

**Disarmament and Conflict
Resolution Project**

**Managing Arms
in Peace Processes:
Liberia**



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United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Geneva

**Disarmament and
Conflict Resolution Project**

**Managing Arms in Peace Processes:
Liberia**

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Project funded by: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.



UNITED NATIONS
New York and Geneva, 1996

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UNIDIR/96/32

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

Sales No. GV.E.96.0.23

ISBN 92-9045-117-3

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Previous DCR Project Publications

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique

Small Arms and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Psychological Operations and Intelligence

Preface

Under the heading of Collective Security, UNIDIR is conducting a major project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examines the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts. It collects field experiences regarding the demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviews 11 collective security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examines the role that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (El Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNMIH (Haiti), and the 1979 Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.

Being an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time, being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the Secretary-General's report on "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era,"¹ the DCR Project also relates to a great many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional auspices. Last but not least, comprehensive networks of communication and cooperation have been developed with UN personnel having field experience.

Weapons-wise, the disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many armed conflicts. UNIDIR recently published a paper on this subject (*Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, UNIDIR Paper No. 34, 1995). The Secretary-General's appeal for stronger efforts to control small arms - to promote "micro disarmament"² - is one which UNIDIR will continue to attend to in the framework of the DCR Project.

¹ Document A/C.1/47/7, No. 31, 23 October 1992.

² Document 50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

This volume offers a critical analysis of the Military Observer Group assembled by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOMOG) as well as the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) with particular focus on the execution of their disarmament mandates. The case study was written by Dr. Clement Adibe during the autumn and winter of 1995/96. In his report, Dr. Adibe chronicles the difficulties and challenges faced by the Economic Community of West African States in launching the first large-scale peacekeeping operation by a regional organization and in implementing a peace plan dependent on the success of a disarmament program. The report is the sixth in a series of UNIDIR publications on the disarmament dimension of peace operations. There will be a report on each of the cases mentioned above.

The authors of the case studies have drawn on the professional advice and assistance of military officers intimately acquainted with peace operations. They were Col. Roberto Bendini (Argentina), Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen (Finland) and Lt. Col. Jakkie Potgieter (South Africa). UNIDIR is grateful to all of them for their invaluable contributions to clarifying and solving the multitude of questions and problems we put before them.

I would like to thank the staff at UNIDIR who assisted in the publication process: Virginia Gamba, for leading the DCR project until the end of March 1996; our Editor, Lara Bernini, and two Interns, Mike MacKinnon and Alessandra Fabrello, for editing this volume; and our Specialized Publications Secretary, Anita Blétry, for designing and producing the camera-ready copy.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in this report. They are Dr. Adibe's. I am grateful to him for his contribution: UNIDIR has been happy to have such a resourceful and dedicated collaborator.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR

Acknowledgements

The DCR Project takes this opportunity to thank the many foundations and governments who have contributed financially and with personnel to the establishment and evolution of the research associated with the Project. Among our contributors the following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centered on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.

Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the *international* arena, whereas now it is to stabilize *domestic* situations. The international community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local security, and by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability.¹

¹ James S. Sutterlin, "Military Force in the Service of Peace," *Aurora Papers*, No. 18 (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993), p. 13.

The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations' presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence, such as the one in Rwanda in 1994. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilizing actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined as longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the international community. More and more organizations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders

it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and does, militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.

There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who *do* focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Control of Arms during Peace Processes (CAPP)

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example, instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis include confidence-building measures, weapons control agreements, and the control of illegal weapons transfers across borders.² Likewise, during conflict situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors. Finally, after the termination of armed

² Fred Tanner, "Arms Control in Times of Conflict," Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, PRAC Paper 7, October 1993.

conflict, a situation of stability is required for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be facilitated by troop withdrawals, the demilitarization of border zones, and effective disarmament, demobilization and demining.

Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities center on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighboring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of recurrent problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and problems concerned with the lack of coordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were understood differently. The establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease-fire arrangements. Such a

demonstration of resolve would make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was underway.

The coordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is cooperation and coordination between the international effort and the nations which immediately neighbor the stricken country. But coordination must not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be coordinated among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of coordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organizations working in the field; these components must cooperate with each other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission coordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided, including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and population protection mechanisms.

Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account *both* the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, *and also* the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighboring countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, *the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament program as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management program that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programs between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.*

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*; (2) the


development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) and the settlement of conflict.


The first case study examined the way in which three international peace processes (UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) struggled with the issue of controlling and managing light weapons in Somalia. The second volume focused on the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in Rhodesia, the third on the complex missions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), the fourth study looked at the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), and the fifth examined the UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). This study is concerned with the combined efforts of a regional organization (ECOWAS) and the UN to end Liberia's civil war. The paper is presented with a summary of the responses regarding this mission which were obtained through the Project's own *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*.

Virginia Gamba
Project Director
Geneva, March 1996

List of Acronyms

AAFC	Allied Armed Forces of the Community
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Military Observer Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity
INN	International Negotiation Network
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
JCMC	Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee
LNTG	Liberian National Transitional Government
NDPL	National Democratic Party of Liberia
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
UN	United Nations
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council





Part I:
Case Study

Chapter 1

Introduction

The introduction of a West African regional peacekeeping force into the Liberian civil war in August 1990 effectively catapulted this rather "obscure" conflict onto the center-stage of international diplomacy.¹ Indeed, by 1993 when the United Nations began a direct involvement in the conflict, Liberia had become a test case for the ability of regional organizations and the United Nations to jointly mediate armed conflicts. The objective of this study is to examine the contributions of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the resolution of the Liberian conflict through the initiation and implementation of a program of disarmament. In this regard, this study covers the period between the outbreak of conflict in 1989 through the ECOWAS intervention in 1990 to 1994 when the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was introduced to restore confidence amongst the parties to the dispute.

For ease of presentation, this study has been divided into four sections. The first examines the historical origins of the conflict. The second discusses the nature and dynamics of ECOWAS intervention. The third section focuses on the triumphs and travails of the disarmament program in Liberia. The fourth and concluding section discusses some of the salient lessons that emerge from the Liberian attempts at disarmament and conflict resolution.

¹ For a useful discussion of the impact of regional peacekeepers on the Liberian conflict, see Margaret A. Vogt (ed.), *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping* (Lagos: Gabumo Publishing Company, 1992); E. John Inegbedion, "ECOMOG in Comparative Perspective", in Timothy M. Shaw and Julius E. Okolo (eds), *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS* (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), chap. 12; Colin Scott, *Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia, 1989-1994* (Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies), Occasional Paper No. 20 (1995); and John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency*, (New York: United Nations University), Occasional Paper No. 1 (1995).

1.1. The Historical Context of the Liberian Conflict

The causes of the Liberian conflict may be safely categorized into two: remote and immediate. To provide causal explanations, many historians and social scientists have been quick to emphasize the antecedent factors to conflicts in general. Students of Liberian politics agree that since the founding of the Republic of Liberia by emancipated African-American slaves in 1847, the country had been governed by an exclusivist oligarchy imbued with a sense of "the civilizing mission."² According to David Wippman, this group:

The Americo-Liberians... recreated the social hierarchy they had experienced in the antebellum South [of the United States], but with themselves as the socially dominant, landowning class. They considered the indigenous population primitive and uncivilized, and treated it as little more than an abundant source of forced labor.³

This view has also been shared by other scholars, such as W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, who argued that as long as the "hegemony" of this privileged "settler oligarchy" lasted, this group wielded "a monopoly of power over a majority of indigenous peoples, with the same paternalistic contempt as most of the other colonial governments in Africa."⁴ Ofuatey-Kodjoe further elaborated that the primary objective of the...

"settler oligarchy" [was] to maintain its *domination* over the indigenous population. Not surprisingly, this system [was] maintained by extreme economic exploitation including

² See, among others, J. Gus Liebenow, *Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969); Jacob F. Ajayi and Michael Crowther (eds), *History of West Africa*, Volume 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973); Monday Akpan, "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule Over the African Peoples of Liberia, 1841-1964", *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 7.2 (1973), pp. 217-36; Christian Cassell, *Liberia: History of the First African Republic* (New York: Fountainhead, 1979); G.S. Boley, *Liberia: The Rise and Fall of the First Republic* (London: Macmillan Press, 1983); Yekutiel Gershoni, *Black Colonialism: The Americo-Liberian Scramble for the Hinterland* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); and D.E. Dunn and S.B. Tarr, *Liberia: A National Polity in Transition* (Metuchwen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1988).

³ David Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War", in Lori Fisler Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), p. 160.

⁴ W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia", paper presented at a workshop on Multilateral Organizations and the Amelioration of Ethnic Conflicts, held at The Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations, City University of New York, New York City, 14 May 1993, p. 5.

forced and slave labor and brutal repression of the indigenous peoples. In this pattern of repression, the repatriates used a policy of "divide and rule" [and] a policy of recruiting armed forces along ethnic lines and deploying them to brutalize other ethnic groups.⁵

Notwithstanding the strong terms of his description, Ofuately-Kodjoe is attempting to convey the reality of *race*-based politico-economic domination in pre-1980 Liberia. So ruthless and spiteful was the oppression that some scholars, such as Monday Akpan and Yekutiel Gershoni, have called it "black imperialism" or "black colonialism."⁶ For more than a century, argues Professor Wippman, "the Americo-Liberians dominated the country's political, economic, and social life, even though they constituted only about 5 percent of the population."⁷

Indeed, between Edward Blyden, the Liberian patriarch, and William Tubman who reigned from 1944 until his death in 1971, the ship of the Liberian state was captained by Americo-Liberians under the aegis of the True Whig Party, and it sailed reasonably smoothly without major social upheavals.⁸ The poverty and illiteracy of the mass of the population (mainly, but not exclusively, the "natives") was significantly ameliorated by social programs introduced shortly after World War II by President Tubman to integrate the native population into the mainstream of Liberia's political economy. The result was that by the early 1960's there had emerged a corps of educated natives who began to ascend the socio-economic ladder. In this arena, the native elites found themselves in stiff competition for power and wealth with their relatively more established, but definitely better educated and well connected, Americo-Liberian counterparts. As is the case elsewhere in Africa, the struggle for socio-economic space by elites took on a national character as each group returned to its social base for support. For the Americo-Liberian elite, the constituency was made up of secret societies, lodges, fraternities, such as the Free Masons, and an elaborate network of "300 families," while the kinship/ethnic groups served as a natural constituency for the native Liberian elite.⁹

William Tolbert, the last of the Americo-Liberian Presidents, inherited from Tubman in 1971 a highly corrupt and manifestly nepotistic state apparatus. However, unlike his predecessors, he was saddled with a rapidly deteriorating national and

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7 (emphasis added).

⁶ Akpan, "Black Imperialism", pp. 217-36; Gershoni, *Black Colonialism*.

⁷ Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil War", p. 160.

⁸ For an overview of Liberia's political history, see Alan Rake (ed.), *New African Yearbook, 1995-96*, 10th ed. (London: IC Publications Ltd., 1996), pp. 221-231.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

global economy and a mounting socio-economic tension originating from below—thanks mainly to Tubman's educational reform which had resulted in the emergence of a articulate native middle class. Unable to "bribe" the leaders of the awakened native population and unable to control the arrogance and waste of his fellow Americo-Liberian elites, Tolbert resorted to the use of force to exert his authority. His state security agents harassed and arrested the top hierarchy of the increasingly demanding native elites as well as members of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy who would not submit to his rule.

The infamous "Rice Riots" which took place in Monrovia in April 1979 crystallized the popular discontent with the Tolbert regime. Under increased financial pressures following yet another oil crisis which had been orchestrated by the Iran-Iraq war, the Tolbert government announced its intention to dispense with the state subsidy of rice, the staple food of Liberia's elites as well as the significant but as yet silent urban poor. The resulting increases in the price of rice and other consumer products touched off a series of mass riots in Monrovia throughout the spring of 1979. The government's reaction was a swift crackdown on the rioters and their (perceived) instigators, and the resolution of the latter to go back to the streets. It was this repressively discordant environment that provided the impetus for the native members of the presidential guard, led by Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe, to stage a *coup d'état* on 12 April 1980. Doe and his fellow mutineers achieved instant success by assassinating President Tolbert and other prominent members of his cabinet moments before their departure for the summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

In the absence of any organized resistance by the Americo-Liberian elite, Doe and his group embarked upon a mission to shred the Americo-Liberian oligarchy, thereby forcing many of them into political exile in the United States.¹⁰ It was Doe's ill-fated attempt to supplant Americo-Liberian imperialism with its native-Liberian version or, as it later turned out, "Khran-imperialism,"¹¹ that resulted in the series of conflicts which metamorphosed into a full-blown civil war by 1990 (see Table 1.1).

¹⁰ Cf. J. Gus Liebenow, *Liberia: The Evolution of Privilege; Liberia: The Quest for Democracy*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969); and Amos Sawyer, *Effective Immediately: Dictatorship in Liberia, 1980-1986—A Personal Perspective*. Bremen: Liberia Working Group Papers, No. 5, 1987.

¹¹ Doe belongs to the Krahn tribe which, like the Americo-Liberian community, constitutes about four percent of Liberia's population. For details, see Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace", p. 162.

**Table 1.1: A Chronicle of Decade-Long Efforts
to Topple Samuel Doe's Dictatorship**

Date	Description of Event
April 1980	Master-Sgt. Doe seizes power after leading a bloody coup in which President William Tolbert was assassinated and prominent members of the Americo-Liberian elite publicly executed.
May 1980	An abortive counter-coup is attempted against Doe by some Tolbert loyalists within the Armed Forces of Liberia.
November 1983	Doe announces that he has uncovered an alleged plot to overthrow his government by persons promising to return Liberia to civil rule.
November 1984	A coup attempt by what the government claims to be "terrorists from abroad" is botched by troops loyal to President Doe.
May 1985	Government security agencies foil an assassination attempt on President Doe by the Deputy Commander of his crack Presidential Guard.
November 1985	A section of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), led by former army commander, Gen. Quiwonkpa, stages a costly abortive coup attempt to oust President Doe after the latter's "blatant rigging" of the presidential elections. In the aftermath, Gen. Quiwonkpa is "killed, his dismembered body paraded through the streets of Monrovia" by troops loyal to President Doe.
September 1986	Doe loyalists thwart yet another plot by dissidents allegedly based in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana to topple the president while he was attending the Non-Aligned summit in Harare.
July 1988	Government forces abort a coup attempt led by Doe's former deputy, Gen. Nicholas Podier. Podier's forces were attempting to cross into Liberia at the border crossing point in northern Nimba County.

December 1989	Troops belonging to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, erstwhile member of Doe's cabinet, invade Nimba county in a determined insurrection that would later snowball into an all-out civil war.
10 September 1990	President Doe dies in Caldwell base, Monrovia, after 24 hours of torture at the hands of Prince Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL)—a rebel splinter group from Taylor's NPFL. Armed conflict continues amidst a political stalemate caused by the inability of any of the rebel factions to assume unilaterally the presidency of Liberia.

Source: Clement E. Adibe, *Hegemony, Security and West African Integration: Nigeria, Ghana and the Transformation of ECOWAS*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1994, p. 150.

By most accounts, Doe's accession to power was marked by extreme and bizarre acts of violence and brutality. Aside from his gruesome murder of President William Tolbert, Doe and his cohorts displayed an unusual appetite for murder. In a series of televised executions carried out during the early days of the regime, the Doe government "shot thirteen of the country's most prominent politicians" on Monrovia's major public beach. These executions, which were described by one eyewitness as "an episode of extreme barbarity and bloodlust by soldiers driven wild with hatred,"¹² inaugurated "a decade of brutal and arbitrary exercise of power" and an escalating cycle of violence.¹³

Because of his obsession with "shredding" or "eliminating" whatever remained of the Americo-Liberian political elites, Doe became increasingly addicted to violence and repression as he embarked upon an unlimited quest for personal power. The resulting opposition from elements within the government and army, as well as civic organizations, only served to fuel his fear of insecurity. As the various incidents of abortive coups catalogued in Table 1.1 demonstrate, the more insecure President Doe felt or became, the more violence he unleashed

¹² Brian Silk, quoted in *West Africa*, 28 April 1980, p. 762. See also Inegbedion, "ECOMOG in Comparative Perspective", p. 224; Welch, "The Military Factor in West Africa", pp. 168-9.

¹³ Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace", p. 161.

against his real or imagined "enemies," and the more the latter resorted to even higher levels of violence in a desperate effort to oust him from power. All these events reached a turning point in 1985 following Doe's ill-advised move to "civilianize" his dictatorship by "rigging" himself and his political party, the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), to electoral victory.¹⁴ The vociferous opposition that came mainly from political parties, religious and civil rights groups, and the overwhelming public outcry against such blatant violation of the electoral process by the Doe government, provided further ammunition for Brigadier-General Thomas Quiwonkpa—a fellow native Liberian and Doe's estranged second-in-command in the defunct ruling People's Redemption Council—to stage what later amounted to a *very* costly abortive *coup d'état* in November 1985. In the aftermath of that coup, General Quiwonkpa was killed and, consistent with the government's notoriety for barbarity, the General's "bullet-ridden corpse was [put] on public show" by troops loyal to President Doe.¹⁵ Furthermore, according to Professor Wippman, Doe's fellow native Krahn soldiers "took immediate reprisals against Quiwonkpa's ethnic group, the Gios, and against a closely related group, the Manos. Hundreds were executed after being subjected to 'blood-curdling brutality.'"¹⁶

Thereafter, all hell broke loose in Liberia as Doe became more determined than ever to crush not only the remnants of the Americo-Liberian elites but also indigenous segments of the population who are neither ethnic Krahns nor supporters of his regime. For this purpose, he employed "all sorts of measures," the foremost among them being:

¹⁴ The details of Doe's bizarre plots to manipulate the electoral process in order to hang on to power are contained in a widely publicized confidential memorandum which was written by John Rancy, his Minister of State for Presidential Affairs. See *West Africa*, 23 March 1984, p. 864.

¹⁵ Rake, *New African Yearbook*, 1995-96, p. 226.

¹⁶ Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace", p. 162. See also Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict", p. 9; and Christopher Clapham, "Liberia", in Shaw and Okolo (eds) *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS*, esp. pp. 75-6.

