

**Disarmament and Conflict
Resolution Project**

**Managing Arms
in Peace Processes:
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe**



**UNITED NATIONS
NATIONS UNIES**

UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement

UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Geneva

**Disarmament and
Conflict Resolution Project**

**Managing Arms in Peace Processes:
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe**

Paper: *Jeremy Ginifer*
Questionnaire Compilation: *LT Col J.W. Potgieter*,
Military Expert, DCR Project

Project funded by: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Finland, France, Austria, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Argentina, and the Republic of South Africa.

UNITED NATIONS
New York and Geneva, 1995

NOTE

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

*
* *

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Secretariat.

UNIDIR/95/41

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

<i>Sales No.</i> GV.E.95.0.28

ISBN 92-9045-109-2

Table of Contents

	Page
Preface - <i>Sverre Lodgaard</i>	v
Acknowledgements	vii
Project Introduction - <i>Virginia Gamba</i>	ix
Project Staff	xvii
List of Acronyms	xix
Part I: Case Study	1
1. Introduction	3
2. Political and Historical Context of Demilitarization in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia	5
2.1 The Civil War	6
3. The Role of External Intervention in the Demilitarization Settlement	10
4. Negotiating the Demilitarization Mandate	13
4.1 Points of Contention: British Hegemony	16
4.2 Inequalities in the Status of the Warring Factions	18
4.3 The Issue of External Intervention	20
4.4 Partiality	21
4.5 Imposition Versus Facilitation	22
4.6 Duration of Cease-Fire	24

5. Operational Implementation of Demilitarization	25
5.1 Implementation	26
5.2 Containment Crisis Points	34
5.3 Development of Dialogue/Cooperation	46
5.4 Development of Reconciliation	47
5.5 Integration into a Unified National Force	49
6. Conclusion	51
Biographical Note	57
Part II Bibliography	59
Part III Questionnaire Analysis	69
 List of Maps	
Southern Rhodesia	67
Zimbabwe	68

Preface

Under the headline of Collective Security, UNIDIR is conducting a major project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examines the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts. It collects field experiences regarding the demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviews 11 collective security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examines the role that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), UNOMOZ (Mozambique), Liberia, Haiti and the 1979 Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.

Being an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time, being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the Secretary General's report on "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era",¹ the DCR Project also relates to a great many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional auspices. Last but not least, comprehensive networks of communication and co-operation have been developed with UN personnel having field experience.

Weapons-wise, the disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many armed conflicts. UNIDIR recently published a paper on this subject (*Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, UNIDIR Paper No 34, 1995). The Secretary General's appeal for stronger efforts to control small arms - to promote "micro disarmament"² - is one which UNIDIR will continue to attend to in the framework of the DCR Project.

This Report on the demilitarization of Patriotic Front guerrillas and Government forces in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in 1979/1980 is the only case study

¹ Document A/C.1/47/7, No 31, 23 October 1992.

² Document 50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

from the Cold War period. All the others examine peace operations conducted in the 1990's. At the time, inter-position peacekeeping was well understood; however, the British Commonwealth undertook a novel approach: the separation and cantonment of forces. The analysis of this pioneering effort was made by Jeremy Ginifer while staying at UNIDIR in the winter/spring of 1995. It has been reviewed by Peter Batchelor (the Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa), Steven John Stedman (John Hopkins University, Washington D.C.) and by the project staff. It is the second in a series of UNIDIR Reports on the disarmament dimension of peace operations. There will be a Report on each of the cases mentioned above.

The authors of the case studies have drawn on the professional advice and assistance of military officers intimately acquainted with peace operations. They were Col. Roberto Bendini (Argentina), Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen (Finland) and Lt. Col. Jakkie Potgieter (South Africa). UNIDIR is grateful to all of them for their invaluable contributions to clarifying and solving the multitude of questions and problems we put before them. This Report also benefitted from the assistance of the British Armed Forces in securing lists of practitioners for the Questionnaire responses on this case.

Since October 1994, the DCR Project has developed under the guidance of Virginia Gamba. Under her able leadership, the project has not only become the largest in UNIDIR history: its evolution has been a source of inspiration for the entire Institute.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in the Report. They are Dr Ginifer's. My final word of thanks goes to him: UNIDIR has been happy to have such a resourceful and dedicated collaborator.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed in these papers which are those of their authors. Nevertheless, UNIDIR considers that such papers merit publication and recommends them to the attention of its readers.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR

Acknowledgements

The DCR Project takes this opportunity to thank the many foundations and governments who have contributed with finance and personnel to the setting up and evolution of the research associated with the Project. Among our contributors the following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Finland, France, Austria, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Argentina, and the Republic of South Africa.

Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centred on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.

Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the *international* arena, whereas now it is to stabilize *domestic* situations. The international community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local security, and by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability.¹

¹ James S. Sutterlin, "Military Force in the Service of Peace", *Aurora Papers*, No 18, Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993, p.13.

The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations' presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence, such as the one in Rwanda in 1994. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilizing actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined as longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the international community. More and more organizations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and does,

militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.

There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who *do* focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Control of Arms during Peace Processes (CAPP)

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example, instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis include confidence-building measures, weapons control agreements, and the control of illegal weapons transfers across borders.² Likewise, during conflict situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors. Finally, after the termination of armed conflict, a situation of stability is required for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be facilitated by troop

² Fred Tanner, "Arms Control in Times of Conflict", Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, PRAC Paper 7, October 1993.

withdrawals, the demilitarization of border zones, and effective disarmament, demobilization and demining.

Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities centre on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighbouring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of recurrent problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and problems concerned with the lack of co-ordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were understood differently. The establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease-fire arrangements. Such a demonstration of resolve would make it more

difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was underway.

The co-ordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is co-operation and co-ordination between the international effort and the nations which immediately neighbour the stricken country. But co-ordination must not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be co-ordinated among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of co-ordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organizations working in the field; these components must co-operate with each other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission co-ordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided, including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and population protection mechanisms.

Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account *both* the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, *and also* the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighbouring countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, *the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management programme that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programmes between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.*

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*; (2) the development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which

disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

Between September 1995 and March 1996, the Project foresees four sets of publications. The first of these will involve eleven case studies, covering peace operations in Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Bosnia/Croatia, Central America (ONUCA and ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. The second set of publications will include nine policy papers, addressing topics such as Security Council Procedures, Mandate Specificity, Doctrine, Rules of Engagement, Coercive versus Consensual Arms Control and Demobilization Processes, Consensus, Intelligence and Media, and Training. A third set of publications will involve three papers on the relationship between arms and conflict in the region of Southern Africa. The last of the Project's published works will be an overarching policy paper summarizing the conclusions of the research and delineating recommendations based on the Project's findings.

Taking into account the existing material on some of the case studies, the DCR project has purposefully concentrated on providing more information on the disarmament and arms control components of the relevant international peace operations than on providing a comprehensive political and diplomatic account of each case.

The first volume published by the DCR Project examined the way in which three international peace processes (UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) struggled with the issue of controlling and managing light weapons in Somalia. This volume of the DCR series introduces the second of the Project's case studies, focusing on the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in Rhodesia. The volume is divided into three sections. The first section analyzes the role of the CMF in assisting Rhodesia's transition to full democracy. The second section presents a full bibliography of primary and secondary material used in the making of this study. Finally, the third section provides a summary of the responses regarding the CMF mission which were obtained through the Project's own *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*.

My special thanks go to the researcher for this case study, Dr. Jeremy Ginifer, and also to the project staff at UNIDIR, especially our Information Officer, Kent Highnam; our Specialized Publications Editor, Cara Cantarella; and the interns who served as coordinators for this publication, Mira Berglund and Lara Bernini.

Virginia Gamba
Project Director
Geneva, August 1995

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project

Project Staff

Project Director
Virginia Gamba

Primary Project Researcher
Andrei Raevsky

Information Officer
Kent Highnam

Specialized Publications Editor
Cara Cantarella

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Production Assistance

Publication Coordinators
Mira Berglund, Intern
Lara Bernini, Intern

Camera-Ready Production
Anita Blétry, Specialized Secretary (Publications)

Editorial Assistance
Gaëlle Arenson, Intern

Publication Consultant
Claudia Querner, Junior Professional Officer

List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
AP	Assembly Point
BMATT	British Military Assistance Training Team
BSAP	British South Africa Police
CBT	Company Base Team
CC	Cease-fire Commission
CMF	Commonwealth Monitoring Force
COMOPS	Communication Operations
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FLS	Front-Line States
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambique Liberation Front)
GPMG	General-Purpose Machine Gun
HQ	Headquarters
JOC	Joint Operational Command
LO	Liaison Officer
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NP	National Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PF	Patriotic Front
RFP	Rhodesia Front Party
RSF	Rhodesian Security Forces
RV	Rendezvous Point
SADF	South African Defence Force
SC	Security Council
TTL	Tribal Trust Land
UN	United Nations
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

Part I:
Case Study

1. Introduction*

The Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) was greeted with almost universal pessimism when it arrived in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in December 1979 to demilitarize the 15-year civil war that had been raging between nationalist guerrilla forces and the Rhodesian government. Almost all the indicators were unfavourable: the protagonists were hostile to the force; its mandate was perceived as flawed; fighting continued, despite a cease-fire; and the peace process was precarious. Yet the CMF mission has been regarded subsequently as one of the most effective demilitarization operations that has been

* The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of the following individuals and organizations in terms of his research.

In the UK: Maj Gen Sir John Acland (ret); Col J.B.A. Bailey, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Staff College, Camberley; Ruth Emily Bailey, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton; Dr Mats R. Berdal, Research Fellow, International Institute for Strategic Studies; David Blake, Library, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London; Dr Phyllis Ferguson, St Antony's College, Oxford; the staff at Greenwich College Library; Margaret Hall, African Research Unit, Research & Analysis Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office; Dr Darryl Howlett, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton; Col A.T.B. Kimber, Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, Ministry of Defence; A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, St Antony's College, Oxford; Prof Kenneth Kirkwood, St Antony's College, Oxford; Dr Peter Lyon, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London; Bruce Mann, Director of Defence Policy, Ministry of Defence; Brig R.J. Rhoderick-Jones (ret); the library, School of African and Oriental Studies, University of London; Prof John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton; T.B. Smyth, Black Watch Association; and the Hartley Library, University of Southampton.

Valuable assistance was also provided in South Africa by Dr Peter Batchelor, Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town and Prof Annette Seegers, Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town; in Zimbabwe by Lt Col Martin Rupiah (ret), Department of History, University of Zimbabwe; and in the United States by Dr Stephen Stedman, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, John Hopkins University.

The support of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), its director, Sverre Lodgaard, and the project director of the Disarmament and Conflict Resolution project (DCR), Virginia Gamba, is also gratefully acknowledged, along with that of other UNIDIR staff and various military officers who visited the DCR project during its duration.

Finally, the author would also like to thank the Ministry of Defence, London, for their financial support and assistance. It should be noted, however, that this report does not reflect the views or policy of the Ministry of Defence or the British government.

mounted. In less than three months it managed to disengage the combatants, initiate reconciliation and integration and, critically, it created the conditions for elections to take place and for a new Zimbabwe state to emerge.

The means by which this was achieved in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia were both innovative and idiosyncratic. In fact, the operation differed in a number of important respects from current United Nations demilitarization operations. First, disarmament was not attempted - the parties to the conflict were permitted to retain their weaponry, although their use was proscribed. Second, the UN was deliberately excluded from the process - the CMF was a Commonwealth initiative, in effect, unilaterally directed by the British. Third, the CMF rejected the UN peacekeeping and enforcement models as appropriate models for demilitarization, opting instead for a novel form of monitoring. Last, it used only minimal forces on the ground - a total of 1,319 monitors.

These methods proved controversial. The absence of disarmament allowed violence to continue at a high level during periods of the cease-fire. Accusations of partiality and authoritarianism were levelled at the British, particularly during the mandate negotiations, and the exclusion of the UN, and the absence of effective international oversight of the process were constant sources of criticism. There were claims that the success of the mission was largely fortuitous. Nevertheless, the Rhodesian operation had a core of operational and conceptual characteristics which have considerable relevance in terms of current UN demilitarization. In essence, its methods were consensual rather than coercive, and its posture characterized by vulnerability rather than assertion. It was a minimalist operation with clearly defined goals and a coherent mandate. All these factors appear to have had a strong bearing on its successful outcome and are in contradistinction to a number of recent UN demilitarization operations. Its methods were a response to a set of unique political and historical conditions in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, which will now be considered.

2. Political and Historical Context of Demilitarization in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

The monitoring force that was deployed into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in December 1979 consisted of 1,319 personnel drawn from five Commonwealth countries consisting of Australia, New Zealand, Kenya, Fiji and Britain.¹ Its brief was to monitor a cease-fire that had been agreed to by the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government and the PF guerrillas at the Lancaster House Constitutional talks earlier in the month. The two warring parties, who had been fighting a 15-year civil war, had agreed - albeit with considerable reservations - to a novel form of monitoring. This consisted of a separation process in which the Rhodesian Security Forces (RSF) withdrew from the bush to their bases, once the cease-fire was in effect, while the guerrillas congregated at Rendezvous Points (RVs) and Assembly Points (APs) that were distanced from Rhodesian bases. The CMF would then monitor both parties to ensure that they complied with the cease-fire. Both the RSF and the PF were permitted to keep their weaponry. Democratic elections were to follow in March 1980.

The CMF mandate was to a large extent a product of the extremely bitter nature of the civil war and the lack of trust between the warring parties. Ethnic, ideological and social cleavages divided the two parties, which precluded a conciliatory approach to demilitarization. The chances of

¹ Which nationalities should be represented in the force was a contentious issue. To address Patriotic Front (PF) concerns, the force was more nationally diverse than had been originally envisaged, with 159 Australians, 75 New Zealanders, 51 Kenyans and 24 Fijians, in addition to British troops. Nevertheless, the PF were concerned about the predominance of white soldiers and called for more black troops (The Patriotic Front, "Press Statement", 4 December 1979, p.4):

Is it unreasonable of us to insist that the Commonwealth Force should be more balanced and representative of the true multi-cultural character of the Commonwealth as a whole and involve such states as Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, India, and Jamaica?

The British rejected African states such as Ghana and Nigeria who had extensive peacekeeping experience, and chose the pro-Western Kenya against PF wishes. They also chose Fiji, whose soldiers were British-trained and had peacekeeping experience. According to the CMF Deputy Commander, Brig Learmont, the British did seek to consult and inform the various national contingents and they played a part at every level in the chain of command. Of the Assembly Points, four were principally manned by Australians, three by New Zealanders, and one each by the other contingents whose commanders were from Kenya and Fiji.

achieving demilitarization in fact appeared slim. The combatants had signed up to a peace process but with considerable reservations. Indeed, it was questionable whether the parties expected to fully implement the undertakings they had agreed to at Lancaster House.

The RSF continued to be hostile to the PF during the cease-fire, particularly to the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), and sought to police its movements around APs. The PF, for their part, felt vulnerable to attack under the cease-fire arrangements, and were concerned that by forgoing the military struggle they risked throwing away their military advantage. They too broke the cease-fire with acts of violence designed to intimidate voters prior to the elections. The mistrust of both parties led them into action-reaction violations of the cease-fire. The attainment of reconciliation appeared a forlorn task:

Rhodesia had seemingly inscribed itself on the permanent agenda of the world's political ethnic conundrums ... unamendable to human persuasion or reason.²

2.1 The Civil War

The roots of the conflict - the opposition of blacks to white settler minority rule - can be traced back to the creation of Rhodesia in 1895 and the annexations of Mashonaland and Mataberland by the British colonialist Cecil Rhodes. These annexations prompted rebellions, but it was not until after the Second World War and the rise of black nationalism that a cohesive challenge was mounted to white rule in Rhodesia, which was to lead to civil war.

Initially, black opposition was primarily political and designed to bring about reform. The aims of the black nationalist organizations up until the 1950s were relatively modest - they sought to modify rather than supplant the existing system. But hopes of reform were dashed by a series of hard-line responses from the white government, such as the formation of the Central African Federation in 1953 and the banning of the African National Congress (ANC). The election of the hard-line Rhodesia Front Party (RFP) by whites in 1962, and critically, the "break away" of Rhodesia from

² Jeffrey Davidow, *A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979*, Westview Press, Boulder, 1984, p.13.

Britain with the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence, were further blows to black nationalist aspirations. The lack of a military response from Britain and the continued ineffectiveness of externally negotiated settlements led to a perception that black aspirations could only truly be fulfilled through an armed struggle designed to overthrow white rule, rather than negotiation with the regime or external intervention. The two principal black opposition parties, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), formed military wings (ZANLA and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army [ZIPRA], respectively) and sent guerrillas abroad for training.³ With the first major nationalist insurgent guerrilla incident in July 1964, in which the so-called "Crocodile Gang" killed a white farmer, the eve of a civil war had been reached.

The civil war had two distinct phases. In the first phase - approximately 1964-68 - the chances of reaching a negotiated settlement appeared bleak. The Rhodesian regime was sufficiently powerful to resist black nationalist aspirations. However, in the second phase - roughly 1968-79 - political and military developments opened a window of opportunity for a settlement by the late 1970s.

The first phase, then, was characterized by the Rhodesian government's capacity to resist reform, whether internally or externally generated. The RSF were able to comfortably contain guerrilla incursions as the guerrilla tactics and training were poor. A series of incursions made by ZANLA into rural areas during 1966 and 1967 was easily defeated by the RSF, as were ZIPRA incursions from Botswana in August 1967 and from Zambia in 1968. The perception that the political system could be maintained and the guerrilla challenge contained led the Rhodesian government into isolationism and defiance of international pressure after the 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Between 1965 and 1979 more than 25 UN Resolutions were adopted by the Security Council (SC),⁴ including selective UN sanctions in 1966 and comprehensive sanctions in 1968, but these did not initially appear to have a dramatic impact on Rhodesia.

³ As early as 1963 ZANU was sending its first contingent of troops to China for guerrilla training.

⁴ The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Zimbabwe: Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence*, Australian Government Publicity Service, Canberra, 1980, p.41.

Similarly, the British-brokered 1966 Tiger proposals and the 1968 Fearless terms were rejected by the Rhodesians.

