

UNIDIR  
United Nations Institute  
for Disarmament Research  
Geneva

UNIDIR  
Institut des Nations Unies  
pour la recherche sur le désarmement  
Genève

# **Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990s**

## **Proceedings of the Sochi Conference** (22-24 March 1988)

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## **Le désarmement : Programme pour les années 90**

## **Actes de la Conférence de Sotchi** (22-24 mars 1988)

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## PREFACE

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research - UNIDIR - which has been in existence since October 1, 1980, was established by the General Assembly as an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations to carry out independent research on disarmament and related international security issues.

The work of the Institute, which is based on the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, aims at:

- Providing the International community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States, and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;
- Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;
- Assisting on-going negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;
- Carrying out more in-depth, forward looking and long-term research on disarmament so as to provide a general insight to the problems involved and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

The UNIDIR Statute refers significantly to "*arrangements for co-operation with other organizations and institutions active in the field of disarmament research which may be of assistance in the performance of the Institute's functions*". In pursuance of this UNIDIR has built up a network of such arrangements with a view to encouraging the flow of ideas and initiatives in the field of disarmament research. UNIDIR has also assisted in establishing a dialogue between the research community and the diplomatic community through the organization of Conferences, Symposia and Seminars.

The major developments in disarmament in recent months and the real prospect of further progress in the immediate future has led to a widely shared realization that the agenda of disarmament research must be re-examined. In UNIDIR's view this important task was best undertaken as a collective exercise by the disarmament research community. Hence the Sochi Conference of Disarmament Research Institutes was organized from March 22-24, 1988. Its proceedings have fulfilled our expectations and justify their publication.

This publication is also conceived as a UNIDIR contribution to the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD III) to be held in New York from May 31 to June 25. In our endeavour to ensure the availability of this publication in time for SSOD III it has, regretfully, been necessary to exclude the interventions of participants who did not send us their corrected proofs in time.

UNIDIR customarily takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed by individual participants of the Conference. However, we do assume responsibility for determining that the Conference proceedings merit publication and, consequently, we commend this publication to its readers.

**Jayantha Dhanapala**  
Director, UNIDIR

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## INTRODUCTION

On behalf of UNIDIR, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to you all and to wish you a very pleasant stay here in Sochi. We are gratified that you have been able to accept our invitation to be present at this Conference of Directors and Representatives of Research Institutes in the field of disarmament and related issues despite your busy schedules. Many of you have travelled for many hours over long distances to be with us here. Over the next three days we will have a unique opportunity of exchanging ideas and views on the theme of our Conference "*Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990's*". This exchange is an indispensable process in the task of intellectual inquiry and scholarly research.

The idea of a Conference of Directors of Research Institutes on Disarmament is not new. In November 1981, on the initiative of the newly established UNIDIR, a Conference was convened in Geneva. Its objectives were to strengthen international co-operation in the field of disarmament research, to explore ways and means for the optimum use of the material and intellectual resources available, to avoid unnecessary duplication and to strengthen the impact of research on governmental policies as well as on deliberations and negotiations in the field of disarmament. More than 50 representatives of research institutes from different parts of the world, about 15 representatives of organizations from within the UN System together with observers from the Geneva diplomatic community and non-governmental organizations participated in this conference. The Conference was held a few months before the Second Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and was welcomed as a timely initiative. Among the achievements of the Conference was the recognition of the importance of promoting autonomous disarmament research in developing countries as a step towards diversifying our perspectives on the issues concerned.

The success of that First Conference led to a consensus that such conferences should be convened more regularly by UNIDIR in the future. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons this has not been possible but we have, seven years later, succeeded in organizing this Conference. Despite the lapse of some years we meet at an opportune moment. The international climate has been improving steadily with positive developments in bilateral US-USSR arms negotiations. The conclusion of the INF Treaty in December last year has been acclaimed as a first step with the potential of stimulating further agreements and has engendered a rethinking of orthodox strategies and the revision of basic premises. In the multilateral scene while no similar progress can be pointed to the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is to be held from May 31 to June 25 and provides all member states with an opportunity to discuss and agree on a common platform.

The theme of our Conference is the preparation of the Disarmament Research Agenda for the next decade before we enter in the next century. The present decade has witnessed the escalation of the arms race to unprecedented levels including the threat of new types of weapons and the extension of the arms race to outer space. It has also witnessed, after a long interval of time, an important agreement abolishing an entire category of nuclear weapons. What will the agenda of disarmament be in the next decade and how can we as disarmament institutes contribute to that? In providing the answers to these questions we will review the current state of disarmament research evaluating our achievements and current activities. We will identify the priorities for the next decade. We will

discuss ways and means of strengthening the co-operation amongst our institutes with particular reference to assisting in the growth of indigenous research in developing countries. Finally it is my hope that we will together identify the contribution we can make towards the success of the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

A basic feature of our discussions concerns the role of the disarmament research worker. Coming as I do from the field of diplomacy I have been concerned over the gap that appears to exist between the diplomatic community and the academic research community. It is a gap which UNIDIR has frequently attempted to bridge through Conferences in which representatives of both communities are represented and through other activities. I am deeply convinced that the progress of disarmament is linked to the harnessing of the best efforts of both the diplomatic and academic communities. For its part the research community has an obligation to relate its work to the political agenda of its time and yet must seek to influence that agenda. This Conference presents us with such an opportunity. As with all international Conferences this will undoubtedly produce lively and varied opinions. We shall not attempt to pin them down in the form of conclusions. At the same time, I am sure that the ideas that emerge during the discussions will be of great value to UNIDIR and, I hope, to all others present here.

UNIDIR's own efforts to strengthen co-operation amongst institutes working in the field of disarmament research are not confined to the organization of Conferences of this nature. You will receive copies of the first issue of the UNIDIR Newsletter and we would appreciate your assistance in making this venture a success. We will also give you our questionnaire in pursuit of a survey conducted by UNIDIR on the priorities for disarmament research in the next decade. A section of the Conference Hall has also been set aside for the display of research material from different institutes.

In conclusion I would like to thank all of you for your presence here. UNIDIR is proud to have been able to assemble such a group of eminent representatives of the research community. I wish also to thank the Government of the USSR for its generous contribution to UNIDIR in financing this Conference and hosting it; to our friends in IMEMO who have co-operated closely with us in the planning and organization of this Conference; to the local authorities in Sochi for their splendid hospitality and the excellent arrangements made for us; and to the staff of this Hotel. I have of course a special word of thanks to my colleagues in UNIDIR who have worked tirelessly for many months in preparing this Conference.

Jayantha Dhanapala  
Director, UNIDIR

**FIRST/PREMIÈRE SESSION**

**THE ROLE OF RESEARCH INSTITUTES IN DISARMAMENT/LE RÔLE DES INSTITUTS DE RECHERCHE SUR  
LE DÉSARMEMENT**

**REPORTS/RAPPORTS:**

John Edwin Mroz, Wang Shu

**DISCUSSION:**

Joseph Rotblat, Kamal Matinuddin, Milan Sahovic, Marco Carnovale, William C. Potter,  
Douglas M. Johnston

**CHAIRMAN/PRÉSIDENT:**

Oleg Bykov



## REPORT

JOHN EDWIN MROZ

### I. INTRODUCTION

#### A. THE BEGINNING OF A DISARMAMENT PROCESS

This UNIDIR Conference takes place at a particularly important time in the history of relations between East and West. After decades of explosive military spending and a seemingly unstoppable arms race, it is now possible to reverse this process, reorient our national priorities and change the nature of the competition between the two social systems to the non-military sphere. We might begin our deliberations in Sochi by asking whether our American, Soviet, European and Third World colleagues can all agree that we have reached a crossroads in efforts to achieve disarmament. If so, we might focus discussion on what priorities should be established by research institutions that would move the disarmament process forward?

The successful conclusion of an INF Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union is the first step of an important new process, albeit a fragile one -- a disarmament process. This UNIDIR conference provides us with an opportunity to consider the responsibilities and opportunities which our institutions must take to further this process.

The improvement of US-Soviet relations over the past three years has created an environment conducive to beginning actual reduction and elimination of weapons. The INF Agreement stands as a model of what can be achieved in the field of disarmament. The importance of this Agreement being ratified by the U.S. Senate and strictly observed by both parties is critical to future progress in the disarmament field. In the aftermath of the INF Treaty, the mistrust and hostility of some fifty years between the United States and the Soviet Union can only be mitigated by the successful implementation of all of the agreed provisions of this Treaty.

Although progress in multilateral disarmament fora, including Vienna and Geneva, has not been as impressive as the results of bilateral US-Soviet negotiations, there is a heightened sense of expectation today that long-standing deadlocks can be broken and worthwhile agreements reached. The attention given to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's September 17, 1987 *Pravda* article on multilateralism, "*The Realities and Guarantees of a Secure World*" has revived this field considerably (1). This emphasis on multilateralism is particularly important as the small and medium states play an increasingly important role in the search for an improved international security system.

Not all of the changes which have made the newly established disarmament process possible have been in the military arena. The significant economic difficulties with which both the US and the Soviet Union have been confronted in the 1980s, albeit of different causes and nature, have contributed greatly toward a new attitude about disarmament in both East and West. This attitude can be characterized as a belief that increased military spending has not made either

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1. The interest caused by this change in Soviet attitude has led to several new projects on multilateralism including a major two-year project at the Institute for East-West Security Studies to bring together an interdisciplinary group of specialists from East and West to respond to and develop new multilateral opportunities for improving the security of East and West in the 1990s.

side more secure and that a shift of the competition from the military sphere to economic, political and diplomatic spheres is possible. This is particularly true with public opinion, the emergence of strong Soviet leadership capable of new thinking, and the revitalization of a number of existing Western ideas (such as global interdependence) which have been made timely and relevant by Mr. Gorbachev's leadership.

The changes which have taken place over the past several years have dramatically begun to alter the agenda, priorities and scope of research work at many of our institutions. Directors of Western, particularly American, research institutions will remember that not many years ago the very word "*disarmament*", when used without the words "*arms control*" was considered to be an unacceptable way of describing the field. Following the Geneva and Reykjavik Summits, the prospect for arms reduction agreements rather than the arms control agreements of the past, gave new credibility to the term "*disarmament*". Similarly, two years ago it was considered totally unrealistic in many research institutions to suggest a 50% reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. As we prepare for a Moscow Summit later this spring, such a reduction is now widely accepted as the second step in the disarmament process.

To consolidate these significant developments, the research community must redouble its efforts to deal with the problems of disarmament in as non-polemical and scientific way possible. We must demonstrate leadership in dealing with the broader questions which will emerge as new problems arise, including many that are now unanticipated by the policy community and are associated with more extensive disarmament steps. An unexpected problem between the two leading nuclear powers could terminate the disarmament process and rekindle the arms race. It is the fragility of this new process that places a particular responsibility on our research efforts. There is a great deal which our institutions can contribute to consolidating and institutionalizing this process.

We must guard against losing sight of the longer term issues and the interdisciplinary implications of certain disarmament measures. For example, major conventional force reductions will have a significant impact on domestic economies, labor forces, alliance relations and public opinion. Such agreements would compel societies to rethink the allocation of resources within the society, and perhaps more fundamentally, the way they see and define their security. It will also force them to rethink their international role and posture.

Recent developments in the disarmament field, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union can be viewed as opportunities and challenges to our research institutions.

## B. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The International system of the late 1980s is marked by its multipolarity, the complexity of the global interrelationship of issues and the strains on its international institutions (GATT, United Nations etc.). Technological breakthroughs, the shift of important proportions of financial and economic power to Asia as well as global environmental, health and demographic issues have begun to affect the way in which the leadership of our nations view the world. The increasingly interdependent world of the 1980s and 1990s necessitates new approaches to addressing the way people and nations see themselves as secure. The US and the Soviet Union have one overriding common interest -- to avoid nuclear war. But there are other mutual interests as well. The zero-sum game approach to relations between states is an increasingly inadequate way to guarantee any nations's security.

Arms control and disarmament specialists have lived through several decades where their views were largely relegated to the theoretical rather than the policy realm. We talked largely to ourselves. Whereas some of the reasons are of our own making, it has been largely due to the political environment in which we have had to work. Bold approaches to ending the arms race were often couched in highly polemic and thus completely unacceptable terms. Leaders assessed their security in terms of quantity and quality of weapons and manpower. In negotiations where the core security interests of states were involved, such as the SALT negotiations, the research community was by and large standing on the outside looking in, with both the conceptual and practical work being carried out within the bureaucracies of the two governments involved.

In the world of multilateral disarmament, after the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, issues which were being addressed were moving forward so slowly, that only a few outside experts were prepared to devote the time to monitoring many of the seemingly obscure subjects under negotiation. The advent of perestroika, glasnost and new thinking in the Soviet Union has done much to radically changed this situation (2).

Mr. Gorbachev has introduced a new and much-needed dynamism into the Soviet Union's approach to arms control and disarmament, especially in the area of verification, evidenced by the Stockholm agreement of November 1986 and the verification provisions of the INF Treaty. This new factor has been matched on the Western side by a willingness to embrace substantial reductions in the number of weapon systems deployed, both in the reductions in the number of weapon systems deployed, both in the context of the INF Treaty and in any future START agreement. Both sides have stated their intention to abolish chemical weapons, drastically reduce conventional weapons and establish more foolproof verification arrangements.

This situation has opened up new possibilities for research institutes to have an immediate and large-scale impact on policy-makers in both East and West. The growing importance in our host country of such institutions as the Institute of the USA and Canada (SCShA) and the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) or in the West of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and other institutions demonstrates this fact. The intellectual leadership needs to be provided if we are to develop a new and all-embracing international security system which has at its core the lowering of the level of military-strategic parity. This task requires significant attention from our research community (3).

The indeterminacy of world politics, global interdependence, the possibility of general annihilation through nuclear war, and the underlying vitality and stability of the West have played roles in the new and more realistic Soviet approach to international affairs, in particular the disarmament area (4). For the first time, in several decades, Western governments are faced with the opportunity of restructuring their approach towards international security questions. The reduction in numbers of nuclear weapons, the putative negotiations on the reduction of

2. The speech of Mikhail Gorbachev on January 15, 1986 contained a three stage disarmament proposal, which was considered unrealistic in the West three years ago. The changes in East-West relations and attitudes toward defense policy have made the first two stages seem more possible. See John Edwin Mroz, *Podlinnoye Doveriye Vozhmozhno, Sovetskaya Rossiya*, February 2, 1988.

3. See for example Yevgeny Primakov, *"A Philosophy of Security. The 27th CPSU Congress: Elaborating a Foreign Policy Strategy"*, *Pravda*, 17 March 1986, p.6.

4. For a fuller discussion see Allen Lynch *The Soviet Study of International Relations*, Cambridge University Press 1987.

conventional forces, the elimination of chemical weapons and the significant reduction in the ideological diatribes which characterized the early 1980s all mean that the countries of the West must begin to consider the shape of the world in which the predominant international security concern might not be the adversarial relationship with the East. Whereas the difference of social systems and geopolitical interests will likely keep competition between these nations at a high level, the hostile nature of their past relationship need not remain the cornerstone of international relations (5).

Research institutes have a unique chance to shape both the scope and direction of the disarmament negotiating process as well as the shape and nature of the new relationship between East and West, North and South. Diminishing military competition between East and West and increased economic, environmental, humanitarian and political cooperation in addressing global problems will open up a series of possibilities unthinkable five years ago. It is our task not only to consider immediate policy-relevant disarmament issues but to intensify our consideration of the larger and more fundamental problems.

For example, where and how does one draw the line between national interests and the demands of common responsibility? How can our existing regional and global institutions, be they economic, social or political, be strengthened, transformed or replaced in order to better provide for the security and well-being of each nation's people and for mankind as a whole? Disarmament research in the 1990s will have to be more interdisciplinary than it has been. It will also have to help find answers to fundamental questions which need to be answered before the disarmament process can go much further: questions about the nature and use of power, the role of nation states and international organizations, the limitations of sovereignty, the role and perceptions of small and medium-powers in the international arena.

Seeking security in the world of the 1990s requires a rethinking by East and West, the North and the South. Our research institutions should and must be in the forefront of such a rethinking.

The following section reviews some of the developments in the field of disarmament research which have taken place in recent years in the East, West and the Neutral/Non-aligned countries. The reader is asked not to consider this section of the paper as an exhaustive review of what our institutions have undertaken and achieved but rather a set of examples to remind us of the scope and richness of our research activities.

## **II. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN DISARMAMENT RESEARCH**

Over the past twenty years significant steps have been made in the field of disarmament and arms control research. The development of new approaches and important new substantive research have broadened and deepened the scope of this subject. There is considerable scope for further research which can not only expand the theoretical base of the disarmament process but also have an immediate impact on national and international policy-making.

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 5. This view is directly contradicted by the recent New York Times article by Richard Nixon "*Dealing with Gorbachev*" which argues that the beginning of the Gorbachev era does not represent the end of rivalry between the two superpowers but rather the beginning of "*a dangerous, challenging new stage of the struggle*", The New York Times Magazine, March 13, 1987, p.26-79.

## REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARMS

The INF Treaty (6) is a significant step towards reversing the nuclear arms race and points the way to further reductions in the future. For the first time two classes of offensive missiles are to be eliminated completely on a worldwide scale benefiting the security interests of not only Western and Eastern Europe, the US and the Soviet Union but also Japan and China as well.

The elimination of these nuclear weapons has highlighted the disparities between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty at the conventional level, setting a broad research agenda on this issue, which is addressed below. Within NATO, the Treaty on Intermediate- and Shorter-range Missiles is already having a profound effect and is accelerating processes already in motion. For example, greater French-German cooperation is becoming a reality in plans for defending NATO's central front. Similarly UK-French cooperation in sharing information and programs at the nuclear level is developing in the treaty's wake.

Much research needs to be done into the area of the denuclearization of both political and military postures. More work must be done now if research institutes are going to contribute to the shaping of decisions taken by governments in the future. The following questions should be addressed: After INF, what will be the future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? How will the particularly complex question of dual capable systems be addressed considering that it may require the cooperation of more than just the United States and the Soviet Union? Similarly, at what point, if any, will the nuclear forces of Third powers be brought into the discussions?

Even more acute questions will be raised by the potential treaty stipulating 50% reduction in strategic weapons between the superpowers. Research institutes need to think about what weapons should be reduced in the next round or if there even should be a next round. Is a nuclear free world desirable and achievable? Can mutual criteria be formulated for agreeing on postures which will best preserve strategic stability? A large number of institutes in the West are already focusing on these questions and presumably researchers in the Soviet Union are giving these questions equal attention. Greater West-West cooperation and exchanges of information are necessary to coordinate the results of all this research if a coherent Western approach is to emerge. A new and critical element could be regular, institutionalized East-West exchange on these critical nuclear questions, focusing both on the political level but with a heavy emphasis on the military-technical level (7). Increased data and information on Soviet military expenditures, doctrine and related matters is essential if this process is to be a serious, scientific one.

## THE MOVE FROM OFFENSIVE TO DEFENSIVE STRATEGIES

Research into the viability of a transition from national security based largely on offensive weapons to an international security regime based on non-offensive defense systems has become a

6. As for example, *"The INF Treaty and the Future of Western Security"*, A Report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, Jonathan Dean, Peter Clausen, January 1988 and *"The Soviet Approach to Nuclear Arms Control: Continuity and Change"* *Survival*, November/December 1987, pp.483-510. Among the other institutions with major studies in this area are the Institute for Peace and International Security, Cambridge, MA, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

7. It should be noted that an initial and useful step has already been made in the area of East-West information exchange on the level of publications with IMEMO's publication of its annual *Razouruzheniye I Bezopastnost'* (*Disarmament and Security*) series.

central concern (8). Of major significance in this respect is the Soviet and Warsaw Treaty proposals to discuss the two sides military doctrines in order to determine what each side perceives as offensive in the other's posture or strategy until formal talks get under way. Research institutes may play a catalytic role in crystallizing specific points and perhaps even to help set the agenda. Greater East-West interaction at this level is particularly crucial for it may construct the foundation upon which more specific arms control proposals may be advanced and justified. In this respect, we would do well to recall the great contributions of the early Pugwash meetings in encouraging mutual East-West agreement on the destabilizing nature of strategic defenses. This issue has received less attention outside Central Europe than the American Strategic Defense Initiative and would seem to represent one of the most promising for expanded research and study.

## STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Research institutes in the United States and Europe have been involved in examining the advantages and disadvantages of developing SDI systems and the role they may play in the light of future arms agreements (9). Many studies in the United States have concentrated on issues related to SDI's technical feasibility and its impact on the security of the two superpowers. However, insufficient attention has been given to European perceptions and the impact that any considerable deployment of strategic defenses might have for Europe (10). European researchers are profoundly skeptical about SDI's ability to contribute greater security and are concerned about the impact SDI will have on the broad political framework of East-West relations. European institutes appear to be more receptive to proposals for non-offensive and stabilizing systems. Further work needs to be done to explore the economic burden of a full developed SDI system and on the defense-offense relationship and what constitutes strategic stability (11).

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8. The following research groups are among those focusing on non-offensive defense: The Non-Offensive Defence Newsletter, University of Copenhagen; The Alternative Defence Commission, Bradford, England; Program on Nonviolent Sanctions in Conflict and Defense at Harvard University; Alternative Defense Working Group of the Institute of Defense and Disarmament Studies in Brookline, MA. A particularly interesting study is being undertaken by the Hungarian Institute for International Relations, Budapest and the Center of Peace Conflict Research, Copenhagen, Denmark is studying the concept of "*non-offensive defense systems*".

9. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has suggested judging the legitimacy of the West's involvement only in the light of the state of Soviet commitment to their own programs and to the ABM Treaty. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has approached the issue of defensive weapons technology, especially in the ASAT and BMD systems in the context of their contribution or lack thereof to arms control and reduction efforts. The Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace published an important report on "*Space Strike Arms and International Security*" (1985).

10. *SDI and European Security*, East-West Monograph Series #5, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1988. Regina Cowen (UK) looks at SDI in the evolution of strategic doctrine and the implications for the Atlantic Alliance; Peter Rajcsanyi (Hungary) examines the implications of SDI for US-Soviet relations and arms control and Vladimir Bilandzic (Yugoslavia), analyzes European attitudes and responses to SDI including those of the neutral/non-aligned countries.

11. For other dimensions of space research see: "*Satellite Warfare: A Challenge for the International Community*", French Institute for International Relations, 1987 and "*Disarmament: Problems Related to Outer Space*", United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1987.

## CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTION

While overshadowed by nuclear issues in the past, conventional arms control will be an increasingly critical security issue in coming years. The conclusion of the INF Treaty eliminating medium- and short-range nuclear weapons has led to increasing attention to the conventional issue. Many West Europeans and Americans see Mr. Gorbachev's willingness to address this issue, including the need for asymmetrical reductions, as a major test of his seriousness about arms control and disarmament. The Soviet Union has begun to show greater interest in conventional arms control and a new willingness to address long-standing Western concerns. Soviet analysts are in the process of reexamining the historical importance of conventional defense and challenging the long-standing notion in Soviet military thought that a decisive offensive attack is the key to victory.

Members of the two alliances are currently discussing in Vienna a mandate for a new, expanded 23-member negotiations to replace the old MBFR talks on conventional troop reductions. These new talks will focus both on manpower and equipment. Economic and manpower constraints have increased pressure for reductions in conventional forces. Neither the West nor the East has a clear view of the long-term implications of any major reductions. Conventional arms negotiations will involve a complex process of intra-alliance bargaining in which the West and East European roles are likely to become of increased importance. These issues will require significant research attention.

Long-term planning and analysis which examines how conventional arms can contribute to greater security and stability in Europe is a necessity. To date, most of the work in the West has focused on technical analysis of deficiencies in NATO's force posture or static analysis of the conventional balance (12). The Western European Union has disputed claims by some NATO governments that the Warsaw Pact has massive advantages in conventional forces (13).

Research into the viability of a global transition from mutual security based on offensive weapons to an international security regime based on non-offensive defense weapons will be a major issue in the coming decade (14). Research in conventional arms should address non-offensive defensive issues and the possibilities for force reductions in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the West (15). New conceptual approaches to conventional arms control involving the East directly in the dialogue must be developed (16).

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12. Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Bonn maintains that the Warsaw Treaty Organization has an overwhelming conventional force superiority.

13. *Defence Weekly*, Vol.8, No.22, December 5, 1987. The WEU's Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments says the Soviets have a superiority over the USA in the ratio of 1:0.5 for armed forces and 1:0.8 for defence expenditure. However, the same comparisons for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO show the WTO to be equal or inferior in the ratios 1:1 and 1:1.1 respectively. See also Carl Levin *"Beyond the Bean Count: Realistically Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe"* January 1988.

14. See for example the work of Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg is focusing on alternative defense posture and the concept of *"Common security"*.

15. IISS, SIPRI and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik are among those institutions which have research programs in this area. Several Eastern European Institutes are also studying this problem.

16. The major conventional arms project of the Institute for East-West Security Studies include an East-West Working Group on Conventional Arms Reduction and a Study Group on Conventional Arms Control is designed to construct new attitudes and approaches to the study of conventional arms and the process of conventional arms reduction.

## CHEMICAL WEAPONS

As the possibilities for a Chemical Weapons Convention increase and as the last technical issues are resolved, attention on chemical weapons will focus increasingly on ways of preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons outside the major powers. The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict has pointed the way to what must be done to convince governments that the procurement of Chemical Weapons is not a quick solution to achieving military predominance in a region. The price in terms of international "sanctions" against using chemical weapons must be greatly increased. Scientific institutions and those who mold public opinion can and must play a central role in this process. SIPRI continues to play a major role in research work on this subject. While the delegations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva rely on their own experts, many are drawn from outside research institutes. This type of cross-fertilization could be used in other types of negotiations. To date the chemical weapons issue has been largely covered by military experts rather than research institutes. Now chemical weapons research is increasingly appearing on the research agendas of these institutes (17).

## VERIFICATION/COMPLIANCE

Verification of and compliance with the arms control treaties has always been a principal focus of research institutes developing acceptable and as far as possible foolproof ways of verifying treaties. The recent shifts in the Soviet attitude (18) have brought renewed emphasis to the search for widely acceptable verification regimes. The unprecedented verification arrangements established by the INF Treaty sets an important precedent for verification of more far-reaching nuclear reductions in the future. So, we have arrived at a stage where the technical issues of verification are no longer insoluble problems. We can reliably verify almost any conceivable arms limitation or disarmament treaty either by national technical means or by intrusive measures (19). The creation of verification provisions is not a technical issue, but a political one.

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17. See for example, "*Chemical Weapons and Western Security Policy*", Aspen Strategy Group and European Strategy Group, 1987.

18. Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmerthnykh "*The Soviet Union stands for the strictest possible verification, including inspections of facilities where missiles are to be dismantled and destroyed, test ranges and missile bases, including those located in the Third World, and plants and depots..*" at a disarmament conference in Dagomys, USSR, June 8-12, 1987 UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. *Disarmament*, "*After Reykjavik: Planning for the Nineties*", Autumn 1987, Volume X, No.3.

19. The Natural Resources Defense Council together with the Soviet Academy of Sciences have demonstrated seismic verification measures that could prove instrumental in negotiating a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Parliamentarians for Global Action for Disarmament, Development and World Reform has also done work on developing an international verification system. The Center for International Security and Arms Control Studies at Stanford University recently published the results of an 18 month study of superpower compliance with existing arms control treaties, especially the ABM Treaty. The two SALT treaties were also examined in the framework of overall alliance strategy. The International Institute for Strategic Studies has examined the changing role of space in the verification debate, noting that the effect of the recent blossoming of strategic defense programs in undermining the traditional role that space has played in the verification of arms control agreements. The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and SIPRI have launched a joint project with prominent seismologists, physicists, nuclear weapons designers and political analysts reviewing the technical problems of a Comprehensive Test Ban. See also "*The Verification Issue in United Nations Disarmament Negotiations*", United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1987.

## NON-PROLIFERATION

Nuclear proliferation receives less public attention than the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it may well pose as great a risk to global security in the long run. The non-proliferation treaty is the cornerstone of the multilateral disarmament process. The vast majority of world states have forgone the option of developing nuclear weapons in exchange for the hope of reductions by the five nuclear weapons states. The monitoring regime created by the Treaty is of critical importance to international stability. The future of the treaty will play a fundamental role in determining the future course of international relations. Despite expectations to the contrary, the treaty remains firm. Still it faces another review conference in 1990 before the treaty lapses in 1995 and must be renewed (20). The disenchantment felt by many countries in the world over the failure of the nuclear powers to disarm or even to significantly reduce their stockpiles will influence the decision as to whether the treaty is renewed. Attitudes will evolve in reaction to the outcome of the present nuclear weapons reduction talks, thus providing another impetus to conclude the 50% reduction of strategic nuclear forces between the US and the USSR who together account for 97% of the world's nuclear forces. The problem of nuclear proliferation and the increasingly sensitive situation in India and Pakistan has been studied (21).

The conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has become one of the key political issues surrounding the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The majority of countries in the world view a verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as an important step (22).

Research should be carried out as to what steps are necessary to convince states that Non-Proliferation Treaty is still a useful instrument. The academic community could explore the options for revising the treaty to take account of the changed security situation and the attitudes towards peaceful nuclear exchanges.

## CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

There has been a growing interest over the past five years among policy-makers and academic specialists in confidence-building measures (CBMs) (23). Security today embraces more complex

20. The Center for European Policy Studies and the Peace Research Institute have been among those institutions involved in coordinating efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons.

21. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Armament and Disarmament Information Unit have focused on the problem in the context of South Asia. See *"Nuclear Weapons and South Asia Security"*, 1988. Regional institutions for example in Pakistan and India have also studied the problem. See for example, *Strategic Studies*, Summer and Autumn 1987, Vol.X and Vol.XI. *"Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia"*.

22. See for example Lall, G. Betty and Paul Brandes *"Banning Nuclear Tests: Verification, Compliance and Savings"*, Council on Economic Priorities, 1987.

23. The Institute for East-West Security Studies has sponsored a six year project to study different approaches to CBMs: examining the specific role of CBMs as an aspect of international security policy; analyzing and evaluating the application of CBMs in Europe and exploring the contributions that CBMs can make outside the traditional European framework. These have appeared in three monographs and two occasional papers. IMEMO and the Polish Institute of International Affairs also have research programs on CBMs. The Institute of European Security of the German Democratic Republic has done considerable research on a nuclear free corridor in Central Europe. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., proposed a plan for US-Soviet nuclear risk reduction centers which was recently approved by both governments. The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, through the use of computer forecasting has played an important role in the formulation of regimes designed to analyze the US or USSR's operational and tactical doctrines to better avoid possible escalations into various military crises.

factors and broader dimensions of various military and non-military factors. In the nuclear age, security can be assured not simply by new military technologies but in the first instance by political measures. Only international agreement can provide foundations for security (24). CBMs have entered a new era as a result of the CSCE process and CDE final document which for the first time creates militarily significant CBMs which are to be monitored by intrusive verification. Now that this principle has been accepted there are wide possibilities for CBMs in terms of restricting military manoeuvre on both land and sea, the curtailment of out-of-garrison activities and the exchange of information on the nature of military doctrines and forces. The Warsaw Treaty countries have already proposed talks to explore the nature of the military doctrines of both alliance systems and these talks could include a discussion of the impact of military doctrine on force-levels and postures (25).

CBMs are not restricted to Europe, they are useful in all areas of tension. Although the European experience is not directly applicable, nonetheless, this model could be adapted to other regions of the world. Research institutes in other countries can work to accommodate the provisions agreed to at Stockholm to their own particular regional settings. Arms control and disarmament has, for too long, been seen as an activity for the countries of the two major alliances systems. There have been a reluctance on the part of other countries to admit that each region has its own particular tensions unrelated to East-West rivalries, and that regional arms races must be addressed by regional solutions. It is important to build on the experience of in Stockholm and Vienna both in Europe and elsewhere. The exploration of possible CBMs for a particular region, as happened twenty years ago in Latin America, would form a useful basis on which to begin this process. However, research institutes must examine the European experience critically before attempting to apply it to other areas where some of the important preconditions that gave rise to the European security system are lacking.

#### THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM

Both European alliance systems are going through a period of reappraisal as their members seek to reach a modus vivendi both amongst themselves and with their adversaries. For NATO, the questions revolve largely around the future of the US-European relationship, at a time when the US is looking more and more toward the Pacific, on questions of burden-sharing, the size of military budgets and the modernization of both nuclear forces and conventional forces (26). For the Warsaw Treaty countries, the issues may be said to include the question of the sanctuarization of the Soviet Union from nuclear attack in any European conflict, again issues of burden-sharing within the WTO, questions of economic cooperation and interdependence and the issue of political and social restructuring to complement economic changes. All of this is an extremely dynamic process for both alliances. Academic research on the long-term future of the alliance systems may have a direct impact on shorter-term policy decisions. Governments, publications and public opinion, are for the first time

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24. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, *"Developing a Confidence-Building System in East-West Relations: Europe and the CSCE"* Building Security in Europe, p.119, Institute for East-West Security Studies Monograph Series #4.

25. See Deputy Minister of Foreign Minister, Aleksander Bessmertnykh: *"It would be extremely important to compare the military doctrines of NATO and the WTO and to examine how they might evolve in the future. This would dispel mutual suspicion and distrust, while making military doctrines and concepts fundamentally defensive"*. Disarmament conference at Dagomys, USSR, June 1987, UN Department for Disarmament Affairs. See also the much discussed military doctrine provisions of the *"Jaruzelski Plan"* presented on May 8, 1987.

26. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has begun to examine the political, military and economic ramifications of a proposed withdrawal from Western Europe, outlining ways for Europeans to defend themselves successfully after such a pullout. Many other institutes are addressing the concern about the lack of a consistent and balanced arms control policy acceptable to all the NATO allies.

prepared to entertain ideas on where both alliances are going in terms not only of their relationship with one another but how these new relationships will impact on North-South relations

#### CONVERSION AND THE SOCIAL ASPECT OF DISARMAMENT

As it becomes possible to speak of process in conventional disarmament in more practical terms, than has been possible up to now, the issue of conversion of industry concerned primarily with military production to civil production will become more critical. Military industries have such deep roots in the economic fabric of the advanced industrialized states that they permeate all areas of economic activity. The shrinkage of this sector will have major social and economic implications. These require close and careful management, if public opinion in both East and West are not to become discontented with any process of disarmament which involves major job losses and dislocations and possible mobilization of industrial forces (27). The critical problem until now hindering any progress on this issue has been the lack of data and information from the USSR. Without better data, Soviet scientists are unable to engage in any serious studies of this topic. It is hoped that perestroika and glasnost' of the Soviet Union today will eventually come to affect the military arena.

Restructuring will require a step-by-step approach linked to conventional disarmament as each side remains suspicious of the production capabilities of the other, fearful of a surge of production to replace weapons systems as part of an arms control agreement. Conversion of facilities will need to be extensive enough to convince treaty partners that short or medium-term reconversion is not possible. Is there scope for East-West cooperation in terms of the exchange of information and the restructuring of resources from the military to the civilian economy? More attention must be devoted to these issues.

#### ARMS TRADE

Arms trade especially with the Third World achieved increasing significance for both the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the seventies. Selling arms to Third World countries was done not only for profit. It became an important aspect of another aspect of US-USSR rivalry. NATO and Warsaw Treaty arms exports declined between 1983-1985, when it became evident that at an intermediary technological level, third world producers could capture a considerable share of the arms export market (28). Domestic arms production and other suppliers still did not reduce dramatically the dependence on the major arms producers. The political will to rethink attitudes toward regional conflicts and selling arms to the Third World is developing in both the US and the USSR. Research must focus on how the hard economic interests of arms exporters can be modified and compensated for in order to adjust to the political changes taking place.

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27. The Pax Christi Group in Belgium has taken a leadership role in Belgium over the question of conversion. Professor Seymour Melman of Columbia University has devoted more than twenty years to studying this problem.

28. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, pp. 238-239.

## DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Apart from United Nations Studies focusing on Disarmament and Development and the limited work being done by a handful of major research institutions, the issue of conversion of military resources into aid for the Third World has not been adequately addressed (29). The more than US \$450 billion per year currently spent on the maintenance of military establishments throughout the world has been called "*the largest existing economic reserve*" that could be utilized to accelerate the growth of the less developed regions (30). The United States' absence from the UN Conference on Disarmament and Development in July 1987 is a reflection of US governmental attitude toward this linkage. Research institutions can help legitimize this issue by devoting greater resources to conversion and redeployment of resources from military purposes through disarmament measures to economic and social development purposes.

## III. THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

The preceding review is testimony both to the rich variety of issues being addressed today in the arms control and disarmament field and the enormous work which remains in front of us. Some concluding ideas are presented for consideration and discussion in Sochi.

Research projects should be pursued with the goal of how they can better contribute to increased security. Specific research projects should attempt to strike a balance between mutual and common interests, while recognizing that practical limits to cooperation do exist. We must try to better define where national interests and mutual benefits from cooperation intersect. International security research projects should be defined in broad political and economic terms rather than in strictly military or technological terms.

The recent shift by a number of research institutions to focus on conventional arms and the increasing willingness to include economic and social dimensions of disarmament as an integral component of research agendas reflects the changing priorities in the policy communities of East and West. It also reflects a reversal of the tendency in the past to downplay the non-nuclear, multilateral and regional dimensions of disarmament. Our research institutes are in a privileged position, viewed almost as "*neutral interpreters of facts*" (31). We have a special responsibility to work to maintain this reputation. With the conclusion of the INF Treaty, it is our obligation to push the frontiers of the disarmament field forward to help policy-makers and our publics in their efforts to choose and pursue policies that will bring greater security.

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29. Laszlo Lang "*Issues in Converting from Military to Civil Production in a Small, Socialist Country: Some thoughts on and from Hungary*". A paper presented to NGO Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, Stockholm, Sweden, May 1987.

30. Wassily Leontief as quoted in Bo Hovstadius and Manne Wangborg, "*The United Nations Study of Disarmament and Development : An Overview*", *Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol.XVIII, No.2, pp.209-217.

31. The significance of the authoritative respect which is given to the work of our research institutions was revealed in the latest issue of *The Military Balance 1987-1988* in an unusual final section "*Trends in Global Defense Spending and Defence Industries*", pp.238-240. The IISS presents a discussion of the problem of accurately measuring the military balance. Since its views are taken by many to be authoritative, the concluding essay was particularly significant.

In 1981, a detailed study of peace research programs of the last twenty years led to the conclusion that an appropriate balance between purely scientific approaches to the field of arms control and disarmament and policy-oriented analyses had yet to be achieved (32). While some progress has been made, this lack of synthesis among researchers themselves and between researchers and policy-makers still exists and needs to be further addressed.

A renewed effort is also needed to adapt more quickly to the changing political and military environment in which arms control and disarmament negotiations take place and to analyze the essential goals that arms control should try to achieve in the evolving international system. In 1986, East and West hailed the on-side verification provisions of the Stockholm Agreement as revolutionary. Compared to the verification provisions of the INF Treaty, the Stockholm provisions, although significant, are far from revolutionary. The pace of change will continue to have an important effect on our institutional allocation of human and financial resources as well as on our research priorities.

Greater information and data from the East on military expenditures, doctrine and forces must be obtained. Today almost all of the information on WTO military matters is derived from Western sources or Western interpretations of original sources.

There is a need for a much greater communication and information-exchange between researchers in East and West, North and South. It would also be useful to have an expanded program of collaborative projects between East and West, including more serious attention to the other side's fears and insecurities. Certain important fora for East-West exchange already exist including the Pugwash Conferences, the International Peace Research Association, the Institute for East-West Security Studies, the International Studies Association Annual Meeting and the Dartmouth Conferences. But there still remains a need to expand the opportunities to engage East and West more directly and regularly in the research and conceptual development process.

This emphasis on cooperation by scientists of the two major military alliances in Europe is very much justified as the US, the USSR and their allies account for an estimated 75-80 per cent of global defense expenditures (33).

We should dramatically expand efforts to exchange information and more widely disseminate among our sister institutions prepared papers, analyses and publications. The Scientific Research Council on Peace and Disarmament in the Soviet Union plays an important institutional role in integrating work on disarmament and arms control in that country. Almost all Soviet institutions are represented on this Council and cooperation with Academies of Science in other East European countries further this communication and coordination of research. Western specialists could benefit from a similar form of cooperation. The Institute for East-West Security Studies will increasingly attempt to fill this void in East-West cooperation.

A cautionary note should be added at the conclusion of this paper -- the current international environment and the rapidity of change makes it increasingly difficult for our scientific institutions to avoid concentrating on topical issues. It also makes it impractical to concentrate solely on lengthy, multi-year studies on specific topics. A balance will have to be struck between the long-term and short-term. Similarly, we will all have to seek an equilibrium between national interests, ideological interests and common global responsibilities.

32. "What have we learned about Peace?" Hakan Wiberg *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.XVIII, No.2, 1981, pp.111-148.

33. *The Military Balance 1987-1988*, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p.238.

Public perceptions about security issues play an increasingly important role in the East and the West. The role of public opinion deserves more detailed study at our research institutes. The involvement of more sociologists and behavioral scientists can make an important contribution in the effort to reach a more integrated approach. A greater effort should be made to involve specialists from other disciplines in our specific research projects.

Our most pressing task is to examine the problem of the integration of our research with the dynamic international environment. We must seek to fit research projects on specific disarmament topics into a more general framework which acknowledges the interrelation of political, military, technical, economic, environmental and social factors in the field of arms control and disarmament and the political process in general. As part of this process we must encourage greater communication between policy-makers, scientists and the public, between East and West, North and South.

The restructuring of the international system has led many research institutes to fall behind governments and negotiators rather than to be at the "*cutting-edge*". Our research institutes should try to provide greater intellectual leadership to the disarmament debate and find new ways for dealing with the emerging conceptual and practical issues of arms control and disarmament. Increased integration will benefit us all.

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**REPORT****WANG SHU**

It is a great pleasure for me to be in this beautiful city of Sochi to attend the International Conference of Directors of Research Institutes at the invitation of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and to exchange views with you on disarmament research in the 1990s. I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and our Soviet colleagues and friends in Sochi for the efforts and arrangements they have made for the success of the Conference.

I believe it is necessary and beneficial for directors of research institutes from so many countries to get together and exchange views and perceptions on disarmament issues of our common concern. This will help promote mutual understanding, draw on each other's experiences, conceive new ideas and set out new proposals, thus contributing to the cause of world disarmament. We appreciate very much that in recent years the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research has made great endeavours to promote international exchange and cooperation, and we are ready to do our best to strengthen such cooperation in the future.

Disarmament is a major issue of universal concern. The people the world over follow its development and long for its realization, and it is an important component part in the effort to maintain world peace and security. Like other institutes in the world, my Institute always attaches great importance to disarmament research, regarding it as a priority in our research on the overall strategic pattern of international relationship. We will continue to do so in the future. It is my view that the study of disarmament will be a long-term task. The issue of disarmament has been discussed for decades in international fora. But one cannot but note with regret that the vision of a world free from the danger of war, and of a nuclear holocaust in particular, remains remote. So, it is imperative for us to redouble our efforts. We should timely inform the international community and world public opinion about the arms race and arms reduction talks and point to the right direction for new efforts. I am keenly aware that disarmament research is very complicated, encompassing multi-dimensions -- military, political, diplomatic, economic, and scientific and technological, etc. Disarmament involves both quantitative reduction and qualitative limitation. In view of the development of new technologies and their military application, the latter merits more attention. While nuclear disarmament is very important, conventional disarmament and banning of chemical weapons should by no means be neglected. Moreover, what is more worrisome is that the arms race is now extending to outer space. And disarmament negotiations, including negotiations on verification and inspection regimes, are becoming more complicated than before. Moreover, disarmament is closely linked to the military and foreign policies of various countries and has a close bearing on the international situation and the East-West relations as a whole. This calls for our integrated and in-depth research on the arms race and disarmament talks and objective analyses of and realistic conclusions on disarmament issues and their impact on the international situation. Partaking in the efforts for peace and security, we researchers shoulder a dedicated task with vital responsibility.

