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UNIDIR
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European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe

Proceedings of the Rhodes Conference
(6-7 September 1991)

La sécurité européenne dans les années 90 : Problèmes de l'Europe du Sud-Est

Actes de la Conférence de Rhodes
(6-7 septembre 1991)

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Table of Contents

| | Page |
|--|-----------|
| Preface | ix |
| Préface | xi |
| Opening Address I - <i>Jayantha Dhanapala</i> | xiii |
| Opening Address II <i>Thanos Veremis</i> | xvii |
| Message of the Foreign Minister of Greece - <i>Andonis Samaras</i> | xix |
| Introduction (English) <i>Chantal de Jonge Oudraat</i> | 1 |
| Introduction (français) - <i>Chantal de Jonge Oudraat</i> | 9 |
| Part I Evolution of the South-East European Security Context | 19 |
| Chapter 1 Internal Changes in South-East European Countries <i>Miodrag Mihajlovic</i> | 21 |
| I (23); II (26), <i>Heterogeneity, especially ethno-nationalism exacerbated by socio-economic and regional disparities</i> (26), <i>Active opposition to the old nomenclature and secret police</i> (27), <i>Questionable loyalty among senior military officers and an uncertain relationship between civil and military authorities</i> (27); III (27), <i>Germany and Poland</i> (27), <i>Poland and Belarus, the Ukraine and Lithuania</i> (28), <i>Hungary and Romania</i> (28), <i>Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia</i> (28), <i>Albania and Yugoslavia</i> (28), <i>Greece and Albania</i> (29), <i>The Soviet Union and Romania</i> (30), <i>Bulgaria and Turkey</i> (30), <i>Bulgaria and Romania</i> (30); IV (30); V (31); VI (34) | |
| Chapter 2 Attitudes of the USA and the USSR towards the South-East European Region - <i>Traian Chebeleu</i> | 37 |
| The Renewed Topicality of the Region (37); Attitudes of the USSR and the USA (39), <i>USSR's Dilemmas</i> (39), <i>US Inertia</i> (41), <i>Renewed Interest in the Balkans in 1991</i> (41); Extent of Desirable Super Power Involvement (43) | |
| Chapter 3 Impact of Existing European Institutions on South-East Europe (CSCE, CEE...) - <i>Franz-Lothar Altmann</i> | 47 |
| Introduction (47); <i>Military Security</i> (48), <i>Western European Union</i> (49), <i>European Economic Integration</i> (50), <i>European Political Co-operation</i> (51), <i>Human Rights and Democratization</i> (52), <i>The Role of the CSCE</i> (52) | |
| Responses and Discussion | 55 |
| <i>Yannis Valinakis</i> (55), <i>F. Stephen Larrabee</i> (57), <i>Todor Ditchew</i> (58), <i>Abdi Baleta*</i> (63), <i>Ignac Golob</i> (66) | |

* Text in French / Texte en français.

| | | |
|--------------------------|--|------------|
| Part II | Present State of Security of the South-East European Countries | 69 |
| Chapter 4 | Military Postures and Doctrines of the South-East European Countries - <i>George Katsirdakis</i> | 71 |
| | Introduction (71), <i>Definition</i> (71), <i>Area</i> (71), <i>Borders/Coastline</i> (71), <i>Terrain Characteristics</i> (71), <i>Population</i> (73), <i>Minorities</i> (73); <i>Strategic Considerations</i> (74), <i>Strategic Importance</i> (74), <i>Strategic Resources</i> (75); <i>Security Considerations</i> (76), <i>Security Risks</i> (76) <i>Security Policy</i> (78); <i>Military Doctrines</i> (80), <i>Albania</i> (80), <i>Bulgaria</i> (81), <i>Greece</i> (81), <i>Romania</i> (83), <i>Turkey</i> (83), <i>Yugoslavia</i> (84), <i>Conclusion</i> (85); <i>Defence</i> (86), <i>Albania</i> (86), <i>Bulgaria</i> (87), <i>Greece</i> (88), <i>Romania</i> (90), <i>Turkey</i> (92), <i>Yugoslavia</i> (93); <i>Conclusions</i> (95), <i>Defence Potential</i> (95), <i>Threat Perceptions</i> (96), <i>What Can Be Done?</i> (97); <i>Sources</i> (99) | |
| Chapter 5 | South-East European Security and the Military Alliances: The Case of Bulgaria - <i>Stoyan Andreev</i> | 101 |
| Chapter 6 | South-East European Countries' Threat Perceptions - <i>Nikos Protonotarios</i> | 105 |
| | Romania (106); Bulgaria (108); Yugoslavia (110); Albania (112); Greece and Turkey (113) | |
| Responses and Discussion | | 117 |
| | <i>Igor Scherbak</i> (117), <i>Roberto Aliboni</i> (118) | |
| Part III | South-East European Countries and the Negotiations and Agreements on Disarmament and Arms Limitation . | 121 |
| Chapter 7 | South-East European Countries and the CSCE, CFE Negotiations - <i>Ali L. Karaosmanoglu</i> | 123 |
| | The Security Environment (123); The CFE Treaty and Beyond (124); The CSCE Process (129); Naval Arms Control (130); Conclusion (132) | |
| Chapter 8 | Les pays d'Europe du Sud-Est et les problèmes nucléaires (South-East European Countries and the Nuclear Problems)* - <i>Abdi Baleta</i> | 133 |
| Chapter 9 | South-East European Countries and the Problems of Chemical Weapons - <i>Evgheni Alexandrov</i> | 139 |
| | South-East European Countries and CW Disarmament (139); Specific Implications of the CW Problem in the South-East European Area (140); CW Talks and Endeavours in South-Eastern Europe (142); Possible Avenues for Regional Co-operation (145) | |
| Responses and Discussion | | 147 |
| | <i>Mircea Pascu</i> (147), <i>Pierre Buhler*</i> (148), <i>Chantal de Jonge Oudraat*</i> (150) | |

* Text in French / Texte en français.

| | | |
|---|--|------------|
| Part IV | Proposals for Co-operation in the Field of Security Between the South-East European Countries | 153 |
| Chapter 10 | Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project: Anarchy, the Demise of Bipolarity, and the Turkish Call on the Regional Players to Co- operate rather than Defect - <i>Duygu Sezer</i> Theoretical Insights on Co-operation (155); Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project (158), <i>Objectives</i> (158), <i>The Agenda of Co-operation</i> (160), <i>Negotiations</i> (160), <i>Prospects</i> (160) | 155 |
| Chapter 11 | Greece and the European Challenge in the Balkans - <i>Theodore A. Couloumbis</i> Overview (163); The Shifting Patterns of Global Security (163); Greece and the European Challenge in the Balkans (166), <i>Democratization in the Balkans and its Potential Dangers</i> (166), <i>A Role for Greece in the Post-Communist Balkan Transition</i> (167); The Challenge of Greek-Turkish Relations (168); A Need for pan-European Institutions (171) | 163 |
| Chapter 12 | Mesures visant à accroître la confiance et la sécurité dans les Balkans (Confidence, Security and Stability Measures)* - <i>Corneliu Vlad</i> | 173 |
| Responses and Discussion | <i>Todor Ditchov</i> (183), <i>Vladimir Vereš</i> (185), <i>Alfred Papuciu*</i> (189) | 183 |
| Concluding Remarks - <i>Serge Sur</i> | Reversal of the Outlook (191); Persistence of Fundamental Problems (193); Urgency and Duration (195), <i>Relative Disengagement of the World Powers</i> (196), <i>Faltering of European Solutions</i> (196), <i>Inadequacy of Regional Solutions</i> (200) | 191 |
| Remarques conclusives - <i>Serge Sur</i> | Renversement des perspectives (204); Subsistance des problèmes de fond (205); Urgence et durée (207), <i>Désengagement relatif des puissances mondiales</i> (208), <i>Bégaïement des solutions européennes</i> (209), <i>Carences des solutions régionales</i> (212) | 203 |
| List of Participants / Liste des participants | | 215 |

* Text in French / Texte en français.



Preface

From 6-7 September 1991, UNIDIR organized in co-operation with the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the European Centre for International Security (ECIS) an international conference on "European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe".

I would like to thank the various authors of this volume for their contribution. Special thanks are also due to Brent Schindele, a UNIDIR intern from Dartmouth College, who assisted Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, a UNIDIR Research Associate, with the editing of the proceedings of this conference and Anita Blétry, from UNIDIR, for making the manuscript ready for publication.

UNIDIR received a special grant from the Volkswagen Stiftung for the organization of this conference for which we express our gratitude.

Except for the Introduction and Conclusive Remarks, the texts have been published in the language in which they were presented (*i.e.* English or French). The views expressed by the authors are their own and do not necessarily reflect those of UNIDIR.

Jayantha Dhanapala
Director

March 1992

Préface

Du 6 au 7 septembre 1991, l'UNIDIR a organisé, en coopération avec la Fondation pour la Défense et la Politique Etrangère (ELIAMEP) et le Centre Européen pour la Sécurité Internationale (CESI), une conférence internationale sur "La sécurité européenne dans les années 90 : problèmes de l'Europe du Sud-Est".

Je voudrais remercier les différents auteurs de cet ouvrage pour leur contribution. Des remerciements particuliers sont dûs à Brent Schindele, du Collège de Dartmouth et interne à l'UNIDIR, qui a aidé Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, attachée de recherche à l'UNIDIR, à mettre au point les actes de la conférence, et à Anita Blétry, de l'UNIDIR, pour la mise en page finale du manuscrit.

L'UNIDIR a reçu une contribution spéciale de Volkswagen Stiftung pour l'organisation de cette conférence et pour laquelle nous exprimons notre gratitude.

Hormis l'Introduction et les Remarques conclusives, les textes ont été publiés dans la langue dans laquelle ils ont été présentés (*i.e.* anglais ou français). Les opinions exprimées sont celles des différents auteurs et ne reflètent pas nécessairement celles de l'UNIDIR.

Jayantha Dhanapala
Directeur

Mars 1992

Opening Address I

Jayantha Dhanapala

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Firstly, allow me to extend a warm welcome to all of you who have accepted UNIDIR's invitation to participate in this conference. I appreciate the time and effort you have contributed to ensure that we have a useful and productive discussion on a most important issue of great relevance to contemporary developments in international security.

Secondly, I must thank our hosts, the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, or ELIAMEP, for their co-operation in helping UNIDIR to organize this Conference. We began our discussions about two years ago and rapidly reached agreement on the need to collaborate closely on the theme of this conference. Thereafter we have had excellent co-operation through every stage of the planning process. I would like to pay sincere tribute to Professor Veremis and his colleagues in ELIAMEP for sparing no effort in ensuring the success of the Conference and for the warm hospitality extended to all of us. My thanks are also due to Dr. Albrecht von Müller of the Centre for European Security Studies in Feldafing, Germany, for his advice and assistance and to the Volkswagen Foundation for their support.

UNIDIR is an autonomous institution established by the General Assembly within the framework of the United Nations. Its task is to conduct independent research on disarmament, international security and related subjects. We have both a responsibility to identify research areas that have a relevance and supporting value to the ongoing political process as well as to engage the talents of a broad multilateral group of scholars in this task. I believe we have discharged both these responsibilities admirably with this Conference. I look forward to a stimulating and constructive discussion.

It is undoubtedly appropriate that we should meet in a country which is commonly regarded as the cradle of Western civilization to discuss how that rich inheritance in this region should be secured in peace and harmony. In the centuries that have unfolded since the glory of ancient Greece we have seen war and peace, the rapid advancement of civilization and its temporary setbacks and the ebb and flow of national fortunes. Throughout all this panorama of history there has been an inexorable progress of humankind through the unparalleled exercise of creative imagination and constructive endeavour. Science and technology have taken the human race further along the path of development in this modern age. At the same time we are confronted by the age-old causes of human conflict that led to the Peloponnesian War in the fifth century B.C. Their presence in a nuclear age where weapons of mass destruction threaten the very existence of the human race and its life-supporting ecosystem are a grim reminder of the fragility of our world and the fallibility of man in repeating the mistakes of history.

In a subsequent age in the fourth century A.D. Vegetius wrote *Qui desiderat pacem, praeparet bellum* (Let him who desires peace prepare for war). Centuries later Clausewitz wrote that "War is nothing more than the continuation of politics by other means". The fallacy that preparations for war through an arms race are politically necessary to achieve peace persists at many levels - domestic, regional, and global. No conflict, however, has resulted in a permanent peace. Indeed, many conflicts have laid the grounds for further conflict to be renewed after varying intervals of time.

Today we are at a fortunate stage of history. We are at the threshold of a world situation where, as the founders of the United Nations Charter hoped, the scourge of war can be eliminated and where conditions of peace appear promising, enabling human development and universal prosperity. The restructuring of global politics following the improvement of relations between the US and USSR has resulted in the ending of the Cold War, the revitalization of the United Nations and the efflorescence of self-determination and democracy. The transition from bipolarity to multipolarity is not easily achieved. Change even of the most propitious kind has to be managed. Failure to do so could result in historic opportunities being missed. The liberation of Kuwait and the failure of the recent Soviet coup are proof that a strong deep-seated historical process is in motion often at an incredibly accelerated pace.

Our Conference in Rhodes is an attempt to ensure that this historical process is harnessed for the peace and stability of South-East Europe. Regional arrangements in accordance with the Charter exist for the pacific settlement of disputes. The CSCE process from Helsinki through Madrid to Stockholm has established a sturdy framework for the common European home. Political arrangements have been buttressed by realistic economic structures. While dramatic progress has been achieved in Europe with the collapse of the antagonistic alliance system, historical animosities that pre-date world War II threaten the new peace. These threats are at an incipient stage. They are assisted by rekindled ethnic nationalisms that overspill the national boundaries drawn up at Yalta.

More than a century ago, the promise of 1848, with its wave of liberal revolutions in Europe, was quickly dissipated, and Europe degenerated into war. Are we to allow the *Annus Mirabilis* of 1989 and the 1990 Charter of Paris to be similarly nullified? Cannot Europe through its new structures resolve the nascent conflicts within and among nations? This Conference is a modest attempt to search for solutions. That this search should take place among scholars of repute from the region is a justifiable cause for optimism. Some of the participants will provide us with an extra-regional perspective, coming, as they do, from other regions. The research community has the tools for objective analysis despite our proximity in time and space to the volatile events and historical currents that we seek to understand and harness for our common benefit. Already many of the papers prepared for this Conference contain valuable proposals for security in the Balkan region.

We meet in Rhodes amidst its well-known natural beauty and memories of classical myths. Centuries ago the history of this island was linked to the crusades. Today it is part of a new Europe.

Today a new Colossus bestrides Europe. It is in the form of peace, disarmament and conciliation; of a commitment to the shared values of democracy and to the principles of the UN Charter. We are nowhere near the complex web of conflicts that led to the First World War. Pan-European security structures and institutions have been established. They are facing challenges to which I have no doubt they will respond positively.

Much has been achieved in terms of disarmament in Europe - the INF Treaty, CFE, and now START. A Chemical Weapons Convention is due soon. These achievements must be consolidated and the pace of disarmament accelerated in order to achieve security and lower levels of armaments. This has to take place as much at sub-regional and regional levels as at the global level. Ideology has ceased to be the dominant divisive factor in global politics. It must not be replaced by resurgent nationalism. The need for rapid economic progress especially in Eastern Europe and South-East Europe and the consolidation of democratic regimes are essential prerequisites. The institutionalization of the CSCE process will result

in the creation of reliable systems for crisis prevention and conflict resolution. Multilateral fire brigades cannot always be assembled and paid for on an ad-hoc basis especially if the vital national interests of major powers are not affected. Consequently, reliable mechanisms have to be set up for use when occasions demand them. Transparency, verification and confidence-building measures have all proven their value in achieving an end to the Cold War. They remain useful in solving intra-European problems.

I have no doubt that we will have a good discussion as we together search for new paradigms in the post-Cold War situation in South-East Europe. We have the right ambience and the right conditions to do so.

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Opening Address II

Thanos Veremis

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Board of Directors of the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) I would like to welcome you to Rhodes in this joint Conference on *European Security in the 1990s: Problems of South-East Europe*.

A major source of current European anxiety stems from the disintegration of the Eastern bloc and the demise of Communism. The artificial delineation between East and West and the constraints set up by an ideology which was hostile to nationalism, have now evaporated, reviving pre-war ethnic, religious and political conflicts. There is little that institutions of collective security or national nuclear deterrents can do about a possible Soviet collapse with all its implications for Europe, or civil strife in Yugoslavia. Such problems have nothing to do with the issues between East and West that until now dominated post-war international affairs and require the competence of organizations that deal with interstate conflicts. Of all parts of Eastern Europe its South is surely the most volatile. The proverbial "powder keg" of the continent could once again display its destabilising features. It is precisely in this region, as well as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that one can expect a growing role for a carefully-developed and institutionalized center for conflict prevention and, hopefully, conflict management as well as conflict resolution. In fact, as Europeans, we are being offered a rare opportunity to perfect all the necessary mechanisms for a stable European political process ensuring the peaceful and just settlement of disputes - whether they are inter- or intra-state in nature. The twin principles of the inviolability of borders and the full and comprehensive respect of the human rights of all the inhabitants of the region can indeed prevent the appellation of "powder keg" from fitting the Balkans again.

As Western Europe moves towards political integration, its weaker components will want to ensure the survival of their cultural identity in a federation dominated by the larger states. The trend to recognise and secure the rights of national and cultural EC minorities in anticipation of political unification constitutes an encouragement to Eastern Europeans striving for the political independence of their historical ethnicities. However, the history of nationalisms - especially in South-Eastern Europe - is often chequered with totalitarian overtones which bear little regard for principles of tolerance and democracy. They are also associated with irredentist appetites of adjacent states and great power designs of regional influence and indeed domination. The demarcation line between freedom and the emergence of a new tyranny is often unclear.

In the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy we are gradually defining our profile, purposes and objectives: namely, to participate in the international community of foreign policy and strategic studies, sustaining long-range linkages between practitioners and scholars functioning in and outside Greece. South-Eastern Europe continues to be our major regional focus, but we are conscious of a series of concentric and intersecting circles of study involving Mediterranean studies, European studies (East and West), the military and economic roles of the Great Powers (US, Japan and the Soviet Union) in our region and, last but not least, the challenges of managing North-South relations in the future. In an era of genuine interdependence, we should avoid marching toward the creation of a divided planet that pits the world's rich in the North against the world's poor in the South.

Message of the Foreign Minister of Greece

Andonis Samaras

Dear Participants,

This Conference, with its highly topical theme, has been organized at a time when the Balkans are undergoing important developments, a time of hopeful prospects but also of great dangers for the Balkan countries.

Now is the time for the experts to contribute their knowledge, cool-headedness and sense of responsibility to the smooth development of the socio-political reality in this sensitive area of the Balkans.

The experts play an important role and carry great responsibility in our society, which often suffers from anachronistic sensitivities and persistence in putting right historic *injustices* committed decades ago. Certainly, history is respected, as are political traditions and the memories of nations, but we should not allow the sentimentalists to jeopardize peace in the area. Now is the right time to elaborate new systems of collaboration, based on the principles of law and democracy, to avert crises and build democratic institutions.

The participants to this Conference must realize that the problems in the Balkans are in many ways indigenous, the result of both their historical past and their geo-political position, and that they must help each other to find solutions. It would be disastrous if outside factors or countries were to appear on the scene and play a leading role, promoting isolated and personal interests.

On the other hand, International Organisations, in particular European Organisations, may be able to play a positive role, since these organisations act in compliance with the will of their members.

I extend my greetings to your Conference, and I wish you every success in your proceedings.

Introduction

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat

At present, not a day goes by without some disconcerting news from South-East Europe. In the post-World War II period - and, more specifically, in the Cold War period - South-East Europe occupied a relatively marginal position. The East-West conflict crystallized around Germany and Central Europe. South-East Europe, while involved to a certain extent, remained largely outside the main focus of the European arms limitation negotiations, *i.e.* the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Talks and their successor, the CDE (CSCE) and CFE negotiations.

Nonetheless South-East Europe, or what in the past was more commonly known as the Balkans, has traditionally been a source of instability and a seat of conflict in Europe. Were not the Balkans, in the not-too-distant past, referred to in popular speech as the "powder keg" of Europe?

The breaking down of the Berlin Wall, German unification and the collapse of the communist state system in Eastern Europe stirred up long-dormant ethnic tensions in many of the Eastern European countries. These tensions and the ensuing conflicts appeared to be of a particularly destabilizing and security-threatening nature in South-Eastern Europe. The possibility that such conflicts could seriously threaten security and stability not only in the Balkans, but security in Europe in general, was a real one that had to be considered. Moreover, interest in the Balkans was also stirred by its geopolitical position at the crossroads of the Christian and Islamic worlds.

The renewed interest in the region made the two-day international conference organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) - in co-operation with the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and the European Centre for International Security (ECIS) - extremely topical. The objective of the conference was to examine the development as well as the present state of security as seen from within the region itself, to review proposals for co-operation, and to analyze positions of the countries concerned in the field of disarmament. More generally, the concern was also how South-Eastern European security problems would evolve in the context of the radically new overall European security situation, and what effects these problems would have on Europe as a whole.

The terms "South-East Europe" and "the Balkans" have been used interchangeably throughout the conference and throughout this publication. As pointed out by Serge Sur in his concluding remarks, preference was initially given to the more neutral term of "South-East Europe". "The Balkans" indeed seemed to be invested with "an image, evoking either a former time of disorders and violence or the irenic prospects of co-operation on a homogeneous and clearly delimited regional basis." However, this somewhat disparaging connotation of the term "the Balkans" seems to be more strongly felt out outside the region than within it, where the terms "the Balkans" and "South-East Europe" are used indiscriminately.

At the time of the conference (6 - 7 September 1991), the initial euphoria over the collapse of the socialist system had abated somewhat and had been replaced by anxiety over the future of security in Europe.

The images of the distress of the Albanian people landing on the Eastern shores of Italy and drifting through the streets of Bari in the summer of 1991 were still vivid. The advent

of a military dictatorship in what was then still the USSR had been a real possibility. Indeed, had not the August coup almost succeeded? And was not the spectre of other such coups a real possibility? The situation in Yugoslavia, similarly, was far from reassuring; the question of ethnic or national minorities, prevalent throughout the Balkans, reached its paroxysmic pinnacle in that country. Was Europe creating in its Southern underbelly a Lebanon of its own?

* * *

Just as the Balkans were, at one point in history, considered a potential source of war in Europe, so was the Yugoslav situation considered to contain the seeds of fragmentation and conflict which could spread on the winds of political discontent and economic tribulation to the entire Balkan region and possibly throughout the whole of Europe.

Fighting began after Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence on the 25th of June 1991.¹ The Brioni cease-fire of 7 July 1991 - which had been negotiated with the intervention of the European Community and in which both republics accepted to postpone implementation of their proclamation of independence until the 7th of October 1991 - was broken almost immediately and battles intensified, particularly in the Croatian territories of Slavonia and Krajina, along the frontiers of Croatia and Bosnia.²

On the 27th of August 1991, the European Community, through the European Council, declared:

The Community and its Member States cannot stand idly by as the bloodshed in Croatia increases day by day. An agreement on the monitoring of the cease-fire and its maintenance should allow the Community and its Member States to convene a peace conference and establish an arbitration procedure.

Three basic principles were to guide the conference: no unilateral change of borders by force; respect and protection for the rights of all who live in Yugoslavia, including minorities; and the need to take account of all legitimate concerns and aspirations.³

But how to organize a conference on the future of Yugoslavia, without the settlement of more immediate questions such as the establishment and monitoring of an effective cease-fire? How to organize such a conference without the consent of all parties concerned? Was not the Conference doomed to fail right from the beginning? Had not the Chairman of the Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, been given an impossible task?

Moreover, a great deal of disagreement existed within the EC with respect to the Yugoslav crisis, concerning both the issues of recognition and of intervention.

In terms of the former, it may be recalled that at the opening of the Conference on 7 September 1991 the German Foreign Minister had warned that, in the event that the

¹ Macedonia proclaimed its independence on 15 September 1991. A referendum, with 95% of the electorate voting in favour of independence, was held on 8 September 1991. Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaimed its independence on 3 March 1992, after the referendum held on 1 March 1992, which saw 99 % of the voters voting in favour of independence. Montenegro, which also held a referendum on 1 March 1992, voted in favour of Union with Serbia.

² On 10 July 1991, following the Brioni agreement, the European Community sent a 30 to 50-strong multinational monitoring team to Slovenia, with the understanding that it might also be deployed at some later stage and if the need arose in Croatia. On 2 August the EEC tried to extend the monitoring mission to Croatia. European observers were sent to the Croatian combat area on 11 September 1991, bringing the total of EC observers to approximately 200 in January 1992.

³ Cf. The European Community declarations of 3 and 19 September 1991.

conference was unsuccessful, Germany would immediately recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent sovereign states.⁴ The EC decided on 16 December 1991 that the question of recognition would be dealt with on 15 January 1992. A number of conditions had been laid down and it was agreed that requests for recognition would be examined by the Arbitration Commission. The Arbitration Commission had been set up to assist the Conference on Yugoslavia and, in particular, to look at the constitutional and legal issues posed by the dissolution of Yugoslavia.⁵

With respect to the latter, it should be noted that some urged the deployment of European buffer-zone forces, others preferred active intervention through a Western European Union peacekeeping or peacemaking force, while still others counseled a more cautious attitude. These last argued that only a clear political objective, in addition to an invitation by all parties to intervene, would warrant the deployment of European forces. The repeated breaking of the subsequent cease-fires the EC managed to negotiate was inauspicious in this respect. Meanwhile, it was imperative that the conflict not spread to neighbouring countries. Containment was hence the watchword, the order of the day.

Discussions in the framework of the EC, the CSCE or the WEU did not lead to any decisive outcomes. Agreement by the European Community on limited economic sanctions, covering the whole of Yugoslavia, was reached on 8 November 1991, but because of the nature of the measures they did not to have any immediate effects.⁶

The United Nations seized the initiative on the Yugoslav question on the 25th of September 1991. In its resolution 713 (1991) the UN Security Council expressed its support for the European efforts and imposed a general arms embargo on Yugoslavia. The cease-fire it sought had not taken effect, however, nor had the idea of sending an emergency force received any support.⁷

On 8 October 1991, the UN Secretary General appointed Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, former US Secretary of State, as his Personal Envoy. Mr. Vance undertook several missions in Yugoslavia and negotiated a cease-fire that was signed in Geneva on 23 November 1991. He also elaborated the concept of, and a plan for, a UN peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia. While the cease-fire agreement did not hold and some last minute offensives were mounted, a text was signed on 2 January 1992 in Sarajevo to actually implement the previously-signed cease-fire agreement of 23 November 1991. The conflict had reached the point of exhaustion; nothing further was to be gained through battle.

⁴ Germany resorted to this recognition on the 25th of December 1991, as did the European Community on the 15th of January 1992.

⁵ The Arbitration Commission, chaired by Robert Badinter, publicized their advice on recognition on 15 January 1992. It supported recognition of Slovenia, Macedonia, and Croatia (under certain conditions). It stated that conditions for recognition in Bosnia-Herzegovina were not yet established. The EC proceeded with recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, but postponed recognition of Macedonia, under pressure from Greece, who seems to fear that an independent Macedonian Republic might, despite a declaration to the contrary, sooner or later make territorial claims on the Greek Macedonian province.

⁶ The measures included the following: suspension of the application of, and decision to terminate, the trade and co-operation agreement with Yugoslavia; restoration of quantitative limits for textiles; removal of Yugoslavia from the list of beneficiaries of the General System of Preferences; formal suspension of benefits under the PHARE programme. The European Community further invited the United Nations Security Council to take steps to impose an oil embargo. Such an embargo was, however, never instituted. The only embargo decreed by the United Nations was an arms and military equipment embargo. Cf.: UN Security Council resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991, paragraph 6. The embargo was reinforced by UNSC resolution 724 (1991) of 14 December 1991, paragraph 5; and reaffirmed in UNSC resolution 727 (1991) of 9 January 1992, paragraph 6.

⁷ For the references of the relevant UN Documents see the Annex.

Faced with the obvious failure of the European efforts and the war weariness of the protagonists, the United Nations Security Council, upon recommendation of the UN Secretary General, finally decided on the 21st of February 1992, to send a peace-keeping force of some 14,000 men to Yugoslavia (after more than eight months of war, an estimated 600,000 displaced persons and an estimated 10,000 dead).⁸

The purpose of the UN peace-keeping operation is to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, to be carried out within the EC-sponsored Conference on Yugoslavia. Contrary to normal practice, the overall command of the UN operation was entrusted to the Force Commander and not to a civilian mission chief as initially envisioned. The reason forwarded was that it was necessary to clearly delineate the peace-keeping role of the United Nations from the peace-making role of the European Communities.

* * *

While at the time of the Rhodes conference the failure of the European formula to solve the Yugoslav situation had not yet come to its full consummation, its dismal prospects were already apparent.

Yugoslavia may, in many ways, be considered a *concentrate*, not just of South-Eastern European problems, but also of the relation between the region and Europe as a whole.

Many scholars have articulated the archaic nature of the minority conflicts in Yugoslavia. Perhaps less emphasized has been the danger of complete isolation, which is probably the greatest danger facing Yugoslavia, and beyond Yugoslavia, the Balkan region.

Indeed, contrary to the pre-World War II period, none of the great powers - and certainly not the US or Russia - currently has any direct stake in the region. Neither Yugoslavia nor South-East Europe in general is today the "tinderbox" of Europe. The collapse of the East-West divide prohibits such a role. The greatest threat to South-East Europe emanates from within the region itself. It is a threat which nourishes itself with old historic and religious divisions, a threat which drapes itself in historic determinism. In light of the recent, as well as the not-so-recent, past of South-East Europe, the region seems to be endowed with a prodigious storehouse in this respect. Apart from nearly half a century of communism, authors are increasingly pointing to the religious, orthodox tradition of the region and to the fact that neither the Renaissance, the Reformation, nor the Industrial Revolution ever really took root in that part of Europe. Emphasis is also placed on the low level of development of the nation-state and its civil society.⁹

⁸ See UN Security Council Resolution 743 (1992), by which it is decided to establish a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), for an initial period of 12 months. The force was deployed to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. The force consists of a total of 13,870 military and police personnel and a 519-member civilian component. Cf. The report of the Secretary General in Annex.

⁹ See, for instance, the thesis of Krzysztof Pomian, historian, philosopher and Director of research at the Paris-based CNRS. See his book *L'Europe et ses nations*, Paris, Gallimard, and his interview in the French newspaper *Liberation*, 10 January 1992, pp.23-24. See also the interview with the French geographer Michel Foucher in *Le Monde* of 7 May 1991. According to these theses, Europe is divided into two zones - not into Western Europe on the one hand and Central and Eastern Europe on the other - but into Western and Central Europe on the one hand and Eastern Europe on the other. This division, from a religious point of view, corresponds to the zones dominated respectively by the Latin Roman Catholic Church and the Greek Orthodox Church. The line runs from the White Sea in the North, down to the Adriatic. It leaves the greater part of Finland, the Baltic Republics, a small part of Belarus, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Transylvania (in Rumania), Slovenia and Croatia to the West.

Is any unity or cohesiveness possible in this region, where, after all, two States were members of the Warsaw Pact, where one State was party to the non-aligned movement, where two States are members of NATO, and where one State is unclassifiable in any of those existing or defunct political groupings? The common bond between members of the region - while real, and noticeable to researchers and academics of the region - is too negatively charged.

To a certain extent one could say that the Balkans do not really constitute a region, but merely a grouping of bilateral concerns. Indeed, the region seems to be defined through bilateral points of contention. All six countries of the region have at least one, if not more, dispute (or at least cause for discord) with each one of their neighbours. There is no real positive communality among the countries of the region. From this standpoint it might be argued that the power of South-East European countries is more accidental and residual in nature than original - *i.e.*, the elements of power lie outside the region. Here again Yugoslavia is a poignant illustration. The Second World War and the subsequent partition of Europe into East and West enabled Marshal Tito to federate and keep together the different constituent republics of Yugoslavia. One of the conditions for its viability, however, was that it would not align itself with either of the two blocs. Yugoslavia as a *trait d'union* was viable option. Did not the situation in Yugoslavia become slowly but steadily intractable after Tito's death and after the subsequent steady alignment with the Soviet bloc? Similarly, did not the Balkans implode after their function as *trait d'union* between East and West was no longer warranted? In this light the parallel developments in Yugoslavia and the USSR are indeed striking, as events in both countries mirrored each other.

* * *

The reports and papers presented at the Conference have been organized around four main topics, corresponding to the four main sessions of the Conference. Part I deals with the evolution of the South-East European Security context, Part II with the present state of security in the South-East European countries, Part III with the South-East European countries and the negotiations and agreements on disarmament and arms limitation, and Part IV with proposals for co-operation between the South-East European countries in the field of security. Concluding remarks were presented by *Serge Sur*, the Deputy Director of UNIDIR.

The discussion of the first session, which dealt with the evolution of the South-East European security context, was introduced with the presentation of three reports. One report, by *Miodrag Mihajlovic*, former Minister Plenipotentiary of the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, addressed internal changes in South-East European Countries; one report, by Ambassador *Traian Chebeleu* of the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dealt with the attitude of the USA and the USSR towards the region; and one report, presented by *Franz-Lothar Altmann*, Deputy Director of the Süd-Ost Institute in München, Germany, examined the impact of existing European institutions on the region presented.

The discussions were naturally heavily influenced by the Yugoslav situation. Here, as in reality, heated debates ensued. The mosaic of ethnic or national minorities making claims to specific parts of territory, either within one of the existing, pre-World War II States, or over the territory of several of those States, is in this respect very reminiscent of the post-and even pre-Versailles period. The different reports presented at the conference and published in this volume clearly emphasize this point *i.e.* the territorial character of the minority conflicts.

With respect to the attitude of the US and the USSR (Russia) towards the region, it was observed that the decline in interest by both the USSR (Russia) and the United States represented both an opportunity and a misfortune for the region – an opportunity because no longer would issues external to the region define relations among States within the region, and a misfortune because it underscored the marginal and possibly isolated position of the region, not just on a global level but even on an European level.

The decline of interest in the region by the United States, however, is only partial. Indeed, the present American focus on the Persian Gulf and the Middle East indicates the importance of its security relationship with at least one of the Balkan countries – namely, Turkey. It was also emphasized that the decline of Russian interest in the region was only temporary, dictated by the terrible economic situation of the country; sooner or later Russia would again regain its natural interests in the region. The latter may partly explain the quasi-plebiscite by which an organization like NATO was hailed, particularly among the former Warsaw Pact members. NATO's success is, of course, also to be attributed to the failure of the purely European institutions to deal effectively with the Yugoslav situation. The CSCE, in particular, has in this respect shown its limitations and demonstrated the necessity of outlining a new political agenda for this pan-European institution.

The economic plight of the region was stressed time and time again. The huge differences in economic development even between countries within the region as well as between the Western and even Central European countries cannot but create tensions and frustrations. The primacy of economic factors in defining the security context in South-East Europe again gives credence, with an ironic twist of historical nemesis, to one of Marx's basic precepts.

The second and third sessions addressed, in addition to the evident global changes in military postures and doctrines, the different and less-known sub-regional aspects of the security equation in the Balkan region as well. In both sessions non-military aspects of security, particularly those related to the development of democracy, human rights and the environment, were emphasized. Three reports were presented in the second session, dealing with the current state of security. *George Katsirdakis* of the Defence Planning and Policy Division of NATO presented a report on military postures and military doctrines of the states in the region; General *Stoyan Andreev*, National Security Adviser of the Bulgarian President, examined the case of Bulgaria, particularly its position with respect to military alliances; and *Nikos Protonotarios*, Defence Economist at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, UK, presented a report on the threat perceptions of the South-East European countries. In the third session, which dealt with the more traditional extra-regional disarmament agenda and with South-East European positions concerning that agenda, reports were presented by *Ali Karaosmanoglu*, Professor at the Bilkent University in Ankara, who examined the conventional weapon issues and, in particular, the CSCE and CFE Negotiations; *Abdi Baleta*, member of the Albanian Democratic Party, and member of Parliament who examined the nuclear issue; and Ambassador *Evgheni Alexandrov* of the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry, who examined the issue of chemical weapons.

With respect to the more specific military security issues, primary importance was placed on the need for increased transparency, especially since both the nature and perception of threats are considered to be increasingly and almost exclusively intraregional.

The traditional arms limitation and disarmament agenda was considered a lower priority. Whether this is because of objective factors related to this region's peculiar security equation, or whether it is also an illustration of a more general global trend, remains to be seen. In terms of the latter hypothesis, there does seem to be a developing trend whereby interest in

specific and singular disarmament and arms limitation agreements tends to give way to interest in more general arms limitation and armament restriction régimes. This observation holds true not only for the nuclear field but also for the biological and chemical weapons domain. Indeed, the control regimes in these fields increasingly comprise not only universal, multilateral, formal treaties, but also regional, bilateral as well as more informal agreements or sets of standards. The weapons issue is increasingly being seen in a more general international security context, in which crisis prevention and crisis management are of more immediate importance, and which calls upon either UN Charter Chapter VII situations - *i.e.* actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, or on Chapter VIII situations *i.e.* situations involving intervention of regional organisations or of regional arrangements.

In the final session, intraregional forms of co-operation were discussed. *Duygu Sezer*, Professor at the Bilkent University in Ankara, presented a report on regional co-operation, and *Theodore Couloumbis*, General Secretary of ELIAMEP and Professor at the Athens University, presented a report on bilateral co-operation. Lastly *Corneliu Vlad*, Chief Foreign Editor of the Rumanian newspaper *Romania Libera*, presented a report on confidence, security and stability measures.

It was pointed out that the States of the region have always actively advocated regional co-operation schemes, even at the height of the Cold War. However, none of these intraregional efforts has ever been very successful, possibly because there has never been a real communality of interests. Perhaps these measures had primarily bilateral objectives and were aimed at keeping territorial claims of the different national minorities in check. It was stressed that intraregional relations needed to be strengthened and that beneficial results of intraregional Confidence-Building Measures could be gained. At the same time, it was also emphasized that primary importance had to be given to integrating the region into the wider European sphere specifically the Economic Community, for its economic potential, and NATO, for its security potential. The relatively little faith harboured in the CSCE mechanism is understandable in light of the general sentiment that the end of the Cold War could possibly mark the end of the CSCE process as well. At very least, the post Cold War situation poses serious challenges to the CSCE. For the CSCE to be a meaningful mechanism, a new set of objectives will have to be defined.

This question as well as the fledgling attempts of European institutions to deal with the Yugoslav crisis is further elaborated upon by *Serge Sur* in the Concluding Remarks. Emphasis was also placed on the nature and character of the region and its position as a zone of contact with other regions and with other civilisations.

The possible marginalisation of the South-Eastern European region is a very real danger; indeed, if the countries of the region are not able to overcome their bilateral points of contention they might invite policies of quarantine from outside powers, thereby creating what one might call a "Balkan black hole", which would consequently engulf and destroy all Helsinki and Paris Charter hopes. As was stressed throughout the conference, the future of the Balkans lies in the hands of the South-East European countries themselves.

March 1992

Annex

Relevant UN Documents on Yugoslavia

For the different UN Security Council Resolutions, see:

- Resolution 713 (1991) 25 September 1991 - decides upon installation of an arms embargo;
- Resolution 721 (1991) 27 November 1991 - urges the Yugoslav parties to comply with the agreement signed on 23 November 1991 in Geneva, *i.e.* the unconditional cease-fire, and requests the Secretary General to submit recommendations for the possible establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia;
- Resolution 724 (1991) - 14 December 1991 reinforces the arms embargo and approves the report of the Secretary General (of 11 December S/23280), contains *i.a.* a concept and operational plan for a peace-keeping operation;
- Resolution 727 (1992) - 8 January 1992 - welcomes the signature of the implementation accord at Sarajevo on 2 January 1992 concerning modalities for implementing the unconditional cease-fire agreement of 23 November 1991, and endorses the sending of 50 military liaison officers;
- Resolution 740 (1992) 7 February 1992 approves increase of the military liaison mission to 75; 743 (1992) - 21 February - Establishment of UNPROFOR.

Among the relevant reports of the Secretary General, see:

- S/23169 - 25 October 1991 - report on the first mission of Mr. Vance, Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General;
- S/23239 - 24 November 1991 - report on the third mission of Mr. Vance (the second mission was reported upon in camera), containing *i.a.* in annex the text of the Geneva ceasefire agreement of 23 November 1991;
- S/23280 - 11 December 1991 - report on the fourth mission of Mr. Vance and containing *i.a.* in annex the text of the plan for the UN peacekeeping operation;
- S/23363 5 January 1992 - Report on the fifth mission of Mr. Vance, containing *i.a.* in annex the Sarajevo implementing accord of 2 January 1992;
- S/23513 - 5 February 1992 - Report on the situation in Yugoslavia;
- S/23592 and Add.1 15 and 19 February 1992 - report on the situation in Yugoslavia and containing some modifications of the UN peacekeeping plan and a call on the Council to instruct the Secretary General to proceed with deployment of the peacekeeping forces.

N.B.

The Periodical *Review of International Affairs/Revue des Affaires Internationales* (Belgrade) has regularly published the different documents of the UN, CSCE, EC, the Yugoslav Conference, the Arbitration Commission, and the declarations of the different republics.

Introduction

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat

Aujourd'hui, il ne se passe pas un jour sans nouvelles déconcertantes en provenance de l'Europe du Sud-Est. Durant la période de l'après guerre, et plus particulièrement durant la Guerre Froide, cette région n'occupa qu'une position relativement marginale. Le conflit Est-Ouest s'était cristallisé autour de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe Centrale. L'Europe du Sud-Est, bien que partie prenante, restait en marge de l'objet principal des négociations européennes sur la limitation des armements tels que les MBFR et des négociations leurs succédant, la CDE (CSCE) et les négociations FCE.

Toutefois, cette partie de l'Europe, dans le passé plus communément connue sous le nom de Balkans, a toujours été une source d'instabilité et un lieu de conflits pour le continent. Ne se référait-on pas, dans un passé pas trop lointain, suivant une formule familière, à la "poudrière" de l'Europe quand on parlait des Balkans ?

La chute du Mur de Berlin, l'unification allemande et l'effondrement des Etats communistes de l'Europe du Sud-Est ont réveillé des tensions d'ordre ethnique qui sommeillaient depuis longtemps. Les tensions et les conflits qui suivirent apparaissaient d'une nature particulièrement déstabilisante et menaçante pour la sécurité. La possibilité que de tels conflits puissent sérieusement menacer la sécurité et la stabilité, non seulement des Balkans mais de l'Europe en général est réelle et doit être prise en considération. L'intérêt pour les Balkans est aussi provoqué par sa position géopolitique aux carrefours des mondes chrétiens et musulmans.

Le regain d'intérêt porté à la région a ainsi donné à la Conférence internationale organisée par l'UNIDIR - en coopération avec la Fondation Hellénique pour la Défense et la Politique Etrangère (ELIAMEP) et le Centre Européen pour la Sécurité Internationale (CESI) - une particulière actualité. L'objectif de la Conférence était d'examiner l'évolution et l'état présent de la sécurité tels qu'ils étaient perçus à l'intérieur de la région elle-même, de passer en revue des propositions de coopération et d'analyser les positions des pays concernés dans le domaine du désarmement. Plus généralement, la question sous-jacente était de savoir de quelle manière les problèmes de sécurité de l'Europe du Sud-Est évolueraient dans le contexte de la situation radicalement nouvelle de la sécurité en Europe, et quels effets ces problèmes auraient sur le continent en général.

Les termes d'"Europe du Sud-Est" et de "Balkans" ont été utilisés d'une façon interchangeable durant la Conférence et dans cette publication. Comme l'a fait remarquer Serge Sur dans ses remarques conclusives, la préférence avait été donnée initialement au terme plus neutre de "l'Europe du Sud-Est". "Les Balkans" semblaient être investis "d'une image évoquant ou bien une période ancienne de troubles et de violences ou bien les perspectives iréniques d'une coopération sur une base régionale homogène et bien délimitée". Toutefois, la connotation historiquement chargée du terme "Balkans" paraît être ressentie plus négativement à l'extérieur qu'à l'intérieur de la région, où les termes "Balkans", ou "Europe du Sud-Est" sont utilisés sans distinction sensible.

A l'époque de la Conférence (6-7 septembre 1991), l'euphorie initiale qui a suivi l'effondrement du système socialiste était quelque peu apaisée. Elle commençait à être remplacée par l'anxiété quant au devenir de la sécurité en Europe. Les images de détresse des réfugiés albanais débarquant sur les côtes orientales de l'Italie et errant dans les rues de Bari

durant l'été de 1991 étaient encore vives dans tous les esprits. L'arrivée au pouvoir d'une dictature militaire dans ce qui était encore l'URSS avait été une réelle possibilité. Le coup d'Etat du mois d'août n'avait-il pas presque réussi ? La perspective d'autres tentatives n'était-elle pas réaliste ? La situation en Yougoslavie était, de même, loin d'être rassurante. La question des minorités ethniques ou nationales, latente à travers tous les Balkans, atteignait un sommet paroxysmatique dans ce pays. L'Europe n'était-elle pas en train de découvrir, au sud, dans son bas ventre, une situation similaire à celle du Liban ?

* * *

Tout comme les Balkans furent, à un point donné de l'histoire, considérés comme une source potentielle de guerre pour l'Europe, la situation yougoslave peut contenir des germes de fragmentation et de conflits qui pourraient se propager sur les vents du mécontentement politique et des tribulations économiques à la région entière voire à toute l'Europe.

Les combats ont commencé après la proclamation de l'indépendance de la Slovénie et de la Croatie, le 25 juin 1991.¹ Le cessez-le-feu de Brioni du 7 juillet 1991 - qui avait été négocié avec l'intervention de la Communauté Européenne et dans lequel les deux républiques acceptaient d'ajourner la mise en oeuvre effective de la proclamation de leur indépendance jusqu'au 7 octobre 1991 - a été rompu presque aussitôt et la bataille s'est intensifiée, particulièrement dans les territoires croates de la Slavonie et à Krajina, le long des frontières de la Croatie et de la Bosnie.²

Le 27 août 1991, la Communauté européenne, par l'entremise du Conseil européen, déclarait :

La Communauté et ses Etats membres ne peuvent pas rester indifférents face à l'augmentation journalière de la violence et à ses conséquences qui se développent chaque jour en Croatie. Un accord sur le contrôle du cessez-le-feu et le maintien de celui-ci doit permettre à la Communauté et ses Etats membres de convoquer une Conférence de paix et de mettre en oeuvre une procédure d'arbitrage.

Trois principes de base devaient guider les travaux de cette Conférence : aucun changement unilatéral des frontières par la force; le respect et la protection des droits de tous ceux qui vivent en Yougoslavie, y compris les minorités; et le besoin de prendre en considération tous les aspirations et intérêts légitimes.³

Comment, toutefois, organiser une conférence sur l'avenir de la Yougoslavie sans le règlement de questions plus immédiates, telles que l'établissement et le contrôle d'un cessez-le-feu effectif ? Comment, au surplus, l'organiser sans le consentement de toutes les parties concernées ? Cette conférence n'était-elle pas vouée à l'échec dès le départ ? Une tâche

¹ La Macédoine a proclamé son indépendance le 15 septembre 1991. Un référendum a eu lieu le 8 septembre 1991, avec 95% des votants favorables à l'indépendance. La Bosnie-Herzégovine a proclamé son indépendance le 3 mars 1992, après qu'un référendum ait eu lieu le 1 mars 1992, qui vit 99% des électeurs voter en faveur de l'indépendance. Le Monténégro, qui avait également organisé un référendum le 1 mars 1992, a voté en faveur de l'Union avec la Serbie.

² Le 10 juillet 1991, après l'accord de Brioni, la Communauté européenne a envoyé une équipe multinationale d'observation forte de 30 à 50 personnes, avec l'accord qu'elle pourrait être déployée en Croatie à une période ultérieure, en cas de nécessité. Le 2 août la Communauté européenne a essayé d'étendre la mission d'observation à la Croatie. Les observateurs européens ont été envoyés dans les zones de combat, en Croatie, le 11 septembre 1991, ramenant ainsi le nombre total des observateurs à approximativement 200 en janvier 1992.

³ Cf. les déclarations de la Communauté européenne du 3 et du 19 septembre 1991.

impossible n'avait-elle pas été confiée au Président de la Conférence sur la Paix en Yougoslavie, Lord Carrington ?

Au surplus, de profondes divergences existaient à l'intérieur de la Communauté européenne au sujet de la crise yougoslave, aussi bien quant à la question de la reconnaissance qu'à celle de l'intervention. Pour ce qui est de la première, il peut être rappelé qu'à l'ouverture de la Conférence, le 7 septembre 1991, le Ministre Allemand des Affaires étrangères avait averti qu'en cas d'échec de la Conférence, l'Allemagne reconnaîtrait immédiatement la Croatie et la Slovénie en tant qu'Etats indépendants et souverains.⁴ La Communauté européenne décida le 16 décembre 1991 que l'examen de la question de la reconnaissance aurait lieu le 15 janvier 1992. Un certain nombre de conditions avaient été définies, et il avait été convenu que les demandes de reconnaissance seraient examinées par la Commission d'Arbitrage. Cette Commission d'Arbitrage avait été créée afin d'assister la Conférence sur la Yougoslavie, et chargée plus particulièrement d'examiner les questions constitutionnelles et juridiques relatives à la dissolution de la Yougoslavie.⁵

Concernant cette dernière, il faut rappeler que certains recommandaient le déploiement d'une force tampon européenne, voire préféraient une intervention active avec une force de maintien de la paix ou même d'établissement de la paix de l'UEO, tandis que d'autres inclinaient vers une attitude plus prudente. Ces derniers mettaient en avant le fait que seul un objectif politique clair accompagné d'une invitation de toutes les parties en faveur de l'intervention pouvait justifier le déploiement de forces européennes. Les violations répétées des différents cessez-le-feu que la Communauté européenne avait réussi à négocier étaient de mauvais augure à cet égard. Dans l'immédiat, il était impératif que le conflit ne s'étende pas aux pays voisins. L'endiguement devenait ainsi le mot de passe, l'ordre du jour.

Les discussions dans le cadre de la Communauté européenne, de la CSCE ou de l'UEO, n'ont abouti à aucun résultat décisif. Un accord sur des mesures économiques limitées couvrant toute la Yougoslavie a certes été conclu par la Communauté européenne le 8 novembre 1991. Du fait de la nature même de ces mesures, leur effet ne pouvait être immédiat.⁶

Les Nations Unies ont été saisies de la question de la Yougoslavie le 25 septembre 1991. Par sa résolution 713 (1991), le Conseil de sécurité exprimait son soutien aux efforts des instances européennes et imposait un embargo général sur les armes pour la Yougoslavie. Le

⁴ Une reconnaissance à laquelle l'Allemagne procède dès le 25 décembre 1991 et la Communauté européenne le 15 janvier 1992.

⁵ La Commission d'Arbitrage, présidé par Robert Badinter, rendra publics ses avis sur les demandes de reconnaissance le 15 janvier 1992. Elle conseille la reconnaissance de la Sloveenie, la Macédoine et la Croatie (sous certaines conditions). Toutefois la Commission a considéré que les conditions pour la reconnaissance de la Bosnie-Herzégovine n'étaient pas encore réunies. La Communauté européenne procédera à la reconnaissance de la Croatie et de la Slovénie le 15 janvier 1992. Sous la pression grecque, elle repousse toutefois la reconnaissance de la Macédoine à plus tard. La position grecque semble reposer sur la crainte qu'une république indépendante de Macédoine pourrait, même malgré une déclaration contraire, revendiquer le territoire de la province grecque de Macédoine.

⁶ Les mesures incluses étaient les suivantes : la suspension de l'application et la décision de terminer le traité de commerce et de coopération avec la Yougoslavie; la restauration des quotas pour les textiles; l'exclusion de la Yougoslavie de la liste des pays bénéficiaires du Système Général de Préférences; la suspension formelle des bénéfices accordés par le programme PHARE. La Communauté européenne a invité le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies à prendre des mesures afin d'imposer un embargo pétrolier. Un tel embargo ne sera, néanmoins, jamais instauré. Le seul embargo décrété par le Conseil de sécurité concerne l'équipement militaire et l'armement. (Résolution 713 (1991) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies du 25 septembre 1991, paragraphe 6.) L'embargo est renforcé par la Résolution 724 (1991) du Conseil de sécurité du 14 décembre 1991, paragraphe 5; et réaffirmé dans la résolution 727 (1991) du 9 janvier 1992, paragraphe 6.

cessez-le-feu recherché n'entra cependant pas en vigueur, pas plus que l'idée d'envoyer une force d'urgence ne reçut de soutien.⁷

Le 8 octobre 1991, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies désigna Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, ex-Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, comme son Envoyé Personnel. Monsieur Vance effectua plusieurs missions en Yougoslavie et négocia un cessez-le-feu signé à Genève le 23 novembre 1991. Il élaborait aussi un concept et un plan pour une opération de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies en Yougoslavie. Bien que l'accord de cessez-le-feu n'ait pas été respecté et que des offensives de dernière minute aient été lancées, un texte a été signé le 2 janvier 1992 à Sarajevo, pour effectivement mettre en oeuvre l'accord de cessez-le-feu signé le 23 novembre 1991. Le conflit paraissait arrivé au point d'épuisement. Rien de plus ne pouvait être gagné par le combat.

Face à l'échec évident des efforts européens et face à la fatigue des protagonistes, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies décida, le 21 février 1992, suivant la proposition du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies d'envoyer enfin une force de maintien de la paix de quelques 14.000 hommes en Yougoslavie.⁸ Entretemps, après plus de 8 mois de guerre, un nombre estimé de 600.000 personnes avaient été déplacées et quelques 10.000 tués.

Le but de l'opération de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies est de créer les conditions de paix et de sécurité requises pour la négociation d'un règlement global de la crise yougoslave. Cette négociation devrait avoir lieu dans le cadre de la Conférence sur la Yougoslavie qui se déroule sous l'égide de la Communauté européenne. Contrairement à la pratique, le Commandement général de l'opération des Nations Unies a été remis au Commandant de la Force et non à un chef civil de mission, comme initialement envisagé. La raison mise en avant est qu'il fallait clairement marquer et distinguer d'un côté le rôle de maintien de la paix des Nations-Unies, et de l'autre le rôle de créateur ou réalisateur de la paix de la Communauté européenne.

* * *

Au moment de la Conférence de Rhodes l'échec de la formule européenne pour résoudre la situation yougoslave n'était pas encore pleinement consommé. Mais de sombres perspectives étaient déjà apparentes.

La Yougoslavie peut, à plus d'un titre, être considérée comme un concentré, non seulement des problèmes de l'Europe du Sud-Est, mais aussi de la relation entre la région et l'Europe toute entière. Maints auteurs ont déjà souligné la nature archaïque des conflits entre les minorités en Yougoslavie. Le danger de l'isolation complète a été peut-être moins mis en avant. Il constitue toutefois probablement le plus grand danger auquel la Yougoslavie doit faire face, et au-delà de la Yougoslavie, toute la région des Balkans.

En effet, contrairement à la période d'après-guerre, aucune des Grandes Puissances et certainement pas les Etats-Unis ou la Russie n'ont à présent d'intérêts directs dans la région. Ni la Yougoslavie, ni l'Europe du Sud-Est ne sont aujourd'hui la "poudrière" de l'Europe. Le

⁷ Pour les références des documents pertinents des Nations Unies, voir Annexe.

⁸ Voir la résolution 743 (1992) du Conseil de sécurité par laquelle il est décidé d'établir une Force de Protection des Nations Unies (FORPRONU), pour une période initiale de 12 mois. La Force est déployée pour créer les conditions de paix et de sécurité requises pour la négociation d'un règlement global de la crise yougoslave. La Force doit comporter un effectif global de 13.870 personnel militaire et de police, plus 519 membres formant la composante civile. Cf. le rapport du Secrétaire général, *Op.cit.* note 6.

dépassement de la division Est-Ouest prohibe un tel rôle. La plus grande menace pour l'Europe du Sud-Est émane de la région elle-même. C'est une menace qui se nourrit de vieilles divisions historiques et religieuses, une menace qui se drape en déterminisme historique. Quand on considère le passé récent ou plus lointain, cette région semble en effet avoir été dotée d'un prodigieux héritage dans ce domaine. Mis à part un demi de siècle de communisme, des auteurs mettent actuellement de manière plus insistante l'accent sur les traditions religieuses et orthodoxes de la région et sur le fait que ni la Renaissance, ni la Réforme, ni la Révolution Industrielle n'ont jamais réellement pris racine dans cette partie de l'Europe. Le faible niveau de développement de l'Etat Nation et de la société civile est également souligné.⁹

Est-il possible de parler d'unité et de cohésion dans une région où après tout deux Etats étaient membres du Pacte de Varsovie, où un Etat faisait partie du mouvement des non-alignés, où deux Etats sont membres de l'OTAN, et où un Etat est inclassable dans l'un de ces groupements politiques, existants ou défunts ? Le lien commun entre les membres de la région, même s'il est réel et peut être observé par les chercheurs et universitaires de la région, est donc très négativement chargé.

En fait, on pourrait dire que les Balkans ne constituent pas véritablement une région, mais plutôt un regroupement de préoccupations bilatérales. D'un côté, en effet, la région semble être définie à travers des contentieux bilatéraux. Les six Etats de la région ont au moins une, sinon plusieurs, pommes de discorde avec chacun de leurs voisins. Il n'y pas de réelle communauté positive entre les pays de la région. De l'autre, il peut même être avancé que la puissance des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est est de nature plus accidentelle et résiduelle qu'originelle, en ce sens que les éléments de puissance résident en dehors de la région. Là encore, le cas de la Yougoslavie en est une illustration poignante. La Seconde Guerre Mondiale et la partition de l'Europe en Est et Ouest qui a suivi ont permis au Maréchal Tito de fédérer et ensuite d'unir les différentes républiques constituantes de la Yougoslavie. Une des conditions de sa viabilité était, toutefois, le non-alignement sur l'un ou l'autre des blocs. La Yougoslavie en tant que trait d'union était une option viable. La situation en Yougoslavie ne devint-elle pas lentement mais inexorablement impossible après la mort du Maréchal Tito et après une tendance à un alignement rampant sur le bloc soviétique ? De même, les Balkans n'ont-ils pas implosé dès lors que leur fonction de trait d'union entre l'Est et l'Ouest n'était plus nécessaire ? A cet égard, les développements parallèles en Yougoslavie et en URSS sont éclatants, les événements dans les deux pays avaient un effet de miroir.

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Les rapports présentés à la Conférence ont été organisés autour de quatre grands thèmes, correspondant aux quatre séances de la Conférence. La Partie I est consacrée à l'évolution du

⁹ Voir à cet égard, la thèse de Krystof Pomian, historien et philosophe, Directeur de recherche au CRNS, Paris. Voir son ouvrage *L'Europe et ses Nations*, Paris, Gallimard, et son interview dans le quotidien français, *Libération*, 10 janvier 1992, pp.23-24. Voir aussi l'interview avec le géographe français Michel Foucher dans *Le Monde* du 7 mai 1991. Suivant ces thèses, l'Europe est divisée en deux zones - non l'Europe Occidentale d'une part et l'Europe Centrale et Orientale de l'autre - mais entre l'Europe de l'Ouest et Centrale d'une part et l'Europe de l'Est de l'autre. Cette division, d'un point de vue religieux, correspond aux zones dominées respectivement par l'Eglise Latine, Catholique Romaine et l'Eglise Orthodoxe grecque. Cette ligne est tracée de la Mer Blanche au Nord jusqu'à l'Adriatique. Elle laisse la plus grande partie de la Finlande, les Républiques Baltes, une petite partie de la Biélorussie, la Pologne, la République Fédérale Tchèque et Slovaque, la Hongrie, la Transylvanie (en Roumanie), la Slovénie et la Croatie à l'Ouest.

contexte de la sécurité de l'Europe du Sud-Est ; la Partie II examine l'état actuel de la sécurité des pays du sud-est européen ; la Partie III traite des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est et des négociations et accords de désarmement et de limitation des armements ; la Partie IV passe enfin en revue les propositions de coopération entre les pays sud-est européens en matière de sécurité. Les remarques conclusives ont été présentées par *Serge Sur*, Directeur adjoint de l'UNIDIR.

La discussion de la première séance, qui traitait de l'évolution du contexte de la sécurité de l'Europe du Sud-Est a été précédée par la présentation de trois rapports. Le premier, présenté par *Miodrag Mihajlovic*, ancien Ministre Plénipotentiaire du Secrétariat Fédéral des Affaires Etrangères de la Yougoslavie, porte sur les changements internes dans les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est ; le deuxième rapport, par l'Ambassadeur *Traian Chebeleu* du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Roumanie, examine l'attitude des Etats-Unis et de l'URSS envers la région ; enfin, le troisième rapport, présenté par *Franz-Lothar Altmann*, Directeur-adjoint du *Süd-Ost Europa Institut* à Munich, Allemagne, traite de l'impact des organisations européennes existantes sur la région.

Les discussions ont naturellement été grandement influencées par la situation en Yougoslavie. Ici, comme dans la réalité, de vifs débats ont suivi. La mosaïque des minorités ethniques ou nationales revendiquant des parties de territoires spécifiques à l'intérieur des Etats, ou appartenant au territoire de plusieurs de ces Etats, fait beaucoup penser à une époque révolue, celle de l'entre deux guerres, voire à l'époque antérieure au Traité de Versailles. Les différents rapports présentés à la Conférence et publiés dans ce volume soulignent très clairement ce point, c'est-à-dire le caractère en définitive territorial des conflits des minorités.

Pour ce qui est de l'attitude des Etats-Unis et de l'URSS (Russie) envers cette région, il a été observé que la diminution de l'intérêt pour la région, tant de la part de l'URSS (Russie), que des Etats-Unis, était tout autant une chance qu'une malchance : une chance parce que ce ne sont plus des éléments étrangers à la région qui définissent les relations entre Etats concernés ; une malchance parce que ce déclin souligne la position marginale et possiblement isolée de la région, non seulement au niveau global mais aussi européen.

Le déclin de l'intérêt de la région pour les Etats-Unis n'est toutefois que partiel. En effet, son regard présentement centré sur le Golfe Persique et sur le Moyen Orient fait ressortir l'importance, du point de vue de la sécurité, de ses relations avec l'un des pays des Balkans - à savoir la Turquie. De même, il a été souligné que le déclin de l'intérêt de la Russie dans la région n'était que temporaire et qu'il n'était dicté que par la terrible situation économique de ce pays ; tôt ou tard la Russie retrouverait ses intérêts naturels dans la région. Ce dernier fait pourrait peut-être expliquer la quasi-unanimité par laquelle une organisation telle que l'OTAN a été saluée, tout particulièrement parmi les pays membres de l'ex-Pacte de Varsovie. Le succès de l'OTAN est, bien sûr, également attribué à l'échec des institutions purement européennes face à la situation yougoslave. A cet égard, la CSCE, en particulier, a montré ses limites. La nécessité de définir un nouvel ordre du jour politique pour cette institution pan-européenne n'en est que plus manifeste.

L'état critique de la situation économique des Etats de la région a été maintes fois souligné. Les grands écarts entre les développements économiques, entre les pays de la région eux-mêmes ainsi qu'avec les pays occidentaux, voire certains pays d'Europe centrale, ne peuvent que créer tensions et frustrations. La primauté des facteurs économiques dans la définition du contexte de la sécurité de l'Europe du Sud-Est donne ainsi de nouveau crédit, avec l'une de ces tournures ironiques dont l'histoire est friande, à l'un des préceptes de base de Marx.

La seconde et la troisième séances se sont penchées non seulement sur les changements globaux des postures militaires et des doctrines, mais aussi sur les aspects moins connus et sub-régionaux de l'équation de sécurité dans la région. Dans les deux sessions, les aspects non militaires de la sécurité, particulièrement celles relatives au développement de la démocratie, des droits de l'homme et de l'environnement, ont été soulignés.

Trois rapports ont été présentés à la seconde séance, durant laquelle était examiné l'état actuel de la sécurité. *George Katsirdakis*, de la Division de Politique et de Planification de l'OTAN, a présenté un rapport sur les postures et doctrines militaires des Etats de la région; le Général *Stoyan Andreev*, Conseiller de sécurité nationale auprès du Président bulgare, a examiné le cas de la Bulgarie, particulièrement sa position à l'égard des alliances militaires; enfin *Nikos Protonotarios*, économiste de défense de l'Institut international des études stratégiques (IISS) de Londres, a présenté un rapport sur la perception des menaces par les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est.

La troisième séance a été consacrée à l'ordre du jour traditionnel et extra-régional du désarmement ainsi qu'aux positions des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est sur ces questions, des rapports ont été présentés par *Ali Karaosmanoglu*, Professeur à l'Université Bilkent d'Ankara, qui a examiné la question des armements conventionnels et en particulier les négociations CSCE et FCE ; *Abdi Baleta*, Membre du Parti démocratique albanais, membre du Parlement, a examiné la question nucléaire ; et l'Ambassadeur *Evgheeni Alexandrov* du Ministère Bulgare des Affaires Etrangères a traité de la question des armements chimiques.

En ce qui concerne les questions plus spécifiques de sécurité militaire, la nécessité d'une transparence accrue a été affirmée comme de première importance, plus particulièrement dans la mesure où la nature et la perception des menaces sont considérées comme étant de plus en plus, voire presque exclusivement de nature intrarégionale.

L'ordre du jour traditionnel du désarmement et de la limitation des armements a été considéré comme une priorité moins importante. Il reste à voir si cela peut être expliqué par des facteurs objectifs propres à l'équation de sécurité de la région, ou si cela n'est que l'illustration d'une tendance plus générale. Il semble en effet se développer un courant plus large, qui tend à délaïsser cette approche classique, l'élaboration d'accords spécifiques et singuliers, en faveur de l'élaboration de régimes plus généraux de limitation et de restriction d'armements. Cette observation est vraie non seulement pour le domaine nucléaire mais aussi pour le domaine des armements biologiques ou chimiques. Les régimes de contrôle en la matière comprennent de plus en plus non seulement des traités de caractère formel à vocation universelle mais aussi des accords de nature régionale, bilatérale ou partielle, ainsi que des actions plus informelles, établissant non pas des obligations bien définies mais des codes ou suggestions de conduite. La question des armements tend ainsi à être de plus en plus considérée dans un contexte plus général de sécurité internationale. La prévention et la gestion des crises ont alors une importance plus immédiate. On est en présence ou bien de situations relevant du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies - actions à l'égard de menaces contre la paix, violations de la paix et des actes d'agression, ou bien des situations relevant du Chapitre VIII et supposant l'intervention d'organisations régionales ou des arrangements régionaux.

Durant la dernière session, les formes intrarégionale de coopération ont été examinées. *Duygu Sezer*, Professeur à l'Université Bilkent d'Ankara, a présenté un rapport sur la coopération régionale ; *Théodore Couloumbis*, Secrétaire général de l'ELIAMEP et Professeur à l'Université d'Athènes a présenté un rapport sur la coopération bilatérale. Enfin,

Corneliu Vlad, Rédacteur en chef de la rubrique étrangère du quotidien roumain *Romania Libera* a présenté un rapport sur les mesures de confiance, de sécurité et de stabilité.

Il a été souligné que les Etats de la région ont toujours activement soutenu des projets de coopération régionale, même à l'apogée de la Guerre Froide. Aucun de ces efforts intrarégionaux, n'a eu, toutefois, beaucoup de succès, probablement parce qu'il n'y a jamais eu une réelle communauté d'intérêts. Peut-être, aussi, avaient-ils primordialement des objectifs bilatéraux et visaient-ils à contrôler les revendications territoriales des différentes minorités nationales. Il a été souligné qu'il était nécessaire de renforcer les relations intrarégionales et que des mesures régionales de confiance pourraient produire des résultats bénéfiques. L'accent a également été mis sur l'importance primordiale de l'intégration de la région dans une sphère européenne plus vaste notamment la Communauté Européenne, pour son potentiel économique, et l'OTAN, pour son potentiel de sécurité. Le relatif peu de confiance exprimé à l'égard du mécanisme de la CSCE peut être compris à la lumière d'un sentiment plus général : la fin de la Guerre Froide ne marque-t-elle pas d'une certaine manière la fin du processus de la CSCE ? Elle illustre tout au moins que l'époque de l'après-guerre froide pose un sérieux défi à la CSCE. Pour qu'elle constitue un mécanisme significatif et effectif, un nouvel ensemble d'objectifs et de moyens doit être défini.

