

**Disarmament and Conflict
Resolution Project**

**Managing Arms
in Peace Processes:
Haiti**



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United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
Geneva

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Conflict Resolution Project**

**Managing Arms in Peace Processes:
Haiti**

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NOTE

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Previous DCR Project Publications

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique

Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Liberia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Psychological Operations and Intelligence

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues

Preface

Under the heading of Collective Security, UNIDIR is conducting a major project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution (DCR). The project examines the utility and modalities of disarming warring parties as an element of efforts to resolve intra-state conflicts. It collects field experiences regarding the demobilization and disarmament of warring factions; reviews 11 collective security actions where disarmament has been attempted; and examines the role that disarmament of belligerents can play in the management and resolution of internal conflicts. The 11 cases are UNPROFOR (Yugoslavia), UNOSOM and UNITAF (Somalia), UNAVEM (Angola), UNTAC (Cambodia), ONUSAL (El Salvador), ONUCA (Central America), UNTAG (Namibia), ONUMOZ (Mozambique), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNMIH (Haiti), and the 1979 Commonwealth operation in Rhodesia.

Being an autonomous institute charged with the task of undertaking independent, applied research, UNIDIR keeps a certain distance from political actors of all kinds. The impact of our publications is predicated on the independence with which we are seen to conduct our research. At the same time, being a research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR naturally relates its work to the needs of the Organization. Inspired by the Secretary-General's report on "New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era,"¹ the DCR Project also relates to a great many governments involved in peace operations through the UN or under regional auspices. Last but not least, comprehensive networks of communication and cooperation have been developed with UN personnel having field experience.

Weapons-wise, the disarmament of warring parties is mostly a matter of light weapons. These weapons account for as much as 90% of the casualties in many armed conflicts. UNIDIR recently published a paper on this subject (*Small Arms and Intra-State Conflicts*, UNIDIR Paper No. 34, 1995). The Secretary-General's appeal for stronger efforts to control small arms - to promote "micro disarmament"² - is one which UNIDIR will continue to attend to in the framework of the DCR Project.

¹ Document A/C.1/47/7, No. 31, 23 October 1992.

² Document 50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

This volume examines the UN intervention in Haiti, which constitutes a significant example of collective intervention in an internal conflict. The case study was co-authored by Sarah Meek and Marcos Mendiburu. Specifically, the authors of this volume detail the evolution of the Haitian crisis (1990-1994), outline the response of the UN to this crisis in the guise of the Multinational Force (MNF) and the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and address the role that disarmament and demobilization played in the process. The report is the seventh in a series of UNIDIR publications on the disarmament dimension of peace operations. There will be a report on each of the cases mentioned above.

The authors of the case studies have drawn on the professional advice and assistance of military officers intimately acquainted with peace operations. They were Col. Roberto Bendini (Argentina), Lt. Col. Ilkka Tiihonen (Finland) and Lt. Col. Jakkie Potgieter (South Africa). UNIDIR is grateful to all of them for their invaluable contributions to clarifying and solving the multitude of questions and problems we put before them.

I would like to thank the staff at UNIDIR who assisted in the publication process: Virginia Gamba, for leading the DCR project until the end of March 1996; Lara Bernini, Claudia Querner, Alessandra Fabrello, and Steve Tulliu, for editing this volume; and our Specialized Publications Secretary, Anita Blétry, for designing and producing the camera-ready copy.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in this report. They are that of Ms. Meek and Mr. Mendiburu. I am grateful to them for their contribution: UNIDIR has been happy to have such resourceful and dedicated collaborators.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR

Acknowledgements

The DCR Project takes this opportunity to thank the many foundations and governments who have contributed financially and with personnel to the establishment and evolution of the research associated with the Project. Among our contributors the following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centered on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action.

Before and since the Cold War, the main objective of the international community when taking action has been the maintenance and/or recovery of stability. The main difference between then and now, however, is that then, the main objective of global action was to maintain stability in the *international* arena, whereas now it is to stabilize *domestic* situations. The international community assists in stabilizing domestic situations in five different ways: by facilitating dialogue between warring parties, by preventing a renewal of internal armed conflict, by strengthening infrastructure, by improving local security, and by facilitating an electoral process intended to lead to political stability.¹

¹ James S. Sutterlin, "Military Force in the Service of Peace," *Aurora Papers*, No. 18 (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Centre for Global Security, 1993), p. 13.

The United Nations is by no means the only organization that has been requested by governments to undertake these tasks. However, the reputation of the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations' presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations such as those in Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Mozambique and Somalia. It has also been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence, such as the one in Rwanda in 1994. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilizing actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined as longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem is beginning to be recognized and acted upon by the international community. More and more organizations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict. The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders

it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and does, militarize societies in general. It also destabilizes regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.

There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who *do* focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Control of Arms during Peace Processes (CAPP)

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than long-term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important component for the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Various instruments can be used to implement weapons control. For example, instruments which may be used to support preventive diplomacy in times of crisis include confidence-building measures, weapons control agreements, and the control of illegal weapons transfers across borders.² Likewise, during conflict situations, and particularly in the early phases of a peace operation, negotiations conducive to lasting peace can be brought about by effective monitoring and the establishment of safe havens, humanitarian corridors, and disengagement sectors. Finally, after the termination of armed

² Fred Tanner, "Arms Control in Times of Conflict," Project on Rethinking Arms Control, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, PRAC Paper 7, October 1993.

conflict, a situation of stability is required for post-conflict reconstruction processes to be successful. Such stability can be facilitated by troop withdrawals, the demilitarization of border zones, and effective disarmament, demobilization and demining.

Nevertheless, problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities center on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighboring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon.

The case studies undertaken by the DCR Project highlight a number of recurrent problems that have impinged on the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations. Foremost among these are problems associated with the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment early in the mission, and problems concerned with the lack of coordination of efforts among the various groups involved in the mission. Many secondary complications would be alleviated if these two problems areas were understood differently. The establishment of a secure environment, for example, would make the warring parties more likely to agree on consensual disarmament initiatives. Likewise, a concerted effort at weapons control early in the mission would demonstrate the international community's determination to hold the parties to their original peace agreements and cease-fire arrangements. Such a

demonstration of resolve would make it more difficult for these agreements to be broken once the peace operation was underway.

The coordination problem applies both to international interactions and to the components of the peace operation. A peace process will be more likely to succeed if there is cooperation and coordination between the international effort and the nations which immediately neighbor the stricken country. But coordination must not simply be present at the international level; it must permeate the entire peace operation as well. To obtain maximum effect, relations must be coordinated among and within the civil affairs, military, and humanitarian groups which comprise a peace operation. A minimum of coordination must also be achieved between intra- and inter-state mission commands, the civil and military components at strategic, operational and tactical levels, and the humanitarian aid organizations working in the field; these components must cooperate with each other if the mission is to reach its desired outcome. If problems with mission coordination are overcome, many secondary difficulties could also be avoided, including lack of joint management, lack of unity of effort, and lack of mission and population protection mechanisms.

Given these considerations, the Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account *both* the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, *and also* the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighboring countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, *the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament program as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management program that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programs between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.*

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*; (2) the


development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the control of arms during peace processes (CAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

The first case study examined the way in which three international peace processes (UNOSOM, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II) struggled with the issue of controlling and managing light weapons in Somalia. The second volume focused on the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) in Rhodesia, the third on the complex missions in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), the fourth study looked at the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), the fifth examined the UN operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the sixth volume addressed the United Nations observer mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). This study is concerned with the combined efforts of the Multinational Force (MNF) and United Nations mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to manage the restoration of the democratically elected Aristide government in Haiti. The paper is presented with a summary of the responses regarding this mission which were obtained through the Project's own *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*.

Virginia Gamba
Project Director
Geneva, March 1996

List of Acronyms

AFSOC	Air Force Special Operations Command
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CMOC	Civil Military Operations Center
FAd'H	Forces Armées d'Haïti
FRAPH	Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haïtien
HNP	Haitian National Police
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPSF	Interim Public Security Force
MICIVIH	International Civilian Mission in Haiti
MIST	Military Intelligence Support Team
MNF	Multinational Force
OAS	Organization of American States
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PVO's	Private Voluntary Organizations
ROE's	Rules of Engagement
SF	Special Forces
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIH	United Nations Mission to Haiti
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNSC	United Nations Security Council



Part I:
Case Study

I. Introduction¹

Ever since the end of the Cold War, democracy has become a widely shared value in the world community.² Hence, the US-UN intervention in Haiti has assumed a particularly important significance in the context of recent global security and political transformations. For the first time, a collective initiative has taken place to re-establish a democratically elected regime, ousted by military leaders.

In fact, the Haitian operation constitutes an example of collective intervention in an internal conflict in the name of democratic values. As the Secretary-General of the UN, Mr. Boutros-Ghali, stated: "There have been dramatic changes in both the volume and the nature of the United Nations activities in the field...One is the fact that so many of today's conflicts are within States rather than between States."³

Many factors can explain the outbreak of the Haitian conflict. Some of them are related to Haiti's history as, for instance, the prominence of a minority that exerted power with the help of the military's complicity. Others are external, such as the US engagement in Haitian politics which began nearly a century ago as a consequence of the US interest in the Caribbean. However, this paper analyzes only the most recent and immediate causes of the crisis that started when the Haitian military toppled President Aristide. Some of the roots of this conflict can be found in a more distant past.