As a matter of course, my Institute gives top priority in our research to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, an issue that arrests world-wide attention. It is an undeniable fact that the United States and the Soviet Union possess the largest and the most sophisticated nuclear arsenals

which account for over 97% of the world's total. Therefore, to find out the way to the cessation of nuclear arms race and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war, it is imperative to undertake intensive studies of the ongoing nuclear arms race and nuclear arms reduction talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. We welcome the signing of the INF Treaty between the USA and the USSR. But one should not fail to see that this treaty which covers only about 4% of their nuclear arsenals is just a beginning. Moreover, as is related to the overall nuclear and conventional disarmament, the agreed scrapping of those missiles has given rise to renewed worries about tactical nuclear and conventional disparities. We hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will take into consideration the popular aspirations of the world and continue their talks in earnest so as to substantially reduce their nuclear armaments. Only when the United States and the Soviet Union take the lead in halting immediately the testing, production and deployment of and substantially reducing and destroying all types of their nuclear weapons deployed at home and abroad, can conditions be created for the convocation of a broadly-represented international conference with the participation of all nuclear countries. So, even in the field of nuclear disarmament, there is a long way to go. We should therefore not slacken or weaken our research efforts, but rather strengthen such efforts persistently in view of the development of nuclear technology and qualitative improvement of nuclear weaponry.

My Institute attaches great importance to the conventional arms buildup and the urgency of conventional disarmament as well. It is known to all that, nuclear and conventional armaments are the main components of the arms race and their buildup has kept spiraling with the priority shifting from one to the other at different times. The conventional armaments have piled up in such a way that they far exceed the need for self-defence. With the development of high technologies, the lethality and destructive power of conventional weapons are becoming greater and greater. It should be noted that, while the two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals in the world have acknowledged that nuclear war must never be fought and cannot be won, conventional war might become more likely. In fact, conventional armaments are often used to threaten, intervene in, subvert or occupy sovereign states, creating tension in many "hot spots" which may escalate at any time, thus posing a grave threat to world peace and security. It is disquieting that many countries are beset with growing economic difficulties and ever heavier debts and stricken by poverty, deficiency of daily necessities, malnutrition and starvation. In spite of all this, the ever-increasing and more sophisticated conventional armaments are engulfing enormous resources to the amount of hundreds of billions of US dollars. Undoubtedly, the countries with largest and most advanced conventional weapons and the military blocs headed by them should take the lead in drastically cutting their conventional arms and remove the existing "hot spots". This is equally important and urgent as the nuclear disarmament. However, the talks on conventional disarmament remain at loggerheads while conventional weapons are being steadily upgraded and new conventional strategies are being explored. In these circumstances, intensified research on the conventional arms competition and reduction becomes all the more important and necessary.

Like our colleagues in other institutes, we are deeply concerned about an arms race looming large in outer space. For centuries past, scientists all over the world have dreamed of exploring the outer space for the benefit of mankind. Now that the advance of emerging technologies promises to make it possible to explore and utilize the outer space, it may turn to be an arena for a fierce arms race. Such a race, no matter how it is labelled, will further destabilize the international situation and have an adverse impact on the recent positive developments in the arms talks. Therefore, to stop this arms race and oppose the development, testing, production and deployment of space weapons by any country in any form is a most urgent task that the people of the world should undertake without delay. And it is of course a serious responsibility incumbent upon us.

In my view, in addition to research on the arms race and disarmament negotiations, we, researchers, should also analyse the attitudes and positions of various countries on disarmament, and attend to the aspirations and calls of the people of the world for being free from the danger and scourge of war. The cessation of arms race and the realization of disarmament, and nuclear disarmament in particular, are a complex and arduous task, which can only be accomplished with active and extensive participation of the people throughout the world. All countries, big or small in size, strong or weak in military strength, should have equal rights to participate in the deliberation and solution of disarmament issues. Disarmament affairs should not be monopolized by one or two nuclear powers, and still less should they be dealt with to the detriment of other countries' interests. At present, there is an increasing demand for the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones and peace zones. This just desire should be respected and supported by all nuclear countries. All nuclear states should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. We, researchers, should attend and actively respond to the call of the people of all countries for peace and an easing of tension.

Undoubtedly, disarmament is a matter of great importance to world peace and security. But it should also be pointed out that it is only part of the effort in safeguarding world peace and security. In our research, we should pay equal attention to interference in the internal affairs of other countries, encroachment on their sovereignty and territorial integrity, threats by force of arms, acts of aggression or military occupation. Such acts likewise pose a grave threat to world peace and security, as they may create regional "hot spots", which might touch off a major war, or even a nuclear war. We should uphold justice, check acts of aggression and expansion, eliminate the "hot spots", respect each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and not interfere in other countries' internal affairs by any means. Only by so doing can we stabilize the international situation and help promote the disarmament process.

Suffice it to say that disarmament is of vital importance to economic development and the improvement of the people's living standards when today many countries are suffering from deteriorating economies, or ever-increasing foreign debts, or dire poverty and hunger.

It is a common cause for millions upon millions of people in the world to safeguard world peace and security. Only by mobilizing people all over the world on the broadest possible scale, can we gradually achieve this lofty goal. My Institute, like many institutes in other countries, sends its research findings -- papers, studies, forum proceedings, books, the Institute's magazine, etc. -- to government agencies concerned or publishes them for the general public. Such findings serve to inform both domestic and international communities about the current developments of the arms race and the disarmament negotiations and their impact on the international situation, in addition to our proposals for better ways to maintain peace and security. We are fully aware that this is not an easy job, but we will continue our efforts in this connection. The facts about the arms race, military expenditures, the research and development of new weapons, and negotiations on and implementation of disarmament agreements and treaties tend to be camouflaged or distorted by the smog of propaganda. It is only by taking a fair and scientific approach that we can distinguish the true from the false and bring the essence of matters to light. Recently, some progress has been made in the nuclear disarmament while there is no immediate prospect for the conventional disarmament. We

should not slack our efforts in a somewhat euphoric atmosphere. It is a long way to go before people of all countries are free from the scourge of war. We should continue our efforts, not only in the 1990s, but also in the next century; our children and grandchildren will proceed from where we have left off toward our goal. I believe that mankind will not be intimidated into submission by weaponry. Let us strive together, with unwavering confidence and best wishes, to build a peaceful and secure world.

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## DISCUSSION

JOSEPH ROTBLAT

The paper by Mr. Mroz is a comprehensive and excellent review of recent developments in disarmament research. Many of its sections merit further analysis and discussion at this Conference, but at this stage I would like to raise one item, verification compliance.

On this topic Mr. Mroz writes "*the technical issues of verification are no longer insoluble problems... The creation of verification provisions is not a technical issue but a political one*". In my opinion, this assessment is correct but only if applied to a limited programme of disarmament, such as the INF Treaty. I am not sure whether it still applies to the present START negotiations to reduce strategic arms to one half, and it is certainly not true in relation to deeper cuts.

This raises the important question of the objectives in further disarmament negotiations. I do not believe that anybody would be satisfied with a 50% cut as the final word in nuclear disarmament. Nineteen years ago, a Pugwash Conference was held in this city of Sochi to discuss this problem. At that time, the number of strategic warheads was much less than a half of the present arsenals, and yet we were very worried about the threat of a nuclear war arising from the existence of such huge arsenals, and we were seeking means to reduce them drastically. I am convinced that this must be our aim today.

How far should we go down in the process of nuclear disarmament? Some analysts talk about a minimum deterrent, consisting of about 5% of the present arsenals. Others think of going down to zero, of a nuclear-free world, following the lead of General-Secretary Gorbachev, and - in a special context - to the even earlier lead of President Reagan.

However, the further we go down in reducing the nuclear arms the more important - and the more difficult - become the technical aspects of verification. Indeed, when the arsenals are still large verification does not matter greatly from the point of view of security. But when we come down to very low levels, then it becomes essential to have a fool-proof verifiable system of compliance, and the technical problems of achieving such a system increase enormously. If, therefore, the objective of nuclear disarmament is very low minimum deterrent, or even a zero nuclear arsenal, then the technical aspects of verification are of paramount importance.

Realizing this, the Pugwash Conferences have placed verification issues at the top of the agenda. But in this Conference too the problem of the minimum deterrent, or of a nuclear-free world, indeed the very philosophy of nuclear deterrence, should be discussed. Much had been written on this in the past, perhaps ad nauseam, but the political climate has changed, we now have a new way of thinking, a new approach to problems, and therefore it is incumbent on us to look at these issues again, to approach them with a fresh mind.

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**KAMAL MATINUDDIN**

Research Institutes can play a very positive role in the field of disarmament. This is so because their research enables them to collect a list of very valuable data which is not commonly known to the public at large and sometimes not known even to government officials and others responsible for policy decisions in respective national governments.

It is the task of research institutes to draw the attention of the leaders of the world to the fact that the maintenance of a balance of terror is not the solution to peace, stability and economic development. It is true military superiority creates a certain fear and tension in a region or between two potential belligerents but the strategic stability needed for security should be achieved at the lowest level of military hardware.

Research Institutes should continue to write research papers on the need for complete and universal disarmament but they should also propagate the gradual reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons. They should advocate very strongly that elimination of weapons is not the only goal. Money spent on defence oriented Research and development should also be stopped and money so saved should be diverted to development.

Research Institutes must bring out very clearly the linkage between not only disarmament and development but also between armament and poverty. Every dollar spent on weapons could save a child from going to sleep on a city pavement, hungry and cold in many developing countries.

Research Institutes should analyze security issues in great depth and should come up with practical and implementable short term and long term measures to reduce military expenditure and then disseminate their analysis widely. Unfortunately, security and the territorial integrity of a country is such a vital issue that no government is prepared to take any risk by lowering its guard. It is, therefore, not easy for research institutes to sell their idea of a reduction of weapons specially in a region where tension and fear prevail due to actual or perceived threats.

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**MILAN SAHOVIC**

La première séance de notre Conférence est consacrée, d'après notre programme, à la considération du rôle des Instituts de recherche sur le désarmement, mais le débat, d'après ce que nous avons entendu, a été beaucoup plus large. Nous avons parlé de la matière du désarmement dans un sens général. Cependant, il faudrait, avant de se lancer dans une discussion plus concrète, bien clarifier le rôle des Instituts. Car en fin de compte nous nous sommes réunis pour voir quelles sont les possibilités du renforcement de leur influence et le programme d'action qui devrait être conçu en accord avec la situation réelle existante dans le cadre des négociations sur le désarmement. C'est d'autant plus nécessaire que, pendant les dernières décennies, le rapport des Etats et tout particulièrement des grandes puissances envers l'activité des instituts et des résultats de leurs recherches dans le domaine du désarmement a

démontré un déclin d'intérêt bien visible. Sauf dans le cadre bilatéral des négociations entre les super-puissances qui ont confié de temps en temps à leurs groupes d'experts des tâches bien déterminées qui se rapportaient à leurs propres besoins, on ne peut pas dire qu'on a démontré un grand intérêt envers l'action des Instituts, tout particulièrement sur le plan multilatéral. Nous avons aujourd'hui les résultats de recherches menées par le SIPRI et Pugwash ainsi que d'un nombre d'instituts nationaux qui devraient être beaucoup plus présents dans les débats dans le cadre des organes des Nations Unies et même dans les négociations entre les grands.

On peut s'interroger sur les raisons de cette négligence des résultats des recherches scientifiques relatives aux désarmement. Laissant de côté les raisons politiques, qui peuvent être souvent décisives, on peut mentionner les problèmes d'accessibilité, les difficultés de traduction, financières, le manque d'information et de contacts quotidiens, d'échanges de littérature etc. Le remède doit être cherché, d'après notre opinion, dans le renforcement du rôle de l'UNIDIR. Il pourrait devenir centre de coordination et d'information ainsi que de concentration des résultats des recherches réalisées par les instituts nationaux et internationaux en dehors des Nations Unies. Parallèlement à ses autres tâches, l'UNIDIR pourrait contribuer ainsi efficacement à l'élargissement du débat sur les problèmes actuels relatifs aux négociations sur le désarmement. De cette façon on pourrait créer une ambiance internationale favorable à un meilleur échange d'idées, plus représentative, ouvrant la voie à une influence plus concrète de la science traitant des problèmes du désarmement à l'échelle mondiale.

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#### MARCO CARNOVALE

The recent INF agreement has marked an unprecedented step in the history of arms control, not only because it constitutes the first actual step in the direction of disarmament, but, perhaps more importantly, because it lays the foundation of a comprehensive detailed and reliably intrusive scheme of data exchange and on-site verification.

Verification of arms control agreements will become all the more important if further reductions are negotiated. In fact, as the levels of remaining arms go down, the relative military significance of a possible violation of reduction agreements goes up, and it therefore becomes imperative that the parties of these agreements rest assured that such violations do not occur. The only way to do that is through detailed knowledge of one other's forces and intrusive inspections.

This will be more difficult for future arms control agreements than for the relatively few sites involved in the INF agreement. On the positive side, one might notice that, at the same time, lower levels of forces make verification easier, and zero levels make it easiest. In a word, arms reductions make verification both easier and more important to perform.

In light of this, research institutes have an important role to play in exploring alternative arrangements to submit to the consideration of their governments, particularly within the two alliance systems in Europe, where agreements seem most imminent.

The UN is a particularly well suited framework to study and implement arms control verification, through at least two of its specialized agencies: UNIDIR and the IAEA.

Specifically, UNIDIR might provide an essential forum to research the relevant political and, to some extent, also technical issues. The IAEA might provide its extensive technical expertise, accumulated in decades of verification of the Treaty on Nuclear Non-proliferation.

On our part, we at IAI are especially interested in studying such possibility and to elaborate concrete proposals. We would be grateful to exchange ideas with other colleagues, in Europe and elsewhere, who might want to participate in our effort. In particular, we are interested in exploring the possibility of involving neutral states in verification agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

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**WILLIAM C. POTTER**

Too little attention in the field is given to the issues of developing and facilitating access to databases. As a consequence, a great deal of time and money is spent in duplicating research efforts.

The UCLA Center for International and Strategic Affairs (CISA) Database on International Nuclear Commerce is one example of a computer-based data system which can be utilized by scholars throughout the world interested in the subject of nuclear exports and non-proliferation. A description of the database is provided in William C. Potter, "*Creating a Database On International Nuclear Commerce*", CISA Working Paper #59 (September 1987).

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**DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON**

On the spectrum of possible program involvement ranging from conceptualization through actual implementation, the most appropriate role for the research institute is at the conceptual stage where the need is greatest to think creatively about new approaches to existing problems and to develop conceptual frameworks for dealing with complex issues, such as conventional arms control. Moreover, collaborative efforts with other research institutes at this stage of the process can often yield products where the whole exceeds the sum of the parts.

An excellent illustration of the above approach was the role played by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. working in conjunction with the Moscow-based Institute of USA and Canada to conceptualize and promote the adoption of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in the capitals of both countries. Through their willingness to work together and to influence their respective governments, a result was achieved that will produce lasting and global benefits.

In view of the budget constraints under which most institutes presently labor, this is clearly a time for thinking smarter, not richer. This is particularly the case when it comes to exchanging information and personnel with other institutes where the potential for useful collaboration exists. Because there is such a proliferation of research centers worldwide, it becomes very costly to exchange information on a broad scale. Accordingly, it is strongly recommended that UNIDIR serve as a clearing-house for substantive input from all centers interested in sharing information and ideas. It can then use its newly established newsletter to promulgate those inputs likely to have the widest appeal. Where there is commonality of substance and/or direction, the opportunities for effective collaboration and program outcomes are enhanced accordingly.

In similar regard, well-designed exercises with a strong emphasis on role playing can often constitute an effective surrogate for the exchange of personnel with other research centers, particularly when it comes to imparting a better appreciation of other countries perspectives. Where resources permit, of course, exchanging personnel is often a good idea for any number of reasons. Where they do not, creative alternatives are in order.

There is an obvious role for research institutes in the pursuit of disarmament and other compelling initiatives. To enhance the impact of this involvement, effective mechanisms for the cost-effective exchange of ideas and perspectives is necessary. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research can and should play a major role in this regard.

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**SECOND/DEUXIÈME SESSION**

**WAYS AND MEANS OF INCREASING CO-OPERATION AMONG THE INSTITUTES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES/MOYENS ET MÉTHODES D'ACCROISSEMENT DE LA COOPÉRATION ENTRE INSTITUTS EN TENANT SPÉCIALEMENT COMPTE DES PAYS EN DÉVELOPPEMENT**

**REPORTS/RAPPORTS:**

**Gelson Fonseca, G.O. Olusanya, Jasjit Singh**

**DISCUSSION:**

**Ray Forbes, Michael Brown, Kamal Matinuddin, Jean Klein, Jeffrey Pearson, William Potter**

**CHAIRMAN/PRÉSIDENT:**

**Kamal Matinuddin**

**REPORT****GELSON FONSECA**

It is clear that there are several ways in which one can present the issue of "*ways and means*" that this seminar has so opportunely proposed. There are, for instance, approaches which are more conceptual in scope and that would link the subject to the dynamics itself of intellectual cooperation in our times. At the other end of the scale, there are operational solutions that would raise questions of research financing, of concrete forms of bringing Institutes into closer contact, etc.

My considerations are pitched midway between these two points of view. They will not be conceptual, but they will require brief reflection on the major approaches to the problem of disarmament; they will not be exclusively operational, but they will attempt to reflect a specific situation, that of the context surrounding Brazilian research on international relations. Moreover, my comments are delimited by the fact that I represent an institution that has only just commenced its activities and is still in the throes of defining the major thrust of its vocation. For this reason, I naturally have more questions to put than answers to give.

Before entering upon an analysis of the context in which institutes are situated, it would be useful to emphasize the following points as premises of what I shall go on to say:

1. For developing countries, it is undeniably important to receive cooperation from governmental agencies, non-governmental organizations and governments of developed countries, for the purpose of building up a stock of knowledge, including but not limited to bibliographies, in a highly specialized field which also incorporates the latest scientific and technological advances;
2. It is even more important to developing countries that horizontal cooperation be established no longer with a view to obtaining the "*material*" portion of knowledge, but rather so as to mesh (and coordinate) conceptual systems of their own which deal with the subject matter. It is these two elements - vertical and horizontal cooperation - that lead one to contemplate the useful and timely nature of this seminar organized by UNIDIR.

I shall now make one or two brief comments about the Brazilian context which will, I believe, provide a more suitable foundation for a precise proposal of "*ways and means*" of increasing cooperation.

Briefly, the most salient characteristics of the Brazilian situation are the following:

1. There is no strong tradition of study and research into international relations in Brazilian academic circles; this applies to general studies and particularly to the subject of disarmament and peace;

2. To make the statement more precise, one could say that research has traditionally concentrated above all on economic studies because it is these that most directly address the analysis of the country's condition as a developing country per se (one in the international field, one of the most typical creations is dependency theory, whose aim is precisely to trace the consequences of a country's insertion in an international context in order to explain underdevelopment). There is also a solid tradition of studies in the field of international public law (after all, law has always been a defense for weaker countries in the international system), but academia's endeavour to attempt a political reflection on the international situation is of very recent date;

3. In the case of disarmament, there are specific factors that explain the secondary position the subject occupies in Brazilian academic thought:

(a) Brazil is not a strongly armed country and consequently there is no "Brazilian disarmament" issues;

(b) In the regional context of South America, Brazil has no "*enemies*" and so there is no prospect of armed conflict (a call to disarmament would thus have no political motivation, such as averting a situation of imminent conflict); (a revealing fact is that there are far more studies of the military as agents of domestic politics than as supporters of a particular strategic outlook);

(c) With the exception of its participation as one of the Allies in the World Wars, during this century Brazil has not had to face the dramatic reality of armed conflict waged with modern techniques of mass destruction. This makes public opinion less responsive to, and, consequently, politicians and academics less interested in, the matter;

4. In this context, there is no Brazilian institute exclusively dedicated to the study or promotion of disarmament (though there are noteworthy scholars in this field);

5. Finally, another feature of the Brazilian situation: the "*culture relating to disarmament*", especially vis-à-vis matters of an institutional nature, is in the hands of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, which has played a very active role down the years regarding issues of disarmament (not only by expressing global positions but also by defining tenets in international conferences, in negotiations on legal texts, etc.). Just to mention the last Brazilian contribution on the field of international security, I would recall the proposal for the creation of a Zone of Peace and Cooperation in the South Atlantic. Nevertheless, for the reasons mentioned above, Brazilian diplomacy has virtually no interlocutor, no "*supplier*" of information or of frames of reference inside the country.

On the basis of this description, certain conclusions regarding "*ways and means*" immediately come to the fore: perhaps one should not begin cooperation endeavours with topics in the leading edge of the field research topics; it is important that there be efficient channels of communication between university research and the diplomatic service, precisely so that knowledge about what I have called the "*culture relating to disarmament*" can be obtained, etc...

But it would be worthwhile to advance, and to do so systematically, in our considerations. Reflecting on the objectives themselves of research into disarmament in a country like Brazil is a key element of this process. To my mind, there are basically two such objectives:

- (a) Collating existing information on the subject, working on it until "*new knowledge*" can be produced by means of original Brazilian research, research with its own perspectives;
- (b) Disseminating knowledge: despite its commitment to the creation of knowledge, as mentioned above, academia cannot evade its responsibility for spreading new information which might serve to increase society's interest in the matter as well.

It is, above all, the latter factor which requires of research and cooperation options that they be extremely well chosen and managed in order to enable the groundwork of knowledge about disarmament in Brazil and Latin America to be consolidated. It is evident that in societies like Brazil, which currently displays a strongly democratic bent, the State should not intervene forcefully to channel research in one direction or another, or to steer cooperation towards this or that topic. I believe that these matters must be settled by debate and, in this sense, the present paper aims simply to suggest one of the possible alternatives for dealing with the problem under discussion.

At this stage, I should like to introduce the issue of cooperation on two levels: that of topics and that of methods. The questions to be posed are: what topics would provide us with the basic knowledge for motivating original research? What methods of cooperation could be developed to achieve this end?

Let us begin by tackling the question of topics. If the intention is to select lines of research, the first observation to make is that the disarmament issue is extremely complex and can be approached from various analytical angles. Briefly, these would include:

#### A. DISARMAMENT AND THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The disarmament debate may touch on the very core of philosophical reflection about international relations, from a realistic viewpoint, in order to preserve their independence, States should provide for their security and to do as much must maintain armed forces, armaments are thus an ineluctable necessity in international relations: but does realism imply the need for armaments to multiply by geometric progression? Or, on the contrary, are there philosophical solutions that would indicate the possibilities of an equation between greater security and less arms? The tradition in the Third World is to formulate solutions of an ethical nature to deal with this problem. Are they satisfactory? To what extent do ethical solutions have effective political clout? In brief; philosophical questions with regard to disarmament are manifold and complex. Nevertheless we feel that such philosophical considerations should be part of the framework of reflection in developing countries because they constitute an essential analytical basis for any attempt to formulate a comprehensive understanding of disarmament.

## B. DISARMAMENT AND HISTORY

Post-war history, especially that focusing on the East-West approach, can be interpreted to a great extent as the history of attempts - mostly failures and a few successes - at disarmament negotiations (a history, as a matter of fact, that runs counter to another history, viewed from the South, which revolves around two D's - decolonization and development rather than around the East-West confrontation). In this respect, two lines of enquiry open out before us: on the one hand, the developing countries' stance on disarmament is crucial in delimiting their own international role, as well as some of their basic conceptual foreign policy options and, for this reason, deserves to be researched separately by each Third World country); on the other hand, it is necessary to combine such studies with research into the question of development and economic transformation, among other reasons so as to discover conceptual and political links between the two areas (nowadays, for example, while disarmament is a dominant issue on the international agenda, one encounters situations of difficulty and non-progress on the economic and social fronts, considerably more dramatic for developing countries: could any link be established between these facts?).

## C. DISARMAMENT AS A QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The topics here proliferate:

1. The institutions of disarmament (accords, bilateral negotiations, the Geneva Conference);
2. Disarmament as an element in the political chess game between the superpowers;
3. Disarmament and its economic, social and political implications; disarmament and development, etc.;
4. Global versus regional and conventional versus nuclear disarmament; preemptive disarmament and disarmament as a means to détente, etc.

The topics could have been presented in a more precise fashion, but the objective here was simply to highlight two aspects: how central the disarmament issue is on the international agenda and how complex a subject it is. These are aspects that should be examined head-on by the institutes in the developing world; above all they should seek to present their own standpoint with reference to each one of the facets of disarmament.

## D. DISARMAMENT AS A TECHNICAL PROBLEM

In a way, this discussion could be included in the subject-matter described under item "c", but the point of presenting it as something rather singular is that, from one angle, disarmament has become the preserve of specialists or, to be more precise, an issue about which the diplomat must frequently and systematically seek out the advice of specialists (see, for instance, the debate over the typology of nuclear weapons and their equivalences in the framework of the treaty on medium-range

missiles; the intricacies of the disarmament process in the field of chemical weaponry etc.). For Third World researchers, the question that must be posed is: what interest is there in specializing in the technical aspects of disarmament as a necessary prelude to the coordination of analysis and research into political issues in this field? Or: by what means can one make the most of expertise in specific topics - chemistry, nuclear energy, etc. - so as to improve one's positions in terms of the political side of disarmament? Are there chances of setting up pools of international specialists? Or on the contrary, should this knowledge basically be produced at a national level.

#### E. DISARMAMENT AND THE FUTURE OF MANKIND

It is common knowledge that the advent of atomic weapons has added a new dimension to the disarmament issue, since maintaining nuclear arsenals at current levels holds the very survival of mankind in check. In this respect, disarmament is a matter of universal interest and raises a basic question for developing countries: how can they contribute to disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, when, to the present day, negotiations have always been carried out by a restricted group behind closed doors? Intrinsicly, how can they have a hand in building their own future?

From this presentation, which does not presume to be complete or definitive, is it possible to identify what could be considered ideal topic from the point of view of cooperation? Topics that would comprise subject-matter that is both basic and motivating? Certain topics are considered the natural preserve of developing countries, and the first of these would, of course, be the relation between disarmament and development. Others include: the disclosure of forms of participation in the processes that lead to nuclear disarmament (the oligopolist side of actions like the Non-Proliferation Treaty), disarmament and arms control and non-proliferation of certain technologies as means of hampering developing countries' access to more advanced technological and scientific (capabilities), etc... And still others: disarmament efforts associated with the solution of regional crises, as in the case of Central America, etc. But my impression is that all the avenues of research I have described are equally relevant. Comprehending disarmament is knowing how to situate it as a philosophical issue within international relations and, at the same time, understanding the technical side of a discussion in Geneva on chemical weapons. I have no ready answer in terms of providing a list of topics naturally suited to cooperation. In other words, given the lack of resources, one must find paths that will give the process of reflection unity and yet will also consider the specific characteristics (those of a developing country) of the context of the reflection.

One of the subjects, among others, that I believe would serve such purposes is the history of the positions that the governments of developing countries have taken on the subject of disarmament. There are a number of reasons for this:

- (a) It would make a comparative studies possible, thus providing an opportunity for cooperation between the institutes;
- (b) It could be undertaken in such a way so as to incorporate an element of political motivation that would help to increase society's concern about disarmament;

(c) It would be useful because it would necessarily lead to cooperation between Foreign Ministries and academic institutions;

(d) It would be a specially propitious topic for defining the “specificity” of thinking in the South on disarmament and, thus, for constructing independent formulations on an issue that is absolutely central to the contemporary world of international politics. There are, of course, limits to this approach and it is not possible, for example, to shunt aside the analysis of more general problems, such as the history of direct negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, that give the framework for the specific topic that I am proposing to be a part of the Institutes’ agenda. But it is a possible first step, particularly if the joint reflection undertaken by the Institutes involved should come to incorporate a notion that it is essential, in the process of reviewing history, to determine the limits of developing countries’ thinking and action in this field.

I shall now proceed to make a brief description of possible instruments of cooperation. An initial point to make is that I do not regard cooperation between Institutes in developing countries as exclusive even when the topic being researched is as “singular” as the comparative history of the stances adopted by different governments. The limits of these positions can only be pinned down when contrasted with the reflection on what actually occurs about the internal process of negotiation between the Superpowers and, in this regard, the cooperation between Institutes in developing and developed countries is fundamental. A second observation to be made is that research on disarmament would gain depth and a solid institutional foundation to the same extent that broad sectors of society were encouraged to play a part. Hence, it seems to me that the research carried out in cooperation with others should pave the way for seminars that would bring together not only members of the academic community but also representatives of other organizations in society (journalists, members of parliament, labour union representatives, etc).

Another point: joint research should explore regional coincidences, especially in the early phase. A Latin American concept of disarmament will perhaps be distinguishable from an Asian or African concept. But, as far as I am aware, there are as yet no thorough surveys or satisfactory studies regarding regional perspectives on disarmament. There would thus be an initial phase of intra-regional comparative studies that would evolve towards a second stage of more globally-oriented undertakings.

To round off my observations, I would say that what marks out the stance of developing countries over the last forty years, if one can reduce such things to formulas, is their desire to participate in international affairs. For its political, economic, technological and scientific implications, disarmament is an issue that lies at the heart of the international process; to the extent that the Research Institutes involved provide good knowledge for dealing with the issue, they will also be strengthening the hand of the Third World countries in the international arena. And, if this happens, the consequences for the process of disarmament, so crucial for the survival of mankind, will certainly be positive.

Note: The author is a Brazilian diplomat but the observations contained herein represent an entirely personal point of view.

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**REPORT****G. O. OLUSANYA**

I want to thank the Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Mr. Dhanapala, for asking me to write this short paper. The topic is of interest to me, particularly because I come from a developing world in which, by and large, many Institutes work in isolation, and under severe constraints, thus making the issue of co-operation very vital.

The question of cooperation amongst peoples, institutions or nations is so vital that it needs no elaboration. Everyone appreciates the immense value of co-operation in human life and even in the animal world. What is always the problem, indeed the challenge, is how to secure meaningful participation in a particular given context. This is why this topic: *"Ways and Means of Increasing Co-operation amongst the Institutes with Special Reference to Developing Countries"* is so very significant and more so in the case of Institutes in developing countries. I say this because, for certain obvious reasons, co-operation amongst Institutes in developed countries is comparatively quite easy, given the existence of good telecommunication and transportation infrastructures and adequate facilities in documentation services etc. In fact, where there are inadequacies, facilities for exchange or inter-library borrowings exist. But for the Institutes in developing countries, particularly in Africa with which I am quite familiar, the situation is different and far from the picture I have just painted. In the first instance, there are very few Institutes and out of these few, only some engage in Disarmament and Peace Research, which is the primary preoccupation of this distinguished Institutes.

Secondly, research institutes in developing countries tend to work in isolation to a great extent. More importantly, they are not adequately funded to be able to effectively discharge their responsibilities. There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule; but such exceptions are few and far between. Thus, the issue of co-operation in the context of the picture just painted assumes a much greater dimension and poses a much greater challenge that requires a creative response.

How then can we bring about co-operation and in what areas? I will proceed to identify and suggest a few areas where this can be achieved. These are by no means exhaustive, but I believe the collective wisdom of all of us here will enlarge upon these so that by the time we leave this Conference we shall have with us a blueprint for co-operation.

I should like to preface my general remarks with an express admission and appreciation of the crucial relevance of disarmament not only as a public policy imperative for statesmen concerned with the search for peace but also as a research field which calls for urgent attention by research scholars in both developed and developing countries. Given the crucial importance of disarmament to the search for global peace and development, investment of time, energy and resources on study and research in the field is a wise and productive investment which needs to be increased. Perhaps more importantly is the need for cultivating the culture of co-operation among the research institutes involved in disarmament studies and research for a more effective utilization of their resources.

With regard to the areas of co-operation, the first that comes to my mind is exchange of information and research material through exchange of books and journals. This practice is already in vogue with some Institutes. For example, my own Institute has a programme of exchange with similar Institutes in different parts of the world. All Institutes should establish this kind of exchange and where it is already in existence, it should be extended. The advantage here to Institutes in developing countries lies in the fact that many of them cannot afford to stock their libraries up-to-date and the current economic crisis has worsened this. Since exchange of books and journals does not involve foreign exchange transactions, these Institutes will be able to obtain up-to-date information up to a point without tears.

Next is the exchange of research personnel. It is quite obvious that some Institutes are better endowed than others in terms of the number and quality of research personnel as well as the quantity and quality of their documentation services. An exchange programme such as recommended will be a useful means of providing Institutes not so well-endowed with expertise and experience. Besides, such an exchange will help to streamline research endeavours on disarmament; thus simplifying the task of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in organizing an agenda for UNSSOD. It will prevent duplication and overlapping as well as provide cross fertilisation of ideas which should help to enrich the activities of each Institute.

UNIDIR may have to make some provision for such an exchange because of current economic crisis going on in many of the developing countries which put Research Institutes of this type at a disadvantage financially. This is because governments tend to concentrate on urgent economic and social matters and, because of limited resources, their action inevitably involves cutting down on the amount of fund voted for research.

There is also the need to organize, at intervals or periodically, what I would call "*Disarmament dialogue*" which should provide an additional opportunity for contact and exchange of ideas as well as cross fertilization of ideas. Such dialogues can be organised at various levels - subregional, regional and global level. In the case of sub-regional or regional dialogues, Regional Centres may have to underwrite such dialogues or do it jointly with the various National Institutes.

The aim of such dialogues is to enable participants to understand better the respective national perspective on disarmament with a view to possibly influencing such perceptions in a positive direction.

Furthermore, there is a need for joint research projects between regional and national institutes. This would certainly be of mutual advantage. Such joint research projects would be funded by both the national Institute and the Regional Centre. This should prove very valuable in developing countries where there is a limited number of experts by helping to pool resources together.

Finally, there is a need for joint sponsorship of Conferences and workshops periodically amongst Institutes both at regional and global level, both amongst the Institutes in the South as well as amongst Institutes in both the North and the South. For this purpose, Institutes in the developed world should endeavour to establish a linkage with various Institutes in the developing countries

to be able to assist the latter and to be able to understand more clearly the views and perspective of the developing world on the question of disarmament.

In concluding this short address, it is vital to emphasize that the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research should serve as the anchor or umbrella for successful cooperation amongst the national institutes and the regional centres. It is heartening to note that UNIDIR is already fully alive to its responsibility in this respect. The very fact that it has organised a Bulletin (the maiden issue of which is out this month) which would help to disseminate information on completed and on-going research projects, conferences, etc. as well as other institutional aspects such as establishment of new Institutes is a step in the right direction.

We congratulate both the Director and the staff for this valuable initiative, while requesting at the same time for an expansion of activities along the lines suggested above.

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## REPORT

JASJIT SINGH

In their ongoing search for enduring peace and security in the world, states, institutions, and individuals have been constantly examining amongst a large range of issues, that of disarmament, which, with all its implications, is central to the problem itself. Research undertaken so far indicates that, in spite of the commendable work done in this field so far, we have, perhaps, only succeeded in touching the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Development and growth of military technology, arms build-ups and arms race, conflictual patterns of inter-state behaviour, reliance and resort to force in international affairs and a host of other factors and issues impinging directly, and indirectly, on peace and security coalesce and cleave to generate centrifugal and centripetal pressures in a dynamic framework, in time, space, and substance. The same factors in an evolving environment play a varying role supporting or retarding disarmament processes. Since peace and security are the universal goal of mankind, it becomes necessary to undertake continuous analytical and objective research in issues and areas associated with and influencing disarmament for enduring peace and greater security. These being the objective goals of all peoples, international cooperation and collaboration in the field of disarmament research would help to not only build a sound and more broad-based foundation for such research, but the process itself would go a long way in mutual understanding of different perceptions and perspectives and thus contribute to greater understanding and appreciation of varying standpoints. Cooperation in disarmament research, therefore, should enhance its value well beyond the advantages emanating from individual and national approach to research.

In order to try and identify the ways and means of increasing cooperation amongst the Institutes in the world, especially as it affects the developing countries, it may be useful to briefly outline some critical areas and factors affecting disarmament research in general, and cooperation among Institutes in particular.

## CRITICAL FACTORS AND AREAS

The first critical area concerns the quantum and imbalance of disarmament research being undertaken at present. Considering the importance of the topic, very few Institutes in the world seem to be devoting adequate focus and effort on disarmament research. This has restricted the quantum of research itself. At the same time, by and large, disarmament research has been concentrated in a few countries of the developed world, mostly the great powers. This imbalance has inevitably tended to channelize the focus of research in the context of East-West cold war politics, at the cost of studies related to and affecting the developing world. At the same time, the "*arms control*" approach adopted by most developed countries as against a "*disarmament*" approach, has in itself inhibited disarmament research and created imbalances in research towards enhancement of peace and security. The research in the developed countries has tended to focus on problems of control, regulation, and other means of "*managing*" the arms race, rather than seeking to eliminate or avoid arms races. The arms control approach has unfortunately always tended to reject the "*disarmament*" approach as utopian and unrealistic. It is increasingly becoming clear that disarmament and arms reduction are the only ways out of the current predicament facing mankind. Research undertaken by individuals, groups and institutions in the developing countries, limited as it is, fails to receive due

note in the overall consideration and discussion of disarmament issues, or as source material in disarmament research in the developed countries. In most of the developing countries, disarmament issues are handled by the governments in their foreign offices, largely as part of work connected with UN affairs. Their work receives limited disseminations. There are few institutions in the developing world undertaking research into disarmament and related issues. The imbalance between developed and developing countries is perhaps highlighted by the very composition of the UNIDIR Conference itself where, of the 50 Institutes participating, 32 Institutes from developed countries are represented (with 5 from USA itself) from amongst the 32 developed States, as against 18 Institutes from the developing world composed of 132 States. One major issue, therefore, which needs to be addressed is how to rectify this situation and increase the quantum of disarmament research in its totality, and encourage greater effort in the developing countries.

The second critical area concerns the information imbalance and flow. Authentic information about military technology, force levels, structures, and preparedness, and weapons system of a country is very difficult to obtain. Traditional "*bean count*" system of estimating military capabilities has long been rendered redundant. As it is, advances in technology make it difficult to arrive at accurate assessments even by highly specialised experts. A great deal of misinformation also creeps into the data available. Validity and accuracy of data as a source for research, thus, becomes doubtful; and with variable data (depending upon source of information) and differing norms of assessing data, serious errors in research tend to crop up besides providing scope for application of bias and prejudices of the researchers. One of the major handicap of complete and speedy flow of information to and from researchers is due to language barriers. A great deal of data and research undertaken and published in languages other than English may remain available only to limited users familiar with those languages. Research institutions would find it extremely difficult and costly to generate multi-lingual translation facilities or faculties. In the developing countries, poor availability of financial resources also acts as a serious constraint in acquisition of research material and literature, even where language is not a barrier, especially due to the very high costs of published works, books and periodicals emanating from the developed countries. Information distribution systems also face considerable handicaps, especially from socialist bloc countries and non-English speaking world. The resulting information imbalances, whether as a consequence of problems of correct estimation of capabilities and performance data, or due to disjunction in information flow due to language problems, resource constraints or information distribution limitations, create serious lacunae in disarmament research. At the same time, the problem also points to a major area for cooperation amongst Institutes engaged in disarmament research.

The third major critical area affecting disarmament research is the little recognized, but none-the-less serious problem of ethnocentrism. The real threats facing civilization emanate from (i) military technology, and (ii) strategic doctrine. In the understanding, analyses, and application of both these ethnocentric perceptions play a great role. In recent history ethnocentrism has been a source of mistakes in strategic practice and misconceptions in theorising about strategy and disarmament. For example, nations see themselves as the centre of the universe, the "*sovereign nation state*" concept itself being highly ego-centric. Nations, therefore, tend to worry about all manner of threats because they explicitly or implicitly see behaviour elsewhere being directed towards themselves; and interpret the actions of adversaries or potential adversaries in terms of their own problems and vulnerabilities. The sense of threat is intensified as policy-makers extrapolate all sources of aggression as focussed in their own direction. To add to this, the fog of culture interferes with the theory and practice of strategy; and ethnocentric perceptions, racial antipathy, culture-bound thinking and the tendency to project one's own assumptions distorts the images and perceived

motivations of other nations. To compound the problem, information imbalances tend to overemphasize one's own concepts and assumptions in matters related to peace, security and disarmament. Objective research in peace and disarmament, therefore, suffers deeply from the fallacy of transferring national points of reference and national assumptions onto potential adversaries and other nations. Our culture bound thinking prevents us from recreating the world through our opponent's eyes. Yet it is necessary to do so if objective and scientific analysis of capabilities, performances and intentions is to be undertaken. The inability to recreate the world through another's eyes, to walk in his footsteps and to feel his pain or his hopes has been the cause of a plethora of strategic problems and failures. A great deal of disjunction in objective analyses and mutual understanding is created by ethnocentrism: as in the case of the domination of western strategic thought and literature, and its inadequate note of the perceptions and analyses from other sources, especially those emanating from the developing countries; or inter- and intra-developed and developing countries, or even amongst institutions of disarmament and strategic studies. There is, thus, a need to penetrate the mind and seek the cultural correlates in interpreting factual data. The source of many errors in the arms race has not been the absence of factual knowledge, but rather the absence of corrective mechanisms in ethnocentric perceptions. The problem can, perhaps, best be eased by increasing cooperation which would help to understand the other side's point of view, and study of ethnocentrism as a factor in strategic thought and logic.

#### INCREASING COOPERATION

There can be little about the need to increase cooperation amongst the Institutes undertaking research in peace, security and disarmament. Some of the critical areas which influence strategic thinking and disarmament research are outlined above. Some others can also be identified to reinforce the point. It may also be noted that the level of cooperation amongst the Institutes in the developed countries is much higher than between those belonging to developed and developing countries, and between Institutes in developing countries themselves. A closer examination would reveal that this may be due to three main factors: greater and easier flow of information amongst developed countries (east-west disjunction being another dimension), greater mobility of research scholars amongst the Institutes in the developed world (partly because of a larger number of institutions engaged in such research); financial constraints under which institutions in developing countries operate especially when and where they have to relate to the developed states. At the same time, it is for consideration whether apprehensions of "*intellectual imperialism*" real or imaginary, may not be a factor inhibiting greater cooperation in many cases, especially between developed states and developing countries. The approach to finding ways and means of increasing cooperation amongst Institutes must, therefore, address itself to these issues and factors.

One fundamental step required is to increase the quantum of disarmament research being undertaken in the developing countries. This would require the strengthening of infrastructures in existing Institutes, and establishment of additional Institutes. It must be noted that increasing the quantum of research does not necessarily mean increase in the quality of research. However, with adequate resources, a higher quantum of research should (especially with passage of time and greater interaction with other institutions) lead to a higher quantum of research of quality than what may be possible today. The quantum of research contribution from developing countries could also be increased by their greater involvement in joint research projects with other Institutes.

Cooperation amongst Institutes needs to be increased through the medium of joint research projects. These could be sponsored by the UN, regional and other organisation like the Non-aligned Movement, OAU etc. and national governments and NGOs. Institutes in the developed countries, especially the larger ones, may consider inviting scholars from other countries (especially developing nations) to work jointly in their research projects, so that perception and perspectives from other countries can receive due weightage. To support this approach, the ways and means of increasing cooperation would need to pay attention to the need for necessary financial resources, academic expertise, collection, processing and dissemination of information on arms race and disarmament, dissemination of research findings and so on.

The second major area where substantive scope exists for increasing cooperation is in relation to information flow and data sharing. Gross asymmetries exist amongst institutes in respect of their data collection, processing, and dissemination capabilities and procedures. It would be almost impossible to achieve some level of compatibility across the board amongst all these Institutes. Yet it is necessary to achieve greater and smoother flow of relevant information amongst all Institutes engaged in disarmament research, besides linking-in data base from other relevant institutions and organisations. A modest start could be made by free exchange of publications amongst the Institutes represented at the UNIDIR Conference besides extending this cooperation to all other Institutes engaged in similar activities in the world. However, additional definitive measures would be required to achieve higher levels of cooperation. Given the existing constraints and the complex nature of the problems, it may be worth considering, as a starting step, nomination of selected nodal Institutes as repositories of information base and data bank, on a regional/continental basis. Other institutions then would be able to bank on these nodal institutes for information. Better communications and flow of information amongst the nodal institutes (and UNIDIR) would go a long way in reducing information imbalance and overcoming information barriers and constraints. This would also enable concentration of efforts at a few points initially, thus making for optimum utilisation of resources with the aim of progressive expansion of cooperation in information and data sharing.

The third area of cooperation would broadly involve increasing interaction amongst scholars. This is important so that different perceptions, ideas and concepts get opportunities for interaction and interplay. At one level this would go a long way in reducing the negative impulses of ethnocentrism. At another, greater interaction in the academic/scholastic field should help promote greater understanding by the decision-makers and those engaged in policy formulation in their respective governments. Not least of the advantages accruing would be the improved scope and extent of sensitivity to and from wider base of public opinion on issues of peace, security and disarmament. The interaction amongst scholars and institutes could take the form of:

1. Seminars and conferences, national and international, bilateral and multilateral, where individual scholars and/or Institutes from other countries can take part.
2. Exchange of scholars on short term and longer duration fellowship schemes to work in the Institutes of other countries on specified research topics.
3. Lectures and talks by visiting scholars from other countries and Institutes.

