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Preface

For the last five years, the political scene in Europe has been tumultuous. Once again, major armed conflicts are being waged on European soil. Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has been changed and enlarged to encompass new aspects of military security, but also various non-military considerations.

It was a very unfortunate historical circumstance that the European Community - now the European Union - got into serious economic and political difficulties precisely at the time when the great transitions in the East began. Still, considerable activity has been unfolding in two arenas: the EU/WEU/CSCE and NATO/NACC/CSCE. The latter represents an Atlantic touch to European affairs, the former a more distinctly European orientation. To some degree they have been complementary - both being oriented towards the countries in the east and their problems - to some degree they have been competitive. Basically, the question has not been who is going to defend Western Europe - there is no real competition on defending what is not threatened - but who is going to have the political leadership in Europe. The question has also been how best to relate to Russia, and how to include the East European countries and the countries of the former Soviet Union in a new European system of security and cooperation. Last but not least, the question has been how to deal with the armed conflicts revisiting the region.

In 1993, 34 major armed conflicts were being waged in the world. For some years, this number has remained about the same. Europe is the only region where the number has increased. They were all internal conflicts of great complexity, calling for a wide range of measures for conflict resolution as well as for the protection of international rules, norms and standards. When the UN Secretary General met with regional security organizations recently, five out of 10 were European. How can the performance of these institutions be improved; what is the likely division of labour between them; and what should be the relationship between the world organization and the regional institutions? One thing is certain: unless the security organizations can demonstrate their utility when acute security problems occur, their legitimacy is bound to suffer.

What are the new perspectives on European security, in terms of problems and in terms of responses? The present Research Report addresses these questions. It has been written by Professor Victor-Yves Ghebali and Ms Brigitte Sauerwein. Professor Ghebali teaches at the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales (IUHEI) in Geneva, and is a renowned specialist on European

affairs in general and on the CSCE in particular. Ms Sauerwein is an expert in the field of security and disarmament. She has published extensively in international scientific journals. The Project was initiated and organized by Professor Serge Sur, Deputy Director of UNIDIR.

To assist in the preparation of the Report, several experts were asked to elaborate on specific aspects of the project. These contributions were published separately, in the form of UNIDIR Papers: *Migration and Population Change in Europe*, by John Salt (No 19, 1993); *La sécurité européenne dans les années 90, défis et perspectives. La dimension écologique*, by Jean-Daniel Clavel (No 20, 1993); *Les minorités nationales et le défi de la sécurité en Europe*, by Dominique Rosenberg (No 21, 1993); *Crisis in the Balkans*, by Ali L. Karaosmanoglu (No 22, 1993); *La transition vers l'économie de marché des pays "ex de l'Est"*, by Louis Pilandon (No 23, 1994); and *Le désarmement et la conversion de l'industrie militaire en Russie*, by Sonia Ben Ouagrham (No 24, 1993).

A first draft of this Research Report was discussed by an international group of experts which met in Geneva, 13-14 September 1993. The participants were Professor Gheballi, Ms Sauerwein and Professor Sur, Mr Jean-Daniel Clavel (Switzerland), Mr Ignac Golob (Slovenia), Ms Chantal de Jonge Oudraat (UNIDIR), Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu (Turkey), Professor Louis Pilandon (France), Mr Andrei Raevsky (UNIDIR), Professor Dominique Rosenberg (France), Mr Igor Scherbak (Russian Federation), and Mr Théodore Winkler (Switzerland). Each expert participated in his/her personal capacity. In addition, several meetings took place between the authors and the Director of UNIDIR.

UNIDIR extends its warm thanks to the authors of the Research Report, to all the other contributors to the project, and to Anita Blétry, UNIDIR's technical editor, who prepared the manuscript for publication. Our gratitude goes, furthermore, to the governments of France and Switzerland and to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP, Washington), whose generous financial support made this project possible.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed in the Report: they are those of the authors. However, UNIDIR considers that the Report merits publication, and so we recommend it to the attention of our readers.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director
UNIDIR

Avant-Propos

The changes which have affected Europe in the last few years are unprecedented. Consequently, the problems of security on the continent must be considered in a completely new light.