The banning of political parties and associations; the purging and summary execution of many high officials in his government suspected of being too influential; and increasing dependence on a top hierarchy of people in the armed forces (AFL), the Executive Mansion Guard (EMG), and the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU), all belonging to his Krahn ethnic group.¹⁷

By the end of December 1989, Doe had clearly outlived his welcome and usefulness. His army, exhausted, demoralized and badly depleted after a decade of senseless and unguarded pursuit of real and imaginary enemies, was no longer in a position to contain, let alone repel, an insurrection launched from the northern Nimba towns of Khanple and Butuo by a couple hundred "ill-trained recruits, many of them in their early teens," belonging to Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).¹⁸ In fact, that "two [government] army battalions dispatched from Monrovia with mortars and artilleries" in the early phase of the insurrection could not contain a small group of "200...and mostly local Gio tribesmen [who barely made] hit-and-run attacks on small villages" in Nimba county,¹⁹ clearly attests to the professional and material bankruptcy of Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the government resorted instead to senseless acts of mini-genocide against some segments of the defenseless and vulnerable civilian population, as was grotesquely illustrated by the July 1990 massacre of refuge-seeking women and children in the premises of a Lutheran church in the outskirts of Monrovia.²⁰

By mid-1990, what began as a hit-and-run attack against government forces by Charles Taylor's guerrillas had metamorphosed into a well-coordinated, full-scale, traditional military assault on Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia. Every minute territorial gain by rebel forces translated into a major loss for President Doe, and this made him even more desperate. By July 23, Taylor's forces had "burst into the centre of Monrovia", thereby leaving President Doe "a virtual prisoner in his sea-

¹⁷ Ofuately-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict", pp. 4-5.

¹⁸ Wippman, "Enforcing the Peace", p. 163.

¹⁹ *Africa Research Bulletin*, 15 February 1990, p. 9557.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 15 August 1990, p. 9774. To be sure, rebel forces are also guilty of similarly bizarre episodes of mass murder in Liberia. The point I am making, however, is that if "government" is also the purveyor of societal ethics and morality, then whoever purports to represent it must be ethically and morally responsible, notwithstanding any claims of provocation. This is the essence of ethical arguments in international politics. For details, see among others, Charles Beitz, "Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics", *International Organization* 33.3 (1979), pp. 405-24; and his more elaborate study: *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

front [presidential] mansion."²¹ Unable to leave the presidential Mansion—not only because of his encirclement by rebel troops, but also because his own "Krahn bodyguards [refused] to let him [leave] unless their collective safety was guaranteed"—the embattled president dragged Liberia into a peculiar form of politico-military stalemate in which the rebels had virtual territorial control over the country but no political authority, whilst the president --who no longer had a territory-- still represented the political "authority" within the state!²² As the military-political stalemate persisted, Liberian civilians paid the ultimate price while external actors pondered over alternative strategies to contain the conflict.

²¹ *Africa Research Bulletin*, 15 August 1990, p. 9772.

²² This stalemate was extended even further by the surprising inability of the rebel forces to overrun Doe and his guards who were only yards away. One plausible explanation for this puzzle is that the rift within the rebel forces had widened by the time they approached the presidential mansion in Monrovia. Fundamental differences over the division of the spoils of war may have induced Taylor's NPFL and Johnson's INPFL to concentrate on denying each other victory rather than overrunning what was left of Doe's thin defense perimeter. Prince Yormie Johnson had broken away from Charles Taylor in February 1990, taking with him about 7,000 loyalists. For details, see *The Guardian* (London) 9 July 1990; *The Independent* (London) 20 and 31 July 1990; *Daily Telegraph* (London) 30 July 1990; and *Africa Research Bulletin*, 15 August 1990, pp. 9773-4.

Chapter 2

ECOWAS and the Liberian Conflict

When the Liberian conflict captured global attention in the summer of 1990, the international community was concentrating on a much larger problem in the Gulf. Iraq's invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait was more in conformity with the traditional problem of international politics than the civil war raging in Liberia. Besides, the former was more appealing to the dominant geo-strategic paradigm than the latter. The United States which, as Liberia's longtime benefactor, would be crucial to any international initiative in Liberia was too busy assembling an Allied coalition in the Gulf to be bothered with Liberia. As S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss have observed correctly: "...the fact that some 1.5 million persons were displaced, the same number that led to the humanitarian intervention in Kurdistan, was seemingly not enough to trigger a response from outside the [West African] region."²³ This obvious power vacuum created tremendous opportunities for regional initiatives led by ECOWAS. However, due to pre-existing asymmetry of state capabilities and a long-standing linguistic fault line between francophone and anglophone West African states, ECOWAS intervention in Liberia could not escape the realities of geo-political considerations within the region.

Nothing in the history of ECOWAS prepared the organization for its intervention in the Liberian conflict. Not surprisingly, many scholars have considered the organization's Liberian initiative to be a major leap in the process of West African integration.²⁴ For a proper understanding of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, therefore, it is important to discuss, albeit briefly, the history and political nuances of the organization. ECOWAS was established on 28 May 1975 as a consequence of the signing of the Treaty of Lagos by the heads of government of fifteen West African states: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria,

²³ S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security", *Security Studies* 2.1 (1992), p. 18.

²⁴ For details, see C.E. Adibe, *Hegemony, Security and West African Integration: Nigeria, Ghana and the Transformation of ECOWAS*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1994, esp. chaps. 3-4.

Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.²⁵ The island of Cape Verde—a former Portuguese colony—joined in 1977 to become the sixteenth member of the Community.

Like many regional groupings that emerged in the developing world following the initiatives of the European Economic Community, the primary objective of ECOWAS was improving intra-regional trade and securing favorable terms of trade from their western trading partners.²⁶ In West Africa, however, underlying such economic goals was a strong desire for some form of security integration, and the reasons for this aspiration became manifest in 1977 as the Kerekou government in Benin and other West African regimes faced serious threats of aggression from internal and external sources.²⁷

The pervasive sense of national or regime insecurity in the late-1970's was heightened further by a spate of military *coups d'état* originating in domestic struggles, or what Emmanuel Aning refers to as "the preponderance of violent military take-overs in the sub-region with probable spill-over characteristics."²⁸ It is in this particular context of regional insecurity (or the perception thereof) that the leaders of ECOWAS began to conceive a mechanism for regional collective security. The first step towards the attainment of this goal was taken in Lagos on 22 April, 1978, when the Community Heads of State endorsed the *Protocol on Non-Aggression* (hereafter referred to as the Protocol). This Protocol made good on an earlier promise contained in the Lomé Summit Resolution of 5 November, 1976, regarding the signing, in due course, of an agreement on "non-recourse to force by Member-States of the Community."²⁹ Essentially, the Protocol enjoined signatories to refrain from "committing, encouraging or condoning the acts of

²⁵ See Olajide Aluko, "Oil at Concessionary Prices for Africa: A Case-Study in Nigeria's Decision-Making", *African Affairs* 75.301 (1976), pp. 425-443; and Olatunde Ojo, "Nigeria and the Formation of ECOWAS", *International Organization* 34.4 (1980), pp. 571-604.

²⁶ For useful comparative and theoretical discussions of economic integration among developing countries, see William P. Avery and James Cochrane, "Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: The Andean Common Market", *International Organization* 30.4 (1973), pp. 409-430; and W. Andrew Axline, "Underdevelopment, Dependence and Integration: The Politics of Regionalism in the Third World", *International Organization* 31.1 (1977), pp. 83-104.

²⁷ See Emeka Nwokedi, *Regional Integration and Regional Security: ECOMOG, Liberia and the Liberian Crisis* (Bordeaux: Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, 1992).

²⁸ Emmanuel Kwezi Aning, *Managing Regional Security in West Africa: ECOWAS, ECOMOG and Liberia* (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research), Working Paper No. 94.2 (February 1994), p. 5. See also Pat McGowan and Thomas Johnson, "African Military Coups d'État and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 22.4 (1984), p. 649.

²⁹ ECOWAS, *Protocol on Non-Aggression* (1978), Preamble.

subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of other Member-States."³⁰ It did not, however, provide for any institutional mechanism for responding to such aggression should one be committed against a member-state.

The Protocol was thus widely criticized as a mere idealistic *injunction*, and so did little to allay the mounting fear of regime insecurity in the subregion. Consequently, barely one year after its adoption, prominent West African leaders began to publicly express their desire for a more elaborate defense arrangement that would respond effectively to any act of aggression against the region's increasingly unstable regimes. In this regard, no less a personality than President Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal used the 1979 Dakar Summit to make a case for a more comprehensive regional arrangement for collective security. Senghor's argument was that "development cannot be secured in a climate of insecurity", and "this being so, we must among ourselves, establish a genuine West African solidarity pact to guard against external aggression."³¹

At the 1981 Summit meeting in Freetown, Sierra Leone, ECOWAS leaders expanded the 1978 protocol by ratifying the *Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence* (hereafter referred to as the Defence Protocol). The Defence Protocol which entered into force in September 1986, not only forbade "all acts of subversion, hostility or aggression" directed at a member-state, but considered them as constituting "a threat or aggression against the entire Community."³² Accordingly, it created an elaborate response mechanism, including a regional defense force: the Allied Armed Forces of the Community.³³

As some scholars have rightly noted, the real object of the pact was less external than internal security threats, for West African states lack the military capability to deter, let alone repel, an attack by foreign (i.e. developed states') forces. According to Ralph Onwuka, the Defence Protocol was deemed necessary because of "political instability generated mainly by border claims, and the activities of political dissidents and/or refugees of one country [living] in an alien

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Article 2.

³¹ President Senghor, quoted in Tom Imobighe, "ECOWAS Defence Pact and Regionalism in Africa", in Ralph Onwuka and Amadu Sesay (eds), *The Future of Regionalism in Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986) p. 117.

³² ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence* (1981), Article 2.

³³ *Ibid.*, Articles 5-18.

ECOWAS territory."³⁴ That being the case, it is reasonable to infer that the adoption of the Defence Protocol brought to the fore the primary concern of West African leaders—"regime security"³⁵—and, also, that it laid the foundations for the eventual transformation of ECOWAS into a "Collective Defense System."³⁶

Because scholars and commentators have frequently invoked the provisions of the 1981 Defence Protocol to buttress arguments for or against the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, I shall attempt to highlight some of its essential elements. Let me begin by emphasizing that the Defence Protocol makes no distinction between internal and external sources of threat to the region's states. Such lack of distinction is evident in Article 2, which states that "*any* armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community." In the event of such acts occurring, Article 3 obliges the Community to "give mutual aid and assistance for defence against *any* armed aggression" committed against a member State.³⁷ In Article 4, the Defence Protocol establishes a linkage between an individual nation's security and collective regional security and commits the Community to intervening in the event of any "armed conflict which is 'engineered and supported actively from the outside' and which

³⁴ Ralph Onwuka, "The Role of ECOWAS in Ensuring a Working Peace System", in A.A. Owosekun (eds), *Towards An African Economic Community: Lessons of Experience From ECOWAS* (Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1986), p. 382.

³⁵ For the wider theoretical context of this thesis, cf. A.M. Al-Mashat, *National Security in the Third World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); Robert Jackson, "Quasi-States, Dual Regimes, and Neo-Classical Theory: International Jurisprudence and the Third World", *International Organization* 41.4 (1987), pp. 519-549; Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg, "Sovereignty and Underdevelopment: Juridical Statehood in the African Crisis", *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 24.1 (1986), pp. 1-31; Brian Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World", *World Politics* 43.2 (1991), pp. 257-83; and his "The Third World in a Changing Strategic Context", in David Dewitt, David Haglund and John Kirton (eds), *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security* (Oxford and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 86-103.

³⁶ Imobighe, "ECOWAS Defense Pact and Regionalism in Africa", pp. 110-24. For a useful discussion of the origins and dimensions of bilateral defense arrangements in (West) Africa, see Claude Welch, Jr., "The Military Factor in West Africa: Leadership and Regional Development", in Julius E. Okolo and Stephen Wright (eds), *West African Regional Cooperation and Development* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 157-83; and Gerald Bender, James Coleman and Richard Sklar (eds), *African Crisis Areas and US. Foreign Policy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

³⁷ ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence* (1981), Articles 2 and 3 (emphasis added).

is likely to endanger the security and peace of the Community."³⁸ The Defense Protocol, however, fails to specify or define when, how and what types of conflict within one Member State constitutes a threat to the entire subregion. Rather, the remaining provisions of the Defence Protocol deal mostly with the institutional framework of a regional collective security arrangement and have as their sole purpose the countering of any act of aggression against an ECOWAS member-state. The institutional provisions include the Authority, which is composed of the Heads of government, with powers to decide on "the expediency of military action; the Defence Council, which is an advisory body composed of ministers responsible for defence and foreign affairs; the Defence Commission, which is a technical or professional body, composed of the Chief of Staff of each Member-State's national armed forces, from which shall be drawn the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (see Figure 2.1).³⁹


Because it lacked a clear definition of the nature, magnitude and conditions which make an internal conflict a matter for regional security concern—that is, assuming that such a definition was possible—the Defence Protocol, like other legalistic instruments of international politics, left the twin issue of interpretation and application to the domain of power politics.⁴⁰ This situation was bound to produce some difficulties in the event that its provisions were called into use.

³⁸ Imobighe, "ECOWAS Defense Pact and Regionalism in Africa", p. 119.

³⁹ Needless to say, such institution did not exist at the time of the outbreak of the Liberian conflict, and none has been established since then.

⁴⁰ See Babajimi Peters, "The ECOWAS Defence Pact: Problems and Prospects", *Nigerian Forum* 3.10-12 (October-November, 1983), pp. 1267-76.

Figure 2.1: The Organization and Command Structure of the Proposed ECOWAS Defence System



Note: 1-4 represent units of contributed troops including those of the assisted country.

Source: Tom Imobighe, "ECOWAS Defence Pact and Regionalism in Africa", in Ralph Onwuka and Amadu Sesay, eds. *The Future of Regionalism in Africa* York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 121.

This was precisely what happened in 1990 when some member states invoked the Defence Protocol to justify their proposal for the Community's intervention in the Liberian civil conflict. The formal involvement of ECOWAS in the Liberian crisis did not begin until the organization's summit meeting in May 1990 (see Annex I for a chronology of events). Prior to that summit, some individual member-states, particularly Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, had exercised

unilateral national options in relation to the conflict. Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso had been actively supportive of the rebel insurgency, providing *ad hoc* military bases, logistics and supplies. Nigeria, on the other hand, supported the Doe government's efforts to contain the rebellion with supplies of light arms and ammunitions. Obviously, the resulting correlation of forces in Liberia worked against the possibility of a victorious outcome for any of the factions. By contrast, it was thought that a unified ECOWAS approach to the conflict would ensure a quick resolution.

The ECOWAS involvement in the Liberian crisis comprised two simultaneous trajectories. The first, which I will call "political peace-making", involved a flurry of diplomatic initiatives. This trajectory involved a combination of attempts to install and protect an interim civilian government in Monrovia, while also pressuring the warring military factions, especially Taylor's NPFL, into a political settlement by means of what may be rightly described as a diplomatic *blitzkrieg*. The product of this approach has been an unusually high turn-over of cease-fire agreements and nearly as many violations (see Annex I). The second trajectory is a correlate of the political, and I call it the military peacekeeping and peace-enforcement trajectory. It involved the formation of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG). The landing of ECOMOG troops in Liberia on 24 August, 1990, launched the military trajectory, which has since shifted uneasily between a defensive and an offensive strategy in an effort to implement the stated political objectives and a program of disarmament.⁴¹

2.1. The Political Trajectory: From "Persuasion for Peace" to the Imposition of an Interim Government

When the Liberian conflict was first introduced by President Ibrahim Babangida as a regional problem during the 1990 ECOWAS summit meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, few observers predicted that any institutional mediation effort could do more than appeal to the rebels and the Liberian government to agree to a cease-fire. Consequently, the summit's resolution calling on the warring factions to stop the killing and destruction of their motherland was seen to be consistent with the tradition of passivity in African multilateral diplomacy. Accordingly, the

⁴¹ For an insightful, even if biased, account of the politico-military aspects of the early phase of the ECOMOG operation, see Nkem Agetua, *Operation Liberty: The Story of Major General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro* (Lagos: Hona Communications Limited, 1992).

formation of a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to deal with the Liberian conflict by the authority of ECOWAS did little to alter this perception. It was not until the inaugural ministerial meeting of the SMC in July 1990 that observers began to notice a shift from traditional passivity to multilateral intervention.

The purpose of the SMC Ministerial meeting was to hammer out a unified ECOWAS approach to the crisis in Liberia.⁴² The participants deliberated on a proposal by Dr. Abass Bundu, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, setting out the following guidelines for the ECOWAS peace initiative in Liberia:⁴³

- i) That *all* parties to the conflict accept the ECOWAS mediatory role;
- ii) That the warring parties agree to an immediate cease-fire;
- iii) That ECOWAS monitor the cease-fire;
- iv) That all parties agree to stop the destruction of life and property;
- v) That the government of Samuel Doe lift the ban on all political parties, and release all political prisoners;
- vi) That the parties agree to establish an Interim Administration, and hold national elections as soon as practicable to elect a substantive government;
- vii) That the parties agree to constitute an Electoral Commission which commands the confidence of the parties and which would supervise the elections;
- viii) That ECOWAS observe the elections to ensure that they are conducted freely and fairly.

According to the official minutes of the Ministerial conference of the SMC, every element of the guideline outlined by the Executive Secretary for peace in Liberia was put forward to the delegates for discussion and possible endorsement. The minutes also show that there had been substantial disagreement on some key issues between the Ministerial Committee of the SMC and the NPFL—which the minutes described as *the* main party to the armed conflict with the government of Liberia. The areas of contention included:

a) *Acceptance of ECOWAS Mediation and the Requirement of an Immediate Cease-fire Agreement.* The minutes of the conference acknowledge that there were different perceptions of and conditions for ECOWAS's mediation. For the

⁴² The Standing Mediation Committee originally comprised The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. But the Committee invited two of Liberia's neighbours, Guinea and Sierra Leone, to participate in its deliberations.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

government of Liberia, the mediation was a welcome relief and should proceed with an immediate cease-fire. By contrast, the NPFL "insisted on President Doe leaving office before they even contemplated accepting a cease-fire."⁴⁴ Put simply, the NPFL rejected ECOWAS's mediation. According to the minutes of the meeting:

The Ministerial Meeting found that, while the Government of Liberia was ready and indeed pressed for a cease-fire, the NPFL either found it unnecessary (because it felt it had triumphed militarily) or would entertain the idea only after President Doe had resigned and left the country.