Such interactions are necessary not only between the Institutes in developed countries but also between the developed and developing countries, as also between the developing countries themselves (where, perhaps, such interactions are at their lowest level).

In conclusion, it has to be recognized that while there is an urgent need to increase across the board cooperation in disarmament research, there are a number of constraints and limitations inhibiting such increase. The greatest one, perhaps, relate to financial resources, especially in respect of the developing countries. Here the developing countries themselves need to make definitive efforts to allocate more resources for research in disarmament, peace and security issues. Serious thought needs to be given to allocate funds for such purposes and tasks, as indeed has been done in India, from out of the defence budgetary allocations. With the world military expenditures now reaching \$1,000 billion figures, it is ironic that disarmament research is plagued by paucity of financial resources. A positive momentum towards this direction could be provided by the UN Special Session on Disarmament scheduled this year by calling for allocation of resources, from out of military expenditures, towards disarmament research and studies in peace and security by academic and research institutes. The UNIDIR itself needs to be supported further on the same principle.

Other factors like ethnocentric perceptions, information imbalance and inadequate scope and opportunities for cooperative efforts also have their impact. Increasing cooperation by itself would help to expand the scope and extent of disarmament research; and at the same time improve objectivity in research by subduing national (and even institutional) biases, better appreciation of varying perceptions and interests, and reduce the adverse effects of ethnocentrism. Increasing cooperation in disarmament research should reinforce policy formulations supporting disarmament due to increased mutual understanding and reconciliation of different perceptions and perspectives. The scope for cooperation is vast. What is required is concerted and collective effort to tap the potentialities and provide the requisite direction, resources and coordination. In this the UNIDIR can play an increasing role, especially as a focal institution for cooperative activities.

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## DISCUSSION

**RAY FORBES**

I would like to comment on the three valuable reports which have been presented this afternoon, on ways and means of increasing cooperation among Disarmament Research Institutes with special reference to developing countries. I am making my comment as Director of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies, a Teaching and Research Centre named after a leader who ushered in the Age of the Common Man in Sri Lanka.

Very relevant and practical suggestions have been made in the three papers just presented as to how cooperation among Disarmament Research Institutes could be increased.

Up to now the East-West dimensions of Disarmament Research have been stressed. It is not necessary to stress that Disarmament to be effective has to be global in outlook, envisaging all regions. It is therefore essential that the South-South dimensions of Disarmament Research have to be brought more and more into focus. May I suggest that Disarmament Research Institutes include in their programmes a greater consideration of how regional tensions could be lessened and regional security ensured.

Disarmament Research however important and valuable, will be of no avail to the vast masses of humanity unless it is explained and made known to them. We cannot afford to keep Disarmament Research in the clouds. We have to bring it to earth. It is vitally important to ensure that the elitist perspective of Disarmament Research is transformed with the least possible delay to a mass perspective.

The Report presented this afternoon referred very correctly to the need for an exchange of research personnel. This could however be a drain on limited resources and its out-reach could be limited. I would go further and urge an even more broad-based methodology employing an accentuated and concentrated use of the organs of mass media - radio, television, films, even cartoons for the projection of the aims and objectives of Disarmament Research among the peoples of the world.

Much more, in my opinion, than what is already being done, could be achieved through the United Nations Radio Programmes, which should be expanded into the fields of television, feature and documentary films and cartoons.

May I even suggest that the possibility of having a Disarmament Research Ship sailing around the world, carrying up-to-date information about the status of Disarmament Research be pursued. We have had experiences of Medical Ships and Bible Ships, why not a Disarmament Research Ship or a Peace Research Ship? If the constraint is financial resources, may I suggest that Foundations in the First World, whose aims and objectives are the promotion of international peace and cooperation, be requested to fund this project. Who knows, the Peace Research Ship may turn out to be another Noah's Ark.

Before I conclude, I wish to congratulate UNIDIR on its new venture, its Bulletin, which fills

a much felt need for information on what is going on in Disarmament Research Institutes. I wish the Bulletin all success as a continuing endeavour.

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**MICHAEL E. BROWN**

It is reassuring to hear that three thoughtful commentators came to many of the same conclusions about the steps that should be taken to promote cooperation among research institutes in the developing world. There seems to be a consensus that the following steps should be taken:

- (i) research materials and publications could be exchanged;
- (ii) joint research projects could be undertaken;
- (iii) joint conferences could be held;
- (iv) library holdings could be better publicized.

Outlining the steps that should be taken in this area is a valuable first step toward improving cooperation among research institutes in the developing world. I would argue, however, that a second and more important step must also be taken. We have been told what we should do; now we need to determine what we can do, given likely budgetary constraints. With this problem in mind, I would like to direct three sets of questions at our panelists.

First, what are the prospects for promoting cooperation among research institutes in the developing world, in your opinion? How likely is it that your recommendations will be fully implemented? One of the panelists observed that his institute has experienced problems in maintaining library subscriptions to periodicals, given rising journal costs. If institutes are experiencing problems in maintaining existing activities, how likely is it that they will be able to undertake additional activities, especially given that the list of recommended activities is a fairly ambitious one?

Second, where are the financial resources for this expanded agenda going to come from? Most of us in this room are familiar with the problems associated with fund raising. In uncertain economic times, it can be difficult to simply maintain one's institutional activities at current levels. One of the panelists noted that his institute received funding from his country's Ministry of Defence. I would assume that, since many defence budgets around the world are under severe pressure and since weapon and equipment costs only increase as time goes by, that this particular source of income is only going to become more problematic as time goes by. So, what specific sources of funding do you have in mind for your expanded program?

Third, if you are unable to secure funding for all of these expanded activities, what are your priorities? Which of these recommendations are near the top of your list? And which are the most cost-effective?

It is obvious that our panelists have already spent a great deal of time thinking about the important issues in this area. I would be delighted if any or all of them would elaborate on some of these more pragmatic issues.

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**KAMAL MATINUDDIN**

Researchers in developing countries are handicapped because of the limitation of funds. Although most of them possess the same academic qualifications as their counter-part in the developed world the quality of their research is sometimes not as good. This is so not because they are less intelligent or less hardworking but because the material on which they base their research is inadequate and certainly much less than what is available in the research institutes of the richer countries.

Cooperation between institutes devoted to disarmament and allied security issues will greatly help in improving the quality of research of the less fortunate institutes as well. Cooperation can be achieved by an exchange of publications on a no cost basis, by providing research material to other institutes on a concessional basis and if possible even free. Since it may not be possible to disseminate information to institutes around the world relevant data can be provided to UNIDIR which can keep other institutes informed about the availability of all research papers on disarmament. Individual researchers can then obtain specific information from UNIDIR.

On a regional basis institutes should encourage visits of researchers to each others institutes and even arrange regional seminar, conferences and workshops devoted to disarmament. This would create a healthy environment in conflict ridden regions. Experts on disarmament like those working for DDA, UNIDIR, SIPRI, IPRA and Pugwash could visit institutes in developing countries where talks by then could be arranged. A well informed public opinion can thus be built up around the world.

NGOs dealing with disarmament from the developed countries could offer scholarships for disarmament researchers of the poorer nations. They could also encourage joint research on projects dealing with a reduction of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

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**JEAN KLEIN**

Les exposés que nous venons d'entendre ont mis en évidence les difficultés de la coopération entre Instituts qui se consacrent à la recherche en matière de désarmement et il n'est pas surprenant que les représentants du Tiers-Monde se soient exprimés sur ce sujet de la manière la plus explicite. En effet, dans les pays riches de l'hémisphère Nord, les problèmes relatifs à l'acquisition des données de base et à l'échange d'informations ne se posent pas d'une manière aiguë, bien que les Instituts se heurtent tous

à des difficultés financières et que leurs possibilités d'action soient limitées. En revanche, dans les pays en voie de développement, la situation est moins satisfaisante et correspond souvent aux réalités décrites par le Professeur Olusanya, Directeur général de l'Institut nigérian des Affaires internationales. Personnellement, j'ai eu l'occasion de m'en rendre compte en effectuant des missions dans des pays de l'Afrique francophone et je me suis toujours efforcé de remédier, dans la mesure de mes faibles moyens, aux carences que je découvrais. Il me semble que les Instituts les mieux dotés devraient se préoccuper davantage du sort de leurs homologues du Tiers-Monde et tenter de l'améliorer par la voie d'une coopération diversifiée.

Un autre obstacle à la coopération entre Instituts est lié à un phénomène que le Docteur Singh a qualifié d'ethnocentrisme. On a rappelé hier que le désarmement n'a de signification que s'il contribue au renforcement de la paix et de la sécurité internationale, et que les Etats n'accepteront de s'engager dans cette voie que s'ils escomptent des avantages sur ce plan. Or, la sécurité est conditionnée par de nombreuses variables et la perception qu'en ont les dirigeants varie dans l'espace et le temps. Ainsi, M. Fonseca a mis à juste titre l'accent sur l'intérêt que présenterait pour le Brésil la création de zones de paix dans l'Atlantique Sud et il serait facile de citer d'autres exemples où la sécurité ne se conçoit que si l'on tient compte des particularités régionales. Toutefois, cette approche ne doit pas être exclusive de la recherche de solutions de type universaliste et, en Occident, on est conscient des inconvénients que présente l'application de mesures de désarmement dans une zone trop étroite comme celle qui a été retenue pour la réduction mutuelle des forces en Europe centrale et pour la création de zones exemptes d'armes chimiques ou nucléaires.

Enfin, je me permettrai de faire une brève observation sur le lien entre le désarmement et le développement. On conçoit que pour les pays du Tiers-Monde le désarmement soit surtout envisagé dans la perspective d'une redistribution des ressources économisées sur les dépenses militaires au profit des pays les plus démunis. Or, une telle démarche n'a de signification que si le désarmement se traduit par une réduction de l'effort de défense et l'affectation des moyens prévus pour l'acquisition et la modernisation des armements à la promotion du développement. Jusqu'à présent, les accords de maîtrise des armements n'ont eu qu'une incidence négligeable sur les dépenses militaires et l'idée d'un fonds du désarmement pour le développement, lancée par la France en 1978, se heurte à des objections de tous ordres. C'est dans ce contexte que la querelle entre les tenants de l'arms control et les partisans du désarmement prend tout son sens, puisque l'aménagement du statu-quo stratégique et la maîtrise de la course aux armements (*Hedley Bull*) ne sont pas susceptibles de réduire le poids des dépenses militaires, alors que la finalité du désarmement est toute autre : ne détourner vers les armements que le minimum des ressources humaines et économiques du monde (Article 26 de la Charte de l'ONU). Aussi longtemps que cet objectif ne sera pas atteint, il serait vain de créer un fonds du désarmement pour le développement, puisque les frais de fonctionnement seraient, selon toute vraisemblance, plus élevés que le montant de l'aide qu'il pourrait accorder aux pays pauvres.

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**GEOFFREY PEARSON**

UNIDIR is to be congratulated for this initiative. I hope it leads to greater cooperation between Institutes for research on disarmament and defence questions by means of exchanges of publications and Fellows. It would be useful if similar meetings could be arranged by UNIDIR at regular intervals. The purpose would be to keep each other informed of research in progress and to develop new perspectives on the main challenges to international peace and security.

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**WILLIAM POTTER**

An underutilized method for enhancing cooperation among institutes and promoting improved understanding of other nations' perspectives is the use of multinational simulations. A simulation of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations, for example, has the pedagogical attraction of fostering empathy on the part of participants who must try to view the world, if only for a short time, from very different perspectives. The results of "*seeing with the eyes of others*" can be quite remarkable, especially when one conducts a simulation involving participants from different nations, including traditional adversaries.

A multinational simulation also may have the great merit of bringing together for an extended simulation environment friendships are often formed which may serve the interest of international cooperation when in subsequent years the participants rise in their respective governments and research institutions. This has been the case in the three week summer simulation conducted in alternate years at a University of California campus and at the University of Bonn. For a description of the simulation approach see William C. Potter, "*A Guide to Simulating U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Negotiations*", CISA Working Paper No 62 (March 1988).

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**THIRD/TROISIÈME SESSION**

**THE PRESENT STATUS OF DISARMAMENT RESEARCH/L'ÉTAT ACTUEL DE LA RECHERCHE SUR LE  
DÉSARMEMENT**

**REPORTS/RAPPORTS:**

**Trevor Findlay, Jean-François Guilhaudis, Kurt Spillmann**

**DISCUSSION:**

**Wolfgang Schwendler, Joseph Rotblat, Ray Forbes,**

**CHAIRMAN/PRÉSIDENT:**

**Sir Hugh Beach**

## REPORT

TREVOR FINDLAY

A novel by John Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids, describes the arrival on earth of strange plant-like creatures - called triffids - from outer space (34). The most prominent features of these creatures are: (a) they keep growing and (b) they pop up in the most unlikely of places. Trying to give a status report on disarmament research at any particular point in time is a bit like catching triffids. Disarmament research is growing rapidly and is being carried out all over the place - in international organizations like UNITAR; in government bureaucracies like the Peace, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; in international relations departments at universities; at strategic studies institutes and at peace research centres. Disarmament research is also carried out by groups involved in the peace movement, ranging from the globe-straddling Pugwash movement to the tiny New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee. Finally there are countless individuals beavering away alone in academic institutions or simply in their spare time. This state of affairs reflects the hybrid origins of disarmament research.

Disarmament research - the study and critical investigation of measures to reduce or abolish armaments - has been with us at least since Immanuel Kant wrote his work Perpetual Peace in 1795 (35). Indeed Kant, who advocated the gradual abolition of standing armies, can probably be described as the first disarmament researcher. His work was both descriptive and prescriptive - that is, it not only described the existing state of affairs but offered a solution. Such a combination helps explain why disarmament research is so triffid-like. Everyone concerned about international peace can imagine some type of disarmament scheme and be induced to engage themselves in what they may regard as "*disarmament research*". A recent example was a "*New Plan For the Elimination of All Atomic Weapons*" published in the International Journal on World Peace (36). It was written by an emeritus professor of medicine at the New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Centre and was rebutted in scathing terms, in the same issue of the journal, by a professor of sociology at California State University - neither of whom would normally be described as disarmament researchers.

There is of course nothing wrong with this. The genesis of the biological weapons convention can be traced not to a disarmament research body but largely to the determination of one man - the professor of biology at Harvard, Matthew Meselson (37). Meselson researched the BW problem, was shocked by what he discovered and persuaded Henry Kissinger that biological weapons should be unilaterally renounced by the United States, which in turn led to the 1972 BW Convention. This example illustrates the problem of coming to grips with the current status of disarmament research at any particular point in time. Against this background, one is only likely to be able to survey and make recommendations about disarmament research being carried out in a formal, "*academic*" way by recognizable institutions.

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34. J. Wyndham, The Day of the Triffids, (Horwitz Press, Sydney, 1961).

35. A.C.F. Beales, The History of Peace, (G. Bell & Sons Ltd., London, 1931), pp.36-37.

36. C.E. Forkner, "*A New Plan for the Elimination of all Atomic Weapons - A Referendum for Human Destiny*" and commentary by T.M. Kando in International Journal On World Peace, Vol.II, No.3, July-September 1985.

37. F. Dyson, Disturbing the Universe, Pan Books, London, 1979, p.175.

After Kant, where should we look for the origins of disarmament research? The nineteenth century was littered with failed attempts at achieving disarmament, which in turn induced some “*academic*” study of the problems facing such an enterprise. Nevertheless disarmament research in the sense of a systematic, on-going study, is a product of the early twentieth century. It was after all the horrors of World War I which gave the idea of disarmament, particularly universal disarmament, its greatest fillip. Along with greater interest in disarmament came greater study. Lord Philip Noel-Baker’s 1926 book called simply Disarmament may be regarded as a notable example of disarmament research in this period (38).

The academic study of disarmament problems in the 1920s arose however not as a separate, identifiable discipline, but as a sub-category of the discipline known as “*International Relations*”. The study of international relations itself had blossomed after World War I, as an intellectual attempt to understand the origins of war and discover means for preventing its future occurrence. Disarmament was seen as just one of the potential means of war prevention. Often disarmament research was relegated way down the pecking order in international relations departments as a sub-category of what became known - with great suspicion by many - as “*peace research*”. With the failure of the 1932 World Disarmament Conference, the collapse of the League of Nations and the coming of World War II, disarmament fell from favour. Like its object of study, disarmament research also declined.

Not until the late 1950s and early 1960s did disarmament research as we know it today come into being. At this point a further complication arose: the idea of disarmament became wedded to a new but complementary idea - that of “*arms control*”. Arms control was intended to broaden disarmament to include measures other than reductions in numbers or abolition of weapons - such as qualitative restrictions, risk-reduction measures and so-called confidence-building measures. While the developing countries and others have from the outset been suspicious of the term “*arms control*”, with its implied aim of regulating rather than abolishing armaments, the fact is that since the 1960s the terms disarmament and arms control have become inextricably linked and in some quarters interchangeable. A survey of the status of disarmament research must therefore necessarily survey research into arms control.

The academic study of arms control and so-called “*partial*” measures of disarmament was triggered off in the 1960s by British and American scholars, most notably Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin in the United States, Inis Claude in the United Kingdom and Hedley Bull at the Australian National University. Their work was theoretical and their focus tended to be on nuclear weapons and the strategic balance between the two superpowers. Geographically their gaze fell largely on Europe and North America. This new academic activity coincided with a revived interest on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union in actually negotiating disarmament and arms control measures. In 1958 the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests began in Geneva. In 1959 came the Antarctic Treaty, the world’s first nuclear-free zone. In 1962 both the United States and the Soviet Union tabled draft treaties on general and complete disarmament in the then Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. In 1963 the first modern arms control agreement, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, was signed.

With the beginnings of modern disarmament and arms control negotiations came a need for well-prepared negotiating positions based on research. In the United States this resulted in the creation in 1961 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the first government agency of its kind. President Kennedy's aim in establishing ACDA was reportedly to "*help him to conduct arms control and disarmament negotiations in a more professional and less haphazard style*" (39). ACDA went on to become a significant stimulant for disarmament and arms control research in the United States - both directly by commissioning such research from outside or indirectly, by raising the level of consciousness of disarmament issues generally. Other governments soon followed the United States' lead by establishing disarmament research bodies within or attached to their bureaucracies.

But of course such bodies could not - however high the quality of their research - be regarded as entirely disinterested. As Jennings Randolph puts it, "*The ACDA experience shows that policy and education are uneasy companions, and under the roof of a federal department, the practical demands of policy will dominate because they are immediate*" (40).

The need for independent disarmament research therefore also became evident in the 1960s. The result was the establishment of several non-governmental disarmament research bodies or at least peace research centres in which disarmament research played a prominent role. The most renowned of these, and the one that has tended to set the standard for others to emulate, is the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute or SIPRI, established in 1966. In the years since the establishment of SIPRI, the number of independent bodies involved in disarmament research has soared, particularly in Europe and the United States, but also in other parts of the world, as has the number of researchers and their output.

Disarmament research in the 1980s, not unexpectedly, reflects these complex, hybrid origins. Its characteristics, admirable and otherwise, are as follows:

1. Disarmament research is rarely conducted in organizations exclusively dedicated to such research. UNIDIR is itself one of the few research bodies wholly concerned with disarmament research and which actually mentions disarmament in its name. Even the renowned SIPRI, which devotes a large proportion of its efforts to disarmament and arms control, does not specify this in its title. Disarmament research is largely conducted not in dedicated institutions, but in international relations schools, in peace research centres and in security studies institutes. This has advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand it means that disarmament researchers are not cut off from research into other aspects of the international system in which disarmament must operate. Disarmament research may benefit greatly, for instance, from being carried out in an institution that also conducts research into defensive defence.

The subsuming of disarmament research into more broadly-based institutes does mean however that it has a lower public profile than it might otherwise have. In addition, while the association of disarmament research with international relations studies or strategic studies may heighten its reputation with conservatives, traditionalists and governments, the peace movement may regard this as leading to disarmament research that shrinks from radically challenging the status quo.

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39. Dyson, p.131

40. J. Randolph, "*Themes from the Legislative Debate*" in C.D. Smith, The One Hundred Per Cent Challenge, Seven Locks Press, Washington D.C., 1985, p.118.

Alternatively, the subsumation of much disarmament research under the broad rubric of “*peace research*” makes it equally “*suspect*” in the eyes of conservatives who, in some countries, equate the word “*peace*” with appeasement. Given the controversies in most Western countries about the worth of peace research generally and especially the teaching of peace studies, this may be unfortunate.

The subsuming of disarmament research within more broadly-based organizations also means that disarmament research has to compete for resources with alternative approaches to the attainment of international peace. The Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University, for instance, has a very broad charter, requiring it “*to carry out high quality research on topics relating to the conditions for establishing and maintaining peace on national, regional and global scales*”. While the Centre does devote a large portion of its time to disarmament and arms control, it must also pay attention to other avenues in the peace research field.

2. A second characteristic of disarmament research is its marked Eurocentricity. Most disarmament research conducted today is concerned with the two superpowers and, geographically, with Europe and North America. Such a bias even creeps into the language of disarmament research, such as when SS20s become “*Euromissiles*” - even though initially they were deployed against Asia rather than Western Europe (41). The Eurocentric bias in such a vital area as disarmament research is of concern not only to the developing countries, but also to countries like Australia and New Zealand which lie far from Europe and North America.

An example of the neglect of the Pacific Ocean area, for instance, came to light last year when our Peace Research Centre was organizing its August conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific. Prior to the conference we drew up, with the help of a computer search, a list of all the references to arms control in the North Pacific. Only 8 books, monographs or working papers relating to the subject and only 35 articles (half a dozen of which also appeared in one of the monographs) were found. This paucity of material on a major arena of potential superpower conflict is a stunning illustration of the over-preoccupation of disarmament research with Europe. Undoubtedly the amount of disarmament research done on the South Pacific region, in which Australia is located, is even less extensive than that on the North Pacific - with the exception of research related to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.

This Eurocentric bias is not just an academic question. After all, the boundaries of the states of Europe have been fixed, the continent is now one of the world’s most peaceable, and the chances of war, especially nuclear war, breaking out there are greatly diminished. It is Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and Central America, that provide today’s flashpoints. In terms of the possible outbreak of a nuclear conflict, the North Pacific is today of greater concern than Europe - particularly in view of the increased naval deployments of both superpowers in the region, the adoption of aggressive naval strategies and the resulting increase in the number of incidents at sea. As Andrew Mack, Head of the Peace Research Centre in Canberra, has noted:

*“The fact that European security issues should have been the focus of so much attention from the arms control community while those of the Pacific have received so little is unfortunate, since the need for arms control is clearly greater in the latter than in the former”* (42).

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41. D. Stuart, “*The International Context of Asian Arms Control*” in G. Segal (ed.), Arms Control in Asia, Macmillan Press, London, 1987, p.171.

42. A. Mack, “*Conclusion*” in A. Mack & P. Keale, Security Arms Control in the North Pacific (forthcoming).

3. A third characteristic of current disarmament research is its infatuation with nuclear issues, at the expense of conventional arms and armed forces. This is in part a reflection of the international community's own priorities, as reflected at the United Nations. Consider for instance that the Program of Action of the Final Document of the First Special Session on Disarmament devotes a miserly 9 paragraphs out of 112 to conventional disarmament. Conventional disarmament is not even on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, although it certainly falls within its charter. This is unfortunate, not only because nuclear war is most likely to start with escalation from conventional conflict rather than as a "*bolt from the blue*", but because of the continuing loss of life from current conventional wars.

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) Talks, which have been conducted fruitlessly in Vienna for the past 15 years, have largely stalled over the so-called data question. While this may simply be a symptom of political antipathy to the idea of conventional force reductions, disarmament research could at least help neutralize the data question as an excuse for the parties not agreeing to tangible, balanced and verifiable troop reductions. It is pleasing to note that the United Nations Meeting of Experts held in the Soviet Union in June 1987 on the subject of "*After Reykjavik: Planning For The 1990s*" devoted one third of its agenda to conventional disarmament (43).

4. A further curiously neglected area of current disarmament research is armaments at sea - the phenomenon that Greenpeace describes as the "*invisible*" arms race. According to National Defense Resources Council researcher William Arkin, some one-third to one-quarter of the world's nuclear arsenals are naval nuclear weapons (44). Given that naval forces are routinely nuclear-armed, says Arkin, a naval confrontation risks escalation to nuclear war. Operational practices by the nuclear-armed navies of the world are increasing the likelihood that a nuclear war will begin at sea. Yet there are no extant arms control negotiations concerned with the naval arms race - with the exception of the START negotiations which cover strategic submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Until the Swedish initiative at the United Nations in 1984, the UN itself mostly ignored the issue. Disarmament research has mirrored this lack of interest by largely confining itself to the more visible arms race on land and the more exotic, if largely potential, arms race in space. The dearth of research work on the naval arms race is in urgent need of rectification.

It may be asked why the priorities of disarmament research have been so skewed. Part of the answer is of course that historically disarmament and arms control have been European modes of dealing with the potential for conflict between states. As George Segal puts it, "*Arms control is a 'game' that Europeans have been playing for hundreds of years ...*" (45). Nobel Peace Prize winner Alva Myrdal used a similar expression in relation to the two superpowers (46). Disarmament and arms control also tends to be initiated by those states which have largely settled their internal stability problems and can devote greater attention to securing their external situation. To date many of the states of the region in which Australia is situated have been preoccupied with post-independence struggles for political stability and economic development. Only now are they beginning to focus on the possibilities of disarmament and arms control for introducing predictability into international relations in their region. An example is the greatly increased role of China in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Another is Indonesian promotion of a Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone.

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43. See Disarmament, United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, New York, Autumn 1987.

44. W.M. Arkin, "*The Nuclear Arms Race At Sea*" Neptune Papers, No.1, October 1987, p.1.

45. Segal, p.6.

46. A. Myrdal, "*The Game of Disarmament*", Pantheon Books, Stockholm, 1976.

This does not mean that arms control has not been considered or used to effect in Asia - rather that it has tended to be of the unwritten, implicit variety. Consider the reduction of forces on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border, compared with the sterility of the MBFR talks in Europe. This is in itself a fertile subject for disarmament researchers - the utility of informal disarmament arrangements rather than the formal, treaty arrangements that are the legacy of European diplomacy.

For all this, there has been a recent upsurge in activity in the field of disarmament and arms control in the Asia/Pacific region. Much of this could not be legitimately described as disarmament research but rather as information gathering and dissemination. Nonetheless as Douglas Stuart notes, states in the region are beginning to develop "*the requisite scholarly and professional infrastructure for the analysis and management of the arcana of arms control*" (47). While it is clearly impossible to provide a comprehensive survey of all disarmament research in the region at this point, a brief tour will suffice to make the point.

#### AUSTRALIA

In 1984 the Australian Government established the Peace Research Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, which has devoted much of its attention to disarmament and arms control - with a Pacific emphasis. In August 1987 the Centre organized a conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, the first international gathering to have North Pacific arms control as its central theme. The Centre plans to follow up the conference with a major study on the potential for successful confidence-building measures in the Pacific region. The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, also at the Australian National University, and headed by Professor Desmond Ball, also conducts research relevant to disarmament and arms control.

#### CANADA

Canada, in addition to having the Dundas Peace Research Institute, established as early as 1959, now has two centres in Ottawa dealing with arms control and disarmament - the government-funded Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and the privately funded Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament. Both these and other Canadian institutes are beginning to devote more attention to the Pacific region. In May 1988 a major conference will be held in Vancouver on Maritime Security and Arms Control in the Pacific Region, organized by the Institute of International Relations at the University of British Columbia and sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

#### CHINA

China is also devoting more resources to disarmament research, a reflection of its increasing role in disarmament matters since re-joining multilateral disarmament talks in 1979. In 1980 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a disarmament division within its International Organization Department to develop and coordinate China's disarmament and arms control policy (48). The division includes a handful of researchers.

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47. Stuart, p.162

48. A.I. Johnson, *China & Arms Control*, Aurora Papers, No.3, Canadian Centre for Arms Control & Disarmament, Ottawa, 1986, p.41.

China also has an Institute of International Studies (IIS), attached to the MFA, which was re-established in 1973 after its abolition during the Cultural Revolution (49). The IIS is the most active disarmament research body in China. According to Alistair Johnson it played a key role in developing China's outer space arms control policy (50). In 1979 the Ministry of National Defence established a think tank called the Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies (BIIS), although it is not clear how much of its work could be described as disarmament research.

China's research efforts are likely to be stimulated by its increasing international contacts in the field. In 1985 a delegation of 24 officials from the PRC visited American universities and research institutes to discuss arms control issues (51). In October 1988 Pugwash will hold a conference in Beijing which will have regional arms control as one of its central themes.

### COSTA RICA

The UN University for Peace, based at San José, Costa Rica, is well placed to contribute substantially to disarmament research within its broad mandate of helping "*lessen obstacles to world peace and progress*" (52). Of potentially great assistance to disarmament researchers throughout the world is the University's planned Global Computer Network.

### INDIA

The Indian Council of World Affairs and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis both devote some research resources to disarmament issues. At the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, disarmament and arms control research is conducted at the Centre for International Politics and Organization.

### INDONESIA

Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) pays some attention to disarmament and arms control issues as part of its coverage of international events generally. In 1987 it organized a seminar on the subject for the benefit of Indonesia's decision-makers. According to the Centre's Mr. Kajat Hartoyo, disarmament research is not however a priority for CSIS at this stage (53).

### JAPAN

In Japan a variety of institutions is taking a greater interest in disarmament issues. This is in part a reflection of Japan's traditional anti-nuclear credentials and partly a result of its increasing role in world affairs. The presence in Tokyo of the UN University and the existence of the Peace Studies Association of Japan, one of the largest in the world (with over 6,000 members), also stimulates interest in disarmament and arms control in Japan. However, according to Ms Naomi Koisumi of the Japan Institute of International Affairs, this new Japanese interest has not resulted in a major increase in disarmament research in the strict sense, but rather in a greater flow of information.

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49. From an IIS pamphlet.

50. Johnson, p.41.

51. Stuart, p.171.

52. Charter of the University for Peace, Article 2.

53. From a statement by Mr. Hartoyo at the UNIDIR Conference on *Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990s*, Sochi, USSR, 24 March 1988.

The closest Japanese equivalent to the European or American-style disarmament research institute is the Institute for Peace Science at Hiroshima University. While only part of its activities are devoted to disarmament research, some of the researchers associated with the Institute have carried out work on a comprehensive program of disarmament and nuclear-weapon free zones. Japan also has several other small centres that devote some resources to disarmament research, including the Research Institute for Peace and Security, the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Nagasaki Institute for Peace Culture. According to UNIDIR's Repertory of Disarmament Research, the Japanese National Defense Academy also conducts research into disarmament and arms control (54).

In 1986 the International Peace Research Institute Meigaku (PRIME) was established at Yokohama. PRIME, according to Japan scholar Glenn Hook, is expected to develop along the lines of SIPRI, "*albeit with a different research program*" (55). It is not clear how much attention the new Institute will devote to disarmament research.

#### REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The Republic of Korea has a variety of organizations interested in disarmament issues, including the Korean Institute of International Studies in Seoul. In June 1988 the Sea Lanes of Communication Group - Korea, a private body interested in oceanic affairs, is cosponsoring, with the Institute of East and West Studies at Yonsei University, a Conference on global ocean politics which will address *inter alia* maritime disarmament issues.

#### MALAYSIA

In Malaysia, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies in January 1987 instituted an Asia Pacific Roundtable on Confidence-Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific, which aims to bring top-level scholars, diplomats and bureaucrats together annually for several days' intensive discussion. A second meeting will be held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1988.

#### Mexico

Disarmament research in Mexico faded after SALT II, despite the activism of the Mexican Government in disarmament affairs and the energy of its Disarmament Ambassador Sr. Alfonso Garcia Robles. According to Sr. Alejandro Nadal of El Colegio de Mexico, his institute is currently the only one in Mexico conducting disarmament-related research (56). As part of the Institute's Science and Technology Program, studies are being conducted on the history of Mexico's involvement in disarmament, the impact of new military technology on Mexican security and the implications for Mexico of nuclear war and nuclear winter.

#### PAKISTAN

In Pakistan the Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad has carried out disarmament research, including holding a successful conference on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia in

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54. UNIDIR, *Repertory of Disarmament Research*, United Nations, Geneva, 1982, p.341.
  55. G. Hook, "*Peace Research In Japan*", unpublished MSS, pp.7-8.
  56. From a statement by Sr. Nadal at the UNIDIR Conference, Sochi, 23 March 1988.

September 1987. Since 1980 a special section in the Department of International Relations at Quaid-I-Azam University has carried out some research into disarmament and arms control (57).

## **SRI LANKA**

Sri Lanka has made a contribution to disarmament research in the area of outer space arms control, especially as a result of the presence in Sri Lanka of Arthur C. Clarke. Sri Lanka's activity in this area will be enhanced if its bid to host a United Nations outer space agency is successful. (This bid has been put on hold due to the current communal unrest in the country). At a governmental level Sri Lanka has of course undertaken serious research into the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace concept, which Sri Lanka initiated in 1971. Sri Lanka's Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies has also engaged in research related to disarmament, especially in regard to the security implications of the South Asia Regional Cooperation (SARC) initiative (58).

This is of course only a very sketchy guide to disarmament research in the Asia/Pacific region. It neglects disarmament research conducted in the two major Pacific powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and most of the Latin American and Central American states on the Pacific rim. It also neglects the many individuals working solo in tertiary educational institutes or in voluntary peace organizations throughout the region.

The detailed questionnaire on disarmament research which has just been launched by UNIDIR, and which is designed to obtain systematic and comprehensive data on disarmament research worldwide, is an extremely important initiative that will help fill the gaps in our knowledge of the discipline. Hopefully this task will prove less taxing than tracking down John Wyndham's triffids.

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57. UNIDIR, *Repertory of Disarmament Research*, p.355.

58. From a statement by Mr. Ray Forbes, Director, Bandaranaike Center for International Studies, at the UNIDIR Conference, Sochi, 24 March 1988.

## RAPPORT

JEAN-FRANÇOIS GUILHAUDIS

Il n'est pas possible de parler de la recherche sur le désarmement en France, surtout pour dresser un état, sans évoquer d'abord, plus généralement, ce que nous appelons les recherches et enseignements de défense ou, plus précisément les recherches et enseignements intéressant la défense et la sécurité. Il s'agit de l'ensemble beaucoup plus vaste dans lequel la recherche sur le désarmement, au sens large du terme, s'inscrit. C'est par rapport à lui qu'on peut l'apprécier du point de vue quantitatif et qualitatif.

Il faut préciser que la présente étude porte essentiellement sur la recherche universitaire. Il existe aussi, mais elle a une dimension plus réduite et plus difficile à mesurer, une part de recherche dans l'administration elle-même et dans le cadre de ce que l'on peut appeler le "*Mouvement de paix*" (59).

### I. RECHERCHES ET ENSEIGNEMENTS INTÉRESSANT LA DÉFENSE ET LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALE.

Ils ont connu un essor incontestable à la fin des années soixante dix et au début des années quatre vingt, qui concerne à la fois la constitution d'équipes de recherche, les enseignements et les publications.

#### A. LES CENTRES DE RECHERCHES

Il y a plusieurs générations parmi les institutions qui, actuellement, travaillent en France sur les questions de défense et sécurité internationale.

1. L'Institut de Polémologie, fondé par Gaston Bouthoul, fait figure d'ancêtre. Il a été créé en 1945. Le Centre d'études et de recherches internationales (CERI) date de 1952 (60). L'Institut atlantique pour les affaires internationales a été fondé en 1961.

2. La seconde génération est de la fin des années soixante et du début des années 70 : le Centre d'histoire militaire et d'études de défense de Montpellier date de 1968; le Centre d'études et de recherches sur les stratégies et les conflits a été fondé en 1972. C'est cette même année qu'était créée la Fondation pour les études de défense nationale.

3. Dans la deuxième moitié des années soixante dix, on assiste à une vague de création de centres de recherches dans les Universités, en particulier le CERSA à Toulouse (1974) le CLESID, Lyon (1976), le CEDSI à Grenoble (1977), l'Institut de politique internationale et européenne à Paris

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59. Sur le Mouvement de paix en France, voir: J. Fontanel, J.F. Guilhaudis et D. Colard. *A la recherche du Mouvement de paix en France*. Supplément Arès, No.2, 1983. Dans le cadre de ce Mouvement existent plusieurs publications intéressantes du point de vue du désarmement; on citera notamment : La Gazette nucléaire, publication bimestrielle du Groupement de scientifiques pour l'information sur l'énergie nucléaire (GSIEN); Médecine et guerre nucléaire, revue trimestrielle de l'Association des médecins français pour la prévention de la guerre nucléaire; Alternatives non violentes.

60. Parmi les ancêtres peut aussi figurer le Centre d'études germaniques de Strasbourg, fondé en 1921.

(1978). Des Centres d'étude de défense naissent encore en province, notamment à Lille, à Nice et à Strasbourg. A l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales est créée, comme équipe de recherche informelle, le Groupe de sociologie de la défense. C'est à la fin de cette période, en 1979, par fusion du Centre d'études de politique étrangère, qui publiait *Politique internationale* depuis 1936 et du Groupe d'études et de recherche sur les problèmes internationaux, créé par R. Aron, que naît l'IFRI, l'Institut Français des Relations Internationales.

4. Plus récemment sont apparus, dans l'Université : le Centre interdisciplinaire de recherches sur la paix et d'études stratégiques, CIRPES (1982), lié au Groupe de sociologie de la défense, qui était lui même officialisé à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes la même année; l'INSED, créé en 1983 par fusion du CEPODE et du CEREDÉ; le Groupe d'études défense et relations internationales au XXème siècle à Nantes (1982); le laboratoire d'économie et de sociologie des organisations de défense (LESOD, Paris Dauphine) en 1984 ou plus récemment le CEEDAR (Centre d'enseignements et d'études de défense adaptés à La Réunion, 1986). En dehors de l'Université sont apparus : l'Institut international de géopolitique (1982); la Fondation du futur (1980) et l'Institut de recherches sur la résolution non-violente des conflits (1984).

Il y a eu plusieurs regroupements. Le panorama qui vient d'être brossé en montre 2; il faut noter aussi que l'Institut de polémologie a été rattaché à la Fondation pour les études de défense nationale en 1982, à laquelle sont également rattachés l'Institut d'histoire militaire comparée créé en 1980 et l'Institut d'histoire des conflits contemporains.

Si l'on essaye de dresser un tableau d'ensemble, actuellement existent des centres qui abordent les questions de défense et sécurité, et éventuellement le désarmement dans les universités suivantes : Antilles, Guyane, Avignon, Clermont-Ferrand, Grenoble 2, Lille 2, Lyon 3, Montpellier 1 et 3, Nantes, Nice, Paris 1 (4 centres), Paris 2, Paris 4 (3 centres), Paris 5, Paris 7 (2 centres), Paris 9, Paris 10, Paris 11 (2 centres), Reims, La Réunion, Strasbourg 3 (4 centres), Toulouse 1 (2 centres), soit plus d'une trentaine de centres de recherches, à peu près répartis entre les plus grandes Universités et entre Paris et la Province (61). A quoi s'ajoutent : le Groupe de sociologie de la défense (et le CIRPES) à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 3 centres liés à la Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, le CERI et le Centre de sociologie de la défense nationale rattachés à la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, le Centre des hautes études sur l'Afrique et l'Asie modernes (appellation donnée en 1983) et l'IFRI. En tout, une quarantaine d'institutions de recherche, de dimension extrêmement variable.

Toutes ces institutions n'ont en effet ni le même statut ni la même importance; elles n'entendent pas non plus jouer le même rôle. Mis à part l'Institut atlantique et l'Institut international de géopolitique, qui sont des Instituts internationaux, ayant un projet politique, il faut distinguer, l'IFRI, la Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, et l'ensemble universitaire.

L'IFRI est une institution privée, dont le domaine de compétence déborde largement les questions de défense, sécurité et désarmement. Il emploie environ 50 personnes et à trois objets : accomplir des recherches et les publier; favoriser le débat en France sur les questions de relations internationales; participer enfin à diverses réunions internationales et y faire entendre des points de vue français.

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61. A Paris et dans les grandes villes universitaires de Province existent souvent plusieurs Universités qui sont numérotées : Paris 1, 2, 3, ..., Grenoble 1, 2, ...

La Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, elle aussi institution privée, a un objet plus restreint. Elle n'accomplit pas elle-même de recherches. Cependant plusieurs centres de recherche lui sont rattachés : l'Institut français de polémologie, l'Institut d'histoire militaire comparée et l'Institut d'histoire des conflits contemporains. La Fondation encourage la recherche, voire conclut des contrats d'études; ses publications accueillent des travaux de recherche. Ce faisant, elle entend contribuer à la diffusion des connaissances concernant les questions de stratégie, de défense et de sécurité.

Dans l'ensemble dit universitaire, il faut faire une place à part au Centre d'études et recherches internationales (CERI). Le CERI, qui a été fondé en 1952, est rattaché à la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques et la majeure partie de son personnel enseigne à l'Institut d'études politiques de Paris. Les questions de sécurité internationale ne représentent qu'une partie réduite des activités du CERI, qui s'étendent à l'ensemble des relations internationales, à l'analyse comparée des systèmes politiques et aux études régionales.

Le reste est composé d'équipes de dimension très variable et pratiquant une recherche plus ou moins intensive et spécialisée. L'éventail est extrêmement ouvert et va des Centres constitués autour d'une ou deux personnes jusqu'aux équipes relativement lourdes de 10 à 20 participants (enseignants chercheurs ou parfois chercheurs permanents), disposant de centres de documentation bien organisés, informatisés, assurant des publications régulières, comme c'est le cas du Centre d'études et de recherches sur les stratégies et les conflits (Paris 4), du CEDSI à Grenoble et du Centre d'histoire militaire et d'études de défense à Montpellier.

Le Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) est assez peu impliqué dans ce développement. Dans les institutions qui viennent d'être citées, il y a quelques personnels CNRS, parfois au poste de Directeur. Certains liens existent entre le CNRS et des institutions dont le champ d'études déborde nettement les questions de défense et de sécurité internationale (le Centre d'études germaniques est unité associée). A s'en tenir strictement au secteur études et recherches sur la défense et la sécurité internationale, il n'y a que deux investissements du CNRS : Le Centre d'histoire militaire et d'études de défense de Montpellier qui est aussi unité associée et la création en 1986 d'une Recherche coopérative sur programme, actuellement Groupement de recherches, confiée au CEDSI de Grenoble, à laquelle participent le Centre d'histoire militaire et d'études de défense précité et le LESOD (Paris Dauphine).

## B. ENSEIGNEMENTS ET PUBLICATIONS.

Cet essor des institutions s'est accompagné d'un essor des enseignements et des publications. Les publications sont une conséquence du développement de la recherche et de l'enseignement. Les relations entre enseignement et recherche sont plus complexes. Parfois la recherche précède, souvent elle suit.

Le développement des enseignements sur la défense et la sécurité internationale s'est fait en réponse à un intérêt grandissant dans le public, il correspond nettement à une mode. Mais aussi au souci d'ouverture des Universités à la fin des années soixante dix. Il a été d'autre part accompagné par un effort des pouvoirs publics.

Ces enseignements intéressent actuellement 32 universités situées à : Aix-Marseille, Antilles Guyane, Avignon, Bastia, Bordeaux, Clermont-Ferrand, Compiègne, Grenoble, Lille, Lyon, Metz,

Montpellier, Nantes, Nice, Paris, Perpignan, Poitiers, Reims, Rennes, La Réunion, Strasbourg, Toulouse. Ils se développent dans les facultés de droit, de science politique, de sciences économiques mais aussi de lettres (histoire géographie), en sociologie etc. Ils apparaissent aussi dans les Instituts d'études politiques à Paris et en province, les instituts régionaux d'administration, les grandes écoles (Ecole nationale d'administration, Ecole de la magistrature, Ecole polytechnique, Ecole normale supérieure, Ecole des hautes études commerciales par exemple).

Ces enseignements sont d'une durée très variable, intéressent des publics divers, portent sur des questions différentes. Parmi ce vaste ensemble un noyau central ressort néanmoins qu'il faut évoquer rapidement. Il s'agit de ce que l'on peut appeler les diplômes de défense et sécurité. Ce sont des diplômes spécifiques et nationaux, de 3ème cycle (postgraduate). Plus précisément un DESS (diplôme d'études supérieures spécialisées) et de 4 DEA (diplôme d'études approfondies). La différence entre ces 2 catégories de diplômes peut être énoncée facilement en disant que les DESS ont une finalité professionnelle tandis que les DEA entendent préparer à la recherche. L'obtention du DEA (au bout d'un an d'études), ouvre aux étudiants qui en sont jugés capables la possibilité de faire une thèse spécialisée dans le domaine sécurité internationale et défense.