However, the capacity of the Rhodesian regime to resist internal and external challenges was steadily eroded in the post-1968 phase of the civil war. The increasing professionalism of the guerrillas exposed the manpower deficiencies of the RSF, while the decline of the Rhodesian economy, migration and war weariness exposed the inherent weakness of the government's position. It became apparent during the 1970s that the Rhodesians were unable to win the civil war and might even lose it. In a climate of mounting violence, the British initiated the 1971 Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement proposals, but these were overwhelmingly rejected by the black population and were followed by a resurgence of armed resistance at the end of 1972. This marked a substantive escalation of the guerrilla war, with ZANU guerrillas launching an offensive in northeastern Rhodesia. The offensive led Prime Minister Ian Smith to warn the public in December 1972 that the situation was "far more serious than it appear[ed] on the surface".⁵ The conflict was further complicated by the various linkages that the combatants had formed with external forces, heightening insecurities and fears of escalating external intervention.

The guerrillas' tactics became increasingly effective with the opening up of the border between Mozambique and Rhodesia in 1975 by a Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique or FRELIMO) government following Mozambique's independence. The border opening handed the guerrillas a significant advantage in the central and southern areas of Rhodesia, which came under attack from both Mozambique and Zambia, including urban areas which had previously been virtually immune. By 1975 the guerrilla war was having a significant impact, and with much of Rhodesia ungovernable and the war coming to Salisbury, ZANU was convinced that victory was certain.⁶ The guerrillas' tactics, which involved avoiding direct engagement with the RSF and disrupting government administration and the economy by attacks on farmers, were proving effective:

⁵ A.R. Wilkinson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe", in B. Davidson, J. Slovo and A.R. Wilkinson, *Southern Africa: The New Politics of Revolution*, Penguin Books, 1976, p.258.

⁶ Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1991, p.166.

Their only doubts were about the time span necessary to finish the job and how the final victory would take place.⁷

In October 1976, a tactical alliance - the PF - was formed between ZANU and ZAPU, although it was by no means a unified body with common policies. External pressure on Rhodesia to find a settlement also mounted, culminating in the Anglo-American proposals of 1977, which were rejected. But the intensification of the civil war between 1977 and mid-1979⁸ as well as external pressures forced the regime to make limited concessions to black aspirations. In early 1978, Ian Smith entered into the Salisbury Agreement with the black leaders, Bishop Abel Muzorewa (United African National Council), Ndabaningi Sithole (ZANU) and Jeremiah Chirau (Zimbabwe National Front). The Internal Settlement of 1979 marked an attempt to devolve power to "moderate" blacks while still retaining "behind the scenes" influence. This drew little support internally or internationally, however, and the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) of 8 March and 30 April 1979 condemned the Internal Settlement process.

The RSF were palpably losing the initiative with guerilla numbers rising rapidly and the RSF coming under increasing strain. Estimates of the strength of the RSF vary. A British estimate suggests that at best the RSF was able to mobilize about 43,000 personnel during the civil war to combat an effective guerrilla strength of about 22,000 - far less than is required to achieve a favourable result in a counter-revolutionary war. However, other estimates take a broader view of the deployable strength of the RSF and suggest that they had about 100,000 personnel they could call upon.⁹ The effectiveness of Rhodesian tactics was also questionable. Unlike the guerrillas, who saw the struggle in terms of its wider political and social context, the Rhodesian military strategy stressed military superiority. Excessive concentration on the military dimension precluded a more sophisticated approach that stressed "hearts and minds" rather than

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ By 1979 over 90% of the country was under martial law.

⁹ See Martin Rupiah, *Problems of Demobilization and Integration: the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980-87: Operation Merger*, The South African Service Corp., Seminar, "Any Lessons for Zimbabwe?", Pretoria/Johannesburg, 2 March 1995.

resources, control of territory, and the suppression of dissent.¹⁰ Given the capacity of the PF to endure, and the Rhodesians' moral, emotional and economic exhaustion, it was clear that the RSF could not win the war. Conscription was beginning to seriously impact on the economy and many whites "were wondering whether Rhodesian society warranted such sacrifices".¹¹ The direct cost of the war represented 37% of 1979-80 government budget expenditure.¹²

It was in this climate of weakening Rhodesian resolve and increasing external pressure that the parties went to the negotiating table. A conference was called in Lusaka in August 1979. It was agreed at Lusaka, 1 - 7 August, that comprehensive, all-party talks would be held in London at Lancaster House in September 1979, in an attempt to achieve a comprehensive settlement, a cease-fire and demilitarization.

3. The Role of External Intervention in the Demilitarization Settlement

The military successes of the PF played a major part in forcing the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government to negotiate. However, the role of external actors also proved critical in the Lusaka and Lancaster House processes. They not only pressured the parties into attending, but they also averted breakdowns at the crisis points that characterized the peace process.

The peace process was made feasible by an extraordinary convergence of external interest in a settlement during 1979, which had been absent from previous negotiations. Most of the external parties stood to gain from a cessation of the conflict. There was a sense that 1979 presented a last window of opportunity for a settlement before the civil war assumed catastrophic proportions. The Front-Line States (FLS) were key actors in both exerting leverage on, and representing the interests of, the PF. The FLS were eager to see a settlement and demilitarization, not just out of

¹⁰ It has recently been suggested that the Rhodesian military was in fact in favour of a "hearts and minds" type of campaign, but was over-ruled. See Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds), "Volume Introduction", in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, vol. I, University of Zimbabwe Publications & James Currey, Heinemann, Portsmouth, 1995, p.15.

¹¹ The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *op. cit.*, p.169.

¹² *Ibid.*

black nationalist solidarity, but also because they were nearing the point where they were unable to sustain the economic and military costs imposed by the Rhodesians in retaliation for the FLS' support of the PF.

Rhodesia, making its last desperate bid to stave off defeat, was widening the war in an effort to weaken the will and capacity of Zambia and Mozambique to continue their support for the PF forces; and its forces were indeed successful in bringing the economies of both countries to the point of collapse.¹³

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was also in a position to bring considerable pressure to bear on the guerrilla movements, because of their dependence on it and the FLS.¹⁴

The British government, which had historic constitutional responsibilities in Rhodesia, saw an opportunity to finally resolve the intractable issue of a negotiated settlement at Lancaster House. Rhodesia had become a political liability, particularly in terms of Britain's political and economic relations with key Commonwealth partners. Britain saw the talks as the last chance to bring about a settlement and was consequently prepared to be forceful and take risks. According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) the:

... situation was ripe for one *final* attempt to reach an all-sides settlement *provided that Britain was prepared to act boldly and seize the initiative.*¹⁵

Because of its constitutional and historic connections with Rhodesia, it was able to apply leverage on both the PF and the RSF.

The Commonwealth was a key supporter of the PF's position in the face of the frequently tough negotiating stances adopted by the British. Its influence was felt most strongly during the talks where it frequently worked through the informal Southern African group of High Commissioners in

¹³ Colin Legum, "Southern Africa: The Road to and from Lancaster House", *Africa Contemporary Record*, Annual Survey and Documents, 1979-80, Africana Publishing Company, London, 1981, p.A4.

¹⁴ It is interesting to note that from an early stage in the conflict the OAU took the view that it could more or less impose unity on the liberation movements. At one point prior to the formation of the PF, the OAU Liberation Committee even refused to release ZIPRA weapons held in Zambia until the parties united. See Dumiso Dabengwa, "ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation", in Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds), *op. cit.*, pp.29 and 33.

¹⁵ Stedman, *op. cit.*, p.168.

London. Although Secretary-General Shridath Ramphal was "denied any direct influence inside Lancaster House", he saw his role as ensuring that any settlement would be fair to the PF.¹⁶ The Commonwealth was frequently at odds with the British over the peace and demilitarization process, but it played a critical part in keeping the PF in the peace process.

The UN, for its part, was deliberately excluded from the peace process by the British for reasons that are elaborated below. Its role was largely limited to implementing sanctions against Rhodesia and highlighting what it perceived as unfair treatment of the PF by the British during the talks, while the United States played a largely subsidiary role, other than on the issues of the lifting of sanctions and recognition. The United States was prepared to forgo the more prominent role it adopted during the Anglo-American talks.

Historically, South Africa had exerted considerable leverage over Rhodesian policy through the provision of military and economic aid during the civil war. Between 1974 and 1976 it had used this leverage to compel Smith to negotiate with the guerrillas. However, with the failure of the Geneva talks in 1976, and the emergence of the Internal Settlement, South Africa no longer exerted pressure on the Rhodesians to negotiate. Indeed, at the time of Lancaster House, military support was continuing and the South Africans were not pressing for Rhodesian participation. The best that can be said about the South African position was that they were acquiescent. With the election of Muzowera, the British had a direct line of contact through to the Rhodesians - rather than through Pretoria as in previous negotiations.¹⁷ However, South Africa still had the capacity to undermine any agreement. The British sought to secure South African acquiescence by:

... assurance to them; by raising their fears of being sucked in deeper in an escalating conflict; and by convincing them that Muzowera could win.¹⁸

¹⁶ Michael Charlton, *The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990, p.109.

¹⁷ See Stedman, *op. cit.*, pp.136, 176 and 230-1, on South Africa's stance prior to Lancaster House.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.176, quoting unnamed British diplomat.

This constellation of external actors by no means worked in a unitary manner, and there were a number of cleavages between them. Relations between the British government, the FLS and the Commonwealth Shridath group, for example, were frequently bad. Elements of the British Conservative party, which was in power at the time, had sympathetic leanings towards the Rhodesians, and there had been a widespread presumption prior to Lusaka that the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, would favour a Muzorewa/Internal Settlement type solution, rather than genuine black majority rule. Sections of the Conservative party regarded the Commonwealth and FLS as "meddling" in Rhodesia, while the latter suspected the British government as having a secret pro-Rhodesian/Muzorewa agenda. Nevertheless, this combination of powerful external actors, offering both incentives and disincentives to participate in talks, effectively compelled the parties to negotiate, whatever their reservations.

4. Negotiating the Demilitarization Mandate

The objective of the London Lancaster House talks, which ran from 10 September - 21 December 1979, was to arrive at an agreed constitutional settlement followed by democratic elections. A stable and peaceful transitional period prior to elections was regarded as essential, but negotiating the modalities of how this could be achieved was highly contentious. Before and during the Lancaster House conference, both observers and participants were frequently highly pessimistic regarding a successful outcome. One British negotiator, for example, was said to believe there was only a one in one hundred chance of a settlement. The Rhodesians were expected to be intransigent, while ZANU in particular was highly reluctant to attend the conference. PF attendance was ultimately secured only by the pressure of the FLS leaders, such as Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, and Mozambique's President Samora Machel, who threatened to withdraw support for the war.¹⁹ Further complicating the talks was the fact that the two negotiating teams were by no means internally united throughout the talks. The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia team had to reconcile

¹⁹ At the same time the PF were told that if the conference failed because of Muzorewa or Britain, the FLS would back a return to the armed struggle. Stedman, *op. cit.*, p.171.

the sometimes contending objectives of the security forces and political figures, such as Smith and Muzowera, while there were tensions between Nkomo and Mugabe within the PF.

Previous attempts to achieve transitional cease-fire arrangements had floundered on mutual intransigences regarding the modalities of a cease-fire. During the 1977 Anglo-American initiative, for example, the stipulation that the armed forces in the transitional period should be based on the guerrilla forces precluded acceptance by the whites. The Anglo-American initiative also envisaged a UN Zimbabwe Force and a UN Special Representative with significant overseeing powers. This once again precluded white acceptance given their antipathy to the UN. Conversely, in the Kissinger package deal, white control of defence and white vetoes had made guerrilla acceptance unachievable.²⁰

It appeared that any successful demilitarization mandate would have to address the mutual sensitivities of the parties. This implied conciliatory and protracted negotiations. In fact the British, who convened and chaired the Lancaster House conference, and effectively assumed control of the proceedings, took a different view. They decided that the demilitarization mandate, in the light of past difficulties, would have to be presented to the parties as a virtual *fait accompli* if any progress was to be made. And, rather than a conciliatory, hands-off approach, they opted for a confrontational strategy of deadlines and challenges. In order to conclude an agreement, the chairman, Lord Carrington, exerted pressure on the PF, in particular, to make concessions. This approach was to prove effective in concluding a demilitarization agreement, but damaging in terms of its implementation on the ground, as the PF retained a residual distrust of the mandate.

The British conception of the demilitarization mandate, and its implementation, was developed in a series of documents during the four months of the conference. These documents were presented to the warring parties to debate and approve, but it was made clear that no other documents would be considered as a basis for the mandate. The British position for the cease-fire period in essence envisaged:

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.169.

- *A minimalist force disposition* to supervise the cease-fire - initially as small as 300 personnel, but later increased to 1,319;²¹
- *British command and control/Commonwealth legitimization* - the force composition was predominantly British, but with small contingents from other Commonwealth countries. Britain, rather than the Commonwealth Secretariat, assumed command and control of the force. However, the Commonwealth did legitimize its deployment;
- *British "rule"* - a British Governor was appointed to run Rhodesia prior to, and during the cease-fire;
- *A facilitating, monitoring role* for the force, rather than an enforcement or an interpositioning peacekeeping role. The task of the force could not be, in the view of the British, "to compel either side to maintain a cease-fire, or in any sense to guard the forces of one side or the other. Its task was to observe and report";²²
- *Demilitarization through separation and containment* - demilitarization was to be achieved through "disengagement of the forces".²³ This entailed the RSF being monitored within their existing bases, and the PF being required to assemble at intermediate collection areas - RVs - and then given safe passage to more permanent APs;
- *A short, well-defined timescale for implementation/withdrawal* - the demilitarization process was completed in under three months; the elections took place in March, and the CMF then departed;
- *A rejection of the disarmament option* - none of the parties would contemplate disarmament. The CMF and the British government did not see it as a viable option; indeed, disarmament was never seriously entertained.

²¹ In mid-November 1979, at the initial planning stage, it was thought that the mission could be accomplished by 300 personnel, according to Learmont. Brig J.H. Learmont, "Reflections from Rhodesia", *RUSI: Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, vol. 125, no. 4, December 1980, p.47.

²² "Attachment to Ceasefire Agreement", Statement by the Chairman on 11 December 1979 in Southern Rhodesia, "Report of the Constitutional Conference", Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979, *Cmnd. 7802*, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1980, p.46.

²³ *Conference Spokesman Press Release*, "Rhodesia: Ceasefire Arrangements", Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, 22 November 1979, p.4.

Almost all these demilitarization proposals had objectionable aspects for the parties, particularly the PF. The PF most notably failed to overturn any substantive elements of the British proposals - the concessions they achieved were mainly cosmetic.²⁴ PF resistance to the Lancaster House mandate coalesced around a number of key issues, which were to re-emerge during the demilitarization process, namely:

- British hegemony in the monitoring force;
- inequalities in the treatment of the parties;
- external intervention;
- alleged British partiality;
- operational implementation issues (such as timescales); and
- the facilitator conception of the mandate.

During the negotiations, and the cease-fire, these objections threatened to terminally derail the peace process, and the process of arriving at an agreement was long-winded, fractious, and frequently on the point of breakdown.

4.1 Points of Contention: British Hegemony

The British assumption of governance of Rhodesia for a limited period prior to the elections - in effect a colonial act - proved less controversial than it might have done. The endorsement of the FLS and other parties gave British governance a certain international and internal legitimacy, although some Rhodesians in particular opposed a re-assertion of British ties. However, the arrangements regarding the monitoring force proved highly contentious. From the outset, the PF were opposed to unfettered British control of any cease-fire force. Initially, they called for UN involvement. In their "Analysis of British Proposals for the Interim Period", 26 October 1979, for example, the PF called on the cease-fire agreement to be:

²⁴ D. Smith and C. Simpson, *Mugabe*, Sphere Books, London, 1981, p.145. The "equality of status" provision in the agreement and the South African external intervention clause were their most significant gains.

... supervised and policed by the UN, which alone has the legal status, experience and capacity for such an operation.

Their acceptance of a Commonwealth force was, in fact, a compromise brokered by Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, in the face of Britain's refusal to contemplate a UN mission. Having accepted a Commonwealth force, the PF attempted at the end of November to transform the CMF into a true, rather than a nominal, Commonwealth force, with a chain of authority through to the Commonwealth Secretariat, as well as to the British Governor.²⁵ This move was resisted by Carrington, who wanted to maintain British authority over the force.

British resistance to UN involvement stemmed from its fears that the UN and the concept of peacekeeping would be ineffective in the Rhodesian context. UN conflict resolution was associated with the persistent renewal of mandates,²⁶ which the British with their "fast-in, fast-out" approach wished to avoid. They regarded themselves as able to move faster than the UN - a critical factor in what was judged to be a precarious demilitarization process. The fact that one country coordinated the CMF planning and held the command made for simplicity and speed of decision. Further, responses to requests for goods and services in London and Salisbury (Rhodesia) were quicker than could be expected from the bureaucratic UN system. The selection of an established headquarters (HQ 8 Field Force) was intended to avoid the improvisations inherent in setting up a new UN HQ.

In their determination to avoid identification with UN peacekeeping, the British authorities studiously avoided or denied application of the term.²⁷ In the view of the CMF commander, Maj Gen Acland, the concept was unworkable in Rhodesia:

In such a big country with the combatants scattered all over it, you could not interpose yourselves between them - it would have needed hundreds of thousands of soldiers.²⁸

²⁵ *Patriotic Front Statement*, "Disposition of the Forces and the Commonwealth Force", the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, London, 30 November 1979, p.3.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ Henry Wiseman and Alastair M. Taylor, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition*, Pergamon Press/International Peace Academy, New York, 1981, p.46.

²⁸ Interview with Maj Gen Sir John Acland, 16 May 1995, Honiton, UK.

But British exclusion of the UN was also a political calculation: Britain knew that the Salisbury regime would not contemplate UN involvement.²⁹ By the end of Lancaster House the parties had, albeit reluctantly, conceded British hegemony in the process, despite their reservations.

4.2 Inequalities in the Status of the Warring Factions

A central flaw in the demilitarization mandate was the unequal powers assumed by the two parties during the cease-fire period. Technically speaking, the PF was accorded equal status with the RSF at Lancaster House. This had been fought long and hard for by the PF. It was in effect finally conceded by Lord Carrington in a statement of 15 November 1979:

I can confirm that your (PF) forces, and the Rhodesian security forces, will be under the authority of the Governor. The Patriotic Front forces will be required to comply with the directions of the Governor.³⁰

One of the major obstacles to reaching a demilitarization agreement had been surmounted.