The Ministerial Meeting *believed* that since there were still hostilities—and reports of atrocities were being received—the *declaration of a cease-fire had to precede any other peace moves*. The inability of the NPFL to perceive and agree to such necessity led to the indefinite adjournment of the Ministerial Meeting.⁴⁵

b) *Monitoring of Cease-fire.* On this, the SMC proposal was that "a cease-fire monitoring group be drawn from the armed forces of member states of the Committee." Not surprisingly, this proposal was accepted by Doe's government while the NPFL stood in opposition. The report elaborates:

While the idea was acceptable to the Government of Liberia, the NPFL did not think President Doe would honour the cease-fire or would leave office and either did not have confidence in ECOWAS or did not believe ECOWAS possessed the ability to restrain the Liberian national army. The NPFL therefore did not give definitive response to the need for an ECOWAS monitoring group during the cease-fire.⁴⁶

c) *Agreement to Cease Hostilities and Disarm.* For the SMC, this was especially important because it underlined the regional spill-over effect of the Liberian conflict. According to the report:

This was an issue that concerned more than the two warring parties... [as] there was a near-collapse of law and order in Liberia.... This state of affairs had led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons and compounded the refugee problem. All three Liberian neighbours (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone) have had to shelter refugees.... The

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 7 (emphasis added).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

latest report received was that NPFL had carried the fight into Guinea and killed Guinean civilians.⁴⁷

By invoking the specter of widespread regional socio-political dislocation and attributing them to the Liberian conflict, the SMC was in effect communicating its desire, if not right, to intervene *willy nilly* in order to forestall further threat to the supposed regional socio-political and economic homeostasis. That desire is precisely what Charles Taylor did not want fulfilled, and hence his outright rejection of the ECOWAS argument.

d) *Unbanning of Political Parties and the Release of all Political Prisoners.* It will be recalled that the conflict was caused mainly by the ruthlessness of Samuel Doe's ten-year dictatorship. The twin purpose of this provision was to ensure the freedom of those few political figures who were still alive in Doe's dungeons and, secondly, to defuse the political tension by placating his now-powerful political adversaries. As expected, while Doe, who had little choice, "committed himself to such a programme and had already begun the unbanning of political parties", for the NPFL, which had been insisting that "Doe must go", such a concession amounted to doing too little too late.⁴⁸

e) *Establishment of an Interim Government.* This provision was premised upon the widespread assumption within the leadership circles of SMC member-states that "Doe was a factor, that Doe constituted a problem" and that "Doe must go...so that peace would reign."⁴⁹ Accordingly,

The ECOWAS proposal was that in order to ensure peace and stability during the transition as well as assure acceptability and respectability of the electoral process, neither President Doe nor Mr. Charles Taylor of the NPFL should head this administration. Secondly, whoever headed it should not contest the next presidential election. It was further proposed by ECOWAS that the interim government should be broad-based and acceptable to all the parties concerned.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Interview with President Ibrahim Babangida, *West Africa* 1-7 October 1990, p. 2578. Indeed, Dr. Bundu's official statement that the death of President Doe "fitted in with the peace plan" confirms this view. For details, see Peter da Costa, "The Plot Thickens", *West Africa*, 17-23 September 1990, p. 2478.

⁵⁰ ECOWAS, *Final Report of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee Ministerial Meeting* (1990), p. 9.

As might have been predicted, the report states that although "all the parties concerned expressed their acceptance of this proposal [in principle]... there were divergences... over the composition and leadership of such an interim administration."⁵¹ These differences took the following form:

The Government of Liberia wanted President Doe to head this interim government, while the NPFL wanted to have the posts of both the President and Vice-President. Not only this, NPFL insisted that not only should President Doe not be on the interim government, but at least five positions of their proposed 24-member administration should be filled by the NPFL. The latest proposal by the NPFL was that an All-Party Convention be held on Liberian soil to determine the nature of the interim administration and other issues related to the reconstruction of the country.⁵²

So, on this issue, as in others, the SMC could not reach an agreement with the principal rebel faction, Charles Taylor's NPFL.

f) Establishment of an Electoral Commission and the Holding of Early Elections. While there was agreement in principle for the return of the country to democratic rule, both the NPFL and the Doe government disagreed over the timing of the elections and the composition of an independent Electoral Commission.

Without an agreement with the principal warring faction—the NPFL—on the foregoing guidelines, it was hardly surprising that the SMC Ministerial meeting could "not produce the result desired by the people of Liberia and the entire international community who had been appealing over a considerable period of time for an immediate cease-fire."⁵³ What was surprising, however, was that, given such lack of agreement, the Ministerial Committee of the SMC would proceed with the formation of a Sub-Committee on Defense Matters "to consider issues relating to the military arm of the proposed ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia."⁵⁴ That this Sub-Committee quickly met in Freetown from 18-20 July 1990 to work out the logistical details of ECOWAS's military intervention in Liberia, suggests that the leadership of the SMC had already decided to intervene militarily in Liberia with or without the approval of the parties concerned. To this attests a series of later events, beginning with the speed with which the Sub-Committee's report, together with that of the Ministerial Meeting,

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.

⁵³ Jonah, "ECOMOG", p. 200.

⁵⁴ ECOWAS, *Final Report of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee Ministerial Meeting* (1990), p. 10.

was dispatched to the Summit of the SMC states with a request to act quickly "to bring the Liberian crisis to a *speedy* and peaceful end."⁵⁵ In justifying this injunction, Ghana's foreign Minister, Dr. Obed Asamoah, argued that "the Liberian situation has now assumed international dimensions because several thousand Ghanaians, Nigerians and other nationals have been holed up in Liberia and are suffering because of the fighting."⁵⁶ He stressed further that the economic toll of the worsening refugee situation on Liberia's neighbors had made a quick intervention by ECOWAS an imperative. In his own words:

We do not have to look at the interest of warring factions alone but also at the interests of the neighbouring countries. So many countries have been saddled with refugees. Are they to continue to carry this burden because one particular faction in Liberia wants to carry out its ambition?⁵⁷

The President of Guinea and Summit member of the SMC, General Lansana Conté, was less patient and diplomatic in responding to this question: "We do not need the permission of any party involved in the conflict to implement the decisions reached in Banjul. So, with or without the agreement of any of the parties, ECOWAS troops will be in Liberia."⁵⁸

Two weeks after the "indefinite adjournment" of the SMC Ministerial meeting, the Heads of States and Governments of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee responded to the injunction of the Ministerial meeting when they convened in Banjul, between 6-7 August to "explore new grounds for mediation in the Liberian crisis."⁵⁹ Speaking at a pre-Summit conference, ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Dr. Abass Bundu, said that "leaders of the Community believe that it is within their capacity to find a peaceful solution to the seven month-long conflict."⁶⁰ In attendance at this epoch-making meeting were the heads of governments of the five SMC states (except for Togo's Eyadema who was represented by Justice Minister Bitokotipou Yagninim); Dr. N'golo Traore, Mali's Foreign Minister; OAU Secretary-General Salim A. Salim; representatives of the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee, as well as Lt. General Arnold Quainoo,

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11 (emphasis added).

⁵⁶ Dr. Obed Asamoah, quoted in the *People's Daily Graphic* (Accra), 23 August 1990, p. 1.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Quoted in *Africa Research Bulletin*, 15 September 1990, p. 9802.

⁵⁹ *People's Daily Graphic* (Accra), 3 August 1990, p. 1.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Ghana's leading military officer and the architect of the military plan that would soon become known as ECOMOG.

The SMC Summit's resolution, known within ECOWAS circles as *Decision A/DEC.1/8/90*, contains five key elements. The first, relating to an "immediate cease-fire", stipulates that the parties to the conflict shall, among other things:

- i) cease all activities of a military or para-military nature, as well as all acts of violence;
- ii) surrender all arms and ammunition to the custody of ECOMOG;
- iii) refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation and acquisition of weapons or war materials;
- iv) refrain from any activity which might prejudice the establishment of an Interim Government for the governance of Liberia until the election of a substantive government by the people;
- v) fully cooperate with the SMC, the Executive Secretary and ECOMOG for "the effective maintenance of the cease-fire and restoration of law and order."⁶¹

The second element relates to the establishment, composition and function of ECOMOG. Article II of the Decision stipulates that ECOMOG shall be "composed of military contingents" drawn from the member-states of the SMC as well as from Guinea and Sierra Leone.⁶² ECOMOG will be under the command of a Force Commander who "shall be entrusted with powers to conduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the cease-fire, restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections to be held in Liberia." The third element relates to the duration of the force and stipulates that ECOMOG operations "shall commence forthwith" (i.e. 7 August 1990) and "shall remain in Liberia, if necessary, until the successful holding of general elections and the installation of an elected government."⁶³

The fourth major element, which deals with finances, established a \$50m-Special Emergency Fund from which "all expenses relating to the operations of the

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

⁶² On August 23, Togo announced its decision to "refrain from intervening" in Liberia, until the three factions agreed to the mediatory mission." See *Africa Research Bulletin*, 15 September 1990, p. 9801.

⁶³ ECOWAS, *Decision A/DEC.1/8/90* (1990), p. 4.

Ceasefire Monitoring Group shall be drawn."⁶⁴ In a related decision (A/DEC.3/8/90), the Summit called for voluntary donations from ECOWAS and OAU states as well as "donor governments and institutions outside Africa."⁶⁵ Lastly, the Decision entrusted the Executive Secretary with the responsibility "for the proper implementation and application" of its provisions.⁶⁶

Following on the heels of the SMC summit was a meeting of Liberian political parties, which had been called at the instance of ECOWAS. The purpose of the meeting was to elect an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) to replace the Doe government in Liberia. The formation of an interim government remained one of the most contentious hallmarks of the ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia. It is important, therefore, to provide an appropriate context for the discussion that follows. It may be recalled that at the first meeting of Liberian political and associated groups in Freetown, ECOWAS ministers failed to reach an agreement with the warring factions, particularly the NPFL. In fact, that meeting ended abruptly because of disagreements over such issues as the formation and composition of an interim administration to replace the government of Samuel Doe. The NPFL wanted an interim government, but only if it would be headed by Charles Taylor. Similarly, Doe sanctioned the arrangement insofar as he would remain president. For its part, ECOWAS wanted neither Taylor nor Doe to be part of the interim government. Consequently, the formation of IGNU became the lightning rod for the most *fundamental* objections to the ECOWAS peace initiative. In what *The Guardian* (Lagos) described as "a sudden new-found confidence", President Doe accused ECOWAS leaders of "meddling in Liberia's internal affairs."⁶⁷ According to *The Guardian*, it is on the strength of this allegation that Phillip Thompson, Doe's Press Secretary, contended that "the ECOWAS discussion of an interim government showed complete and total disregard for the constitution and sovereignty of Liberia."⁶⁸ In the same vein, the spokesman for the NPFL, Tom Woewiyu, not only insisted that the sovereignty of Liberia must be respected, but threatened that "if there was any attempt at

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ ECOWAS, *Decision A/DEC.3/8/90 on the Establishment of a Special Emergency Fund for ECOWAS Operations in the Republic of Liberia* (1990), p. 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁶⁷ *The Guardian* (Lagos), 21 August 1990, p. 1.

⁶⁸ Quoted in *The Guardian* (Lagos), 21 August 1990, p. 1.

peacekeeping from any part of the world, we [i.e. the NPFL] would not allow that force to enter."⁶⁹

Notwithstanding these objections, the consequences of which became manifest, ECOWAS went ahead with its plan and convened another conference of Liberian political and civil organizations in Banjul, the Gambia, between 27-31 August 1990. The conference was attended by well over fifty delegates representing "a broad spectrum" of Liberian political parties, drawn from all thirteen counties as well as religious groups. Foremost among the parties and organizations that attended the conference were the National Democratic Party of Liberia (Doe's party), the Liberian Council of Churches, Liberian Muslim Congress, and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).⁷⁰ In the election that followed, Dr. Amos Sawyer, the exiled head of the Liberian People's Party and founder of the Movement for Justice in Africa, and Bishop Ronald Riggs of the Lutheran Church of Liberia, emerged as, respectively, President and Vice-President of the newly established IGNU. Other key members of the government were Mr. G. Baccus Matthews of the United People's Party (Foreign Minister); Dr. S. Byron Tarr of the Liberia Action Party (Finance Minister), Dr. Edward Kesselly of Unity Party (Defense), and Dr. Joseph Saye Guannu of the Liberia People's Party (Minister of State for Presidential Affairs).⁷¹

The Interim Government was mandated to return the country to "normalcy" and hold general elections within twelve months. It was also required to despatch two special delegations, one to notify the NPFL of the conference's decisions, and the other to "consult with ECOWAS governments and members of the international community" for recognition and support.⁷² As might be expected, IGNU achieved recognition from SMC member states, while some francophone-ECOWAS states, especially Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire—Taylor's major backers⁷³—refused or delayed recognition. On their part, the NPFL "refused the offer, saying that the interim government was created by outsiders",⁷⁴ and

⁶⁹ *People's Daily Graphic* (Accra), 21 July 1990, p. 2.

⁷⁰ See, among others, *Africa Insight* 21.1 (1991), p. 64.

⁷¹ *Africa Research Bulletin*, 31 December 1990, p. 9950.

⁷² Jonah, "ECOMOG", p. 202.

⁷³ The Burkinabé leader, Blaise Compaoré admitted his support for Taylor and his NPFL. For details, see Barki Gbanabome, "'Enfant Terrible' Explains", *West Africa* (4-10 May 1992), p. 756. See also the excellent review by Kenneth Best (1991), "The Continuing Quagmire", *Africa Report* (July-August 1991), pp. 39-41.

⁷⁴ James Butty, "A Year of Terror", *West Africa* (7-13 January 1991), p. 3151.

composed of political "nobodies."⁷⁵ One month later, Taylor constituted his own Interim Government in his command headquarters in Gbarnga, with himself as President. In the light of these events, it became clear that ECOMOG would have to "install" Dr. Sawyer as the President of Liberia's "legitimate" government—the IGNU—and underwrite his security as well.⁷⁶ This was precisely what ECOMOG did on 21 November when it inaugurated the Sawyer government in its headquarters in Monrovia before a select audience, including American, British, Egyptian and Nigerian diplomats. The consolidation of IGNU and its tacit, as well as explicit, recognition by the international community (including the United Nations) amidst Taylor's vocal opposition, had the effect of making the Sawyer-government a party to the conflict and a key participant in future negotiations. It is in this context that an Extra-Ordinary session of the ECOWAS Summit—the first in the Community's history—was called in Bamako at the end of November 1990.

By now the fissures within ECOWAS, which reflected contending claims for regional hegemony, had become apparent. Ivorian agitation over what it considered a Nigerian master plan to exercise regional hegemony—an allegation that had been strengthened by Nigeria's manipulation of ECOMOG—had boiled over, threatening to undermine the unity of ECOWAS. This prompted the convening of an extra-ordinary session of ECOWAS Summit designed to achieve two inter-related objectives. The first of these was to bridge the rapidly widening gap between francophone and anglophone member-states which had arisen from the SMC-imposed mediation in the Liberian crisis. As I have stated earlier, Taylor's rebellion against Samuel Doe was backed morally and materially by Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. According to Blaise Compaoré, the Burkinabé leader, supporting Taylor was a moral responsibility: "it was a moral duty to save Liberians from the wrath of a ruthless dictator."⁷⁷ But the problem for ECOWAS went beyond the support given to Taylor by these two member-states. According to James O.C. Jonah, the real issue was that:

⁷⁵ Jonah, "ECOMOG", p. 202.

⁷⁶ The unique position of IGNU has been brilliantly described by Ofuately-Kodjoe: "The IGNU had no military force of its own, since the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) had completely disintegrated. Therefore, militarily, the IGNU was completely dependent on... ECOMOG troops. Monrovia had practically no economy. It was almost completely sustained by supplies from the UN and other relief agencies." See his "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict", pp. 19-20.

⁷⁷ Quoted in Gbanabome, "'Enfant Terrible' Explains", p. 756. Ironically, Compaoré is himself a ruthless military dictator who had assassinated his friend and colleague, Capt. Thomas Sankara, in a *coup d'état*.

By a quirk of fate, the initial composition of ECOMOG was, save for a contingent from Guinea, all Anglophone. There were also suspicions among ECOWAS Member States that France had not been happy with ECOWAS becoming involved with political/security issues, which was viewed as potentially inimical to French security interests in the area. In short, it was apparent that the Francophone members of ECOWAS were behind Taylor.⁷⁸

Thus the mediation effort was threatening to split the Community along "colonial lines."⁷⁹ As the Ghanaian *People's Daily Graphic* put it, the Liberian crisis, "especially the question of legitimacy and role of the ECOMOG force poses a threat to the unity of the Community as the francophone countries seem not to favour the anglophone-dominated force."⁸⁰ Therefore, avoiding such an occurrence became the primary objective of ECOWAS's leadership during the Bamako Summit.

Owing largely to a flurry of diplomatic activity involving the Executive Secretary, the Chairman of ECOWAS Authority, some key member-states, the United Nations, OAU and the United States, the tension within the Community was considerably defused by the time of the Summit, thereby enabling the leaders to concentrate on the second objective of the extra-ordinary Summit—that is, a negotiated cease-fire between the warring factions within the framework of the Peace Plan designed by the SMC. As Dr. Jonah—himself an observer at the historic Summit—recounts the events at the time:

The meeting was well attended. The first thing to be resolved was the question of the authority under which ECOMOG had been established. This matter was tackled by President Jawara, seizing the occasion to report to the Summit about the mandate given to the Standing [Mediation] Committee. In response to a question put by President Diouf, President Jawara replied that he was making his first report to the Summit on the activities of the Standing [Mediation] Committee which had been mandated by the Summit in the first place. President Jawara reported that the Standing [Mediation] Committee had met at ministerial level and had taken decisions on the establishment of ECOMOG. It was, he continued, for the Summit to decide in the final analysis. The Summit [then] endorsed the establishment of ECOMOG. This was a major step in healing the rift in ECOWAS.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Jonah, "ECOMOG", p. 205.

⁷⁹ James Butty, "A Year of Terror", *West Africa* (7-13 January 1991), p. 3151.

⁸⁰ *People's Daily Graphic* (Accra), 27 November 1990, p. 9.

⁸¹ Jonah, "ECOMOG", p. 205.

Aside from endorsing the ECOWAS Peace Plan⁸² and contributing significantly in "healing the rift in ECOWAS", the Bamako Summit also succeeded in securing a cease-fire agreement between the warring factions. Indeed, the presence of Taylor at the conference was considered by many to be a major achievement. Unlike the previous agreement, this cease-fire was signed by Taylor and witnessed by his backers—Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. It enjoined the parties to "fully cooperate with the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for the effective maintenance of the cease-fire and the restoration of peace."⁸³ The agreement also empowered ECOMOG to "disarm and encamp" troops belonging to the warring parties. Like the preceding agreements, this one left the details of the implementation to be worked out by the warring parties and ECOMOG at a future date, thereby greatly increasing the probability of its violation.⁸⁴ In what amounted to a major victory for ECOWAS, the United Nations Security Council endorsed the peace plan two months later.⁸⁵

The process of projecting a common ECOWAS policy on the Liberian conflict was also enhanced by a tactical decision made in mid-1991 by Nigeria and its anglophone partners to drop the mediation process in the court of the francophone states. This led to a series of agreements reached in Yamoussoukro, the capital of Côte d'Ivoire and hometown of the late President Houphouët-Boigny. The starring role of President Houphouët-Boigny in these negotiations and agreements established an inextricable linkage between francophone states and the ECOWAS peace plan originally designed by Nigeria and its anglophone partners. Thereafter, the collaboration between the Ivorian-led Committee of Five and the Nigerian-led Standing Mediation Committee served only to broaden the range of coercive instruments against the principal rebel group, the NPFL (see Figure 2.2 showing the pattern of interaction among the various actors in the Liberian conflict resolution initiative).