Cette question ainsi que les tentatives vacillantes des institutions européennes en vue de régler la crise yougoslave sont plus amplement élaborées par Serge Sur dans les remarques conclusives. La nature et le caractère de la région comme sa position de zone de contact avec d'autres régions et civilisations y sont également soulignés. La marginalisation de cette région est un danger réel. En effet, si les pays concernés n'arrivent pas à mettre un terme à leurs contentieux bilatéraux, ils pourraient provoquer des politiques d'abstention, de retrait voire de quarantaine de la part des puissances extérieures, créant ainsi ce qu'on pourrait appeler un "trou noir balkanique" qui pourrait ensuite engloutir et détruire tous les espoirs d'Helsinki et de la Charte de Paris. Comme il a été souligné durant toute la Conférence, l'avenir de l'Europe du Sud-Est est d'abord entre les mains des pays balkaniques eux-mêmes.

Mars 1992

Annexe

Documents des Nations Unies concernant la situation en Yougoslavie

Pour les différentes Résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies voir :

- Résolution 713 (1991) - 25 septembre 1991 - décide de l'installation d'un embargo sur les armements ;
- Résolution 721 (1991) - 27 novembre 1991 - demande aux parties yougoslaves de se conformer à l'accord signé le 23 novembre 1991 à Genève (*i.e.* le cessez-le-feu inconditionnel) et au Secrétaire général de soumettre des propositions pour l'établissement possible d'une opération de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies en Yougoslavie ;
- Résolution 724 (1991)- 14 décembre 1991 - renforce l'embargo sur les armements et approuve le rapport du Secrétaire général (S/23280) du 11 décembre, contient *i.a.* un concept et un plan opérationnel pour une opération de maintien de la paix ;
- Résolution 727 (1992) - 8 janvier 1992 - note avec satisfaction la signature de l'accord de la mise en oeuvre des accords de Sarajevo du 2 janvier 1992 concernant les modalités pour l'application du cessez-le-feu inconditionnel du 23 novembre 1991, et endosse l'envoi de 50 officiers de liaison militaire ;
- Résolution 740 (1992) - 7 février 1992- approuve l'accroissement de l'effectif de la mission de liaison militaire à 75;
- Résolution 743 (1992) - 21 février - l'établissement de la FORPRONU.

Parmi les rapports pertinents du Secrétaire général, voir :

- S/23169 - 25 octobre 1991 - rapport sur la première mission de Mr. Vance, envoyé personnel du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies ;
- S/23239 - 24 novembre 1991 - rapport de la troisième mission de Mr. Vance (le rapport de la deuxième mission a été fait à huis-clos) , contenant *i.a.* en annexe le texte du cessez-le-feu de Genève du 23 novembre 1991 ;
- S/23280 - 11 décembre 1991 - rapport sur la quatrième mission de Mr. Vance et contenant *i.a.* en annexe le texte du plan pour les opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies;
- S/23363 - 5 janvier 1992 - Rapport de la cinquième mission de Mr. Vance, contenant *i.a.* en annexe l'accord de mise en oeuvre des accords de Sarajevo du 2 janvier 1992 ;
- S/23513 - 5 février 1992 - rapport sur la situation en Yougoslavie ;
- S/23592 et Add.1 - 15 février au 19 février 1992 - rapport sur la situation en Yougoslavie et contenant quelques modifications en ce qui concerne le plan de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies et un appel au Conseil de sécurité afin qu'il donne des instructions au Secrétaire général de procéder au déploiement des forces de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies.

N.B.

Le périodique *Review of International Affairs/Revue des Affaires Internationales* (Belgrade) a publié régulièrement les différents documents des Nations Unies, de la CSCE, de la CE, de la Conférence sur la Yougoslavie, de la Commission d'Arbitrage et les déclarations des différentes Républiques.

Part I

Evolution of the South-East European Security Context

Chapter 1

Internal Changes in South-East European Countries

Miodrag Mihajlovic

The breaking of the Berlin Wall was the dramatic symbol of a new, profoundly different era in Europe. That day, November 9, 1989, was the day when the question for Europe changed from how to maintain a divided and hostile peace to how to organize a new, inclusive continental system.

The Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the States participating in the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Paris in November 1990 marked the beginning of a new phase in European relations.

The Charter of Paris for a new Europe declared the end of the era of confrontation and division in Europe (the Cold War era) and the beginning of new relations which would be founded on respect and co-operation. It announced the beginning of a new phase of stabilization and consolidation of relations in Europe, which from the very start appears to be more complicated and difficult to realize than it appeared to be at the time in Paris.

Europe is now going through a period of adaptation and oscillation. As a result of the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, there are currently three distinctive and parallel processes going on in Europe and which will no doubt have many consequences for the future of the continent:

- Western Europe is continuing the process of integration at a much faster pace than before and acquiring a gradually more significant political, economic and security role;
- Eastern Europe is disintegrating, and
- Germany is united.

Some of the changes, although expected to be long rather than short-term goals - such as the unification of Germany - have come much more rapidly than expected and have come as a surprise even to the two German nations.

The unification of Germany deserves a separate analysis because of the many important social, economic and political changes and consequences it is bringing to Europe and the world. In this connection it should be noted that, while all Europe is being divided and separated, it is only Germany which is uniting. There are growing opinions in Europe that this could lead not only to the homogenisation of German people, but also to new polarisation on the old continent.

There is a correlation between the internal changes and developments in the USSR and those in Europe. Political changes in 1989 shifted the Eastern European region's six former Soviet allies away from the East and closer to the West. Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe has ceased to exist. All these countries are now independent and embrace the concepts of democracy, a market economy and free enterprise. The Central European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and what used to be East Germany) have already instituted democratic institutions. Farther to the South, in the Balkans - in Bulgaria, Romania and especially Albania - democracy has yet to be won. Yugoslavia is a case in itself, undergoing very painful changes as a result of democratic processes, but also as a result of the awakening

of old ethnic struggles and the reliance on the use of arms and nationalist terrorist actions by strong separatist and nationalist movements.

The process of the economic and partial political integration of Western Europe moves in parallel with the process of disintegration in the East. This process of disintegration is, however, gradually being transformed into a process of closer relationships with Western European countries through their association with economic and political structures of the West.

East-Central Europe is absorbed in an ardent and arduous search for a new identity. The euphoria of 1989 has given way to a painful awakening. Time has become the crucial factor. There is little controversy over the long-term future of Europe, over guarantees of peace and co-operation, over the goal of achieving some kind of European confederation someday. The difficult questions concern the interim period of transformation, which is going to be painful and risky as grievances mount and patience erodes, as demagogues rise to make use of new freedoms to exploit nationalism. The short-term problems are more easily identified, although massively difficult to solve, but they too could be faced with more confidence if there were a sense that the way ahead were charted. Actually, as we speak, there are no clear and positive indicators of the way events may turn out either in the Soviet Union or in Yugoslavia.

There are certain contradictions among the points that need to be taken into account. In the words of Flora Lewis:

Countries of what is coming to be called East-Central Europe have various needs in common, but to organize the region on that basis would perniciously serve to perpetuate the Cold War division. These must be transcended. The Soviet Union is qualitatively and quantitatively different from Eastern Europe. Even if it breaks up, Russia alone is a huge Euro-Asian power and will not fit as an equal among European peers. It cannot be excluded, but it can hardly be included as just another member of the family. Germany will acquire an awesome weight that must somehow be bounded and distributed so as not to crush its partners. The US role will shift as military power loses importance; security will remain an important issue, though its parameters will be redefined. No single design can encompass all this, but the elements must be linked. ("Bringing in the East", *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1990)

High expectations among many people have been replaced by confusion, divisions and disappointments. The effort to create democratic systems and a new base for national security are inextricably intertwined.

There is confusion because the struggle is now being waged within the ranks of those who have won the battle against former communist governments. Wherever the communist governments submitted to the popular will and lost, new divisions have come to impede the work of some of the freely-elected, non-communist Governments. In Poland, for example, the impressive unity of Solidarity is gone. With pressure for Slovak autonomy rapidly growing, Czechoslovakia has already renamed itself the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. In Hungary, there is an intense struggle under way between those whose foremost concern is the fate of millions of ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring countries, especially in Romania, and those whose main priority is the shaping of a political and economic order that Europe will welcome. Election results, both in Bulgaria and Romania, reveal a divergence between city-dwellers who voted against the communists and the rural population who returned them to power. In Yugoslavia, two of its Federal Republics - Slovenia and Croatia - have made one-sided and illegal secessionist declarations, have abolished the federal Constitution and Laws

and have created national paramilitary armed forces which are used against the Yugoslav army in Slovenia and against the ethnic Serbian minority in Croatia.

The confusion and division have sparked disappointment as well. Anxious and impatient people in Eastern Europe now ask: was not the new democratic order supposed to be economically advantageous, politically harmonious and morally uplifting? Must the transition be as slow and as painful as it is? Will it be better only for the next generation, or perhaps for the generation after that?

In the new East-Central Europe of 1990, competitive and, in most cases, free elections have been held, parliamentary institutions created, and freedom of religion and the press established. The very slow pace of economic change reflects anxiety about some of the effects of the transfer to a market economy namely, unemployment, inflation, and declining living standards.

One thing is certain in my mind. Europe of yesterday, very tranquil and pleased with itself, will no longer be the same after the breaking of the Berlin Wall and the Paris Conference. To my mind, Europe is entering a very difficult period. Unwillingly, many "Pandora's Boxes" have been opened. Many old and some new grievances have come to the surface. Many little flames have started to burn and threaten to spread all over Europe. Security in Europe is not on very solid ground, and can easily be disrupted. Great caution and wisdom are required when offering solutions for many European problems. Serious mistakes could be made if solutions are founded on bases of inequality of peoples and nations, if favouritism is shown on the basis of religion, or the old divisions of East and West. The experience of two World Wars, both of which started in Europe, should serve as a warning that Europe is a very fertile ground for any dangerous seeds to be planted there.

- I -

For four decades, the West had two objectives in its policies towards communist Eastern Europe. First, it sought to encourage polycentric tendencies in order to weaken the Soviet bloc in general and the Warsaw Pact in particular. It seems, however, that the West was not aware of the many unwanted consequences such policies could bring, nor was it ready to face them so soon and so dramatically. Second, the West also sought the emergence of a politically democratic régime where human rights would be respected. With Moscow's retreat from Eastern Europe, the first objective has been accomplished and Western security enhanced.

Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact in the last three years ran parallel with the social and political changes in the Eastern European countries. These changes were generated by the policy of *perestroika* in the USSR, and produced a qualitatively different relationship between member countries on the political as well as on the military level. Therefore, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as of the 1st July, 1991 is only the final act in the departure from the historical scene of one of the two military blocs. This fact, in addition to all the other positive changes in Eastern Europe and in the world as a whole, calls into question the justification, *i.e.* the reasons, for the existence of the other military bloc.

On the agenda for the 1990s is the second objective: democracy and the shaping of new national security policies for Eastern European countries.

One of the key factors of the present European political scene is a parallel process of rationalizing *perestroika* and incorporating it into the basic national and state interests of the USSR, and the strengthening of the political, economic and military positions of the USA and Western Europe. The latter is one of the main reasons for Moscow's reevaluation of its

foreign policy. It has become obvious that the balance of power has been shifted to its disadvantage, contrary to its expectations. The Gulf victory, as well as the widening of the internal crisis in the USSR and the weakening of its international position, are tempting the American administration to exploit the situation to the maximum in order to strengthen its key role in contemporary international relations. The pursuit of such a policy, if not checked in time, could be counterproductive, mainly from the point of view of the strengthening of conservative and anti-American forces in the USSR and in other parts of the world. Furthermore, the rather quick disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance could also present destabilizing factors, if used to exploit the USSR's disadvantage and as a means of pressure.

Contrary to early and more hopeful judgments about Europe's future, the recent political-military transformations - and especially the situation in Yugoslavia - indicate that the security needs of the states of the Continent have grown, not diminished.

The threat is no longer the much-feared invasion of Western Europe by the East; it is instead the pre-Cold War, precommunist, traditional, and far more subtle challenge of European instability. The issues have to do with the fragmentation of old alliances, with the incalculability of how the two most powerful European countries - the Soviet Union and Germany - will behave under new circumstances, in the absence of a new security order, and with the prospect of rising nationalist and ethnic passions in the Balkans and many other parts of Europe. The challenges now facing Europe and Eastern Europe in particular are more complex than they were in the recent past.

One of the major destabilizing factors concerning the present situation in Europe is the growth of nationalism and national divisions in the USSR, Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia. Therefore, the major threat to European peace and security is not the possibility of confrontation along the classic divide between East and West, or, more precisely, between the USSR and the USA, but in the widening of internal differences due to the renewal of national and state aspirations which the Eastern or Southern European countries inherited from the period between the two World Wars.

Western Europe is faced with the difficulty of realizing its political determination to get rid of the "socialist inheritance" and to break the military-political ties between the Eastern European countries and the USSR, and its inability to satisfy the great expectations of Eastern European populations for quick integration into the economic and political structures of Western Europe. Such integration entails a very complex process of adjusting the changed international status of the Eastern European countries to the already-defined and organized Western European group of countries and their joint political structures and institutions.

The most difficult problem in organizing the new shape of Europe is to find a place for the Soviet Union. Whatever emerges from the new decentralizing, federalizing movement gaining momentum in the Soviet Union, however many republics may break off, it will remain a great Euro-Asian country, a nuclear weapon superpower State.

While on one side there are interactive processes going on in Western Europe, breaking the existing cultural, political and economic barriers on the continent (which will hopefully be crowned in 1992 with Western European unification), on the other side, the Eastern European countries, which have broken their one-party political monopoly, are beginning the process of democratization and the creation of political pluralism and market economies. Naturally, these processes have to be compatible with the European integration trend.

However, the cohesive role in Eastern European countries is being played, in almost every case, by growing nationalism, which appears to be much stronger and more vital than

their initial democratic achievements. The most distinct phenomenon among the changes occurring in former communist states is SEPARATISM. But this is also a phenomenon within a phenomenon. Each of these separatisms actually consists of two separatisms. One is regional in relation to the central state, and the other is local in relation to the region. This applies particularly to the federal states, where the existence of nationalist and separatist authoritarianism is very visible and pronounced. Such is, for example, the case in Moldavia, Lethonia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Such processes in fact run counter to the European political and economic integrative movements. They are also outside of the basic framework of the development of the democratic concept of human rights in Europe. According to this concept, which is at the root of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, at the forefront are the political and other rights of the *individual*, while the nationalist concepts place emphasis not on the sovereign right of an individual but on dependency and obligations of an individual to a collectivity, such as the *nation*, in order to fulfil its national state pretensions. The awakening of nationalism in Eastern Europe can be partly explained by a very prolonged suppression of political rights by a monopolistic ruling party, but its upsurge is nevertheless an anachronism in present-day Europe and can not be easily merged with its contemporary civilization trends.

However, the existing active and dormant separatist volcanoes, which also exist in some Western countries with rich parliamentary democratic traditions, cannot be explained by "prolonged political suppression of a monopolistic ruling party". For example, France, has major nationalist and separatist problems with its Corsican population and with the Basques.

The IRA presents a long-lasting problem for Great Britain, and equally-known in Europe and in the world is the Spanish ETA. Inspired by Slovenian and Croat separatisms, there is another revival of German separatism in the Italian province of Alto Adige, also known as South Tirol.

At a time when the European Community has begun seriously talking of one United Europe, the old continent is suddenly threatened with a number of national divisions, destructive nationalisms and separatisms and mass exoduses for instance, from Albania, an exodus which is nothing compared to those that could follow from other parts of Europe. Instead of a United Europe, the situation could easily lead to the creation of dozens of new small states and midget states, with most of them quarrelling and fighting among themselves and being incapable of independent life and wider integration. Instead of "United Europe" one can very often hear mention of "Regions of Europe".

Growth of nationalism has produced, besides other phenomena, very serious complications in multinational states (the USSR, Yugoslavia, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic) bringing them to the brink of civil-war (*e.g.*, the USSR, Yugoslavia) or war among different states (*e.g.*, Hungary-Romania, Bulgaria-Turkey).

For example, in Croatia, one of the six Federal Republics of Yugoslavia, the Croatian Government changed its Constitution immediately after democratic parliamentary election, thus depriving many among the Serbian population living in Croatia of their equal citizen rights as a nation, which they had enjoyed alongside with Croats for many decades, even during the Austro-Hungarian rule. Croatian authorities have undertaken a number of nationalist and racist measures against the Serbian population, such as creating ethnically-pure police and paramilitary forces, firing Serbs employed in Government services, industry and economy for no reason other than their being Serbian, demanding that Serbs sign a statement of allegiance to the new Croat Government, and forbidding the public use of their language and alphabet as one of the languages used on Croatian territory. These authorities further encouraged a number of terrorist acts against the life and property of Serbs in Croatia, acts

which included blowing up their houses with high explosives, or strafing with machine gun fire Serbian houses situated in mixed villages or city communities on a nightly basis. This is done with the aim of making the Serbs leave the Croatian territory, by employing pressure, terrorist methods and manifesting a high degree of intolerance and hatred against Serbs. As a result, thousands of Serbs, more than 100,000 (at present over 160,000) and many families have been forced to leave their ancestral homes and seek refuge across the Danube in Serbia, as their fathers and mothers did during the Second World War to escape the Croat-Ustashi régime of massacre and terror.

As a consequence of such hostile policy against Serbs in Croatia, some parts in which the majority of the population is Serbian have organized civilian and armed self-defence forces, wishing to avoid repetition of the fate of their families who fell victim to Ustashi mass genocide during the Second World War.

- II -

If the new European structure is to be stable it must include in its ranks an increasingly-prosperous, and therefore an increasingly-democratic, East-Central Europe. As it appears now, security in Europe will be sought in more than just the military realm. Military effort as conceived through the late 1980s is being diminished within Europe. There are plans to significantly cut expensive standing armed forces but at the same time make them more efficient and manoeuvrable.

An important part of the pressure for demilitarizing security comes from the recognition as Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev argued, that "no country has any hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means - for example, by building up a defence, even the most powerful". Redefining security to include economic, environmental, or social considerations is entirely appropriate and overdue. However, the entire Eastern half of Europe is a "threat-rich" environment, composed of weak political entities. Some are stronger than others, and some face fewer or less ominous threats. But the over all characterization is appropriate, that in post-hegemonic and largely post-communist Europe, few capacities are sufficient to deter or defeat emerging threats. The security of former Eastern European States is endangered by many old and new internal threats:

Heterogeneity, especially ethno-nationalism exacerbated by socio-economic and regional disparities

The largest ethnic groups in Bulgaria and Romania make up roughly 80 per cent of the total population, although there is imprecision and debate about the actual size of the Hungarian, Turkish and Gypsy minorities.

Czechs account for less than two-thirds of the total population of Czechoslovakia, while Magyars are more than 90 per cent of Hungary's populace. Nevertheless, these figures do not by themselves suggest the severity of ethnonationalism. Each of the nationalities of East-Central, South-Eastern and Soviet Europe has kindred in surrounding countries -a diaspora ready available for political exploitation. It is often possible for minority ethnic groups to claim that they are denied civil rights or socio-economic opportunities while neighbouring governments use complaints by such groups as a tie to nationalism. Regional disparities that worsened or were not mitigated during the communist period have added fervour to this issue.

Illegal importation of arms, creation of illegal military and paramilitary units, arming of antagonistic national party membership in mixed communities and the waging of armed

attacks against ethnic minorities have become almost a daily feature in some parts of Yugoslavia (Croatia) and the USSR.

Active opposition to the old nomenclature and secret police

Almost everyone previously active in public life (politics, mass organizations, or cultural activities) was linked either to the communist party or to its controlling mechanisms. The intricate intertwining of the communist apparatus and the state has meant that immediately disentangling the two would have necessitated disembowelling the state. Such radical surgery could not take place in Eastern Europe, where some post-communist leaders are being accused of prior co-operation with the communist secret police (East Germany, Bulgaria, Romania and elsewhere).

Questionable loyalty among senior military officers and an uncertain relationship between civil and military authorities

The old symbiotic ties between the communist party and the army have been ruptured, both by the 1989-90 transformation and by popular and budgetary pressures for the demilitarization of society. But wresting control from the groups and institutions that have made such decisions for decades is a substantial and lengthy political procedure.

Antipathy is festering among unemployed workers, demobilized troops, and others whose social welfare expectations have been disrupted by marketization. The abrupt withdrawal of the state from economic activity, coupled with arms reductions, will unleash harsh market "corrections" on a population already exhausted from generations of state socialism. This is a central danger confronting Eastern Europe and the USSR.

Political apathy toward all politicians is manifested by low turnouts in local elections (one to two-thirds in local elections in both Poland and Hungary in 1990), reflecting a suspicion of governmental authority which is believed incapable of resolving ongoing crises. Such an attitude endangers the political legitimacy of any elected government, and opens the door for demagogic and bizarre candidacies.

- III -

In addition to these internal difficulties, which to a greater or lesser degree stand in the way of smooth democratic transformation in Eastern European countries, there exists an ample and growing inventory of external threats:

Germany and Poland

Issues include protection of ownership of national minorities, ownership of properties in Poland once held by German citizens, and a resolution of the two states' conflicting claims about navigation rights in the Baltic. The Bundestag has given assurances about postwar borders, German and Polish leaders signed a bilateral treaty in November 1990 officially recognizing the Oder-Neisse frontier, and a friendship and co-operation Treaty was signed on June 17th, 1991. Today the number of Germans in Poland is a political issue, with the figure swelling as many Poles seek association with the reunified Germany. Figures range from a pre-unification estimate of 50,000 to a current high of 1 million. However, future German-Polish relations are more dependent on current economic realities than on late twentieth-century demography, *i.e.*, politically and economically weak Poland has found itself to be the

neighbour of a state twice as populous and with a gross national product more than six times as large.

Poland and Belarus, the Ukraine and Lithuania

Polish nationalists are unlikely to sit quietly through the 1990's over the territories Poland lost after World War II and the approximately 1.2 million ethnic Poles (according to the 1989 Soviet census) which are scattered throughout the territory of USSR. Similarly, nationalities from the increasingly-independent Soviet republics continue to reject Polish claims while pointing to their own irredenta.

Hungary and Romania

Hungary claims that the 1.5 to 2.3 million ethnic Hungarians in the Romanian territory of Transylvania have been denied economic and political rights. Romania denies this and contends that Hungary is attempting to interfere in Romanian affairs. There are competing historical claims to Transylvania and interpretations of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon that took Transylvania from Hungary.

Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia

It is the question of recognition or non-recognition of the existence of the Macedonian nation(ality) or minority within the borders of these three states that can be easily manipulated, as has been done in the past, to the detriment of their neighbouring relations.

Macedonia is one of the six republics of the federation of Yugoslavia created after the Second World War on the former territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The territory of the present republic of Macedonia was part of the territories liberated after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Some other parts of the Ottoman-occupied territories were at the same time included as part of state territories in Bulgaria and Greece.

Bulgaria has only for a brief period (in its census after the Second World War) recognized the existence within its border of a Macedonian minority, but has long since returned to its position that Macedonians are Bulgarians. It has twice in this century occupied and claimed Macedonia and some other parts of Serbian territory, first as an ally of the Central European powers during the First World War, and second as an ally of Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The Macedonian question also represents a stumbling block in otherwise very good Yugoslav-Greek bilateral relations.

Albania and Yugoslavia

The ethnic Albanian minority makes up approximately 85 per cent of the population of Kosovo and the Metohia region, which is the southern and autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia that borders Albania. According to the last official census in Yugoslavia in April 1991, the Republic of Serbia has 9,721,177 inhabitants and in the Kosovo province an estimated 1,954,747 ethnic Albanians who refused to participate in the census. The total Yugoslav population is 23,475,887 inhabitants.

The central issue in Kosovo and the Metohia region concerns the strong ethnic Albanian separatist movement, assisted by Albania and some other centers abroad, as well as by separatist movements in Yugoslavia, notably Croatia and Slovenia. Albanian separatists aim at the creation of a Great Albania by separating parts of the territory of Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and the Metohia region from Serbia and Yugoslavia. As an initial step there is a request to create a so-called Kosovo Republic, as a second Albanian State in

Europe, which would later be unified with Albania. (It is well known that internationally accepted standards for the protection of minorities apply solely to cultural and religious freedoms and nowhere in Europe, certainly not in Western or Central Europe, do national minorities enjoy territorial administrative autonomy.)

The Albanization of Kosovo and Metohia has gone on uninterrupted, with the result that between 1966 and 1988, some 220,000 Serbs and Montenegrins abandoned their homes in this province, for the most part forced to leave by campaigns of harassment and persecution. The demographic picture of Kosovo and Metohia has radically changed. From the Congress of Berlin in 1878 to 1988, 600,000 Serbs have been expelled from Kosovo and Metohia. During the Second World War and the fascist occupation, 100,000 Serbs and Montenegrins were deported from Kosovo and Metohia, and approximately 10,000 Serbian men, women and children were killed. Albanian citizens from Albania moved into this region and took possession of Serbian farms and houses. At the end of the war in March 1945, the Yugoslav communist authorities banned the return of 1,683 Serbian families to their homes in Kosovo. The figures supplied by the Federal Statistic Office show that the number of Serbs, who before the war made up nearly 50 percent of the Province's population has been steadily declining: from 27.9 percent in 1953, to 27.5 percent in 1961, 20.9 percent in 1971, 14.9 percent in 1981, and down to just 10 percent in 1988. Immigrants from Albania have been settling in Kosovo in unknown numbers, and the legal question of their presence in Yugoslavia has never been raised by the central Government. Another reason for the shrinking percentage of the Serbian and Montenegrin population in the Province is the demographic explosion of the ethnic Albanian population (one of the highest in the world), which can only be understood in the light of the influence of Islam.

Kosovo and Metohia, on the other hand, have never been part of Albania, but its population has, throughout history, been used, manipulated and instigated - first by the Ottoman empire, and later by fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and other separatist and fascist movements in Europe and Yugoslavia (ustashi), as a political tool and as an ally against the independence and territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia.

As the territory of Kosovo and Metohia was once part of the Serbian medieval state and the Serbian empire, whose capital was Prizren, and since Kosovo and Metohia were the cradle of the Serbian nation and Serbian spiritual and political identity, there is an exceptionally large number of historic and cultural monuments located in this area, many of which have been irretrievably destroyed or damaged beyond repair.

Kosovo and Metohia, with its separatist Albanian population, is one of the very dangerous hot beds in Europe which, if not properly checked, can provoke tragic consequences for peace and security in Europe.

Albania has not recognized the existence of Serbian and Montenegrin minorities on its territory, and consequently has not permitted the opening of schools and the use of the Serbian language by these minorities.

Greece and Albania

There are an estimated 350,000 Greeks in Albania, located in an area the Greeks refer to as Northern Epirus, as well as an Albanian minority in Northern Greece. There has recently been a "spontaneous" exodus across the Greek border of a number of ethnic Greeks from Albania, as well as many Albanians. A similar mass exodus of Albanians was also organized, to Italy and other European states. A number of Albanians went to Yugoslavia, as an attempt to ease the internal pressure and social unrest in Albania.

The Soviet Union and Romania

According to a 1989 Soviet census there are within the former Soviet Union approximately 3.3 million "Moldovians" and slightly more than 145,000 people who refer to themselves as Romanian. According to the 1979 census, 85 percent of Soviet Moldovians lived in the republic of that name, and those estimated 2,5 million individuals constituted almost two-thirds of the Moldovian republic's population at that time. Within the Moldovian republic, the ethnic Romanian majority wants independence from Moscow, while nationalists on both sides of the Prut river want a unified Romanian-Moldovian state. Russian and non-Romanian minorities in the republic are against such reunification. There was fighting among ethnic groups in 1990 which necessitated the deployment of Interior Ministry troops.

Bulgaria and Turkey

A very large Turkish minority is concentrated in North-Eastern and South-Eastern Bulgaria. Although estimates vary greatly, at least 10 percent of Bulgaria's 9 million people are Turkish Muslims or Bulgarian Muslims, known as Pomaks. Higher estimates, however, place the total Turk/Pomak population at more than 1,3 million representing 14 percent of the total. There are, moreover, many other, smaller minorities. The former communist régime tried to forcibly assimilate the Turks, which led to violence and police repression, especially in 1984-85 and 1989. The efforts of hundreds of thousands of Turks who fled Bulgaria in 1989 to return and resume their past occupations and claim their possessions are producing severe tensions within Bulgaria. This is an open issue between the Turkish and Bulgarian Governments, and always provokes disputes between the two countries.

Bulgaria and Romania

Territorial disputes between Bulgaria and Romania stem from the divided territory of Dobrudja adjacent to the Black Sea, notably from the unrest of the Bulgarian minority residing in the Romanian portion. These disputes may also have potential long-term difficulties.

- IV -

There is no doubt that these interstate flash points are more dangerous in the 1990s than they have been for decades. Internal threats are as "real" to the new systems of post-communist Europe and the USSR's central or republican governments, as are the threats emanating from other states possibly more so. Imminent armed conflict across state borders is not the daily concern of new governments and leaders. Nevertheless, interstate disputes are real, and political figures utilize these conflicts to enhance their rhetorical appeal, thereby heightening tensions.

For each state's new government, different conditions have already led to divergent national security policies. Nevertheless, there is some uniformity. Countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland see themselves as Western and want to pursue their security by looking away from Moscow. Bulgaria, too, wants to avoid alignment with the USSR or any successor of a Russian-focused union.

Among the remaining non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states in the region, Greece and Turkey are NATO members, and Yugoslavia and Albania are unaffiliated with any military alliance, thus adding to the security mix in Eastern Europe, which is fraught with uncertainties.

In late September 1990, the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland convened at Zakopane, Poland to consider "the role of these states' armed forces under the new conditions". The event was significant because it was the first time a public session among the pact's European members had taken place at which the Soviet representation was specifically excluded.

The first step for former pact members in developing truly national capacities to counter threats is to detach themselves from security linkages with the Soviet Union. Such detachment requires that Soviet Army combat units, technicians and advisers leave. Further steps call for officers within Eastern European armies who have been most associated with the Soviets to retire or move aside and for residual obligations and ties through the Warsaw Pact to be terminated. In addition, national plans call for arms purchases to be diversified, and officer training and education to be indigenous or broadened.

The former Warsaw Pact countries are eagerly seeking bilateral, regional and multilateral security arrangements as a means of enhancing their security and involvement in political and economic institutions that had their origins in post-World War II Western Europe. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland are in the forefront of this effort, in part because they are viewed as having the best chance for a smooth transition to stable democracy (Council of Europe).

Regional security arrangements have also been vigorously pursued. The so called "Pentagonale" - consisting of Austria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia - is one example of alternative groupings that might enhance governmental, systemic or state security. The inaugural meeting, held in Venice in August 1990, included significant overlapping of economic, environmental and human rights interests, with evident concerns for stability in the region.

In the Balkans, a continuation of the Balkan foreign minister's conferences, which began in 1988, led to a meeting in October 1990 in Tirana.

Balkan co-operation has a long and inglorious history, but the current efforts are meant to expand intra-Balkan activities in many areas, including security, although independent of military ties.

Bilateral contacts and *de facto* security guarantees multiplied in 1989 and again in 1990. Romania has renewed pre-World War II ties with the French army and has been discussing possible shipbuilding and training co-operation with the Spanish navy. The defence ministers of Hungary and Romania met in October 1990 to begin a program, which, according to the Romanian side, was "designed to increase trust between the two armies, including mutual checks to ensure that neither side has intentions that are belligerent".

Perhaps the most well-developed bilateral security arrangement has been between Bulgaria and Greece; their agreement provides assurances to one another about peaceful intentions and co-operative spirit. The countries signed to that effect a September 1986 Protocol.

- V -

The events in Eastern Europe have encouraged trends toward widespread disintegration within the Soviet Union. Direct ties exist between countries of Eastern Europe and some of the restive Soviet border republics. The overthrow and execution of Ceausescu in neighbouring Romania added impetus to the Moldovian separatist movement, which in turn sparked ethnic clashes in Moldavia during October-November 1990. Other nationalities within the Soviet

republics - Poles in the Ukraine and Belorussia, for example - were similarly emboldened by the Eastern European transformations.

The loss of Eastern Europe, moreover, has created disruptions in Soviet political life. During and after the 28th Party Congress in July 1990, serious debate was raised by different anti-reformist groups to discredit the Gorbachev leadership, accusing him of being responsible for losing Eastern Europe. There is an uneasy feeling among many Russians that they are now alone, without a secure buffer zone along the Soviet border.

Analysis of the situation in the Soviet Union also points to the remote, but still plausible, chance of the emergence of an anti-Russian coalition from Central and Eastern Europe, which would pose a military threat to the Soviet heartland. One does not have to look too far away in history to be reminded of the substantial Ukrainian, Slovak and Romanian co-operation in German attacks on the Russian-dominated Union earlier this century. The Polish invasion of the Soviet Union before the Bolsheviks had secured victory in their civil war is a chapter in Polish-Russian relations that is likewise not forgotten in Moscow.

The most imminent and the widespread concern of Governments in Western Europe and on the Soviet periphery is the threat posed by a violent disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia and the destabilizing migration that could precede and follow such turmoil. This concern is shared in Germany, and anything other than the *status quo* is certain to be considered dangerous by German leaders.

A Russian nationalist militaristic régime in Moscow, or any attempt to revoke reforms, would almost surely disrupt the close Russo-German relations that developed during 1989-90, and rekindle NATO's Cold War policy.

Among the USSR's former Warsaw Pact allies, ample underlying antagonism remains toward Russia, both as a memory from Russian czarist days and from the events of 1956 and 1968.

Since the old régimes were ousted and the Soviet Army began its withdrawals, every internal and external threat suppressed in Eastern Europe since World War II has arisen again. Some are now muted, but many are perhaps more disruptive to post-communist Governments, political systems, and states than were the disputes of the first years of this century.

So far the overall Western and broader response to these unsettling issues has been uneven and fragmented. The process of ongoing changes will not be an easy one, but a long and rather unpredictable one. Which turn the events in Europe are going to take will to a great extent depend on the creation of a political atmosphere, on democratic changes in each Eastern European country, and on the building of a new system of mutual obligations within the CSCE, which should prevent destabilisation of the new European order in case of internal complications in any of these countries.

With all the positive changes taking place in Europe with Gorbachev's *perestroika* policy, for a time it seemed that conditions for the creation of lasting peace and prosperity were better than ever. However, some analyses point out that the latest events in the Soviet Union could have been prevented if the West had not hesitated so much in offering Gorbachev timely and more substantial economic assistance and know-how. One of the reasons was probably a lack of faith in *perestroika* policy to produce the desired results. But paradoxically, it is the development of democratic forces - which Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* enabled to take roots in the Soviet Union - which saved him, Europe and the world from new dictatorship.

It is assumed that what was known as "East and West" does not exist any longer, and that the old ideological division is gradually nearing its end. All European countries swear

to the same values: democracy, free election, human rights, market economies, although in practice it may not look the same.

It is also important to note that with the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the two military alliances are not facing each other any longer. Despite the important differences which are now being emphasized at a time when the bipolar international system disintegrates, there are similarities in defining the US and Soviet roles in Europe. Both nations are continental powers with important Pacific interests. Both require special forms of involvement that do not flow automatically from geography or history.

In the whole era after the Second World War, European nations had no say on their continent without the prior blessing of the two superpowers. The space for individual policy in Europe was very narrow. With the change of the European picture it seems that it can now be organized much more easily. The European Community can attract to its ranks former small and medium-sized Eastern European countries and can at the same time co-operate closely with the Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians. The EC method of security through mutual interdependence can now be pursued to the East of the continent. This applies also to the undertaking of other measures, such as disarmament and its verification. Europe can grow together, can overcome many other obstacles standing in the way of lasting peace and prosperity. Russians and Germans, each one too big for Europe, may hopefully in time co-operate nicely in its overall development.

How Germany uses its economic and political weight will make an important difference to its neighbours' perceptions. For example, the more-or-less open support on the part of Germany and Austria for Slovenian and Croatian separatist policies was a subject of some anxiety in Europe. According to the Paris newspaper "*Libération*", the recent moves by Bonn and Vienna are "a renewed strengthening of the idea for the creation of a German sphere of influence in Central Europe in which Germany, Austria and Slovenia will be the focal points". This is explained as nostalgia for the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and for the Croatian alliance with Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The Yugoslav example has shown more clearly than before the cracks in European unity, and all the dangers it is facing, with German unification and its potential might as a leading European power. Germany is not the only country with a role to play in developing Eastern economics and in establishing a Western European presence. Eastern European countries are keen to see France, Britain, Italy, the United States, Japan and other economic powers become active in Eastern Europe, so as not to leave the region too dependent on German businessmen and bankers. It is felt that the USA could, as a consequence, gradually leave Europe to its own affairs. Former communist countries with the aid of Western countries, could also become internally stable, and in time, could gradually reach their standard of living.

But the events and scenario may also turn to the contrary. We may again have "East and West" but this time with a new meaning namely: poor and rich. The Eastern part of the European continent is burdened with economic catastrophe and social unrest. Out of need and necessity Eastern Europeans are flocking to the West, which, in turn, out of fear and overpopulation are closing their borders to them. This process has already begun and there is a real danger of its spreading.

One could say that such development replaces the former "political" division of the continent with a new "economic" division - into rich and poor.

This danger is growing with the reawakening of Eastern European nationalisms. While Western Europe is overcoming its preoccupation with the national state, Eastern Europe is returning to the prewar period, and some parts of it even to the 19th century. There is again

a growing struggle to create national borders, with unlimited national sovereignties for its own national minorities while denying rights to other minorities. There is an awakening of nearly all the old rivalries, and there is a real danger for the outbreak of civil war.

- VI -

The process of the historic transformation of Soviet society has intensified, followed closely by instability in its internal political and economic life. For the most part, the same can be said for the other Eastern European countries. But in their practical interrelationship with the USSR, all world powers and major actors must realize that the USSR cannot be neglected, left alone, or simply "written off". After all, the USSR is still a key world power, especially in its capacity as a nuclear-weapon state, and it is one of the possible crisis "hot spots", with specific destabilizing potentials. Without the USSR and its good will, no matter how it appears, there is no disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, no military and security stability in Europe and Asia, and no ecological security for that matter.

On the other hand, the changes in Soviet society are also irreversible in the sense that there is no return to the former state of affairs. This, however, does not mean that it would be impossible to harmfully interfere from within or outside the USSR and to delay its transformation for a period of time. Such retrograde development would be extremely harmful and dangerous. In retrospect it can be said that the overall results of the voluntary transformation of the USSR and of East and Central Europe constituted the last chance to achieve them by peaceful means. Otherwise no German unification or Warsaw Pact dissipation or the numerous other changes in Eastern Europe would have been possible, short of World War III. Stable transformation of the USSR is in the interest of the continuation of positive democratic changes in European and world relations.

Europe's peace and well-being in the twenty-first century can be assured only in its entirety. If freedom, well-being and stability does not embrace the whole of Europe, it will be harmful for all of it. The creation of a common European space for democracy, economy, human rights, protection of the environment and for ensuring security for all States is a major European political task for the future.

Anything less than an unreserved investment by the CSCE in a new security concept may condemn Eastern Europe - and thereby the whole of the Continent - to recurrent trauma and national tragedy. Such an investment is not merely financial. It upholds the notion that the West can no longer find security by assuming military power within a common defensive alliance. Western security is now imperiled by the same environment that endangers Eastern Europe. To abate these threats, and to reinforce non-military and hence non-threatening - capacities of the post-communist systems, requires dispensing with the Cold War notions of force, power and security. The instability in Yugoslavia is, however, only one of the examples that Europe is facing on its very long and difficult road to peace, stability and prosperity.

Some careless moves and proclamations made by some members of the European community - and especially towards Yugoslavia by some of its neighbours alongside the secessionist *fait accompli* and policies of Slovenia and Croatia, are raising doubts concerning respect for the basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act. Some European politicians, who only yesterday appeared shocked to even think of separatist fires flaring up in Europe with unforeseen and tragic consequences, seem to have suddenly come to a change of heart. There are open threats by some of Yugoslavia's neighbours to recognize separatist Slovenia and Croatia, thereby ignoring completely the fact that both Slovenia and Croatia have illegally and

unilaterally proclaimed their separation from Yugoslavia. They have abolished the Federal Constitution and federal laws, and refuse to abide by the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia, which has proclaimed their acts illegal, including the arming of members of the ruling nationalist Croatian party and the creation of other paramilitary forces.

There is hardly a single day, for example, that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr. Mock is not inviting members of the EC and his Government to immediately recognize separatist Slovenia and Croatia. Austria, by the way, is completely forgetting that as a neutral state and as a CSCE member it is obliged to show much more self-restraint in its international policy.

Austria, Hungary and some other states are deeply involved in illegal but open arms supply, including heavy equipment to Slovenian and Croatian separatist paramilitary forces, thus helping open armed revolt against the legitimate Government of Yugoslavia and its federal army.

At the same time, the EC is trying, in its numerous declarations and statements, to make fighting in Croatia stop, but without ever pointing a finger at those who are aiding the overthrow of the legitimate Government of Yugoslavia and advancing the country's disintegration.

Some of these countries are forgetting that there are several potential separatist Slovenias and Croatias in Europe, and that many separatist blazes could easily spark even in the "heart" of Europe and destroy not only the European dream of unity, but also quite a lot of what has already been created with great patience and difficulty.

In their involvement in Yugoslavian affairs, some EC members are giving priority to the principle of self-determination, placing it above the established principle of international law of respect of sovereignty of people and for territorial integrity. Even internal administrative borders which were never subject to international treaties or established by democratic methods or by constitutional or legal acts are given equal status as internationally recognized borders.

These members of the European Community, which are acting with the blessing of the CSCE, and some of Yugoslavia's neighbours, are not showing necessary restraint and patience, but instead are - singly or as part of former alliances - trying again to fulfil their old national political and expansionist territorial ambitions at the expense of Yugoslavia. These are being carried out, *inter alia*, by interference into its internal affairs, by exerting high political and economic pressure and by showing unrestrained partiality against Serbia, as they did some 77 and 50 years ago, and using almost the same arguments as before.

Taking into account the situation both in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it seems that the time has come for Europe to give its most serious reconsideration and confirmation to the Helsinki Final Act, which guarantees full respect for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of its members - or to make new rules.

Unless great political wisdom and patience is shown in a democratic search for a peaceful solution to the many potential and fast-growing trouble spots in Europe, and unless there is a commitment to honour in letter and spirit both the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, the situation can easily get out of hand. If solutions for existing trouble spots in Europe are not found in the interest of all, or for Europe as an entirety, but rather as a quick and temporary solution in order to prevent the spreading of nationalist or separatist flames through Europe, which could be harmful to its process of integration - in that case, the European stage will be set for future crises.

Chapter 2

Attitudes of the USA and the USSR towards the South-East European Region

Traian Chebeleu

The Renewed Topicality of the Region

The South-East European Region, or the Balkans comprising Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia has entered a new political dynamic. For some time now, the region has once again become topical on the Euro-Atlantic political scene.

The contradictory events that have taken place within the Balkans during the past few months point to an ambivalent topicality of that zone. The crisis in Yugoslavia, the tendency of some of its neighbours to fuel rather than to appease its violent evolution, and the relative disunity of the European Community member states over the most convenient solution are merely the most visible illustration of the Balkans' *negative topicality*. It is not difficult to predict that a narrow European response to that crisis would provoke a repetition, in new forms, of those imbalanced arrangements that inflamed the region at the beginning of this century. The consequences are too well-known to dwell largely on them.

Conversely, the *positive topicality* of the Balkans became crystal clear all throughout the Persian Gulf crisis, when the direct contribution of Turkey and Greece to the success of the allied forces' operations was reinforced by the supportive attitude of Romania, particularly in the United Nations Security Council, and by other Balkan countries. The fact that the USA and USSR were, on that occasion, on the same side was undoubtedly one of the main springs of Balkan cohesion, even though, indirectly, the possible non-unity of a "Balkan front" would have changed for the worse the "environment" of the Gulf War. Fortunately, that was not the case. The positive topicality of the region is also highlighted by the renewed impetus for multilateral co-operation in the Balkan countries.

Under the new circumstances created by the revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Balkans' topicality - one which is not connected with temporary situations of one kind or another stems from the fact that, on a small scale, that area represents the political picture of the whole of Europe. There is no other region in Europe where the present non-homogeneity of the Continent is more concentrated than it is within the Balkans.

Turkey and Greece are firmly anchored in NATO, while the other four countries, each of them in its own way, are looking for new security arrangements. The Greek and Turkish success stories of overcoming dictatorial régimes and creating market economies are accompanied nowadays by similar attempts on the part of the new democracies. EC membership for the time being the exclusive apanage of Greece is an explicit goal for all the other countries belonging to the area. Three sub-regional structures the "Hexagonale", the Balkan Multilateral Co-operation, and the Black Sea Co-operation zone - have overlapping activities in the area. Through Turkey, the Balkans are directly connected to the Middle East. Due to Albania's inclusion among CSCE-participating States, the embryonic unity of the whole Continent has been completed.

Taking into account all these aspects, one might say that, in a certain sense, the Balkans - considered by some the "periphery of Europe" - might be, in fact, an important testing

ground for the possibility and viability of a new European architecture. This architecture should be instrumental both in bringing about a whole and free Europe that is no longer obsessed with distinctions between "centre" and "periphery", and in transforming it into a solid pillar of the new world order.

If the countries which make up the Balkan states will succeed in coming closer to one other, in peacefully solving the disputes which continue to keep some of them apart, in creating a network of co-operation between them and between the different structures to which they belong, then one of the "Gordian knots" impeding the transformation from the present non-homogenous Europe to a common European economic, political, juridical, and humanitarian space, favouring and, in its turn, supported by an all-European security system, will irreversibly disappear.

In fact, traditions bring the Balkan countries together. Their peoples belong to different cultures and civilizations. Yet throughout the centuries, they have influenced and enriched each other, bringing out strong common features and creating a sense of togetherness that are today an important factor of rapprochement and mutual understanding. It is precisely on these grounds that the idea of Balkan solidarity has capitalized during the last six decades, taking institutional forms, in particular at the non-governmental level.

However, it would be difficult to say that Balkan multilateral co-operation has managed to play a decisive role in the foreign policies of the six states during the previous decades. It remained somehow superficial, at least in its political and security aspects, and it usually collapsed when external forces, aggressively promoting their interests in the region, decided to ignore it.

Reflecting the increasing need for a Balkan dialogue, the 1988 Belgrade Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs laid foundations for a more comprehensive process of co-operation among all the Balkan countries, both at the governmental and the non-governmental levels. Thanks to the generalization of democratic options throughout the area as early as the beginning of 1990, the Balkan countries have embarked on new efforts to extend and deepen their dialogue and co-operation. The 1990 Tirana Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, heralding a new partnership of the Balkan countries, initiated a process of institutionalization for their multilateral co-operation.

Those efforts are an expression of the political will of the governments concerned to fulfil their responsibilities in building, from within the Balkans, structures of peace and multilateral co-operation in the area. Taking into account that, especially in the Balkans, the domestic stability of every neighbouring country is part of the national interest of any of the region's states, such an option seems to be the most realistic one. Of course, the renewed Balkan multilateral co-operation is not advancing smoothly. But promising steps have already been taken.

The spirit and the substance of a recent document, issued on the occasion of the Meeting of High Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Balkan Countries (Ankara, 12-14 June, 1991), are illustrative in this respect. It reiterates the determination of the Balkan countries "to consolidate and further promote the process of Balkan Co-operation and to intensify their efforts for reaching concrete results aimed at better understanding and good neighbourliness, for the benefit of the peoples of the region, and for peace and security in the Balkans". It is also remarkable in this respect that the six states of the region give a "common answer" to possible consequences of the Yugoslav crisis.

There is no doubt that the Sofia Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, scheduled to take place towards the end of 1991, will be instrumental in bringing Balkan multilateral co-operation closer to its declared goals.

Attitudes of the USSR and the USA

Looking back into the post-World War II political history of the Balkans, it would be hard to say that either the USSR or the USA has conducted coherent policies towards the Balkans. Their policies in the region always fitted perfectly into the Cold War schemes. Both of the major powers had their own allies, and both limited their interests mainly, if not exclusively, to their respective allies. Both of them maintained a somewhat similar attitude towards non-aligned Yugoslavia and *sui generis* non-aligned Albania.

For the most part, circumspection and mistrust characterized the attitude of the two major powers regarding the multilateral co-operation of the Balkan states, in particular in the political and military fields. During the Cold War, when the Soviet or American presence and/or influence in different parts of the area was in itself a guarantee that the *powder keg* would not explode, the two Super Powers' attitude was more-or-less understandable. But nowadays, as the Balkans prove to be a not ignorable part of the endeavour to bring about a new Europe and a new world order, a certain evolution can be detected in the attitudes of both the USSR and the USA towards the Balkan states and even towards the region as such.

USSR's Dilemmas

A report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, submitted to the Supreme Soviet, regarding the foreign policy and diplomacy of the USSR between 1985 and 1989, contained the following paragraph, relevant for the Soviet Balkan policy of the time:

The USSR declares itself consistently in favour of the development of co-operation in the Balkans and supports the efforts of Balkan countries aimed at the development of regional co-operation in various fields. In March 1988, at Belgrade, high-level support was expressed for the initiatives of Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece aiming at diminishing military activities in the Balkans, and the withdrawal from the peninsula of all foreign troops and military bases. The Soviet Union shall give the necessary guarantees, if the decision to establish a nuclear and chemical weapons free zone in the Balkans is taken. (*Mezhdunarodnaia Jizni*, No. 12, 1989, p. 52 - unofficial translation).

These positions became largely outdated after the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty.

For more than a year after the shock of the revolutionary events in the Eastern part of the Continent, the Soviet Union did not seem to follow a clear political line of conduct towards the Balkans, in particular towards the ex-socialist countries in the region, or even towards the other countries in Eastern Europe, for that matter. This might be explained, among other things, as hesitation before the complex and often unpredictable character of the evolutions in these countries, as the need for longer periods of time to assess the constellation of forces in these countries and their political orientation, and, also, as a re-definition of the political, security and economic interests of the Soviet Union in the region.

A first indication of the strategic goals of the USSR with regard to its policy towards the Balkan states could be given - by extrapolation - by the decision of the Central Committee

of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, adopted on 22 January 1991, regarding the evolution of the situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet policy in this region:

The Soviet Union is interested in good neighbourly relations with the states of the region. It is very important that these states should promote a friendly policy towards us, that they should not be a source of anti-Sovietism nor play the role of external catalysts for national separatism and for centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet Union, and that they should not act as promoters of political forces that never abandoned their plans to redraw the political map of Europe. (*Izvestia TK - KPSS*, No. 3, 1991, p. 2 - unofficial translation).

After openly supporting the processes aiming at changes in Eastern Europe (which obviously did not lead to the expected results for the Soviet Union), the subsequent attitude of the Kremlin towards the region was uncertain. Now, for the past 8 or 9 months, Eastern Europe seems to have once again become a prime interest of Soviet foreign policy.

In fact, recognizing that during the last one or two years, Eastern Europe "has unjustifiably remained on a secondary plane" within the general system of international priorities of the Soviet Union and here four out of the six Balkan countries are included - a report drawn up by the International Section of the Central Committee Party of the Soviet Union states that, given its proximity and geopolitical, historical, ethnic and cultural links, this region should remain

one of the important priorities of the Soviet policy, despite the changes in Eastern Europe that seriously alter the place and role this region used to have for the Soviet Union. (*Izvestia TK - KPSS*, No. 3, 1991, p. 14 - unofficial translation).

The essence of the Soviet attitude towards these countries - which implicitly defines the Soviet policy towards the Balkans as a whole - was quite well synthesized by the deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Yuli Kvitsinski:

It goes without saying that there can be no return to the policy of domination in the Eastern European region for any nation. At the same time the Soviet Union's legitimate interests in this region have historical and geopolitical roots and must be taken into account". He subsequently added that "the Eastern region under no circumstances should become a source of threat to the security of the USSR. It is equally clear that there should be no foreign military bases or foreign armed forces in this region. (*Talking points for the Prague International Conference on the Future European Security*, 25-26 April 1991).

Consequently, it may be concluded that a major object of preoccupation in Soviet foreign policy, applying also to the Balkans, remains the military one, *i.e.* the possible use of countries in the region as a potential supporting point for a threat to the security of the Soviet Union.

Certainly, for future relations between the USSR and the Balkan states, one of the conclusions of the afore mentioned report of the International Section of the CPSU is highly relevant: "the internal difficulties of the USSR make it less capable of initiatives in co-operation with its partners". (*Ibid.* p. 14) To the political uncertainties of the Soviet Union including those connected with the negotiation of the Union Treaty - which hinder its capacity for international action, one should add the Western military conditionality, *i.e.* the fact that substantial Western economic assistance will be forthcoming only if severe reductions in the military budget are effected.

The interest of the Soviet Union in the multilateral co-operation of the Balkan countries also materialized in its request to be invited as an observer to the Balkan ministerial meetings. This request is consistent with the general distrust with which the Soviet Union perceives multilateral initiatives of co-operation that have security and/or military connotations, or that are conceived without its participation. Take, for instance, the tripartite co-operation among Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, which, according to the Soviet deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Yuli Kvitsinski, "is little different from efforts to crown the European Communities with a structure of military and political co-operation within the Western European Union" (*Ibid.*). In its turn, the reluctance of the Balkan governments to accede to the Soviet request is, to a great extent, a reflection of the slowness in getting rid of old thinking.

US Inertia

As in the case of the Soviet Union, the examination of official statements and documents does not point to an explicit policy of the United States towards the region. Consequently, it has to be inferred from the general US policies towards the individual countries and towards the "new architecture" of Europe.

After the 1989 revolutions, there was a certain detectable tendency to continue projecting old patterns of US policy towards the Balkan states. Thus, American relations with the ex-socialist states of the region still seem sometimes to be tainted by ideological considerations, as exemplified by their performances in the field of human rights and by the fact that, as far as these countries are concerned, US assistance is mainly confined to humanitarian needs. Obviously, the same standards do not apply in the case of the other two Balkan countries, who are regarded as "valued NATO allies" (see remarks of President Bush to the US and Greek armed forces in Souda Bay, Crete, on 19 July, 1991; and the remarks of President Bush, on 22 July 1991, before his departure from Istanbul). A policy of *sparing susceptibilities* surfaces now and then, and seems to prevail as far as those two countries are concerned, since it is in line with the importance the US attaches to ensuring a strong NATO southern flank.

Considering the Balkans as a whole, it is unclear whether the US regards that region as one towards which a coherent policy is even necessary. The only clear thing is the American interest in firmly anchoring Greece and Turkey in NATO, and the policy of strengthening security relationships with both countries.

As far as the US policy regarding the other Balkan states is concerned, one has to assume that it is an integral part of the general policy towards Eastern Europe, concisely described by the US Secretary of State, Mr. James Baker, as follows:

We must begin to extend the Trans-Atlantic Community to Central and Eastern Europe and to the Soviet Union. These are still incomplete pieces of our architecture. The revolutions of freedom in Central and Eastern Europe need our ongoing support to become lasting democracies. ... Our objective is both a Europe whole and free, and a Euro-Atlantic Community that extends East from Vancouver to Vladivostock. (*The Euro-Atlantic Architecture: from West to East*, Speech on June 18, 1991, at Aspen Institute Meeting in Berlin).

Renewed Interest in the Balkans in 1991

1991 was marked by a growing interest in the Balkan region, on the part of both Super Powers.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is obvious that its policy is to establish a network of bilateral political treaties with the Balkan states, as an integral part of the policy to conclude such treaties, both with its former allies and with other CSCE participating states, as proposed by the Paris Charter for a New Europe. Friendship and co-operation treaties were signed with Turkey in March 1991, with Romania in April 1991 and with Greece in July 1991, on the occasions of the respective visits to the Soviet Union of President Turgüt Özal, President Ion Iliescu and Prime-Minister Constantin Mitsotakis. Similar treaties are being negotiated with Bulgaria and Albania. Also notable in this context are the successive visits paid this year by the Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov and the Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnih to Yugoslavia, and by the Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovich to the Soviet Union. And, for the first time in 30 years, an Albanian parliamentary delegation, headed by the President of the National Assembly, Mr. Kastriot Islami, visited Moscow in July 1991 and had talks with President Mikhail Gorbachev.

As far as the United States is concerned, a comparable political and diplomatic activity can be ascertained. In July 1991, after 30 years, President George Bush was the first American President to pay a visit to Greece. The same is true for Turkey. The very day he arrived in Athens, the US President indicated that, in his talks with Greek leaders, he would confirm the common interest "in a new world order, stability of the Balkans, peace on Cyprus and reconciliation between Greece and Turkey".

The statement of the US President before the Greek Parliament, on 18 July, 1991 is also indicative of the American interest in the region: "We are encouraged that your government is advancing new ideas to foster stability in the Balkans and the Aegean. The opportunity for a new era of accommodation in this region beckons".

On the bilateral level, the strong US security interest was reaffirmed by President's Bush announcement of a series of initiatives designed to strengthen US-Greek security and to help modernize the Greek Armed Forces.

Similar pledges to extend military co-operation and to provide assistance for military force modernization were put forward by the American President during his visit to Turkey.

Bulgaria was another Balkan country visited by a high US official - Vice-President Dan Quayle, in June 1991. During the same month Secretary of State James Baker visited two other Balkan states - Yugoslavia and Albania. All these visits provided opportunities to announce US measures supporting the democratization processes in these countries. There are also signs of an upswing in the US-Romanian relationship.

There is no doubt that this renewed interest of the Super Powers in the Balkans is due to the topicality of the region, expressed at the beginning of this paper. Most probably it is due to the recent turbulence in the neighbouring Gulf and Middle East areas, as well as to the Yugoslavian crisis, whose implications could go well beyond Yugoslavia's borders and affect the stability in the region and in Europe as a whole.

In this regard the moderation with which the two Super Powers have approached the events in Yugoslavia is quite remarkable. They emphasized that

the USSR and the United States proceed from the premise that the resolution of the problems that have arisen should be found by the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves on the basis of democratic principles and by means of peace negotiations and constructive dialogue

further adding that both of them

have stressed the need for all parties to respect the fundamental principles recorded in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a New Europe (*Joint Statement of the United States and the Soviet Union*, July 31, 1991).

Obviously, the *positive topicality* of the Balkans has every chance of becoming and remaining a *negative* one, if a brutal severance of its "Gordian knot" is encouraged both from within and outside the area. External support for the peaceful solution of the area's interwoven problems is crucial. The implementation of a constructive - as opposed to a brutal and costly solution to the problems and tensions boiling now within and around the Balkans highly depends on the co-operative involvement of the USA and the USSR in the process.

Their interest in solidarity with the Balkan states will be instrumental in preventing new forms of concurrent satellization of the different countries belonging to the area. Nowadays, it is more clear than ever that as long as the Balkans continue to be perceived as "no man's land" *i.e.* "anybody's land" - fragmentation of the area, and its gloomy consequences, will continue, reviving bad memories of the past. As a result, not only the Balkans, but Europe as a whole, could explode. Under such circumstances, Europe would become more vulnerable to external threats and risks, and instead of being a vehicle for the new international order, it might become its graveyard.

Extent of Desirable Super Power Involvement

The expected future role of the Super Powers in the region stems from the fact that security in Europe is inconceivable without peace in the Balkans. Therefore, the goal to strive for involves turning the Balkans into a factor of stability in the South-Eastern part of Europe, as is the case, for instance, with the European Community in the heart of the continent.

The joint efforts of the Balkan states to increase their own contribution - through multilateral co-operation - to the stability of their region, suggest their determination to make the Balkans a peaceful and stable corner of Europe. The question is, can they succeed, without external support, in achieving such a goal? And what kind of support would be helpful in preventing an explosion of the *powder keg*?

The lessons of history seem to suggest that not all kinds of external support are beneficial to the Balkans or to Europe at large. Especially damaging has been the tendency throughout this century to fuel enmities within the Balkans for the sake of short-sighted interests.

Stability in the Balkans is a Euro-Atlantic challenge, and should likewise be a Euro-Atlantic endeavour. There is no doubt that stabilizing this region and prompting the Balkan countries toward self-sustainable economic growth in a democratic environment would be an advance of historic proportions.

The achievement of such an advance could be facilitated by an appropriate involvement of the two major powers. However, it should be a new type of involvement, different from the traditional type *i.e.* a "co-operative" one and not a version of the old spheres-of-influence policy.

Of course, the Super Powers' involvement will, in all probability, demand a certain political price of the concerned countries. Nevertheless, a lack of interest on the part of the USSR and the USA would be more detrimental to the region than would their involvement.

This is so because lack of interest would mean lack of support for the processes taking place in this part of Europe, support needed especially by the young democracies. Moreover, the absence of the Super Powers would leave room for a revival of inter-war policies of "big-small rivalries" between European powers for influence in the region. The Yugoslav crisis is but one example, and there should be no doubt that the "territorial appetite" of some would increase if the attempts to dismember Yugoslavia were successful; the temptations to go back and revive old pages of history in the neighbouring areas could become more difficult to resist.

The new Soviet-American relationship, highlighted by the recent visit of President Bush to the Soviet Union, is another promising sign of a new type of co-operation, both between the Super Powers themselves and between each of them and the Balkan countries, in the spirit of the Paris Charter.

The desirable kind of involvement is political and economic, and not mainly military. The latter should be confined to the present commitment of the Super Powers in the region and in the adjacent seas – the Mediterranean and the Black Sea – and should follow a pattern consonant with the CSCE and other future accords, in such a way as to deter a potential armed attack in the region.

Several types of Super Power involvement could be envisioned and explored by all concerned. For the sake of discussion, the author ventures to put forward a number of ideas:

1. *Support for multilateral co-operation of the Balkan states, in order to increase the credibility of such co-operation, including its political and military components*

In this regard, the idea would entail the presence of both the USSR and the USA as observers to the emerging multilateral Balkan institutions – and in the first place, to the annual meetings of the foreign ministers.

Actually, just such an institution of observers was established when the Balkan countries agreed to accept, on a reciprocal basis, observers from the neighbouring "Hexagonale" grouping.

The presence of the USSR and the USA at Balkan gatherings is desirable on the grounds that they are major military powers in Europe, and implicitly in the Balkans; consequently, they have a strong influence in the region as well as a special role in protecting its peace and security. It is not inconceivable that the two major powers would be invited to act as guarantors of military and political agreements the Balkan states might possibly reach in the future.

2. *Establishment of an "identity of Balkan defense"*

The USSR and the USA might envision aiding in the establishment of such an identity, in full compatibility with the NATO membership of two of the six Balkan states, through already-existing agreements and future agreements which could be reached within the CSCE framework, and through *inter alia*:

- transparency of arms transfers in the Balkan countries;
- multilateral co-operation among the General Staffs of Balkan countries;
- development of forms of emergency multilateral consultation in cases that might affect their security interests;
- adequate information from other CSCE participating states on relevant measures that are agreed upon.

This might prove a better formula than the "Rapid Reaction Force" of NATO, whose utilization in the Balkans - one of the foredoomed areas in this regard - could lead to great complications.

It is to be expected that the security concerns of the Balkan states and the possible arrangements they could reach in this field will greatly depend upon the evolution of NATO. It seems that the debates within this alliance regarding its future strategy are not yet resolved. Nevertheless, as the stabilizing role of NATO becomes more widely recognized, it might be appropriate for NATO to attend, as an observer, the meetings of the Balkan countries devoted to the military aspects of their co-operation.

3. *Development of a régime of collective security and political consultation among the Balkan countries*

This is an option put forward by the Tirana Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The measures agreed upon on that occasion - annual meetings of the foreign ministers, bi-annual meetings of high officials of the ministries of foreign affairs, the establishment of an institution co-ordinating multilateral activities - do indeed pave the way towards a régime of collective security and political consultation among the Balkan states. Again it is in the interest of the major powers to encourage such a development.

In addition, they could further encourage Balkan states to act as a "caucus" in formulating concerted positions at the CSCE gatherings on political and security matters. It is understood that such a form of consultation should in no way affect the participation of Balkan states in other caucuses to which they belong - NATO, EC, "n+n" or other groupings. Such a suggestion aims at promoting an increased awareness of common security interests and a habit of consultation, which could be beneficial for strengthening peace and security in the Balkans.

4. *Adoption of stabilizing policies towards the Balkans*

The security strategy and defence planning will depend upon hypothetical scenarios of possible conflicts.

As far as the Balkans are concerned, only two types of conflicts are possible: on the one hand, those evolving from existing disputes, like the conflicts regarding Cyprus or the disputed claims in the Aegean, and, on the other hand, those emerging from territorial revisionism, stimulated nowadays by nationalist propensities or irredentist aspirations.

The two major powers since they are less suspected of petty interests in the region, might play a positive role in the existing disputes mainly as catalysts to bring about settlements in a peaceful fashion. In this regard, the current US efforts to help interested parties settle the Cyprus problem bode well for such a role. The same goes for the Soviet and American attitudes regarding the aforementioned Yugoslav crisis.

As far as the conflicts that could develop from nationalist approaches or from irredentist claims, the experience of post-World War II Western Europe demonstrates that the key to containing the harmful consequences of nationalism is democracy and development. After World War II, what prevailed were efforts to heal the wounds of the Western countries who were economically and socially devastated, and to generalize the acceptance of the new philosophy of human rights. Emphasis was not placed on satisfying nationalist aspirations of various groups, but rather on promoting development and democracy. This experience should be a source of inspiration towards the most appropriate line of action in the Balkans - *i.e.* support for economic development and democratic processes in the region.

From this point of view, at least for the foreseeable future, only one of the two major powers is able to involve itself - and it is desirable that it does so - in a substantial support program for the Balkan countries.

Generally speaking, external assistance and support that aims at consolidating democracy and market economies throughout the area while playing due attention to the specific difficulties with which the new democracies are confronted, are the best answers the US and Western Europe can offer in response to their express concerns over developments in the Balkans. Such an approach would be only natural, remembering that the democratic and economic recovery of the West European countries themselves in the aftermath of World War II was made possible by external help and support that encouraged the pursuit of their common interest, and not their enmities. As a result, "historical adversities" (in no way less present at that time in Western Europe than they are nowadays in the Balkans) have gradually lost their significance. The Balkan states have to be given the same opportunity, in order to dispose of the Balkans' widely-perceived "scarecrow" image as soon as possible. Otherwise, the Balkan peoples might be inclined to ask if it is in someone's interest to continuously assign to their region the role of the "European scapegoat".

Chapter 3


Impact of Existing European Institutions on South-East Europe (CSCE, CEE...)

Franz-Lothar Altmann

Introduction

Throughout Europe various international political, economic, and security institutions have developed their specific respective functions with very different scopes of competence and regional significance. Until recently, only two multinational institutions existed in the eastern part of Europe, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon) and the Warsaw Pact Organization. In the western part of Europe (the term "western" is used here in the political and not in the geographical sense), quite a number of different organizations developed with various kinds of functional tasks and targets. In addition to the purely "Eastern" and "Western" institutions, two multinational European institutions must also be mentioned which are of rather recent origin: the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the Hexagonal Initiative, which started with four countries in 1989 (Austria, Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia), and was later joined by Czechoslovakia (May 1990, at which point it was called the Pentagon) and by Poland (June 1991). The following chart illustrates the interlocking of the mutual memberships.

Interlocking Memberships: A Schematic Portrayal of the Most Important European Multinational Organizations



Source: Douglas L. Clarke, "European Multinational Organizations: A Primer", in: *Report on Eastern Europe*, August 9, 1991.

This chapter will deal only with the impact of the still-existing European multinational institutions, therefore excluding the two former Eastern European organizations, CMEA and WTO. Three main fields of activities and consequent possible impacts will be considered:

- military security and disarmament the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West European Union (WEU) will be examined here, although the former is not a pure European institution, it was founded in 1949 to prevent Soviet military advance in Europe;
- economic co-operation, including the advancement of political co-operation the European Community (EC) and, to a lesser extent, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) are the major acting organizations in this capacity;
- last but not least, the field of Human Rights and the overall democratization of the societies in transition - the Council of Europe comes to mind first in this context.

All three fields of activities are incorporated into the three baskets of the CSCE-process.

The question might arise as to why economic co-operation and human rights are included in this chapter, when "security" is the topic of this conference. The reason is that the current security situation in Eastern and South-East Europe depends decisively on factors beyond the scope of political instruments of pure defence. This is particularly true for the former socialist countries. It is obvious that the major task at present in South-Eastern Europe is the stabilization of the processes of economic reformation or rather transformation, and aid is demanded to stabilize the economic welfare of South-Eastern Europe. Economic and political assistance must be provided to these countries to secure their passage towards stable democracy and respect for human rights. Stabilization of the economies and of democracy, and general acceptance of the principles of individual and collective human rights, are the best preconditions for new and stable security structures in South-Eastern Europe.