... Mugabe had obtained the legal recognition for his army and, in his own mind at least, for his war, which he had always craved. His men were no longer "terrorists" or "guerrillas", they were on equal footing with the armies of Salisbury.³¹

Nevertheless, it was apparent that, in reality, the RSF had accrued powers that were denied to the PF during the demilitarization period. The fact that the RSF and the British South Africa Police (BSAP) would be called upon to administer law and order during the cease-fire - albeit under the control of the Governor, Lord Soames - gave the RSF scope to abuse its powers and attack the demilitarizing PF. The PF was denied involvement in policing and was expected to remain within APs. This, in the PF's view, constituted a violation of its equality of status. As the PF commented in a Press Statement of 4 December 1979, this:

²⁹ Stedman, *op. cit.*, p.183.

³⁰ Legum, *op. cit.*, p.A14.

³¹ Smith and Simpson, *op. cit.*, pp.136-7.

... glaringly unequal treatment ... is not only disadvantageous but also positively dangerous to the Patriotic Front forces.

This was a serious reversal for the PF, who in the past had called for the disarming and dismantling of the existing security forces.³² The PF wanted to see a substantial role for a PF army and police force. It proposed the integration of forces with a Transitional Defence Committee - comprised of the PF, the Rhodesian regime and the British government - assuming oversight. This committee would also have started the process of forming a Zimbabwe army during the cease-fire period. The ZANU leader Robert Mugabe commented:

... the British government has relegated our forces to mere observers of the ceasefire ... this is discrimination and bias We cannot accept a position of inferiority in a situation where we are moving towards victory - although victory may take time.³³

The British regarded the inequality in the demilitarization mandate as a necessary concession to a successful conclusion of the process. They regarded themselves as having no alternative but to utilize Rhodesian police and security forces. First, the Rhodesians possessed the only available professional police force (there was not time to train a new police force); second, it appears that the Rhodesians insisted on the police and security forces' retention as a condition of their acceptance of the Lancaster House terms - a condition which the British could not or would not overturn; and third, and perhaps most importantly, the Governor did not have the physical power to prevent the RSF from continuing its policing role. As Lord Soames put it:

Both ... parties, although accepting my legal authority, disposed of forces far larger than any at my disposal My responsibility was all embracing - my real power was negligible.³⁴

The CMF was a small, lightly armed force. The prudent policy to the pragmatically-minded British appeared to be to legitimize RSF activities,

³² The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *op. cit.*, p.94.

³³ Stedman, *op. cit.*, pp.191-2.

³⁴ Lord Soames, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe", *International Affairs*, vol. 56, no. 3, Summer 1980, pp.412-3.

and to try to retain some kind of control of its activities through persuasion. Accordingly, the British once again refused to concede the PF demands for inclusion in the maintenance of law and order, or for the disbanding of sectors of the RSF.

4.3 The Issue of External Intervention

The PF's vulnerability to attack during the assembly period led it to be adamant that no external forces should be in Rhodesia during this time. Specifically, the PF wanted assurances that South African troops would not be present in Rhodesia during the cease-fire period. The PF's great fear was that:

... once the guerrillas came out of the bush and were concentrated in their camps, a pretext could be found by the Rhodesians and South Africans (they were also suspicious of possible British collusion) to break the cease-fire, surround the camps and decimate the guerrillas.³⁵

This, in conjunction with other issues, deadlocked the talks in early December 1979. It was only after an intervention by Ramphal that Carrington offered assurances that South Africa would not intervene. The South African presence also caused dissension within the CMF, with Kenya threatening to withdraw its monitors. "I do not see", said President Moi, "how I can allow Kenyan troops to share Rhodesian soil with South African troops".³⁶

It subsequently transpired that South African troops remained in Rhodesia throughout the cease-fire period, and after the elections, according to some accounts, confirming PF fears.³⁷

The Rhodesians also had reason to be concerned regarding external intervention. ZANLA was being aided by Tanzanian and FRELIMO forces, while ZIPRA had support from South African ANC guerrillas. The presence of these external forces was to complicate the CMF's task when it was eventually deployed.

³⁵ Legum, *op. cit.*, p.A15.

³⁶ *The Herald*, 15 January 1980, in Wiseman, *op. cit.*, p.25.

³⁷ Dumiso Dabengwa notes that there is fairly convincing evidence that elements of the South African forces remained after independence and played a destructive role during the so-called "dissident" period. Dumiso Dabengwa, *op. cit.*, p.28.

4.4 Partiality

For such a sensitive process as demilitarization to take place, both parties characteristically need confidence in the neutrality of the supervising force. Neither party, in fact, was confident that the CMF would be impartial. The PF were concerned that the British had struck secret deals with the Rhodesians, while many in the RSF saw the agreements being reached as favouring the PF and as a betrayal of white solidarity. The PF feared that racial, historical and ideological ties between white Rhodesians and the British were being reflected in the framing of the mandate. ZANU, in particular, suspected that the British favoured an election result in which Bishop Muzowera would head a "moderate" coalition government, rather than a Mugabe-dominated "communist", revolutionary government. The PF further suspected that the British proposals had been influenced by the RSF and were even designed to hamper the PF in the run-up to the elections. In fact, the RSF had formulated the original concept of confining the PF within APs. The APs were:

... chosen by the Combined Operations Staff of the RSF and later passed on to Brigadier Gurdon (who planned much of the operation).³⁸

Gen G.P. Walls, Commander of Combined Operations, is said to have insisted that the PF should be kept as far away as possible from population centres and under very strict control. Further, it is alleged that the British secretly agreed that no Rhodesians could be placed under the direct control of Soames; that Walls would not be subject to the Governor's control; and that cross-border raids would in certain circumstances be permitted.³⁹ Certainly, the British, fearing a coup or a reneging on the cease-fire by the Rhodesians, went out of their way to be tough on ZANU in order to keep Muzorewa and Walls on board.⁴⁰ By undercutting the Lancaster House

³⁸ John Mackinlay, "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1979-80", in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), *Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa*, Macmillan/International Peace Academy, London, 1990, p.41.

³⁹ Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981*, John Murray, London, 1987, pp.246-7.

⁴⁰ Stedman, *op. cit.*, p.201.

document, these secret bilateral talks, which were kept from the CMF, were a constant source of frustration, according to Acland.⁴¹

The RSF, for their part, regarded the negotiations as giving far too much weight to the PF - an illegitimate force in their eyes. As the legitimate policing force in the country, they regarded it as quite natural that the British should apportion them greater weight. The PF were unable to substantively influence the alleged British bias during the negotiations. As a consequence, they directed their energies towards preparations that would boost their security and their political support during the cease-fire period. This lack of confidence in impartiality created severe problems during much of the demilitarization phase.

4.5 Imposition Versus Facilitation

The British position at Lancaster House was that the monitoring force should operate consensually. Its role was to help facilitate the agreement that the parties had voluntarily agreed to, not to seek to coerce them. In a statement of 11 December 1979 the British declared that it is:

... impossible for any external authority or force to guarantee that a cease-fire will be effective. Only the parties themselves can ensure this.⁴²

For the PF it was a major negotiating objective to change the CMF's proposed mandate so that the PF was afforded greater protection against the possibility of RSF attacks. The British maintained that the PF wanted the CMF to take on the role of an enforcer of demilitarization, but the PF claimed that its conception of the CMF was more that of a traditional peacekeeper:

What we require of this force is ... an interpositioning capacity, combined with an ability to defend itself when dealing with a localized breach, and thus a credibility and deterrent character which the present British proposals appear to deny it.⁴³

⁴¹ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

⁴² "Attachment to Ceasefire Agreement, Rhodesia: Ceasefire Negotiations", *op. cit.*, p.46.

⁴³ *Patriotic Front Statement*, "Disposition of the Forces and the Commonwealth Force", *op. cit.*, p.3.

As the reference to the CMF's "deterrent" character implies, the PF envisaged such a force as forming some kind of buffer between itself and the RSF which would protect it from attack. Without such a buffer, a movement by the guerrillas to RVs and APs would be akin to, in the words of ZAPU leader, Joshua Nkomo:

... signing our own death warrant, and we have not fought a successful war to do that.⁴⁴

To further boost its security, the PF called for itself (and the RSF) to be allocated "areas of control". For good measure, the PF also maintained on 30 November 1979 that the CMF would need to be of a size capable of fulfilling its multiple tasks. The British regarded the peacekeeping model as inapplicable in Rhodesia and likely to lead to a long-term commitment. The concept of separation they proposed, in which the PF and the RSF were geographically dispersed and then monitored separately, was thought to be a more effective approach than interpositioning between two parties in close proximity. Even if a large powerful force had been deployed it would have had "great difficulty in enforcing peace if, after a breakdown of mutual confidence, fighting had resumed on a large scale".⁴⁵ The utility of the separation approach - if it worked - was that:

... the ground lost all tactical significance from the moment of the cease-fire. The forces themselves were not eyeball to eyeball, arrayed in battle formation; in this carefully organized melee ... it would be difficult for either side to form into a military force of such overwhelming size that it could be sure of destroying the other.⁴⁶

The RSF for their part were vehemently opposed to coercive intervention and unsympathetic to UN peacekeeping. The non-confrontational style of monitoring that the British were propounding, and the British acknowledgement of a Rhodesian policing role, was less objectionable to the RSF than peacekeeping, and still appeared to give the RSF scope for independent action to ensure their own security or restrain the PF. Once again the British view of demilitarization prevailed over the PF perspective,

⁴⁴ *The Observer*, 9 December 1979 in Legum, *op. cit.*, p.A17.

⁴⁵ Mackinlay, *op. cit.*, pp.42.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

and the definitive cease-fire document⁴⁷ contained no reference to enforcement or peacekeeping.

4.6 Duration of Cease-Fire

The issue of the duration of the cease-fire prior to elections was a sensitive one for the conflicting parties. A lengthy cease-fire period would give them an opportunity to mobilize political support and bolster their security. In late October, the PF called for a six-month period before elections took place.⁴⁸ This would have allowed the PF more time for guerrillas to arrive at RVs/APs.⁴⁹ During Lancaster House the PF frequently complained that the cease-fire period was insufficient, and the Rhodesians held up signing for two days in late December over the time factor.⁵⁰

However, the British negotiators calculated that a longer demilitarization process was potentially destabilizing. First, the longer its duration, the greater the chance of the cease-fire breaking down given its precarious nature. Second, a long-term commitment on the part of the CMF was likely to involve it more deeply in the peace process and would work against the "distanced" approach favoured by the British.

At the political level, the negotiators were keen to foster the perception that any of the main parties could win or make gains in the election, thus retaining their support for demilitarization. The longer the cease-fire, the more likely this perception was to be exposed, thus risking a collapse of the process. Carrington was able to resist an extended demilitarization process and with it the lengthy deployments routinely a feature of UN missions. Nor would the British government contemplate a military or peace-building role for the CMF after the elections, although a British military team was subsequently sent to help integrate and train a new national army.

⁴⁷ "Attachment to Ceasefire Agreement", *op. cit.*, p.46.

⁴⁸ *Conference Paper CC(79)39*, "Patriotic Front Analysis of British Proposals for the Interim Period", 17th plenary, Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, London.

⁴⁹ Gen Tongogara, ZANLA, acknowledged to the FCO that he could have orders delivered from Mozambique to any point in Zimbabwe in four days. Jeffrey Davidow, *op. cit.*, pp.81-2.

⁵⁰ Flower, *op. cit.*, p.248.

5. Operational Implementation of Demilitarization

The parties finally formally signed up to the demilitarization mandate, as part of the Lancaster House agreement, on 21 December 1979. The broad parameters of the mandate had been established, but how it would be implemented operationally had not been fully determined. Behind the scenes, British military planners were hurriedly attempting to arrive at a coherent operational plan. Apart from time and resource constraints, the major problem was that this type of operation had never before been attempted. It:

... was without precedent and there were no operational blueprints available for reference.⁵¹

Interpositional peacekeeping was well understood, and the British had considerable experience with counter-insurgency operations, but the monitoring of separation and cantonment was a novel concept - the operational nuances of containing two hostile and suspicious parties within restricted areas were little understood. Also, demilitarization as a process had not been developed. How, for example, should the mission progress in the post-separation stage? Should the warring parties be rigidly kept apart until the elections to prevent clashes, or was some form of pre-election reconciliation feasible?

The demilitarization method that was utilized in Rhodesia can be conceptualized in terms of stages, each representing an incremental step up the conflict resolution ladder. This method has been widely emulated in a number of subsequent UN demilitarization operations:

- Stage 1 - separation of forces;
- Stage 2 - containment within cantons;
- Stage 3 - the development of cooperation/dialogue;
- Stage 4 - the development of reconciliation; and
- Stage 5 - integration into a national force.

⁵¹ Capt J.B.A. Bailey, "Operation Agila: Rhodesia 1979-80", *British Army Review*, December 1980, no. 66, p.19.

Within each of these stages, severe implementational problems were encountered - indeed, a degree of integration and reconciliation was only slowly achieved. However, the establishment of a viable demilitarization process was a considerable achievement for the CMF. With limited personnel and within an extremely short time frame, the CMF implemented a mandate that neither party regarded as wholly legitimate. The CMF had to demonstrate that it was unbiased and was above the politics that had characterized the negotiations. First, however, an extremely rapid deployment had to be effected in adverse conditions.

5.1 Implementation

5.1.1 The Deployment Phase

The demilitarization timetable stipulated that at midnight on 21 December 1979 all military movements were to stop, and the cease-fire was to come into effect at midnight on 28 December 1979. The RSF were to first return to their bases. The PF guerrillas were then to report to RVs by 4 January 1980 and subsequently move onto APs. This signalled the completion of the separation process. Campaigning for elections could then take place, with the elections expected to take place in March 1980. This timetable put extreme pressure on the CMF in terms of logistics, administration and planning. The CMF had to deploy to over 100 diverse locations in only three days. Despite the fact that the total deployment period was increased from the original seven to ten days, this was still extremely tight. Throughout much of December it was uncertain whether the PF would sign up to the British proposals - would the CMF actually be required? But British planning staff, anticipating a successful conclusion, had started preparatory planning work as early as 5 November 1979. On 22 November 1979 the British sent a four-man reconnaissance team to Rhodesia and this was followed on 8 December by a small advance party. Despite this planning, the first stage - the physical separation of forces - was unknown territory to the CMF and potentially fraught with difficulties. The CMF was extremely vulnerable to attack, and the reaction of demobilizing guerrillas to white monitors, who looked similar to the Rhodesians they had been fighting, was unknown.

As well as the hazards, a multiplicity of tasks were allocated to the small monitoring force. It was expected to:

- provide its own logistics and deployment;
- meet PF forces at RVs and escort them to APs;
- provide teams for the APs;
- monitor RSF bases;
- man border crossings;
- maintain liaison teams in Mozambique and Zambia;
- maintain communications between all units and HQ at Salisbury;
- ensure safe transportation throughout the country;
- identify breaches of the cease-fire; and
- conduct investigations into cease-fire breaches through the Cease-fire Commission (CC).⁵²

About half the force were directly involved in monitoring the over one hundred locations, and frequently there were only 17-20 personnel to meet, escort and monitor the PF at RVs and APs. The majority of the RVs and APs were situated within 50 miles of the border, away from RSF units, although there were a number near towns where the PF had made military inroads. The RSF had been keen during the planning of the assembly places to generally avoid acknowledging that the PF had established inroads in urban areas, hence the predominant border dispositions. In addition, seven Border Liaison teams were deployed at major border crossings to monitor illegal crossings and to oversee refugee repatriation.

5.1.2 Separation of Forces

The first stage of the demilitarization process was perhaps the most problematic. The CMF had yet to establish trust - arguably a prerequisite of successful demilitarization. The CMF was unsure how the RSF and particularly the PF would react to its presence. Although the PF leaders had signed the Lancaster House agreement, had they effectively communicated this to guerrillas in the field, and would they comply with it?

⁵² Wiseman, *op. cit.*, p.48.

CMF commanders had been warned by senior RSF officers that the assembly place plan was unworkable and that the CMF would be attacked and decimated at assembly places. The consensus of opinion, in the words of the CMF Deputy Commander, Brig J.H. Learmont:

... was that we were about to embark on a militarily disastrous enterprise, with the near certainty of being "taken out" the first night, even if we were lucky enough to have got there in the first place due to the mine risk.⁵³

The Black Watch regimental history of the operation talks of "the seemingly impossible job that lay ahead",⁵⁴ while a British Joint Operational Command (JOC) commander noted the hatred that existed between the RSF and the PF, and the suspicion with which they both regarded the CMF.⁵⁵

There were doubts regarding the CMF's proposal of a passive approach at RVs/APs. Given the anticipated aggressive response of the guerrillas, should not the CMF adopt a defensive, but more warlike posture? These pressures were resisted. It was insisted by the CMF leadership that a non-threatening posture was essential if PF guerrillas were to be persuaded to place themselves at risk by congregating in APs. Furthermore, Gurdon argued that the PF leadership would be careful to make sure that monitors were not harmed.⁵⁶ Nevertheless, deploying the CMF in such hazardous conditions was the "most difficult decision that I ever took", according to Acland.⁵⁷

The adopted demilitarization strategy was that of an overt, non-threatening presence, characterized by vulnerability rather than assertion. The monitors were ordered to:

... show an overt and friendly presence on the ground so the PF personnel will be reassured enough to come forward.⁵⁸

⁵³ Learmont, *op. cit.*, p.49.

⁵⁴ The Black Watch Archives, "Operation Agila: Rhodesia, December 1979-80", *BW Arch. 0637*, Regimental Headquarters of the Black Watch, Perth, p.1.

⁵⁵ Interview with Brig R.J. Rhoderick-Jones, 5 May 1995, Milford-on-Sea, UK.

⁵⁶ Susan Rice, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, D Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990, p.73.

⁵⁷ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

⁵⁸ "Orders for an RV Point Commander" in Learmont, *op. cit.*, p.50.

The monitors were also directed to make "plenty of noise and movement" to help create the appearance of a non-threatening atmosphere. The Force Commander's orders required monitors to seek, by personal contact and peaceful persuasion, to dissuade the PF from cease-fire breaches. They were explicitly ordered not to resort to force except in self-defence, nor to interpose themselves between hostile forces.