Consequently, this paper shall briefly, at first, describe the three-year negotiating process, with its many set backs and unfulfilled agreements. This negotiating process was accompanied by an escalation in the use of sanctions aimed at isolating the military rulers and getting them to the negotiating table. The shift from the use of coercive measures imposed by the Organization of American States (OAS) to UN sanctions, will be also examined.

¹ I am very grateful to Monica Hirst, Col. Roberto Bendini and Donald Daniel for their comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank Col. Cecil Bailey and Gen. Richard Potter for providing information on the military operation.

² For details, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative," *Global Governance*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 3-11.

³ See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations," *Document A/50/60 - S/1995/1*, 3 January 1995, p. 18.

II. Evolution of the Haitian Crisis (1990-1994)

In 1990, there were great expectations for political change in Haiti. The country became one of the last states to join the re-democratization wave of Latin America which had begun in the early eighties. In the first democratic elections in the history of Haiti, held on 16 December 1990, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected President with around 67% of the vote. It was hoped that the election would put an end to the long period of dictatorship and political instability under the Duvalier Era first, and then, for five years under five different rulers.

During his seven-month tenure, Aristide's administration made numerous enemies who conspired against the President inside and outside the island. Aristide's previous proposals to reform the armed forces and create a separate police force, as well as his decisions to punish human rights abuses and his will to fight drug-trafficking, stimulated growing opposition from the military. His differences with the upper segments of the Catholic Church (he professed many of the dogmas of liberation theology) contributed to strengthening the ties between the military and the Church. His proposal to raise the minimum wage from \$3 to \$5 angered the business sector, especially the assembly industry in Haiti. Moreover, external support for Aristide was constrained by his outspoken anti-American sentiments and his complaints against the Dominican Republic's immigration policy which affected Haitian citizens.

Once Aristide took office, he lost the backing of many members of the coalition that had supported his candidacy. The selection of close friends such as René Preval for Prime Minister and his unwillingness to accept criticism affected the ruling coalition, increasingly isolating Aristide. It is also important to mention that the political sectors supportive of Aristide were relatively weak among the Haitian community. In fact, the lowest segments of society were the ones which made up his democratic government constituency. The isolation of the President from the ruling class became even more pronounced after Aristide supporters attacked parliamentarians, including some among the ruling coalition, who refused to vote in favor of Aristide's measures.

It is in this context that the Haitian situation evolved towards its 1994 denouement. Between 1990 and 1994 three different phases to the crisis can be clearly defined: (1) the overthrow of Aristide and the OAS sanctions; (2) the increasing regional pressure and the UN's actions; and (3) the US involvement.

The first phase began with the overthrow of the constitutional President, Aristide, on 30 September 1991 by the armed forces. During this period, the OAS became the main supporter of Aristide's restoration. The diplomatic and economic

sanctions against the *de facto* government and the creation of the OAS/DEMOC Mission were the most relevant measures adopted by the regional organization.

The second phase began in December 1992 and ended in late 1993. Throughout this period, an increasing engagement of the UN was observed. After a first step in the cooperation between the OAS and the UN, with both participating in the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), the Governors Island Accord led to the creation of the UN Mission to Haiti (UNMIH).

The third phase began in early 1994 and was characterized by a major involvement of the US. On various occasions, the US attempted to break the impasse caused by the failure of the Governors Island Accord, and eventually constituted a Multinational Force (MNF) to remove the Cedras regime.

1. Implementing Regional Coercive Measures

On 30 September 1991, the Haitian military, headed by Lt.-Gen. Cedras, ousted the democratic administration of Aristide. Cedras then became the strongman of the country, and President Aristide was forced into exile, leaving the island with the help of the French Ambassador. On the same day, the Permanent Council of the OAS adopted a resolution condemning the *coup d'état* and demanding respect for the Constitution and the legitimate government.⁴ Three days later, an *ad hoc* Meeting of the OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs passed a resolution demanding the reinstatement of constitutional rule in Haiti and recommending the adoption of diplomatic and economic sanctions in order to isolate the *de facto* authorities.⁵ The OAS Ministers also decided to dispatch to Haiti a mission of eight OAS Foreign Ministers, headed by Secretary-General Baena Soares for a two-day meeting.

On 7 October 1991, the two Chambers of the Haitian Parliament nominated the aging judge Joseph Nerette as provisional President who, in turn, appointed Jean-Jacques Honorat as his Prime Minister. In the meantime, the OAS Ministers passed a second resolution, urging OAS member States to freeze the financial assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti, from which humanitarian relief was exempt.⁶ Furthermore, at the request of Aristide, a resolution authorized the constitution of a civilian mission, known as Resolution OAS/DEMOC, to re-establish and strengthen democracy in Haiti, and asked the

⁴ See OAS Document CP/RES. 567 (870/91) (30 September 1991).

⁵ See OAS Document MRE/RES. 1/91 (3 October 1991).

⁶ See OAS Document MRE/RES. 2/91 (8 October 1991).

member States of the UN to adopt the same measures. From November 1991 to February 1992 a series of negotiations between Aristide's Presidential Commission and a Haitian parliamentary delegation took place respectively in Caracas, Cartagena, Port-au-Prince and Washington, under the auspices of the OAS mediator, former Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Augusto Ramirez Ocampo.

In early 1992 Aristide and the leaders of the Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies signed the "Protocol of Washington," under the auspices of the OAS. The agreement called for the nomination of a Prime Minister, a general amnesty for the coup plotters, the preservation of the post-coup legislation, the removal of the OAS sanctions, and the restoration of President Aristide. The agreement was to be ratified by the Haitian Parliament. Aristide finally accepted René Théodore as Prime Minister but refused to grant amnesty to Cedras. For this reason the agreement was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Justice and not ratified by the Parliament.

Throughout this first phase, the UN kept a low-profile attitude *vis-à-vis* Haiti. This period coincided with the end of Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar's tenure and the election of the new UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. The UN's stance limited itself to supporting OAS efforts in defense of democracy in Haiti. On 3 October 1991, after Aristide addressed the UN Security Council (UNSC), the President of the UNSC made a statement condemning the coup, calling for the restoration of the legitimate government and supporting the efforts of the OAS. Eight days later, the General Assembly of the UN passed a resolution in which it condemned the illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti, the use of police and military violence and the violation of human rights in the country. It also urged the members of the UN to take measures in support of OAS efforts, requesting the UN Secretary-General to cooperate with the OAS Secretary-General in the implementation of the OAS resolutions.

While the negotiations between the exiled President and the illegal authorities remained interrupted, the army, the *de facto* executive power in Haiti, and the presidents of the two Chambers of Parliament signed the "Villa d' Accueil Agreement," calling for a "government of consensus." As a result, Marc Bazin was appointed new Prime Minister and took office on 19 June 1992. The *de facto* President, Joseph Nerette, then resigned according to the conditions established by the tripartite agreement. In the meantime, Aristide named a ten-member Presidential Commission to represent his government in Haiti.

In May 1992, an OAS *ad hoc* Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers passed a resolution urging its member States to adopt all necessary actions for the greater effectiveness of the measures approved against the military rule in earlier

resolutions.⁷ This new resolution requested OAS member States to deny access to port facilities to any vessel that violated the embargo, and to monitor compliance with the embargo, as well as to deny visas to perpetrators and supporters of the coup and to freeze their assets.

In July 1992, newly elected Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accepted the offer of the Secretary-General of the OAS, Joao Clemente Baena Soares, to include UN participation in a mission to Haiti. On 24 November 1992, the General Assembly adopted another resolution reaffirming its support of Aristide.

2. Increasing the International Pressure: A Mandatory and Universal Embargo

By the end of December 1992, Boutros-Ghali appointed a Special Envoy for Haiti, Dante Caputo, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, who also became the OAS Special Representative one month later. Caputo held a series of consultations in Washington with Aristide; and with the members of the Presidential Commission, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces, with the *de facto* Prime Minister, and with the leaders of the two Chambers of Parliament in Port-au-Prince to pave the way for Aristide's return to power.

In January 1993, Aristide sent a letter to the UN and another to the OAS Secretary-Generals, requesting the following: (a) the deployment by the UN and OAS of an international civilian mission to monitor respect for human rights and the elimination of all forms of violence in Haiti; and (b) the initiation of a process of dialogue among all Haitian parties, under the auspices of the Special Envoy, in order to reach an agreement to solve the political crisis. The *de facto* government accepted both requests and MICIVIH was established in March 1993.⁸ In the meantime, further consultations were held by Caputo with the UN and OAS Secretary-Generals concerning the mandate and implementation of the MICIVIH. The UN component of the Mission would comprise some 200 international staff members, including 133 human rights observers. The OAS would provide another 133 international observers, plus other required personnel for its component.

The OAS sanctions were not effective in isolating the Cedras regime which continued to obstruct all pro-democratic initiatives. By the end of 1992, the OAS had lost the power of initiative *vis-a-vis* the UN in solving the Haitian crisis, and the UN assumed diplomatic and coercive measures. As the negotiating process

⁷ See OAS Document MRE/RES. 3/92 (17 May 1992).

⁸ See Document A/RES/47/20 B (20 April 1993).

undertaken by Dante Caputo was completely boycotted by the military, the UN decided to increase the pressure on the regime by tightening the embargo.