The changes are striking, first of all, because of the way in which they have come about. Largely speaking, in sharp contrast with the upheavals that Europe had previously experienced in the twentieth century, they have been effected peacefully. The earlier transformations were the result of conflicts, 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, which began in Europe but then spread throughout the world. The close link which normally exists between international change and violence has thus been broken. This link reflects the traditional inability of the established mechanisms to control the evolution of world society, in which change seems inevitably to entail upheaval. Though they may have been peaceful, however, the recent changes have not been kept under control, and that is another surprise, because where changes have been peaceful, even if rapid, they have been shaped by an overall strategic approach and design. For example, decolonization was anything but a smooth and well-planned process. However, a great deal of thought was given to it, and attempts were made to guide the process, which made it more generally acceptable. This time, however, things were completely different. Two events, the reunification of Germany and the breakup of the USSR, which occurred almost simultaneously, following the opening of the Berlin Wall in 1989, set off a rapid and irreversible transformation of the situation which had previously existed in Europe.

The changes are also striking in terms of their consequences: a geopolitical shake-up, with no hope of restoring order in the foreseeable future. On the previous occasions, the process of overcoming divisions and re-establishing balanced structures was both more rapid and more ambitious. After 1918, the League of Nations was set up, the first major political and security organization of a universal nature. It failed for various reasons, some of which were internal whilst others were external. But an overall conception of a new world order and a common intention to achieve it did exist. It would no doubt have been viable if those it was meant to benefit had not themselves abandoned it. After 1945, the setting up of the United Nations was a response to the vast changes resulting from the Second World War. It survived the vicissitudes of the cold war, guided the process of decolonization and welcomed the new States resulting from that process

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thereby facilitating their integration into the international community. Admittedly, such situations are scarcely comparable to the one currently facing Europe. Firstly, the continent does not have to cope today with human and material destruction on a massive scale, and secondly, it is still largely made up of old States noted for their solid internal and international stability and their wealth of diplomatic experience. But this third post-war period without a war has resulted in general uncertainty regarding security and in response offers only reactions and projects characterized by anxiety and modesty. Far from being the end of history, this period represents the return of history, as heritage and presence of the past on the one hand, and also as event or accident, history that is synonymous with insecurity on the other hand.

Uncertainties Regarding Security

These are due first of all to an intellectual problem, which is also a political one, i.e. the inability to foresee the future, at least a lack of prescience. This was already evident in the failure to foresee recent changes. The uncertainties are also seen in the broadening or decentralization of the very notion of security, or of the sources of insecurity. Such broadening goes hand in hand with the wider geographical distribution of the problems, with their ubiquitous nature, with the fact that they are not restricted to a given location or a precise area.

1. Failure to predict future developments. This must lead experts and researchers to ask themselves questions. The rapid changes experienced in Europe took everyone by surprise and met with an improvised response. The institutional and diplomatic frameworks emerging from the cold war appeared to be reliable, and the alternation between periods of cold war and of detente did not really put them to the test. People moved quite flexibly from one situation to the other, so that the process could have continued indefinitely. The task of overcoming the underlying divisions could be postponed to the far distant future. The CSCE process itself, at least in the minds of its promoters and participants, was not intended to bring about upheavals of a political or ideological nature. It was designed in a more limited fashion to develop coexistence in a climate of mutual trust, paving the way through confidence-building measures to lessen the possibility of a military confrontation. Even if it sought to achieve stability, it did not prevent competition between the two systems, nor did it prevent the arms race in areas outside its control, especially the nuclear and technological fields.