Military Security

With regard to military national security, it is advisable to consider the South-East European countries individually, rather than the region as a whole. NATO, as *the* Western defense organization, has played an important role with respect to the security perceptions of the respective Balkan countries, in particular during the period of the Cold War confrontation between East and West. Starting in the north of the Balkan region, one can easily state that the simple existence of NATO enabled Yugoslavia to withdraw from Cominform structures and pursue its own path of ideological development, independent from Stalin's tutelage. During all the post-war years, NATO helped preserve Yugoslavia's special status, which finally achieved international recognition in the (now almost defunct) position of speaker for the non-aligned movement. A similar though not-so-clearly set role was played by NATO with respect to Ceausescu's efforts to conduct a relatively independent foreign policy for Romania.

For Bulgaria, on the other hand, threats to national security were multifaceted. Unresolved questions concerning minorities in the country (Turks, Macedonians) or abroad (in Greece and Macedonia) as well as pending border questions (South Dobrudsha) have given Bulgaria the permanent feeling of isolation between more-or-less hostile neighbours. On top of this general apprehension, the very specific threat of NATO, the great Western adversary as represented by the two member countries Greece and Turkey on its southern border, forced

Sofia to believe that its only possible security option lay in a firm alliance with the USSR. The constant alleged menace of NATO made Bulgaria the most secure Southern pillar of the Warsaw Pact.

On the contrary, Greece and Turkey, as NATO members, enjoyed national security guarantees against the northern threat. Greece could remain calm and assured in the face of any Bulgarian claims on Greek's Macedonia or any allegations concerning the Slovak-speaking (Macedonian and/or Bulgarian) minority. Turkey, as the only NATO member country that had direct border contacts with as many as two WTO-countries (if the special German case is excluded), certainly benefitted the most from its NATO membership. Its strategic position controlling the exit of the Black Sea and situated between the USSR and the Middle Eastern oil fields, provided Turkey with many military, economic and political advantages that made the country *the* political power between Europe and the Middle East. Also, without NATO, the association with the European Community would probably not have been achieved.

NATO certainly played and still plays an important role in the Greek-Turkish conflict concerning the Aegean and the Cyprus questions. NATO tried to take up the role of umpire between the two conflicting parties, and armament deliveries to both countries were balanced over all the years by a ratio of 6-10 (Greece-Turkey).

In the past, NATO's security concept was based on the traditional perception of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat. Thus the task of NATO was to secure the defense of Western Europe behind clear-cut (political and military) frontiers. Combined with the effects of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, this led to the separation of the South-East European countries, from each other (Yugoslavia - Rumania - Bulgaria - Greece, Turkey), and from the rest of Europe, particularly from Western Europe.

This former security concept must now, after the collapse of Soviet domination of Eastern and South-East Europe, be changed - must become broader, more co-operative, more pan-European. Although the Cold War is over, the Western European alliance still has a role to play in maintaining stability on the Continent, but new parameters of stability must be found. After NATO's invitation to the former WTO governments to establish regular diplomatic liaisons with the NATO secretariat, the governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR accredited their respective Ambassadors to Belgium to NATO as well. Furthermore, some of these governments have already expressed demands that the alliance should assume a greater security role in their region. Since the WTO has been dissolved (militarily in February and politically on 1 July, 1991), no organization can protect the former member countries any longer, and NATO is the only functioning European security organization that is left.

Western European Union

This raises the question of the role of WEU. WEU grew out of the 1948 Brussels Treaty signed by France, Great Britain and the Benelux countries and its concern about the aggravated East-West conflict in Europe. Germany and Italy were not admitted until 1954, while Portugal and Spain became members as late as 1990. In contrast to NATO, where Canada and the United States are non-European members, WEU is a purely European institution with a firm contractual engagement to assist one other in case of outside aggression (Article 5). However, because the task of guaranteeing Europe's security was taken over by NATO, military competences of WEU were transferred to the Atlantic Alliance. Since then,

it is common to refer to WEU as the "empty box", because no concrete military framework exists, only a political roof. Nevertheless, periodical attempts to reactivate WEU can be observed, particularly since the mid-1980s: in 1984 the declaration of Rome revitalized the discussion of European defense, and it was concluded that the WEU Council (which since 1987 has consisted not only of Foreign Ministers but also of Ministers of Defense) would from then meet twice a year. Under France's urging, WEU formulated during its 1987 meeting at the Hague a new programmatic basis, the *Platform of European Security Interests*, and in 1989 it founded its own *Institute for Security Questions*. The Institute started work in July 1990 in Paris.

The debate on the future role of WEU received an important push in December 1990, when German Chancellor Kohl and French President Mitterrand demanded in their joint initiative on the Political Union that "a clear and organic linkage" be installed between the Western European Union and the European Community, aimed at anchoring institutionally a joint European security and defense policy.

From this short history of WEU it becomes clear that almost no impact on the South-East European region can be expected. Until recently no military function in fact existed, but the resumed discussion about a possible future role of WEU has prompted increased interest in this organization and also in the Balkans. Greece has tried since 1988 to become a member, consequently Turkey does not want to stay aside. However, the well-known animosities between these two countries block the advancement of the admission procedure. For the other Balkan countries, the tightened linkage between WEU and the EC which developed in the 1980s made their possible membership in the EC more difficult, as long as the Eastern Warsaw Pact still existed.

At present a kind of competition among the (Western) European security organizations can be observed. NATO officials, of course, question the ability of both the EC and WEU to assume any important role in the defense field. They prefer a strong European pillar within the alliance whereby NATO and the EC could develop a "creative parallelism" by coordinating their policies - the EC would concentrate on economic and probably also on purely political affairs, while NATO would focus on military issues. Of course this "division of labour" cannot follow the traditional lines, particularly not in the field of European security proper. Since the CSCE can only contribute to European security but cannot replace the existing security structure, a renewed and widely-altered NATO concept must secure stability for the new emerging European structure. South-Eastern Europe as a whole must also be incorporated into this concept, which must co-operate closely with political and economic developments in the EC architecture.

European Economic Integration

There exist only two European institutions which have to be considered when dealing with economic integration processes in Europe, and in fact only one when talking about future developments. The agreement on the formation of a European Economic Space consisting of the 12 members of the EC and the seven member countries of EFTA has placed the former into the leader position for further European economic (and political) integration. To some extent EFTA, which was founded in 1960 as an alternative to the EC, had some significance for South-East Europe, but mainly as a supplement to the relationship with the EC or as a possibility to work more closely with the EC, through EFTA association or even though EFTA member status particularly in view of the planned European Economic Space.

Anyhow, be it directly or via EFTA, the European Community has become by sheer economic fact the main firmly-established rock in the rough and suddenly turbulent European waters. In recent years the EC has become by far the largest trade partner for all South-East European countries. The alleged intensification of its integration process with the not so far away transitional date of end 1992 has become the major threat for non-member countries. This means that, when discussing possible impacts of the existence and the actions of the EC, one must clearly distinguish between countries that are full EC-members (Greece), those with associated status (Turkey), and countries which have only signed treaties on economic co-operation and trade (Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania).

So far Greece and Turkey have definitely benefitted from their close ties with Western Europe. Without the direct (financial) and indirect (structural advantages, larger market for commodities and labor, capital inflow, etc.) assistance derived from their respective positions of EC membership and EC association, the economies of Greece and Turkey would be in much worse condition, and domestic policies would certainly exhibit even more radical confrontation patterns, and less democratic behaviour, than they do now.

However, the European Community has also become the most important trade and co-operation partner of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Stabilization of their ailing economies cannot be achieved solely by their own efforts, but must rely on intensification of economic ties with their most powerful partner. The EC is by far the strongest partner for the future economic orientation of South-East Europe, a fact which also conditions obligations on the side of the EC towards that region. If the European Community wishes a stable South-East European backyard, then serious European attempts must be undertaken to first of all foster economic and social stabilization in the Balkan region through additional concessions in negotiations on trade liberalization.

The EC has played a more direct role in the process of reform assistance. Help has been and will be provided through many channels, *e.g.* the PHARE-program which was recently extended, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), additional credits from the European Investment Bank, etc. In particular it must be remembered that the EC has been appointed to take over the leading role in the G-24 assistance program for the former Socialist countries. Thus, a certainly positive impact from the EC exists in this very special field, although it is questionable whether the overall dimension of this assistance is sufficiently large enough. If one compares the financial transfers which West Germany has to provide for the coming years (roughly 100 billion US\$ per year) to East Germany with the actual financial assistance that the West (mainly the EC) directs to the remaining six East and South-East European countries, then sceptical expectations about the possible effects seem justified.

European Political Co-operation

A particular field of possible EC influence on South-East European development is European Political Co-operation (EPC) within the EC framework. As Thanos Veremis explained in more detail at a security conference in Bucharest in July 1991, EPC was born in 1969 when the members of the EEC agreed to engage in a process of consultations that would coordinate their foreign policy positions. EPC, however, was used more as a testing ground for future political unification (Veremis), until the mid-1970s, when the EPC played an important role in the preparation of the pan-European Conference on Security and Co-operation (CSCE). Five years later it tried to introduce the Community in the Middle-East political process with

its Declaration of Venice (1980). But only the thaw in East-West relations at the end of the 1980s and the subsequent debate over the future role of NATO made EPC a likely candidate for collective security issues.

The first test case emerged with the Yugoslav crisis, and the question of EPC effectiveness in conflict situations was clearly on the table. It seemed obvious from the very beginning that only the EC could assert enough pressure on the conflicting parties to avoid the use of arms. But particular interests - in Great Britain (the Northern Ireland problem), in Italy (the South Tyrol question), and in Spain (the Basque autonomy claims) - impeded EPC acknowledgement of Slovenian and Croatian independence at a time when this decision would have set clear signals for the right of self-determination in democratizing societies. Instead, the European Community backed Belgrade, and the Communist generals of the Yugoslav People's Army for too long, thereby implying international support for their war of conquest. Only in late fall of 1991, but too late for hundreds of civilians on both sides, the EC decided to engage itself more resolutely in favour of stopping a bloody war taking place only a couple of hours' drive from Trieste, Vienna or Munich! The threat of economic blockade is a serious instrument, and it should be used accordingly. It is in the economic sphere that South-East Europe is most vulnerable, and politicians in these countries are very well aware of this.

Human Rights and Democratization

In recent years the Council of Europe has assumed the position of "entrance institution" to the family of European democracies. The basic requirements for membership in the Council of Europe have become important challenges for the former Socialist countries, in particular as far as the human rights conditions are concerned. Admission to the Council of Europe opens the door for promising negotiations with the European Community for association or even membership status. The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, and Poland have taken this course and are close to signing their "European" association agreements. Bulgaria will probably follow early in 1992 when its special guest status in the Parliamentary Assembly is changed into full membership in the Council. The possible, and also realized, impact of the Council of Europe is thus obvious: it substantially helped to accelerate the democratization process in the region simply by its existence and by its requirements for membership, which became the basic norm for the improvement of human rights.

The Role of the CSCE

Reflections on the impacts of existing European institutions would not be complete if the CSCE was not mentioned. However, another paper for this conference (by A. Karaosmanoglu) deals extensively and very competently with the importance of the CSCE process for South-Eastern Europe's security. Therefore it should only be noted here (for the sake of the completeness of our reflections) that, after the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, the process of erosion in the Eastern part of Europe has irrevocably started. The three baskets have formulated the overall framework of intra- and international changes, and more and more citizens in the Eastern bloc referred in their protests to the signatures of their leaders on the Helsinki document. Thus, the CSCE process became the basic fundament on which the entire pan-European security pattern started to change completely, with the result that today the question of a new security architecture for Eastern and Western Europe has emerged. Only one of the current issues involves the question as to whether the instruments of the CSCE

should be enlarged. An attempt in this direction has already been made through the establishment of a Secretariat in Prague and a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna, as well as through the institution of a Committee of Senior Officials which will meet on an *ad hoc* basis. However, as the failure of these new CSCE institutions in the Yugoslav crisis proves, time and additional political efforts are still needed to make them effective.

To sum up: There is not a great deal of effective impact from the existing European institutions on the South-East European region, in particular on its security structures. This may be due to the relative weakness of these institutions which are democratically structured and thus characterized by difficult decision-making processes.

However, as the example of Western Europe proves, in the long run these institutions have been very successful in stabilizing and integrating extremely different nations.

Responses and Discussion

Yannis Valinakis

After the collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War, European History seems to be returning to the Europeans again. The era in which the Super Powers controlled Europe's destiny is probably coming to an end. As the forced tranquillity of Soviet control leaves with Soviet troops, will Eastern Europe once again miss opportunities as it did after World War I? Indeed, will South-East European nationalists revert to their intense rivalry and thus justify their reputation as Europe's *powder keg*? The new generation of Eastern European leaders who will guide these ex-communist states into the 1990s will have to provide innovative and realistic answers to these questions.

For forty years the Eastern European states have developed a complex fabric of relations, traditions and habits. The legacies of the past will therefore weigh heavily on their attitudes and calculations in the formulation of their new foreign and internal policies. Beyond that, they have little, if any, guidance as to how they should plan their future course. Major factors of change and the rapidity of new developments have rendered politically sound and financially sustainable choices more difficult than ever.

This state of flux and uncertainty is even more pronounced in South-Eastern Europe; too much and contradictory change on the one hand, and too little real and productive progress on the other, are rapidly leading to a mixture of fears which differs from country to country, but shakes their populations across the board.

The end of the Cold War has had contradictory consequences for South-Eastern Europe: on the one hand it has reduced the importance of the region as an area of potential Super Power confrontation; on the other hand, however, it has led to the emergence and proliferation of a number of ethnic problems (the Yugoslav case has been a microcosm of the type of future security threats). Additional tensions could stem from economic disparities, migration, or even environmental accidents.

Ethnic problems, long suppressed by the omnipotent Soviet presence, are about to resurface in the Balkans. As demonstrated by the Yugoslav case, the right of self-determination often clashes with the principle of the inviolability of state borders and differing views were adopted as to balancing these conflicting interests. On the one hand, since at least the Helsinki Accord of 1975, European security and stability have been based on the principle that international borders should not be altered through the use of force. On the other hand, however, the collapse of communism has created a new momentum for self-determination among Eastern European nationalists who are seemingly unaware of the escalation risks it entails.

Even though ethnic disputes are not necessarily inherently unmanageable, in the South-Eastern part of Europe they could be fuelled by minorities whose allegiance and loyalty belong to their countries of historical origin rather than to those of residence. In fact, minority issues tend to become particularly explosive when the following two conditions are met: (i) when the minority's birth rate is significantly higher than that of the majority (even at the regional level), and (ii) when a real or perceived "umbilical cord" ties a minority to a neighbouring country and the latter displays an attitude of "protecting" and "guaranteeing the security" of this minority. Ankara's attitude vis-à-vis the Turkish minority in Bulgaria or

Tirana's increasing interest in Kosovo's Albanians are two eloquent examples of the explosive potential of such minority issues.

Democratisation

Although communism has fallen apart in South-Eastern Europe as well, here the de-sovietization process was not linked to the dismantling of a Soviet military presence (no Soviet troops were stationed in the Balkans); it had more to do with the elimination of largely local versions of communism (with a sometimes strong personality or cult flavour): Enver Hoxha in Albania, Tito in Yugoslavia, Ceaucescu in Romania, Zhivkov in Bulgaria. This development of national variations adapted to the particular conditions of each country explains the resistance of communist forces in South-Eastern Europe, even after free elections.

In general terms, the democratization process in South-Eastern Europe has been among the slowest and most unstable in the former communist countries. The political development is still hesitant, and the situation in terms of human rights is unbalanced. Thus, the road to a Western-style pluralist democracy in the Balkans is fraught with risks and possible deviations or even U-turns (as shown in the case of the Soviet Union). Populist leaders or even dictators are still considered an option here, and the risks of coups cannot be disregarded.

Economic Restructuring

The introduction of a free-market economy in South-Eastern Europe has been a rather slow and hesitant process. The period of transformation is going to be painful and risky and the economic recession has already created widespread social unrest. These developments not only constitute destabilizing factors for these countries but are also already generating floods of refugees to the West. Albanian refugees to Italy and Greece are readily becoming an important issue; both countries have been forced to adopt strict measures of border policing, sending most of these refugees back to their home country.

Furthermore, governments of this region facing economic reunion and social unrest might be tempted to inflame nationalist passions (for example "in solidarity to fellow-countrymen" living as a minority in a neighbouring country) as a diversion from the internal chaotic situation.

The economic crisis has also brought back to the surface schemes of regional co-operation. Even though accession to the EC seems to be the most attractive solution, it is realistically regarded as a long-term goal; in the meantime, the cataclysmic changes in East-West relations have made possible new schemes of regional co-operation. The Italian-sponsored Hexagonal and the Turkish proposal for economic co-operation in the Black Sea have been two recent examples. However, vague and grandiose these proposals are usually intended as vehicles of political activism, as well as evidence of a desire for political reassurance and support in uncertain times.

The Inter-Balkan co-operation which succeeded during the Cold War era in bringing together all the Balkan states was another venue. Attempts were made during the 1970s and 80s at multilateral regional co-operation in the fields of trade, transport, energy, environment etc., but with no lasting success. Given a new series of complicating factors, such as the Yugoslav crisis, it would be rather surprising if the Balkan states could agree to new forms of multilateral co-operation in the short term. However, the tradition of working together and

the fact of some shared common features, as well as the product of sixteen years of conferences (plans, arrangements, etc.) could prove more resistant in the meantime.

Conclusions

The end of the Cold War has fundamentally affected South-Eastern Europe. Whereas the probability of an all-out nuclear war has diminished, instability and conflict in Eastern Europe have increased. Failures in reconstructing the economies of the former communist states and in building effective democracies in the region bring dangers of a return to authoritarian practices, the rise of populism and resort to military force. The resurgence of nationalism further aggravates the situation by generating violence and anti-status quo aspirations.

As a result of the end of the Cold War, the more regional concerns of the countries in South-Eastern Europe have come to the fore. At the same time, it is up to the states of the region themselves to see how they may best work together - without external interventions to enhance their security and solve their internal problems.

F. Stephen Larrabee

I have very few specific comments on the paper by Traian Chebeleu, as I agree with much of it, especially his thesis that the Balkans are becoming "topical" on the Euro-Atlantic agenda. I also agree that the two Super Powers have not always pursued coherent policies towards the Balkans. My remarks are therefore designed to supplement his paper rather than to critique it.

There is, however, one point a very important one - with which I disagree. Ambassador Chebeleu suggests that there has been renewed interest in the Balkans on the part of the Super Powers. I do not think this is really true. On the contrary, I think Super Power interest in the region has declined as the Cold War has receded. This is an important difference between the current period and previous periods, especially the postwar era.

In the early postwar period, South-Eastern Europe was a source of Super Power interest and conflict. US involvement in the area was a direct result of efforts to block Soviet expansion into the area, first through the Truman Doctrine and later, after the Stalin-Tito break, through aid to Yugoslavia. Over time, the US came to see the preservation of Yugoslavia's independence and unity as an interest "bordering on the vital".

The demise of the Cold War, however, has reduced the interest of both powers in South-Eastern Europe. Strategically, the USSR has lost its main foothold in the area (Bulgaria). Moreover, the internal problems which the USSR faces will make it difficult for the Soviet Union - or any successor state - to play a very active role in the Balkans in the near future.

Similarly, US interest in the area has also declined. The focus of American interests in the area is likely to shift with the end of the Cold War. In the future, the United States is likely to focus greater attention on the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. US interests in Turkey and, to a lesser extent Greece, will increasingly be viewed through the prism of "out of area" contingencies rather than the Soviet military threat, which has, for all practical purposes, evaporated.

In addition, Greece and Turkey's relations with the US may begin to increasingly diverge. Over the long run Greece's policy is likely to witness an increasing Europeanization as a result of Greece's closer integration into the EC. As a consequence, Athens is likely to

become cautious about taking measures in the security area that diverge from the EC consensus.

Turkey's ties to Washington have been strengthened by its strong support for the US in the Gulf War. Ankara's relations with Europe, however, remain cool. If Turkey begins to feel increasingly excluded from the creation of a European security identity, it could seek to intensify security ties with the United States. There is a danger, however, that this bilateralization of security ties might overburden the US-Turkish relationship, adding new strains. Moreover, Turkey's expectations regarding the degree of financial support it can receive from Washington may prove difficult to fulfil, especially in an area of budget constraints and reduced foreign aid.

The Yugoslav crisis highlights the shift in Super Power interests and approach to the region. In the past the preservation of Yugoslavia as an integral state had been seen as an important US interest. Moscow also had taken a strong interest in Yugoslavia. In the present crisis, however, neither Super Power has played a major role and both have preferred to let the EC manage the crisis. Indeed, the marginal role played by both Super Powers is one of the most striking features of the present crisis.

The low profile adopted by the US in the Yugoslav crisis raised major questions about the American role in the Balkans and Europe more generally. Many Europeans view the low profile approach as an indication that Washington no longer intends to play a major role in European affairs. This perception could contribute to the marginalization of the US in Europe and undercut its ability to play a constructive role in shaping the new European security order over the long run. The policy risks overburdening the EC with intractable problems before it has had a chance to develop the political and military instruments necessary to successfully manage such a sensitive issue.

Todor Ditchev

Since we are discussing security, I cannot but emphasize from the outset the indisputable contribution of the United Nations Organization in the consideration of security and disarmament issues. I am convinced that the role of the United Nations in this field will continue to grow.

Over the past few years, and even months, security perceptions have changed at an amazing speed owing to many factors. Foremost among them are:

- the overcoming of the Cold War situation;
- the radical transformations in Eastern Europe and the latest events in the USSR, which have enabled those countries to embark on the road to democracy and market economies;
- the deepening of the political and economic integration of Europe, which is characterized by elements of common co-operation on security issues within the framework of the pan-European process;
- the transition of the world from a bipolar to a multipolar system of interaction;
- and last but not least, the renovated role of the United Nations in security and disarmament issues.

Today, the very notion of security is undergoing changes. Security implicates not just military and strategic positions and interests. Security has taken on new dimensions, ranging from environmental protection to processes of migration, from communication to human rights.

It is in this context that I would like to share with you some observations concerning the relations between Bulgaria and the USSR. Both countries have gone through drastic change. Currently, Bulgaria is striving with all its strength to rediscover itself and to open up to the world. This is a rare moment in our history, whose rationality is still to be vindicated. This is not possible, however, unless we get active assistance from all developed countries, including our immediate neighbours. At this juncture I should like to draw your attention to the fact that nowadays, when many regions and individual countries throughout the world are scoring successes in the field of democracy and eliminating the remains of the Cold War, the Balkans continue to be a place with ethnic antagonisms, national rivalries, religious tensions, personal ambitions, etc. The dramatic history of the Balkans has led to the coining of the famous expression *Balkanization*. Many politicians and politologists have used and still resort to the expression *Balkanization of international relations*.

Balkan history, however, is constantly on the move. The Republic of Bulgaria, for instance, has recently taken many positive steps to overcome tensions in this area. Bulgaria took an active part in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. It stated its willingness to become a member of NATO, after having intensified its relations with that Organization. Bulgaria has declared that it will not sign with the Soviet Union any treaty that would include military provisions. My Government has retired scores of generals and high-ranking officers from high military command positions; it has sent officers to the United States for retraining; it has invited and shown warm hospitality to the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Manfred Wornier. The flagman ship of the Sixth US fleet, with the Fleet Commander on board, paid a visit to a Bulgarian port; a Bulgarian military contingent has been included for the first time in the "Blue Helmets" of the United Nations. These facts speak for themselves. They also describe the evolution of Bulgaria with respect to its own national security perceptions. The same is valid for our domestic and foreign policies. For the first time since World War II we have a Head of State who was also a leader of the opposition forces, Dr. Jelio Jeleu. The Government is, after half a century of one-party Cabinets, led by a non-political personality, the jurist Dimitar Popov. The new parliament, or Grand National Assembly, as it is called, was freely elected last year. It has adopted a package of laws that constitute a solid legislative basis for our market economy. May I be allowed to say that Bulgaria is the only country in Eastern Europe that has adopted a new Constitution following the radical democratic changes, on the basis of which it derives its full legality as a Republic. I am not quite sure whether the same is valid for the other countries of the former Socialist "camp", although the word camp was changed in the official documents to the word "system" owing to etymological considerations. However, it became apparent in the end that the "camp" was where we stood, with the system being somewhere else.

At present, Bulgaria is not in a position to take care of its national security alone. As I pointed out, we have terminated our bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union, a treaty which included security-related clauses. Furthermore, the Warsaw Pact is now a subject of research for the historians. At the same time there exists in the area a military potential which took decades to create and which could be used in geo-political conflicts. Today, such conflicts are not feasible any more due to a radically new political situation, but there is a military potential that continues to be there. According to some reports this potential is being continuously increased and modernized. Modern weapons, stationed until recently in Central

Europe, are being transferred to South Eastern Europe and its vicinity. This is having an unbalancing effect on the security of our continent, particularly in the Balkans, where this effect is much more tangible. I do not doubt that any participant here correctly assess the well-founded nature of our concern. It is not necessary to go too far back in history in order to be convinced of the legitimate apprehensions of Bulgaria. In keeping with the above, I should like to strongly endorse the very recent idea of German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of a ban on both Soviet and American short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. Mr. Genscher is right when he says that the disarmament momentum should be accelerated, specifically in the form of a world-wide ban on short-range nuclear weapons, meaning missiles, artillery and other weaponry with ranges shorter than 500 kilometres (three hundred miles). In a personal capacity, I appeal to all Balkan States to embrace this idea.

Against the background of these recent developments - I would like to give a more detailed description of the cardinal changes in Bulgaria's national security policy.

In August 1990 President Jelio Jeleu visited Washington where he was received by President George Bush. This was the first such presidential encounter since the establishment of Bulgarian-US relations. President Jeleu's visit was not just a courtesy visit. In Washington he proclaimed loudly that "Bulgaria is not a communist country any more". After Washington he visited London and Paris. Just yesterday he returned from an official visit to Germany.

All this cannot but make me ask myself, purely as a Bulgarian: "Who is currently guaranteeing the security of my country? For, as the old wisdom goes, one that the British are fond of repeating: "Right or wrong - it is my country!" Today, millions of Bulgarian citizens are asking themselves this question. It is a heated debate at home whether we should guarantee our national security alone, by bilateral or regional alliances, within the framework of the pan-European process or at the global level. Where is the truth in all this? the Bulgarians ask themselves. Should we go as far as allowing military bases of foreign countries on our territory, or should we write off completely such an eventuality? And what about this nightmare of regional threats versus the opposing concept of "peaceful engagement"? Personally I favour firmly the second option, the peaceful engagement of the Balkans, along with the reduction and elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, sharp cuts in conventional armaments, the restructuring of military doctrines exclusively - defensive precepts, doctrines aiming at ensuring adequate protection. This should go hand-in-hand with a constant increase in economic well-being which is, viewed from a long-term perspective, the basis of true security in the region.

The past is inextricably linked to the present, and both are linked to the future. This statement is valid for each one of us and for all of us together. It is valid for domestic and foreign policies. Our goal today could not be other than contributing to the best of our ability, individually or collectively, to the building of a new Balkans. The ideas of democracy, human rights and security for all have their deep historic roots in our region. Today, they have a promising basis for new blossoming. Such is the quintessence of national security in South-Eastern Europe.

The role of the United States within the European security context, and its effect on security in the Balkans, should be duly considered. Nowadays, certain circles are apprehensive of increased US influence around the world, particularly in Europe. I am well aware of some reservations and concerns in this respect. It is understandable that Europe must want to be European, but, at the same time, I am of the view that the United States has nothing to gain from a politically and economically subordinate Europe. It cannot be denied that South-Eastern Europe continues to be of vital importance in global security policies. At the same

time, Balkan countries should increase their support for United Nations actions in their region aimed at safeguarding peace, improving living conditions, preventing human suffering, and so on. Solving the security issues of South-Eastern Europe requires a new agenda time-table, an all-Balkan agenda and time-table capable of dealing with the issues of refugees, violations of human rights, the deteriorating environment, etc.

The European Community, NATO, and the Council of Europe are the three pillars around which is materializing the *fabric* of newly-emerging European institutions whose historical role is to be the driving force in the creation of a radically new Europe. The more intensive the weaving of the new European *tapestry*, the speedier will be the demise of founded or unfounded apprehensions - for instance, the notion that democracy can not go hand-in-hand with national security. Such views are not unfounded within the European context, especially in its South-Eastern region, of which Bulgaria is a part. At this stage it is difficult to say which structures will finally shape the new Europe and its South-Eastern region - whether it will be the present aforementioned structures or the newly-emerging ones, including sub-regional structures. Most probably, this would come as a result of a "natural selection" on the road to unification of the European East with the European West on the basis of democratic ideals. This mixed scenario is a most likely one. South-Eastern Europe could do much in this respect by taking the lead in providing a suitable example. Our Seminar in Rhodes could even become a starting point in achieving this objective.

May I now touch upon a specific aspect of the interrelationship between economic stability and security. This issue is perfectly clear. The more economically stable a country is, the more genuinely guaranteed is its national security. However, societies and individuals do not live for themselves only; they do not exist in a world separate from the world of other societies and individuals. All societies and individuals are interrelated and mutually interdependent. Let me take the case of Bulgaria as an example. The downfall of the planned economy, coupled with the lack of established market mechanisms, has disorganized economic activity. Consequently, according to this argument, the national security of the State is now lowered as well. Early this year the new Government adopted a series of measures designed to stabilize the economy and thereby enhance our national security at the same time. Bulgaria became a member of the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Monetary Fund; it was granted associated member status in the Council of Europe, negotiations will be conducted for admission to the GATT in the near-future. We also expect to enter the Common Market in a few years.

I should like to share with you sincerely that Bulgaria is a proud nation. There is a full awareness of our situation, and we are analyzing the causes for the deep crisis - or catastrophe, to put it more precisely - that befell our country. The historic facts demonstrate that Bulgaria's fate was pre-decided without her own participation some 50 years ago in Yalta and Potsdam, when others made the decision for her as to which political and economic zone she would belong to. What ensued from there on is well known.

To illustrate this historic context may I make a comparison between just two facts. I believe this is acceptable because comparison is one of the well-established methods of scientific analysis.

First, in 1908 US President Theodore Roosevelt stated that in terms of economic growth rates Bulgaria ranked second in the world, after Japan.

Second, at the beginning of World War II the Bulgarian lev continued to be a "gold" currency, meaning that it was convertible, while official statistics pointed out that in Bulgaria the standard of living was twice that of its southern neighbour. I refrain from commenting on

the standard of living of Bulgaria today. In Yalta and Potsdam, different decisions could have been made: for instance, the frontier between East and West in South-Eastern Europe could have followed natural divides, such as the Mediterranean or the River Danube. In that case another country or other countries would be in the same pitiful situation in which Bulgaria is today, national security included, while in the latter case, Bulgaria would surely be in a better situation today, like that of other Western European countries, economically and security-wise.

I am not a professional jurist, but I do know that according to the generally-accepted tenets of law and morality, when a country does not participate in a given international agreement, it cannot be considered as bound by its provisions. If, on the other hand, a country suffers material or moral damages or fails to acquire specific benefits from the action of such an agreement, it is totally natural and warranted that the concerned country lays its claim for a corresponding compensation.

I said earlier that the Bulgarians are a proud lot. We hold the view that the West owes us assistance - now, not tomorrow - assistance we need in order to restore our economic ascension which was discontinued half a century ago, not by our own doing. Of course, we would return this assistance, but we vitally need it now both for our own national security and for the security of the region in which we live. Otherwise, all the positive things that have taken place in Bulgaria over the past few months may be doomed to failure, because the people cannot wait interminably in lines for bread, milk, medication, heating, electricity, and so on. There is a real danger for civil disturbances, for chaos caused by economic destabilization and, ultimately, for destabilization of the political and economic foundations of our national security. We urgently need a new, humane and just, rereading of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, so that reason may finally be triumphant, so that economic stability is achieved while security is strengthened.

A few words about neutrality, security, and South-Eastern Europe. There is a group of countries in the European political setting which have officially proclaimed their neutrality in international politics - Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, Finland. There is also another group of States, like Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, which have defined their political credo to be non-participation in any alliances whatsoever. Those two groups of States are known as the N + N, meaning neutral and non-aligned. It should be added that on 24 August 1991, the Ukrainian Ambassador, at the Geneva United Nations Office, Guennadi Ondorenko stressed during a news Conference that the Ukraine wants to be a "neutral State guided by three non-nuclear principles": non-production, non-use and non-possession of nuclear weapons in the Ukraine.

The N + N Group asserted itself within the Helsinki process, especially during the 1980-1983 Madrid Meeting. This was followed by the meetings in Stockholm, Vienna and others, culminating at the Paris meeting where agreement was reached that, following the coming Helsinki-2 Conference in 1992, the two types of negotiations on disarmament - the negotiations of the 22 States on the reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Armaments and the negotiations of the 34 States on Confidence-Building Measures should be united. This would to a significant degree help to overcome the bloc approach in negotiations on disarmament, and would also take into account the military potentials of the N + N States, since some of them possess quite a serious military potential.

Why am I trying to draw your attention to the principle of neutrality, a principle that is as topical as in times past? The practical content of various elements constituting this principle has been subject to change over past periods, but the essence of the policy of

neutrality is vital, it has stood the test of time and it certainly has a bright future. The transition from bloc structures to a pan-European security framework requires an active involvement on the part of all States, the N + N inclusive, for they are a respected factor, an viable expression of pragmatism in the CSCE. If I were allowed a glimpse into the future of Europe, I would conclude that this would be a continent characterized by neutrality politics, free of any military alliances. The South-Eastern part of our continent has every reason to be a leading region in this regard.

Abdi Baleta

Dans le cadre de la discussion générale de ce matin je voudrais réagir à propos du rapport de M. Miodrag Mihajlovic. Il me semble que tout ce qui est dit dans ce texte à propos de l'Albanie et des albanais est inexacte et infondé. J'ajoute que la question des albanais en Yougoslavie ne peut être traitée comme une question de minorité nationale, parce qu'il s'agit d'une nation qui s'efforce pacifiquement à réaliser ses droits nationaux légitimes sur la base du principe du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes. Les aspects historiques du problème sont traités d'une manière tout à fait inexacte. Au lieu de parler de l'albanisation du Kossovo serbe, il faut parler de la serbisation du Kossovo albanais. S'il y a un peuple qui a été chassé, décimé, exterminé au Kossovo, ce sont justement les albanais et non les serbes.

Je regrette de me voir obligé d'intervenir à propos du rapport présenté par M. Miodrag Mihajlovic, intitulé "Changements internes dans les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est". Quand je suis parti de mon pays pour la belle île de Rhodes et pour jouir de l'hospitalité grecque bien connue, je ne pouvais pas m'imaginer des surprises inopportunes et deviner que je devrais affronter des déclarations anti-albanaises comme celles contenues dans le rapport de M. Mihajlovic. Je dois avouer que de telles déclarations m'ont étonné, parce que je trouve qu'elles sont en contradiction flagrante avec l'esprit qui doit animer les travaux de cette conférence, et surtout parce qu'elles sont malveillantes, profondément hostiles à la nation albanaise et visent à jeter les participants de la conférence et l'opinion publique dans la confusion quant à la situation actuelle du Kossovo et l'histoire du peuple albanais. Je dois encore avouer qu'à mon départ je n'ai point songé à me munir de matériaux et de données précises concernant les changements de la population du Kossovo (actuellement République du Kossovo) parce que je ne croyait pas me trouver en cette occasion face à une intervention que je ne peux qualifier que de "provocation". Pour cette raison, je suis donc obligé d'opérer avec ce que je peux retenir par coeur de mes lectures de documents.

Mais je peux vous assurer, Mesdames et Messieurs, que les données fournies par le rapport de M. Mihajlovic non seulement ne correspondent pas à la réalité, mais cherchent encore à renverser complètement la vérité déjà bien établie scientifiquement, au profit des thèses serbes périmées et des convoitises actuelles de Belgrade pour faire revivre les fantasmes du Moyen Age et pour justifier les préparatifs de massacres nouveaux contre les albanais.

Si quelqu'un a le droit de se plaindre d'être discriminé, chassé, exterminé sans cesse pendant presque 200 ans au Kossovo, ce serait les albanais. On nous parle d'un mouvement séparatiste albanais au Kossovo aidé par l'Albanie (faites attention, les albanais qui manifestent pacifiquement au Kossovo seraient des "séparatistes (...), et les serbes qui provoquent des affrontements violents en Croatie sur l'instigation de Belgrade agiraient en "auto-défense"). A ce propos, je dois dire sans équivoque que le problème des albanais en Yougoslavie ne peut aucunement être déformé par des accusations de séparatisme. Il n'est pas

question d'un mouvement séparatiste albanais au Kosovo, mais d'une lutte populaire et pacifique d'une nation (la nation albanaise) pour obtenir ses droits nationaux inaliénables sur la base du principe bien connu du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes, et pour jouir des mêmes droits que les autres nations dans l'Etat yougoslave multinational. Quant à l'Albanie, c'est injustement qu'elle est accusée. L'Albanie a le droit d'être solidaire et de soutenir la lutte pour l'auto-détermination de la nation albanaise en Yougoslavie comme toute autre lutte de ce genre dans les limites permises par le droit international. Mais l'Albanie n'a pas su ni pu le faire pour plusieurs raisons d'ordre international et interne, et surtout parce qu'elle a été longtemps dominée par une équipe de dirigeants communistes qui, depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale et la lune de miel dans les rapports albanos-yougoslaves, dans les années 1944-48 et par la suite, ont sacrifié les intérêts légitimes de la population albanaise en Yougoslavie au profit de "l'internationalisme" et des rapports étroits entre communistes albanais et yougoslaves. D'autre part, la Yougoslavie a réussi par sa politique et par des moyens divers à imposer à l'Albanie des situations très difficiles sur le plan international et à l'intérieur du pays. A Belgrade on doit savoir cela mieux que n'importe où et ne pas prétendre que l'Albanie a aidé le "mouvement séparatiste" au Kosovo.

Les albanais de Yougoslavie ne peuvent en aucune manière être considérés et traités comme une minorité nationale. Ils ont tous les traits d'une nation. Ils sont, quant au nombre, le troisième groupe national après les serbes et les croates. Ils ont non seulement le droit, mais la volonté et la détermination de prendre place comme nation, égale avec les autres. Il y a exactement un an, le 7 septembre 1991, l'Assemblée des députés élus par la population du Kosovo a proclamé la République du Kosovo, territoire qui se trouve actuellement sous occupation militaire par la Serbie. Le gouvernement albanais n'a pas, jusqu'à ce jour, reconnu cette République, malgré les demandes réitérées de l'opinion publique albanaise et des députés de l'opposition au parlement. Voilà un autre témoignage qui prouve que l'Albanie officielle a "aidé" les albanais de Yougoslavie, que certains qualifie de "séparatistes".

Je tiens aussi à affirmer que les albanais du Kosovo et de Yougoslavie en général, ne sont pas non plus une minorité si l'on tient compte de leur rapport avec l'autre partie de la nation albanaise. Ils sont aussi nombreux que les albanais citoyens de la République d'Albanie. Les albanais en Yougoslavie sont autochtones depuis des temps immémoriaux. Ils habitent, à une forte concentration et en masse très compacte, des territoires bien déterminés, qui forment des unités politiques, géographiques, culturelles, historiques et ethnographiques distinctes et bien précises. Un fait plus important encore est que les albanais du Kosovo ont fait clairement savoir, par la voix de leurs hommes de sciences et de culture les plus éminents, par leurs hommes politiques les plus populaires, par tous les intellectuels et finalement par le peuple entier, qu'ils rejettent la thèse serbe qui cherche à leur imposer un statut de minorité nationale, thèse qui joue également le rôle de cheval de bataille dans le rapport de M. Mihajlovic, mais qui est périmée depuis bien longtemps face à la réalité. Les albanais du Kosovo ont fait savoir de façon résolue qu'ils n'accepteront jamais d'être à nouveau réduits au stade de minorité nationale, ce qui serait renoncer à leurs droits nationaux.

Dans le rapport on retrouve la thèse largement rabattue par la propagande de Belgrade à propos des efforts des albanais pour mettre sur pied la "Grande Albanie". Ce concept n'a été ni inventé ni utilisé par les albanais, mais par les serbes, pour justifier les actes anti-albanais. L'Albanie ne peut et ne doit être ni grande, ni petite, ni moyenne, mais elle-même, comme tout autre Etat national, c'est-à-dire l'Albanie. C'est par contre l'Etat serbe qui historiquement et actuellement cherche à devenir la "Grande Serbie", en prétendant inclure même des villages serbes qui existent quelque part comme enclaves.

L'albanisation du Kosovo entre 1966-1988 est difficilement concevable et tout-à-fait contraire aux faits. Je doute qu'il y ait quelqu'un pour la prendre au sérieux. Cette histoire ne saurait devenir vraie en prétendant que 220.000 serbes ont été chassés du Kosovo pendant cette période. C'est un autre fait surprenant de constater l'allégation que, depuis le congrès de Berlin de 1878, jusqu'à 1988, 600.000 serbes ont été chassés du Kosovo. Mais comment et par qui ce nombre fantastique de serbes a été chassé. Or on sait bien que jamais, jusqu'au début de la colonisation serbe en 1913 dans la région du Kosovo, il n'y a eu de quantité importante de serbes. Bien au contraire, après le Congrès de Berlin, les serbes ont massacré et chassé plus d'une centaine de milliers d'albanais des régions de Toplica, Prokouple, les alentours du Nish. Après l'occupation du Kosovo en 1912-1913, ils ont perpétré des massacres successifs et chassé les albanais pour changer le caractère ethnique de la région. Les chiffres fournis dans le rapport de M. Mihajlovic sont calculés pour induire en erreur l'opinion européenne et balkanique et pour justifier les visées serbes d'entreprendre une nouvelle colonisation du Kosovo.

Il est complètement faux de prétendre que des albanais d'Albanie se soient introduits au Kosovo pour prendre les maisons et les propriétés des serbes. Il n'y a eu que quelques centaines de fugitifs albanais qui se sont installés temporairement au Kosovo après la deuxième guerre mondiale, et qui ont ensuite quitté la Yougoslavie de leur propre gré ou de force.

Si l'on veut apprendre la vérité sur le Kosovo, il faut se référer aux faits historiques. La Serbie a toujours mené une politique féroce de dénationalisation du Kosovo albanais par tous les moyens. Cette politique a été présentée de façon claire et nette dans de nombreuses études politiques et scientifiques serbes, et surtout dans les deux rapports "tristement fameux" de l'académicien serbe Vasa Tchoubrilovitch, l'un présenté devant le club culturel Serbe en 1937 et l'autre envoyé à Tito en 1944, et qui contenait des propositions concrètes pour exterminer la population albanaise. En fait, la politique serbe d'extermination a été et reste constante. Depuis le début du XXe, environ 1.000.000 d'albanais ont été massacrés ou chassés du Kosovo. A plusieurs reprises les serbes ont provoqué, par la terreur et les ruses, des exodes massifs d'albanais. Au milieu des années 1950 par exemple, plus de 300.000 albanais ont quitté la Yougoslavie pour aller s'installer en Turquie. En 1944-1945 l'Armée yougoslave de libération nationale, de concert avec les bandes serbes, ont tué 50.000 albanais. 4.000 jeunes albanais qui avaient été mobilisés pour le front de guerre contre les nazis ont été amenés et massacrés à Tivar comme des moutons. Et que dire encore des centaines de milliers d'autres qui sont obligés d'aller en Europe, aux Etats-Unis, ou en Australie pour chercher du travail. Il est vrai que les albanais ont une forte natalité et que leur croissance démographique est plus importante que celle des serbes. Mais faut-il encore penser à leurs imposer des quotas de naissance. Va-t-on vraiment, pour plaire à la politique de domination serbe au Kosovo, s'ingérer dans les affaires du lit conjugal ? Je me demande qui est alors victime de discrimination au Kosovo: les serbes ou les albanais ?

Il serait long de rejeter point par point les allégations concernant la manipulation et l'utilisation de la population albanaise par l'empire ottoman, les nazis, les séparatistes, les mouvements fascistes européens et yougoslaves aujourd'hui contre l'intégrité de la Serbie. Mais je crois que tout le monde peut facilement se rendre compte que de telles allégations ne peuvent avoir force d'arguments. L'autre thèse serbe qui consiste à présenter le Kosovo comme le berceau de l'identité spirituelle, politique, culturelle serbe, parce qu'elle a fait partie de l'Etat serbe du Roi Dushan au moyen-âge. C'est ici le malheur du chauvinisme serbe. Il tente de faire revenir sur la scène historique le moyen-âge. Mais à ce moment d'autres terres

balkaniques ont été occupées par les serbes. Et puis il ne faut pas oublier que les ancêtres des albanais étaient au Kosovo avant l'arrivée des premiers immigrants serbes. Si l'on parle de droit d'occupation tous les Balkans devraient tomber dans les mains d'autres Etats.

Un avertissement trop sérieux est lancé concernant les conséquences tragiques qui pourraient se produire pour la paix et la sécurité en Europe si la situation au Kosovo n'est pas contrôlée comme il faut. Il est clair que la Serbie cherche à faire monter la tension pour réaliser ses propres visées. On voit aussi cela en Croatie, où la main de Belgrade crée des troubles et des conflits. Cette politique est très dangereuse et ne peut aboutir à rien de bon. Pour servir la paix et la sécurité en Europe il faut reconnaître et garantir les droits nationaux des albanais en Yougoslavie et ne pas les massacrer ou les opprimer. Il est vrai que l'Europe ne peut pas se sentir tranquille sans que la question nationale albanaise aboutisse à une solution juste et acceptable d'un point de vue du droit, de la justesse historique et des réalités contemporaines. Des écoles pour quelques prétendues minorités monténégrines et serbes en Albanie sont demandées. Mais il n'est pas possible de satisfaire cette demande pour la simple raison qu'il n'existe pas de telle minorité. Peut-on considérer comme minorité un poignée de familles d'immigrants ? Combien d'immigrants y a-t-il partout dans le monde ? Parlant de minorité on n'hésite pas d'essayer de créer de fausses impressions à propos de la minorité grecque en Albanie en évoquant le chiffre de 350.000 grecs. Il n'y en a que 58.000.

Une dernière remarque. M. Mihajlovic écrit dans son rapport: "... dans les Balkans, en Bulgarie, Roumanie et en particulier en Albanie, la démocratie reste à être instaurée". Oui, en Albanie nous avons vraiment besoin d'une démocratie plus large et véritable et nous travaillons pour cela. Mais c'est la Serbie qui est trop en retard quant aux changements démocratiques.

Ignac Golob

Worries and fears for the future of security in South-East Europe seem to be the clearest common denominator of the debate this morning. These fears are mostly situated in the context of the status quo or, more precisely, the notion that security may be maintained in the framework of the status quo. This is out of tune with some important present-day facts.

The fall of the Berlin wall symbolized the beginning of changes in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union. These changes are no doubt going to affect the rest of Europe in the long run. Changes are like rivers - they cannot be stopped arbitrarily or be allowed to engulf only some specifically chosen and targeted subjects. The changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are now engulfing the undemocratic relationships in some countries that were kept together by authoritarianism, earlier of dynastic origins and later of an ideological character.

In this, "undemocratic" is the key word, since the changes in Berlin are about democracy. Democracy nationally and internationally is a *spiritus movens* of all these changes.

This has brought about the speedy unification of Germany and all the requests and efforts for the implementation of self-determination in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Democracy and its future is at stake.

It is commendable how this was widely understood in the case of Germany. It is regrettable how this is not understood in the case of Yugoslavia. Some people that I know had "self-determination" on their lips for forty years, but now that the issue has come to their door, they are trying to avoid it. There is no way of ducking the issue or pretending that this is all about "illegal secessionist" action, on the part of republics or governments.

In Slovenia 97% of voters voted in favour of independence at secret polls. To claim that 97% of the Slovenes are "illegal" or in violation of law is unreasonable, to say the least. Slovenes have decided for independence in a fully democratic way. Slovenia is not aiming to live in isolation. Slovenes want to be independent and be open to co-operation with all.

It has become fashionable to speak about "nationalist passions". Why not take a dispassionate view and understand that we are not dealing with passions but with the refusal to honor the right of self-determination?

The United Nations Organization and its role in the area has not been mentioned yet. No doubt the United Nations will play a role in the conflicts in the Balkans. Its first and most important peace-keeping role was in this area, in Greece at the end of the 1940s. It is interesting to note that the United Nations has been involved in security or peace issues in Europe only in the Balkans or the outer edges of this area (Trieste, South Tyrol, the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, the threat of Soviet intervention in Yugoslavia in 1949/50 and the afore mentioned case of civil war in Greece).

The United Nations will have to play a role in Balkans, perhaps sooner than any of us thinks.

Part II

Present State of Security of the South-East European Countries

Chapter 4

Military Postures and Doctrines of the South-East European Countries

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Introduction¹

Definition

In the various data and information included in this paper, the countries referred to as "South-Eastern European countries" or for brevity "the Balkans" or "Balkan countries" are, in alphabetical order, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Some might also include the South-Western areas of the Soviet Union (Republics of Moldavia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaidzan) and also the republic of Cyprus. However, for the purposes of this paper I would like to concentrate only on the Balkan countries, recognising that Turkey, although partly a Balkan country, is located for the most part outside of Europe.

Area

The Balkans constitute a large territorial group with a total area of 1,546,610 square kilometres, from the northern borders of Yugoslavia and Romania to the island of Crete, and from the Adriatic Sea to the Turko-Iranian Borders. To make the size of this territory better understood one could say that the area of the Balkans is roughly equal to the aggregate area of Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany. (Table 1 gives a detailed analysis of the area by individual country.)

Borders/Coastline

The total length of the external land borders of the six Balkan countries (excluding borders with each other) is 5,163 km while the total length of their extensive coastline is 27,097 km, a huge length of borders not at all easy to defend. The Balkan countries share borders with 7 other countries (Italy, Austria, Hungary, the USSR, Iran, Iraq and Syria). In particular the Greek and the Dalmatian coasts of Yugoslavia are endowed with thousands of islands and many safe ports and anchorages where naval forces could be accommodated. (Table 2 gives details on borders and coastlines by individual country.)

Terrain Characteristics

The Balkan terrain is mainly mountainous, especially in Yugoslavia (with the exception of the north-eastern parts and some central and eastern plateaus and valleys) Albania, Greece (with some flat areas in the central parts of Thessaly and Macedonia) and Turkey (excluding its European section of Turkish Thrace and some small strips near the coast of Asiatic Turkey). Bulgaria has a long mountain chain running through its central region along its southern border with Greece, and along its western borders with Yugoslavia, with relatively

¹ All information contained in this paper is unclassified and represents personal views of the author not necessarily reflecting NATO views.

large plains in the South, South-East, East and North along the Romanian borders. Finally, Romania, except for the bulk of the Carpathian mountains in the centre, is made up low-elevation terrain. The mountain chains, however, form many tank-passable valleys in all of these countries, which traditionally have been used for launching military operations against the Balkan countries.

Table 1: Defence Posture and Military Doctrines Area and Population Data

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Area (km²)</i> | <i>% of Total Area</i> | <i>Population</i> | <i>Density</i> | <i>Labour Force</i> |
|----------------|------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|----------------|---------------------|
| Albania | 28,748 | 1.86 | 3,273,131 | 195.4 | 1,500,000 |
| Bulgaria | 110,910 | 7.18 | 8,933,544 | 80.5 | 4,300,000 |
| Greece | 131,957 | 8.54 | 10,028,171 | 76.0 | 4,046,000 |
| Romania | 237,500 | 15.36 | 23,273,285 | 98.0 | 11,129,000 |
| Turkey | 780,695 | 50.51 | 56,704,327 | 72.6 | 18,680,000 |
| Yugoslavia | 255,800 | 16.55 | 23,841,606 | 93.2 | 9,600,000 |
| Total | 1,546,610 | 100.00 | 126,054,066 | 81.5 | 49,255,000 |

Table 2: Borders and Coastlines of Balkan Countries

| <i>Countries</i> | <i>Coastline (kms)</i> | <i>Borders - Total (kms)</i> | |
|------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|---|
| Albania | 362 | 768 | (Greece: 282 - Yugoslavia: 486) |
| Bulgaria | 354 | 1,881 | (Greece: 494 Romania: 608) |
| Greece | 15,021 | 1,228 | (Albania: 282 Bulgaria: 494) (Turkey: 206 - Yugoslavia: 246) |
| Romania | 225 | 2,904 | (Bulgaria: 608 Hungary: 443) (USSR: 1,307 - Yugoslavia: 546) |
| Turkey | 7,200 | 2,715 | (Bulgaria: 240 - Greece: 206) (Iran: 499 - Iraq: 331) (USSR: 617 - Syria: 822) |
| Yugoslavia | 3,935 | 2,961 | (Albania: 486 Austria: 311) (Bulgaria: 539 Greece: 246) (Hungary: 631 - Italy: 202) (Romania: 546) |

Population

The Balkans are not very densely populated due to the mountainous and inhospitable terrain in most parts of their territory. The total population is 126,054,066 with an overall density of 81.5 inhabitants per square kilometre. This population (by 1990 estimates) is roughly equal to the aggregate population of Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. As can be seen on Table 1, although Turkey has the largest population, it has the lowest population density. On the other hand Albania has the smallest population but its population density is extremely high - 2.7 times that of Turkey, or 2.4 times the average for the Balkans. This last element, coupled with the extremely high growth rate of Albania's population - 2.5% per year - indicates that sooner or later Albania will have to consider expanding itself to accommodate its oversized and explosively-increasing population.

Table 3 outlines the defence-related demographic information for the Balkans. It is interesting to note that the number of young males fit for service and of drafting age in the 6 countries amounts to 1,153,263. With an average of 20 months of military service in the Balkans, the 6 countries could have a total of 1,922,105 conscripts in service without mobilisation or a peacetime armed force totaling 2.6 million men if the current number of regular personnel were serving in the armed forces. This military manpower potential of the Balkans is truly stunning if one considers that the total peacetime manpower of the 16 NATO countries in Europe is 3.1 million. The Balkan military potential is therefore approximately 84% of the total NATO manpower in Europe. Also interesting to note from Table 3 is the very high growth rate of Albania and Turkey (around 2.5% per year), which is 5 times greater than that of Yugoslavia and Romania, nearly 17 times greater than that of Greece and 31 times greater than the growth rate of Bulgaria. This is especially significant if it is considered as an underlying factor potentially conditioning the foreign and security policy of those two countries.

Table 3: Military Demographic Information

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Males</i> | <i>Military Age Males (15-49)</i> | <i>Males Fit for Military Service</i> | <i>Drafting Age Males Fit for Military Service</i> | <i>Population Growth Rate</i> |
|----------------|-------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| Albania | 1,678,600 | 882,965 | 729,635 | 33,598 | 2.50 |
| Bulgaria | 4,409,600 | 2,177,404 | 1,823,111 | 66,744 | 0.08 |
| Greece | 4,933,860 | 2,418,754 | 1,861,141 | 73,809 | 0.15 |
| Romania | 11,492,200 | 5,736,783 | 4,860,427 | 193,537 | 0.53 |
| Turkey | 28,698,264 | 14,413,944 | 8,813,430 | 597,547 | 2.35 |
| Yugoslavia | 11,844,600 | 6,135,628 | 4,970,420 | 188,028 | 0.52 |
| Total | 63,057,124 | 31,765,478 | 23,058,164 | 1,153,263 | |

Minorities

One of the striking characteristics of the Balkans is the great diversity presented by the multitude of religious and ethnic minorities that tends to complicate immensely the various

local disputes and makes efforts for increased security in the area much more difficult. In terms of religion, 49.6% of the Balkan population is Muslim, 39% Eastern Orthodox, 7.5% is Roman Catholic, and the remaining 3.9% are Protestants, Jews, and other groups. The politically-motivated movements by Turkey to strengthen its ties with the Muslim populations in the Balkans, the *rapprochement* of Greece with Eastern Orthodox groups, again for political reasons, and the fierce struggle in Yugoslavia between the Eastern Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Slovenes and Croats all indicate how politically important the religious affiliations of the various minorities can be from a security standpoint.

However, the social groupings scenario is far more fragmented than the mention of these religious minority groups suggests. The fragmentation is further complicated by the innumerable ethnic groups and minorities that dot the map of the Balkan territory. Counting only the major groups and grouping the smaller ones under the heading "others" produces some 30 major groups and at least twice as many if the category "others" is further analyzed. For example, Yugoslavia has at least 22 ethnic groups, Romania at least 9, Turkey 11, and Bulgaria approximately 8 groups. Greece has 4 groups according to some statistics, and finally Albania is said to have 7 ethnic groups. This amounts to a grand total of 61 ethnic groups, not counting the groups amounting to less than 0.2% of each country's population. The current ethnic struggles in Yugoslavia, the ousting of the Turks from Bulgaria, the crisis of the Albanians in Kosovo, the question of Hungarians in Transylvania and the minority questions between Greece and Turkey illustrate vividly all the security risks that may arise from disputes between ethnic or religious minorities in the Balkans.

Strategic Considerations

Strategic Importance

The Balkan peninsula, the Turkish Straits, the mainland of Turkey, and the Greek island complex constitute an area of great geostrategic importance. Some of the more basic elements of strategic importance are:

1. The Balkans are contiguous to the Soviet Union, the Middle East and North Africa, three areas of great strategic significance for the West.
2. The Turkish Straits and their continuation by the Greek island complex in the Aegean Sea constitute a strategic position that can adequately control the exit of Soviet naval forces from the Black Sea.
3. The island of Crete in Greece can serve as a important air and naval base controlling the lines of communication in the Eastern Mediterranean. It could also serve as a base for operations against North Africa (as in World War II), the Balkans (from the South) or Turkey. All these areas are less than 150 miles from Crete.
4. Yugoslavia is the natural way joining Western and Central Europe, through Greece and/or Turkey, with North Africa and the Middle East, by road or by ferry transports.
5. Romanian and Bulgarian territory has always been considered essential for any Soviet operations against Greece or Turkey to the South, particularly during the Warsaw Pact days.
6. Albanian territory could be used as a basis to block the sea lines of communication in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas and also for launching operations against Greece and Yugoslavia. This latter option was actually used by Italy in World War II.

7. Greek territory is vital for the security of Turkey and vice-versa. NATO's strategy, especially with the recent increased emphasis on risks from the Middle East and North Africa, depends on maintaining control of both of those strategically-placed countries.

Strategic Resources

One additional dimension of the strategic importance of the Balkans is the set of strategic resources of those countries. The main geostrategic assets of the Balkans are:

1. Ports

Balkan countries are endowed with several safe ports and bays that can safely be used for naval bases and, both combat and support, naval operations. Greece, with the longest coastline (15,000 kms) has at least 40 major ports, most of which are suitable for naval operations, while the other 5 countries are also equipped with adequate facilities.

2. Airfields

This is an important strategic asset for the Balkans. There are 930 usable airfields of which 334 (36%) are equipped with permanent hard surface and adequately long runways to support all kinds of military operations. An interesting detail is that 41% of those airfields (for a total of 380, of which 120 are hard-surfaced) are in Bulgaria.

3. Energy Potential

All the Balkan countries produce some crude oil, but not much. Total known reserves of the six countries amount to 2.05 billion barrels or roughly 3 years' consumption. The total production level in 1989 was 129.7 million barrels or 17.8% of their total consumption (Albania's production covers 55% of its consumption, Romania's 32%, Yugoslavia's 21.4%, Turkey's 11.7%, Greece's 7% and Bulgaria's 0.6%).

The proven natural gas reserves amount to 281 billion m³, almost 50% of which is in Romania. Production in 1989 - 35.87 billion m³ - covered 65.9% of consumption. Only Albania has a production more than its requirements.

In terms of uranium, Greece is known to have considerable deposits amounting to 23,000 tons while Turkey is estimated to have around 6,000 tons. The other countries also have deposits but of unknown size. As far as production goes, Bulgaria most likely meets its uranium requirements of 850 tons per year through local production, while Yugoslavia produces 85 tons and Turkey about 1.3 tons on an experimental basis.

Only Bulgaria makes wide use of nuclear energy (about one third of its electricity is generated by nuclear plants) while most other electricity is produced in the Balkans by thermoelectric plants. Only Albania has a large part of its electricity produced by hydroelectric plants. Finally, coal resources (mostly lignite) are significant - about 70 billion tons (49.2% in Yugoslavia). Production in 1989 was 250.9 million tons of lignite and 26.2 million tons of coke and hard coal (92.8% of consumption requirements).

4. Strategic Mineral Resources

The Balkans have proven reserves and production facilities for nine of the 13 metals normally referred to as strategic. This is of particular importance in view of the fact that, excluding Greek deposits and production of those minerals, the EEC is 100% dependent on

imports of 11 of those 13 strategic minerals with only a small production of aluminium (6% of requirements) and tungsten (25% of requirements).

If Greece, for illustrative purposes, is included in the Balkans rather than in the EEC, then the production of strategic minerals of the Balkans versus total EEC consumption requirements would look as follows: Aluminium (Bauxite) 53.6%; Chromium (Chromite) 198% (or 13.7% of world production); Cobalt -10%, Manganese - 2.5%; Molybdenum -1%; Nickel - 11.8%; platinum group metals - 0.2%; Titanium -0.4%; Tungsten 2.6%. There are no known reserves or production of Niobium/Columbium, Tantalum, Tin or Vanadium.

5. *Other Mineral Wealth*

Balkan countries also have a wide range of other valuable minerals for industry, some of which are in considerable production even compared to total world production. Again, expressing Balkan production as a percentage of EEC demand (and including Greece in the Balkans) the statistics are: Antimony - 20.8%; Barytes - 64.6%; Asbestos - 22.7%, Bismuth - 12.5%; Boron 125% (or 43.8% of world production); Cadmium - 9.8%; copper - 13.7%; Fluorspar - 3.2%; Gold - 0.3%; industrial (synthetic) diamonds - 7.9%; iron ore - 6.3%; Lead - 17.2%; Magnesium - 1700% (or 19.9% of world production) Mercury - 2.7% of world production (no data for EEC demand); Phosphates - 0.08% of world reserves (no consumption data or production levels); Selenium - 8.2%; Silicon - 30.8%; Silver - 3%; Sulphur - 9.5%; Zinc - 13.8%.

6. *Merchant Marine Resources*

Another important resource for sea transport operations is the huge merchant marine potential of the Balkans. In total, Balkan countries have 3,950 ships over 100 gross tons for a total tonnage of 58,370,139. Of those, 47.9% of the ships and 65.9% of the tonnage belong to Greece.

7. *Inland Road/Railroad Network*

This is a valuable resource for inland transport, but in the Balkans it is not as extensive as it could be. Total railroad network length is 36,600 kms (one third of which is in Romania) while the road network is 673,000 kms, of which only 299,000 (44.5%) are paved. The rest are dirt roads.

8. *Pipelines*

The crude oil pipeline system has a total length of 6,725 kms (44.6% of which is in Romania), the natural gas pipeline has a total length of 11,472 kms (of which 55.8% is in Romania) while the pipeline network for the transport of refined products (petrol, oil and lubricants) has a total length of 4,920 kms (47.2% of which is in Turkey).

Security Considerations

Security Risks

As a rule, the amount of effort invested in defence by each country is determined mainly by that country's threat perceptions, its economic capabilities and its foreign and security policy. In the Balkans, very large defence postures are visible, postures which are not commensurate to the economic capabilities of the countries, mainly because of their increased threat

perceptions. Threat perceptions in the Balkans can be classified in three categories - minority-related, external risks which are not directly related to minorities, and internal risks.

1. Minority-Related Risks

This is a category of risks perceived by all Balkan countries because of the intricate maze of the distribution of minorities - as a rule, all countries host at least one minority from another Balkan country (or from more than one), and there are also odd minority cases. The purpose of this paper is not to describe such cases in detail but rather to mention only indicatively the following cases:

Albania hosts the Greek minority in its South, called Northern Epirus by Greece, while Albania in its turn has large ethnic Albanian groups in Yugoslavia (a total of over 3 million, although Albania itself has a total population of 3.2 million), with the highest concentration in the Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo;

Bulgaria hosts a large Muslim minority numbering about 1,000,000, almost 800,000 of which are ethnic Turks, and also claims sponsorship of the "Macedonian" minority in Yugoslavia;

Greece hosts a Muslim minority in its north-eastern area of Thrace (around 130,000 people, about 100,000 of which are ethnic Turks) and supports the Greek minority in Albania and the dwindling Greek minority in Turkey while having a special interest and concern in the case of the so-called "Macedonian" minority of Yugoslavia;

Romania hosts an almost 2,000,000-strong Hungarian minority in its Northern territory of Transylvania and supports Moldavia (a breakaway republic of the former USSR which, until 1940, was the Romanian province of Bessarabia) as well as a Romanian minority (42,000 people) in the Serbian autonomous region of Vojvodina;

Turkey hosts a small Greek minority (numbering over 110,000 in 1922, but now only 5,000 are remaining) as well as the odd case of the Kurds (numbering around 8.5 million) who are not supported by other countries but are part of the Kurdish nation spreading through Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and the USSR. Turkey supports the Muslim minorities in Greece and Bulgaria and lately has expressed interest in and sensitivity for all Muslim populations in the Balkans and in the Soviet Union;

Yugoslavia hosts the largest ethnic Albanian minority (most problematic is the case of Kosovo), the much-disputed minority of "Macedonians" supported by Bulgaria, a large Hungarian minority (over 400,000 people), and a smaller Romanian minority in the autonomous province of Vojvodina. Lately, the large ethnic "Muslim" minority of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1.8 million people) also seems to be supported by Turkey although they have no ethnic relationship to Turkey.

All these intricate interrelationships of minority sponsorships and liabilities generate many concerns in the countries concerned. In particular, countries hosting a minority that is supported by another country suspect that the interest and sensitivity displayed by the sponsor country for the welfare of the minority is not genuine. They fear that this interest is only an excuse that would allow them to express a territorial claim and ultimately try to annex that territory at the expense of the hosting country. In some cases, this gives rise to a multi-directional threat perception, which fuels large investments in defence and the maintenance of an extremely high defence establishment to avoid the danger of external intervention.

2. External Risks not Directly Related to Minorities

In addition to minority-related risks there are additional risks for the Balkans - that is, threat perceptions from external sources not related to minority questions. Some examples are the mutual threat perceptions expressed by Greece and Turkey, the perception of Yugoslavia (Serbia and its allies) that the West may intervene to stop the Serb and the Yugoslav Federal Army from attacking the Croats and other anti-Serbian groups (Slovenes, "Muslims", "Macedonians", ethnic Albanians, ethnic Hungarians, and ethnic Romanians); Greece's perception of the more remote possibility that Bulgaria (despite the current honeymoon period of Greek-Bulgarian relations) could become hostile in the future because of different views and conflicting interests in "Macedonia" and could revive its old claims on territory in Northern Greece (Eastern Macedonia and Thrace); and the additional threat perception of Turkey arising from its Middle-Eastern neighbours - Syria, Iraq and Iran. These risks further fuel the defence effort and inflate the defence postures of the Balkan countries.

3. Internal Risks

A common characteristic of the Balkans is the level of internal instability, exhibited to a greater degree in the four non-NATO countries. Such instabilities are fuelled by serious economic problems in all six countries thereby causing frustration and disappointment for various professional, social or political groups that result in demonstrations, riots and other destabilising activities. This situation is, of course, much more serious in the four non-NATO countries. Political instability in the non-NATO countries is another very important instability factor that could cause the governing groups to consider using the armed forces to quell the reactions of various groups to the processes of democratisation and economic transformation with the introduction of a market economy (as exemplified by the recent violent miners' riots in Romania). Finally, a serious source of instability could be the reaction of the armed forces to efforts by the central government to depoliticise, restructure or reduce the influence of the armed forces. There have been several such examples already in Albania and Bulgaria, and the current autonomy of the Yugoslav Federal Army is one more illustration of the maverick that refuses to subject itself to the control of legal government authorities.

Security Policy

Each country is trying to organise its defence establishment and to organise its foreign relations in such a way as to most effectively reduce the possibility of a security risk turning into a real conflict.

1. Foreign Relations Aspects

One way of improving feelings of security is to improve relations with potential adversaries for the purpose of reducing security risks. Albanian-Greek relations have greatly improved recently. Albanian-Yugoslavian relations remain tense and without any significant improvement because of the strong position adopted by Serbia towards Kosovo. Greek-Turkish relations have been in perpetual transition from crises to slight improvements, but there has not been any tangible developments of late to indicate a serious improvement. Greek-Bulgarian relations are better than ever, and there is very little to indicate a deterioration of those relations except for possible negative developments in the future over the "Macedonian" issue. Turkish-Bulgarian relations, after a period of explosive crisis in 1989, have improved substantially and seem to be improving continuously, although the Bulgarians

are frequently suspicious of Turkish intentions. Bulgarian-Serbian relations are not bad, certainly not dangerous, but neither are they good, because of the "Macedonian" question. It seems likely that as soon as Serbia has solved its problems in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, it will deal rather violently with "Macedonia's" independence, which would certainly lead to a confrontation with Bulgaria. Romanian-Hungarian relations are much better now than in the past two years, and although the Hungarian minority question still remains unresolved the two countries have even signed some co-operation agreements including an "Open Skies" régime over each other's territory. Romanian-USSR relations are good, but rather confused because of recent developments in the USSR. The question of Moldavia remains but the two governments are trying to keep it in low profile. Yugoslavian (Serbian) relations with Hungary are generally good although there seems to be some unrest in the Hungarian minority of Vojvodina.