⁸² For details, see ECOWAS, *Decision A/DEC.2/11/90 Relating to the Adoption of an ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia and the Entire West African Sub-Region* (1990) and *Decision A/DEC.1/11/90 Relating to the approval of the Decisions of the Community Standing Mediation Community Taken During its First Session* (1990).

⁸³ ECOWAS, *Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities and Peaceful Settlement of Conflict*, Original Document (1990), p. 3.

⁸⁴ Nnamdi Obasi (1992), "The Negotiation Process", in Vogt (ed.), *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG*, pp. 174-186.

⁸⁵ Prof. Ibrahim Gambari, Nigeria's Ambassador to the United Nations, quoted in *The Guardian* (Lagos), 24 January 1991, p. 1.

Figure 2.2: Patterns of Interaction among the Major Actors in the Liberian Conflict and International Intervention



In July 1992, ECOWAS imposed a comprehensive economic sanction on the territory held by the NPFL and called on the international community to follow suit. The United Nations Security Council responded with Resolution 788 of November 1992 which "imposed a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia" (except for the activities of ECOMOG).⁸⁶ Following the appointment of Mr. Trevor Gordon-Somers as the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Liberia and his early success in negotiating a high profile cease-fire between the Liberian warring factions in Geneva in July 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 866

⁸⁶ United Nations Security Council Resolution 788, 19 November 1992.

establishing the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).⁸⁷ Working in alliance with ECOMOG, UNOMIL was mandated to monitor the implementation of the now revised Geneva-Cotonou accord designed to lead up to elections in Liberia at the end of 1994.

2.2. The Military Trajectory: From Containment to Escalation

Barely one week after the Banjul Summit of the Standing Mediation Committee established ECOMOG in August 1990, a military contingent drawn from contributing member states—Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia and Sierra Leone—was assembled at Queen Elizabeth Quay in Freetown, Sierra Leone, for onward deployment in Monrovia. Under the command of Ghana's General Arnold Quainoo, ECOMOG troops landed in Monrovia on August 24, 1990, to commence what they dubbed "Operation Liberty."⁸⁸ Significantly, but unfortunately, "Operation Liberty commenced without the consent of *all* the warring parties in the Liberian conflict, nor a prior cease-fire agreement. Not surprisingly, therefore, the troops had hardly disembarked from their naval and merchant vessels when they came under a barrage of artillery fire from the leading rebel faction, the NPFL, which had militantly opposed the deployment of a peacekeeping force. According to an eye-witness account of the beginnings of "Operation Liberty":

On landing, nothing had changed at the diplomatic level to raise bright hopes for ECOMOG in the task ahead. And so, the force had to inch ahead against all the persistent odds. The fierce fighting we sensed on the high sea between the NPFL rebels of Charles Taylor and the INPFL forces of Prince Johnson did not subside. Even as sea men struggled to anchor the ships and off-load their contents, heavy gunfire cracked, interspersed with booms from mortar, lasting for an hour.⁸⁹

From the very beginning, therefore, the ECOMOG mission was a complex peace-building operation that differed fundamentally from traditional peacekeeping

⁸⁷ United Nations Security Council Resolution 866, 22 September 1993.

⁸⁸ For a detailed account of the military operation, see Agetua, *Operation Liberty*; and Segun Aderiye, "ECOMOG Landing", in Vogt (ed.), *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG*, pp. 95-122.

⁸⁹ Aderiye, "ECOMOG Landing", p. 106.

(see Table 2.1).⁹⁰ The implication of this was that "at the onset, the political character of Quainoo's force would be that of an expeditionary force which the mainstream rebel movement, the NPFL of Charles Taylor, perceived as a status quo movement whose real design was to prevent it from achieving absolute power."⁹¹

ECOMOG's response to its baptism of fire from the guns of the NPFL was initially defensive. In doing so, the strategy was to consolidate their hold by establishing a wide defense perimeter beyond its initial headquarters located within the Free-port area of Monrovia. This move involved "pushing" rebel forces away from the immediate vicinity of Monrovia where they had been dug-in, in preparation for their final drive to capture the Executive mansion. In practical terms, this meant an uneasy combination of defensive and offensive strategies which produced two unpleasant consequences: a) the escalation of conflict between the "peacekeepers" and the rebel groups, particularly the NPFL; and b) the rapid evaporation of whatever measure of confidence was reposed in the neutrality of ECOMOG forces by the rebel factions as well as the outside world.

With the capture of President Doe by Johnson's rebel faction in the premises of ECOMOG and his consequent torture to death, ECOMOG's original mandate and strategy were completely transformed.⁹² General Quainoo of the Ghanaian Army was promptly replaced as Force Commander by a Nigeria officer, General Dogonyaro, who thenceforth reported directly to the Nigerian presidency.⁹³ General Ibrahim Babangida, at the time Nigeria's President, tersely instructed General Dogonyaro to "stabilise the chaotic situation, end the bloodletting and create an enabling atmosphere for a peaceful resolution of the crisis."⁹⁴ According to Margaret Vogt, the new Field Commander was "also ordered 'to try and prevent arms and ammunition continuing to come into the rebel forces, who were still not subscribing to a cease-fire.'"⁹⁵ With additional reinforcements of troops and materiel from Nigeria and Ghana, General Dogonyaro reorganized the ECOMOG force structure (see Figure 2.3 and Tables 2.1 and 2.2). He then launched a "limited

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* According to the author, the Force Commander, Gen. Quainoo was "known to have agonized over deploying a peacekeeping force which would face an NPFL attack" (p. 243).

⁹² *The Guardian* (Lagos), 14 September 1990, p.1, and 20 September 1990, p. 1; *Sunday Concord* (Lagos), 23 September 1990, p. 7.

⁹³ *The Guardian* (Lagos), 21 September 1990, p. 1.

⁹⁴ General Ibrahim Babangida, "Foreword", in Agetua, *Operation Liberty*, p. xiii.

⁹⁵ M.A. Vogt, "The Problems and Challenges of Peace-Making: From Peace-Keeping to Peace Enforcement", in *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG*, p. 155.


offensive" operation against the NPFL in a bid to impose some form of order in Monrovia and encourage the warring factions to yield to ECOWAS's demands for political negotiations.

**Table 2.1: Contributions to ECOMOG Force Structure
as of 30 September 1990**

Army	Navy	Air Force
Force Headquarters	Landing Craft (Nigeria and Ghana)	Fighter Jets (Nigeria)
Ghanbatt I (First Ghanaian Battalion)	Assault Craft (Nigeria and Ghana)	Transport Planes (Ghana)
Ghanbatt II (Second Ghanaian Battalion)	Mine sweepers (Nigeria)	
Nigbatt I (First Nigerian Battalion)		
Nigbatt II (Second Nigerian Battalion)		
Leobat (Sierra Leonean Battalion)		
Gucon (Guinea Company)		
Gamcoy (Gambia Company)		
Field Artillery Regiment (Nigeria)		
Locating Battery (Nigeria)		
Field Engineering Squadron (Nigeria)		
Reconnaissance Squadron (Nigeria)		

Adapted from Nkem Agetua, *Operation Liberty: The Story of Major General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro* (Lagos: Hona Communications Limited, 1992), pp. 82-83.

Figure 2.3: ECOMOG Command Structure Under General Dogonyaro



Adapted from Nkem Agetua, *Operation Liberty: The Story of Major General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro* (Lagos: Hona Communications Limited, 1992), pp. 83-85.

The circumstances of this operation and its achievements have been aptly described by Margaret Vogt in the following passage:

The adoption of a strategy of 'limited offensive' by ECOMOG should... be viewed within the perspective of the complete paralysis of social order in Liberia. Electricity, water supply and other social services had been cut off so that Monrovia was a depressing disease-infested grave-yard... with no food and with people unable to move from one end of town to another. The liberation of the central power plant and the main water works from the rebel forces and their reactivation... was one of the major objectives sought through the adoption of a minimum enforcement action. The NPFL, which was the most hostile of the rebel groups to the multilateral force was driven out of the firing range of the Monrovia region.⁹⁶

Furthermore:

The limited offensive action succeeded in placing a check on the excesses of the various contentious factions. Prince Johnson's faction was successfully restricted to a sector of the city while the Armed Forces of Liberia, having disintegrated since the death of Samuel Doe, had no claim to any territorial area... The enforcement action persuaded the various factions to accept a cease-fire agreement under the supervision of ECOWAS and to commence extensive discussions with each other; thus facilitating the convening of the All-Liberia Conference... which resulted in the formation of the interim government headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer. The restoration of civil facilities, law and order at Monrovia had made it possible for the interim government to establish itself in Monrovia.... The pacification of Monrovia had led to the restoration of hospital facilities, schools, hotels and a return of normal economic activity enough for many of the foreign Embassies to resume normal diplomatic activities. The most important achievement of the enforcement action was the facilitation of the evacuation of thousands of refugees consisting of nationals of various West African countries, and Liberian nationals also.... Several humanitarian organizations which were previously handicapped in providing relief assistance to the refugees had their efforts facilitated by the security provided by the multilateral force.⁹⁷

Despite its immediate successes, the "limited offensive" operation was called off, partly in response to growing public concern in the contributing states over the rapid increase in casualties, and also to allow for political negotiations between the warring factions and ECOWAS diplomats. General Dogonyaro was recalled back to Nigeria and replaced by a more placable Field Commander.⁹⁸ During this period, several peace initiatives were made which resulted in several cease-fire

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

⁹⁸ Jinmi Adisa, "ECOMOG Force Commanders", in Vogt (ed.), *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG*, pp. 237-270.

agreements. But the NPFL also used the hiatus to replenish its arsenal in preparation for a major military assault on the multilateral forces. This assault came in October 1992 in what the NPFL code-named "Operation Octopus." For two months, the NPFL mounted a heavy artillery bombardment of ECOMOG positions in a desperate bid to seize Monrovia. According to one account:

The October NPFL war on ECOMOG and Liberia which had enjoyed two years of peace tested the military preparedness not only of the troops on the ground, but the professionalism of the military of the participating countries. The velocity of the determined NPFL attacks meant reinforcement and logistics had to be rushed in from ECOMOG core states.... The NPFL fighters were fast over-running ECOMOG positions around the city of Monrovia and in some instance were deep behind ECOMOG defensive lines in the city shanties, abducting frightened civilians. The strategic Port area and ECOMOG headquarters were all threatened.

... ECOMOG was forced into a defensive-offensive posture in an operation which months later pushed NPFL forces far from the capital. When it was over, the NPFL had lost several strategic areas and economic zones, including Roberts[field] International Airport, Firestone Plantations and the country's second largest seaport and city, Buchanan, to ECOMOG and the civil authority of President Sawyer.⁹⁹

One other major consequence of this operation was the dramatic reinforcement of ECOMOG forces to an all-time high of 14,600 troops (see Table 2.2). ECOMOG maintained this troop level until the onset of the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in late 1993.

That this latest enforcement action by ECOMOG stabilized the military situation in Liberia and contributed in large measure to Charles Taylor's unilateral declaration of cease-fire, as well as his subsequent appeal to the United Nations' envoy to initiate the political negotiations that culminated in the Geneva II-Cotonou Accord (see Annex III), supported current scholarly thinking about the need for multinational forces interposed between parties in conflict to move "beyond the sheriff's posse" and become "powerful peace-keepers" instead.¹⁰⁰ According to Sir Brian Urquhart, such a transition "from a series of somewhat lonely (and sometimes embattled) presences in conflict areas into a more general and consistent method of policing and facilitating international decisions... could become an important and effective symbol of a new determination to relieve the

⁹⁹ *West Africa* (23-29 August 1993), p. 1484. For similar views, see also Ofuatye-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts", esp. pp. 23-24.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse'"; and John Mackinlay, "Powerful Peace-Keepers". Both articles are found in *Survival* 32.3 (May/June 1990), pp. 196-205 and 241-250 respectively.

peoples of the world of unnecessary conflict, excessive armaments and the constant threat of war."¹⁰¹

Table 2.2: The Composition of ECOMOG, February 1993

Country	No. of Troops in ECOMOG	National Total
Gambia	150	900
Ghana	1,500	11,900
Guinea	600	9,700
Mali	6	7,300
Nigeria	9,000	94,500
Sierra Leone	700	3,150
TOTAL	11,956	127,450

Source: John E. Inegbedion, "ECOMOG in Comparative Perspective", in Timothy M. Shaw and Julius E. Okolo, eds. *The Political Economy of Foreign Policy in ECOWAS States* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 231.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Urquhart, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse'", p. 205.

Chapter 3

An Assessment of the Disarmament Component of the Liberian Peace Initiative

As I have already stated in the preceding section, disarmament was the cornerstone of the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia. Very early during the organization's involvement in the conflict, members of the Standing Mediation Committee considered a comprehensive disarmament program to be central to the restoration of peace throughout Liberia. To this end, early discussions in the summer of 1990 between ECOWAS and Liberia's warring factions for the first of several cease-fire agreements centered on how to ensure the cessation of hostilities and the speedy and peaceful surrender of all arms and ammunition to ECOMOG troops. Indeed, Article 1(2) of the ECOWAS decision establishing the regional peacekeeping force contained the earliest provisions for *de jure* disarmament in Liberia when it called on the warring parties to, among other things:¹⁰²

- a) Cease all activities of a military or para-military nature;
- b) Surrender all arms and ammunition to the custody of ECOMOG;
- c) Refrain from importing or acquiring all sorts of arms and ammunition.

There was very little improvement in the security situation in Liberia in the summer of 1990 to indicate that the warring factions would disarm voluntarily. Thus, in the absence of any expectation of a consensual submission to the ECOWAS disarmament provisions, there was little doubt that ECOMOG troops would have to engage in combat actions in order to disarm Liberia's warring factions. Indeed, the implementation of the ECOMOG security measure requiring all visitors to its headquarters to be completely disarmed, resulted very early on in the death of President Doe in the presence of embarrassed West African peacekeepers. The incident occurred on 9 September 1990 when President Doe arrived at ECOMOG headquarters in Monrovia for talks with Lt. General Quainoo, then ECOMOG Force Commander. According to Colonel T. Gowah, one of late President Doe's military aides and a survivor of the incident:

¹⁰² *Decision A/DEC.1/8/90 on the Ceasefire and Establishment of an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group for Liberia.* (Lagos: ECOWAS Secretariat, 1990). For details, see Annex II.

... the body-guards of the President and ministers, Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff were all disarmed by the ECOWAS. They [ECOMOG soldiers] walked up to me and said: 'We are here for peace. In the past few days, President Doe and Prince Johnson agreed to peace, so you see your soldiers here are really under the protection of the ECOMOG. So you will give your arms to us...'

We... gave up arms. When the President came in, Prince Johnson opened fire and started killing (the disarmed soldiers of the AFL). They started killing...; no soldiers from the government side exchanged fire with Prince Johnson's troops. ECOMOG made us understand that they were for peace but they never disarmed Prince Johnson's troops. Prince Johnson's troops were well armed. And they were going from office to office, killing soldiers in the presence of ECOMOG.¹⁰³

In the aftermath of Doe's death, an embarrassed ECOWAS retooled the principles and organization of its mission from a peacekeeping force to a peace-enforcement multinational force. This was not a legal move, such as would have been required in a United Nations mission shifting from "Chapter VI and one half" to Chapter VII. Rather, it was a political decision reached by the Nigerian sponsors of the ECOWAS mission, a decision which was driven more by exigency than by any particular conception of "a success strategy."¹⁰⁴ General Joshua Dogonyaro, the new Nigerian replacement for General Quainoo Force Commander, attributed the assassination of President Doe to Quainoo's "softness." Dogonyaro was also critical of Quainoo's faith in the warring parties, while also questioning the wisdom of the disarmament initiative.¹⁰⁵ Not surprisingly, he opted to strengthen ECOMOG as a fighting force with the sole purpose of defeating the warring militias. Throughout Dogonyaro's stint as Force Commander, disarmament suffered and so did any prospects for a negotiated solution to the conflict as ECOMOG fought relentless battles to secure military advantage over the warring parties.

¹⁰³ Colonel T. Gowah, excerpted in *The Punch*, 18 October 1990, p. 7.

¹⁰⁴ Mackinlay and Alao, *Liberia 1994*, p. 47; and Jinmi Adisa, "Nigeria in ECOMOG: Political Undercurrents and the Burden of Community Spirit," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 5.1 (1994), pp. 83-110.

¹⁰⁵ Agetua, *Operation Liberty: The Story of Major General Joshua Nimyel Dogonyaro*, p. 90.

Table 3.1: Yamoussoukro IV Program of Implementation

Date	Description of Activities
D-Day†	Issue Orders
D-Day + 7	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confirmatory reconnaissance completed of all encampment areas and forward patrol bases. • Border guards in place, including buffer zones along Sierra Leone/Liberia border. • Road blocks and check points removed in collaboration with administrative authorities. • Reception centers for encampment open. • ECOMOG patrols commence. • NPFL encampment + documentation. • Receiving, crating and storage of weapons at designated points completed. • Resettlement program commences. • Reactivation of Robertsfield International Airport. • Consolidation of border areas in collaboration with administrative. authorities. • Deployment of appropriate light air detachments (including helicopters). • Routine patrols continue. • Permanent presence & monitoring of all airports and seaports. • International flights into Robertsfield Airport commence. • No movement of heavy weapons belonging to ECOMOG necessary.
D-Day + 60	Assignment completed by 14 January 1992.

† D-Day was November 15 1991.

Source: ECOWAS, *Final Communiqué of the Third Meeting of the Committee of Five on the Liberian Crisis Held in Yamoussoukro, 29-30 October 1991*, Annex.

