the FRG. There are no other chemical weapons belonging to any WTO country deployed or stored on the territories of Czechoslovakia and the GDR 9/. On the other hand, large stockpiles of US chemical weapons are known to exist in the FRG; the most important stockpile is located at Fischbach near Pirmasens in Rhineland-Palatinate 10/.

3. Using chemical weapons in Europe could have fatal consequences. Even if used only against combatant troops, they could cause some hundreds of thousands to millions of deaths; with the losses among poorly

9/ J. Matousek, Towards a Chemical-Weapon Free Zone in Central Europe, in R. Trapp (Ed.): SIPRI Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies No.7 Oxford University Press (in press)
equipped civilians possibly being up to twenty times as high as for well-equipped and trained military and civil-defence troops 11/.

4. Europe, especially Central Europe is endangered by the plans for modernization of US chemical arsenals; it is clear, that the binary weaponry will serve to improve US European stocks, currently located in the FRG 12/, no matter, whether they are to be stationed there only in a crisis situation after 1992, as promised by President Reagan to Chancellor Kohl at the Tokyo summit, 1986 13/.

5. Chemical warfare has recently become a part of the current military concept known as "AirLand Battle", a doctrine designed for Europe, for the military confrontation between two major coalitions. Basic elements of this doctrine, such as the principles of the integrated battlefield as well as that of the extended battlefield (FOFA - follow-on forces attack) were constructed directly and only for the European theatre of operations, against WTO forces 14/.

6. The offensive strategic concept of AirLand Battle, as specified in the US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, has been broadly and completely adopted by NATO armed forces 15/.

7. Chemical weapons would play an important role in performing tactical and operational tasks in the entire depth of the extended battlefield according to the FOFA principle. To these ends, rapidly acting volatile G-agents as well as non-volatile VX-agent are planned to be delivered simultaneously by artillery, air force and other modern means against the combatant troops, reserves and second echelons of the WTO.

8. It was not a group of irresponsible individuals, but the highest representatives of military authorities, among them NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Bernard Rogers, who called officially for new chemical weapons for NATO armed forces to solve the tactical and operational problems mentioned above 16/.

9. Chemical weapons were adopted as one of the force goals of NATO by the Defence Planning Committee in May 1986, 17/, and two West European Governments promised to deploy binary chemical weapons in their countries (June 1986).

Given these circumstances, it becomes quite understandable, why the Governments of Czechoslovakia and of the GDR, supported by the people of these socialist countries as well as by the majority of the citizens of the FRG, represented mainly by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the trade unions (DGB), accompanied by many scientific, peace, youth, women's, church and other democratic organisations, urge the Government of the FRG to join the initiative to create a chemical-weapon-free zone with the urgent aim of removing US chemical weapons from the territory of the FRG prior to global prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is to be noticed, that the consideration of a zone free of chemical weapons originated as a result of public resistance by pastor Heipp of Reischweiler, was noted as early as 1969, 18/. A new citizen action against US chemical weapons occurred in the early 1980s after the publication of relevant facts about the US stockpiles, particularly by those at Fischbach 19/. This initiative towards a peace movement was then supported by a corresponding resolution of the Federal Congress of both DGB and SPD (1982) and became very early a matter of discussion between

17/ J.P. Robinson, Alternatives for Western policy on chemical armament, CCAD International Conference, Schloss Friedenwald, 28 August-1 September 1986.  
18/ Ibid 10(a),(c).  
19/ (a) Ibid 10(a). (b) J. Matousek, Zapadonemecka verejnost a chemicke zbrane (West German publicity and chemical weapons), Obrana vlasti, vol.16, no.3 (1984), pp.41-44. (c) W. Dosch, P. Herrlich (Eds.), Achtung der Giftwaffen: Naturwissenschaftler warnen vor chemischen und biologischen Waffen, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1985.
As a result of this preparatory work, the Governments of Czechoslovakia and of the GDR presented Federal Chancellor Kohl, on 12 September 1985, with the proposal to begin negotiations concerning a chemical-weapon-free zone, initially involving the territories of Czechoslovakia, the FRG and the GDR. It was also emphasized, that both states should continue to endorse the establishment of the comprehensive convention on prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction and that they are also convinced that regional agreements for the creation of a zone without chemical weapons would represent concrete steps towards both confidence-building and a global ban of these weapons.

As is well known, in his response on 27 September, Chancellor Kohl rejected the proposal, arguing that no alternative exists to the continuation of efforts to achieve a global ban of chemical weapons. He proposed the opening of discussions between CD delegations of three states involved on unresolved questions concerning the global prohibition.

In the opinion of the Governments of the GDR, Czechoslovakia and major non-governmental organizations in both countries, a chemical-weapon-free zone is neither a substitution for a global ban, nor an alternative to it. It is also not to be regarded as a condition for the attainment of a prohibition on a global scale; it is only a step, which can make the final solution more accessible. This common-sense philosophy means: the lower the level of armaments, the easier it will be to eliminate them.

It was interesting to hear the objections against the chemical weapon free zone. Some of them have been repeated in both official and unofficial statements made in FR Germany, other West European countries and overseas. The first of them, concerning the relation of this regional measure to the Geneva negotiations sometimes takes the form of an argument, that the negotiators have to concentrate on the global issue. Another objection deals with the well-known issue of verification. It is argued that verification in a small zone would be more difficult than on a global scale. This thesis can hardly be taken seriously. Verification in connection with the

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20/ For a Zone Free of Chemical Weapons in Europe: Joint political initiative by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Verlag Zeit im Bild, Dresden 1985.
implementation of the provisions of the projected Chemical Weapons Convention is an extraordinarily complicated problem. Verification is, of course, much simpler in a relatively small territory where only a limited number of problems are to be solved. First of all, with the exception of US stockpiles, the whereabouts of which are known or presumed, there are no other stockpiles or sites with deployed weapons in the proposed zone. There are also no chemical-weapon facilities there. After the withdrawal of US stockpiles, there is most probably nothing left to be declared in the terms of the projected Chemical Weapons Convention (with the exception of laboratory-scale facilities for production for protective purposes and small-scale facilities for testing and/or law-enforcement production of irritants). No stocks and no production facilities will be destroyed. The location of plants producing chemicals for peaceful purposes are known; they do not exist in obscure sites in deserts or jungles. The territory of the three states involved is so small and almost all of it is so well-known, not only to potential inspectors but even to many citizens who have crossed it frequently as tourists, that it would hardly be possible to conceal any arsenals. In addition to this, verification procedures, carried out by a consultative commission of the chemical-weapon-free zone agreement and with the presence of foreign inspectors, would apply the broadly accepted principles of challenge procedures. An interesting objection has also been expressed that the centre of gravity of the problem of chemical warfare has been shifted to the Third World and, in this connection, that the projected zone would not make the world safer. It is true that a European zone without chemical weapons cannot solve the problems which exist in the relations among Third World countries. But such an European zone can help the Third World indirectly. Arrangements for the zone could be combined with commitments not to export risk chemicals and technologies to countries outside of the zone (including the Third World). Such a zone can serve also as an example for Third World countries. There can be no doubt that should one zone be created, others would follow. There is, in the author's opinion, only one substantial objection as to why a chemical-weapon-free zone is not acceptable to the Government of the FRG. The objection is that such an undertaking would be in conflict with the obligations of FR Germany to its allies. This has been intimated and has, of course, to be fully taken into account. The future existence of this issue is heavily dependent upon the US attitude towards chemical disarmament and upon US disarmament measures, among which the withdrawal of US chemical arsenals from the territories of other states (including FRG) should be a matter of primary commitment and realized as soon as possible.

Besides the above-mentioned points of controversy, related to the creation of a chemical-weapon-free zone and the principles behind it, other basic problems exist which have to do with the
establishment, function and maintenance of such a zone. These, as well as the relevant military implications, remain to be elucidated. To such a discussion belong considerations of: the basic steps to be taken in the creation, function and maintenance of a zone; the aim and role of each individual step and its function; the extent of the zone and its future extension; the military implications associated with the size of the zone; and the problems of guaranteeing the status of the zone.

These problems are broadly enlightened by taking into account opposite views in the most recent publications 21/.

It is clear that the crucial problem connected with the establishment of the zone is not the first step, i.e. removal of all chemical weapons from the zone, but the second one - its maintenance. After initial removal of chemical weapons from the zone, the potential risk exists, in the event of hostilities, that chemical weapons might be used against the zone from the outside or be re-introduced into it. Such occurrences must be foreseen at the time of the creation, and the agreement must contain provisions which would make such actions a violation of international law and establishing corresponding verification régime.

These principles are envisaged in the proposed text of the agreement 22/. Besides observing relevant obligations, the states involved must make a commitment never to use or threaten to use chemical weapons against the chemical-weapon-free zone. Such a demand for respect of the status of the zone is nothing new or surprising. Major states which possess nuclear weapons have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco for similar reasons. Moreover, it is essential, that in that case, not only major possessors of chemical weapons, but all states with military, political and economic prestige assure the status of the zone. This applies especially to the United Nations Security Council members.

Currently, only the USSR has endorsed this initiative and has agreed to support and assure the projected chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, provided the USA reciprocates. This is understood to mean that the USSR will guarantee the status of the zone as described above. It can only be hoped that USA will act in a similar fashion.

22/ Ibid 20, 21(b) & (c).
It can be concluded that the proposed chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe could be a very positive confidence-building measure with concrete military significance. It could serve as the first real step towards freeing Europe from chemical weapons and contribute to the global elimination of chemical arsenals. If the convention on the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and suggesting their destruction which is the ultimate goal of the efforts of those proposing a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, should be concluded very speedily, its establishment, as a separate measure, would not be necessary. In this event, the proponents of such a zone would invite other nations to establish it as an urgent partial and regional measure - an initial step in the implementation of the world-wide convention.

**Battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe - an important measure in preventing a nuclear confrontation**

A battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free corridor, although similar, is very different when compared to a chemical-weapon-free zone, which is a partial and regional step to the global solution in kind. As a matter of fact, no corresponding global disarmament solution exists. It can be regarded, however, as a step to global nuclear disarmament and as part of a programme of the prevention of nuclear war. Both these initiatives are similar - neither involves the physical elimination of weapons from a defined geographic area. This arms-control measure is closely bound to medium-range nuclear weapons on one side and to conventional arms and forces on the other.

During 1980-82, the problem of reducing the nuclear threat in Europe as a vital issue of common security, was thoroughly analyzed by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI). This body is composed of outstanding personalities, mostly world-wide known political authorities from 17 countries under the chairmanship of former Prime Minister of Sweden Olof Palme.

The Commission stated that the nuclear arsenals in Europe were awesome and expressed its concern about those nuclear postures and doctrines which dangerously and erroneously suggested that it might be possible to fight and win a limited nuclear war. In the event of crisis their effect could be to drive the contending forces across the threshold of a nuclear war. The Commission was convinced that there had to be a substantial reduction in the nuclear stockpile which would lead to the denuclearization of Europe and eventually to a world free of nuclear weapons; a necessary precondition was a negotiated agreement on substantial mutual force reductions establishing
and guaranteeing an approximate parity of conventional forces between the two major alliances.

The report of ICDSI, which introduces a coherent and thought provoking set of proposals for resolving the unsettled issues of strategic and theatre nuclear weapons, conventional armaments, Third World conflict and regional security, can be read 23/:

"...The Commission supports a negotiated agreement for approximate parity in conventional forces between the two alliances. Such an agreement would facilitate reduction in nuclear weapons and reordering of the priority now accorded to nuclear arms in military contingency planning... ...Our proposal for the gradual removal of the nuclear threat posed to Europe includes establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-weapon free zone and measures to strengthen the nuclear threshold and reduce pressures for the early use of nuclear weapons, and substantial reduction in all categories of intermediate- (medium) and shorter-range nuclear weapons which threaten Europe..."

Due to the fact that the conclusions of ICDSI's analysis are still valid, it is reasonable to remember their substance: Special attention is called to the dangers posed by battlefield nuclear weapons whose delivery systems are deployed in considerable numbers in forward positions in Europe. A large portion of NATO's and WTO's nuclear munitions in Europe are of this type. The weapons are designed and deployed to provide support to ground forces in direct contact with the adversary's forces. Their delivery systems have a range up to 150 kilometres, and are primarily short-range rockets, mines and artillery. Most of the delivery systems are dual-capable, i.e. they can fire either conventional or nuclear munitions.

Because of their deployment in forward areas, battlefield nuclear weapons run the risk of being overrun early in an armed conflict. Maintaining command and control over such weapons in the "fog of war" would be difficult. Pressures for delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons to local commanders and for their early use would be strong. The danger of crossing the nuclear threshold and of future escalation could become acute. It should be remembered in this connection that the areas close to the East-West border in Central Europe are densely populated and contain large industrial concentrations.

The ICDSI recommends the establishment of a battlefield-nuclear-free corridor, starting with Central Europe and extending ultimately from the northern to the southern flanks of the two alliances. This scheme would be implemented

in the context of an agreement on parity and mutual force reductions in Central Europe. No nuclear munitions would be permitted in the zone. Storage sites for nuclear munitions would be prohibited. Manoeuvres simulating nuclear operations would not be allowed in the zone. Preparations for the emplacement of nuclear demolition munitions and storage of such weapons would be prohibited. There also should be rules governing the presence in the zone of artillery and short-range missiles that could be adapted for both nuclear and conventional use. The geographic definitions of the zone should be determined through negotiations, taking into account the relevant circumstances in the area involved. For illustrative purposes, a width of 150 kms on both sides along the line of contact may be suggested. Provisions for verifying compliance with these prohibitions would be negotiated. They would have to include a limited number of on-site inspections in the zone on a challenge basis. The Commission recognizes that nuclear munitions may be brought back to the forward areas in wartime, and the nuclear weapons may be delivered by aircraft and other longer range systems. However, it considers the establishment of the proposed zone an important confidence-building measure which would raise the nuclear threshold and reduce some of the pressures for early use of nuclear weapons. It is consistent with the rejection of limited nuclear war as a matter of deliberate policy. The agreement for withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons from the forward zone should be followed by substantial reductions in the number of nuclear munitions in Europe with adequate measures of verification.

Another pertinent problem, closely connected with short-range nuclear weapons, as analyzed by the IODSI, is the problem of nuclear threshold, which will be shortly discussed in connection to conventional weapons 24/.

The IODSI proposal has been broadly talked about since it appeared. The specific character of the battlefield nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe was emphasized comparing other nuclear-weapon-free zones proposed, i.e. in northern and southern Europe with the conclusion, that it might set new trends for military planning and political thought, and thus lead to a comprehensive withdrawal of nuclear weapons from European states which do not themselves possess such arms 25/.

The main criticism of the nuclear-weapon-free corridor appeared in member states of NATO. According to them the implementation of this measure could undermine the ability of

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24/ Ibid 5.
NATO to offset the alleged WTO's superior conventional forces with a threat of nuclear counter-attack. Because of the existence of dual-purpose weapons, the proposed arrangement would lead to a reduction in conventional capacity; and nuclear weapons withdrawn from the corridor would become an attractive target. The corridor proposal disregards, according to opponents, the geographical diversity of the territories covered by the two alliances; corridor arrangements would contravene the principle of collective security as defined by the Western Alliance; it is also argued that negotiations on a battlefield-weapon-free corridor could divert attention from the current negotiations on European medium-range nuclear weapons and, as say the critics, the proposed arrangement would not bring about decrease in the number of operational nuclear weapons in Europe; verification is said to be complicated; the final objection is that the corridor arrangement risks being viewed in isolation from the current negotiations in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm 26/.

It is up to the reader to judge how serious these objection are, but it is without any doubt that even a partial denuclearization, as provided for in the corridor proposal, may help to control the risk of nuclear war. This would provide a practical brake on the operational release of nuclear weapons and allow time for diplomatic endeavours to resolve the conflict and provide an opportunity to reduce both nuclear and conventional forces on the basis of reciprocity 27/.

A new negotiating potential has been created recently as a sign of new political thinking with regard to the comprehensive set of proposals within the framework of the programme for a total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. This was presented in the speech of M.S. Gorbachev, January 15, 1986, which became well-known for its complexity and clear ends - total nuclear disarmament.

A very serious shift in bilateral negotiations was made by the USSR with regard to medium-range weapons in Reykjavik, October 12, 1986: Without touching British and French forces to eliminate all US and USSR medium-range weapons from Europe as a part of complex solution encompassing strategic and space weapons. This flexibility of the USSR leader continued with the proposal to accept the original US Zero-option for elimination of all US and USSR medium-range nuclear weapons as a separate measure, with the withdrawal of the Soviet operational-tactical missiles with extended range from the territories of the GDR and

Czechoslovakia. This was just after corresponding treaty between USA and USSR concerning medium-range nuclear missiles (February 28, 1987).

This atmosphere contributed to the solving of a complicated problem of utmost urgency - medium-range nuclear weapons, which have become a key to the whole process of disarmament 28/. In addition it brought new perspectives for solving the very dangerous question of short-range nuclear weapons.

Under these conditions, using main ideas elaborated by the ICDSI, as mentioned earlier, after preparatory work made by the joint political initiative of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany 29/, the Governments of the GDR and the Czechoslovakia sent a proposal to the Government of the FRG to create a nuclear-weapon-free corridor (April 3, 1987) along the divide between the two alliances in Central Europe. The corridor on the territory of FRG, GDR and Czechoslovakia should initially have a width of about 150 kilometres on either side and should be negotiated into a Central European nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Elimination of medium-range and short-range nuclear weapons in connection with other strategic and conventional disarmament issues has become an urgent need of European security as a crucial part of global security. This goal can be facilitated by initial and partial measures, especially by the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Europe, particularly if the battlefield-nuclear-weapon-corridor in Central Europe is the first step. Recent proposals by M.S. Gorbachev from Prague, April 10, 1987, have shown new accessible ways how to reach agreements between East and West.

Conventional weapons - a case for regional and global talks

Conventional forces are still a basic part of armed forces of any country even in the nuclear age. The absurdity of intentional use of nuclear weapons leads to a conviction that the importance of conventional weapons has been increasing since

28/ J. Matousek, Medium-and short-range nuclear weapons - dangerous fuse of global nuclear war, in, Ways out of the Arms Race, Spiegel-Verlag, Hamburg (in press)
nuclear overkill and thus mutual assured destruction was accepted as principle.

Some people argue that conventional armaments are a matter of highest priority. One can agree that even conventional war with contemporary conventional arms, without using weapons of mass destruction, carried out on densely populated European continent with hundreds of nuclear facilities and hundreds of facilities storing harmful chemicals, could make this continent uninhabitable for a long period of time. Nevertheless, only nuclear arsenals could eradicate the whole population on global scale.

Conventional forces of both alliances are objects of regional (European) Vienna MBFR negotiations, which have been going on without any tangible result. It cannot be expected that separate negotiations on conventional forces could be successful due to links with other military, military-technical and political questions. On the other hand it is unfair when some western authorities use the existence of conventional weapons as an argument against progress in the negotiations on crucial issues like medium-range and short-range nuclear weapons. This says nothing about the various numbers of games which confuse public opinion about the real size of WTO conventional forces.

It seems to be reasonable to carry out negotiations on conventional forces in close connection with short-range nuclear weapons due to close technical and tactical link between these matters.

First of all, it is the question of nuclear threshold, which is to be maintained. It is extremely important to maintain a clear distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. Nuclear weapon states should abstain from developing and deploying weapons which blur the distinction by appearing to be more "usable" in war. The so-called "mini-nukes" and enhanced radiation (so-called "neutron") weapons (ERW) both fall into this category. Another feature, on the side of conventional arms can be mentioned in this connection: the development and use of some conventional charges, like heavy demolition bombs and fuel-air-explosives (FAE), creating a fire-ball in some cases, can make the clear distinction between conventional and small nuclear explosion sometimes difficult.

Another problem is the dual-capability of conventional weapons, which can be used for both, conventional explosive and nuclear charges, like artillery, tactical missiles and battlefield aviation.