Critically, the level of armament that monitors were ordered to deploy at APs was generally minimal - personal firearms - rather than the mortars and other heavy weaponry that some regarded as necessary to deter attack. The only overt concession to the possibility of being overrun was Acland's insistence that each AP should have a general purpose machine gun (GPMG) for protection. Slit trenches and sentries were further low-key defensive measures. It is claimed that some monitors acquired heavier weaponry. At AP BRAVO, for example, at one point there were two large mortars deployed.⁵⁹ However, the Force Commander "never sanctioned or was aware" of the deployment of heavy weaponry.⁶⁰

The modalities of the contact stage of separation were radically different for the two parties. In the case of the RSF it was relatively straightforward. The RSF were required to withdraw units deployed in the bush and their forces were to be monitored at their existing bases, whose location was known. The RSF had split Rhodesia into five JOCs to counter terrorism, namely: Hurricane, Thrasher, Repulse, Grapple and Tangent. This structure was retained by the CMF for monitoring purposes. CMF Lieutenant Colonel monitors were located at the five RSF JOCs and also observed 17 sub-JOCs. Two-man teams were deployed down to company bases. It was the responsibility of the CMF Lieutenant Colonels to keep PF Commissioners informed regarding developments within JOCs. Although it was straightforward enough to establish contact with the RSF, their acceptance of the principle of separation and disengagement was frequently in doubt.

Implementing PF RVs and APs was much more complex, both in physically establishing contact and in establishing a measure of trust. First, the guerrillas had to be located. Second, confidence-building was required to facilitate entry into RVs. Third, safe passage had to be arranged from the

⁵⁹ The Black Watch Archives, *op. cit.*, p.10.

⁶⁰ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

23 RVs to the more permanent APs, of which there were 15.⁶¹ The PF command managed to establish contact with many guerrillas, but some were unaware of the cease-fire, or refused to conform to it, until clearance from high ranking officers had been received. The guerrillas in the bush feared a trap. During the Kissinger-Vorster negotiations in 1974 it was claimed that hundreds or even thousands of guerrillas had been killed in ambushes during a "bogus cease-fire".⁶² The PF were also wary of the white CMF monitors who resembled RSF soldiers and who they suspected of collusion. This perception was heightened by the fact that CMF personnel were escorted by the RSF to RVs, although they subsequently left.⁶³ This meant that the RV phase was extremely dangerous for the monitors - indeed, both Acland and Learmont regarded it as the most hazardous phase of the whole operation. Further adding to the potential instability of the process was the presence of covert South African troops who were secretly monitoring the movements of the PF between RVs and APs. They were part of small observation teams, consisting of both Rhodesians and South Africans, who monitored most of the RVs. The South African troops were ordered to follow and observe PF guerrillas who failed to make the journey between RVs and APs and report on any hidden arms caches.⁶⁴

PF suspicions were alleviated by the confidence-building use of PF Liaison Officers (LOs), who accompanied the CMF and assured the guerrillas that the CMF was a legitimate and non-threatening force.⁶⁵ Without the LOs it is doubtful whether the guerrillas would have assembled at RVs or APs. Further, the extraordinary posture of the CMF at RVs and APs proved sufficient to establish that it was not a warfighting force. The APs were floodlit at night; they were deliberately noisy with loudhailers being used; Union Jacks were displayed; and the monitors wore white armbands. The appearance of the monitors contrasted radically with the RSF units the guerrillas had previously encountered.

The PF, however, took their own precautions before placing themselves in the CMF's hands. First, they would typically send a young supporter, a

⁶¹ In a few instances the PF entered directly into APs rather than reporting at RVs first.

⁶² Rice, *op. cit.*, p.90.

⁶³ The RSF had a twofold function in this respect: to provide security and to act as guides to the CMF in transit to RVs.

⁶⁴ Interviews with UNIDIR visiting military experts, Geneva, February-April 1995.

⁶⁵ It was determined that no CMF team was to deploy without a PF LO. Maj C.M.S. Kaye, "Mission Extraordinary: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia", *British Army Review*, no. 65, August 1980, p.11.

Mujiba (unarmed, youth messenger boy), to take a general look at the RV. If the situation was satisfactory, a guerrilla would enter the RV for a trial run. Only then would a unit report. When a degree of trust had been established between the PF and the CMF the guerrillas tended to arrive in a flood at RVs. This created huge logistical problems. Furthermore, transportation between RVs and APs was problematic with substandard, mined or non-existent roads, and the ever-present fear that the RSF might ambush convoys. For these reasons, convoys were not permitted to stop.⁶⁶

The lack of PF trust in the demilitarization process meant that the separation process was seriously delayed. This in turn heightened the perceptions of the RSF that the PF did not intend to comply with the cease-fire, and increased the likelihood of RSF attacks. The RVs were meant to close at midnight 4 January 1980, by which time 12,147 PF guerrillas had checked in. However, as substantial numbers remained outside, the RV phase was extended by an extra week, according to Acland. This entailed special arrangements to transfer latecomers to APs. By the deadline, 15,730 PF guerrillas had reported, but it was estimated at the time that 4,000-6,000 remained in the bush, in part to be ready in case of a breakdown in the cease-fire, and in part to undertake political activities during the elections.⁶⁷

5.1.3 Containment within APs/bases

Maintaining containment of the separated RSF and the PF was critical. Breakouts threatened a resumption of fighting and a possible collapse of demilitarization. The CMF used innovative techniques to maintain containment. The CMF's philosophy was that in the absence of the means or will to force the parties to comply,⁶⁸ the development of trust and

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.13.

⁶⁷ Delayed PF were given the option of reporting to the RSF or BSAP before proceeding to APs. Unsurprisingly, few had sufficient trust to take up this option. Learmont, *op. cit.*, p.52.

⁶⁸ The CMF did not have the mandate or the means, for example, to collect or control PF arms within the assembly places. The PF regarded it as essential to retain their arms for self-defence and were not prepared to let the CMF take control of weaponry by, for example, placing it in storage. This meant there was a constant danger of armed clashes between the various parties. The best the CMF could hope to do in terms of controlling weaponry was to persuade the PF to refrain from precipitate use

personal contacts (a variation on the "hearts and minds" strategy used by British in former colonies to counter insurgency movements) constituted the most effective policy instruments.⁶⁹ It was stressed to monitors that this was not an operation of the strictly military sort for which they had all trained, and that its success would frequently depend on pragmatic personal assessment of the best methods. Consequently, there was by no means a uniform approach within camps. Indeed, inevitably approaches varied given the national diversity of the CMF, the differing numbers within camps⁷⁰ and the commanders' freedom to use their personal intuition.

CMF officers widely sought to develop personal relationships with the PF. Joint activities such as football matches were arranged along with lectures and films, and medical treatment was given to ill or wounded PF guerrillas. It was reasoned that PF guerrillas were less likely to attack monitors that they had formed personal relationships with. In the words of an AP monitor:

The principle was that the better they knew us, the harder it would be for the guerrillas to turn against us.⁷¹

However, there were limits to the trust that the monitors managed to build, despite the subsequent characterization of the CMF as "neutral, innocent really as a force" by Josiah Tungamirai, Deputy Commander and Chief Political Commissar, ZANLA.⁷² Although relations on a personal level were often good, the PF, particularly ZANLA, retained an inherent suspicion of the CMF in the pre-election period and guerrillas were encouraged not to confide in monitors. ZANLA guerrillas were required to consult their Higher Command on relatively minor matters. The level of suspicion at AP FOXTROT, for example, can be gauged by a report produced by ZANLA officers within the AP following a dinner party hosted by CMF officers. The conclusion of the report stated that:

and defuse crises as they arose.

⁶⁹ "The only lever held by the monitors was personal influence on the basis of impartiality". Bailey, *op. cit.*, p.22.

⁷⁰ There were 750 guerrillas within AP BRAVO, while FOXTROT had 6,000. The Black Watch Archives, *op. cit.*, p.4.

⁷¹ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p.23.

⁷² Rice, *op. cit.*, p.124.

The British invitation had some form of psychological warfare within it as is the case with imperialists ... the British pretended to be friendly, taking it as a means of investigating us. They thought that by giving us beer we would be easy targets for their investigations⁷³

The CMF had to develop a delicate balance between amicability and authority in order to maintain containment. It was necessary to establish that egress from APs was unlawful, but the CMF did not have a mandate or the physical means to forcibly prevent it.⁷⁴ In a sense, its authority was illusory. As neither ZIPRA nor ZANLA would take orders from the monitors, the monitors sought to create a sense of authority obliquely through holding muster-rolls, joint military parades, drills, etc. At AP ROMEO, conventional military discipline was introduced with the drawing up of Standing Orders, the use of appointment titles, and a geometric camp construction.⁷⁵ It was thought unlikely that the PF would attack monitors that were actually giving them weapons drill training. At some APs like ROMEO, the PF commanders were essentially cooperative - the CMF commander was able to insist that there was mutual access to all parts of the camp, for example.⁷⁶ But at many others it either required protracted negotiation to introduce these types of measures or they proved impossible to implement.

⁷³ Maj T.C.R.B. Purdon, "It Takes Two to Tango but 6,000 to 'Foxtrot'", *Guards Magazine*, Summer 1980, p.80.

⁷⁴ Furthermore, verification measures were weak. The CMF did not have the personnel to set up a comprehensive verification mechanism. Perhaps the most important instrument in terms of verification was the CC within which the various parties could raise complaints regarding ceasefire breaches which the CMF would subsequently investigate. The PF was in a position to monitor compliance with the agreement through their LOs who reported back to the PF leadership. The CMF itself was able to verify PF compliance within individual RVs/APs reasonably effectively, but verification of the RSF was considerably more difficult and much of the RSF escaped verification. A further problem was the armed clashes occurring outside the APs during the run-up to the election, which placed the CMF under considerable strain in its attempts to verify ceasefire breaches. Overall, the verification process had significant weaknesses.

⁷⁵ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p.22.

⁷⁶ Interview with Col J.B.A. Bailey, 10 January 1995, Camberley Staff College, UK.

The capacity of the CMF to influence the behaviour of the RSF was limited in comparison with the PF. While the PF looked to an extent to the CMF to underwrite its security, the RSF regarded itself as autonomous. It was not beholden to the CMF to maintain its security, provide supplies or meet other needs. The RSF, in fact, jealously guarded its independence and developed an antipathy to CMF interference. Indeed, the suspicion existed that the CMF was colluding in PF absences from APs.

The CMF containment strategy was severely tested throughout the cease-fire period. On a number of occasions egress from both RSF bases and APs almost derailed the process. Two structural problems lay at the heart of the containment strategy. First, it was undermined by the framing of the mandate. The inequality of the containment arrangements - specifically the dispensation given to the RSF to exit its bases - created a sense of vulnerability among the PF which encouraged desertion and precipitate action. Indeed, the failure to satisfy the PF anxieties over:

... the safety of their men ... produced a situation which came close to wrecking the Lancaster House agreement in the following two months.⁷⁷

Second, the containment strategy arguably worked against, or at least sufficiently failed to develop, cooperation between the RSF and the PF. It was not until a late stage that this problem of effecting cooperation and integration between the combatants started to be addressed. Acland admitted that this was a major problem which by mid-February 1980 had him despairing. The prospect of a resumption of war when the CMF left, due to the absence of reconciliation, seemed very real.

5.2 Containment Crisis Points

Non-compliance became a major demilitarization issue during January. A trickle of guerrillas continued to report from the bush, but it became evident that large numbers remained there and in neighbouring FLS. The potential for clashes between non-demilitarized PF and roaming RSF forces was a major concern of the CMF. Already, there had been incidents of the

⁷⁷ Legum, *op. cit.*, p.A17.

RSF attacking PF guerrillas trying to make their way between RVs and APs. In one such incident six guerrillas were killed.⁷⁸

A series of further crisis points confronted the CMF containment strategy at this point. These had their origins in resource shortages, violations of the containment mandate, and pre-election violence, committed principally for political ends, outside the containment areas.

5.2.1 Resource Crisis

The meeting of PF needs within APs was a critical element of demilitarization. By consenting to congregate within APs and remain there, the PF had established dependence on the CMF for the provision of supplies and other needs. The CMF had been assured by Salisbury that the APs were situated in areas with sufficient water and that food could be readily procured. This proved to be false in a considerable number of cases; whether because the Rhodesian information was out-of-date, or through deliberate misinformation, was unclear. Many of the APs had inadequate water supplies, no sanitation, and inadequate track or road communications. The PF had been required to turn up with their arms and all their equipment at the APs. Most of them arrived with no equipment other than weapons. At many APs there were minimal food supplies, and no bedding, cooking utensils, or other basic supplies. The CMF was suddenly faced with a supply crisis. The CMF logistical staff had been set up to support 1,300 monitors. Suddenly, almost overnight, they were expected to logistically support 23,500 persons.⁷⁹

The lack of food became a contentious issue. Initially, the CMF attempted to feed the PF on emergency army rations or maize, but these foods were rejected by the PF who demanded meat, causing relationships between the guerrillas and the CMF to rapidly deteriorate in some APs. Some guerrillas suspected that the monitors were deliberately trying to starve them so that they would leave the APs, and could then be blamed for the failure of the AP process.⁸⁰ At AP PAPA, guerrillas actually took

⁷⁸ A RSF Fire Force attacked guerrillas making their way to AP Mike with Fortran rockets, killing six of them. Capt Barry Radford, "Zipcon Tangent", *The Globe and Laurel: The Journal of the Royal Marines*, vol. 89, no. 2, March-April 1980, p.72 in Rice, *op. cit.*, p.96.

⁷⁹ Kaye, *op. cit.*, p.14.

⁸⁰ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p.21.

monitors hostage in anger over a lack of meat and threatened to "wipe them out".⁸¹ The danger of the PF abandoning the APs wholesale to gather supplies and probably never return threatened the whole peace process. The CMF responded by a massive airlift of essential supplies. Hundreds of tons of supplies were flown in and the crisis was averted.

The CMF also sought to meet medical needs. Many PF were in a bad physical condition with untreated or ineffectively treated wounds, and were suffering from disease. Almost inevitably, the medical treatment they were given helped foster a positive attitude toward the CMF. The CMF also treated huge numbers of civilians at APs, thus developing popular perceptions of the CMF as benevolent.⁸² At AP ROMEO, for example, eventually as many as one hundred people a day would come for treatment from the Royal Air Force medical assistants.⁸³ Around 250,000 civilians were treated in all.⁸⁴ So effective was this policy that PF leaders went as far as saying that CMF doctors were:

... among the most powerful weapons in the battle for guerrillas [sic] hearts and minds.⁸⁵

5.2.2 Containment Mandate Violations

The cease-fire was consistently broken by both parties during the mission, dashing hopes of a stable pre-election period - arguably a prerequisite for successful demilitarization. The CMF attempted to defuse these clashes, while at the same time avoiding physical involvement. This involved a dual policy of assurance (that both sides were being effectively monitored and that violations could be addressed in the CC) and diplomatic pressure to refrain from provocative acts.

These methods were effective in a number of instances. CMF Company Base Teams (CBTs) deployed with RSF companies on several occasions managed to dissuade them from provocative actions, and PF commissioners and LOs at the prompting of the CMF went deep into the

⁸¹ Rice, *op. cit.*, p.102.

⁸² Ministry of Defence video, London, "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force" (an account of "Operation Agila"), SKC Productions, 1980.

⁸³ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p.20.

⁸⁴ Ministry of Defence video, *op. cit.*

⁸⁵ Rice, *op. cit.*, p.117.

bush to persuade guerrillas to comply with the cease-fire agreement. However, the RSF and the PF developed their own strategies to manipulate the cease-fire arrangements. The PF within APs generally appeared to be keen to make the AP arrangements work. Violations in terms of egress from APs were frequently more the result of individual indiscipline - guerrillas left to fish, to meet friends or to gather supplies - rather than a deliberate attempt to flout containment. ZIPRA commanders, in fact, imposed severe punishments on lapses of discipline within the camps. It would appear that at one AP the punishment for egressing was to be shot.⁸⁶ However, this basic compliance did not apply at all APs - the ZANLA AP DELTA, for example, saw constant guerrilla movement in and out to allegedly take part in political intimidation.⁸⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Salisbury saw this as the norm rather than the exception and warned on 29 January 1980 that persons moving in and out of APs were:

... considered to be in violation of the truce and [were] liable to be arrested and disarmed or shot.⁸⁸

The PF policy regarding guerrillas kept outside the AP process was less compliant. It led to confrontations between the PF and the RSF, who saw them as acting unlawfully and liable to engagement. According to one estimate, as many as 40% of ZANLA guerrillas (about 9-10,000 personnel) may have remained outside the APs in Rhodesia during most of the cease-fire period,⁸⁹ although according to another estimate all but 1% of ZIPRA guerrillas complied.⁹⁰ Furthermore, intelligence reports received by the British suggested that between 22 December and 6 January, more than 3,000 ZANLA guerrillas had infiltrated into eastern Rhodesia from Mozambique, thus contravening the Lancaster House agreement which prohibited cross-border movements. A number of the guerrillas had not gone into camps and had hidden their arms in caches along the border.⁹¹

⁸⁶ Interview with a British monitor.

⁸⁷ Rhoderick-Jones interview, *op. cit.*

⁸⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, *Weekly Background Briefings*, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 29 January 1980.

⁸⁹ Rice, *op. cit.*, p.161.

⁹⁰ There are conflicting estimates as to the numbers of ZIPRA guerrillas reporting to APs. Legum, for example, maintains that Nkomo kept a substantial portion of his forces in Zambia. Legum, *op. cit.*, p.A20.

⁹¹ Smith and Simpson, *op. cit.*, p.180.

RSF interventions were not solely confined to intercepting PF units deliberately withheld from APs, but sometimes appeared to have the purpose of provoking the PF. At one critical point the RSF surrounded the PF Headquarters with artillery and armoured vehicles. The PF were on the verge of withdrawing their guerrillas from APs in response when the CMF successfully persuaded the RSF to withdraw. It was only prompt and effective mediation by the CMF that averted a resumption of the fighting. At AP BRAVO a firefight broke out, due to what the PF regarded as the provocative siting of a RSF Observation Post only one hundred metres outside the AP boundary.⁹² When the PF learned of its presence - it had been covertly deployed for some time - they attacked it, capturing weapons and forcing the RSF to flee.

... [The PF] had proved the RSF was flouting the cease-fire regulations, and had concrete evidence in the form of captured equipment.⁹³

At least two breaches of the cease-fire were committed at ZANLA APs by the security forces, the Australian Observer Group noted.⁹⁴

Nor was the PF exempt from intimidatory activities. At one point the Australian contingent at AP ECHO was surrounded by PF armed with mortars, machine guns and rocket-propelled guns. The CMF also had to contend with the possibility of clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA, who were sometimes cantoned in common APs. According to one CMF officer, ZIPRA and ZANLA felt as much hatred for each other as they did towards the RSF.⁹⁵ Shortly before the cease-fire, ZIPRA and ZANLA units had in fact been fighting each other in the vicinity of the Midlands town, Gwelo, and in the south-west near Beitbridge. Both sides, then, violated the containment principle.⁹⁶ However, the CMF was less able to maintain containment with respect to the RSF. Because of the Lancaster House secret arrangements, the CMF was seriously constrained in its task of

⁹² The Black Watch Archives, *op. cit.*, p.9.