On 8 June 1993, the *de facto* Prime Minister Marc Bazin, a World Bank official with several US supporters, resigned. A week later, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, unanimously adopted Resolution 841, creating universal and mandatory sanctions on Haiti.⁹ According to this Resolution, the UN imposed on Haiti an oil and arms embargo. The President of the UNSC justified the measure with the unique and exceptional situation in Haiti, remarking that this measure should not be regarded as a precedent. Two days before the sanctions were enforced, Lt.-Gen. Cedras agreed to initiate a dialogue with President Aristide. A delegation headed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Haitian Armed Forces left the country to begin negotiations in New York.

The negotiations were held on Governors Island in New York City Harbor in order to avoid massive demonstrations of Haitian-Americans at the UN. After almost a week of talks, overseen by Dante Caputo, the delegations of Aristide and Cedras reached an agreement. The ten-point agreement, best-known as the "Governors Island Accord," was signed on 3 July 1993 by Aristide and Cedras and called for the selection of a Prime Minister by President Aristide; defined a series of reforms under the UN supervision affecting the Parliament, the police and the army; promised a general amnesty for the coup plotters and coup supporters; and anticipated the voluntary retirement of Cedras at some point prior to Aristide's return, at the end of October.¹⁰ After the legally-reconstituted Parliament ratified the appointment of the new Prime Minister, Robert Malval, the UNSC, in accordance with the Governors Island Agreement, suspended the sanctions to facilitate a peaceful transition.

Meanwhile, the UNSC passed Resolution 867, authorizing the establishment and immediate dispatch of UNMIH for a period of six months to assist in modernizing the Haitian armed forces and establishing the new police force indicated in the Agreement.¹¹ UNMIH would comprise 567 police monitors and a military construction unit with a strength of approximately 700 men, as well as 60 military trainers.

⁹ See Document S/RES/841 (16 June 1993).

¹⁰ See Document A/47/975 - S/26063, The Governors Island Agreement, New York (3 July 1993).

¹¹ See Document S/RES/867 (23 September 1993). The military component would be provided by Argentina, Canada and the US while the police personnel would be provided by Algeria, Austria, Canada, France, Indonesia, Madagascar, Russia, Senegal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia and Venezuela.

Contrary to general international expectations, the Governors Island Accord was torpedoed by the Haitian military and by the *de facto* authorities. When the ship, the *USS Harlan County*, carrying personnel of the UNMIH military contingent arrived in Port-au-Prince on 11 October 1993, armed civilians from the *Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haïtien* (FRAPH) reacted with violent disturbances in the seaport and prevented the ship from casting anchor. The FRAPH supporters threatened local and international press professionals and diplomats that were waiting for the UN troops at the harbor. After this incident, the *USS Harlan County* was requested to return to the naval base of Guantanamo under the US administration.

In the following days, the majority of the UNMIH and MICIVIH personnel, as well as diplomats and international agencies' staff left the country in the midst of a growing wave of violence. At that stage, the return to power of Aristide appeared to be almost impossible. The agreement was not fulfilled, and as a consequence, on 15 October 1993, the UNSC reimposed the embargo in accordance with Resolution 873.

3. Authorizing the "Use of All Necessary Means": An Armed Intervention

During the first months of 1994, the Clinton administration became more actively involved as various initiatives were launched to break the impasse of the Haiti crisis. At this point, pro-democratic initiatives began to originate more in the White House than in the UN Headquarters. The International Conference on Haiti, held in Miami in mid-January, with Aristide's presence together with many Haitian parliamentarians, is an illustrative case of the American initiative. The "Parliamentarians' Plan" (19 February 1994), calling for a "broad" coalition government composed of representatives from all Haitian parties,¹² and the Gore Plan (24 March 1994), both rejected by President Aristide, were planned in Washington.

The migration flows became the salient issue for the Clinton administration, to the extent of altering Clinton's policy toward Haiti. The more the refugee flows increased, the more the US got involved. In order to stem the flow of refugees toward Florida, the US requested Western countries and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to cooperate in the resettlement of Haitian

¹² See Document S/1994/203, Letter from a delegation of Haitian Parliamentarians addressed to the Secretary-General (19 February 1994).

refugees. President Clinton urged the Haitian population to apply for refugee status at US offices or refugee processing centers within Haiti, as the safest way of seeking refuge. At the same time, off-shore processing centers were opened for people who were interdicted at sea in Jamaica (1 June 1994) and on the Turks and Caicos Islands (3 June 1994). By mid-1994, the refugee problem had become unmanageable and threatened to overwhelm the US. In addition to the Haitians, Cuban refugees were arriving in large numbers in late August and early September 1994. The US government feared that the refugee crisis could have an impact on the US mid-term elections of November 1994.

In Haiti on 11 April 1994, the *de facto* Parliament appointed the Supreme Court President, Judge Emile Jonaissant, as the new President of the country. Jonaissant requested MICIVIH to end its activities and leave the island. The MICIVIH staff was immediately evacuated. At the same time, the human rights conditions continued to deteriorate: there were arbitrary arrests, rapes, and disappearances, as well as beatings, and other forms of torture. Within the context of the escalation of human rights violations, the refugee flow, and the expulsion of the MICIVIH staff, the UNSC passed Resolution 940 authorizing the constitution of a multinational force to remove the Cedras regime. The UNSC recognized that the "unique character" of Haiti's situation and its "deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature" required an "exceptional response."¹³

Unlike previous decisions regarding the Haitian crisis Resolution 940 did not receive the unanimous approval within the UNSC for its adoption. Whereas out of the 15 members, 12 of them voted for the resolution, Brazil and China abstained.¹⁴ At the same time, the authorization of the use of force to restore democracy led to an important debate among the Western Hemisphere countries. Several States requested the President of the UNSC that they be invited to participate as observers in the UNSC discussions regarding the draft resolution, authorizing the use of military force in Haiti. Many Latin American countries favored diplomatic efforts or the use of economic sanctions. States such as Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela opposed the intervention, arguing that the *de facto* government in Haiti did not threaten the international peace and security, in accordance with article 42 of the UN Charter, and that the use of force was not the most appropriate means to reinstate democracy. On the other hand, Argentina, Canada and the Caribbean,

¹³ See Document S/RES/940 (31 July 1994).

¹⁴ The following member states voted for the Resolution 940: Argentina, the Czech Republic, Djibouti, France, New Zealand, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the US. Rwanda was absent.

together with Haiti and the US, supported a multilateral military intervention. The Haitian representative stated that the resolution did not violate the principle of national sovereignty, because the *de facto* authorities did not represent the will of the people. Further, the principles of national sovereignty and of self-determination were complementary. The US representative argued that there had been enough time for a peaceful settlement, pointing to the rejection by the US administration of the idea of a military intervention several months before, but that the international community's patience had run thin since the Cedras regime had reaffirmed its unwillingness to cooperate with the UN. In accordance to this approach, the US Permanent Representative before the UNSC, Mrs. Madeleine Albright stated the following:

This Council has pursued patiently a peaceful and just end to the Haitian crisis. The Organization of American States has pursued a parallel effort. Member states, including my own, have taken steps independently to encourage the illegitimate leaders to leave. Together, we -the international community- have tried condemnation, persuasion, isolation and negotiation. At Governors Island, we helped broker an agreement that the military's leader signed but refused to implement. We have imposed sanctions, suspended them and strengthened them. We have provided every opportunity for the *de facto* leaders in Haiti to meet their obligations. But patience is an exhaustible commodity...The *status quo* in Haiti is neither tenable nor acceptable.¹⁵

On the other side, the Chinese Permanent Representative considered that there was still room to explore other peaceful means. Brazil's abstention was justified on the ground that there had been a lack of consensus among Latin American and Caribbean countries represented by Brazil in the UNSC.

¹⁵ See Document S/PV.3413 (31 July 1994), p. 12.

III. The Military Intervention in Haiti¹⁶

This section focuses on the moments prior to the US-led intervention and to the last-minute diplomacy that led to the Port-au-Prince agreement. It also examines the mandates of the MNF and the UNMIH which provide the international legal authority. Finally, it includes a brief description of the US doctrine for peace operations and the tasks carried out by the US-led military coalition during the seven-month occupation.

1. Towards the Intervention

Together with the lack of unanimous approval of Resolution 940 among the UNSC members, disagreement also existed among different agencies of the US government over an American military intervention to Haiti. An important debate divided the Clinton administration during August between the Defense Department, on one side, and the State Department, on the other.¹⁷ The Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and a large part of the US military wanted to avoid an invasion and were willing to offer a comfortable exile to the military leaders once they had stepped down. According to the Pentagon's plan, the US would arrange the departure of the three strongmen of Haiti (Raoul Cedras, Philippe Biamby and Michel François), helping them recover their assets from frozen bank accounts and keep their properties. The US would also guarantee that the coup plotters would not be prosecuted either in Haiti or abroad.

On the other hand, US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, favored an early intervention. Talbott, who emerged as the State Department's chief policymaker on Haiti, considered the Pentagon's plan morally repugnant. He supported the idea of delivering an ultimatum to the Cedras regime to leave power or risk an invasion without offering any incentive for their departure. These two stances were to coexist in the Democratic administration until the very last moment. While the US organized a MNF and delivered an ultimatum to the Haitian military leaders, Clinton sent a US delegation to convince the Cedras regime to relinquish power.

¹⁶ In this section, the concept "intervention" is used with a more strict meaning and refers to the presence of foreign military forces in the territory of another state.

¹⁷ See Elaine Sciolino, "Top US Officials are Divided in the Debate on Invading Haiti to Remove Junta," *The New York Times*, 4 August 1994, p. 1.