The problems per se are fire and incendiary weapons, which are regarded, according to some UNO documents, as the weapons of mass destruction.
The way, to approach the complex issue of theatre/battlefield nuclear weapons in connection with reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe was shown in the W lO member states address to NATO member states and to all European countries with a programme of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, presented on the Budapest session, June 11, 1986, 30/ . W lO states propose a substantial reduction in all components of the land forces and tactical strike aviation of the European states, as well as of corresponding forces and weapon systems of the US and Canada deployed in Europe. Operational-tactical nuclear arms with a range up to 1000 kilometres would be reduced alongside conventional armaments.

It is also mentioned that confidence-building conditions for proposed stepwise reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe (on-time reduction by 100-150 thousand troops on each side within 1-2 years followed by further reduction by approximately 25 percent as compared to the present level in early nineties) would be promoted inter alia by the creation of zones free from nuclear and chemical weapons.

This honest offer of W lO member states has remained without answer till now. But this proposal, in connection with the motions from Prague, shows the way ahead. Now NATO has to answer!


* * * * *
REPORT

THE DEVELOPMENT OF WAYS AND MEANS
OF CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT

Hendrik Wagenmakers

In my presentation I will not go into the specifics, of the nuts and bolts of the CW negotiations. As we have heard from Mr. Berdennikov there are others around this table directly involved in these negotiations who are much better placed than I, to dwell on the particulars of the CW negotiations.

Rather I will try to analyse in a wider perspective some characteristics of the ongoing negotiating process ever since its inception in the early 1920s until the present day. I have noticed that in the course of time, the conceptualization of scope and parameters of the sought after convention has changed. In line with the change of society which in our technological era has become rather complicated, if not sophisticated, the ideas about the requirements which a future convention will have to fulfill have changed as well. If technical possibilities for verification have grown immensely, so have regrettably the technical possibilities for production. Nonetheless, I think sophistication will do no harm to the convention. Furthermore, I have tried to see what influences or rather what benefit one can draw when comparing the CW negotiating process with the development pertaining to the biological weapons convention and to the safeguard system of IAEA.

The idea of chemical disarmament is about as old as chemical weapons themselves. We are all aware of the atrocities which occurred during World War I, and ever after there has been a widespread consensus that these weapons should be abolished. From the outset, one should realize that one is dealing with a ban on a category of existing and deployed weapons. From the existence of an actual CW capability follows logically the existence of mistrust on the side of those who feel threatened by that capability. Moreover, CW related problems are complicated by nature and therefore, a grey zone, where mistrust, mutual mistrust, and arbitrary judgements abound, comes easily into existence. Which are these complexities? In the first place, chemical weapons and the facilities to produce these weapons can easily be concealed. This is particularly true in big countries with a lot of empty or half empty space and in countries where a closed political system makes it possible that parts of the territory can be made less accessible. In the second place, chemical weapons are comparatively cheap and not too difficult to produce. Therefore, the risk of chemical weapons becoming a global phenomenon is a real one. According to very tentative
estimates the number of states that possess or try to acquire chemical weapons is around 20. That number may easily increase in the next few years which in itself favours a climate of mistrust about potential procedures and possessors of chemical weapons. One could if one wishes add a third reason why proliferation is a real risk providing fuel to the fire of mistrust. Contrary to nuclear weapons, chemical weapons will not easily reach a level of overkill. The equivalent of nuclear overkill does not seem in sight for chemical weapons. The sky is, unfortunately, the limit.

I just mention in passing, of course the worrying phenomenon of the recent use of chemical weapons in regional conflicts. What is the development that I see? If I try to analyse the developments I start from the Protocol of Geneva of 1925 which very adequately reflects the great repugnance, the abhorance of use one has witnessed. So the Protocol bans use but at the same time, the Geneva Protocol contains many shortcomings. Its scope is limited, the Protocol is only binding between parties and only in case of war. Furthermore, numerous escape clauses were stipulated by States on adhesion. There is finally the absence of verification provisions and complaint procedures. In order to resolve the shortcomings of the Geneva Protocol, negotiations started in 1969 on a convention that would comprehensively prohibit development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and chemical weapons, and would oblige parties to destroy existing stockpiles. In 1972 these negotiations resulted in a biological weapons convention. The negotiations on the CW ban continued to this day and seem to have reached a decisive stage. It seems that agreement exists in principle on a definition of chemical weapons, which toxic substances and precursors thereof are going to be dealt with, which means of delivery and which material, especially designed for CW use, are going to be banned. The present state of the negotiations shows emphasis on verification of destruction and of necessary challenge inspections in cases of undeclared stocks and installations, presumed use, etc. In this context, it is interesting to note that the Soviet Union and the US seem to have become more confident about the outcome of the negotiations. The US delegation has given full information on the location of its chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has made a beginning of a more open policy of affirmation on existing stocks by no longer concealing their existence. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has announced that it will start the construction of a facility for the destruction of chemical weapons. This is the type of confidence-building measure that, seems to be useful at this stage, and of course I should mention in this context, also that the US delegation has invited Soviet experts to come and visit the US destruction facilities in Utah, and the bunker containing chemical weapons, at a period later on this year. It is not an exaggeration to qualify these steps as CBM's, conducive to reducing to reasonable proportions the
other's perception of threat and thus creating a climate in which parties are prepared to enter a convention. The current phase of the CW negotiations, the third phase I would say, cannot be easily separated from the preceding phase, but I will try to demonstrate that there is a great difference in the conceptualization amongst the negotiators which are dealing with this draft CW convention now. They do it in a way which is different from what was seen some 18 years ago. Although the elimination of existing stockpiles and production facilities is still a very important part for the foreseen convention, more and more emphasis is being laid on the prevention of misuse of existing civil chemical capabilities for chemical weapons purposes even by those who previously did not do so. The change in thinking about the ways and means to abolish CW can be described as a tendency to control, not only chemical weapons as such but also their key precursors and other intermediates. And I think we will derive benefit from a comparison with the biological weapons convention file. It starts with the prohibition of use under the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Then in the BW convention of 1972, stockpiles and storage were prohibited. Production is prohibited concurrently in 1972 and gradually one sees a growth which came to a stage of maturity in 1986, last autumn, when although not in treaty form but in an understanding form, a limited obligation was accepted. This allowed the BW parties to declare their capabilities to produce potential substances for BW. In the same year, one sees in 1986 in the fall, an obligation entered into not in treaty form but in an understanding form of declaring certain forms of defence research. How can one explain this change? There are political factors.

A stringent obligation not to make use of a weapon does in practice not suffice to make parties feel confident that other parties would honour their obligations. Therefore, many parties felt it in the case of CW, necessary to keep stocks intact with a view to deterring use by another party or a non-party. A stringent obligation not to produce or store CW would build some confidence but not enough. Only when compliance with obligations is assured through adequate verification is there a chance that all States would be willing to forego the option of production of chemical weapons. The technical possibilities for verification, for production, have grown enormously over the last 50 years. Although lots of time and money will have to be spent on the further development, the technology for monitoring by means of instruments providing real information over large distances is now available. The use of mass spectrometers and other instruments has made it possible to find very small traces of chemical weapons. By way of these methods, it is in principle possible to find a needle in a haystack. The Prince Maurits Laboratory of TNO in Ryswijk, the Netherlands, under the able leadership of Doctor Jack Ooms, has delivered convincing proof of the results which can be reached by means of waste-water
sanpling. I make reference in this context to the CW workshop held in the Netherlands, in June 1986, during which a demonstration was given on how to efficiently inspect an industrial chemical production plant.

There are also social political factors. In all industrialized countries a system of control of industrial activities has expanded. At first primarily to protect workers in their working environment, it recently also protects the wider environment. These national controls have accustomed both governments and industries, at least in, the Western part of the world, to the idea and practice of inspection of industry. Thus, an international system of verification of some civil chemical industries has become a more realistic possibility. So in short, I could say that increasingly, the need is felt for adequately verified controls on civil activities that could lead to a CW capability.

As a result of technological developments such controls seem to become more and more feasible. This is all the more relevant since politically the notion of verification, in general terms, is no longer a controversial one. I would like to exemplify this trend now with a few words on what is probably the most difficult part of the CW Convention; the verification of non-production and non-stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Ten years ago it was not the main problem and it was not seen as the main problem. Now it is the complicated centrepiece of the negotiations. Why is it the centrepiece? Because the destruction of stockpiles, chemical warfare agents and their key precursors is useless when production of these same chemicals for civil purposes continues uncontrolled.

This civil production should be strictly limited to non-prohibited purposes. This obligation should be adequately verified and I think to establish an adequate verification system in comparison with the safeguard system of the IAEA, would be very useful and beneficial. There are of course differences. The nuclear facilities which the IAEA inspects are single purpose and the chemical plants are more and more multi-purpose facilities. Nuclear facilities from a rather well-defined category of facilities. The CW relevant part of chemical industry cannot be so well-defined. What can I draw from this IAEA experience? I think the system of IAEA which has brought about model agreements and facility attachments; a system in which rights and obligations of inspectors are entrenched; and a system which provides for procedures for solving problems that might arise around inspection. My Soviet colleague has already spoken about challenge inspections. I am happy to note that it seems that positions are coming closer to each other. I will not dwell at length now, in view of the urgency of time with the more broader aspects of verification, I will focus a bit on challenge inspections.
I believe that the solution of the problem of verification of non-production and non-stockpiling will probably be found in a complicated system of lists, model agreements, elaborated rules, facility attachments etc. But at the same time, challenge inspections can only be workable if the system agreed on is a simple one and undetailed. The rule should be that States are granted satisfaction through the report of an on-site inspection team. In exceptional cases alternative measures can be considered. The underlying question is of course whether the challenging state will have the last word or not. I think personally that the positions on this controversial point are sufficiently close to enable parties to find a way out. In the Dutch view, admission to the bunker must be possible, if alternative inspection measures do not prove to be convincing. Otherwise the risk would be too great that chemical weapons will be stocked in buildings that are declared to be of a very sensitive nature. Moreover, movements of maintenance people will stop and ventilation systems and other installations visible from the outside may be removed or covered within 48 hours before the arrival of the inspection team.

In this context I am happy to have read an article in the International Herald Tribune of 28 May 1987 in which it was reported that Ambassador Nazarkin of the USSR has announced at the international CW symposium in Oslo last week that in principle a quick inspection within 48 hours is acceptable to the USSR. There remains, of course, a question. What happens if rules are violated? According to the British proposal "the Executive Council shall take such measures as it may collectively decide. Measures may include a withdrawal of rights and privileges from that party under the Convention. Such measures shall be without prejudice to the right of the other States party to take unilateral action up to and including withdrawal from the Convention". I consider such a penalty clause of fundamental importance. The perspective of strong measures is required to serve as a deterrence to potential violators. As we have learned from the Iraq/Iran tragedy, sheer political pressure on the country concerned may not present an effective deterrence.

Even when as I ardently hope, current negotiations, will soon lead to agreement on a Convention, this will not be the end of our responsibility for the ban on CW. As long as science and technology develop further and they do so at a still increasing speed, the parties will be confronted with new challenges and with new necessities to answer them.

The CW Convention will have to acknowledge this fact by providing for efficient procedures for changes in lists of chemicals, detailed clarification procedures etc. when technological developments make such modifications desirable. Only in that way can the provisions of the treaty be upheld and
maintained and I take it that the provisions are known to you all. I will skip that part of my presentation for time sake. I note that of course the Convention will have to provide for adequate machinery for implementation of the treaty and for reviewing its operation and I think of particular importance is also that some fine print will be worked out on the duration of the treaty and on the number of ratifications needed for its entry into force.

The momentum in the Geneva negotiations is impressive. In the last 12 months more has been achieved than in the previous 12 years. We must make the best use of this momentum by concentrating our efforts on the key areas of this agreement which remain unresolved. We must do so realizing the broader context in which the negotiations take place. On the one hand there is a growing use proved by fact, of chemical weapons in the regional conflicts on our globe. On the other hand, there is the related development or the proliferation of CW production capability, both in the developed and developing parts of the world.

A momentum towards production seems to be growing after a period during which a long unilateral moratorium, on the part of one of the superpowers remained unanswered. The drastic proposals for nuclear arms reduction inevitably point to the existing discrepancies in the conventional and chemical fields. All this shows in my opinion that no effort should be spared to complete the CW ban now. Fifteen years after its predecessor, the Biological Weapons Convention which has been reviewed and confirmed recently, it is high time.

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Asif Ezdi

In my brief intervention I propose to confine myself to conventional disarmament, a subject which often suffers from some neglect in the disarmament debate. Partly, this is so because of an understandable preoccupation with the nuclear arms race which threatens civilization and in fact the entire human race with extinction. Another reason why conventional disarmament has not received the attention it merits is perhaps the complexity of the issues it presents, stemming from the vast differences in the structure and composition of armed forces and the weapons they possess and from the fact that it involves not just two superpowers or two alliance systems or five nuclear powers but almost every nation in the world, each with its own security problems and concerns and sometimes its own ambitions and aspirations. These are not, however, sufficient reasons why the problem of conventional disarmament should not be addressed in serious and urgent manner, nor is the fact that since the Second World War, Europe has been fortunate enough to be spared the destruction that conventional weapons have brought in so many countries of the Third World, often with the support and sometimes with the participation of the superpowers in the pursuit of their global strategies.

The United Nations Study on Conventional Disarmament three years ago was a timely reminder of the dimensions of this problem. As it pointed out, the more than 150 wars and armed conflicts which have taken place since 1946 have all been fought with conventional weapons. The use of these weapons has caused more than 20 million war-related deaths and material damage and destruction running into billions of dollars. Of the near 5 percent of the gross national product of the nations of the world which is spent on military expenditure, about four-fifths relate to conventional armed forces and weapons. This represents a colossal drain on economic and technological resources. There has also been a sharp upward spiral in the qualitative aspects of the conventional arms race. Advances in military technology continue to increase the destructive power of conventional weapons and new types of such weapons are being developed.

The conventional arms race, no less than a nuclear arms race, increases political tensions and military confrontation. It thereby impedes the emergence of a more stable world and enhances the possibility of armed conflict. A reversal of the conventional arms race would be particularly beneficial to the developing countries which have been the stage and indeed the victims of all the armed conflicts which have taken place since the Second World War.
To emphasize the importance of conventional disarmament does not detract from the foremost priority which must be accorded to measures for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war, upon which human survival depends. Nuclear and conventional disarmament, moreover, are not two mutually exclusive processes but have a close interrelationship and ought to be pursued in conjunction.

The present conventional arms race is closely related to situations arising from unresolved territorial disputes, denial of the right of self-determination, ambitions for regional or global dominance, foreign occupation, military intervention etc. In Europe the main impetus to the conventional arms race comes from East-West tensions. Many non-aligned countries have tended to develop their own military power largely because the collective security provisions of the United Nations Charter have not been implemented.

In the pursuit of conventional disarmament, the global and regional approaches are both relevant, depending on the nature, and scope of the measures envisaged. Some measures which would apply to all States like those outlawing a particular category of weapons or a particular method of conducting hostilities ought to be the subject of multilateral negotiations with the participation of all States. Other measures which might be applicable to States in a given region, or to two or more neighbouring States ought naturally to form the subject of regional or bilateral negotiations among the concerned parties.

The regional and global approaches to conventional disarmament can thus be taken up simultaneously. However, given the fact that the impetus to the conventional arms race in most cases comes from the real or perceived capabilities of neighbouring States, or from situations, actual or potential, in the immediate geopolitical area, it is the regional approach which offers the most realistic prospects for progress. The security concerns of States and consequently the reasons for the acquisition of arms differ from situation to situation and from region to region. Regional measures could therefore best reflect the specific conditions and particular requirements of various areas. It might be possible in some cases to reach agreement on a regional basis on measures more far-reaching than those which could be implemented on a global scale.

In any realistic effort towards conventional disarmament certain fundamental principles would need to be recognized and observed. These are: firstly, the right of each State to maintain a level of forces essential to its security keeping in view its security concerns. Secondly, and this is a necessary corollary of the above, in each region a military balance must be aimed at providing each State in that region with a
reasonable capability for self-defence. To determine such a balance, account should be taken of the capacity of each State for the production of arms, acquisitions from external sources and the level of sophistication of arms. Thirdly, the special responsibility of States which are in a preponderant military position in a particular region to promote and initiate arms limitations ought to be recognized. In many regions the arms race is fueled by the efforts of the militarily most powerful State to attain a position of unchallenged superiority to justify a claim to regional hegemony or what would earlier have been called a sphere of influence. Such a policy exacerbates political and military tensions thereby condemning the States of the region to the vicious circle of ever-increasing levels of forces and armaments and diminished security.

The limitation and reduction of conventional arms and armed forces can be either qualitative or quantitative or both and can relate to weaponry, manpower or the deployment of weapons and forces. The concrete measures of conventional disarmament which can realistically be undertaken in the present situation have been identified in the UN study on the subject and can include reduction in material, reduction in personnel, reduction of military budgets, reduction and restrictions on military deployments, restraints on military research and development and restraints on international arms transfers.

In each region a conscious step-by-step process can be commenced, tailored towards specific requirements, to promote security for all the regional States at the lowest possible level of armaments. Such a process could begin with measures to enhance confidence and proceed to concrete arms control and disarmament measures. Openness and transparency of military information and data can serve an important confidence-building role. It would thus be useful for the States of a region to exchange information on force levels and on arms acquisition and production. Broader commitments of non-utilization and non-use of force would be equally helpful in fostering mutual confidence. The resolution of outstanding disputes by peaceful means, thus removing the underlying causes of international friction, can contribute significantly to the regional arms control process.

The aim of a regional disarmament process should be to establish a mutually acceptable military equilibrium among the regional States and to exclude the military presence of foreign forces. Disproportion in the level and sophistication of armaments is likely to encourage policies of domination and intervention and to increase the danger of regional conflict. Measures to create regional balance could include the following: Renunciation of certain types of advanced weapons, agreed ceilings on armed forces, and geographical restrictions.
on deployment of armed forces, for instance, the establishment of demilitarized zones. The prospects of success in promoting regional security and arms control can be greatly enhanced by the parallel pursuit of regional co-operation in the economic, social and other fields.

To sum up, conventional disarmament is an area which deserves greater attention than it has received so far. As the impulse to the conventional arms race comes largely from regional factors, it is regional solutions which one should strive for. In this effort, the main responsibility must be borne by the country possessing the greatest military strength in the region. The disarmament process would be greatly facilitated if it is accompanied by confidence-building measures by the establishment of regional institutions for socio-economic co-operation and by the peaceful resolution of disputes. Finally, the aim of this process should be to establish a military equilibrium among regional States and to exclude foreign military presence.

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Andrei Karkoszka

I wish to make a few comments about the present stage of European security. I think it would not be an exaggeration, if I say that all European States feel secure today. This feeling, this perception, stems from several political, economic and military factors. Among those which I consider most important are the acceptance of the geopolitical situation in Europe by all States of the region, the tacit or open admission of a military equilibrium to exist now in Europe and the lack of direct military threats, the increased co-operation in various fields of life between East and West and, lastly, the ongoing process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe which has brought along several positive experiences over the last 12 years. The latest achievement of this process is the Stockholm Agreement which embodies several important breakthroughs, like that on geographical scope of the agreement, on mechanisms for verification, and on scope of confidence-building measures.

However, this feeling of stability and security in Europe is kept with a very high level of military preparedness and at great financial, political and economic costs. What is more important, this stability is permanently in danger of being undermined by, first the possibility of crises in other regions of the world spilling over to Europe and, second, by the dynamics of military technology.
Let me dwell a little longer on this technological factor. Technology of conventional weapons allows great increase of their operational qualities. This increase was gradual and took several years. However, when we observe now the results of this long process we tend to describe it as a revolution in conventional weapons' capabilities.

It is an extremely difficult task to restrain or to halt technological sophistication of weapons through international negotiations. But if the arms race is to be politically and militarily controlled, and preferably slowed down, it is of greatest necessity to address its qualitative, that is technological aspects.