Disarmament did not re-emerge as an important objective of ECOMOG until the fall of 1991. Paradoxically, it was the threat of Nigeria's regional domination which had been raised precipitously by Dogonyaro's military successes

against the Liberian factions, that brought about renewed political negotiations to disarm all parties, including ECOMOG. At the Yamoussoukro peace meeting of October 1991, a detailed program of disarmament was concluded for implementation within two months (see Table 3.1). In general, the program called for measures aimed at dismantling Liberia's irregular armies. More specifically, the agreement provided for the maintenance of depots for the storage of all category of weapons and ammunition belonging to the warring parties; the demobilization and cantonment of warring militias by an expanded and a more diversified ECOMOG force; and the eventual resettlement of all combatants and civilians into normal life. What is intriguing about the Yamoussoukro program is that the entire disarmament process was scheduled to be completed within seven days from the commencement of implementation on 15 November 1991 (see Table 3.1). And within two months, ECOMOG was also expected to return Liberia to socio-economic normalcy, with the completion of repairs to the major air and seaports in order to facilitate the full resumption of international commerce. Not surprisingly, the program flopped even before it had begun. Thus, in a recent post-mortem of the failed Yamoussoukro disarmament initiative, John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao have criticized "the instinctive urge to have warring factions disarmed as soon as possible" as potentially "counter-productive to the overall effort to establish conditions for a lasting peace process."¹⁰⁶ According to them:

No population that has 'survived in' a war zone for several years can expect to be absolutely disarmed. There will be too many residual weapon caches to monitor, and consequently impossible to guarantee that factions could not swiftly rearm when the need arises. Nor can disarmament be conducted in isolation. First there must be convincing reasons to disarm.... This is only likely to happen when individual security can be assured by a higher authority or regime in which the individual does not have to fend for himself [sic]. In a collapsed state, it is when a super-gang or military force which is superior to the sum of all the parties in the immediate area, possibly nation-wide, can establish itself.... *The question that the designers and negotiators of a peace process have to decide is whether a despotic regime is easier to bring into a peace process than the array of sub-factions and local gangs spawned by a partially successful disarmament process that has robbed the district of its super gang which previously guaranteed security.*¹⁰⁷

Mackinlay and Alao were responding to the frustrations that had resulted from the partial implementation of disarmament in Liberia. To much surprise, the notion that disarmament need not be conducted in isolation, but instead pursued alongside other political and socio-economic measures designed to gain mutual confidence

¹⁰⁶ Mackinlay and Alao, *Liberia 1994*, p. 32.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33 (emphasis added).

and assure individual security, was not given serious consideration by the organizers of future peace talks despite the weaknesses of previous agreements in this regard. This was especially so with respect to the peace negotiations which took place in Geneva in 1993. As it transpired, the purpose of the involvement of the United Nations at this stage of the peace process was merely to provide *transparency* to the process of disarmament, without any significant commitments by the organization to the socio-economic measures needed to cushion the impact of disarmament on Liberians. Ratified in Cotonou, Benin Republic, in July 1993, the Geneva agreement stated that:

Disarmament being the ultimate objective of the cease-fire, the Parties hereto agree and express their intent and willingness to disarm to and under the supervision of ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the United Nations Observer Mission [UNOMIL].¹⁰⁸

Pursuant to this objective, ECOMOG—which had by now been expanded to include non-ECOWAS states (see Table 3.2)—was authorized to "disarm *any* combatant or non-combatant in possession of weapons and warlike materials" with UNOMIL monitoring such activities. It also called for the immediate encampment of all combatants in centers designated for that purpose by ECOMOG.

The implementation of other aspects of the Cotonou agreement, such as the replacement of the puppet regime of Amos Sawyer with a broader government—the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG)—went rather smoothly until ECOMOG began implementing the disarmament provision. According to Mackinlay and Alao's account:

Due to the lack of Liberia-wide security and the failure of ECOMOG's infantry companies to reach all their agreed locations, disarmament and demobilisation sites were not opened in all of the areas originally proposed. On arrival at an established site, fighters received clothing, rations, digging tools and transport to a community of their choice. [Not surprisingly], after an initial flow of personnel and weapons from each faction (except the LPC), disarmament came to a standstill by June 1994 except for a small trickle of variously motivated fighters heading for Monrovia.¹⁰⁹

Consequently, as Table 3.3 shows, fewer than expected weapons and ammunition were recovered from the warring parties, with the exception of the AFL which, for all practical purposes, had become a mere extension of ECOMOG.

¹⁰⁸ See Annex III.

¹⁰⁹ Mackinlay and Alao, *Liberia 1994*, p. 35.

Table 3.2: The Strength and Distribution of Multinational Forces in Liberia, June 1994

Contingent	Officers	Soldiers	Total
GAMCON (Gambia)	1	9	10
GHANCON (Ghana)	73	1,048	1,121
GUCON (Guinea)	140	440	580
LEOCON (Sierra Leone)	16	348	364
MALICON (Mali)	3	7	10
NIGCON (Nigeria)	442	7,489	7,931
TANCON (Tanzania)	41	733	774
UGACON (Uganda)	53	731	784
TOTAL	769	10,805	11,574

Source: John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency*, New York: United Nations University, Occasional Paper No. 1 (1994), p. 39.

Table 3.3: Disarmament Statistics in Liberia, 1994

Faction	Personnel		Weapons		Ammunition	
	Estimated for Disarming	Disarmed by 22/6/94	Estimated for Hand-over	Handed Over by 22/6/94	Estimated for Hand-over	Handed Over by 22/6/84
AFL	8,037	755	1,921	1,078	85,413	151,062
NPFL	35,000	741	3,500	562	-	1,284
ULIMO	10,500	769	3,520	378	-	78,096

Source: John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, *Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency*, New York: United Nations University, Occasional Paper No. 1 (1994), p. 36.

Chapter 4

Summary and Conclusion

The Liberian case is especially significant because it is one of few post-Cold War examples of a regional initiative in the area of conflict resolution. For this particular reason, much could be learned by reviewing the performance of the ECOWAS mission in Liberia with respect to the following pairs of objectives: a) humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping; and b) crisis containment, mediation and resolution through a program of disarmament.¹¹⁰

The humanitarian imperative for the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia has been accepted as the standard explanation for the increasing resort to multinational military forces as a mechanism of conflict resolution since the end of the Cold War. As West African officials have argued repeatedly, given the speed and scale of destruction in Liberia in 1990, "it would have been morally reprehensible... to stand by and watch while citizens of [Liberia] decimate[d] themselves."¹¹¹ Such moral undertones featured prominently in the early phases of the intervention during which ECOMOG troops concentrated mainly on evacuating and resettling large numbers of Liberian refugees and other nationals in neighboring countries that were (and still are) themselves reeling from economic hardship. In addition to supporting refugees located in their territories, ECOWAS states also donated food, clothing and other materials to displaced Liberians residing in camps established and run by humanitarian agencies in Monrovia.¹¹² According to Emmanuel Aning, "relief programmes initiated by individual ECOWAS countries... involved the provision of food, health services, distribution facilities and the provision of

¹¹⁰ For a detailed assessment, see W. Ouatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," *International Peacekeeping* 1.3 (1994), pp. 261-302.

¹¹¹ *West Africa* (4-10 February 1991), p. 140. President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe took an even tougher stance by arguing that it would be "really criminal" not to have intervened to save Liberia. For details, see Ephson, "Right to Intervene," p. 141.

¹¹² It was estimated that about 227,500 Liberians displaced by the civil war resided in Côte d'Ivoire alone; while more than half a million were spread across Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Nigeria. For details, see, among others, A. Essuman-Johnson, "The Liberian Refugee Problem and Ghana's Response to it," *LECIA Bulletin* 2.1 (March 1992), pp. 34-40.

logistics."¹¹³ More importantly, the deployment of a military force facilitated the emergence of an environment safe enough for internal and external humanitarian support. In this regard, it has been argued that "from the standpoint of humanitarian assistance, the intervention... not only [reduced] the number of atrocities, [but] it also created the conditions under which... relief agencies could more effectively carry out their operations."¹¹⁴ This situation made it possible for humanitarian agencies, such as the United Nations World Food Program, "to distribute about 14,000 tons of food through the Catholic Relief Services and the Lutheran World Service" between November 1990 and May 1991 and "some \$67 million worth of emergency assistance" by June 1991.¹¹⁵

Although a strong ECOMOG military presence has, in many respects, had a beneficial effect on humanitarian activities in the Monrovia area, it should also be conceded that the presence of ECOMOG troops has indeed prolonged the duration of the conflict by turning Liberia into a garrison state.¹¹⁶ Prior to the United Nations' involvement in 1993, ECOMOG continually denied all forms of support, including humanitarian assistance, to territories held by the NPFL because those were considered "enemy territories."¹¹⁷ The lesson for the future, therefore, is that to the extent that humanitarian justifications are needed for multinational military interventions, such as in Liberia, it would be necessary for the international community to carefully examine the human rights record of participating countries before endorsing such operations.

With regards to peacekeeping, ECOWAS officials have been rather elliptic in characterizing their military mission in Liberia as a "peacekeeping" operation. The reality, however, is that in terms of its conceptual and operational dimensions, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia is a peace-enforcement mission.¹¹⁸ It has

¹¹³ Aning, "Managing Regional Security in West Africa," pp. 14-15.

¹¹⁴ Ofuately-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict," p. 33.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

¹¹⁶ ECOMOG forces have not escaped criticisms of human rights abuses, and this is hardly surprising given the pathetic condition of human rights in the contributing states. For useful insights, see Scott, *Humanitarian Action and Security in Liberia*.

¹¹⁷ For a useful discussion of the incessant clashes between ECOMOG and humanitarian organizations' efforts to reach out to rebel-held territories, see Colin Scott, *Options for Reform of the International System for Humanitarian Assistance*, Summary Report prepared for the Overseas Research Dept., Save the Children, UK (1994), p. 11.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Urquhart, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse'," p. 198. See also Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," *International Affairs* 69.3 (1993), pp. 451-464.

been argued that in the absence of any peace to keep in Liberia, ECOWAS forces had resorted to creating and enforcing some semblance of peace, at least within the vicinity of Monrovia. According to Dr. Obed Asamoah, Ghana's Foreign Secretary, the ECOMOG mandate in Liberia was simply to "impose a peace on the parties."¹¹⁹ By so doing, however, ECOWAS forces essentially became peace-enforcers rather than peacekeepers in the traditional sense of the concept.

Many observers have noted that, although their efforts in peace-enforcement have been tenuous and erratic, ECOWAS forces have discharged their responsibility rather creditably. According to one observer, the bottom line is that the ECOWAS experience in Liberia "demonstrates the short-term benefits of a military intervention as an 'act of rescue' [especially] in situations of anarchy."¹²⁰ Nevertheless, in the absence of an established institutional framework for discharging these functions, the ECOWAS operation did eventually become a victim of the vicissitudes of *ad hoc* arrangements. The phenomenal increase in the functional tasks the organization has undertaken since the beginning of the Liberian operation in 1990 has not been accompanied by a commensurate improvement in the quantity and quality of manpower in the Secretariat. Consequently, the demands of finance and logistics, as well as the challenges of operational planning, command and control have strained the meager resource capability of the organization and the contributing states to ECOMOG. As I said earlier, in the highly suspicious environment of West African politics, this situation took a heavy toll on the Community's fragile *esprit de corps*, greatly compounding the process of conflict resolution in Liberia and leading rather inexorably to the collapse of successive regimes in West Africa.¹²¹

The obsession of ECOMOG states with containing the Liberian conflict derives from what has been described as "the de-stabilising potentials" of the

¹¹⁹ Interview with Dr. Obed Asamoah, *Africa Report*, November-December, p. 17 (emphasis added).

¹²⁰ Scott, *Options for Reform of the International System for Humanitarian Assistance*, p. 11. See also his more detailed report on *Liberia 1990-3*, London School of Economics and Save the Children, UK (January 1994).

¹²¹ Since the Liberian operation began in 1990, Sierra Leone, The Gambia and Guinea have suffered directly because of their involvement in ECOMOG. Sierra Leone has since been fighting a low intensity civil war, and soldiers have, on many occasions, mutinied because of poor equipment and low wages despite their continuing involvement in combat operations in Liberia. A few weeks ago, Guinean soldiers stormed the presidential mansion in an act of mutiny amidst complaints of low wages and the harsh conditions in Liberia. In Nigeria, the strains of external commitments in Liberia have worsened domestic economic and political conditions, with great potential for a further slide to anarchy.

conflict for the West African subregion.¹²² As General Emmanuel Erskine argued at the outset of the conflict, because the Liberian conflict has generated "unbearable refugee problems" for the West African subregion, "it is obvious that the situation... has gone beyond the boundaries of that country and cease[s] to be an exclusive[ly] Liberian question."¹²³ Erskine's thesis is but one of several intellectual attempts to propound a "domino theory" from the Liberian conflict and to argue that the crisis threatens to spread anarchy throughout the subregion.¹²⁴ For this reason, Erskine contended that it was imperative to "contain" the conflict in terms of limiting its scale or *intensity*, and, more importantly, its *locale*. The state-sponsors of the ECOWAS intervention, notably Nigeria and Ghana, have used this argument effectively for domestic political purposes. But if the objective of the intervention is to contain the conflict by employing superior military force, then it has failed because the conflict in Liberia was the product of a more fundamental problem in society: bad governance resulting from authoritarian political control. That being the case, the intervention has not addressed the root causes of the conflict, namely: mass deprivation and political authoritarianism. But aside from that, the Liberian case points to increasing danger to international peace and security if states decide to intervene in others mainly to halt emigration flows and other negative multipliers from conflict areas.

Finally, the objective of disarmament as a mission objective in peace operations should be tailored to fit the particularities of each case. In Liberia, it was premature to talk of disarmament in 1990 as ECOWAS did unless, of course, as a political gimmick. However, following the relative exhaustion of the combatants in 1993, Liberia was ripe enough for the initiation of a program of disarmament on a nation-wide scale. Regrettably, however, the United Nations proved to be only marginally better than ECOWAS in committing resources for

¹²² See Emmanuel Erskine, "Peacekeeping," *Africa Forum* 1.1 (1991), p. 27; and Robert Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994), pp. 44-76.

¹²³ Erskine, "Peacekeeping," p. 27.

¹²⁴ Within Nigeria's military circles, Charles Taylor's revolt and his successful recruitment of a significant number of "disgruntled" nationals of other ECOWAS states, including Nigeria, was viewed as a forerunner of "the coming anarchy": a "carefully orchestrated" plan to "destabilize" the entire West African subregion. In Lagos, suspicions were rife that Taylor's recruits included some military personnel who had been declared "wanted persons" in Nigeria because of their alleged role in an unsuccessful coup attempt to topple the government of General Ibrahim Babangida in 1990. For this reason in particular, confirmed reports reaching Lagos of Libyan support in terms of training and equipment quickly struck a raw nerve in government and security circles, and helped to elevate the Liberian crisis as a national security issue *par excellence* for Nigeria.

the program. It is necessary to emphasize again that disarmament involves a responsibility for individual security which disarmers have been reluctant to assume. In this regard, Liberia shares a chilling commonality with other failed cases of disarmament such as Somalia, Bosnia and Angola.

In conclusion, the international community could draw important lessons from the Liberian experience in disarmament, as the following observation by Mackinlay and Alao suggests:

In Liberia it was demonstrated that disarmament cannot take place in isolation to prevailing conditions in the area. Unless faction fighters have reasonable expectations of employment, shelter, a community structure and personal security, they will probably retain their weapons and remain as part of a local gang. *As a rule, disarmament planners should not attempt to disarm factions until they have organised effective state-wide security or at least the guarantee of achieving it.* In the uncertain period after the reduction of hostilities, a failed or half successful disarmament can encourage a proliferation of smaller groups at local level. These lawless gangs become even harder to bring back into the disarmament process than their parent factions....¹²⁵

There is no better testimony to this condition than the present situation in Liberia.

¹²⁵ Mackinlay and Alao, *Liberia 1994*, p. 49 (emphasis added).

Annex I

Chronology of Major Events Since ECOWAS's Intervention in Liberia

Date	Event
30 May 1990	ECOWAS Authority meeting in Banjul, the Gambia, calls for an end to hostility, and establishes a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) with a mandate to deal with the Liberian crisis.
7 August 1990	The first Summit of the SMC adopts a peace plan for Liberia. The Plan includes the establishment of an Interim Government of National Unity in Liberia (IGNU) and an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to implement the peace plan.
23 August 1990	ECOMOG troops drawn from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone arrive in Monrovia from Freetown under the command of Lt. Gen. Arnold Quainoo of Ghana.
27-31 August 1990	A conference of Liberian political parties, interest groups and concerned citizens meeting in Banjul under the auspices of ECOWAS elects Prof. Amos Sawyer to head an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU).
9 September 1990	President Doe is captured by rebel leader Prince Yormie Johnson while on a visit to ECOMOG headquarters. Doe dies 24 hours later of torture in Johnson's captivity, and an embarrassed ECOMOG considers a shake-up.
24 September 1990	Charles Taylor installs himself as president of Liberia in his command headquarters in Gbarnga. Three days later, Major General Joshua Dogonyaro of Nigeria arrives in Monrovia to assume command of ECOWAS "field operations," effectively relieving Ghana's Gen. Quainoo of his command. With a reinforcement of 1200 troops and material, ECOWAS goes on the offensive against NPFL.

24 October 1990	Lt. General Hezekiah Bowen, head of the remnants of Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Charles Taylor's NPFL and Johnson's INPFL, represented by Dr. Peter Naigow, sign the first of several cease-fire agreements.
21 November 1990	Dr. Amos Sawyer, head of IGNU, arrives in Monrovia aboard a Nigerian helicopter to assume responsibilities of state. At a swearing-in ceremony in the office of Gen. Dogonyaro, ECOMOG Field Commander, Prince Johnson and AFL pledge their allegiance to the new government, while an embittered Taylor refuses to recognize IGNU and vows to fight on. Sawyer's "inauguration" ceremony was attended by diplomats from the USA, Britain, Nigeria and Egypt, thus implying their countries' <i>de facto</i> recognition of the new government.
28 November 1990	Charles Taylor, Noah Bordolo, Sr. and Col. Wilmot Diggs, representing the NPFL, INPFL and AFL respectively sign yet another cease-fire agreement in Bamako. Taylor's assent to the agreement comes as a result of pressures mounted on him by his backers, notably Libya's Muammar Quadaffi who had been consulted for support on Nov. 19 by a high-powered ECOWAS delegation.
21 December 1990	Under the auspices of ECOWAS, the NPFL represented by Tom Woewiyu, INPFL by Peter Naigow, and AFL by Lt. Gen. J.H. Bowen sign a joint statement in Banjul, in which they agree to hold an All-Liberia Conference within sixty days, and work out modalities for monitoring and implementing the cease-fire.
13 February 1991	Another cease-fire between the warring factions is signed in Lomé, Togo. The parties agree to hold a national conference by mid-March which would, among other things, decide on the composition of a new transitional government.