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However, it was this narrow approach of confidence-building measures, and arms control and reduction which was the first omen of the recent upheavals. And yet the question still remains: was it the CSCE process which progressively undermined the solidity of the socialist camp and exposed its weaknesses? Or was it on the contrary the partial return to the cold war at the beginning of the 1980s? Was it a subtle combination of the two? Or was it a question of internal factors specific to the USSR and the socialist camp? The failure to foresee events carried over into uncertainty about the explanation for them, as if hindsight were just as difficult as foresight. The transition from a period of structural stability, albeit unsatisfactory, to one of structural instability was thus not foreseen. Neither was the extent of the changes, or the chain of consequences that would follow. This inability to see what was coming explains the resistance, albeit timid and limited, to the reunification of Germany, just as it explains the widespread preference for maintaining a stable USSR, and also the vague attempts to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia - caused not so much by attachment to the old order as by the difficulty, primarily intellectual, but also political, of grasping the implications of accepting the idea of its disappearance.

It was as if people's mind were seeking to catch up with events, continually forestalled by them and trying to get a grip on them, whilst the events themselves were continually overtaken. This was a fundamental problem for all institutions working in the field of analysis and forecasting, particularly in Europe and North America. Neither public organizations nor private institutes grasped the depth or extent of the events which laid the ground for and then precipitated these rapid upheavals. No doubt too preoccupied with immediate events on the world stage and troubled by their own internal difficulties, politicians also lacked the historical vision which would have been indispensable. The conclusions to be drawn are largely negative. In spite of the number and quality of experts and researchers, and of the means of obtaining information they currently have at their disposal, little progress has been made in this field since the nineteenth century. Questions must thus be asked about the tools and criteria used to assess and interpret events. On the one hand, we have a plethora of micro-analyses, a concern with the immediate situation, recognizing the complexity and interdependence of a variety of phenomena that one may try to analyze without being able to establish the hierarchy or direction of events; on the other hand, we find reference is being made to concepts of systems analysis which place the emphasis on elements of stability, on conditions for the harmonious operation of international relations, beyond immediate or local events.

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These two apparently contrasting approaches are much more complementary than contradictory. The appraisal of current events is in fact counterbalanced by the consideration of fixed structures, static models and constants which absorb minor changes. However, this still leaves a gap as far as looking into the future is concerned. Prospective analyses, which should make the connection between the two, were very much in fashion a few decades ago. Their decline began first in the field of economics, as a result of successive crises, and then extended to the spheres of politics and security. It appears that, as in certain scientific disciplines, the study of international relations would in future need a disaster theory, seeking to identify apparently insignificant tendencies which may eventually threaten the most stable structures and to achieve better evaluation of the risks. No deliberate attempt to plan preventive action or develop a stabilization mechanism can be effective without the support of these types of research tools, which are still in their infancy.

2. Broadening of the content of the notion of security. The failure to foresee and predict future events, a subjective factor, is reinforced by an objective element, i.e. the way in which the very notion of international security is becoming more diffuse and decentralized. It is no longer limited to military concerns. Indeed, the role played by weapons, defence needs and the capacity and need for a country to take action outside its borders have not disappeared. It would be vain to expect that the new situation would escape from the grim necessity of power, of which the military component remains and will remain an inseparable part. But in addition to these traditional issues, there are new problems which are not so much a matter of power than of a lack of power: they are the non-military aspects of security, resulting from political, economic and social weakness and instability. Their persistence may eventually force them to be considered in military terms, such is the extent to which the military dimension compensates for the ineffectiveness of political approaches and general attempts at prevention.

- The *military aspects* include various possibilities of open violence, of which the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is the most extensive and dramatic example. They also cover various matters of a more peaceful nature, concerning the implementation of agreements and instruments on disarmament.


The conflict in the former Yugoslavia certainly haunts Europeans, who find it intolerable. It bears witness to the real risk faced by the continent and underlines its inability to prevent them from developing, or to react effectively in the face of aggressive behaviour and suffering on the part of the peoples involved. However, over and above any legitimate emotion and desire to normalize the

Mediterranean the epicentre of tension? Are the old ideological battles to be substituted by more deeply rooted cultural conflicts? Are not the problems on the periphery ultimately more serious and threatening than those in the centre? In a less localized and more general way, how are the political, economic, social, cultural, ideological and national contradictions likely to evolve in the future? Whatever the case may be, it would be rash to disregard some of the issues in favour of others. The challenges in terms of security are manifold and are springing up on all sides. And yet, or rather because of that, the only response so far has been in the form of local or ad hoc adjustments, makeshift affairs with no organized plan.