Le DESS de défense de l'Université de Paris 2 est orienté vers l'encadrement dans des établissements travaillant dans le secteur de la défense.

Les 4 DEA on les intitulés suivants:

1. Sécurité internationale et défense (DEA conjoint Grenoble 2 et Lyon 3);
2. Défense nationale et sécurité européenne (Lille 2);
3. Histoire militaire et études de défense nationale (DEA conjoint Montpellier 3, Aix, Marseille 3 et Nantes);
4. Sécurité civile et sociétés (Reims)

Dans plusieurs autres universités existent aussi des options défense dans des DEA moins spécialisés (par exemple des DEA de science politique) : Metz, Strasbourg, Paris bien sûr, Clermont-Ferrand, Toulouse et Nice.

En ce qui concerne les publications, l'essor a aussi été très important à la fin des années soixante dix et depuis cette époque : de nouveaux périodiques et plusieurs collections sont apparus qui concernent exclusivement les questions de défense et sécurité internationale ou au moins leur consacrent une large place. Voici les principaux d'entre eux :

#### Périodiques

- |       |                                  |   |
|-------|----------------------------------|---|
| (i)   | Ramsès (annuaire)                | producteur : IFRI                             |
| (ii)  | Arès (annuaire, en 3 fascicules) | producteur : CEDSI                            |
| (iii) | Géopolitique (trim)              | producteur : Institut de géopolitique         |
| (iv)  | Politique internationale (trim)  |   |
| (v)   | Stratégique (trim)               | producteur : FEDN                             |
| (vi)  | Cosmopolitiques (trim)           | producteur : Forum international de politique |

En ce qui concerne les périodiques, on doit aussi noter que *Politique étrangère* (trimestriel) a été repris et modernisé par l'IFRI, que la Fondation pour les études de défense nationale a fait la même chose pour *Etudes polémologiques* (trimestriel) et que les revues plus traditionnelles ont progressivement accordé une place plus grande aux questions de défense et de sécurité internationale, par ex. l'*Annuaire français de droit international*. Les publications qui viennent d'être mentionnées s'ajoutent évidemment à d'autres déjà existantes, notamment *Défense nationale*, *Relations internationales*, *la Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale* ou les publications de *la Documentation française (Problèmes politiques et sociaux, Afrique contemporaine...)*.

### Collections

On peut citer notamment:

(i)	Les sept épées	producteur : FEDN
(ii)	Les dossiers de la FEDN	producteur : FEDN
(iii)	Travaux et recherches de l'IFRI	producteur : IFRI
(iv)	Enjeux Internationaux	producteur : IFRI

Dans l'Université :

(v)	Les Cahiers d'études stratégiques	producteur : CIRPES
(vi)	Les Cahiers de Montpellier	producteur : CHMEDN
(vii)	Les Cahiers du CEDSI	producteur : CEDSI
(viii)	Les Cahiers de l'Observatoire stratégique méditerranéen	producteur : OSM Nice
(ix)	Série contemporaine, série historique	producteur : CERSC
(x)	Classiques de la stratégie	producteur : CERSC

Bien qu'il soit très difficile de donner des chiffres, on peut avancer, très approximativement, que le nombre des enseignants de défense atteint à peu près 450 personnes. Environ une centaine publient régulièrement dans le secteur défense et sécurité internationale.

Si on raisonne en termes de disciplines, il semble que, à l'échelle française, ce soient l'histoire et la science politique qui viennent en premier. L'histoire compte plusieurs équipes organisées, notamment le CHMEDN de Montpellier, le Centre d'histoire militaire et de défense de Paris 1, l'Institut d'histoire militaire comparée et l'Institut d'histoire des conflits rattachés à la FEDN et le Centre d'histoire des relations internationales de Strasbourg. Le développement des études de défense dans le milieu de la sociologie et de la science politique est plus récent mais relativement rapide et important (Centre de sociologie de la défense nationale à la FNNSP, GSD, à l'Ecole des hautes études, Centre W. I. Thomas et CERSA à Toulouse, Institut de Polémologie, CEDSI Grenoble). Le droit est en retrait bien que les Facultés de droit aient vu naître plusieurs centres de recherches (Centre de défense de Lille, de Strasbourg, de l'IDPD de Nice, CRED à Paris 1, Centre Droit et défense à Paris 5, CEDSI Grenoble). Les autres disciplines sont beaucoup plus faibles, voire inexistantes.

Une mention spéciale doit être faite de l'économie. Grâce aux efforts accomplis à Grenoble (CEDSI), Montpellier (ERED), Clermont-Ferrand (Groupe de recherche sur les problèmes de défense) et Paris (notamment LESOD), l'économie de la défense a rapidement progressé. Les

économistes se sont d'ailleurs organisés dans une association des économistes de défense, ce qui est une preuve de dynamisme, dans un milieu qui a beaucoup de peine à se structurer.

L'approche des questions de défense et sécurité internationale est généralement mono-disciplinaire. Il y a peu de réelles expériences de la pluridisciplinarité (par ex. CEDSI Grenoble), ou de coopération entre équipes.

Ces indications essentiellement quantitatives sur l'ensemble Défense et Sécurité internationale introduisent évidemment, s'agissant de course aux armements et de désarmement, l'idée générale qu'il ne s'agit pas d'un secteur de recherches très développé. Tel est bien le cas.

## II. RECHERCHES, ENSEIGNEMENTS ET PUBLICATIONS SUR LE DÉSARMEMENT

Le désarmement, au sens large du terme, n'est pas une discipline. Le mot désigne un ensemble de questions (projets, discours, négociations, accords etc..., touchant la course aux armements, la limitation, la réduction, l'interdiction des armements...), un domaine d'étude, qui se prête très bien à une approche pluridisciplinaire.

Retient-il ou non l'attention de la Communauté scientifique? La réponse que l'on est obligé de faire est qu'il n'occupe qu'une place assez marginale, qu'il s'agisse d'enseignement, de recherche ou de publications. Mais sa part s'agrandit, comme celle des autres questions de défense et sécurité internationale et peut être plus qu'elles.

### 1. LA PLACE DU DÉSARMEMENT PARMIS LES ÉTUDES DE DÉFENSE ET SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALE.

Dans les programmes de formation, la place des enseignements sur la course aux armements, la maîtrise des armements et le désarmement est très faible, tout à fait marginale. On s'en aperçoit facilement en considérant les programmes des DESS et DEA mentionnés précédemment : seul le DEA Sécurité internationale et défense (commun à Grenoble 2 et Lyon 3) comporte un enseignement de ce type. Sur l'ensemble des formations, la part des enseignements sur le désarmement est sans doute proportionnellement plus faible encore. Normalement, il n'y a pas d'enseignement sur le désarmement, au mieux la question est abordée dans le cadre d'un cours général sur la paix ou la sécurité internationale, ou dans des conférences ou cours à option, en liaison avec la proximité, ou le passage sur invitation, d'un spécialiste. Les enseignements qui priment concernent l'histoire, la défense de la France, la géopolitique ou la géostratégie, les doctrines, la dissuasion ou les politiques de défense et des aires géographiques. Le désarmement n'est pas le seul parent pauvre, on peut ranger dans le même groupe, les alliances, les conflits, la défense civile, par exemple.

Toutefois ces indications doivent être nuancées dans la mesure où des enseignements qui abordent le désarmement peuvent se glisser dans des formations plus classiques, par ex. les DEA de droit international - le DEA droit international de Paris 1 permet d'aborder l'utilisation militaire de l'espace et ses aspects juridiques, celui de Nice, à l'IDPD, organise régulièrement des conférences avec la coopération du CEDSI - ou dans des formations où l'on n'attend pas a priori le désarmement. Ainsi le DESS "*Production et distribution d'énergie*" (Paris 1) comporte un enseignement sur le droit international de l'énergie atomique qui permet d'aborder les risques de prolifération.

Dans l'ensemble, il est net que la situation ne peut que s'améliorer dans la mesure où les négociations se multiplient et surtout réussissent. Dès cet instant les disciplines traditionnelles que sont le droit et l'histoire vont intensifier leurs efforts.

## 2. LES PUBLICATIONS.

Si on fait un pointage des principaux périodiques, qui servent de débouché aux études de défense, (en exceptant Arès dont il sera question plus loin), la place du désarmement reste faible mais relativement moins effacée, semble-t-il, que pour les enseignements. Cela tient probablement au fait que l'actualité, très fournie récemment, impose de parler vite et suffisamment pour satisfaire les interrogations du public, du désarmement. De fait, la très grande majorité des études que l'on peut relever dans Géopolitique, Politique étrangère, Politique internationale, la négociation sur les armes nucléaires et spatiales (particulièrement la négociation sur les "euromissiles" et l'IDS) ou la CDE et la négociation sur le désarmement classique en Europe. Ces caractères se retrouvent si l'on considère les collections, par exemple celles de l'IFRI ou de la Fondation pour les études de défense nationale.

En réalité, il n'existe, en France, qu'une publication spécialisée sur le désarmement. Il s'agit de l'annuaire Arès. Encore s'agit-il d'une spécialisation partielle puisqu'un seul fascicule, par an, de 300 à 400 pages est consacré à la course aux armements et au désarmement. Arès, qui est réalisé au CEDSI de Grenoble par l'équipe du CEDSI avec l'aide de divers collaborateurs spécialisés, parmi lesquels l'UNIDIR et le Département des affaires du désarmement, donne chaque année le suivi des grandes négociations du désarmement et des travaux des Nations Unies et recueille sur un thème d'actualité, par exemple le désarmement pour le développement, les contributions de spécialistes connus français ou étrangers.

Des publications où comptent beaucoup l'actualité et le souci de d'abord informer : Cela signifie qu'il s'agit souvent plus de journalisme scientifique que de recherche fondamentale. Cette notation est confirmée par le petit nombre des ouvrages de fond ou des thèses de qualité publiés en France sur le désarmement. Cela ne signifie pas, bien sûr, que certaines institutions n'ont pas une politique de recherche à long terme et que n'ont pas été publiés des ouvrages qui traduisent une recherche très approfondie. L'IFRI et le CEDSI à Grenoble ont, dans le domaine du désarmement, une politique de recherche, et des travaux d'envergure ont été accomplis et publiés, parfois avec une coopération sur le plan national ou même international. Du point de vue de la recherche, les publications périodiques universitaires classiques (par exemple l'Annuaire français de droit international), moins tenues par le souci de diffuser, peuvent offrir un apport intéressant, avec la limite de la monodisciplinarité. Il en va de même pour les cahiers universitaires, à diffusion restreinte, mais qui sont précisément disponibles pour accueillir des textes techniques qui ne sont pas destinés au public.

Ces remarques concernant les publications françaises ne comportent pas, contrairement à ce qu'on pourrait penser, de tonalité critique. En effet, il y a un ordre normal des choses. S'agissant d'un secteur d'études relativement nouveau et pour lequel il faut suivre une actualité exigeante et informer, comme c'est le cas ici, il importe d'abord de constituer des instruments de base, qui permettent de disposer des informations élémentaires. Nous n'avons pas encore tout à fait franchi, en France - mais nous ne sommes pas les seuls - cette étape. La recherche vient ensuite. Il est donc naturel qu'elle ne soit pas encore très développée.

Pour expliquer cette situation de la recherche en matière de désarmement, on peut songer à une orientation de l'esprit des universitaires français. Dire qu'ils sont plus intéressés par la défense ou la dissuasion que par le désarmement. Cela n'est sans doute pas tout à fait inexact. Mais il faut insister sur le fait que l'aide qu'attribuent les autorités publiques à la recherche sur le désarmement est extrêmement faible.

### 3. LES PROJETS DE RECHERCHE.

Pour les projets de recherches, une correspondance faite spécialement pour la rédaction de cette communication ne fait apparaître, sauf les cas de l'IFRI et du CEDSI et des équipes ou personnes qui collaborent avec eux, que quelques projets individuels (62).

De même une interrogation du fichier des sujets de thèses déposés ne donne que quelques signalements.

C'est qu'il n'existe en France que deux centres où l'on procède de manière autre qu'occasionnelle à une recherche collective, organisée, en matière de désarmement : l'IFRI et le CEDSI.

Les collections de l'IFRI donnent une idée des travaux qui ont été conduits dans le passé par l'Institut. Actuellement, l'IFRI, outre le suivi régulier des grandes négociations, est en train de terminer deux études collectives : l'une sur l'impact de la recherche développement militaire sur l'économie civile (en collaboration avec des universitaires); l'autre sur le désarmement classique en Europe. Cette seconde étude est faite en coopération avec l'UNIDIR.

Au cours des prochaines années, l'IFRI entend consacrer ses efforts à 2 projets d'envergure l'un concerne la question nucléaire en Asie, l'autre les relations entre la France et l'OTAN. Un troisième projet, d'une durée plus brève, pour l'UNIDIR, devrait être lancé prochainement. Ce projet qui porte sur la conception française en matière de vérification du désarmement, doit associer l'IFRI et le CEDSI.

Comme cela a été dit plus haut, le CEDSI a en charge une recherche coopérative sur programme dont le thème est "Techniques, économie, défense et sécurité internationale". Cette recherche doit se poursuivre pendant encore au moins 2 ans.

Un des intérêts de ce type de projets est d'avoir un certain effet structurant, c'est à dire de renforcer l'habitude de travailler ensemble des équipes participantes (CEDSI, CHMEDN et LESOD). Ici l'on recoupe d'ailleurs l'effort de travail en commun que font les économistes de défense.

Le CEDSI a, en outre, 3 projets de recherches permanents :

1. La diplomatie du désarmement;
2. Les conceptions du désarmement;
3. L'économie du désarmement.

Sur chacun de ces projets sont au travail plusieurs personnes au CEDSI même, mais nous essayons autant que possible d'établir une coopération en France et à l'étranger.

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62. Une lettre demandant des informations sur les recherches et publications accomplies au cours des 2 dernières années, les recherches en cours, les travaux dirigés a été envoyée, pour aider à l'établissement de ce rapport, à tous les directeurs d'instituts et centres de recherches universitaires sur la défense et la sécurité et à une sélection de personnalités. Sur 75 demandes d'information, 30 réponses ont été obtenues. 4 seulement font état de projets (individuels) en cours.

Il est difficile de préciser combien de personnes travaillent et publient sur le désarmement. La mode a ses contraintes. On peut avancer, en ce qui concerne les travaux en cours, le nombre de 30 à 50 personnes. Mais le nombre des spécialistes est beaucoup plus réduit et ne dépasse guère une quinzaine de personnes.

La situation n'est donc pas florissante mais il y a progrès. L'actualité, surtout quand elle est ponctuée de résultats, quand on peut enregistrer la conclusion d'accords, comme c'est à nouveau le cas, fait beaucoup pour la consolidation de la recherche en matière de désarmement.

Souhaitons donc que les évolutions récentes se poursuivent dans l'intérêt de la recherche et dans celui de la paix.

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## REPORT

KURT SPILLMANN

*"An unchecked arms race ... threatens to destroy human civilization".*

In such a situation, no avenue which offers even the slightest chance of success in tackling these issues should remain unexplored. UNIDIR's mandate is to focus on "... *the arms race, disarmament and related issues.*" Such begins the Foreword of former UNIDIR Director Liviu Bota in a pioneering study, sponsored by UNIDIR, written by the Swiss political scientist Daniel Frei and first published under the auspices of the UN. Under the title of "*Perceived Images*" the study deals with "*U.S. and Soviet Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament*" (63).

I believe this UNIDIR study to be a very significant contribution to a still new approach to disarmament research.

Disarmament research has been dominated by the analysis of so-called "*objective*" factors, even aspects of hardware: numbers, capabilities and reaches of weapons, their locations, logistics, strategies, employment policies and the like. The collection and interpretation of these data is an important aspect of disarmament research, because it makes an invaluable contribution to a better understanding of the difficult problems that are involved in controlling the international and regional arms races. It also provides the framework for informed guesses as to provisions and intentions of different parties. It finally provides the necessary basis for the complicated technicalities of an arms control and arms reduction process.

Studies of this sort - dealing with "*objective*" factors - are clearly more numerous than the complementing ones that deal with "*subjective*" factors, i.e. perceptions, assumptions and the problems of communication between different language groups, value systems, belief systems, doctrines, religions, ideologies and the like.

Yet it is my firm belief that we cannot get to the roots of the problem if we ignore the non-rational, non-quantifiable factors.

UNIDIR's work is intended to contribute as efficiently as possible toward reducing the danger of war and self-annihilation. Weapons are a means and serve an end. What is this end? Are weapons mainly the expression of people's fears and defensive precautions against outside violence? Or are they the means to acquire somebody else's property, extend one's own influence and realize so-called "*vital interests*"?

Obviously this question has never been settled. Weapons are instruments, things, and are indifferent to their defensive or offensive use. What matters here is the user, and that's why

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63. Liviu BOTA, Foreword, in: Daniel FREI, *Perceived Images; US and Soviet Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament*; (Published in cooperation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) Totowa (N.J.),

disarmament research - in my perception - should focus more intensely on the motives of the user of weapons.

A very interesting case in this type of disarmament research that deals with fundamentals has been the discussion about the origins of World War I, with very interesting recent contributions.

Let me just pick out a few points.

There are - essentially - two schools of thought: the contemporary one, that condemned Germany as the aggressor, and the "revisionist" one, first proposed shortly after the end of World War I, stating that nobody had wanted that war, that it had occurred more or less by accident and that it was caused much more by the arms race and the existence of large arsenals of weapons than by a calculated German policy of expansion (64).

One of the most recent contributions to this discussion by Patrick Glynn and published less than a year ago reaches the conclusion that "*power politics was - and is - a permanent feature of the human condition*", that "*the phenomenon of the hegemonic or aggressive state is an elemental reality of political life, to be understood on its own terms <and> irreducible to other factors*" and that paradoxically "*those powers least prone to choose war as a vehicle of policy have also been a fortiori the least prone to take steps necessary to prevent other powers from choosing it*" (65).

Whether we take the first of these theories (the possibility of "accidental" occurrence of war) or the second (power policy as a "feature of the human condition" ) as our point of departure for research into the conditions of risk reduction: either way we are left with a nebulous notion of the true motivations of human action: "accident" is about as elusive as the "human condition". Quite understandably, this state of affairs has discouraged many serious students.

Theodore Sorensen reports, that President John F. Kennedy as a student had taken a course on the origins of World War I. It made him realize, he said, "*how quickly countries which were comparatively uninvolved were taken, in the space of a few days, into war*". Their leaders were talking, as their successors are now, he added, about military strength keeping the peace, but strength alone failed to work. In 1963 Kennedy would cite the 1914 conversation between two German leaders on the origins and expansion of that war, a former chancellor asking, "*How did it all happen?*" and his successor saying "*Ah, if only one knew*". - "*If this planet*", said President Kennedy, "*is ever ravaged by nuclear war - if the survivors of that devastation can then endure the fire, poison, chaos and catastrophe - I do not want one of these survivors to ask another, 'How did it all happen?' and to receive the incredible reply: 'Ah, if only one knew.'*" (66).

64. For the most recent contributions to the discussion see on the one hand Steven E. MILLER, ed., *Military Strategy and the Origin of the First World War*, Princeton University Press, 1985; and on the other hand Patrick GLYNN, *The Sarajevo Fallacy; The Historical and Intellectual Origins of Arms Control Theology*, in: *The National Interest*, No.9, 1987, pp.3-32. For an in-depth analysis of the fundamental issues where 1914 is used as a case study see Richard Ned LEBOW, *Nuclear Crisis Management; A dangerous Illusion*, Ithaca / London (Cornell University Press) 1987 pp.24ff., 32ff., 59f., 109ff.

65. Patrick GLYNN, op.cit. pp.30-31

66. Theodore C. SORENSEN, *Kennedy*, New York, Bantam Books, 1965, p.578.

Kennedy was fully aware of the fact that we understand very little of the inner workings of humans and how they operate, individually as well as in groups. And he realized with many others that this state of affairs had become intolerable in an age where these same human beings could build weapons with a self-destructing capacity but at the same time were not able to understand, control or anticipate their way of dealing with them in a future conflict.

These considerations resulted in the first serious efforts at controlling the arms race and trying to establish a regular process of communication. Soon it became clear that the arms race had very complicated roots, that it could not simply be blamed on the "*merchants of death*" and that the will to control it needed not only more technical information but a new understanding of and a new approach to the process of communication about these delicate matters as well.

The first studies began to appear that looked into the difficulties of perception-communication, i.e. perceiving a certain political or military "*reality*" and communicating what one thought was "*reality*" to a counterpart. In 1970 "*The Logic of Images in International Relations*" by Robert Jervis was published, a truly pioneering work, followed in 1976 by the same author's study on "*Perception and Misperception in International Politics*" (67). Since then the number of publications trying to come to grips with the "*subjective factors*" in international politics has grown steadily (68).

But the basic problem remains unresolved, namely the interpreting of the motives behind the opponents foreign policy or behavior, that determine one's attitude toward arms control and arms reduction. Some ten years ago Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing expressed the core issue as follows:

*"Whether to be firm and tough toward an adversary, in order to deter him, but at the risk of provoking his anger or fear and heightened conflict, or to conciliate him in the hope of reducing sources of conflict, but at the risk of strengthening him and causing him to miscalculate one's own relations. A rational resolution of this dilemma depends most of all on an accurate assessment of the long run interests and intentions of the opponent"* (69).

If it is impossible to gain reliable information and therefore impossible to assess realistically the opponent's long term intentions, then this theory gets caught in the "*prisoners dilemma*", where the lack of trust and the impossibility of acquiring trust allows only for a worst case strategy (70).

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67. Robert JERVIS, *The Logic of Images in International Relations*, Princeton University Press, 1970; and Robert JERVIS, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1976.

68. For extensive bibliographies see Richard K. HERRMANN, *Perceptions and Behavior in Soviet Foreign Policy*, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987, pp.249-261; Irving L. JANIS and Leon MANN, *Decision Making, A psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice and Commitment*, New York (The Free Press), 1977, pp.445-473; and Daniel FREI, op.cit. pp.302-323.

69. Glen SNYDER and Paul DIESING, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*, Princeton University Press, 1977, p.254.

70. Thomas C. SCHELLING, *The Strategy of Conflict*, New York (Oxford University Press), 1960, p.214.

The key issue, therefore, not only behind disarmament research, but behind overcoming the obstacles in the real political world, is the perception and assessment of the opponents motives and long term intentions and the communication with him about them, and the twin problem of communicating about one's own motives and intentions.

Motives and intentions can only be perceived, they can never be transmitted 1:1 beyond any doubt. Richard K. Herrmann has strongly urged the scientific study of motivations and perceptions and his 1985-book about American perceptions of Soviet foreign policy is revolving around the question: what do people think certain actions mean? Still, the actual state of this refined art of understanding is still very little developed. *"Concepts about motivation and perception"*, Hermann writes, *"serve as core variables in many foreign policy models. Efforts to avoid them have not been successful in producing important and convincing explanations for international behavior. Often these attempts have not circumvented claims about motivation but simply incorporated them as either implicit assumptions or explicit, yet undefined, assertions. Moreover, frequently employed concepts such as defense, expansion, perception of threat, and perception of opportunity imply judgments about motives. ... Broader-level theories of international relations cannot be empirically tested and thus will remain premature if the root assumptions on which they are based are not examined. Unless we tackle the basic problems inherent in generating the data about aims, values, motives, or perceptions, a good deal of research in international relations will suffer from a lack of meaningful evidence"*. (71)

There will, of course, always remain a difference between one's own secure knowledge of one's own motives and intentions and the opponents mere perception of one's motives and intentions (leaving aside, for a moment, all conscious distortions and/or subconscious motives and intentions). Therefore, a process of communication is required to narrow that gap. Such a process can take years, as in the case of the SALT I, SALT II or INF agreements. But it can pick up speed under the influence of voluntary changes in perception, such as have been introduced by Secretary General Gorbachev. Still, a good deal of solid groundwork is required before we can hope to see secure, stable and mutually beneficial relations between opposing camps in today's world.

The UNIDIR study by Daniel Frei which was mentioned in the beginning, concluded, that the acquiring of mutual knowledge through empathy is needed in order to establish a working process of communication. *"Empathy"*, the political scientist writes, *"is of course not the same as sympathy. Empathy may and should also include an understanding of the adversary's less benign and more threatening traits"*. (72) We must free our perceptions of all distortions, pleasant and unpleasant, and move towards a realistic identification of areas of conflict as well as areas of common interests. Only then can we hope to establish ways of dealing with either category in a rational and structured fashion.

A message similar to Frei's call for empathy is being sent by psychologists. Starting from the findings of Jean Piaget about the development of the perception of space, modern psychologists

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71. Richard K. HERRMANN, op.cit. pp.198-199.

72. Daniel FREI, op.cit. p.286.

have developed the concept of role-taking or perspective-taking, which means the human ability to habitually assume another person's perspective in order to assess more realistically the other person's intentions.(73)

This can be done in two ways: either by switching from one's own to the other person's perspective, or by assuming a third perspective, above both individuals. Both operations provide the experience that a thing, a person or an association of things and persons can be seen differently from different perspectives. Things, people and relations appear different than from one's own usual view. There are different perspectives.

The possibility of this operation and the empirical data make it plausible, that these human capacities can be further developed. (74) They have not been used consciously as instruments of international communication and therefore of risk reduction.

But practical beginnings are made.

Not only has the European Conference on Confidence Building Measures in Stockholm opened up new channels of communication in hitherto blocked areas, there was also a very promising beginning in the context of the INF agreement, namely the signing of the treaty about the installation of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow. Whatever channels of direct communication open up, they will help to reduce the risk of misperceptions, distorted assessments of intentions and hopefully contribute to a better mutual understanding.

I would like to conclude my brief remarks by drawing your attention to a project that is presently being developed and seems to bring into focus all the promising elements mentioned above. The project is called "*U.S. - U.S.S.R. Conflict Risk Reduction Through Mutual Assessments of Interests*". (75) It plans to bring together American and Soviet leaders who participated in their own government's key decisions during past U.S. - U.S.S.R. crises. The participants would hold a series of small, informal discussion meetings to:

1. Evaluate the validity of the unilateral assessments made at such times by each government about the interests, concerns, and intentions of the other; and
2. Suggest procedures that could reduce the risk of conflict in future crises by sharing such assessments before actions are taken and by other means.

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73. Jean PIAGET, and Bärbel INHELDER, *The child's conception of space*, London (Routledge & Degan Paul) 1956; John FLAVELL et al., *The Development of role-taking and communication skills in children*, New York (Wiley)1968

74. Dieter GEULEN, ed., *Perspektivenübernahme und soziales Handeln*, Texte zur sozial-kognitiven Entwicklung (Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 348), Frankfurt 1982.

75. A previous study by the same team was published in April 1987: National Academy of Public Administration, *Strengthening the U.S. - Soviet Communications Process to Reduce the Risks of Misunderstandings and Conflicts*, A Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration (Benjamin H. READ, Director), Washington D.C., 1987.

The two gentlemen developing the program are William G. Miller, President of the American Committee on U.S. - Soviet Relations, and Benjamin H. Read, attorney and former Under Secretary of State. Both are in Moscow this month to discuss the proposal with appropriate Soviet Government and C.P.S.U. officials and academicians. This is the kind of program that can enhance our understanding of the complexities of perception and communication and make a real contribution to the process of risk reduction through a strategy of "reassurance". (76) My institution in Switzerland, therefore, is offering to support the project by organizing upcoming meetings on neutral ground, if the parties concerned should wish to meet there.

A year ago in Baku, when I had the privilege to speak to a similar forum of eminent personalities, I suggested that UNIDIR should set up a mixed commission with members from eastern as well as western nations and start work on a common dictionary, or rather a common list of political, military, social and economic terms. If we could come up with mutually agreeable definitions of such basic concepts as "peaceful coexistence", then the crucial process of communication in the interest of risk reduction would be greatly enhanced.

But in this or other forms: the difficulties are still enormous and all our efforts are needed to support the great task of reducing the dangers of war.

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76. The term "*strategy of reassurance*" is taken from Richard Ned LEBOW, *The Deterrence Deadlock: Is there a Way Out?* in: Robert JERVIS, Richard Ned LEBOW and Janice Gross STEIN, *Psychology and Deterrence*, Baltimore / London (The Johns Hopkins University Press), 1985, pp.180-202.

## DISCUSSION

WOLFGANG SCHWENDLER

The topic "*Disarmament Research: Agenda for the 1990s*" is an ambitious one. We hope that our discussions will provide us with guidance for the decade to come and will shed light on the path before us. Thanks to the treaty signed by the Heads of the two superpowers it might be less hazardous. There is at least hope that slowly mankind may be rid of the menace that has loomed over its head ever since the end of World War II.

For the past two days we have had a most fruitful exchange on a great many aspects of disarmament: the role of research institutes, ways and means of increasing co-operation among them, in particular with the Third World, the present status of disarmament research, etc.

It puzzled me, though, that the term "*education*" never came up in our deliberations: "*education for disarmament*", for example. And yet, as the Preamble of UNESCO's Constitution recalls, "*it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed*". Could there be a more appropriate means to do this than through educating people of all ages and at all levels of formal and non-formal education in a spirit of mutual trust and understanding thus laying the foundations for peace and, if you wish, disarmament?

If I were not convinced already that UNESCO had a clear brief in this field, our discussions here would have been sufficient proof that the Organization has an important part to play which in no way overlaps with the preoccupations of your institutions but which happily complements them.

UNESCO's mandate and its bases for action are to be found in the decisions adopted by consensus at the different sessions of its General Conference, such as the Recommendation on Education for Understanding, Co-operation and International Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1974). It was further strengthened by the Recommendations of the Intergovernmental Conference of 1983 on Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with a view to developing a Climate of Opinion favourable to the Strengthening of Security and Disarmament.

Last but not least, the World Congress of Disarmament Education held in Paris in 1980 constituted a significant contribution by UNESCO to the implementation of the Final Document of the First Special Session devoted to Disarmament (1978) which urged UNESCO to "*intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and publications on armament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and should disseminate the results of such research*" (paragraph 103).

In concrete terms, UNESCO's activities related to disarmament consist of:

## A) RESEARCH

In the framework of its programme on the study of the causes and consequences of the arms race and of its effects in UNESCO's fields of competence, Dr. Hans Günter Brauch, Chairman of the Research Group on Peace Research and European Security Studies, University of Stuttgart, has prepared an analysis of research activities in the social and human sciences, already carried out or in progress, both within the United Nations system and by international, regional and national institutions in education, science, culture and communication, in the field of disarmament, encompassing those relating to the causes and consequences of the arms race and the relationship between peace, security, development and disarmament. The analysis is complemented by a directory of the institutions, including those of the United Nations system, which conduct research on all disarmament questions as defined above, and a selective bibliography of the studies completed or currently being carried out by these institutions. The survey is meant to be an information tool to provide access to this vast field and to assist inter alia in the preparation of courses and seminars at institutions of higher education on the educational, scientific, social and cultural aspects of disarmament issues.

In late 1988 a consultation of researchers will be held in Paris to consider ways of increasing research capacities in the social and human sciences dealing with disarmament issues. It will benefit from the findings of this meeting and the from Third Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-III) which will be held in New York in May/June.

## B) THE UNESCO YEARBOOK ON PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES

The Yearbook is published in co-edition by UNESCO and Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, USA.

Volume VI (1985) of the Yearbook, now available, is concerned with the Second World War.

Volume VII (1986) of the Yearbook, which will be published in October 1988, treats the following topics: plural society and conflict, ethnic violence, human rights and early warning systems, social conflict in South Africa, conflict situations in newly independent African countries, and international responses to conflict.

Volume VIII (1987) which is scheduled to appear in early 1989 will highlight the impact of the arms race on education, science and technology, culture and communication; the arms trade and technology transfer to the developing countries; and the arms race and the process of national reconstruction in developing countries.

Volume IX (1988) which is in preparation will mainly deal, within UNESCO's fields of competence, with the relationship of disarmament and development and the results of SSOD-III.

In each volume a final chapter reports on the activities undertaken in peace and disarmament research at the international and regional levels, by institutions such as the ones represented at this Conference. I would, therefore, invite you to let us have for the 1988 volume short abstracts of your activities which we could publish together with a brief résumé of the results of the Sochi meeting.

c) THE UNESCO PRIZE FOR PEACE EDUCATION

The aim of this Prize, created in 1981, and awarded annually is to promote all forms of action designed to "*construct the defences of peace in the minds of men*" by rewarding a particularly outstanding example of activity designed to alert public opinion and mobilize the conscience of mankind in the cause of peace, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of UNESCO and of the United Nations Charter. In 1987 the Prize was shared by the celebrated Swiss journalist and writer Ms. Laurence Deonna, and the "*Servicio Paz y Justicia en América Latina*" an oecumenical non-violent organization founded in 1971. You are kindly invited to put forward suitable candidates for next year's Prize. Applications should be addressed to the Director General of UNESCO and be submitted no later than 31 March 1989.

d) COURSES AND SEMINARS

In this context special reference should be made to UNESCO's Associated Schools Project and its particular relevance to the programmes on education for peace and international understanding in many of the Member States.

With UNESCO's assistance, the Centre for Continuing Education of the Australian National University in Canberra, has prepared a "*Peace course for adults*". The aim of the course is to ensure a better understanding by adults of the relationship between peace, disarmament, security and development and to enhance their motivation and skills.

The Swedish National Commission for UNESCO has prepared a training programme on the relationship between peace, disarmament, security and development and on the dangers of nuclear war. The programme is to be used for the training of non-formal literacy and adult education personnel.

A seminar was held in Belgium to draw up experimental higher education projects to provide students with a better knowledge of problems relating to peace, respect for human rights and the rights of peoples, the dangers of nuclear war, the arms race and harmful uses of science and technology.

A training seminar was organized in Finland in June 1987 for non-formal and adult education personnel on the relationship between peace, disarmament, security and development.

Finally, UNESCO has strengthened relations with the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs in New York, UNIDIR, and competent NGOs like IPRA, Pugwash, etc. with a view to improving mutual information and co-operation. This will further help to reduce the duplication of efforts and the depletion of the very scarce financial and manpower resources.

The "*Agenda for the 1990's*" outlined by this Conference, may also provide inspiration for UNESCO's Third Medium Plan (1990-1995) which is being elaborated.

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**JOSEPH ROTBLAT**

Under the heading "*The present status of disarmament research*" it may be appropriate to describe briefly the work of the Pugwash Conferences, even though this work cannot be strictly called research, at least as I understand this term as a University Professor. Indeed, the position of Pugwash in this Conference is somewhat uncertain; unlike other participants I am not a director of an Institute, or representing such a director. In fact, Pugwash is not an Institute, or representing such a director. In fact, Pugwash is not an Institute at all; we have not a single person on our payroll, except for secretaries. Yet, what we are doing has very much the same sort of interest as the Peace Research Institutes.

The best way to describe the difference between us is that we are amateurs while you are professionals. Most of us are amateurs in the sense that we work on the problems discussed here as an extracurricular activity, in the time we can spare from our own professional duties. But this makes us experts, because the knowledge resulting from our professional work is often of vital importance in tackling the problems of concern here, the problems of disarmament.

These remarks are not meant to be an apology, because I believe - and I hope you will agree with me - that in this world there is room for professionals and amateurs; both are needed, we complement each other, and we should collaborate with each other.

One of the most important characteristics of the Pugwash meetings, is that they always have participants from the East and the West; and nowadays we also always have participants from the Third World. In the earlier years Pugwash was the only channel of communication between scientists from East and West on disarmament issues at a non-governmental level. We were a forum for debate across the ideological divide, which was kept alive even at the darkest moments of the cold war. And because we approached the problem in a scientific way, and because our discussions were held in private, in an atmosphere conducive to the generation of original ideas, we were often able to reach agreement well ahead of official negotiations. The output of the Pugwash debates often served as an input to governmental discussions.

By way of example I will mention just three cases. One was the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the details of which had been extensively discussed in Pugwash. Another is the ABM Treaty of 1972, in which our main task was to convince our Soviet colleagues of its importance, just as now we have the job of persuading the US Administration to adhere to the narrow interpretation of the Treaty. The third is the INF Treaty, the subject of which was discussed in our "*Workshop on Nuclear Forces in Europe*" which we have run since 1980. Incidentally, one outcome of that series of workshops, which has not culminated in a treaty but in unilateral action, was the declaration by the Soviet Government of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. So far we have failed to persuade the Western nuclear powers to follow suit.

Perhaps the best known of Pugwash activities are the Annual Conferences in which we bring together about 200 scientists to discuss a variety of problems. For example, in the next Pugwash Conference to be held at the end of August this year in Dagomys (14 kilometres from here), the topics to be discussed are:

1. Strategic Nuclear Disarmament and Preventing the Weaponization of Space;

2. European Security: Nuclear and Non-nuclear Forces;
3. Military Research and Development
4. Global Environmental Problems and International Relations;
5. Alleviating Underdevelopment, Poverty and Hunger.

This is a pretty wide agenda, roaming all over space, and overlapping much of the work you are doing. But we also run a number of specialized symposia and workshops, with about 30-40 participants in each. Again by way of example I shall mention the topics of other meetings planned for the rest of 1988:

14-17 April, in Prague, Czechoslovakia:

Symposium on *"Disengagement in Europe towards Arms Reductions and Weapon-Free Zones"*.

21-24 April, in Bochum, FRG:

Symposium on *"Political Conditions for Peace in Europe: Obstacles and Perspectives"*.

11-13 June, in Geneva, Switzerland:

Workshop on *"Nuclear Forces Reductions Related to Conventional Forces Postures and Crisis Stability"*.

23-26 June, in Oslo, Norway:

Symposium on *"Naval Forces: Arms Restraints and Confidence-building"*.

17-20 October, in Beijing:

Symposium on *"Peace and Security in the Asian-Pacific Region"*.

11-13 November, in Amsterdam, Netherlands:

Workshop on *"Conventional Forces in Europe"*.

Although, by its very nature, Pugwash cannot engage in continuous and sustained research, the nearest we come to this are the "Study Groups" in which the same topic is discussed time and time again, with many participants being the same, and to which we invite non-scientists, such as military people and diplomats.

We have at present three such study groups. One is on *"Nuclear Forces"*, which started as a Workshop on Nuclear Forces in Europe, but was subsequently broadened to include nuclear forces in general and space weapons. The second is on *"Chemical Warfare"* which has been running for many years. A meeting held in January on *"Monitoring a Chemical Weapons Treaty"* was highly successful. The third study group is on *"Conventional Forces in Europe"* in which the concept of *"non-provocative defence"* was introduced. This concept met at first with scepticism but has now become recognized as an important way of dealing with disarmament in general.

At the present time the problem of verification of compliance with treaties occupies the top of our agenda. A Pugwash book on verification is being prepared, to which the most knowledgeable people from Europe, USA, and USSR will contribute. Meetings of the authors, in which they will be able to interact with each other, will be held this year in New York, Moscow and London.

Finally, Pugwash will be making important contribution to the 3rd UN SSOD. We have been invited by the United Nations to provide a special scientific dimension to information at the disposal of UNSSOD. ON 11-13 May, a meeting will be held in New York on "Scientific and Technological Aspects in the Development of New Weapons, Verification Issues, and Global Security".

In conclusion I should like to add that the nature of our meetings, namely that the participants come as individuals and not as representatives of institutions, does not allow for a formal liaison with Peace Research Institutes. But collaboration can be achieved on a personal level. Indeed, I am glad to note from the list of participants in this Conference that about a dozen of them participated in Pugwash meetings.

There is also another possibility of collaboration. From time to time scientists from Pugwash go on sabbatical leave, for a few months to a year, to work on problems of interest to you here. They may be glad to receive an invitation from your institutes to spend the leave there.

We would be glad to receive suggestions for other ways of collaboration.

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**RAY FORBES**

I would like to add a couple of comments to the Report presented this morning by Mr. Trevor Findlay on the present status of disarmament research.

With reference to the United Nations Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace which was adopted at the General Assembly in 1971. I would like to recall that prior to this, the proposal had been accepted by the Second Non-Aligned Summit in Cairo in 1964 and the Third Non-Aligned Summit in Lusaka in 1970. It is unfortunate that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean has not yet been able to set the stage for the United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean. It appears that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean scheduled to be held in Colombo in June this year will not take place. This is unfortunate since the holding of the UN Conference on the Indian Ocean could open the door to the ushering in of a regime which could make not only the Ocean area, but also the areas of the littoral and hinterland states free from the dangers of nuclear conflict and super-power involvement.

To supplement the references made in Mr. Findlay's Report to the regional efforts in disarmament research, I would also like to refer to the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) which has now set up a Secretariat in Kathmandu. The Fourth Summit of the SAARC leaders is scheduled

to be held in Colombo in November this year. SAARC has since its inception in Dhaka in December 1985 kept regional security aspects within its purview.

Adverting to the need for UNIDIR to compile a Directory of Disarmament research, mentioned in Mr. Findlay's Report, I would strongly support this. Disarmament research has grown to be highly technical over the years, and the availability of a Directory or Dictionary of Disarmament research would be of much benefit to researchers, students and the general public who need to be informed.

I would like to avail of this opportunity to refer to the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS), Colombo, which is a teaching and research Institute, founded in December 1974. Disarmament studies form part of the lecture-course on international relations which is part of the regular Diploma Programme in International Affairs conducted by the Centre. Disarmament Studies have also been the subject of dissertations submitted for the Post-Graduate Diploma in International Affairs awarded by the Centre.

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**FOURTH/QUATRIÈME SESSION**

**PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH IN THE '90s/PRIORITÉS POUR LA RECHERCHE DANS LES ANNÉES 90**

**REPORTS/RAPPORTS:**

**Thomas Enders, Wojciech Multan, Milan Sahovic, Vladimir Shoustov**

**DISCUSSION:**

**G.O. Olusanya, William Potter, Jasjit Singh, Jan Pudlak, Marco Carnovale, Kamal Matinuddin,**

**CHAIRMAN/PRÉSIDENT:**

**Johan Lundin**

## REPORT

THOMAS ENDERS

In 1969 the General Assembly of the United Nations declared the 1970s the First Disarmament Decade. Today, almost twenty years later, it is safe to conclude that the 1970s were certainly anything but a disarmament decade. Although significant arms limitation efforts were undertaken by the superpowers, the number of nuclear weapons increased beyond any reasonable level.

It is highly probable, however, that the 1980s will earn the honorary title "*First Disarmament Decade*" ex post. But who would have dared to predict so only three or four years ago? With the INF Treaty signed and a highly complex START agreement emerging, the superpowers nuclear weapon inventories are bound for very significant reductions. Assuming that the 50 per cent reductions of strategic nuclear weapons will be agreed upon soon, the question is : How do we proceed from here? Should we walk further down the road of nuclear disarmament or is a reorientation, a shift of focus necessary? -- This paper will try to answer these questions by sketching out a tentative research agenda for the 1990s. A brief review of arms control and disarmament research in the 1980s and a description of the future security environment will provide the necessary basis. But, first of all, some remarks as to the conceptual approach of this paper :

1. The author proceeds from the assumption that the overriding political goal of our age, which has rightly been called the "*nuclear-cosmic*" age, must be war-prevention and security, not disarmament per se. Arms control and disarmament should be instruments of a prudent security policy, although the preferable ones. They should be applied to enhance military and political stability between nations and to curtail economically unproductive military spending. It needs to be recognized that arms control and disarmament measures do not automatically improve the security situation of states. They can have detrimental effects because - as in the East-West context - they may serve antagonistic political goals.

2. Total disarmament, as demanded by the United Nations since its very creation, is not in sight. It is questionable whether this goal can ever be realized. Even the desirability of total disarmament can be questioned, at least as long as the international system of states - despite all laudable UN efforts to establish a world order - continues to be anarchical in nature. This fact may be deplorable but responsible politics must not ignore it. Therefore, in the foreseeable future military means will exist and should serve the purpose of deterring aggression and coercion in the first place. If necessary, they must be employed against military attack, defend and help restore the attacked parties integrity. The appropriate question here, of course, is not just "*How much is enough?*" but rather : *What should the military structures of opposing states or alliances look like in order to promote stability and détente ?*

3. The focus of this paper is on the East-West relationship, particularly the European situation. This is due to the specialization of the research institute the author is representing.