1 March 1991	At the invitation of President Gnassingbe Eyadema, Dr. Amos Sawyer, representing IGNU, Charles Taylor of NPFL and Prince Yeduo Johnson meet to discuss the crisis. They agree to work towards a national conference by mid-month and to "refrain from taking any action that might be prejudicial to the arrangements being made." By mid-March the national conference is held, with the notable abstention of Charles Taylor, and Amos Sawyer is re-elected President of IGNU.
30 June 1991	In the first of several efforts, President Houphouet-Boigny brings the warring factions under the auspices of the Committee of Five to find a solution to the conflict. The agreement reached becomes known as Yamoussoukro I.
29 July 1991	Yamoussoukro II is signed; it is the product of ECOWAS working jointly with Jimmy Carter's International Negotiation Network (INN).
17 September 1991	Yamoussoukro III is signed amidst great expectation as well as skepticism.
30 October 1991	Yamoussoukro IV is signed amidst the escalation of ECOMOG offensive. Present at the formal ceremonies are OAU Sec.-Gen., Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, and Mrs. Dayle Spencer of INN. The agreement stipulates that the ECOMOG mission "cover the whole of Liberia," and that all warring factions be encamped and disarmed within sixty days. Senegal agrees to contribute troops to ECOMOG.
7 April 1992	ECOWAS Committee of Five meeting at Houphouet-Boigny's winter home in Geneva reaffirms Yamoussoukro IV, and directs "the Field Commander of ECOMOG to implement the Yamoussoukro Accord without any further delay."
15 October 1992	Charles Taylor launches a major offensive against ECOMOG forces in a bid to take over Monrovia. ECOMOG responds with an air, land, and sea-launched counter-offensive against NPFL territories well into the hinterland.

19 October 1992	A joint session of the SMC and the Committee of Five takes place in Cotonou, Benin Republic. Taylor's assault is reviewed, and the meeting calls for an economic embargo on the NPFL effective November 5 if it fails to disarm. ECOWAS invites the UN to assist in implementing the peace plan.
November 1992	The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 788 which endorses the ECOWAS Peace Plan, condemns Taylor's attack on ECOMOG troops and imposes an arms embargo on the NPFL. Trevor Gordon Sommers is appointed special representative of the Sec.-Gen. of the UN in Liberia.
January 1993	Senegal pulls out of ECOMOG, ostensibly for reasons of domestic politics. ECOMOG forces, reinforced by 5,000 Nigerian and Ghanaian troops, swell to 16,000 in preparation for a "final" assault on an over-stretched NPFL.
4 April 1993	ECOMOG captures the vital port of Buchanan, the major import/export channel, from Charles Taylor, alongside other important territories such as Harbel and Kakata.
17 July 1993	Ostensibly abandoned by its friends—Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire—and under intense military pressure, war-weary NPFL requests that the UN envoy convene another round of peace talks in Geneva. So, under the tripartite auspices of the UN, OAU and ECOWAS, the NPFL, IGNU and ULIMO agree to a <i>new</i> agreement which provides for a transitional government, general and presidential elections after six months. None of the leaders of the factions may participate in the transitional government, although they may contest in the elections which follow.

25 July 1993	Geneva II is ratified at the Cotonou ECOWAS Summit. This agreement provides for a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) made up of representatives from ECOMOG, the three Liberian factions (NPFL, INPFL and ULIMO) as well as members of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The JCMC will later be replaced by a new monitoring team composed of fresh ECOMOG troops and an African contingent drawn from Botswana, Egypt, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
22 September 1993	The UN Security Council passes Resolution 866 establishing the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), charged with the responsibility of monitoring the implementation of the Geneva II peace plan and cease-fire and the UN-imposed arms embargo. The mission will also coordinate ECOMOG's non-enforcement activities.
November 1993	Dr. Amos Sawyer, head of IGNU, declares ECOMOG "a West African success story," despite renewed fears that the Cotonou Accord may be endangered by NPFL's sudden replacement of the "more congenial" Dorothy Museleng-Cooper with "battlefield Commander" Isaac Musa in the Transitional Council of State.
January 1994	The Cotonou Accord runs into a deadlock over the sequence and timetable for implementing three aspects of the Accord: disarmament, installation of the transitional government, and presidential elections. NPFL wants the installation of the transitional government to be followed by general elections before disarmament, whereas IGNU and ULIMO insist that the disarmament provision must first be implemented before any other provisions.
7 February 1994	The Cotonou Accord is amended and supplemented by the "Triple 7 Agreement." Negotiated with the help of ECOWAS and the US Ambassador to Liberia, Triple 7 responds to the problem of sequencing in the Cotonou Accord by requiring that the deployment of peacekeeping troops, disarmament, and the installation of LNTG all commence simultaneously on March 7 1994.

May 1994	<p>The LNTG which replaced Dr. Amos Sawyer's IGNU finally takes off with an executive organ which includes NPFL strongman, Thomas Woewiyu, as Labor Minister.</p> <p>The UN Security Council Resolution 911 extends the mandate of UNOMIL by six months to assist in overseeing the completion of the transition process with national elections to be held throughout Liberia on September 7, 1994. The resolution also signifies that the patience of the international community for the Liberian peace process is wearing thin and that the Liberian factions should, therefore, hasten efforts to reconstitute the civil society.</p>
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Annex II

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

FIRST SESSION OF THE COMMUNITY STANDING MEDIATION COMMITTEE

BANJUL, 6 - 7 AUGUST 1990

DECISION A/DEC.1/8/90 ON THE CEASEFIRE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ECOWAS CEASEFIRE MONITORING GROUP FOR LIBERIA

The Community Standing Mediation Committee

MINDFUL of Article 5 of the ECOWAS Treaty establishing the Authority of Heads of State and Government and defining its composition and functions;

MINDFUL of Decision A/DEC.9/5/90 of 30 May 1990 of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government on the creation of a Community Standing Mediation Committee;

RECALLING the Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence signed by the Heads of State and Government at Freetown on 29th May 1981;

GRAVELY CONCERNED about the armed conflict existing in Liberia and the wanton destruction of human life and property and the displacement of persons occasioned by the said conflict;

CONSIDERING the massive damage in various forms being caused by the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation;

DEEPLY CONCERNED about the plight of foreign nationals, particularly citizens of the Community who are seriously affected by the conflict;

CONSIDERING that law and order in Liberia have broken down;

DETERMINED to find a peaceful and lasting solution to the conflict and to put an end to the situation which is seriously disrupting the normal life of innocent citizens in Liberia;

CONVINCED that the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee established by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States at its Thirteenth Session held from 28 to 30 May 1990 in Banjul provides an appropriate mechanism for resolving the situation.

Decides

Article I: Ceasefire

1. The Standing Mediation Committee, acting on behalf of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, hereby calls on all the parties to the conflict to observe an immediate ceasefire as a contribution to the restoration and maintenance of peace and security throughout Liberia.

2. The parties to the conflict shall:

a) cease all activities of a military or para-military nature, as well as all acts of violence;

b) surrender all arms and ammunition to the custody of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG);

c) refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation and acquisition of weapons or war materials;

d) refrain, pending the establishment of an Interim Government for the governance of Liberia until a new government is set up as a result of democratically conducted elections, from any activity which might prejudice the establishment of such Interim Government or the holding of general and presidential elections;

e) release all political prisoners and prisoners of war;

f) respect, unless otherwise suspended to facilitate the administration of the country by the Interim Government, the Constitution of the Republic of Liberia adopted on 6th January 1986;

g) fully cooperate with the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group for the effective maintenance of the ceasefire and the restoration of law and order.

3. The Interim Government shall unban all political parties and facilitate the return of all refugees and political exiles.

Article II: Ceasefire Monitoring Group

1. In order to arrive at a peaceful and lasting settlement of the dispute, ECOWAS shall establish, under the authority of the Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS and under the command of an ECOWAS Member State, a Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to be composed of military contingents drawn from the Member States of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee as well as from Guinea and Sierra Leone.

2. The Ceasefire Monitoring Group shall be under the command of a Force Commander appointed by the Committee. He shall be entrusted with powers to conduct military operations for the purpose of Monitoring the ceasefire, restoring law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections to be held in Liberia.

3. The Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) shall be assigned the function of assisting the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee in supervising the implementation and in ensuring the strict compliance by the parties with the provisions of the ceasefire throughout the territory of Liberia.

4. The Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) shall remain in Liberia, if necessary, until the successful holding of general elections and the installation of an elected government.

5. The Executive Secretary shall establish rules and regulations for the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) after consultation with the Chairman of the Authority.

6. The Executive Secretary is hereby authorised to appoint a Special Representative and other supporting staff for the operations in Liberia. The Special Representative shall work in close collaboration with the Forces Commander and assist in carrying out the ECOWAS operations in Liberia.

Article III: Financing of the Operations

All expenses relating to the operations of the Ceasefire Monitoring Group shall be drawn from the Special Emergency Fund created by Decision A/DEC.3/8/90 of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee.

Article IV: Commencement

The operations of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group in Liberia shall commence forthwith.

Article V: Appeal to the International Community

The Committee appeals to all members of the International Community not to assist any of the warring parties in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the ceasefire and the holding of general and presidential elections.

Article VI: Final Provisions

The ECOWAS Executive Secretary shall be responsible for the proper implementation and application of this Decision which shall enter into force upon signature and shall be published in the Official Journal of the Community and in the National Gazette of each Member State.

Done at Banjul this 7th Day of August 1990.

H.E. Dawda Kairaba Jawara

Annex III

UNITED
NATIONS

S



UNIDIR

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/26272
9 August 1993
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL:

FRENCH

LETTER DATED 6 AUGUST 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BENIN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In transmitting to you the Cotonou Agreement relating to the situation in Liberia, I have the honour to request, on instructions from my Government, that you arrange for it to be circulated as a United Nations document, more specifically as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ayité J. C. KRAKPO
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

93-44288 (E) 110893 110893

/...

Annex

[Original: English]

Agreement

THIS AGREEMENT is made this twenty-fifth day of July one thousand nine hundred and ninety-three -

BETWEEN THE Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU) of the first part and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) of the second part and the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) of the third part.

PART I
Military issues
SECTION A
Article 1
DECLARATION

1. The Parties to this Agreement hereby agree and declare a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities - to become effective at the date and time and on the conditions stipulated in article 2 and section C below.

2. The Parties further declare that all parties or groups within and without the perimeter of Liberia shall refrain from act(s) or activity(ies) that may violate or facilitate the violation of the cease-fire.

Article 2
EFFECTIVE DATE

The Parties also agree that the cease-fire stated hereinabove and the cessation of hostilities shall take effect seven days from the date of signing of this Agreement, commencing at 12 midnight.

SECTION B
Article 3
SUPERVISORY AND MONITORING AUTHORITY

1. The ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission shall supervise and monitor the implementation of this Agreement. The Parties hereby expressly recognize the neutrality and authority of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) and

the United Nations Observer Mission in respect of the foregoing. Accordingly, the ECOMOG and United Nations observers shall enjoy complete freedom of movement throughout Liberia.

2. By "ECOMOG Peace-keeping Force" is meant an expanded ECOMOG which includes the forces of ECOWAS Member States and African troops from outside the West African region.

3. The Parties agree further that in order to monitor and ensure against any violation of the cease-fire between the period of the effective date of the cease-fire and the arrival of ECOMOG and full contingent of the United Nations Observer Mission, a Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee is hereby established, which shall have the authority to monitor, investigate and report all cease-fire violations. The Committee shall comprise an equal number of representatives from each of the parties hereto, ECOMOG and an advance team of the United Nations Observer Mission. Each group of the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee shall be chaired by the United Nations observer in the group. It shall freely travel throughout the country. This Committee shall automatically be dissolved and deemed to be dissolved upon the arrival and deployment of ECOMOG and the full contingent of the United Nations Observer Mission.

SECTION C
Article 4
TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The Parties hereby state further that they have agreed to the cease-fire stipulated above on the following terms and conditions:

1. *Prohibitions upon the Parties:*

The Parties agree not to:

- (a) Import any weapons and war-like materials by any means into Liberia;
- (b) Use the period of the cease-fire to engage in any military build-up whether in manpower or armaments; or

(c) Engage in any other activity that would violate or result in the violation of the cease-fire.

2. *Adherence to stipulations on military embargo*

The Parties recognize and accept that the military embargo imposed on and upon all warring parties by ECOWAS and the United Nations Security Council shall remain in full force and effect.

3. *Creation of buffer zones*

ECOMOG shall create zones or otherwise seal the borders, whichever is militarily feasible, of Liberia-Guinea, Liberia-Sierra Leone and Liberia-Côte d'Ivoire to prevent cross-border attacks, infiltration or importation of arms. There shall be deployed United Nations observers in all of such zones to monitor, verify and report on any and all of the foregoing and the implementation thereof.

4. *Monitoring and supervision of entry points*

All points of entry including, sea ports, airfields and roads shall be monitored and supervised by ECOMOG. There shall be deployed United Nations observers to monitor, verify and report on the implementation of the foregoing activities.

5. *Position of warring parties at declaration of cease-fire*

The warring parties shall remain and maintain their positions held as at the effective date of this cease-fire, until the commencement of encampment.

SECTION D
Article 5
ACTS OF VIOLATION

1. The Parties hereto hereby agree to honour every and all provisions of this Agreement, and stipulate that any party committing any acts of violations shall be held liable for such violations.

2. The following acts shall constitute violation of the cease-fire:

-
- (a) Importation of arms and ammunition, incendiary devices and other war-related items;
 - (b) Changing or improvement of existing positions or fortification or alteration of existing positions;
 - (c) Attack (whether with conventional or unconventional weapons) against the position of any warring faction by another, or firing at an individual of a warring faction established to have been carried out at the instance of the authority of the warring party to which he/she belongs;
 - (d) The systematic use of conventional or unconventional weapons (i.e. knives, cutlasses, bows and arrows, etc.);
 - (e) Recruitment and training of combatants and/or groups of persons after the effective date of this Agreement;
 - (f) Any proven use of communication devices, facilities or propaganda designed to incite or having the effect of inciting hostilities between any of the warring parties;
 - (g) Planting of mines and incendiary devices subsequent to the effective date of the cease-fire; refusal to disclose the existence of or places where such devices or mines have been planted; and deliberate failure to cooperate or furnish maps (where available) where such devices have been planted;
 - (h) Obstruction of the implementation of any of the provisions of the Agreement by any party or its authorized agent;
 - (i) Harassments or attacks upon ECOMOG, the United Nations Observer Mission or the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee;
 - (j) Obstructions of the activities of ECOMOG, United Nations observers and the Joint Cease-fire Monitoring Committee.

SECTION E
Article 6
DISARMAMENT

Disarmament being the ultimate objective of the cease-fire, the Parties hereto agree and express their intent and willingness to disarm to and under the supervision of ECOMOG, monitored and verified by the United Nations Observer Mission. In conformity therewith, the parties agree that:

1. All weapons and warlike materials collected shall be stored by ECOMOG in armouries designated by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations observers.
2. All weapons and warlike materials in the possession of the parties shall be given to ECOMOG, monitored by United Nations observers, upon appropriate recording and inventory, and placed in designated armouries.
3. Said armouries shall be secured by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations observers, upon proper documentation or inventory of all weapons and warlike materials received.
4. Each of the warring factions shall ensure that its combatants report all weapons and warlike materials to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations observers, upon proper inventory. Such weapons and warlike materials, upon inventory, shall be taken to the designated armouries by ECOMOG, under the monitoring and verification of United Nations observers.
5. All non-combatants who are in possession of weapons and warlike materials shall also report and surrender same to ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations observers. Such weapons and warlike materials shall be returned to the owners after due registration, licensing and certification by the governing authority after the elections.
6. ECOMOG shall have the authority to disarm any combatant or non-combatant in possession of weapons and warlike materials. The United Nations observers shall monitor all such activities.

7. For the sole purpose of maintaining the cease-fire, ECOMOG shall conduct any search to recover lost or hidden weapons, observed and monitored by the United Nations observers.

SECTION F
Article 7
ENCAMPMENT

1. *Purpose*

(a) The Parties agree and fully commit themselves to the encampment of their combatants in encampment centres established by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations observers, the purpose of which shall be, in addition to the disarmament and demobilization, to serve as a transit point for the further education, training and rehabilitation of said combatants; and

(b) Consistent with the above, the parties agree to submit to ECOMOG and the United Nations observers, a complete listing of their combatants and weapons and warlike materials and their locations to the nearest encampment centres.

2. *Commencement of encampment*

The Parties agree that encampment shall commence immediately upon the deployment of ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission. Copies of the schedule of encampment shall be furnished to all the parties hereto.

3. *Identification and security of encampment sites*

In consultation with the Parties, ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission shall identify locations for encampment. Security of encampment sites shall be provided by ECOMOG, monitored and verified by United Nations observers.

SECTION G

Article 8

PEACE ENFORCEMENT POWERS

1. It is also agreed upon that ECOMOG shall have the right to self-defence where it has been physically attacked by any warring faction hereto.
2. There shall be established, upon deployment of ECOMOG and the full contingent of the United Nations Observer Mission, a Violation Committee consisting of one person from each of the parties hereto and ECOMOG and the United Nations Observer Mission, chaired by a member of the United Nations Observer Mission.
3. All violations of the cease-fire shall be reported to the United Nations Observer Mission/observers who shall, immediately upon receipt of the information of violation, commence an investigation and make findings thereof. In the event the violations can be cured by the United Nations observers, they shall pursue such a course. However, should such a course not be possible, the United Nations observers shall submit their findings to the Violation Committee. The Violation Committee shall invite the violating party/(ies) for the purpose of having such party/(ies) take corrective measures to cure the violations within such time-frame as may be stipulated by the Committee. Should the violating party not take the required corrective measures, ECOMOG shall be informed thereof and shall thereupon resort to the use of its peace-enforcement powers against the violator.

SECTION H

Article 9

DEMOBILIZATION

1. The Parties hereby agree that any warring faction or factions that may have non-Liberian fighters or mercenaries shall repatriate such persons, or when found, upon evidence, shall be expelled by the Government of the Republic of Liberia.
2. Further, the Parties hereby call upon the United Nations, other international organizations and countries, to programme and finance the process of demobilization, retraining, rehabilitation and re-absorption of all former combatants to normal social and community life.

3. It is agreed by the Parties hereto that each party shall immediately commence a community information or educational programme, explaining to the public by means of communication devices or any form of media, the essence and purpose of the cease-fire, encampment, disarmament and demobilization. Such programme shall include other social institutions.

SECTION I
Article 10
PRISONERS-OF-WAR

The Parties hereby agree that upon signing of this Agreement all prisoners-of-war and detainees shall be immediately released to the Red Cross authority in an area where such prisoners or detainees are detained, for onward transmission to encampment sites or the authority of the prisoner-of-war or detainee. Common criminals are not covered by this provision.

SECTION J
Article 11
SUBMISSION BY PARTIES TO AUTHORITY
OF TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

Consistent with the provisions of paragraph 5 of article 14 of this Agreement, all Parties agree to submit themselves to the authority of the Transitional Government.