2. *Broader Inter-Balkan Relations*

Albanian relations with all the Balkan countries (except Yugoslavia) are developing quite well, with Greece and Turkey being the major players. However, each is suspicious of the other, which could lead to eventual deterioration in Albanian relations with the country that perceives itself to be marginalised by Albania. Bulgaria maintains excellent relations with all the Balkan countries except Turkey, where not all the ice has been broken. Romania maintains excellent relations with all the Balkan countries and has no open issues of confrontation with any other country. Yugoslavia's relations can hardly be considered since, in essence, it is necessary to assess the relations of each individual republic. Finally, Greece and Turkey have been improving their relations with the other Balkan states, but Turkey suspects that Greece's motive is to gather support from their Balkan neighbours to use against Turkish interests. Likewise Greece is suspicious that Turkey's goal in seeking closer relations with "Macedonia", Albania and the Muslim groups in the Balkans is to frustrate Greece's efforts and create a counter balance that would act against Greek interests.

3. *Defence-Related Agreements, Measures and Proposals in the Balkans*

The agreement signed between Romania and the USSR for mutual military co-operation is an interesting example of Romania's effort to maintain a link with the USSR. Bulgaria is considering a similar agreement but without the non-NATO clause. However, the non-ratification of the Romania-USSR agreement by the Romanian Parliament is a bad omen for a potentially similar Bulgarian-Soviet agreement. The agreement between Romania and Hungary to conduct 4 aerial overflight missions over each other's territory is an elementary "Open Skies" arrangement. This is certainly a positive confidence-building measure. A further interesting case was the proposal of the Greek Prime Minister K. Mitsotakis for the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from an area adjacent to the Greek-Bulgarian-Turkish borders to reduce the possibility of a surprise attack and thereby increase confidence. The Bulgarians agreed to the proposal enthusiastically but Turkey rejected it, stating that it was very general and that it failed to consider the possibility of other potential areas of confrontation such as the Aegean Sea. A positive development has been the agreement of friendship and mutual co-operation between Greece and Bulgaria which has allowed for a broad spectrum of contacts and co-operation even in the military field. Finally, all the Balkan countries participate in the Balkan Co-operation Council of foreign ministers, which has met several times already, in hopes that it might develop into an important co-operation forum.

4. Participation in Various Security Fora

All Balkan countries are members of the CSCE process with Albania becoming the newest Balkan member in June 1991. Greece is the only Balkan member of the EEC while Yugoslavia and Turkey have an associate status and Bulgaria and Romania are considering joining the EEC under some sort of special status that may be devised for the Central and Eastern European countries. Albania is also looking forward to some sort of contact with the EEC. Greece and Turkey are members of NATO, former Warsaw Pact members Bulgaria and Romania are now also seeking some form of association with NATO, while Yugoslavia and Albania remain uncommitted to any alliance. Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania are signatories of the CFE Treaty and also participate in the negotiations for CFE IA. Greece and Turkey are also candidates for accession to the Western European Union (WEU).

Military Doctrines

Before anything can be said about the defence postures of the six countries of the region, it is necessary to look into the question of military doctrines. One observation is that there is quite a lot of confusion on the precise meaning of "doctrine". The term means, it seems, different things for every country. For some it is confused with "strategy" while for others the meaning is more related with the way forces are to be organized to defend the country. No effort will be made in this paper to give a blanket definition of the term in an attempt to adapt each country's to that definition. What will rather be done will be a presentation of what each country considers its own military doctrine. The main source for this information is the presentations of the respective countries in the CSCE Military Doctrine Seminars.

Albania

The Albanian notion of military doctrine is the method of utilising the potential of the country for guaranteeing its defence with the smallest possible size of armed forces. The military doctrine could be characterised as "People's Defence" and has always had a defensive orientation. It reflects the strategic military objectives of Albania and caters to its geographical configuration.

In case of aggression, the armed forces will conduct only defensive operations and attacks on the rear lines of the aggressor in an attempt to delay offensive strikes, cause damage and break the aggressors will to fight. The doctrine is particularly suited to the rugged territory of the country and makes maximum use of the ground constraints on the attacking forces. Special attention is given to the defense of important strategic points, points of particular economic (including points of industrial production), political, and administrative importance. The mission of the active defending forces is to try to repel the aggression. If this is not possible and the enemy occupies national territory, the doctrine provides for general mobilisation to support the active forces and try to repel the enemy. Should orthodox defence fail, the armed forces and partisan units would switch to unorthodox warfare and would engage the enemy by means of guerilla warfare to cause maximum attrition and break morale. Albanian forces and civilians and reservists are quite capable of carrying on extended guerilla warfare, although they do not seem to have any substantial capability to launch an offensive operation against another state.

The doctrine of "People's Defence" also involves women (a small number of whom also serve in the armed forces) and children. School children have military training every two

weeks. They are frequently seen marching for target practice. Artillery and tanks are also seen frequently manoeuvring. The country is dotted with tens of thousands of dome-like unmanned pill-boxes intended as cover for riflemen in the event of foreign invasion. In the vineyards stand large numbers of posts topped with metal spikes as guards against potential paratrooper attacks.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria's military doctrine can be termed "reasonable defensive sufficiency". It is a strictly defensive doctrine stemming from Article 9 of the Bulgarian constitution, which states: "The Armed Forces guarantee the sovereignty, security and independence of the country and defend its territorial integrity". Bulgaria does not intend to maintain armed forces in excess of the absolutely essential level for its defence.

According to the Bulgarian doctrine, in the event of aggression, the Bulgarian armed forces will conduct only defensive operations. In formulating the defence plan the specific military and geographic conditions in the country have been taken into account. Special attention is given to defending the most important lines, regions, passes and sectors of the Black Sea coast accessible for landings and the administrative, political and economic centres which are most important in the operational sense. A particularly important role is assigned to the first echelon formations and units, to organise mined obstacles, artillery fire and air strikes. Land forces, air defence forces, the air force and the navy are used to repel aggression in a primarily defensive operation. Active forces are retained at a high level of defence preparedness, and there is also readiness for mobilisation if and when required.

In the event of an armed attack, the army mobilises all available forces to repel aggression and restore the potentially-violated frontier. The aim is to contain the attack and discourage the enemy from continuing the war. The basic concept is to force the enemy to concentrate all its efforts on narrow sectors by a cohesive, rather static defence of first-echelon divisions. After the enemy concentrations have already suffered considerable attrition by the resistance of the first-echelon divisions, manoeuvring elements are to launch counterstrikes to destroy the enemy's attack formations. If such counterstrikes have little probability of success, second-echelon formations will occupy prepared defensive positions in the rear to further weaken the enemy and delay its advance. The objective is to gain time for the higher echelon's counterstrike or for the arrival of reinforcements. The Bulgarian territory with its mostly hilly and mountainous configuration, is quite suitable for static defence of multiple echelons. If, however, the enemy is highly mobile and flexible he could outflank the defensive formations of the first echelon and achieve deep penetrations.

Greece

According to Greece, "doctrine" is the system of fundamental principles by which the Armed Forces accomplish their missions, both on a national and on an allied level. More specifically, through "doctrine" a country aims to determine the most practical and efficient way of using the armed forces under the conditions prevailing at the time of their utilisation. The "doctrine", therefore, expresses the manner in which a country plans and decides to employ its armed forces in view of national pursuits and goals as well as determining the stance which the country will take with regard to its relationship with other countries.

As far as Greece is concerned, the strategic environment dictated by its geography implies a doctrine of combined-arms defensive operations conducted jointly by the Army, Navy and Air Force. In this context, Greek forces are compelled to use the concept of "forward defence" along the border due to the lack of strategic depth, while, at the same time, the lines of communications to the islands must be ensured.

The characteristics of the Greek territory have their impact on the formulation of Greek military doctrine:

- The very long borderline (1,000 km from the north only), which requires appropriate organization and deployment of increased numbers of forces in order to effectively cover the national territory;
- The generally-mountainous terrain, suitable for defence manoeuvres and conduct of unconventional warfare;
- The lack of depth for effective defence, requiring forward defence on the border line;
- The inadequacy of the road and rail network due to geographical constraints, requiring self-sufficiency of the forward commands;
- The extended beaches, which provide great possibilities for infiltration, dictating the need for establishment of an appropriate surveillance system.

A basic goal of Greek defence is not to cede national territory, neither continental nor insular. To achieve this the defence organization is characterised by:

- The necessary prepared means to deal with the potential numerical superiority of the opponent;
- Forward deployment of the armed forces to defend the mainland and the islands;
- Decisive actions to break the morale and the aggressive determination of the potential opponent and to create favourable conditions, should war be imposed;
- In case of loss of national territory, Greece intends to continue fighting, by whatever means necessary, until the aggressor's determination is broken and the integrity of the national territory is restored.

For the implementation of its doctrine, Greece has established and maintains suitably equipped and trained armed forces that are in peacetime deployed in such a way as to deter any potential enemy from attacking the country. However, should deterrence fail, and an armed attack be launched against the country, the active forces, reinforced by reserves through mobilisation, will be expected to conduct war operations to break the enemy's will to continue fighting and to secure the territorial integrity of the country. The armed forces have a similar mission within the framework of the Alliance.

The totality of the active population, male and female, would be expected to contribute to the national defence effort. But apart from its main contribution to manning the armed forces, the population would also support the defence effort through civil mobilisation, the continuation of the economic and other vital activities of the country.

The demographic problem of the country, the limited financial resources, and the defence mission of the armed forces, have the combined result that a number of units are below capacity strength in peacetime. Through the mobilisation system and through requisition of means and equipment, Greece can rapidly activate her war potential.

Finally, in the framework of the Alliance, the provision of external reinforcements from allied forces contributes to deterrence and, should deterrence fail, these reinforcements would aid the Greek national forces in defending Greek territory.

Romania

Romania's new military doctrine is considered to be strictly defensive in nature and makes no allowance for the potential use of Romanian forces outside the national territory. This, of course, is in line with standard Romanian policy since 1968, when Romania refused to participate in the forces sent by the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia. In the event of aggression, both the army and the population will be expected to take up arms and participate in the defence of the country.

According to the recent Romanian presentation at the second military doctrine seminar in Vienna (October 1991), Romania will maintain a sufficient defence capability to safeguard its security and to repel any armed aggression. The doctrine is characterised as *Adequate Sufficiency of Defence and Optimum Gradual Response*. According to this principle, any armed aggression will be repelled by forces, means and actions strictly commensurate to the level of forces and resources allocated to the military effort of the aggressor, the intensity of the operations, and the overall strategic-operational requirements. In the military field the single strategic aim is the defence of the country against any aggression.

According to the Romanian doctrine, if war cannot be avoided, then from the outset the response will be strategic defence in the entire theatre of operations. Action in areas temporarily occupied by the enemy will take the form of an active resistance both by military elements and by the general/civilian population, organised into resistance groups.

The final stage of the strategic defence provides for counter-offensive operations by units designed to repel the aggressor and restore the territorial integrity of the country.

Turkey

Turkey characterises its military doctrine as defensive, in line with the military doctrine of NATO, of which it has been a member since 1952. The Turkish and allied plans provide for allied participation in the defence of Turkey. The main element of the doctrine is to prevent war through deterrence. For this reason, sufficient military strength is maintained in peacetime. In the event of an armed attack, Turkey would defend its interests, restore its territorial integrity and do its utmost to terminate the war as soon as possible. Elements of NATO strategy (forward defence, flexible response) are also elements in the doctrine of Turkey.

In peacetime, Turkish forces are maintained at a level which is considered the minimum for credible deterrence and assured defence. In the formation of the force structure, the basic criterion is maximum efficiency with minimum force. Turkey's peacetime forces are deployed at three separate fronts:

- One front is the Thrace-Straits front. Since Turkey considers the defence of the Straits as vital both for Turkey and for the Alliance, and given the lack of strategic depth, Turkey feels it has to maintain in Turkish Thrace a level of forces capable of defending the region against attacks coming from land-based, amphibious and airborne units.

- Two other fronts are those of Eastern and of South-Eastern Anatolia. In both those fronts adequate forces are deployed since Turkey in those areas neighbours not only the Soviet Union but also several unstable regimes in the Middle East that possess weapons of mass destruction, against both of which Turkey must maintain a credible defence posture.
- In addition, there is also the Army of the Aegean, deployed along the coasts of the Aegean, which, according to Turkey, consists mainly of training units.

In case of crisis or war, Turkey aims to increase and maintain a much greater force level based on mobilisation with adequate capabilities for defending her interests and enforcing her general security policy. The aim of wartime operations would be to defend the territory and stop the aggressor at the frontier. If territory is lost at that point, Turkey would be able to launch counter attacks with the help of reinforcements made available by other NATO countries, in order to re-establish the integrity of its territory. Since Turkey relies on Allied reinforcements, both for combat and for logistical support, it is imperative to keep the sea lines of communication safe and open.

Yugoslavia

Speaking about the military doctrine of Yugoslavia has been made difficult, in light of the cataclysmic developments in that country. It is no longer relevant to speak of a "Yugoslavian" military doctrine; to be more realistic, references should be made to the doctrines of each individual republic, and even those might be insufficient. Due to the volatile situation, however, and the lack of salient information concerning the warring republics, for the purposes of this paper the basic tenets of the official "Yugoslav" military doctrine will be discussed which, incidentally, form the philosophical basis for the respective doctrines of the republics.

The official doctrine, which is termed *Doctrine of a Total People's Defensive War*, begins with the explicit constitutional prohibition of anyone - be it an individual or a social or governmental body - signing or acknowledging capitulation or occupation of Yugoslavia in its entirety, or of any part of its territory whatsoever. On the contrary, the doctrine of defence is designed in such a way as to offer to each Yugoslavian citizen the best opportunity to participate, using arms or in some other way, in the defence of his own country.

The Yugoslavian doctrine, designed by Marshal Tito and tested during World War II in Yugoslavia, has been continuously updated and adapted to new internal and external circumstances.

According to the stipulations of the doctrine, Yugoslavia, without exception, would wage war only for the purpose of defending its independence and territorial integrity under attack.

The *Total People's Defensive War* means the active participation of all the people, of the whole population as well as all resources for the defence and protection of the country. This "total defence" combines all types of combat and overall people's resistance in the fields of economy, politics, culture and so on with the armed struggle and resistance. Armed struggle is the basic and decisive form of combat and resistance in the total people's defensive war and has been chosen because the intention is to strike the aggressor at his most vulnerable point - manpower.

The doctrine has adopted a combination of frontal and partisan forms of armed struggle which is more than a simple sum of the two parts; rather, it introduces a new quality in their

combination, which is its essential feature. The combined form of armed struggle means conducting high-intensity and large-scale combat operations and campaigns along the main operational and strategic avenues of approach on the front line and in the temporarily-seized territory (in the aggressor's rear), and, when necessary, even in the defenders' rear, fighting the aggressor's airborne assaults. The ratio of frontal to partisan components would depend upon the overall ratio of forces and on other conditions in the theatre, whenever the general ratio of forces would guarantee a certain and quick military victory, the defenders would carry out combined operations with the main emphasis on a frontal form of armed combat, attempting to terminate the war as quickly as possible. On the other hand, in the event that the general ratio of military forces and other conditions are not favourable for the defenders, the doctrine puts greater emphasis on partisan operations within the temporarily-seized territory. If the situation is unfavourable, the defenders would continue a high-intensity armed struggle with the aim to turn a blitzkrieg war - a set of decisive attacks that the aggressor would wish to deliver quickly and cleanly - into a long-lasting war of attrition, where all the comparative advantages of that doctrine would become prominent.

In applying the doctrine to the confrontation of a blitzkrieg war, the basic aim is to expand the battlefield both along the front line and in depth, forcing the aggressor to stretch in both directions and to introduce a large number of different combat activities at all levels, thereby engaging the aggressor at all times and places, in order to compel the enemy to use a large portion of its forces for the protection of its own rear. The resultant weakening of the aggressor's offensive capability would enable the defenders to take over the strategic initiative and create conditions for decisive battles, with the aim of driving the aggressor out of their national territory or forcing the enemy to quit further activities, thereby signifying military defeat.

The Yugoslav doctrine aims at achieving its objectives by way of the following four options:

- first, efficient deterrence in both its basic forms: defence and intimidation (this can be achieved by conducting counter-actions and by inflicting unacceptable losses upon the aggressor);
- second, quick military defeat of the aggressor wherever the ratio of forces permits the defenders to do so;
- third, efficient waging of a long-lasting total people's defensive war, whenever the ratio of forces is not to the defenders' advantage; and
- fourth, efficient opposition to all means and types of threat to Yugoslavia's security and independence posed by means of special warfare and military intervention, including initiation of low-intensity conflicts.

For the practical implementation of the objectives of the doctrine, Yugoslavia depends on a massive military force, 85% of which are called up through mobilisation. This means that the Yugoslav peacetime armed forces are relatively small in number, with a primary task of training citizens for an armed struggle and preventing a strategic surprise.

Conclusion

From the analysis of the military doctrines given above, it is evident that all the Balkan countries appear to have a defensive doctrine, tailored to their local requirements, and

utilizing all facets of their populations in a defensive and resistance struggle - except in Turkey, where this element does not appear explicitly in the doctrine. All these doctrines are now under reconsideration by the respective countries, which may lead to substantial changes in their formulation although their basic philosophy will probably remain unchanged. The new Alliance Strategic Concept, to be agreed upon at the NATO Summit in Rome in November 1991, will be the basis for reconsideration of the doctrines of Greece and Turkey, the two NATO countries.

Defence

To safeguard its security, every Balkan country has organised a comparatively massive defence posture which, as a rule, is far greater than economic realities would dictate if some Western European countries are taken as a basis for comparison. To facilitate understanding of the defence realities, each country will be treated separately in summary form to allow some conclusions to be made later.

Albania

This is the poorest country in the Balkans with a per capita GNP in the order of 900 US\$ and yet it maintains 5.73% of its total economically-active population (numbering 837,000) under arms (not counting paramilitary forces, which account for 1.43% more, for a total of 7.16%). The defence expenditure is approximately 4.5% (1990), one of the highest in the Balkans, and rising!

The Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian armed forces is the President, who chairs the Defence Council with the participation of the Minister of Defence and other Government personalities, with the Chief of the General Staff being the only military member. This is the highest authority on defence issues. There are four services (Land, Naval, Air and Air Defence Forces) organised in four defence commands of an integrated nature.

The land forces (35,000 regulars with 20,000 conscripts and 150,000 reservists) are organised into one tank brigade, 11 infantry brigades (some undermanned) and some artillery engineer coastal defence and other support units.

The navy (2,000 regulars with 1,000 conscripts and 2,000 reservists), part of the Coastal Defence Command, along with land forces and paramilitary border guards units, has mainly obsolete units of a coastal defence nature with questionable operational capabilities.

The Air Force (6,500 regulars with 1,000 conscripts and 1,000 reservists) comprises eight squadrons of very old (most likely obsolete) aircraft. The air force operates the fighter ground attack, trainer and transport aircraft, the transport-liaison helicopters and support facilities.

The Air Defence (4,500 regulars with 400 conscripts and 2,000 reservists) commands five squadrons of fighter aircraft (most probably non-operational), some old radar instruments of Soviet-Chinese origin and six SAM sites.

The Paramilitary is comprised, of the Border Guards (numbering 7,000) and the Internal Security Forces (numbering 5,000). The Border Guards units are normally under the command of the local military authorities, although they are administratively under the Border Guards Command.

Conscripts in the Albanian forces serve two years in the land forces and three years elsewhere; when they are released from active duty, they remain in reserve status until the age of 56 and are called up for periodic reservists' training. Recent legislation provides for

a reduction of service time by six months, reduction of reservists' training time per year, improvement of welfare conditions and an overall organisational restructuring, the details of which are not yet finalised. Also, for the first time under the communist regime, the Minister of Defence is a civilian and the Parliament, through a special parliamentary commission on defence has tried to increase its role in defence matters in an effort to put the military under civilian control.

The military equipment of Albania is very old, provided either by the Soviets, who broke off relations with Albania in the early 60s, or by the Chinese, who in 1978, also broke off relations with this Balkan country. Ever since, Albania has not procured any military hardware except for some spare parts (in negligible quantities) from Romania in 1990 and from its underdeveloped indigenous spare parts industry. In general, the operational capability of the Albanian forces is considered very low, with practically no offensive potential. The equipment held by Albanian forces is comprised of the following:

- *Land Forces*: 190 battle tanks, 310 armoured combat vehicles (only 130 believed to be operational), 700 pieces of artillery (122 mm, 130 mm and 152 mm towed weapons plus 120 mm and 160 mm mortars) not counting 82 mm mortars, 80 anti-aircraft guns (23 mm, 37 mm, 57 mm, 85 mm) and an unknown number of anti-tank rocket launchers (82 mm) and anti-tank guns (45 mm, 57 mm, 85 mm).
- *Navy*: two obsolete submarines, 29 torpedo craft, two offshore patrol craft, six inshore gun patrol craft, three other coastal patrol craft, 10 mine warfare ships (only four operational), 10 lake patrol craft and 10-12 other support/auxiliaries.
- *Air Force/Air Defence*: 95 fighters/ground attack combat aircraft (with possibly 35 more that are non-operational), 18 transport aircraft, 40 trainer aircraft, 32 assault/transport/liaison helicopters, some radar sites and 6 SA-2 sites with 32 launchers.

Bulgaria

This is the second richest country in the Balkans, after Greece and before Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey and Albania with a per capita income of 5.149 US\$ (1990) and a level of defence expenditures of an estimated 4.55% of the per capita GNP, a quite high level. Despite its severe demographic problems (Bulgaria has the lowest population growth in the Balkans - only 0.08% per year versus, for example, 2.35% per year for Turkey), Bulgaria maintains 3.08% of its economically active population (4,300,000) under arms in the armed forces (plus 1.27% more in paramilitary formations, for a total of 4.35%).

The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Bulgarian armed forces. The Government through the Minister of Defence exercises daily control, with the highest military authority being the Chief of the General Staff (Colonel General). Like to all the former Warsaw Pact countries, the Bulgarian forces are organised in four services (Land, Naval, Air and Air Defence forces).

The Land forces (75,475 regulars with 49,000 conscripts and 420,000 reservists) is comprised of three Armies with a total of five tank brigades and 11 motorised rifle divisions (one TB and three MRD mobilisable), plus four SCUD SSM brigades, 1 SAM brigade and other artillery, air defence artillery, commando and service/logistic support units.

The Navy (10,000 regulars with 5,000 conscripts and 7,500 reservists) has little or no offensive capability and can only conduct limited-scale naval operations - mainly coastal

patrol and mine warfare. There is also a Naval Infantry force (three companies) plus a Motor Rifle Regiment of the Land forces trained in amphibious operations, one squadron of naval aviation helicopters (ASW/SAR) and two regiments of coastal artillery.

The Air Force (6,397 regulars with 4,000 conscripts and 15,000 reservists) is comprised of nine regiments of aircraft (two fighter/ground attack, one reconnaissance, three training, one transport aircraft, one attack helicopter and one assault/transport helicopter) and in addition one airborne regiment jointly manned by the Air Force and the Land forces but under the command of the Land forces, plus various support units.

The Air Defence (16,627 regulars with 12,000 conscripts and 30,000 reservists) commands two regiments of fighters, a number of early-warning radar and 30 SAM sites.

The Paramilitary (12,000 border guards, 4,000 Internal Security Troops, 39,000 civil defence and others, and at least 150,000 in the People's Territorial Militia not in active status, mostly formed by reservists) co-operates with local military commanders and are under their command, although administratively they are under their own service command.

Conscripts serve for 18 months and are in reservist status until the age of 55 (Army, Navy) or 60 (Air/Air Defence). The severe demographic problems in Bulgaria have led to a large utilisation of conscripts in various non-military posts, and many units are normally undermanned due to low conscript intake. In an effort to improve the operational capability of the Army, cadre training has been improved, although all other forms of training have been reduced, and units are to be restructured to adapt to the new purely-defensive doctrine by creating smaller and more mobile formations and increasing the number of engineers as well as anti-tank, anti-air, and electronic warfare units.

The equipment of the Bulgarian armed forces is of relatively good quality, compared to other Balkan countries, and is almost all of Soviet origin. In addition, Bulgaria has a quite developed armaments industry able to produce all kinds of military equipment for ground forces except tanks and sophisticated SAMs imported from the USSR. Recently, Bulgaria has been reorienting its defence towards Western technology, and it is largely being converted to non-military production (by the end of 1994, 85% of Bulgarian defense will have been converted to non-military production). The equipment holdings of the Bulgarian forces are:

- *Land Forces:* 2,145 battle tanks (to be reduced to 1,475 under the CFE Treaty), 2,204 armoured combat vehicles (to be reduced to 2,000), 2,116 artillery pieces (to be reduced to 1,750), 450 reconnaissance vehicles, 64 SCUD launchers, 200 anti-tank guided weapons, 350 anti-tank guns, 400 air defence guns, 50 SAM launchers.
- *Naval Forces:* one submarine (plus two reserve), two frigates, 22 patrol and coastal combatants, 33 mine warfare units, two amphibious LSM, 21 LCM and nine support and miscellaneous.
- *Air Force/Air Defence:* 243 combat aircraft (to be reduced to 234), 44 attack helicopters (can be increased to 67), 190 trainer aircraft, 35 transport/liasion/utility aircraft, 43 assault/transport helicopters, six ASW/SAR helicopters (under Navy command as Naval Aviation) and most likely a large number of older versions of aircraft in storage. There are also 30 sites of SAMs with 280 launchers.

Greece

Greece is the richest country in the Balkans with a per capita GDP of 6,697 US\$ (1990) and has the highest level of defence expenditures, amounting to 5.84% of the per capita income.

Greece also has a very high level of armed forces amounting to 4.16% of its economically-active population (4,046,000). If the paramilitary forces are also counted then 0.85% should be added for a total of 5.01%.

The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and the government exercises control over them through the Minister of Defence and the Governmental Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA) chaired by the Prime Minister (or the President) with the participation of various ministers. The Chief of the National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) is the only military member, and, in wartime, the Chief HNDGS is the Chief of the Armed Forces. The armed forces is comprised of three services - the Army, Navy and Air Force each one headed by a respective Service General Staff.

The Land Forces (122,400 regulars with 100,000 conscripts and 350,000 reservists) control the field army and the territorial army units. The field army is comprised of the Hellenic First Army (HFA), four army corps, nine infantry divisions, one logistic support division, five armoured brigades, one commando regiment, one raider regiment and other combat (reconnaissance, field artillery, air defence, improved HAWK, army aviation) and logistic support units. The territorial army consists of the Higher Military Command of Interior and Islands (ASDEN), four military command headquarters, one infantry division, one paratrooper regiment, eight field artillery regiments and other combat support (air defence artillery, army aviation) and service support units. There is also a National Guard manned by reservists with only a small number of active duty personnel.

The navy (19,500 regulars with 11,400 conscripts and 24,000 reservists) is comprised of the fleet with its naval aviation, the Navy Logistic Command and the Navy Training Command. There are three naval district commands, three squadrons of naval aviation with ASW helicopters and one squadron of maritime patrol aircraft (mixed navy-air force crews under naval command).

The Air Force (26,221 regulars with 14,400 conscripts and 32,000 reserves) has three commands - the Tactical Air Force, the Air Logistics Command and the Air Training Command. There are 33 squadrons of aircraft (10 ground attack, nine interceptor, two reconnaissance, one maritime patrol, three assault/transport helicopters, three transport aircraft, one liaison aircraft, four training aircraft), one NIKE-HERCULES battalion, 12 skyguard/sparrow SAM batteries and various training and support facilities.

The paramilitary (34,500 soldiers) is made up of the Gendarmerie, the Customs Guard and the Coast Guard.

Conscripts serve 19 months in the Army, 21 months in the Air Force and 23 in the Navy. There are also various categories of recruits that may serve less than these periods under certain conditions. Conscripts remain under reserve status until the age of 50. Greece, however, with its 0.15% per year population growth rate (higher than that of Bulgaria but about 17 times less than that of Albania) has an overall demographic problem in maintaining its current forces and thus many units are undermanned. To resolve this problem, Greece has been recruiting gradually more and more long-term service volunteers to alleviate the shortage of conscript availability.

The equipment of the Greek armed forces is to a considerable extent quite modern but there is also a lot of quite old and obsolescent equipment now in the process of modernisation. The equipment of the Greek armed forces is comprised of the following:

- *Land Forces:* 1,879 battle tanks (to be reduced to 1,735 under the CFE Treaty), 1,641 armoured combat vehicles (that may be increased to 2,534) 1,908 artillery pieces (to

be reduced to 1,878), 48 reconnaissance vehicles, 394 anti-tank guided weapons, 1820 anti-tank rocket launchers, 447 air defence guns, 42 SAM launchers, 25 liaison aircraft and 111 assault/transport helicopters.

- *Naval Forces*: 10 submarines, 11 destroyers, 7 frigates, 16 missile craft, 10 torpedo craft, 10 patrol craft, 16 mine warfare ships, 12 amphibious ships plus 55 amphibious craft, 13 support and miscellaneous, 15 ASW armed helicopters.
- *Air Force*: 469 combat aircraft (that may be increased to 650 under the CFE provisions), no attack helicopters (but 18 are to be procured) 12 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, 55 transport aircraft, 137 training aircraft, 31 assault/transport helicopters, 76 SAM launchers (NIKE Hercules plus Sparrow).
- *Paramilitary*: 15 armoured personnel carriers, six helicopters, an unspecified number of armoured cars, 100 patrol craft and four fixed-wing aircraft.

The Greek defence industry is quite advanced, with considerable capacity in the aerospace, ship building, light arms, armoured vehicle and ammunition industries although its market share is limited. It could, however, if required, provide the Greek armed forces with maintenance, repair, ammunition and a good deal of its less sophisticated equipment.

Romania

Romania, with its 3,695 US\$ (1990) per capita GNP is the fourth richest country in the Balkans - only better off than Turkey and Albania - and its defence expenditures are the lowest in the Balkans, amounting to only 1.81% (1990) of the per capita GNP. The armed forces represent 2.19% of the economically-active population (11,129,000) and if paramilitary forces are counted too, they represent 0.48% or a total of 2.67% - the lowest in the Balkans.

In Romania, again, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and the Romanian Parliament is the highest decision-making body on military policy. The highest co-ordinating authority is the Supreme Defence Council chaired by the President. The President may also, in an emergency, declare war but must have his decision ratified within five days by the Parliament. The control of the forces lies with the Minister of Defence, while the command of the forces at the strategic level is in the hands of the Chief of the General Staff, who is subordinate to the Defence Minister.

The Romanian defence forces are comprised of: central command structures; the 4 armed services: land forces, naval forces, air forces, air defence forces; and territorial defence structures.

The "Central Command Structures" include: the General Staff, the Supply Department of the Armed Forces, the Logistics Department, the Education Department, the Science and Culture Department, the Personnel Directorate, the Accountance, Budget and Administration Control Directorate and the Command headquarters of the four services. These organizations employ a total of 21,748 personnel.

The land forces are the major service of the armed forces. They have a total strength of 131,084 soldiers of which 105,000 are conscripts serving for 12 months. The land forces comprise four combined armed armies as well as some independent centrally-controlled units. The four armies have a total of two tank brigades and eight motorised rifle divisions (each with three motorised rifle regiments and one tank regiment) as well as various support units. The centrally-controlled units include five mountain brigades (the elite Romanian units with special equipment and training), three artillery brigades, one anti-tank brigade plus five

independent anti-tank regiments, 2 SSM (SCUD) brigades, as well as field engineer units, chemical protection units and various logistics support units.

The navy comprises five major units - one maritime division (land-based elements plus most of the fleet), one patrol boat brigade, one river brigade, one river-maritime brigade and one naval infantry division. These major units have both land-based and ship-based elements. There are also various combat support naval units, extensive coastal artillery and other support units. The total strength of the navy is 17,500 men (10,800 conscripts) of which 9,000 belong to the Naval Infantry units and 700 to coastal defence.

The air force is composed of two aviation divisions, three paratrooper (airborne) brigades (mainly in support of land forces) and six smaller independent support units. There are five regiments and three independent squadrons of fixed-wing airplanes and helicopters plus one regiment of transport aircraft and other training and support airplanes and helicopters. Most of the helicopters in the combat units have a support role for land force operations. The three paratrooper brigades are the air mobile units used mainly in support of land operations. The brigades have their own transport and logistics support. The personnel strength of the air force, including the three paratroopers brigades is estimated at 28,000 (4,000 conscripts).

The territorial air defence has two divisions of air defence, as well as radar installations, anti-aircraft missiles and anti-aircraft artillery. The two divisions feature: radio warfare, anti-aircraft missile units and some anti-aircraft artillery. They also have all the fighter/interceptor aircraft estimated to be five MIG-21 regiments and three MIG-29 and MIG-23 squadrons. There are an estimated 24 anti-aircraft missile sites of SA-2, SA-3 (medium and short range, respectively). The air defence units are 80% manned in peacetime and are fully manned by reservists in wartime. The total peacetime strength is 27,760 regulars (6,700 conscripts).

The territorial defence forces are composed of four regional commands whose mission is to co-ordinate and control all matters relating to conscription, manning and supply of the armed forces, the training of the population for civil protection, the organization and training of territorial forces in peacetime, and their command and control in wartime. These forces are organisationally considered paramilitary forces. Their total strength in peacetime is estimated at around 7,000 but they are the nuclei of large mobilisable units. The reservists are estimated to be around 1,600,000 in number, 400,000 of which have been released from active duty in the past five years.

Other paramilitary forces include the border guards, estimated at around 18,400, of which 1,000 are in the maritime border guard units under operational control of the navy (there are 14,400 conscripts included in this number), and the internal security troops, which used to be the old "securitate" (around 30,000 strong) of the Ministry of the Interior.

Most of the equipment is of low quality and obsolete or obsolescent, while several types are locally produced by the rather large Romanian defence industry. Current equipment holdings include the following:

- *Land Forces:* 2,851 battle tanks (to be reduced to 1,375), 3,102 armoured combat vehicles (to be reduced to 2,100), 3,789 artillery pieces (to be reduced to 1,475), 139 reconnaissance vehicles, 28 surface-to-surface missiles, 534 anti-tank guided weapons, 1,450 anti-tank guns, 1,118 air defence guns, 62 SAM launchers.
- *Navy:* one submarine, one destroyer, four frigates, four corvettes, six missile craft, 42 torpedo patrol craft, 53 patrol craft, 43 mine warfare, 10 support and miscellaneous, two helicopters, 32 coastal artillery guns, 60 anti-aircraft artillery guns.

- *Air Force/Air Defence:* 505 combat aircraft (to be reduced to 430), 13 attack helicopters (may be increased to 120), 28 transport aircraft, three survey aircraft, 220 assault/transport helicopters, 203 training aircraft, 20 SAM sites with 135 launchers.

The military's readiness, despite recent improvements, continues to be severely limited. The armed forces have previously performed many non-military tasks in agriculture and construction. But they have devoted inadequate resources for effective military training. Up to 80,000 conscripts have been dedicated full time as cheap labour for Government projects. Since the 1989 revolution, the involvement of troops in construction has declined markedly, and such tasks have been replaced by military training. A number of senior officers have also been retired because of their age or political beliefs.

Military readiness remains low, however, largely because of limited budgets. Although Romania can produce 80% of the military equipment it needs, a lack of foreign exchange for energy and other imports has virtually halted the defence industry.

Turkey

Turkey is the second poorest country in the Balkans, only better off than Albania, with a per capita GNP of only 2,016 US\$ (1990) and comparatively low defence expenditures - 2.61% of the per capita GNP (1990). Despite its very difficult economic situation, however, Turkey has huge armed forces amounting to 3.16% of the economically-active population if the paramilitary forces are added (0.53% more) the total is 3.69%. But a perhaps more telling figure representative of the situation is that Turkey alone has 43.7% of the total forces of the 6 Balkan countries!

The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces but a unique characteristic is that although the Government has control of the Armed Forces through the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence is not superior to the Chief of the General Staff. If anything, he is subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, since the Minister has only administrative authority and "for all his tasks the Minister has to act on the basis of principles, priorities and major programmes determined by the Chief of General Staff" (*Law* no. 1325). The Turkish armed forces are comprised of three services - land, naval and air forces.

The land forces (numbering 468,300 regulars with 427,000 regulars conscripts and 950,000 reservists) consist of four armies plus one independent corps command, one training command and one logistics command. In total there are 10 army corps, consisting of one armoured, one mechanised, and 13 infantry divisions (two are in Cyprus), eight armoured brigades, four mechanised brigades, 11 infantry brigades, one airborne brigade, one commando brigade, some coastal defence units and some support, training and logistics units.

The Navy (52,000 regulars with 40,000 conscripts and 84,000 reservists) has four major commands (the fleet, the Northern Command, the Southern Command and the Training Command) and, in addition to the fleet units, there is the naval aviation corps and one regiment of Marines.

The Air Force (69,713 regulars with 31,800 conscripts and 73,000 reservists) is organised into two Tactical Air Force Commands, one logistics command and one training command. The air potential features 27 squadrons of aircraft (16 fighter bombers, two interceptors, one recon, one ASW (for support of the Navy), four transport and three training squadrons), 13 flights of liaison aircraft, 10 SAM squadrons (eight NIKE-HERCULES and two Rapier) and various support, training and logistic units and facilities.

The paramilitary consists mainly of the Gendarmerie, a large force numbering 97,850 with military training and missions, composed of three light infantry brigades (border guard duties), one commando brigade, four commando regiments plus other more police-oriented elements. The Coast Guard (around 1,100 troops) is entrusted with maritime border guard missions.

Conscripts, who constitute 84.5% of the Turkish forces, serve for 18 months and are in reservist status until the age of 46. A notable feature of the Turkish military is the lack of any demographic shortage, due to the extremely high growth rate of its population - 2.35% per year, only slightly less than that of Albania (2.5% per year). As a matter of fact, despite its large forces, Turkey has an annual availability of around 600,000 young males at drafting age to fill the posts of 285,000 recruits released every year - a demographic luxury not available to any other Balkan country.

The equipment of the armed forces is for the most part old and of rather low quality, although in the last few years a large effort of modernisation has been undertaken, already with noticeable results. The Turkish defence industry, with considerable capabilities in many sectors, is easing the burden of procurement; quite some progress has been made in those sectors, especially in the aerospace industry (which has undertaken the assembly of the F-16) and the vehicle and electronics industry. The current equipment holdings are the following:

- *Land Forces*: 3,783 battle tanks, of which 2,823 are in Turkey's CFE sector and 960 are in the non-CFE sector (those in the CFE sector are to be reduced to 2,795), 3,674 armoured combat vehicles, 1502 in the CFE sector and 2,172 in the non-CFE sector (those in the CFE sector can increase to 3,120), 4,187 artillery pieces, 3,442 in the CFE sector and 45 in the non-CFE sector (those in the CFE sector can increase to 3,523), 20 pieces of coastal artillery, 1,608 anti-tank guided weapons, 3,426 rocket launchers, 1,285 air defence guns, 162 SAMs, 163 transport/liasion army aircraft and 273 assault/transport helicopters.
- *Navy*: 15 submarines, 12 destroyers, eight frigates, 16 missile craft two torpedo craft, 29 patrol craft, 37 mine warfare units, seven amphibious LSTs, 79 amphibious craft, 26 support and miscellaneous, 22 anti-submarine warfare combat aircraft of naval aviation (under the command of the Navy but manned by the Air Force) and 15 naval helicopters.
- *Air Force*: 694 combat aircraft, 511 in the CFE sector (which can increase to 750) and 183 in the non-CFE sector (164 in store) 78 transport aircraft, 205 training aircraft, 45 assault/transport helicopters, five attack helicopters (can be increased to 43 in the CFE sector), 172 SAMs (128 NIKE-HERCULES and 24 Rapier)
- *Forces in Cyprus*: 300 battle tanks, 200 armoured personnel carriers, 326 artillery pieces, 84 anti-aircraft guns, eight aircraft and 12 helicopters.

Yugoslavia

The unfortunate events in Yugoslavia do not afford a clear picture of the defence posture of the country, since it is presently difficult to define what is still part of the country and what is not. Thus, the only present option is to refer to what was known about the Yugoslav federal forces before the current civil war, with the understanding that much of the information given may not be valid any more. With this caveat, Yugoslavia could be considered as the third richest country in the Balkans (after Greece and Bulgaria) with 4,940 US\$ per capita GNP. The defence expenditures were 1.81% of the per capita GNP in 1990 but of course now these

figures are irrelevant. The Yugoslav federal forces represent 1.76% of the economically active population plus 0.15% for the paramilitary border guard (for a total of 1.91%) - the smallest in the Balkans.

Theoretically, the armed forces are under the command of the collective Presidency of Yugoslavia but the unfortunate reality is that they are self-commanded and seem to serve only Serbian interests, at the expense of all others. The Yugoslav armed forces are collectively referred to as the "Yugoslav People's Army" (JNA) and were substantially reorganised in the late 1980's into an integrated structure of combined arms. According to the new organization there are four military regions, three for army, air force, air defence forces and one for naval forces and the coastal defence.

The land forces (numbering 129,000 with 87,000 conscripts and 440,000 reservists) are comprised of 17 corps headquarters, three infantry division headquarters, one mechanised division headquarters, eight tank brigades, 11 mechanised brigades, 24 motorised infantry brigades, one mountain brigade, four light infantry brigades, one amphibious brigade, one airborne brigade, 14 regiments of field artillery, six anti-tank regiments, 11 anti-aircraft artillery regiments and six SAM regiments. Recent developments, however, indicate that all this organization is probably substantially changed with new units formed and others disbanded (probably around 11,000 including 900 marines and 2,300 coastal defence with 4,500 conscripts and 43,000 reservists).

The navy is under the control of the maritime region command and consists of the fleet, the maritime border guards (administratively under the paramilitary Border Guards' command), two brigades of marines (naval infantry), 25 coastal artillery batteries and an unknown number of surface-to-surface missiles.

The Air Force/Air Defence (numbering 29,000 with 3,500 conscripts and 27,000 reserves) is made up of three air corps, each of which has one air defence division, a number of aircraft and helicopters, air defence artillery and SAMs. These formations include two Fighter Bomber Regiments, three Fighter Regiments, two reconnaissance Regiments, one Transport Brigade, one Transport Regiment, three Training Regiments plus four Training Squadrons and one Helicopter Training Regiment. There is also one regiment - plus 7 squadrons - of attack helicopters in support of the Land Forces (subordinate to the Military Regions), and two Fighter Bomber Squadrons, one reconnaissance squadron, one ASW helicopter squadron, one helicopter transport squadron and one fire-fighting squadron in support of the naval operations. There are also 14 SAM battalions (SA-2/SA-3) and 15 air defence artillery regiments.

Conscripts serve for 12 months and stay in reserve status until the age of 55 (or to 60 for officers). The Yugoslavian defence doctrine depends very much on reservists, who man 85% of the wartime formations and who are comprised of an estimated 2 million people in the 19-to-55 age group. Reservists also man the militia and territorial defence units of the various Yugoslav republics. With the recent developments, conscript intake is very limited due to unwillingness of conscripts to enlist and large scale desertions, thus necessitating the mobilisation of reservists, who are of low training status and who also have a large scale desertion record. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to calculate the actual active strength of the JNA today.

In addition to the official JNA forces, Yugoslavia also has forces for each republic estimated to be as follows: Slovenia - 103,000 (60,000 territorial defence forces plus 35,000 armed militia and 8,000 armed police); Bosnia-Herzegovina 200,000 territorial defence forces with around 20,000 irregular armed Serbians fighting them from the Serbian areas of

the Republic; Croatia - 278,000 (200,000 territorial defence forces plus 48,000 armed militia and 30,000 armed police). These forces have probably increased of late, after Croatian mobilisation. Fighting the Croatians, in addition to the JNA, there are about 20,000 armed irregulars from the Serbs in Croatia. Macedonia - 102,000 territorial defence forces; Serbia - 490,000 territorial defence force plus 15,000 militiamen; Montenegro - 30,000 territorial defence forces.

The equipment of the JNA, after the operations of the last few months, has suffered considerable losses and it is very difficult to estimate the current holdings. The holdings, before the hostilities however, were as stated below, with the understanding that the industrial capability of the Yugoslav defence is quite large and can cover 70% of the country's defence equipment requirements, so some of the losses may have been covered by the local defence industry.

- *Land Forces:* 1,850 battle tanks, 1000 armoured combat vehicles, around 6,500 artillery pieces (by CFE definitions), 240 reconnaissance vehicles, 3,400 light mortars, four SSM FROG-7, 4,200 rocket launchers, 1800 anti-tank guns, 4,300 air defence guns and also an unspecified number of anti-tank guided weapons and SAMs.
- *Navy:* five submarines, four frigates, six coastal escorts, 16 missile patrol craft, 14 torpedo patrol craft, 36 other patrol craft, 28 minesweepers, 46 amphibious craft and seven support and miscellaneous ships.
- *Air Force/Air Defence:* 140 Air defence fighters, 163 ground attack, 115 reconnaissance, 46 transport, 120 attack helicopters, 16 anti-submarine helicopters, 90 assault/transport helicopters, 210 trainer aircraft and air defence artillery and SAMs.
- *Paramilitary:* The Border Guards, the Militia and the Territorial Defence Forces are equipped with light arms, some armoured combat vehicles and some rocket launchers and anti-aircraft artillery.

Conclusions

Defence Potential

A first conclusion drawn from the detailed analysis of the previous section is that the six Balkan countries have collectively a very high military potential - disproportionately high, considering their size, economic capabilities and demographic realities.

1. Manpower

The total manpower manning the armed forces of the six countries is 1,351,340 (43.7% belong to Turkey) not counting paramilitary forces and the republican and irregular forces of Yugoslavia. To put this military strength into perspective, the combined Balkan manpower equals 42.6% of all NATO forces (the 16 European countries). If Greece and Turkey are not included in the NATO forces, then the 6 Balkan countries field 56% of the total NATO forces of the 14 European countries. Compared to Soviet forces, the Balkans have an aggregate strength of 39.75% of that of the USSR (all former Soviet republics included). The following comparison may better illustrate the (sheer) size of Balkan forces in terms of manpower.

The six Balkan countries have an aggregate population of 126 million people, roughly equal to the population of six Western European countries (Spain, Portugal, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium) which total 132 million. The aggregate armed forces of

those six Western European countries number 959,950 versus 1,340,921 for the Balkans. That is, the Balkans maintain 39.7% more military force than do the Western nations. What makes this more remarkable is that the combined GNP of the six Western countries is 2,212.56 billion US\$ (1990) while the aggregate GNP of the six Balkan countries is only 435.05 billion US\$; that is, the Balkans have 19.7% of the GNP of the six Western nations and yet maintain 39.7% more forces. If the Balkan countries were to maintain forces proportional to that of their GNP (with similar proportions to those of the six Western European countries) they should have no more than 189,000 for the six of them - yet they maintain more than seven times as much.

2. Defence Equipment

Considering only the CFE-related equipment of the six Balkan countries, it becomes apparent that their TLE holdings (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters) are disproportionately high. Table 4 compares CFE Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) holdings of the Balkans with those of NATO including Greece and Turkey, then with those of NATO excluding Greece and Turkey, and then with those of the USSR. The comparison very eloquently indicates how over-armed the Balkans are.

It is notable that the six Balkan countries have 24.7% more artillery than do all NATO countries combined except Greece and Turkey, as well as that the combined artillery potential of the six is 27.8% higher than that of the USSR. The amount of battle tanks in the Balkans is also very high 64.6% that of the 14 NATO countries and 58.6% that of the USSR. A similar situation exists with respect to combat aircraft (51.9% that of 14 NATO countries and 37.7% that of the USSR) while the number of ACVs and, in particular, attack helicopters is relatively few. Even after the full implementation of the CFE Treaty the ratio of the Balkan holdings to those of the 14 NATO countries (excluding Greece and Turkey) and the USSR will be even more disproportionate. One question that arises concern the amount of money these countries spend for a defence of this size. In 1990 the six Balkan countries spent 13.33 billion US\$ for defence or 3.06% of their combined GNP. At the same time the six Western European countries (Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) with roughly the same population spent 56.306 billion US\$ 2.54% of their combined GNP or 20% less. A final point on defence equipment is that the six Balkan countries have in total 43,249 TLEs while the six Western European countries to which we compare them hold only 18,390 TLEs that is, the Balkans have 2.35 more TLE's than do the six Western countries combined, although they have a slightly greater population and more than five times the aggregate GNP (Balkans 435.05 billion US\$; 6 Western 2,212.56 billion US\$).

Threat Perceptions

The Balkans, unfortunately, are now the most unstable region in Europe, with one country already in the midst of a horrible civil war which will most likely lead to its disintegration, and with all the others perceiving serious or more remote threats originating either from their neighbours or from within their own territory, in the form of minority problems and social, political or economic unrest. Greece and Bulgaria feel seriously threatened by Turkey, Albania is openly demanding Kosovo from Yugoslavia, Hungary wants Transylvania back (although recently these tensions have relaxed), Romania wants Moldavia back from the USSR, and Macedonia seems to present a first-class confrontation issue for all the Balkan

countries for different reasons. This situation breeds serious security problems for the Balkan countries and therefore for all of Europe as well.

Table 4: Balkan CFE Treaty Limited Equipment as Compared to NATO/the USSR

| <i>TLE</i> | <i>Balkan TLE</i> | <i>NATO (16) TLE (GR/TU in)</i> | <i>Balkan as % of NATO (16)</i> | <i>NATO (14) TLE (GR/TU out)</i> | <i>Balkan TLE as % OF NATO (14)</i> | <i>USSR TLE</i> | <i>Balkan TLE as % of USSR</i> |
|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Battle Tanks | | | | | | | |
| - Feb. 91 | 12,698 | 24,366 | 52.1 | 19,664 | 64.6 | 21,658 | 58.6 |
| - Maximum | 10,380 | 20,000 | 51.9 | 15,470 | 67.1 | 13,150 | 78.9 |
| ACV | | | | | | | |
| - Feb. 91 | 11,931 | 34,225 | 34.9 | 31,082 | 38.4 | 31,615 | 37.7 |
| - Maximum | 13,236 | 30,000 | 44.1 | 24,346 | 54.4 | 20,000 | 66.2 |
| Artillery | | | | | | | |
| - Feb. 91 | 19,200 | 20,744 | 92.6 | 15,394 | 124.7 | 15,018 | 127.8 |
| Maximum | 16,571 | 20,000 | 82.9 | 14,599 | 113.5 | 13,175 | 125.8 |
| Combat A/C | | | | | | | |
| - Feb. 91 | 2,495 | 5,786 | 43.1 | 4,806 | 51.9 | 6,611 | 37.7 |
| - Maximum | 2,831 | 6,800 | 41.6 | 5,400 | 52.4 | 5,150 | 55.0 |
| Attack Helic | | | | | | | |
| Feb. 91 | 182 | 1,630 | 11.2 | 1,625 | 11.2 | 1,481 | 12.3 |
| Maximum | 368 | 2,000 | 18.4 | 1,939 | 19.0 | 1,500 | 24.5 |

What Can Be Done?

This question is not easy to answer in view of local sensitivities and the complexity of local problems. Some measures that could certainly help are the following:

1. Dialogue

There is no way that problems in the Balkans can be solved any other way than by dialogue. With their over-sensitivity, over-militarisation and over-arming, lack of dialogue could lead into an armed confrontation with quite unpredictable results. A dialogue, however, will have no results whatsoever unless all parties involved are prepared to show self-restraint, non-recourse to nationalist passions, and non-aggressive attitudes.

2. Co-operation

The challenge here is to find areas of common interest whereby the Balkan countries could constructively combine their efforts instead of confronting one other. Such areas could be tourism, economic activities, transports, and communications, bringing the countries closer, increasing confidence, and thus reducing the probability of an accidental confrontation due to misunderstanding.

3. *Confidence-Building Measures*

The forum of the Balkan Co-operation Council or other bilateral or multilateral fora where Balkan countries participate could be used to discuss and agree on various measures that would improve transparency and reduce suspicion that one country is preparing for military intervention against another. Such measures could include wide-scale exchange of information, "open skies" régimes similar to what exists already between Romania and Hungary, and the exchange of military observers that could have free access to the military formations and equipment of other neighbouring countries.

4. *Disarmament*

In a spirit similar to that of the CFE, the Balkan countries should strive for mutual force reduction agreements. Such measures would ideally lead to gradually-lower levels of armed forces, thus making it very difficult for any country in the Balkans to initiate any kind of military activity against each other.

5. *Balkan "Helsinki" Commitments*

One of the greatest threat perceptions of the Balkan countries is the apprehension that due to minority differences or other factors, one country could intervene militarily in another and forcibly try to occupy part of its territory. This apprehension could be mitigated if the Balkan countries were to sign a treaty by which they would commit themselves to respect the territorial integrity of all others as well as a statement that under no circumstances would any country use force against another. This would not exclude the possibility for cases like Kosovo to be resolved peacefully, but it would exclude the connection of minority differences with territorial claims.

6. *Regional Economic Co-operation*

It would be most interesting if all Balkan countries could be persuaded to participate in some form of local economic community co-operation - in this respect initiatives like the Black Sea initiative could provide a useful pattern, although other more acceptable formulas could also be negotiated.

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Chapter 5

South-East European Security and the Military Alliances: The Case of Bulgaria

Stoyan Andreev

The historical changes in South-Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation have changed the security perceptions of the countries in the region. In this respect Bulgaria, considered a "close friend" of the USSR, is a special case.

The radical political and economic changes going on in Bulgaria have also substantially changed the basis of its national security. Up to now it has been chiefly grounded in the military-political guarantees of the Warsaw Pact and on the military-economic support of COMECON. The inner infrastructure of the Bulgarian national security system has been based on the dominance of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the leadership of the country. The military industry, providing the technical basis of developing armed forces, was fully inserted into the ex-Eastern European bloc structure and was of an entirely centralised type. Nowadays these fundamental components of Bulgarian national security exist no more. Therefore, it is necessary to elaborate a new system of national security.

What are the main trends directing the building of a new security system ?

1. Firstly, the Warsaw Pact has disintegrated and Bulgaria no longer has any military guarantees. This makes it indispensable to build up quite different relations, with all the ex-Warsaw Pact member countries, and especially with the Soviet Union. These should be relations without military-political engagements, and should render account of our national interests, our national independence and dignity. In other words, these should be relations among free and equal nations. It does not mean that military-economic relations with ex-Warsaw Pact partners should be left unsettled. But it is impossible to maintain the involvement of our armed forces in the old, disappearing structures. Bulgaria has acquired armaments for tens of billions of dollars, but it cannot afford in the next ten years to have them superseded by others, produced elsewhere. The experience of countries like Egypt shows that military-technological ties between countries like Bulgaria and the Soviet Union survive for approximately twenty years, even when military-political contacts are frozen - *i.e.*, as long as the life cycle of a generation of armaments for the basic armed forces lasts. However, all these military-economic and military-technological ties, inevitable as they are, will be based on entirely new principles. Besides, further modernisation of the already-supplied armaments and military equipment as well as development of the armed forces are consistent with Bulgaria's new doctrine, that it shall use the experience and assistance of all countries, especially of the industrially-developed countries of Western Europe, the US and Israel.

2. Secondly, after dropping the doctrinal requirement of strict coordination of Bulgarian foreign policy with the policy of the Warsaw Pact, it is necessary to reconstruct bilateral relations with neighbouring countries as well. No more restrictions exist in this respect for Bulgaria on the part of its ex-military bloc, and with NATO redirecting its bloc strategy towards defence and towards all-European military and political stability, vast possibilities are opening up for Bulgarian collaboration with neighbouring countries in the interest of its national security.

More specifically, Bulgaria is improving its relations with Turkey and Greece, members of NATO, and openly sharing its concerns regarding the concentration of Turkish troops and modern offensive armaments around its border. It is understood that to a great extent this is a situation created by the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which lasted for decades. But it does not exist any more. Besides, Bulgaria does not think that Turkey intends to attack it, nor does it intend to intrude into the coordinated strategy between the US and Turkey in the Near East. But it must question the following two parallel tendencies:

- Bulgaria continuously decreases its troops and armaments unilaterally and in accordance with the "Paris Decisions".
- Turkey continuously increases the quantity of its troops and the quantity and quality of its armaments, especially the offensive ones, all of which are concentrated mainly around the Bulgarian border. This is a fact that influences Bulgaria national mentality and sets the stage for the development of a nationalist political spirit. In this respect Bulgaria relates its new national security doctrine to an understanding of the European countries, especially Turkey.

Bulgaria is currently examining very closely the military-economic aspects of the proposal made by Mr. Mitsotakis, the President of Greece, which is considered to be of principal importance for the military and political stability of the Balkans.

3. Third is the reassessment of the military factor in the Bulgarian system of national security. Without underestimating the military factor, Bulgaria considers the political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, scientific and technological factors operating in the all-European structures to be essential to the efforts of increasing its exterior guarantees. In other words, the main reason for restructuring Bulgarian national security is the decisive increase in the effectiveness of non-military factors. It was necessary to start with a drastic restructuring of the armed forces. Bulgaria is in the process of completing considerable cuts on troops and armaments and has begun preparing the professionalisation of its army. It has already depoliticised all effectives and has provided for the democratization of army life, authorizing the existence of servicemen's trade unions. It is also preparing some parliamentary measures for effecting full civil control over the activity of the armed forces.

4. One of the fundamental features of Bulgaria's "new politics" is the succession of positive achievements in Bulgaria's bilateral relations with its neighbours. In spite of doctrinal and ideological restrictions and some serious failures in Bulgarian national security, these diplomatic breakthroughs significantly contributed to the enhancement of our reliability. However, these values have to be incorporated into Bulgaria's new design for all-European security. In this respect, a full programme of activities has been proposed to the Bulgarian Parliament, President and Government.

5. The next prerequisite is strict observance of the requirements of the "Paris Charter". No longer does Bulgaria see the settlement of the problems of ensuring its national security as falling outside the all-European process. In the scheme of the Paris Charter, the notion of "defensive sufficiency" has acquired quite tangible military-political and military-technological implications for Bulgaria. For politicians the notion has a fairly definite content and structure, but in the eyes of the professional military men it still retains a lot of inadequately-specified details. Obviously, for each country and in every particular interior, regional and global military-political situation, the Charter has its specific application. For Bulgaria, "defensive sufficiency" means minimum armed forces necessary to vindicate the existence of the state,

since the all-European defensive structures designed by the Paris Charter are as yet not implemented.

6. It is imperative to finish the architecture of the European security system as soon as possible, including the defence system and its executive bodies. This system should then be fully reconstructed and made to operate efficiently.

7. It is also important to institutionalise the agencies for preventing and managing crisis situations in Europe, as provided by the Paris Charter. Bulgaria does not deny the difficulties standing before it as NATO is still not ready to admit new members, in spite of the demand of influential Bulgarian political forces that the country should be admitted and given full membership. It is still not evident whether there will be a new all-European military structure supporting and affirming the military needs and demands of European states' security, or what would serve as a model and what the precise functions of such a structure would be. Bulgaria is seriously examining those problems and is ready to associate and comply with those structures, supported by its neighbours. In this respect, Bulgaria is faced with vast prospects for fruitful and useful collaboration, in terms of its security. Bulgaria is placing faith in its neighbours to not only understand its uneasiness, but also to support its efforts to dispel doubts through acceptable pledges and other confidence-building measures. In this respect, Bulgaria is in the process of working out a "package" of measures, leading to consolidation of confidence and stability of the Balkans.

8. The character of Bulgaria's new national security concept is highly influenced by the fact that it is built up and put into practice within the context of vigorous democratisation of Bulgarian society and transition to a market economy. The armed forces, as already indicated, have been depoliticised. Their battle training is carried out with openness and publicity. Bulgaria seeks to achieve its goals without affecting the interests of any other country, but in harmony with them. This is Bulgaria's positive influence on the common security of Europe and the Balkans, and it seems that the prestige of this factor in the relationships with neighbours can only increase in significance, thereby contributing substantially to the consolidation of Balkan national security.

9. The defence industry is one of the pillars of Bulgaria's national security. As in all developed countries, it fulfills the following three functions :

- It supplies arms, military technology and military possession of arms;
- It sets up a considerable part of the military balance;
- It carries out industrial technological development of machine-building, electronics and manufacturing branches.

Nowadays, as the whole economy turns to market tenets, relations between defence and the defence industry have to be seriously reconsidered.

State monopoly of arms production and marketing should be preserved, which does not mean that the defence industry should not be decentralised and become more economically-efficient. In order to prepare for integration into the all-European structures, Bulgaria must accept the clauses of COCOM, the international rules for selling arms, the international standards, and the western method of warranting foreign investments. For the resolution of these problems, new structures and new relationships between the defence, industry, commerce, and other concerned departments and the Government have to be built up.

For Bulgaria, the ecological factor (both in its external as internal aspects) has become an important component of national security. Protection of the population from natural and

technological calamities has acquired an unusual sharpness, especially after the Chernobyl tragedy, and is subject to extraordinary social anxiety. Because of the close interconnection of the Balkan and European countries, every sizable disaster is already difficult to localise. Thus, many different situations posing a potential ecological threat to Bulgaria can have strong and unpredictable consequences. That is why on the basis of its existing civil defence, Bulgaria must construct a modern system for protecting its population from such disastrous occurrences. This is one of the obligatory prerequisites for our integration into the Atlantic community.

The military component of our national security system will remain an important factor in the coming 10 years. Even countries who are members of NATO, who have the military bloc's guarantee and no external threats, are carrying out vast programmes for qualitative improvements of their armed forces. Arms control in these countries is carried out thanks to the recent scientific and high technology achievements.

As far as the countries of the ex-Warsaw Pact are concerned, there operates a tacit, but irresistibly destructive factor - a significant scientific and technological lagging behind.

The war in the Gulf has shown that new technologies have acquired decisive importance in hostilities. Being NATO members, Bulgaria's neighbours Greece and Turkey will continue modernising their armaments on the basis of the latest technological and scientific achievements beyond COCOM's restrictions. It is likely that this process will very soon acquire a new military-strategic importance. That is why in time decisions of principle should be made, concerning western assistance to the Bulgarian armed forces' modernisation. Otherwise, the accumulated military-political sphere, could give rise to strongly negative consequences for the Balkans' stability.

This is a situation which derives from enduring intransient conflict factors - ethnic tensions, strong social stratification, regional tensions, religious confrontations and ecological perils. Thus, the military factor will evidently play an important role in Bulgaria's national security, without dominantly changing other components. However, keeping in mind the new realities of the world, which have specific implications for Europe, the Balkans and Bulgaria, the reconstruction of Bulgarian armed forces should be based on the following principles:

- The army should consist of a few highly-mobile and highly-sophisticated professionals;
- There should be a dynamic fixation of the levels of defence sufficiency;
- A system could be elaborated for quick and constant introduction of global scientific and technological achievements to the army;
- Personnel should be trained in the spirit of Bulgaria's national ideals and universal human values.

Bulgaria's new national security doctrine reflects the changes, which have taken place in the Balkans and in Europe, as well as its own new strategic interests. The doctrine has been elaborated in the spirit of the Paris Charter and its substantial foundation is comprised the all-European structures and their respective functions, in light of the new realities in South-Eastern Europe.

Chapter 6

South-East European Countries' Threat Perceptions

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In the aftermath of the Gulf War, new events seem to be upsetting the tranquillity of Europe reforming. Whereas the Iraqi invasion had direct and often measurable implications for almost every country in the world, especially regarding their economies, the events in the Yugoslav republics and the possibility of spill-over effects for their Balkan neighbours may prove difficult to gauge and harder to control. Even these unsettling developments, however, have been overshadowed by the recent attempt to overthrow the reformers in the USSR and the ensuing reaction by elements loyal to the elected government of Russia. It is self-evident that had the outcome of the coup in Moscow been successful, it would have determined not only the orientation of its former allies in South-Eastern Europe but also the stance of Greece and Turkey as members of NATO, reintroducing the East-West element in North-South relations and complicating the Gordian knot of Yugoslavia even further. As the symbols of communist power are being torn down in Moscow and the Russian flag is flying once more all over the country, events in the Balkans are bound to accelerate, thus making compromise solutions less likely in the future. As the reformers have managed to survive and are now taking the offensive by purging the USSR of its conservative elements, the future of communism in the Balkans is bleak and the roles of the EC and the USA will probably cease to be that of innocent bystanders mildly encouraging their champion in the fight. Yeltsin has not failed to convince the Russian people that they are capable of determining their own fate. The consequences for the Russian people are beyond the scope of this paper, so it suffices to say that, in the short duration of the coup, the conservatives, with the co-operation of the beneficiaries of the old régime, were unable to change the course of events, proving to the world - and particularly to their old allies - that the present course is irreversible. The Russian population could not be bribed into believing that law and order are more conducive to economic prosperity than the uncertainty of a brave new world.

In the near future, it is quite feasible to imagine the production lines of the USSR beginning to run out of parts and sub-assemblies, and the country being faced with unwilling OECD trade partners for consumer and investment goods - let alone economic aid as well as an uncompromising demand from the military for increased defence spending. This hypothetical situation would likely have given rise to a regressive Soviet Union attempting to reclaim its dominant position in Eastern Europe and the Balkans both as a trading partner and guarantor of their security. The reaction to this scenario by the West would lead to a very dangerous confrontation, especially in Eastern Europe. In the Balkans, such a move by the USSR would have had variable consequences, given the different developments in each of the region's countries: for example, Romania is already shackled to the Soviet Union by a very inflexible bilateral treaty (but signed with the legitimate government and already under fire by an equally-uneasy opposition), Bulgaria is at least officially, committed to the West, despite its socialist government, and Yugoslavia is in complete disarray.

Finally, in the long term, it is difficult to see how the old, inefficient, discredited, economic system could be maintained, since its major advantage, the lack of accountability, has been completely undermined by *glasnost* over a period of almost six years. As events continue to unfold in Moscow and the Soviet republics, it is becoming increasingly difficult

to focus on the Balkans in isolation - a look at the background of each country is necessary to understand potential developments in the future.

The region as a whole has been described in the past as the "powder keg" of Europe, and it would not be wholly inappropriate to call it today the Middle East of Europe. The major linkage for both of these troubled regions was originally the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and even today Turkey remains one of the major linkages, with its dual role as a Balkan and a Middle Eastern country. The linkage with Western Europe has been to a large extent through the Russian and then Soviet Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries by Russian confrontation with the Ottomans, and following the establishment of the communist régime in Moscow, by the Cold War. However, causes for unrest abound in the Balkans and are today, perhaps not surprisingly, more connected with ethnic and religious differences than with economic interests. It is precisely this which makes the region so volatile and difficult to extinguish and which makes the understanding of each country's peculiarities so imperative. For Europe, the danger is twofold - on the one hand, Greece and Turkey, still holding the south-eastern flank of NATO against an increasingly multi-azimuth threat, and on the other hand, a very volatile Yugoslavia stretches deep into Central Europe, which is itself in great need of peaceful recuperation from its reforming operation. To complicate things even further, Greece, as an EC member, could bring Western Europe directly into the fray, if political union is really the ultimate goal of the EC. If anyone in Europe is aspiring to isolationist tendencies, it is very bad timing indeed.

Romania

It seems appropriate to begin with Romania, given the country's geographical isolation from the West and its proximity to the Soviet Union. Following the demise of the Ceausescu régime and its replacement by the more-or-less democratically-elected Iliescu government, the opposition has been trying to raise its voice, struggling to avoid a return to the old days of communist rule and calling, among other things, for the resignation of Iliescu and for the opposition to unite rather than accept a coalition with the NSF. One of the possible governmental options is indeed a monarch, King Michael, who discounts criticism of his being anachronistic by pointing to King Juan Carlos of Spain, a constitutional monarch who has successfully promoted the transition to democracy. At the moment, however, Romania is far from being accepted as a successfully reforming country. Reports from the Atlantic Council and the Helsinki Watch show that no civic society has been developed yet and that there is still a long way to democracy and a market economy.