## RESEARCH FIELDS IN THE 1980S

It needs no elaborate study to conclude that the "*nuclear threat*" or - to put it less dramatic - *nuclear armaments* were the main subject of arms control and disarmament research in this decade.

Academic work on this topic had been going on for many years but it had never gained nearly as much public and, therefore, political attention as in the 1980s. Fear of nuclear war, caused by major weapon deployments in a period of tense East-West relations, gave rise to a rather broad anti-nuclear sentiment in the West and in other countries as well. This, of course, intensified the research activities. Yet, most of the resulting proposals were anything but new. "Freeze", the "Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zones" concept and the "No First Use" proposal, inter alia, can be traced back to the late 1950s and early 60s.

There is no doubt that the UN, most notably with its two special sessions devoted to disarmament in 1978 and 1982, the activities of the Conference on Disarmament, and the foundation and work of UNIDIR contributed significantly to the international discussion about nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.

Particular attention deserves the comprehensive study on deterrence requested by the General Assembly in 1984 and concluded by a group of eight governmental experts two years later. This study displays the fundamentally different attitudes of the NATO member countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries with respect to nuclear deterrence, which will certainly also prevail throughout the next decade.

In the realm of academic research these attitudes translate into two diametrically opposed schools of thought, one stressing the important contribution of nuclear deterrence to war-prevention and peaceful conflict solution and the other emphasizing the grave danger posed by the very existence of nuclear weapons and, hence, demanding total nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty and START show that these positions need not inevitably prevent *partial* nuclear disarmament.

Besides arms control and disarmament research in the nuclear field there has also been important work in recent years regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is conceivable that the Conference on Disarmament will achieve a convention completely banning the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons in 1988. However, most researchers have refrained so far from working out the very crucial relationship between a C-weapons ban and the further availability of nuclear weapons. The present US and French negotiation stance at the Geneva Conference sheds light on this relationship.

The increasing use of outer space for military purposes and the initiation of the US Strategic Defense Initiative intensified research in this field as well. Regrettably, up to now much research is characterized by a distinctive lack of sober analysis and foresight.

Finally, one needs to mention the important progress with respect to confidence-building measures and conventional arms control in Europe. The Conventional Stability Talks (CST) between the 23 members of the two military alliances in Europe are likely to commence later this year. They will be accompanied by negotiations on further confidence and security building measures involving all 35 CSCE signatory states.

Academic work in this field was for some years hindered by many researchers fixation upon nuclear weapons. It is certainly not surprising that so far the Institutes in those countries whose security situation is likely to be most affected by any future conventional arms agreement have made the most valuable contributions.

## THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

*"In the years ahead, weapons production will be much more widely diffused, and the superpowers (especially if there are three or four) will have less control over transfers of advanced systems. Many lesser powers will have sizable arsenals. These will often include chemical weapons and short-range or even medium-range missiles. Several large and mid-sized countries that used to be listed among less-developed countries - Brazil, Egypt, India, South and North Korea - are now building sizable arms industries. The next twenty years could also see the production of atomic bombs in many countries not now possessing them".*

This is the prediction of the US Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. If the prediction is correct, regional arms control will greatly gain in importance. East-West efforts now underway, especially in the conventional field, could set a useful precedent for arms arrangements in other parts of the world. In view of the unclear future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) after 1995, the prospect of further horizontal proliferation is certainly worrisome. A close look at those countries believed to possess or strive for a nuclear weapon capability suggests that regional conflicts and not the desire to mimic the nuclear powers motivate their nuclear policy. If this assessment is right, solving these apparent conflicts by political means and through conventional arms control might contain nuclear proliferation more effectively than tightening up the NPT or building down the superpowers nuclear arsenals. A tendency on the part of the superpowers to withdraw longheld security guaranties from certain regions or alliances could also fuel horizontal proliferation.

The United States and the Soviet Union are in the process of reducing their vast nuclear arsenals but nuclear disarmament will probably slow down after a START agreement. Further reductions of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe may ensure but denuclearization is clearly not in the cards. The NATO countries just recently declared: *"Our aim will continue to be to prevent any kind of war or intimidation. By maintaining credible deterrence the Alliance has secured peace in Europe for nearly 40 years; therefore, for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the Alliance strategy for the prevention of war. This is a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces which will continue to be kept up to date where necessary"*.

This is a clear and unambiguous answer to General Secretary Gorbachev's vision of a nuclear-free world by the year 2000. Even if conventional stability could be achieved in Europe through the impending arms control negotiations, the West will not end the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe. There should be no doubt that this position is met by unanimous consent in the government of the Federal Republic of Germany too.

So in the 1990s we are likely to live in a security environment in the Northern hemisphere based on a somewhat diminished quantity of nuclear weapons. But this will not alter fundamentally the mutual deterrence relationship. As US and Soviet nuclear arsenals are built down, however, it is probable that British and French nuclear forces will play a more prominent role in extending deterrence to West European countries. The post-INF situation suggests such a development. A comparable shift on the side of the Warsaw Treaty countries can be excluded.

Many of those advanced technologies, particularly in the field of sensors and information processing, that emerged during the late 1970s will be ready for military use in the decade ahead. While contributing only marginally to nuclear weapons design and configuration, these develop-

ments will have a dramatic impact on sophisticated conventional weaponry and space systems. They could indeed require "*major revisions in military doctrines and force structures*", as the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy has stated.

It is possible that advanced military technology could lead to conventional force postures Soviet military experts have called "*reconnaissance/strike-complex*". But the notion that such armaments would resemble weapons of "*mass destruction*" is profoundly mistaken. Their one outstanding and truly revolutionary characteristic will be precision, not indiscriminate destructiveness.

In combination with appropriate delivery means the new weapons could rapidly extend war across a wider geographic area than is now possible. This could create an unstable military environment in Europe or elsewhere; an unprecedented offense-orientation of military doctrines is conceivable.

On the other hand, the new technologies could also be exploited for strengthening the defense. West German defense experts emphasize this point in particular. Their work on "*non-provocative-defense*" concepts is widely appreciated and has recently attracted also the attention of the Soviet leadership. -- In any case, technology once again offers possibilities that yearn for sound and far-sighted political treatment.

Whether or not the United States and the Soviet Union will agree on nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a definite period of time, strategic anti-missile defenses are likely to be deployed before the end of the century anyway.

The USSR already operates a small strategic defense force around Moscow that is being modernized and expanded within the limits of the ABM Treaty. Western Intelligence reports suggest that the Soviet Union is far along in developing a nationwide ground-based anti-missile defense. Even if these reports should be exaggerating Soviet BMD achievements, there is at least one reason why the USSR could go ahead with BMD development, quite independent of what is happening to the US Strategic Defense Initiative: the proliferation of ballistic missile technology on its southern periphery (to which the Soviet Union has contributed itself).

Whereas countries like Iran, Iraq and Syria seem to possess only short-range missiles yet, Israel is already developing a medium-range ballistic missile capable of reaching targets deep on Soviet territory. Israel is also assumed to have nuclear weapons. This combination, missiles and nuclear weapons, causes deep concern in the Soviet leadership. In a future 1973-situation an Israeli ability to threaten Soviet targets could severely restrict the Soviet governments freedom of action, irrespective of US policy. However, the Israeli example serves only to illustrate the emerging problem.

For obvious geographic reasons, the missile proliferation problem affects Soviet security even more than US security. But the US, having no BMD capability at all right now, might also want to buy some insurance against the risk of third-party attack and, perhaps, accidental missile launch. Such a defense would not need to be near-perfect; a light, mainly ground-based area-defense might suffice. It would not change the mutual deterrence relationship of the superpowers. After all, moderate strategic defenses would be technologically and financially feasible. In terms of effectiveness, they would perhaps resemble today's air defenses.

It is conceivable that the US and the USSR should be able to agree on deploying such strategic defenses, thereby enhancing rather than diminishing East-West stability. The ABM Treaty could be modified appropriately or replaced by a new agreement.

In sum, the East-West security environment I envisage for the 1990s and beyond will be neither non-nuclear nor free of strategic missile defenses, as some hope today. There will be a mix of offense and defense, nuclear and non-nuclear force postures. New technologies will be introduced which pose a threat to military stability if incorporated primarily into offensive weaponry. But these very same technologies can also be used to strengthen the defense and thereby stability, especially in Europe.

#### PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH IN THE 1990s

1. From a European perspective, the first priority on the research agenda of the 1990s should be conventional arms control. As has been pointed out before, the preoccupation with the “*nuclear threat*” has delayed substantial research in the conventional field unduly. This must change in the years ahead because the conventional asymmetries are the main threat to European security. They cast a political shadow over the whole of Europe, as NATO heads of state have emphasized on the occasion of their recent meeting at Brussels.

NATO and the WTO have already agreed upon the general goals for the upcoming CST:

- a) They want to strengthen stability and security in Europe by establishing a stable balance of conventional forces;
- b) They intend to eliminate disparities, and, as a matter of priority, the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

The question of nuclear stability has been addressed by the international research community at least since the early 1960s. Research on the far more complex question of conventional stability has just commenced. I suggest it start from the pre-supposition that “*stability*” is not just another word for “*parity*” . The First Joint East-West Proposal for a Conventional Arms Control Regime in Europe, drafted by Polish and German experts, offers the following definition: “*Conventional stability exists only when the robust defense capabilities of both sides clearly exceed the offense capabilities of the respective opponent*” .

Of course, there are also other sensible definitions, but there should be a consensus that “*conventional stability*” demands for clearly defensively accentuated force postures in East and West. The contribution new technologies could provide in this respect needs to be thoroughly examined as well.

The claim that technology and arms control could bring about a situation where military attack were no longer possible at all (“*structural incapacity for attack*” ) can be dismissed as an utopian one. But the security situation in Europe and the general political climate would already improve markedly if a future CST agreement would eliminate the WTO’s capability for large-scale invasion on short notice and rapid reinforcement. In this case threat perceptions in Western Europe would further decrease and would rightly do so.

Conventional arms control should certainly not be confined to Europe. European solutions or models with respect to conventional stability might also be applicable to other confrontation spots on the globe. Scholars should explore such possibilities.

2. The success of future conventional arms control is to a large extent dependent on adequate verification schemes. Most experts would readily agree that the already elaborate verification measures provided for in the INF Treaty would not suffice the needs of a CST agreement for Europe. German military experts have suggested that any meaningful CST agreement would require each side, NATO and the WTO, to generate inspection forces in the order of magnitude of some 10,000-15,000 experts (the INF Treaty in comparison allows for a maximum of 600 inspectors on each side). A fairly large part of these inspection forces would constantly roam the territories of the parties, looking for signs of treaty circumvention. Of course, inspectors will not be given access to just every important military installation at any time they want. Even if no party tries to intentionally circumvent the agreement there will almost unavoidably be ambiguous incidents. Whether such incidents, i.e. the resulting disputes could be settled or rather fuel suspicion and distrust would depend largely on the general political climate and the transparency and openness of the parties societies.

In times of crisis between East and West it might well be that NATO and the WTO countries would not feel very comfortable with hundreds or thousands of foreign (and probably military) personnel on their respective territories.

The bottomline of all this is that we should not assume easily that ever more detailed and complex verification measures would automatically result in confidence building. Intrusive verification could work to the detriment of confidence building if not carefully calibrated with the arms agreement it serves, the military strategies on both sides, and the development of East-West relations in general. Hence, a robust, "*all-weather*" verification regime might be preferable to a very complex and elaborate one. But this, of course, determines very significantly what is feasible in terms of reductions, redeployments etc.

The sketchy thoughts above have perhaps made clear that in the context of confidence building, verification poses a big problem for future arms control. This problem ought to be addressed by the international research community. Hardly anybody has thought about it thoroughly as yet. But, to be sure, inadequate verification, under certain circumstances generating distrust rather than confidence, could jeopardize the whole arms control and disarmament process.

3. Following incisive reductions, research in the nuclear field should focus on reconsidering the proper political and military role of nuclear weapons in the force postures of NATO and the WTO. Since the time of nuclear naivety has long passed, the nuclear arsenals of both sides in Europe should be restructured towards a minimum deterrence posture. Research institutes could help to define the appropriate force structures and weapon configuration.

Vulnerability is the core problem of every minimum deterrent, hence, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics must be defined very carefully. Fewer weapons do not automatically or necessarily result in improved military stability. West European institutes, in particular, might also want to do research on the future role of French and British nuclear forces within NATO.

A START agreement may cause some problems with respect to the strategic force structures of the US and the USSR. Individual legs of their strategic triads may become increasingly vulnerable,

especially in case of certain technological breakthroughs (e.g., in the field of Anti-Submarine Warfare).

Instead of examining the implications of highly improbable 95 per cent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons systems, as, for instance, Soviet scientists have done in recent years (with no reassuring results for those concerned about crisis stability!), experts should rather tackle the very real stability problems already posed by 50 per cent reductions. Unless convincing solutions for these problems can be provided, further strategic weapons reductions will certainly not materialize.

4. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is running out in 1995. The treaty may have had the effect of promoting clandestine rather than open proliferation. However, there can be little doubt that the NPT has slowed down the proliferation process considerably. Therefore, the treaty is likely to be prolonged.

Approaching 1995, discussions about the future of the NPT should not be confined to the question of safeguards improvements. It is of utmost importance to remove the political incentives for nuclear proliferation. Very often these incentives are rooted in the existence of regional conflicts. Finding ways and means to solve or ease these conflicts can strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

5. Last not least, I think arms control in outer space must also be a research priority in the 1990s. A few years ago Colin Gray asserted in an article: "*Space is not a sanctuary*". Whether we like it or not, he was right.

Military use of space is a fact of life since the late 1950s, although some still hold fast to the illusion that "*militarization*" of space could be prevented. Space has become what the oceans became already long ago: a medium for both, military as well as non-military activities, open to everybody.

So the task ahead is not, to "*demilitarize*" space but rather to regulate and, if possible, limit military use to the benefit of civil activities. We need a lot of innovative thinking here. For instance, the concept of self-defense zones in space is certainly worth discussing and refining. One could also conceive of all kinds of confidence building measures for outer space. A lot of this could be done in the context of further developing international space law.

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## REPORT

WOJCIECH MULTAN

In determining research priorities for the 1990's in the field of disarmament and related security questions, one should consider as a starting point the following three premises:

1. The present state and prospects for the further development of the international situation in the broad context of problems defining conditions for the maintenance of world peace and the sense of security in particular regions of our globe;
2. Long-term threats to international security stemming from various forms and manifestations of the arms race;
3. The current state of research on key problems of armaments and related questions, where their stronger and weaker points should be fully realized.

In the multi-faceted strand of international developments over the past dozen months or so, one can sense reasons for cautious optimism. In the overall shape of relations between countries, postures and practical steps guided by rational considerations, a broader approach to security matters and a sense of responsibility for the fate of world peace seem to be slowly gaining the upper hand. These are manifest in the perception of national interests against the background of problems and challenges relating to the entire world. Those positive tendencies are particularly conspicuous in East-West relations, notably in contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States. A spectacular manifestation of this tendency was the signing last December by the two powers of the treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles. Some progress is also apparent in the all-European East-West dialogue, though it encounters major obstacles and proceeds at a slow pace.

Of course, it would be a serious oversimplification to detect nothing but positive disarmament phenomena in present relations between states. It is common knowledge that even in East-West contacts there is still no shortage of steps of a clearly confrontational nature. Likewise, in North-South relations, a number of moves have been registered of what one could mildly term a traditional nature.

Writing about the current state of international relations one should not neglect the existing regional conflicts and outside interference. All these considered, I would still wish to stress that an auspicious trend has dominated the world political scene for dozen or so months. One should note at this point that the development of this positive tendency is organically linked with the multi-faceted process of fundamental reappraisals and profound transformations now under way in the Soviet Union, which also covers foreign policies of that world power. This has become apparent both in the realms of the concept, and of practical activities.

All those factors create a favourable atmosphere, offer encouragement and inspiration for the Institutes represented here to undertake an intellectual effort and make an attempt to devise solutions that could stimulate and perpetuate positive transformations in the present day world in the vital realm of policies concerning the reduction of armaments and international stabilization in general. I

believe that the recommendations of the Third Special Session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament could provide additional stimuli for our Institutes to exert such efforts.

The number of research centres throughout the world which study various aspects of disarmament and issues directly or indirectly related to disarmament is steadily growing. The number of periodicals of various kinds that specialize in disarmament issues and of magazines that pay considerable attention to those questions is also on the rise. The two trends have grown out of the rise in the significance of the complex disarmament issues, and of the related need on the part of growing numbers of people and entire social, professional, political and denominational groups to become better familiarized with those problems.

Gone are the days when disarmament was the concern of but a narrow group of professionals who negotiated international agreements in the field, usually with little success. With time the interest in disarmament started to mount rapidly, encompassing broader and broader social circles. The concern in the grasping of the phenomena underlying the policy of armaments with its multitude of consequences on the one hand, and in determination of the avenues of curbing it on the other, evolved parallel to the growth of demand for reliable works explaining complex problems related to disarmament, hence for the work of scientific research centres.

State decision-making bodies started increasingly demanding expertise that could serve as a starting point for adopting official stands vis-a-vis particular questions related to disarmament. This involved the defining of state security interests and the working out of stands to be presented at particular disarmament negotiations. Consequently research centres became on the one hand agencies shaping the views of the ever growing social circles on selected issues, and on the other in a number of cases they became a factor molding state policies.

The majority of centres engaged in the study of disarmament and issues related to it are based in the developed countries. In most cases, they are scientific institutions possessing considerable experience and well-established prestige. However, in recent years, new centres of this type have been emerging in the developing countries. They are often modestly equipped and have to cope with the shortages of resources and personnel. Those centres require assistance in both these terms.

Each of the centres engaged in the study of disarmament issues has its specificity reflected primarily in its research foci determined by a given country's research traditions concerning war and peace, the perception of contemporary threats, immediate needs of the sponsors of the research pursuits, as well as a centre's material and personnel capabilities. It is also understandable that among scientific institutions conducting studies on disarmament and related issues there exist marked differences concerning the organization of research work, research methods, dependence upon state agencies, ways of financing etc. It is also legitimate to note that the individual centres show a degree of specialization in the particular subject-areas.

At the same time, there is a large number of features and problems common to the majority of those institutes. These clearly include dilemmas concerning the selection of the research topics most vital in terms of research and application. Analysing research programmes of a number of institutes, one can observe that they periodically focus on issues that are for some reasons "*fashionable*" at the time. Very often, this happens at the cost of other, no less important topics. Thus, on the one hand one is confronted with a concentration of research on definite fashionable topics,

while on the other, there are blank spots in research due to the fact that weighty problems elude the attention of research centres. Fundamental research on such key issues as peace, security and disarmament also needs extending and intensifying. It is therefore necessary jointly to reflect on the principal research trends which are likely to emerge in the near or a more distant future.

As the 20th century is drawing to close an intensive armaments remain a vital instrument of state policies which are used with varying effects to affect both the international community and to a significant extent the individual domestic situations. As far as the former aspect is concerned, in wishing to subordinate other countries, or nations, in extreme cases such endeavours assume the form of aggression and military intervention. They also often evolve into: pressure, blackmail and coercion. The history of international relations after World War II abounds in such acts. The policy of intensive armaments plays a generally known negative role in overall East-West and North-South relations providing material shape for policies pursued from the position of strength. Armaments play an equally important role in the creation of the internal policies of particular countries in the broad sense of the term, primarily in the political and economic dimensions. On the other hand, it is commonly recognized that the policy of intensive armaments is in many instances motivated by the feeling that vital security interests of a state or a group of states are in jeopardy. While, the internal motivation is often accounted for by considerations having to do with the economic well-being, which is often the case with the countries that manufacture and export weapons.

Naturally, the policy of intensive armaments should not be viewed as a phenomenon isolated from a variety of historical, political, social, economic and other determinants.

Nevertheless, in keeping with opinions that are quite commonly accepted in science, armaments maintain dynamics of their own and being such should be considered as a central issue, i.e. the factor, responsible for the many acts and activities with far-reaching consequences for the maintenance, or violation, of international security. It is precisely for those reasons, that certain causes, manifestations and characteristic features of both present-day armaments and those looked upon as likely to occur in future, require special attention, as a factor fundamental for the determination of the lots of the present and future generations, in terms of war and peace.

The examination of the present-day armaments with regard to the threats they might pose to world peace and international stability requires the noting of some of their particularly dangerous aspects.

1. First it is nuclear armaments involving especially the threats to the existing, admittedly imperfect, regime of the non-proliferation of those weapons. There is some likelihood that the process of reducing the existing volumes of nuclear weapons by the two superpowers initiated by the signature of the Washington Treaty will be continued. At present, the most urgent priorities are: the joining of the process of negotiations on reducing the nuclear arsenals by the other nuclear powers and the no less important problem of the further stepping up of the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. It is expected that in twenty years time, the number of the nuclear threshold countries will reach forty or more. A highly dangerous situation might emerge at the turn of the 20th Century unless a fully efficient non-proliferation regime is established by then.

2. It seems that another group of mass destruction weapons i.e. chemical weapons pose no less serious threats to mankind. The situation is serious at this point in a sense that a dangerous threshold can soon be crossed as a significant number of countries may soon be capable of producing binary

weapons. The United States has already acquired the technological capability of manufacturing these. It can be expected that in the not too distant a future new kinds of chemical weapons featuring tempting properties as a means of struggle and mass killing may find their way to the arsenals of a number of countries unless the convention, which has been negotiated for years within the Geneva Committee of forty countries wins universal acceptance.

3. Another threat to international stability and hence world peace could be posed by the implementation of the programme providing for the deployment of strike weapons in outer space. Mankind has manifested its far-sightedness by abandoning the deployment of mass-destruction weapons in certain environments (sea-beds and ocean floors, outer space, the Antarctic) which has proved to be a genuine blessing. Outer space is a similar case. Should imagination fail and strike weapons be deployed in outer space for the self-centred goals of a single power, the proverbial Pandora's box will be opened. The operation performed today by a single power will be repeated tomorrow by another power then yet another one and so on. Outer space will become a military base, its guns aimed at life on Earth.

4. Last but not least, the issue of the modernization of conventional weapons is to be considered. The use of the latest achievements of the technological revolution to make conventional weapons nearly as destructive as nuclear weapons to produce "*stealth weapons*" of utmost precision might bring about fundamental transformations in fighting methods of incalculable consequences.

It is extremely difficult to impose any restrictions on the qualitative development of weaponry, but this was successfully done in the past. The SALT II Treaty is one of the examples of such an approach. One can hardly imagine the maintenance of international stability in the long run without the working out of agreements on the halting of the qualitative aspect of the arms race.

The four afore-mentioned groups of problems require a comprehensive scientific treatment and the subsequent establishment of the relevant recommendations for the negotiators. In groups 1,2, and 3 research is considerably advanced and its collective results were contained in studies prepared under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary General (77). Those studies should be continued. At the same time, taken up should be the issues contained in group 4 i.e. the examination of the possibilities of introducing international restrictions on the qualitative development of weapons, with special emphasis being placed on conventional weapons.

It seems that well-worth establishing, are certain priorities for research which could be of interest to a larger number of institutes. In question are multi-faceted and long-term studies on problems of fundamental significance for the further peaceful development of international relations. This would necessitate the launching of a pre-planned joint research project which might take a big number of research centres a few years to complete.

1. The rapid pace of transformations taking place on the international scene reflecting the overall development of nations, makes it imperative to take up topics concerned with the sources, origins, development and the multivarious effects the policy of armaments has had on the particular communities and the whole world. This primarily concerns the context referred to as matters of war and peace (including the issue of education for peace and disarmament). The heretofore foundations

77. I am mainly referring to the studies prepared directly under the auspices of the UN Secretary General and those prepared by UNIDIR. They concern such issues as: Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, International Nuclear Trade and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Disarmament: Problems Related to Outer Space; Studies on Conventional Disarmament.

and formulas concerning the organization of international security appear to be inadequate vis-a-vis the challenges posed by the present-day military technology and to a no lesser extent by social development. This is because they are based on 19th century views on the role and importance of military power as an instrument of politics. Those views have been eroded to a major extent, mainly through the great availability of mass destruction weapons of unimaginable destructive capabilities.

It is the task of precisely such research institutes as the ones represented at this Conference, to seek to formulate new concepts of international security appropriate for the present time and reflecting no political or local self-centred attitudes, but expressing universal, human interests instead (78). In this context, particular attention should be directed toward the concept of common security viewed as a formula of international law, and as a philosophy. The idea of rational military sufficiency would be linked to this concept. At issue would primarily be the examination of such questions as: premises necessary for the implementation of the concept of common security (rational sufficiency), difficulties and possible dangers likely to occur in the course of implementation of the concepts. It would also be necessary to determine whether they can only apply to the two superpowers, i.e. the USSR and US, or whether they can become an accepted practice in relations between other countries; whether the concepts can be applicable to specific geographical regions; whether this concept could be implemented unilaterally or whether it requires reciprocity; what possible stages of implementation should be taken into account etc.

2. The issue of military implications of tensions in East-West relations requires scientific study. It is necessary to pinpoint their main sources, manifestations and forms and possibilities of preventing them from occurring. Undoubtedly, the recurrent tensions in East-West relations in the past posed the gravest threats to peace and international security. A question arised thus to what extent this is the consequence of the very existence of the two social-political systems and how the importance of the military aspect in this rivalry can be decreased.

3. Military doctrines as a reflection of views and intentions of contemporary states and the advisable trends of their change, represent another problem calling for a multi-faceted study by Institutes involved in Research on disarmament and related issues. Military doctrines can be described as a quintessence of views accepted by a given country on relations with other countries. These express to the same extent potential capabilities and intentions of those countries. At the present moment, both the East and the West perceive the other side's military doctrine to be offensive. I believe that a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the position military doctrines occupy in the policies of the states could help to formulate general recommendations concerning their modification, so that they could be seen by the opposite side as an expression of good intentions (79).

4. In January 1986, the Soviet Union advanced a programme concerning the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000. It is a very attractive and bold idea. It has therefore won the support and understanding of a number of countries and milieus. At the same time, however it has given rise to reservations and doubts stemming from a variety of reasons among which predominant was the concern about the fate of peace and international security founded on the belief that the world can hardly do without nuclear weapons. Their elimination would mean uncertainty and chaos in international relations.

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78. An initial contribution in this respect was provided by the writers of the "*Study on Concepts of Security*", A/40/553.

79. An interesting beginning in this field was made in "*Study on Deterrence*", A/41/432

The Institutes represented here should take up the issue of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Scientific analysis should be applied in the first place to the treatment of such problems as the conditions for the implementation of the programme of the gradual elimination of those weapons (in political, military and organizational terms), difficulties and obstacles it is likely to involve, stages of the implementation of the programme, and implications of the elimination of nuclear weapons for international relations.

5. I am inclined to believe that it will soon become necessary and possible to make attempts jointly to work out a concept of a harmonious development of countries. Such phenomena as the wasteful exploitation of natural resources, degradation of the natural environment etc. Such a study, taking into account all the fundamental aspects of the overall long-term development of countries of particular regions and on a global scale, could become a highly valuable process of getting to know one another and realizing the multidimensional interdependencies. Indirectly, it would constitute a vital factor of shaping a sense of co-responsibility for the lot of our civilization in people's minds.

The afore-mentioned research goals are multidimensional and very ambitious. They require critical assessments done from various points of reference, and an approach free from oversimplification, or easy wishful thinking. For these reasons, the research cannot be conducted by just one team. What is required is scientific, creative juxtaposing of various methodological approaches. Thus, all Institutes represented here to the extent that their capabilities allow should strive for the achievement of those goals. The role of an inspirer, sponsor and co-ordinator of all those undertakings could successfully be played by UNIDIR.

The treatment of those topics should become in the near future one of the main objectives in collaboration between the institutes assembled here. However, this should not be the only platform of co-operation which should have a lasting and multi-faceted character.

The following possible types of the co-operation deserve consideration:

1. The holding of periodical (every 1-2 years) conferences of the heads of the institutes devoted to discussing overall co-operation and assessment of the state of the implementation of planned research programmes. The successive conferences would be hosted by individual institutes including UNIDIR (and possibly UNU and IPRA);
2. The organization of meetings by the individual institutes with the view to discussing the questions currently under examination;
3. The publishing under UNIDIR auspices of a periodical concerned with issues belonging to the scope of interest of research pursued by the institutes assembled at this conference. The editorial board of the periodical would include representatives of Institutes according to geographical representation. Membership in the board would be organized on the basis of rotation with a term of office lasting 3-5 years. The periodical would be published in 2-3 languages of the United Nations facilitating the comprehensive popularization of ideas especially among representatives speaking languages of smaller countries.
4. A very productive form of co-operation between Institutes could be the free of charge exchange of publications issued by particular centres. The rules of the exchange would not have to take account of the financial equivalent. The more affluent institutes and those providing numerous

publications could send out more publications receiving fewer works in return.

5. Worth considering is the possibility of expanding the exchange of short-term research grants (1-2 months) serving the pursuit of specific research tasks. Such research-grants would be provided on a non-payment basis. Such an exchange would be conducted under bilateral agreements and in principle on the basis of reciprocity. Some institutes have been maintaining such bilateral exchange for a number of years now. Practice confirms the value of this form of co-operation between institutes.

In conclusion, I should like to express my profound belief that there exists a need to establish the closest possible and regular contacts between all research centres engaged in the study of disarmament and related issues. The basic platform of such contacts would be joint participation in the pursuit of selected key research problems. A significant role in this respect can be played by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

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## RAPPORT

MILAN SAHOVIC

A la veille de la troisième session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies consacrée au désarmement la question des priorités pour la recherche dans les années 1990 se pose toujours inévitablement comme un impératif devant tous ceux qui d'une manière ou d'une autre, sur le plan pratique, d'une part, et scientifique, d'autre part, travaillent dans ce domaine. Nous avons déjà devant nous des résultats concrets de l'activité initiée par la première session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale en 1978, réalisés par l'UNIDIR et par d'autres institutions et organisations non-gouvernementales internationales, comme par exemple le SIPRI ou Pugwash, pour ne nommer que ces deux institutions. Tout cet effort demande une évaluation scientifique et politique en tant que contribution à la clarification de la situation régnant sur le plan du désarmement. A la base de ces résultats il faudrait en tous cas préparer un nouveau plan de recherche. Il nous paraît, cependant, qu'en ce moment historique cette tâche demande une démarche et une attention tout à fait particulières et dans une large mesure nouvelles.

En effet, il nous semble que tout ce qui s'est passé et se passe dans la communauté internationale par la nature des tendances qui se cristallisent lentement dans les relations interétatiques et par rapport à la course aux armements et au désarmement, ouvre la voie à un débat compréhensif précédé par des recherches scientifiques beaucoup plus largement conçues que par le passé. Il est toujours dangereux d'insister, en appréciant la situation, sur la valeur des phénomènes sociaux nouveaux et du changement des conditions politiques au moment de leur apparition, en n'attendant pas leur confirmation dans le temps, mais il peut être encore plus erroné de fermer les yeux et de ne pas reconnaître leur existence et d'orienter la recherche scientifique en négligeant leur influence. La meilleure réponse à ce dilemme consiste dans l'application des méthodes qui, en respectant la réalité, cherchent en même temps des nouvelles solutions pour les problèmes humains et sociaux, internationaux et nationaux, qui se posent toujours de nouveau tout au long de l'évolution historique de notre civilisation. Ce n'est qu'ainsi que la science peut servir au progrès.

En partant de ces considérations générales on peut se demander quels sont les paramètres qui encadrent les possibilités d'une recherche nouvelle dans le domaine du désarmement pour les années 1990. Il va de soi qu'il nous est impossible de les analyser systématiquement et en détails dans le cadre de court rapport mais leur énumération est indispensable pour que l'on puisse extraire des priorités de cette recherche. Ces paramètres se dégagent effectivement des domaines suivantes :

1. L'évolution récente des rapports entre les deux grandes puissances, les Etats Unis d'Amérique et l'Union Soviétique sur le plan général et tout particulièrement du désarmement, qui est interprété par les uns comme une nouvelle phase de la détente, et par les autres comme une ouverture visant un but ambitieux consistant dans la création d'un système de sécurité internationale complexe et universel. Mais cette tendance, encourageante et méritant un appui global, est contrebalancée par un grand nombre de conflits régionaux, armés et non-armés, comme par les contradictions profondes divisant notre monde sur les plans politiques, économiques, idéologiques, techniques, technologiques et autres. Un progrès frappant combiné avec une pauvreté inacceptable du point de vue de l'humanité et de la civilisation, avec le danger permanent d'annihilation nucléaire et une course aux armements qui revêt toujours des formes nouvelles. C'est l'environnement mondial qui exige des transformations beaucoup plus profondes et durables des pays les plus forts et les plus

développés que celles que nous avons pu voir ces derniers temps;

2. L'état des négociations pour le désarmement ou le contrôle de la course aux armements, qui pendant des années ont trainé, surtout après les sessions extraordinaires de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, sur le plan multilatéral ou régional. Elles n'ont pas connu non plus de résultat impressionnant sur le plan bilatéral entre les Etats Unis d'Amérique et l'Union Soviétique jusqu'à la conclusion de l'accord Reagan-Gorbachev du 7 décembre 1987 sur les missiles de moyenne et courte portée, dont la contribution qualitativement nouvelle relative au contrôle et la vérification directe représente indubitablement, du point de vue politique, juridique et technique une grande ouverture. Ses conséquences doivent se manifester dans un proche avenir dans d'autres secteurs des négociations bilatérales et multilatérales pour qu'on puisse en apprécier la valeur. Il faut le dire, car un scepticisme profond de la majorité des Etats et de l'opinion publique accompagne les négociations sur le désarmement. Il se reflète sur l'autorité des Nations Unies et de son mécanisme, dont l'inefficacité est due au refus des grands de s'adapter à l'existence d'une communauté internationale intégrée et organisée sur la base des buts et principes de la Charte. Ce scepticisme a un fondement rationnel car le destin n'était malheureusement pas favorable lors de la mise en oeuvre des résultats auxquels on a abouti sous pression des impératifs politiques, militaires et techniques. On a conclu une dizaine de conventions internationales multilatérales, une dizaine aussi d'accords bilatéraux entre les Etats Unis d'Amérique et l'Union Soviétique et on a approuvé un nombre énorme de recommandations dans le cadre des Nations Unies sous la pression et grâce aux efforts des pays non-alignés. Mais on est obligé de reconnaître qu'on a échoué sur le plan du désarmement, et que la survie de notre planète est encore et toujours en cause. En présence des nouveaux caractères de la course aux armements, la continuation des essais nucléaires, les tentatives de transfert de la course aux armements dans l'espace extra-atmosphérique, de l'application des techniques et technologies les plus sophistiquées dans la production des armes conventionnelles, les nouvelles armes biologiques, bactériologiques et chimiques, la création des armes tactiques nucléaires et la formulation des nouvelles stratégies de dissuasion - aucune autre réaction et conclusion n'est imaginable. Sans une revitalisation et l'adaptation de l'action pour le désarmement aux nouvelles conditions nous arriverons très probablement à une situation dans laquelle la militarisation de la politique étrangère déformera totalement le caractère de la vie internationale, avec comme résultat la possibilité réelle du déclenchement d'une nouvelle guerre mondiale. Au lieu du progrès de la coopération internationale, nous aurons le retour au temps de l'hégémonie totale de la politique de force et le triomphe du militarisme sur les idées du progrès démocratique et social dans la vie interne des Etats et sur le plan international. Si on y ajoute les risques qui proviennent de l'application des nouvelles technologies, et tout spécialement liés à l'utilisation pacifique de l'énergie nucléaire, (on ne peut pas laisser de côté l'incident de Tchernobyl), ainsi que leur influence sur l'équilibre écologique sur notre planète, on peut voir que s'élargit le contexte dans lequel il faut chercher les sujets de la recherche pour les années 1990.

On peut constater, donc, sans grande hésitation, que les priorités pour la recherche dans les années 1990 devraient être cherchées en n'oubliant jamais qu'au niveau contemporain de l'évolution des rapports internationaux l'analyse scientifique doit combiner les aspects techniques, militaires et stratégiques, avec ceux relatifs aux conséquences politiques, économiques, juridiques, écologiques, même psychologiques et autres qui concernent la vie des nations et des êtres humains. On peut remarquer à propos de cette demande qu'un regard sur les études préparées et publiées par l'UNIDIR et par certaines autres institutions, n'ont pas négligé ces aspects plus larges ayant trait aux conséquences de la course aux armements et les conséquences éventuelles du désarmement. Tout en constatant ceci, en considérant la liste des études et publications publiées par l'UNIDIR qui se trouve

dans les Annexes du document A/42/300, qui examine l'application des recommandations et décisions de la dixième session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale, on peut dire qu'il faudrait faire aujourd'hui, et sur la base des nouvelles données, un pas en avant. Et dans deux directions :

1. Premièrement, dans une formulation de nouveaux sujets d'étude, tenant compte de la situation nouvelle qui s'est formée grâce à l'atmosphère créée entre les Etats Unis d'Amérique et l'Union Soviétique sur les plans militaires (du désarmement et du contrôle), et du renforcement éventuel du rôle du mécanisme des Nations Unies, grâce à l'idée de la création du système de sécurité internationale complexe et universel. La position des pays non-nucléaires, ainsi les concepts relatifs aux zones dénucléarisées et zones sans armements chimiques, méritent aussi d'être réétudiés. Le thème des Nations Unies devrait être au premier plan et envisagé avec les rapports entre les négociations bilatérales et multilatérales. La vérification dans les accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux ouvre la voie aux analyses et prévisions de grande portée. Surtout, la vérification du désarmement conventionnel et son rapport avec le désarmement nucléaire avec tous ses aspects modernes, représente un sujet de premier rang. Il faut reconnaître également que la notion de la sécurité des Etats a des connotations tout à fait nouvelles, liées à la situation économique des Etats. Le désarmement régional devient de plus en plus un thème urgent si l'on considère les événements et les conflits existants. Le rapport entre le désarmement et la sécurité internationale exige, semble-t-il, certaines nouvelles analyses. Mais ce qui pourrait être extrêmement intéressant, c'est une étude sur le rôle des petits Etats sur le plan du désarmement, et tout particulièrement sur l'attitude des grands à l'égard de leur positions et de leur rôle.

2. Deuxièmement, il est enfin devenu clair que la matière qui doit être étudiée doit être également considérée du point de vue du droit international. Cet aspect a été négligé consciemment pendant des décennies, sous l'influence des grandes puissances et des facteurs militaires en général, afin de dissimuler l'illégalité des armes nucléaires et de leur utilisation. Le caractère obligatoire des interdictions formelles de toutes les conventions internationales ainsi que le droit coutumier doivent, être étudiés afin de d'éclairer les aspects juridiques concernant la réglementation de la course aux armements et du désarmement. Il faut voir si et comment un secteur du droit international consacré au désarmement pourrait être constitué. Pour être plus clair, nous dirons qu'il n'est pas question seulement du développement des prohibitions d'utilisation, mais de la production et des abus de production de l'énergie nucléaire ainsi que des autres acquisitions du progrès technique et technologiques utilisées à des fins pacifiques, de la conversion des armements en produits pacifiques, etc.

On pourrait bien sûr continuer avec l'énumération des thèmes et même les systématiser d'une manière ou d'une autre. Notre propos est beaucoup plus modeste. Nous avons voulu seulement indiquer les directions et les orientations de la recherche pour les années 1990. Pour arriver à un programme définitif il faudrait continuer le débat en traitant les suggestions systématiquement. Il faudrait, d'après notre opinion, analyser toute une série de sources, en partant des résolutions de l'Assemblée générale approuvées au cours de la 42ème session en 1987, les Déclarations des pays non-alignés de New Delhi et de Harare (7ème et 8ème Conférence au sommet), la Déclaration de Stockholm de 1988 des dirigeants de six pays (Argentine, Grèce, Inde, Mexique, Suède et Tanzanie), pour voir comment se reflètent dans les vues des Etats et de l'opinion publique les besoins d'adaptation des études sur le désarmement aux nouveaux besoins de la communauté internationale.

Un aspect particulier mérite, d'après notre opinion, une attention spéciale car de lui dépend dans une bonne mesure le succès de toutes les tentatives visant la réalisation des études futures sur le désarmement. Il s'agit de la représentativité des membres des groupes de consultants, qui doivent

appartenir à toutes les régions géographiques et groupements politiques d'Etats. D'après les informations préparées par l'UNIDIR, des experts provenant de 58 pays ont participé à la préparation des études achevées entre 1980 et 1986. Pourtant, le nombre des auteurs des études qui ont été publiées est beaucoup plus restreint. Il est limité à un nombre de personnalités éminentes, mais représentant surtout une région déterminée et ses écoles de pensée (la région occidentale). Par conséquent, une différenciation adéquate est nécessaire pour qu'on puisse comprendre et donner l'occasion aux experts des autres régions du monde de publier les résultats de leurs recherches pour lesquelles ils devraient être engagés par l'UNIDIR. Il va s'en dire qu'une collaboration quotidienne doit être établie avec les instituts et centres de recherche travaillant dans les domaines des relations internationales et du désarmement.

Avant de terminer ce court rapport, nous ne pouvons pas laisser de côté le problème du consensus en tant que principe d'élaboration des études et de la formulation des conclusions. L'importance du consensus est incontestable mais son application ne devrait pas préjudicier aux données scientifiquement déterminées et aux conclusions qui en découlent. L'objectivité scientifique devrait être préservée dans son intégralité tout en laissant, en même temps, aux représentants étatiques, dans les organes compétents, le droit de prendre des positions qui correspondent à leurs intérêts politiques et de trouver des solutions qui représenteront l'expression des compromis en vue de conclure des accords internationaux. L'objectivité comme expression fondamentale des résultats de la recherche scientifique doit être préservée coûte que coûte.

On peut voir sans grandes difficultés que le développement contemporain des relations internationales, et tout spécialement de la course aux armements, persistent à exiger qu'on poursuive la recherche de modalités nouvelles du désarmement. Cette recherche, ayant en vue la nature des armements modernes, et surtout des armes nucléaires, englobe de plus en plus des secteurs très différents de la vie internationale. Le reflet direct de cette situation est la nécessité d'adopter des méthodes multidisciplinaires et de réaliser des études synthétiques qui seules, par la largeur de leurs analyses et la complémentarité de leurs conclusions, peuvent contribuer à la clarification des phénomènes étudiés et ainsi aider les négociateurs cherchant la possibilité d'arriver à la conclusion d'accords sur le désarmement.

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**REPORT****VLADIMIR SHOUSTOV**

Disarmament research under the auspices of the UN has proved to be useful. This activity contributes essentially to the attainment of goals of the world campaign for disarmament, promotes new topics for negotiations and in-depth study of problems emerging in the course of negotiations.

I would like to note with satisfaction, that inspite of shortages of financial resources and personnel, UNIDIR has managed to present a number of serious research works which have made a positive impact. Notably among these are the following studies: Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War and U.S. and Soviet Assumptions and Perceptions in Disarmament by Professor Daniel Frei, as well as the Study on possible ways to create an International Disarmament Fund for Development.

Today disarmament researchers have a special responsibility, since the present-day situation is characterised by transition from the level of discussion to the more practical plane of promoting the coordination and implementation of possible measures of disarmament.

I quite agree with the idea, that time has come to discuss a long-term programme of research for UNIDIR till the year 2000. In this respect we think that the major research trends in the Institute should be defined on terms of disarmament priorities. UNIDIR could take up research of long-term problems and if necessary, of issues emerging in the process of negotiations on disarmament. In this way, the research functions performed by the governmental groups of experts established under the guidance of the UN Secretary-General would not be duplicated.

In the immediate future the most important topic could be an all-embracing study on the ways and means of establishing comprehensive security taking into account the nuclear and space related realities of the contemporary world. I think that the experience accumulated by the Institute in the course of preparing its publications on national concepts of security could prove useful in this regard.

In order to prevent war, whether nuclear or conventional, it would be useful to reach mutual understandings between States and agreements on the concept of defence strategies and the idea of reasonable sufficiency. These notions envisage a structure of armed forces which would be only defensive or non-offensive in character.

In our view, such principles set clear goals to be pursued in the course of negotiations on the reduction of military potentials and their components.

Thus, a special study on defence strategies and reasonable sufficiency could serve as a perspective for setting the trend in research work carried out under the guidance of UNIDIR.

The signing of the Soviet-American INF Treaty was the first tangible step towards easing the

nuclear threat. At this stage of negotiations the focus has necessarily been on Soviet and American armaments, since these nuclear powers have a special responsibility for the cause of peace and for initiating the process of radical nuclear disarmament.