SECTION K
Article 12
SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION

Schedules of implementation of this Agreement, including a schedule for disarmament, encampment and demobilization of combatants, shall be drawn by ECOMOG and the United Nations observers. This schedule of implementation shall be given to each of the warring parties prior to implementation. The Parties undertake that they will create no obstacles to the full implementation of any of the foregoing activities.

PART II
Political Issues
SECTION A
Article 13
REVIEW AND REAFFIRMATION
OF THE YAMO USSOUKRO ACCORDS

The Parties to this Agreement reaffirm that the Yamoussoukro Accords provide the best framework for peace in Liberia, noting the links between the ECOWAS peace plan and the Yamoussoukro Accords.

SECTION B
Article 14
STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

1. The Parties observe that Liberia is a unitary State and as such agree to form a single transitional Government, styled THE LIBERIA NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT. The authority of the transitional Government shall extend throughout the territorial limits of the Republic of Liberia.
2. The mandate of the transitional Government is to provide essential government services during the transitional period and to also hold and supervise general and presidential elections in accordance with the ECOWAS peace plan. The Transitional Legislature Assembly or the Council of State shall have power to enact or cause to be enacted any rule(s), regulation(s) or law, or take any action(s) which may facilitate the holding of free and fair democratic elections.
3. Formal installation of the Council of State shall take place in Monrovia, the capital city of the Republic of Liberia, and the Council of State shall also be permanently headquartered there.
4. The Parties further agree that the aforesaid transitional Government shall be selected in accordance with the below listed provisions and installed in approximately thirty (30) days of the date of signature of this Agreement, concomitant with the commencement of the disarmament process. Upon the installation of the transitional government, both IGNU and NPRAG shall cease to exist and shall be deemed dissolved.

5. The Parties further agree that the transitional Government shall operate as closely as practicable under the Constitution and laws of Liberia.
6. The Parties further agree, warrant and promise that from the date of signature of this Agreement, no loans shall be negotiated or contracted in the name of or on behalf of the Liberian Government except to ensure the carrying out of the operations and activities of governmental and other public services. All financial transactions entered into by the Transitional Government shall be formally submitted to the Transitional Legislative Assembly for ratification.
7. The Parties also agree that the transitional Government shall have three branches: legislative, executive and judicial.

Executive

- (i) The Parties further agree that, during the transitional period, the executive powers of the Republic shall be vested in a five (5)-member Council of State which is hereby established. Each of the Parties shall appoint one (1) member to the Council, whilst the remaining two (2) shall be selected in accordance with the following procedure:

Each of the Parties shall nominate three (3) eminent Liberians who together shall select two (2) of their number to be additional members of the Council.
- (ii) Each Party shall submit the name of its appointee to the Council and also the names of its three (3) nominees in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph to the office of the current Chairman of ECOWAS within a period of seven (7) days from the date of signature of this Agreement. Copies of the list of these names shall also be forwarded to each of the Parties.
- (iii) The Parties shall, not later than three (3) days from submission of the aforesaid names, jointly and mutually determine the time and venue for the selection of the two (2) additional members of the Council. This entire selection process shall not exceed ten (10) days after the determination of the time and place of the meeting. If at the appointed place and time, any of the nominees fail to appear, the

nominating party shall forfeit its right to renominate any other person(s), and the selection process shall proceed.

- (iv) Proof of the selection of the two additional Council members shall be made by a written statement signed by all the nominees (excluding the two nominees selected) who participated in the selection process confirming same. The statement shall be forwarded to the current Chairman of ECOWAS with copy to each of the Parties.
- (v) The Council shall select from amongst its members a Chairman and two (2) Vice-Chairmen.
- (vi) The Council shall conduct and be responsible for the day-to-day operation of Government. All decisions shall be made by consensus of all the members.
- (vii) The Council shall also devise and implement appropriate procedural rules in respect of its operation.
- (viii) The Parties shall, in consultation with each other, determine the allocation of cabinet posts.

Judicial

8. The Parties further agree that for purposes of continuity, there shall be no change in the existing structure of the Supreme Court. ULIMO shall have the right to nominate the fifth member of the Court to fill the vacancy which currently exists. The nominee by ULIMO to the Supreme Court shall meet the established criteria and successfully undergo a screening by his or her peers in the Court.

Legislature

9. The Parties agree that the Transitional Legislative Assembly shall be a unicameral body composed of thirty-five (35) members. Both IGNU and NPFL shall each be entitled to thirteen (13) members, and ULIMO nine (9) members. The Parties agree that ULIMO shall have the right to nominate the Speaker from one of its members in the Assembly.

SECTION C
Article 15
ELECTIONS MODALITIES

1. The Parties agree that, in order to enhance the inclusive nature of the transitional Government, ULIMO shall have the right to nominate two members to the Elections Commission, thus expanding the existing Elections Commission to seven (7) members. For the purpose of continuity the present structure shall remain the same.
2. *Supreme Court:* The Supreme Court shall adjudicate all matters arising out of the elections during the transition, in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the country.
3. *Voters registration:* Voters Registration shall commence as soon as possible having due regard for the need to expedite repatriation.
4. *Observers and Monitors:* The transitional Government and the Elections Commission will work out the modalities for the participation of observers and monitors in the electoral process.
5. *Financing:* Financing will be sought from the national and international communities.
6. The Parties agree that the elections to be conducted shall conform to the several United Nations and internationally accepted codes of conduct and the Elections Commission shall, accordingly be guided thereby.

SECTION D
Article 16
TENURE AND MANDATE OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. The transitional Government shall be installed approximately one month after the signing of this Agreement, concomitant with the commencement of the disarmament process.
2. The transitional Government shall have a life span of approximately six (6) months commencing from the date of its installation.

3. General and presidential elections shall take place approximately seven (7) months from the signature of this Agreement.

4. Holders of positions of leadership within the Transitional Government (i.e. members of the Council of State, Supreme Court Justice; members of the Elections Commission, Cabinet Ministers, members of the Transitional Legislative Assembly, Managing Directors or Heads of Public Corporations and Autonomous Agencies) shall be ineligible to contest the election provided for in paragraph 3 of this article.

SECTION E

Article 17

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The Parties agree that every effort should be made to deliver humanitarian assistance to all Liberians, particularly children, who are malnourished and suffering from related diseases. Convoys of humanitarian assistance should travel to all areas of Liberia through the most direct routes, under inspection to ensure compliance with the sanctions and embargo provisions of this Agreement.

SECTION F

Article 18

REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES

1. The Parties hereby commit themselves immediately and permanently to bring to an end any further external or internal displacement of Liberians and to create the conditions that will allow all refugees and displaced persons to, respectively, voluntarily repatriate and return to Liberia to their places of origin or habitual residence under conditions of safety and dignity.

2. The Parties further call upon Liberian refugees and displaced persons to return to Liberia and to their places of origin or habitual residence and declare that they shall not be jeopardized in any ethnic, political, religious, regional or geographical considerations.

3. The Parties also call upon the relevant organizations of the United Nations system, particularly the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Development Programme, other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, to implement

programmes for the voluntary repatriation, return and reintegration of the Liberian refugees and internally displaced persons.

4. The Parties proclaim that they shall, jointly or individually, cooperate in all necessary ways with themselves and with the above-mentioned organizations in order to facilitate the repatriation, return and reintegration of the refugees and displaced persons. Amongst others, they agree to:

(a) Establish all necessary mechanisms or arrangements, such as joint repatriation committees, which would facilitate contacts, communications and work with the relevant organizations for purposes of implementing the repatriation, return and reintegration operation and to enable effective decision-making and implementation of the relevant activities;

(b) Facilitate access by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations to the refugees and displaced persons who have returned so as to deliver the necessary humanitarian assistance and programmes and monitor their situation;

(c) Guarantee and provide security to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the other relevant organizations, their staff, vehicles, equipment and resources necessary to carry out their work;

(d) Provide all other necessary facilities and support that will be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the return, voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.

SECTION G
Article 19
GENERAL AMNESTY

The Parties hereby agree that upon the execution of this Agreement there shall be a general amnesty granted to all persons and parties involved in the Liberian civil conflict in the course of actual military engagements. Accordingly, acts committed by the Parties or by their forces while in actual combat or on authority of any of the Parties in the course of actual combat are hereby granted amnesty. Similarly, the Parties agree that business transactions legally carried out by any of the Parties hereto with private business institutions

in accordance with the laws of Liberia shall in like manner be covered by the amnesty herein granted.

DONE AT COTONOU, REPUBLIC OF BENIN, IN SEVEN ORIGINAL
COPIES THIS TWENTY-FIFTH DAY OF JULY 1993

(Signed) Amos Claudius SAYWER
President of the Interim
Government of National
Unity of Liberia, for and on
behalf of the Interim Government
of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU)

(Signed) Enoch DOGOLEA
Vice-President of the
National Patriotic Front of
of Liberia, for and on behalf
of the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPFL/NPRAG)

(Signed) Major-General Alhaji G. V. KROMAH
Leader of the United Liberation Movement
of Liberia for Democracy, for and on behalf
of the United Liberation Movement of Liberia
for Democracy (ULIMO)

(Signed) His Excellency Nicephore Dieudonne SOGLO
President of the Republic of Benin
and Current Chairman of ECOWAS

(Signed) Dr. James O. C. JONAH
Under-Secretary-General
Department of Political Affairs,
United Nations Secretariat, for and
on behalf of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

(Signed) Rev. Canaan BANANA
OAU Eminent Person for Liberia,
for and on behalf of the
Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity

Biographical Note

Clement Adibe received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, with specializations in International Relations and Comparative Politics of Development. Between 1992-1994, he held a pre-doctoral fellowship in International Peace and Security under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council, New York, and the MacArthur Foundation in Chicago. He also held research fellowships at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (1992/93), Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University (1993/94), Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana at Legon (Summer 1993) and the Center for International Relations, Queen's University at Kingston (1994/95). He has published articles in learned journals, including *Peace Research*, *Futures* and the *South African Journal of International Affairs*, as well chapters in volumes on foreign policy and international political economy. He is currently a Killam post-doctoral fellow at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.

Part II:
Questionnaire Analysis

DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT
The Disarming of Warring Parties
as an Integral Part of Conflict Settlement

PRACTITIONERS' QUESTIONNAIRE ON:
WEAPONS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND
DEMOBILIZATION DURING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

ANALYSIS REPORT: LIBERIA

COMPILED BY: MIKE MACKINNON

DATE: APRIL 1996

Note to Readers: The responses which appear in this analysis have been reproduced directly from the respondents' answers to the DCR *Practitioner's Questionnaire*. Changes, if any, have been made only to correct spelling, grammar, and sentence structure; all efforts have been made to maintain the integrity of the original responses. Illegible portions of the original written responses have been indicated with ellipses.

Reference Number:
UNIDIR/UNOMIL/01

Summary of Practitioners' Questionnaires

Number of questionnaires: 04

IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION

1. OPERATION

- a. **Name of operation:** United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
- b. **Location of operation:** Liberia
- c. **Time frame covered by questionnaires:**
 - (L049) 00/10/93 - 00/10/94
 - (L050) 23/12/93 - 30/12/94
 - (L051) 28/10/93 - 05/10/94
 - (L052) 23/12/93 - 27/12/94

2. RESPONDENTS

a. Primary Role:

UN Civilian: 00

Chief : 00

Other : 00

Military Officer: 04

Commander : 00

Other : 04

Humanitarian Relief Operator and/or NGO personnel: 00

National Official: 00

b. Primary Mission:

Military: 04

HQ Staff	: 00	Military Observer	: 04
Infantry	: 00	Armor	: 00
Artillery	: 00	Engineer	: 00
Medical	: 00	Aviation	: 00
Transport	: 00	Logistics	: 00
Military Police	: 00		

Civilian: 00

Civil Affairs	: 00	Staff HQ	: 00
Representative	: 00	Relief Coordinator	: 00
Relief	: 00	Volunteer	: 00

c. Regular Activities:

Convoy Operations	: 03
Convoy Security	: 00
Base Security	: 00
Patrolling	: 03
Search Operations	: 02
Checkpoint Operations	: 00
Cease-fire Monitoring	: 04
Cease-fire Violations Investigations	: 02
Weapons Inspections	: 00
Weapons Inventories	: 00
Weapons Collection - Voluntary	: 02
Weapons Collection - Involuntary	: 00
Weapons Elimination	: 00
Cantonment Construction	: 00
Cantonment Security	: 00
Disarmament Verification	: 00
Information Collection	: 03
Police Operations (Military)	: 00
Special Operations	: 02
Humanitarian Relief	: 01

SECTION ONE

(Note to readers: Two caveats should be kept in mind when surveying the respondents' answers to the Practitioners' Questionnaire. First, in answering the questionnaire, respondents were instructed to answer only those questions which pertained to their specific mission and/or function; as a result, most respondents did not answer all of the "yes" or "no" questions. The number of responses for each question, therefore, will not always add up to the total number of respondents. Second, respondents often provided additional commentary for questions they should have skipped -- they may have answered a question with "no", for example, and then elaborated on their answer in the space provided for the "yes" respondents. For this reason, certain questions may contain more responses than the number expected.)

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT:

Q1.1 Was there a disarmament component in the original peace agreement and/or relevant UNSC Resolution? (If no, go to Section II.)

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q1.2 If yes, was the disarmament component a central feature of the agreement?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q1.3 Describe the desired outcome of the disarmament component vis-à-vis the peace agreement.

(L050) They [were to] collect some of the weapons during that mission, but stopped.

(L051) The desired outcome was not completely attained.

(L052) Most of the factions in Liberia refused to give the weapons to [the] disarmament component.

Q1.4 Was there a timetable planned for implementation?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q1.5 If so, did it go as planned?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q1.6 If not, why? Give three reasons.

(L050) The situation was bad through[out] the mission, and the parties stopped the disarmament.

(L051) 1) One of the warring factions refused until after the elections [were] completed. 2) Other sub-factions deviated from their main factions. 3) Some individuals were uncontrollable.

(L052) 1) Because [the] cease-fire in Liberia was violated most [of] the time. 2) There was no confidence between the observers and the factions.

Q1.7 If there were delays in the implementation, summarize their impact on the disarmament process.

(L051) The impact was in the form of fighting burst as a result of deviation from the main factions of the conflict that also delayed the elections.

(L052) There was no disarmament in Liberia at all.

Q1.8 Did the existing agreements hinder you at any time from conducting disarmament measures?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q1.9 If so, mention some of the ways in which you felt hindered.

No responses.

II. MANDATE:**Q2.1 At the start of your mission, were you informed of the part of the mandate regarding disarmament?**

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q2.2 How was the disarmament component expressed in your mission mandate? (Summarize.)

(L051) It was clearly stated that by April disarmament [should have been] completed so that they [could] start the elections.

(L052) There was no disarmament in Liberia and the component just wait[ed] all of the time until the mission [was] finished.

Q2.3 How did you interpret the mandate you received?

(L051) First, we had to finish with the disarmament process; and second, we [were to] help carry out the elections.

(L052) The factions refused to give [up their] weapons.

Q2.4 Did the way the disarmament component was expressed hinder or assist your disarming task?

Hindered: 00 Assisted: 03

Q2.5 If it was a hindrance, how would you have preferred your mandate to read?

No responses.

Q2.6 Were your actions/freedom of action during disarmament operations influenced by external factors other than the mandate?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q2.7 If so, which ones?

(L049) The functions.

(L051) The ECOMOG was not under the control and command of the UN.

(L052) ECOMOG soldiers help[ed] some factions against other factions.

III. SUBSIDIARY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS:

Q3.1 Did the warring factions enter into a separate disarmament agreement?

Yes: 00 No: 04
(If not, go to question 4.)

Q3.2 If so, describe the agreement.

No responses.

Q3.3 Was the agreement formulated with the mandate in mind or independent of the mandate?

Mandate-oriented: 01
Independent of mandate: 01

Q3.4 Were there any contradictions between the mandate and the agreement?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q3.5 If so, which ones?

No responses.

Q3.6 What was the impact of the agreement on the mandate?

(L051) The agreement was matching with the mandate had it succeeded as planned.

(L052) There was no confidence between factions [which are] fighting most of the time.

IV. TOP-DOWN CHANGES: CONSISTENCY OF THE MANDATE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DISARMAMENT COMPONENT:**Q4.1 Did the mandate change while you were engaged in the UN/national operation?**

Yes: 02 No: 02
(If not, go to question 5.)

Q4.2 If so, what was(were) the change(s)? (Describe the most important aspects.)

(L051) Since some parties insisted that they give up their arms after the election, the change was to hand in their weapons in September.

Q4.3 Did this(these) change(s) affect your disarmament operations?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q4.4 If so, how? (Name the three most important effects.)

(L051) 1) It was a sort of frustrating to us. 2) The mission was extended. 3) The population showed resentment to the UN people.

Q4.5 If disarmament was affected, was it still possible for you to implement disarmament measures as first envisaged?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q4.6 In the context of 4.5, did you have to change or abandon procedures?

Change: 01 Abandon: 01

Q4.7 If you changed procedures, what were the changes? (Mention the three most important ones.)

(L051) Due to the lack of cooperation from the warring factions, no changes were made possible.

Q4.8 Were you adequately informed of changes when and as they occurred?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q4.9 Were you able to implement alternative measures immediately?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q4.10 If not, why? (Give the three most salient points.)

(L051) 1) We were unarmed observers. 2) We were not able to reach all regions. 3) ECOMOG did not cooperate with us.

V. BOTTOM-UP CHANGES: DISPUTES AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES ARISING DURING THE MISSION:

Q5.1 Was there a mechanism or a provision for the settlement of disputes if and when these emerged?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q5.2 If so, what type of mechanism/provision did you have (i.e., mission, special agreement, the UN process, special commission, etc.)?

(L050) Special commission

(L051) 1) Having meetings with the parties. 2) Such meetings were headed by the SRSG [Special Representative of the Secretary General] who met with all parties in Accra to settle the disputes.

Q5.3 What kind of regulations were agreed between the parties and the peacekeepers for the collection of arms?

(L049) [They] were not serving.

(L051) 1) On voluntarily basis, some of the warring parties used to bring arms and hand them to the UN in return for some food or medicine. 2) The UN kept such arms in storehouses.

Q5.4 What kind of negotiations/regulations were agreed at the top and lower levels with respect to the storage of arms?

(L050) The arms were stored with the peacekeeper forces and [under UN supervision].

(L051) Arms handed to the ECOMOG should be handed to the UN and kept under their control.

Q5.5 Was there a conflict between these *new* agreements and the *original* agreement and/or mandate?

Yes: 03 No: 01

VI. PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION DURING THE MISSION:

Q6.1. Did you consider the protection of the population when negotiating disarmament clauses with the warring parties?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q6.2. Was the protection of the population a part of your mission?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q6.3 If so, did you have the means to do so?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q6.4 What were the three most important means at your disposal to achieve this objective?