Modesty of Responses and Projects

One can only be struck by the contrast between the scale of the changes and the feebleness of the international endeavours undertaken to adapt to them. They are disparate, sporadic, usually limited in scope and uncoordinated; a mixture of hope, anxiety and passivity is their dominant feature. There has been no major conference or institution, as after 1815, 1918 or 1945, no overall plan or programme to define a "New European Order". It would, indeed, have been the first of its kind in history, Europe having always been characterized by a degree of disorder - sometimes friendly, more often violent. Most of the existing institutions, caught off balance by outside events, have kept going and are seeking a new role. If any effort at reorganization is actually being made, it is taking its time and proceeding on a pragmatic basis. But what may appear to be a lack of thought, ambition, will or means may also be seen as a form of wisdom. The inability to control events leads to legitimate caution. It would be pointless to seek refuge in high-sounding statements or to set up institutions or mechanisms that were simply for show. In the current circumstances and in the foreseeable future, Europe's major need is tools for the analysis, early warning and management of crises.

1. **Lack of an overall plan.** This may be surprising in a continent which has always demonstrated great creative imagination for institutions and shown its ability to adapt rapidly to the biggest political changes. In terms of the most recent period alone, in the space of a few years and in particularly difficult conditions, organizations such as NATO or the European Community were set up and the consequences of decolonization were overcome. Is Europe short of inventiveness or out of breath, or is the general lack of strength which afflicts public institutions



In spite of their intrinsic limits and their relative inability to adapt to the new situation, the institutions nevertheless have great merits. First of all, they exist. Thus the CSCE, in spite of its current inadequacies, offers a permanent means of contact, and in its tensions and contradictions, if they cannot automatically be resolved, can at least express themselves peacefully, so that States can avoid misconceptions and misunderstandings, whilst endeavouring to establish an atmosphere of mutual trust. This is the effect of the milieu, of the context of multilateral diplomacy, which is the minimum input provided by all international organizations. On a different level, NATO represents a pole of stability which no one wishes to see disappear. As for the European Union, it has probably made the biggest effort to adapt, firstly by reforming itself through the Maastricht Treaty, and then by enlarging its membership to 15, as a prelude to the establishment of a new kind of balance.

The tension and ambiguity which have always characterized the construction of the Community - between an interstate system and integration, between a Europe of nation States and the prospect of federation - and which are reflected in the double process of deepening and expansion, continue to exist. But the process of building the European Union has always progressed through a succession of crises, which have in the end been resolved to its advantage. Constructive ambiguity will most probably continue, and the question of the final aim remains open: a multi-track Europe, simply a broad and loose framework for cooperation, or a new model of economic, political and security organization, going beyond individual States, without absorbing them, but possessing power of its own?

In more general terms, the multiplicity of institutions is not necessarily a sign of anarchy. On the one hand, each of them can claim to have its own particular field and its own particular purpose. On the other, it may be a good thing for a certain degree of competition to develop between them, in accordance with their particular capacities. They can be used in different ways, and competition between them will make it possible to decide which are the most suitable to carry out certain duties. For example, the Council of Europe plays an irreplaceable role in the democratization of national institutions and the development of the techniques by which a State establishes the rule of law. The European Union will in any case remain a powerful centre of attraction in economic terms. There is competition between NATO, WEU, the European Union and the CSCE in the

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analysis mechanism keeping watch for them. In this regard, international and even transnational cooperation is highly desirable, with the setting up, even on an informal basis, of private and public networks of experts and researchers who are able to ensure the circulation of information and its independent appraisal by different authorities. The development of early warning procedures should follow, so that the competent authorities can be made aware of the threats and risks in good time, thus encouraging the development of preventive diplomacy or systems of administrative and technical assistance, as appropriate. Finally, by drawing on experience of cases where things have gone wrong, lessons could be learnt with a view to improving the instruments and methods of crisis management, including peace-keeping and the ending of hostilities.