As far as Europe is concerned the technological menace comes from the prospect of the number of new weapon systems which would have particular influence on military stability and security in Europe. Prospects which I think will materialize in a few years, that is five to ten years from now. I would like to mention in this respect first of all, the long-range reconnaissance and strike systems consisting of several sensor platforms connected by several channels and means of communication with command centres and various means of attack, all of them having great offensive value. A second category of these dangerous systems would be the "stealth" aircraft and missiles, rendering anti-air defenses of prospective opponents useless or at least ineffective; these systems may threaten other countries with a surprise attack. A third category I have in mind are accurate, long-and-medium-range conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, often replacing presently nuclear-armed missiles. The new missiles would permit quick, surprise attacks, especially against command centres, and would enable subsequent large scale aircraft attacks. Fourth, which actually is very much connected with the third category is the prospect of anti-tactical ballistic missile systems in Europe. When deployed, such systems would undermine existing perception of balance on the continent. All of these new weapons would have a great military value that in time of crisis an opponent threatened by them would rush to destroy them before they would be used in a potential conflict. Thus they are extremely destabilizing. There is a need for very fast action on these weapon systems which, as I said, might be soon deployed in Europe. We have, of course, certain existing methods for tackling the military situation in Europe, like the Vienna talks, the Stockholm Conference and some other fora. Each one of them presents specific opportunities, not yet utilized in full, to achieve internationally binding measures of restraint in the field of military technology. However, it seems that the existing framework of negotiations is already burdened with such complex tasks that it will not be able to address the even more complex matters of procurement of new military technologies.
One could enumerate four possible theoretical approaches to arms limitation in Europe. First, I would name an explanatory approach, being, a kind of learning process. It consists mainly of exchange of information on actual state of military affairs and on blueprints of future activities. As a second I would name the operational approach where measures could be created against surprise attack, measures for confidence building and imposing constraints on military activities. And third, the structural approach in which I would count reductions of weapons and zonal deployment arrangements. These three approaches are already undertaken at present. The only new approach which has not been tried so far would be one which I would call a preventive one. It would be oriented at those weapon systems which are already known as extremely threatening, though not yet deployed. This fourth approach would be directed at weapons to be procured soon or still in research and development phases. This approach seems to be the only one to present a chance of abating the constant drive for ever more potent weapons, which is the main material (in contrast to the political and ideological) source of threat perception.

The goal of preventive limitation of arms is as urgent as it is difficult. We could achieve it by starting a series of debates on threat perceptions by NATO and WTO States, on procurement acquisition policies, on military doctrines. Only after these debates formal and informal, would the two sides, that is East and West Europe, understand each other properly, and be more willing to agree on measures restraining the new technological developments. Some of these ideas were already put into formal propositions, recently by WTO at its Berlin meeting and a few weeks before by Poland in its proposal concerning Central Europe and consisting of four elements, of which the second and third one dealt directly with the technological aspects of the arms race. I think the restraint in new weapon systems development, worthy in itself, may also be conducive to reductions and redeployment of forces already existing in Europe.

Without some restraints on the forthcoming conventional weapon systems the CABS achieved so far will not be sufficient in the long run to balance the negative effects the technological arms race may have on European security.

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As stated in the Final Document of the United Nations First Special Session devoted to Disarmament, the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. This was true in 1978 and is even more valid in 1987, nine years after the First Special Session devoted to Disarmament. The objective is to rid the world of these cruel and abhorrent weapons. The urgency of that objective is underlined by the use of chemical weapons in the prolonged war between Iran and Iraq and by the danger of further proliferation of these cruel weapons.

As the sole negotiating forum for global disarmament questions, the Conference on Disarmament has the responsibility to elaborate the global convention on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. This has been stated in several resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. At its forty-first session, the General Assembly urged the Conference on Disarmament, as a matter of high priority, to intensify the negotiations during its 1987 session with a view to the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest possible date (A/RES/41/58D). In fact, the question of chemical weapons has been independently considered in the multilateral negotiating forum at Geneva since 1971. A separate subsidiary body for chemical weapons was established in 1980, and in 1984 that body was given a full negotiating mandate. The task of the Conference on Disarmament has been facilitated by the introduction in 1982 by the USSR of basic provisions of a Convention (document CD/294 of 21 July 1982) and in 1984 by the tabling by the United States of a draft Convention (document CD/500 of 18 April 1984), as well as by numerous important and specific contributions by other States.

Even though there are several countries which have chemical weapons, only two countries - the United States and the Soviet Union - have declared that they possess stocks of such weapons. The declaration by the Soviet Union was made on 18 February 1987. Being the two countries with the largest stocks of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility for implementing a ban on chemical weapons. In fact, the United States and the Soviet Union announced to the Geneva Conference in 1974 that they had agreed in principle to consider a joint initiative with respect to the conclusion of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. The two countries held a total of 12 bilateral negotiating sessions from 1974 to 1980 and submitted two joint reports to the CD on the progress of their negotiations (document CD/48 of 7 August 1979 and
document CD/112 of 7 July 1980). These documents, which inter alia stressed the scope of the prohibition in the Convention should be determined on the basis of the general purpose criterion, formed a good basis for the initial work of the subsidiary body of the CD.

Official bilateral talks on the Chemical Weapons Convention were resumed after the meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan at Geneva in November 1985. In their joint statement the two leaders reaffirmed that they are in favour of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter and to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification.

The new series of bilateral talks, which began after the Geneva Summit in 1985, serve as a problem-solving exercise with a view to speeding up the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, not to replace the multilateral negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union had, however, bilateral negotiations during the period 1974-1980. This difference of the objectives of the two series of talks is of interest in the light of the main topic of this Conference: "The Interrelationship of Bilateral and Multilateral Disarmament Negotiations". The new character of the bilateral talks confirms that the Conference on Disarmament has the responsibility for pursuing the negotiations on the finalization of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

So far, the United States and the Soviet Union have had five bilateral sessions. The sixth session is due to take place some time after the start of CD's summer session on 9 June 1987. In addition, Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in their meeting in Moscow 13-15 April 1987 agreed to have experts visit each other's respective sites for destroying chemical weapons in order to observe destruction procedures as a step in improving confidence between the States with the largest chemical weapons facilities.

It follows from what I have said that the United States and the Soviet Union since the Geneva Summit have held bilateral discussions on a broad range of questions relevant to the Chemical Weapons Convention. This bilateral contact has already had a positive effect on the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, particularly concerning destruction of chemical weapons production facilities. The bilateral talks can in the future contribute to the solution of the main outstanding questions in the negotiations, notably in the field of
verification. There is thus a constructive interrelationship between the bilateral talks and the multilateral negotiations.

The solution of the verification problems in connection with the Chemical Weapons Convention is a momentous task, because it concerns the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. That implies destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons and the chemical weapons production facilities. It also implies monitoring of the chemical industry in order to ensure that it is not being misused for the clandestine manufacture of chemical weapons. Therefore, the Conference on Disarmament needs to solve both sensitive political issues and complicated technical questions. If the Conference on Disarmament succeeds in this task it will evidently increase the status of the Conference in the history of disarmament negotiations. In addition, the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention will have an influence on future disarmament negotiations concerning other categories of weapons.

So far the Conference on Disarmament has in principle agreed on routine on-site inspections concerning three vital areas of the Convention:

1. Destruction of stocks of chemical weapons;

2. Destruction of chemical weapons production facilities, and;

3. Non-production of chemical weapons.

However, many technical questions remain to be resolved concerning the procedures for the routine on-site inspections. In addition, there is a need for a system of on-site inspection on challenge, which would represent the safety-net of the Convention. Such a system which should enable on-site inspection of undeclared facilities on short notice, should only be resorted to in exceptional circumstances. In order to provide the ultimate source of confidence in the Convention, the system of on-site inspection on challenge has to satisfy certain criteria, of which the following three are the most essential: Firstly, the challenged State must be under obligation to demonstrate to other States, and especially the challenging State, that it complies with the provisions of the Convention. Secondly, an inspection would have to be undertaken immediately after the issue of a challenge. Thirdly, the investigation should be detailed and comprehensive.

The Conference on Disarmament also has to solve the question of the incorporation in the Convention of a prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. Such an incorporation is necessary since the Geneva Protocol of 1925 contains no
verification mechanism and since that Protocol is limited to prohibit the use of chemical (and biological) weapons in war. The conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Convention would therefore reinforce the Geneva Protocol, which is one of the oldest disarmament agreements and which have more than 100 States Parties.

The aim of the multilateral negotiations is to arrive at a global and effective ban on these weapons. Considerations concerning temporary measures must be second to this fundamental objective. The momentum which has been created in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, should be sustained with a view to concluding the Convention as soon as possible, while solving the outstanding issues.

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Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt

Je me bornerai dans mon intervention à quelques remarques sur le désarmement chimique et sur la convention en cours de négociation depuis 1979, dans le cadre de la Conférence sur le Désarmement à Genève.

Tout d'abord, contrairement à l'impression qu'a pu donner l'intervention de M. Berdennikov, je crois qu'il est important de remarquer que le problème n'est pas celui du programme binaire américain, qu'il n'est pas non plus un problème soviéto-américain, mais que c'est un problème qui regarde tous les États et singulièrement les États européens, dans la mesure où l'un de ces États, l'URSS a des stocks importants et toujours inconnus à ce jour. Ensuite, M. Berdennikov nous a dit tout à l'heure qu'une convention était en vue, que selon toute probabilité, avec la volonté politique nécessaire, elle pourrait être signée ou concluse en 1987 ou au plus tard en 1988. Un bon travail a en effet été accompli, surtout lors de la dernière session de la Conférence du désarmement, des progrès nombreux ont été faits, de nombreux progrès restent cependant à accomplir. M. Wagenmakers tout à l'heure dans son intervention en a touché un certain nombre, M. Lundbo en a évoqué d'autres. Je me bornerai quand à moi à évoquer 4 points: la question institutionnelle, la question de l'inspection par défi, celle de la non destruction et enfin celle de la destruction des stocks et du maintien des stocks de sécurité.

Tout d'abord, la question institutionnelle. La Convention et sa mise en œuvre comportent deux phases dans notre esprit, et cela est généralement accepté: avant la destruction, qui correspond à une phase de liaison, après la destruction des stocks. Nous pensons qu'une synergie doit s'exercer durant ces
deux phases au travers d'institutions lourdes du type de celle de l'AIEA. Nous pensons que c'est nécessaire et qu'il est nécessaire d'en passer par là pour trois raisons. D'une part la multiplicité des produits et des pays capables de fabriquer des précurseurs d'armes chimiques ou des armes chimiques rend une gestion de la convention nécessaire; d'autre part la mise en oeuvre de la convention implique au jour le jour une gestion technique touchant à la destruction, à la vérification mais aussi à la non-production; enfin les institutions, sans se substituer au Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, devraient, comme le suggérait récemment le Pakistan, se pencher sur le problème des garanties, des protections à apporter aux pays dépourvus d'armes chimiques et menacés par un agresseur potentiel.

En ce qui concerne le problème de l'inspection par défi, une proposition britannique a fait l'objet de longues discussions et d'un accord quasi unanime. L'URSS nous a dit par la voix de ses délégués, et M. Berdennikov vient de le répéter, qu'elle pouvait travailler sur cette base. M. Berdennikov a évoqué tout à l'heure la question du Challenge Inspection. Nous attendons quant à nous qu'une position plus claire de l'URSS soit prise à ce sujet et nous pensons qu'un accord pourrait alors se faire assez rapidement.

Troisièmement, la question de la non-destruction. La convention en cours de négociation à l'heure actuelle ne peut être parfaite dès sa signature, elle ne peut en particulier comporter la liste de toutes les substances destinées à la fabrication d'armes chimiques : tout d'abord parce que la composition des stocks existants nous est inconnue et le sera jusqu'au jour de la mise en œuvre de la convention et de la déclaration de ces stocks; ensuite parce que les technologies et les produits évoluent chaque jour dans l'industrie chimique et qu'il serait vain d'essayer de faire la liste de ces technologies et de ces produits avant même la conclusion de la convention. D'où la nécessité de confier à un organe, un conseil scientifique, composé de personnalités indépendantes ayant un rôle consultatif, le rôle d'attirer l'attention des organes de la convention sur les nouveaux produits qui pourraient apparaître, les nouvelles technologies et enfin les méthodes de vérification. En bref, de prévoir un mécanisme institutionnel qui assurerait la gestion de la convention dans sa vie.

Quatrièmement, la question de la destruction des stocks. L'objectif de la convention actuellement en négociation à Genève est l'interdiction totale des armes chimiques. Cet objectif, il faut en être conscient, ne sera pas atteint du jour au lendemain. Là encore, la convention ne peut être parfaite dès sa signature. Cette convention doit être globale, ce qui exclut, à mon sens, toute approche régionale dans la mesure ou
une approche régionale, compte tenu de la mobilité des substances et des produits et des armes chimiques, serait parfaitement in vérifiable et ne répondrait pas à l'objectif poursuivi actuellement dans la négociation d'une convention universelle. Cette convention enfin doit garantir la sécurité de tous les États à chaque étape de sa mise en œuvre et ce, jusqu'à ce qu'elle ait atteint son objectif final, l'élimination des stocks et des facilités de production de tous les États. Il convient en effet de garantir la sécurité des États non seulement dans le futur, ce qui serait parfait, mais aussi dans l'immédiat ce qui est nécessaire. Il s'agit là d'une question urgente, car tout d'abord, la mise en œuvre des dispositions agréées entre toutes les parties constitue un préalable nécessaire à l'application de la convention dans sa deuxième phase, c'est-à-dire dans cette phase où aurait été opérées la destruction et l'élimination de tous les stocks d'armes chimiques. Cette question ne saurait en aucun cas être déléguée aux seuls États détenteurs au moment de la convention. Elle ne saurait être purement bilatérale.

Un deuxième point concernant la destruction des stocks est que, pour que la sécurité existe entre les parties à tout moment une fois la convention en vigueur, il convient que s'établisse une relation de sécurité égale entre tous les États concernés au regard des armes chimiques. Or force est de constater à l'heure actuelle un grand déséquilibre entre, d'une part les deux pays les plus armés, les États-Unis, mais aussi l'URSS dont les stocks doit on le rappeler sont et resteront en Europe, et les autres pays d'autre part. La convention, pour être viable, pour être acceptable par tous, ne saurait être un traité de désarmement des pays désarmés dès sa signature. Aussi pour organiser dès la mise en œuvre de la convention les dispositions qui doivent y figurer sur la base d'un équilibre de sécurité, trois options sont possibles, comportant chacune une approche bilatérale et multilatérale.

Tout d'abord une option bilatérale. Elle consisterait en un accord préalable soviéto-américain précédant la signature de la convention. Cet accord bilatéral entrerait en vigueur immédiatement, dès la signature. En revanche, l'accord multilatéral, la convention elle-même, n'entrerait en vigueur qu'au moment où serait atteint un niveau effectif de destruction des stocks internationalement contrôlé, acceptable par tous.

Deuxième possibilité, un aménagement de la période de 10 ans. La convention elle-même, alors, comporterait une première phase de 5 ans bilatérale, pendant laquelle seraient détruits les stocks américains et soviétiques. La seconde phase, multilatérale, correspondrait à la destruction finale de l'ensemble des stocks existants et des facilités de production existantes. Cette phase serait toutefois assez difficile, compte-tenu d'une part, de l'ampleur des stocks existants qui
rendent difficile d'imaginer une destruction en 5 ans et d'autre part, de leur variété et de tous les problèmes que poserait la définition d'équivalence.

Troisième possibilité, la mise en place dès l'entrée en vigueur de la convention et pour une période de 10 ans d'un équilibre impartial de stocks de sécurité limités et homogènes. Ces stocks seraient contrôlés internationalement et devraient être détruits ainsi que la facilité de production qui en assurerait l'entretien pendant les deux dernières années de la période de 10 ans.

Cette position, qui a la préférence de mon pays, repose sur la distinction dans la convention entre deux phases bien distinctes. D'une part, une phase de 10 ans qui aurait pour but de porter à la connaissance des parties les stocks et les facilités existants, de permettre la vérification de ces déclarations, de définir les modalités de la destruction et de les mettre en œuvre et, enfin, de tester l'efficacité des dispositions agréées au regard de l'objectif poursuivi. Pendant toute cette période, je le répète, nous pensons que la sécurité de tous les États ne pourrait être véritablement garantie face à certains stocks existants, que si est défini un stock de sécurité homogène identique pour tous et inchangé jusqu'à la période de destruction complète, c'est-à-dire inchangé pendant 10 ans. Après cette période de 10 ans, l'objectif serait enfin atteint, la sécurité de tous les États en regard des armes chimiques serait enfin assurée, les stocks détruits y compris le stock de sécurité et les facilités de production, bref l'on aurait atteint l'objectif même. Dans ce cadre, celui du respect de la sécurité des États, l'objectif de la France reste celui de la convention, l'élimination totale des armes chimiques de la surface du globe. Mon pays y est activement et fermement engagé. Je puis vous assurer que la France ne sera pas le dernier État à désarmer sur le plan chimique et qu'elle rejoindra les autres pays au niveau zéro.

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Klaus-Jürgen Citron

I would like to make some short remarks as to some of the interesting papers presented around the table. As to Professor Matousek, I think as many around the table have expressed, we have also a strong preference for a global solution for the chemical weapons. There seems to be even quite a good outlook as we heard from members from East and West. I don't think that the geographical solution limited to the two German States and Czechoslovakia would be sufficient. Just to give an example as the weapons would be removed, they could be brought back within
a night, or two, with massive transport, verification would be extremely difficult, and security would not be improved. The same is true I think for any limited nuclear weapons zone. I think we all prefer that we now get into the zero solution for INF and make a major step ahead - limited zones would not add real security. In this regard let me just remind you of Professor Arbatov who in the Palme Report made critical remarks himself because he had doubts at that time about the usefulness of such limited solutions because there would be no real security increase for such limited zones. I was very much positively impressed by Minister Ezdi's positive evaluation of conventional disarmament needs and efforts. I think we agree and think that the United Nations study on conventional disarmament has been very positive. I think their are important elements he indicated, for possible solutions in the various regions in the world. As to Mr. Karkoszka, I agree with him as to the positive evaluation he has given for the contribution of the CSCE and of the Stockholm Conference but I think this is only a beginning. We all realize that more has to be done in this field. I cannot agree with him that there is no threat to Europe. Naturally things have improved and we are glad that these things have improved, but the feeling of distrust still exists. A lot has to be done and I'll try to speak of it tomorrow when I have the floor. But in view of this I think we can't say yet that there is no feeling of threat. I must admit on the western side we still feel a considerable concern because of superiority in the conventional field on the other side and I think it would not be fair not to speak about it. We have proposals on the table from East and West. I would like to remind you of the Halifax statement of Western Foreign Ministers and of the Brussels Declaration of last December. On your side there is the Budapest appeal and let me just say that our aim is stability at lower levels, elimination of the capacity for surprise attack and, the capacity for offensive action and the elimination of disparities.

I think it would be wrong to create the impression that we are already in paradise. There is a lot to do and I hope to be able to speak about it in the next session.

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Thomas Barthelemy

I would like to make several comments, primarily directed to some points made by Mr. Berdennikov. I generally, and my Government generally share the view of others expressed here, including Mr. Berdennikov, about the fact that in the last 12 months there has been rather rapid progress in the chemical weapons negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. I
certainly do agree with Mr. Berdennikov's statement that 1986 appeared to be a turning point. I would like to return to that in a moment.

However, I think for those who aren't too close to the details of the negotiations it is very important for you to understand that, apart from the issue of on-site inspection on challenge, there are a plethora of other issues, largely technical and legal, that are very complex and on which there is a great deal of work to be done. That is, the solutions are not fully in hand in the view of any government participating in the negotiations. Once one or more governments find a solution to some of these problems in detail, as a draft language, then of course it has to be agreed among the 40 countries.