No responses.

SECTION TWO

VII. FORCE COMPOSITION AND FORCE STRUCTURE

Q7.1 Was the force composition for your mission area unilateral or multilateral?

Unilateral: 01 Multilateral: 03

Q7.2 Describe the three most important advantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

(L051) 1) In such a case, the force is guaranteed to be neutral. 2) The local population shows more respect to such a force. 3) It fulfils the name "UN".

(L052) No advantage

Unilateral force composition:

No responses.

Q7.3 Describe the three most important disadvantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

(L051) 1) Different cultures are difficult to be accepted all at the same time by the population. 2) It might be that one nationality is not welcomed by the population. 3) It is difficult for the force members to get in harmony in a short time.

(L052) 1) Fighting all of the time. 2) No confidence between ECOMOG soldiers and observers.

Unilateral force composition:

No responses.

Q7.4 If you worked in a multilateral context: how important was consensus (with peacekeepers from other countries) for the achievement of disarmament and demobilization components during the operation?

(L051) Consensus is very important but it needs some UN forces, not observers, to carry it out.

Q7.5. Was adequate consideration given to the disarmament component as the mission evolved?

Adequate: 04 Inadequate: 00

Q7.6 If it was inadequate, explain how this affected your mission (mention the three most important issues).

No responses.

Q7.7 Did the force composition identify a specific structure to support the disarmament component of the mandate?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q7.8 If so, what was it?

No responses.

Q7.9 Did the force composition allow for verification and monitoring measures for the control of weapons and disarmament?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q7.10 If so, what were they?

No responses.

Q7.11 Was the chosen force structure appropriate for executing the mission?

Yes: 02 No: 02

- Q7.12** Were the units efficient for the mission given?
- Yes: 02 No: 02
- Q7.13** Were the units appropriate for conducting the disarmament operations?
- Yes: 03 No: 01
- Q7.14** Were your units augmented with specific personnel and equipment for the disarmament mission?
- Yes: 00 No: 04
- Q7.15** If so, what additional capabilities did they provide? (List the five most important ones.)
- No responses.
- Q7.16** If you were a commander, were you briefed by HQ's prior to your disarming mission and before your arrival in the area of operations?
- Yes: 00 No: 03
- Q7.17** Did the security situation in the mission area allow for weapons control and disarmament operations?
- Yes: 02 No: 02
- Q7.18** If not, what steps were required in order to establish and maintain a secure environment?
- (L051) 1) Troops were needed to control all regions. 2) Then, the observers would work more efficiently.

Q7.19 Did these force protection measures affect the accomplishment of the disarmament operations positively or negatively?

Positively: 01 Negatively: 02

Q7.20 Elaborate on the impact mentioned in 7.19 above.

(L051) Due to the lack of UN troops, protection measures leading to the accomplishment were difficult to implement.

Q7.21 Were command and control/operational procedures adequate for your task?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q7.22 If not, mention three examples which demonstrate their inadequacy.

(L050) Different parties, different headquarters, bad coordination between the units.

Q7.23 Summarize your salient experiences with command and control/operational procedures while on this mission.

(L051) Command and control depend heavily on communications which were very efficient. But the most important factor here is lack of troops to cover all of the mission area.

(L052) There is no [...] activity for military observers at lower level.

Q7.24 What additional support (special capabilities/force multipliers) did you receive which helped the disarmament mission? List the three most important ones.

(L051) Nothing.

(L052) Sometimes, ECOMOG soldiers help[ed] observers to [...] negotiate about disarmament.

Q7.25 Were they adequate?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q7.26 If not, what other capabilities would you have needed to make your mission more effective? (List the most relevant.)

(L051) 1) Troops. 2) UN command and control. 3) UN mandate to clearly state that all factions to abide by UN resolutions.

VIII. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES/RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Q8.1 Did you abide by national or UN rules of engagement/operational procedures during the pursuit of your mission?

National: 00 UN: 04

Q8.2 Were these rules/procedures adequate for the performance of your task?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q8.3 If not, what other rules should you have had?

(L050) No cooperation between UN and peacekeepers.

(L051) Observers can not efficiently carry out such a mission alone.

Q8.4 If and when the situation changed, were your rules altered accordingly?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q8.5 If so, summarize the relevant changes.

(L051) Dates set for disarmament were flexible to give the parties time for showing goodwill. Agreements were aimed at by the UN to go along with the changes.

IX. COERCIVE DISARMAMENT AND PREVENTIVE DISARMAMENT

Q9.1 Did you have to use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve the mission as mandated?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q9.2 Judging from your experience, is it possible to use coercive disarmament in these types of operations?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q9.3 Do you believe that force can and should be used to enforce the disarmament components of an agreement?

Can:	Yes: 04	No: 00
Should:	Yes: 02	No: 00

Q9.4 Mention three reasons why force can/cannot and should/should not be used to enforce the disarmament component of an agreement.

(L051) Since the warring factions were exhausted, the UN [could] enforce disarmament in case of having UN troops to do so.

Q9.5 If fighting was an ongoing process, was it possible for you to continue with your disarmament tasks?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q9.6 If so, describe how it was possible to continue with your disarmament tasks.

No responses.

Q9.7 Were you involved in any preventive deployment operations (i.e., as an observer, preventive diplomacy official, etc.)?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q9.8 If so, was disarmament a major concern of this deployment?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q9.9 If so, were there already arms control agreements (i.e., registers of conventional weapons, MTCR, etc.) in place within the country where you were operating?

Yes: 02 No: 01

SECTION THREE

X. INFORMATION: COLLECTION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND THE MEDIA

Q10.1 Did you receive sufficient relevant information prior to and during your disarming mission?

Prior:	Yes: 02	No: 01
During:	Yes: 02	No: 00

Q10.2 Was information always available and reliable?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q10.3 How did you receive/obtain your information prior to and during the mission? (Describe the three most important ways.)

(L051) 1) The agreement itself was accessible to us prior and during. 2) The results of the meeting were made available to us. 3) The UNSC Resolutions were available immediately after being adopted and issued.

(L052) The factions talked [directly] to the military observers.

Q10.4 Was there a structured information exchange between HQ's and the units in the field?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q10.5 And between the various field commanders?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q10.6 Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information purposes?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q10.7 If so, list which ones and for what purpose. (Mention not more than three.)

(L051) 1) The observers themselves in the field (instead). 2) The warring factions themselves.

Q10.7.1 Was the use of on-site and remote sensing an adequate tool for verifying and monitoring weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q10.7.2 In your opinion, could sensor systems (acoustic, radar, photo, video, infrared, etc.) play a useful role in monitoring the weapons control and disarmament aspects of a peacekeeping operation?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q10.7.3 If so, give some examples of phases of the peacekeeping process in which such sensors could be used.

No responses.

Q10.7.4 What would you suggest about the possible organizational set-up of the use of such sensor systems (i.e., UN, regional organization, national, etc.)?

(L051) UN organizational set-up only

(L052) If there is [no] confidence, [then] not good to send UN to any country.

Q10.8 Do you think that normal information collection assets (i.e., intelligence) could and should be used for peacekeeping and disarming purposes?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q10.9 Why? (List three reasons.)

(L051) 1) Due to the large area of responsibility. 2) Due to different factions' existence. 3) The difficulty and restrictions of movement.

- Q10.10 Is there a need for satellite surveillance in peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations?**
- Yes: 02 No: 02
- Q10.11 Did you use the local population for information collection purposes?**
- Yes: 03 No: 01
- Q10.12 Did you implement any transparency measures to create mutual confidence between warring parties?**
- Yes: 03 No: 01
- Q10.13 If so, did you act as an intermediary?**
- Yes: 03 No: 00
- Q10.14 Was public affairs/media essential to the disarming mission?**
- Yes: 03 No: 00
- Q10.15 Were communication and public relations efforts of importance during your mission?**
- Yes: 01 No: 03
- Q10.16 If so, give three reasons why this was so.**
- (L051) 1) Because the majority of the population should know about everything going on. 2) The warring faction leaders can not inform their people otherwise.
- Q10.17 Was there a well-funded and planned communications effort to support and explain your activities and mission to the local population?**

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q10.18 If not, should there have been one?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q10.19 Did media attention at any time hamper or benefit your disarming efforts?

Hamper: 01 Benefit: 03

Q10.20 Summarize your experience with the media.

(L051) In our mission, the only means available were some pamphlets published in the local language. It would be more efficient if there were a radio station to cover more [of the] area of concern.

Q10.21 Was there sufficient briefing to the general public in the conflict area on the disarming process?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q10.22 If so, who organized this and who carried it out?

Organized:

(L049) UNOMIL.

Carried it out:

(L049) We did.

Q10.23 Was there cooperation with the local media in explaining the steps of disarmament you were carrying out?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q10.24 Were leaflets distributed?

Yes: 02 No: 02

SECTION FOUR**XI. EXPERIENCES IN THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS AND IN DISARMAMENT DURING YOUR MISSION:****Q11.1 Describe, by order of importance, your specific tasks, if any, in weapons control and disarmament during this mission.**

(L049) My mission [was] to observe the peacekeepers

Q11.2 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for arms control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.3 If not, what steps were required to establish and maintain a secure environment?

(L049) Nothing.

(L051) UN troops to task and cover the entire mission area.

(L052) We need[ed] a strong peacekeeping [force].

Q11.4 Do you think your weapons control and disarming tasks could have been handled more efficiently?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.5 If so, mention three ways in which your task could have been improved.

(L051) 1) Extensive media coverage was needed. 2) UN troops to carry out the tasks. 3) Excluding the ECOMOG from the mission.

Q11.6 Were opportunities missed to take advantage of or implement weapons control and disarmament measures?

Missed: 02 Not missed: 01

Q11.7 If opportunities were missed, mention the main reasons why this happened.

(L049) The situation was very bad.

(L051) Because the whole mission was made up of monitors only.

(L052) 1) Fighting and 2) no confidence.

Q11.8 Did you find the national diversity of contributed troops a problem for command and control during disarmament operations?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.9 If so, mention the three problems you considered most challenging.

(L051) Because the troops were only ECOMOG and the monitors were multinational, the two components were not under the same command.

Q11.10 Was the disarmament process reversible (i.e., were there instances where devolution was foreseen or requested)?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.11 If so, were there provisions to this effect in the mandate, mission or agreement?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q11.12 Which types of weapons were in use, and by whom (e.g., your own unit(s), warring parties, individuals, irregular units, national officials, etc.)? (If applicable, list the five principal ones for each category.)

Weapon: Small arms Whom : All parties
RPG's

Other comments:

(L050) No, we [were] observers.

Q11.13 Were you given priorities as to the type of weapons you should disarm first?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.14 If so, how were priorities assigned (i.e., on what basis)? (List three reasons.)

(L051) 1) RPG's, 2) machine guns, 3) side-arms

Q11.15 At the beginning of your mission, were you able to have sufficient information on military capabilities in regard to numbers and quality of equipment used by warring parties?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.16 Did you have the impression that there were caches of weapons in your sector or adjoining sectors?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q11.17 **Were illicit weapons a problem for you (illicit as in: not in your inventories)?**

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q11.18 **Was there evidence in your sector that the warring parties continued to have access to weapons through external channels of supply?**

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q11.19 **Could you control external channels of weapons supply in your sector?**

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.20 **How important was the control of external channels of supply for the success of the mission?**

Very Important: 03 Important: 00 Unimportant: 01

Q11.21 **In your experience, do weapons continue to flow during the conflict even after sanctions, inspections, and checks have been applied?**

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q11.22 **Were there any security zones established?**

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q11.23 **If so, were you able to control your sector effectively?**

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q11.24 Depending on your answer under 11.23, elaborate on how you were able to control the sector or on why you were unable to control it.

(L050) They are forest.

(L051) It was only controllable in the capital city, Monrovia.

Q11.25 Were you involved in any monitoring of arms embargoes/sanctions?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.26 What was your experience in this respect?

No responses.

Q11.27 Were any weapons collected for cash or land during your mission?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.28 If so, comment on the effectiveness of this incentive.

No responses.

Q11.29 Were national police involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.30 Were other organizations involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.31 If so, which ones?

No responses.

Q11.32 If involved in Chapter VI operations (peacekeeping), were military observers used in the collection of arms?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q11.33 If so, what type of military observer was used (i.e., UN, regional, other organization, etc.)?

(L049) UN.

(L050) UN.

Q11.34 Answer if applicable: was there satisfactory coordination between military observers and yourself as unit commander/chief of operation?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.35 Were the warring factions themselves involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.36 Did you use opposite party liaison officers so that all factions were represented in the collection of arms and the disarming process?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.37 If so, reflect upon your experiences in this issue.

No responses.

Q11.38 With regard to the UN/national mission you participated in, do you believe arms can be effectively collected?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q11.39 Were you involved in the disarming of individuals, private and irregular units, and/or bandits?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.40 Was the UN police involved in these tasks?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.41 Were local authorities involved in disarming individuals?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q11.42 If so, what was their role?

(L049) Collect the weapon and hand it to peacekeepers.

Q11.43 Were there regulations in the mandate or peace agreement with respect to how to deal with private and irregular units?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q11.44 If not, do you think your task would have improved if there had been such an accord?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.45 Did you experience problems with snipers?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q11.46 If so, how did you counter this?

No responses.

SECTION FIVE**XII. DEMOBILIZATION EXPERIENCES**

Q12.1 Did the disarmament component of your mission include or infer demobilization?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q12.2 If so, what types of demobilization operations were conducted during this UN/national operation (i.e., cease-fire monitoring, weapons cantonment, etc.)?

(L049) Both [cease-fire monitoring and weapons cantonment].

(L050) Both [cease-fire monitoring and weapons cantonment].

Q12.3 Was the demobilization process accompanied by a national reintegration process involving government forces and opposing forces?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q12.4 If so, were sufficient means available for an effective reintegration process?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q12.5 If not, elaborate on the problems you experienced with this task.

(L050) [...] there is no [desire] for peace.

Q12.6 Which organizations assisted you in demobilizing (i.e., other services, international organizations, national organizations, or nongovernmental organizations)? List by order starting with most assistance to least assistance.

(L052) Sometimes ECOMOG soldiers helped [the] observers.

Q12.7 Was there a person or a branch responsible for plans for demobilization?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q12.8 If so, who or which branch was it?

(L049) Civilian.

(L050) Civilian.

XIII. DEMINING EXPERIENCES

Q13.1 Did you experience mine problems?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q13.2 If so, what did you do to counteract them?

No responses.

Q13.3 Was there an exchange of maps of minefields at the outset when the agreements were signed?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.4 If not, was it feasible to have such maps?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.5 If so, do you think there should have been an agreement for the exchange of maps at the outset as part of the agreements signed?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q13.6 If no maps were available and it was not feasible to chart the location of minefields, did you consider yourself adequately prepared to deal with the demining of haphazard minefields?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q13.7 Did your unit play a role in the demining process?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.8 Was the UN involved in demining?

No responses.

Q13.9 Was the UN interested in becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q13.10 Was the host nation involved in demining or interested in becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.11 Were local groups/militias involved in demining?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.12 Do you think local groups and militias should be encouraged to undertake demining tasks?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.13 Why?

No responses.

Q13.14 Were humanitarian organizations or private firms involved in demining?

Humanitarian Organizations:	Yes:	00	No:	01
Private Firms:	Yes:	00	No:	01

Q13.15 In your opinion, who should undertake demining processes and why?

No responses.

SECTION SIX

XIV. TRAINING

Q14.1 Prior to deployment, did your units undertake specific training programs related to disarmament operations?

Yes:	00	No:	03
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Q14.2 If so, were these training programs based on guidance from the UN forces already in the field, from the UN in general, or from your national authorities?

UN forces in field:	01	UN in general:	00
National authorities:	00	Other:	00

Q14.3 Were your units trained specifically for the collection of arms and cantonment of factions?

Yes:	00	No:	02
------	----	-----	----

Q14.4 Were you and/or your units trained in on-site inspection and observation techniques?

Yes:	02	No:	01
------	----	-----	----

Q14.5 Have you been trained in verification technologies nationally?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q14.6 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific weapons control and disarmament operations (i.e., weapons searches, inventories, elimination, etc.)?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q14.7 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demobilization operations?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q14.8 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demining operations?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q14.9 On the whole, did you consider yourself technically and tactically prepared for the accomplishment of your mission?

Technically : Yes: 02 No: 01
Tactically : Yes: 02 No: 00

Q14.10 Was there anything done at the end of the mission to gather lessons learned?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q14.11 Back in your own country, were you debriefed?

Yes: 01 No: 02

SECTION SEVEN

XV. INTERACTIONS

Given that there are three common elements to a UN mission -- the military, the humanitarian agencies, and the political branch:

Q15.1 Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?

Very good: 01 Adequate: 01 Inadequate: 02

Q15.2 If you think it could have been improved, specify three ways in which this could have been achieved.

(L051) 1) Terms of reference for each component should be on a clear-cut basis. 2) Exact numbers of people should be considered, (i.e. big numbers hamper the accomplishment of the mission).

(L052) If the people [gave] more interest to their country and [if] there is [some] confidence between the UN and observers [...].

Q15.3 How was the overall cooperation of the three elements of the UN components achieved during your mission? Summarize.

(L049) It was very active and exchanged.

(L050) Not coordinated.

(L051) There was a high level of cooperation but it was the task of each component that was inter-related that required a joint committee from the three parts to [allow for a greater degree of] coordination [among] them.

Q15.4 Did cooperation exist between the UN military, private and irregular elements, and existing police forces (UN or local)?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q15.5 If so, describe which components cooperated with whom and the level of their cooperation.

(L051) UNOMIL and UNHCR were in full cooperation but with the local authorities it was not felt.

XVI. PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

On reflection,

Q16.1 What was the overall importance of the disarmament task for the overall success of the mission?

Very important: 03 Important: 01
Not important: 00

Q16.2 What were the three major lessons you learned from your field experience?

(L049) How to deal with the factions

(L051) 1) UN operations are to be carefully studied before making a decision on starting them. 2) If the mission is to be carried out by the observers and troops, they should be under one command.

Q16.3 What other question should we have asked here and how would you have answered it?

Questions:

(L049) Was the UN mission [a success]?

(L051) Are you satisfied with the results so far achieved in your mission?

Answers:

(L049) No.

(L051) No, since we were full of hopes to help finish the conflict peacefully but unfortunately, we were not able to reach that sacred objective.

To be answered only by those who participated in completed UN/national peacekeeping missions:

Q16.4 Do you think that the disarmament-related tasks which you undertook had an impact on the national reconstruction processes which followed the end of the mission?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q16.5 If so, briefly explain how and why:

No responses.