⁹³ After this incident the monitors at AP BRAVO mounted joint patrols as a precautionary, confidence-building measure. The Black Watch Archives, *op. cit.*, p.9.

⁹⁴ The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *op. cit.*, p.127.

⁹⁵ Rhoderick-Jones interview, *op. cit.*

⁹⁶ In Acland's opinion, the majority of the incidents in the vicinity of APs were the responsibility of the RSF, and the majority in the countryside that of ZANLA. Acland interview, *op. cit.*

monitoring the RSF. It is alleged that "some 65% of auxiliaries escaped any effective surveillance",⁹⁷ while special forces such as the Special Air Service and the Selous Scouts were not permitted to be monitored. The monitoring of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force was less than complete as monitors were not permitted to board flights and had to confine themselves to observing the withdrawal of weapons from armouries. In fact, Rhodesian aircraft overflew APs on a number of occasions, leading guerrillas to egress or fire upon them.⁹⁸ During Lancaster House the PF had unsuccessfully called for all combat aircraft to be grounded.⁹⁹

The CMF was also dependent on the Rhodesians in areas such as logistics, supplies, and communications, which further limited its scope to be confrontational. As a result, the CMF had to use persuasion to modify the behaviour of the RSF. In this it was only partially successful, as relations between the Rhodesian High Command - COMOPS - and the CMF command were poor.

At best COMOPS perceived the CMF as a minor nuisance and at worst as traitors who undermined the white Rhodesian cause.¹⁰⁰

On the ground and at an operational level relations were perhaps better.¹⁰¹

While there were a number of instances of Rhodesian cooperation with the CMF and the development of trust, there was frequently a perception within the CMF that the RSF were holding back information or cooperation. Acland formed the view that:

The RSF were far more devious than the PF in this respect - they deliberately kept information back from us, particularly early on.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 19, no. 1, March 1981, p.87.

⁹⁸ Rice, *op. cit.*, p.123.

⁹⁹ *Patriotic Front Statement*, "Disposition of the Forces and the Commonwealth Force", *op. cit.*, p.2.

¹⁰⁰ Rice, *op. cit.*, p.129.

¹⁰¹ A Signals Officer in Rhodesia commented:

From the start, the Rhodesians in every field could not have been more willing and helpful Indeed, it would be a total understatement to say that without their willingness to help and the Rhodesian "fix-it" approach to life, "Operation Agila" would have been an impossible task.

¹⁰² Acland interview, *op. cit.*

At JOC Hurricane, for example, its CMF commander Brig Rhoderick-Jones came to realize that while he had free access to all parts of the Rhodesian Headquarters and its Operations Room, there were Rhodesian operations being kept secret from him. Most notably, he discovered that an illicit elite Field Force made up from the Rhodesian Light Infantry was being helicoptered around his JOC to confront guerrillas.¹⁰³ It was also clear that special forces like the Selous Scouts were carrying out a "destabilizing exercise" through attempted assassinations. After a series of warnings and an insistence on extra briefings the situation improved in Hurricane, but the monitors had minimal powers to enforce their will:

We were in no position to check everything that was happening. We wanted to put monitors in the field with the Rhodesians, but this was not permitted. I would have ideally liked to have seen every unit at company level monitored 24 hours a day.¹⁰⁴

Part of the reason for RSF non-compliance was their profound mistrust of the PF's intentions. According to Rhoderick-Jones:

The Rhodesians deduced any large group of PF to be up to no good - like killing farmers. Their attitude was they had to be intercepted and killed before they could do any damage.¹⁰⁵

The PF developed their own responses to lessen their vulnerability. In many APs the PF heavily fortified their positions by digging in, posting sentries around the perimeter, and deploying anti-aircraft weapon systems to protect against air attacks. They also sometimes occupied the 5km buffer zones that were established around some APs.¹⁰⁶ A further strategy developed by the PF was to use the CMF as a human shield - making sure it would be hit first in the event of a RSF attack on APs.

The unsatisfactory nature of containment left the CMF in a highly vulnerable position with a GPMG constituting its main means of defence. The GPMG's purpose was to initially contain any PF attack and allow for a tactical retreat. In the event of a retreat from an AP, the monitors would

¹⁰³ Rhoderick-Jones interview, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ The Black Watch Archives, *op. cit.*, p.8.

have called upon RSF protection. How effective this would have been some monitors question. At AP FOXTROT, Maj T.C.R.B. Purdon noted:

... we were very concerned about our own safety. The nearest Rhodesians ... were 30 minutes away by road and ... were lucky to be 60 strong. We had the impression that they were more concerned with their own safety against 6,000 PF than worrying about 50 Brits.¹⁰⁷

In the event of a RSF attack, which some monitors did not discount, particularly from the Selous Scouts who were regarded as anti-CMF, the CMF would have been extremely vulnerable. In fact, neither the RSF nor the PF fired directly at monitors on the ground during the mission, according to Acland.¹⁰⁸

At the heart of the containment problem was the profound lack of a critical psychological "meeting point" between the RSF and the PF until the very end of the mission. This was exemplified in the relations between the PF LOs and the RSF. An officer in the Rhodesian army who dealt with the LOs complained that he found them "a closed book":

We had come to an agreement and we had to discuss the details, but they were not even prepared to discuss them. We felt this mistrust was unreasonable.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁷ Purdon, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁸ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁹ Interview with an officer who served in Rhodesia.

5.2.3 External Intervention and Factional "In-Fighting"

The containment process - and indeed the whole peace process - could have been subverted by the various external linkages that the PF and the RSF had developed during the civil war, and which had already, as mentioned above, deadlocked the Lancaster House talks at a critical juncture. South African military involvement in Rhodesia was longstanding. By 1967 there were already units of the South African army operating with the Rhodesians along the Rhodesian border with Zambia, and ZAPU had also formed links with South African ANC who penetrated into Rhodesia.¹¹⁰ In addition, ZANU was cooperating with Tanzanian and FRELIMO forces. The threat that these external forces posed was considerable. If the RSF believed that "illicit" forces from the FLS were operating in Rhodesia it would give the RSF further rationales for leaving bases and seeking to engage these forces, with the risk of the PF getting involved. The PF feared that the South Africans might take part in attacks on APs. FRELIMO and Tanzanian troops were withdrawn in January 1980. However, the potential for conflict remained with the ANC still in Rhodesia and ZIPRA troops being held in readiness outside of Rhodesia:

ZAPU ... had over 5,500 guerrillas move into the APs, together with South African ANC cadres with a smaller mix floating in the Bulawayo area while leaving a larger force of some 6-8,000 still posed across the Zambian border.¹¹¹

During the containment period the worst fears of the CMF were not realized. None of the external parties appear to have made major interventions designed to wreck the containment process. Nevertheless, South African involvement was substantial and provocative in the eyes of the PF. In addition to the units guarding the Beitbridge route in the south, which were there to safeguard an escape route for South Africans and Rhodesians and possibly to facilitate South African intervention in the case of Rhodesian military set-backs, there were also individual South African soldiers and sub-units attached to Rhodesian army units. Furthermore, South African helicopter pilots were ferrying special Rhodesian Field Force units in South African helicopters.

¹¹⁰ Dumiso Dabengwa, *op. cit.*, pp.27-28.

¹¹¹ Martin Rupiah, *op. cit.*, p.2.

The possibility that internal clashes within the PF between ZANLA and ZIPRA might derail containment also existed. There had been considerable tensions between ZAPU and ZANU throughout much of the civil war. Both parties, and their military wings, had significant differences in terms of ideology, political organization, and military methods. During the war they had clashed a number of times and attempts to present a united front, such as the Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) earlier in the 1970s, had broken down. Indeed, it is alleged that as ZIPA began to collapse in 1975, ZIPRA elements were shot in cold blood by ZANLA forces in Mozambique and Tanzania.¹¹² The noticeably different military tactics of the two PF wings were also a source of tension, with ZIPRA being accused of holding a large portion of its forces outside Rhodesia - it was suspected by some to challenge ZANLA at a later state - and leaving ZANLA to do the bulk of the fighting. Although this view of radically differing tactics has been challenged recently,¹¹³ the possibility existed of clashes between ZANLA and ZIPRA in joint camps, or of a split in the alliance.

There were also divisions within the Rhodesian military and security services. The 20,000 strong unit of auxiliaries was regarded by many as the personal army of Muzovewa and as only partly under RSF control, while the special forces appeared to have a large measure of independence. With conflicting and ambivalent attitudes existing within the Rhodesian High Command, there was ample scope for inconsistent responses to the cease-fire.

5.2.4 External Pre-Election Violence

External cease-fire violations - violations not connected with the separation process - constituted a further serious impediment to demilitarization. The CMF could do little to contain RSF and PF pre-election violence intended to intimidate or influence voters in the forthcoming elections. Flower described the CMF in this context as:

... little more than a gesture of precarious British responsibility, utterly ineffective against the widespread intimidation which continued unobserved around it.¹¹⁴

¹¹² Dumiso Dabengwa, *op. cit.*, p.35.

¹¹³ Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (eds), *op. cit.*, p.7.

¹¹⁴ Flower, *op. cit.*, p.253.

The CMF had been conceived to operate at APs and bases, not on the more expansive basis required to tackle nationwide political violence. Indeed, privately it was admitted that a force of 5-7,000 - somewhat nearer the size of force the PF wanted (allegedly around 10,000 personnel) - could have acted more effectively to manage the APs and prevent cease-fire violations, but this would have added to costs and administration.¹¹⁵

External pre-election violence and the inability of the CMF to contain it negatively impacted upon the peace process. As a consequence of the CMF's limited mandate and numbers, the Governor was compelled to rely on the Rhodesians to police the cease-fire, thus undermining equality of status and damaging his relationship with the PF. The critical challenge posed by the cease-fire violations came to a head with the attempts of Rhodesian special forces to assassinate Mugabe. At least two attempts were made to kill Mugabe in grenade and mine attacks, which the CMF determined to be the work of the Selous Scouts. If these attempts had succeeded, ZANLA would have almost certainly resumed the civil war in response. Rhodesian special forces also attempted to derail elections by staging the blowing up of two churches in Salisbury two weeks before elections, hoping that ZANLA would be blamed.

In this climate of escalating violence the Governor permitted Gen Walls, Commander of Combined Operations, to deploy the Security Force Auxiliaries - hated in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) - to restore order: one of the most controversial actions of the British Governorship. According to Flower, Soames had hoped to persuade Walls to withdraw Muzorewa's Auxiliaries, but the suspicion that ZANLA had thousands of guerrillas outside the APs, and the fear that the RSF might attack APs compelled him to accept the re-deployment of Rhodesian forces throughout the operational areas.¹¹⁶ In reality, the auxiliaries set about persuading or coercing people to vote for Muzorewa, rather than fulfilling their brief of restoring order.¹¹⁷

At this juncture Soames appeared to have formed the opinion that ZANLA was responsible for most cease-fire violations, and was considering banning it from standing in certain TTLs. The RSF were highly critical of the Governor's perceived reluctance to tackle ZANLA

¹¹⁵ Wiseman, *op. cit.*, p.46.

¹¹⁶ Flower, *op. cit.*, p.254.

¹¹⁷ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

contraventions of the cease-fire,¹¹⁸ while British election supervisors warned that the conditions for free and fair elections did not exist in five of the eight electoral districts, largely because of guerrilla intimidation.¹¹⁹ Amidst fears that ZANLA would be banned or severely circumscribed, Mugabe warned that he would:

... order his men to leave the assembly camps if Lord Soames attempted to ban his party ... from contesting the election in any region. "ZANU (PF) will consider itself absolved from the Lancaster House agreement."¹²⁰

The number of contacts in the mid-February period between the RSF and guerrillas outside APs was now running at nine or ten a day: twice the level of a few weeks earlier and mainly in Mugabe-dominated territory. The apparent scale of the violence can be judged by one estimate which put the number of ZANLA soldiers alone killed by the Rhodesians as more than 200 during the cease-fire.¹²¹ However, Acland estimates that PF deaths were a rather lower 150, with many of these being the result of engagements between the BSAP and individual guerrillas involved in criminal activities, rather than military engagements.¹²²

A demilitarization crisis was only averted when Soames was persuaded to allow the PF to stand in all TTLs. The CMF with its direct contact with the PF on the ground played a major part in changing Soames' mind - CMF officers believed that ZANLA intimidation was not as detrimental or widespread as the Rhodesians claimed. The CMF was also the only part of the British mission that predicted that Mugabe would win the elections.¹²³

Although the CMF was unable to prevent most of the cease-fire violations, the CC was in place to assess responsibilities for these violations. Its significance came to reside, not so much in its capacity to directly reduce cease-fire breaches, but in providing a forum where the rival parties could confidentially air their grievances, discuss important issues, and develop personal relationships beneficial to conflict avoidance. It also gave the CMF commander an opportunity to prevent precipitous actions.

¹¹⁸ Flower, *op. cit.*, p.251.

¹¹⁹ Smith and Simpson, *op. cit.*, p.181.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.185.

¹²¹ Rice, *op. cit.*, p.125.

¹²² Acland interview, *op. cit.*

¹²³ Legum, *op. cit.*, p.A20.

On a number of occasions, a PF CC representative was sent to APs to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. Although the two sides remained suspicious of each other, by the time the integration period arrived, the benefits of dialogue within the CC became apparent and a degree of trust emerged between the CC representatives. Indeed, although Acland initially thought the CC a "complete waste of time", in the end he came to view it as the "agency which principally achieved reconciliation".¹²⁴ Much of its success can be attributed to the fact that the highest level of military personnel from the RSF, ZANLA and ZIPRA were represented within the CC giving it great authority and the capacity to issue orders to soldiers in the field when things went wrong.

5.3 Development of Dialogue/Cooperation

The CMF was able to largely maintain separation, despite incidents in the vicinity of APs, but this essentially negative activity was insufficient to complete the demilitarization process. The development of cooperation and dialogue between the parties with a view to integrating forces was required to complete demilitarization. Throughout January and much of February 1980 virtually no progress was made. This has been described as a major flaw of the operation:

The most serious short-term error ... was the failure to allow for sufficient time before independence for the two wings of the PF forces and the Rhodesian army to be integrated into a single national army. Although a start was made with integrating the forces during the transition, progress was minimal.¹²⁵

At Lancaster House, Carrington maintained that integration was not possible in the short period before elections.¹²⁶ Nkomo, however, was concerned regarding the vulnerability of ZIPRA in the post-election period if integration was not achieved. It was all very well for the British to separate the parties and put themselves in the middle as a "referee", he said, but what would happen subsequently?

¹²⁴ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

¹²⁵ Legum, *op. cit.*, p.A18.

¹²⁶ Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, 24th Plenary, 1 November 1979.

Would the winning party eliminate the other? The question before the conference is one of life and death We have to be certain that any agreed plan will bring about reconciliation between the two fighting forces.¹²⁷

Against this had to be weighed the consideration that the achievement of reconciliation in a little over two months was probably not possible, given the levels of hostilities between the parties, and particularly as the PF and the RSF position appeared to be to wait to see the election outcome before agreeing to disarm, demobilize and integrate. Acland contends that the low level of integration was not because "integration was discounted by the British", but because it was realized that the parties would not contemplate full integration before elections.¹²⁸

Nevertheless, Acland in mid-February had reached the point of despair on the lack of progress and feared that:

... what had so far been achieved would ... collapse in dust and ashes.¹²⁹

However, against expectations a breakthrough came on 19 February 1980 when at a CC meeting PF and RSF officers agreed to attempt to initiate the integration process. After consultation with their political leaders, it was agreed that RSF and PF commanders would tour APs explaining that RSF contingents would shortly deploy there and that the PF was to cooperate with them.

5.4 Development of Reconciliation

Developing a sense of reconciliation - or even cooperation - between the warring parties required extremely sensitive handling by the CMF and the will on the part of the combatants to make it succeed. The method adopted by the CMF was to act as a facilitator and "umpire" in bringing the parties together at APs. This was followed in some instances by the mounting of joint patrols supervised by the CMF, and finally, joint training to facilitate the emergence of a unified national army with the CMF once again

¹²⁷ Lancaster House Constitutional Conference, Minutes of 35th Plenary, in Stedman, *op. cit.*, p.197.

¹²⁸ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

¹²⁹ Rice, *op. cit.*, p.172.

adopting a monitoring function. At the end of January the CMF started discussing how cooperation and integration might be developed between the three armies, but they were "desperately suspicious" of each other.

We were trying to get the RSF into APs and start up joint patrols, but the RSF were reluctant and, initially, ZANLA wouldn't agree.¹³⁰

Joint patrols were initially mounted at AP ROMEO between the RSF and ZIPRA, but these were quickly stopped by Gen Walls when they were discovered. The impasse was broken in late February. At AP ROMEO for example, after a visit on 24 February 1980 by Acland, Dumiso Dabengwa, the ZIPRA commander, and Gen Maclean, the RSF army commander, it was announced that Grey's Scouts and the BSAP would move into the AP on a permanent basis. The choice of Grey's Scouts was controversial as ZIPRA guerrillas had a particular dislike of the Scouts. The first meeting was planned with great care by the monitors and ZIPRA. Both parties sought to demonstrate their peaceful intentions and goodwill.

When the 20 Scouts and BSAP arrived, they were met by a ZIPRA fatigue party which offered to carry their kit bags and to erect their tents. The Scouts and BSAP police were equally keen that the meeting should be a success.¹³¹

The monitors organized mixed volley ball matches, and with the establishment of a joint RSF/ZIPRA/CMF Operations room and goodwill gifts of stores, the reconciliation process was well under way. The process was further consolidated by the CMF organizing a tour of the Scouts' base camp.

In the second stage, joint training in drill, signals and weapons handling was undertaken, leading to joint patrols involving ZIPRA and the Scouts, which sought to track ZIPRA guerrillas that had failed to assemble at APs.¹³² In the final weeks before the election, a BSAP and RSF presence was achieved in all camps up to a strength of 70 personnel in some instances. The RSF gradually started to administer the camps, taking over from the CMF. However, the reconciliation process was not uniformly

¹³⁰ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

¹³¹ Bailey, *op. cit.*, p.25.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p.26.

successful in the APs, despite the entry of the RSF into all APs between 19 February and 4 March. Some ZANLA APs proved problematic because of mutual suspicions between the RSF and ZANLA. Ironically, it was hostility between ZANLA and ZIPRA elements, rather than between the Rhodesians and the guerrillas, that caused problems after independence. Furthermore, the short duration and limited scope of the reconciliation process created problems after independence when ZIPRA and ZANLA forces clashed.