On the question of on-site inspection on challenge, Mr. Berdennikov said that the Soviet Government considers this very important. My Government agrees with this, because verification is exceptionally difficult in the area of chemical weapons. The monitoring of the chemical industry and the achievement of a sense of confidence on the part of States that will be asked to destroy deterrent stocks that they have, requires that there be high confidence in the compliance of all States. Indeed, fully effective verification in this area is not possible in the view of my Government, compared to, let us say, verification of the provisions of the ABM Treaty or SALT I, for example. And therefore, the proposal contained in the 1984 US Draft Convention for on-site inspection on challenge was an essential element of the US proposal, in order to provide deterrent power and give confidence in compliance. Or perhaps I should say, instead of deterrent, discouraging of violations, in order to ensure that there is no misunderstanding here.

Mr. Berdennikov also said that verification must cover any facility. He said the Soviet Union supports the UK proposal and referred specifically to the concept of managed access.

I hope that when he said that it must cover any facility, he had in mind not only production facility but stockpiling facility, because it is not entirely clear that the Soviet Government is prepared to accept that in the negotiations at this time.

As regards the proposal of the United Kingdom Government, I hope I'll be excused if I speak for the UK. But in the negotiations this Spring the Soviet Union said that it could not accept mandatory challenge inspection in the case of alleged hidden stockpiles, but it instead reserved the right, where it determined it necessary, to refuse challenge.

The position stated by the UK Government was that its proposal provided for consideration of alternative measures but
that, in the final analysis, the challenger must be satisfied with those measures or an on-site inspection would be mandatory.

The US position is that on-site inspection on challenge must be accepted as mandatory and that this must be prompt.

On the issue of the binary genie, I think after 18 years it will be understood that it is important to retain deterrence so long as there is no Convention; and in fact, the United States is not aware whether the binary genie is out of the bottle or not, because we have no information about the Soviet stockpile.

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Peter Davies

I think in view of the various references which have been made this afternoon to the British proposals, perhaps I could in the time available, very briefly refer to them.

Mr. Berdennikov made reference to them and I would say that we would see the prime purpose of this challenge inspection régime as being to act as a deterrent against violation in the first place. There are a number of principles which we consider crucial to an effective challenge inspection régime and perhaps I could just run through them very briefly, though they are not intended to exclude other factors.

Firstly, an objective standard for non-compliance is crucial. Secondly, it is for the challenging State to judge whether it is satisfied on the question of compliance by the challenged State. Thirdly, promptness and this has been mentioned and I think it is still the subject of discussion in implementing and concluding the entire challenge procedure, including inspection will be all important. These points in turn imply a number of further conclusions. There must be no procedural obstacles or filters to the straightforward implementation of the challenge procedure. The onus must rest upon the challenged State to demonstrate its compliance and there would be considerable value in iterative inspection process providing for further measures if the original arrangements have not enabled the issue to be resolved satisfactorily.

Finally, there could be no discrimination between the rights of State parties to challenge others. Clearly, it would make a nonsense of the proposed procedure if it could under certain circumstances be subject to an outright refusal.

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Derek Boothby

I would like to say a few words if I may about conventional weapons. And as a background I would like to say that I am a member of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs where I was the Secretary of the United Nations Study on Conventional Disarmament which was mentioned by two or three earlier speakers.

The subject of limitations and reductions and other measures of conventional disarmament has been slow in attracting attention in the international community but this situation has been changing in the past three or four years. At long last the topic is beginning to be under active discussion in the United Nations and indeed elsewhere in the international community. As a diversion may I say that if indeed there is an INF deal in Europe we have already seen that the spotlight is beginning to fall on what effect that will have on the conventional imbalances; that is just one example of a situation which is repeated elsewhere around the world where there is more interest in this conventional disarmament issue. For the past three weeks I have been assisting with the discussions on conventional disarmament in the United Nations Disarmament Commission and where, yet again, it seemed to me, there was a further demonstration of the growing recognition among the majority of governments, - not yet all, but certainly the majority, - that the problems of conventional disarmament need to be addressed and ways found to move forward with some sort of negotiations.

I would like to express support for the aspects described earlier by Minister Asif Ezdi. Without in any way diverting attention from other issues before the United Nations, conventional disarmament does indeed deserve to receive greater attention. Clearly it should be discussed at a multilateral level and yet while many of the issues can be discussed in a global context probably the best chances indeed of effective progress lie in regional measures. Conventional disarmament is not an issue that lends itself to be discussed and resolved amongst 159 member States. The actual negotiations and resolution of these things will have to be done on a regional basis, with of course appropriate participation by extraregional States who have an interest or a responsibility in those particular regions. Unfortunately, however, the ponderous plodding of political discussion is often outpaced by the speed of technological development and from time to time outpaced by the nature of political events. Even so, I venture to suggest for a number of reasons the subject of conventional weapons and conventional disarmament is coming to the fore and I would also therefore like to suggest to the academic experts here, and the other experts here today, that now is the time for them to do some thinking and come forward with some practical ideas, published practical ideas, and proposals. I think that they
will begin to find that there is a ready market for those in the next few years.

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Anders Boserup

I was happy to hear the interventions by Minister Asif Ezdi, Andrei Karkoszka and Derek Boothby because it seems to me that too little attention is devoted to the problem of conventional disarmament at this meeting. From a European perspective the central problem is the huge build-up of conventional forces in this continent. The questions that loom large on our agenda - INF, chemical weapons and confidence building - are important subjects, but they are after all exercises on the periphery of the main subject: conventional disarmament.

Yesterday we discussed nuclear deterrence - whether it is needed and whether there are alternatives to it. I submit that this debate will remain abstract and somewhat pointless until it is specifically related to the question of conventional forces and of the means to improve stability at the conventional level, in Europe, and in other parts of the world. It is evident that in Europe, deterrence through threats of nuclear escalation will not be given up unless the situation at the conventional level is perceived as stable by both sides. As I see it, therefore, the key to nuclear disarmament (and to confidence building as well) is a restructuring of conventional forces towards "mutual defensive superiority", where neither side could hope to succeed in an attack or could feel impelled to pre-empt in a crisis.

There is an urgent need to open an East-West discussion of possible unilateral or joint steps that could promote mutual defensive superiority without jeopardizing the security of either side. Without such steps there is little prospect of genuine confidence building or of fundamental changes in nuclear postures and doctrines. It is unfortunate, therefore, that conventional forces which are at the core of all the disarmament problems have been so little in focus at this meeting.

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Michael Intriligator

I would like to make two comments, on conventional weapons and two others on chemical weapons. On conventional weapons, I think one must recognize that there are important connections
between conventional and strategic weapons. For example, nuclear disarmament or even the adoption of a nuclear no first use doctrine may require an increase in conventional weapons. We sometimes refer to this as the "dove's dilemma", namely if one tries to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons in any way it may require an increase in reliance on conventional weapons, including increased military personnel, increased conventional weapons, increased budgets, and so forth. I think one has to recognize the fact that that is the reality of the situation, and we can't separate conventional from nuclear when we talk about disarmament.

My second comment concerns chemical weapons and basically I would like to register a somewhat sceptical note about the whole subject. It seems to me that chemical and also biological weapons are rather easily produced. Unlike nuclear weapons, they require very little technical sophistication or infrastructure. Again unlike nuclear weapons, they are accessible even to small nations, subnational groups, terrorists, individuals, etc. Therefore, it seems to me that it is virtually impossible by way of conventions, agreements, treaties etc., to control production, transport and storage of those types of weapons.

My suggestion, given that conclusion, is that what we should concentrate on is sanctions against the use of chemical weapons. For example, if the two superpowers or the five permanent members of the Security Council or some other major influential group of nations agreed among themselves that they would take strong action against any nation that made use of chemical weapons, I think that could have some effect and, in fact, a much greater effect than any sort of treaty on production or whatever. The actions that could be taken could include, for example a cut-off of all military assistance, economic assistance, or trade relations with those nations that use such chemical weapons or even possibly stronger military sanctions such as destruction of chemical plants in the event of the continued use of chemical weapons by those nations.

I would like to suggest then, consideration of sanctions rather than treaties limiting production as a way of dealing with chemical (and also biological) weapons.

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Grigory Berdennikov

I do not intend to reply to any of the remarks made in the discussion. I merely wish to say that the discussion clearly confirms that there is a good chance of rapid progress towards
the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. There have, of course, been a number of pessimistic statements, including that of the last speaker, but that is an indication of the diversity of positions represented in our conference. I have only one comment on a number of ideas expressed by the honorable representative of France. For some past years France has been putting forward the idea of a "safety margin", an idea that I personally regard as creating some difficulties in the way of speedy agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons. At the same time, the idea itself does not seem to me to be completely logical. After all, France does not admit to the possession of chemical weapons at the present time, but still insists that it should have the so-called safety margin at every stage in the destruction of chemical weapons. The effect is that all the states that are parties to the convention will destroy their chemical weapons and cease production under the convention, while France, which does not at present have chemical weapons, should apparently acquire the right under the convention to produce chemical weapons, so that it can have a safety margin. That is a logical inconsistency in the French position. It seems to me that it would be a good thing to clarify this matter in the course of the negotiations in Geneva.

Jiri Matousek

I would like to make some comments on what was said by various speakers. I think that it is without doubt that verification of especially non-production of chemical weapons would be extremely difficult and it remains in my opinion the main problem of the projected global prohibition of chemical weapons. Nevertheless there are some ways, to proceed as was shown for example at the 12th Pugwash workshop specially devoted to this problem which was held in Berlin at the beginning of March. There was especially the problem of the interrelationship of national and international verifications means and mechanisms discussed which could promote the potential shift of the negotiations in Geneva.

As for the zone, free of chemical weapons, I think that we are in no contradiction, because for all, especially for the proponents of such a regional measure, it is only a step which should facilitate the final goal and the final goal is without any doubt the prohibition on a global scale. To be precise I would like to shortly comment on the intervention made by the distinguished Ambassador Citron. The geographic shape of this zone (as proposed initially covers the territory of two German States and Czechoslovakia) is regarded only as initial, because
one must, if such events should take place, begin with one step and it would be desirable to extend this zone to the whole of Central Europe according to the Vienna talks and perhaps then to all Europe. Of course the proponents of this measure would be happy if you do speed up the proceedings of the negotiations in Geneva, if this original measure would be unnecessary and if it would be anachronism. It is of course clear, as was said by Mr. Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt that the global prohibition can not refer to any regional measures and should be global. But to be precise I would only shortly comment that it is not possible during the period of destruction of chemical weapons and of facilities to speak about equal security (because security is a more complex concept) but only about exclusion of one-sided military advantage, as it is also, clearly indicated in the nearly agreed text of the convention on conventional weapons.

As to what was said by the distinguished Minister Ezdi, I would like to add that with regard to the figures on funds given to conventional arms world wide it is necessary to take into account that they are also due to the arms trade which concentrates only on conventional weapons. It is perhaps also to be added that the third world countries spent for their military budgets about 20 percent of their gross national product and sometimes even more in some crisis situations. But there is also a problem of military strategic conceptions which should be taken into account when speaking about conventional arms and weapons which are necessary to be included into the talks.

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Hendrik Wagenmakers

If I have to summarize I would say that it seems that all of us are agreed that we want a comprehensive convention eliminating all existing chemical weapons and prohibition of all capacity to produce such weapons. It seems we are agreed that we want a ban on development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or retention of CW. We want to ban the transfer of CW, we want to ban the assistance or encouragement of prohibited activities, we want a ban on the use of CW, we want a clear definition of committed activities. We are in need of an obligation to destroy existing CW stockpiles, we are also in favour to destroy CW production plans. I think this is not a small degree of consensus. There are of course differences in approaches. I for one, would not pronounce myself in favour of a chemical-weapon free zone because I think, in view of the momentum reached in the CD negotiations, it might not be conducive to maintaining that momentum. The scope of the area is rather limited, chemical weapons can easily be concealed and
it would be very easy to circumvent the obligations under such a CW free zone. It would imply that a very stringent verification system would have to be set up. I think it would all only detract from the efforts that we have deployed and are deploying in Geneva. I would like to thank our French colleague, Jean de Ponton d'Amécourt for his contribution which for me opened some new avenues, as always the French contribution is intellectually stimulating but I have to confess to him that for me it needs careful further study and consideration.

As regards observation of Professor Intriligator I can see his point that he wants penalties and sanctions and more drastic action. I would ask him to consider, rather than just criticizing treaties, that treaties and sanctions could go hand in hand.

Finally, I would like to thank Minister Asif Ezdi who has very rightfully and very correctly pointed out the merits of the conventional disarmament file. I concur with his visions and I would also concur with the observation of Professor Boserup of Denmark that it is not completely fair to the importance of the file, the conventional weapons file, just to treat it only, so to say, in a rather limited way as we did today. I would agree with the Danish Professor that this file is so important that it would merit separate treatment.

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Fifth/Cinquième Session

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND VERIFICATION: BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PERSPECTIVES/MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET VÉRIFICATION: PERSPECTIVES BILATÉRALES ET MULTILATÉRALES.

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The history of mankind has known CEM's a long time, without, however, giving them this modern name. Wherever war-fighting kings wanted to make peace they looked for means to prove their peaceful intentions. They sometimes even offered their children as hostages or better as marriage partners to the other side. The classical concept of CEM's is described by the famous Greek writer Xenophon in his "Anabasis"; when the Greek leader offers to make peace and in trusting the assurances of his Persian hosts comes without arms to the "conciliation meal", he is killed together with his officers. The old cruel story tells us that trust is not enough, that we need ground for trust.

We have gone a long way since the Anabasis; modern wars have taught our nations better lessons. Political leaders have looked for new instruments to stabilize peace and avoid conflict. This became particularly important after the invention of atomic weapons and the development of ever more destructive conventional weapons. We all know about the development of CEM's in the postwar history. The aim was to:

1. Diminish mistrust
2. Create better communication
3. Avoid miscalculations
4. Create instruments for crisis management
5. Facilitate disarmament negotiations
6. Assure the participants that agreements would be complied with i.e. so that verification really can take place.

Some chances for agreements were unfortunately missed because East and West could not agree in the fifties and early sixties on specific details concerning the relationship of disarmament and verification. There were, however, also positive developments in the sixties and seventies, for example the Hot Line Agreements between the USA and the USSR, other Agreements to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and to prevent incidents on and over the High Seas. These crisis management agreements facilitated the bilateral arms control agreements of the following years between the USA and the USSR. Since that time CEMs have become part and parcel of most arms control negotiations. At the same time, negotiators realized that the agreement on satisfactory verification rules would contribute considerably to the necessary confidence between the participating states.

Verification was therefore considered not a value in itself but a necessary prerequisite for long-term confidence.
building and further disarmament steps. But C\textsuperscript{Ms} were not only important between the two major powers. When the climate in Europe began to improve in the seventies, European Governments, inter alia the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany took the initiative to introduce C\textsuperscript{Ms} into the new CSCE-process. It took major efforts in the CSCE-negotiations of 1974/75 until the first modest multilateral C\textsuperscript{Ms} of the Helsinki Final Act could be recorded:

1. Obligatory notification of major military manoeuvres with more than 25,000 men 21 days before the start;
2. Invitation of observers, unfortunately only on a voluntary basis;
3. Voluntary notification of movements.

In view of the fact that we made major progress last year in Stockholm it is fair to state that a learning process has taken place, inter alia in the W.P. Whereas it was impossible to get agreement by Eastern military officers on obligatory observation of military exercises in 1975, all this proved less difficult - though still not easy - in 1986. Implementation of the first C\textsuperscript{Ms} of Helsinki was uneven, most major military manoeuvres were notified in a satisfactory manner but observation was granted by W.P. States only rarely and on a selective basis, whereas Neutral and Non-Aligned countries and Western States invited to quite a number of exercises. It was France which considered the need for more C\textsuperscript{Ms} so important that it proposed in 1978 a Conference on Disarmament for the whole of Europe, the first phase of which was to be dedicated to further C\textsuperscript{Ms}. The Federal Government supported this initiative right from the beginning. It was during the CSCE-Follow-up Meeting of Madrid that the mandate for the first phase of the CDE was elaborated. The elaboration of the mandate for the Stockholm Conference proved difficult. In the end all participating States agreed on very precise conditions: It said inter alia that C\textsuperscript{BM} had to be of military significance, politically binding and provided with adequate forms of verification.

The Conference in Stockholm was opened by the 35 foreign ministers in January 1984 who stressed the importance of this new venture and outlined the various conceptions. Immediately after the official opening the negotiations began. The 16 NATO-countries presented their set of proposals on January 24, thereby underlining their resolution to start immediately with concrete steps. Romania and the Non-Aligned Countries followed soon with their proposals, the USA in May and Malta in November 1984. The concepts of West and East were quite different at the beginning. The West proposed 6 concrete measures:

1. Exchange of information on military headquarters and structures;
2. Early notification of all military activities involving 6,000 men;
3. Obligatory observation of all these activities;
4. The exchange of annual calendars of all notifiable military activities;
5. Regular on-site-inspections;
6. Improved communications.

These practical steps at confidence-building were in the beginning criticized by the East as being purely technical.

The East presented its proposals as large-scale political measures, namely:

1. A Treaty on the Non-Use of Force;
2. An agreement not to use nuclear weapons first;
3. A chemical weapon free zone in Europe;
4. Various nuclear-weapon free zones;
5. The reduction of military budgets and, in addition;
6. Constraints on the size of manoeuvres and;
7. Vague hints at improving the CEMs of Helsinki.

It took two years of very difficult negotiations until there was some meeting of minds. The fact that the dialogue between the superpowers improved since January 1985 helped the ODE. The Neutral and Non-aligned Countries (NNA) of Europe contributed also to this process; they had, however, to develop their own position and discovered soon that their interests were best served by concrete measures and not by political promises. So the Non-Aligned Countries came out with a substantial package of concrete measures, many of them very closely to Western concepts.

In the East, too, new thinking developed, probably due to the new leadership of Secretary-General Gorbachev. When the West, in the interest of moving the Conference forward, stated its willingness to reaffirm the "Non-use of force" in the final document, provided that the USSR agreed to a set of concrete measures, the road was open to a substantial give and take. The negotiations proved, however, to be tough and difficult.
In summer 1986 everything still seemed uncertain, the Conference spinning its wheels in the sand, when the Western countries decided to take a major initiative. They stated themselves ready to accept a number of substantial compromises in case the other participants were willing to do likewise. The central open issue was "verification". The West had asked right from the beginning that there should be the right of on-site-inspections in case of doubts on the implementation of the agreed CSBMs. The East had regarded inspections as unnecessary for CSBMs and as an attempt at spying. It was the West which finally suggested a compromise, namely a limitation of the number of inspections a country would have to accept from other countries every year.

The new Soviet leadership, willing to prove a new attitude, accepted this solution in principle at the beginning of the last round, but the Eastern negotiators wanted to postpone the implementation of this principle to a later stage of the CDE. It took several weeks of tough negotiations to convince all the participants that the West was not willing to accept a general promise, but that the CDE needed clear rules, particularly concerning the modalities of on-site-inspection, including rules for air-inspections.

On August 29, three weeks before the end, Marshal Achromeev, Deputy Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, came to Stockholm to show the willingness of the Soviet military to accept air-inspections, but only with Soviet aircraft or helicopters. The West had so far insisted that the inspecting State provide the aircraft for the inspection. In order to show flexibility, the West proposed that inspections take place in neutral aircraft, thereby giving a special role to Non-Aligned countries. The Non-Aligned countries welcomed this NATO proposal and declared themselves ready to keep at the disposal of the participating States aircraft to be used for such inspections.

The Warsaw Pact countries remained adamant: "inspections yes, but not with foreign cars and aircraft". In order to save the negotiations, the West gave in and accepted a compromise solution which would practically leave the ultimate decision whether to accept a foreign aircraft to the inspected States. In exchange, the West succeeded to get a rather comprehensive text on the inspection modalities. The number of inspections a country has to accept per year was fixed at three.