If there is a common threat to all reforming Eastern European countries, it is probably the bad health of their economies - and Romania is certainly no exception. In fact it is probably worse off than most, with a significant segment of the population shifting its stance towards the old Ceausescu régime, resulting in what has been described as a "cult following" and an increasingly vocal Ceausescu family. Amid social insecurity and frustration over the difficulties of the transition to a democratic society, even Iliescu has accepted that "certain aspects of present life are becoming worse". Given the 25 years of Ceausescu rule this should not be surprising, but despite the appalling living conditions of Romanians, it is fatigue turning to desperation which is causing this odd reaction. Macroeconomic imbalances appear better on paper when compared to other reforming economies, especially with regard to foreign debt, but the social cost is not taken into account; with an estimated 13% drop in national product in 1990 following a decline of 6% in 1989 (in real terms), the situation is

not promising. As a result, emigration since 1990 has been estimated at over 100,000 people. One of Ceausescu's legacies was the inhuman effort to cut foreign debt to almost nil, resulting in conditions of virtual starvation in the country. This may have lessened the burden of debt repayment today, but with declining oil reserves and output, Romania is no better off in satisfying its hard currency needs. In effect, Romania has adopted fewer reforms toward "market socialism" and has maintained even more extensive price controls since the change of government. The situation seems to be improving of late, with some measures taken since April 1991 to define an appropriate legal framework for private sector activity and with some privatization having taken place in agriculture, coupled with the removal of foreign trade monopolies and most quantitative restrictions.

The social and economic situation described above set the stage for the new bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union, which can be described as the most influential document in defining Romania's future security policy. The treaty, officially titled *Treaty of Cooperation, Good Neighbourliness and Friendship*, is not the first one between the two countries and is supposed to replace the 1970 *Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance* (which expires in 1995). As a bilateral agreement it is supposed to blaze a trail for similar treaties to be signed by other Eastern European countries, and it lays the foundations for Soviet oversight of Romanian security policy. Given, however, the imprecision of a number of its clauses allowing for unilateral interpretations, it is clearly unacceptable for other members of the WTO and is also the subject of intense attacks from the Romanian opposition. Highlights of the treaty are the constraints on foreign and defence policy by not allowing the signatories to be "part of an alliance directed against either of them" and forbidding the "use of territory by a third state to commit aggression against the other". Given the current turn of events in the USSR, it is obvious how important these clauses are by forcing Romania to implicitly ally itself with any régime in Moscow, conservative or otherwise, or repudiate the treaty altogether - an awkward move for the hard-pressed Iliescu, but an opportunistic one as well.

From the Soviet point of view, it was initially obvious that the old *cordon sanitaire* of the WTO needed to be reinstated through a series of similar bilateral treaties with the countries of Eastern Europe, forming a shield for the USSR from the West. Recent events, however, make even these precautions seem obsolete.

As for Romania's security needs, the opposition has been quite adamant about what the treaty fails to address: no mention is made of Moldavian sovereignty or even of direct contacts with Moldavia. Bessarabia and North Bukovina, both potentially-disputable regions, are accepted as being incorporated in the USSR. Iliescu attempted to dispel these criticisms of the opposition by including an article (article 20) mentioning the role of the Soviet republics, regions and other administrative structures in carrying out the clauses of the treaty. His claim was that this article implies direct contacts between Romania and Moldavia, but this was at best a half-hearted attempt at filling the gap. It is no wonder that the opposition accused the treaty of "codifying a relationship of vassalage" and immediately called for direct ties with the Russian Republic of Boris Yeltsin. In fact, the possibility of such a move meeting with success is quite good. Foreign trade operations involving goods from the RSFSR require the consent of the republic, and the Romanians are keen to maintain an uninterrupted flow of raw materials into their economy. Today, article 20 and its implementation seem to have saved the treaty, as bilateral talks with other republics are well under way.

The treaty, however, also serves another purpose. Romania, in an unrestrained environment characteristic of the post-Cold War era, feels threatened by the Hungarian

minority within its borders and by the Transylvanian question. For both these issues the support of the Soviet Union seems to be the only immediate security guarantee. Any pressure on the Soviets on the Moldavian issue could result in Soviet retaliation by pressuring the Hungarians on the Transylvanian issue. Perhaps more importantly, with the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania (HDFR) becoming increasingly vocal, the strong anti-ethnic stance of the USSR was considered as a valuable asset. Now, the whole scheme seems to have backfired on the Iliescu government. As the reformers are moving ahead, there is little doubt that the breakaway tendencies in the republics will be strengthened and the Romanian government may find itself without any strong cards in its hand. Alternatively, with some quick footwork, Romania may find itself better placed to renegotiate its position vis-à-vis the constituent republics of the USSR for having chosen an Eastern-oriented security policy.

In conclusion, it appears as if the Romanian government has gambled on a powerful but very unstable ally in order to keep the country's internal and external threats in check. On the economic front, with events in Russia expected to hasten market reforms there, the whole rationale of the Iliescu initiative seems obsolete and the opposition appears justified in condemning such an inflexible policy. Following the outcome of the coup in Moscow, however, the proposed bilateral treaties with the other republics could take on a significance of even greater proportions and make the whole concept of an Eastern alliance quite attractive.

Bulgaria

Bulgaria has traditionally been the staunchest ally of the Soviet Union and one of the most reliable members of the WTO. It was therefore with considerable interest that developments there were followed by the West, particularly by Turkey and Greece. The new constitution in parliament is the fourth one in the country's history and signals a clean break with communism and a return to the pre-communist political system. It is based on the 1879 constitution and may imply some legal foundations for the return of constitutional monarchy, although fears that this may have a detrimental effect on the country's political and economic reforms are largely alarmist and groundless. The confusion resulting from the demise of the old régime has caused a lot of speculation about the pace of reform in the country; along with Romania, Bulgaria seems to be lagging behind other Eastern European countries by maintaining strong central control of the economy. The threat of economic catastrophe is a very real one, with the country suffering a 9% decline in output in 1990, coupled with a growing-but-suppressed inflation of around 50%. Major steps to curb inflation were taken in February 1991 by adopting tight control of wages in the public sector. At the same time, the structural changes necessary for economic reform received a boost with trade liberalization and a unified, floating exchange rate. Public support for the difficult measures necessary for economic reform, however, is conditional on political reforms maintaining their pace; it is in this area that vacillation may prove damaging, by spoiling Bulgaria's international image. The economic situation has not been helped by the loss of Iraq as a trading partner and by higher oil prices, which now increasingly affect Bulgaria's need for hard currency and economic assistance (its foreign loan request from the IMF was 3 billion US\$).

Economics aside, Bulgaria is also faced with minority problems, both inside and outside its borders. In its Eastern provinces is the well publicized Turkish minority, the suppression of which led to a diplomatic confrontation with the Turks, lasting until December 1989 when the assimilation decree was revoked. The Turks were favourable to Zhivkov's downfall but

relations between the two countries were minimal at best over the draft law on Turkish names. The election results favouring the reformed communist party did not help either, given Turkey's stance against communism. Another possible reason for this early confrontation may have been Popov's wish to capitalize on the very strong anti-Turkish sentiment in order to push forward with unpopular reforms. Relations with Greece, surprisingly good given the countries' past history, were further cultivated by a virtual Bulgarian-Greek axis emerging in late 1990, following the signing of a military co-operation treaty in the face of a common threat. This arrangement will provide some stability in the two countries faced with potential Turkish expansionism on the one hand and multiple threats resulting from the situation in Yugoslavia on the other. The identical views of the two concerning minority issues were greatly publicized in a common statement that there is no legal ground for classification of an ethnic minority on Bulgarian territory and that the Macedonian minority claimed by Skopje is a "phantom creation". As for the defence co-operation agreement, this was described as being founded on the basis of CSCE decisions regarding transparency; in fact, however, it is perhaps a better indication of true perceptions of a threat from Turkey, especially following the huge increases in military and economic aid received by Turkey in the wake of the Gulf War. The *status quo* was seen to be seriously affected by Turkey's increasing military potential, and Greece was not only seen as a useful counterweight against a growing Turkish threat but also as a bridge to NATO and the EC.

More surprising, perhaps, is Bulgaria's wooing of NATO itself. Following the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact institutions, Bulgaria was in need of redefining its national security requirements and its military doctrine, to bring it in line with the current situation. Unlike Romania, which sought the heavy wing of the Soviet Union for protection, Bulgaria made a move away from its previous satellite status, with Zhelev declaring that the strategy of seeking the support of a great power to guarantee the country's national security was no longer valid. The desire to become part of an alliance which would respect its sovereign rights and provide for its security needs made NATO the obvious choice. In August 1990, Defence Minister Dobri Dzhurov openly admitted that he could not rule out Bulgaria's joining NATO someday. From then on, relations improved rapidly, culminating in General Woerner's visit to Bulgaria in June 1991. The visit was hailed as a great success, being described as "psychotherapy on a national level", and resulted in various facilities being made available to the Bulgarians, including the NATO schools. A civic organization, the Atlantic Club, emerged to provide a forum for non-governmental contacts, and the declarations stopped just short of mentioning Bulgaria's joining the Alliance. In retrospect, all of these colourful exclamations would have been more-or-less insignificant but for the August *coup d'état* in Moscow.

Even the most conservative elements in both camps cannot fail to see the real possibility of something like this actually taking place if the Soviet Union's demise begins to accelerate. Bulgaria was in fact hoping to balance its overtures to the West by signing a new treaty with the USSR, along the lines of the Romanian treaty, although probably with fewer restrictions on foreign and defence policy. Also, Zhelev made it clear that other treaties would follow with the Soviet Republics. The former may now become a mere formality with the latter providing the truly multi-dimensional solution to Bulgaria's security needs.

Turkey, for its part, was not slow in realizing the threat of a successful Bulgarian-Greek axis and responded rapidly and energetically. Following the resolution - at least for the time being - of the issue of the Turkish minority's assimilation, Ozal was (officially) invited by Zhelev to visit Bulgaria, opening a series of high level exchanges between the two countries.

In October 1990, Turkey arranged a 100 million US\$ loan to be equally divided between consumer and investment goods and recently provided another loan of 50,000 tons of oil, to alleviate Bulgaria's energy problems. Since 1991, economic ties have been strengthened further by exchanges with the Business Forum and by the provision of medical aid to the hard-pressed Bulgarians. From a security point of view, the highlight of these exchanges came in November 1990 with the exchange visit to Turkey by the Bulgarian General Staff - an unprecedented move, but one which stopped short of a non-aggression pact, possibly because of Bulgaria's relations with Greece. All of these efforts, however, have not been in vain: the Greco-Bulgarian axis serves today as a counterweight to an emerging Turco-Bulgarian relationship at best and, with the situation in the USSR still uncertain, Turkey may prove a more powerful ally than Greece, although not a more reliable one.

The picture in Bulgaria would not be complete without mention of the Yugoslav crisis and its effect on the population of Macedonia, claimed by Bulgaria to be ethnic Bulgarian. There is little doubt that there is an element of truth in such a claim, although this would hardly justify an intrusion in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. The Bulgarians have thus chosen to avoid a confrontation with Belgrade by declaring that they are unwilling to re-open the issue. More recently, however, there have been indications that the Bulgarian government would recognize and even support an independent Macedonia. Given Macedonia's inability to maintain a viable, independent statehood, the significance of this shift is obvious, providing the Macedonians with an additional incentive to push for independence, especially once the situation in the USSR is resolved. This has caused considerable alarm both in Athens and in Belgrade, which see Bulgaria's move as an effort to drive a wedge in the middle of the Balkans by acquiring control of its Macedonian satellite. Considering Bulgaria's extremely weak economic situation, its multi-azimuth threats, including the Dobruja issue with Romania, and its wish to make a good impression in the West, these moves may prove extremely unwise, stretching the country's limited potential beyond the breaking point.

In conclusion, Bulgaria seems to be considering the West as its best means of escape from a number of difficulties, including its reform efforts and the Turkish threat. At the same time, however, it is also opening up new fronts in an effort to satisfy all of its existing requirements. Joining NATO seemed unrealistic until August 1991, the proposed Soviet treaty was unpopular, and bilateral agreements with Greece and Turkey are not without their limitations. In the end, Bulgaria may find that it has overstretched itself trying to remain neutral, and may realize that multi-azimuth threats do not necessarily require multi-azimuth solutions but rather a decisive, well defined policy.

Yugoslavia

Regarding threat perception in Yugoslavia, there is now little to be said. The crisis in the country cannot fail but to bring to mind all the pessimistic warnings heard after Tito's death in 1980 but the history and creation of Yugoslavia do not concern us here. It is better to attempt to discern what can realistically be salvaged from an apparently unsalvageable situation. Starting with the outbreak of peace in Slovenia, we are now confronted with the outbreak of war in Croatia and the possibility of further violence in Macedonia. There is no threat perception but rather threat realization.

A quick look at the various republics' economic viability may be more useful than any threat perception analysis.

Slovenia, first of all, seems to have escaped relatively unscathed from the ills of civil war, for the moment at least. There is some industrial potential in the republic and it is by far the wealthiest with 18.8% of national income for 8.2% of the population, but its industry has relied mainly on the domestic market, often as a subcontractor for its sales, and has little experience in market competition strategies. The tourist industry potential is limited and there are no energy resources or raw material deposits which could be developed. The republic's best asset is probably its relatively well-educated and well-motivated work force and its geographical location which, depending on political developments further south, could be exploited in the future through economic or political alliances.

Croatia is, at least on paper, better off, but this is largely a function of its maintaining its original territory intact. The republic has significant energy resources including oil deposits off the Adriatic coast and in Slavonia (the latter, however, is close to the Serbian border) and is also credited with having one of the largest ship-building industries in the world. On its Dalmatian coast, the tourist industry had been flourishing for many years and, possibly as a result, the infrastructure, in the form of roads and utilities, was the best in the country.

Serbia, the largest of the republics, has an even more varied potential of prosperity, with important high technology and defence industries south of Belgrade and the added advantage of agricultural land to support the country's needs in food and export potential through its wine-producing vineyards. The republic is also endowed with copper, coal, gold and silver deposits and significant energy resources through hydro-electricity. Its tourist industry can also be developed, and unlike the other republics, can rely on a large domestic market for its products, at least in the short term. It is, however, suffering from high unemployment, low productivity and heavy state bureaucracy.

Bosnia has economic potential with coal and hydro-energy resources, forestry and livestock, but unlike the other republics, there are no ethnic characteristics nor a truly dominant nationality, and Bosnia could thus face some form of partition.

Finally, the Republic of Macedonia has very poor economic prospects, being by far the most underdeveloped republic of Yugoslavia and one of the poorest regions in the Balkans, along with Albania.

The extent to which the republics can mobilize their resources in the future will depend upon the duration of the conflict and the amount of collateral damage inflicted on the infrastructure and human resources. Yugoslavia, as a reforming unified country, was not problem-free but had just managed to pull back from a hyper-inflating economy in 1989 and was expecting some improvement in its growth output from a record drop of 9% in 1990. The severity of the nationalistic sentiment gripping the country is marked by a catastrophic obsession with the past and the present without consideration for the problems of the future. A study published on the 5th of August by the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies estimated the cost of operations in Croatia alone at 4.5 billion US\$, or 25% of GDP. Unemployment countrywide is expected to reach 20%, and in the Kosovo region, 40%, while revenue from transit fees and tourism has been lost. Under these circumstances, national output decline is purely conjectural.

In sum, then, the internal threat to Yugoslavia stems from the unwillingness of its own constituent elements to sustain the country's existence as a unified state. Feelings are running so high that an economic catastrophe of unprecedented scale is of secondary importance to vague utopias of independence in the future.

External threats are also present, however, adding to the woes of this unfortunate country. Macedonia's scheduled referendum for September could result in the previously-discussed

complications with Bulgaria, and the Kosovo region, with its two million ethnic Albanians, has been a source of unrest and violent clashes long before the present crisis, bringing Albania and possibly Turkey into the picture. With a few exceptions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, Muslims in Yugoslavia are generally ethnic Muslims rather than ethnic Turks (Yugoslavia was accepted as a Muslim nation in 1961 by Tito himself, who no doubt felt more confident about his capability to hold the country together than do his heirs). Turkey, however, has indicated it would act as the protector of these minorities and the guarantor of their faith, which had led to increase Turkish assertiveness in this capacity, with or without the minorities' consent. Another potential threat is from Vojvodina, which is home to almost 500,000 ethnic Hungarians, and a Serbian clampdown has already caused the Hungarian Prime Minister Josef Antal to declare that Hungary's southern frontiers were determined by the signing of treaties (Trianon and Paris) with Yugoslavia, not Serbia.

In conclusion, it is impossible to predict what the coming months can bring to Yugoslavia other than misery and further downgrading of living standards. The situation in the USSR, with political power cascading down to the republics, appears to favour an acceleration of the breakdown of the federation, but a more benevolent and less egocentric Soviet Union could become a role model for the embattled republics. Unlike five years ago, Soviet intervention today could possibly be welcomed by the West and the Yugoslavs themselves.

Albania

Albania has for many years been the "black hole" of South-East Europe and one of the few countries untouched by foreign intervention. Alliances were experimented with, first with the USSR and then with China, but both were rejected by the most egocentric of communist leaders, Emver Hoja. Not long after his death, the country is showing signs of almost complete disintegration in record time. Political events, however, do not necessarily provide sufficient explanation for the mass exodus of the summer of 1991. The opening of the country to the outside world began in a relatively optimistic manner. The country's first democratic parliament, elected in March 1991, saw the communist Albanian Workers Party (AWP) in power with an increasingly-vocal opposition led by the Albanian Democratic Party (ADP) which won over the electorate in the cities and called for a radical approach to reform. Other parties taking part - with varying degrees of success - were the Republican Party, advocating a gradual reform program, OMONIA, representing the Greek minority and the Agrarian Party in rural areas. The optimism stems not from the results themselves but from the fact that elections were held at all.

When Prime Minister Fatos Nano presented the government's programme in parliament, he presented the case in very stark terms: the economy had begun to decline as early as 1989, accelerating in the following years to -6%, while the population growth was approaching a very high 2%. Foreign currency earnings had fallen 316 million US\$ below the 1990 projected plan and the trade deficit had increased by 165%. The country was for all intents and purposes bankrupt. The programme in itself, however, was liberal and comprehensive with significant changes made regarding the privatization of the economy, the banking sector and state enterprises while a new, transitional, constitutional law catered for freedom of religion, pluralism and the relinquishing of Ministry control by the communists. In spite of this, the government's position seems precarious, and with the collapse of the hard-liners in Moscow in August, its ideological base may become a liability.

Albania has turned to the West for assistance and representatives of the IMF have visited the country twice in the past few months. It is, however, the social crisis which is presenting the country with its most dangerous threat. The exodus of 50,000 young Albanians was indeed prompted mostly by economic reasons, but the ensuing series of massive strikes and anger directed at anything connected with the prior culture of socialist isolation has showed that the country is suffering from a severe case of demoralization and insecurity. This is the legacy of years of complete isolation from the rest of the world economically, politically and, worst of all, culturally. It has proved most damaging to the younger generations, depriving them of any cultural identity and national self-esteem. Economic aid from Italy, Turkey and the US has been forthcoming in the form of food, medical supplies, investments and credits, but the damage inflicted on the younger generations may prove harder to heal and the exodus is not expected to be halted entirely.

For such a small country to have minority problems in addition to everything else is truly unfortunate, but the country has three ethnic groups and three religions. The Tosks in the South (mostly representing the AWP), the Ghegs in the North, and an estimated 350,000 ethnic Greeks. The country is further divided along religious lines - 70% Muslim, 20% Greek Orthodox and 10% Roman Catholic - thus providing for potential flashpoints inside the country. Another three million ethnic Albanians live outside Albania's borders in Yugoslavia, providing for hostile relations between the two countries, serious enough to warrant the placing of the country's armed forces on alert status. In the past, Greece was viewed with suspicion as both a member of NATO and as the fatherland of Albania's ethnic minority and a claimant to the South, which the Greeks call North Epirus. Greece, as an EC member, is presently not considered a threat, but should the situation deteriorate into anarchy, there are reasons to believe that Greece would make moves to ensure the safety of the Greek minority.

In conclusion, Albania may find it very hard to pursue half-hearted attempts towards reform. Although the opening moves of its communist government were not unreasonable given the crumbling state of society and economy, only Western aid can give this or any other government time to work. The situation in Yugoslavia is of even greater importance, as it could suck this small country into the crisis. The worst threat, however, is the emigration of young people, which deprives the country of its only potential for future development and demoralizes those who stay behind.

Greece and Turkey

The last two countries are dealt with together and, as they have been in the post-World War II years, apart from other Balkan countries. Their co-existence as neighbours has been uncomfortable at best, with a series of clashes since the Greek War of independence in 1821. The two share as many similarities as they do hostile differences, but they probably have more to gain from improving their relations than do any other countries in the region. Regarding internal problems, both countries have witnessed political turmoil and military interventions, which have affected their perceptions of threat and their methods of response. Since the normalisation of political life and restoration of democratic institutions, however, the two countries have developed quite differently, a fact which may result in a significant imbalance in the Aegean and potential trouble in the future.

Greece was the first off the mark, with the downfall of the Junta in 1974 and the country's accession to the EEC. The Greek economy received a massive infusion of funds from the EC in the 80s but much of this was squandered unwisely in support of party politics

instead of being used to build up the country's infrastructure. In the early 90s, Greece found itself increasingly under fire from its EC partners for its huge bureaucracy and inability to rein in tax evasion resulting in record public sector deficits (at some point reaching over 18% of GDP) and rising inflation. In January 1991, the European Commission intervened, demanding government action if any more loans were to be released, all in order to prop up the crumbling economy.

The threat of bankruptcy for Greece has serious implications for its security policy, as it has consistently been the highest spender on defence among NATO members (over 5.7% of GDP). This heavy burden on defence spending reflects Greece's preoccupation with external threats. Until the 70s these threats were more-or-less perceived as emanating equally from the North and the East. With Greek-Bulgarian relations steadily improving and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea dispute in full swing, however, the emphasis soon shifted to the East, reaching crisis proportions with the Gulf War. Both the Conservatives in 1980 and the Socialists in 1985 adhered to this orientation of the country's defences with the full agreement of the population, a fact which has allowed defence spending to remain at very high levels and conscription to remain quite lengthy, although the latter has been cut from a maximum of 27 months in the early 80s, to less than two years today. A weak economy not only undermines the procurement value of defence outlays but also inhibits the country from playing a significant role in the Balkans at a time when taking the initiative is imperative for its future security. These weaknesses became painfully apparent during the exodus from Albania of a large number of ethnic Greeks, with minimal reaction from the Albanian border guards, who until recently shot or jailed them to keep them from escaping. The Greeks not only panicked at the prospect of harbouring so many refugees but were unable to play a sponsoring role through economic aid allowing Italy and Turkey to upstage them. In similar fashion, its well publicised axis with Bulgaria, aimed at safeguarding its land border against Turkey, has been allowed to be downgraded by Turkey's economic clout. Admittedly, a sudden influx of 11,000 starved refugees would be a major headache for any economy far larger than Greece's, as witnessed by Italy's similar reaction to the situation, but there is no doubt that economic weakness means fewer options in defence and foreign policy.

To add to Greek worries comes the opening of hostilities in Croatia and the rapid breakdown of the Yugoslav federation. A new chapter was added in September when the Socialist Republic of Macedonia held its referendum resulting in a 75% vote in favour of independence. It is not surprising that Greece is almost as worried about Yugoslavia breaking up as are the Serbs themselves. As for its Eastern neighbour, Greece can be forgiven for being alarmist, given its past historical experience, as the balance of power - military, political and economic - is rapidly shifting in favour of Turkey. Turkish defence spending, in particular, would attract anyone's attention, not least of all the Greeks'. Depending on the source, defence spending for 1991 reflects a real increase of 17-28% from 1985 prices, which is enormous by any standards. Some of this is undoubtedly natural growth, resulting from the very high GDP growth of 9%, but Greece is more worried about the development in Turkey's defence industry, which will give the country a sustainable source of military power with even higher growth potential in the future. Furthermore, Arab and extra US aid to Turkey in reward for its role in the Gulf War has further boosted Turkey's military assets, and the 7 to 10 ratio of US military assistance to Greece and Turkey now exists only in name, despite American assurances to the contrary.

In conclusion, Greece is finding itself increasingly uncompetitive in an increasingly competitive world. Some of its ills have been brought about through its own actions or inactions, especially with regard to the internal political stalemate and the devastation of its economy. Some of the Greeks' complaints, however, sound convincing as the United States is increasingly perceived to favour one of its allies at the expense of the other. If the balance of power is allowed to deteriorate much further against Greece, Turkish expansionism could quite easily become a reality, possibly leading to a flare-up in the Aegean, which would be undesirable for all. Furthermore, a solution to this problem does not require any greater sacrifice for US foreign policy other than a balanced approach to security assistance, especially if Greece is seen to be making a sincere effort to pull itself together.

Expansionist tendencies in Turkey may in fact prove to be Turkey's major threat, albeit one which it does not realize. Only a few years ago the country appeared to be facing multiple and highly dangerous threats, which probably prompted the current Turkish military build-up. These included Iraq's phenomenal military might in the South-East, complicating the Kurdish problem, Syria's role as principal Soviet satellite in the South-West, Greece's geographical position off its coastline and disputes over the Aegean Sea, Bulgaria's suppression of its Turkish minority with the assimilation act and, of course, its traditional threat in the North-East, Communist Russia. Meanwhile, internally, Turkey has been facing the ever-present danger of Islamic fundamentalism.

It was President Ozal who understood that Turkey's only chance of facing up to these threats was through economic revitalisation, a goal he had already established from his post in the Demirel government before the military take-over. In his view, turning Turkey into a powerful industrial state would pay dividends in the future, allowing for more flexibility in foreign policy vis-à-vis both the West and Turkey's neighbours. His efforts appear to be bearing fruit today. Despite the Gulf War and its estimated 6.2 billion US\$ cost to the economy, Turkey is in the midst of a gigantic infrastructural development project (GAP) which aims primarily at developing the impoverished Eastern province of Anatolia and meeting the employment needs of a population growing at a rate of over 2.4%. Equal attention has also been given to Turkey's status as a trading partner by boosting exports to the EC. The ultimate goal is entry into the EC but the Turks themselves realize that this may still take some time. This drive for development has not been without problems: an annual inflation rate of between 60% and 65% in the past two years has been fuelled by high public sector borrowing, which reached 8.5% of GNP in 1990. Cash infusions, on the other hand, have been forthcoming, with 4.2 billion US\$ pledged by various sources to offset losses incurred during the War, and foreign investment expected to rise from 1.5 billion US\$ in 1990 to more than 2 billion US\$ in 1991.

Overall, Ozal has steered the country onto the right track -the track leading to Europe. Whether the Europeans will find an expanding population of 60 million Muslim easy to digest, however, is another matter. Turkish tradition is allegedly very secularized after Kemal's revolution, but the prospect is still very much ahead of its time and demographic growth in the East may make secularism unviable.

At the moment, the West is content to use Greece as a bulwark for not allowing Turkey into the EC. In the meantime, Islamic elements are striving, with some success, to penetrate higher institutions through para-religious organizations like the Tarikat. For its part, the state is attempting to integrate secular and religious forces through the TIS (Turkish-Islamic Synthesis) programme, with each having a clearly-defined and government-controlled role in Turkish society. If it succeeds, it will remove one of Turkey's major handicaps in approaching

the EC, but this is conditional upon unabated economic development of the highest order and at least some progress towards becoming accepted by the West. Otherwise, any relapse could be seen as a weakness to be exploited by the religious groups.

At the same time that Turkey was striving to revitalise itself, its external threats were disappearing or weakening significantly. First to go was the military threat of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in a war that saw Turkey's standing increase in proportion to its size. Syria, visibly shaken by the situation in the USSR, was carefully approaching the West. Greece, never a real military threat, was relatively marginalised through its internal problems. Bulgaria was pulling back from its tough positions on the minority issue and was an excellent target for Turkish economic aid, and the USSR, faced with the cataclysmic developments of the summer of 1991, was in no position to initiate hostile activities and was itself a prime target for Turkish investment.

In conclusion, given Turkey's position in relation to all of its neighbours, there is no reasonable threat that cannot be dealt with in the immediate future. It is only Turkey which could mismanage its own newly-acquired importance and growing power in the region, thereby bringing on the threat of an unified opposition if its actions were seen to be threatening to its neighbors. Mr. Ozal may find it to be to everyone's benefit if Turkey did not project the image of an expansionist regional power, but rather one willing to promote stability in the area by continuing to upgrade not just the country's economy but its political status as well. A first move could be to turn the country into a true democracy, by improving its record of human rights and allowing full freedom to all parties; given the situation in the USSR today, Mr. Ozal could not find a better opportunity.

Responses and Discussion

Igor Scherbak

I think that the new challenges to European security and stability demand a totally different approach with respect to military doctrines. The military doctrines after the Cold War and the dissolution of the WTO have ceased to play their traditional roles as the main tools for the preparation and waging of wars and for assuring strategic stability and order in the prevailing conditions of "deterrence".

At this particular stage of events in Europe, military doctrines in their present form cannot assure stability and security in Europe and cope with emerging crises of different natures (social-economic disorders, ethnic and national conflicts, growing environmental problems, etc.). The task now is to orient military doctrines (both those of NATO and of the USSR) towards the most acute problem in Europe - the prevention of war and different crises which could endanger European security and peace (for example, the situation in Yugoslavia).

Defensive military doctrines could play a still greater stabilizing role if they simultaneously provided means of forestalling and resolving crisis situations at the earliest possible stage so as to prevent the evolution of a large-scale armed conflict. Furthermore, the mechanism for preventing war and crisis situations must be woven into the fabric of military doctrines and brought into play by means of mutual consultation and other political steps (exchange of information, rapid communication between armed forces commands, on-site inspections to dispel suspicion, etc.), rather than by "deterrence" (by nuclear or conventional forces) or threats to use force.

Obviously, as the range of threats to strategic stability in Europe expands as a result of the interrelationships among military, economic and social crisis situations and as a result of the proliferation of nuclear or chemical weapons, entirely new demands are being made on military doctrines. First and foremost, they must be adapted to provide for early detection and prevention of crisis situations in the military field, and to furnish a basis for the formulation of a "code of behaviour" for armed forces in crisis situations that would enable armed forces to stay out of conflict situations. There is a clear need for a mechanism to allow for interaction between military doctrines and international agreements (patterned after the Soviet-United States Agreement of 12 June 1989 on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities) so as to prevent threatening military activities. An ideal approach would be the establishment of an international framework of multilateral agreements in Europe (similar to the 1986 Stockholm agreement on Confidence-Building Measures) to restrict or ban the most dangerous types of military activities that provoke crisis situations. If guidelines and procedures for the behavior of the armed forces in crisis situations were incorporated into the armed forces' plans of operation, such military doctrines could become effective tools for preventing war and crisis situations. One of the elements of such procedures is probably the renunciation by the armed forces of any show of force or military activities that could cause concern to the other side (exercises, mobilization measures, etc.). It is important in this respect that plans of operation not envisage any pre-emptive strikes against targets on the territory of the hypothetical enemy or the launching of attacks that would carry hostilities beyond the country's own territory or that of its allies.

The restructuring of military doctrines along defensive lines and the active role they could play in preventing crises and armed conflicts are acquiring added importance in the

context of radical reductions in conventional forces, new reductions in tactical nuclear forces, dynamic political changes in Eastern European countries, the lessened military weight and even the possible future dissolution or serious modification of NATO, and the reunification of Germany. It may be assumed that the transition from bloc-centered structures to new common European structures and permanent political institutions responsible for maintaining stability and security in Europe would be the most complex period of time, from the point of view of stability and predictability of the strategic situation. Military doctrines, if drastically modified, could play a key stabilizing role during this critical period.

The same applies to the Balkan sub-region and its corresponding military doctrines. It would be logical if the formation of modern national military doctrines, as well as structural changes in and modernization of their armed forces, were accompanied by the establishment of a spirit of openness, transparency, and mutual cooperation through elaboration of a "code of behaviour" for their armed forces in case of crisis. There should be open multilateral consultations in the sub-region when new trends in the military doctrines of some states are introduced (for example the adoption of the principle of tactical mobility of the armed forces). Such consultations would aim to avoid any fears or possible threats to the security of different states. It may be necessary even to initiate the plans for modernization of the armed forces with this aim in view. This is the only way to maintain stability and to avoid creating new fears concerning national security, since it would provide a sort of guarantee for a proper understanding of the positions of the Balkan states concerning the modernization of their armed forces, and would enable crisis prevention and crisis regulation.

Roberto Aliboni

I would like to make two observations on the *nature* as opposed to the *perception* of threat in South-East Europe. These two observations lead to a single policy recommendation: there is a common interest in encouraging EC attention and action toward this area.

The first observation is that the emerging threats in South-East Europe, particularly in the Balkans, are of a highly regional nature. This makes intervention from outside the Balkan area unlikely, resulting in more numerous and more serious risks for people living in the region. This may seem ironic or paradoxical since intervention by major external powers is sometimes a factor in the conflict, and is therefore part of the threat; the fact is, however, that the potential of opposing outcomes is always implicit in such intervention in that it may stabilize or create conflict. The superpowers have little interest in the current crisis in the Balkans and South-East Europe, and not much more in Cyprus.

This means that the Balkans are not the "powder keg" of Europe. During the first World War the instability of this region played a key role. But it is no longer possible for this instability to spread to a Europe which is no longer engaged in internal conflicts. The end of the East-West confrontation strengthens European stability, making the explosion of the "powder keg" less of a threat to Europe and the international system as a whole. This means that the Balkans risk having to deal with their problems in isolation - as did Lebanon - and that there will be those who resign themselves to the idea that Serbia should take on the same stabilizing role in the region that Syria performs with respect to Lebanese communities.

Seen in this light, the instability of the region could become chronic, worthy not of major newspaper headlines, and representing a problem only for the poorer neighbouring countries - Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Hungary - as opposed to the wealthier Austria and Italy.

If the region is of little interest to the superpowers, the refugee problem it creates and the increasing economic assistance it requires make it of great concern to the EC. These problems represent threats to the prosperity and internal stability of the EC. They affect all of Eastern Europe - not just the countries of the South-East - and above all, the USSR (or whatever form the USSR may take in the future). So the Balkans are not alone: the EC and several of its major and wealthiest members (*e.g.* Germany and Italy) are interested in their stability. Those interested in peace in the region must therefore encourage EC interest and action in the region, particularly Greece. This may seem obvious, but there are limits to EC interest. While the lack of international interest in the Balkans is apparent mainly in the attitudes of the two superpowers, it should be pointed out that EC interest also only goes so far.


The second observation regards the role of nationalism. This factor is important not only in the Balkans (and, in broader terms, the entire South-Eastern region of Europe), but also in its neighbouring countries. In the Yugoslav crisis, many communities are threatened. But it is not only an inter-community conflict - though this aspect may be destined to become increasingly important. Several communities (primarily the Serbs, but also the Croats) are aspiring to supremacy, hegemony, or domination. This constitutes a danger for neighbouring countries and could become a factor in the Balkan crisis. I would like to consider the case of Italy (though the current position of the Italian government and those of Italian political forces make the following hypothesis quite unlikely).

Inter-community conflicts are characterized by external intervention and the involvement of other parties. There is an Italian community between Slovenia and Croatia. Its concerns had largely been resolved and Italian public opinion had largely ignored it, until the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis, at which point it became an issue even for one of the coalition parties, in addition to - of course - right-wing groups and Italian regions close to Yugoslavia.

Nationalism and micro-nationalism are contagious and reinforce nationalism in neighbouring countries. What is happening in Italy at a probably innocuous level could also spread to Austria and Greece.

This is yet another reason to work within the EC. Thus far, events have unfolded according to this pattern. The situation is becoming more complicated, however, and it is important that the EC framework remain firm.

To respond to a threat characterized by problems such as those in the Balkans, therefore, the importance of the EC role must be stressed; similarly, the EC must also recognize its responsibility. The EC should be commended for the initiatives it has taken, though they were taken with some delay and hesitation (and not without polemics). The EC role, which could be enlarged, must be encouraged by the Balkans and sustained by its members.



Part III

South-East European Countries and the Negotiations and Agreements on Disarmament and Arms Limitation

the following are the names of the persons who have been
mentioned in the above report.

Chapter 7

South-East European Countries and the CSCE, CFE Negotiations

Ali L. Karaosmanoglu

For arms control purposes the region we call South-Eastern Europe should be delineated as the Balkans. History confirms that Europe cannot be secure unless Balkan security is assured. Most of the Eastern European states are in the Balkans. The region includes two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, two former Warsaw Pact members, Romania and Bulgaria, and two non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia and Albania. It is contiguous to other unstable regions such as the Middle East and the Caucasus. Furthermore, its security problems cannot be analyzed without taking into consideration the Mediterranean and the Soviet military districts in the South-Western and Southern Theater of Military Operations (TVDs).

This paper intends to discuss the major challenges facing the regional states in their search for enhanced military stability and security in the post-CFE period. First of all, it will make an assessment of what constitutes a threat to security and stability in the region. Then it will examine the implications of the CFE and CSCE negotiations and the possibility of extending their framework at the regional level.

The Security Environment

The peculiarities of the Balkans require the adoption of a differentiated approach to the problem of "threat". The scenario of a deliberately-planned Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on the Thrace/Straits area and Eastern Turkey has lost credibility. The radical changes within the Soviet Union have not only alleviated the Soviet pressure upon the region, but have also encouraged the vision of a regional co-operation system with the Soviets. As a matter of fact, the steps taken for a rapid implementation of the idea of the Black Sea Cooperation Region is emblematic of this new psychological atmosphere.

In the West, however, there remains a certain apprehension concerning the possibility of reversion in the Soviet Union. Consequently most NATO members regard their armed forces as long-term insurance against such an eventuality. The Soviet Union's military doctrine has certainly become less offensively-oriented. The reduction of conventional forces through the application of the CFE and the adoption of CSBMs will considerably decrease the possibility of a surprise attack. The Soviet mobilization and sustained operational capabilities, however, will continue to be considerably greater than those of the other states in the region. In the post-CFE period, Soviet conventional forces West of the Urals will be deployed mostly between the Baltic Sea and the Carpathian mountains north of the Balkans, and in the Kiev and other military districts close to the Balkan region. Because of Soviet force proximity - even after CFE - the strategic warning time will be much shorter for the Balkan states than for Western Europe.

Greek and Bulgarian officials have, on various occasions, expressed their concern over the military disequilibrium between their forces and those of Turkey. It is noteworthy that the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact has created a certain feeling of insecurity in Bulgaria. Relations between Turkey and Greece are undoubtedly one of the major security problems

in the Balkans. Disagreements over Cyprus and the Aegean are at the basis of present hostility. These issues, dominated by nationalistic perceptions, have, on various occasions, brought both nations to the threshold of armed conflict. Greece and Turkey were able to avoid war in 1974, 1976, and again in 1987, thanks to their circumspection and crisis-management ability.

The unravelling of Yugoslavia has drawn the attention of analysts to intra-state security situations and their implications. Many people are afraid of the spill-over effects of the conflict. A successful secessionist movement in one country could encourage revolt among ethnic groups in other countries. The Balkan Peninsula is traditionally a heterogenous and volatile region. In the post-Cold War era all the traditional conflicts have a strong potential to reemerge. The decline of Soviet power and of communist régimes in general have brought about not only the strengthening of national independence of the regional states, but also the reemergence of narrow nationalism with the danger of renewed authoritarianism and regional conflicts.

In every Balkan country the population is composed of various ethnic groups, and the maltreatment of ethnic minorities is a widespread practice in the region. Turmoil or civil war in one country might tempt neighbouring states to intervene in order to protect the ethnic groups with whom they identify. Moreover, the maltreatment of minorities or economic deprivations might result in mass migrations. Consequently some of the regional states would face an influx of a great number of refugees on short notice. This was precisely what happened in 1989, when the Bulgarian government forced more than 300,000 ethnic Turks to emigrate to Turkey.

Terrorism is a potential threat to regional security. At the moment, it is a serious security problem for Turkey and, to some extent, for Greece. Political conditions of the region provide a fertile ground for the spread of terrorism to other countries of the region as well.

Political leaders in the region tend to utilize potential and actual conflicts to enhance their position within their respective countries. Old differences, inter-ethnic distrust as well as the popular longing for security and peace are often exploited by governments for propaganda purposes, diplomatic manoeuvring, and tactical advantages.

The interaction between various security problems and the complexity of national perceptions, shaped by deep-rooted historical experiences, are the main obstacles to the establishment of regional security régimes. Under such circumstances, it is extremely difficult to develop a regional concept of security that can be acceptable to all nations of South-Eastern Europe. Any analysis of the Balkan security situation must therefore go beyond an assessment of the balance of power in purely military terms and local front line force comparisons. It must examine the interaction between internal and external factors of security as well as the highly diversified character of the "threats".¹

The CFE Treaty and Beyond

Article 5 of the CFE treaty delimits the flank areas. That provision defines the southern flank as consisting of "the Republic of Bulgaria, the Hellenic Republic (...) Romania, the part of

¹ For an interesting overview, see John Chipman, "Introduction", in J. Chipman, (ed.), *NATO's Southern Allies*, London, Routledge, 1988, pp. 1-7.

the Republic of Turkey within the area of application and that part of the USSR comprising the (...) Odessa, Transcaucasus and North Caucasus Military Districts".

The principal aim of the CFE negotiations was to establish military stability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at a reduced level of armaments. The talks took place in a context of East-West military confrontation, and were conducted on an alliance-to-alliance basis.

Each of the four Balkan participants (Romania, Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria), however, had its own particular conception of security. They had individual security needs arising from the political and historical peculiarities of the region, and they were reflected in the negotiations.

Romania's major concern was not NATO but the Soviet Union. Romania did not participate in the Warsaw Pact's military operation against Czechoslovakia in 1968. It feared the Soviets would mount a similar operation against Romania. After the Czechoslovak incident, it loosened its ties with the Pact. It completely revised its military doctrine by adopting a territorial defense concept based on the Yugoslav model and by increasing the role and number of the Patriotic Guards.² Romania had more contacts with the United States and NATO forces than the other Warsaw Pact members did.³ Nevertheless, Romania's position did not have much impact on the CFE talks.

Turkey had more than one special security concern. First of all, due to its geostrategic position and the traditional perceived Soviet threat, it was very much involved in the East-West aspect of the process. It had, however, several other concerns that went beyond the inter-alliance relationship. One of them was the fear of becoming isolated on the flank of an arms control application area. Within the Alliance Turkey vehemently rejected proposals which it regarded as leading to such isolation.⁴ Eventually, to satisfy Turkey, the allies put forward the idea of dividing the ATTU area into concentric sub-regions, and this proposal was accepted by the Warsaw Pact as well.

Turkey faced - and still faces - serious security challenges emanating from its Middle Eastern neighbours. This induced Ankara to demand the exclusion of its border areas adjoining the Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian territories from a CFE treaty. In spite of the Greek objection, participants in the CFE negotiations, including the Soviet Union, recognized Turkey's concern and accepted the exclusion the south-eastern provinces from the application of conventional force reductions. This concern of Turkey's was clearly justified by the Gulf War and its aftermath.

Turkey and Norway made efforts to prevent the weakening of the flanks as a result of the CFE régime and, to a considerable extent, they were successful. For example, Article V of the Treaty (section 1-B) recognized the possibility of reinforcing the flanks "on a temporary basis" in time of crisis, by deploying additional tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces. Moreover, Turkey believed that the exclusion of the heavy equipment held by the Soviet paramilitary units (the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Committee for State

² See Alex Alexiev, "Romania and the Warsaw Pact: The Defense Policy of a Reluctant Ally", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1, March 1981, pp. 5-18; and George W. Price, "The Romanian Armed Forces" in: Jeffrey Simon, (ed.), *NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization*, Washington, D.C., The National Defense University Press, 1988, pp. 485 and 489.

³ George W. Price, "Romanian Armed Forces" in: Jeffrey Simon, *European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989*, Washington, D.C., The National Defense University Press, 1991, p. 474.

⁴ Klaus Wittmann, *Challenges of Conventional Arms Control*, London, IISS, Adelphi Papers, No. 239, Summer 1989, pp. 34-35. To a lesser extent Norway had a similar fear.

Security (KGB) troops responsible for border and internal security) could upset the balance brought about by the CFE régime. Especially thanks to the initiative of Turkey, Article XII of the Treaty stipulated certain limitations concerning these kinds of paramilitary forces.

During the CFE negotiations, Turkey was a major security policy preoccupation for Greece and Bulgaria. Their common interest induced the two nations of rival alliances to make palpable efforts of diplomatic co-operation in the conventional arms control talks, albeit without putting forward concrete proposals. Their major objective was to ensure, through the CFE, a reduction of Turkish forces to a level which they consider reasonable. So the Greco-Bulgarian tactics became a preoccupation for Turkey during the negotiations.

Greece and Bulgaria argue that in spite of the CFE, there is a continuing regional military disequilibrium in favour of Turkey, which should be remedied as soon as possible either by regional arms reductions and/or by CFE II. One recent document reflecting this view is Prime Minister Mitsotakis' proposal of 12 July 1991 to create "an area free of offensive weapons" between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey by the withdrawal of their respective forces from the border areas.

More specifically, the Greek Prime Minister proposed:

To create, on both sides of the border between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey, an area free of the offensive weapons mentioned in the CFE treaty namely, battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, in accordance with the spirit of the CFE and CSBM treaties. This area will be limited:

- In Greece by the river Néstos.
- In Bulgaria by the line joining the cities of Smolian, Plovdiv and Burgas.
- In Turkey by the straits of Istanbul, the sea of Marmara and the straits of Çanakkale.

In response to the claims of disequilibrium Turkey emphasizes the difference between the security needs of the three countries. Turkey is a much bigger country with much longer frontiers than those of Bulgaria or Greece. Its armed forces, including the First Army in Thrace, have multiple purposes, including, above all, NATO missions. The maximum CFE force levels of these three countries do not justify the Greek and Bulgarian arguments. In case of further reductions, Turkey would have a tremendous difficulty covering its long border with fewer units, while Greece and Bulgaria could continue to position most of their forces against Turkey. Moreover, Ankara says that it does not exclude the possibility of further reductions of its forces according to changes in NATO's strategic plans and its security needs.

Maximum Force Levels

| | <i>Tanks</i> | <i>ACV</i> | <i>Artillery</i> | <i>Combat Aircraft</i> | <i>Helicopters</i> |
|----------|--------------|------------|------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| Turkey | 2795 | 3120 | 3523 | 750 | 43 |
| Greece | 1735 | 2534 | 1878 | 650 | 18 |
| Bulgaria | 1475 | 2000 | 1750 | 235 | 67 |

| | <i>Aera (km)</i> | <i>Population</i> |
|----------|------------------|-------------------|
| Turkey | 780.576 | 55.860.000 |
| Greece | 132.562 | 10.139.000 |
| Bulgaria | 110.927 | 9.062.000 |

As for the Mitsotakis proposal of 12 July 1991, since it provides for the withdrawal of all the "offensive weapons", in the final analysis, it would amount to the creation of a demilitarized zone in the region. However, any substantial force reductions in Thrace should take into consideration the following aspects of the strategic equation :

- The CFE Treaty is based on both global and regional considerations of balance of forces. Any regional arms control initiative, therefore, should not overlook the stability of the broader balance.
- The lack of territorial depth in the Thrace/Straits area would not allow the defending Turkish forces to trade space for time. Turkish forces must, therefore, be prepared to meet the enemy offensive as early as possible to deprive advancing forces of their momentum. From the Greek point of view, a similar argument was put forward by General Stamatios Vellidis, Chief of Defense Staff of Hellenic Armed Forces, during the Seminar on Military Doctrines held in Vienna, on 19 January 1990: "It is imperative to implement the concept of forward defense on our borders due to the lack of strategic depth".
- If Turkey withdraws its forces "by the Straits" - which, in practice, would imply a withdrawal to the eastern side of the Straits - its major industrial area (nearly 50 percent of its industry) would find itself completely undefended. Bulgarian and Greek territories adjoining the Turkish border are not industrial areas and are not densely populated. So the withdrawal of their forces to the West and to the South (in the case of Greece) will not have the same effect.
- In case of a crisis the redeployment of Greek and Bulgarian forces to the areas adjacent to the Turkish border would be much easier and quicker than that of the Turkish forces withdrawn to and deployed in Asia Minor.
- In any discussion on the creation of a demilitarized zone in the region, Ankara would certainly raise the issue of the remilitarization of the Greek islands in the proximity of Turkey which, in terms of international treaties, must be kept demilitarized.
- Before taking any further conventional arms control commitments the parties would like to see the results of the application of the CFE I Treaty.
- Finally, regional arms control arrangements should not disturb the delicate regional stability in the Balkans. They should not result in creating new insecurities for certain regional states while enhancing the security of the others. The creation of a demilitarized zone in Thrace might produce such an effect, if the Greek and Bulgarian forces withdrawn from the Turkish border are deployed in areas adjoining Yugoslavia and Albania. Such an eventuality would considerably increase pressure upon those countries, given their internal troubles, the Macedonian problem between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece, and the minority issues between Greece and Albania.

It is to be noted that reduced force levels do not necessarily imply security. "History shows that the notion of conventional equilibrium and stability has never really existed (...) Most European wars have been fought between roughly equal forces".⁵ The reduction of conventional forces and the creation of demilitarized zones would diminish the risk of an invasion of one country by another, but they will not eliminate the possibility of war. As long as political disputes and instabilities exist, that possibility will continue to loom over the Balkan nations.

Nevertheless, war between Turkey and Bulgaria is very unlikely. The maltreatment of the Turkish minority by the Bulgarians is hardly an issue which is apt to escalate into an armed conflict between the two states. All in all the status of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria has rapidly improved since the collapse of the Zhivkov régime. Although there is still the possibility of a renewal of the extreme nationalist policies against the Turkish minority, such an eventuality would not provoke Turkey to go to war with Bulgaria. Ankara would rather opt for diplomatic initiatives within the framework of international fora such as the CSCE. The minority issue is the only problem between the two nations.

It is difficult, however, to say the same for Greek-Turkish relations. An acute crisis in Cyprus or the Aegean is likely to escalate to war. Both states have a very limited invasion capability. They have the capacity to initiate an offensive operation but not the logistic ability to sustain it. They have a great deal of damage-inflicting capability, however. Moreover, the worldwide reaction to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait has clearly evinced that the acquisition of territory through a war of invasion will not be tolerated by international public opinion and that the invader will most probably risk heavy punishment. A war between Turkey and Greece, therefore, would probably be a very destructive conflict in which both parties would inflict considerable damage upon each other without a decisive result.

Another possible scenario would be a prolonged crisis situation in which a limited conflict would take place through sporadic engagements in the Aegean sea and its airspace. This scenario becomes very likely in the event that Greek territorial waters in the Aegean are extended beyond the present limit of six miles. Although such a limited but prolonged conflict situation provides the parties with time to manage the crisis, it also carries a high danger of escalation to a full-scale war.

The likelihood of either of these scenarios can be diminished through structural arms control measures aiming at reduced force levels or force withdrawals. Under the present political circumstances, substantial force reductions in Thrace might eliminate a significant factor of deterrence and encourage the parties to make rash moves prejudicing each other's vital interests. Furthermore, they would create, on the part of the states concerned, a greater dependence on rapid deployment and early mobilization. Such measures would raise fears at the early stages of a crisis and would complicate the crisis-management by provoking the parties to preempt one other.

⁵ Thierry de Montbrial, "Implications and Options for the West", in: the *Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union*, Part 2, London, IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 248, Winter 1989/1990, p. 85.

The CSCE Process

All the Balkan states are parties to the Vienna Document 1990;⁶ and under the CFE Treaty, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey are periodically required to exchange detailed information concerning the location, numbers and types of their conventional armaments and equipment. The Vienna Document 1990, which provides for Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs), is a political document, and as such it is not legally binding. In terms of its preamble, the Document is "a substantial and integral part of the multilateral process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe". This implies that the CSBMs are to be considered together with other political issues such as the protection of human rights, co-operation and settlement of disputes. If the minority questions, territorial disputes and the possibilities of economic co-operation are neglected, an over-emphasis on the CSBMs may not yield satisfactory results.

At present the CSCE process does not seem adequate to deal with ethnic and regional conflicts in the Balkans. The problem of minority rights should be tackled by a specialized permanent institution within the framework of the CSCE. In order to prevent the recurrence of a particular conflict and prepare the ground for peaceful settlement, it would be useful to establish a peace-keeping mechanism.⁷ Nevertheless, during its Berlin meeting of 19-20 June 1991, the CSCE Council took steps to improve the system. It decided to establish a mechanism for consultation and co-operation with regard to emergency situations. During the recent Yugoslav crisis this mechanism functioned upon the call of Austria, and the CSCE was able to send observers to Yugoslavia and to urge the European Community to delegate a peace-making mission, which has unfortunately proven to be completely ineffective.

Since the Balkans are the most unstable region in Europe, the Balkan states may be expected to make more efforts to broaden and strengthen the application of the CSBMs. In a meeting held in Ankara on 12-14 June 1991, the representatives of the Balkan states, conscious of this expectation, "recommended" that their experts on CSBMs "accelerate their activities in view of the impending European Security Talks that will follow the CSCE Helsinki Summit in 1992".

With respect to the CSBMs, Greece and Turkey have made certain progress within the framework of the Davos process. In 1988, by signing two documents, they decided to apply, on a bilateral basis, the following measures:

1. In conducting national military activities on the high seas and in international airspace, they shall endeavour to avoid interfering with smooth shipping and air traffic.
2. The planning and the conduct of national military exercises on the high seas and in international airspace should be carried out in such a way as to avoid the isolation of certain areas, the blocking of exercise areas for long periods of time, the tourist peak period (1 July - 1 September), and main national and religious holidays.
3. The naval and air force units, in conducting military activities, will act in conformity with international law as well as military custom and courtesy.

⁶ Albania was welcomed as a participating State of the CSCE during the Berlin meeting of its Council on 19-20 June 1991. On a number of occasions, Turkey placed reservations regarding the representation of Cyprus at the CSCE and the applicability of the CSBMs in relation to Cyprus.

⁷ Stephen F. Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans", *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 1990/91, p. 89.

4. The naval units will refrain from acts of mutual harassment. When they are engaged in the surveillance of ships of the other party during military activities, they shall maintain a position which does not hamper their smooth progress.
5. Pilots shall display utmost caution when in proximity of aircraft of the other party and shall not maneuver or react in a manner that would be hazardous to the safety of the flight and/or affect the mission of the aircraft.
6. To promote an atmosphere of confidence, whenever there are claims of acts contrary to the above measures, the parties will refrain from releasing official statements. They will in the first place inform one other through diplomatic channels.
7. It is also agreed, as a crisis-management measure, to set up a direct telephone line between the Prime Ministers of both countries.

Although these measures are not comprehensive and are violated from time to time, they may be regarded as a first step forward in the Balkan CSBM experience. Their improvement and gradual extension to the land forces and to other states in the region deserve consideration.

Naval Arms Control

The inclusion of naval forces and their activities in the CFE and CSCE negotiations has always been a contentious issue. While the USSR has been proposing talks on naval arms control, the West has declined such calls. The Soviet Union feels that the present Western naval strategy, as formulated by the United States, "bears a clearly aggressive and dangerous nature". Soviet military analysts argue that the Western strategy calls for NATO forces, led by the US, "to inflict preemptive strikes against the opponent's fleet, shore installations and strategic submarines even during the non-nuclear phase of a conflict".⁸ They believe that the Soviet homeland is to a great extent exposed to this kind of damage-inflicting strike.⁹

The West's counter-argument is mainly based on the notion of geographical asymmetry: NATO depends on exterior sea lines of communication, whereas the Soviet Union benefits from the advantage of shorter and more secure interior lines. Consequently, it has been argued that this justifies NATO's maintenance of adequate naval forces, in order to keep Western sealines of communication (SLOC) open. Moreover, the reduction of the Soviet military threat, as a result of the CFE and CSCE processes, is inducing the United States - and to a certain extent Western Europe, which endeavours to create a separate defense identity to pursue more global policies emphasizing mobility, flexibility, reserve forces, and force projection capabilities. This will certainly increase the strategic importance of naval forces, and make major naval powers even more reluctant to agree to naval arms control measures.¹⁰

At the regional level, there are additional obstacles to naval arms control. They can be summarized as follows:

- The geographical disequilibrium between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (at present the Soviet Union) is significant, particularly with regard to NATO's flank countries,

⁸ Andrei A. Kokoshin, "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and NATO", in Robert D. Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds, *Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security*, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 226.

⁹ James Eberle, "Global Security and Naval Arms Control", *Survival*, Vol. 32, No.4, July/August 1990, p. 325.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 327-328.

situated at the extremities of the Alliance's logistical line.¹¹ This continues to be particularly relevant for the south-eastern region which is exposed to diversified security challenges even in the post-Cold War period.

- The regional geography renders sea control particularly important, in order to permit amphibious operations for the purpose of supporting defensive land forces and to prevent amphibious landing operations of invading enemy forces. For example, as the Thracian peninsula narrows towards the East, the last defensive position before reaching Istanbul and the Bosphorus is the Çatalca line, which extends between the shores of the Marmara and the Black Seas. The defensibility of this position depends on the command of the coastal waters of both seas. In the Balkan War, Turkey's naval capability to control those coastal waters was the major reason for the failure of the final offensive of the Bulgarian army in November 1912.¹²
- Greece and Turkey are peninsular countries whose economies greatly depend on SLOCs. Both countries have coastlines of tens of thousands of kilometers. Greece requires free and safe navigation to supply its Aegean islands and Turkey needs the same to transport crude oil to its refineries and to maintain the activity of its major ports.
- In such a volatile region as South-Eastern Europe, decision-makers of the regional states may regard the navies as a flexible tool of crisis management. Sea power operates relatively slowly, providing the conflicting parties with more time to resolve a crisis. Compared with the air force, it is more easily controlled by the military and political decision-makers. Moreover, since it is not an invading force, it does not provoke the parties in crisis to hasty decisions of preemption. For instance, in a future crisis in the Aegean, if Greece and Turkey give priority to the use of their naval forces over their air and land forces, they would certainly have a better chance to resolve such a crisis before its escalation to war.
- The delimitation of the geographic area of naval arms control might prove to be extremely difficult. Moscow would like to limit arms control measures on the Mediterranean and the Aegean - excluding the Black Sea, which is of crucial importance for the security of the Soviet homeland and where the Soviets maintain a significant naval presence. On the other hand, the separate treatment of the Black Sea would cause inequities between the regional states. In particular, it would considerably decrease the security of Turkey.
- Although the Soviet Union, within the framework of its new "defensive doctrine", has reduced its overseas presence and embarked on a long-term program to dismantle obsolescent naval units and weapon systems, it has emphasized the defense of maritime areas in the proximity of the USSR and engaged in a continuing modernization program. The Soviet maritime capability will grow with the entry into service of the two Tbilisi-class aircraft carriers.¹³ One of them is still under construction at a Black Sea shipyard and the other has begun its sea trials. The Black Sea Fleet has the Soviet Navy's most modern amphibious landing equipment. The

¹¹ Johan J. Holst, "Uncertainty and Opportunity in an Era of East-West Change", in: *The Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union*, Part. 1, London, IISS, Adelphi Papers No. 247, Winter 1989/1990, p.13.

¹² Hugh Faringdon, *Strategic Geography*, London, Routledge, 1989, p. 216.

¹³ See *The Military Balance 1990-1991*, London, Brassey's for the IISS, 1990, pp. 31-32; and *Soviet Military Power 1990*, Washington DC, US Department of Defense, pp. 82-83.

Soviet Naval Infantry continues to upgrade its mobility and firepower capabilities. Although Moscow stresses coastal defense, in line with its defensive doctrine, these rapidly deployable forces - which considerably reduce the strategic warning time - could play a crucial role in any operation against other regional states. Another significant challenge confronting strategic planners is how to deal with Soviet superiority in terms of minelaying and minesweeping capabilities.

The Soviet maritime power has global dimensions and, as such, it is not amenable to regional arms control if attempts are confined to the Mediterranean. This difficulty can probably be overcome only through an extended regional approach including the Black Sea and the Atlantic and not ignoring geostrategic asymmetries between NATO and the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, Greece and Turkey should continue their dialogue to improve and extend naval CSBMs in the Aegean. Certain transparency measures, such as the exchange of observers during major naval exercises, might be considered. The adoption of these kinds of measures would be a significant step in regional arms control, and would contribute to regional stability.

Conclusion

The dangers of growing instability and diversity of threats in the Balkans should make security co-operation an item of priority on the diplomatic agenda of the regional states. Since overall European security cannot be isolated from that of the Balkans, Western Europe and the United States should encourage regional efforts of co-operation. The major responsibility for enhancing regional security, however, should be assumed by the regional states themselves.

Given the regional politico-military context, operational arms control seems to be more appropriate and more easily applicable than structural arms control. CFE II will probably embrace all the Balkan states. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the inclusion of neutral and non-aligned States, however, will render irrelevant "the main operational concept of the CFE talks"¹⁴, the force comparison between the two alliances. The problems of integrating the new participants and developing a new concept of reduction will be difficult to solve in a short period of time. Moreover, any progress in the talks will depend on the participants' evaluation of CFE I's application.

This does not imply that the possibility of regional structural arms control aiming at reduced force levels should be eliminated; but under the present circumstances, such arms control is very difficult to realize. Even if such an arrangement is agreed to at the regional level, it might create a more dangerous and risk-laden security environment.

At this stage it would be more useful to consider the improvement and extension of the CSCE mechanisms and the CSBMs. At the same time, the regional states should make efforts to increase interdependence through enhanced co-operation in other fields.

¹⁴ Jonathan Dean, "The CFE Negotiations, Present and Future", *Survival*, Vol. 32, No.4, July/August 1990, p. 318.

Chapitre 8

Les pays d'Europe du Sud-Est et les problèmes nucléaires

Abdi Baleta

L'examen de ce sujet brûlant et préoccupant par d'éminentes personnalités de la vie politique, scientifique et diplomatique venant des pays les plus intéressés, nous offre une occasion magnifique de profiter de leurs connaissances approfondies en la matière et de leur expérience afin d'essayer de mieux nous diriger dans l'avenir pour la discussion de ce sujet. Si j'ai accepté volontiers de prendre la parole ici, ce n'est pas pour faire un rapport proprement dit sur un sujet aussi complexe que *Les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est et les problèmes nucléaires*, mais pour faire entendre dans cette enceinte prestigieuse une voix albanaise, même si elle est la moins douée et la moins qualifiée pour présenter des analyses concernant les problèmes nucléaires.

J'aimerais solliciter votre bienveillance pour considérer mon intervention comme témoignage d'une situation politique nouvelle qui vient d'être instaurée dans mon pays à partir des manifestations des étudiants en décembre 1990 qui aboutirent à la naissance du premier parti politique d'opposition, le Parti démocratique, et à l'établissement du pluralisme politique en Albanie. J'ai donc le plaisir d'affirmer que l'Albanie d'aujourd'hui n'est plus l'Albanie que le monde a connu pendant 46 ans, et que nous sommes finalement arrivés au stade où un albanais peut prendre la parole dans une Conférence internationale en tant qu'individu appartenant à l'opposition et non comme représentant gouvernemental. Pour être franc, je compte beaucoup sur ce fait afin d'éveiller quelque intérêt par mon intervention, étant donné que je suis très conscient de mes possibilités bien limitées de me présenter devant vous avec un rapport d'expert.

L'Albanie est le plus petit des Etats de l'Europe du Sud-Est tant par rapport à sa superficie qu'à son nombre d'habitants. Il est également le plus faible économiquement et militairement. Il commence à peine à sortir de son passé très dur et son peuple traverse des moments très difficiles à cause des changements profonds qui sont en train de s'opérer dans sa vie politique, économique et sociale, ce qui dans une certaine mesure a provoqué une crise de confiance.

Il va sans dire que ni l'Etat, ni les forces politiques albanaises ne sont en mesure de traiter à fond les problèmes de sécurité et de désarmement dans la zone de l'Europe du Sud-Est. Mais cela ne veut pas dire que nous ne sommes pas vivement intéressés par la discussion et à la solution de ces problèmes. Si la politique officielle albanaise n'a jusqu'à présent pas pu faire valoir comme il faut l'intérêt de l'Albanie à participer plus activement à la recherche des solutions aux problèmes de sécurité et de désarmement en Europe du Sud-Est, ou en Europe en général, l'Albanie saura dans l'avenir mieux jouer son rôle et prendre ses responsabilités.

L'Albanie vient à peine d'être admise à la CSCE. Cela a constitué un événement très important pour elle et pour son peuple qui a été plongé dans l'isolement le plus néfaste par ses dirigeants et la dictature communiste la plus féroce. Mais il serait inexact de penser que les Albanais, dans les conditions de cet isolement, ne se soient pas intéressés aux problèmes de la sécurité et du désarmement dans la région de l'Europe du Sud-Est. Ils ont suivi les événements avec les mêmes inquiétudes que les autres peuples et les autres Etats. Ils ont eu les mêmes sentiments de préoccupation et de désapprobation devant l'application malheureuse

et dangereuse des progrès scientifiques dans le domaine de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins militaires. En Albanie comme ailleurs, les gens ont été profondément attristés de voir la course aux armements conventionnels et nucléaires continuer sans cesse, de voir augmenter les arsenaux d'armes nucléaires, de voir accroître les possibilités de prolifération d'armes nucléaires et des menaces d'emploi de ces armes.

Mais ces inquiétudes du peuple n'ont pas toujours trouvé leur traduction dans la politique d'Etat que préconisait et menait le gouvernement albanais, c'est-à-dire l'équipe dirigeante communiste à la tête du Parti du Travail d'Albanie. La politique étrangère albanaise a été profondément idéologisée et de ce fait elle ne partageait pas complètement les opinions qui ont été généralement adoptées par la majorité écrasante des Etats du monde et notamment par l'ONU et ses organismes spécialisés en matière d'armement et de désarmement nucléaires.

L'Albanie, par exemple, est connue comme un Etat qui a justifié la continuation des essais nucléaires au nom du principe consistant à briser le monopole nucléaire des deux super puissances, qui a adopté des attitudes critiques très violentes contre un certain nombre d'accords passés entre puissances nucléaires. Elle a été également très réservée envers le concept des zones exemptes d'armes nucléaires et de paix. La politique du gouvernement albanais fortement teintée d'une orthodoxie marxiste-léniniste a eu pour résultat que l'Albanie se trouve parmi le très petit nombre de pays qui n'ont ni signé, ni ratifié, ni adhéré à aucun des traités internationaux importants dans le domaine de la limitation des armements et du désarmement nucléaires. Cela peut bien sûr paraître bizarre quand il s'agit d'un pays qui n'a ni les moyens, ni les possibilités, ni même l'intention de développer des activités nucléaires militaires ou même pacifiques. Personne bien sûr n'a cru que l'Albanie prenne cette position négative envers les traités internationaux parce qu'elle avait des arrière-pensées. Mais l'Albanie aurait quand même dû et doit maintenant prendre une attitude conforme à une logique simple - faire comme tout le monde dans ce domaine.

Ces dernières années, la politique trop rigide du gouvernement albanais vis-à-vis des efforts entrepris par l'ONU et les autres organismes internationaux dans le domaine du désarmement, a dû changer et se conformer un peu plus à la tendance générale qui consiste à apprécier hautement l'oeuvre accomplie dans les délibérations et négociations internationales. C'est un fait encourageant que le nom de mon pays figure maintenant parmi la grande majorité des pays qui votent pour les résolutions des Nations Unies consacrées au désarmement. Je suis moi-même très bien placé pour témoigner avec quel sentiment de malaise les représentants albanais doivent parfois exposer les positions très extrémistes de leur gouvernement quant aux efforts internationaux destinés à promouvoir les discussions sur les problèmes du désarmement. Quelle amertume pour nous aujourd'hui s'il s'avère qu'il y a encore des gens pouvant croire que les albanais n'ont pas compris les dangers nucléaires ou la nécessité de lutter par tous les moyens contre ces dangers. Mais je peux vous assurer que les albanais ont toujours, malgré la politique officielle, considéré que les armes, qu'elles soient conventionnelles ou nucléaires, n'apportent que des souffrances aux hommes et non le progrès. S'il y a un pays ou un peuple qui a de bonnes raisons pour se déclarer contre les armes nucléaires, ce doit être en premier lieu celui qui ne rêve pas du tout d'en avoir. Et je dois dire que c'est aussi le cas du peuple albanais.

Voilà pourquoi je crois que mon peuple est fortement intéressé par l'établissement d'une sécurité véritable et durable dans la zone d'Europe du Sud-Est, d'Europe et du monde en général, ainsi que par l'élimination du danger et de la menace d'emploi des armes nucléaires.

Or nous nous trouvons toujours face à une question, simple dans le fond mais difficile à trancher de façon claire et précise : comment faire pour établir la sécurité en Europe du

Sud-Est ? Quelles sont les conditions nécessaires pour y parvenir ? Quel est le rapport entre cette sécurité et les problèmes nucléaires d'aujourd'hui ?

Il me semble juste d'affirmer que l'établissement d'une sécurité véritable en Europe du Sud-Est n'est pas chose facile, ce qui nous conduit à l'idée qu'elle est impossible ou improbable. On ne peut certes rêver et penser que la sécurité dans cette partie de l'Europe peut se réaliser du jour au lendemain. Il faut beaucoup d'efforts pour y arriver. Ce qui nous donne confiance, c'est que le développement des événements en général va dans le sens de l'amélioration du climat politique dans le monde.