5.5 Integration into a Unified National Force

The lack of force integration achieved before elections can be attributed in large part to the fact that the Lancaster House agreement made no provision for the unification of armies.¹³³ Further, the attitude of the RSF and ZANLA to integration was not particularly positive throughout much of the cease-fire period. As the "winning" combatant, ZANLA thought it had the right to form the new army, while the RSF saw the guerrillas as less proficient militarily, and consequently assumed that they would have to disband with white officers forming the core of a new national army. ZIPRA was arguably considerably more constructive in terms of its willingness to integrate.

It was the CC that ensured that at least limited steps towards integration were initiated during the mission. It was the efforts within the CC that persuaded Mugabe and Nkomo to tour APs and set the integration process on track. In fact, in late February 1980 the CC role changed from primarily that of an investigator of cease-fire violations to an initiator of integration.¹³⁴

The CMF was compelled to implement integration on a makeshift basis given its limited resources and time pressures. A ZIPRA training battalion comprised of 617 soldiers was set up first in Essexvale, Bulawayo on 26 February 1980 under British supervision using a nucleus of RSF instructors.¹³⁵ At Essexvale were 30 British monitors, 26 RSF and six Rhodesian African Rifles instructors. AP LIMA was closed to provide

¹³³ Mackinlay, *op. cit.*, p.55., notes that:

The Lancaster House Agreement had failed to anticipate this contingency, and had made no effective provisions for the reconstitution of the three undefeated armies into a single entity to back the fledgling government.

¹³⁴ Rice, *op. cit.*, p.173.

¹³⁵ The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *op. cit.*, p.129.

instructors for the operation. At the beginning of March, ZANLA soldiers went to Rathgar north of Salisbury as part of a similar scheme, with AP BRAVO providing the instructors. Integration was the only phase of the demilitarization process in which limited disarmament took place with both the RSF and PF agreeing to hand in their weapons before undertaking joint training.

The CMF was only able to begin the process of force integration. It had been made clear that a speedy withdrawal was a priority for the CMF and despite appeals for monitors to remain,¹³⁶ the CMF left Zimbabwe between 3 - 5 March 1980, shortly after the elections. The British were extremely concerned regarding the vulnerability of monitors at APs if any of the parties refused to accept the election result and resumed fighting.

After his election victory on 4 March 1980, Mugabe formally requested a British training team to be deployed in Zimbabwe. The British responded with the British Military Assistance Training Team (BMATT). A Committee of Reconciliation and Integration was also set up, chaired by Walls and including Gen Rex Nhongo, ZANLA, Gen Lookout Masuku, ZIPRA, and a British General. This committee was tasked with handling training and integration and determining the future size and structure of the armed forces.¹³⁷

The problems that subsequently emerged in the post-election period underlined the desirability of establishing a cohesive integration plan prior to elections. BMATT was faced with an increasingly difficult situation. It was required to help disarm, demobilize and integrate in the region of 18,000 ZANLA, 6,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 RSF personnel.¹³⁸ Following the elections, the government attempted to implement disarmament through a weapons amnesty in February 1981, the disarming of guerrillas still in APs, and the collection of ZIPRA weaponry inside and outside Rhodesia.¹³⁹ However, hostilities between ZIPRA and ZANLA contingents led to a series of tense incidents during early 1981 and a mutiny in March 1981. Armed guerrillas were involved in banditry. Fortunately, sufficient cohesion had been developed in the national army to prevent its break-up

¹³⁶ Both Mugabe and Nkomo asked for the CMF to carry on in the post-election period. Wiseman, *op. cit.*, p.65.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.66.

¹³⁸ Mackinlay, *op. cit.*, p.54.

¹³⁹ Martin Rupiah, *op. cit.*, p.16.

and the resumption of civil war. However, had this process of disarmament and demobilization been started earlier many of the subsequent problems might have been avoided. Certainly, towards the end of the CMF deployment a degree of cooperation had been established between the CMF, the RSF and the PF, which might have made a more ambitious approach to demilitarization possible. However, whether this could have been foreseen is open to question. During Lancaster House and much of January and February 1980, hostilities between the PF and the RSF remained high, and the CMF was regarded with considerable suspicion. Further, the parties to the conflict were vehemently opposed to disarmament in the pre-election stage.

6. Conclusion

It was remarkable that the demilitarization operation succeeded in the prevailing conditions. At one level, it can be seen as a tribute to the effectiveness of the CMF that had to work with a flawed mandate - which was regularly contravened - and a profound lack of political trust between the RSF and the PF. Their unwillingness to concede any point that might heighten their vulnerability almost inevitably resulted in a demilitarization agreement that had grave deficiencies. Foremost among these, arguably, was the absence of disarmament prior to elections. Political conditions in Rhodesia, including the animosities between key leaders, and the intensity of the civil war, made any disarmament agreement virtually impossible. That the peace process succeeded in these conditions, where the parties had few common goals or common perception of how conflict resolution should proceed, was in large part due to the CMF's professionalism. In a sense, the Rhodesian operation can be seen as a triumph of military competence over political constraints.

However, at another level it could be argued that the parties showed a dogged commitment to the peace process. Although there were "tactical" contraventions of the cease-fire, particularly by elements of the RSF around APs and by the PF in the run-up to the elections, the parties' overall

commitment to demilitarization remained intact.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, the attitude of the PF at the APs was remarkable given their insecurity, and was indicative of the strong sense of political leadership and discipline that ZANU, in particular, had established over its guerrillas. The cooperation of many Rhodesians - particularly in the civil service where they were in a position to undermine the peace process - was also instrumental to its successful conclusion.

It could be further argued that the success of the mission was due to the very lack of disarmament. If the PF and RSF had given up arms they might only have heightened their own insecurities - was it really credible in the eyes of the PF that the RSF would hand in its arms or *vice versa*? The strategy of geographically distancing the parties and permitting them to retain their arms might be seen in retrospect as an inspired approach to the Rhodesia demilitarization problem, albeit one partly forced on the British negotiators.

If the CMF can be judged a success in creating the conditions that permitted elections to take place, it was less successful in specific modalities of the operation, such as maintaining containment. However, the nature of the mandate and the hostility of the various parties made this virtually impossible to achieve. Critics point to the failure of the CMF to bring about reconciliation and integration prior to elections, but this did not prove to be disastrous, despite the 1981 mutiny, once the basis of a national Zimbabwe army was established.

A more telling criticism of the mission was that its mandate was concluded through forcing a disproportionate number of concessions from the PF. This created acute operational problems for the CMF, which seemed to be eventually accepted as an impartial force, but was obliged to implement an inequitable mandate. If the elections had failed to bring about a ZANU victory, there would have been a strong likelihood of resumed fighting given its resentment over its "unequal" treatment. This shortcoming, however, needs to be weighed against the enormous difficulties of arriving at a settlement in Rhodesia, and the delicate balance that needed to be maintained between averting a Rhodesian coup and recognizing legitimate PF concerns. Inevitably, the perceived preference of

¹⁴⁰ It could, however, be argued that elements of the RSF wanted to see the process fail and tried to provoke the PF to abandon the peace process to achieve this.

the FCO for a non-ZANU dominated government led ZANU to distrust the mission.

The conceptual significance of the Rhodesia operation was that it demonstrated that demilitarization of intractable internal conflicts was possible and it suggested an appropriate method. The UN has subsequently mounted a plethora of demilitarization operations in the post-Cold War period, which have drawn on elements of the Rhodesian operation. Comparative analysis shows that the methods recently used by the UN have differed in important respects from Rhodesia. This is partly a function of the differing political, institutional and operational contexts within which CMF and UN missions have taken place. Rhodesia was an extraordinary operation in which a power with colonial interests assumed temporary governance of a country and unilaterally directed the mission - UN operations are unlikely to follow this pattern.

Nevertheless, the Rhodesian method has a core of operational and conceptual characteristics which have relevance to current UN demilitarization missions. The first of these is that disarmament is not invariably the most appropriate method of bringing about demilitarization, although it remains an end goal of the process. In Rhodesia none of the parties would contemplate disarmament because of their mutual mistrust, vulnerability, and their perception that they had a right to bear arms. Similar preconceptions exist in a number of current internal conflicts where disarmament is viewed with acute antipathy.

It would appear that disarmament has frequently been agreed to in bad faith, with the intention of non-compliance; or as a negotiating strategy, with harmful results for the mission. If disarmament is to be successfully implemented certain conditions need to be met. As demonstrated in Rhodesia, the parties need to be confident that their security can be underwritten, otherwise they will be tempted to act pre-emptively or to resist disarmament. In addition, the existence of a genuine will to achieve reconciliation, or at least a will to make a peace settlement work, is a fundamental condition of success. It is doubtful whether disarmament and other forms of demilitarization can effectively take place without the prior existence of an agreed-upon peace settlement, or advanced negotiations.

A second characteristic of relevance to current UN missions concerns the efficacy of unilateral intervention. Was British hegemony at the political and military level productive in terms of demilitarization? In the case of

Rhodesia it permitted the gap between the parties to be bridged through a mixture of political coercion at the negotiating table and persuasion in the field. Unusually, and critically, this unilateralism was usually supported and legitimized at a multilateral level by the FLS, the Commonwealth, and other actors, who kept the parties in the process through a mixture of reassurance and pressure. Unilateralist solutions to conflict resolution are generally rare and tend to lack legitimacy in international society. Nevertheless, they cannot be ruled out and, indeed, the methods used by the British may have considerable relevance if the UN seeks to take a unilateral "trusteeship" role in conflict resolution by assuming governance of a state, for example.

One of the most useful aspects of unilateralism lies in the operational advantages it potentially confers. The cohesion of the British-led mission with its clear lines of authority and relative lack of inter-state bickering could be seen to contrast favourably with a number of recent peacekeeping efforts.¹⁴¹ Disagreements between the CMF national contingents appear to have been rare. With a few exceptions, the British conception of the mission was not challenged by the national contingents. A possible source of friction arose when the Australians arrived in Rhodesia with instructions which seriously limited their scope for action in the view of the British. But it was insisted that they conform to the general concept of operations that had been prepared.¹⁴²

Whether the recent difficulties experienced by the UN in multinational peace support operations will encourage states to act unilaterally or in regional groupings is open to question. International norms seem to currently dictate that multilateralism, rather than unilateralism, is the customary condition of intervention. However, if unilateral intervention is to be legitimized, the CMF operation has a number of features worthy of emulation.

¹⁴¹ One of the principal advantages of unilateralism is speedy responses to requests from the ground. In Rhodesia this was particularly evident. When Acland wanted to secure more helicopters or transporters or other equipment for the CMF, all he had to do was ring up the appropriate political authority in Rhodesia, secure permission, and then contact the Ministry of Defence in London to transport the equipment out. Rhodesia was an exceptional operation in that the British government was prepared to sanction high levels of expenditure. Nevertheless, it serves as an example of the potential response advantages of unilateralism.

¹⁴² The Australian government appeared to have suspicions that the British wanted to finesse things so that a "puppet" government would be installed in Zimbabwe.

Third, consensuality was the *modus operandi* adopted by the CMF. The force did not have the power to compel the parties to do anything. As a consequence, the CMF monitors had to rely on diplomacy, and the development of personal relationships to influence the parties. The very vulnerability of the force constituted one of its greatest strengths, in that it helped alleviate perceptions that it might side with one of the parties. Impartiality proved to be vital in winning the eventual confidence, or at least tolerance, of the RSF and PF. The empirical record would tend to suggest that demilitarization operations in which UN personnel adopt a minimalist, non-threatening posture tend to achieve better results. With the UN reluctant to enforce demilitarization - even assuming demilitarization is enforceable - consensual methods seem to be an increasingly viable approach.

Fourth, the CMF had a clearly framed mandate and Standing Operating Procedures which were adhered to. There was little of the confusion currently evident in certain peace support operations regarding differing national interpretations of mandates and imprecise wording. Fifth, the CMF demilitarization operation was of short duration. There was a clear timescale within which set objectives had to be achieved. This concentrated the minds of both the warring parties and the force monitors. It also avoided the protracted deployments that have been a feature of some peacekeeping missions. In short, the Rhodesian operation was highly focused and extremely professionally conducted.

Last, the fact that a coherent state structure existed during the operation with a functioning bureaucracy enabled decisions to be centrally implemented and avoided the administrative chaos inherent in a number of current "failed-state" peacekeeping operations. While the Governor's powers in practice were limited, particularly in terms of the military, the administrative function, whatever their feelings regarding change in Rhodesia, helped implement the peace process. The existence of strong state structures onto which peacekeeping operations can be "bolted" appears to be a major contributor to the success of a peace process and demilitarization.

To conclude, the CMF operation was undoubtedly lucky. As its force commander commented: "its success was a miracle really".¹⁴³ There were

¹⁴³ Acland interview, *op. cit.*

a number of crisis points which could have derailed demilitarization if circumstances had been less fortuitous. Clashes around APs, for example, may have led to the abandonment of containment by the PF and a resumption of the civil war. If this had happened, the CMF mission would have no doubt been judged a rash operation which failed to provide the CMF with the tools to protect the PF and relied too heavily on consensual techniques. The mandate had limitations, but at least it was professionally implemented, and its more problematic features were mitigated by the sophisticated diplomatic methods used by the CMF on the ground.

Biographical Note

Jeremy Ginifer is currently a Research Associate with the UN Programme at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and a Research Fellow at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, UK. Prior to his research on UNIDIR's DCR Project, he was a Mountbatten Centre Research Fellow with the World Society Foundation "UN, Intervention and Sovereignty Project" (1993-94). Between 1990 and 1992, he was a Research Fellow with the "Naval Peacekeeping Research Project" located at the Mountbatten Centre. His publications include articles in *International Peacekeeping*, *Arms Control* and other journals, and chapters in edited volumes on peacekeeping and nuclear non-proliferation. His current research focuses on UN peacekeeping and development, UN institutional learning, and conflict resolution in Southern Africa.

Part II:
Bibliography

BOOKS AND CHAPTERS

- Abbott, Peter, Philip Botham and Mike Chappell, *Modern African Wars (1): Rhodesia 1965-80*, Osprey Publishing, London, 1986.
- Bhebe, Ngwabi and Terence Ranger (eds), *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, vol. I, University of Zimbabwe Publications & James Currey, Heinemann, Portsmouth, 1995.
- Caute, David, *Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia*, Penguin, New York, 1983.
- Charlton, Michael, *The Last Colony in Africa: Diplomacy and the Independence of Rhodesia*, Blackwell, Oxford, 1990.
- Davidow, Jeffrey, *A Peace in Southern Africa: The Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, 1979*, Westview, Boulder, 1984.
- Hills, Denis, *The Last Days of White Rhodesia*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1981.
- Flower, Ken, *Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981*, John Murray, London, 1987.
- Gann, L. and T. Henriksen, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe*, Praeger, New York, 1981.
- Hanlon, Joseph, *Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa*, Indiana University Press, Indiana, 1986.
- Johnson, Phyllis and David Martin (eds), *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War*, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1986.
- Johnson, Phyllis and David Martin, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War*, Faber and Faber, London, 1981.
- Kruger, Norma J., *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War: Peasant Voices*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.
- Mackinlay, John, "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe/Rhodesia, 1979-80", in Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.), *Humanitarian Emergencies and Military Help in Africa*, Macmillan/International Peace Academy, 1990.
- Moorcroft, P. and P. McLaughlin, *Chimurenga! The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980*, Sygma/Collins, Marshalltown, South Africa, 1982.
- Nyangoni, C. and G. Nyandoro (eds), *Zimbabwe Independence Movements: Selected Documents*, Rex Collins, London, 1979.

- Ohlson, Thomas and Stephen John Stedman, with Robert Davies, *The New is Not Yet Born: Conflict Resolution in Southern Africa*, The Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 1994.
- Nkomo, Joshua, *The Story of My Life*, Methuen, London, 1984.
- Peacock, L., *Mighty Hercules: The First Four Decades*, RAF Benevolent Fund Enterprises, Gloucester, 1995.
- Smith, D. and C. Simpson, *Mugabe*, Sphere Books, London, 1981.
- Stedman, Stephen John, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado, 1991.
- Thompson, Carol, *Challenge to Imperialism: The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe*, Zimbabwe Publishing House, Harare, 1985.
- Verrier, Anthony, *The Road to Zimbabwe, 1890-1980*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1986.
- Wiseman, Henry and Alastair M. Taylor, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition*, Pergamon Press/International Peace Academy, New York, 1981.

ARTICLES

- Anglin, Douglas G., "Zimbabwe: Retrospect and Prospect", *International Journal*, vol. 35, no. 4, Autumn 1980.
- Capt Bailey, J.B.A., "Operation Agila: Rhodesia 1979-80", *British Army Review*, December 1980, no. 66.
- Chan, Stephen, "Three Birds of Different Feathers: The Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Secretary-General and the Commonwealth Secretariat", *The Round Table*, no. 291, 1984.
- Chan, Stephen, "The Commonwealth Observer Group in Zimbabwe: A Personal Memoir", *Mambo Occasional Papers: Socio-Economic Series* no. 18, Mambo Press, Gweru, Zimbabwe, 1985.
- Gregory, Martyn, "Rhodesia: From Lusaka to Lancaster House", *The World Today*, vol. 36, no. 1, January 1980.
- Maj Kaye, C.M.S., "Mission Extraordinary: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia", *British Army Review*, no. 65, August 1980.

- Brig Learmont, J.H., "Reflections from Rhodesia", *RUSI: Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, vol. 125, no. 4, December 1980.
- Legum, Colin, "Southern Africa: The Road to and from Lancaster House", *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents, 1979-80*, Africana Publishing Company, London, 1981.
- Lewis, Roy, "From Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Lancaster House Conference", *The Round Table*, vol. 70, no. 277, January 1980.
- Morris-Jones, W.H. and Dennis Austin (eds), "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: Behind and Beyond Lancaster House", *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol. 18, no. 1, March 1980.
- Maj Purdon, T.C.R.B., "It Takes Two to Tango but 6,000 to 'Foxtrot'", *Guards Magazine: Journal of the Household Division*, Summer 1980.
- Capt Roberts, S.J.L., "Romeo, Romeo, Wherefore Art Thou Romeo ... Over", *Guards Magazine: Journal of the Household Division*, Summer 1980.
- Lord Soames, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe", *International Affairs*, vol. 56, no. 3, Summer 1980.