Another tough negotiation concerned the thresholds for notification and observation. Whereas the East had in the end been willing to agree on a solid solution for inspections, they stubbornly refused low thresholds. When the Conference-clock was stopped on September 19, the agreed day of adjournment of the CDE, East and West were still negotiating on the numbers.
The result is a compromise which was not as good as we would have liked: States have to notify 42 days in advance all military activities if 13,000 men participate; invitations to observe the activities are to be made if 17,000 men participate. Another field where the results were unsatisfactory, was the exchange of information. The East particularly refused to give any static information, e.g. the designation of participating divisions or the headquarters address of such military units.

If we want to evaluate the result of the Stockholm Conference, we have to look at the results as a whole: it represents a major step ahead in the CSCE and in the context of East-West relations in general. It was seen by public opinion in Europe as a proof that agreements on military matters are still possible between East and West and that the process of the CSCE still has a chance. Foreign Ministers of the 35 countries which met in Vienna at the opening of the Follow-up meeting underlined the contribution of the Stockholm Conference on the CSCE.

Having said all this, I would like to add a word of caution: The result of the CSCE will be as good as the implementation of the agreed document. We hope that all participating States realize this and that we will see in the months and years ahead a satisfactory transparency of military matters as agreed in Stockholm. The first step took place as soon as mid-december of 1986, when the participants transmitted the annual forecasts of their major military activities to all the others. At first glance these forecasts represent a considerable step ahead: they contain 25 WP military activities of which 10 are to be observed and 17 NATO activities, of which 9 are going to be observed, in addition 5 notifications and 2 observations of neutral and non-aligned activities.

The first observations in Eastern Europe have been rather satisfactory, not all of them perfect but by and large sincere attempts to obey the letter of the Stockholm Document. The instrument of on-site-inspection has not yet been used by any participant. The question can be asked whether it should be used: I remember that negotiators from East and West at the end of the Stockholm negotiations felt that this new instrument should in good time be tried out. We had succeeded for the first time in arms control negotiations to agree on obligatory on-site-inspections. We had laid down rather precise rules. I think it will be necessary to use this instrument, not as a weapon of mistrust, but as a sober tool of compliance control. May I in this context refer to the inspections of the International Atomic Energy Organisation (IAEO). States which agreed to these inspections accept them now as a kind of routine, the general public hardly noticing these inspections. I hope that the same can develop in the CSCE-context.
The question has been asked: What can CSBMs contribute in a world full of modern weapons of mass-destruction? I will try to answer: It is the task of governments to do everything possible to ensure that these weapons will never be used. CSBMs represent a new approach, an attempt to facilitate disarmament by approaching the roots of the arms-race, distrust and fear. CSBMs aim at creating a better way of evaluating the other side, of analysing the capacities and - possibly - intentions of the opposing forces. We hope that CSBMs can contribute in the long run to a better understanding and a clearer perception of the military thinking of the other side. The ultimate objective of CSBMs is to create stability by reducing occasions for misunderstandings and miscalculations. Some of the first CSBMs were agreed on by the USA and the USSR, as for example the "Hot Lines Agreement" of 1963 and the 1972 "Agreement to prevent incidents at sea".

Even in the negotiations on the reduction of nuclear weapons CSBMs play an important role, as for example the provision to inform each other whenever major elements of the strategic forces of both sides go into exercise. But CSBMs are only one field where suspicions have to be diminished in order to create a more co-operative atmosphere in Europe. The Final Act of the CSCE agreed to in Helsinki in 1975 includes i.e. the field of human rights and human contacts. It is in these fields that the countries can do and must do more to implement the promises of the Final Act of Helsinki, thereby diminishing fear and mistrust. The Vienna Follow-up Meeting has been given the task of evaluating progress in all fields of the CSCE. The participating States will have to decide about the next steps in order to move all areas of the Final Act forward.

There, in Vienna, the decision will also have to be made how the CSCE can continue and expand the results of the Stockholm Conference on CSBMs by agreeing on additional measures and how at the same time conventional stability in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals can be achieved by eliminating existing disparities. Since mid February of this year informal negotiations have started in Vienna between the 16 countries of NATO and 7 Warsaw Pact States with the aim of preparing a new mandate for negotiations on conventional stability for the whole of Europe.

In both negotiations further CEM will play a major role. Stockholm was but a step, though an important one, on the road to stability and security in Europe.

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The example of Ambassador Citron, with whom I had the occasion to work at the Stockholm Conference, prompts me also to give you my views on the development of measures in this conference to strengthen confidence and security in Europe. We have, obviously, to spread an atmosphere of confidence between states if we are to succeed in advancing towards real disarmament. The Stockholm Conference was important in that sense as the first successful military and political conference of recent years. Although its participants - 33 European States, plus the United States and Canada - mainly discussed matters relating to the European continent, the measures that were discussed are nevertheless of a universal nature, and may evidently be extended to and be of interest for other regions of the world. That applies, moreover, to measures taken in other regions, especially the initiative for a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. All that is also experience which may be of use for Europe.

The Stockholm Conference adopted a number of measures in the military sphere that were of a more significant nature and wider in their scope than what was achieved in accordance with the Helsinki Agreement. As a result, the Final Act, which laid the basis for the Europe-wide process, was developed appreciably. In fact, the framework of the Helsinki Agreement was extended twice in Stockholm - the period for prior notification of military activity by participating states was lengthened, and the level of movement occasioning such notification was reduced. Notification is now given not 21 days, but 42 days before the start of military manoeuvres, and the threshold level for notification is not 25,000, but 15,000 men engaged independently in these manoeuvres or in conjunction with the various possible airforce and naval components. The same conditions of prior notification are also extended to troop transfers to Europe, including transfers from across the ocean, and to troop concentrations, which extends and clarifies the provision of the Helsinki Act on major troop movements. The agreement in Stockholm on the compulsory rather than, as previously, the voluntary invitation of observers from all participating states to notified military activity is also a serious advance on the Helsinki Agreement. The presence of observers enables all states to ascertain that the military activity being carried out corresponds to what was notified and is no threat to anyone. It was a considerable achievement of the Stockholm Conference that it succeeded in adopting new measures for the strengthening of confidence, measures that
although previously non-existent are in keeping with the spirit of the Helsinki Agreement. Those measures include the annual exchange of advance plans of notifiable military activity, and some limitations concerning military operations.

The socialist countries, and also the neutral and non-aligned countries, strove in Stockholm for the adoption of measures to limit large-scale manoeuvres, in view of their continual growth and their dangerous, destabilizing nature. Manoeuvres of the "Autumn Forge" type, in which some 350,000 troops, 15,000 tracked and wheeled vehicles, 2,000 military aircraft, and up to 400 ships are involved every autumn, are difficult to distinguish from preparations for the start of military operations. Manoeuvres on that scale and intensity are not needed for ordinary troop training, and all that they can do is to increase tension and aggravate mistrust. The United States, the United Kingdom and some other NATO countries close to them categorically opposed any serious discussion at the conference of the proposals of the socialist countries, and of a group of neutral and non-aligned countries to restrict the level, number and duration of major military exercises. As a result agreement could be reached only on some parts of measures of limitation, in particular that the largest military activity - 75,000 men or more - cannot be carried out unless prior notification has been given two years in advance. Attention is thus focussed on the most dangerous types of manoeuvres. What is important in principle, however, is that a previously non-existent measure of limitation has now been initiated, and may subsequently be developed and extended.

Owing to the position of the United States and some of its NATO allies, extension of measures of confidence to the independent activity of naval and air forces was not decided in Stockholm, although the mandate received by the conference from the Madrid meeting had stipulated that measures would be applied to the military activities of all participating States in the whole of Europe as well in the adjoining sea area and air space whenever these activities affect security in Europe. The experience of the last war shows that powerful navies and air forces are important and often decisive in military operations and inflict vast damage even when using conventional weaponry. How can we fail to recall, for example, that the second world war began for the United States with the sudden attack on Pearl Harbour by aircraft in December 1941. Nor can we overlook the fact that in our time, naval and air-force activity taken to be ordinary manoeuvres have been turned into militaristic actions against sovereign states. Nevertheless the United States and its naval allies have made every attempt to exclude their fleets and air forces from control.

In order to keep these questions of vital importance to confidence and security in Europe open for future discussion,
the Soviet delegation announced at the closing session of the Conference that it intended to raise at the next phase of the QIE the questions of notification of independent air force and naval exercises, limitation of the scale of military manoeuvres and coverage by notifications of the territories of all the participating States of the Conference. There were no open objections to this interpretative statement.

Proceeding from the premise that security cannot be strengthened solely by measures of confidence in the military sphere, and that what are needed are first and foremost political agreements, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries made proposals of a political nature to the effect that participating states possessing nuclear weapons should not be the first to use them, that Europe should be freed of chemical weapons, and that nuclear weapon-free zones should be created. Many of these proposals were based on the opinions of most countries of the international community. Nevertheless, the leading NATO countries avoided discussing them on various formal pretexts. Life has shown, however, that these problems which still remain on the agenda, are being even further developed, and must be solved. With the support of the neutral and non-aligned countries, and of some other western countries, the socialist countries have succeeded in obtaining confirmation and introduction into practice of the principle of not having recourse to force, or the threat of force. In that respect, the Declaration contains the specific obligation that participating states must refrain from the threat of force or its use in any of forms, including its most dangerous manifestation - the use of armed force.

Stockholm also opened up new prospects in the sphere of verification of the observance of the agreed decisions by the participating states. The first agreement in the history of international relations in the military sphere on problems of verification, including, in particular, on-site inspections, was reached at the Conference. That undoubtedly will have, or, rather, already is having a positive effect on other negotiations. Ambassador Citron paid much attention in his statement to the way in which the question of verification was examined at the Stockholm Conference. Its discussion was, indeed, no light matter, but mainly because some were trying to work out verificatory procedures before specific measures of confidence had been agreed, and not their application, but as some sort of independent measure. Echoes of such an approach are still to be heard today, in the reasoning as to why we should wait until doubts arise over fulfilment by some state or other of the agreements reached. All that need be done, the argument goes, is to organize on-site inspections routinely, without any cause. But monitoring, especially on-site inspections, is a useful instrument when it is a guarantee of the observance of accepted undertakings by other states, in
which sense it helps to build confidence. When used without due grounds it is, however, an instrument that may have the opposite effect.

As regards assertions that the neutral and non-aligned countries welcomed the proposal of NATO to use a neutral aircraft for inspection purposes, it should in fairness be pointed out that there was a split in their group on precisely this question during the Conference. This idea failed on political and technical grounds to gain the support even of many of the countries of the West. The majority tended to the view that inspection should be conducted in transport, including aircraft supplied by the country concerned. The Soviet Union has shown clearly in and after Stockholm, and in other negotiations, that it is for the strictest, the most thorough, and the most effective monitoring of the fulfillment by all states of their obligations, as a guarantee that agreements reached are being observed. In speaking of the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference, comrade Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, noted that it was a victory for common sense, and that the Soviet Union saw in the Stockholm Agreement the first sprouting of new thinking in European soil. The Stockholm Conference was itself a factor in the strengthening of confidence, since it created the certainty that it is possible to agree on matters of security, given the political will and the desire, even in such difficult circumstances, and with such a diversity of participating states representing different social and economic systems and belonging to opposing military and political alliances.

Stockholm is an example that has highlighted an important feature, I would even say a certain advantage, of multilateral conferences, by comparison with bilateral negotiations, which is that the possibility exists in multilateral conferences of the majority opinion that forms in them in favour of agreement influencing individual participants who still persist in their set negative attitudes. Stockholm also provided clear confirmation that neutral and non-aligned countries may make a major and, at times, indispensable contribution to the search for compromise solutions and reliable versions. The Stockholm Conference has had a beneficial effect on the situation in Europe. In particular, I should like to draw attention to the fact that the United States and its NATO allies slightly reduced the level of their manoeuvres after the Conference, which is a positive thing in itself, although the influence of the situation is clearly not the only explanation, another factor being the definite intention to reduce the number of prior notifications and invitations to observers. Thus, whereas 30 military practices of a size to require notification by the Stockholm parameters were conducted in 1986, their number has been reduced to 17 in the plans for 1987, and observers need be
invited to only 10. The Federal Republic of Germany, for example, has reduced the number of participants in most divisional exercises from 18-20,000 to 10-12,000, with the result that only two exercises had to be included in the annual plan instead of five. As regards the fulfillment of what was agreed on in Stockholm, it must be noted that some western countries are not sufficiently rigorous in their observance, although they comply on the whole.

Representatives of the general staffs of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic reported in the Vienna meeting on their military exercises and on conditions offered to observers. The western countries have not as yet followed that useful example. It must be noted that, on the whole, the western countries are avoiding discussion of the questions of military policy in "Basket One" in Vienna. In practice, all proposals under this important aspect of the Vienna meeting come from the socialist countries, including the Polish proposal to supplement the mandate of the Stockholm Conference in its next stage by the addition of disarmament problems, so that they can be discussed by Stockholm-2 along with the continued examination of measures to strengthen confidence and security in Europe. I refer specifically to the discussion on the programme for a 25% reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in the early nineties in Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals put forward by the Warsaw Pact states in the Budapest Appeal in June 1986. Such reductions would be effected simultaneously and in conjunction with the reductions of tactical nuclear weapons. It should be noted that the United States and some other NATO countries are attempting to restrict discussion of the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, and not allow the neutral and non-aligned countries into the negotiations, although they are known to have a useful contribution and a useful role, and although their interests are affected by these negotiations. In general, there is a manifest intention to remove the subject matter of disarmament from the general European process, and ultimately destroy it. At the meeting of their Political Consultative Committee in Berlin on 28-29 May, the Member States of the Warsaw Pact stated their opinion that the second stage of the Conference would be the best forum in which to discuss these matters, but that there were at the same time other possibilities, above all in the context of the general European process, including the holding of a special forum.

Confidence-building measures are clearing the way for the limitation and reduction of armaments, but real steps in disarmament are, in turn, a powerful stimulus to the building of confidence. This interconnection between disarmament and confidence is clearly expressed in the Communiqué of the PCC. There is, in particular, the proposal to hold a meeting of foreign ministers that could decide to initiate large-scale
negotiations for a radical reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, and at the same time discuss a number of pressing matters in connection with the reduction of military confrontation and averting the threat of attack.

The document adopted at the Berlin Conference on the military doctrine of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact is also aimed at building confidence and overcoming suspicion. A proposal is made in it to the Member States of the North Atlantic Alliance to hold a consultation this year for the purpose of comparing the military doctrines of the two alliances, to analyse their nature, and to give joint consideration to their subsequent evolution with a view to doing away with the mutual suspicion and mistrust that has accumulated over the years. One would hope to arrive at a better understanding of each other's intentions, so that the military views and doctrines of the military blocs and their participants could be based on defensive principles. In conclusion, I should like to remark that the above proposal is one that, in my opinion, can free contemporary international relations from the vicious circle in which the arms race is whipped up by mistrust, and, in its turn, further deepens mistrust. The way out, obviously, is to change this state of affairs, to strengthen confidence in every possible way, and thus promote real steps by way of disarmament, the feedback from which will increase confidence.
Confidence-Building-Measures, while still the poor relations within the arms control family, have assumed a certain respectability of late, and are even taking on an aura of success. With the coming into force of the Stockholm Conference Document this year and the recent conclusion of a USA-USSR agreement on the establishment of risk reduction centres current prospects for CBMs appear good.

The interest in CBMs relates in part to their acting as a complement to traditional arms reduction negotiations. CBMs also seem to afford an opportunity for realizing some tangible progress relatively quickly to the often protracted, at times glacial, pace of arms reductions negotiations. While CBMs and arms reductions can both represent legitimate arms control efforts in the sense of measures to reduce the risk of war or its severity should it occur, they represent two different approaches to arms control.

The two approaches can be characterized as the "structural", with a focus on reducing military forces, and the "operational", with a focus on regulating military activity /1/. While the structural approach, with its emphasis on reducing actual armament level, continues to receive by far the greatest attention on the part of governments and their publics, there is a growing awareness that it is the manner in which arms are deployed and employed rather than their absolute numbers, which poses the more real threat to peace. The "structural" and "operational" approaches can be viewed, to borrow, with apologies, from the lexicon of social science, as "quantifiable" versus "normative" approaches. The former dealing with specific quantities of military equipment and the latter setting out agreed norms for the conduct of military activity and the exchange of information on its character. Of course there are elements of overlap, norms for military behaviour usually requiring some quantifiable expression in terms of length of notification, size of thresholds, etc, but the basic aim of the normative approach is to regulate military behaviour rather than military equipment. Dealing as it does with a less tangible

aspect of military force its significance is less readily grasped by publics. As one commentator has also observed, the two approaches have not to date been successfully combined in a single negotiation.

The principal vehicle for implementing the operational approach to arms control consists of CBMs. While there are numerous definitions and competing systems of classification, it is useful to speak of two broad categories of CBMs:

(a) information measures, and;
(b) constraint measures.

In the first category are all measures that are directed at providing information which would include notification, communication, verification and consultation measures.

Into the second category would fall all measures that restrict, as opposed to merely reveal, the nature and conduct of military activity and deployment. This would include such concepts as limits on the size, frequency or area of certain military activity and constraints or prohibitions on the use of selected military equipment.

Another important distinction between the two categories of CBMs is that historically, it has proven relatively much easier to reach agreement on adopting category-I CBMs than it has on category-II. Some may argue that constraints should not be considered as CBMs at all but rather as an interim form of arms control between CBMs and arms reduction measures. It does seem clear that while states are prepared, albeit at times with reluctance, to impart a certain transparency to their military activity, they are much more resistant to accepting prior restrictions on the manner of employing or deploying their military forces. Constraints seem to mesh very well with the CBM objective of providing "credible evidence of the absence of feared threats" by supplementing the evidence of benign intention and warning indicators offered by category-I CBMs with evidence of the lack of capability to undertake effectively certain feared military activity. Since means for reducing the risk of surprise attack have loomed large on at least the Western agenda at conventional arms control negotiations, it is probable that the search for suitable category-II CBMs to impede the potential for surprise attack will continue.

The assertion that CBMs and the operational approach to arms control is somewhat in the ascendant at present can be supported by the considerable progress registered during the last two years in realizing CBM agreements. While the Stockholm Conference Document stands out as the prime example of a multilateral agreement it is also appropriate to note the significant results flowing from the decision of the Second
Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention to develop a series of CBMs "to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions" 2/, relative to the Convention. CBMs also appear to be enjoying something of a revival in the bilateral relations between the USA and USSR.

One can point to the agreement reached in July 1984 to upgrade the Hotline Communication link, which occurred despite, or some might argue due to, the poor state of superpower relations at that time. This was followed in July 1985 with two understandings achieved in the Standing Consultative Commission relating to verification and consultation concerns, the joint statement from the November 1985 summit meeting, proposals made by President Reagan in 1985 and similar suggestions made by General Secretary Gorbachev in 1986 for improved contacts between respective military establishments and most recently the conclusion of an accord to establish nuclear risk reduction centres in respective capitals.

While the exact terms of the accord on risk reduction centres have not been made public, the New York Times has suggested that: "Americans in Washington and Russians in Moscow specifically assigned to the centres would routinely keep each other informed about such things as missile tests, long-range bomber flights and possible episodes of nuclear terrorism 3/. Initially, these centres may be limited to passing information pursuant to existing agreements, such as notification of certain ICBM launches as provided for under Article XVI of the SALT II accord (an aspect of that unratified treaty that it is hoped both parties will want to continue to observe), information on naval incidents relating to the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement or certain aspects of consultation envisaged under the 1971 Accident Measures Agreement.