L'aspect militaire de la sécurité en Europe du Sud-Est a été pendant longtemps au centre de l'attention des analyses à tous niveaux. Les problèmes nucléaires ont aussi donné lieu à des discussions fréquentes dans les rencontres bilatérales, les délibérations officielles, ou à des propositions visant à créer dans les Balkans une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires. C'est l'idée clé qui a caractérisé pendant des années les initiatives politiques et diplomatiques sans pour autant parvenir à se concrétiser et à devenir le sujet de négociations appropriées entre les Etats de la région et d'autres Etats intéressés.

Après les changements très importants qui se sont produits sur la scène politique internationale et surtout européenne, les problèmes nucléaires dans les Balkans ne peuvent plus être envisagés de la même façon que dans un passé encore très récent.

Il n'y a pas si longtemps, tous les problèmes de sécurité, d'équilibres militaires, de désarmement dans les Balkans, devaient être considérés dans l'optique d'une politique de confrontation probable entre l'OTAN et le Pacte de Varsovie, dans celle de la stratégie des super-puissances tendant à maintenir un certain équilibre, et des obligations d'alliances politiques et militaires, ou à leurs options politiques particulières.

Dans ces circonstances, l'idée de transformer les Balkans en zone exempte d'armes nucléaires ne suscitait pas énormément d'enthousiasme et n'a jamais eu de chances réelles de devenir le sujet de négociations. Les problèmes nucléaires dans la zone des Balkans étaient en effet bel et bien considérés comme partie intégrante des problèmes nucléaires dans un cadre plus large, européen ou même global. Et il ne pouvait pas en être autrement étant donné les positions géostratégiques de la région, l'engagement des blocs militaires, l'implication des intérêts des super puissances et la situation de division qui existait en Europe. Il était vraiment difficile de concevoir et d'autant plus d'implanter en Europe du Sud-Est une solution pour les problèmes nucléaires qui serait différente ou qui n'aurait rien à voir avec la solution de ces problèmes sur le plan européen. Le fait est qu'aucune solution balkanique n'a été trouvée.

Aujourd'hui, pour les raisons que l'on connaît, il y a une autre situation politique aussi bien dans les Balkans qu'en Europe. On pourrait peut-être penser que les conditions sont plus propices pour trouver aux problèmes nucléaires des solutions valables uniquement pour les Balkans, et que la transmutation de cette région en zone exempte d'armes nucléaires serait plus facile. Il y a plus de possibilités, il est vrai, d'agir avec plus de liberté sur le plan local. Mais il faut toujours se demander si cela comporte des avantages tangibles et si cela peut se réaliser avec efficacité hors du cadre général européen. On peut en douter. Les problèmes nucléaires, de par leur nature, sont trop compliqués pour pouvoir être résolus par des efforts uniquement régionaux, surtout dans une région comme l'Europe du Sud-Est.

Il nous paraît plus sage d'aborder les problèmes nucléaires dans les Balkans dans un cadre plus large, dans un cadre européen, surtout maintenant que la tendance générale de la politique et de la diplomatie doit être l'approche européenne de tous les problèmes du continent.

On ne veut pas dire par cela que la solution des problèmes dans les Balkans devrait attendre la solution finale des problèmes européens. Seulement, on ne peut envisager qu'une solution valable pour l'Europe du Sud-Est puisse intervenir indépendamment des événements en Europe.

Le premier pas à faire vers une solution généralisée dans l'avenir est, bien sûr, de ne pas permettre des développements de la situation actuelle pour ce qui concerne les possibilités d'utilisation de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins militaires. Il est important que tous les pays de la région et les pays qui ont les moyens et la tradition d'être présents, respectent scrupuleusement les accords et les obligations internationaux. Les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est ont déjà réussi à avancer dans l'institutionnalisation de leur coopération multilatérale, ce qui peut leur servir d'exemple pour coordonner encore mieux les efforts pour résoudre des problèmes nucléaires : réduire les risques que l'emploi de cette énergie peut créer.

Les problèmes nucléaires en Europe du Sud-Est, à notre avis, peuvent se résoudre sur la base des garanties explicites et solides de la part de puissances nucléaires de ne pas permettre des pas qui puissent constituer une menace pour les pays de la région. C'est un principe bien connu mais qui revêt une importance particulière dans le cas de l'Europe du Sud-Est vu les nombreux facteurs qui peuvent provoquer des situations tendues dans cette région ou dans les zones très proches.

Le niveau de maîtrise des techniques et des technologies nucléaires utilisées à des fins pacifiques n'est pas le même dans tous les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est. Cela nécessitera des soins particuliers pour ne pas éveiller des soupçons chez les voisins ou pour ne pas créer des conditions pouvant affecter négativement les intérêts des autres pays. A part le respect par tous des obligations internationales, il serait avantageux que les gouvernements des pays d'Europe du Sud-Est trouvent des moyens supplémentaires pour renforcer la confiance et coopérer à éviter tout malentendu, ou tout risque commun dans le processus d'utilisation de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins pratiques.

Il serait intéressant que les pays d'Europe du Sud-Est puissent mettre sur pied des mécanismes de consultation pour s'entraider dans l'application des accords internationaux visant à réduire et éliminer la menace nucléaire, à contrôler l'emploi de l'énergie nucléaire et à résoudre aussi des problèmes spécifiques qui peuvent surgir dans la région. La fameuse affaire de Tchernobyl a été riche d'enseignements pour les responsables et les experts en matière d'énergie nucléaire dans les pays d'Europe du Sud-Est, région qui a été affectée directement.

Un autre champ de coopération interbalkanique serait justement l'échange d'informations sur les risques de radiations, sur les techniques de protection de l'environnement en cas d'accident, sur les procédés de protection contre les déchets nucléaires et autres problèmes de cette nature. La protection de l'environnement contre la pollution, y compris la pollution radioactive, ne peut pas être réglée correctement par chaque pays isolément dans notre région dont le milieu écologique s'étend au delà des frontières des Etats. Et ce milieu ne peut être préservé que par des efforts communs.

En ce qui concerne le renforcement des mesures de confiance face aux risques ou aux menaces nucléaires, il y a place pour des mesures de caractère régional, afin de rendre encore plus effectives les normes internationales déjà établies et aussi pour faire prévaloir le principe de bon-voisinage sur toute autre considération ou obligation découlant des traités d'alliance, d'affiliation traditionnelle ou de conjoncture particulière.

Une menace nucléaire contre n'importe quel pays d'Europe du Sud-Est serait un fait terrifiant pour d'autres pays et pourrait bien sûr provoquer des implications et des

complications entraînant des conséquences imprévisibles. Nous y voyons une raison de plus pour encourager les pays de la région à considérer des solutions aux problèmes nucléaires valables pour tous, et à s'opposer à toute politique qui pour des avantages particuliers entraînerait des réactions en chaîne entre adversaires potentiels.

Il a désormais été accumulé assez d'expérience pour se convaincre que les tentatives de s'approprier les secrets de la fabrication d'armes nucléaires, de se doter de capacités de production ou simplement d'armes nucléaires de fabrication étrangère à des fins politiques égoïstes et de chantage envers les voisins, ne sont pas sans risque, même pour le pays qui s'engage dans une telle voie. Renoncer à ce genre de tentatives serait bénéfique surtout dans des régions comme l'Europe du Sud-Est où existent de très nombreux facteurs qui peuvent rompre les équilibres politiques souvent fragiles, et faire renaître les forces destructrices du passé comme encourager celles du présent.

La bonne volonté et la détermination à s'engager sans préjugés dans une approche plus pratique et moins controversée des problèmes nucléaires dans l'Europe du Sud-Est serait bénéfique à tout point de vue. Ce serait en tout premier lieu une autre pierre angulaire dans la confiance mutuelle. Mais malheureusement, il y a encore des nuages dans le ciel balkanique et des orages liés aux risques de confrontation militaire ou de recours à la force pour résoudre des problèmes existants. Nous devons donc rester vigilants, même dans ces moments de grands espoirs pour une Europe unie, et pour un monde meilleur d'après la guerre froide.

Chapter 9

South-East European Countries and the Problem of Chemical Weapons

Evgheni Alexandrov

South-East European Countries and CW Disarmament

Profound changes have taken place in Europe during the last two years. These changes, in combination with long-submerged regional disagreements, have introduced serious conflict into the situation in South-East Europe. It is small wonder, therefore, that a sensitive issue like chemical disarmament - although not a priority topic on the Balkan agenda - could be both a divisive and unifying factor in this part of the world.

The question of banning chemical warfare has been discussed at length in the framework of different international fora and bilaterally ever since World War I. As early as the 1920s, the world struggled to rid itself of this scourge, and the Geneva Protocol, banning the use of these weapons, was signed in 1925. The states of South-East Europe, who themselves paid a heavy price to chemical warfare, were among the first signatories.

The end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s saw some turning points in the debate on chemical weapons. The Paris Conference and the Canberra meeting enjoyed broad international participation - 149 and 66 countries respectively. They demonstrated universal political and public support for the elimination of chemical weaponry by a binding and comprehensive international instrument. In June 1990 the two superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union - concluded a key treaty for non-production and destruction of existing chemical arsenals.¹ The document also envisaged measures to facilitate the conclusion of a global convention providing for a total ban on the development, stockpiling, production and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. American stockpiles were successfully removed from Clausen (FRG). In May 1991 President Bush made additional commitments in this respect, by renouncing a retaliatory posture in case of war, after the conclusion of the convention. All these events helped to create a better atmosphere for the negotiations on such a convention in Geneva. The work on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is in an advanced stage, although some parts of the draft still remain to be concluded.

The states of South-East Europe have always been supportive and committed to the international efforts to eliminate the danger of chemical warfare. They have actively participated in numerous international bodies where the problem is considered; Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia are permanent negotiating nations of the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Turkey and Greece are observers at the CD. Bulgaria also became a member of the United Nations Group of Qualified Experts on procedures and measures to investigate allegations of the use of chemical, bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.²

At the Paris Conference all Balkan states called for more vigorous efforts to conclude the CWC and confirmed the importance of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. They also endorsed the

¹ See *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, Oxford University Press 1991, pp. 536-539.

² See *SIPRI Yearbook 1990*, Oxford University Press, pp. 540.

role of the United Nations and made important statements concerning non-possession of chemical weapons and declarations of intent.

The Bulgarian foreign minister stated that Sofia was not developing chemical weapons, did not manufacture them and had none stationed on Bulgarian territory.

The Greek delegation spoke of "*mon pays qui ne dispose pas d'armes chimiques*".

Romania announced that it had no chemical weapons and that there were no stocks of such weapons on its territory.

Turkey stated in turn that it did not have chemical weapons in stock, nor did it aspire to possess any in the future.

At the Canberra Conference, Yugoslavia declared that its industry did not produce chemicals listed in Schedules I and II, *i.e.* substances for military usage.³

The unanimous rejection of chemical weapons on moral, humanitarian, political and even military utility grounds universally strengthened the security climate and promoted the cause of disarmament. But it still falls short of overcoming the impact of certain realities that continue to generate contradictions, difficulties and risks worldwide and regionally. This holds true for South-East Europe, where the gravity of the issue is exacerbated by old geopolitical rivalries and current political and social turmoil.

Specific Implications of the CW Problem in the South-East European Area

When speaking of the continued danger of CW confrontation, reference to the following well known facts might be of relevance:

- The superpowers, and very probably other militarily important states, retain large and deadly chemical arsenals, and this situation will remain practically unchanged in the next few years. According to official declarations, the US and the USSR possessed, at the end of the 1980s 35,000 and 50,000 tonnes respectively. The question of emergency stockpiling of such weapons on the territories of third countries in a crisis situation remains open. At the same time, "allowed" riot-control substances are becoming more and more widely used in circumstances where disturbances due to internal conflicts are common.
- In fact, the modernization of chemical weapons goes unchecked, and now and then information appears about the finding of new lethal agents. An example is the new perfluoro-isobutene, a choking chemical claimed to be capable of penetrating gas masks. Bioregulators like Fusarium and Palytoxin also enter the scene. Concerns are repeatedly expressed over new germ and genetic-engineering techniques, which can be used clandestinely, especially against ethnic groups.⁴
- Huge industrial installations, intended for commercial production, severely pollute the environment, causing health problems and public unrest. Such plants and stockpiles are real chemical "time bombs" that could be detonated either through

³ The *SIPRI Yearbook 1990*, "Statements on possession and non-possession of chemical weapons", Appendix A4, pp. 134-138, etc.

⁴ *SIPRI Yearbook 1990*, p. 132; *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 109-110. Biological agents, although a different category, are often treated together with CW's, both being silent killers specialized in destroying living nature. The use of BW is covered by the Geneva Protocol, *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 522, 531.

negligence or ill will, with either result being equally disastrous. Ecologically-unclean chemical and other industrial facilities abound in the Eastern European region. They are a highly dangerous source of acute chemical threat both in times of peace and war.

- The world faces the problem of chemical weapons' proliferation, which is more difficult to restrain or control than nuclear or even conventional weapons proliferation. One can easily identify a tank on sight, and a professional can distinguish between enriched uranium and cement. But it is not so easy with precursors. An important precursor for mustard gas is thiodiglycol, which also goes into the ink of a pen to make it flow. Any petrochemical plant, fertilizer plant, nor pharmaceutical plant can produce toxic components.⁵ Moreover, the acquisition of chemical weapons is not currently prohibited, whatever ethical and political objections may be raised. American sources put the number of modern chemically-armed states as high as 25; fortunately, no South-East European states figure among them so far.⁶ Whatever the details, such mass destruction capabilities are not conducive to an environment of mutual trust and disarmament. Chemical weapons and related technologies are proliferating to regions of intense confrontation and to terrorist networks.⁷ Some countries decline measures for chemical disarmament under the pretext that transfer of mobile CW by big military powers to an ally's territory is virtually unpreventable.
- There is also a strong political orientation towards linking chemical and nuclear disarmament. Certain states, mostly Arab, regard the acquisition of chemical weapons as a legitimate deterrent against much stronger opponents with nuclear capabilities, like Israel.
- The wars in the Persian Gulf led to a dramatic reassessment of the chemical warfare threat for belligerents and non-belligerents alike. Recent experience revealed certain advantages in the first use of CW against an enemy who does not possess such capabilities, as well as that ground-to-ground missiles with chemical warheads may constitute new threats for states within striking distance. As a matter of fact, allegations of use, threat of use and acquisition of these weapons are increasingly occurring.⁸

All these destabilizing implications affect the South-East European region. This area is still a site of East-West strategic competition, and is geographically close to the fiery and unpredictable Middle Eastern region. What is most troublesome is that the aforementioned implications only tend to exacerbate local tensions and disputes.

The chemical weapon factor - as any other weapon of violence, terror and annihilation for that matter - can only play a destructive role in the context of the tense, conflict-ridden internal situation in most Balkan countries and their instable intra-regional relationships. Social problems are pressing here, and ethnic grievances are long-standing. Recently they

⁵ Brad Roberts, "Chemical Weapons: Proliferation, Control, An Alliance Issue", *Studia Diplomatica*, Vol. XLII, No. 2, 1989, p. 180.

⁶ *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, p. 115.

⁷ Former SIPRI director Frank Barnaby lists among CBW, specially suited for terrorist attacks, phosphoryl chloride and dimethylamine, anthrax and plague bacteria, botulinum - see for example, *Conflict Studies 235*, Research Institute for Study of Conflict and Terrorism, London, 1990, p. 26.

⁸ See *SIPRI Yearbook 1990*, p. 118; *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 114-116.

have developed into street skirmishes and local clashes, as well as large-scale military engagements. State formations are disintegrating under the pressure of centrifugal tendencies.

It is not difficult to imagine, under such circumstances, a desperate resort to tear gas and other incapacitants by police or other state authorities, possibly in order to prevent violence and rampage.⁹ But this kind of law enforcement is not harmless either. Extensive use of harassing agents may cause severe intoxications. They could prove to be more than enough to trigger an escalation of conflict and brutality. If ethnic elements are involved, the situation might be interpreted as a "chemical ethnocide". Such confrontations are very likely to invite external pressures and interferences of every kind.

As a matter of fact, the mere mention of such actions can easily worsen the situation. This is particularly true of the delicate inter-ethnic disputes, or inter-state disagreements where human life and health is involved. Horrifying headlines about children poisoned *en masse* in Kosovo or the "sterilizing" vaccinations of Muslims in Bulgaria are a sufficient reminder to fuel unrest. In September 1991 the Yugoslav army was accused of using chemical weapons against Croatian military units and civilians. Even if unproven, such accusations can feed a real psychological war with devastating consequences.

Although it is not strictly a problem of weaponry, a serious irritant in this respect could be ecological failures like trans-border chemical contamination, the so-called "gassing" which is frequent in this part of Europe. The disastrous experience of the Bulgarian city of Rousse, which for years suffered from chlorine exhausts of Giurgu plants, is a case in point.

The last war in the Persian Gulf additionally highlighted the psychological and military vulnerability of South-East Europe and the Balkans *vis-à-vis* the chemical menace. The Iraqi threats of chemical reprisals alarmed the public in most Balkan capitals. Nervousness was visible at certain stages of the war, and there were appeals to governments cautioning against steps that might annoy Baghdad and invite chemical missile bombardment. Probably this area is the only one in Europe where people sense the real danger of a CW attack, possibly coming from the troubled South-Eastern direction at any time.

CW Talks and Endeavours in South-Eastern Europe

Unfortunately, ideologized stereotypes, prevailing until recently in South-East Europe, together with historical and territorial grievances, prevented Balkan states from adopting a practical co-ordinated stand *vis-à-vis* the major disarmament and security issues. An abortive attempt to synchronize positions on a symbolic regional undertaking was indicative in this respect. On the eve of the Paris Conference, Bulgaria began consultations with the other South-East European countries to collectively sign the future convention banning chemical weapons. Although the proposal was not turned down outright, Greece was the only one to embrace the idea. The Romanian leadership at that time advocated linkage between chemical and nuclear disarmament.¹⁰ Turkey reiterated its position in favour of global solutions. In spite of these objections, all South-East European states (except Albania) signed the Paris Charter, thereby actually undertaking the obligation to become initial signatories of CWC. In other words, it

⁹ In the negotiations on Chemical Weapons Convention it is clearly understood that the use and production of tear gasses for police purposes will be permitted under the Convention. There is agreement among participants in the talks that even heavy use of such gasses may save lives under extreme conditions of street fighting, as the only alternative to firearms.

¹⁰ See the briefing of the Deputy-Foreign Minister of Romania K. Oanca of 30 December, 1988, and the Statement by President N. Ceausescu of 1 January, 1989.

was not vital interests that foiled this modest initiative, which was still capable of having a favourable influence, if not upon the outcome of the conference, at least on the good neighbourly relations in the area.

Steps of this kind, although limited in scope and practical accomplishment, are nevertheless useful in one respect - they generate a sense of common interests and goals. That is a good omen in a region torn by political fragmentation. Unilateral declarations are no doubt trustworthy, but too often they can be subject to differing interpretations owing to ambiguities regarding definitions and formulations. For instance, what does it mean if a state declares that it does not stockpile chemical weapons but does not mention whether chemical weapons of an ally are stockpiled on its territory? All semantic and other ambiguities inviting questions, if not suspicions, could be avoided through a carefully-prepared joint declaration on chemical weapons, or through another collective step that would both serve as a confidence-building measure and provide an impetus to further international efforts against the CW threat.

Of course it would be a mistake to jump to conclusions about hostile intentions because of a lack of a co-ordinated policy on chemical weapons in South-East Europe. On the contrary, professional analysis and common sense convincingly indicate that no Balkan state intends to wage chemical warfare. Resentment of these weapons is no less strong here than anywhere else.

The point is that a more active policy and dialogue on this subject would contribute to, rather than hamper, the achievement of a broader international solution. Practice has shown that national and international agreements on this particular issue have led to arrangements which are closely related to those necessary for the future national implementation of a global CW ban.¹¹ At the same time it could help ameliorate other existing tensions. Such a policy would be promoting security for Europe at the crucial Balkan crossroads.

Ideas and goodwill are not lacking either. Different options have been contemplated by the countries of this region. They provide quite a panoply of approaches to this matter. In 1988 at the Special Session of the UN on disarmament, Yugoslavia proposed that an international conference on chemical weapons be held.¹² Somewhat earlier, in December 1985, Bulgaria and Romania championed the idea of establishing a chemical weapons-free zone (CWFZ) in the Balkans. Greece and Yugoslavia supported the initiative. It was discussed at the expert level in Bucharest late in 1986, and the Tirana meeting of High Officials of the Foreign Ministries recommended that the proposal remain a topic for further consideration.¹³

Symptomatically, by the end of the 80s the views of Balkan countries regarding chemical disarmament continued to be articulated more or less in the East-West context, bearing at the same time the imprint of traditional intra-Balkan differences. For example, the Bulgarian preference for CWFZ was closely linked to the Soviet proposal popular at the time for elimination of all weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000; the Yugoslavs, although supportive of the idea, referred to minority problems and other "unsettled" questions as an obstacle to more significant co-operation; Romania more than once addressed the issue as a mere component of a more grandiose scheme by Bucharest to transform the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation. At least two influential opposition parties in Greece strongly

¹¹ *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, p. 534.

¹² *International Relations*, 20.IX.1989, p. 22 (In Russian).

¹³ *Proces-Verbal of the Meeting of High Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Balkan Countries.*

criticized the concept of CWFZ as detrimental to NATO strategy in the area. Practical moves were further checked by Turkey's objections in principle.

Nevertheless, the exchange on this important topic was instrumental in initiating much broader consultation on regional security measures; clearly the talks have established new channels for discussion and produced political incentives for the continuation of the dialogue.¹⁴ In 1989 the scope of the initiative was broadened: Greece, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia agreed to start discussions on chemical weapons and a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Balkans. In 1990 Bulgaria and Romania provided statistics of production, consumption and transfer of chemicals under CWC schedules.

The interest displayed by most Balkan states in a regional decision as a step to a global solution significantly contributed to a much broader international trend, which has gained momentum during the last two or three years. Australia, the Soviet Union, Egypt, Peru, Vietnam, Israel, South Africa and others called for instituting CWFZs in Europe, South-East Asia and the Pacific, the Tlatelolco Area and Latin America as a whole, Africa and the Mediterranean, the Korean Peninsula and Scandinavia. Discussions of these subjects served to open deliberations on more general political problems and to focus public attention upon the urgency of the matter.¹⁵ In 1991, in the city of Mendoza, a concrete decision was reached: Brazil, Chile and Argentina agreed not to develop, produce, buy, stockpile or use chemical and biological weapons, thus effectively establishing a CWFZ over nearly two thirds of the continent's territory.

The revolutionary changes that swept through Central-East and South-East Europe created a very different political picture in comparison to the state of affairs just two years earlier. In the Balkans, new forces are at work, which could have an important impact on the security of the area as well as on European security in broader terms.¹⁶ It remains to be seen whether these forces will proceed along the path of Balkan multilateral co-operation set by their predecessors or will insist on a full-scale reexamination of the security problems of the region.

One thing seems clear: regional agreements, envisaged by the UN Charter, have a better chance of becoming reality now than ever before. This observation holds especially true when weapons of mass destruction are concerned, since the conceptual justification for them (*i.e.* deterrence) is quickly becoming obsolete, and state policies in the region have rid themselves of certain ideological and propaganda clichés that previously invited mistrust. With the eclipse of bloc confrontation, regional initiatives and security debates are being relieved of "enemy image" prejudices. Accordingly, arguments that weapons for mass destruction are indispensable for the Western Alliance in South-East Europe for instance in its tactical defense in Macedonia and Thrace - are losing credibility.¹⁷

As far as chemical weaponry is concerned, there is no concrete argument whatsoever in favour of its retention where it exists, or for its introduction where it is missing. Chemical disarmament has no alternative, and selective solutions are very much in place as stopgap measures on the way to a global ban - which, by the way, still cannot be taken for granted in the immediate future.¹⁸ A proof to this end are the findings of the Palme Commission

¹⁴ *SIPRI Yearbook 1988*, p. 115-116.

¹⁵ *SIPRI Yearbook 1990*, p. 539.

¹⁶ F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans", *International Security*, Winter 1990-91, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 59.

¹⁷ For argumentation in this vein see E. Kofos, "Greece and the Balkans in the '70s and '80s, in: *Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy Yearbook 1990*, pp. 220-221.

¹⁸ Workshop of Pugwash Study Group on Chemical Warfare, 27-28 January 1989, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 1.

regarding chemical weapons, the proposals of the Australia Group, the Dublin Meeting of European and Arab parliamentarians, and many other regional, governmental and non-governmental institutions. Steps to enhance international activity to abolish CW and, in the meantime, to keep important areas "clean" from them are two fully compatible approaches and converging lines of thinking, leading to a common objective. The deliberation of such moves in South-East Europe could have stimulating implications for the Middle East, where the chemical menace is very much a reality.

Possible Avenues for Regional Co-operation

A course of action built on the positive trends in the disarmament situation in the 1990s and the directions adopted by the Paris Conference could involve a set of regional measures meant both to promote the objectives of the global convention and to safeguard against use and spread of chemical weapons while it is being negotiated:

- Strong and sustained emphasis on the negotiations in Geneva, leading to a global ban and annihilation of CW in the near future;
- Unilateral and multilateral, clear and exhaustive declarations of non-possession and non-use of chemical weapons, demonstration of openness, disclosure of industrial structures and information, all of which will serve as confidence-building measures;
- Full adherence and support to existing international instruments (first of all the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972) as well as bilateral talks and agreements;
- Continued discussion of the CWFZ possibilities, with a view to both "prepare the ground" for a CWC, and build an *ad hoc* emergency mechanism in case of unpredictable developments;
- Appeals to states which are still outside the Geneva Protocol or have expressed reservations, to join and forgo the chemical option;
- Co-ordination of experimentation in verification, especially in the context of articles VII and IX of the Rolling Text of the draft CWC;
- Proposals by Balkan states for a ministerial meeting to examine the status of negotiations and identify approaches to complete them;
- Exchange of miscellaneous data related to the régime of the future convention, with an emphasis on national implementation measures;
- Exchange of views on establishing National Authority Agencies under the CWC;
- Joint research and other undertakings on protection against chemical weapons for the civil population along the lines of articles X and XI;
- Measures to minimize chemical pollution and prevent any misuse of chemical and biological agents, which are particularly relevant for CWC negotiations and the implementation of the Convention.

The dialogue in this field should be conducted in a manner conducive and not detrimental to progress towards a universal solution.

It would be pertinent to conclude with a quotation from a paper of Ambassador Morel, ex-chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and Representative of France to the Conference on Disarmament, presented in June 1989 at a Seminar held by the Institute for East-West Security Studies in Washington:

Through an impressive mobilization, the international community has collectively demonstrated its ability to react to growing risks in the field of chemical weapons. But it must be clear that this cannot be a one-time operation. Precise political orientations must now be converted into facts and practices.

There is no doubt that the problem of chemical disarmament cannot be resolved by the activities of the states of South-East Europe, however dynamic and inventive they might be. It is also true that the chemical weapons issue is not heading the priority list of security issues of the nations in the region. But the co-operation among them in this field may facilitate a global solution both conceptually and psychologically, and at the same time promote better regional understanding, a vital prerequisite for the new security architecture at the threshold of the 21st century.

Responses and Discussion

Mircea Pascu

Generally, there are two ways to comment on a paper. One is to state one's mind on most of the opinions expressed in that paper. The other is to place the emphasis rather on some of the most important ideas raised by the lecture of the given paper. As for myself, I shall attempt a combination of two.

To begin with, I would like to say that Professor Karaosmanoglu's paper is based on a set of correct assumptions:

- that European security cannot be dissociated from Balkan security;
- that the Balkans cannot be viewed separately from the larger context of the Mediterranean and certain (former) Soviet military districts;
- that Balkans are asking for a differentiated approach to the problem of "threat".

In respect to the latter, I would say that, indeed, we are now witnessing a shift in threat perception from direct aggression towards crisis escalation, which, in turn, could trigger external direct involvement. Specifically, although it is true that the Soviet threat diminished considerably (leaving aside the dangers of an internal implosion), one should not neglect the increasing importance of other potential threats, some derived from known rivalries (the Greek-Turkish conflict), others from the dismemberment of Yugoslavia (Macedonia).

This is so because the Balkans did not comply entirely with the postwar division of Europe. Here, history proves always stronger than reality, the result being a tendency to substitute the past for the present. Moreover, we should add to the picture terrorism and ethnic disputes, as Professor Karaosmanoglu correctly does.

In general, due to the latest developments, Balkan cooperation is now faced with its most difficult test: either it is able to contribute to the efforts to solve the Yugoslav crisis, thus surviving, or it is not, and we engage ourselves on the way to its multiplying.

With respect to the individual threat perceptions of the Balkan countries, which are correctly presented in the paper (it is encouraging to see that the relationships between Turkey and Bulgaria are not that conflictual as they appear) one should take into consideration a number of affecting elements, such as:

- the Balkan specific,
- the new internal environment, and
- the new external environment.

As a consequence, each Balkan country will have to make an assessment of its security requirements under the new conditions. Its result would be a rather dynamic concept of security, capable of adapting itself to continuously changing circumstances.

Another point of interest is the relevance of the CEE accords for the Balkan region, a problem to which the author gives, of course, considerable consideration. In my opinion, one must see whether it will be possible to use the agreed CEE levels as a starting point for a subregional Balkan agreement in order to have a better answer to the new security requirements in our zone.

In respect to the author's rejection of such a possibility, my impression is that such a rejection is not aiming at the regime itself, but rather at its particular substance.

But that could be subject to negotiation, which is a positive and encouraging sign, *vis-à-vis* such a possibility.

With respect to the minorities and human rights problems mentioned by the authors in the CSCE context, I would have a suggestion: placing them in the Greek-Turkish context instead of the Bulgarian-Turkish one, where they really belong, makes them rather irrelevant.

And one final point linked to naval arms control: perhaps it would have been more promising to look to it from a local, rather than global, perspective. Because the latter is indeed less promising than the former.

All in all, and in the light of recent developments, the main conclusion of the paper might be that we are now faced with a dilemma: either we add immediately a security dimension to the Balkan co-operation, or we abdicate from it entirely.

Pierre Buhler

Puisqu'il me revient l'honneur de présenter des commentaires sur l'exposé de M. Baleta, je tiens à dire qu'il ne peut s'agir que de commentaires élogieux.

J'ai été pour ma part sensible à son évocation de l'avènement de la démocratie et du pluralisme en Albanie et je voudrais saluer ici le courage d'un peuple - dont en tant que député il est le représentant ici - le courage dont les Albanais font preuve pour se débarrasser de ce qui a tout de même été la dictature communiste la plus anachronique - il a même employé le terme "féroce" - de ce continent. Il convient d'adresser, à travers M. Baleta, toute notre sympathie et notre soutien à cet immense effort.

S'agissant de l'objet de l'exposé que nous venons d'entendre, je partage entièrement les inquiétudes exprimées par l'orateur quant à la sécurité des installations nucléaires civiles.

Le spectre de Tchernobyl, qu'a évoqué M. Baleta, continue de planer et il existe dans l'Europe post-communiste une cinquantaine de Tchernobyl potentiels. Fort heureusement l'Europe du Sud-Est a été relativement épargnée. Je ne connais pour ma part que la centrale nucléaire de Kozloduy en Bulgarie, qui, aux dires de tous les experts, est dans un piteux état.

L'heure, cependant, n'est pas aux procès, ni aux accusations, mais à une démarche pragmatique pour éloigner la menace d'un nouveau Tchernobyl.

Je ne vois que des avantages à la coopération balkanique suggérée par M. Baleta sous la forme de mesures de prévention et de traitement des déchets.

Ce que je crois également, et par dessus tout, essentiel est un effort de la communauté internationale - en particulier des Etats occidentaux qui ont une industrie nucléaire civile - pour remettre en état toutes ces installations vétustes. Il y a là un immense besoin à satisfaire et à satisfaire en toute première priorité.

Quant au nucléaire militaire, je dirais, sur un mode un peu provocant, qu'aujourd'hui la question du nucléaire est pour l'Europe du Sud-Est une non-question. Le retrait des forces armées soviétiques - et de leurs armes nucléaires - d'Europe de l'Est, la dissolution du Pacte de Varsovie ainsi que l'accord FCE rendent l'hypothèse d'un conflit nucléaire sur le continent quasiment invraisemblable.

Elle l'est a fortiori pour l'Europe du Sud, que sa géographie disqualifie pour être le couloir de pénétration potentiel d'une attaque massive. C'est ce qui explique pourquoi presque toutes les armes nucléaires ont été concentrées au Nord de part et d'autre de la frontière inter-

allemande. Au Sud, on trouve seulement quelques "Lance" en Italie pour verrouiller la trouée de Goritzia avec la Yougoslavie.

A ce qui avant la fin de la guerre froide était déjà une non-question on a essayé régulièrement d'apporter une réponse, avec l'idée de zone dénucléarisée dans les Balkans, à l'initiative du Pacte de Varsovie, une idée dont M. Baleta a reconnu qu'elle était inadéquate.

Aujourd'hui, cette question a pratiquement disparu de l'ordre du jour du débat sur le désarmement (Balkans, Europe centrale, Europe nordique), ce qui montre a posteriori :

- que ce n'était pas là le fond du problème ;
- qu'en tout état de cause ce n'était même pas le bon moyen de l'aborder.

Le fond du problème ayant été en grande partie résolu par les bouleversements politiques dans l'ex-camp socialiste, il apparaît maintenant que la dissuasion nucléaire n'est nullement ce mal absolu, ce danger absolu que certains ont voulu démoniser dans le passé.

La vraie menace aujourd'hui pour la paix dans le monde, et en tout cas pour la paix en Europe, n'est pas l'arme nucléaire, mais la multiplication de conflits limités, de faible intensité, qui se développent d'autant plus facilement qu'ils n'y a guère de chance qu'ils débouchent sur une escalade nucléaire.

Avec la fin de la guerre froide, l'Europe quitte en quelque sorte l'ère nucléaire, qui a, pendant 40 ans, été le fondement de la stabilité politico-militaire. Il ne s'agit pas de regretter le passé, mais de constater le fait.

Ce qui ne veut pas dire que le nucléaire est indistinctement dispensateur de sécurité. Ce qui est dangereux dans l'arme nucléaire, et M. Baleta l'a à juste titre souligné, n'est pas tant sa détention que sa dissémination :

- que ce soit par l'éclatement d'un Etat détenteur de l'arme nucléaire comme l'URSS. Le problème ne se pose en l'occurrence que pour les armes tactiques, plus mobiles, plus dispersées entre les républiques et au commandement plus décentralisé que les armes stratégiques. De virtuel qu'il est actuellement, ce risque deviendrait réel si les armes nucléaires devenaient un élément ou un enjeu du marchandage entre républiques. Pour l'heure, ce marchandage revêt une forme purement politique et au moment où nous parlons, aucune des républiques où sont déployées ces armes n'a émis de revendications sur elles. On peut espérer que ces armes resteront soumises à un pouvoir unique.
- ou alors par la prolifération dans des mains incertaines. Là est le vrai danger, y compris pour l'Europe du Sud-Est, que sa géographie expose au premier chef au chantage nucléaire d'Etats cherchant à s'assurer en toute impunité une hégémonie régionale.

Les missions d'inspection, sous l'égide de l'ONU, des installations nucléaires de l'Irak ont révélé un niveau stupéfiant d'avancement des recherches et de la technologie dans la mise au point de l'arme nucléaire.

Il est beaucoup plus tard qu'on ne le croit. Et le risque qui se profile très clairement à l'horizon commande une coopération de tous les Etats concernés autour des instruments existants (TNP, MTCR) et dans les institutions comme l'AIEA pour sinon surveiller du moins retarder suffisamment l'accession de nouveaux Etats à la technologie nucléaire et balistique jusqu'à ce que ces armes aient prouvé leur parade.

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat

L'importance de la question des armes chimiques et la façon dont ce problème est perçu dans la région est d'une manière on ne peut plus claire illustré dans le rapport de l'Ambassadeur Alexandrov. Cette intervention ne peut répondre à tous les points et questions soulevés dans ce rapport. Je voudrais limiter mon commentaire à cinq points.

Le premier point concerne les négociations sur les armes chimiques telles qu'elles sont conduites au sein de la Conférence du désarmement à Genève. Ces négociations ont pour but l'élaboration d'une Convention qui interdirait le développement, la production, l'acquisition, le stockage, le transfert et, depuis peu, aussi l'utilisation des armes chimiques. La destruction sur une période de 10 ans, des armes chimiques existantes, ainsi que des installations de fabrication de ces armes, est également prévue dans le cadre de cet accord. L'objectif des négociations à Genève va donc bien au-delà du Protocole de Genève de 1925, qui lui n'interdit que l'usage de ces armes en temps de guerre et en permet l'usage en représailles. Et en effet, un certain nombre de pays s'est effectivement réservé ce droit.

Il est important me semble-t-il de souligner que la guerre du Golfe a donné un souffle nouveau aux négociations de Genève et que les négociations sont arrivées aujourd'hui à un moment décisif. A un moment du "*now or never*". On peut effectivement dire que si une Convention n'est pas signée au cours de l'année 1992, on ne la signera probablement jamais. La guerre du Golfe a changé les perspectives des différents pays et a eu pour résultat une réexamination de l'intérêt, tant politique que militaire, de l'utilisation des armes chimiques. Elle a permis de recadrer le problème de l'interdiction de l'usage des armes chimiques et notamment son usage en représailles. La concession américaine sur ce point au mois de mai 1991¹ en a été une suite logique et a permis que l'interdiction d'usage soit incorporé dans l'article I du "texte évolutif".

Un certain nombre de problèmes importants et épineux restent pourtant à résoudre et se ramènent à principalement trois domaines.

- Premièrement, il y a les problèmes liés à la *vérification*. En schématisant, on peut dire que l'obstacle consiste à trouver une formule qui permette d'une part l'accès complet et à tout instant aux installations chimiques, et qui d'autre part permette de protéger certains secrets légitimes, qu'ils soient de nature commerciale et/ou militaire.

Les nouveaux concepts, qui ont été récemment introduits dans les négociations à Genève (tels ceux d'un accès réglementé (*managed access*) ou de définition d'un périmètre dans lequel une inspection peut avoir lieu) ont pour origine la protection de l'information confidentielle de nature civile et militaire. Ils entrent toutefois rapidement en conflit avec le principe de l'inspection n'importe où et n'importe quand. Le noeud du problème de vérification se situe à ce niveau là.

- Deuxièmement, il y a le problème de l'*universalité*, c'est-à-dire comment s'assurer que tous les Etats, *i.e.* tous ceux avec une capacité ou un potentiel chimique, signeront la Convention. A cet égard il me semble que la nature même des armes chimiques fait que des mesures régionales, telle l'idée de zones exemptes d'armes

¹ Pour le texte de l'initiative américaine consulter le document CD/1077 du 23 mai 1991. On pourrait également rappeler dans ce contexte la déclaration du Président français du 7 février 1991 qui a fait savoir que les armes chimiques ne seraient pas utilisées par les soldats français quelles que soient les circonstances.

chimiques, n'ont qu'un intérêt très limité. De telles mesures peuvent éventuellement appuyer une convention, mais jamais la remplacer ou en être un substitut. De la même manière des mesures visant à régulariser le transfert et l'export des agents chimiques ne pourraient avoir qu'un rayon d'action limité.

- Le troisième domaine dont il faudrait faire état concerne le problème de la mise en oeuvre de la Convention, le problème des *sanctions*, de l'application effective de la Convention. Comment organiser les sanctions ? Qui appliquera les sanctions ? Quels types de sanctions ? Ce ne sont que quelques questions auxquelles, tôt ou tard, il faudra bien répondre. Différentes solutions peuvent être envisagées. On peut élaborer un système endogène ou laisser la responsabilité au Conseil de Sécurité, auquel cas elle n'interviendrait pas nécessairement dans le cadre de la vérification de la Convention, mais plutôt dans le cadre de ses responsabilités pour le maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationale. Il est évident que la solution adoptée aurait des conséquences allant bien au-delà de la Convention chimique.

Voilà les trois grands défis qui se posent aux négociateurs à Genève.

Le deuxième point sur lequel je souhaiterais m'attarder quelques instants concerne les gaz lacrymogènes et tout autre produit irritant utilisé à des fins de maintien de l'ordre public et de lutte anti-émeute.

Il est important de souligner qu'il n'y a aucun accord international qui interdit l'utilisation des gaz lacrymogènes, ou des produits irritants, à des fins de maintien de l'ordre public et de lutte anti-émeute. Le projet de convention tel qu'il est négocié à Genève permet très explicitement dans l'article II, paragraphe 5 l'usage de ces gaz pour contenir les émeutes domestiques. A vrai dire dans le cadre des négociations à Genève, le problème ne se pose pas.

Le problème de l'utilisation des gaz lacrymogènes ou autre type de produits similaires semble, au surplus, plus du ressort du droit humanitaire que du droit du désarmement et il me semble qu'il est important de faire une distinction entre les deux, ils procèdent de deux logiques différentes.

Si le problème des gaz lacrymogènes se pose avec une certaine acuité dans l'Europe du Sud-Est, faut-il alors imaginer ou envisager une initiative régionale dans ce domaine ? Est-ce que l'on pourrait élaborer un accord, un protocole régional, qui réglerait ou prohiberait l'utilisation des gaz, des produits chimiques létaux ou létaux supertoxiques dans les pays de la région ? Dans un contexte où les conflits des minorités semblent sans bornes, ceci pourrait peut-être effectivement être une mesure importante. Toutefois on voit bien que ce n'est que dans un cadre humanitaire, et non pas dans un cadre du désarmement, qu'une telle initiative s'imposerait.

Le troisième point concerne les problèmes écologiques, les problèmes liés à l'environnement.

Ces problèmes sont activement discutés et très présents dans les négociations à Genève, dans la mesure où ils ont trait à la destruction des armes chimiques. Dans un certain nombre de pays, et notamment les Etats-Unis, des législations nationales existent, limitant sévèrement les modalités de destruction.

Le problème soulevé dans le rapport de l'Ambassadeur Alexandrov et qui a trait aux pollutions chimiques transnationales et à l'industrie chimique équipée avec des installations défectueuses du point de vue de l'environnement ne me semble toutefois pas relever de la Convention chimique. Ces problèmes sont extrêmement importants, mais sont du ressort des

accords de la protection de l'environnement. Ils n'ont pas de justification dans des accords de désarmement.

Mon quatrième point concerne le lien entre le chimique et le nucléaire et les conséquences de la guerre du Golfe. Le lien entre le chimique et le nucléaire, cette idée que l'arme chimique est l'arme nucléaire du pauvre, qu'elle pourrait être un substitut pour l'arme nucléaire, a grandement nuit aux négociations sur les armes chimiques. Aujourd'hui, l'idée perd rapidement du terrain. La guerre du Golfe y en est bien évidemment pour quelque chose. De la même manière on peut dire qu'après la guerre du Golfe, le spectre de la menace, ou mieux encore l'éventualité de l'utilisation des armes chimiques, a grandement diminué. Les prises de position française et américaine, pendant et après la guerre, sont à cet égard illustratives.² Il y a donc actuellement un climat très favorable à l'interdiction complète des armes chimiques. En effet, l'assimilation arme chimique-arme nucléaire ne se justifie ni dans ses effets matériels, ni dans ses implications stratégiques. A cet égard il faut également mentionner les travaux de la Commission spéciale, Commission établie par la résolution 687 (1991) du Conseil de Sécurité et chargée de la destruction des armes chimiques en Irak. Il est toutefois clair que si la Commission échoue dans sa tâche, si la Conférence du désarmement laisse passer ce "momentum", et si on ne signe pas cette Convention en 1992, la menace des armes chimiques se posera de nouveau et avec force.

Le dernier et cinquième point concerne les initiatives régionales. L'Ambassadeur Alexandrov fait état de possibles avenues pour la coopération régionale. Un certain nombre de ces mesures, tel par exemple l'échange de données ou la possibilité d'effectuer des vérifications expérimentales jointes, existent déjà et sont opératoires au sein de la Conférence du désarmement. Ceci est donc un mécanisme tout prêt qui peut être utilisé dans le cadre d'une coopération régionale. Est-ce que dans ce cadre on développe de nouvelles initiatives? Y a-t-il des possibilités pour l'élaboration d'un système régional de contrôle et de vérification, pour un système régional qui aiderait à la destruction des armes et agents chimiques une fois la Convention signée ? Quel apport nouveau la région pourrait-elle donner dans ce domaine?

² Positions où on renonce au droit de l'usage des armes chimiques en représailles et à l'idée d'un stock de sécurité. Voir à cet égard notamment la position américaine du mois de mai 1991 où elle renonce à l'idée de garder 2 % de son stock d'armes chimiques jusqu'au moment où tous les Etats avec des capacités chimiques auront signé la Convention.

Part IV

Proposals for Co-operation in the Field of Security Between the South-East European Countries

Chapter 10

Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project: Anarchy, the Demise of Bipolarity, and the Turkish Call on the Regional Players to Co-operate rather than Defect

Duygu Sezer

Theoretical Insights on Co-operation

Anarchy continues to be one of the hallmarks of the international system. At a time in world politics when the stability provided by post-war nuclear bipolarity has peaceably broken down, the spectre of anarchy and its potential to unleash the forces of large-scale international violence have loomed ominously in people's minds.¹

Aware of the stark reality of an anarchical international system, politicians and scholars - each employing the methodology particular to their respective professions - have devoted considerable energy throughout history to devising schemes to reduce the potential for conflict among egotists not subject to central authority. International relations literature is rich with studies of mechanisms (*i.e.* balance of power, hegemony, bipolarity, multipolarity, alliances, coalitions, international institutions and regime-formation, etc.) commonly practiced by state-actors since the dawn of the Westphalia state-system, for the specific purpose of minimizing the chances of facing an armed attack. These mechanisms have been historically relied on to dissuade or deter the other egotists from indulging in self-help and to defend against them if they went ahead and attacked regardless.

In other words, throughout most of modern history organized communities have made deliberate attempts to obviate the propensity for armed conflict inherent in the anarchic international system, which, by definition, allows its constituent units the freedom to maximize their gains. Such theoretical freedom resides in every sovereign state, providing it with the legitimacy to exercise self-help. Self-help by one state-actor for value maximization could easily run counter to the interests of other state-actors who are equally empowered to

¹ For a forceful argument in support of the link between bipolarity and stability - and conversely, the threat of instability in a multipolar world in the European context, see: John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", *International Security*, Summer 1990, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-57. The Mearsheimer article has raised a lively debate among scholars. It was criticized by Stanley Hoffmann on the central question of which of the two structural configurations, namely bipolarity or multipolarity, gave rise to stability. Hoffmann dismissed the Mearsheimer analysis of the structural roots of stability, for, according to him, "structural factors do not cause or explain outcomes themselves. In anarchy, any structure can lead either to peace or war; it depends on domestic characteristics of the main actors, on their preferences and goals, as well as on the relation and links among them", in: "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part II: International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe", *International Security*, Fall 1990, Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 192. Robert O. Keohane was critical of the Mearsheimer "form of realism" for its pessimism regarding the contributions of "institutionalized co-operation" to peace and stability. According to Keohane, the nature and strength of international institutions were also important determinants of expectations and therefore of state behavior, see: *op. cit.*, p. 193. Bruce M. Russett, sceptical of the alleged stability of bipolar systems, refuted the implications of what he saw as Mearsheimer's "realist" proposition that institutions and ideologies were irrelevant and that only the "realities" of power competition mattered - in: "Correspondence: Back to the Future, Part III: Realism and the Realities of European Security", *International Security*, Winter 1990/91, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 216-17. Thomas Rissen-Kaplan is similarly in disagreement with Mearsheimer's use of the structural realist paradigm to the exclusion of domestic politics and international institutions as important determinants of state-behavior: *op. cit.*, p. 218.

fend for themselves and who are rational actors equally motivated in the direction of a value-maximization behaviour. The resulting confrontation of interests can spark off a process that might ultimately end in armed conflict, thereby jeopardizing regional and/or international stability.

The anarchic system is pure or absolute only at the abstract level, however. The types of historical mechanisms mentioned above suggest that in real life that abstraction has been compromised. For states need peace and stability, too, in a very real sense. Historically speaking, the mechanism most frequently used in reconciling the abstraction of the anarchic system with the "real life" needs of states for peace and stability has been none other than policies designed to manipulate the structure of power.

Historical periods of balance of power, world hegemony, multipolarity and bipolarity have, by manipulating the distribution of power, significantly curtailed the power of the state-actor for unbridled conduct against others. International institution-building, a phenomenon unique to the twentieth century in terms of the variety and scope of the co-operation it has generated, has also set limits on the capacity of the international anarchic system to function unimpeded. Was not the concept of collective security conceived as a restraint on the anarchic system? The same is true for regional integration.

A common element, conceptually and politically, that runs through all the various mechanisms and processes that have restrained the spontaneous implementation and execution of the implications of the anarchical international system is co-operation.

"Co-operation", then, is the magic word, the key construct, with whose help the anarchic system can be, and has been, kept under check. Co-operation is the antithesis of self-help and conflict and the antidote of the struggle for power, which is the principal end-result of the state of anarchy.

The role of co-operation in mitigating the impact of the absence of a central world authority that would enforce the rules of conduct - and hence its role as a prerequisite for world peace and stability - has been studied extensively. A selective number of valuable insights offered by these studies will be recounted below with the aim of providing a theoretical underpinning to a primarily political initiative for regional co-operation - namely, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project, the preliminary outlines of which will be described in the second part of this chapter.

Turkey initiated the idea of regional co-operation in the wake of the dissolution of East-West bipolarity upon the collapse of Soviet power at the close of the 1980s. Post-war nuclear bipolarity had terrified many who, believing in mankind's bounded rationality, were appalled at both poles' hair-trigger policies. Nevertheless, over four decades' of peace was attained in Europe, the epicentre of the East-West conflict, throughout the lifespan of bipolarity based on nuclear parity.

Now, "after bipolarity", we indeed witness the emergence of forces, both domestic and international, that threaten regional and possibly even Eurasian stability and peace. Nationalism has dissolved the Soviet Union. It is not only dissolving but is physically destroying parts of Yugoslavia in a fierce civil war. And it has been wrecking the Caucasus. As the stresses caused by economic restructuring in the former socialist countries accumulate, social and political tensions might receive fresh and powerful impetus, reinforcing inter-nation and inter-ethnic hatreds. The Balkans is a "powder keg" not only of nations but also of minorities, thereby complicating the task of achieving peace and stability. Against this background of renewed potential for regional instability due to the collapse of bipolarity,

Turkey has made a formal proposal for economic co-operation among the Black Sea countries.

Before examining this proposal, a brief clarification of the analytically- and politically-crucial concept of "co-operation" is in order.

Co-operation refers to a process of policy coordination in which the parties aim to adjust their behaviour to the preferences of others.² The ultimate goal is to derive greater mutual advantages that would not be forthcoming in the absence of co-operation. Keohane's more formal definition runs as follows:

Intergovernmental co-operation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partner as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.³

For analytical clarity and political soundness, it is important to keep in mind that harmony and co-operation are distinct forms of inter-state relationships.

Harmony refers to a situation in which actors' policies (pursued in their own self-interest without regard for others) *automatically* facilitate the attainment of others' goals.⁴

Harmony exists independently of conscious adjustments. It is, so to say, a natural state in the relationship that does not require prior communication and coordination. Co-operation, on the other hand, is a deliberate and active process of communication and co-ordination aimed at persuading the other side, the merits of adjusting its policies, in order to attain mutual gains and, simultaneously, to reverse the potential for conflict in case of unilateral pursuit of national interests. Co-operation does not require the elimination of conflict. It co-exists with conflict, expecting to restrain and eventually eliminate it. It is the spectre of conflict that creates the need to co-operate.⁵

Co-operation has been the subject of studies by scholars employing game-theoretic perspectives. Among the more recent contributions, Robert Axelrod's *Co-operation Theory* should be recapitulated. Based on an investigation of individuals who pursued their own self-interest in the absence of a central authority to force them to co-operate with each other, Axelrod came to the conclusion that the strategy of "tit-for-tat" showed the best performance in a game of "Prisoner's Dilemma".⁶ The "Prisoner's Dilemma" is an abstract formulation of common situations in which what is best for each person on an individual level leads to conflict and mutual defection, whereas everyone would have been better off with mutual co-operation.⁷ "Tit-for-tat" refers to the policy of co-operating on the first move and replying in kind to the other player with the second move.⁸

Kenneth A. Oyle reminds us that when states confront each other in situations that resemble single-play "Prisoner's Dilemma", or single-play "Stag Hunt" or "Chicken", they are

² Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 51.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁶ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York, Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1984, pp. 31-32.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

constantly tempted to chose defection over co-operation by the attractiveness of immediate gains.⁹ To offset this impediment to co-operation, players need to be involved in iterated situations, meaning that states must expect to continue dealing with each other. Moreover, payoff structures must not change substantially over time and states should be able to maintain the same level of optimism about future payoffs.¹⁰

The question of what the players expect of the future has been an important consideration in co-operation theory. Expectation of being placed in a similar situation in the future, a reputation for reliability and for resisting temptation, iteration and reciprocity frequently appear in game-theoretic literature as attributes that promote co-operation.¹¹ A most disheartening aspect of game-theoretic studies of co-operation relates to the size of the game - that is, the number of players. For example, the Black Sea Co-operation project is conceived in regional rather than bilateral terms. Two-person games are given greater credit for promoting co-operation, whereas "*n*-person games", because of their complexity, are less conducive to multilateral co-operation.¹²

Black Sea Economic Co-operation Project

The idea of deliberately fostered economic co-operation among countries in the Black Sea region was first put forward by Turkey in the wake of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990. Within a short time it evolved into an officially-proposed project of regional co-operation, culminating in the drafting of a treaty in the summer of 1991, after a series of consultations and negotiations in the capitals of four Black Sea - bordering countries - namely, the Soviet Union, Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Objectives

Ambassador Sükrü Elekdag, often credited with designing the initial idea, has expressed the main objective as "the creation of favourable conditions and the establishment of institutional arrangements among the Black Sea countries for the development and diversification of their economic relations".¹³

Geographical proximity and mutual complementarity among the economies of the said countries, reform and restructuring in the former socialist countries, and the Turkish reform experience that began in early 1980s are seen by Turkish officials as natural advantages whose expeditious exploitation could yield significant mutual benefits.¹⁴

Turkish interest groups seem to have taken a keen interest in the project and view it in a favourable light. An official of the Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges, a high-powered association of businessmen, apparently feels that

⁹ Kenneth A. Oyle (ed.), *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 12-13.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Mr. Sükrü Elekdag articulated his view initially in the oped page of the Turkish daily, *Cumhuriyet*, 20 February 1991, p. 2.

¹⁴ For official views, see the following articles authored by two Foreign Ministry Officials: Yaman Baskurt, "Regional Cooperation Will Create New Opportunities", *Turkey: Economy* (bi-annual publication of the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), Vol. 4, No. 6, May 1991, pp. 38-39; Tansug Bleda, "Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region", *Dis Politika, Foreign Policy*, Ankara, Vol. XVI, Nos. 1-2, 1991, pp. 230-35.

Turkish desire to engage in a more active role could, if successful, bring about the stable economic environment necessary for sustained growth in the countries surrounding the Black Sea.¹⁵

A discussion on the objectives would not be complete if it did not mention the broader aspiration behind the initiative - the desire to contribute to regional peace and security. The people who worked on developing the project must have reasoned that by contributing to the creation of greater material wealth while simultaneously cultivating the habit of co-operation, the project could give a major boost to mutual trust, goodwill and friendship in the region. To what extent the project was thought to possess the long-term potential to create spill-over effects on co-operation in other areas of mutual inter-state concern, such as security, is difficult to ascertain at this point. The limited number of publicly available documents and studies on the subject suggests that the project was conceived in an exclusively economic context.

In one of the few quantitative studies conducted by a Turkish economist, it has been suggested that regional co-operation might perform a cushioning effect, limiting the negative impact that policies of integration of centrally-planned economies with the world economy would engender.¹⁶ Integration with the world economy - the professed aim of all the former socialist countries - requires competitiveness. To achieve competitiveness, the Soviet Union, Rumania, and Bulgaria need to restructure their economies at the risk of great social dislocation and unrest. Turkey initiated restructuring a decade ago and there is broad agreement in international circles that it has come a long way.¹⁷ Mr. H. Ersel, the author of the above study, argues that regional co-operation could create a common market for goods that are uncompetitive at world prices. In this event, contracting parties would be trading goods at prices higher than world prices, the only alternative to this would be to close down the uncompetitive industries altogether. Therefore, each country would have to weigh the costs of co-operation against the cost of closing down the uncompetitive industries, with all the social risk and costs that would entail. If the costs to be incurred by the former are less than those by the latter, then co-operation should present itself as a rational alternative. Since the ultimate goal of this hypothetical coalition of states is integration with the world economy, co-operation would continue only as long as the transitional stage lasted, leaving an option for getting out at that point when integration was achieved.¹⁸

This option of terminating the co-operation in the future at the time of integration with the world economy answers the question of whether Turkey views the project as an alternative to the European Community. Turkish officials and analysts reject this suggestion.

The Turkish proposal also envisages the establishment of an investment bank to be called the "Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank".

¹⁵ Okan Üçer, "The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region", *Turkey: Economy*, Vol. 4, No. 6, May 1991, p. 40.

¹⁶ Hasan Ersel, "İktisadi Açidan Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Bölgesi" (Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region from an Economic Perspective) in T.C. Kültür Bakanlığı; Atatürk Üniversitesi ve Türk İş Konseyi, *Doğu Bloku Ülkelerindeki Gelişmeler ve Türkiye Ekonomisine Muhtemel Etkileri*, Erzurum, 1991, pp. 130-39.

¹⁷ Alfred Kuehn, "Prospects for International Cooperation of Countries in Transition to the Market Economy", in State Planning Organization, *Report of the International Symposium on Turkey's Experience in Developing a Market Economy and Its Relevance for the Reforming Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, Antalya, 1-3 April 1991, Ankara, pp. 417-423.

¹⁸ Ersel, *op. cit.*

The Agenda of Co-operation

In the Turkish scheme of things, the primary agents of co-operation are to be the business communities of each country. The free movement of goods, services and capital are the *sine qua non* of regional co-operation. In fact, it is this feature of the project that gives it a novel character. Traditionally, trade among the said countries was subject to state monopoly. Now, private enterprise is to be the key player, the state assuming a supportive role only.

Yet, for all this activity to flourish, governments have important responsibilities to create favourable parameters for co-operation, particularly in terms of infrastructure. The activities that will require inter-governmental co-operation include transportation, telecommunication, informatics, environment and energy.

Briefly, then, the Turkish proposal aims at regional co-operation in the implementation of several fundamental principles that in effect define the systemic environment within which co-operation is envisaged. These principles are the following: the reduction of the public sector and, conversely, the strengthening of the private sector (privatization); removal of restrictions on free trade; greater currency convertibility; and elimination of domestic price controls and subsidies.¹⁹ Clearly, the system these principles inspire amounts to nothing less than a full-fledged market economy.

Negotiations

Following a series of informal contacts with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Rumania, Turkey hosted the first formal meeting in December 1990, in Ankara, attended by the Foreign Ministry officials of the four Black Sea countries. The Republics of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Moldavia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were each represented in the Soviet delegation.

At Ankara, the participants declared their intention to enter into economic co-operation with each other and, to that end, authorized the drafting of the agreement containing the fundamental principles that would guide and regulate the proposed co-operation.

Meetings were held first in Bucharest and then in Sofia in spring of 1991, attended mostly by technicians who worked on drafting the text of the proposed agreement. The draft agreement was finalized at the Moscow meeting held on July 11-12, 1991, pending signature at a high-level summit, possibly in Ankara. Greece and Yugoslavia attended the Moscow meeting with observer status. Turkey does not seem to be motivated by narrow regionalism; membership is open to anyone who undertakes to abide by the fundamental principles.

Prospects

Uncertainty in the larger political arena has been a setback to movement on the project ever since the initial announcement of the Turkish initiative. The speedy momentum towards the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the second half of 1991 prevented further movement on the draft agreement adopted last July in Moscow. The transformation of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States has produced an entirely new political and juridical landscape in the Black Sea region, requiring the renegotiation of the draft text or perhaps its indefinite postponement. Business does not thrive in an environment of political instability;

¹⁹ Üçer, *op. cit.*

nor can governments be expected to enter into commitments that they feel they might be prevented from honouring by new circumstances imposed by political change. Hence, the Turkish initiatives might need to wait until every one of the prospective partners, in particular the Commonwealth, acquires a deeper sense of direction.

The fear of insidious Turkish designs for regional domination seems to have troubled Bulgaria, in particular, in its initial assessment of the proposal. Recently, however, bilateral relations have acquired a greater sense of mutual trust as a result of a series of visits between Ankara and Sofia by civilian and military officials.

It is true that the Turkish economy has certain advantages over the others simply because it has had a ten-year head start in economic restructuring. But it is highly questionable that Turkey's present advantages could easily translate into a position of domination when some of its vulnerabilities, *i.e.* resource deficiency and inflationary growth, are recalled.

Another reservation in people's minds about the project is its impact on relations with the European Community (EC). Some EC countries have questioned the compatibility of the project with Turkey's desire to be eventually admitted as a full member. It is only logical to expect all prospective participants in the project to ensure that their EC option will not be foreclosed by joining the proposed Black Sea Co-operation.

The fact that the Turkish initiative has had to contend with a very uncertain political environment should not obscure a fundamental disadvantage of an economic nature, namely, the standstill in the national economies of the former socialist countries. Wealth is not being created. A strong national currency is nowhere in sight. The only convertible currency, the Turkish Lira, does not perform as hard currency. With declining national GNPs and weak currencies, who will be in a position to fund the investment bank which in turn will finance the co-operative schemes?

Against all these odds, however, Mr. Ersel's study makes a good case for regional co-operation. From his analysis, the proposed co-operation among Black Sea countries corresponds to the game of "Stag Hunt", in which a group of hunters surround a stag.²⁰ Co-operation among them to trap the stag will result in a good meal. However, if one of the hunters leaves the stag in order to chase a rabbit that is passing by, the stag will escape, leaving everyone except the rabbit-chaser with no food. The rabbit-catcher (the "defector" in game-theoretic language) will eat lightly. If all hunters defect to chase a rabbit, all might catch one and enjoy a light rabbit meal instead of a full stag-meal that co-operation would have produced. Black Sea countries might choose to "co-operate" to obtain a stag, as Turkey suggests, or "defect" to chase a rabbit, as a result of mutual fears and reservations. The second option could, at best, merely produce a rabbit for each.

²⁰ Oyle, *op. cit.*

Chapter 11

Greece and the European Challenge in the Balkans

Theodore A. Couloumbis

Overview

The topic of this paper poses a difficult conceptual challenge. We are dealing simultaneously with three asymmetrically-interrelated levels of analysis: Greece, European/Atlantic security and South-Eastern Europe. Our task is to examine the impact of the revolutionary changes in Eastern Europe as they affect (and are affected by) an evolving security community in the Atlantic region and, in turn, to isolate Greece's foreign policy behaviour in this fluid and rapidly-shifting setting.

In the first part of this chapter, adopting a clearly normative approach, we will focus on the post-Cold War "international system" which is gradually unfolding, placing special emphasis on the role of NATO as well as the roles of other international institutions needed for purposes of conflict prevention, conflict-management and peaceful settlement of disputes at the global level. In the second part of the chapter we will concentrate on the dilemmas facing Greece, the only Balkan state which is a member of the European Community *and* NATO, in relation to the exciting but also fluid and sometimes dangerous situation of the Balkan (or Southeastern European) region.

The two-pronged assertion of this chapter (which frequently coincides with the recommendations of its author) is that at the global level a complex network of interdependent international institutions (global, regional, and functional) is likely to fill the vacuum being created by the rapid disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet bloc. At the regional/national level, the thesis of this chapter is that in the post-1974 period especially after January 1981 and Greece's entry into the European Community - Greek foreign policy should be understood primarily in terms of the rapid integrative characteristics of an emerging Western European Union (*i.e.* an integrated European Community). Accordingly, Greece's role in the Balkans will evolve increasingly as a product of common external policies adopted by the European Community's twelve member states.

The Shifting Patterns of Global Security

The historic events of 1989-91 have fundamentally altered the very core of the international system. The bloodless "revolutions" in the Soviet Union and in most countries of Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, the process of voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA, the significant progress made in nuclear and conventional arms control, the Gulf War as a response to regional aggression under the United Nations Security Council's umbrella, and the Yugoslav civil/constitutional conflict, are all clear indications that the Cold War and bipolarity are conditions of the past.

Most analysts and commentators have accepted the notion that our planet has crossed the threshold and has entered the "post-Cold War era". But what kind of profile will this successor era assume? Is our planet on the way to developing a new "World Order" based on

premises of respect for the territorial integrity of states, enhancement and consolidation of democratic institutions, protection of the human rights of all citizens of all states, and institutionalization of structures and processes for the peaceful settlement of international and intrastate disputes? Or are we moving toward a period of disorder, disorientation, fluidity, ethnic separatism and escalating economic protectionism, all resulting in higher frequency and intensity of local conflicts? Will the so-called "limited wars" which have been taking place in the troubled South of our planet - with the Middle East (and lately the Balkans) positioned at the apex of the pyramid of global conflict - continue to plague much of humankind?

In a world where a number of states still possess awesome military capabilities (including weapons of mass destruction) there is no substitute for a system of global order, backed by major centres of military and economic power, which can provide adequate institutional mechanisms for the peaceful and tolerably just settlement of disputes. The destabilizing vacuum that is temporarily being created by the rapid disintegration of Cold War bipolarity must not be allowed to drift into global anarchy and chaos. (There was, despite its dangers, an inherent stability to a bipolar system, premised on the mutually-detering balance of nuclear terror.) The new architecture of global security should therefore be based on an implicit, if not explicit, *consensus* on fundamental premises shared by the world's major centres of power. Needless to say, a great power consensus on the rules of the international game cannot last unless it is shared by a considerable number of small and intermediate (in terms of power) states. It would seem that such a political climate now exists, and every effort must be made to perpetuate it.

If we were to assume the perpetuation of what today appears to be a global great power consensus, a series of interlocking international institutions of economic and political co-operation can be developed and sustained. It is vital that NATO is maintained and strengthened at the very apex of the new global order. However, this great post-war regional security organization must dramatically reorient its objectives in order to survive and prosper. Its central function will no longer be to contain Soviet communism but rather to maintain and manage the historic partnership between a North American and a European pillar on each side of the Atlantic. NATO can and will progressively shift to the status of a grand organizational experiment whose main function will be to prevent the gradual drifting apart of its two strong pillars; and to protect conditions of inter-pillar interdependence based on premises of equality in partnership, thus forming a stable core around which global security can be structured for generations to come.

Following the logic of institutional complementary patterns (*e.g.* concentric, overlapping, adjacent), NATO should be enhanced as a security-producing structure by the projected speeding-up of the integration process taking place within the European Community. This Community of 12 European States, most of which are also members of NATO, will invariably emerge as a complex but unified entity not only in the economic but also in the political, security and defence dimensions. The European Community, whether it eventually incorporates the Western European Union or develops new structures for community-wide planning and implementation of common defence policies, will hopefully have a wholly integrated character by the end of this century.

NATO, with two powerful and equal defence pillars that operate on basic tenets of partnership, interdependence, mutuality of interests and common cultural and economic values, will be able to serve as a stable global platform contributing systematically to spill-over integrative processes in other parts of the planet - processes that can be emulated, tried,

and tested. NATO can also carry out successful institutional experiments, which have already created nearly unbreakable bonds among the states of the Atlantic Community.

It must be clearly understood, however, that a solitary global island of stability (a two-pillared Atlantic Community) surrounded by a sea of disorganization and disorder will be doomed to a sorry fate, sliding ultimately to a global-scale confrontation with nuclear weapons. Today, therefore, the crucial challenge facing humankind rests on the need to establish a set of complementary and overlapping security structures in areas of potential conflict such as Eastern Europe (including the Balkans), the Soviet Union, East and South-East Asia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, Africa and Latin America.

The institutional vacuum that has been created by the disestablishment of Eastern European international organizations is more than likely going to be filled, at least partially, by parallel sets of association agreements between the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the European Community. However, with democratization proceeding at various rates of speed and effectiveness in the erstwhile Socialist camp, there are a number of new problems (chief among them the challenge of ethnic autonomist movements) that could easily cross the threshold of armed conflict. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), currently in the process of institutional reshaping, appears to be aiming for a role beyond standard-setting and confidence building, to include conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-making. It will also become necessary with the passage of time to develop additional sub-regional economic co-operation and security organizations in Central and Eastern Europe which will mirror and complement the successful institutional models of NATO and the European Community.