As the US-UN collective intervention was being carried out in mid-September, the US tried to convince many countries to collaborate toward the constitution of a multinational force. Yet various governments refused to send troops to participate in a military operation to remove the Cedras regime from power. They agreed, however, to participate in the "peacekeeping stage" of the operation, in which international police monitors would train the new Haitian civilian police force and help guarantee public order. Thus, the multinational force sent to Haiti was only composed of US and Caribbean soldiers.¹⁸ A meeting between the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states and representatives of the US government had already been held in Kingston, Jamaica, on 30 August 1994 to coordinate the participation in the MNF.

As President Clinton delivered an ultimatum on 15 July 1994, demanding that the Cedras regime step down, Washington made one last attempt to make peace with the regime. Even though various polls indicated that an intervention would be very unpopular with the American population, the US President addressed the nation to explain the reasons for the imminent intervention. In face of the absence of a response from the *de facto* authorities, the US administration sent a mission to Port-au-Prince led by American former President Carter, joined by Senator Sam Nunn and Gen. Colin Powell. They were critical of an intervention and hoped for an agreement between the US delegation and the *de facto* authorities which was finally reached on 18 September 1994. This last minute agreement altered the original strategy and permitted a peaceful disembarking in Haiti of the multinational force led by US Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton. Jimmy Carter prevented an invasion and the multinational force was invited to enter Haiti without resistance opposing it. Thus the international "intervasion" had begun. Under the new political and military conditions created by the US-UN intervention, and after a three-year exile, President Aristide could return to Haiti.

2. The Port-au-Prince Agreement

The text of the Port-au-Prince agreement was considered very vague. This did not however create a problem for the US administration because the presence of American troops in Haiti left the Haitian armed forces little power, allowing US officials to interpret the terms of the agreement according to their will. The

¹⁸ The MNF was made up of the US (20,00), Bangladesh (1,250), Guatemala (125), Nepal (860), CARICOM I (260) and CARICOM II (250). CARICOM I and CARICOM II consisted of the following countries: Antigua/Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago.

agreement established that, "In order to contribute to the success of the agreement, certain military officers of the Haitian armed forces are willing to consent to an early and honorable retirement in accordance with UN resolution 917 and 940 when a general amnesty will be voted into law by the Haitian Parliament, or October 15, 1994, whichever is earlier."¹⁹

The Port-au-Prince Agreement included the stepping-down of the military *junta* and a peaceful deployment of the American troops. The three military leaders were to leave power, after an amnesty law had been approved, or before 15 October 1994, and President Aristide would return to Haiti once the *de facto* authorities had abandoned office.

To implement this agreement, the Haitian military and police forces would work in close cooperation with the US military mission. The activities of the MNF would be coordinated with the Haitian military high command. The embargo and the other sanctions would also be lifted.

There were significant differences between the first and the second agreement. The Governors Island Accord had been signed by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the chief commander of the Haitian armed forces, Raoul Cedras, under the auspices of the two international organizations. The second was signed by former American President Carter and Lt.-Gen. Cedras, without the consent of President Aristide or the Special Envoy of the UN/OAS Secretary-Generals for Haiti, Dante Caputo.²⁰

President Clinton and Gen. Cedras each had their own reasons for reaching an agreement. On the US side, the US administration feared that potential US casualties could embarrass President Clinton and the Democratic Party before the mid-term elections in November. Cedras' position within the Haitian military had deteriorated to such a degree that he had no choice but to resign and go into exile. His lack of field experience and contact with the troops reduced the support he received from the *Forces Armées d'Haïti* (FAd'H). Unlike François Michel, Cedras had always been perceived as a bureaucrat, serving either at the military academy or at headquarters. Many high-ranking military officers also blamed Cedras for misjudging the situation to the point that an invasion seemed imminent. The officers particularly resented his decision not to have had Father Aristide killed during the military coup in September 1991, allowing the deposed President to go

¹⁹ See The Port-au-Prince Agreement, Port-au-Prince, (18 September 1994).

²⁰ The UN/OAS Special Envoy for Haiti, Dante Caputo was neither consulted nor informed by the US about the deal between the Carter Mission and the dictatorial rule, forcing him to resign and to be replaced by the former Minister of Algeria, Brahimi Lakdhar. Indeed, in the last months before the collective intervention, the US initiatives to reach an agreement could be considered as a parallel diplomacy to Caputo's efforts.

into exile and obtain international support for his restoration. General Cedras' authority had also been eroded by the military's lack of professionalism and cohesion.

3. The Mandate

Resolution 940 of the UNSC previewed two phases in the international efforts to restore democracy in Haiti. The first phase, under the responsibility of the US-led multinational force, would last from September 1994 until March 1995. The second phase, in charge of the UNMIH, would begin in April 1995 and is scheduled to end in May 1996.

Regarding the first phase, the UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized member States to constitute a multinational force. This force was allowed to "use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti."²¹ Besides the removal of the illegal authorities, the multinational force would "establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that [would] permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement."

The UNSC also approved the establishment of "an advance team of UNMIH, of not more than sixty personnel, including a group of observers to establish the appropriate means of coordination with the multinational force, to carry out the monitoring of the operations of the multinational force and other functions (such as) to assess requirements and to prepare for the deployment of UNMIH upon completion of the mission of the multinational force."

With respect to the transfer of authority from the MNF to the UNMIH, the MNF withdrawal and the UNMIH deployment would occur "when a secure and stable environment had been established and UNMIH had adequate force capability and structure to assume its functions. The date of the transfer from the MNF to UNMIH would be adopted by the Security Council, taking into account recommendations from the member States of the MNF, which would be based on the assessment of the multinational force commander and from the Secretary General."

The terms of the mandate of UNMIH being under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, are different and involve the following three main tasks: (a) to sustain the secure and stable environment established during the MNF phase and protect

²¹ See Document S/RES/940 (31 July 1994).

international personnel and key installations; (b) to professionalize the Haitian armed forces and create a separate police force; and (c) to assist in providing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections and monitored by the UN, in cooperation with the OAS. To this end, the UNSC agreed on an increase of the number of UNMIH troops to 6,000.

4. The US Doctrine for Peace Operations

The US-UN intervention in Haiti, especially the planning and evolution of the MNF intervention, took place in the midst of a major debate concerning US participation in UN peace operations. The operation in Somalia forced a new approach onto US involvement in multilateral peace missions. The Somalia incident had a big impact on military thinking in the White House and led the US to adopt clearer rules for American participation in UN peace operations. It also encouraged the armed forces to develop new doctrines and tactics.

The US-led intervention in Haiti was preceded by President Clinton's review of the US policy concerning multilateral peace operations. This review that resulted in the Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) which contains the criteria to be applied by the White House in deciding whether and how to support UN peace missions. According to this document, the US considers the disruption of a democratic process a reason to support the establishment of a multilateral peace operation. Three causes are mentioned as generating a threat to, or a breach in international peace and security: (a) an international aggression, (b) an urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence and (c) a sudden interruption of an established democracy or gross human rights abuses coupled with violence or the threat of violence.

PDD-25 enumerates a list of issues to be taken into account before any US engagement in multilateral peace operations. PDD 25 sets the conditions for the participation in UN peace operations as follows: an acceptable command and control, a clear mandate and objectives, and an exit date. The command of the US troops has been a key issue regarding its involvement in this kind of operations and the document restates the US policy of American command for the US troops. A mandate with clear objectives and a timetable for the withdrawal of the forces are other issues that need be considered by the US, prior to any decision regarding a possible American involvement.

Apart from the command of the American troops, the US military doctrine emphasizes the level of the use of force and force protection. The use of overwhelming force to guarantee victory is a prerequisite of the US military since the presence of such force tends to diminish the confidence of a would-be

aggressor. Force protection is related to the minimal loss of personnel and represents a major concern for US political and military officials due to the impact on the public opinion.

5. Operation "Uphold Democracy"

The arrangement reached by Cedras-Jonaissant and the Carter mission allowed the US-led military coalition to enter Haiti without bloodshed and violence. Upon his arrival in Haiti on 19 September 1994, Lt. Gen. Hugh Shelton, the Commander of the multinational force, also known as the Combined Joint Task Force-180, coordinated the entry of the force with Haiti's military leaders. A battalion task force of the US 10th Mountain Division was the first to arrive in Port-au-Prince. The immediate goals were the protection of the airport and seaport of the capital. By the end of the first day, after these two key transportation facilities were under control, additional forces, totalling approximately 3,000 soldiers, entered Haiti.

Throughout the intervention, the rules of engagement (ROE's) were designed to allow a maximum flexibility to act.²² The ROE's were written by the MNF and

²² ROE's are directives issued by a competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations within which force may be applied to achieve a mission or an objective. In the case of a UN conducted operation, it is the responsibility of the UN to set the parameters within which UN forces will operate. ROE's are the means by which the UN can provide commanders, at all levels, with specific guidance on the use of force by UN personnel. ROE's are drafted by the Force Commander, but are approved by the UN and may only be changed with UN authority. The right of self-defense is recognized under ROE's of UN operations at all times. A summary of the MNF ROE's includes: (a) all necessary and appropriate action for self-defense are authorized; (b) no forces have been declared hostile; (c) persons may be stopped and detained if they appear to threaten essential civic order; (d) necessary and proportional force is authorized to control civilian disturbances; (e) persons observed committing serious criminal acts may be detained using force (serious criminal acts include homicide, aggravated assault, rape, arson and robbery); (f) civilian vehicles may be stopped and their occupants identities checked for security purposes. Vehicles not stopping on order may be disabled by weapons fire; (g) deadly force is not authorized to disarm Haitians, enforce curfews, or stop looting, unless those individuals involved engage in hostile acts or demonstrate hostile intent.