The actual existence of such a dedicated mechanism for direct exchange between the superpowers may encourage its fuller utilization, which in turn could revive interest in those CBMs proposed in the context of the USA-USSR strategic arms negotiations in 1983. These CBMs included proposals for the advance notification of all ballistic missile launches, more detailed exchanges of information on the composition of each country's strategic forces and advanced notification of major exercises of nuclear forces. While there was a certain degree of convergence between the USA and Soviet CBM proposals (especially with respect to notification of major heavy bomber exercises) circumstances prevented a substantial examination at

that time. Developments since that time would be conducive to a
renewal of discussions on strategic CEMs between the USA and the
USSR. It would seem a propitious time for such an exchange
because both countries appear to recognize that, as one expert
put it, "there is an inherent value in agreed measures to
enhance each country's confidence in its judgments respecting
the strategic military capabilities and activities of the
other" 4/. Moreover, the premium on an accurate assessment of
respective strategic force capabilities increases with the
prospect of major reductions in the level of those forces. This
could be a case where success in negotiating major reductions in
armaments will increase rather than decrease the need for
associated CEMs.

In turning, admittedly somewhat belatedly, to the subject
of this panel and paper, I want to expand the discussion beyond
CEMs to encompass verification and in particular to examine the
relationship between these two arms control concepts. The issue
of the relationship between CEMs and verification has usually,
and perhaps not all that usefully, been posed in the question of
whether verification is a CEM in itself. Those of you familiar
with the course of negotiations at the Stockholm Conference will
recall how it engendered an elaborate and convoluted debate and
associated procedural wrangling reminiscent of medieval
theological disputes over the nature of transubstantiation. The
West citing the confidence-building properties of verification
argued that verification was a CEM and the East noting that
verification was to apply to all the CEMs argued that it could
not constitute a CEM in its own right as this would amount to
having to verify verification.

While the question is perhaps not amenable to definitive
answers, it could be helpful to conceive of the relationship
between CEMs and verification as a symbiotic one. That is of
complementary, but distinct processes or procedures which
coop-exist for mutual benefit. In the broad categorization of
CEMs at the beginning of this paper verification was included in
the Category-I information measures, because verification is
essentially a process of obtaining and interpreting information
pertaining to compliance with treaties or other agreements. In
the context of an international arms control accord a pattern of
successful implementation of co-operative verification
provisions builds confidence in much the same way that a
successful pattern of notification does. To the extent that
verification involves information exchange it acts as a CEM and

4/ Michael H. Mobbs "CEMs for Stabilizing the Strategic
Nuclear Competition", in Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age: CEMs
page 154.
to the degree that it confirms compliance with arms control obligations it serves the CBM aim of building confidence in the absence of feared threats. In this sense verification is a dual capable system.

The ability of verification to serve as a CBM is dependent on the perception of verification by the parties concerned. Fortunately, there appears to be a growing maturity of attitude towards verification on the part of the international community which is crucial for the acceptance of verification and the realization of its confidence-building potential.

Indicative of this new appreciation was the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly at its 1985 and 1986 sessions of Canadian-initiated resolutions on "verification in all its aspects" (41/86Q). Not only were the resolutions adopted by consensus, but in the case of the 1986 resolution, there were twice the number of co-sponsors, including representatives from the Western states, Eastern Europe and the Non-Aligned movement.

Against this backdrop of international endorsement of verification it is perhaps difficult to recall the suspicion and antipathy towards verification that was characteristic of many official attitudes not all that long ago. Even in the pioneer verification efforts of the USA and USSR the joint acceptance of relatively effective verification methods took a long time. The viability of satellite reconnaissance as a verification instrument may have had more to do at first with the inability to shoot them down than with the joint appreciation of the contribution they could make to verification. It was not until 1972 and the ABM and SALT accords that there was an agreed mutual acceptance of the utility of National Technical Means (NTM) in the verification of arms control agreements. It was not until 1979 and the SALT II agreement that the negative obligations of non-interference with NTM and non-concealment of systems restricted by the agreement was expanded to include a positive commitment not to encrypt telemetry to the point where it would prevent verification of treaty limits. And it took the Stockholm Conference Document of September 1986 to incorporate provisions for mandatory on-site inspection into an operational East-West control agreement.

A principal significance of the Stockholm Conference Document is that, in its verification provisions, it goes beyond the traditional and passive recognition of the verification utility of NTM to include a co-operative engagement on the part of the signatories to facilitate intrusive verification on their respective territories. As we know these provisions are subject to several limitations, and how they will actually be implemented in practice remains to be seen, but the fact that they were adopted in a binding accord represents an important

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political and perhaps even psychological move towards the acceptance of the notion of verification as a co-operative endeavour, in the success of which all parties have an equal stake.

Similarly, the significance of the forecast, notification and observation measures of the Stockholm Document was not that these measures appreciably added to the stock of military information available through NIM but that the information conveyed was freely given. The information was being volunteered rather than surreptitiously extracted in order to give credence to the state parties' professions of non-hostile intent in their military activity. A verification system predicated on a co-operative rather than a purely unilateral approach has over the long term a greater confidence building potential in the sense that it can result not only in confidence in national judgments of respective capabilities but also confidence in the joint commitment of the parties to the objectives of the agreement.

While the Stockholm Documents mark an important turning point towards formal acceptance of a co-operative approach to verification, there is still more progress that can be made in this direction. The attitude of states in practice to the invoking of rights for inspection under the Document will be particularly important in this respect. The more inspections are seen as routine and positive acts permitting reassurance of doubts and the less they are considered provocative indictments the stronger will be the co-operative nature of the verification regime associated with the Stockholm Document and its purposes. It is a process that will take time and will no doubt encounter certain setbacks but the chief consideration is that it is moving in the right direction.

In order to put this movement towards a more open and co-operative verification scheme into some context, it may be helpful to consider the historical treatment within the CSCE of observation provisions. It will be recalled that the Helsinki Final Act left the issuance of invitations to observe and the conduct of the observation programme exclusively to the discretion of the host state. The results over the subsequent decade were checkered with widely different standards of implementation. At Stockholm participating states were prepared to adopt mandatory observation for all military activities above set thresholds as well as specific standards towards realizing the agreed aims of the observation. While the observation measure has a verification element to it (it being specified that observers are "to confirm that the notified activity is non-threatening in character and that it is carried out in conformity with the appropriate provisions of the notification"), its primary contribution as a CSM is to serve as a demonstrable and universal indicator of the participating states' commitment
to conduct their military activity in accordance with the principles of the Final Act and the Stockholm Document. There was sufficient acceptance, on the part of all the states involved, of the desirability of imparting greater openness to the military affairs of Europe to permit the adoption of these much more comprehensive observation measures. The question remains whether this commitment to openness will sustain itself and eventually allow for the acceptance of even more thorough measures of information exchange and verification. One indication of the onset of a fully co-operative verification regime would be when inspection visits are considered as routine and innocuous as observer visits are now judged to be by the CSCE member states. And there is some reason to hope that this change of perception will take less time than the eleven years required to gain acceptance among the CSCE member states of the idea of foreign observation of military activity as a matter of routine.

If some of the above has been designed to show how a verification process can act as a CEM, it is now my intention to point out how selected CEMs can assist the effectiveness of verification. The importance of verification in coming to judgments on the compliance of states to arms control obligations, is now universally acknowledged and since judgments on compliance have important ramifications for international security relations, it follows that the accuracy and effectiveness of verification is crucial. Certain CEMs could have the effect of making the verification task easier, and given the increasingly mutual recognition of the need for effective verification, merit further consideration by the major arms control players. A forerunner of such CEMs was the non-concealment provision of the ABM and SALT accords which was designed to contribute to the effectiveness of verification through NIM. The SALT II prohibition on excessive encryption of missile telemetry was intended to fulfill a similar function, but due to residual doubts about this move to openness, the formula agreed upon in 1979 was ambiguous and open to differing interpretation. A total ban on encryption would seem a logical successor CEM that would improve upon the earlier SALT II constraints and would clearly be a great functional aid to the verification tasks. What is not so clear is the readiness of both superpowers to accept that degree of openness in the testing of their strategic missile forces.

Another CEM that would promote the effectiveness of verification and which currently seems to offer a greater chance of bilateral acceptance is the proposal to have on-site monitoring equipment installed, on a reciprocal basis, at the nuclear weapons test sites of the USA and the USSR. The presence of such monitoring equipment during an actual nuclear test would provide for more accurate calibrations which would help perfect seismic verification of a possible agreement.
banning or restricting nuclear tests. Some steps towards this form of reciprocal arrangement have already been taken by the USA and the USSR and a CBM providing for its implementation would be a positive interim byproduct of the on-going bilateral discussions on nuclear testing.

A further example of CBMs that will assist verification are the series of measures elaborated and adopted by the April 1987 meeting of experts pursuant to the Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention. These measures provide for a detailed exchange of data on the nature and location of laboratories that handle high-risk biological materials as well as exchanges of information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that appear to deviate from normal patterns. The initial exchange of information by the Convention signatories is to be made via the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs no later than October 1987. With an extensive data base on centres of biological research and a commitment to systematic reporting of abnormal outbreaks of disease, it is hoped that states will acquire higher confidence that the Convention's provisions are being observed.

There would seem to be scope for formulating additional CBMs that could contribute to effective verification. Some possible candidates in the strategic realm would be an expanded data exchange on strategic arsenals and further measures to ensure the inviolability of satellites used for arms control verification.

By way of concluding this examination of the inter-relationship of CBMs and verification, I would like to devote a few comments to the question of verification of CBMs. Here again the historical experience is limited and some of the same evolution in official thinking has occurred in this regard as has happened with respect to observation. The CBMs of the Helsinki Final Act were not accompanied by any verification provisions because there was no common agreement in 1975 as to the necessity of having such provisions. Indeed, in the opinion of some, insisting on verification provisions was incompatible with the confidence-building objectives of the accord. By the time, however, the mandate for the Stockholm Conference was being formulated at the CSCE Madrid Follow-Up Meeting, all states had concluded that the CSCEs to be negotiated at Stockholm "will be provided with adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content" 5/. In the Stockholm Document itself, verification of the provisions is to rely

5/ Mandate for the CSCE Madrid Follow-Up Meeting, 1983.
essentially on a combination of NIM plus on-site aerial or ground inspections according to certain rules. Clearly some of the CBMs agreed upon at Stockholm are basically self-verifying due to their specific nature, e.g. an invitation to observe is either issued or not, an annual calendar of forecasted military activity is transmitted by November 15 of each year or it is not. Others however, like those detailing thresholds for triggering notification or observation are more complicated and require the more elaborate verification procedures provided for in the Document. Only time will tell how satisfactory these provisions will prove to be in verifying compliance with the Stockholm CBMs.

What is satisfactory for the verification of category-I CBMs as represented by the Stockholm Document may be judged inadequate for the verification of category-II CBMs that may emerge out of a future Stockholm Conference continuation or conventional forces stability negotiation. Category-II CBMs or constraints involving as they do actual restrictions on military force deployments, will likely demand more intensive verification than that associated with the verification of category-I information CBMs. Such verification procedures may closely resemble those being formulated in the context of current arms reduction negotiations in that their military significance and hence sensitivity are of a similar order. At the same time, the practical record on verification and implementation of the Stockholm Document CBMs during the next few years will have an impact on the formulation of verification provisions for future conventional arms control agreements and in particular, on determinations as to the adequacy and effectiveness of those verification provisions. It is to be hoped that this implementation experience and consequent impact will be a positive one.

The interaction between CBMs and verification in international arms control should in all probability continue to develop and intensify as the benefits of both concepts become increasingly evident to states party to security accords. The interaction of these two factors should be of mutual benefit as appropriate CBMs can facilitate verification, and successful verification procedures can in time, establish a base of confidence conducive to the promotion of CBMs. The symbiotic relationship between CBMs and verification seems a natural one given the fact that the ideals of greater openness in the realm of military affairs and the reduction of the negative role of miscalculation or misperception can play in assessing state behaviour are inherent to both the CBM and verification enterprise.

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Ednan Agaev

Je voudrais dire quelques mots sur la confiance, sur les mesures propres à la créer et le rôle qu'elles jouent dans l'ensemble du processus de désarmement. Nous avons entendu ici trois interventions importantes sur ce sujet, dans lesquelles sont analysées de façon très détaillée, et dirai-je circonstanciée, les mesures propres à créer la confiance dans le domaine militaire et la façon dont elles se matérialisent concrètement dans des pourparlers et dans des accords. Je voudrais consacrer une certaine attention à la confiance en tant que notion plus large, en tant que catégorie philosophico-politique. Dans les pourparlers sur le désarmement, quelle qu'en soit l'orientation, il s'agit avant tout de sauvegarde des intérêts et de pleine sauvegarde de la sécurité nationale. Et comme nous avons pu le constater dans nos débats, à l'ère des fusées et du nucléaire dans laquelle nous vivons tous, la sécurité nationale ne peut être atteinte qu'en créant une sécurité générale ce qui, à son tour présume l'édification d'un système solide de confiance dans les relations entre les États et entre les peuples. Dans ce contexte, le désarmement n'apparaît plus comme une fin en soi mais comme un moyen d'atteindre un niveau plus élevé de développement des relations internationales qui correspond au niveau général de développement de notre civilisation. C'est là qu'apparaît la nécessité de concevoir largement le désarmement comme un ensemble d'engagements réciproques de réduction et de suppression des armements, de renforcement de la confiance réciproque, d'établissement d'un système solide de confiance dans les relations internationales, et notamment toute mesure massive, doit s'accompagner, comme cela se produit d'ailleurs dans la réalité, de la création d'une atmosphère politique appropriée. En même temps la réalisation du désarmement renforce la confiance et contribue à la création d'une atmosphère politique plus favorable à l'expansion de la coopération internationale. Il y a là un lien réciproque subtil avec l'interdépendance dialectique, plus il y a de confiance plus il y a de désarmement, plus il y a de désarmement plus il y a de confiance et il est même impossible de discuter sur la question de savoir ce qui vient en premier et ce qui vient ensuite. Faut-il commencer par la création d'une atmosphère politique appropriée et désarmer ensuite ou commencer par désarmer pour créer ensuite une atmosphère politique appropriée? Tout se passe parallèlement,
simultanément et, si l'on peut dire, tout s'interpénètre. Mais en même temps l'un et l'autre sont impossibles, sinon difficiles, à atteindre, si l'on n'envisage pas tous les efforts comme autant de moyens d'arriver à la sécurité. Il ne peut naturellement y avoir aucune recette toute faite pour atteindre la sécurité et pour l'assurer à tous et à chacun. C'est au cours d'une longue évolution historique que chaque pays et chaque peuple s'est fait son idée de la sécurité et des moyens propres à l'assurer. Mais comme on l'a déjà souligné plusieurs fois ici, les réalités du monde contemporain confèrent aujourd'hui à la notion de sécurité des paramètres globaux, universels et les notions anciennes sur les moyens d'atteindre la sécurité ont déjà sombré irrévocablement dans le néant. Il est aujourd'hui impossible de sauvegarder sa propre sécurité aux dépens de la sécurité d'autres pays. Je voudrais rappeler à cet égard ce qu'a dit le Secrétaire général du PC de l'URSS, M.S. Gorbatchev, à savoir que l'Union Soviétique, pour sa part, ne s'intéresse nullement à réduire la sécurité des États-Unis, tout au contraire. Nous pensons que plus la sécurité des États-Unis est solide, plus la nôtre l'est aussi. A vrai dire, on a déjà tenté dans le passé de trouver une notion commune de sauvegarde de la sécurité et de créer un système qui permette de réglementer la sécurité internationale. Il suffit de rappeler le précédent historique d'établissement au dix-neuvième siècle de ce qu'on appelé l'équilibre des forces. Mais l'évolution historique obéit à ses lois objectives et l'humanité a dû traverser des épreuves assez dures et douloureuses pour arriver à la conclusion que la sécurité ne peut être que générale. A partir d'une analyse de la situation actuelle, l'Union soviétique a élaboré et avancé la conception d'une sécurité internationale totale embrassant toutes les sphères : la militaire, la politique, l'économique et l'humanitaire. Cette conception a ensuite été développée et complétée en commun par d'autres pays socialistes européens et présentée à la quarante-et-unième Session de l'Assemblée générale de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour être examinée par la communauté internationale. Le jugement de l'Assemblée générale a confirmé la concordance de nos idées avec le sentiment général qui prévaut dans le monde. La résolution sur un système total de sécurité internationale a recueilli une majorité impressionnante : 102 États ont voté pour. Mais nous n'allons pas nous reposer sur nos lauriers et penser qu'un but a été atteint que nous sommes déjà soutenus, que nous pouvons nous en tenir là, comme cela s'est malheureusement produit dans le passé. Nous ne pouvons pas ne pas être alarmés et inquiétés par le fait que cette résolution n'a pas eu l'appui d'un groupe d'États occidentaux suffisamment influent dans le monde. Construire une sécurité totale sans la participation des États occidentaux est chose impossible. Nous ne pouvons pas vivre isolés les uns des autres. C'est pourquoi, bien que nous soyons convaincus que notre regard sur la sécurité vise l'avenir et que notre conception doit devenir une réalité, nous pensons, comme l'a dit Jules Cambon, qu'en diplomatie, il ne suffit pas d'avoir
raison, il faut aussi plaire. Au cours de nos consultations avec les représentants des pays occidentaux, nous nous sommes efforcés de comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles ces pays ne veulent pas aujourd'hui s'associer à cette conception, à cette façon de voir les relations internationales et la sauvegarde de la sécurité. Nous essayons de tenir compte des préoccupations objectives et subjectives et des obstacles qui s'opposent à la création d'un tel système et nous avons, pour notre part, pu constater qu'il s'agit d'un manque de confiance de la part de l'Occident.

On peut discerner là les obstacles objectifs et subjectifs et les raisons objectives et subjectives de l'absence de cette confiance. Certes, bien des choses nous séparent, trop de différences historiques, culturelles, idéologiques et économiques. Mais une analyse détaillée et approfondie de ces différences montre qu'il n'en est aucune qui porte en elle la menace immanente de se transformer en contradictions totalement intolérables et recèle un danger de guerre.

Prenons par exemple nos relations réciproques avec les Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Il n'y a entre eux et nous ni contradictions économiques, ni prétentions territoriales réciproques, ni contradictions politiques sérieuses. Evidemment, direz-vous, nous sommes séparés par des contradictions idéologiques. Il est vrai qu'il y a des contradictions idéologiques, mais en fait notre civilisation a déjà atteint un degré de développement tel que les contradictions idéologiques ne peuvent en aucun cas être une raison d'essayer de l'emporter l'un sur l'autre par la force. L'ére des "croisades" de toute nature et des guerres de religion est révolue depuis bien longtemps. Nous n'essayons pas d'imposer notre idéologie mais nous tenons aussi à ce qu'on ne nous en impose aucune autre. Je pense qu'on peut trouver là un "modus vivendi".

Or il apparaît que le domaine qui ne cesse d'engendrer des contradictions susceptibles de s'aggraver est celui de la course aux armements. C'est précisément là que se manifestent les divergences et les contradictions les plus vives avec les Etats-Unis.

Nous abordons là les raisons pour lesquelles la course aux armements continue et ne cesse de saper la confiance entre nous. Outre les raisons historiques objectives, dont il serait hors de propos de parler ici, je voudrais rappeler un facteur purement objectif qui se traduit en Occident par une doctrine stratégique fondée sur les principes de la dissuasion nucléaire et de l'endiguement nucléaire. Il est bien évident qu'il y a eu des raisons historiques pour que cette stratégie s'établisse, mais en vérité la stratégie de dissuasion nucléaire non seulement appartient aujourd'hui au passé, mais encore retient en arrière toutes nos relations, toute l'évolution de notre civilisation.
Et l'on s'attire parfois de voir l'énorme potentiel intellectuel que gaspillent de nombreux stratèges de l'Occident en s'efforçant de faire entrer tout le système des relations internationales, à savoir le développement objectif de ces relations, dans le cadre de la notion de dissuasion nucléaire.