However, the agenda for discussion of 50% reduction of strategic offensive weapons may possibly include such issues as nuclear disarmament of other states, proportions for further reduction of nuclear arsenals, guarantees for "*non-revival*" of nuclear armaments. Naturally, these problems should be solved in the process of negotiations. But the discussion would be more fruitful, if scientifically substantiated recommendations are provided. Such recommendations could be worked out, for example, by the UN.

Today the problem of conventional armaments and the reduction of forces particularly in Europe has been put into the forefront. The Soviet Union is ready to eliminate historical asymmetry and disparity in this field not through a build-up but by means of reduction.

On the whole the Soviet Union guided by the principle of reasonable sufficiency considers it necessary to reduce conventional armaments and forces to the level that provides no means for surprise attack and for launching offensive operations.

We are fully aware of the complexity of the task which can be accomplished through a step-by-step approach. Research on conventional arms reduction in Europe can be very useful for the efforts of the negotiating parties.

With regard to the perspective for fostering trends in disarmament research in general, we cannot avoid mentioning naval problems. Such problems have not yet been given due attention in most research centers. This cannot be justified either from a scientific, military or political point of view, especially since the situation existing in the oceans of the world is still cause of great concern. The oceans cover over 70% of the total surface of the planet. It is unfortunate that such a vast area has not been included in the common process of reduction and limitation of arms. Further build-up of naval fleets and increase in their activity might undermine stability and conditions for peaceful cooperation, both in some specific regions as well as on a global scale. This tendency is worrying especially having in mind a meaningful step forward in the field of conventional armed forces and arms reduction in Europe. The world will gain nothing if the arms race is extended to the sea. The naval problems cannot remain "*closed*" for the negotiations. The revitalisation of multifaceted efforts in this area could be promoted by well-oriented and well-thought research studies both at the national and international levels and within the framework of UNIDIR.

Efforts undertaken in the field of verification and disarmament tend to acquire an international character. And the establishment of an international mechanism of ensuring compliance with agreements on arms limitation and the reduction of international tension, including the verification of situations in the "*hot spots*", under the auspices of the UN may become logical accomplishment of these efforts. Similar ideas exist among a number of countries. Meaningful research which would seek optimal ways and means for establishing such a mechanism might turn out to be very useful. UNIDIR might consider it as one of the most important trends for its research for the near future.

Last year the International Conference on the Relationship between Development and Disarmament manifested the determination of the overwhelming majority of states to apply technological progress for the purposes of development, prosperity and well-being. The Conference confirmed the existing close interrelation between the two processes and charted concrete paths for turning disarmament into a factor for development. The Conference's Final Document envisages the carrying out of research on the conversion of military production and finding out advantages that could arise from redistributing military resources. It also focuses on the establishment of a universal data base on global and national military expenditures which would make it possible to ascertain trends in the field of military spending. We share the opinion that UNIDIR, as a unique UN body can organize a variety of information which could play a very important role in the realization of the Final Document's provisions.

Regarding the improvement of the forms and trends of UNIDIR's research activity, we cannot but mention the activity of the Consultative Council on disarmament research. Time has come for a fresh assessment of the potentials of this body which brings together experts from many countries. The Soviet Union is prepared to participate in discussions of all matters aimed at making UNIDIR's activity more effective.

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## DISCUSSION

**G. O. OLUSANYA**

In Nigeria we do not have Institutes specifically devoted to Disarmament Research. There are, however, Institutions that devote attention to Disarmament Research as part of their programme. In this respect, there are two Institutes that deserve mention - The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs and the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies.

The thrust of research in the two Institutes is not on technical issues such as verification etc. Attention is centered on the general issue of security and this is likely to continue into the 1990s. Attention is directed towards such issues as:

a. Inter- state conflicts and the involvement of outside powers in such conflicts e.g. Libya/ Chad Conflict and the Somali/Ethiopia conflict which hopefully is about to be resolved;

b. The threat South Africa poses to the Security of Black African countries, as for example, the continuing distabilization of the Frontline States by direct acts of aggression and the frantic attempts to find footholds in the small island states along the West African coast - Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde Islands. There is also the fact that South Africa is now a nuclear power with the help of some Western countries which may pose a problem for the renewal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty when it expires in 1995. There may be states that have to reconsider their position on this matter because of these developments;

c. The issue of borders which continues to bedevil peaceful interaction among states despite the 1964 O.A.U. decision which enjoined all states to respect the inherited colonial boundaries also occupies attention and more so, because such border conflicts sometimes become internationalised leading to interference of outside powers in African affairs;

d. There is also the problem that many African countries are heavily in debt. This endangers their sovereignty and independence because it makes them preys or victims to outside control or manipulation. This, of course, is tied up with the problem of development which daily stares us in the face. We therefore, have keen interest in disarmament because of its relationship with development which has been discussed at length in different forums and will, therefore, need no elaboration.

e. Finally, there is the issue of arms sales. Because of the inter-state conflicts mentioned above, poor African nations spend their very limited resources on the purchase of arms, thus diverting the much needed resources for development towards arms purchases.

My Institute is proposing a Conference on the Reduction of Inter-State Conflicts and Confidence-building measures next year as an attempt to start a process which may help contain, if not altogether remove, these problems which contribute in a general way to the total problem of insecurity in the world.

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**WILLIAM POTTER**

Two important areas for research which have not received adequate attention are the role of unilateral initiatives and the sources of policy change and innovation. The former topic is a major focus of the CISA central research project on Alternative Approaches to Arms Control and seeks to expand the definition of arms control from a fixation on formal, bilateral superpower negotiations. A conference sponsored by CISA on this topic will be held in October 1988 in Boston. Research on the second topic is more theoretical in nature and draws upon an extensive literature in the policy sciences as well as other disciplines. It seeks to better understand such policymaking processes as agenda setting, policy implementation, and policy termination. Among the important practical questions it seeks to address are the sources for the dramatic changes in recent U.S. and Soviet perspectives on verification, deep cuts, military doctrine, and nuclear safety.

It is also important to pay more attention on how better to utilize scarce resources. One must resist, for example, the temptation of investing much of our limited research funds in conferences and conference-produced, edited volumes. Instead more resources should be reserved for long-term, focused research. More use also should be made of the relatively inexpensive research talents of bright undergraduate students. They are the core, for example, of my large research project on the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers and Non-proliferation.

Finally, more attention in the field must be paid to methodology. Lack of progress in research on disarmament, I would argue, is due as much to the methods of research (or lack thereof) as to the topics for research. The field is particularly deficient in the use of the basic scientific principle of making explicit the propositions we wish to test and the evidence that we will regard as supportive of the propositions. In the absence of such elementary methods, we lack of any prospect of accumulating knowledge in the arms control and disarmament field.

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**JASJIT SINGH**

There are vast areas in which research into disarmament and related subjects could be undertaken in the coming years with advantage. A possible list of such topics is enclosed. Without in any way trying to reduce the importance of other issues, I would like to emphasise both the need and urgency of research into new and emerging technologies which have all the potential of generating a qualitatively new arms race, which would have serious implications for international peace and security in future.

New and emerging technologies have been under development both by the US and USSR, along with some other developed states' participation. Some of these have already reached maturity; and many more will reach operational deployment stage in the next few years. These technologies cover the broad areas of:

1. **Delivery systems**, like aerospace planes, and transatmospheric vehicles etc, at one level (capable of intercontinental travel at 30 times the speed of sound, after normal take off from a regular airfield, and undertake sub-orbital manoeuvring with a payload of around 10,000 Kg). At another level, hypersonic delivery systems are under development;
2. Completely new range of **weapons** employing kinetic energy, directed energy, (particle beams, lasers etc) along with "*tailored*" nuclear weapons with very high degrees of discrete selectivity and lethality;
3. Elaborate **command, control, communication and intelligence** systems which include exploitation of Artificial Intelligence and other applications;

New and emerging technologies, although being developed for dual role, would have serious implications in military fields, especially for future conflicts:

- Non-nuclear nature of weaponry may tend to make it more acceptable (morally and politically) and hence more usable, as compared to nuclear weapons;
- Discrete, selective employment of "*tailored*" nuclear weapons with marginal collateral effects may tend to increase their perceived utility and thus their usability;
- Accurate assessment of capabilities of new technology weapons systems, force levels, force structures, and force postures and deployments will be very difficult. This is likely to increase instability in the security environment;
- New technology weapons systems would tend to be offense dominated. The risk of conflict, therefore, is likely to increase;
- In consonance with historical experiences, the immensely increased accuracy and lethality of new technology weapons is likely to increase the incentive for pre-emption. The risk further increases rapidly also because of compression of time dimensions available for the information-decision-action cycle. The likelihood of early use of such weapons, thus, would increase.
- The new arms race will be much more difficult to manage and control especially once the technologies start being applied for military purposes. In fact, we may already be crossing the point of no return in this regard.
- New technology based military capabilities are likely to be available only with the two superpowers for a long time to come. It would, therefore, provide them with hegemonistic capabilities not only in relation to the developing world (where the differential in capabilities will increase dramatically), but also against developed states, including their friends and allies. New and emerging technologies are also likely to reduce superpower dependence on their friends and allies thus delinking their security concerns from those of their friends and allies. Superpower capabilities for coercive diplomacy will increase markedly.

In view of the above, development and application of the new and emerging technologies for military purposes is likely to lead to a new arms race, the emergent nature of which may be seen to be discernible already. The very process of nuclear disarmament negotiations is likely to obscure and camouflage the incipient growth of the new arms race.

#### **LIST OF DISARMAMENT RESEARCH TOPICS FOR THE 1990s**

- Comprehensive international security and political conditions for disarmament.
- Conflict management in a nuclear free and non-violent world.
- Role of United Nations, CD/SSOD/Multilateralism.
- Military doctrine and its impact on peace and security.
- Military doctrine: Defensive defence as a viable strategy for security.
- Theories and strategies of Deterrence, Nuclear-deterrence, Minimum deterrence, Alternatives.
- Non-military threats to security.
- Naval arms limitation and reduction.
- New technologies and new methods of warfighting: impact on strategic stability.
- Deep strike as replacement for nuclear deterrence.
- Nuclear proliferation: Mechanisms for management, control and reduction.
- Delegitimization of nuclear weapon.
- Militarisation of space.
- Chemical, biological weapon and warfare.
- Verification and inspection.
- Confidence-building measures.
- Coercive diplomacy and use of force without war.
- Regional Conflicts: Genesis and linkages with great power politics.
- Impact of military expenditures.
- Military build ups and linkages with conflicts.

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#### **JAN PUDLAK**

Compte tenu de la position géographique de la Tchécoslovaquie au coeur de l'Europe, très avantageuse en temps de paix, mais très vulnérable en temps de guerre, ainsi que de nos expériences historiques (Munich, deuxième guerre mondiale) nous attachons une grande importance à l'étude des problèmes relatifs au désarmement et à la sécurité internationale. Comme les moyens de notre institut sont limités, la coopération avec les autres institutions à l'échelle nationale et internationale, y compris avec l'UNIDIR, est très utile.

Les priorités de nos recherches sont les suivantes:

- a. Désarmement dans le domaine des armes nucléaires et chimiques;
- b. Désarmement conventionnel, notamment en Europe;
- c. Désarmement et développement;
- d. Aspects écologiques de la sécurité internationale;
- e. Initiatives et propositions de caractère partiel et régional telles que les propositions de la Tchécoslovaquie et de la RDA concernant la création d'une zone sans armes chimiques et d'un corridor dénucléarisé en Europe centrale.

Dans son discours du 24 février le Secrétaire Général du C.C. du Parti Communiste de Tchécoslovaquie Milos Jakes a avancé une nouvelle proposition envisageant la création d'une zone de confiance, de coopération et des relations de bon voisinage sur la ligne de contact entre les deux blocs politico-militaires c'est à dire entre le Traité de Varsovie et l'OTAN. Après les consultations en cours avec les pays concernés cette proposition, qui tient compte des aspects politico-militaires, économiques, écologiques et humanitaires, sera précisée d'une manière plus élaborée. Notre institut participe aussi à l'élaboration de cette initiative.

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#### MARCO CARNOVALE

I would like to pick up on an observation which has been put forward by another participant earlier in the Conference, that is on the need to differentiate between "*arms control*" and "*disarmament*". It has been pointed out that research institutes spend too much time on the former at the expense of the latter, particularly in the nuclear field. I would like to express a different view of this issue, and it is perhaps useful in this respect to spend a word on terminology.

Nuclear disarmament aims at the elimination of all nuclear arms; arms control avowedly aims at reconfiguring the postures of nuclear arsenals, possibly, though not necessarily, also through quantitative reductions. Both are means toward the goal of maintaining peace, but disarmament would also allow substantial diversions of resources to civilian uses, and thus, much more than arms control, is also an end in itself. For this reason, it is especially desired by developing countries, which most sorely need those resources.

However, clearly, disarmament is both much more difficult to negotiate and far from being the ultimate solution to the problem of maintaining nuclear peace - not to speak of what would then be the problem of maintaining conventional peace among ex-nuclear powers. In fact, it can safely be argued that, in the current and foreseeable political environment, an overall nuclear-free world would not be the most stable one, since both the possibility of and the premium for surreptitious rearmament in a crisis would be high.

This argument is not as strong with respect to conventional arms, where deep reductions would both save more money and be more difficult to reverse than in the nuclear realm. Moreover, possibly with very few exceptions, it is conventional arms which drain the resources of developing countries.

Far from being pessimistic about the prospect for risk and expenditure reducing agreements, I merely would like to underline that it is necessary, for research institutes, to use our skills and our creativity to highlight constructive avenues to our policy-makers. At the same time, we would be wasting our time, and our own precious resources, if we let our creativity lead us into impractical or utopian paths. Painful as it is to admit, overly ambitious schemes for disarmament have time and again proven fruitless. The recent INF Treaty has been hailed, correctly, as a major breakthrough, and yet it involves but a tiny fraction of the arsenals of the two superpowers. It is such small but solid steps which have the greatest chance of being agreed upon and might constitute the links of a strong chain of disarmament agreements.

The root of wars lies in political conflicts, not in arms themselves. While the nations of the earth work toward political settlements to provide for a less conflictual world, it is arms control, including drastic quantitative reductions, that offers the most useful prospects, and it is indeed essential to a stable peace. For this same reason, I believe, the focus of arms control research in the future should shift away for what seems to have been an excessive preoccupation with numbers, and emphasize instead procedural arrangements, such as confidence-building measures, aimed specifically at reducing the risk of wars.

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#### **KAMAL MATINUDDIN**

So far the concentration of institutes devoted to disarmament has been on the elimination of nuclear weapons and that too with special emphasis on the European mainland. There is a need also to carry out an indepth analysis of the requirements of disarmament of conventional weapons.

Since World War II, 150 conflicts have taken place around the world in which 20 million people have lost their lives. All these have been victims of conventional weapons only. There is also a qualitative improvement in the accuracy, range and lethality in these non-nuclear weapons. Lasers, beam riders, precision guided munitions have added to the destructive power available to non-nuclear weapon states.

The military expenditure on commercial weapons has also been rising much of this is not for purely defensive purposes. Regional actors, wishing to dominate the countries around them continue to spend billions of dollars on the acquisition of, or on indigenously producing weapon systems which is far in excess of their basic defence needs.purely defensive purposes.

Research institutes should therefore devote their studies in the next decade to all such expenditures which create instability in a region.

While continuing to advocate the total elimination of nuclear weapons from the surface of the earth and while insisting that the sea-bed and outer-space should remain free of nuclear weapon, disarmament research in the 90s should not lose sight of the necessity to propagate the idea of a reduction in conventional weapons as well. They should also analyse regional tensions and highlight the causes for the mistrust, misunderstanding and misconception that prevails amongst neighbouring states in the

developing world so that scarce resources can be directed from armament to disarmament.

Our common enemy is hunger, ill-health and illiteracy. Let us join hands to fight against these rather than fight against each other.

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**FIFTH/CINQUIÈME SESSION**

**CONTRIBUTION OF THE DISARMAMENT RESEARCH INSTITUTES TO THE THIRD SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT/CONTRIBUTION DES INSTITUTS DE RECHERCHE SUR LE DÉSARMEMENT À LA TROISIÈME SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DE L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DES NATIONS UNIES CONSACRÉE AU DÉSARMEMENT**

**REPORTS/RAPPORTS:**

**Nazir Kamal, Johan Nordenfeldt**

**DISCUSSION:**

**Thomas F. Barthelemy, Joseph Rotblat, Jean Klein, Silvana da Silva, Miljan Komatina, Jayantha Dhanapala**

**CHAIRMAN/PRÉSIDENT:**

**Miljan Komatina**

**REPORT****THE UN'S THIRD SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT:  
VIEWS OF AN OUTSIDE OBSERVER****NAZIR KAMAL (80)****INTRODUCTION**

The UN General Assembly's Third Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-III) will take place from 31st May to 25th June 1988. Coincidentally, the occasion will complete a decade of the SSOD process. Sufficient time has elapsed to merit an appraisal of past efforts and to think increasingly of the future, especially since the year 2000 - merely 12 years away - has begun to loom large.

The First Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I) was held in mid-1978. The consensus achieved on this occasion, in the form of a Final Document, was unprecedented in multi-lateral diplomacy. It understandably raised hopes and was aptly described at the time as a small miracle. However, the consensus reflected a relatively low common denominator and before long it began to erode. A greater preoccupation with contentious issues of primary interest to the big powers and some of the major regional states, as well as a hardening of attitudes, led to a considerably reduced consensus at the Second Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-II) held in 1982. This caused a great deal of disappointment and even some despair and disillusionment.

The results of SSOD-III, it is hoped, will mark an improvement over the outcome of the previous special session. With a little luck, it should be possible to achieve this, provided the objectives are modest and the approach is dynamic and also if the big powers and major regional states can be persuaded to accommodate to a greater degree than on previous occasions the stabilizing concerns of many medium and small states, which represent the vast majority of states in the world.

SSOD-III will have the benefit of hindsight provided by the two previous special sessions and their aftermath, including the difficulties in multilateral diplomacy that have of late, become more apparent. In view of the undiminished importance of the disarmament process for the pursuit of international peace and security and the unsatisfactory state of multilateral diplomacy, SSOD-III should be regarded as an important event, whether it veers towards failure or some success.

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80. Dr. Nazir Kamal is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI), and is currently Visiting Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. The author wishes to thank UNIDIR for the opportunity to work on issues concerning SSOD-III. He is also thankful to the UNIDIR staff and in particular Ambassador J. Dhanapala, the Director, for the feedback to an earlier draft of this paper. Additionally, the author is warmly thankful to Ambassador Mansur Ahmad (Chairman of SSOD-III's Preparatory Committee) for discussing issues related to SSOD-III. The views expressed in this paper are strictly the author's own and should not be attributed to either the ISSI or UNIDIR.

It has been a decade since the current process was initiated at SSOD-I and much of that period has been marked by an erosion of consensus together with the persistence of certain fundamental issues and attitudes. Furthermore, the 21st century will be soon upon us, which could be potentially a unique opportunity to strengthen the disarmament-related legacy of mankind so that it can move into the next century with more hope for the future. If this does not happen, a 100 years might pass, with relatively little change, since the disarmament enterprise was first set in motion at the Hague Conference in 1898 in a world much less interdependent and in circumstances much less compelling than today.

## OUTLINE

This paper will address a number of general and specific issues germane to the principal items (Nos.11, 12 and 13) in the provisional agenda adopted for SSOD-III (81). These items are, respectively: consideration and adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD); assessment of developments and trends relevant to the disarmament process as well as an elaboration of concrete and practical measures; and, consideration of the UN's institutional involvement in the disarmament field.

The presentation will be mainly concerned with two broad questions: (a) how the prospects of a positive outcome at SSOD-III could be improved; and (b) how the disarmament process which was initiated at SSOD-I could be strengthened and stabilized. There is a substantial overlap between these two concerns, partly because something of a "*crisis*", so to speak, exists in multilateral disarmament diplomacy, which has been in the making since SSOD-II. The "*crisis*" has now become more apparent. In the author's view the situation calls for reflection and perhaps some reappraisal of the dominant approaches to the disarmament process.

The paper discusses and proceeds on the premise that there is a fair scope for attempting reasonable compromises, both to avert the danger of an impasse at SSOD-III and to make the disarmament process inherently more balanced and thus potentially more productive. The presentation deals with both substantive as well as procedural matters. The author believes that some of the difficulties associated with consensus-building derive from complications of a purely procedural nature. There are however certain critical issues of substance which could give rise to polarized postures at SSOD-III. In the author's view there is a good case for pragmatism in these areas - not just to avert an impasse, but also because there is an intrinsic merit in the "*middle-way*".

The paper contains a number of concrete and indicative suggestions for seeking compromises and introducing more balance in the disarmament process. Certain suggestions involve substantial changes in the positions of states, some more than others. Other observations have a secondary consequence in this respect.

The paper does not attempt an exhaustive treatment of the issues it addresses. This is because the subject is vast and complex (politically, conceptually and technically) and, additionally, because of limitations of time and considerations of space and emphasis.

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81. See United Nations document A/AC.230/1988/CRP.1, 5 February 1988.

### **PREPARATORY PROCESS OF SSOD-III**

The genesis of SSOD-III lies in the agreement at SSOD-II that there should be a Third Special Session on Disarmament and the question of staging it should be decided by the General Assembly at its regular session in 1983. In 1983 the General Assembly decided that SSOD-III should be held not later than 1988.

Effectively, the decision to convene SSOD-III was taken by the General Assembly in 1986 through a resolution (42/40) adopted without a vote, establishing a preparatory committee for making the necessary arrangements. The Preparatory Committee held three sessions, starting with an organizational session in December 1986. The second session took place in May-June 1987 and the third and final in January-February 1988.

The Preparatory Committee of SSOD-III was unable to do any substantive work to assist the proceedings of SSOD-III. The attempt to engage in this exercise proved to be virtually a non-starter, giving rise to fears regarding the outcome of SSOD-III. This has been largely due to minimal US interest in any substantive preparatory work unless there was prior agreement on the objectives of SSOD-III's concluding document. Such an agreement could not be reached. The task was made particularly difficult by a hardening of US attitude, especially towards the role of multilateral diplomacy and the pattern of disarmament diplomacy established by the SSOD process.

SSOD-III will be of a shorter duration than SSOD-II (five weeks) and SSOD-I (six weeks). SSOD-III will also be different from the previous special sessions in terms of the substantive preparatory work done. Similarly, the enthusiasm of the non-aligned group - the initiators of the SSOD process - towards SSOD-III has been distinctly less pronounced than on previous occasions. In part this appears to be related to the disappointing progress of work on the draft CPD text of 1987. Barring 1983, the CPD has been under deliberation in the Conference on Disarmament since 1979.

There is apparently more promise of moderation in the non-aligned stance now than seen on previous occasions, as evident for example in the Indian statement in SSOD-III's Preparatory Committee. This is a potentially significant development. But the non-aligned states might be reluctant to seek major compromises if the commitment of any of the big powers to multilateral diplomacy is in serious doubt or if the Final Document adopted at SSOD-I is significantly threatened.

The United Kingdom was also an active participant at the Preparatory Committee's final session. Although the UK position contains several positive elements of substance and some pertinent observations, it appears to differ little from the reported US position that SSOD-III should highlight the progress made in central arms control since 1982 and that it should also concentrate its attention on supporting the big-power arms control process currently underway (82). In short, the suggestion seems to be that critical comments should be kept to a minimum and that SSOD-III should primarily concern itself with matters of the immediate future. However, it remains to be seen how restrictive this potentially problematic approach will be in practice at SSOD-III.

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82. UNSSOD III: Statement by the United Kingdom Representative, Richard Edis, 28 January 1988.

## PROGRESS OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

The work of facilitating the disarmament process is a ponderous task. A major breakthrough in the disarmament field would probably require a pattern of incremental progress in various complementary spheres and this itself might depend to some extent on a fortuitous combination of circumstances. Whatever the case, the conduct of multilateral diplomacy is an important factor, both in its substance as well as form. Unfortunately, in both these respects, multilateral diplomacy has failed to do much in the way of reducing distrust and circumspection towards making compromises or facilitating a conceptual shift from unilateralism (or bilateralism) towards more multilateralism. Over the past decade, limited progress has been made towards narrowing differences of perspective and conflict of interests between states or groups of states.

The proceedings of SSOD-I and SSOD-II, as well as the conduct of disarmament diplomacy in general, have been dominated for the most part by the interests and preoccupations of the big powers and some of the major regional states. This was partly because of acute concerns aroused by the sharp decline of relations between the big powers in the first half of the 1980s. Another important factor, which has predated the deterioration of the big power relations, has been the influence of some major regional states over the non-aligned group's disarmament and arms control posture. This has affected the approach of the numerous smaller states and deflected their interests from being adequately projected. As a result, there has been a wedge in multilateral diplomacy which has brought the often conflicting preoccupations and postures of the global and regional powers into a sharper focus and thereby reduced the prospect of consensus among states and the emergence of a balanced approach to the disarmament process.

There are also other, more fundamental problems for the progress of multilateral diplomacy - namely, the phenomena of unilateralism and bilateralism - which remain a matter of some serious concern.

The recent improvement of US-USSR relations has brought bilateralism back onto the centre stage of diplomatic dealings between the two powers. This development appears to have led not only to a protective attitude towards the bilateral process (which is understandable to some extent), but also to a narrowing of perspective towards the importance of multilateralism. If this proves to be the case at SSOD-III, it would be an unfortunate turn for multilateral diplomacy because improved bilateral relations could alternatively enable the United States and the Soviet Union, together with their allies, to play a more influential and productive role. As mentioned earlier, the non-aligned group appears to be in a more responsive mood than on previous occasions.

The big powers should maintain a rational balance between bilateralism and multilateralism and, concomitantly, between short-term and longer-term interests. Improved bilateral relations cannot be assumed to be stable or predictable beyond the short-term. The past pattern confirms such a view - that is to say, it provides little reassurance. There are also domestic factors that contribute to uncertainty. The current euphoria therefore should be suitably tempered. Unilateralism has not worked for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The price of "*going it alone*", as it were, has become more exorbitant with the passage of time. Though less daunting, bilateralism too will prove onerous. The risks of a costly failure, both for national and international security, will be ever-present in the complex conditions of the contemporary world, which continues to be characterized by the absence of security assurances associated with systems of multilateral constraints or controls.

There are various elements in the recent politico-military thinking in the Soviet Union which are of considerable potential significance. Conceptually, the idea of “*comprehensive security*” represents a major advance over previous Soviet thinking on multilateralism. For many countries the status accorded to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) - a 40-member multilateral negotiating body based in Geneva - is considered an essential aspect of the commitment of the big powers to multilateralism. As far as this is concerned, the joint Socialist position adopted at the WTO Foreign Ministers meeting held in Prague last October and transmitted to the CD in January 1988 is a welcome development (83). It contains numerous suggestions which together constitute a credible Soviet commitment to the importance of multilateral disarmament negotiations and the CD’s central role in this process.

A matter of some serious concern, however, is the US attitude. The dominant trend in US political circles, both official and non-governmental, has been decidedly towards de-emphasising the UN’s role (perhaps barring the first two years of the Carter Administration, inclusive of SSOD-I). Since the early 1960s there has been an almost progressive decline of US interest in the UN.

The influential mainstream opinion reflected in the recent Pentagon-sponsored report is a cause for some concern. The Report entitled *Discriminate Deterrence* was submitted in January 1988 by the Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy. Co-chaired by Fred Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter, the Commission consists of eleven other members, including Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Clark. The Report was prepared over a 15-month period and was backed by a large support staff, with the researchers being divided into four working groups. There will be follow-on reports devoted to specific topics. The Commission’s overall report is devoid of any mention of the UN or disarmament. Even arms control appears as a restrictive concept, designed essentially to improve the central military balance, reduce NATO’s problems and enable a more flexible and less inhibited use of military power (including nuclear weapons) in contingencies other than a situation of general war.

The Report is specifically concerned about exploiting new technological developments for a significant upgrade of the US war-fighting capability in nuclear, conventional and other weapons. The qualitative build-up of military power is directed towards the containment of the Soviet Union, greater and more flexible global military capability, and enhanced ability to engage in so-called “*low intensity*” conflicts in the Third World. With regard to the latter case, the Report says: “*To defend its interests in the Third World, the United States will have to take low intensity conflict much more seriously*” (84). It also virtually ignores (or seems to dismiss) the potential significance of the “*new thinking*” in the Soviet Union under General Secretary Gorbachev.

The Report is remarkable for its narrow world-view and, on the whole, for the selective and superficial treatment of the “*perils and uncertainties in the future*” putatively facing the United States and its central alliance partners. The Report is also remarkable for its preoccupation with developing

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83. CD/794, 27 January 1988.

84. *Discriminate Deterrence*, Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy, January 1988, p.11.

a nuclear capability for more flexible use. In addressing the question of how the likelihood of an all-out nuclear attack could be minimized if the proposed strategic shift is effected the Report suggests that it would be sufficient for United States to retain "*a dying sting*" (85). It goes on to say: "*If our civil society were destroyed, it would not matter much whether Soviet military targets were destroyed promptly or comprehensively*" (86). The statement does not address the fact that the question might matter very much to an adversary contemplating an attack. The Report's analysis apparently overlooks an important and long-standing tenet of deterrent. "*A dying sting*" of the kind mentioned in the Report would hardly constitute an effective deterrence, since the attacker would not have to consider inviting self-destruction in the process of mortally devastating its adversary.

The Report of the high-powered Commission lends credibility to the view that the United States remains preoccupied with "*going it alone*" and using bilateralism for selective short-term purposes. More reassuring, at least in theory, are recent developments in the official Soviet thinking on national and international security issues. These developments contrast rather sharply with the persistence, as it were, of "*old thinking*" in the United States.

Ideological exclusivity as well as temptations associated with a sense of technological superiority and relative economic prowess could be influential factors behind the dominant US thinking reflected in the Pentagon-commissioned report. If this is not the case, the United States could credibly demonstrate its commitment to multilateralism. One of the steps in this direction, now that there is improved bilateralism with the Soviet Union, could be to engage in a conscious dialogue with the non-aligned group.

It could be argued that minimal US interest in multilateralism is dominantly related to the distinct non-aligned role witnessed over the past two decades, especially since the early 1970s. If this is the case, it perhaps needs to be communicated more clearly. The United States has frequently played a reactive rather than an active role and has shown a tendency towards over-reaction.

For many years there has been an "*overspill*" of acrimony and recrimination and it has spread, as it were, across the board. The proximity of the year 2000 could serve as an additional incentive to contain and reverse, at least to some extent the divergent perspectives. To a certain degree, there seems to have been "*a dialogue of the deaf*". To be sure, there are some intrinsic conflicts of interests and perceptions. But before these problems can be addressed directly, the move away from multilateralism has to be arrested. SSOD-III offers a safer and an opportune moment to begin such a process. Circumstances could be less benign in the 1990s and the year 2000 would be precariously close.

## PROCEDURAL POINTS

Since there are difficulties and the SSOD event is envisaged as a periodic affair, it is neither advisable nor necessary to pursue ambitious objectives or approach the forthcoming occasion as an opportunity for states to try to put one another on the spot, as it were, in an attempt to sway public

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85. Ibid, p.36.

86. Ibid.

opinion. Inter alia, this is not in the interest of attracting the support of informed public opinion for multilateralism. The approach should be more business-like. It should also be more in keeping with the complex and sensitive nature of the subject-matter and the longer-term interest of strengthening the evolution of multilateral diplomacy. The regular General Assembly sessions and other occasions provide sufficient opportunities for states to vent their grievances and score debating points.

The composite CPD text submitted to the regular session of the General Assembly in 1987 provides a good picture of most issues that are likely to affect the proceedings of SSOD-III. Many of these issues can be tackled if there is a discernible willingness to make reasonable compromises. Some changes in the draft CPD text are necessary in their own right in order to make the disarmament process more balanced and realistic. These should therefore be conceded on their own merit. If this happens, the “*baggage*” of problems will lighten considerably and the atmosphere for seeking a positive outcome will improve greatly. In some other cases, solutions will depend on reasonableness and reciprocity since unilateral concessions would introduce imbalance and distort the disarmament framework.

Together with a flexible approach, there are other procedural changes which could significantly facilitate the work of SSOD-III. States should not approach SSOD-III’s activity as if treaty-type negotiations were underway. Admittedly, this is much easier said than done, given the way deliberative diplomacy on disarmament issues has implacably evolved over the years and, in particular, the psychological difficulties of making a break with entrenched patterns. Nevertheless, there is a compelling need for some attitudinal change.

The sensitivity towards the possible implications of formulations (whether terms, phrases, sentences or paragraphs) can often be excessive or rather out of proportion to the recommendatory nature of deliberative outcomes and the fact that such a process would be subject to periodic review. The document under deliberation also has to be evaluated in its entirety. The focus on specific paragraphs, etc, should not result in a loss of overall perspective and the interrelationship of paragraphs, etc, contained in a document.

There is scope for improving the conceptual distinction between principles and measures and thus streamlining the formulation of measures. It seems unnecessary to repeatedly insert certain principles in paragraphs devoted to measures, when such principles have already been postulated separately. Perhaps it could be made clear at the outset that the pursuit of disarmament measures should take all relevant principles into account. If necessary, certain basic principles could be emphasised - such as, the right to self-defence, undiminished security, etc. This would help to reduce the verbal bulk and improve the readability of an agreed text, especially for the public. An example of such an approach is the provisional acceptance of a Chinese proposal by the Special Committee on the Strengthening of the Organization during its work in 1987 on a draft declaration devoted to the maintenance of international peace and security.

It is also advisable for reasons of conceptual clarity and textual effectiveness that principles should not be confused or cluttered with exhortations, assumptions and other enunciations. For example, the Chapter on “*Principles*” in the draft CPD text submitted to the General Assembly in 1987 contains a number of paragraphs that are not strictly principles and could be easily dispensed with in that chapter. Since basic principles are an essential aspect of the disarmament effort, they should stand out separately. Such an exercise would also make it unnecessary to repeat them in paragraphs specifying measures or objectives, or some other category of items. Basic principles

should not be repeated in specific paragraphs, since such principles provide a fundamental safeguard against any interpretation or implication related to a specific paragraph, etc, that might impinge on the security of a state. Thus, such principles would greatly help to neutralize any adverse consequence of agreeing to a formulation that lacks finality or fails to settle the issue to the satisfaction of a state.

The proposed procedural reform would be an important measure for reducing the political sensitivity of states - a phenomenon which has been a major problem for the efficient conduct of multilateral diplomacy on disarmament. Such a reform is also important from a purely conceptual point of view and increasing the political effectiveness of any agreed text.

While every effort should be made to seek reasonable compromises, it would be best to indicate disagreement of a significant nature where agreement is still not possible. The effort should be to narrow divergences to the extent possible before such areas of disagreement are bared. Success does not have to depend on an unanimous document. If SSOD-III's concluding document can show a narrowing of differences, this would represent a potentially important beginning for the future and a break with the diplomatic imbroglio witnessed in recent years. Thus, such a document could be regarded as a positive outcome - all the more so in view of the Preparatory Committee's inability to facilitate the work of SSOD-III and, of course, the dismal outcome of the General Assembly's previous special session on disarmament.

It would be better to present the public with a limited and relatively transparent and readable text, rather than an expanded document which is difficult to grasp or too contradictory to make a credible impression. It is a good idea to structure SSOD-III's concluding document so that areas of agreement are bifurcated from areas of disagreement. Similarly, the structure should perhaps reflect the degrees of convergence and divergence unless this proves difficult or too engaging from a conceptual or practical point of view. If differences of a fundamental nature should persist, such divergences should not be concealed in complex or convoluted formulation of paragraphs. It is better that they are made apparent for the public's knowledge and attention. This would also indicate that member-states, non-governmental experts and other personalities should reflect upon the problems. It would be difficult to engage in such an exercise unless there was a clear idea of the state of affairs.

States should not however insist on including disagreements of a secondary or momentary nature in SSOD-III's concluding document. This could make a poor impression on the public, which might take an overly pessimistic view of the UN and its multilateral diplomacy. In spelling out disagreements on important matters, reference should be limited preferably to those cases where one or a small number of states account for the absence of consensus. In such cases, if a reference is not made, it could convey the incorrect impression, especially to the uninformed public, that the absence of consensus suggests a major division of opinion among member-states. On important matters, the public ought to know both the nature of differences and the balance of opinion among member-states. For the sake of avoiding a voluminous text, however, only the most important disagreements which have significant implications or ramifications should be mentioned.

It is equally advisable to avoid making the Final Document adopted at SSOD-I a subject of controversy at SSOD-III. *Inter alia*, this would set a bad precedent for the future conduct of multilateral business on disarmament matters. At least for the time-being, the controversy should

be kept to a minimum and confined to the regular sessions of the UN's deliberative and negotiating forums. This is one of several important reasons why the approach at SSOD-III should be forward-looking or future-oriented.

### COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

It is a good idea not to make the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CPD) the centerpiece of SSOD-III's work, as was the case at SSOD-II. The number of brackets depicting reservations in the composite CPD draft text has not decreased to manageable proportions and many of these brackets are manifestations of fundamental differences. The draft text also suffers from certain conceptual weaknesses which have persisted from the outset. Nor does it take an adequate account of the pattern of past CPD and General and Complete Disarmament (GCD) negotiations. The most conspicuous of these weaknesses are perhaps the short and relatively tight time-frames and the somewhat perfunctory treatment of the interrelationship of disarmament and international security, especially the question of progressively strengthening the UN's role in the maintenance of international peace and security. There has been an element of unreality in the way CPD has been pursued from the beginning.

The CPD concept is however important for at least two reasons:

1. To rationalize the disarmament process in order to make it more than a short-term exercise; and,
2. To reaffirm the commitment of states in a more credible manner than reflected in declaratory and rhetorical statements of policy.

But in the way the concept has been elaborated, there is scope for improving the CPD approach and, in the process, reducing differences to more manageable proportions. The CPD question requires a renewed effort marked by a relatively fresh approach and a more considered method of work. A superficial consensus should be avoided at SSOD-III. At any rate, any procedural attempts to resolve the current differences over the draft text will probably fail to cover the distance. It will also perhaps result in eroding the status of the Final Document of SSOD-I.

### MULTILATERAL MACHINERY

The UN's multilateral role in disarmament negotiations is likely to be a contentious issue in view of the greater preoccupation of the big powers with their bilateral dealings and the hardening of US attitude witnessed at the final session of SSOD-III's Preparatory Committee. Interestingly, in a recent message to the CD on the commencement of its 1988 session, President Reagan's characterization of the institution's role did not include the idea of negotiations or disarmament, for which the CD was primarily created, as its several predecessor bodies were since the late 1950s. His statement read: "*The Conference on Disarmament plays an important role in international endeavours (emphasis added) to create a more stable and peaceful world (emphasis added)...*" (87).

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87. United Nations Information Service, Geneva Office, Press Release DC/1520, 2 February 1988.

The changing attitudes of the big powers towards multilateral involvement has been the subject of some comment and reaction in the CD. For example, Ambassador Butler of Australia remarked: *"What has been made clear to us ... is that the two major nuclear-weapon States prefer, at least at the present stage, to conduct their nuclear-arms control and disarmament negotiations bilaterally"* (88). Summarizing the implications of this development for the CD's multilateral role, Ambassador Butler went on to say: *"These circumstances do mean a limitation upon the role that a Conference such as ours may be able to play, at present, in negotiating measures of nuclear disarmament"*. He however disagreed with the view that the big powers intended *"merely to allow us in this Conference the crumbs from the table"*. In Ambassador Butler's view, the Conference on Disarmament could usefully serve as a forum where the international community's disarmament-related concerns could be expressed to the big powers. Similarly, the Conference could also *"demonstrate that the multilateral machinery is available for the development of treaties or agreements of a wider kind than might be encompassed by bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament, as and when multilateral action is required"*.

Such a position is not shared by many non-aligned states. In a recent declaration at Stockholm, the six-nation group (comprising Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) called for strengthening the Conference on Disarmament in order to make it *"a more effective instrument for achieving nuclear disarmament and for the elimination of all other weapons of mass destruction"*, including the urgent conclusion of a chemical weapons convention.

As far as SSOD-III is concerned, since no substantive activity occurred at the Preparatory Committee's final session, it remains to be seen to what extent the United States would wish to highlight bilateralism and regionalism at the expense of the UN's institutional involvement in disarmament negotiations. The issue could be handled discreetly - for example, in the manner reflected in the 1987 draft CPD text under *"Machinery and Procedures"* (89). Paragraphs 1 to 4 in this chapter could be replicated and the bracketed phrase *"in accordance with the (UN) Charter"* in Paragraph 1 could be dropped. The paragraph reads: *"The United Nations [, in accordance with the Charter,] should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament"*. (This is a truncated version of Paragraph 114 in the Final Document which not only includes the bracketed phrase but also proceeds to declare: *"Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field and, in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral ..."*).

The UN Charter does not explicitly call for disarmament. Under Article 26, it envisages *"a system for the regulation of armaments"* to be established by the Security Council, based on the *"least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources"*. As far as the General Assembly is concerned, Article 11 of the Charter enables it to consider and recommend to the Security Council or all member-states *"principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments"*.

88. CD/PV.426, p.9, CD/787, Appendix II/Volume IV, 28 August 1987.

89. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, CD/783, 20 August 1987.

The disarmament objective and the UN's central role are subsequent developments which have given an additional dimension to the work of the Organisation. Thus, if the bracketed phrase is retained, the paragraph as a whole would look self-contradictory. Indeed, the retention of the bracketed phrase could have the unintended effect of conceptually diminishing the disarmament role which the UN has painstakingly acquired since its inception, especially over the past decade.

The UK position on multilateral machinery should prove helpful towards softening the US attitude. The UK statement at the final session of SSOD-III's Preparatory Committee contains a positive element concerning the role of the existing multilateral disarmament machinery, directly or indirectly linked to the UN. The statement considers that the General Assembly's First Committee, the UN Disarmament Commission and the CD have proved their worth and, equally important, that the *"respective roles of these bodies were well described in the Final Document of 1978 and retain their validity"* (emphasis added) (90).

#### STATUS OF FINAL DOCUMENT

A problem of potentially fateful importance for the outcome of SSOD-III is the issue concerning the status of the Final Document. A major impediment in the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a draft CPD text has been the recent and somewhat unexpected hardening of US attitude towards reliance on the Final Document for finding fall-back solutions to certain contentious issues of significance. A similar US attitude prevailed at the third and final session of SSOD-III's Preparatory Committee in January-February 1988. The attempt in the Preparatory Committee to follow the pattern of the Final Document on measures and priorities or to put forward the Final Document as something of a charter for multilateral disarmament efforts (as in Paragraph 1 under *"Principles"* in the draft CPD text) reportedly drew forthright US objection and apparently even a hint of admonition. If therefore appears that this is an issue on which the United States is unlikely to concede much ground, at least for the time-being.

Since the issue could create awkward problems for SSOD-III, it deserves a serious reflection between now and the commencement of SSOD-III. Depending on the situation at SSOD-III, one course of action could be to simply insist that the Final Document should be reaffirmed, even at the risk of courting an impasse. The other approach could be to drop any such reference to the Final Document. This would be a conspicuous omission, given that the Final Document was categorically reaffirmed at SSOD-II. Perhaps more importantly, it could be regarded as a bad precedent for the future conduct of multilateral diplomacy. From a practical point of view, it would be particularly difficult to get the non-aligned states and perhaps some other states to accept such an extreme course of action designed largely to placate the United States.

Another approach could be to avoid the *"extremes"* by seeking an ad hoc consensus to tide over the present juncture on the basis of a milder reference to the Final Document. For example, the first bracketed paragraph in the draft CPD text under *"Principles"* and paragraphs 57, 58 and 62 of SSOD-II's Concluding Document could be temporarily shelved. The relevant part of paragraph 57 refers to SSOD-I as *"an event of historical significance"* and to the Final Document as representing

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90. UK Statement, op.cit.

*“a consensus on an international disarmament strategy, the immediate goal of which was the elimination of the danger of nuclear war ...”*. Paragraph 58 describes the Final Document as embodying a *“historic consensus ... rooted in a common awareness that the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, constituted much more a threat to than a protection of mankind”*. Paragraph 62 *inter alia* talks about *“the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document ... as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action”* .

Of the four paragraphs, the one contained in the draft CPD text under *“Principles”* would presumably invite the strongest reservation. The paragraph in question, which goes beyond the other three paragraphs, reads: *“[The United Nations Charter together with the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament embodies the basic philosophy for achieving general and complete disarmament]”* . Since the Final Document is juxtaposed with the UN Charter, the formulation has the effect of bringing the former at par with the latter in the disarmament field. This creates conceptual complication since the Charter does not explicitly call for disarmament and because its greater reliance on the concept of collective security. It also creates legal incongruity since the Final Document which is a product of the General Assembly - a deliberative body - cannot be equated or juxtaposed with the Organisation’s Charter.