PAPERS

- Lt Col Rupiah, Martin, *Problems of Demobilization and Integration: the Zimbabwe National Defence Forces, 1980-87: Operation Merger*, The South African Service Corp., Seminar, "Any Lessons for Zimbabwe?", Pretoria/Johannesburg, 2 March 1995.

THESIS

- Rice, Susan Elizabeth, *The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1980: Implications for International Peacekeeping*, D Phil thesis, New College, Oxford University, 1990.

DOCUMENTS/OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS/REPORTS:**Commonwealth**

Commonwealth Secretariat, *Report of the Commonwealth Secretary-General 1979*, London, 1979.

Commonwealth Secretariat, Southern Rhodesia Elections, February 1980, *Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on Elections Leading to Independent Zimbabwe*, London, 1980.

Commonwealth Secretariat, Commonwealth Heads of Government, Meeting in Lusaka, 1-7 August 1979: *Final Communique*, London, 1979.

Special Document: Commonwealth Judgement. "Extracts from the Final Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group on the Zimbabwe Elections", 8 March 1980, in *Africa Currents*, no. 19/20, Spring/Summer 1980.

Front-Line States/Africa

The Organization of African Unity, *Resolution on Zimbabwe Passed by the Thirteenth Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers*, Addis Ababa, 10-12 March 1980.

President Kaunda, *The Zimbabwe Constitutional Conference: Proposals by President Kaunda*, State House, Lusaka (undated).

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Salisbury, *Weekly Background Briefings*, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, 1979-80.

Patriotic Front, *Press Statements*, Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, November-December 1979.

Patriotic Front, *Statements/Proposals*, Constitutional Conference, Lancaster House, London, October-December 1979.

Sir John Boynton, "Southern Rhodesia: Independence Elections 1980", *Report of the Election Commissioner*, Salisbury, March 1980.

UK

The Black Watch Archives, "Operation Agila: Rhodesia, December 1979-80", *BWArch 0637*, Regimental Headquarters of the Black Watch, Perth.

Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, "British Initiatives for a Rhodesian Settlement: Transition to Independence", Chronology, December 1979 to April 1980, *Background Brief Series*, April 1980.

Southern Rhodesia, "Report of the Constitutional Conference", Lancaster House, London, September-December 1979, *Cmnd. 7802*, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1980.

Others

The World Bank, "Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Case Studies", *Africa Regional Series: Discussion Paper, Report no. IDP-130*, October 1993.

US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, "Demobilization in Developing Countries", Carlisle Barracks, *ACN 85007, USAWC*, 1985.

The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, *Zimbabwe: Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence*, Australian Government Publicity Service, Canberra, 1980.

UN DOCUMENTS

UN Document S/13764, letter dated 25 January 1980.

UN Document, S/463, 2 February 1980.

UN Document, Press Release, SC/4166, 2 February 1980.

UN Document, S/445, 8 March 1979.

Video

Ministry of Defence, London, "The Commonwealth Monitoring Force" (an account of "Operation Agila"), *SKC Productions*, 1980.

Media

BBC, Radio 4, PM Programme, *Interview with Joshua Nkomo*, 14 November 1979.

ITN, News at One, *Peter Sissons Interview with Sir Ian Gilmour on the Lancaster House Talks*, 9 November 1979.

Interviews

Maj Gen Sir John Acland, 16 May 1995, Honiton, UK.

Col J.B.A. Bailey, 10 January 1995, Camberley Staff College, UK.

Brig Rhoderick-Jones, 5 May 1995, Milford-on-Sea, UK.

Lt Col Martin Rupiah (telephone), 31 May 1995, University of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe.

UNIDIR Primary Sources

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Practitioners' Questionnaire On Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*, Nos. R104, R106, R118, and R171. Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey responses.


United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, *Analysis Report Of Practitioners' Questionnaire On Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished draft.

Consultations with External Reviewers and Military Experts:

Dr Peter Batchelor, the Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, South Africa.

Dr Stephen John Stedman, John Hopkins University, Washington DC, USA.

UNIDIR DCR Project Military Expert Team



Part III:
Questionnaire Analysis

DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT
The Disarming of Warring Parties
as an Integral Part of Conflict Settlement

PRACTITIONERS' QUESTIONNAIRE ON:
WEAPONS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND
DEMOBILIZATION DURING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

ANALYSIS REPORT: RHODESIA

COMPILED BY UNIDIR'S MILITARY EXPERT GROUP

COMPLETED BY: LT COL J.W. POTGIETER

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1995

Note to Readers: The responses which appear in this analysis have been reproduced directly from the respondents' answers to the DCR *Practitioner's Questionnaire*. Changes, if any, have been made only to correct spelling, grammar, and sentence structure; all efforts have been made to maintain the integrity of the original responses.

Reference Number:
UNIDIR/CMF/001

Summary of Practitioners' Questionnaires

Number of questionnaires analysed: 04

IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION

1. OPERATION

a. Name of operation: CMF

b. Location of operation: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

c. Time frame covered by questionnaires:

(R104)	01/12/79 - 30/04/80
(R106)	01/10/79 - 30/03/80
(R118)	25/12/79 - 30/03/80
(R171)	No date available

2. RESPONDENTS

a. Primary Role:

UN Civilian: 00

Chief	: 00
Other	: 00

Military Officer: 04

Commander	: 01
Other	: 03

Humanitarian Relief Operator and/or NGO personnel: 00

National Official: 00

b. Primary Function/Mission:

<u>Military</u> : 03			
HQ Staff	: 01	Military Observer	: 01
Infantry	: 01	Armour	: 00
Artillery	: 00	Engineer	: 00
Medical	: 00	Aviation	: 00
Transport	: 00	Logistics	
: 00			
Mil Police	: 00		
<u>Civilian</u> : 02			
Civil Affairs	: 00	Staff HQs	: 00
Representative	: 00	Relief Coordinator	: 00
Relief	: 00	Volunteer	: 00
Other: Monitoring & Liaison			
: 01			
		Liaison with HQ	
	: 01		

c. Regular Activities:

Convoy Operations	: 00	Convoy Security	: 00
Base Security	: 01	Patrolling	
: 01			
Search Ops	: 01	Check Point Ops	: 00
Cease Fire Monitor	: 04	Cease Fire Viol Investig	: 02
Weapons Inspection	: 01	Weapons Inventories	: 01
Weap Collect Volunt	: 02	Weap Collect Involunt	: 01
Weapons Elimination	: 00	Cantonment Construct	: 00
Cantonment Security	: 01	Disarmament Verific	: 00
Information Collection	: 03	Police Operations (Mil)	: 00
Special Ops:	: 00	Humanitarian Relief	: 01
Other:		Briefing of Governor or Press Secretary	: 01
		Consultation with civilian community	: 01
		Distribution of provisions & med. aid to combatants	: 01
		Evacuation of casualties	: 01
		Liaison between warring parties & their HQs	: 02
		Liaison with Rhodesian Combined Operations	: 01
		Liaison with HQ Monitoring Force	: 01
		Secretary to the Ceasefire Commission	: 01

SECTION ONE

(Note to readers: Two caveats should be kept in mind when surveying the respondents' answers to the Practitioners' Questionnaire. First, in answering the questionnaire, respondents were instructed to answer only those questions which pertained to their specific mission and/or function; as a result, most respondents did not answer all of the "yes" or "no" questions. The number of responses for each question, therefore, will not always add up to the total number of respondents. Second, respondents often provided additional commentary for questions they should have skipped -- they may have answered a question with "no", for example, and then elaborated on their answer in the space provided for the "yes" respondents. For this reason, certain questions may contain more responses than the number expected.)

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT:

Q1.1 Was there a disarmament component in the original peace agreement and/or relevant UNSC Resolution?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q1.2 Was the disarmament component a central feature of the agreement?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q1.3 Describe the desired outcome of the disarmament component vis-à-vis the peace agreement.

(R104) For the forces of the Patriotic Front (ZANU and ZAPU) to hand in their weapons and proceed to organized Assembly Areas and abide there until after the democratic elections.

(R106) That disarmament would take place at pre-agreed Assembly Areas prior to a general election.

(R171) The combatants retained arms as enforcement of [the] original intention [of disarmament] was too difficult, mainly owing to [the] suspicion of [the] lower ranks and lack of effective control by senior commanders of the Patriotic Front.

Q1.4 Was there a timetable planned for implementation?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q1.5 If so, did it go as planned?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q1.6 If not, why? Give three reasons.

(R104) Some guerrilla groups initially refused to cooperate with their leader[s] directives either because they distrusted the agreement, or because they were anarchic in tendency.

Q1.7 If there were delays in the implementation, summarize their impact on the disarmament process.

(R104) It placed a strain on the timetable of events, and bred accusations of non- cooperation by the Rhodesian authorities.

(R106) There were no delays though most combatants remained armed until after the electoral process was complete.

(R171) [The] impact [was] concerned with continuing suspicion and [the] need to conduct negotiations with extreme care.

Q1.8 Did the existing agreements hinder you at any time from conducting disarmament measures?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q1.9 If so, mention some of the ways in which you felt hindered.

(R106) Whilst the agreements did not prevent us, the lack of trust on all sides meant that disarmament was a much slower process than intended.

II. MANDATE:

Q2.1 At the start of your mission, were you informed of the part of the mandate regarding disarmament?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q2.2 How was the disarmament component expressed in your mission mandate? (Summarize.)

(R104) To disseminate information regarding the timetable for disarmament, and the locations for weapons collection, to all Patriotic Front Forces.

(R171) I was asked to try [to] convince the returning combatants to give up their arms.

Q2.3 How did you interpret the mandate you received?

(R104) To make contact with local guerrilla leaders and persuade them to carry out the terms of the Lancaster House agreement.

(R171) Negotiate and, if necessary, compromise.

Q2.4 Did the way the disarmament component was expressed hinder or assist your disarming task?

Hindered: 00 Assisted: 01

Q2.5 If it was a hindrance, how would you have preferred your mandate to read?

No responses.

Q2.6 Were your actions/freedom of action during disarmament operations influenced by external factors other than the mandate?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q2.7 If so, which ones?

(R104) By the refusal of individual commanders to carry out the orders of their military and political leaders.

III. SUBSIDIARY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS:**Q3.1 Did the warring factions enter into a separate disarmament agreement?**

Yes: 00 No: 03

(If not, go to question 4.)

Q3.2 If so, describe the agreement.

No responses.

Q3.3 Was the agreement formulated with the mandate in mind or independent of the mandate?

No responses.

Q3.4 Were there any contradictions between the mandate and the agreement?

No responses.

Q3.5 If so, which ones?

No responses.

Q3.6 What was the impact of the agreement on the mandate?

No responses.

IV. TOP-DOWN CHANGES: CONSISTENCY OF THE MANDATE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DISARMAMENT COMPONENT:**Q4.1 Did the mandate change while you were engaged in the UN/national operation?**

Yes: 00 No: 04
(If not, go to question 5.)

Q4.2 If so, what was(were) the change(s)? (Describe the most important aspects.)

No responses.

Q4.3 Did this(these) change(s) affect your disarmament operations?

No responses.

Q4.4 If so, how? (Name the three most important effects.)

No responses.

Q4.5 If disarmament was affected, was it still possible for you to implement disarmament measures as first envisaged?

No responses.

Q4.6 In the context of 4.5, did you have to change or abandon procedures?

No responses.

Q4.7 If you changed procedures, what were the changes? (Mention the three most important ones.)

No responses.

Q4.8 Were you adequately informed of changes when and as they occurred?

No responses.

Q4.9 Were you able to implement alternative measures immediately?

No responses.

Q4.10 If not, why? (Give the three most salient points.)

No responses.

V. BOTTOM-UP CHANGES: DISPUTES AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES ARISING DURING THE MISSION:**Q5.1 Was there a mechanism or a provision for the settlement of disputes if and when these emerged?**

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q5.2 If so, what type of mechanism/provision did you have (i.e., mission, special agreement, the UN process, special commission, etc.)?

(R104) For the Cease-fire Monitors to persuade individual commanders, in conjunction with PF liaison officers, to adhere to the mandate.

(R106) All disputes were brought before the Cease-fire Commission which investigated as even-handedly as it could, reporting its judgement back to the Commission [sic].

(R118) Cease-fire Commission.

(R171) Local agreement[s] with personnel entering the *cordon sanitaire* that I was responsible for.

Q5.3 What kind of regulations were agreed between the parties and the peacekeepers for the collection of arms?

(R104) Representatives from all parties were present at the collection points.

(R106) The agreement was simply to hand over weapons to the monitoring force in Assembly Areas. Weapons were made safe and backloaded with safe ammunition. Unsafe ammunition and explosives were mainly destroyed *in situ*.

(R118) Safe handling of [surface-to-air missiles] and hand-held weapons. I was not aware of the heavy weapon[s] arrangements.

(R171) No agreement was reached in my Assembly P[oint], although I understand [that] in other parts of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe local agreements were reached and regulations put in place.

Q5.4 What kind of negotiations/regulations were agreed at the top and lower levels with respect to the storage of arms?

(R106) From recollection, most of the weapons collected in Assembly Areas were to be destroyed. Those ZIPRA and ZANLA soldiers going into the new Zimbabwean forces were to be reissued with new weapons after training.

(R118) Security and safe handling in the RV[s] and Assembly Points.

(R171) Unknown.

Q5.5 Was there a conflict between these *new* agreements and the *original* agreement and/or mandate?

Yes: 00 No 01

VI. PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION DURING THE MISSION:

Q6.1. Did you consider the protection of the population when negotiating disarmament clauses with the warring parties?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q6.2. Was the protection of the population a part of your mission?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q6.3 If so, did you have the means to do so?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q6.4 What were the three most important means at your disposal to achieve this objective?

(R106) [The] Assembly Areas and the RVs were sited well away from population centres.

SECTION TWO

VII. FORCE COMPOSITION AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Q7.1 Was the force composition for your mission area unilateral or multilateral?

Unilateral: 03 Multilateral: 01

Q7.2 Describe the three most important advantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

(R106) The variety of different interested parties (ZIPRA, ZANLA, Rhodesian units, adjacent countries). Commonwealth involvement. Political involvement from UK through the Governor.

Unilateral force composition:

- (R104) Efficient passage of information and communication. Effective command and control. Units used to working with each other can rely on each other.
- (R118) Small team. Single leadership, management and direction. Easier communications and administration.
- (R171) Ease of command and control although I had an allied component under [my] command. Any problems were [based on] personality rather than national[ity].

Q7.3 Describe the three most important disadvantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.Multilateral force composition:

- (R106) The amount of dialogue and discussion necessary to achieve concurrence. Lack of security [for] Commonwealth forces at times. Lack of confidentiality.

Unilateral force composition:

- (R104) Lack of awareness of the needs and attitudes of other components.
- (R118) None.
- (R171) None.

Q7.4 If you worked in a multilateral context: how important was consensus (with peacekeepers from other countries) for the achievement of disarmament and demobilization components during the operation?

- (R106) Essential.

(R171) Reasonable.

Q7.5. Was adequate consideration given to the disarmament component as the mission evolved?

Adequate: 02 Inadequate: 02

Q7.6 If it was inadequate, explain how this affected your mission (mention the three most important issues).

(R104) The mechanism for persuading dissident guerrilla groups to disarm [was] ad hoc and depended on the initiative of local peacekeepers and their PF liaison officers.

(R171) High element of risk to Monitoring Force. PF personnel engaged in local[ized] banditry against local villagers.

Q7.7 Did the force composition identify a specific structure to support the disarmament component of the mandate?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q7.8 If so, what was it?

(R106) A mixture of military, police and civil personnel.

Q7.9 Did the force composition allow for verification and monitoring measures for the control of weapons and disarmament?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q7.10 If so, what were they?

(R106) The three components were able to receive, record and backload weaponry in a rudimentary way. However, it was suspected that other arms and equipment remained concealed for emergencies.

Q7.11 Was the chosen force structure appropriate for executing the mission?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q7.12 Were the units efficient for the mission given?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q7.13 Were the units appropriate for conducting the disarmament operations?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q7.14 Were your units augmented with specific personnel and equipment for the disarmament mission?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q7.15 If so, what additional capabilities did they provide? (List the five most important ones.)

(R106) Personnel only. They provided interpreters, interview techniques, recording ability, local knowledge [and] extra authority.

Q7.16 If you were a commander, were you briefed by HQs prior to your disarming mission and before your arrival in the area of operations?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q7.17 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q7.18 If not, what steps were required in order to establish and maintain a secure environment?

(R106) Weapons had to be given up voluntarily. The operational success was based on confidence-building measures.

(R171) A *cordon sanitaire* was proclaimed. The trust of the local commanders was sought. Rhodesian Security Forces were kept out of the area by agreements.

Q7.19 Did these force protection measures affect the accomplishment of the disarmament operations positively or negatively?

Positively: 03 Negatively: 00

Q7.20 Elaborate on the impact mentioned in 7.19 above.

(R106) The extra "forces" [that were] brought in were unarmed. It was a confidence- building measure.

(R171) Enabled [the] Monitoring Force to establish trust in [what was] perceived [to be a] stable environment.

Q7.21 Were command and control/operational procedures adequate for your task?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q7.22 If not, mention three examples which demonstrate their inadequacy.

No responses.

Q7.23 Summarize your salient experiences with command and control/operational procedures while on this mission.

(R104) Generally good within the Commonwealth units. However, there was too little planning and cooperation between units monitoring the Rhodesian Security Forces, and units monitoring the Patriotic Front. Not enough flexibility for junior commanders in the field.

(R118) Guaranteed com[mands]. Security wherever possible. Simplicity.

(R171) A very good [command and control] system was put in place with three levels [...]. I received very good support at [the] provincial level from the intermediate HQ.

Q7.24 What additional support (special capabilities/force multipliers) did you receive which helped the disarmament mission? List the three most important ones.

(R118) Good com[mands].

(R171) None.

Q7.25 Were they adequate?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q7.26 If not, what other capabilities would you have needed to make your mission more effective? (List the most relevant.)

- (R104) More troops -- particularly senior NCOs. More vehicles and more access to helicopters. We had to rely a good deal on Rhodesian transport.

VIII. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES/RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Q8.1 Did you abide by national or UN rules of engagement/operational procedures during the pursuit of your mission?

National: 04 UN: 00

Q8.2 Were these rules/procedures adequate for the performance of your task?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q8.3 If not, what other rules should you have had?

No responses.

Q8.4 If and when the situation changed, were your rules altered accordingly?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q8.5 If so, summarize the relevant changes.