En quoi consiste la stratégie de dissuasion nucléaire? C'est une conception dogmatique figée comportant des postulats très dogmatiques et nullement dynamiques. Un des dogmes fondamentaux de la dissuasion nucléaire consiste en ceci que la présence constante d'un adversaire, d'un ennemi, y est absolument indispensable. Et, au détriment du fait qu'il se produise souvent et objectivement un certain rapprochement, que l'on trouve des points de contact, cette position de départ selon laquelle il faut à tout prix trouver un adversaire empêche les dirigeants politiques de l'Occident de porter un jugement objectif et mesuré sur la situation et ne cesse d'attiser la méfiance et la peur réciproques. On peut dire que la stratégie de dissuasion nucléaire, qui est elle même l'expression concentrée d'idées militaristes et une concentration de conceptions dogmatiques, sert en même temps d'aliment à tout ce qui est figé et dogmatique. N'avons nous pas constaté ici même, notamment lors des séances consacrées à la limitation des armements nucléaires et à la prévention de la course aux armements dans l'espace, que de nombreux délégués, représentants des milieux intellectuels de l'Occident, s'efforcent d'assujettir à la dissuasion nucléaire le processus irréversible qui se déroule actuellement dans le domaine du désarmement nucléaire? Or on ne peut pas faire entrer dans le cadre de la dissuasion et de l'endiguement nucléaires la notion de la possibilité d'une liquidation des armements, d'une création d'un autre système de sauvegarde de la sécurité.

Pour en venir aux mesures propres à créer la confiance, on peut se demander s'il n'y aurait pas lieu d'échanger des informations et de créer des groupes d'experts afin de se consulter sur la façon de modifier des idées dans le domaine de la stratégie militaire. Je voudrais à ce sujet attirer l'attention sur un document adopté à Berlin, à la veille de notre Conférence, au sujet de la doctrine militaire des pays du Pacte de Varsovie. Nous avons à plusieurs reprises dit à l'Occident qu'on pourrait certainement entamer des pourparlers spéciaux sur la façon de faire concorder les doctrines militaires avec les exigences de notre temps et les impératifs de la sauvegarde de la sécurité internationale.

Nous comprenons certes qu'il soit impossible de renoncer en un jour à cette idée: se mettre au lit et le matin, au réveil, dire que nous renonçons tous à l'endiguement nucléaire. Il s'agit incontestablement d'un processus qui prend du temps; il faudra prendre des mesures réciproques et avancer pas à pas.
Mais ce qu'il y a de plus important, c'est quand même la volonté politique et le désir de parler à ce sujet. Les pourparlers jouent incontestablement un rôle très important pour le renforcement de la confiance et de la connaissance réciproque lorsqu'il s'agit d'écarter les soupçons réciproques. Le dicton bien connu selon lequel de mauvais pourparlers valent mieux qu'une bonne guerre ne saurait en aucun cas guider l'action des diplomates d'aujourd'hui. Nous ne pouvons pas nous transformer en Chevaliers de la Triste-Figure et dissiper notre énergie en combattant les moulins à vent. C'est pourquoi tous les pourparlers doivent viser un but et donner des résultats car la confiance ne peut se matérialiser que dans des résultats concrets. C'est ce que confirme fort bien l'heureuse conclusion de la conférence de Stockholm, dont nous avons parlé trois de nos rapporteurs principaux.

Il y a toutes les chances pour que ce processus se poursuive. Le processus d'établissement et d'édification d'une confiance internationale totale ne s'arrête pas à Stockholm et il faut aussi ne pas oublier qu'il s'agit là d'une mesure importante certes mais régionale, qui ne s'applique qu'à la région du continent européen.

Encore quelques mots pour terminer. La quarante-deuxième session de l'Assemblée générale, où toute la communauté internationale pourrait poursuivre le dialogue sur la sécurité total et penser à la façon d'utiliser la conférence de Stockholm à l'échelle mondiale, n'est pas loin.

Enfin encore une idée, la dernière, à savoir qu'il est certainement impossible de créer la confiance sans transparence et sans visibilité réciproques. J'emploie à dessein ces deux termes parce que, je ne sais pourquoi, on croit en Occident que c'est là le point faible de l'Union soviétique. Il n'en est rien. Nous voulons que tous les plans soient clairs et visibles pour les uns comme pour les autres, mais la transparence ne doit pas être une fin en soi. En principe, et c'est là dessus que je terminerai, les efforts faits pour renforcer la confiance et pour le désarmement ne doivent pas être considérés comme des fins en soi, mais comme une combinaison de mesures réciproques qui contribuent à l'établissement d'une paix moins précaire.

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Herbert von Arx

The former Greek diplomat and international lawyer, Mr. Politis declared once that if we will arrive to the aim we are treating today, i.e. disarmament, we should go the following way: First build confidence, then construct mediation and
arbitration measures and then finally you have the necessary ground for real and deep cut disarmament measures.

I think this remark of Mr. Politis is absolutely right, because today the international community of states is not yet in paradise. We are still living, in spite of a lot of working international organizations, in a sort of anarchistic condition, in a decentralisation of power. We have no international government, we have no international executive, we have no compulsory international justice. Every State has to look alone or together with other States for its own security, for its rights and interests. And so it is clear, at least for me, that every State is free to have the means to defend its security, rights and interests, and this means, until now as we know, especially military forces.

I am convinced that we will never go beyond a certain level in disarmament without replacing the possibility of military forces through other means. There will always be conflicts in the world and conflicts or disputes must be solved. If you cut the States' military possibilities, you must give them other possibilities to solve the conflicts. That is why I would like to say some words on the question of mediation and arbitration before coming to confidence-building.

We think that one of the possibilities, not the only one, to replace military forces would be the development of the international law. To create institutions able to solve the disputes of new situations arising day by day in the world. As in the internal law, in international relationships there are principally two kinds of disputes or situations, namely: (i) those concerning the implementation and interpretation of existing law and (ii) those which concern changes, the development of existing law or introduction of new rules and regulations. Frequently these two types of situations are named legal and political disputes, but I think that is not quite right because in every case you have legal and political factors. So I would prefer to name them justiciable and non-justiciable disputes, and we should arrive to create organs for those disputes. For the justiciable conflicts, those applying existing law, it should be arbitration institutions and for the non-justiciable disputes we could create institutions for investigation, conciliation and mediation. Both these institutions should be compulsory, that will say that each party has the right to appeal to such an institution if the dispute cannot be solved by other means, such as consultation, or negotiation. The arbitration judgement should also be compulsory. For the mediation, the conciliation, that is not possible because they are creating new law and you would have an international government. But at least the procedure of mediation and conciliation should also be compulsory.
This was an old Swiss idea that we brought forward in 1973 at the CSCE Conference in Geneva which resulted in the Helsinki Final Act of the CSCE. We have proposed a complete text for an international treaty, compulsory for all the CSCE countries. We have discussed this idea during two years, and we have, unfortunately, not arrived at a result. But the idea is still on the table of the CSCE. We had a specialist group in 1978 in Montreux, Switzerland; we had another specialist group in 1984 in Athens, and the idea of a compulsory system of peaceful settlement of disputes which could replace a part of the armed forces will probably be brought up again in the Vienna CSCE Conference going on just now.

I think it would be worthwhile to study a little bit further on in this Conference, this system. You cannot diminish one side of the security system existing now in the world without giving in exchange something to replace it. This idea, the Swiss idea, of 1973 - 1975 was concentrated on Europe and the United States and Canada, participating in the CSCE, but it could be applied very easily also in other regions. And we had a lot of interest from other regions in the world in this idea and in our proposal.

Now I will come to the real CBMs. In my opinion a peaceful settlement of conflict can also be put under the heading of CBM. We have heard in the three excellent presentations of this morning what happened especially in Stockholm. Switzerland has welcomed the results of Stockholm on confidence-and security-building measures, but we are of the opinion that the results we have already reached could and should be further developed.

I think this confidence-and security-building process should go on, because it was clearly, based on the document of Madrid of the CSCE, a pre-condition of effective disarmament negotiations. Now we are of the opinion that the work that has been achieved in Stockholm is a basis for beginning also the real disarmament negotiations. But we think that the CBM (the confidence-and security-building measures) should run parallel to the effective disarmament talks and be more developed. Concerning the real disarmament negotiations, if ever in Vienna we arrive at results, at a mandate for such a Conference: I am not speaking for the Neutral and Non-Aligned, I am only able to speak for Switzerland. We are of the opinion that it is in the first round the duty of the two military pacts to begin with these disarmament negotiations for Europe, and that we (Switzerland, but I think also the other Neutral and Non-Aligned States) should not contribute to the negotiation, but should have a link to the negotiations in being informed about what happens and in having the possibility to be consulted and to express our own experience if situations are created with a direct consequence also for Switzerland and probably also for

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the other Neutral and Non-Aligned States.

So we should have a sort of house with two levels. In the first level you have the real negotiation and in the second level you have the Neutral and Non-Aligned with a certain contact with the negotiations and overall you have the roof which could be the CSCE as such. These are some ideas for our discussions of this morning.

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Janos Petran

I shall attempt to be brief, in view of the short time that remains. It is very important these days that states, and military and political alliances, should correctly understand each other's aims and purposes. That is why the document on the military doctrine of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact, signed by the supreme leaders of those states on 29 May 1987 in Berlin, at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, is extremely significant. That document sets forth many very important proposals that have a direct bearing on our discussions here.

First, there are the proposed consultations between the two blocs to compare their military doctrines. Secondly, and this is very important, it is suggested that the consultations could also examine the imbalances and asymmetries that have arisen with respect to individual types of weapon and armed forces, and could seek ways of righting them.

The Member States of the Warsaw Pact have expressed their readiness to hold such consultations this year. A positive acceptance by the North Atlantic Alliance would help to remove the suspicion and mistrust that have built up over the years and would make for a deep understanding of each other's intentions. I recall this because our partners in the negotiations from the North Atlantic Alliance quite often say that the matter is not one of intentions but of possibilities. If I remember right and understood him correctly, Mr. Davies of the United Kingdom reminded us of this. In that connection, I should like to draw your attention to the following: point 3 of chapter II of the document on the military doctrine of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact refers to "the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe to a level at which neither side, while ensuring its own defence, would have the means to make a sudden attack on the other side, or, in general, to develop offensive operations".

I consider that we have here a statement of the utmost clarity on the position of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact.
on this matter. It is, of course, important to have a correct understanding and assessment of actions and not merely of intentions. Measures of confidence and monitoring can and must be of assistance here. The Stockholm Conference on confidence-and-security-building measures in Europe demonstrated, in the first place, that if states have the political will and the desire, agreement can be reached on matters of security. Secondly, it was possible in Stockholm, at the Conference, to agree on inspection, which is of extreme importance because, as many of those present are aware, this question has been and still is a stumbling block in the disarmament negotiations. That was referred to by one of yesterday's speakers, who informed us about the progress in drafting a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The position of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact on monitoring has been given in the Berlin documents. I have in mind the document on the military doctrine of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact and the communiqué from the meetings of the political consultative committee. In accordance with this position of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact, the implementation of disarmament measures would be guaranteed by an effective monitoring system appropriate to the disarmament measures, including on-site inspection. The Member States of the Warsaw Pact proceed from the premise that monitoring will become one of the most important means of ensuring the security of states in the transition to real disarmament. Consequently, as was pointed out yesterday by Ambassador Karpov, verification of fulfillment of the obligations on disarmament undertaken by states requires a new function - that of being a guarantee of the security of the states that are parties to the agreement.

The Member States of the Warsaw Pact are advancing actual proposals to weaken military confrontation and to build confidence in Central Europe. I should like to recall the plan recently put forward by the Polish People's Republic. That plan, also known as the Jaruzelski plan, provides for a reduction of armaments and an increase of confidence in Central Europe. I consider it to be clear from all that has been said that the approach of the Member States of the Warsaw Pact to peace, security, confidence and monitoring is a very broad one. They seek the formation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security that would encompass both the military and political spheres, and the economic and humanitarian spheres. What is very important is that the interaction in the sphere of ecology would also be one of its components, as is also apparent from the Berlin documents. Consequently, these states are striving to reduce military confrontation, above all in the European continent, and to institute relations between states based on confidence and broad co-operation. Those are my comments and remarks.

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Sohrab Kheradi

My remarks are directed more to the general theme of this Conference, namely, the interrelationship of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations, rather than to the specific issues that have been the focus of our discussions today. I am emboldened to do so in as much as this is our concluding session and hence certain comments offered in a broader context may not be out of place at this stage, especially since as Secretary of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, I have had the privilege of observing at close range the dynamics of the international decision-making process in the arms limitation and disarmament field, within the framework of the world organization. The experience provides at least a partial opportunity to see the interplay of forces undergirding bilateral and multilateral approaches as the international community strives relentlessly, though not yet successfully, to banish the scourge of war from the face of the earth.

Ambassador Jaipal, in his presentation, noted that multilateral approaches to the process of arms limitation and disarmament did not begin with the establishment of the United Nations and gave us a succinct account of how the approach has progressively evolved over the years. My brief remarks, given the time constraints, will be confined to certain conclusions that may be drawn from an examination of the role that the United Nations has played and can continue to play, hopefully in a more effective and enhanced manner in the field of disarmament.

During the life-time of the United Nations, the world has increasingly come to share various common concerns over the issues of war and peace. Human misery and suffering are no respecters of territorial boundaries, political divergences, or ideological watersheds. Hence, there is a common recognition, for example, that nuclear war must never be fought. As an international organization, enjoying virtually, universal participation, the United Nations has been a major instrument for expressing the grave concern of nations over the possibility of the outbreak of war, in particular nuclear war. Furthermore, it has provided a primary forum for addressing the issues of war, peace and security from a global perspective.

I will not here expand on the successes and/or failures that can be chalked to the account of the United Nations, with respect to disarmament agreements. It needs reiterating, however, that the predecessor bodies of the present Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, succeeded, over the years, in negotiating several significant multilateral disarmament and arms-limitation agreements, including the NPT, the BW Convention, the Sea-Bed Treaty and the ENMD Treaty. A number of other examples can be added to this list, if one takes into
account the combined efforts of governments and the United Nations which produced limited, yet significant first steps in the form of international agreements on partial measures for the regulation of armaments.

The United Nations has thus provided, and continues to provide a forum in which disarmament can be given the necessary prominence on the international agenda. It was, perhaps, in recognition of this fact, and with a view to enabling the world body to fulfill its role more adequately in the field of disarmament, that the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament, inter alia, conferred upon the United Nations the central role and responsibility in the field of disarmament.

It is undoubtedly true, of course, that multilateral negotiation is not advocated as a measure that would supplant, by any stretch of the imagination, bilateral negotiations. The stark realities prevalent in the world dictate otherwise. It has already been pointed out here, and elsewhere, that the two approaches are not only complementary but could also reinforce each other. In a world cohabited by nations whose offensive and defensive capabilities present great asymmetry, multilateral negotiations do not stand the chance of succeeding unless there is a convergence of views and a measure of agreement on fundamental issues, among the major military Powers. And yet, in a world where interdependence at various levels and in different spheres, be they military, political or economic, is not longer a mere sopoleth, but a resonant fact of the present day human condition, the multilateral process may provide an increasingly meaningful approach.

And so, one may ask, in what direction does the United Nations's role in multilateral negotiations proceed?

As the Secretary-General of the United Nations has repeatedly pointed out, the international community already has, at its disposal, a unique and universal forum for carrying out deliberations and negotiations in the field of disarmament. Unfortunately, the instrumentality so readily available has not always been fully utilized.

If I may be permitted to make one final comment; the United Nations Disarmament Commission has been engaged, since last year, in reviewing the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, with a view to analyzing and subsequently making recommendations to the General Assembly for rationalizing the machinery and procedures of the United Nations system in the field of disarmament. This process is envisaged to come to culmination at the third special session on disarmament, which is currently scheduled for 1988. In this connection, I would like to make a purely personal suggestion. In the context of
the review that is being carried out, the Member States could, perhaps, examine the issues under consideration from the perspective of any appropriate linkages that could be established between bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations. In any case, and here I will conclude my remarks, I would like to express the hope that as we travel the arduous and sometimes bumpy road to the third special session, the Member States may find themselves in a position to reaffirm the validity of the United Nations's present role in disarmament and that, perhaps, they may even deem it fit to go beyond it.

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Kurt Spillmann

The Conference has been a very interesting experience but it has been a very sad experience as well for me in one respect. Listening to statements, especially made at the third session, concerning outer space that gave expression to fears and threat assessments, I couldn't help feeling that we are still not able to communicate very successfully about the most basic issues, such as basic common interests, common objectives, and threat perceptions. Haven't we learned from Chernobyl that no rational human being in charge can possibly plan to start a nuclear catastrophe? Or are we so caught up in a mode of thinking in worst-case scenarios like the professional military have to do that we have become unable to identify the many interests we have in common as inhabitants of this fragile earth?

The disarmament process is moving on shaky grounds if there persists a lack of interest to get down to discuss basics, and with basics I mean mutually acceptable definitions of objectives, as well as open exchanges on threat perceptions. In the process of building confidence I would like to support the suggestion made yesterday by Mr. Karkoszka, and I would like to go one step further and suggest that it would be useful, even necessary, to establish within the existing framework of CND and CSCE, a permanent committee which would have to deal with defining as precisely as possible such basic interests, comparing the different perceptions of vital interests, objectives and threat perceptions.

The Committee should open a catalogue of threat perceptions. These interests and threat perceptions, again as precisely defined as possible, should be discussed in order to replace allegations with mutually acceptable definitions and assessments. Could not a commonly-agreed-upon definition of peaceful coexistence by a very meaningful beginning? Our perceptions make up reality and as long as they are not being dealt with in an open exchange of views in the context of the
arms control and disarmament process, the danger persists that we keep falling back into archaic forms of behaviour, perceptions and reactions. And this we can no longer afford. This proposal seems either naive or impossible, but we have to try it in the face of possible cost of not doing it.

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Luvsandorjiin Bayart

La discussion est tellement intéressante que j'ai du mal à résister à la tentation de dire quelques mots. À la lumière de ce qui s'est dit ce matin, l'histoire de la trahison classique grecque que nous a exposée l'Ambassadeur Citron, est très instructive. Je pense que si les Perses n'avaient pas eu d'armes, il n'y aurait pas eu de massacre. La confiance à elle seule n'est pas suffisante sans qu'elle soit bâtie sur des fondements matériels solides. Stockholm, c'est évidemment un grand pas. Nous avons salué ses résultats, d'autant plus que l'Europe est un continent où se font face deux puissants groupes militaires et politiques et que de la paix en Europe dépend la paix dans les autres parties du monde et, bien entendu, vice versa. Je suis reconnaissant à l'Ambassadeur Citron d'avoir dit qu'il faut étendre aux autres parties du monde les mesures de confiance de l'Europe. A cet égard, je veux dire que cet exemple de l'Europe est très nécessaire et particulièrement pour l'Asie. L'Asie est le plus vaste continent de notre planète. Deux guerres y ont eu lieu, en Corée et au Vietnam. C'est là qu'on a pour la première fois employé l'arme atomique contre deux villes japonaises. J'espère profondément que l'humanité ne connaîtra plus jamais un sort pareil. C'est pourquoi les peuples de l'Asie ont besoin d'une paix solide et de sécurité. Les États de ce continent avancent les propositions concrètes visant à y renforcer la confiance et la sécurité. Un programme de paix et de sécurité en Asie et dans le pacifique a été proposé dans l'important déclaration faite par M.S. Gorbatchev l'an dernier à Vladivostok. Je voudrais rappeler aussi la proposition de la République populaire de Mongolie portant sur la création d'un mécanisme excluant l'emploi de la force dans les relations entre les États d'Asie et du bassin de l'Océan Pacifique.

L'exemple de l'Europe n'est pas un modèle à suivre et à appliquer immédiatement au reste du monde. Il faut l'adapter aux conditions spécifiques de chaque région et notamment de celles de l'Asie et du Pacifique. Je voudrais aussi faire observer que, comme on l'a dit ici, l'exemple de la création d'une zone dénucléarisée dans le Pacifique-sud pourrait aussi être suivi en Europe. A cet égard, nous appuyons les propositions faites par les États socialistes de l'Europe de l'Est concernant la création de zones et corridor dénucléarisées en Europe. Toutes
ces mesures tendent évidemment à renforcer la confiance, à
pousser le processus du désarmement et à consolider la sécurité
et la paix en Europe et dans le monde entier.