A summary of UNMIH ROE's includes: (a) use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized to defend oneself and other UNMIH military or civilian personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent; (b) use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized to defend international personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent; (c) interventions to prevent death or grievous bodily harm at the hands of a hostile group, will only be authorized by the Force Commander in order to defend the mandate of the mission; (d) use of force, up to and including

the Atlantic Command, and approved by the UN. The ROE's for the MNF in Haiti provided authority for the use of any necessary force. The original ROE's went through several changes after violent acts required the MNF involvement. To this end, the ROE's were modified to allow the use of deadly force to prevent people from committing serious criminal acts. Serious criminal acts were defined as homicide, aggravated assault, arson, rape and robbery. The MNF could also prevent people from committing less serious acts, such as burglary, larceny, etc., but in these cases the MNF was limited to the use of non-lethal force.

On the next day following the intervention, US marines entered the city of Cap Haïtien without meeting any resistance and subsequently expanded their activities to the countryside with the deployment of Special Forces (SF) units. The SF, which usually ensure the advance ground work before the regular troops' arrival, were responsible for checking 27 towns in the first week while the US military was initially concentrated exclusively in the capital and Cap Haïtien, the two largest cities. Working in groups of about a dozen, the SF units met with town leaders and Haitian military officials to inform them exactly on what the troops would do, once they had reached their towns. The US Coast Guard provided resources to enable the multinational force to reach areas which were not accessible by land.

Major units of the US-led coalition included the command ship *Mount Whitney*, the aircraft carriers *Eisenhower* and *America*, elements of the 82nd Airborne Division, the 10th Mountain Division, the 2nd Marine Regiment, the Air Mobility Command and the Air Combat Command. The Task Force also included a Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC), whose 190 staff members coordinated civilian and military activities in Haiti.. The CMOC helped US AID and the private voluntary organizations (PVO's) to provide humanitarian assistance.

By the end of October 1994, at the request of US Ambassador in Haiti, W. Lacy Swing, 37 Civil Affairs Reservists were deployed in the Caribbean nation to work in different cabinet offices. Their task consisted of assisting the Haitian government to lay down the basic functions of its civil administration.

During the first week of operations, the MNF took several steps to create a secure and stable environment to enable the full implementation of Resolution 940. Firstly, the force took control of the headquarters of the heavy weapons company of the Haitian armed forces (Camp d' Application); secondly, it initiated a weapons

deadly force, is authorized to protect key installations which have been designated by the Force Commander; (e) search, apprehension, and disarmament is authorized when acting in self-defense, or to enforce other rules of engagement.

control program that included a buy-back program designed to rid the streets of as many illegally-held weapons as possible; and, finally, it conducted mobile patrols and monitored the activities of the Haitian police.

A number of civilian programs were launched to prevent potential causes of unrest among the local people. Several psychological operations took place to prevent popular incidents and to obtain support for the MNF. The military coalition also began to provide humanitarian assistance in Port-au-Prince and other areas, through setting up basic services such as water purification, medical care, food programs, etc. The MNF refused, however, to get involved in nation-building operations in Haiti. As President Clinton stated, the international community would collaborate with the Haitian government to rebuild the national economy.

The US military had carried out psychological operations even before the landing of the MNF. A US Air National Guard unit had carried out daily radio broadcasts to the Haitians, using specialized Lockheed C-130 Hercules communications aircraft. The 193rd Special Operations Group, based at Harrisburgh, a unit of the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), had flown several EC-130E Commando Solo aircraft from the US naval base at Roosevelt Roads, in Puerto Rico. The aircraft, initially, broadcasted radio messages, urging Haitians to use local emigration centers instead of fleeing the country in precarious boats. Then, from 18 July 1994 onwards Radio Democracy began, which included a taped message from exiled President Aristide. Airborne broadcasts were chosen by the Pentagon, because Haiti's mountainous topography would have prevented ground or sea-based radio transmissions from reaching large segments of the country.

On 29 September 1994, the UNSC passed Resolution 944 for the lifting of sanctions imposed on Haiti by Resolutions 841 (1993), 873 (1993) and 917 (1994). This measure was to be implemented the day after Aristide's return to Haiti.

With respect to the normalization of the institutions, the Parliament reconvened a couple of weeks after the arrival of the MNF. The approval of an amnesty bill authorizing President Aristide to grant amnesty to those who had seized power in the 1991-coup was the first issue on the Parliament's agenda. At the same time, the legitimate Mayor of Port-au-Prince returned to power. On 15 October 1994, after the departure of the military *junta*, President Aristide resumed office, while Prime Minister Michel and his cabinet took office on 9 November 1994.

The number of US soldiers involved in the MNF fluctuated, with a peak of approximately 20,000. This number progressively declined. The Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) deployments in various locations outside Port-au-Prince, the presence of other foreign military forces, and the addition of contracted security

personnel in Port-au-Prince allowed a reduction of the US contingent's level. By late November 1994, the MNF numbered about 10,500, half of the initial forces; of which 4,000 were US troops.

A Bangladeshi battalion, consisting of 1,035 soldiers, assumed security missions for the Port-au-Prince airfield, Fort Dimanche, the Haitian Sugar Company and Camp d' Application, replacing the US forces. The Guatemalan contingent was deployed in Cap Haïtien and was immediately integrated into security operations taking over the port security and conducting patrols. The CARICOM battalion comprised 266 troops from Jamaica, Barbados, Belize and Trinidad and Tobago. The CARICOM contingent maintained order at the capital's port and supervised the repatriation of Haitians from the US Guantanamo base. These troops had been trained at the US naval base at Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico.

Regarding the electoral timetable, legislative elections were to be held on 4 June 1995 when all 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 18 of 27 Senate seats would be contested together with approximately 2,200 state and local positions.

The MNF operated under three different US force commanders. General Shelton, who headed the deployment of the MNF in Haiti, was succeeded by Major General Meade, then replaced by Major General Fisher.²³ Following the withdrawal of the MNF, General Kinzer was appointed UNMIH force commander.²⁴

²³ Gen. Shelton ended his duties on 25 October 1994 and Major Gen. Meade left Haiti on 15 January 1995.

²⁴ Major Gen. Kinzer was former chief of Army operations at the Pentagon and had previously served abroad in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and Panama (1989).

IV. The Disarmament

Neither the Governors Island Accord nor the Port-au-Prince Agreement contained a mandate for the disarmament of factions in Haiti. The MNF derived its disarmament mandate from Resolution 940, which called for the use "of all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement."²⁵

Under the command of US General Shelton, the MNF took responsibility for the following disarmament activities: the disarming of the FAd'H; a voluntary weapons collection program (gun buy-back); the confiscation of weapons found in vehicles during routine stops, disarmament of attachés;²⁶ and the seizure of weapons caches. The disarmament mandate of the MNF, such as it was, never extended to the general disarmament of the citizenry,²⁷ although weapons were collected from them in an attempt to establish a secure and stable environment.

1. Establishment of a Secure and Stable Environment

The primary concern of the MNF following its deployment in Haiti was the maintenance of civil order. The Americans feared a wave of assassinations and reprisals between Aristide supporters and paramilitary groups that could deteriorate the situation and force the US military to take over the administration of public order, as had occurred in Panama and Somalia. As one American official noted, "the issue has never been the invasion. The issue is disorder after the invasion."²⁸

²⁵ See Document SC/RES/ 940, operative paragraph 4.

²⁶ Note that permission was given to the MNF to disarm the attachés, however, the MNF was under no obligation to do so.

²⁷ See United Nations institute for Disarmament Research, "Analysis Report of Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peace-keeping Operations: Haiti," in Sarah Meek and Marcos Mendiburu, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Haiti*, Geneva: United Nations, 1996, questionnaire number H070.

²⁸ Eric Schmitt and Michael Gordon, "Looking Beyond An Invasion, U.S. Plans Haiti Police Force," *The New York Times*, 10 September 1994, p. 1.

The US troops had the primary responsibility of restoring basic civil order, as part of the mandate to establish a secure and stable environment. However, they were opposed to performing police functions in Haiti. Instead the Interim Police Security Force (IPSF) was created. To prevent the looting and chaos that followed the US invasion of Panama in December 1989, the Port-au-Prince Agreement allowed Cedras to remain in office until mid-October. This helped promote an orderly transition of power and prevented a vacuum of authority prior to the return of Aristide.

The MNF forces quickly deployed to multiple sites around the country to provide security. Prior to the creation of the Haitian National Police (HNP) the US set up the IPSF to guarantee public order. The members of the IPSF were former military officers with clean records and Haitian residing abroad, including refugees at the Guantanamo naval base in Cuba. Some of these people worked as interpreters and guides for American troops. Members of President Aristide's government and US State Department officials chose the recruits based on the results of a literacy test and a personal interview. The recruits received six days of training in ethics, Haitian criminal law, community relations, and basic skills, such as traffic control. By December 1994, 2,900 men had graduated from the introductory course and had been incorporated as members of the IPSF. The activities of the IPSF were closely monitored by international police observers.

The international police observers were police officers from various countries who were under the direction of Raymond W. Kelly, a former New York City police commissioner. The training of the international police monitors began on 26 September 1994 at Camp Santiago, Puerto Rico.

During the same period, the government of Haiti, assisted by the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the US Department of Justice, began training civilian applicants to the new police force. ICITAP also conducted the training of judges and lawyers in rural areas.