The CSCE undoubtedly has a special role to play in these areas, and it has begun to prepare itself for it. Whatever the framework chosen for action - be it universal, through the United Nations, or sub-regional, through NATO, WEU or even the CIS - everyone in Europe is affected by these emergency situations. With regard to armed hostilities in particular, it would be useful to have a classification of different types of conflicts according to their nature and their dimensions, in order to evolve a range of suitable responses and to mobilize in advance the facilities necessary to deal with them. These facilities will be less important and will cost less if the crises are tackled as soon as they break out. Of course, all situations are specific and reveal the shortcomings of preconceived plans in areas they have not covered. A crisis in itself is already a sign that the preventive mechanisms have failed. Hence, developing techniques for foreseeing crises and responding to them and setting up more and more emergency preparedness teams and peaceful military intervention forces does not dispense us from the need to find fundamental solutions, which may be slower, more complex, less spectacular, but in the end are the only ones likely to be effective.

Such solutions will be long term; only later will it be possible to evaluate the success of measures which will take time to produce results, and which in addition cannot be limited to State action. They presuppose the intervention of a large number of participants from different sources: public institutions, but also non-governmental organizations, research institutes, enterprises, mass media, and in general all the agents and means allowing the development of exchanges and communications. Governments have the capacity and duty to channel these resources by developing their infrastructures and facilitating their use. It would no doubt be unrealistic to envisage a common pan-European policy on telecommunications, infrastructures, transport and energy, or indeed on the

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environment. At the very least one can hope for a coordination of policies along those lines.

Such an opening up, not just of States' territories but also of their societies, entails risks, the true scale of which can now be seen: growth in organized crime, drug and arms trafficking, racketeering, and even terrorism, possibly concealed behind political motives; and also economic crimes, eroding national economies and quietly undermining, through the corruption associated with them, the stability of Governments. This is the price to be paid for the relaxation of national constraints and controls. The answer is not a simple one, and problems of this type are far from being limited to Europe. It may even have been spared the troubles of other regions, in the sense that they are connected with a weakening of the State, whereas the States of Europe were a set of established and apparently sound structures. The remedies include a mixture of coordinated national and international measures: the adaptation and strengthening of national criminal legislation and the independence of the judiciary on the one hand, and the development of police and judicial cooperation, together with greater checks on the origin and movement of capital, on the other. No State should be allowed to turn itself into a sanctuary: if there are any borders to be defended, they are moral ones.

- As regards the *spatial aspect*, a number of problems can also only be envisaged in the long term, and they defy attempts to impose a solution by fiat. The question at issue is what the new geography of European security is to be. There are several conceivable possibilities, but they remain tied to the legacy of the past, and in this area the future cannot be predicted by reference to history. A comprehensive way of considering them is to look at the future positions that might be occupied by the United States and Russia respectively.

For the *United States*, the answer depends both on that country itself and on the countries of Western Europe. More particularly, the question is largely one of the future of NATO. It seems clear that a degree of American disengagement is inevitable, already noticeable, and even desirable, since Europe cannot depend for ever on outside assistance in security matters when no threat exists to justify it. On the other hand, nobody wishes for a military or political withdrawal which will shatter the United States' influence. Its role should therefore lie somewhere between the two: disengagement without withdrawal, or vice versa. The level and speed of the process depend on various other considerations, apart from those relating to internal United States policy: firstly, the capability that the European Union may demonstrate to develop a common foreign and security policy,

in all these hypotheses, it is the role played by the States involved which is the most important, whether it be in terms of the stabilization and the development of the national societies that they embody, or in terms of the search for an agreed framework for international security. These questions, among others, are covered and analyzed at full length in the fruitful following Research Report.