The Gulf War has sharpened the sensitivities of global, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean powers regarding the need to develop *ad hoc* as well as a more permanent institutional mechanisms for the settlement of unresolved disputes such as the Arab-Israeli relations, the Palestinian issue and long-simmering questions of states threatened by partitionist movements, such as Lebanon and Cyprus. The institutional patterns of the North (especially CSCE) can hopefully be modified for application to regional settings such as the Mediterranean, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, Africa and Central America. The disappointing record of conflict management in the Yugoslav civil/constitutional conflagration is a harsh reminder of the unpreparedness of global and regional institutions to control or prevent complicated intra-state and inter-ethnic conflicts.

Finally, in this cursory review of the post-Cold War international system, we must not lose sight of the numerous possibilities for peace-keeping activities available to the United Nations (through the reinforced role of the Security Council and the Secretariat), now that the Security Council's permanent members (with veto privileges) appear to be converging on fundamental questions involving North-North, North-South and South-South relations. Once again, we must point to the remarkable cohesiveness and staying power demonstrated by a coalition of diverse powers, operating under the legitimizing umbrella of the United Nations Security Council, which was brought to bear in order to reverse a clear-cut case of aggression - the occupation/annexation perpetrated by Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

Greece and the European Challenge in the Balkans

Democratization in the Balkans and its Potential Dangers

The ongoing transition from totalitarianism toward democratic/pluralist systems in the Balkans is a remarkably positive development. This is more so, because *revolutionary changes* are happening - at least so far - without internal violence (Romania and Yugoslavia being the major exceptions). The three-day coup in the Soviet Union in mid-August 1991 could have led to serious repression and counter-violence, though the Soviet Union is not out of the woods yet. In the past, *revolution* and *non-violence* were a contradiction in terms. The notion of a "white revolution" and a "peaceful revolution" was considered a public relations device and/or useful rationalization employed by authoritarian figures such as the Shah of Iran.

Given the fact that the processes of transition and consolidation of democracy are still in their very early stages, there are at least two major dangers lurking in the background.

The first danger is that ethnic-autonomist problems - which during the Cold War period of Soviet hegemony were kept under control - could now cross the threshold into violent conflict as has occurred to a greater or lesser extent in Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary, Romania and the USSR. We now realize that the régime of the Cold War and Soviet hegemony of Eastern Europe had *enforced* since the late 1940s a certain type of *order*. Today the Soviet Union is hardly able to maintain the minimum level of cohesiveness within its territory to avoid the complete break-up advocated by separatist republics (following the example set by the Baltic states) eager to exercise their rights of national self-determination. Indeed, there is a clear danger of potential conflict which could escalate into civil and international wars designed to restructure the geopolitical map of Eastern Europe.

The second danger is the deactivation of a relationship of mutual deterrence which had been a product of Cold War bipolarity, the balance of terror and the "tranquillizing" dogma of Mutually Assured (nuclear) Destruction (MAD). For the first time since the end of World War II, "local conflicts" can break out "safely" without the fear of active superpower competition and a process of escalation that could cross the nuclear threshold. Yugoslavia, once more, provides a poignant case in point.

It is of critical importance nowadays, that the states and governments concerned in South-Eastern Europe work together to avoid retrogression to the time when the Balkans were referred to as the "powder keg" of Europe on account of its highly charged revisionist and irredentist problems.

Let us look, for example, at the explosive issue of minorities, and other *dual-identity groups* - abounding in the Balkan region and, in fact, in all parts of the world. In our view, the presence of minorities and other dual-identity groups could play very useful and constructive roles. We believe that ethnic groups enrich countries. *Mosaics* are always much more interesting and lively than monochrome canvasses. Minorities can pose a danger *only* when in neighbouring states there exist governments which seek to activate ethnic-affinity groups with a purpose of preparing the ground for territorial (boundary) changes. In our view the post-Cold War structure of peace in the Balkans (and elsewhere) should rest on two inviolable principles: first, the full protection of human rights of all citizens of all states (Helsinki Principles) and, second, the proscription of the use of force as a means of altering the geopolitical contours (the boundaries of states) in the region.

A Role for Greece in the Post-Communist Balkan Transition

What should be the role of Greece as a European Community member and as a NATO country - *vis-à-vis* its Balkan neighbours during the critical years of post-Cold War transition ahead?

Greece - as a European Community country committed to democracy, the protection of human rights, co-operative and institutionalized relationships and peaceful methods of dispute settlement, *can* and *should* contribute considerably in the direction of building structures of peace and international co-operation in the Balkan area in particular and Eastern Europe more generally.

Toward Albania, Greece's policies should continue to be those of peaceful engagement, encouraging the process of transition to political and economic democracy and the protection of the human rights of the Greek minority in Albania. The more advanced, pluralist and tolerant Albania becomes, the more the Greek minority - as an integral and lively part of the Albanian state - can play the role of a vibrant connecting-link between Greece and its struggle to escape from a self-isolationist neighbour.

Vis-à-vis Yugoslavia, Greece's interests are best served by the maintenance of the Yugoslav Federation (adjusted peacefully to suit the needs and interests of its constituent republics). It is also in Greece's interest to see Yugoslavia move toward the full implementation of a political democracy and a market economy. The feared break-up of Yugoslavia could set off a "domino effect" which could prove regionally contagious and turn into a widespread epidemic. The fragmentation of Yugoslavia is not in Greece's interest for a very particular reason as well. The collective policies of the Federation are subject to an internal balancing effect. A potentially independent "Yugoslav Macedonian" state, feeling vulnerable and isolated, would seek the support of other revisionist or potentially revisionist centres in the greater Balkan region (and Turkey would be among those heading this list).

Greece's relations with Bulgaria are currently excellent, and there is a good prospect for further improvement in relations, not only in the economic and political sectors, but also in aspects of defense co-operation. This is because both countries are facing a serious revisionist challenge in Turkey, who appears to have dreams of acting as protector and sole guarantor of Muslim populations well beyond the sovereign boundaries of the Republic of Turkey. Further, we must keep in mind that the Cold War taboos limiting defense co-ordination across bloc lines are no longer operative.

With respect to Romania, with whom Greece does not share a border, present as well as future prospects for comprehensive co-operation are excellent. Greece, as is the case with other Balkan states discussed above, should assist Romania to the best of its ability in the transition process toward genuine multiparty democracy and market economy, cultivating the best possible relationships not only at the bilateral and Balkan regional levels but also facilitating Romanian-EC relations. Romania, too, as is the case with other Balkan states, has the dual problem of calibrating standards for a Hungarian minority in Transylvania simultaneously with expectations for improvement of Romanian ethnic-affinity populations in neighbouring Moldavia (the issues of Bessarabia and Bukovina are forcing analysts to brush the dust off their history books).

In sum, Greece can and should play an active role in the Balkans of tomorrow. The country is a member of the European Community and has linked its destiny with this remarkable transnational experiment. But Greece is also a Balkan and a Mediterranean state. In our view, therefore, Greece can afford to assume a more energetic role - something that

has not been done adequately to date - in the formulation of a European-Community-wide policy *vis-à-vis* the Balkans. In this respect, Greece should operate through the expanding mechanisms of European political co-operation. The structure of multilateral Balkan Co-operation could also be enhanced through the participation of Italy, in an observer status, just as Italy's initiative, the *Pentagonal*, would be enhanced through the involvement of Greece in an analogous manner. In order to act in this new fashion, Greece must escape pre-war, Cold-War and Civil War prejudices, and must also insulate its policies from corrosive, even if at times unavoidable, calculations for internal (partisan) consumption.

Greece must promote a policy package which commits the European Community to assist the Balkans (and the rest of Eastern Europe) in its attempt to develop market mechanisms without serious socio-economic dislocations that might result in public unrest and gravitate toward violent conflict. And needless to say, effective efforts for economic development go hand-in-hand with the transition to and consolidation of democratic institutions.

In the critical years ahead Greece cannot be or appear to be hostile to the *gradual enlargement* of the European Community. However, the prospect of a future enlargement should not interfere with the on-going efforts to move forward with the European Union of the current 12 members. For it is certain that a premature attempt of today's EC to digest a great number of new member states would "water down" the on-going processes for political and economic union. It would make sense, perhaps, to move forward in the next few years with the vertical integration of the Twelve before opening up to the next set of Community members.

The Challenge of Greek-Turkish Relations

With respect to Turkey, one finds the greatest challenges as well as opportunities in the Balkan cluster of Greece's bilateral relationships.

The points of friction between Greece and Turkey are multiple, and the literature is extensive concerning the description and analysis of these problems as well as in the presentation of a variety of Greek-oriented, Turkish-oriented and third-party perspectives.¹

They include issues such as the delimitation of the Greek and Turkish portions of the Aegean continental shelf as well as Turkish complaints and challenges regarding present and potential arrangements of Greek territorial air space and territorial waters, defensive emplacements on the Greek islands of the Eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands, civil rights for the Muslim minority living in Greek Western Thrace, and both present and potential command and control responsibilities within the framework of NATO. Greek complaints, in turn, begin with the continued Turkish occupation, since July 1974, of Northern Cyprus, the emplacement of large Turkish amphibious forces in the western coast of Turkey, systematic violation of Greek minority rights in Istanbul and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos, and continuing pressures on the Oecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Regardless of the merits and demerits of the case made by each side, the central question that needs to be asked is whether Greece and Turkey, which have been involved in an undisguised Cold War since 1974, will be better off in a condition of protracted conflict

¹ For a detailed and detached review of positions advanced by Greece and Turkey on their bilateral dispute(s) see Andrew Wilson, *The Aegean Dispute*, London, IISS, Adelphi Paper No. 155, 1979, p. 80.

as opposed to entering into a new phase of mutual and active engagement and co-operation. Unequivocally, the answer is that both countries will be much better off if they can reach a final reconciliation, a new historic compromise, reminiscent of the Lausanne settlement of 1923.

The ingredients of a final compromise can only be based on the assumption that both Greece and Turkey adopt a West European profile. Greece, since 1974, has developed and tested durable democratic institutions and subsequently (in January 1981) became a permanent member of the European Community. Turkey is currently at the crucial crossroads between a European and a Third World orientation. Thus, like post-World War II France and Germany, they will bury the geopolitical divisions of the past, accept and respect the territorial *status quo* that emerged after World War II, and resolve to proscribe the use of force in their bilateral relations.

No fundamental progress toward a comprehensive Greek-Turkish settlement can be made without a just and mutually-acceptable solution to the prickly problem of Cyprus. As long as the present situation in Cyprus continues (occupation of 37 percent of the island's territory by the Armed Forces of Turkey), the Greek-Turkish dispute in the Aegean - which could otherwise become eminently manageable - will be shaded by Greek fears that Turkey might proceed in the Aegean in accordance with its partitionist behaviour in Cyprus.

A genuine settlement of the Cyprus problem (which is today ripe for a solution) would exclude *enosis* (union of Cyprus with Greece) and *taksim* (partition of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish segments). The historic compromise, therefore, calls for the independence of a federal, bizonal and bicomunal state along the lines of the Makarios-Denktaş and Kyprianou-Denktaş agreements.

The federal state of Cyprus that would emerge, following an agreement of the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, would be given an excellent chance to survive and prosper if, at the time of its birth, the "Federal Republic of Cyprus" were to become simultaneously a member state of the European Community. EC membership, together with genuine collective guarantees (including those of Greece, Britain and Turkey), demilitarization (except for the British base areas), and a U.N.- commanded multinational police force (until mutual confidence is securely established), will allow the troubled Cypriots to forge a long-lasting unity based on all the rights, duties and freedoms that democracy provides.

A genuine settlement of Cyprus, however, cannot rest on a premise simply equating (in terms of *shares* of territory, GNP, parliamentary and executive powers) the 80% of the Greek-Cypriots with the 18% of the Turkish-Cypriot minority community. In fact, all states and governments in the ethnically volatile Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean regions must begin to abide by a simple and logical rule of behaviour; otherwise the chances of establishing peace in the region will be very slim. This rule could be articulated as follows: "Treat minority communities and other dual-identity groups residing in your own country as well as you expect third countries to treat minorities and other dual-identity groups that are ethnically related to you". For example, Greece should treat its Muslim minority in Western Thrace as well as it expects Albania to treat the Greek minority in Southern Albania. Similarly, Turkey should treat its Kurdish minority community as well (*i.e.* offer similar rights and guarantees) as it expects Turkish minority communities to be treated outside of Turkey - whether in Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria or elsewhere. Albania, to give one more example, should also treat the Greek minority in Albania as well as it would like Albanians to be treated in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia. One could proceed by offering examples involving a variety of

states with ethnically heterogeneous populations in Southeastern Europe and elsewhere in the world.

A much-needed historic compromise between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean must rest on two general and two operational principles of foreign policy behaviour. The first general principle involves the mutual denunciation of the use of force by Greece and Turkey through the signing of a non-aggression pact. The second general principle is that the Greek-Turkish dispute(s) in the Aegean will follow the road of peaceful settlement, utilizing time-tested methods such as bilateral negotiations and, in case of deadlocks, conciliation, good offices, mediation, arbitration and adjudication.

The two operational principles apply to Turkey and Greece respectively. For the benefit of Turkey, it must be understood, the Aegean cannot be transformed into a "Greek lake". For the benefit of Greece, it must be also understood, the Aegean cannot be partitioned or subdivided in such a fashion that it enclaves Greek territories (Eastern Aegean and the Dodecanese islands) into a Turkish zone of functional responsibility or joint responsibility.

For heuristic purposes, we could outline here one of many alternative strategies leading toward (or at least permitting) a comprehensive settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute(s). It begins, as was stressed above, with the assumption that a mutually-acceptable settlement of the Cyprus question has been decided. Further, the strategy rests upon the two operational principles discussed above - the Aegean neither becomes a Greek lake nor is it divided in a way that enclaves Greek territories into a Turkish zone of functional responsibility.

Following the steps of the proposed strategy, the delicate issue of the Aegean continental shelf will become subject to bilateral negotiations. Questions that do not lead to mutual agreement will then be submitted to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice. Alternatively, both Greece and Turkey could agree - following the prototype of the Antarctic Treaty - to freeze the issue of continental shelf delimitation for a number of years, reserving the right to press their respective claims at the end of the Treaty period. Needless to say, the "Antarctic approach" gains additional appeal if it is assumed that there are no significant and readily exploitable oil reserves in the Aegean region. Further, the opportunity costs involving probable Aegean environmental dangers (caused by oil spills) should be taken into consideration given the fact that both Greece and Turkey are heavily dependent on the tourist industry in the area to help balance their payments.

One way of bypassing the thorny issues of Turkish challenges to Greece's 10-mile territorial air limit (in effect since 1931) and the potential of extending Greece's territorial waters from the present six miles to the widely-accepted 12-mile limit could be as follows: both Greece and Turkey would agree to 12-mile limits (for both territorial waters and territorial air) for their mainland territory, and to six mile limits for islands belonging to Greece and Turkey in the Aegean.

The potentially-explosive issue of minorities in Greece and Turkey should follow the dual rule that *a*) minority protection should not lead to claims by either side calling for boundary changes, and *b*) minorities within one's own country should be treated as well as one demands that affinity ethnic groups in third countries should be treated.

Technical questions such as Flight Information Region (FIR) and NATO command and control arrangements in the Aegean should be handled as subsidiary issues to be settled within the framework of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and NATO, respectively, and in accordance with practices that have been employed since the early 1950s.

Finally, in an era favouring arms control, arms reduction and confidence-building measures, Greece and Turkey would be best advised to begin a series of mutually and

balanced force reductions (MBFRs) involving their land and sea border areas in Thrace and the Aegean. A mirror-image reduction or the removal of offensive weapons (along the lines proposed in August 1991 by Greece's Prime Minister Mitsotakis) would go a long way toward reducing the chances of the outbreak of armed conflict as well as relieving the hard-pressed economies of both countries from the heavy burden of high military expenditures.

Last but not least, Greece and Turkey, as well as other Balkan States, should embark on the much-needed task of MBPR (Mutually and Balanced *Prejudice* Reduction) whether prejudice is manifested in hostile press commentaries, text books, literature, theatre, movies, sports or other forms of social and cultural expression.

Following a hypothetical grand settlement, both Greece and Turkey will increase significantly (in textbook-style neofunctionalist fashion) their trade, tourism, investment and joint ventures at home and abroad. Greece will also gladly abandon its policy of *linkage* of Turkey's accession project to the European Community and will, in fact, seek to facilitate Turkish entry. Simply put, a European Turkey will be for Greece a much easier neighbour to live with than will an alienated, fundamentalist and militaristic Turkey.

Ultimately, the state of relations between countries is a product of attitudes and perceptions of ruling elites and general publics. Looking at the Balkans in its long and adventurous history, we see clear manifestations of conflicting visions reflecting on a "greater Albania", a "greater Serbia", a "greater Bulgaria" and a "greater Romania". Furthermore, the Greeks still have memories of Alexander's Macedonian Empire and the thousand-year Byzantine Empire. The Italians can look back to the days of the Roman Empire, and the Turks have even more recent memories of great power that came with the Ottoman Empire. Needless to say, these overlapping and potentially-irredentist visions add up to a highly explosive formula.

Epigrammatically, we might conclude that when the Italians think and act as Italians and not as Romans, when the Greeks think and act as Greeks and not as Byzantines, and when the Turks think and act as Turks and not as Ottomans, there will be peace among them.

A Need for pan-European Institutions

As we view the future of Europe today, we see that it begins with a great paradox. The western half of Europe appears to be firmly and effectively organized. NATO will continue - retrofitted for a post-Cold War setting - to provide security and stability at a transatlantic level. The European Community, with or without Western European Union, will expand its functional concerns to include security and defense matters. Concurrently, the Council of Europe will transform itself into an all-European organization dedicated to the protection and promotion of human rights, freedoms and responsibilities.

The paradox is that the eastern half of Europe is currently experiencing a rapid process of de-institutionalization, as the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact are being placed upon museum shelves. At present, the main hope for conflict prevention and conflict management at a pan-European level (including US and Canadian membership) is the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The CSCE can help stabilize the Eastern and South-Eastern European region during this critical period of transition toward the so-called "New International Order". The CSCE, furthermore, can be augmented with a series of sub-regional co-operation and security arrangements, such as those involving initiatives of Balkan Multilateral Co-operation, the *Pentagonal*, and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean.

As we sail through perilous straits seeking to define a post-Cold War order, it would behoove us to tie ourselves - like a modern Ulysses - to a number of self-restraining institutional masts, in order to withstand the enchanting and heroic Siren songs praising the epic deeds of a bygone era.

Chapitre 12

Mesures visant à accroître la confiance et la sécurité dans les Balkans

Corneliu Vlad

Depuis quelques années, l'espace géopolitique de l'Europe subit des changements radicaux, et la finalité en est salubre. Pour la première fois, ce processus d'importance continentale et mondiale se produit essentiellement par des moyens politiques, en l'absence de conflagrations militaires dévastatrices. Néanmoins, ces mutations d'envergure ne sont pas sans risques pour la sécurité et elles obligent à une réévaluation, à l'échelle du continent et, sous cette perspective, dans ses zones les plus vulnérables, de l'équilibre des forces dans son ensemble.

Lors de cette réévaluation, la situation politique et militaire dans les Balkans doit être jugée en fonction d'une multitude de facteurs, de portée régionale, européenne et même mondiale, dont nous nous permettrons de rappeler :

1. La cessation de la guerre froide, déclenchée par les grandes puissances et l'érosion du régime dominant bipolaire dans l'après-guerre au moyen de la diminution des possibilités de manifestation de l'URSS en tant que superpuissance dans les relations internationales ;
2. Le démantèlement du Traité de Varsovie et du COMECON, en tant que structures politico-militaires et économiques, dont la vocation fondamentale était la réalisation des intérêts stratégiques de l'URSS.
3. La réévaluation des options stratégiques de politique globale des Etats-Unis d'Amérique et de l'URSS vis-à-vis de l'Europe, des Balkans et des différents Etats situés dans cette région.
4. La croissance du poids de l'Allemagne réunifiée dans les relations européennes, avec des effets sur les projets d'intégration politique et économique ouest-européenne et sur les possibilités d'action de ce pays en Europe Centrale et dans les Balkans ; et dans ce contexte, l'intérêt ressuscité de certaines grandes puissances de l'entre-deux-guerres (la France et l'Italie, notamment) envers les Balkans ;
5. L'option des anciens pays socialistes pour la constitution de l'Etat démocratique de droit, le multipartisme et l'économie de marché ; la définition, pour la première fois dans l'après-guerre, de leurs intérêts nationaux et leurs tentatives d'instaurer - à la hâte - un certain climat de sécurité nationale, un moyen entre autres de la négociation et de la signature de traités bilatéraux avec les autres Etats de la région et même d'Europe (les traités post-Paris) ;
6. La multiplication des démarches individuelles des Etats de la région, en faveur de l'intégration politique, économique et militaire aux structures européennes ; en même temps, les tendances à découpler les Balkans de l'Europe Centrale dans les démarches en faveur de l'intégration politique et économique, et le risque d'adopter plusieurs cadences dans ce processus, au détriment des anciens pays socialistes de la région, du fait des disparités d'ordre économique, des pressions migrationnistes et des situations nouvelles apparues dans le domaine des contacts humains ;
7. La recrudescence de certains conflits historiques, de nature ethnique et territoriale, greffés sur des difficultés économiques et sociales de taille dans les anciens pays socialistes ;

8. L'apparition de nouvelles sources d'instabilité au niveau régional ou bien au niveau de certains pays de la région, suite à la disparition de la "discipline de bloc" et de la réduction de l'engagement militaire de l'URSS et des USA en Europe. Le démantèlement du Traité de Varsovie - acte historique d'ailleurs nécessaire - fait augmenter les risques inhérents de décisions d'ordre militaire et d'autre nature, toujours déstabilisatrice, de certains Etats de la région, motivés par des perceptions émotionnelles, subjectives, exagérées, décisions qui pourraient avoir des effets négatifs non seulement au plan bilatéral, mais encore pour toute la zone et même pour l'Europe dans son ensemble ;
9. Le lancement et la promotion, en Europe centrale et de l'Est, d'idées et de formules d'organisation sous-régionale, ayant pour but essentiel le renforcement de la coopération, notamment dans le domaine économique, mais qui acquiert, dans les conditions de la période de transition et du vide de sécurité, des connotations politiques et de sécurité ;
10. Le début du processus de création d'un système institutionnalisé de sécurité et de coopération pan-européennes, par la signature de la Charte de Paris, comme un processus d'envergure historique, mais dont la mise sur pied demande du temps.

* * *

Sur le plan de la confiance et de la sécurité dans les Balkans, les processus positifs au niveau général-européen ont eu notamment pour résultats :

1. "L'universalisation" de la participation des Etats de la région au dialogue balkanique, du fait de l'association de l'Albanie aux réunions de caractère régional.
2. L'engagement de tous les Etats de la région, selon des modalités et à des degrés différents, à l'approfondissement de la démocratie et au développement de l'économie de marché.
3. La réduction de la menace militaire, de la part des grandes puissances, pour la sécurité des pays de la zone, ainsi que des politiques tendant à imposer de l'extérieur un certain modèle d'organisation sociale.

Néanmoins, la diminution considérable de la tension et des risques de confrontation sur le continent européen dans son ensemble se fait beaucoup moins ressentir dans les Balkans.

En dépit de l'amélioration du climat européen et mondial, les Balkans continuent d'offrir, dans un espace géographique assez restreint, mais très peuplé, la gamme la plus large de convulsions et de conflits latents qui marquent, dans le temps, l'histoire du continent. Les racines les plus profondes des différences actuelles relèvent pourtant de la culture et de la civilisation, nettement illustrées par la présence, dans cette région, de quatre grands systèmes d'écriture : grec, latin, slavon et islamique. C'est par là que passe la frontière religieuse, d'âge millénaire, entre les deux églises chrétiennes, et c'est toujours là que se trouve la zone d'interférence du christianisme et de l'islamisme.

Après la deuxième guerre mondiale, de nouvelles frontières ont fait leur apparition - politiques et idéologiques -, auxquelles ne devaient pas tarder à s'ajouter des différences de système économique et, par conséquent, de niveau de vie.

La création des deux blocs politiques et militaires, puis la naissance du mouvement des non-alignés apportèrent un nouvel élément d'antagonisme - d'ordre militaire - entre des pays membres de l'OTAN, du Traité de Varsovie et du mouvement des non-alignés.

Le processus de désintégration du "bloc soviétique" entraîne d'autres différenciations entre les Etats de la région qui partageaient la même idéologie : la Yougoslavie - en dehors des blocs, l'Albanie communiste dogmatique, mais échappant à la tutelle de Moscou, la Roumanie et la Bulgarie membres du Traité de Varsovie, mais la première souvent insoumise au Kremlin, alors que l'autre en était l'allié inconditionnel et parfaitement dépendant.

Des problèmes bilatéraux aigus déterminent des rapports critiques entre les deux Etats de la région membres de l'OTAN - la Grèce et la Turquie.

Toutes ces situations d'insécurité, et d'autres encore, sur lesquelles nous n'allons pas nous attarder maintenant, sont désormais aggravées par la recrudescence des problèmes ethniques, qui se fait ressentir aussi bien dans les relations bilatérales qu'à l'intérieur des Etats en question.

Le problème politique soulevé par les minorités excède le cadre intérieur d'un pays, pour influencer aussi sur les rapports entre les pays de la région, comme entre ces pays et d'autres voisins, extérieurs à la région, comme l'Italie, l'Autriche, la Hongrie, l'URSS.

La région des Balkans représente, avec l'Europe Centrale, une zone privée, du moins pour l'instant, d'arrangements spécifiques qui assurent sa propre sécurité, comme en ont par exemple les pays de l'OTAN et l'URSS. Les incertitudes et les labilités dans le domaine de la sécurité sont encore accentuées par les perceptions de certains pays de la zone, anciens membres du Traité de Varsovie, qui manifestent des préoccupations tout à fait logiques pour les garanties de sécurité se trouvant à leur disposition.

Par exemple, il y aurait, selon la Roumanie, dans le domaine de la sécurité, des disparités considérables pour ce qui concerne le degré de protection des Etats participants au processus de la CSCE ; alors que certains Etats disposent d'une double ou même triple protection de sécurité, grâce à des institutions comme l'OTAN, l'Union de l'Europe Occidentale, l'union politique de la CEE (en projet) et d'autres encore, d'autres Etats, dont les jeunes démocraties en transition des Balkans, n'ont que les engagements et les structures - en herbe - en matière de sécurité de la CSCE (voir le discours du ministre roumain des Affaires étrangères Adrian Nastase à la réunion du Conseil des Ministres de la CSCE, Berlin, juin 1991).

La Bulgarie considère pour sa part "avoir des possibilités limitées de dissuader une agression contre son intégrité territoriale et son indépendance politique", alors qu'elle était et demeure le pays de l'Est "le plus intégré à l'économie soviétique, et notamment à l'ensemble militaire-industriel soviétique" et qu'elle est affectée par "la réduction asymétrique des forces des armements" (voir la communication de Stéphan Sotirov au symposium "Perceptions et conceptions en Europe de l'Est", Bucarest, juillet 1991).

La deuxième réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays balkaniques, qui s'est tenue à Tirana en octobre 1990, a marqué, dans le domaine de la coopération et de la sécurité dans la zone, quelques progrès, qui ne sont cependant pas à la mesure de ceux que devait enregistrer au plan général-européen le sommet de novembre 1990 à Paris.

Les efforts de faire définir et adopter des mesures de confiance et de sécurité dans les Balkans, y compris dans la sphère politico-militaire, entamés lors de la réunion à ce sujet tenue en 1989 à Bucarest, n'ont pu permettre d'éliminer les approches essentiellement différentes que les Etats balkaniques ont manifestées dès le début sur le plan de la sécurité militaire et générale.

Les propositions et les initiatives des divers pays des Balkans dans ce domaine sont toujours analysées et approfondies, mais les progrès sont encore timides. Des efforts continuent d'être fournis pour traduire en acte la proposition de l'Albanie, concernant la

formulation et l'adoption des principes du bon voisinage dans les Balkans ; la Grèce vient de s'y joindre, en proposant la réunion d'un groupe d'experts chargée d'élaborer un projet de document sur des mesures de confiance, qui inclue les principes du bon voisinage.

* * *

Pourrait-on cependant parler d'un vide absolu de sécurité dans les Balkans, comme d'ailleurs en Europe Centrale et de l'Est, en général ? Là encore, comme dans la physique, il ne peut être question d'un vide absolu. Des structures de sécurité, même si elles ne sont pas bien articulées, existent aux niveaux bilatéral, régional et continental.

1. De toutes ces variantes de sécurité extérieure, c'est la première qui - grâce aux traités bilatéraux de coopération et de bon voisinage - semble la plus réaliste ; elle est cependant la moins efficace dans le rôle d'alliance. Tout importante qu'elle soit, la variante bilatérale ne peut représenter à elle seule une solution qui donne à un pays la garantie de sa sécurité.

Pour ce qui est des alliances bilatérales héritage politico militaire des anciens pays socialistes de l'Europe de l'Est, elles sont maintenant en plein processus de révision. A ce chapitre, une importance à part revient aux systèmes d'arrangements bilatéraux entre l'URSS et ses anciens alliés de la région, fait considéré comme un premier pas indispensable pour le processus d'unification de l'Europe, au moyen d'un système de sécurité collective. L'aspect le plus discuté de ce genre de traité, c'est la possibilité de formuler les principes fondamentaux de la sécurité militaire, tout en respectant la souveraineté des parties aux négociations. La principale controverse est engendrée par la "clause anti-alliance", proposée par l'URSS, dont l'effet est évidemment interprété comme une limitation de la liberté de décision des Etats.

2. Au niveau régional, le système de sécurité dans les Balkans, profondément affecté en ce moment par la situation en Yougoslavie, dispose d'un cadre traditionnel, qui a pu naître en pleine guerre froide et qui attend d'être approfondi, lors notamment du sommet projeté des Etats balkaniques. La sécurité et la coopération dans les Balkans ne sauraient pourtant être résumées à quelques formules au niveau régional, qu'il s'agisse de l'économie ou de la sécurité. Les expériences d'un passé plus ou moins récent montrent que la solution n'est pas à rechercher dans les Balkans, mais bien dans les institutions et les organismes intégrés européens. La constitution d'un système sous-régional de sécurité dans les Balkans est peu probable, du moins dans l'immédiat, et même si l'on admet cette possibilité, un tel système aurait un caractère transitoire. Il ne pourrait aucunement servir de substitut à une politique orientée vers l'OTAN ou d'autres structures de sécurité ouest-européennes, et d'autant moins d'alternative à un système de sécurité générale-européenne.

3. Le troisième pilier de la sécurité des Etats des Balkans, le plus viable, mais aussi le plus éloigné comme perspective, est le cadre général-européen, qui dépasse aussi le contexte strictement militaire de la sécurité. La Charte de Paris pour une nouvelle Europe proclame une sécurité égale pour les pays participants et déclare que la sécurité est indivisible, la sécurité de chacun des Etats participants étant inséparable de celle des autres.

En même temps, l'OTAN et certaines institutions ouest-européennes ont des responsabilités dans le domaine de la sécurité au niveau de tout le continent, les Balkans compris, même si des acteurs responsables de l'OTAN déclarent que l'alliance n'a pas de conception à elle, définie avec précision, sur la sécurité pour l'Europe Centrale et de l'Est, donc les Balkans aussi. Par ailleurs, le fait que les Balkans représentent pour l'OTAN "l'une

des trois zones de risque", à côté de l'URSS et du Moyen-Orient, zones qu'elle surveille de près, selon les affirmations du secrétaire général de l'alliance, Manfred Woerner, montre que la sécurité dans les Balkans ne reste pas en dehors de la zone d'intérêt et d'action de l'OTAN.

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Dans la situation actuelle en Europe, et notamment dans les Balkans, où elle est marquée par les incertitudes politiques et par un certain vide de sécurité, les mesures destinées à accroître la confiance entre les Etats acquièrent un rôle de précurseur dans l'instauration d'une architecture européenne de stabilité et de normalité.

Sans vouloir proposer des nombreuses variantes déjà existantes ou possibles, une définition exhaustive ou généralement acceptée des mesures destinées à accroître la confiance, nous nous contenterons de faire remarquer qu'elles sont conçues avant tout comme une catégorie spécifique de standards de conduite des Etats pour ce qui concerne les problèmes de sécurité et militaires, appelés à rendre prévisibles et crédibles les intentions pacifiques des Etats en question.

Les mesures mêmes de confiance ont eu leur première expression formelle dans l'Acte Final de Helsinki, en 1975, qui contenait des dispositions relatives à un ensemble de cinq mesures de caractère volontaire. Bien qu'il contienne des mesures assez modestes, l'Acte Final de Helsinki demeure le premier document multilatéral qui ait illustré la volonté politique de faire démarrer un processus de réduction d'un conflit armé en Europe et de la possibilité d'une attaque surprise. Les mesures de croissance de la confiance, contenues dans l'Acte Final, revêtent par conséquent une signification politique et psychologique, plutôt que militaire.

Le document de Stockholm, de la Conférence sur des mesures de confiance et de sécurité en Europe, marque la naissance d'une nouvelle génération de mesures, comportant des éléments qualitatifs nouveaux dans le domaine, dont l'obligativité, les clauses limitatives et des mesures de vérification sans précédent, telles les inspections sur les lieux. Une nouvelle génération de mesures de confiance et de sécurité, qui illustrent les progrès enregistrés sur le continent européen, l'audience accrue dont ces mesures bénéficient en Europe, se retrouve dans le Document de Vienne de 1990, qui se propose de répondre par des moyens spécifiques aux réalités politico-militaires nouvelles sur le continent, dans le processus d'application du Traité de réduction des armements conventionnels en Europe.

L'apparition des mesures destinées à accroître la confiance dans le dialogue portant sur la politique de sécurité a eu lieu en Europe. Au plan international, les mesures de confiance et de sécurité ont été consacrées lors de la première session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU sur le désarmement, en 1978. Le document final de la session dit, dans un court paragraphe, que les mesures destinées à accroître la confiance pourraient avoir une contribution significative à la préparation de futurs progrès dans le domaine du désarmement et qu'elles comportent un élément de prévention potentielle de la guerre. Ultérieurement, en 1980-1981, un groupe d'experts de l'ONU devait élaborer une vaste étude contenant une description et une analyse minutieuses de la conception qui était à l'origine des mesures visant à accroître la confiance ; à partir de 1983, la Commission de désarmement de l'ONU inscrivait ce point sur son agenda de travail.

Les incertitudes qui marquent l'actuelle période de transition amènent les pays de la région des Balkans et, en général, les pays participants à la CSCE, à attacher une importance grandissante aux mesures visant à accroître la confiance et la sécurité. Ce n'est donc pas un

hasard bien que des négociations sur ce sujet aient lieu depuis quelques décennies - que l'on ai pu convenir ces dernières années seulement, à Helsinki, à Stockholm et à Vienne, de mesures significatives sous rapport militaire, obligatoires sous rapport politique et vérifiables sous rapport concret, à l'échelle du continent.

L'extension des conceptions présidant aux mesures destinées à accroître la confiance, depuis les engagements modestes, de nature informationnelle (échanges d'informations, notification préalable, vérification), à des mesures impliquant des efforts de coopération visant le renforcement de la confiance et à des limitations sur l'utilisation, la disposition et les activités en temps de paix des forces militaires ; depuis des mesures concernant notamment les problèmes militaires (transparence, manoeuvres, etc..), des mesures visant à réduire les risques d'une interprétation erronée de la situation et des évolutions politico-militaires ; depuis des mesures visant à réduire la méfiance à des mesures destinées à atténuer le risque d'un calcul erroné ; depuis la consolidation de la détente et de la sécurité dans les relations Est-Ouest à la sphère des relations bi- et multilatérales entre Etats ; voilà autant d'arguments en faveur de l'identification et de l'adoption de nouvelles mesures, de la même nature, dans des domaines toujours plus nombreux, dans le dessein d'assainir le climat général-européen et en diverses régions du continent.

Une étude faite par des experts de l'ONU montre que les mesures destinées à accroître la confiance, pour être efficaces, doivent être considérées en fonction des éléments de risque existant dans une situation particulière, et ces mesures jouent un rôle particulier dans la mesure où elles contribuent au règlement de certains problèmes spécifiques de sécurité. La région des Balkans comporte des facteurs et des éléments de nature régionale qui permettent une approche régionale des problèmes dans le domaine des mesures destinées à accroître la confiance. Les évolutions actuelles dans la région mettent notamment en lumière deux causes majeures de l'insécurité, à savoir les problèmes économiques, politiques et sociaux des Etats, et la recrudescence des questions ethniques.

Il est évident que les mesures destinées à accroître la confiance et la sécurité en Europe, qui comportent des dispositions concernant essentiellement le domaine militaire, ont une applicabilité immédiate et obligatoire dans les Balkans aussi.

La multitude et la complexité des problèmes économiques, sociaux, ethniques, écologiques et autres de cette région appellent aussi à une approche spécifique des mesures non militaires à adopter pour faire croître la confiance et la stabilité.

La confiance, au sens le plus large du terme, qui embrasse l'ensemble des relations internationales est, comme la sécurité, la résultante de plusieurs facteurs d'ordre militaire, mais aussi d'autre nature - politique, économique, sociale, etc. Maintenant que le risque d'un affrontement militaire entre les deux grandes puissances a sensiblement diminué, surtout après la signature d'accords importants pour le contrôle de l'armement et le désarmement, après le démantèlement du Traité de Varsovie et l'adoption de la Charte de Paris, les préoccupations dans le domaine militaire, prioritaires, sinon exclusives, en diverses instances de négociation des mesures destinées à accroître la confiance et la sécurité, devraient être assorties de préoccupations d'une nature autre que militaire, d'autant plus que les problèmes économiques au plan mondial, au plan européen et dans la région des Balkans tendent à devenir l'un des grands défis auxquels les Etats se verront confrontés dans leurs effort d'éteindre les foyers de méfiance, d'insécurité et de conflit.

Les mesures destinées à accroître la confiance et la sécurité d'une nature autre que militaire, sont d'autant plus importantes dans la zone des Balkans, où des problèmes liés aux inégalités économiques entre Etats, les différends de nature historique, refoulés jusqu'ici, liés

à des revendications territoriales, directement ou indirectement exprimées, se dessinent comme des facteurs importants d'insécurité et de méfiance entre Etats.

Les mesures destinées à accroître la confiance dans les Balkans pourraient donc aider aussi au règlement d'autres questions, relevant des menaces non militaires pour la sécurité dans la zone, telles par exemple les questions écologiques et les pressions migrationnistes, ou bien l'intervention rapide et coordonnée en cas de catastrophes naturelles, ou encore la prévention de dangers majeurs, comme par exemple la liquidation des effets d'accidents nucléaires.

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Les chances de l'instauration d'un système régional de sécurité dans les Balkans, même transitoire, jusqu'à l'édification, dans toutes ses structures et tous ses compartiments, du système général-européen de sécurité dans le cadre de la CSCE sont, du moins pour le moment, assez réduites.

Par contre, l'identification et le choix d'un ensemble de mesures visant à accroître la confiance, d'une nouvelle génération d'après-Vienne, sont tout à fait possibles et nécessaires dans le contexte des évolutions actuelles dans la région, caractérisées par des déséquilibres entre Etats au chapitre des garanties de sécurité, des tensions dans les relations entre Etats dues aux problèmes ethniques et d'autre nature, liés notamment aux difficultés inhérentes à la période de transition des nouvelles démocraties à l'économie de marché, par des menaces à l'adresse de l'environnement.

En ce sens, lors des différentes réunions balkaniques et à d'autres occasions, des propositions concrètes ont été avancées pour des mesures visant à accroître la confiance, auxquelles on pourrait ajouter d'autres, qui pourraient être examinées par le groupe d'experts en la matière créé au niveau régional.

On pourrait citer, parmi ces mesures :

1. La réduction des forces et des activités militaires dans les zones de frontière ;
2. La création de régions au régime de "ciel ouvert" ;
3. L'abstention des activités militaires en des moments de tension et de convulsion dans la zone ;
4. Des consultations en vue d'harmoniser les doctrines militaires des Etats de la région, dans le sens de l'acceptation de leur caractère défensif ;
5. L'établissement d'un système de consultations politiques entre les Etats balkaniques, à différents échelons, et l'établissement de liaisons téléphoniques directes entre les ministères des Affaires étrangères de ces pays, pour assurer des communications plus rapides en cas de besoin ;
6. La création de mécanismes destinés à prévenir les distorsions dans les conceptions militaires et les perceptions déformées dans le domaine militaire, pour permettre un règlement de tous les problèmes créés par les activités militaires d'un Etat, susceptibles d'inquiéter un autre Etat. Ces mécanismes devraient assurer un échange rapide d'informations, qui permette d'élucider les activités militaires suspectes, et une intensification des consultations bilatérales entre les pays concernés, ainsi que consultations multilatérales avec un autre pays ou bien avec tous les pays des Balkans ;

7. La multiplication des contacts militaires, comme par exemple les réunions des ministres de la Défense ou/et des chefs d'Etat-Major, ainsi que des contacts dans le domaine de la formulation militaire, y compris au moyen des échanges d'étudiants ;
8. La conclusion d'un accord sur un système de procédures permettant de prévenir et d'aplanir les litiges et les tensions entre les Etats de la région. Ce système devrait comporter plusieurs moyens, dont les consultations et les négociations directes, les bons offices, la médiation et la conciliation.

Les nécessités dictées par l'augmentation de la confiance et de la stabilité dans les Balkans ne sauraient plus être conçues en dehors de la prise en calcul d'une série de facteurs qui ne relèvent pas directement de l'aspect militaire, tels les facteurs économiques et humanitaires, mais qui tiennent un rôle grandissant dans les relations entre les pays balkaniques.

Dans une région traditionnellement marquée, comme les Balkans, par des problèmes ethniques et nationaux, la sécurité ne saurait être obtenue si l'on ne prend pas en compte cet aspect, d'autant plus que les évolutions des dernières années ont ramené à l'actualité beaucoup de problèmes ethniques.

Les pays des Balkans partent de l'idée que les minorités devraient être un facteur de cohésion, de rapprochement et d'amitié entre leurs peuples, mais le respect des droits nationaux, politiques, économiques et culturels fait sous beaucoup d'aspects l'objet de bien des débats et controverses tant sur le plan intérieur dans certains des pays, qu'entre divers pays balkaniques.

Dans l'idée que "les minorités peuvent créer un danger seulement lorsqu'il y a dans les Etats voisins des gouvernements qui s'emploient à activer des groupements aux affinités ethniques, dans le but de préparer la base des modifications territoriales (des frontières)", le professeur Theodore Coulombis recommande deux principes inviolables, à savoir la protection totale des droits de l'homme, conformément à l'Acte d'Helsinki, et l'interdiction de l'usage de la force, en tant que moyen d'altérer les contours géographiques (les frontières d'Etat).

Le respect des minorités nationales - note le professeur Radovan Vukadinovic - réclame en même temps l'existence de règles comportant des droits et des obligations qui engagent ces minorités à une conduite loyale vis-à-vis de la population majoritaire et à l'acceptation de normes communes de coexistence. Par ailleurs, les problèmes interethniques pourraient trouver leur solution dans le processus du développement économique, à la suite de l'amélioration du standard de vie des membres de la société et de la réduction des tensions sociales-économiques et des difficultés qui affectent les contacts humains, entre les Etats de la région.

Les difficultés économiques immenses auxquelles se trouvent confrontés, notamment les anciens pays socialistes de la région, ainsi que les disparités économiques qui s'aggravent entre les Etats, dressent de grands obstacles devant le commerce et la coopération économique, entravant en réalité la libre-circulation des personnes et faisant ainsi augmenter l'inquiétude et la tension dans les relations entre Etats.

Là encore, des mesures intelligentes et efficaces sont nécessaires, pour réduire et finalement faire disparaître les décalages économiques. Faute de telles mesures, on assisterait à la naissance de graves instabilités sociales, à des migrations massives de personnes, ce qui affecterait la sécurité dans la zone et sur le continent.

Le vrai risque d'insécurité et d'instabilité en Europe du Sud-Est est à rechercher notamment dans les écarts économiques grandissants ; c'est ce qui impose la mobilisation du maximum de ressources intérieures et extérieures pour assurer le succès des réformes

économiques et la stabilité des jeunes démocraties, ainsi que la situation dans la zone en général.

Il serait donc extrêmement utile de créer des mécanismes susceptibles de contribuer au règlement des problèmes relevant des instances non militaires à l'adresse de la sécurité dans la région, dont on pourrait citer :

1. La coopération à la prévention et au combat de phénomènes qui affectent la stabilité économique des Etats ;
2. La coopération à la prévention et au combat de sources de méfiance telles les actions terroristes, le trafic illicite d'armes, le trafic illicite de matériel radio-actif ;
3. La prévention des pressions migrationnistes ;
4. La création d'un système régional de communication rapide sur les événements produits par les activités nucléaires à des fins pacifiques, l'intervention rapide et coordonnée en cas de catastrophes naturelles.

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La nature indivisible de la sécurité fait que les problèmes spécifiques, dans ce domaine, à la région des Balkans, dépassent le cadre géopolitique, pour impliquer toute la dynamique des rapports intra-européens, mais aussi les rapports avec la zone méditerranéenne moyen-orientale.

Les rapports de coopération entre les anciens pays socialistes de l'Europe Centrale, l'Italie et l'Autriche, et les pays de la zone des Balkans, ne sauraient bénéficier d'un cadre nouveau de développement que dans un climat de sécurité et de stabilité dans les pays des Balkans. Les évolutions préoccupantes en Yougoslavie offrent l'exemple le plus récent et le plus éloquent en ce sens. La stabilité en Europe Centrale, en Europe en général, domaine où des progrès ont déjà été faits, ne peut s'engager dans un processus durable et de perspective si, dans l'immédiat voisinage des Balkans, l'insécurité et l'instabilité augmentent.

Par conséquent, il serait de l'intérêt des tous les Etats de cette partie de l'Europe d'imaginer et d'appliquer des mesures spécifiques pour accroître la confiance et la sécurité, suivant les réalités spécifiques de l'aire des Balkans, des Alpes, de l'Adriatique et de l'Europe Centrale.

Ces mesures visant à accroître la confiance et la sécurité pourraient concerner non seulement le domaine militaire, mais bien d'autres encore économique, écologique, processus et tendances migrationnistes.

Les situations complexes dans l'est de la Méditerranée et au Moyen-Orient pourraient faire à leur tour l'objet d'évaluations et de démarches communes des Etats de ces zones et des Etats des Balkans, dans la sphère de la confiance et de la sécurité.

Les processus de remodelage des structures politiques et militaires internationales et européennes, déclenchés à la fin des années 80, sont loin d'avoir épuisé toutes leurs énergies, tout comme les démarches en faveur de la mise sur pied des nouvelles structures de sécurité sont loin de s'être achevées. Des évolutions importantes en cours, comme celles d'URSS et de Yougoslavie, comporte une grande dose d'incertitude et d'imprévisible, et les diverses conceptions de la sécurité européenne, l'image de l'architecture européenne future en matière de sécurité ne sont pas encore très claires.

Néanmoins, les mesures visant à accroître la confiance et la sécurité demeurent un domaine insuffisamment exploré et exploité. Leur rôle ne saurait en être, de toute évidence,

que limité, mais tout progrès dans ce domaine aussi ferait sensiblement augmenter la confiance, la sécurité et la stabilité dans les Balkans et en Europe en général.

Responses and Discussion

Todor Ditchev

There can be hardly a State today which is not reviewing its national security system. Bulgaria, as well as the region in which the course of history has placed it, is no exception. The old basis on which national security doctrines were founded is no more - a new one has emerged. Consequently, security doctrines should differ. Today, economic strength takes the upper hand over military force. I submit that economic strength is what may solve our old conflicts and repeal new threats of various natures ethnic, religious, nationalists - I would even say racist. And all this may happen against the backdrop of the former ideological conflict.

The threats to national security of today and tomorrow may well come from causes such as drug-trafficking, the exceedingly high birth-rate in some areas, the plummeting standards of living, the depletion of energy and water sources, environmental pollution, etc.

The threats just enumerated are probably just a few of those facing Bulgaria and the other countries of South-Eastern Europe. They are different, though, from military threats. The former attack mankind indirectly, while the latter do it directly. The former attack the quality of life, while the latter attack life itself. Both categories of threat are, however, lethal. Unfortunately, while we can to a certain degree put up a defence against military aggression by using adequate armaments, including sophisticated ones, we can not do the same against the sharp drop in living standards, for instance. This brings me to the conclusion that national security should be continually sought - today, tomorrow, and the day after tomorrow -but not through military means, but rather by protection and enhancement of the quality of human life. It is easy to pinpoint the flaws and the ways to remedy them, but it is quite another matter to actually do it. Take, for instance, Japan, a great country. It took Japan nearly 5 decades to become what it is today, an economic superpower, able to guarantee its national security even without the need of a US nuclear umbrella.

When speaking about co-operation in the field of security among South-Eastern European countries one of the first things that comes to mind is that the national security concepts of the 1990s cannot but be intertwined with the security situations of one's neighbours. There is a saying in Bulgaria that "It is more important who your neighbour is than where your house is". Another Bulgarian saying has it that "It is better to have rich friends than poor relatives". It is difficult for me to resist sharing one more piece of Bulgarian folk wisdom, which says that "It is better to be young, in good health and rich, rather than old, ill and poor".

If I were to continuously pollute the waters, the air, and the soil of my country, then I would be committing in actual terms the same type of aggression against my neighbours. Sooner or later their land, air, and water would be polluted too, and vice-versa. This comparison may not be the best one for our discussions, but it is a fact of today's life, a life that we can change for the better through our common efforts.

South-Eastern Europe cannot boast of a high standard of living. Nevertheless, I am convinced that if, for example, we had been in the place of the Benelux or the Scandinavian countries we would not today be seeking an answer to the issue of security co-operation among us in the way we are now. Our countries have priority needs - we need advanced energy technologies rather than military advisers, no matter how competent they may be.

Similarly, we need investment in our civil industries, rather than in our military industry. Our national security would be more enhanced by investments in ecological protection rather than in the manufacturing of sophisticated weapons. It seems to me that today the Balkan States have the rare opportunity to show the world that we are no longer the "powder keg" of Europe, but a "paradise on Earth". For example, if the ecological balance of the Black Sea is not restored it will suffer a major disaster, which means that the Balkan States will suffer a major disaster, too. Could this not be part and parcel of our common security? I doubt it very much. Is there any classic or neo-classic weapon, or even a weapon of mass destruction, that we could use to do away with this enemy of the Black Sea? This enemy, pollution, is present everywhere on the globe. It gains new ground with each passing day. How do we fight it? What is at stake is part of the vital security of the whole world. I think we need fresh large-scale initiatives in this direction. "Time is money" the businessmen say, but it is also security, providing it is correctly used. For even money is ephemeral, while life comes to each of us just once; without reliable security life can be lost prematurely, and through our own doing.

The problems dealt with at this year's CD session are similar, to a large extent, to those of last year. This is so because the security in the 1990s consists of specific interrelated elements at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level. However, whereas the military-strategic component of security has to be evaluated through the prism of the European and world context, such is not the case with confidence-building measures. Those measures could be boldly enacted in bilateral and regional relations. What I have in mind is the following: whenever a given State decides to make real reductions in certain types of weapons, it assesses the defence needs of its national interests by analyzing a number of military and strategic factors, but not simply the potential of its immediate neighbours. This is so because of the ever-growing importance of the time factor in an eventual military conflict. Nowadays, the time factor allows a military conflict to be joined by countries other than the neighbours, as well as. Perhaps this is the main reason why it is so difficult to reach agreement on interesting proposals such as weapon-free zones. It is understandable that the interests of militarily dominant countries would be taken into account. But whenever there is political will for real disarmament on a wider regional scale, the chances to reach an agreement are significantly higher. For instance, could we not expand the proposal to create a chemical and nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans to include other weapons of mass destruction. Could we not link this idea with the proposal of Egyptian President Mr. Hosni Mubarak to create a zone free of all types of weapons of mass destruction? The practical realization of this idea would be of immense benefit for Balkan regional security; it would also strongly promote mutually-beneficial co-operation in different fields. Tlatelolco and Rarotonga have already provided such an example; there are also the latest initiatives of other States, including the Ukrainian initiatives, which declared themselves in favor of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The same thing was done by several cities around the world. Why should it be that our Balkan capitals cannot follow suit? Why should it be that the Balkans may not become a zone free of any types of weapons of mass destruction?

A good opportunity is provided by the upcoming Third Review Biological Conference. This will be an occasion for Balkan States to submit a regional reply to certain confidence-building measures which lie at the basis of the follow-on of this Review Conference.

If, due to various reasons, there exist doubts about a given type of specific disarmament at the bilateral, regional or multilateral scale, what is it that prevents the implementation of adequate confidence-building measures among States? A possible answer is a simple lack of

confidence. But this is precisely the way the whole vicious circle of international security is created, resulting in the arms race. There is a tendency, whenever there is confidence among States, for the experts not to waste their time discussing confidence-building measures but to get right down to more serious matters in the field of practical disarmament. And, conversely, whenever there is a stalemate in disarmament negotiations, confidence-building measures pop up foremost on the agenda. (Though there may be some humour in the above, it is not unfounded.) On a more serious note, let me emphasize that both confidence-building measures and disarmament measures are important levers to enhance security. They complement and support other. I doubt that anyone would cast doubts on the role and importance of direct communication lines, early warning and notification, exchange of military missions, etc. These measures are designed to decrease the risk of an outbreak of war through accident, miscalculation or lack of communication.

Nowadays, long-term reliable solutions of post-Cold War era problems require the creation of new research and training institutes. This means extending the scope of security studies, developing the broader reaches of policy research necessary for understanding how secure societies are built. Security problems will not wait. Governments must build their own organizations now for analyzing and solving the problems that threaten South-Eastern Europe. These matters demand an integrated approach, probably by creating a new body dedicated to guiding South-Eastern Europe securely through the coming era - an era of political, economic, and social development.

In conclusion, may I, somewhat out of context, relate that Bulgaria is among the few world producers of rose oil for the cosmetics industry. This is probably why the rose is a symbol of my country. This rose oil is produced in Bulgaria in the famous "Valley of the Roses". What is most intriguing is that this particular type of rose can be made to grow elsewhere, but it is only in the Valley of Roses that the flowers give a rose oil crop. Security in our region is unique to its kind, as this oil-producing rose and its world-famous fragrance are unique as well. Let us, with common effort, guarantee our respective unique securities so that our region may be prosperous, just as this rose blossoms and gives her rarest of fragrances.

Vladimir Vereš

We are witnessing fundamental changes in contemporary international relations in Europe. Although the positive processes now unfolding can be expected to undergo vacillations and even standstills, we can still claim that the transformation of international relations is truly a profound one, exceeding by far the more-or-less short-lived periods of relaxation of tensions, such as we have seen in Europe before. As opposed to the *détente* in the seventies which in the end turned out to be nothing more than political gaming and tactics in superpower competition, and therefore fell prey to its own inconsistency and feeble foundation, the new process of transformation has deeper and more serious roots. It actually both stems from and reflects crucial domestic interests of individual countries, and it has primarily been triggered off by internal change in a number of them, most notably in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Changes in European relations do not merely reflect a tactical estimation of the balance of power, but on the contrary are an outcome of fundamental political and economic change inside those particular countries.

Put briefly, the dominant feature of the changes in contemporary international relations is that foreign policy in a positive manner increasingly corresponds to domestic needs of

individual countries. This approach to international relations is characterized by a more responsible and tolerant attitude, while consideration is given to a variety of interests dictated by each country's development, which narrows the grounds for political adventurism and foreign policy decisions contrary to the vital interests of the country in question. The general civilization values and the problems threatening all of humankind are increasingly becoming a common denominator of all efforts striving for the establishment of a new system of international relations, in Europe and in general.

The policy of "new thinking" advanced by Mr. Gorbachev and subsequent changes in Soviet foreign policy provided the initial impetus for these processes, which then again coincided with the vital interests of a number of countries. So far they have yielded the greatest results in superpower relations in particular, in European relations in general, as well as in managing some regional crises.

What was known as the post-war political structure in Europe simply ceased to exist which constitutes the underlying feature of new European relations at present. On the other hand, even though such drastic changes have occurred in a peaceful and civilized manner, the fact remains that an international structure which prevailed for decades has disintegrated, an international structure which - for all its risks and uncertainties and its foundation on a balance of power in prevailing conditions of confrontation still provided a certain degree of stability on the continent. It is in the common interest to eliminate precisely this cold-war pattern of relations and the political division of Europe, but when it comes to the elements of this structure, the two alliances namely, their rapid dismantling could be destabilizing.

The new situation in Europe changes the character, sources and nature of possible conflicts on the continent. The increasing interrelatedness between domestic and foreign policy is a two fold process. On the one hand, as has already been mentioned, it gives the current changes in international relations greater credibility. On the other hand, however, new prospects of destabilization open up, namely those contained in the domestic destabilization of certain countries, those that have started down the path of political and economic change. Never in the past has political stability in Europe depended to such an extent on the internal developments in certain countries, primarily the USSR in this case.

Probability of conflict in Europe along old lines, meaning along the East-West and US-Soviet divide are greatly diminished. If positive processes already discussed persist, this possibility will be all the more remote. Two factors today pose the greatest threat to peace and stability in Europe: possible political deterioration in some countries, and the revival of national antagonisms and territorial disputes inherited from historical times in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

In the long run, major political changes in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe are a positive contribution to the strengthening of European security and stability. At the same time the manifold processes in this part of the world may, in the years to come, complicate relationships between certain countries in the region, due to a legacy of unresolved issues - the question of national minorities, and so on. The greatest incentive for them to overcome these problems must be the inclusion of all countries into contemporary European civilization trends. Any conflict in Europe would be in sharp contrast with the processes of opening up, integration and development on the continent. Therefore, the basic clue to preventing such conflicts is a general political climate, a spirit of equity and tolerance in international relations in Europe.

Against this background of international changes one should consider Yugoslavia's foreign policy. Yugoslavia has very grave domestic problems, primarily of an economic and

ethnic character. There are numerous contradictions characteristic of a sudden and drastic turnabout from a one-party monopoly and a state-regulated economy to a parliamentary democracy and market economy. In the case of Yugoslavia this complex situation is further aggravated by inherited economic problems and above all by divisions among nations and republics.

A priority issue in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia are its relations with her neighbours. Yugoslavia maintains a high level of political, economic, cultural and other co-operation with the majority of them. At the same time, however, there are a number of unresolved issues that mark the relations with some neighbouring countries, such as the status of minorities and the failure to recognize the national identity of nations within Yugoslavia. In raising the minority issue, Yugoslavia's intention was never to let this problem become a hindrance to relations with its neighbours. An advanced degree of economic and other forms of co-operation was sustained even with countries with which a number of differences exist. The minority issue is a very delicate one, and Yugoslavia by the very nature of its national structure has vital interest for it to be solved. There are Yugoslav minorities in all neighbouring countries, and at the same time a number of Yugoslavia's inhabitants belong to minorities, *i.e.*, are of other nationalities. The basic stance of Yugoslav policy is that the rights of Yugoslav minorities in neighbouring countries must be explicitly protected, assuming a realistic and balanced approach which takes into consideration the value Yugoslavia places on relations with neighbour-countries. This means that there ought to be mechanisms that would enable the minority issue to be raised seriously, though without hampering or bringing down the whole framework of relations with neighbours. Pursuing co-operation in other areas could pave the way towards resolving the minority issue, given a high degree of political preparedness and tolerance.

Changes that have recently taken place in Eastern European countries open up new possibilities for improving the status of Yugoslav minorities in these countries, within the framework of democratic processes now unfolding in those countries. At the same time, we are confronted with certain risks, since the abolition of the one-party monopoly in the political spheres of these countries (and in Yugoslavia as well) is accompanied by rising nationalism. This could provoke a revival of various claims dating from the period between the two World Wars or earlier. It is essential that such a potential turn of events is prevented by means of political agreement.

The development of political pluralism and rising ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia make its foreign policy towards neighbours more complex. Events in Yugoslavia could have a negative impact on relations with some neighbours that is, conflicts between nations in Yugoslavia could be projected onto the sphere of relationships with certain neighbour-countries. One of the main objectives of Yugoslav foreign policy is to prevent this from happening. At the same time, this state of affairs is not an anomaly. Political pluralism in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe has brought and will continue to bring forth those nationalist feelings which until recently have continuously been suppressed by the conditions of a one-party rule. One has to accept the fact that such positions will surface all the more frequently; meanwhile, what is important is that they are controlled within a democratic and parliamentary process, so as not to complicate relations between neighbours. The best guarantee is democratization within each country, which is likely to subdue extremist feelings, as well as economic co-operation and a tolerant and rational approach towards relations between neighbouring countries in the South-East of Europe. Integration into European civilizational trends -

economic, technological and other - is not possible if past disputes and aspirations are revived.

Yugoslavia sees relations between Balkan countries within this framework. There are numerous problems inherited from the past, in the creation of which powers outside the Balkan region have played a considerable role. The impact of positive changes and a gradual abolition of superpower confrontation in Europe is also felt in the Balkans, but unfortunately the controversies in the region seem to be durable and very resistant. Nevertheless, the European trend towards integration and development of regional co-operation is likely to make a breakthrough in this part of the continent too. In recent years co-operation in the Balkans has been assuming institutionalized forms, not only in areas of economics, culture, transport and environmental protection, but in the political domain as well. Political relations are based on an effort to seek common interests in spite of many unresolved problems which persist among the Balkan countries. Certain progress in this direction has already been achieved, but the stability of relations in the Balkans will primarily depend on bilateral relations and solution of controversial issues, as well as on the domestic stability in individual countries in the region. Yugoslavia played host to the first conference of foreign ministers of the Balkan countries in 1988. We must be aware of the complexity of relations in the Balkans and of the fact that complex processes in some countries, including Yugoslavia, have a controversial impact on the political climate of the entire region. In such a situation political leaders of Balkan countries should call for realism, moderation and recognition of mutual interests. The essential issue is to avoid advancing territorial claims, since this could cause unpredictable negative consequences. The Balkan countries can become part of the modern economic and technological processes only if they overcome the anachronisms of historical controversies which bear heavily on them.

The political image of the contemporary world is changing. The balance of power - which represented the essence of classical diplomacy and which has been so perfected throughout the years that it did in fact provide relative stability in post-war Europe - is now replaced by a balance of interests. On one hand, this does grant a certain thoroughness and weight to the changes in international relations. On the other hand, however, the collapse of the heretofore prevailing system of European relations brings about a period of relative instability, until a new system of common security and stability is created. In the meantime foreign policies and relations between individual countries will particularly depend on the domestic processes in those countries and their ability to resolve the political, economic and other issues which they face. Since interdependence and an objective drive towards integration are stronger than ever, the political leaderships in each country - in Europe and worldwide - face an increasing responsibility for the overall stability of international relations. Confrontation between the superpowers and alliances ceases to be the major source of troublemaking in Europe. The potential danger now lies in the destabilization of some countries and in the rise of ethnic feeling and revival of claims from the pre-war or even earlier periods. These trends are in sharp contrast with integration trends in Europe and worldwide; we can expect that following a relatively turbulent period, a more stable international framework will be set up whereby integration, a joint resolution of global problems, and economic and technological imperatives will supersede divisions, a negative historical legacy and conflicts.

The main issue of Yugoslav foreign policy is in fact the issue of internal development, and above all of solving ethnic and economic problems. All rational political actors in Yugoslavia are well aware that Yugoslavia could best contribute to international and European stability by solving its domestic problems.

Taking into account the recent deterioration of the internal situation in Yugoslavia, it is very important to prevent Yugoslav internal problems from spilling over the borders and complicating the relationship between Yugoslavia, or individual Yugoslav republics, and the neighbouring countries of South-Eastern Europe. This must be a policy priority for both Yugoslavia and its republics. At the same time, it is extremely important that neighbours of Yugoslavia refrain from steps, measures or statements that could be construed as territorial claims towards Yugoslavia, since this would certainly not contribute to the solution of the Yugoslav crisis. In this sense, all South-Eastern European countries share the responsibility for preservation of stability in this part of the continent. Of course, under given circumstances, Yugoslavia and its republics carry the ultimate responsibility for avoiding further deterioration of its internal situation - which would be the best contribution to bilateral relations with South-Eastern European countries. Stopping the war in Yugoslavia, with help of the UN and the international community at large, including South-Eastern European neighbours, would certainly create better conditions for developing the relationships between all the countries of South-Eastern Europe.

Alfred Papuciu

L'évolution de la situation en matière de sécurité internationale au plan mondial, mais aussi régional, est très rapide. Compte-tenu des derniers événements survenus en Europe de l'Est et dans la perspective de nouveaux changements démocratiques qui auront des incidences au niveau des pays et des régions entiers, il est vraiment nécessaires de faire le point de la situation dans les Balkans. L'histoire a montré que les Balkans ont été l'enjeu des deux guerres mondiales dont tous les pays balkaniques ont beaucoup souffert. Aussi a-t-elle montré que la sécurité véritable et durable en Europe ne peut pas être instaurée et assurée sans que la sécurité aux Balkans soit réelle. Mais cette sécurité serait imparfaite et fragile si on veut la réaliser seulement sur le plan militaire, sans l'appuyer solidement sur des rapports stables. Nous sommes ici pour donner une contribution ensemble, pour en finir une fois pour toute avec ce qu'on entend souvent dans les journaux, "la balkanisation", pour qu'ils nous montrent que nous vivons dans une zone incertaine. Des progrès importants ont été réalisés et les pays balkaniques sont engagés à travailler de toutes leurs forces dans le sens de la paix et de l'entente dans le Sud de l'Europe. L'optimiste qui fleurit un peu partout doit devenir une réalité et les idées avancées doivent favoriser la stabilité dans les Balkans. Les problèmes qu'affronte l'Europe balkanique sont immenses : en commençant par les problèmes de minorités, de frontières, des tensions et des contentieux interétatiques bilatéraux, de l'environnement, mais surtout, même du point de vue de sécurité, des problèmes du développement économique. Surtout ce problème qui préoccupe depuis longtemps l'Europe du Sud-Est - une zone de contact et de coopération avec l'Europe toute entière et le monde - provoque des migrations, tensions et peut-être le danger d'une guerre. Pour cela, les efforts qui ont été faits au cours des réunions des ministres des affaires étrangères des pays des Balkans, à Belgrade en février 1988 et dernièrement en 1990 à Tirana, témoignent de la nécessité non seulement de l'échange des points de vue comme c'est le cas ici à Rhodes, mais aussi des pas concrets qu'il faut entreprendre. Cela pourrait être réalisé non seulement par les réunions de ces ministres, ou des hauts fonctionnaires respectivement dans leur capitale pour les problèmes de la sécurité, mais aussi et surtout pour promouvoir la coopération économique et dans le domaine de l'environnement. A part la Conférence pour la Sécurité et la Coopération en Europe, le Conseil de l'Europe, les initiatives de coopération multilatérale

dans le cadre de Pentagonale etc..., doivent être élargies. Par ma propre expérience je me suis persuadé qu'il y a de larges possibilités de coopération dans le cadre de la sécurité européenne et surtout pour résoudre les problèmes économiques des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est, si on sait trouver un langage commun pour promouvoir aussi la marche vers la démocratie, mais surtout pour promouvoir les échanges économiques des pays des Balkans ou de l'Europe du Sud-Est. La Commission Economique pour l'Europe représente un organisme où les six pays des Balkans peuvent coopérer et profiter de son assistance. Pourquoi ? On peut réaliser des projets dans le domaine de l'économie, du commerce, de l'énergie et de l'environnement, ainsi que d'autres domaines que couvre la CEE et qui présentent de l'intérêt pour les pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est. D'ailleurs, même le Secrétaire exécutif de la Commission Economique pour l'Europe, Gérald Hinteregger, au cours de la dernière session de la CEE, en avril dernier, a lancé l'idée d'une telle alternative. Il y a déjà une expérience fructueuse dans l'interconnexion des réseaux d'électricité des pays balkaniques.

Nous sommes réunis ici en tant qu'experts qui connaissent bien les problèmes de leur pays et les efforts qui doivent être faits pour choisir les mécanismes internationaux qui peuvent assurer une concertation de ces efforts. Puisque la CEE, en tant qu'organisme de l'ONU, est réuni régulièrement à Genève, les représentants des pays balkaniques, mais aussi des autres pays européens qui coopèrent avec l'Europe du Sud-Est, peuvent, par l'intermédiaire de la Commission, organiser des réunions périodiques en vue de réaliser des projets qui pourraient jouir aussi de l'assistance de la CEE, du PNUD, mais également des pays donateurs, intéressés à promouvoir le commerce, la coopération dans le domaine de l'énergie, de l'environnement, du tourisme, etc.