While the US did not participate in police functions, during the same period the MNF and US special forces were deployed around the country to increase security and assist in activities to develop the local infrastructure.

MNF forces were deployed in the capital city of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien. From these bases, the MNF expanded into the outlying areas, including larger cities, towns and villages. The MNF undertook patrols in the cities and market places in an effort to increase security and public safety. From these positions, the MNF was in a good position to begin its disarmament activities.

Within three days of arriving in Haiti, the MNF met with General Cédras and Lt. Col. François to set conditions for the MNF's mission. The MNF gained control of 14 areas within the city, including the control of the heavy weapons of

the Haitian armed forces from Camp d'Application. Soon after the weapons kept at the police station of Lt. Col. François were under MNF control. With the departure of General Cédras and Lt. Col. François, and the return of President Aristide, the Haitian armed forces quickly collapsed, and the MNF collected weapons from other locations. At the time of the intervention, the FAd'H was estimated to have a standing force of 6,000 with perhaps 1,000 deployable persons.²⁹ In January 1995 President Aristide dismissed 43 senior officers, and others were sent to diplomatic posts abroad, while most of the troops melted away.³⁰ There are an estimated 1,500 army troops currently, but there is virtually no officers corps, rendering the army unable to operate in any but the most rudimentary manner.³¹

The collection of weapons from the FRAPH proved more difficult. It is widely assumed that many weapons were hidden from the MNF and remain the hands of former FRAPH members.³² The emphasis for the MNF was on collecting large crew-served weapons, and weapons being carried on the street, as these were thought to pose the most immediate threat to public safety. The MNF was under no obligation to disarm the FRAPH, and chose not to take action against those not currently committing crimes. This "don't see, don't disarm" policy and the decision not to undertake the wide-scale disarmament created friction between the MNF and Haitian citizens, and lessened public support for the MNF. It has also raised concern among Haitians that following the departure of UNMIH in 1996, these weapons may resurface.

While the disarmament of the population was not part of the mandate of the MNF, they did implement a voluntary weapons collection program, known as a gun buy-back program to encourage Haitians to get rid of weapons in their homes.

²⁹ Georges A. Fauriol, *Haitian Frustrations: Dilemmas for U.S. Policy*, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995, p. 152.

³⁰ The retraining program for the FAd'H will be discussed later.

³¹ See Georges A. Fauriol, p. 155.

³² Allan Nairn, "Haiti Under the Gun," *The Nation*, 8/15 January 1996, pp. 11-15.

2. The Gun Buy-Back Program³³

The gun buy-back program was a means of collecting weapons from Haitian citizens. Similar programs have been conducted by the US, including one in Panama. The funding for the program was provided by the US Department of Defense.

The US Army conducted the gun buy-back program as a part of its mandate as a member of the Multinational Force. The US Army set up several fixed sites in Haiti, and initially operated several mobile sites.³⁴ Each site was protected by US troops. Weapons were collected under conditions of amnesty. Questions were asked only to determine whether or not the visitor had been to the collection point before and if the weapon belonged to the person turning it in. Weapons were not tested, but were inspected for a firing pin. Any weapon deemed non-functional was confiscated without remuneration. Cash was paid for functional weapons.

The program was run in phases, each approximately two months in duration. During the period September 1994 through March 1995, 13,281 weapons and munitions were bought. As of January 1995 the total paid for weapons collected through the buy-back program was US \$1,924,950.

The mobile sites were discontinued when turn-out began to wane. By September 1995 there was a single site still in operation, at the airport in Port-au-Prince.

As of September 1995 the prices being paid for weapons were: US \$100 for handguns; US \$200 for semi-automatic weapons and grenades; US \$400 for fully automatic weapons; and US \$600 for heavy- and large-caliber weapons. These prices were revised during the course of the program. Initially the prices were lower than the black market price for weapons, and turn-out was low. These prices were increased so that by January 1995 the prices for the weapons had been double the September prices.

³³ This section draws on work done by Neil O'Connor a researcher at the Program for Arms Control, Disarmament and Conversion at the Monterey Institute of International Studies during a visit to Haiti in September 1995, published in Edward J Laurance, *The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferation and Buildup of Small Arms and Light Weapons*, Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, September 1996.

³⁴ Mobile sites included Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, and Les Cayes. For more information see, Dr. Hal Kelpak, "Haiti Takes its Next Step," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 13 May 1995, pp. 1920.

Types of weapons bought-back included: machine guns, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, rifles, shotguns, handguns, pistols, flare guns, mortars, howitzers, high explosives, and CS (tear-gas) grenades.

Many of the weapons collected were in poor condition. Modern weapons in good condition were passed to the U.S. Department of Justice International ICITAP program for use by the Haitian police. Weapons with historical value were set aside as museum pieces. The remainder of the weapons were inventoried, boxed and shipped to Pennsylvania, USA to be melted down at a destruction facility or were destroyed in Haiti.

The goals of the program were to reduce the number of weapons, promote stability and provide monetary incentives to Haitian citizens who supported the program. The U.S. Army stated that these goals were achieved, and that the gun buy-back program helped to create a safe and secure environment to hand over to UNMIH in March 1995.

The program was continued by the US after the transition to UNMIH, but had been stopped by the time the US withdrew its forces from Haiti in February 1996.

3. Other Disarmament Activities

In addition to the more formal disarmament tasks of gaining control of FAd'H weapons and the gun buy-back program, other disarmament activities were conducted by the MNF.

As part of its larger goal of ensuring a secure and stable environment members of the MNF operated checkpoints on main roads and searched people and vehicles for weapons. The MNF also searched police stations in Port-au-Prince, seizing all weapons other than hand pistols. In searches of the police stations and prisons, the MNF collected 2,010 weapons.³⁵ The MNF also secured control over weapons turned by the demobilized soldiers of the FAd'H. Reports of arms caches were often given to MNF forces. These were followed up if the informant was a reliable source or if the information could be verified.

As the Haitian Constitution permits the maintenance of arms in houses for personal safety, house-to-house searches were not implemented. Rather, word was put out that weapons kept in the home were safe, while those carried on the streets were subject to confiscation.

The disarmament activities carried out by the MNF were largely *ad hoc*, in that they were not explicitly part of the mandate under which the MNF was

³⁵ Report of the Secretary-General, S/1995/149 (21 February 1995), paragraph 10.

operating. However, the US commander drew on past experience and implemented a variety of disarmament programs aimed at gaining control of the heavy weapons in Haiti and reducing the number of weapons being carried on the streets.

The MNF did not engage in policing functions, and sought to get Haitian officials to use existing gun-control laws to reduce the weapons in circulation. The aim in reducing the number of weapons on the street was a "sensitive and gradual approach to disarming Haitians not supposed to have weapons."³⁶ As one US official stated the US wanted to "constantly tighten it down, so that the conditions are there not for a disarmed society but a society that frankly has less and less capability for violence."³⁷

4. Disarmament during UNMIH

Following the establishment of a secure and stable environment in Haiti by the MNF, on 31 March 1995, the operation was transferred to UNMIH. As UNMIH was operating under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the use of force was only for self-defense purposes. The mandate of UNMIH was to maintain the secure and stable environment that the MNF had created. There was no disarmament function to UNMIH's mandate.

V. Demobilization

As part of reducing the influence of the Haitian armed forces in political and daily life, a demobilization program was implemented. Under the program, members of FAd'H were to be reintegrated into civilian life once they had registered for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reintegration program. The program was designed to provide assistance to the Haitian government in the design, implementation and operation of a program to reintegrate former soldiers into civilian life by providing vocational training for the soldiers.

During the two enrolment process (the first from November 1994 until January 1995, the second after the 25 January 1995 decision by President Aristide

³⁶ Peter Grier, "Wring Violence Out of Haiti Keeps US Soldiers on Their Toes," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 September 1994, p. 6.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

to disband the armed forces) a total of 4,849 former FAd'H were registered. Of these, 2,213 were discharged members of the IPSF.³⁸

The vocational training period lasted six weeks, during which time each soldier received a stipend from the Haitian government. Each soldier was placed in a training program that matched his skills and for which there was a current demand. Ten specializations were offered that could transfer to employment in both the public and private sector. The Reintegration Program maintained nineteen training centers. The rate of academic failure was low, with approximately 81% of the participants completing training and receiving diplomas.³⁹

Following completion of the training program, the demobilized soldiers could participate in the opportunity and referral services part of the Reintegration Program. Seminars were offered on searching for employment, tool kits are supplied to the participants, and referrals were given to jobs in the private sector. By April 1996 2,155 demobilized soldiers had enrolled in the service.

There was a dispute between the US and President Aristide over the future of the FAd'H. President Aristide's decision in January 1996 to dismantle the FAd'H was met with displeasure by the US. Of the 7,000 Haitian forces the US Department of Defense recommended that 3,500 be kept to protect the borders and patrol the coast. The US considered that a substantial reduction in the number of forces could lead to instability in the country if they could not be quickly reintegrated into civilian life.

Despite US pressure to maintain half of the Haitian armed forces, President Aristide undertook a series of measures to reduce the power of the military, such as reducing military expenditures. Ultimately, President Aristide announced that forced retirement of the senior officer corps, and reduced the size of the armed forces to 1,500 men. President Aristide's supporters recommended a constitutional amendment to officially dissolve the armed forces, but no action was taken.