Reliance on formulations contained in the Final Document for seeking consensus on other sensitive issues could also be avoided at SSOD-III. As far as the status of the Final Document is concerned, its importance could be expressed in terms that are less fundamental than contained in SSOD-II’s Concluding Document or the draft CPD text.

The following formulation, which seeks to limit the damage and salvage the Final Document for a better day, could be considered for indicative purposes: *“The Final Document adopted unanimously at SSOD-I in 1978 and reaffirmed at SSOD-II in 1982 represents an important milestone in the international community’s efforts to promote the disarmament objective for significantly strengthening the pursuit of international peace and security. The final Document also represents an epochal beginning towards building a historic consensus on ways and means of pursuing the disarmament objective over the short and long-term”* . This suggestion could serve as a basis for persuading the United States to drop its opposition to the Final Document. If some of other suggestions contained in this paper are also accepted, a compelling basis could be created for *“softening”* the US attitude.

As in the case of multilateral machinery, the UK position could also be brought into play to moderate the US attitude towards the status of SSOD-I’s Final Document. The statement at the final session of SSOD-III’s Preparatory Committee contains three elements which together could serve as a basis for averting an impasse at SSOD-III. The relevant part of the statement reads: *“As regards ... assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the First and Second Special Sessions, we believe that will involve a recognition of the importance and significance (emphasis added) of the Final Document of 1978, and an acknowledgement that, while much remains to be done to fulfil the aspirations of that historic (emphasis) document, not inconsiderable progress has been made”* (91). The statement sounds somewhat like the controversial NPT approach. Nevertheless, it is carefully structured and seems intended to promote consensus.

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91. Ibid.

**ISSUE OF WAR**

There should be a general paragraph on war. It should stand on its own and serve as a unifying point for sub-paragraphs on specific aspects, particularly nuclear and conventional. Attempts in the draft CPD text to deal with the general and specific in a single paragraph have not succeeded and have led to a focus on one at the expense of the other. The result has been an overlap of reservations.

It is advisable, both for conceptual and practical reasons, that the specific aspects should be addressed in separate sub-paragraphs following a general introductory paragraph on war *per se*. A parent paragraph would provide an overall perspective and invite a general agreement. A general agreement could also improve the prospects of specific agreements. The suggested structure would allow the various preoccupations to be accommodated to a greater extent without running into an imbroglio. It would also help to avoid confusion. Even if specific agreements do not emerge, at least a general agreement should be possible, which would represent some compensatory progress. In short, the proposed scheme consisting of a general paragraph and separate sub-paragraphs seems to offer a framework for inviting general agreement and improving the prospects of specific agreements.

The attempt to put a predominant focus on the nuclear aspect has invited strong reservations. To some extent this is understandable. While the problem posed by nuclear weapons belongs to a category of its own, it is unbalanced to pursue such concerns at the conspicuous expense of the conventional aspect. A preoccupation with the nuclear aspect will diminish the UN Charter's impressive and much-quoted reference to eliminating the "*scourge of war*". It will also contrast sharply with the historical concerns related to conventional wars witnessed at the League of Nations and the Hague Conferences around the turn of the present century. This is an important area where the link with the past should be explicitly maintained and reaffirmed.

The concern with nuclear weapons should not have the effect of weakening the sensitivity towards the destruction caused by modern conventional wars and the problems such wars continue to present for the maintenance of international peace and security, which is the primary function for which the UN was established. The post-war world continues to live under the shadow of nuclear weapons, but it also continues to suffer from conventional armed conflicts which have already caused enormous material damage and the loss of many millions of lives. Technological trends indicate that such wars will grow significantly more destructive in the foreseeable future and that conventional weapons might begin to perform some of the war-time roles currently assigned to tactical nuclear weapons.

With regard to the proposed sub-paragraph on the nuclear aspect, the primacy of nuclear disarmament should not be stressed too strongly or rather too frequently. It should not have the effect of undermining the importance of securing consensus on other important aspects of the nuclear issue. For example, it is important to highlight the joint statement by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev issued at the 1986 summit meeting in Iceland, to the effect that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. This is a significant statement which deserves to be reaffirmed in a multilateral context. (The statement however does not necessarily establish the primacy of nuclear disarmament or imply a commitment to nuclear disarmament). Similarly, it is important to reaffirm paragraph 47 of the Final Document (particularly the first sentence) which has appeared under brackets as paragraph 1 of the Chapter on "*Measures and Stages of Implementation*" in the draft CPD text.

The paragraph in question contains three sentences, the first of which reads: *“Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization”*. This is a very significant and fairly objective statement. It also enjoys wide-spread support among governments and the world public opinion. It should therefore be retained even if it proves necessary to indicate that one or more states do not subscribe to it. A moderate approach towards the primacy of nuclear disarmament should help to generate consensus. The paragraph in question could be made more acceptable if it is accordingly amended. At present the last sentence reads: *“The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons”*. It should perhaps read as follows: *“The ultimate goal in this context is nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament”*.

In a similar manner, the subsequent paragraph 48 in the Final Document (also at issue in the draft CPD text) could be appropriately modified to reflect a moderate attitude towards the question of nuclear disarmament’s primacy. In both documents, it reads: *“In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament (emphasis added), all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility”*. Only the first phrase is at issue here, which could be modified to read: *“In the task of achieving nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament ...”*.

With regard to paragraph 50(c) of the Final Document, the opening phrase which has been put under brackets in the draft CPD text should be replaced by the alternative term *“Significant”*. The opening phrase refers to a *“Comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames ...”*. The concerns underlying the opening phrase are largely met by the concluding phrase of the same paragraph: *“leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time”*. The opening phrase also seems too rigid a basis for engaging in negotiations.

## NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The issue of nuclear disarmament has been a major bone of contention between the non-aligned group and the Western states for at least a decade. The tension was at its highest in the first half of the 1980s, but the issue continues to present a major problem. The disagreement has been the sharpest between the United States and some of the major regional states - notably Argentina, Brazil and India.

Admittedly, a nuclear war will be unimaginably and irreparably devastating. Even a limited nuclear war, if at all such a war can be kept assuredly within bounds, will be unacceptably destructive. It would represent another moral decline - and a particularly significant one - in mankind’s sorry history of warfare. It is thus reprehensible to conceive of nuclear war-fighting doctrines or other doctrines that diverge from purely deterrence-related considerations for purposes of war-avoidance. But there is a dilemma or rather a predicament that cannot be dismissed because of the devastation nuclear weapons can cause if they are used as instruments of war.

The deterrent role of nuclear weapons can be and has been exaggerated. Yet, the deterrent function such weapons can perform (as they have done to some extent in the past) has some real significance over the short-term. This should not be ignored as long as general disarmament has not been achieved and accompanied by an effective system of collective security. A major conventional

conflagration could well be a likely result of undertaking nuclear disarmament in isolation. A modern conventional war at the global level would be much more destructive than the Second World War (which claimed the lives of over 50 million people in a world much less densely populated than today) and its economic and social consequences would be equally great, if not even greater.

The danger of a conventional world war and a resurfacing of the nuclear arsenal must be seriously considered and addressed when devising schemes of nuclear disarmament or general disarmament. The predicament can best be approached through a balanced process involving nuclear and conventional disarmament as well as an effective system of collective security.

The distinct approach to nuclear disarmament witnessed over the past decade has dominated multilateral diplomacy for too long. It has proved costly to the disarmament process and, as has become increasingly apparent, also to the progress of multilateral diplomacy. SSOD-III provides an appropriate forum and an opportune moment to deal with the subject within a more balanced and realistic framework. Rhetoric can deflect attention from the underlying issues associated with nuclear disarmament and the relevance of general disarmament as well as collective security. The recent reduction of tensions following the improvement of relations between the big powers, reflected particularly in the INF accord and the probability of a major START agreement, should help to induce a modification of attitude at SSOD-III - at least for the near future.

#### CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT

Conventional disarmament eminently deserves greater attention at SSOD-III than it was able to receive in the draft CPD text and the Final Document adopted at SSOD-I. To some extent the subject has suffered from neglect on account of the continuing controversy over the nuclear issue. It is time that some break was made with the past pattern of diplomacy.

Indicative figures regarding the incidence, severity and other characteristics of post-war conventional armed conflicts are contained in the UN-sponsored intergovernmental study on conventional disarmament (92). The figures have also been cited elsewhere and are well-known in the UN. But it is perhaps worth stressing the point that conventional armed conflict has been a fairly wide-spread phenomenon in the post-war period and many more people have died in these conflicts than during the First World War. It is also a matter of concern that "*foreign participation ... remains one of the main characteristics of modern wars*" (93). During 1945-76, for example, as many as 84 countries participated in armed conflicts which directly affected the territories of 71 states (94).

There are other dimensions to the conventional issue which deserve serious attention. Present-day armed conflicts can cause or contribute to conditions of famine in economically fragile regions and give rise to refugees on a massive scale. In 1987 there were at least 12 million refugees scattered widely over the world, especially in Asia and Africa (95). Conditions of famine caused by drought but aggravated in most cases by wars, swelled the numbers of refugees in Africa to 4 million

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92. Study Series 12, Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1985

93. Istvan Kende "Local Wars 1945-76" in Esbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, Problems of Contemporary Militarism p.274.

94. Ibid p.261.

95. Refugees UNHCR July 1987, p.9.

in 1987 (96), many tragically caught between two kinds of scourges. This has also affected the situation in neighboring countries, some barely able to sustain their own populations beyond subsistence.

Armed conflicts and crises are significant factors behind increases in the military expenditure of states and for justifying its maintenance at a high level. The rate of increase of military expenditure or the level of expenditure has rarely declined substantially or for any appreciable length of time. According to SIPRI, the world's expenditure on defence in 1985 stood at over 600 billion dollars in constant 1980 prices, registering an inflation-adjusted growth of approximately 140 billion dollars in less than a decade - that is, during 1976-85 (97).

Much of this expenditure is related to conventional armaments and armed forces. Even in the case of the nuclear powers, the expenditure in the conventional field constitutes roughly 70 percent of overall expenditure on defence. More indicative of the pressure on resources is the proportion of the national budget devoted to military expenditure. In 1984, for example, an average of about 15 percent of the national budget of states was allocated for military purposes and in a large number of individual cases the figure is significantly higher.

Not unexpectedly, therefore, recent years have witnessed a sustained effort in the UN to highlight the importance of addressing conventional threats to regional and international security and to promote consensus on this issue. There has been some diplomatic progress on the conventional disarmament front. The most recent General Assembly resolution (42/38 G, 30 November 1987), sponsored by China, on the question of conventional disarmament was adopted without a vote. This development reflects an encouraging trend. The comparable General Assembly resolution adopted in 1985 suffered from eight abstentions and the one in 1986 carried two abstentions.

It is also encouraging to note that, in addition to the impressive involvement of China, a number of other countries from various continents (including Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka from South Asia) undertook initiatives in 1987. The General Assembly's First Committee adopted a draft resolution presented by these seventeen states, entitled "*Conventional disarmament on a regional scale*" (98).

The main operative paragraph in the 17-nation draft resolution reads: The General Assembly "*[e]xpresses its firm support (emphasis added) of all regional or sub-regional endeavours, taking into account the characteristics of each region, and when the regional situation so permits, as well as unilateral measures, directed to strengthening mutual confidence and to assuring the security of all States involved, making possible regional agreements on arms limitation in the future*". The insertion of the element "*and when the regional situation so permits*" does not sound very reassuring, even though the intention presumably was to facilitate consensus. But on the whole the paragraph does a little better than its counterpart in the 1987 General Assembly resolution, mainly because of the comparative thrust of the opening phrase. The latter paragraph reads: The General Assembly "*[e]ncourages all States (emphasis added), while taking into account the need to protect security and*

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96. Ibid.

97. SIPRI Yearbook of *World Armaments and Disarmament* 1986, p.231.

98. A/C.1/42/L.73/Rev.1, 4 November 1987, 42nd Session, First Committee, Agenda item 62(g).

*defensive capabilities, to intensify their efforts and take, either on their own or in a regional context, appropriate steps to promote progress in conventional disarmament and enhance peace and security”*.

Yet, in its entirety, the 1987 General Assembly resolution is distinctly an improvement over the 17-nation draft resolution and the comparable General Assembly resolution of 1985. This is largely because the latter documents contained a paragraph which reaffirmed or reiterated *“the primary responsibility of the military significant States, especially nuclear-weapon States, for halting and reversing the arms race, and the priority assigned to nuclear disarmament in the context of the advance towards general and complete disarmament”*. The caveat has been a contentious issue between the non-aligned group and Western states, with implications for both nuclear and conventional disarmament. It has been one of the chief means by which some major regional states have sought to emphasise the primacy of nuclear disarmament.

Significantly, this contentious and countervailing paragraph is absent in the 1987 General Assembly resolution. The resolution is a modified and slightly watered-down version of the one adopted in 1986 which failed to secure unanimous support. It suffered from two abstentions (India and Libya). Though somewhat diluted, the 1987 resolution is compensated by the fact that it was adopted without a vote - or rather that it made India's adherence possible.

The absence of the contentious paragraph provides a clearer conceptual framework for addressing conventional disarmament issues. Theoretically, it meets the concerns of many smaller non-aligned states as well as the criticisms of Western states. In the CD last year the United States vehemently argued: *“Would not this forum risk becoming the theatre of the absurd if it were to devote much time to addressing the prevention of nuclear war, ... while ignoring the fighting and killing which is actually taking place in so-called conventional conflicts? Where on the programme of work for 1987 is there provision for this Conference to undertake arms control and disarmament efforts which might contribute to the ending of the destruction, pain and suffering now taking place in diverse parts of the world because conventional weapons are being used?”* (99).

At SSOD-III, the concluding document should devote some attention to the conventional threat. It could, for example, reflect the progress made in the 1987 General Assembly resolution - unless of course it proves possible to make more progress. Perhaps the relevant operative paragraphs and some preambular paragraphs contained in that resolution could be replicated.

One of the operative paragraphs has already been quoted. There are three other such paragraphs, the first of which reads: The General Assembly *“[r]eaffirms the importance of the efforts aimed at resolutely pursuing the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament”*. This paragraph exaggerates the actual state of affairs. Current activities of any substance are largely confined to Europe, where resolute efforts have yet to be made - though such efforts may be in the offing. However, the paragraph can remain in its current form, if its improvement should create complications. The paragraph, after all, is overshadowed by more important paragraphs that follow in the text of the resolution.

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99. CD/PV.391, p.10, Report of the Conference on Disarmament, Appendix II, Volume II, Verbatim Records of the 1987 Session, 28 August 1987, CD/787.

The second paragraph reads: The General Assembly “[b]elieves that the military forces of all countries should not be used other than for the purpose of self-defence”. The third one is largely focused on Europe where negotiations are continuing. As far as the preambular paragraphs of the 1987 General Assembly resolution are concerned, it is essential to mention the first one. It reads: “Reaffirming the determination to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war expressed in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations”.

There should also be an additional paragraph - perhaps along the lines to be found in the 1985 General Assembly resolution on conventional disarmament (40/94) - eulogizing unilateral measures such as the ones undertaken by China over the past few years in the conventional field. This is an important development since SSOD-II which should not escape the notice of SSOD-III. The relevant paragraph in the 1985 resolution expresses “most firm support for recent unilateral measures, adopted by some Governments, which are intended to limit conventional armaments and reduce military expenditures and which contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the realization of conventional disarmament on a regional scale”. The formulation would need to be enlarged to include the substantial reduction of military personnel being implemented by China.

The announcement by China in June 1985 envisaged a cut-back of one million military personnel by the end of 1986 (100). According to The Military Balance, the size of China’s regular armed forces had declined from 3,900,000 during 1985-86 to 2,950,000 during 1986-87 and reportedly the reduction process was still underway (101). The figures cited by this source indicate that the cut-back involving a million military personnel was directed entirely at conscripts, whose number fell from 2,300,000 during 1985-86 to 1,300,000 during 1986-87. It is important to note that the size of China’s armed forces had already begun to decline before the 1985 announcement. According to ACDA, China’s armed forces stood at 4,750,000 in 1981, declining to approximately 4,000,000 before the 1985 announcement (102). Thus, since 1981 China has apparently reduced its regular armed forces by about 2 million military personnel or approximately 40 percent.

## REGIONAL APPROACH & RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES

By definition, disarmament is a global concept. But this does not mean that the regional approach should be subordinated to the global approach or that regional measures should be overlooked in the pursuit of global measures. The simultaneity of approaches should be recognised as a general principle because the approaches are interrelated and also because of the importance of addressing regional security issues.

Regional measures are a matter of great interest to many medium and small states and the relationship between global and regional measures can also be important. The principle of simultaneity incorporates this interrelationship as well as the independent importance of regional measures. Thus, the concerns of the multitude of small states (which should find greater expression at SSOD-III) are also addressed through this principle.

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100. Yimin Song *On China’s Concept of Security* UNIDIR Monograph, 1986, p.31.

101. *The Military Balance*, IISS, London, 1985-86 and 1986-87 issues. See p.113 and p.142 respectively.

102. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* 1986, ACDA, Washington DC, p.70. Also see p.91 of *The Military Balance* 1984-85, IISS, London.

The principle of simultaneity seems more reasonable and realistic than the pursuit of a precise formula that risks oversimplifying the reality and becoming selective to a degree that alienates one or more states, or groups of states. A more balanced and pragmatic approach that reflects the complexity, variability and interrelationship of the global and regional situations stands a better chance of doing justice and providing a basis for inducing a more meaningful consensus. Acceptance of the principle of simultaneity does not however mean that the adoption of one approach should depend on the adoption of another or that efforts in one region should necessarily be matched by similar efforts in another. Nor does the reference to one diminish the importance of the other. The principle's versatility provides a safeguard against an oversimplification of the disarmament process, whether at the level of approaches or measures.

As far as the principle of responsibility of states is concerned, it should be emphasised that the application of this principle should not discriminate between the global and regional powers in their respective spheres, nor should it have an adverse implication for the discharge of responsibilities by other states. If the regional powers can insist that the big powers should have primary or special responsibility for global disarmament measures (at least until major changes have occurred), by the same token the smaller states can insist that the regional powers should accept a similar responsibility at the regional level with regard to essentially regional security issues.

The interrelationship of approaches and measures cautions against too much preoccupation with attempts to draw fine distinctions which can become too rigid or lopsided from a practical point of view. This is particularly relevant at the regional level. Since the big powers can be instrumental in resolving or defusing conflicts, crises and situations that have an obvious international dimension, the primary responsibility of the regional powers in the regional sphere has to be qualified to take account of this aspect.

It is also necessary to elaborate further the principle of responsibility in order to restore and rationalize the importance of the regional approach and the question of regional security. The responsibility of the global powers should extend to facilitating regional arms control efforts and refraining from actions that could complicate or prevent such a process from unfolding. The influence that global powers can sometimes exercise over one or more states within a region, including their role as arms-suppliers, could be an important factor for the progress of regional arms control efforts. This is another reason why the role of extra-regional states, especially the global powers, has to be brought into the picture and the question of responsibility placed in a proper perspective. Otherwise the principle of primary or special responsibility of the regional powers will be inconsistent with reality and thus its practical value will stand greatly diminished.

Briefly then, in enunciating the principle of responsibility of states, it is important that the question of primary responsibility should be addressed at the global as well as regional levels, but this should be appropriately qualified.

## **CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES**

A preoccupation with disarmament measures should not distract attention from the significant role that confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) can play towards furthering the disarmament process, especially when that process is at an incipient stage and the situation is

complex. CSBMs can be not only an important stop-gap measure but also indispensable to the pursuit of substantive disarmament measures, particularly at the regional level. CSBMs therefore deserve some focus of attention at SSOD-III, certainly more than on previous occasions.

A significant concern of some of the major regional states with regional disarmament measures is the fear that such measures could put them at a military disadvantage vis-a-vis the global powers and other major powers, particularly in adjoining regions. Consideration of power-status and ambition could be involved in such fears, but there are also understandable considerations of national and regional security. Substantial reduction of armaments and armed forces, not to mention disarmament, by a major regional states, if unreciprocated by other transregional powers and unmatched by measures to limit the military presence of extra-regional powers, could expose the security of the disarming state to unmanageable threats from outside the region. It could also stultify such a state's ability to influence developments within its own region, apart from making it even less consequential on global issues. Regional states with significant power-potential therefore have some weighty considerations to confront. They might exaggerate these fears, but there is a basis for apprehensions which must be addressed.

Similarly, many medium and small states with little or limited potential for regional or global influence are primarily concerned about threats to their national security. Unless accompanied by regional disarmament measures, such states will be reluctant to support the removal of extra-regional military presence because of the fear that this could seriously upset the military balance and enable the more powerful regional state to establish its dominance or hegemony. The fact that most regions are bedevilled by territorial or other potentially explosive disputes underscores the gravity of the concerns of the smaller states.

Thus, there are some valid concerns which cannot be dismissed or overlooked when broaching the subject of regional disarmament. To some extent, these problems can be addressed by engaging in limited disarmament measures, such as specific agreements among the arms-transfer recipients (or between major recipients and suppliers in a particular spatial context) to prevent a regional arms race from going into financial and military excess as a result of a disproportionate action-reaction effect. This would probably require parallel global and regional approaches, but the process could be initiated at either level. Ideally, it should emanate from the region. If a formal agreement is considered too restrictive, it should be possible to engage in tacit understandings or informal agreements of an ad hoc nature in order to tide over a difficult period.

In any case, such CSBMs could be considered which clearly do not involve a reduction of the military potential of states. CSBMs are not being suggested here as a substitute for substantial disarmament measures, but mainly as an interim exercise and as part of a transitional process. The concept of CSBMs is flexible. There is considerable potential for new ideas or variations of available ideas which could be adapted to meet the requirements of a particular region.

The CSBM process in Europe is more than a decade-old. The limited Helsinki agreements of 1975 have been replaced by more substantial and potentially significant agreements reached at the Stockholm Conference in 1986. The improvement of East-West relations has also contributed to a smoother observance of these agreements, after the rather disappointing experience with the implementation, in letter and spirit, of previous agreements. The European efforts have broken new ground and deserve to be congratulated. They offer numerous ideas whose relevance should be

considered by states in other regions. Similarly the illustrative list of approaches mentioned in the 1981 UN-sponsored intergovernmental study on confidence-building measures (103) deserves some attention. In addition, states outside Europe should consider promoting systematic studies on CSBMs related specifically to their regions. This is an aspect which should particularly engage the attention of SSOD-III.

It has already been mentioned that CSBMs are not being proposed with a view to necessarily reducing the military potential of states in regions. They are primarily intended to contain the degree of military threat that states can pose to each other within a region. As such, they can help to deflate threat-perceptions (which are an important factor in the arms race) and thereby also improve the prospects of controlling the arms trade in specific areas for the purpose of either further strengthening or preventing a destabilizing development from upsetting regional security.

Another significant point about CSBMs is that they could greatly help to turn the attention of regional states away from each other and enable their military potential to be directed more effectively towards addressing external threats to regional security. Thus, by reducing or limiting the requirements of intra-regional security, CSBMs could increase the military potential of states for extra-regional purposes. Yet another positive feature of CSBMs is that states could make credible gestures of non-use of force without compromising their positions on a dispute.

The smaller states in the non-aligned group should stress the regional aspects of disarmament at SSOD-III. They should promote a balanced approach towards this question, accommodating the valid concerns of other states. In particular, they should focus more attention on the concept of CSBMs for the incipient stage of the regional disarmament process, as has been the case in Europe.

It is important for various reasons that regional initiatives should not depend too much on the progress of the global disarmament process. Regional security issues have their own urgency and the regional approach has its role to play at both levels. An excessive involvement in semantics can blur these realities and distort the disarmament perspective. CSBMs offer a balanced solution to the problem over the short-term.

## **NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION**

SSOD-III should focus some attention on the nuclear non-proliferation issues, stressing the importance of making a renewed effort both within the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework and outside it, so that all states can engage in the exercise with a view to improving the unsatisfactory situation. Nuclear proliferation trends have become more accentuated and the present juncture could be described as quite critical despite the fact that 136 states are now parties to the NPT.

It is unrealistic to believe that the nuclear-threshold states can be pressured into accepting the non-proliferation regime as it currently stands. It should be instructive that such attempts have proved futile for the past two decades. SSOD-III should at least engage in an effort to show progress on the long-standing question of negative security assurances. Differences of approach still persist in the Conference on Disarmament despite the rather moderate attitude of most non-aligned states and the

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103. Report of the Secretary General, "*General and Complete Disarmament - Confidence-building measures*", United Nations document A/36/474, 1981.

overwhelming support for an effective international arrangement. The doctrine of extended nuclear deterrence of the NATO nuclear powers, especially the United States, militates against any provision of effective security assurances (even in the limited negative mode), other than the innocuous Security Council resolution of 1968 and the conditional unilateral declarations made in the late 1970s.

There could be an interim compromise in order to register some progress on this long-standing issue. For example, the NATO nuclear powers could retain the doctrine of extended nuclear deterrence for the European theatre. Security assurances could be extended to states outside the central alliances which are parties to the NPT and do not have foreign nuclear deployments in their territories. The latter condition will meet the Soviet preoccupation which seems reasonable, if not eminently logical. For the NATO nuclear powers this will entail limiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to Europe, which is the primary East-West theatre of potential conflict and where nuclear weapons have been enmeshed, in terms of doctrine and deployment, with other weapons for many years.

The provision of negative security assurances should be extended to at least those NPT parties which do not have foreign nuclear deployments in their territories and stand outside the protective umbrella of the central alliances. If the NATO nuclear powers should continue to insist on retaining the right to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons more freely, it would be clearly quite unreasonable to expect the nuclear-threshold states to accept the existing non-proliferation regime. Indeed, it could become necessary for the non-nuclear NPT parties to review this aspect of the regime because some of them might have to seriously reconsider their adherence to the Treaty if one or more of the near-nuclear states should cross the threshold.

The threat of proliferation is not necessarily remote. If the last NPT review conference in 1985 is any guide, the threat is serious and urgent. Since then, the drift of political and technological developments has grown more inexorable and it is quite possible that horizontal proliferation could become a reality well before the turn of this century - that is, about the time the NPT completes its mandated duration of 25 years. It would be painfully ironical if this were to happen.

To get back to the issue of security assurances. A spatially limited provision of negative security assurances is hardly proportionate to the more significant act of renunciation by the nuclear-threshold states. Nor is such a provision likely to make a critical difference to the attitude such states towards the NPT regime. But it will serve a number of positive purposes. It will partially remove a major flaw that has been lingering in the non-proliferation regime. It would be seen as an important (and much awaited) gesture by the nuclear powers. It would also strengthen the otherwise weak position of NPT advocates in near-nuclear countries and make the NPT more attractive to the lesser non-parties. More importantly, it would introduce a positive factor into an increasingly gloomy situation and reinforce the non-proliferation norm at a time when proliferation trends have worsened.

The idea of a spatially limited provision of negative assurances should be discussed but not necessarily raised for inclusion in SSOD-III's concluding document. The document could simply stipulate that proliferation trends have grown worse and the highly unsatisfactory situation calls for greater efforts. It could repeat in a marginally truncated form the latter half of paragraph 66 of SSOD-I's Final Document, which states: "*...the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on an*

*universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons*". SSOD-III's concluding document could then express disappointment with the outcome of CD negotiations on negative security assurances, call for more flexibility and emphasise the importance of a provision of assurances in order to strengthen the NPT and the non-proliferation norm during a critical period.

Finally, it must be realized that negative security assurances are a half-way measure. If renunciation by the non-nuclear states is to be adequately reciprocated, the nuclear powers should offer more positive assurances of security, such as a provision for some assistance to a threatened non-nuclear NPT party. The threat can come from a nuclear power violating its assurances in one form or another. If nothing more, a provision for some assistance will help to bolster the credibility of negative assurances and provide some deterrent against breaches of the pledge. It would also reduce to some extent the insecurity of non-nuclear NPT parties against any future threat emanating from the nuclear-threshold states. This is important in view of proliferation trends and the danger that horizontal proliferation could occur in the foreseeable future.

Thus, more positive assurances of security will strengthen the stability of the NPT against pressures from proliferation trends and developments. At the same time, it will provide a firm basis for engaging in a major diplomatic endeavour to convince the near-nuclear non-parties to eschew the nuclear weapons path. Above all, more positive security assurances would bring the obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear NPT parties into some reasonable balance. It would remove a major flaw in the non-proliferation regime and set a good example for resolving other issues.

#### DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

With regard to the interrelationship of disarmament and international security, it would serve little purpose to stress the primacy of one approach over the other. Such contests in semantics - as evident for example in the UN-sponsored intergovernmental study on the Relationship between Disarmament and International Security (104) - can be conceptually and politically damaging to the disarmament process and to the pursuit of international peace and security.

In the circumstances, it would be best to avoid the controversy and set-aside attempts to establish a finality. Attempts to assert the primacy of disarmament will only provoke the opponents or skeptics of disarmament, while it would make little difference to the disarmament process. Similarly, it must be acknowledged that the dominant opinion is that, as a general rule, an arms race is more an effect than a cause of political tensions and disputes between states. It is therefore better to concentrate on developing a general working principle. As far as this is concerned, it should suffice to assert that an important and even intimate relationship exists between the two complementary approaches to the establishment of international peace and security and that concurrent efforts should be made to further both the processes. This would help to reduce disagreement, as it would avoid the sensitive issue of primacy.

The relevance of other approaches should be recognised by proponents of disarmament. After all, the disarmament process could gain considerably from progress on international security issues. Progress towards enhancing the UN's international security role would be a boon for the disarmament

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104. Study Series 8, Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1982.

process and the conditions for disarmament would greatly strengthen. In this regard, it is worth recalling the “*Statement of Agreed Principles*” issued jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1961 for the future conduct of multilateral disarmament negotiations. The joint statement stressed that progress in disarmament should be accompanied by reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of international peace.

A closer look at some of the deep-rooted difficulties in furthering the disarmament process underscores the urgency of progress on collective security issues, particularly towards addressing the political apprehensions of states about the implications of undertaking substantive disarmament measures without multilateral security assurances. The problem is particularly acute at the regional level where territorial and other disputes can get deeply entangled with questions of military security and the utility of military power. Then there is the question of extra-regional implications for states adopting disarmament measures within a region in isolation. The problem can be greatly compounded if a regional state happens to be embroiled in territorial or other disputes across the regional divide, or along the regional frontier. Needless to elaborate, there are many such cases, especially in the latter category.

A strengthening of the UN’s international security role would reduce the utility of military power and the military threat that states could effectively pose to each other. As such, there would be fewer complications towards pursuing disarmament measures, especially at the regional or transregional level where the UN could bring its multilateral weight to bear more effectively. But the Organization’s existing powers and procedures for exercising those powers would have to be streamlined to enable a prompt and efficacious intervention. It would probably also require a period of time for the UN to establish the credibility of its international security role. As for global disarmament, it would be necessary to develop a full-fledged system of collective security. This could be approached through carefully conceived stages linked to the disarmament process.

The linkage between disarmament and international security was propounded quite forcefully by an African representative from Sierra Leone during a debate in the General Assembly’s First Committee in 1983. He postulated that a complex “*symbiotic*” relationship existed between collective security and significant arms control (105). He argued that “*with the institutionalization of the collective security provisions of the Charter, the implementation of total or at least partial disarmament (would become) necessary for member-States*” (106). He further argued that states would be prepared to agree to significant arms control “*only with the establishment of a system of collective security*”.

It is also interesting to recall one of the earliest expositions of the linkage made by an US representative before the General Assembly back in 1952. The delegate pointed out that “*if the states are assured that in case of attack they will not stand alone, they will need fewer arms for their defense. (Similarly) as progress is made in disarmament, the task of building collective security (will) become simpler. The two march together ...*” (107).

SSOD-III should highlight the interrelationship of disarmament and international security, while steering clear of the issue of primacy. It should also do this because a Special Committee of

105. United Nations document A/C.1/38/PV.47, p.17.

106. Ibid.

107. Benjamin Cohen in Normal Palmer and Howard Perkins *International Relations: The World Community in Transition*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, p.244.

the General Assembly has been deliberating upon the question of strengthening the UN's international security role for more than a decade. Of late, it has made some modest progress. The work of the Special Committee should be regarded as potentially significant for the disarmament process. Thus, SSOD-III should express its cognizance of those efforts and at the same time urge greater progress towards substantial agreements of a concrete nature.

In addition, SSOD-III could consider underlining the importance of starting deliberations on collective security matters. Recent Soviet references to strengthening the Security Council's collective security role under the Charter are a welcome development. The US interest in the Soviet overture for talks to revive the defunct Military Staff Committee of the Security Council appears to be almost non-existent. The big powers could be called upon to seriously reconsider the question of creating a subsidiary body to recommend measures to increase the Security Council's political and military effectiveness. This is an important area where they could credibly demonstrate their commitment to multilateralism and where their improved bilateral relations could be directly useful.

In 1983 the General Assembly adopted Resolution 38/91, which sought the establishment of an ad hoc committee to promote the implementation of the Charter's collective security provisions. The move was opposed by the United States and the Soviet Union along with their allies. Another abortive effort was made through General Assembly Resolution 40/159 adopted in 1985. The proposal has not been raised since then. Presumably recent trends in Soviet thinking would suggest that WTO countries would no longer oppose the non-aligned idea (also supported by the five Nordic states since 1985). However, the situation may have become somewhat complicated on account of the recent Soviet preoccupation with the concept of comprehensive security. At any rate, the opposition of the Western states, particularly the United States, United Kingdom and France, remains a problem.

The alternative non-aligned idea that the Security Council itself should engage in efforts to give effect to the Charter's concept of multilateral arms control under Article 26 has attracted substantial support, including the consent of the Soviet Union and its allies. Although the United States is the only country to have voted negatively on the General Assembly Resolution 42/39 related to this question, there are a number of important abstentions from the Western group as well as the neutral states, including Sweden.

On the question of collective security, SSOD-III's concluding document could seek an agreement that does not refer to the establishment of an ad hoc committee. It could simply stress the importance of progress towards implementing the Charter's collective security provisions. It would be enough if SSOD-III could specifically acknowledge the importance of collective security in the context of emphasising the interrelationship of disarmament and international security. Similarly, the support of states which have abstained on the issue of implementing Article 26 of the Charter could be sought by way of a more focused approach. Perhaps some effort could be made through a formula that concentrates wholly on Article 26 and excludes references suggesting the primacy of nuclear disarmament.

Finally, some attempt could be made to resurrect paragraph 5 of the draft 1987 CPD text in the Chapter on "*Principles*" - also to be found in the Final Document of SSOD-I as paragraph 13. Even if contentious, this is an important paragraph since it incorporates disarmament, collective security and international security issues of a political nature and establishes their interrelationship. The paragraph reads: "*[Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the*

*accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the [UN] Charter and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces ... leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means]*" .

To placate the Western states, the paragraph in question could be modified. The phrase "*or doctrines of strategic superiority*" could be expunged. Opponents of this paragraph should realize that the criticism of alliances, etc, is only being made if these are accepted as a permanent feature of the international system. In the paragraph, the terms "*enduring*" and "*lasting*" are appended to the phrase "*international peace*". Furthermore, the paragraph significantly avoids references to the primacy of nuclear disarmament. Nor does it mention general and complete disarmament alone. It also talks about collective security and, in the last sentence, it acknowledges the relationship between disarmament and international security without making any judgement about the nature of the arms race.

The paragraph is fairly balanced and rather important. Barring minor modifications, it should stay in the draft CPD text, even if it has to be placed within brackets.

## CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT

Multilateral negotiations on chemical disarmament in the CD began in 1980 with the establishment of a special subsidiary body. This occurred after some progress was reported in bilateral big-power talks that began in 1977. Since 1984 the CD has been negotiating on the basis of a mandate permitting "*full and complete process of negotiations, developing and working out the convention, except for its final drafting*". At long last, major changes in Soviet attitude towards a number of specific issues occurred in 1986 and further changes followed in 1987, leading to significant progress in the CD.

If the CD's protracted and elaborate work on a chemical disarmament convention is successfully concluded, it would elevate the CD's status and strengthen the cause of multilateral disarmament negotiations. The principal issues whose resolution would greatly expedite the conclusion of the CD's work are related to ensuring the non-production of chemical weapons after stockpiles have been destroyed, and procedures for on-site inspection upon challenge at short notice for clarifying compliance in cases of doubt or suspicion. There are of course complex as well as sensitive questions of national security involved in resolving the outstanding issues. But the main difficulty at this advanced stage of negotiations appears to be the political will to reach agreement.

In view of the accelerated progress of negotiations in the CD and the continued improvement of big-power relations, there was some hope last year that work could be concluded in 1988. This now seems unlikely. There is also some uncertainty about prospects beyond 1988. At the start of the CD's 1988 session, the US representative disconcertingly remarked: "*Many serious issues of the chemical weapons convention remained yet to be resolved. This would take considerable time. It was not only unrealistic but unproductive to speculate that a convention could be completed before*

(SSOD-III) or by some specified, artificial deadline” (108). This statement seems to amplify President Reagan’s view, expressed in his message to the CD at the commencement of its 1988 session, that “you now face the *arduous* (emphasis added) task of working out the details and finding solutions on measures which affect vital security interests of all our countries” (109).

It appears that, at least for the near future, the United States would be assigning priority to refurbishing its chemical arsenal of 1960s vintage with new binary weapons. Such weapons have acquired an important status in NATO’s competitive military strategy against WTO in Europe. It is also noteworthy that the Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy is not supportive of a chemical disarmament treaty for the time-being. Persistent efforts by the Reagan Administration since the early 1980s have incrementally resulted in Congressional approval for modernizing the US chemical arsenal with more effective binary weapons. Progress in big-power talks on conventional arms reduction in Europe could however improve the prospects of US willingness to seek a chemical disarmament agreement.

In any case, the pressure for an early conclusion of CD negotiations on chemical disarmament should be maintained at SSOD-III. The US rationale for proceeding with binary weapons production is not very convincing since the negotiations in the CD have reached an advanced stage and the Soviet commitment to chemical disarmament has become increasingly credible.

The US position that setting a precise deadline for concluding the CD’s work is artificial, etc, can be accommodated by a formulation that calls for an agreement “without delay”. Phrases such as “earliest possible” or “as soon as possible” are conceptually weaker because of the implications of the term “possible”.

## COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

For many years the issue of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) was plagued by controversy over the technical feasibility of adequate verification and the Soviet resistance to intrusive verification procedures. Both these problems have become increasingly manageable and the non-nuclear states remain committed to a CTB. It is a pity that the issue should now be afflicted solely by an expedient US approach to arms control.

The CTB issue is now three decades old. The first series of talks began in the late 1950s and a significant opportunity was lost to reach agreement in the early 1960s due to big-power differences over matters of detail concerning verification and control measures. However, the negotiations eventually resulted in the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 1963. The PTBT stipulated an early conclusion of CTB negotiations. The legal undertaking under this Treaty remains unfulfilled for over a quarter of a century.

The issue has also been significant in the NPT context. The Preamble of the NPT calls for unabated negotiations to reach an early agreement - something that has not happened for almost a decade. Furthermore, from the outset, most non-nuclear NPT parties have regarded a CTB to be an

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 108. Press Release DC/1520, Information Service, United Nations Geneva Office, 2 February 1988, p.5.  
 109. Ibid, p.3.

indispensable measure of reciprocity by the nuclear-weapon states. It was a salient issue during the NPT negotiations. Considerable efforts were made at subsequent review conferences to change the one-sided approach of the big-powers. The expectation of reciprocity had induced many non-nuclear states to join the NPT, while the deficiencies in the NPT were considered too glaring by a number of other non-nuclear states, most of whom still remain outside that treaty regime. The CTB issue also had a telling effect on the outcome of the previous special session on disarmament. The progress of work on the draft CPD text, which was the centerpiece at SSOD-II, was stultified by the US opposition to any firm commitment on a CTB - even beyond the near-term.

There is little hope of forestalling horizontal nuclear proliferation through the reaffirmation of the NPT at periodic review conferences. This exercise has become almost ritualistic and partially outmoded. Similarly, as in the past, big-power collaboration as well as unilateral and multilateral pressures are almost certain to fail. As far as other approaches are concerned, the prospects are hardly reassuring. At the present juncture, a CTB offers the only way of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. It is interesting to note that, although India remains opposed to numerous other non-proliferation proposals, it is still open to the CTB approach. Indeed, the horizontal aspect of a CTB has been stressed in the recent Six Nation Initiative. The Stockholm Declaration considers a CTB to be "*the single most effective measure*" not only in the context of containing the nuclear arms race, "*but also for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which have so far refrained from acquiring them*" (110).

Despite substantial changes in the Soviet attitude towards CTB issues (not to mention, arms control as a whole) and the willingness of the non-aligned states to cooperate actively on resolving the verification question, the US attitude has remained extremely expedient since the early 1980s, notwithstanding some recent modifications. Even if there has been a measure of imbalance in the non-aligned approach to nuclear and conventional disarmament issues, their contributions to the process of nuclear disarmament have been impressive, both on the CTB question and in the NPT context, especially at the last review conference in 1985. By contrast, there has been little, if any, change in the approach of the nuclear weapon states, especially the United States, and to a lesser extent, France and the United Kingdom.

There is a sharp contrast between the consistency of the CTB offer by India and other non-aligned states and, for the most part, the perfunctory or expedient approach of the nuclear weapon states towards their legal and political commitments to a CTB. The offer by some major regional states in the former category has become increasingly magnanimous, since those in the latter category have increased their technological lead and elevated their status well beyond the situation that existed when the compact was first offered.

The bilateral understanding reached at the Washington Summit meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in December last year represents some improvement over the situation that has prevailed since the early 1980s. The joint statement talks about "*step-by-step*" negotiations (111). The first steps will be devoted to issues concerning the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976, both of which have not been ratified by the United States on grounds of inadequate verification provisions and controversial complaints about Soviet non-compliance. At some unspecified stage, these initial steps

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110. "*Stockholm Declaration*" CD/807

111. "*Joint US-Soviet Summit Statement*" CD/797, 5 February 1988, p.5.

are to be followed by intermediate measures to extend the limits on nuclear tests - presumably by lowering the 150-kiloton ceiling in the TTBT and perhaps combining this with curbs on the number of permissible tests. The intermediate steps are supposed to pave the way for a CTB.

The joint statement, however, does little to salvage the CTB issue from the nebulous long-term status to which it has been relegated by the United States since President Reagan assumed office in 1981. It is interesting to observe how loosely and intricately the commitment to a CTB has been defined. The joint statement reads that after the first steps, the parties will *"proceed on further limitations ... leading to the ultimate objective (emphasis added) of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process (emphasis added)"*. Pushing a CTB further into the uncertain future, the statement adds that the disarmament process *"among other things, would pursue, as the first priority (emphasis added), the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination (emphasis added)"*. On the specific issue of nuclear non-proliferation, the bilateral US-USSR understanding simply covers the familiar ground of reiterating the importance they attach to the NPT and, to this end, their determination *"to make, together with other States, additional efforts"* to secure the adherence of non-parties.

For reasons of long-standing legal obligation under the PTBT, the political commitment under the NPT (in force since 1970), and a CTB's enhanced importance for horizontal non-proliferation at the present juncture, the non-aligned and other like-minded states should retain their eminently principled stand on the CTB question at SSOD-III. Such states could gravitate around the relevant paragraph in the Stockholm Declaration of the Six-Nation Group.

## ARMS RACE IN SPACE

The differences of approach between the United States and the Soviet Union towards the interrelationship of START and SDI issues have narrowed, largely on account of recent Soviet flexibility. This is reflected in the joint statement by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at their Summit meeting in Washington DC late last year. While this development has theoretically allowed START negotiations to proceed relatively unobstructed, the linkage has not been easy to resolve in practice. The progress towards preventing an arms race in outer space has been noticeably limited in substantive terms.

The Joint Summit Statement envisages a commitment for the observance of the 1972 ABM Treaty (which forbids the deployment of anti-ballistic missile weapons based on new physical principles) and for non-withdrawal from the Treaty for a period of time to be specified in the context of a START agreement. But such a period of time is not likely to be appreciable enough to delay the emerging militarization of outer space.