(R106) Written into the original rules.

(R118) Moving appropriate to the change in the situation.

(R171) As larger than expected numbers of PF personnel arrived with consequent security and administration problems, more flexible attitudes [regarding the] carriage of weapons and suppl[ies] evolved.

IX. COERCIVE DISARMAMENT AND PREVENTIVE DISARMAMENT

Q9.1 Did you have to use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve the mission as mandated?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q9.2 Judging from your experience, is it possible to use coercive disarmament in these types of operations?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q9.3 Do you believe that force can and should be used to enforce the disarmament components of an agreement?

Can:	Yes: 03	No: 01
Should:	Yes: 01	No: 02

Q9.4 Mention three reasons why force can/cannot and should/should not be used to enforce the disarmament component of an agreement.

(R104) If there is a political mandate to use force. If it is used at the earliest possible stage, and as effectively as possible. If, once a threat has been made, it is carried out immediately. Prevarication is a disaster.

(R106) It can only be used after a surrender, or [when] one side has lost the will to fight. Every side will keep a reserve just in case. Force can degenerate into another conflict with a tremendous burden on forces.

(R118) Resolution. Deterrence.

(R171) If a single party is unduly recalcitrant. If [the] level of banditry is such that [the] civilian population is suffering. [A] disarming force [has the] capability for fast and effective action.

Q9.5 If fighting was an ongoing process, was it possible for you to continue with your disarmament tasks?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q9.6 If so, describe how it was possible to continue with your disarmament tasks.

(R118) Talking and cooperation based on trust.

Q9.7 Were you involved in any preventive deployment operations (i.e., as an observer, preventive diplomacy official, etc.)?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q9.8 If so, was disarmament a major concern of this deployment?

Yes: 00 No: 00

Q9.9 If so, were there already arms control agreements (i.e., registers of conventional weapons, MTCR, etc.) in place within the country where you were operating?

Yes: 00 No: 01

SECTION THREE

X. INFORMATION: COLLECTION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND THE MEDIA

Q10.1 Did you receive sufficient relevant information prior to and during your disarming mission?

Prior: Yes: 03 No: 01
During: Yes: 03 No: 01

Q10.2 Was information always available and reliable?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q10.3 How did you receive/obtain your information prior to and during the mission? (Describe the three most important ways.)

(R104) Reports and signals. Newsletters from HQ. Local newspapers.

(R106) I monitored the Lancaster House talks in [the] MOD. I attended the Rhodesian COMOPS debrief daily. I attended the HQ Monitoring Force brief daily.

(R118) I was at a very low level.

(R171) [In] country briefings before deployment. In country briefings prior to deployment into the AO.

Q10.4 Was there a structured information exchange between HQs and the units in the field?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.5 And between the various field commanders?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q10.6 Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information purposes?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q10.7 If so, list which ones and for what purpose. (Mention not more than three.)

No responses.

Q10.7.1 Was the use of on-site and remote sensing an adequate tool for verifying and monitoring weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q10.7.2 In your opinion, could sensor systems (acoustic, radar, photo, video, infrared, etc.) play a useful role in monitoring the weapons control and disarmament aspects of a peacekeeping operation?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q10.7.3 If so, give some examples of phases of the peacekeeping process in which such sensors could be used.

(R118) Monitoring weapon[s] movement, collection and use.

(R171) Monitoring unauthorized movement.

Q10.7.4 What would you suggest about the possible organizational set-up of the use of such sensor systems (i.e., UN, regional organization, national, etc.)?

(R118) UN or national.

Q10.8 Do you think that normal information collection assets (i.e., intelligence) could and should be used for peacekeeping and disarming purposes?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.9 Why? (List three reasons.)

- (R104) Inexpensive. The more contact with the situation on the ground, the better.
- (R106) Military intelligence was more accurate than political (foreign office) intelligence. Essential to get an accurate "feel". The parties themselves should know they are being checked up on.
- (R118) Operational information. Getting prepared. Giving the [warring factions] confidence in your knowing what is going on.
- R(171) Without information, [peacekeeping operation] processes will fail. Information needs to be assessed and analysed to produce intelligence for short warning puposes. Safety of peacekeeping [operations] should be paramount.

Q10.10 Is there a need for satellite surveillance in peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.11 Did you use the local population for information collection purposes?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.12 Did you implement any transparency measures to create mutual confidence between warring parties?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q10.13 If so, did you act as an intermediary?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q10.14 Was public affairs/media essential to the disarming mission?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.15 Were communication and public relations efforts of importance during your mission?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.16 If so, give three reasons why this was so.

(R104) To disseminate information amongst the indigenous communities. To reassure the PF guerrilla forces that the peacekeepers were non-partisan. To explain the political objectives.

(R106) As a confidence-building measure. To ensure that the key timings were met. To ensure that the political process was achieved.

(R118) Communication. Open sources. Scotching of rumours.

(R171) Achieved trust of combatants and locals. Reinforced non-threat[ening] nature of monitors. Maintained flow of information.

Q10.17 Was there a well-funded and planned communications effort to support and explain your activities and mission to the local population?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q10.18 If not, should there have been one?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q10.19 Did media attention at any time hamper or benefit your disarming efforts?

Hamper: 01 Benefit: 01

Q10.20 Summarize your experience with the media.

(R104) Monthly press conferences followed by question and answer session[s].

(R171) Due to [the] inexperience of some media personnel, several disputes erupted with PF members. This required me to personally intervene and on two occasions to prevent loss of life or injury. Generally, my experience with the media was positive.

Q10.21 Was there sufficient briefing to the general public in the conflict area on the disarming process?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q10.22 If so, who organized this and who carried it out?Organized:

(R106) HQ CLAMOR (Commonwealth Liaison and Monitoring Operation in Rhodesia).

(R118) Diplomats.

Carried it out:

(R106) ZIPRA an[d] ZANLA officers, Rhodesian radio.

(R118) Diplomats and media handling.

Q10.23 Was there cooperation with the local media in explaining the steps of disarmament you were carrying out?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q10.24 Were leaflets distributed?

Yes: 03 No: 00

SECTION FOUR**XI. EXPERIENCES IN THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS AND IN DISARMAMENT****DURING YOUR MISSION:****Q11.1 Describe, by order of importance, your specific tasks, if any, in weapons control and disarmament during this mission.**

- (R104) Persuading groups of recalcitrant guerrillas (Patriotic Front) to hand over their weapons and move to the Assembly Areas.
- (R106) My main task was as secretary to the Cease-fire Commission. I also had a liaison task with Rhodesian combined operations HQ and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force HQ.
- (R118) Security. Knowing where they were.
- (R171) Initially to try [to] convince the returning commanders to get their troops to surrender their weapons. The commanders were unwilling or unable to do so. Combatants retained their personal weapons.

Q11.2 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for arms control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q11.3 If not, what steps were required to establish and maintain a secure environment?

(R171) Training in arms discipline. Constant advice by my troops on correct security procedures regarding weapons to PF personnel. [The] Monitoring Force adopted a non-threatening attitude in performance of their duties.

Q11.4 Do you think your weapons control and disarming tasks could have been handled more efficiently?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.5 If so, mention three ways in which your task could have been improved.

No responses.

Q11.6 Were opportunities missed to take advantage of or implement weapons control and disarmament measures?

Missed: 00 Not missed: 04

Q11.7 If opportunities were missed, mention the main reasons why this happened.

No responses.

Q11.8 Did you find the national diversity of contributed troops a problem for command and control during disarmament operations?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.9 If so, mention the three problems you considered most challenging.

No responses.

Q11.10 Was the disarmament process reversible (i.e., were there instances where devolution was foreseen or requested)?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.11 If so, were there provisions to this effect in the mandate, mission or agreement?

No responses.

Q11.12 Which types of weapons were in use, and by whom (e.g., your own unit(s), warring parties, individuals, irregular units, national officials, etc.)? (If applicable, list the five principal ones for each category.)

(R104) Weapon: 7.62 mm rifle Whom: Own unit
9 mm pistol

Weapon: AK 47 rifle Whom: PF guerrillas
Thomson submachine gun
Grenades
Light mortars

(R118) Weapon: AK 47 rifle Whom: ZIPRA/ZANLA
RPGs

Weapon: SLRs Whom: Monitoring
Force

(R171) Weapon: Rifles Whom: Own units
Machine guns

Weapon: Small arms Whom: Rhodesian
Mortars Security Forces

Weapon: Small arms Whom: Patriotic Front
 Some machine guns
 RCLs
 SAMs

Other comments:

(R171) A number of the crew served weapons, RCLs and SAMs of the 1800 PF [members] in my Assembly P[oint] were kept in caches outside the Assembly P[oint].

Q11.13 Were you given priorities as to the type of weapons you should disarm first?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.14 If so, how were priorities assigned (i.e., on what basis)? (List three reasons.)

(R171) Remove, if possible, crew served weapons (if any).
 Support weapons (SAMs, MG etc.)

Q11.15 At the beginning of your mission, were you able to have sufficient information on military capabilities in regard to numbers and quality of equipment used by warring parties?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.16 Did you have the impression that there were caches of weapons in your sector or adjoining sectors?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q11.17 Were illicit weapons a problem for you (illicit as in: not in your inventories)?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q11.18 Was there evidence in your sector that the warring parties continued to have access to weapons through external channels of supply?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q11.19 Could you control external channels of weapons supply in your sector?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.20 How important was the control of external channels of supply for the success of the mission?

Very Important: 01 Important: 01 Unimportant: 01

Q11.21 In your experience, do weapons continue to flow during the conflict even after sanctions, inspections, and checks have been applied?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q11.22 Were there any security zones established?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q11.23 If so, were you able to control your sector effectively?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q11.24 Depending on your answer to 11.23, elaborate on how you were able to control the sector or on why you were unable to control it.

(R118) Cooperation from ZIPRA.

(R171) Reasonably effectively, by combined patrols with PF forces.

Q11.25 Were you involved in any monitoring of arms embargoes/sanctions?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.26 What was your experience in this respect?

No responses.

Q11.27 Were any weapons collected for cash or land during your mission?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q11.28 If so, comment on the effectiveness of this incentive.

No responses.

Q11.29 Were national police involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q11.30 Were other organizations involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.31 If so, which ones?

(R104) Peacekeeping units. Rhodesian police (BSAP). PF liaison officers.

Q11.32 If involved in chapter VI operations (peacekeeping), were military observers used in the collection of arms?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.33 If so, what type of military observer was used (i.e., UN, regional, other organization, etc.)?

(R104) Commonwealth Monitoring Force officers.

Q11.34 Answer if applicable: was there satisfactory coordination between military observers and yourself as unit commander/chief of operation?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q11.35 Were the warring factions themselves involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q11.36 Did you use opposite party liaison officers so that all factions were represented in the collection of arms and the disarming process?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q11.37 If so, reflect upon your experiences in this issue.

(R104) It was important [to have] representatives from all parties for disarmament operations in order to build up trust.

(R171) I had an LO from the local PF force commander: the first was unreliable and dangerous. The second was better but still ineffective.

Q11.38 With regard to the UN/national mission you participated in, do you believe arms can be effectively collected?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q11.39 Were you involved in the disarming of individuals, private and irregular units, and/or bandits?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q11.40 Was the UN police involved in these tasks?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.41 Were local authorities involved in disarming individuals?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.42 If so, what was their role?

No responses.

Q11.43 Were there regulations in the mandate or peace agreement with respect to how to deal with private and irregular units?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.44 If not, do you think your task would have improved if there had been such an accord?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q11.45 Did you experience problems with snipers?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q11.46 If so, how did you counter this?

(R104) By returning small arms fire.

(R171) This happened twice by disaffected PF force members who were eventually controlled after negotiations with the local PF commander.

SECTION FIVE**XII. DEMOBILIZATION EXPERIENCES****Q12.1 Did the disarmament component of your mission include or infer demobilization?**

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q12.2 If so, what types of demobilization operations were conducted during this UN/national operation (i.e., cease-fire monitoring, weapons cantonment, etc.)?

(R104) Cease-fire monitoring. The gathering of guerrilla forces into Assembly Areas/Camps where they were obliged to await democratic elections. The confinement of Rhodesian forces to defensive patrolling only.

(R106) It was a separate element, and different processes were set up to cope with demobilization.

(R118) Cease-fire monitoring.

(R171) [The] PF [were] required to be within [the] Assembly [Points] and [the] Rhodesian [Security Forces] to be limited to specific patrol bases. CF Monitors were deployed with each group.

Q12.3 Was the demobilization process accompanied by a national reintegration process involving government forces and opposing forces?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q12.4 If so, were sufficient means available for an effective reintegration process?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q12.5 If not, elaborate on the problems you experienced with this task.

(R171) This process was not initially thought out, but gradually evolved over a three-month period. Problems initially involved lack of procedures, facilities and resources.

Q12.6 Which organizations assisted you in demobilizing (i.e., other services, international organizations, national organizations, or nongovernmental organizations)? List by order starting with most assistance to least assistance.

(R118) Other services.

(R171) None.

Q12.7 Was there a person or a branch responsible for plans for demobilization?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q12.8 If so, who or which branch was it?

(R171) HQ Commonwealth Monitoring Force.

XIII. DEMINING EXPERIENCES**Q13.1 Did you experience mine problems?**

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q13.2 If so, what did you do to counteract them?

(R118) Avoidance then clearance.

Q13.3 Was there an exchange of maps of minefields at the outset when the agreements were signed?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.4 If not, was it feasible to have such maps?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.5 If so, do you think there should have been an agreement for the exchange of maps at the outset as part of the agreements signed?

No responses.

Q13.6 If no maps were available and it was not feasible to chart the location of minefields, did you consider yourself adequately prepared to deal with the demining of haphazard minefields?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.7 Did your unit play a role in the demining process?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q13.8 Was the UN involved in demining?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.9 Was the UN interested in becoming involved in demining?

No responses.

Q13.10 Was the host nation involved in demining or interested in becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q13.11 Were local groups/militias involved in demining?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q13.12 Do you think local groups and militias should be encouraged to undertake demining tasks?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q13.13 Why?

(R118) They have a very good idea of location, and [...] when the mines were laid.

(R171) They have the prerequisite local knowledge. They laid them -- they retrieve them.

Q13.14 Were humanitarian organizations or private firms involved in demining?

Humanitarian Organizations: Yes: 00 No: 01
 Private Firms: Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.15 In your opinion, who should undertake demining processes and why?

(R118) Military forces or civil contracted experts -- purely because they can do it more safely than others.

SECTION SIX

XIV. TRAINING

Q14.1 Prior to deployment, did your units undertake specific training programs related to disarmament operations?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q14.2 If so, were these training programs based on guidance from the UN forces already in the field, from the UN in general, or from your national authorities?

UN forces in field: 00 UN in general: 00
 National authorities: 01
 Other: 00

Q14.3 Were your units trained specifically for the collection of arms and cantonment of factions?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q14.4 Were you and/or your units trained in on-site inspection and observation techniques?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q14.5 Have you been trained in verification technologies nationally?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q14.6 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific weapons control and disarmament operations (i.e., weapons searches, inventories, elimination, etc.)?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q14.7 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demobilization operations?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q14.8 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demining operations?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q14.9 On the whole, did you consider yourself technically and tactically prepared for the accomplishment of your mission?

Technically: Yes: 01 No: 01

Tactically: Yes: 02 No: 00

Q14.10 Was there anything done at the end of the mission to gather lessons learned?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q14.11 Back in your own country, were you debriefed?

Yes: 01 No: 01

SECTION SEVEN**XV. INTERACTIONS****Given that there are three common elements to a UN mission -- the military, the humanitarian agencies, and the political branch:****Q15.1 Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?**

Very good: 01 Adequate: 02 Inadequate: 01

Q15.2 If you think it could have been improved, specify three ways in which this could have been achieved.

(R106) There was not the humanitarian infrastructure in place to cope. These aspects were carried out by the Commonwealth forces.

(R171) Adequate combined briefings at the operational level. Better education of the humanitarian agencies [in] the area they are deploying to (some [of the] knowledge demonstrated by these agencies was abysmal).

Q15.3 How was the overall cooperation of the three elements of the UN components achieved during your mission? Summarize.

(R106) By coordination meetings and a significant injection of funds from [the] UK for humanitarian purposes -- particularly food.

(R171) Initially, not good. A degree of suspicion towards the military by the agency (Red Cross) and a naive expectation of the way they would be able to relate with [...] the local community as well as the Patriotic Front. The latter were deeply suspicious; however, there was gradual improvement with time.

Q15.4 Did cooperation exist between the UN military, private and irregular elements, and existing police forces (UN or local)?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q15.5 If so, describe which components cooperated with whom and the level of their cooperation.

(R106) A mixture of cooperation and rivalry as the police were also intelligence gatherers. Our own intelligence was based on special forces information. Police appeared to operate as an element of [the] Rhodesian [Security Forces].

(R171) There was a reasonable degree of discrete cooperation between the local police and the Commonwealth Monitoring Force. Initially, the relationship was sensitive as the police were seen as the enemy by the PF.

XVI. PERSONAL REFLECTIONS**On reflection,****Q16.1 What was the overall importance of the disarmament task for the overall success of the mission?**

Very important: 02 Important: 02 Not important: 00

Q16.2 What were the three major lessons you learned from your field experience?

(R104) The importance of good intelligence. The necessity to have intelligent, well- trained and reliable officers and senior NCOs who could act with initiative away from HQs. The importance of having political will and political agreement behind any military operation.

(R106) The importance of confidence-building and trust-building. That both sides must respect the broker and want an end to [the] conflict. Promises made must be delivered.

(R118) Communications. Cooperation and trust. Mine awareness.

(R171) Importance of military personnel to understand and practice diplomacy. The need for adequate preparation prior to deployment. When hatreds are deep and long-running, the solution is not likely to be rapid.

Q16.3 What other question should we have asked here and how would you have answered it?

Questions:

No responses.

Answers:

No responses.

To be answered only by those who participated in completed UN/national peacekeeping missions:

Q16.4 Do you think that the disarmament-related tasks which you undertook had an impact on the national reconstruction processes which followed the end of the mission?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q16.5 If so, briefly explain how and why:

- (R104) It was absolutely vital to the holding of safe, free and fair democratic elections.
- (R106) It allowed an iterative [sic] political process to take place in a relatively peaceful atmosphere.
- (R171) Although it took some time and turbulence, the country [of] Zimbabwe weathered the storm of post-Rhodesian rule much better than expected. Without the deployment of the Monitoring Force at that particular window of opportunity [during] November/December 1979, the cure might have been even more traumatic.