January 1995

Serge Sur
Deputy Director, UNIDIR*

* The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of UNIDIR.

Introduction

Brigitte Sauerwein

The peaceful revolution of 1989 marked a turning point in European history. With the demise of Communism, heavily armed totalitarian regimes collapsed without bloodshed. The ideological East-West division was overcome without confrontation. However, expectations that freedom meant prosperity were quickly thwarted as were hopes that a new European order would emerge, like Phoenix from the ashes, from the shambles of the Cold War. Change, most welcome in itself, engendered instabilities in the process of democratization and the transition from command to market economies proved more arduous and costly than expected.

Despite some ominous signs that this century of European history may end the way it started - with grandiloquent declarations of peace contrasting sharply with fermenting turmoil - it would be simplistic to conclude that post-Communist Europe is drifting into a "new disorder". During periods of transition, some form of "creative destruction" - Joseph Schumpeter's attribute of capitalism - is inevitable.

In 1993, Europe, like much of the rest of the world, was going through a period of profound and rapid transformation. A slump in an increasingly interdependent world economy accompanied by high levels of unemployment shifted concerns from military matters to economic recovery, international trade being viewed as a possible panacea.

It is the object of this study to analyse recent events and discernible trends in view of probable or possible implications for European security. The authors do not undertake to make predictions about the shape of things to come -indeed, the faculty to read from a crystal ball is beyond their skills - but they will attempt to point out future developments that have an impact on European security. As the essential parameters of this undertaking, post-Cold War "Europe" and "security" have to be re-defined.

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A Europe "Whole and Free"?

In the euphoria following the end of the Cold War, the vision of a "Europe whole and free", drafted in NATO's London Declaration of July 1990,¹ was readily adopted as a baseline concept for what was then called a new European security architecture. While "free" is self-explanatory, "whole" implies both the end of the ideological East-West division of the Cold War and an entity. Perceived as a geographic or political entity, however, Europe is subject to interpretation.

In its east-west dimensions, Europe is singularly ill-defined. As a bicontinent, it shares a huge land mass with Asia from which it is inseparable and unseparated as no geographic landmark has stood the test of history as a true frontier. Europe's physical eastern outlines are blurred and for more than half of this century, the demarcation has been of ideological nature. To its west, on the contrary, the Atlantic Ocean clearly marks land's end. But the favours of geography are blotted out by the common values of liberal democracies which link the transatlantic community of nations.

The attempt to define Europe in political terms proves as excruciating. Europe may be justly defined as an area of shared political and cultural ideas, as a community of aspirations and institutions. However, the manifestations of this political commonality are diametrically opposed in the eastern and western parts of Europe: a gradual destitution of the nation-state under the Maastricht Treaty versus a vigorous restitution of the nation-state in post-Communist countries. While national identities of Western European states are embedded, and to some extent contained, in the framework of the European Union, no European identity has evolved which would have to be shared by central and eastern Europeans - who are as yet in the process of reasserting their long-denied national identities which had been suppressed under the former Communist regimes.

A Europe expeditiously defined in terms of CSCE (Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe) membership of meanwhile 53 states would be beyond the scope of this book and ignore historical and geographical facts. Addressed as a European, an Usbek might in fact be as much taken aback as a Canadian from Quebec. An even wider perception of Europe stretching from "the Atlantic to the Atlantic",² could lead to the conclusion that Europe is everywhere - except in

¹ London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, London, 5-6 July 1990.

² Dr Vladimir Petrovsky, UN Director General, in a lecture at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Affairs, 10 November 1993.

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former Yugoslavia (see map page 5). Like other analysts of European security,³ the authors have therefore adopted a more traditional approach: This book deals with Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals and from the Mediterranean to the Arctic region. The Transcaucasian Republics of the FSU (Former Soviet Union) are taken into account as a source of conflict as is the role of the United States as the leading nation of the Transatlantic Alliance and, for the time being, as the world's only remaining superpower.