As far as the future course of action is concerned, the joint statement does not imply any commitment or constraints of a binding nature for undertaking negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space. It simply talks about engaging in *"intensive discussions of strategic stability"* not later than three years before the ABM Treaty expires under the new schedule. Similarly the joint statement says that if these discussions do not lead to some other agreement, *"each (side) will be free to decide its course of action"* (112). The bilateral understanding represents a major shift of posture by the

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112. Ibid, p.4.

Soviet Union, but involves little change for the United States whose coveted option to deploy SDI weapons remains essentially unaffected.

Despite the Joint Summit Statement, there is still some divergence between the Soviet concern about safeguarding the ABM Treaty and the US preoccupation with a cooperative or unilateral transition to a new system of strategic stability based on the incorporation of SDI-related weapons. The Soviet opposition to the militarization of outer space has not changed. The Soviet Union has re-emphasised its space-related concerns in the recent round of START negotiations with the United States. In these talks, there has been agreement in some areas mainly on account of the progress made at the Washington Summit. But, as the chief US negotiator, Ambassador Cooper has reported, "*clearly, substantial differences remain*" (113).

One of the important issues - yet to be resolved - relates to the length of the proposed period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. More generally, there seems to be a conflict of interpretation of what was agreed or understood at the Washington Summit. The Soviet statement in the CD last month also indicates difficulties. The Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Petrovsky pointed out that "*a whole set of rather difficult issues remain to be solved, the main one being the prevention of the possibility (emphasis added) of undermining strategic stability in the conditions of radical reductions in strategic offensive arms*" (114). He described the current negotiations as having "*noticeably deteriorated*".

Recent developments in the Soviet approach to arms control and other security issues have not had the effect of moderating the US preoccupation with SDI and the early deployment of space-related weapons. Unless there is a US-USSR agreement on strategic defence, the process of nuclear disarmament, which has been reactivated after a decade of stagnation, could be disrupted by the outbreak of an arms race in outer space. And if there is such an agreement, the increased physical security of their home territory provided by strategic defence system (and buttressed by a major START agreement) would proportionately reduce the inhibitions of the big-powers towards using or threatening the use of military power. This would be particularly true of the technologically superior power. An arms race in outer space would also have the unfortunate effect of opening up a vast new frontier at a time when unprecedented prospects exist for reversing the arms race in nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons.

One of the considerations behind the dogged US pursuit of SDI is evidently related to increasing the physical security of its home territory in the event of war in the future. Another appears to be the notion of achieving a military edge through the introduction of a major competition in high technology at a difficult time for the Soviet Union. Conversely, one of the reasons for the apparently undiminished Soviet endeavour to protect the ABM Treaty could be that such a course of action offers a possible way of preventing an early US lead. Such a lead would be de-stabilizing for the Soviet Union, with its relative technological inferiority, if it should substantially reduce its nuclear arsenal under the proposed START agreement, particularly along the lines envisaged by the United States.

Past experience suggests that a technological lead, even in a significant area of military power, cannot be effectively exploited for strategic gains or meaningfully sustained beyond the short-term. Furthermore, the possibly unique opportunities provided by a dynamic Soviet leadership under

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113. *NATO Review* February 1988, p.15.

114. Statement in the CD, 18 February 1988.

General Secretary Gorbachev should encourage the United States to look beyond the short-term to larger and more enduring national and international security objectives. The Soviet Union has made several credible politico-military gestures that indicate some departure from the pursuit of military superiority and, until recently, its expedient approach to arms control and disarmament. In short, the circumstances have changed since the SDI was zealously launched in the early 1980s when a distinctly more competitive military posture and political outlook characterized the Soviet policy.

The question of preventing an arms race in outer space has been under consideration in the CD since 1985 when that body eventually agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Committee to examine and identify issues relevant to the prevention of arms race in outer space. The CD recently re-established the Ad Hoc Committee for the 1988 session on the basis of its previous non-negotiating mandate. The CD's role has remained largely limited to discussing the nature and scope of the existing legal regime for outer space, verification and compliance issues, and other issues concerning definition and terminology. Attempts in the draft CPD text to give greater priority to the prevention of an arms race in outer space have also not succeeded. The main obstacle is continued US pursuit of SDI-related weapons for early deployment - preferably with Soviet cooperation.

The Soviet interest in strengthening the CD's role in preventing a space-arms race also seems to have increased. The Soviet Union recently proposed that the CD should be entrusted with the task of examining the idea of establishing an international outer space inspectorate. The concept has been presented as a possible solution to the question of effective verification of an agreement to prevent an arms race in outer space. This proposal will soon be presented in an elaborate form. It is part of the declared Soviet desire to use the CD as a barrier against an arms race in outer space. The US approach has been to leave the matter to the bilateral US-USSR negotiating forum - or, as was apparently suggested in 1985, the CD's subsidiary body could engage in substantive discussions, but "*in a manner consistent with, and complementary to, the bilateral negotiations*" (115). Such an approach would be restrictive and for many states it would involve a departure from their categorical opposition to the militarization of outer space.

The outer space issue will become more prominent and its bilateral treatment clearer once START negotiations are concluded. It is perhaps at such a stage (provided the talks do not run aground) when it would be most appropriate to review the CD's role in this area. In any case, it should be emphasised at SSOD-III, as the Stockholm Declaration of the Six-Nation Group does, that "*military competition must not be introduced into new fields*" (116).

## VERIFICATION

Of late, there has been a significant improvement in the attitudes of states towards the question of verification of compliance with disarmament agreements. Fundamental differences existed in the past and the issue resurfaced with monotonous regularity in various forums. It was truly a bane of disarmament negotiations since the beginning of the post-war period. The Soviet attitude has changed considerably under General Secretary Gorbachev. A veritable break appears to have been made with the traditional approach, which was highly and unhelpfully restrictive. During this period

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115. Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations, CD/642, 4 September 1985, p.120.

116. CD/807, op.cit.

there has also been a noticeable improvement in the non-aligned attitude with a greater appreciation of the issue of compliance.

The positive change in the situation is reflected in the most recent draft CPD text. The verification section in that document has now been freed of a couple of reservations that afflicted the 1987 draft text. The differences (largely between the United States, on the one hand, and India and Mexico, on the other) have been resolved on the basis of a trade-off. Another positive development has been the agreement to incorporate the UK proposal for emphasizing "*the principles of openness and transparency such as the provision of objective information on military matters*" (117). A similar spirit at SSOD-III could help greatly to avert an impasse on other issues. It is desirable that these important developments in the disarmament field should be fully projected in SSOD-III's concluding Document.

## INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

There are a number of phrases and formulations in the draft CPD text (drawn largely from the Final Document) which could be dropped either because they are extraneous or unbalanced, or because the concerns are addressed in general terms in the same paragraph or elsewhere. Thus, such issues has also dispensable and need not be elaborated if the exercise is likely to create a strong contention. One example is the issue of a new international economic order, which is not strictly the concern of disarmament negotiations.

Reference to the issue has also attracted reservation and, in particular, prevented consensus on paragraph 2 of the Chapter on "*Objectives*" in the draft CPD text. The paragraph reads: "*The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail [and in which the New International Economic Order is fully achieved]*". The paragraph is too important to suffer on account of the extraneous issue under brackets. Thus, it should stand independently and in an undiluted form. The bracketed phrase could be introduced elsewhere - for example, under "*Other Measures*" in the draft CPD text - if it proves difficult to convince its advocates to drop it altogether. More pertinent are references to the social and economic aspects of the arms race and military expenditure; the relationship between disarmament and development; etc. The concept of a new international economic order is also too contentious and thus its introduction will only add to the host of problems that bedevil the disarmament process.

## NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The agenda for SSOD-III includes an item that incorporates the issue of new technological developments. Although the agenda item has been defined in general terms for reasons of consensus, it is clear that the question of new technological developments relevant to the armaments and disarmament situation will be raised at SSOD-III.

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117. CD/CPD/WP.90,18 February 1988.

Apparently India has been the principal proponent that this issue should be addressed. The Indian position was spelled out at the final session of SSOD-III's Preparatory Committee. The statement reflects undiminished concern about the scale and impact of the military R&D effort on the arms race, principally between the United States and the Soviet Union. India's revival of the technological issue is helpfully more tempered than in the past. The statement made in the Preparatory Committee recognises the complexity of the problem and is consistent with the declared view that the attitude of states at SSOD-III should be "*forward looking*" and that "*it is not a period to apportion blame for past failures*".

In principle, the idea is important and it would be timely to discuss the matter at SSOD-III. A technological revolution has been visibly underway in recent years. It is clear that technology will increasingly - if not progressively - affect the strategic and military situation in the world and that it carries implications for the disarmament process which need to be studied at some depth. It is perhaps worth referring here to the recent high-powered study on Discriminate Deterrence, commissioned by the Pentagon, which displays a disturbing preoccupation with the military utility of new technological developments over the next twenty years. It seeks to restore the distinctive technological superiority the United States enjoyed over the Soviet Union in the early post-war years. And it calls for a major long-term investment in military R&D and believes in the urgent acceleration of advances in "**stealth**" and other new technologies, so that they can be readily and extensively integrated in US weapon-systems.

Apart from increasing the stock of research material, the available published literature needs to be disseminated to enable a more informed discussion, both at the multilateral diplomatic and non-governmental levels.

#### MULTILATERAL VERIFICATION SYSTEM

The recent Stockholm Declaration of the Six-Nation Group has called for "*the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system within the United Nations, as an integral part of a strengthened multilateral framework required to ensure peace and security during the process of disarmament as well as in a nuclear-weapon-free world*" (118). The declaration indicates that the Six-Nation Group will be presenting a formal proposal at SSOD-III for the UN to "*promote the establishment of such a system*".

As yet the proposal is not sufficiently clear to enable an assessment to be made. Nor is it clear what specific role the UN will be expected to play to "*promote*" the idea. In principle, it is an interesting idea and relevant to the disarmament process. As a rule the verification of compliance with multilateral agreements should be based on a multilateral mechanism, permitting equal participation by all parties and the technical wherewithal to do so. Where necessary such a mechanism can be duly supplemented by special bilateral arrangements.

The declaration of the Six-Nation Group apparently envisages a unified international system for the verification of all multilateral agreements. The question however should be closely examined. The choice should not be simply between the present system, which is both decentralized and deficient, and

a vastly expanded and centralized alternative. It might be better for political and transitional reasons to focus more attention on in-between solutions provided the proposed system is flexible enough to respond to changing needs and perceptions. Such a system could start on a modest scale and its further evolution could be considered at periodic reviews. One of its functions could be to provide technical assistance to states engaged in disarmament negotiations and concerned about verification aspects, whether at the bilateral, regional or multilateral levels. The system's role should not be restricted to purely multilateral agreements. Such a system could also perform a control function, upon request, with respect to bilateral and regional agreements through the creation of special panels.

Briefly then, there is a need for some multilateral system of verification which can assist the disarmament process at all levels. The nature and scope of such a system would have to be carefully examined. The proposal to be made by the Six-Nation Group at SSOD-III will hopefully serve as a starting-point for an organized discussion and analysis of the issue. The UN's initial role towards promoting the idea could consist of an intergovernmental as well as a more independent study of the question.

#### **ROLE OF RESEARCH & RELATED ACTIVITIES**

Diplomacy needs to be directly and adequately supported by independent research and the informed involvement of non-governmental experts, especially on a subject as intricate and fundamental as disarmament. This would also be a useful way of making the UN more than a peripheral concern to influential publicists in academic, research and other professions. It would give the disarmament process a stronger intellectual and political base than it currently enjoys.

In recent years in the West there has been a surge of research and other related activities devoted to disarmament issues. By contrast, the role of developing countries as a whole remains largely confined to different degrees of official involvement in deliberations and negotiations in the multilateral forums of the UN system. There is limited expertise and little interaction among non-governmental experts of the developing world. Comparatively, there is more (though still insufficient) interaction between them and their counterparts in the West. There is much that remains to be done to facilitate research activities and interactions at the non-governmental level. It is simply not enough to increase official involvement, though this would be a welcome development in its own right and is required in many cases. But such a development should occur alongside a proportionate growth of research and other related activities.

SSOD-III's concluding document should address this question. The non-aligned states, many of whom have maintained a high official profile for long years, should acknowledge that measures are needed to overcome these glaring deficiencies. Inter alia, SSOD-III should recognise the important role that the Geneva-based United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) can play towards increasing the interaction between non-governmental experts from the non-aligned and other groups of states. Being a UN Institute and a research-oriented centre, UNIDIR has an unique potential to contribute to this process, among its other tasks.

SSOD-III's concluding document should reflect an agreement (relevant mainly to the developing world in general) that research and other related activities on disarmament issues at the non-

governmental level are important and that Governments should appropriately support such a process at their respective national and regional levels. Admittedly, such activities should be pertinent to disarmament diplomacy and should contribute to an improved dialogue and a balanced understanding of issues - and to the growth of an objective body of knowledge of the subject in all its important aspects.

#### IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS

States are frequently able to agree on the importance of certain developments and actions, while falling short in matching words with deeds. This is a fairly conspicuous phenomenon. Perhaps there would be less agreement if follow-up commitments were sought in advance. Perhaps for practical reasons, prior commitments may not always be desirable or feasible. Nevertheless, the gulf between words and deeds needs to be narrowed to more acceptable proportions, especially where follow-up action is essential to the nature of an agreement or the subject is too important to brook a perfunctory treatment. An obvious example that readily comes to mind is the non-implementation of paragraph 66 of SSOD-I's Final Document adopted 10 years ago, concerning global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The NPT review conferences in 1980 and 1985 as well as the UN conference early last year on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy do not fall within the scope of paragraph 66.

SSOD-III should perhaps adopt a restrictive approach towards verbal agreements that show little promise of fruition - or it should call upon member-states to demonstrate greater responsiveness. Either of these two courses of action would help to improve the status of its concluding document and the image of the SSOD process as a more business-like affair.

#### CONCLUDING REMARKS

The sensitivity of states towards the formulation of paragraphs for a proposed document, such as the one to emerge from SSOD-III, should be suitably tempered by the fact that the document is not a charter or convention. The apparent tendency to regard recommendatory documents or the outcome of deliberative exercises as treaty-type negotiations suggests excessive sensitivity. In part, this is probably a "*spill-over*" effect of the way multilateral diplomacy as a whole has evolved over the years.

To be sure, since SSOD documents are a product of special sessions devoted exclusively to the subject, they deserve a better status than normally accorded to resolutions of regular General Assembly sessions. Yet, the distinction between deliberative and negotiated outcomes has to be maintained.

It is crucial for the disarmament process and, even more, for the future of the UN (in whose various forums these activities are carried out) that multilateral disarmament diplomacy should register some qualitative change. A beginning in this direction could be made at SSOD-III.

In any case, the SSOD idea is useful and even indispensable. The process it has brought into existence must continue until states are able to conduct their bilateral and multilateral relations without the sanction of military force and at the lowest possible level of armaments consistent with domestic requirements.

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## REPORT

JOHAN NORDENFELT

Disarmament has been a major goal of the United Nations since its inception. A number of significant arms regulation and disarmament agreements were concluded in the years before 1978, but the measures achieved were not considered far-reaching enough in placing real restrictions on the arms race and the continuous growth of military expenditures and arsenals.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was convened in the Spring of 1978. Although coinciding with a period of relaxation in international relations, particularly between the two major Powers, the first special session took place amidst a growing sense of urgency that concerted action was needed.

It was the largest and most representative meeting of nations ever gathered to consider questions of disarmament. For the first time the international community reached consensus on a comprehensive strategy for disarmament based on a set of principles and priorities in disarmament negotiations. The strategy -- embodied in the 129-paragraph Final Document adopted at the special session -- has served the purpose of guiding the disarmament efforts of the international community.

A major achievement of the first special session was to affirm the importance of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the process of disarmament. The General Assembly also explicitly acknowledged the positive role that an informed public opinion may play in the process of disarmament and, within this context, how non-governmental organizations and research institutions might make a contribution.

The second special session was convened in 1982. The years between the two sessions had not seen the goals and potential of the Final Document realized.

Contrary to the atmosphere of détente between the two major Powers which had prevailed during most of the 1970s, in the early 1980s there were growing difficulties in relations between States, the outbreak of a number of local and regional conflicts and the aggravation of worldwide economic problems, particularly in the developing countries. At the same time, a new and larger number of weapons were being produced. In the circumstances, it proved impossible to sustain the positive spirit of the first special session.

The second special session was attended by representatives of more than 140 Governments. More than 60 proposals and position papers by Member States were circulated as documents at the session, reflecting the increasing worldwide concern over the causes and consequences of the arms race. Yet, the General Assembly was unable to reach agreement on the two main items on its agenda: a review of the developments since the first special session and the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

An achievement of the session was a reaffirmation in its Concluding Document of the validity

of the Final Document of the first special session. In addition, the Assembly launched the World Disarmament Campaign under the auspices of the United Nations in order to promote support for the goals of the Organization in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. It also expanded the United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament.

A Preparatory Committee for the third special session was established in 1986 to prepare a draft agenda and examine all questions which might be relevant to the work of the special session. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, the Committee was open to participation by all Member States of the United Nations.

Altogether, the Committee held three sessions. After the second, it made recommendations in a report to the 1987 General Assembly regarding the provisional agenda and the conduct of the session. The report was endorsed by the General Assembly.

During its third and last session, at the beginning of this year, the Committee also heard oral statements from representatives of 18 non-governmental organizations and peace and disarmament research institutes. In addition, their written statements were made available to Committee members.

On the basis of views expressed by delegations during discussions in the Preparatory Committee, the Chairman prepared an informal paper containing elements for consideration. The paper discussed by the Committee at a series of informal meetings. Three main areas of concern were addressed in this connection:

1. A review and appraisal of the present international situation.
2. Developments and trends, including qualitative and quantitative aspects.
3. A consideration of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and of the effectiveness of the disarmament machinery, and United Nations information and educational activities in the field of disarmament.

Some of the topics addressed in these main areas were: nuclear weapons in all aspects, chemical weapons, biological weapons, prevention of an arms race in outer space, conventional weapons in all aspects, verification and compliance, confidence-building measures, and openness, transparency and predictability in military matters.

The discussion also dealt with: compliance with the Charter of the United Nations, in particular its provisions on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force and the peaceful settlement of disputes; reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session and of the pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action; the complementarity of bilateral and multilateral approaches in the field of disarmament; the relationship between disarmament and development; the qualitative aspects of armament and disarmament and their implications for international security, as well as naval armaments and disarmament, zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Other topics included were: reaffirmation of the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament; the role of the Secretary-General in this connection; the Conference on Disarmament; the work of such bodies as the First Committee, Disarmament Commission, Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, as well as the Department for Disarmament Affairs, the World Disarmament Campaign and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

As indicated in its provisional agenda, the third special session is expected to adopt a document or documents of the session in an appropriate format. The exchange of views on the above-mentioned issues and subjects took place also with the need in mind to define in due time the format and content of such a document or documents. A wide range of views were expressed and a number of proposals were made with respect to the Chairman's paper. In the end, the Committee agreed to transmit the Chairman's paper to the General Assembly at its special session without prejudice to the position of any delegation.

The special session will hold plenary sessions, where the general debate and the presentation of statements of policy on disarmament will take place, and all formal decisions will be taken on behalf of the session. Following a recommendation of the Preparatory Committee, a Committee of the Whole will be established to address substantive matters on the agenda and will also consider the establishment of working groups. Consultations conducted by the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee and views expressed by delegations indicate a measure of agreement on the establishment of three working groups, although their mandates are not yet clear. The decision on this matter is to be taken at the special session.

It is important to bear in mind that the special session is not a negotiating forum for the achievement of particular disarmament or arms limitation agreements or treaties. To serve that purpose, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva -- the sole negotiating multilateral forum -- was established. The session will provide Member States with a special opportunity to exchange views and discuss in depth issues concerning not only such agreements, but also other measures which might enhance the process of disarmament. The special session will be an exercise in attempting to narrow differences, explore new ideas, find new avenues for compromise, thus bringing the participants closer to mutually acceptable positions.

Realistic expectations require a pragmatic assessment of the current status of disarmament deliberations and negotiations. It is also essential that such an assessment be done in the light of the complexities of the current international situation.

What, then, can be expected from the third special session devoted to disarmament?

The third special session is being convened at a time when considerable changes are taking place in the international situation, the most notable being the evolution in the relations between the two major Powers and their respective alliances. The recently concluded agreement on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles and the prospects for an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in nuclear strategic weapons provide a positive setting for the special session. So does the important progress registered within the framework of the Stockholm Conference, as well as in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in the area of chemical weapons, where, although complex work remains to be done, there is reason to expect agreement in the foreseeable future.

For many States, too, multilateral disarmament fora remain the primary need for multilateral solutions to international problems, including arms limitation and disarmament. The successful conclusion in 1985 of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the positive results of the recently held International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development held in 1987 attest to that.

Replies received from Member States expressing their views on the work of and prospects for the third special session, indicate a certain degree of agreement on some general points which might serve as useful guidelines in assessing the overall expectations regarding the session:

1. It is important to recognize the historical significance of the Final Document of the first special session as the most comprehensive set of principles and guidelines for disarmament adopted by the international community.
2. The success of the special session should not be measured in terms of its ability to adopt any specific programme of action but, rather, the session should be seen as an international gathering whose primary objective should be a sober and pragmatic reaffirmation of the indispensable role of multilateralism in international affairs.
3. The third special session should be future-oriented and try to identify points of convergence, that is, areas on which consensus can be built and eventually lead to the successful conclusion of agreements.
4. While the importance of bilateral initiatives in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, particularly regarding the two major Powers, must be recognized, it is essential that multilateralism and the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in the process of disarmament be reaffirmed.
5. The principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces must be borne in mind if any serious approach to disarmament is to be considered.
6. The special session must unequivocally confirm the principle that peace and security are universal requirements for all States and that, in the attainment of this objective, not only must the interests of all States be duly taken into account, but their concrete practical contribution to the process must also be sought.

## **PARTICIPATION**

Because of the great significance of special sessions for the multilateral process of disarmament, present and future, the Preparatory Committee for the third special session has recommended that Member States be represented at the highest possible political level. The Secretary-General has added his words to urge heads of State or Government of Member States to attend.

While the General Assembly is an intergovernmental forum, the previous special sessions on disarmament fully recognized that the debate on disarmament issues could not be detached from public opinion. More specifically, the role of peace and disarmament research institutions and non-governmental organizations in this process was highlighted and provisions were made to allow for some

direct input by those institutions and organizations in the special sessions. The Preparatory Committee has thus recommended that the same facilities be accorded to peace and disarmament research institutions and non-governmental organizations at the third special session as those which they received at the first and second special sessions of the Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In line with this recommendation and with the established rules of procedure of the General Assembly, duly accredited research institutions and non-governmental organizations will be given the opportunity to attend public meetings of the third special session, and to submit written statements to the session on matters related to its provisional agenda. A limited number of them will also be able to make oral statements.

The time allotted may not be sufficient to allow for all institutions and organizations interested in speaking at the session, to do so. However, should your organization decide to request an oral statement, please notify the Department for Disarmament Affairs by 1 April 1988 unless you have already done so.

In addition to their official participation, it is expected that both before and during the third special session, NGOs will organize a number of parallel activities.

Scholars, researchers and experts in the field of peace and disarmament are also encouraged to contribute to this process by addressing the topics in the agenda of the session, for instance, in articles in publications of their organizations.

Daily briefings will be organized by the Secretariat of the United Nations during the session to keep participants from research institutions and NGOs informed of relevant developments.

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## DISCUSSION

**THOMAS F. BARTHELEMY**

I would like to offer several comments regarding the Third Special Session. They represent my own views rather than of any institution with which I am or have been associated.

After the second special session in 1982 the state of international security and of disarmament negotiations appeared to deteriorate further for a time. To be sure, there was no shortage of disarmament proposals; but for some, the preoccupation was with declaratory freezes, moratoria, etc., totally devoid of measures for verifying compliance. Then a change seemed to begin, perhaps most notably when the INF negotiations between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. resumed.

In the past three years progress has been most clearly registered. Long efforts to uphold the U.N. Charter's crucial Article II, Paragraph 4 in Southwest Asia, including by the General Assembly, may now bear fruit. Disarmament negotiations achieved success in Europe (the CDE Agreement) and between the superpowers (the INF Treaty), and substantial progress has been achieved in the bilateral START and nuclear testing negotiations. The negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament to finally and comprehensively ban chemical weapons from the Earth have achieved several important breakthroughs - although the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning use continues to be flouted, with largely ineffective international community responses.

Thus, any inclination by nonaligned movement members or others to portray the disarmament negotiating scene as bleak are unjustified and should be resisted at SSOD III by all who are serious and realistic about continuing to strengthen international security. Informed international opinion rightly focuses on practical steps reflecting genuine commitment to the Charter's Principles, not whether that progress has been registered by one or another forum. Nor, surely, should the forward movement on security in the world community be tested only in terms how many disarmament agreements have been opened for adherence at the General Assembly. In the early 1979s the Biological Weapons Convention and the Environmental Modification Convention were completed by the predecessor body to the Conference on Disarmament; but the former convention had to be settled on without provisions for international verification of compliance, and the latter was hardly a seminal achievement.

In the past six years, to speak only of the General Assembly and the CD for the moment, agreement has been registered on the paramount importance of avoiding any major war, including of course a nuclear war, which, it was agreed, could not be won by any participant. Also, much wider recognition has been achieved that arms limitation and disarmament agreements are of value only when compliance with such binding undertakings can be effectively verified to the satisfaction of all states parties. New emphasis has been given to confidence-building and conventional arms limitation measures, especially on a regional basis. The General Assembly has agreed on the importance of openness by states about legitimate self-defense measures they are taking, and some concrete progress has followed.

Indeed, many of the above have occurred in the context of the complex negotiations at the CD

aimed at banning CW. A final successful conclusion to those negotiations is certainly not yet in view, but disarmament research institutions that are working in this field know that practical answers to many of the essential problems are being found. By all means, governments that have held back essential information about their own CW activities or have failed to commit themselves to measures needed to verify compliance should not go unchallenged when they disparage the CW negotiations or insist that priority be given to nuclear and other disarmament proposals that are unverifiable and therefore purely exhortatory or that ignore the security concerns of U.N. Members States. I have in mind here, particularly, an "urgent" CTBT, chemical weapons free zones and some proposals for nuclear weapon free zones.

By concentrating on substance and objectivity, the disarmament research centers can make a genuine contribution to ongoing and potential new negotiations as well as to the avoidance of unjustified prophecies of gloom by a few who cannot comprehend the real progress in the international security and disarmament field. Least of all should broadly philosophical issues such as "disarmament and development" or a "comprehensive program for disarmament" - on which there are regrettably important, honest and mutually respectful differences - be allowed to bring SSOD III to a rancorous conclusion similar to what occurred at SSOD II.

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#### **JOSEPH ROTBLAT**

Mr. Barthelemy has made a useful contribution to the discussion on the Third UNSSOD and I would be in agreement with him except for the comments he made in the last minute of his speech.

I do not accept that the freeze issue is dead. It is not a question of having either a freeze or the INF Treaty; both are needed. Indeed, a freeze is essential if the integrity of the INF Treaty is to be maintained. Without a freeze on new developments, new weapons will be developed under the pretext of modernization, which will in effect completely nullify the achievements of the INF Treaty.

The same applies to a comprehensive test ban treaty. The real obstacles here is not verification but the development of new weapons. Recent advances in seismology have shown that it is now possible to detect and identify explosions of a yield less than one kiloton. From the point of view of verification there is therefore no reason why a CTB, or a very low threshold treaty, should not be agreed upon. The only reason why this has not happened, is because it would make it impossible to develop new generations of nuclear weapons, particularly those related to the SDI programme.

Since Dr. Kamal's background paper has been mentioned in the discussion I would like to make a comment on it. I am very unhappy about his attempt to downgrade nuclear warfare as compared with conventional warfare. Conventional weapons have indeed become more lethal and destructive, but the destructive potential of nuclear weapons is still two orders of magnitude greater than that of conventional weapons.

Dr. Kamal's says that conventional weapons might perform some of the roles currently assigned to tactical nuclear weapons. I do not know of any conventional weapon that produces fall-out and kills many thousands of civilians by radiation. (A nuclear reactor is unlikely to be breached even if hit directly by a conventional bomb). Nor do I know of anything that has happened since 1978 to justify his call to water-down the relevant paragraphs in the Final Document. In fact, what we have learned in the meantime make the consequences of a nuclear war far worse than we thought before. For example, since that time we have learned about a new phenomenon, *nuclear winter*, which shows that even non-combatant countries, far away from the sites where nuclear weapons were exploded, would suffer and probably starve to death. Similarly, recent studies have shown that exposure to radiation kills at much lower doses than assumed hitherto. A study in Milan, of the effects of a limited nuclear war in Europe (even assuming that such a war could be limited), involving an exchange of less than 100 megatons, could result in more than 100 million fatalities. I would recommend to you the new edition of the Report of the World Health Organization on the "Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services" which has just been published.

The recent years have also seen technological advances that have intensified the nuclear arms race and greatly increased the danger of a nuclear war starting inadvertently or by accident. This is mainly due to the much reduced time interval in which a decision has to be made about a response to a perceived attack, and to the ever-increasing reliance on computers and other electronic gadgetry, which may go wrong.

It is the recognition of these dangers that is behind the demands to halt and reverse the arms race and to move away from reliance on the nuclear deterrent. There are two main reasons why some people still cling to the concept of deterrence. One is the belief that it had maintained peace in Europe since 1945. This is being presented as the gospel truth, but it is only a supposition without any scientific evidence to support it. There is no proof that war would have occurred if we did not have nuclear weapons. The deterrent has obviously not prevented the many wars in other continents, in several of which nuclear weapon states were directly involved. The second belief, that nuclear deterrence has created stability in the world, is completely false. A system cannot be called stable if it demands continuous change, and this has been the case with the nuclear arms race. At no time during the past four decades has either side been satisfied with what they had in their nuclear arsenals, even though these were much larger than required for deterrence purposes. Throughout the whole period there has been a continuous growth of nuclear arsenals, either in numbers or in quality. All the time there was the need to modernize the arsenals, because technological advances kept eroding the value of the deterrent, making it vulnerable and increasing the sense of insecurity. Far from being stable, the nuclear deterrent concept kept fueling the arms race which - if continued - would inexorably lead to our destruction.

Fortunately, there has been recently a change in the political climate which is conducive to a reversal of the arms race. The new way of thinking by Mikhail Gorbachev, as exemplified by the agreement to have asymmetrical reduction in arms, and to allow on-site inspections as part of the verification process, has paved the way for radical changes and brightened considerably the prospects of nuclear disarmament. The prospect of a nuclear-free world does not look as utopian as it was even a year ago.

It is often said that people make war, not weapons. This is true, but without weapons people could

not wage war. This also applies to nuclear weapons. We cannot disinvent these weapons, and even if all existing weapons were dismantled it would not take long to reintroduce them should the need for them arise. But even if the incentive to use nuclear weapons did arise in a nuclear free world, the situation would still be much safer than if nuclear weapons were ready in the arsenals. It would take some months to manufacture the weapon, particularly if no weapon-grade plutonium or uranium were kept in storage, and this would provide valuable time for negotiations to end the conflict by peaceful means.

An agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons is contingent on devising a fool-proof system of verification of compliance, and this is likely to take a very long time. But a nuclear-free world, within the framework of general and complete disarmament, must remain our ultimate objective.

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**JEAN KLEIN**

Dans son intervention, M. Strelsov a déploré que certains problèmes n'aient pas fait l'objet d'une discussion approfondie et il a suggéré qu'à l'avenir, les chercheurs abordent l'examen de questions concrètes avec l'aide de praticiens. Cette observation me paraît pertinente, mais il est clair que l'ordre du jour de la conférence de l'UNIDIR, le nombre des participants et l'organisation des débats (toutes les interventions ont eu lieu en séance plénière) ne permettaient pas de satisfaire aux exigences formulées par M. Strelsov. Il conviendrait donc que les organisateurs de la Conférence tirent des leçons de cette expérience et définissent d'une manière plus précise l'ordre du jour des prochaines conférences.

A propos de la 3ème session extraordinaire de l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sur le désarmement, Mr. Nordenfelt a fait le point sur la préparation de cette rencontre et indiqué les limites de l'entreprise. Il a indiqué que ce ne serait pas un forum de négociation et qu'il ne fallait pas s'attendre à des résultats tangibles. Pour l'essentiel, les Etats participants procéderont à un examen de la situation internationale et des négociations en cours et étudieront les moyens d'accroître le rôle des Nations Unies en matière de désarmement. Toutefois, on ne laisse pas d'être surpris par le fait que l'élaboration d'un programme global de désarmement ne soit plus pris en considération.

Certes, le désarmement général et complet est un objectif lointain, sinon une utopie, mais il incombe aux Nations Unies de maintenir cette visée, étant entendu qu'une approche sélective et la conclusion d'accords partiels sont parfaitement conciliables avec la poursuite d'un objectif plus ambitieux à long terme. En outre, la diplomatie bilatérale ne devrait pas être vitupérée au nom d'un multilatéralisme qui correspondrait mieux aux exigences de l'universalité et de la démocratisation des relations internationales. Ce qui importe en définitive, c'est le renforcement de la sécurité par le désarmement et tous les progrès réalisés dans ce sens méritent d'être salués, quelles que soient les méthodes utilisées pour y parvenir. A cet égard, la responsabilité principale des deux protagonistes nucléaires et des grandes puissances militaires en général n'est pas exclusive du rôle éminent qui revient aux Nations Unies pour délibérer du désarmement et montrer la voie qui y conduit.

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**SILVANA DA SILVA**

I should like to make a brief comment in response to one particular point made by Mr. Barthelemy in his presentation when he questioned that the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

I disagree with Mr. Barthelemy's position and must confess that I am both surprised and disappointed to note that none of those present has taken issue with what he said in this connection.

I would like to say that the United Nations does have a central role and primary responsibility in the process of arms limitation and disarmament deliberations, since it provides a multilateral forum where interested parties can actively participate in the debate of issues such as international peace and security, which are, after all, multilateral in character and effect and, therefore, in the interest of all the members of the international community. To illustrate my statement, I find it useful to recall that it was not until the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was held in 1978, that a majority of nations, not least a number of non-aligned States, took a more active role in this area. To date, for many such States, multilateral disarmament forums remain the only means for them to pursue their interests in the field of security and disarmament. Let us also not forget that up until the first special session both France and China, two nuclear States, permanent Members of the Security Council, had stayed outside the mainstream of disarmament negotiations. Beginning with the first special session, these two countries took their place in the multilateral scene.

So the United Nations has indeed contributed a great deal to making the process of arms limitation and disarmament negotiations and deliberations one in which the voice of every State can be heard, and I believe the Organization can continue to contribute to this end.

In conclusion, I would like to add just one more thing to reinforce my point: multilateralism is not meant to replace bilateralism, neither is anyone proposing that it does. Both approaches are instrumental in their own right and should be regarded as complementary to each other rather than as competing with each other.

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**MILJAN KOMATINA**

It is not my intention to sum up, and I could not do it even if I wanted. I understand that the reports and debates, which speak for themselves, will be published. I am not a researcher but a diplomat, and therefore, my language may be more cautious while researchers have the advantage of a kind of *licencia scientifica*. Nevertheless, I would like to make two or three remarks. First of all, I congratulate UNIDIR for a successful conference which was timely, substantial and purposeful. Timely, because it came at the time of change, when all efforts, scientific, diplomatic, political, cultural, should be unified and multiplied to give substance to this change, to make it irreversible, and to increase the knowledge because many errors have been caused by political myopia or simply by ignorance. Substantial, because of the

participation of many outstanding analysts of international relations. It might have been more substantial if, for example, the agenda was more structured. UNIDIR will certainly draw the right conclusion in order to avoid a dispersion of efforts. The conference was purposeful because it addressed the priorities of research for the last decade of the 20th century. This conference confirms UNIDIR as a focal point for coordination of efforts, from which diplomats will draw benefit and which will enable them to play fully their role as *homo habilis*, in one word, to achieve a constructive parallelism between science, politics and diplomacy. For me at least, this conference was very instructive and I am not sure that researchers know how much they influence diplomats. Suffice it to mention the example of SIPRI, whose publications are a sort of text-book for many diplomats of countries which have less independent research capabilities.

The second remark is related to the fact that this conference has confirmed the crucial role of research in clarifying concepts, identifying new emerging questions, developing new approaches and alternatives. This is today as important as ever because of both positive and negative trends in international relations. If, on one side, there is a growing understanding of new security requirements, better understanding of dangers of uncontrolled arms race, increased awareness of the need to accord our behaviours to the new environment in the nuclear and space era, and to lay foundations for new relations, on the other side, the arms race remains a constant feature of our world, the high intensity of tension in many regions, is and will be, continuing for a long time ahead. Hence the need to avoid oversimplification and distortions but also a kind of obscurantism generated by dogmas or voluntarism of any kind in the assessment of trends and events. This obviously cannot be done without scientific research, without scientific input. Science, by definition, can be ahead of politics and diplomacy; science can be more independent, more critical but less scholastic and offering more concrete solutions. Under these conditions, science will be able to give the real input to global re-thinking, not only by analyzing and explaining the nature of processes, but also by predicting the course of events. It will do so if it takes a future-oriented look in the applications and implications of science and technology, not by arresting or controlling scientific research, but by charting a sort of cooperative demarche at the planetary level.

The third observation I wanted to make, which might be more controversial, is about the role of the United Nations, and specifically SSODs. Continuing on what Ms. Da Silva said, I would like to stress that whatever is our basic approach to global multilateralism or our view on its identity, potentials and prospects, there is a simple fact: multilateralism is not a gift but an objective part of international life. It stems from the structure of the international community, from globality of dangers and diversity of threats to survival and security. In one word, multilateralism stems from interdependence. This of course becomes a controversial notion if understood in terms of substitution of multilateral bodies to other negotiating tables or in terms of opposition to bilateral or regional negotiation processes. Multilateralism is nothing of all that; on the contrary, it is able to reinforce all negotiations and has always done so. The UN has always called for bilateral dialogue, was always in favour of bilateral achievements, has never been opposed to bilateral negotiations, on the contrary. There is no possible rigid definitions of relationship between bilateral and multilateral approach. They are parallel in creative and constructive complementarity. Many items are on the agenda of many negotiating tables, bilateral, regional, and globally multilateral. Multilateralism should not be seen in terms of number of participants but in terms of substance; it is not a matter of abstract democracy, but of the need for all countries, unevenly and unequally - because all countries do not have the same responsibility and all questions are not equally ripe for a solution - to participate, to be present at the creation of a system of international relations, of

a structure of international security and of a concept of peace. All countries have not only to express their views but to constructively contribute to the negotiations of real disarmament agreements in whatever framework they are negotiated. One cannot avoid positive rhetoric when speaking about the United Nations, about democracy, and about great ideas of unity and interdependence of our world. But beyond such rhetoric remains the mere fact that the durability and credibility of agreements depends on the universal adherence to them and this cannot be done without the full participation of all concerned. In my view, there cannot be a legitimate, durable policy of security and disarmament unless it is capable of articulating particular interests, synthesizing them in a sort of common denominator and ensuring a real participation of all actors.

I don't want to enter into the meaning of the irreplaceable role of the United Nations in general and SSODs in particular. Their role is not to dictate security policies to individual countries, impose rigid sets of measures or determine the pace of negotiations. SSODs are meant to unify the efforts, to promote and universalize the dialogue, deepen the consensus, broaden the visions of global security while recognizing specific conditions and solutions to develop negotiating potentialities and strengthen international action in favour of disarmament. In that way I think SSODs are a great, global confidence-building measure. SSOD III acquires more importance due to the changing political environment and the positive evolution of ideas and facts, and it will contribute to this evolution. Of course, we will have to make some re-appraisals which are always necessary, of all old-fashioned agendas, of our sometimes slow reactions to changes, of our methods. We have to overcome what sometimes appears as a crisis of identity in respect of the need to distinguish between what we can achieve and what we would like to achieve. It will always be so in disarmament. This SSOD III should not be the repetition of SSOD I, which is unrepeatably. It adopted the Final Document, achieving the broadest international consensus on disarmament. This document, as all written documents, is interpretable, but it remains a sort of Charter on disarmament which up-dates the UN Charter, enriches and completes it. We don't need to repeat such a document. With new political realities and technological developments, we need a good deal of pragmatism but also vision not only to avert an impasse or to preserve bureaucratic institutions but to prevent a narrow view of the world, to influence as much as we can the pace and substance of negotiations. To avoid failure, we should strike a sort of realistic profile but not at equidistance between "nihilistic" or "utopian" expectations. SSOD III is not the beginning of a new phase but we should not neglect the fact that 150 States at high political level will gather to speak about disarmament and security. Realism is not a choice between extremes but the right assessment of conditions for action and adoption of right decisions.

Basic messages of SSOD III would, in my view, be to address disarmament as a global question because all questions have a multilateral dimension including first of all nuclear questions, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the proof of that; to renew and revitalize the multilateral approach, not as an extraneous exercise, but integrating efforts into present realities and necessities to chart achievable programme within realistic directions. We have not achieved enough since 1982 but we can build up on the existing movement towards disarmament. After all, the basic principles of the Final Document, the relationship between the arms race and security (more arms does not mean more but less security) has begun to be implemented.

I will at the end say a few words about the Conference on Disarmament which deserves more research. The predecessors of the CD have shown potentials of multilateralism with about ten

multilateral agreements signed. We have not had any multilateral agreements since a decade but the Conference on Disarmament, with the representative composition of 40 militarily-relevant countries, has ensured the continuity of dialogue when it was interrupted elsewhere, has done huge preparatory and pre-negotiations work and is now negotiating on major disarmament agreement in the area of chemical weapons. It has also clarified many new concepts and questions from a broader perspective.

Disarmament is the most complex political process and needs parallel efforts on many fronts, internal and external, and this Conference has shown that the role of research is irreplaceable because, I want to repeat it on this occasion also, many errors and misperceptions have been caused by ignorance.

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### **JAYANTHA DHANAPALA**

Ladies and Gentlemen, we have concluded two and a half days of discussion. For me it has been a rich and rewarding intellectual experience. Our purposes in UNIDIR in organizing this Conference have been amply fulfilled.

- We have been able to strengthen the co-operative links existing among the disarmament research community and think about creating new links.
- We have been able to discuss what areas demand scholarly attention in the immediate future drawing from our experience in the past.
- Finally we have discussed what has to be done and what can be done at the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament during which the US-USSR Summit will also take place, and how we can collectively contribute to its success.

A number of interesting and useful ideas have surfaced in the discussions. I will not attempt to summarize them. However, among the themes that emerged was that the disarmament research community had an indisputably important role in constructing the conceptual framework for the disarmament process. In the evaluation of this role it was recognized that we should not be partisan advocates but remain objective researchers. While there was an impressive body of research already, it was acknowledged that more needs to be done.

A number of practical suggestions have been made, some of them directed at UNIDIR. We have taken careful note of these and will make every effort to respond within the framework of our mandate and the constraints of our resources. To repeat the Miltonic line quoted by Mr. Schwendler "*Had we but light enough and time*"!

Indeed the problem of resource constraints seems to be universal but certainly more acute among developing countries.

A number of areas for research were focussed upon ranging from the nuclear issues to conventional disarmament, regional disarmament, verification, confidence-building measures, non-military threats to security, strategic stability, etc. The need to study technical issues in depth and to use sophisticated research tools including data bases was mentioned. The role of the UN in disarmament was also cited as an important area for research. The priorities vary from Institute to Institute - what is ethnocentric or region specific to some is of crucial relevance to others.

Many participants viewed UNIDIR as a forum or clearing house in the network of research institutes. Some have even suggested that this Conference should be repeated perhaps every other year. We will consider these proposals carefully. On the organization of the Conference, in view of the fact that we were holding such a Conference after seven years, it was necessary to broaden the scope of discussion while not prolonging the duration of the meeting. Future meetings will be more shape focused.

With regard to the Third Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, Research Institutes will of course have the opportunity of being heard during these proceedings. But beyond that formal participation, it was recognized that we can assist in shaping the discussion and influencing the debate.

May I conclude by saying that UNIDIR has benefitted greatly from your contribution to this Conference. The proceedings of the Conference will be published as a UNIDIR publication and we will be communicating with you on this in the coming weeks.

I would like to thank you all for your presence and to wish to you a safe journey back to your countries. My thanks are due to the Government of the USSR and in particular to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their assistance; the authorities of the Krasnodar region for their hospitality; IMEMO and its staff for the excellent arrangements made for the Conference; the interpreters for their hard work and finally to the Hotel Staff.

The UNIDIR Conference for Disarmament Research Institutes is now concluded.

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