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Javier Sanz

First of all I would like to support heartily the concepts
presented at this Conference recently by Professor Spillmann.
It has been said here, if I recall correctly, by Ambassador
Citron, that the European example of the idea of
Confidence-Building Measures unfortunately is not being applied
in other parts of the World, I would like to make a brief
comment on this.

On 30 November 1985 the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil
signed a joint statement on nuclear policy in which both
countries compromise to work on mechanisms that would guarantee
Peace in the region. In the context of this Presidential
declaration, this means that both countries are engaging on the
basis of regular, technical and political meetings, to work out
some sort of Regime that will guarantee each country that in the
region, neither Brazil nor Argentina are into non sancta nuclear
activities. In this sense I believe that although slow,
important progress has been achieved, and several documents have
emerged.

My point is that even if we have not described officially,
these activities as being Confidence-Building Measures, I
certainly think that such an approach can be adopted within this
concept. To conclude, I would like to make clear that this
initiative has been taken to reassure a pre-existing situation
between the two countries, since there has never been any kind
of mutual suspicion in this sense.

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Michael Intriligator

I would like to make three points about confidence
building measures. First, on the bilateral risk reduction
centres that were recently established, these centres may be
valuable as confidence-building measures, but they could have
some danger in that people may believe that simply establishing
such centres significantly reduces risks. I think that there is
a real danger that we should continue to be worried about, one
which leads into the suggestion for a multilateral approach,
using an international monitoring/warning system with access to international technical means and with warning provided to all countries affected. I think that such a system could be extremely valuable in dealing with potential accidents and other situations. I draw the analogy to the United States role in the Sinai desert which provides warning to both Israel and Egypt as part of the Camp David Agreement. I think an international monitoring/warning system could be the analogue at the global level to the US role at the regional level in providing early warning of possible danger.

Secondly, I would like to suggest that non-proliferation is an important type of confidence building measure. This is an area where the two superpowers have had substantial agreement and in which they promoted treaties and other informal mechanisms. I would also add, in contrast to the view expressed yesterday by Mr. Sanz, that the recent agreement on limiting exports of missiles, missile components, missile technology, etc, I think enhances the non-proliferation regime and augments it and I would certainly hope that the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block would join that agreement on providing some limitations on the exports of missiles. I think it is valuable in reducing the chance of war, especially surprise attack. It also serves as an important potential confidence building measure, and it has value in extending, as I said, the Non-Proliferation Regime.

Third, I would like to suggest that we add a third category to Mr. Meyer's structural and operational types of confidence building measures, namely non-military confidence building measures. We have had scientific co-operation, which I think is an important type of confidence building measure, for example, in Antarctica (which I would point out has on-site inspection) and in space through, for example, the Apollo-Soyuz programme. Our current plans for co-operation in a major plasma fusion facility, which is an example of United States, Soviet, Japanese and West European co-operation stemming from the Geneva Summit. I think there are yet other areas of scientific co-operation, which could provide very valuable confidence building measures. For example, there is trade, exchange of people, and, especially, the potential for United States-Soviet co-operation to help the Third World, which could provide a very valuable type of confidence building measure.

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Peter Davies

This session on Confidence Building Measures and Verification, I think goes to the heart of the arms control
problem. There have been a number of Warsaw Pact and Soviet Statements of general intent, which were detailed in Ambassador Citron's paper this morning, referring to a Security Policy which rests very largely on good intentions. But as Ambassador Petran reminded us just now, in assessing intentions we also have to take capabilities into account and by any standard Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities are not only formidable but continue to increase rapidly, even in this new era of glasnost and promising movement in arms control negotiations. I think on Confidence Building Measures and Verification the proof of the pudding has to be in the eating as we would say. And in my view, in this area the Soviet side has been somewhat reluctant to accept proposals for greater transparency.

The Stockholm agreement good as it was, could have been even better, if we had had more acceptance and more proposals for a greater degree of access and inspection. In Chemical Weapons negotiations which we went over, there was reference made yesterday, I think, by Mr. Berdennikov to the French position, but I would actually remind the delegates here that it was only in February this year that the Soviets acknowledged for the first time their possession of chemical weapons stocks, and amendments proposed to the UK Challenge Inspection Proposal could possibly have the effect of weakening its effectiveness.

In MBFR, the Soviet Union has still not provided the detailed information on troop formations etc, which have been requested a number of times during this very long running series of negotiations. We don't, for my part, always understand this reluctance to provide this information and agree to these proposals for more transparency and they don't in a way assist the process of creating confidence. Mr. Agaev said this morning that "the age of crusades is over" but I feel bound to say in response to that, that the Soviet military action in Afghanistan continues to cause concern and the Soviet record on its commitment on Human Rights contained in the Helsinki Final Act are also viewed with concern in my country. There is a very high level of interest in media reporting of the Soviet record in these areas, and that record, to be quite frank, is widely regarded as being unsatisfactory. As I said, a lack of performance in one area undermines confidence in others.

So proposals such as we have already heard or very general "statement of intent" agreements are not really regarded with much enthusiasm in the West. For the UK's part we would prefer a much more specific and verifiable approach. If I may say, I think we need much more Glasnost in the military field. Ambassador Karpov appeared on British Television only a few days ago and referred to Soviet willingness to accept far reaching verification measures in the conventional field. We look
forward to this offer being reflected at the negotiation table. Verification is not an optional extra but a vital ingredient in worthwhile agreements.

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Andrei Karkoszka

As time is short I will be very brief though there are several points I wanted to mention here.

First the question of the military balance, the conventional military balance in Europe. I think it is customary for politicians and diplomats, especially in Western Europe to refer to the numerical imbalances existing especially in Central Europe, and in Europe as a whole. I would just say that we all know how easy it is to arrange figures in this or that way to prove this or that idea about the balance of forces. The question is that the actual numbers, are playing a diminishing role in present security considerations. I was pleased with Mr. Meyers statement today which said that it is obvious now that it is not numbers of weapons but the pattern of their deployments which is important for the security of States. I think the technological factors and dynamic operational factors would have to be always taken into consideration to make judgements about the actual balance of forces.

Another point that I wanted to mention is the problem of the so called conventional deterence. We have heard the first day and the second day by Professor Siccama and Professor Dougherty their denial of such a concept existing at all. I would say that their argument that there are so many wars still carried on in the Third World and the examples of the First and Second World Wars is missing the point. I think when we talk of Conventional Deterence we think about the strategic European situation, we think about extremely modern arsenals in which weapon systems have by several orders of magnitude bigger fire power and area coverage. And the other point here is that if one considers possible war in Central Europe in an extremely urbanized and highly populated area, one could easily see that any war in this area would destroy all necessary conditions for life: no big city could survive without water, energy supply and many other facilities, and that would be the first and unavoidable result of such a conflict. This would be a threat for an attacked as well as for the attacking side. This I call a conventional deterrent which is a specific phenomenon for the European continent.
I agree with Ambassador Citron that it is not very important what forum of negotiations we would accept for discussing doctrines or other elements of the military situation. The important thing is to recognize that the CEEM's and the restraining measures are not addressed to the most dangerous element in European security at present, that is to military technology, which is a dynamic element objectively endangering all States in Europe, not only Eastern States but all States in Europe.

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Pierre Morel

Je voudrais me référer à un point traité par M. Agaev dans son intervention, savoir la proposition soviétique de résolution aux Nations Unies sur le "nouveau système de sécurité internationale", et expliquer brièvement notre position. Nous avons été, en effet, un des rares pays à voter contre cette résolution. Nous aurions pu nous abstenir, cela aurait été plus commode. Mais nous avons pensé qu'il fallait exprimer clairement son point de vue sur un enjeu important. Il ne s'agit pas tellement comme le pensait M. Agaev en citant Jules Cambon "d'avoir raison et de plaire", il s'agit surtout de convaincre. Je dois dire que nous n'avons pas été convaincus et que nous sommes même préoccupés par l'ambiguïté profonde de cette proposition, où l'on retrouve une difficulté que citait M. Lellouche dans son intervention avant hier, selon laquelle "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien".

Il y a, en effet, risque de substitution d'un système à un autre ou même de concurrence: on ne peut pas vivre sur deux systèmes, et le "mieux", c'est-à-dire le nouveau système de sécurité risque en fait de miner le "bien" même imparfait, qui est le système actuel des Nations Unies. C'est là qu'est la difficulté fondamentale. A vouloir instaurer un nouveau dispositif inspiré par de nouveaux principes ou de meilleurs principes, on risque de porter atteinte au seul système reconnu par tout le monde, même s'il est souvent jugé inconfortable ou insuffisant, qui est le système des Nations Unies. Notre idée est que, si l'on perfectionne les relations internationales, il faut le faire à l'intérieur du système des Nations Unies. Faute de réponses soviétiques sur ce point, nous avons dû constater qu'il y avait dans la présentation de ce nouveau concept une réelle ambiguïté par rapport au système actuel des Nations Unies. Nous pensons que dans les conditions actuelles de la situation internationale, encourager une sorte de révisionnisme est plus porteur de dangers que de bénéfices. Encore une fois la situation actuelle n'est pas parfaite, le système des Nations Unies n'est pas parfait, mais c'est le seul qui existe et qui

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Je voulais ajouter une réaction à une autre remarque de M. Agaev, lorsqu'il a dit qu'à son avis on avait besoin à l'Ouest d'un adversaire; je ne peux pas m'empêcher de réagir à ce genre d'observation. Nous n'avons pas besoin d'adversaire et je crois qu'il faut sortir de cette dialectique de l'ancien et du nouveau qui consiste à dire qu'à l'Ouest il y a la pensée ancienne et à l'Est la nouvelle pensée. Si l'on s'embarque dans ce genre de simplification, on reviendra très vite à des situations de confrontation qui rappellent de la très ancienne pensée.

Je rappelle, pour ce qui concerne mon pays, que nous avons été parmi les premiers à souhaiter et à travailler à la mise en place de la Conférence sur la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe, précisément pour surmonter ce genre d'opposition simpliste, et le partage idéologique qui est un drame pour l'Europe depuis des décennies. Nous avons en 1978 proposé la Conférence pour le Désarmement en Europe devant l'Assemblée Spéciale des Nations Unies sur le Désarmement, qui a conduit aujourd'hui aux résultats de Stockholm dont nous avons parlé. Pour arriver à ce résultat de Stockholm, il y a eu de la "nouvelle pensée" chez tout le monde et pas d'un côté ou de l'autre. Donc, je crois que nous avons vraiment intérêt à sortir de ce genre de simplification.

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**Eberhard Schulz**

I should like to join Ambassador Morel in answering Mr. Agaev. In view of the shortage of time I will confine my remarks to this one observation.

It seems to me that the new political thinking in the Soviet Union is really encouraging and that its meaning for international relations can hardly be over-estimated. On the other hand, this new political thinking is still rather incomplete and is in many respects contradictory. The notion of a comprehensive security system does not to my mind correspond to necessities of our time. I don't object to this notion, but what we should do is deepen the understanding of the necessities of security by further exchange of views. I am very grateful to UNIDIR and IMEMO for this occasion and for the splendid organization of this Conference, but I would very much like our
contacts, which we have with very many institutions in the world, to be expanded to IMEMO and other possible institutions in the Soviet Union in order to deepen the dialogue on security and other mutually interesting questions.

What I have in mind is not the traditional exchange of delegations but the exchange of views by individual researchers or smaller groups of researchers on specific problems on a permanent basis, and I would be very grateful if the Soviet side could take up this proposal.

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Klaus-Jürgen Citron

I will just make some short remarks. I think there was around the table quite some positive assessment of the results of Stockholm. At the same time, I think we all realize that more has to be done. The chances seem not to be bad. In this context, I welcome for example the remarks of Mr. Sanz which has informed us of this very interesting effort in Latin America, and I am sure that similar efforts can take place in other areas of the world where they are needed and there was a reference shortly made concerning events in the Sinai. Similar things in areas where conflicts have threatened people, similar efforts probably can be made but always should be adapted to regional conditions. I don't think that you can just transfer European experiences to other areas - they have to be adapted to the specific conditions in another place.

As to some of the remarks of my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Erofeev, naturally both sides would have liked to have more. We, for example, would have liked to see an exchange of information on military units, on designation of military units. We were unhappy we didn't achieve this, so Ambassador Erofeev, somehow regretted that his side didn't get everything. I think this is the experience of conferences - one never gets everything one wants, or rarely.

There has been I think unjustified criticism of western implementation. I haven't understood the figures Ambassador Erofeev mentioned, but indeed the number of exercises has diminished. The west has had less activities in 1987 but this has nothing to do with Stockholm. There is, I think, also in the west, a feeling that very big exercises are very costly and so the number has been reduced, but if you look at the numbers on both sides it is a kind of parallel implementation.

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There would have been many more activities if the east would have accepted our thresholds. Originally the west would have preferred to announce and notify activities starting at the level of 6,000, later on we moved to 10,000, but it was the eastern side who didn't want to go so far, so let's hope that maybe next time when we go into the next negotiations, we will have settled on lower thresholds and thereby achieve bigger numbers.

As to the remarks of Mr. Karkoszka, I think indeed we will go into a new negotiation and new attempts have to be made to cope with a number of problems. As to instability, asymmetries, disparities, I think there too we have to find ways and I think General-Secretary Gorbachev in one of his speeches once made a good suggestion. He said: "The side which has more should go down to the level of the other side", and I think in a number of fields there are chances that parity can be reached. Even if you agree that numbers alone are not decisive, still if there is a very strong amount of tanks and weapons concentrated in a certain area it creates concerns, it creates fear. So I think, in addition to confidence-building measures, disarmament steps in the conventional field have to be made and all I can hope is that in the years to come we will make more progress.

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Vladimir Erofeev

I shall reply very briefly to the apprehension expressed here by Ambassador Morel that the creation of a general system of security may disrupt the existing security, may disrupt the United Nations Organization. I should like to remark that the communiqué adopted at the meeting of the RCC in Berlin is at pains to state, in its section on the formation of an all-embracing system of international peace and security, that the United Nations Organization could become an effective guarantor of that system. I want to comment that there is, naturally, no intention of disrupting or in any way harming the United Nations Organization, which has done and continues to do a great deal to strengthen peace.

Mr. Davies expressed uneasiness, I would say in a hackneyed form, that should perhaps now be modified in the light of what is taking place in our country and in the international area in general, uneasiness concerning the rights of man. I must say that the Soviet Union has proposed that a conference on humanitarian co-operation be held in Moscow. That is, I consider, new proof of the readiness of our country to go further in solving questions, and it will be a good thing if
that proposal is accepted and supported in, inter alia, the
country from which Mr. Davies comes.

As regards my respected colleague, Ambassador Citron, I
shall not reply fully now, because of lack of time, but merely
wish to say that, naturally, not all the important questions
that should have been solved in Stockholm were solved; we assume
and trust that there will be a second stage of the Stockholm
Conference, where the discussion on measures of confidence and
security will be continued, and where disarmament questions will
also be considered.

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Paul Meyer

I would just like to endorse the observations made by a
number of delegates as to the potential for CBMs to be applied
usefully in regional situations. I think, however, it is
helpful when there is a political basis on which to build
these. With reference to the comment by Professor Intriligator,
I just wanted to clarify that I was speaking of CBMs in the
military realm in terms of the paper, but of course recognize
that there is great scope for political confidence-building
measures. Indeed I think it is significant that what was
achieved in Stockholm in terms of elaborating new measures of
confidence building in the military realm was to a large extent
possible because there was a prior foundation in terms of the
Helsinki Final Act, in expressing certain fundamental principles
for guiding the behaviour of the participating States, and this
political foundation I think made it possible to erect somewhat
more elaborate measures of confidence in the military realm.

In the section of the Stockholm Document that deals with
refraining from the threat or use of force, I think you will
note that there are references to the importance of all 10
principles of the Final Act and the need for them to be equally
and unreservedly applied and implemented for the benefit of
international security and the purposes of the document as a
whole. I think this is significant when we try to extend
confidence-building measures in the military realm. This effort
is supported by prior achievements in the political, social,
economic spheres as well as in the field of human contacts and
rights. Progress in all of these areas is complementary to the
endeavour to elaborate more significant, from the military point
of view, confidence-building measures.

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Anada Segarra

As Chairwoman of the fifth and last meeting of our conference, I have the pleasant duty and privilege to say a few words about the work of our conference.

Let me begin by saying that the intensive discussions we have held in this hall confirmed the relevance of the subjects chosen for our deliberations. They have also underlined the need to seek in a realistic and earnest manner negotiated solutions to the complex problems of reducing and eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons; preventing an extension of the arms race in outer space; tackling the problem of conventional and chemical weapons; building confidence among nations; and, devising effective verification mechanisms to ensure compliance of disarmament agreements. We have dealt with these issues in a frank, serious and constructive manner, and have gained from each other a deeper knowledge and understanding of our respective concerns. This in itself amply justifies this gathering.

I believe this exchange of views has been useful and timely. I say timely because we are meeting here at a time when, after long years of inaction, or rather paralysis, in arms control efforts, we are witnessing a much needed reactivation of disarmament negotiations, especially at the bilateral level, on the basis of a new series of ground-breaking proposals which were ushered at the summit meeting of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union at Reykjavik during 1986.

In the course of our deliberations, we have heard some optimistic assessments on the prospects for success in the ongoing bilateral negotiations in Geneva between the two major Powers, and I am thinking in particular of the report we heard from Mr. Ifft. Other speakers were less optimistic and even critical, in their assessment of the prospects of those negotiations. However, this is only a reflection of the diversity of views that inevitably arise in discussions such as ours. But apart from this, it seems to me, that the main conclusion that can be drawn from our discussions, and one with which we all seem to agree, is the need for the negotiating parties, be it at the bilateral or multilateral level, to be flexible and understanding of the other side's security concerns, and show the necessary degree of co-operation, accommodation and above all willingness to reach concrete agreements. For only thus can negotiations have a successful outcome. At the present juncture, the reaching of agreements must be the ultimate objective of disarmament negotiations. Negotiations conceived as competitive exercises to score propaganda points are no longer acceptable to a world that lives under the constant threat of a nuclear catastrophe. We hope and
expect tangible results in the form of real and significant arms control agreements.

We all know, of course, that negotiations are a difficult undertaking that require long, patient and laborious work. In his statement this morning Ambassador Klaus-Jürgen Citron gave us an idea of the many obstacles encountered in multilateral negotiations, even when these do not deal with crucial questions of security. The agreements that emerged from the negotiations at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures in Europe, in September 1986, have been hailed, and rightly so, as a remarkable achievement. Although they are not arms control agreements, they represent, as Ambassador Citron said, a major step ahead in the CSCE and in the context of East-West relations in general.

I hope that those and other types of confidence building measures can be extended to other regions of the world adapted, of course to their particular needs and circumstances. Trust is a basic requirement for disarmament. It is our common task to build trust among our nations - and destroy their fears.

As we approach the end of our Conference, I would like on behalf of the distinguished participants of this Conference, to express our deep and sincere gratitude to our host country, to the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, to the citizens of this beautiful ancient capital, Baku, for their warm and generous hospitality. I would also like to express our special gratitude to the Deputy Director of UNIDIR, Mr. Serge Sur, to the Deputy Director of IMEKO, Mr. Kislov, and their able staff for organizing and successfully running this Conference.

We greatly appreciate the assistance, co-operation and unfailing efficiency of those staff members involved in the work of the Conference. Our gratitude also goes to the interpreters whose high quality performance has ensured the proper running of our proceedings.

In concluding, let me express the hope that in the months and years ahead rationality will finally prevail over the grotesque absurdity of the spiraling nuclear arms race, so that we may see the beginning of gradual but substantial reductions of nuclear weapons along with other and more important measures in the area of nuclear disarmament.

We have lived too long under the shadow of the nuclear threat. Let us get ourselves out from under that shadow and together strive to construct a better and safer world for us and for the generations to come.

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