New Dimensions of Security

Security is the freedom from threats, dangers or risks. For the purpose of this book, security is more specifically defined as "a condition in which states consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure and economic coercion so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress. The security of individuals and communities of which states are constituted is ensured by the guarantee and effective exercise of individual freedom, political, social and economic rights, as well as by the preservation or restoration of a liveable environment for present and future generations."⁴

The Military Dimension

Throughout the era of the Cold War, the perception of a military megathreat was so overwhelming that other aspects of security were neglected or ignored. Paradoxically, security was provided by the accumulation of military potentials sufficient to annihilate mankind several times. Although a perversion of militarily ensured security, nuclear deterrence on the basis of a mutually assured destruction (MAD), did function in preventing not only nuclear, but also conventional war in Europe. In the field of conventional armament, the need to keep up with the adversary led to an exhausting arms race which ended in deadlock.

Mikhail Gorbachev's *perestroika* stemmed from the realization that the efforts to achieve and maintain military superpower status had sapped the former Soviet Union's economic strength and that security ensured by military means alone was no longer affordable. The change in the Soviet approach to security enabled

³ Mortimer, Edward, European Security after the Cold War, *Adelphi Paper 271*, Summer 1992.
⁴ Fischer, Dietrich, *Nonmilitary Aspects of Security. A Systems Approach*, published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot), 1992, p.11.

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considerable progress in the fields of arms control and confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs) which became acceptable means of achieving security at a lower cost. However, the attempt to mend the Communist edifice made it collapse altogether.

With the disbanding of the former WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization), the demise of Communism and its totalitarian regimes and the advent of fledgling democracies in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and its Central-Eastern European allies, the perception of a military threat has diminished to the point that it seems to be virtually inexistant in the European theatre.

Obviously, the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme. Vast arsenals of weapons remain on European soil, and even after the full implementation of the CFE and the CFE1a Treaties on conventional arms and troop reductions, European armies will not be disarmed or disbanded. Arms available are arms that may be used, for instance in local clashes over ethnic or border disputes, or in the pursuit of territorial gains like in former Yugoslavia. Although Europeans may be loath to admit it - the Serbs have set a new precedent of using military force for the obtention of political goals.

This study will take into account the changes in the *military dimension* of security with its significant shift from confrontation to co-operation, the progress in arms control and confidence-building and the constraints imposed by shrinking defence budgets. It will address the increasing emphasis on peace-keeping and peacemaking and the question whether the soldier of the year 2000 and beyond will still be a conscript warrior or primarily a professional peace-keeper and humanitarian assistant.

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Europe

The Political Dimension

The political developments in post-Cold War Europe are characterized by two broad, diametrically opposed tendencies: supranational integration in the West as opposed to a disintegration of supranational and even national structures in the East. The *political dimension* of European security is multi-faceted and, paradoxically, closely related to risks inherent in the implementation of fundamental democratic and human rights. The process of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe has in turn raised the issue of self-determination which had been denied under the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Helsinki Final Act proclaims the - essentially conflicting principles - of both territorial integrity and "equal rights and self-determination of peoples". If self-determination overrides sovereignty, Central and Eastern Europe may disintegrate into dozens of small or midsize states. If state sovereignty is supreme, the failure to find political solutions to claims of self-determination may trigger an area-wide fire of armed inner-state conflicts. Although self-determination does not apply to minorities, the highly explosive issue of minorities is related and will be duly taken into account.

As democracy does not replace ideology, the demise of communism has left an ideological hangover for which nationalism is a dangerous alternative drug. Lastly, well established Western democracies show signs of wear-and-tear which manifest themselves most blatantly in a lack of leadership and the unwillingness of democratically elected governments to take imperative decisions which may be unpopular, i.e. cutbacks in social benefits which are no longer affordable. The reaction of a disillusioned electorate is a surge of crime and violence, increasingly vociferous calls for "law and order", an erosion of the traditional party landscape with a marked trend towards the extremes of the spectrum.

An important aspect of the political dimension of security, human rights and humanitarian issues have gained a new impetus with the end of the Cold War.