³⁸ *Communal Governance Program, Demobilization and Reintegration Program Monthly Report*, International Organization for Migration/US Agency for International Development, March 1996, p. 14.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

VI. The Transfer of Authority

The multilateral composition of the MNF made the mission international, although it was US-led and US-organized. This permitted the transition to UNMIH and a consequent exit clause for the US troops. As military authority was being transferred from the MNF to UNMIH, the US's military presence rapidly decreased in Haiti.

Various factors stimulated the US's rapid military withdrawal from Haiti. According to Jean-Marc Coicaud, Washington looked forward to a quick transfer of authority from the MNF to UNMIH for three basic reasons:⁴⁰

- (a) *The risk of deterioration of US-Latin American relations.* An extended stay of the US troops in the Caribbean country might have revived "anti-Yankee" sentiments in the region, as well as the perception that the MNF was an occupation force. It is noteworthy that most Latin American countries had opposed the idea of an armed intervention in Haiti, on the ground that past US military interventions in the Western Hemisphere had had traumatic consequences.
- (b) *The risk of US casualties as had occurred in Somalia.* An extended presence of US troops could have increased the likelihood of US casualties. The decision of the US to leave the country as soon as possible prevented a major American involvement in Haiti's domestic politics where inter-partisan conflicts could easily have escalated. For this reason, the US refused to guarantee public order or get involved in an institutional reconstruction process as had been the case in Somalia.
- (c) *The risk of loosening the support of the US Congress and public opinion.* The Republican majority had requested the White House to immediately withdraw the US military contingents from Haiti, once Aristide had been restored to power.

A broad debate took place in the days preceding the UNMIH deployment, focusing on the capabilities of the UN military contingents to accomplish the mission after the withdrawal of the MNF troops. As the FAd'H had a higher degree of respect for the US military than it did for the UNMIH contingents, many feared that the paramilitary groups could be tempted to test the readiness and fighting

⁴⁰ See Jean-Marc Coicaud, "La communauté internationale et la reprise du processus démocratique," in *Le Trimestre du Monde*, No. 29, 1st. Trimester, 1995, pp. 110-111.

ability of the new force. The presence of the American-led force had intimidated the Haitian armed forces due to the long tradition of US intervention in the region. The UNMIH was initially perceived as a weak mission, unable to maintain a secure and stable environment. This perception was related to the limited mandate and the smaller force of UNMIH. The UNMIH contingents would for instance carry light weapons and would not be allowed to arrest people unless they were committing criminal acts at that precise moment. In fact, Boutros-Ghali stated that the UNMIH contingents were not going to carry out police or disarmament activities, because their mandate, based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter did not allow peacekeeping forces to use force except in cases self-defense.⁴¹

With respect to the ROE's, the military Commander-in-Chief of UNMIH, Maj. Gen. Kinzer acknowledged that the UN forces were going to operate under more restrictive rules of engagement than those of the MNF. He stated the following: "The only difference is that I am not authorized to take unilateral offensive action. But I believe that I've got sufficient flexibility in the rules of engagement that if a situation arises, I've got a full range of options, including the use of deadly force."⁴² In the context of the more limited mandate and the more restrictive ROE's of UNMIH, President Aristide expressed some concern that the UN force would be purely reactive in nature, rather than active.

However, the US military presence remained quite significant. As Hal Klepak noted:

It is perhaps not surprising that the United States will remain active behind the scene and indeed in the forefront of UNMIH. Not only will US logistics, as so often elsewhere in current peacekeeping operations, be essential to keep the force deployed, but the United States is by far the largest contributor to the UN force. Perhaps of even more importance, UNMIH is commanded by US Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Kinzer."⁴³

The UNMIH force was made up of 6,000 military personnel and 900 civilian police officers from several countries.⁴⁴ Out of the total, 2,400 were US troops

⁴¹ See Jean-Michel Caroit, "L' ONU ne fera pas régner l'ordre en Haiti," *Le Monde*, 1 April 1995, p. 3.

⁴² See Larry Rother, "UN Force Takes Up Duties in Haiti," *The New York Times*, 2 April 1995, p. 14.

⁴³ See Hal Klepak, "Haiti Takes its Next Step," in *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 13 May 1995, p. 20.

⁴⁴ The following countries contributed officials for the UN civilian police: Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Canada, Dominica, France, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mali, Nepal, Pakistan, Phillipines, Russia, Senegal, St. Vincent and the

have which remained in Haiti to form the core of UNMIH. Bangladesh and Pakistan provided the two next largest contingents followed by Canada, Nepal and a contingent representing a group of Caribbean nations. Approximately two thirds of the military and one third of the civilian police components of UNMIH served already under the MNF. Prior to the official transfer of authority to UNMIH, an UNMIH advance team had been in Haiti for five months working with the MNF in developing the concept of operations, force structure and deployment plans. Prior to the transition, 70% of the military component of UNMIH had been deployed in Haiti under the MNF. Additionally, training and meetings were conducted prior to the transition to permit the maximum preparedness and the least probability of a decrease in military readiness after the transfer of authority on 31 March 1995.⁴⁵

The 900 UN civilian police officers, commanded by an officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Neil Pouliot, replaced the international police monitors. The civilian police would patrol the streets of Haitian cities and towns and work with the Haitian police to fill the vacuum left after the collapse of the security forces.

UNMIH established its headquarters in Port-au-Prince and other sub-headquarters in six operational sectors. The force comprised of five infantry battalions including a US quick reaction force, a military police battalion, an engineering unit, aviation and logistics units, a Military Intelligence Support Team (MIST) and a civilian affairs unit.

In contrast to the American-led force, the UN would deploy some of its units on a permanent basis in the Haitian countryside, an area of considerable political tension in which 70% of the Haitian population lives. This deployment would give the UNMIH more flexibility and mobility, in order to compensate for the smaller size of the UN contingents.

Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Suriname and Togo. Headquarters staff: 172.

⁴⁵ Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, S/1995/305, 13 April 1995, paragraph 28.

VII. Conclusion

Once again, the UN, in cooperation with the OAS, is to monitor presidential elections in Haiti. Nevertheless, the consolidation of a democratic process in Haiti will require more than periodical elections. One mistake in the past was to believe that having experienced authoritarianism for so long, Haiti would incorporate democratic values just by holding fair elections. Moreover, a democratic regime is not only a question of a democratically-elected President. The success of the UNMIH will therefore depend on whether its staff will accomplish tasks other than electoral observation.

The idea of an intervention in favor of democracy should be carefully considered. According to Coicaud, the military intervention in Haiti was a watershed in defense of democracy. He states that to defend democracy, three requirements must be fulfilled: (a) the country affected by collective intervention must be a peripheral country in the international system; (b) the risks of human casualties must be minimal; and (c) the target of the intervention must be within the sphere of influence and affect the interests of the power leading the collective intervention.⁴⁶

William Gray seems to endorse this kind of recipe for democratic interventions. In referring to Haiti, he stated that:

We have a moral stake in promoting democracy and human rights throughout the world. At the same time, our capacity to influence events varies. We may not be able to right every wrong everywhere, every time. But this is not a valid argument against taking action in places where our interests are heavily engaged and at times when we have the ability to do so. Indeed, there are times when the ability to influence events in the right direction gives us the responsibility to do so. This is one of those times.⁴⁷

With respect to the effectiveness of the economic sanctions, one probable mistake was that the *de facto* authorities' assets, as well as the assets of the military and the coup supporters were not immediately frozen. This measure only entered into effect in May, 1994, with the adoption of Resolution 917. The fuel embargo was an insufficient measure because regime collaborators were able to find a way

⁴⁶ See Jean-Marc Coicaud, pp. 114-115.

⁴⁷ See William Gray, "Statement by the Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Haiti, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington DC, 8 June 1994," in *US Department of State Dispatch*, Vol. 5, No. 26, 27 June 1994.

around it, by smuggling. Further, they were able to afford the higher prices on goods imposed by the sanctions. In the end, most of them became richer.

From the sender's perspective, the embargo did not impact on all countries equally. For instance, the costs of cooperating with the embargo for the Dominican Republic were higher than for Asian countries. Another lesson from the Haitian crisis is that the use of economic sanctions deepens social problems, since it accelerates a mass refugee migration, generating a boomerang effect.

Regarding the military intervention, the overwhelming military superiority of the MNF, manifested in the greater number, the better training, technology and experience of the US troops, easily imposed its will on the small, badly armed, inexperienced Haitian troops (both the regular and paramilitary units). With this tremendous "show of force," the US managed to subdue the Haitian forces without exacting any significant political toll. Thus, the US sought to erase the "Somalia Syndrome" and win back the confidence of the US public. By reconfirming the public's faith in the efficiency of the US military might, support could then be counted on for possible future military interventions, when US interests or "international peace and security" would be threatened.

The events in Somalia on 3 October 1995, when the US forces suffered 18 casualties constrained US participation in UN peace operations, and to some extent, US policy toward Haiti. A broad literature on the lessons of Somalia and an extensive review of the US policy toward the UN resulted from the national debate over the use of US forces in UN peace operations. The Congressional and public reaction to the deaths of US soldiers in Somalia led the US to adopt a defensive position in order to avoid "another Somalia."⁴⁸ The peaceful entry of the US-led coalition did not modify the negative opinion of many sectors within the US toward the UN operations.