Il y a encore de graves problèmes qui se posent pour l'Europe du Sud-Est, tels que les problèmes de l'insécurité politique ou militaire, mais surtout économiques. Ces pays sont plus pauvres en comparaison avec les autres pays européens : il existe encore un certain protectionnisme à l'encontre de ces pays dans les échanges commerciaux régionaux. Ces pays n'ont pas le même niveau de vie avec le reste de l'Europe et il ne serait alors pas juste de penser que l'on puisse réaliser la sécurité européenne sans avoir à tenir compte de la sécurité de l'Europe du Sud-Est. L'histoire témoigne que s'il y a des problèmes de minorités, d'insécurité politique, des problèmes avec le passage vers la démocratie, le tout à cause du manque de développement économique de ces pays. C'est pour cela que, au lieu de dépenser des sommes énormes pour tuer des gens, au lieu de produire de nouvelles armes classiques plus sophistiquées qui sont utilisées actuellement même dans de tels pays qui ont accepté la Charte d'Helsinki, il faut penser à la paix sociale, économique, pour en finir avec la pollution qui frappe d'une manière acharnée nos côtes, nos forêts, nos belles villes et campagnes, nos contrées méditerranéennes, etc...¹

Nous devons essayer de trouver un langage commun et de renoncer à certains clichés du passé ainsi qu'aux rancunes du temps de la guerre froide. Nous devons agir avec un sens élevé de responsabilité, non seulement pour pouvoir faire face aux problèmes très préoccupants de l'actualité, mais aussi pour faire notre devoir envers les futures générations, pour ne pas leurs léguer des problèmes difficiles à résoudre à cause de l'accumulation des erreurs et des faux pas dans la politique d'aujourd'hui.

¹ Je partage entièrement l'idée exprimée ici par le distingué Ambassadeur Todor Dichev quand il a dit : "Nous avons une priorité. Nous devons aller en avant en matière technologique, énergétique et non militaire".

Concluding Remarks

Serge Sur

The remarks which follow are no more than personal comments. They are not intended as a summary of the preceding papers, and still less as the conclusion to a debate, considering that the very terms of that debate have changed and remain dependent upon unforeseeable developments. Their aim is simply to trace out some broad lines in the evolving pattern of the security problems of the Balkan region of Europe.

One point in this connection: the term "South-Eastern Europe" has been used preferentially, not because that formulation has any particular connotation, but, on the contrary, because of its neutrality. "The Balkans" are invested with an image, evoking either a former time of disorders and violence or the irenic prospect of co-operation on a homogeneous and clearly delimited regional basis. Both representations would be misleading, the former referring back to the past and the latter forward to an indefinite future. South-Eastern Europe's present, and its immediate future, are more indeterminate. The designation clearly indicates, moreover, the region's special location in relation to the whole of Europe, as well as the need to define its position within that setting.

From this viewpoint the security problems of South-Eastern Europe are a good microcosmic model, though with more marked and dramatic features, of the problems of Europe as a whole. They offer a summary, as well as a concentration, of those problems. The region contains countries belonging to Western Europe and to the Community, former member countries of the Warsaw Pact, and countries that are non-aligned or have tried to go their own special way. It is a zone of contact with other regions - the Mediterranean, the Near East, the Arab world - whose vicissitudes are particularly important to the whole of Europe; it is the gateway to Asia. It has been subject to a variety of influences, known a succession of different civilizations, and been affected by numerous conflicts. Its political geography has been fluid and marked by a perennial dialectic of domination and liberation. After long being a zone of tension as well as contact, deeply divided both by national differences and by cultural, ideological or political options, it is today again challenging Europe's ability to solve its own problems peacefully and to establish, by means of consensual security mechanisms, the conditions for a stability not based on constraint.

It is this new test which constitutes a first line of force. The favourable prospects that were taking shape in the last few years have been abruptly reversed, owing largely to the development of the situation in Yugoslavia and the renewed challenge to its unity. This runaway reversal contrasts sharply with the generally peaceful and controlled, though unforeseen, course of the changes that have recently occurred in Europe. It does not, however, affect the nature of the basic problems, whose essence remains. How are we to respond to it and what do those responses imply for the future of security, not only in South-Eastern Europe but in Europe as a whole? Three series of comments will be submitted on these various points.

Reversal of the Outlook

The reversal has been total and sudden in relation to the recent period. Only a few months ago we were witnessing the triumph of the Europe of Helsinki, the Europe which had

developed slowly and, as it were, underground, from the process set in motion by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and its various stages. This Europe of Helsinki, whose progress - and even consecration - were marked by the Charter of Paris (solemnly adopted in November 1990), replaced the Europe of Yalta which had for so long seemed unchallengeable. To determine whether the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe - seemingly modest, obscure, even bureaucratic, and in any case an inter-State affair - was the root cause of this change or merely an *ad libitum* accompaniment to an external phenomenon is not our purpose. We need only note here the co-existence of the two trends.

In the multilateral, pan-European, and making all due allowances, egalitarian framework that was defined by the CSCE, one might have supposed that there was room for a new form of subregional co-operation and that South-Eastern Europe in particular might lend itself to a sort of decentralization of the security mechanisms recently established or still in developmental stages. Could it not be considered an appropriate framework for suitably-adjusted co-operation and security arrangements, with due respect for the principles and instruments of the CSCE?

These principles, first enshrined in the Helsinki "*Décatalogue*" of 1975, call for the peaceful settlement of boundary questions, military détente, confidence-building and security measures, disarmament, and the promotion of human rights, which must constitute a common basis for European civilization as a whole, irrespective of any ostensible differences in traditions or in political or economic systems. The progressive realization of those principles coincided with the superannuation of the Europe of Yalta, and this happened under entirely peaceful conditions, re-enacting a millennium later the fate of the walls of Jericho.

But hardly has this new Europe appeared and become conscious of its own existence before it is in its turn seriously threatened, or at least called in question, specifically by the development of the situation and of the tensions in South-Eastern Europe. This is an unexpected turn of events, for the general prevailing climate of détente did not seem to presage new crises in the immediate future. Moreover, Yugoslavia seemed to have successfully weathered, a decade ago, the departure from the scene of its contemporary founder and any threat seemed to be at least postponed. Lastly, as it retained the image of a country standing aloof from the Socialist bloc as well as from the orthodox or Soviet-inspired communist system, it seemed that it should be less affected than others by the collapse of the model and the decline of its political and military ascendancy. And yet, confounding these expectations and confirming the fears of a few Cassandras, a disquieting mirror effect was to develop between the course of events in Yugoslavia and in the USSR.

Under these circumstances the current crisis, like all crises, is having a revealing and accelerating effect - revealing the strengths and weaknesses of each party concerned, as well as the shortcomings of the security mechanisms and the extent of the persisting contradictions, and accelerating the dynamics of history as well as the effects of the heightened tensions between partners. What light does this shed upon the state of South-Eastern Europe and, likewise, of Europe as a whole? It highlights the changes in the immediate security parameters and calls into question the suitability of the existing instruments.

The military blocs, which the CSCE had put in parentheses without eliminating them, are already gone. It is no longer even a matter of inter-State relations, but, of internal problems which take on an international or even universal dimension and threaten any nascent European order: problems of minorities or conflicts between intra-State nationalities; irredentism; attempts at boundary modification by force, albeit apparently purely internal and

only potentially international and processes or prospects of dismemberment of existing States accompanying the reunification of Germany. Thus the Europe of Helsinki has seen its historic culmination and discovered *a posteriori* its underlying logic with that reunification. This logic did not necessarily correspond to any conscious design of any of the partners, though of course it may have. But amid the initial ambiguity that characterized Helsinki, like any fruitful political undertaking, namely the ambiguity between the perpetuation of the status quo and peaceful change, the facts made the decision.

With the dislocation of the USSR and of Yugoslavia, we are entering into a new phase, one of uncontrolled decomposition and still more unpredictable developments. Under those conditions, confidence building, prevention of conflicts, disarmament, and even human rights are no longer on the agenda. The issue is one of unilateral resort to uncontrolled violence, whose overspill between States cannot be ruled out, especially in a region where there is a high concentration of conventional armaments whereas civil war, endemic or open, is by definition an unequivocal negation of human rights.

Does this not add up to pronouncing a death sentence over the Europe of Helsinki, its principles, and its mechanisms that failed as soon as they were put to the test? Must we not begin drawing up the death certificate of a barely-emerging Europe? From any standpoint, Europe is faced with a crucial challenge. We must not, however, jump to premature conclusions. The CSCE has already shown its flexibility and its ability to adapt patiently to difficult terrain. The very ambiguity of the process lends itself to a wide range of developments.

From another angle, even supposing that the CSCE is obsolete and cannot rise above what would be perceived as a decisive failure, such a development would not necessarily be a cause for regret. By dint of its long history, Europe is a graveyard of institutions which are too numerous to list. But it has always been a breeding-ground for new institutions, as well. Those institutions are only instruments. They have a function to perform and are suited to certain tasks. If they cannot - or can no longer - perform them, they are marked for renovation, transformation or disappearance. In that respect their apparent fragility can be an advantage, and any institutional fetishism must be guarded against. It is essential to assess the mechanisms in relation to the problems concerned, taking into account their capacity to respond and adapt. A crisis may destroy but may also strengthen them. Meanwhile, the fundamental problems with which South-Eastern Europe is faced, over and beyond the immediate convulsions, remain and reflect those of Europe as a whole.

Persistence of Fundamental Problems

It is precisely insofar as the fundamental problems persist and have changed more in form than in substance that it has been possible to maintain the framework initially defined for this study and adapt it to the new data. The problems concerned are those relating to national minorities, the ability of peoples to express themselves, respect for their freely-expressed wishes, and perhaps above all the problem of economic development, which - perhaps as Marx's ironic posthumous revenge - weighs heavily upon all the others.

They also include the problems of military security and political stability. Obviously a region characterized by instability and endemic agitation, and partitioned between States which were only recently in conflict or are still separated by entrenched distrust or even unresolved differences, and which also have powerful armies, South-East Europe is at risk of gravitating towards inter-State tensions and even conflicts. Recent developments have tended

rather to perpetuate what might be an anachronistic situation or even to revive old dissensions. They make South-Eastern Europe a region apart on the Continent, the only one where this type of tension seems uncontrollable and unattenuated by the new trend of international relations. Whether this be a relic of the past or a premonitory sign, it still raises the question of the capability of the States concerned to accomplish their task - for States, just like other organizations, are simply instruments to perform certain functions. And the most important function, the one which legitimizes and conditions their sovereignty, is the maintenance of law and order and the security of their respective populations.

The State, and the inter-State relations which result from the coexistence of neighbouring States, is central to all these problems. The emergence, or the spectacular resurgence, of the minorities question must not mask the phenomenon. It complicates inter-State relations; it does not take their place nor alter their nature. Self-determination for minorities cannot be substituted for negotiation between States. This hypothetical self-determination offers no peaceful alternative to recognition by the State concerned and acceptance, within the framework of its institutions, of the changes that may be necessary. Modifications in the status of minorities, even new accessions to independence or adjustments of frontiers, are not matters for international intervention beyond what is required by two perennial principles, long-established and in accordance with the United Nations Charter: action in case of threat to or breaches of the peace and international security and respect for human rights.

The appropriate action in case of threat to or breach of international peace and security is a matter for the Security Council and is sanctioned by well-established practice. In this connection, whether from concern for the media or from misunderstanding of the rules, there is a dangerous propensity to dwell upon a "right of intervention" whose novelty is merely apparent and whose ratification cannot be sought in recent international instruments.

In regard to intervention to uphold internationally-proclaimed human rights in particular within the United Nations system, there is no infringement of sovereignty, except in altogether exceptional circumstances. It is an established principle that questions relating to respect for human rights are not within the exclusive competence of States. To monitor and demand such respect does not therefore involve any kind of infringement of the non-intervention principle, whose purpose is different. Long-established practice furnishes many examples of this. The exceptional circumstances arise from the default of the territorial State, which is in no position to discharge its responsibilities and protect its population or foreign residents. A humanitarian intervention, albeit under very restrictive conditions, is therefore not contrary to law and is sanctioned by regular practice.

Self-determination is of course a right recognized in the "international rules", and it is true that its application outside the historical and geographical context of decolonization is new. It must not, however, be misconstrued. Self-determination is essentially bound up with democracy, particularly in the European context, where the latter is constantly invoked. Its exercise must take due account of the rights of the State concerned, and in particular must not lead to premature recognition of independence, especially since it implies the free expression of the will of the populations concerned, so that independence is not its necessary end result. Self-determination may in fact result in the adoption of other formulas, such as the establishment of a special internal status for certain groups, or free association between autonomous entities within a structure defined by themselves. It is striking that federalism based on nationality, a formula used both in the USSR and in Yugoslavia, has failed and is

now seemingly obsolete. But the States concerned must tackle that issue with due regard for their international obligations.

Thus what characterizes the fundamental problems facing South-Eastern Europe is neither their novelty nor any sudden change in their nature, but rather their acuteness, their recent exacerbation to the extreme in a context of crisis. This makes them more difficult to analyse, distinguish or deal with, for they are intermingled and entangled in a sort of Gordian knot, which is precisely one element in the definition of a crisis situation. The internal and inter-State, national and international, local and universal, political, ideological and military aspects, aspirations to autonomy or independence, even questions of environment and development, are so intertwined that nothing seems definite or discernible any longer. The content of security takes on many aspects and can no longer be reduced to the classical military dimension, nor to inter-State relations and political stability, nor to well-trying formulas of power balance. In such conditions, the prospects for a solution, and especially a consensual solution, are clearly problematic. And yet the achievement of such a solution constitutes a test for the orientation and the stability not only of South-Eastern Europe but of Europe as a whole.

Urgency and Duration

The development of the Yugoslavian crisis has led the countries of Europe to adopt several tactics and use several forums, successively or concurrently. This approach is in keeping with the empiricism prevailing after the demise of certainties and reflects the wish to find the most appropriate instrument and procedures to let them demonstrate their effectiveness in the test. The results so far have hardly been encouraging.

There is no denying the challenge facing the States directly concerned, whose existence is at stake, but the problem also concerns the new European institutions coming into being - first of all the CSCE, as well as the European Community, insofar as it aspires to play a pivotal organizing role and to develop its competence in the area of security, and the projects for regional co-operation, which are scarcely in their infancy and have been manifestly superseded. Meanwhile, the acuteness of the crisis and the new form it has taken virtually preclude following the natural inclination to "foresee the past", as it were, seeking guidance from old problem-solving approaches, by comparison and transposition. An attempt must be made to extemporize mechanisms which will not only make it possible to respond to the emergency but must also without calling into question the general rationale of the Europe of Helsinki - facilitate a radical solution, which can only be a long-term one.

There are two ways out of the crisis for the European institutions. One is by the front door, through successful action and strengthening of their mechanisms. The crisis would thus have confirmed their viability. The notion that the utilisation of crises for the development of institutions is a conceivable technique that can be employed with success. Thus the Kuwait affair has, at least for the time being, strengthened the Security Council and revived the prospects for collective security, despite reservations occasionally expressed concerning the insufficient role played by the United Nations in military action in the Gulf. The result is all the more praiseworthy in that the crisis was thrust upon United Nations and coalition countries, and that they were only partly in command of its management. In the case under consideration we are again faced with a crisis which has not - as have some cases that occurred in practice - been controlled nor even provoked in order to bring about a solution.

The back door may provide another possible way out. It would essentially consist of the scrapping of mechanisms and fora shown to be ineffective. The consequences for the reorganization of Europe on a regional and pan-European basis are unpredictable. We must admit that it is more realistic to explore this latter hypothesis. Admittedly, it has not been definitely proved; the one thing that has been established is that it has not been possible to achieve an immediate settlement. There remains only the prospect of an eventual peaceful settlement over time, as with other regional crises which have dragged on and in which - despite protracted efforts to mitigate their consequences - no one has been able to come up with a long-term solution beyond ineffectual declarations. The Near Eastern question is in this respect an archetype. One cannot but be reminded in this connection of the famous Eastern Question, amorphous both in its geography and in its substance, constantly eluding our grasp and reappearing like a will-o'-the-wisp.

For the moment, and without ruling out the possibility of more encouraging developments, it must be recognized that present indications - relative disengagement by the World Powers, faltering of European solutions and inadequacy of regional solutions - are somewhat negative.

Relative Disengagement of the World Powers

The United States and the USSR, while not ceasing to take an interest in the question, seem to be holding back from involvement. The USSR, after first declaring its support in principle for the unity of the established States, with an eye in fact to shore up its own existence, is now concentrating on its own problems. Incidentally, this prudent abstention shows that the USSR can no longer lay claim to World Power status, at least for the time being, and retaining it only on a token basis and subject to some degree of tagging along behind the United States. In terms of the latter country, its prudence may be dictated by several objectives: to avoid problems it cannot solve, to give priority to questions more directly affecting its national interests, and to let the European mechanisms operate - while perhaps waiting for their bankruptcy to be established, thereby allowing freer American action. Looking beyond the specific problem, the United States would thus demonstrate its irreplaceable role in Europe.

This relative disengagement indicates a shifting of the balance in the CSCE, for involvement in its mechanisms both by the United States and of the USSR was an essential factor in the equation. However, the situations in the two countries are in no way symmetrical. The USSR is currently incapable of acting outside its own frontiers and is faced with the problem of its survival as what traditionally constitutes a State. But in the longer term the USSR, or what will stand in its stead, whether it be a new entity or simply Russia, will always be present in the region and in a position to exert there an influence proportional to its means. On the other hand, an American disengagement is likely to be far more difficult to reverse since the national interests of the United States in terms of security will not be directly affected by developments in South-Eastern Europe.

Faltering of European Solutions

The abortive attempts to administer an immediate remedy for a resort to violence highlight the inadequacy of the means brought to bear, but also of the means available. It is not any absence of coordination between the institutions, the CSCE and the Community, which is at

issue, since the CSCE agreed to recognize the competence of the Community, which the latter declared itself ready to exercise. The Community has, by the way, no obvious claim to such competence, since security problems do not concern it directly and the region in question contains only one member State. But the difficulties stem to a greater extent from two other factors - firstly, the deep-seated reluctance or inability of the State concerned to accept the intervention of the Community and its desire to "keep its hands free", despite an agreement in principle or in appearance, and secondly, the latent divisions coming to the fore between member States, both in terms of principles and interests, due to differing memories or divergent loyalties. The Community was forced to take charge of the situation, out of necessity as well as from the failure of other institutions to do so.

1. As a result, there has been talk of the possible usefulness of NATO, which it is agreed should continue to play a role in Europe, if only in order to crystallize European solidarity with the United States, despite apprehensions that this role may become ill-defined and elusive. It is feared both that NATO may disappear and begin drifting toward becoming a political co-ordinating body or a pan-European security mechanism, destined to duplicate the role of the CSCE or even to replace it. In actuality the Alliance has very scant means for coping with the situation prevailing in South-Eastern Europe. It is confronted with a strategic vacuum, without an adversary and precariously situated in relation to the internal confrontations. Moreover, the example of Cyprus, where NATO despite the clauses in the North Atlantic Treaty providing for the peaceful settlement of differences between its members - proved incapable of effecting reconciliation between Greece and Turkey, is scarcely encouraging.

2. As for the CSCE, the weakness of its mechanisms, which are further dependent on consensus and are geared to conflict prevention rather than to the maintenance of peace, doom it to paralysis in this type of situation. Nevertheless, this opportunity can be used to strengthen its means and enhance its role. The two parallel approaches that have been adopted may be mentioned - the normative approach, involving a meeting of experts on national minorities, and the institutional approach, manifested in the idea of establishing a Security Council under the CSCE in order to react to situations specifically endangering European security.

The purpose of the expert meeting organized in Geneva in July 1991 under CSCE auspices was to study a question at the pan-European level of how each individual state measures the risk of instability. The lessons drawn from it are nevertheless limited and remarkably cautious. It is recognized in particular that "national minorities" - which are not defined - have certain rights, namely respect for their cultural identity and involvement in the management of affairs that concern them. It is agreed that any possible encroachment upon those rights could not be considered as an internal matter. But the suggestions put forward are couched in general, often wishful terms, so that the freedom of action of the State concerned is scarcely restricted. There is no reference to a right to secede, nor even any suggestion as to the framing of an international instrument on minorities. It is true that the history of the Europe of Versailles and the failure of the League of Nations is disconcerting. The States concerned are not at all eager to accept a sort of limited sovereignty which they perceive as discriminatory and detrimental to their rights.

Moreover, is it really compatible with the democratic principles of which Europe is so proud to create several categories of citizens with specific rights within one and the same State? Is this abstract, rigid type of solution not liable to establish a new regime founded on

capitulations, and thereafter to foment the grievances of migrant populations? Would its end result not be to create more sources of tension between the States with which the minorities claim kinship, while those minorities would themselves be tempted to appeal to the States for help or rescue on the slightest pretext? Will the internal instability resulting from absence or insufficiency of national homogeneity not then be compounded by external interventionism, a factor of distrust and tensions between States? It is more in keeping with Europe's historic role to stress equality of rights, civil, political, economic and social, among all citizens whatever their origin, without discrimination. Collective and particularly cultural rights thus stem from individual rights, and not vice versa. Their proclamation and their guaranteed exercise are provided first and foremost at the internal level, and international mechanisms play only a residual role, as a safety-valve.

In the institutional sphere, the recent proposal to set up a Security Council at the pan-European level deserves attention. It takes advantage of an emergency to suggest an affirmative approach calculated to respond more fully to the requirements of a collective or common security system in Europe, following the political changes that have occurred and the demise or loss of relevance of the Cold War alliances. Even though it has not been immediately pursued, it raises a fundamental issue which transcends current contingencies.

It seems, however, to pose more problems than it solves and is liable to create new areas of discord between European countries. It offers an undeniable advantage in that it represents a departure from a consensual multilateralism which leads to paralysis, and of strengthening the CSCE and its mechanisms. But how will participants be decided when the membership should by definition be limited? Will it give recommendations or decisions? Will the measures stipulated be voluntary, calling for the interposition of European "blue helmets" with the consent of all the parties concerned, or coercive to enforce a European system of law and order? Who will provide the troops? Will they be integrated or national? Who will finance any operations or engagements? The practice of the United Nations Security Council can of course be of some help - but limited help in light of the fact that some European countries question the very rationale of the Security Council as instituted by the United Nations Charter.

What is more, the creation of such a body would immediately raise the problem of how its sphere of competence meshed with that of the Security Council itself. Clearly, the latter body would in theory retain its primacy based on the Charter. But the regionalization of collective security would be very likely to deprive it in practice of any capacity for action and hence, *de facto*, of its competence in regard to European questions. The result would be a situation in which the Security Council would be confined to acting as the guardian of international order in the Third World, when the countries of the South already have few means of obtaining a hearing in the Council. Would this not seriously undermine its legitimacy, and would the countries of the Third World accept this new type of discrimination, which would establish two classes of international security? European questions would be the concern of the European Security Council, a sort of internal body, while the United Nations Security Council would be responsible for external security. The major powers would, moreover, be members of both Councils, and that, too, without reciprocity.

It would therefore seem more important to put the United Nations Security Council in a position to discharge its responsibilities with respect to any situation that threatens international security, regardless of origin or locality, by giving it the necessary instruments and means. This is a more urgent task than is engaging in the legally complex and politically

difficult process of changing the composition of the Council. There is nothing, for that matter, to prevent the Security Council from creating subsidiary bodies which would report to it and in which there would be some degree of regional specialization with appropriate participation. Such a formula would not introduce any discrimination and would provide a flexible response to changes in regional balances. The instrument which the Security Council constitutes could thus be adapted without risk of its being destroyed or breached by a rival institution.

3. Where the European Community is concerned, its behaviour can give rise to mixed observations.

Prima facie, it has not been very successful in its undertakings because, firstly, the repeated attempts to obtain a cease-fire in Yugoslavia have failed, and secondly, the dispatch of observers has done little to ease the tension. Meanwhile, the peace conference it was setting up in the hope that all the parties concerned would co-operate, will only get started with much difficulty, in the context of a continuing civil war. The arbitration solution proposed by a specially created body of some of the presidents of the community's main administrative divisions therefore seemed indefinitely postponed. This confirms that the Community is ill-equipped to respond to emergencies in the realm of security, whereas it has displayed a capacity to intervene in other circumstances - for example, to help the victims of natural or other disasters in Europe and elsewhere.

A more searching analysis leads, however, to a more qualified and favourable assessment. We must first distinguish between emergencies and long-term problems and note that the Community has, whether deliberately or not, acted in consideration of duration rather than under the immediate pressure of events. As far as emergency measures are concerned, it could hardly do more than declare its readiness to help the attempts to arrange a cease-fire, which could succeed only with the agreement of all involved parties. To send an interposition or intervention force to the area would clearly have been unrealistic without a legal basis and would have raised the same kind of problems as have been mentioned in connection with the CSCE. There was merely a negative demonstration to be made, and the failure of a Franco-German proposal effectively did that.

On the other hand, those immediate responses, even though limited or negative, presented a dual advantage for the Community. Firstly, by taking up the question it was possible to contain any tendency for the conflict to spread to other States, by holding the interest and attention of the other countries of the region and dissuading them from intervening on their own account. Secondly, the Community preserved its unity, which was liable to be endangered by the conflicting sympathies that the Yugoslavian crisis arouses. Thus, premature recognition of certain entities that had declared their independence was avoided and the same line of conduct was adopted in regard to the Baltic republics.

Thus, demonstrating its interest, maintaining an objective attitude, and defining procedures open to the parties, the Community preserved its capacity to act with a view to a long-term settlement. There the peace conference or even arbitration will perhaps finally prove effective. In any event, they mark out a path toward achieving a peaceful solution in the future by side-stepping or by passing the present. This implies as much symbolic gesture as action, as much blind instinct as deliberate calculation, but the Community's principles and its future capabilities are thus preserved. It is evident that in a fragmenting Europe which has yet to begin its reconstruction, the Community represents - as does NATO at another level - a rallying point for stabilization and potential organization. But to retain that capacity it must above all preserve itself and not commit itself, without *locus standi* and means of action, beyond its immediate possibilities.

Inadequacy of Regional Solutions

There are also initiatives and proposals emanating from the Balkan region itself. Mention has of course been made of various initiatives for enhancing the security of the countries of South-Eastern Europe within a classical inter-State framework. However, while interesting from a long-term viewpoint, these proposals - confidence-building measures, zones free from nuclear armaments or weapons of mass destruction, etc. - are ill-suited to coping with the new and varied forms that security problems have now assumed in that region. They are more a response to the situation created by the vacuum resulting from the demise of the Warsaw Pact, by the CFE Accord, and by the persistence of differences and even tensions between neighbouring States. That vacuum and those tensions create the need for a new framework, which remains to be determined and whose content is still clearly undecided. Its evident lack threatens to lead the States concerned to seek alternative and individual solutions and to provoke a renewed fragmentation of the Balkan region, which would remain a mere geographical designation.

1. The geographical and political framework of South-Eastern Europe remains problematical and, at best, shifting and amorphous. As has been pointed out, some of its countries are members of NATO, one is a member of the Community, others may aspire to become members or to be associated with it, yet others are non-aligned or have broken off their alliances and are seeking new domestic and international paths to follow. Under those conditions, must the six-member framework for the nascent Balkan Co-operation be retained or should it be reformulated in a wider context? Should Cyprus, and perhaps Moldavia if its independence is confirmed, be incorporated, or should the co-operation even be extended towards the European Caucasus? What place should be given to the countries of Central Europe, often affected by the same problems? Should there be a number of superimposed forums with special areas of competence - for example, the Danube region or countries bordering on the Black Sea, including Russia? What place should then be accorded to the formerly Pentagonal and now Hexagonal area? The temporarily-dormant Europe of Helsinki precludes for the moment the designation of regional subgroupings which would decentralize its principles and procedures, and the attractive force of the Community is operating in this regard rather to negative effect. Does this give a sporting chance to the theme of the Confederation, which presumably would extend well beyond the Balkan area, but has not yet found either its *idée force* or its dynamics?

2. The various States concerned may then be tempted to go their own respective ways. This would result first in a bilateralization of problems and relations, each one concentrating on its disputes with its immediate neighbours and looking to a settlement with them alone, without interference from a wider Balkan sphere: Greece with Turkey, Bulgaria with Turkey, Albania with Yugoslavia, etc. The wider problems whose implications concern all those States could not then be dealt with in a broader Balkan framework, as shown by the example of Yugoslavia. This impotence does, however, have the advantage that neighbouring States do not intervene, since this could probably only complicate the situation and even entail a very real risk of conflict.

Later, the most powerful of these States or those most outside the Balkan sphere - could develop their own solidarities. This applies more particularly to Turkey, which aspires to be a regional power and moreover, is situated at the intersection of several regions whose security problems are acute on several scores - the Balkans, of course, but also the Near and

Middle East, even certain Republics of the USSR, together with the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Clearly Turkey occupies in many respects a central position, just as its membership of NATO is central to it and the Alliance.

3. The risk facing South-Eastern Europe is accordingly that of being marginalized, fragmented and largely ignored. If outside proposals and peaceful means of settlement are rejected or prove ineffective, there may develop, albeit empirically, a quarantine policy that would tend to ostracize and isolate it in its internal confrontation. The adventurist policy of trying to involve Europe in those confrontations and force it to take one side or the other would probably be doomed to failure. That failure is even desirable in view of the adverse consequences that would ensue for the whole of Europe. Certain aspects of the Yugoslavian problem, as well as of the Albanian problem, have shown that a policy of quarantine and withdrawal is a possibility.

This would lead to a process whereby South-Eastern Europe would become part of the Third World, where endemic conflicts would be associated with economic stagnation or even regression. Endeavours would be made simply to moderate their intensity and mitigate their consequences, with no prospects of a radical solution. The Balkans would no longer be "powder keg" that they still are in Europe's collective memory, but rather a sort of black hole, which as we know absorbs any energy that comes within its field and does not reflect or return the light poured into it. This situation puts the countries concerned squarely in front of their responsibilities *vis-à-vis* themselves and the whole of Europe, for that black hole could swallow up the hopes of Helsinki and the Paris Charter. It also highlights a perennial and today very relevant truth: nothing lasting can be built on constraint, nor can anything be rebuilt on such a foundation.

Remarques conclusives

Serge Sur

Les observations qui suivent constituent de simples remarques personnelles. Elles ne visent ni à synthétiser les textes qui précèdent ni bien sûr à conclure un débat, alors que ses termes mêmes ont changé de nature et restent tributaires de développements imprévisibles. Elles tendent simplement à marquer, sous forme générale, quelques lignes de force dans l'évolution des problèmes de sécurité de l'Europe balkanique.

Une précision à cet égard. On a plus volontiers utilisé l'expression d'Europe du Sud-Est, sans que la formule ait une connotation particulière, mais au contraire en raison de sa neutralité. L'Europe balkanique fait image, et cette image évoque ou bien une période ancienne de troubles et de violences, ou bien les perspectives iréniques d'une coopération sur une base régionale homogène et bien délimitée. Les deux représentations seraient trompeuses, la première renvoyant au passé et la seconde à un futur indéfini. Le présent de l'Europe du Sud-Est et son avenir immédiat sont plus indéterminés. L'expression marque bien au surplus sa localisation particulière, sinon marginale, par rapport à un cadre qui est désormais celui de l'Europe toute entière, et la nécessité de la situer dans ce cadre.

A cet égard les problèmes de sécurité de l'Europe du Sud-Est sont un bon modèle réduit, quoiqu'aux traits plus accusés et dramatiques, de ceux de l'Europe dans son ensemble. Ils en présentent un résumé et comme un concentré. On y trouve des pays se rattachant à l'Europe occidentale et à la Communauté, des pays anciennement membres du Pacte de Varsovie, des pays non alignés ou ayant cherché une voie singulière. La région est une zone de contact avec d'autres régions particulièrement sensibles pour toute l'Europe - le monde méditerranéen, le proche orient, le monde arabe - en même temps qu'elle constitue la porte de l'Asie. Elle a connu des influences variées, une succession de civilisations différentes, et a été affectée par de nombreux conflits. Sa géographie politique a été mobile, et marquée par une dialectique permanente de la domination et de l'affranchissement. Longtemps zone de tension autant que de contacts, profondément divisée par les différences nationales comme par les choix culturels, idéologiques ou politiques, elle met aujourd'hui à nouveau en cause la capacité de l'Europe à résoudre pacifiquement ses propres problèmes et à définir, avec des mécanismes consensuels de sécurité, les bases d'une stabilité qui ne repose pas sur la contrainte.

C'est ce nouveau test qui constitue une première ligne de force. Les perspectives heureuses qui se dessinaient au cours des toutes dernières années ont en effet été brutalement renversées, largement par l'évolution de la situation en Yougoslavie et la remise en cause de son unité. Ce retournement incontrôlé contraste vivement avec le cours globalement pacifique et maîtrisé, quoiqu'imprévu, des changements récents intervenus en Europe. Il n'altère cependant pas la nature des problèmes de fond, dont la substance demeure. Quelles sont les réponses qui peuvent lui être apportées et de quelle façon engagent-elles sur l'avenir de la sécurité, non seulement de l'Europe du Sud-Est, mais de l'Europe dans son ensemble? On présentera sur ces divers points trois séries de remarques.

Renversement des perspectives

Le renversement est en effet complet et soudain par rapport à la période récente. Il y a quelques mois encore, on assistait au triomphe de l'Europe d'Helsinki, celle qui s'était développée lentement et en quelque sorte souterrainement à partir du processus de la CSCE et de ses diverses étapes. Cette Europe d'Helsinki, dont la Charte de Paris, solennellement adoptée en novembre 1990, marquait une étape et comme un couronnement, se substituait à l'Europe de Yalta qui avait si longtemps semblé insurmontable. Savoir si la Conférence sur la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, apparemment modeste, obscure, voire bureaucratique, en tout cas interétatique, a constitué l'origine de cette transformation ou si elle a simplement accompagné en souplesse un phénomène extérieur n'est pas notre propos. Il suffit ici de constater la coexistence des deux mouvements.

Or, dans le cadre multilatéral, paneuropéen, toutes proportions gardées égalitaire qui était défini par la CSCE, on pouvait imaginer qu'il y avait place pour une nouvelle coopération sous-régionale et que l'Europe du Sud-Est pouvait particulièrement se prêter à une sorte de décentralisation des mécanismes de sécurité récemment établis ou encore en gestation. Ne pouvait-on l'envisager comme un cadre approprié pour des arrangements de coopération et de sécurité adaptés, dans le respect des principes et des instruments de la CSCE ?

Ces principes, initialement inscrits dans le "décatalogue" d'Helsinki de 1975, tendent au règlement pacifique des questions de frontière, à la diminution des tensions militaires, à l'instauration de mesures de confiance et de sécurité, au désarmement, et au développement des droits de l'homme, qui doivent former une base commune de la civilisation européenne dans son ensemble, quelles que soient par ailleurs les différences de traditions comme de systèmes politiques ou économiques. Leur réalisation progressive a coïncidé avec le dépassement de l'Europe de Yalta, et ceci dans des conditions pleinement pacifiques, actualisant après quelques millénaires le destin des murs de Jéricho.

Mais à peine cette Europe nouvelle apparaît-elle et prend conscience d'elle-même qu'elle est à son tour gravement menacée, à tout le moins mise en cause, précisément par l'évolution de la situation et des tensions dans l'Europe du Sud-Est. Elle l'est de façon inopinée, car le climat général de détente qui prévalait ne semblait pas porteur de nouvelles crises immédiates. Au surplus, la Yougoslavie paraissait avoir heureusement surmonté, voici une décennie, la disparition de son fondateur contemporain et tout péril paraissait pour le moins différé. Enfin, comme subsistait l'image d'un pays à l'écart du bloc socialiste comme du système communiste orthodoxe ou d'inspiration soviétique, elle semblait devoir être moins affectée que d'autres par l'effondrement du modèle et le déclin de sa domination politique et militaire. Cependant, démontant ces expectations et confirmant les craintes de quelques Cassandre, voici que se développe un redoutable effet de miroir entre l'évolution de la Yougoslavie et celle de l'URSS.

Dans ces conditions, la crise en cours, comme toute crise, a un effet de révélateur et d'accélérateur. Révélateur des forces et faiblesses de chacun, des lacunes des mécanismes de sécurité et de l'ampleur des contradictions subsistantes. Accélérateur de la dynamique historique comme des tensions entre partenaires qui se trouvent avivées. Quelle lumière est ainsi jetée sur l'état de l'Europe du Sud-Est, et, au-delà, de l'Europe dans son ensemble? Elle éclaire la modification des données immédiates de sa sécurité, et met en question l'adéquation des instruments existants.

Les blocs militaires, que la CSCE avait mis entre parenthèses sans les éliminer, sont déjà loin. Il n'est même plus question de relation interétatiques, mais de problèmes internes qui acquièrent une dimension internationale voire universelle et menacent tout nouvel ordre européen en voie de gestation: problèmes de minorités ou d'affrontements de nationalités infra-étatiques; phénomènes d'irrédentisme; tentatives de modification de frontières, même si elles ont un aspect purement interne et ne sont que virtuellement internationales, par la force; processus ou perspectives de dislocation d'Etats existants, qui accompagnent la réunification de l'Allemagne. Ainsi l'Europe d'Helsinki a connu son aboutissement historique et découvert *a posteriori* sa logique profonde avec cette réunification. Il n'est pas nécessaire que cette logique ait correspondu à un dessein conscient des partenaires ou de certains d'entre eux, même si on peut le supposer. Mais dans l'ambiguïté initiale qui caractérisait Helsinki, comme toute entreprise politique féconde, ambiguïté entre la pérennisation du *statu quo* et la transformation pacifique, les faits ont tranché.

Avec la dislocation de l'URSS et de la Yougoslavie, on entre dans une nouvelle phase, qui est celle d'une décomposition non maîtrisée et aux développements encore plus imprévisibles. Dans ces conditions, les mesures de confiance, la prévention des conflits, le désarmement, voire les droits de l'homme, ne sont plus à l'ordre du jour. Il est question du recours unilatéral à une violence incontrôlée, dont la dérive interétatique n'est pas à exclure, et ceci dans une région qui connaît une forte concentration d'armements classiques, cependant que la guerre civile, endémique ou ouverte, constitue par définition la négation des droits de l'homme.

N'est-on pas dès lors en présence d'une condamnation à mort de l'Europe d'Helsinki, de ses principes et de ses mécanismes tenus en échec aussitôt que mis à l'épreuve? Ne doit-on pas commencer à dresser l'acte de décès d'une Europe à peine émergente? Il s'agit en tout cas pour elle d'un défi vital. On ne doit cependant pas sauter à des conclusions prématurées. La CSCE a déjà montré sa flexibilité et son aptitude à épouser patiemment un terrain difficile. L'ambiguïté même du processus se prête à des évolutions multiples.

D'un autre côté, à supposer même que la CSCE soit dépassée, et ne puisse surmonter ce qui serait perçu comme une carence décisive, il ne faudrait pas nécessairement s'en attrister. Du fait de sa longue histoire, l'Europe est un cimetière d'institutions, et il serait trop long d'en dresser la liste. Mais elle a toujours été également une matrice d'institutions nouvelles. Ces institutions ne sont que des instruments. Elles ont une fonction à remplir, elles sont adaptés à certaines tâches. Si elles n'y parviennent pas ou plus, elles sont appelées à être renouvelées, transformées ou à disparaître. A cet égard leur fragilité apparente peut être un avantage, et il faut se garder de tout fétichisme institutionnel. Il importe de confronter les mécanismes aux problèmes en cause, en tenant compte de leur capacité de réponse et d'adaptation. Une crise peut les détruire mais aussi les renforcer. Or les problèmes de fond auxquels l'Europe du Sud-Est est confrontée, au-delà des convulsions immédiates, demeurent et reflètent ceux de l'Europe toute entière.

Subsistance des problèmes de fond

C'est précisément dans la mesure où les problèmes de fond subsistent, où leur forme a davantage changé que leur substance que le cadre initialement défini pour cette recherche a pu être conservé et qu'il s'est adapté aux données nouvelles. Ces problèmes, ce sont ceux des minorités nationales, de la capacité d'expression des peuples et du respect de leur libre

volonté, et peut-être surtout du développement économique qui pèse sur tous les autres, ironique revanche posthume de Marx.

Ce sont également ceux de la sécurité militaire et de la stabilité politique. Il est clair qu'une région marquée par l'instabilité et l'agitation endémique, et partagée entre des Etats encore récemment opposés ou toujours séparés par une solide méfiance, voire des contentieux non résolus, dotés au surplus d'armées puissantes, comporte un risque de dérive vers des tensions voire des conflits interétatiques. L'évolution récente a plutôt pour caractère de maintenir une situation qui pourrait être anachronique, voire de faire ressurgir d'anciens clivages. Elle fait de l'Europe du Sud-Est une région à part en Europe, la seule où ce type de tensions paraît incontrôlable et ne semble pas être atténué par le nouveau cours des relations internationales. Archaïsme ou signe prémonitoire, mise en cause en toute hypothèse de la capacité des Etats concernés de remplir leur tâche - car les Etats, tout comme les autres organisations, ne sont que des instruments au service de certaines fonctions. Le maintien de la paix publique et de la sécurité des populations est la plus importante, celle qui légitime et conditionne leur souveraineté.

L'Etat est en effet au centre de tous ces problèmes, et les relations interétatiques qui résultent de la coexistence d'Etats voisins. Le surgissement, ou la résurgence spectaculaire de la question des minorités ne doit pas masquer le phénomène. Elle complique les relations interétatiques; elle ne s'y substitue pas et ne transforme pas non plus leur nature. L'autodétermination des minorités ne saurait remplacer la négociation entre Etats. Cette autodétermination éventuelle n'offre aucune alternative pacifique à la reconnaissance par l'Etat intéressé et dans le cadre de ses institutions des changements qui peuvent être nécessaires. L'évolution du statut des minorités, voire de nouvelles indépendances, les modifications de frontières éventuelles, ne relèvent pas d'une intervention internationale allant au-delà de deux données permanentes, anciennement établies et conformes à la Charte des Nations Unies: l'action en cas de menace ou d'atteinte à la paix et à la sécurité internationale d'un côté; le respect des droits de l'homme, de l'autre.

L'action proportionnée en cas de menace ou d'atteinte à la sécurité internationale relève du Conseil de Sécurité et est confirmée par une pratique consolidée. A cet égard, par souci médiatique ou par méconnaissance des règles, on tend beaucoup trop à insister sur un "droit d'ingérence" dont la nouveauté est superficielle et dont on cherche en vain la consécration dans les instruments internationaux récents.

Quant à l'intervention que permet la garantie des droits de l'homme internationalement proclamés, notamment dans le cadre des Nations Unies, là encore, et sauf circonstances tout à fait exceptionnelles, il n'y a pas d'atteinte à la souveraineté. Il est en effet constant que les questions liées au respect des droits de l'homme ne relèvent pas de la compétence exclusive des Etats. Surveiller et demander ce respect ne relève donc pas d'une atteinte quelconque à un principe de non intervention qui a un autre objet. La pratique en offre depuis longtemps beaucoup d'exemples. Les circonstances exceptionnelles sont liées à la carence de l'Etat territorial, hors d'état de remplir ses missions et de protéger sa population ou les ressortissants étrangers. Alors une intervention d'humanité, mais dans des conditions très restrictives, n'est pas contraire au droit et est confirmée par une pratique constante.

L'autodétermination est certes un droit reconnu par les règles internationales et il est vrai que son application en dehors du cadre historique et géographique de la décolonisation est nouvelle. Il ne doit cependant pas donner lieu à contresens. Elle est essentiellement liée à la démocratie, spécialement dans le cadre européen, où celle-ci est constamment invoquée. Elle doit s'exercer dans le respect des droits de l'Etat concerné, et notamment ne pas

déboucher sur des reconnaissances d'indépendances prématurées. Ceci d'autant plus qu'elle suppose le libre exercice de la volonté des populations concernées et qu'elle ne débouche pas nécessairement sur l'indépendance. L'autodétermination peut en effet aboutir à d'autres formules, par exemple l'établissement de statuts internes particuliers ou la libre association entre entités autonomes dans un cadre qu'elles définissent elles-mêmes. Il est vrai qu'on ne peut qu'être frappé par l'échec du fédéralisme reposant sur une base nationale, formule utilisée tant en URSS qu'en Yougoslavie, et qui semble aujourd'hui dépassée. Mais il appartient d'abord aux Etats concernés de traiter cette question dans le respect de leurs obligations internationales.

Ce qui caractérise ainsi les problèmes de fond auxquels l'Europe du Sud-Est est confrontée n'est ni leur nouveauté, ni une transformation brutale de leur nature. C'est davantage leur acuité, leur montée aux extrêmes dans un contexte de crise. Dès lors ils deviennent plus difficiles à analyser, à distinguer et à traiter car ils se mélangent et se confondent dans une sorte de noeud gordien qui est précisément un élément de la définition d'une situation de crise. Les aspects intérieurs et interétatiques, nationaux et internationaux, locaux et universels, politiques, idéologiques et militaires, les aspirations à l'autonomie ou à l'indépendance, voire les questions d'environnement et de développement s'emmêlent et rien de précis n'apparaît plus discernable. Le contenu de la sécurité devient multiple et ne peut plus être ramené à la dimension militaire classique, ni même aux relations interétatiques et à la stabilité politique ou aux formules éprouvées d'équilibre. Dans ces conditions, les perspectives de solution, et surtout de solution consensuelle, apparaissent problématiques. En même temps, une telle solution constitue un test pour l'orientation et la stabilité non seulement de l'Europe du Sud-Est mais de l'Europe dans son ensemble.

Urgence et durée

Le développement de la crise yougoslave a conduit les pays européens à jouer sur plusieurs registres, à utiliser plusieurs instances, successivement ou concurremment. Tentatives qui sont conformes à l'empirisme dominant après la fin des certitudes, et qui reposent sur la recherche de l'instrument et des procédures les mieux adaptées, appelées à démontrer leur efficacité dans l'épreuve. Les résultats n'ont jusqu'à présent guère été probants.

On ne saurait dissimuler le défi qui est ainsi lancé, qui met en question, au delà des Etats directement intéressés et dont l'existence est en cause, aux nouvelles institutions européennes en gestation - CSCE d'abord, Communauté européenne également dans la mesure où elle aspire à être un pôle organisateur et à développer ses compétences dans le domaine de la sécurité; perspectives de coopération régionale, à peine balbutiantes et manifestement dépassées. En même temps, l'acuité de la crise et la nouveauté de sa forme ne permettent guère, suivant une pente naturelle, de prévoir le passé et de se référer aux modes de solution anciens, par comparaison et transposition. C'est à chaud qu'il faut tenter de développer des mécanismes qui ne permettent pas seulement de répondre à l'urgence mais doivent aussi, sans mettre en cause la logique générale de l'Europe d'Helsinki, faciliter une solution de fond, qui ne peut s'inscrire que dans la durée.

Pour les institutions européennes, deux types de sortie de crise sont possibles. Une sortie haute, par réussite de l'entreprise et renforcement de leurs mécanismes. La crise aurait ainsi confirmé leur validité. L'hypothèse est concevable, car l'utilisation des crises pour développer les institutions est une technique qui peut être heureusement utilisée. C'est ainsi que l'affaire du Koweït a, au moins pour l'instant, renforcé le Conseil de Sécurité et relancé des

perspectives de la sécurité collective, en dépit des réserves parfois suscitées par le caractère insuffisamment onusien de l'action militaire. Le résultat est d'autant plus méritoire que la crise a été imposée aux Nations Unies comme aux pays de la coalition et qu'ils n'ont été que partiellement maîtres de sa gestion. En l'occurrence, on est également en présence d'une crise qui n'a pas été contrôlée, voire suscitée afin de provoquer une solution, comme la pratique en offre quelques exemples.

Une sortie basse est également envisageable. Elle reposerait sur la mise à l'écart de mécanismes et d'instances dont l'impuissance serait démontrée. Les conséquences pour la réorganisation de l'Europe sur un plan régional et paneuropéen sont imprévisibles. Force est de constater qu'il est plus réaliste d'explorer cette hypothèse. Elle n'est sans doute pas définitivement démontrée. Seul est acquis le fait qu'un règlement à chaud n'a pu être obtenu. Demeure uniquement la perspective d'un règlement pacifique ultérieur par gestion du temps, à l'instar d'autres crises régionales qui ont perduré et dont on a longuement tenté de réduire les conséquences sans pouvoir envisager d'autres solutions de fond que déclaratoires. La question du proche orient en constitue un archétype. Comment à cet égard ne pas évoquer la fameuse Question d'Orient, question mobile tant géographiquement que substantiellement, et souvent insaisissable, qui renaît comme un feu follet ?

Dans l'immédiat, et sans méconnaître la possibilité de développements plus encourageants, on doit reconnaître que les enseignements actuels sont plutôt négatifs. On observe en effet un désengagement relatif des puissances mondiales, le bégaiement des solutions européennes et la carence des solutions régionales.

Désengagement relatif des puissances mondiales

Les Etats-Unis et l'URSS, sans se désintéresser de la question, semblent se tenir sur la réserve. L'URSS, après avoir d'abord affirmé un soutien de principe à l'unité des Etats constitués, qui visait au demeurant à consolider sa propre existence, se concentre sur ses propres problèmes. Au passage, cette prudente abstention démontre que l'URSS ne peut plus guère revendiquer le statut de puissance mondiale, au moins provisoirement, et ne peut le conserver que de façon symbolique et sous réserve d'un certain suivisme à l'égard des Etats-Unis. Quant à eux, leur prudence peut obéir à plusieurs objectifs: ne pas s'engager dans un problème qu'ils ne peuvent maîtriser; donner la priorité à des questions qui mettent plus directement en cause leur intérêts nationaux, laisser agir les instances européennes, en attendant éventuellement que leur carence soit établie et permettent ainsi une action américaine plus libre. Au-delà du problème particulier, les Etats Unis montreraient ainsi combien leur rôle en Europe est irremplaçable.

Ce désengagement relatif indique déjà une altération des équilibres de la CSCE, puisque l'implication dans ses mécanismes tant des Etats-Unis que de l'URSS en constituait un élément fondamental. Cependant, la situation des deux pays n'est nullement symétrique. L'URSS est à l'heure actuelle incapable d'agir à l'extérieur de ses propres frontières et se pose le problème de sa survie sous une forme étatique traditionnelle. Mais, à plus long terme, l'URSS, ou ce qui en tiendra lieu, une nouvelle entité ou plus simplement la Russie, sera toujours présente dans la région et en mesure d'y exercer une influence proportionnée à sa capacité. En revanche, un désengagement américain risque d'être beaucoup plus difficile à inverser dès lors que les intérêts nationaux des Etats-Unis en terme de sécurité ne seraient pas directement affectés par l'évolution de l'Europe du Sud-Est.

Bégaiement des solutions européennes

Les tentatives inabouties d'apporter une solution immédiate au recours à la violence illustrent l'inadéquation des moyens mis en oeuvre, mais aussi des moyens disponibles. Ce n'est pas l'absence de coordination entre institutions, CSCE et Communauté, qui est en cause, puisque la première a accepté de reconnaître la compétence de la seconde, que celle-ci se déclarait prête à exercer. La Communauté n'a pas au demeurant en la matière un titre évident, puisque les problèmes de sécurité ne la concernent pas directement et que la région en cause ne comporte qu'un Etat membre. Mais les difficultés proviennent bien davantage de deux autres éléments: le refus profond, ou l'incapacité de l'Etat intéressé à accepter l'intervention de la Communauté et son désir de garder les mains libres, malgré un consentement de principe ou d'apparence; la division latente qui apparaît entre Etats membres, tant en fonction de principes que d'intérêts et de souvenirs ou de solidarités différents. La Communauté a été confrontée à une situation qu'elle gérait autant par nécessité que par défaut des autres institutions.

1. On a ainsi évoqué l'utilité possible de l'OTAN, dont chacun convient qu'elle doit conserver un rôle en Europe, ne serait-ce que pour cristalliser la solidarité avec les Etats-Unis, tout en redoutant que ce rôle ne devienne indéfini et flottant. On craint aussi bien une disparition de l'OTAN que sa dérive vers un coordination politique ou un mécanisme de sécurité paneuropéen qui aurait vocation à doubler la CSCE, voire à s'y substituer. En l'occurrence, l'Alliance dispose de bien peu de moyens face à la situation qui prévaut en Europe du Sud-Est. Elle se retrouve face à un vide stratégique, sans adversaire et en porte-à-faux par rapport aux affrontements internes. Au surplus le précédent de Chypre, dans lequel l'OTAN, en dépit des dispositions du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord qui prévoit de règlement pacifique des différends entre ses membres, à été dans l'incapacité de rapprocher la Grèce et la Turquie, n'est guère encourageant.

2. Pour la CSCE, l'inadéquation de mécanismes faibles, au surplus consensuels et orientés vers la prévention des conflits davantage que vers le maintien de la paix la condamne à la paralysie en de semblables circonstances. Cependant l'occasion peut être mise à profit pour renforcer ses moyens et développer son rôle. On peut à cet égard mentionner deux voies qui ont été parallèlement empruntées: la voie normative avec une réunion d'experts sur les minorités nationales; la voie institutionnelle avec l'idée d'établir un Conseil de Sécurité dans le cadre de la CSCE afin de réagir aux situations mettant spécifiquement en danger la sécurité européenne.

La Réunion d'experts organisée à Genève au début juillet 1991 dans le cadre de la CSCE avait précisément pour objet d'examiner sur un plan paneuropéen une question dont chacun mesure le risque d'instabilité qu'elle comporte. Ses enseignements sont cependant limités et d'une remarquable prudence. On reconnaît notamment que les minorités nationales, qui ne sont au demeurant pas définies, ont certains droits, au respect de leur identité culturelle et à la participation à la gestion des affaires qui les concernent. On admet que la mise en cause éventuelle de ces droits ne saurait être considérée comme une affaire intérieure. Mais les suggestions qui sont formulées le sont de façon générale, souvent optative, de sorte que la liberté d'action de l'Etat concerné n'est guère entravée. On y chercherait vainement un droit à la sécession ou même l'amorce d'un statut international des minorités. Il est vrai que le précédent de l'Europe de Versailles et l'échec de la SdN apparaissent comme un repoussoir. Les Etats concernés ne sont nullement prêts à accepter une sorte de souveraineté limitée qu'ils ressentent comme attentatoire et discriminatoire.

Au surplus, est-il réellement compatible avec les principes démocratiques dont s'enorgueillit l'Europe de créer plusieurs catégories de citoyens avec des droits spécifiques

dans un même Etat? Ce type de solutions, abstraites et rigides, ne risque-t-il pas d'établir un nouveau régime des capitulations, puis de nourrir ultérieurement les revendications de populations migrantes? N'aboutirait-il pas à multiplier les sources de tensions entre les Etats dont peuvent se réclamer les minorités, elles-mêmes tentées d'invoquer le concours et le secours des Etats au moindre prétexte? L'instabilité interne résultant d'une absence ou d'une insuffisance d'homogénéité nationale ne sera-t-elle pas alors doublée par l'interventionnisme extérieur, élément de méfiance et de tensions interétatiques? Il est plus conforme à la vocation de l'Europe d'insister sur l'égalité des droits entre tous les citoyens, quelle que soit leur origine, droits civils, politiques, économiques et sociaux sans aucune discrimination. Les droits collectifs, et notamment culturels, dérivent alors des droits individuels et non l'inverse. Leur proclamation et leur garantie sont assurés avant tout sur le plan interne et les mécanismes internationaux, soupape de sûreté, n'ont qu'un rôle résiduel.

Sur le plan institutionnel, la proposition récente tendant à établir un Conseil de Sécurité dans un cadre paneuropéen mérite de retenir l'attention. Elle met à profit une situation d'urgence pour suggérer une approche haute, susceptible de répondre plus largement aux besoins d'un système de sécurité collective ou commune en Europe à la suite des transformations politiques et de la disparition ou de l'inadéquation des Alliances du temps de la guerre froide. Même si elle est restée sans lendemain immédiat, elle pose un problème de fond et déborde donc d'un contexte conjoncturel.

Elle semble cependant soulever plus de problèmes qu'elle n'en résout, et risquer de créer de nouvelles pommes de discorde entre pays européens. Elle présente l'incontestable avantage de sortir d'un multilatéralisme consensuel qui conduit à la paralysie, et de renforcer la CSCE comme ses mécanismes. Mais comment déterminer la participation à un Conseil qui devrait être par définition restreint? S'agira-t-il, au surplus, de recommandations ou de décisions? Prévoira-t-on des mesures de bonne volonté, l'interposition de casques bleus européens avec le consentement de toutes les parties intéressées, ou des mesures coercitives destinées à faire respecter un ordre public européen? Qui fournira des troupes? Seront-elles intégrées ou nationales? Qui financera les éventuelles opérations? La pratique du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies peut certes être d'un certain secours, mais limité dans la mesure où quelques pays européens remettent précisément en cause les bases du Conseil de Sécurité tel qu'institué par la Charte des Nations Unies.

Au surplus, un tel organisme soulèverait immédiatement le problème de l'articulation de ses compétences avec celles du Conseil de Sécurité lui-même. Il est clair qu'en théorie la prépondérance de ce dernier resterait établie sur la base de la Charte. Mais la régionalisation de la sécurité collective risquerait fort de le dépouiller en pratique de toute capacité d'action à l'égard des questions européennes, conduisant à son dessaisissement de fait. On aboutirait dès lors à une situation dans laquelle le Conseil de Sécurité serait cantonné à un rôle de gardien de l'ordre international dans le Tiers Monde, alors même que les pays du Sud sont largement dépourvus de moyens pour s'y faire entendre. La légitimité du Conseil n'en serait-elle pas profondément affaiblie, et les pays du Tiers Monde accepteraient-ils longtemps ce nouveau type de discrimination, qui établirait en quelque sorte une sécurité internationale à deux vitesses? Les questions européennes relèveraient du Conseil de Sécurité européen, sorte d'organe intérieur, pendant que le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies serait en charge de la sécurité extérieure. Les principales puissances seraient en outre membres des deux Conseils, et ceci sans réciprocité.

Il paraît ainsi plus important de mettre le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies à même d'exercer ses responsabilités à l'égard de toute situation, quelles que soient son origine et sa

localisation, qui met en cause la sécurité internationale, en le dotant des instruments et des moyens nécessaires. Cette tâche est plus urgente que s'engager dans un processus juridiquement complexe et politiquement difficile de changement de la composition du Conseil. Rien n'interdit à cet égard au Conseil de Sécurité de créer des organes subsidiaires qui lui seraient subordonnés et pourraient comporter une certaine spécialisation régionale avec une participation appropriée. Une telle formule n'établirait pas de discrimination et répondrait de façon souple à l'évolution des équilibres régionaux. L'instrument que constitue le Conseil de Sécurité pourrait ainsi être adapté sans risque d'être détruit ou battu en brèche par une institution concurrente.

3. Pour ce qui est de la Communauté européenne, son comportement peut susciter des observations contrastées.

A première vue, elle n'a guère été heureuse dans ses entreprises puisqu'aussi bien les tentations répétées d'obtenir un cessez-le-feu en Yougoslavie ont échoué et que l'envoi d'observateurs sur place n'a guère détendu la situation. En même temps, la Conférence de Paix qu'elle mettait sur pied en espérant le concours de toutes les parties intéressées ne pouvait que difficilement commencer ses travaux dans un contexte de guerre civile maintenue. La solution d'arbitrage préconisée et qui mobilisait dans une institution spéciale certains des Présidents des principales juridictions des pays de la Communauté paraissait dès lors renvoyée à des jours meilleurs et indéterminés. Il se confirme ainsi que la Communauté n'est guère en mesure de répondre aux situations d'urgence dans le domaine de la sécurité alors qu'elle a démontré cette capacité dans d'autres circonstances, par exemple pour l'aide aux victimes de catastrophes naturelles ou autres, en Europe comme ailleurs.

Une analyse plus approfondie conduit cependant à un jugement plus nuancé et plus positif. Il faut d'abord distinguer entre l'urgence et le long terme, et observer que la Communauté a, délibérément ou non, agi en fonction de la durée plus que de la pression immédiate des événements. Pour ce qui est des mesures d'urgence, il ne lui était guère possible de faire autre chose que d'affirmer sa disponibilité et de prêter son concours à la recherche d'un cessez-le-feu, qui ne pouvait réussir qu'avec l'accord de toutes les parties. Envoyer sur place une force d'interposition ou d'intervention était clairement irréaliste, sans bases juridiques, et soulevait le même type de problèmes que ceux qu'on a mentionnés à propos de la CSCE. Il y avait simplement une démonstration négative à faire, qui a été réalisée avec l'échec d'une proposition franco-allemande.

En revanche, ces réponses immédiates, même limitées ou négatives, présentaient pour la Communauté un double avantage. D'un côté, se saisir de la question permettait de contenir une dérive interétatique du conflit, en retenant l'intérêt et l'attention des autres pays de la région, et en les dissuadant d'intervenir pour leur compte. De l'autre, la Communauté sauvegardait son unité, qui risquait d'être mise en péril par les sympathies contradictoires que suscite la crise yougoslave. On a ainsi notamment évité la reconnaissance prématurée de certaines entités ayant déclaré leur indépendance et adopté la même ligne de conduite qu'à l'égard des République baltes.

Ainsi, marquant son intérêt, conservant une attitude objective, définissant des procédures offertes aux parties, la Communauté conservait sa capacité à agir pour un règlement à long terme. Sur ce plan, la Conférence de Paix, voire l'arbitrage seront peut être en définitive efficaces. En toute hypothèse, ils tracent une voie, ils projettent un mode de solution pacifique dans l'avenir en dépassant le présent, ou en faisant l'impasse sur lui. C'est autant un symbole qu'une action, une fuite en avant qu'un calcul délibéré, mais ils préservent tant les principes de la Communauté que sa capacité ultérieure. Il est bien clair que dans une Europe qui se

décompose avant de se reconstruire, la Communauté constitue - comme l'OTAN sur un autre plan - un pôle stabilisateur et virtuellement organisateur. Mais pour conserver cette capacité elle doit avant tout se préserver et ne pas s'engager sans bases et sans moyens au-delà de ses possibilités immédiates.

Carences des solutions régionales

On vise par là des tentatives et propositions provenant du cadre balkanique lui-même. On a certes mentionné diverses initiatives tendant à renforcer la sécurité des pays de l'Europe du Sud-Est dans un cadre interétatique classique. Mais, sans que leur intérêt à plus long terme soit affecté, ces propositions - mesures de confiance, zones exemptes d'armes nucléaires ou de destruction massive - sont en porte-à-faux par rapport aux formes nouvelles et multiples que revêtent désormais les problèmes de sécurité dans cette région. Elles répondent davantage à la situation créée par le vide résultant de la disparition du Pacte de Varsovie, par l'accord FCE, et par la subsistance de contentieux, voire de tensions, entre Etats voisins. Vide et tensions qui suscitent le besoin d'un nouveau cadre, encore à définir et dont le contenu apparaît toujours indéfini. Son absence aujourd'hui évidente risque de conduire les Etats concernés à rechercher des solutions alternatives chacun pour son compte, et à provoquer un nouvel éclatement de l'Europe balkanique qui resterait une simple expression géographique.

1. Le cadre géographique et politique de l'Europe du Sud-Est demeure en effet problématique et au mieux à géométrie variable. On l'a dit, certains pays sont membres de l'OTAN, un est membre de la Communauté, d'autres peuvent aspirer à le devenir ou à y être associés, d'autres sont non alignés ou en rupture d'alliance et cherchent de nouvelles voies, tant internes qu'internationales. Dans ces conditions, faut-il retenir le cadre à six qu'est celui de la Coopération balkanique naissante ou le reformuler dans un contexte plus large? Incorporer Chypre, éventuellement la Moldavie si son indépendance se confirme, voire étendre la coopération vers l'Europe caucasienne? Quelle place faire aux pays d'Europe centrale, souvent affectés par les mêmes problèmes? Faut-il superposer des instances multiples à objets spéciaux, par exemple pour l'Europe danubienne, les riverains de la mer Noire - y compris la Russie? Quelle place alors faire à la Pentagonale devenue Hexagonale? Le coma peut être provisoire de l'Europe d'Helsinki ne permet guère pour l'instant de définir des sous-ensembles régionaux qui en décentraliseraient les principes et les procédures, et la force d'attraction de la Communauté s'exerce à cet égard de façon plutôt négative. Est-ce une chance pour le thème de la Confédération, qui en toute hypothèse déborderait largement de l'Europe balkanique, mais n'a encore trouvé ni son idée force ni sa dynamique?

2. Les différents Etats concernés peuvent être alors tentés par le cavalier seul. Il les conduit d'abord à la bilatéralisation des problèmes et des relations, chacun considérant son contentieux avec ses voisins immédiats et n'envisageant de le régler qu'avec eux, sans interférence d'un cadre balkanique plus large: ainsi pour la Grèce et la Turquie, la Bulgarie et la Turquie, l'Albanie et la Yougoslavie. Les problèmes d'ampleur plus large et dont les implications concernent tous ces Etats ne peuvent dès lors être traités dans un cadre balkanique plus large, comme le démontre d'exemple de la Yougoslavie. Cette impuissance comporte toutefois un élément positif qui est l'abstention à cet égard des Etats voisins, alors qu'une intervention de leur part ne pourrait sans doute que compliquer la situation voire entraîner un risque très réel de conflit.

Ensuite, les plus puissants - ou les plus extérieurs au cadre balkanique - de ces Etats peuvent développer leurs propres solidarités. C'est principalement le cas pour la Turquie, qui a vocation à être une puissance régionale et ceci au carrefour de plusieurs régions dont les problèmes de sécurité sont aigus à des titres divers: L'Europe balkanique certes, mais aussi le proche et le moyen orient, voire certaines républiques de l'URSS, en même temps que la mer Noire et l'ensemble méditerranéen. Il est clair que la Turquie occupe à beaucoup d'égards une position centrale, comme est centrale pour elle et pour l'Alliance son appartenance à l'OTAN.

3. Le risque pour l'Europe du Sud-Est est dès lors d'être marginalisée, éclatée et largement ignorée. Si les propositions extérieures, si les modes de règlement pacifique sont rejetés ou inefficaces, peut se développer, même empiriquement, une politique du cordon sanitaire qui tendrait à l'éloigner et à l'isoler dans l'affrontement interne autour de ses propres problèmes. Il est probable que la politique aventurée qui tenterait d'impliquer l'Europe dans ces affrontements et de la contraindre à prendre parti pour un camp ou pour un autre serait vouée à l'échec. Cet échec est même souhaitable compte-tenu des conséquences négatives qui en résulteraient pour l'Europe toute entière. Certains aspects du problème yougoslave, mais aussi du problème albanais, ont montré que la politique du cordon sanitaire ou du repli était possible.

Elle mènerait à un processus de tiers-mondisation de l'Europe du Sud-Est, avec des confits endémiques liés à une stagnation voire à une régression économique. On s'efforcerait simplement d'en contrôler l'intensité et d'en réduire les conséquences, sans perspective de solution sur le fond. Les Balkans ne seraient plus une poudrière comme ils le sont encore dans la mémoire collective de l'Europe, mais plutôt une sorte de trou noir, dont on sait qu'il absorbe toute énergie qui passe à sa portée et ne reflète ni ne restitue la lumière qu'on lui apporte. Situation qui place les pays concernés devant leurs propres responsabilités, face à eux mêmes et à l'égard de l'Europe toute entière: ce trou noir pourrait fort bien avaler les espérances d'Helsinki et la Charte de Paris. Situation qui en même temps illustre cette vérité permanente et aujourd'hui très présente: on ne peut rien construire de durable sur la contrainte ni rien reconstruire sur cette base.

The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$. In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.2) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.2) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.2) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

In the second part of the paper, we study the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ for a fixed value of t . In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.3) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.3) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.3) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

In the third part of the paper, we study the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ for a fixed value of x . In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.4) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.4) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.4) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

The asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ is studied in the fourth part of the paper. In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.5) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.5) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.5) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

The asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ is studied in the fifth part of the paper. In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.6) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.6) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.6) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

The asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ is studied in the sixth part of the paper. In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.7) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.7) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.7) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

The asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ is studied in the seventh part of the paper. In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.8) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.8) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.8) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

The asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ is studied in the eighth part of the paper. In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.9) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.9) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.9) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

The asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ is studied in the ninth part of the paper. In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.10) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.10) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.10) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

The asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1.1) as $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$ is studied in the tenth part of the paper. In this case, the system (1.1) is reduced to the system (1.11) which is a system of ordinary differential equations. The solutions of (1.11) are obtained by the method of variation of constants. The asymptotic expansion of the solutions of (1.1) is then obtained by substituting the solutions of (1.11) into (1.1) and expanding in powers of ϵ .

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