Both the 1990 Paris Charter and the 1992 Helsinki Document of the CSCE state that human rights issues are no longer "exclusively the internal affairs of the state concerned".⁵ As with self-determination, national sovereignty is at stake if interference by the international community in the case of gross and massive violations of human rights is admitted by international law, as claimed by UN

⁵ "The Challenges of Change", Helsinki Summit Declaration, paragraph 8, July 1992.

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Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali at the 1993 Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.

The Economic Dimension

Putting it in a nutshell, the *economic dimension* of security globally relates to the tensions created by an increasing difference in wealth and prosperity between nations, groups of nations or parts of the population of individual states. Economic differences are a major motive for migrations which may become an overwhelming security issue. While the arms race of the Cold War had been a heavy economic burden in East and West, it had also been a powerful economic *perpetuum mobile* that created thousands of jobs as ever more performing and sophisticated weaponry had to be produced to replace military hardware that became obsolete without being used.

Although disarmament does create a few jobs, the expected peace dividend failed to materialize. As unemployment rates kept climbing in the world's most prosperous industrial nations, creating considerable political pressure on governments and social tensions, the transition to market economies impoverished large parts of the population in a traditionally unprosperous Central and Eastern Europe, thus exacerbating existing economic differences.

As the process of transition from centrally planned to free market economies in Central and Eastern Europe is without precedent in nature, scope and possible security implications, this chapter will focus on the economic developments in Eastern Europe and in particular in Russia where imponderables cannot be measured by Western standards as in Central Europe.

The economic dimension of security is intimately linked with its political and human dimensions as the failure of economic reforms will foment social unrest. It may spur mass emigration and give rise to reactionary and nationalist trends which foster the advent of demagogues or dictators. Economic pressure or blackmail can also be used for external political purposes. The "energy weapon" which the FSU had threatened to use against former allies⁶ is meanwhile being wielded successfully by Russia against the Baltics and Ukraine.

The Environmental Dimension

⁶ Sauerwein, Brigitte, "Reforming Central-European Defense - neither vacuum nor buffer", *International Defense Review* 8/1991, pp.799-801.

Affecting public health and liveable space, environmental degradation can endanger the lives of thousands of people and spur mass emigration. Although pollution is generally not caused by any harmful intention - the environmental weapon was pioneered by Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War - but mostly by ignorance, neglect and reckless industrial growth, its effects may be as devastating as damage caused by military force, but longer lasting or irreparable. Environmental threats are of global nature and not a specifically European problem. Therefore general trends will be briefly examined with a focus on regional hazards, such as radioactive waste in the FSU which constitutes a new form of nuclear threat, especially for the nordic region of Europe.

The Geographic Dimension

The different dimensions of security are interdependent and overlapping. Just as the emphasis among the various dimensions of security has shifted from *the* military threat to military and non-military risks and dangers, so has the geographic focus. During the era of the Cold War, security concerns centered on Central Europe. With German unification and the end of the east-west division, a confrontation in Central Europe is virtually excluded. A new arc of crises reaches from the Baltic to the Balkans which are a hotbed of conflict. Tensions and sources of conflict - related, among others, to ethnic, nationality or border issues - are rife in the FSU. What promised to become a "whole" Europe in 1990, seemed to fall roughly into three zones of security by the end of 1993: a safe West, a highly unstable East and a war-fighting Southeast.

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Actors

As theaters have changed, so have the actors and their interplay. In the post-Cold War era, "interlocking" institutions proved to be "interblocking" as they all dismally failed in the crucial test case of the war in former Yugoslavia. Therefore this chapter deals with the non-institutionalized post-Cold war relationships between nation-states and their evolving roles. Will Europe be a partnership without leadership as the United States disengages due to domestic problems and economic priorities? Will the Franco-German partnership hold and will Russia form a strategic alliance with the United States? Will Ukraine be a stabilizing factor or a domino if Russia reasserts the hegemonial policy of its Soviet past? Will Europe remain bloc-free or are new blocs already being formed?

September 1994