The probability of success of any Haitian resistance was constrained for the following reasons:

First, the UN embargo against Haiti prevented the Haitians from receiving new armaments. Second, the inexistence of an effective communication system made any coordinated operation to fight against the MNF forces almost impossible. Third, Cedras' reflexive personality and his lack of authority among his subordinates (since most of Cedras' military career was in academics or bureaucracy rather than on the field discouraged any resistance and made the US foresee the disbanding of the FAd'H. Fourth, the rivalry between the two

⁴⁸ See Donald Daniel, "US Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Putting PDD 25 in context," *Research Memorandum 4-94*, US Naval War College, Newport, 1994.

strongmen of the military regime and the differences within the military *junta*, headed by Raoul Cedras (the Commander-in-Chief) and Michel François (the Police Chief of Port-au-Prince who also controlled the paramilitary groups) affected the decision-making process. Fifth, the starvation and repression of the military regime reinforced the assumption of popular support for the MNF operation. Sixth, the Haitian army's capabilities were very poor. The US did fear the action of paramilitary groups over the course of the intervention, but as David Isby asserts: "Many of [these groups] were opportunists rather than ideological supporters of the (military) regime. They could act as prime instigators of violence. Nevertheless, they were poorly trained and equipped, and were unlikely to be able to carry out the long and highly disciplined process of organizing and sustaining insurgency without international support."⁴⁹ Finally, the Cedras regime did not have to face charges in international justice courts for human rights violations as the Serbs and Aideed had.

The Somalia episode made the decision to intervene more difficult, although the internal political conditions and difficulties of the Somalia operation were not present in Haiti's case. Regarding the strategy and planning of the operation, there were more similarities between the multilateral intervention in Haiti and the US invasion of Panama (1989) than between Haiti and Somalia. From a military-strategic view, the MNF intervention was not very significant, because the US did not have a real enemy.

Two of the lessons learned in Somalia were present in the Haiti operation: (a) a clear and flexible mandate (in other words, US participation required the flexibility to change the goals but only within the framework of the mandate) and (b) an exit strategy with a short period of occupation.⁵⁰

According to Gabriel Marcella, a dignified US exit strategy required the achievement of limited objectives, such as the establishment of security, the restoration of Aristide, police and criminal justice training, and an emphasis on the humanitarian dimensions of assistance, rather than pursuing the open-ended goal of the restoration of democracy.⁵¹ In this way, President Clinton asserted that the military intervention in Haiti was not to guarantee democracy, but to provide

⁴⁹ See David Isby, "Restoring Hope Yet Again? Military Intervention in Haiti," in *Jane's Intelligence Review*, August 1994, pp. 381-383.

⁵⁰ See Dennis Quinn (ed.), *Peace Support Operations and the US Military*, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.

⁵¹ See Gabriel Marcella, *Haiti Strategy: Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Hand-offs and Exit*, US Army War College, 20 October 1994, p. 8.

another opportunity to have a democratic regime in the country. The main goal of the MNF was to remove the Cedras regime and facilitate President Aristide's return. Thus, the US prevented open-ended commitments in the Caribbean nation. The transfer of authority from the MNF to the UNMIH allowed the US not to get involved in post-conflict reconstruction activities, and ensured an exit strategy for the bulk of the American troops.

Even though the American administration considered the US exit strategy from Haiti very successful, many Haitians believed that the US-led coalition left Haiti without having accomplished the mission, due to the fact that wide-scale disarmament had not been achieved and public security was still doubtful.

The security issue remains uncertain. The first promotions of the new Haitian civilian police force are expected to be ready by late 1996, while the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF), made up mostly of former military officers and repatriated boat people from Guantanamo, suffered from a lack of credibility among the local population and a lack of authority to enforce law. The problem of setting up a trustful police force was accompanied by an upsurge of violence, of which Mireille Durocher Bertin's assassination became the most significant political crime. This fact questioned the existence of a secure and stable environment for the transition to the UNMIH.

A few days before President Clinton and Secretary-General Boutros Ghali arrived in Haiti to attend the ceremonies marking the formal transfer of authority from the MNF to UNMIH, a prominent supporter of the former military regime was killed on the streets of Port-au-Prince. This incident embarrassed President Aristide and soured President Clinton's visit. It also put in question, whether this was an isolated crime or part of mounting political violence.

The MNF intervention in Haiti was run according to the US military doctrine for multilateral peace operations. The rules of this doctrine were to use American troops under US military command, to carry out operations at low cost, especially regarding the number of casualties among American troops, and to seek international support in order to legitimate the military operation. The MNF intervention reflected the US's main concerns of having clear objectives, an exit strategy and flexibility in the ROE's, including the use of force and force protection.

The use of force became a key issue during the operation. The magnitude of the MNF force, totalling approximately 20,000 troops, served not only to shock the Haitian military leadership and induce it to step down, but also as a means to destroy any will of resistance on the part of the paramilitary groups, after deployment of the US-led coalition.

US political and military officials were concerned about the protection and safety of their own troops in Haiti. Even if the American soldiers were allowed to use force against the Haitian police and military, whenever they observed grave abuses threatening the life of a victim, they did not act to separate pro- and anti-Aristide factions. The most serious incident involving US and Haitian soldiers took place on 24 September 1995, in Cap Haïtien, and resulted in the death of 10 Haitians and the wounding of one marine.

In fact, the risks for the US troops in Haiti were minimal compared to those in other multilateral peace operations. The number of US casualties, a sensitive subject for the American public opinion, remained extremely low. During the six months the US troops suffered fewer than 5 casualties.⁵²

Unlike in other cases, there was a "permissive environment" and "consensual disarmament." The "cash-for-weapons" program was quite successful. The total number of weapons either seized or bought back through the weapons control programs of the multinational force totalled over 30,000.⁵³ However, the principal disarmament problem still remaining is the complete disarmament of the paramilitary groups.

In sum, even if the US intervention in Haiti is considered one of the major foreign policy successes of the Clinton administration, the situation in Haiti seems to be still far from orderly or safe. As *The New York Times* editorial notes:

The US occupation has been a modest success. Mr. Aristide is back in office as Haiti's first democratically elected president, and the refugee issue that drove two administrations into legal contortions has been temporarily resolved. Americans troops have avoided the kind of deadly incidents that marred the US intervention in Somalia. But the administration stretches the truth when it declares that US forces have created the safe and secure environment that the UN made precondition for transferring authority. Washington is handing off to the UN now because it has no political mandate to maintain a large troop contingent in Haiti...⁵⁴

⁵² Only one American soldier was killed and three soldiers were wounded by Haitians. SFC Gregory Cardott was killed in January 1995 when two Haitians attempted to go through a toll booth without paying it. Sgt. Donald Holstead was shot in October 1994. An interpreter was also wounded during an incident at the police headquarters in Cap Haïtien on 24 September 1994.

⁵³ See Document S/1995/211, 20 March 1995.

⁵⁴ See New York Times Editorial, "The Handover in Haiti," in *The International Herald Tribune*, 1-2 April 1995, p. 4.

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Part III:
Questionnaire Analysis

DISARMAMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROJECT
The Disarming of Warring Parties
as an Integral Part of Conflict Settlement

PRACTITIONERS' QUESTIONNAIRE ON:
WEAPONS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND
DEMOBILIZATION DURING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

ANALYSIS REPORT: HAITI

COMPILED BY: UNIDIR'S MILITARY EXPERT GROUP

COMPLETED BY: LT COL P. MARTIN

DATE: 31 JULY 1995

Note to Readers: The responses which appear in this analysis have been reproduced directly from the respondents' answers to the DCR *Practitioner's Questionnaire*. Changes, if any, have been made only to correct spelling, grammar, and sentence structure; all efforts have been made to maintain the integrity of the original responses. Illegible portions of the original written responses have been indicated with ellipses.

Reference Number:
UNIDIR/UNMIH/002

Analysis Report Of Practitioners' Questionnaires

Number of questionnaires analyzed: 08

IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION

1. OPERATION

- a. **Name of operation:** UNMIH
- b. **Location of operation:** HAITI
- c. **Time frame covered by questionnaires:**
 - (H070) 01/06/94 - 01/04/95
 - (H082) 01/12/94 - 01/11/94
 - (H119) 09/11/94 - 09/04/95
 - (H120) 03/01/95 - 04/04/95
 - (H121) 09/01/95 - 06/04/95
 - (H122) 11/01/95 - 08/03/95
 - (H123) 28/12/94 - 04/04/95
 - (H176) 01/09/94 - 00/10/95

2. RESPONDENTS

a. Primary Role:

UN Civilian: 01

Chief : 00
Other : 01

Military Officer: 06

Commander : 04
Other : 02

Humanitarian Relief Operator and/or NGO personnel: 00

National Official: 00

b. Primary Function/Mission:Military : 14

HQ Staff	: 02	Military Observer	: 00
Infantry	: 02	Armour	: 00
Artillery	: 00	Engineer	: 00
Medical	: 01	Aviation	: 02
Transport	: 01	Logistics	: 02
Military Police	: 00	Other	: 02

Civilian : 04

Civil Affairs	: 01	Staff HQ	: 01
Representative	: 00	Relief Coordinator	: 00
Relief	: 01	Volunteer	: 00
Other: transition programs	: 01		

e. Regular Activities:

Convoy Operations	: 06	Convoy Security	: 04
Base Security	: 06	Patrolling	: 05
Search Operations	: 05	Check Point Operations	: 04
Cease Fire Monitoring	: 01		
Cease Fire Violation Investigation			: 00
Weapons Inspections			: 03
Weapons Inventories			: 04
Weapon Collection - Voluntary			: 04
Weapons Collection - Involuntary			: 03
Weapons Elimination			: 03
Cantonment Construction			: 02
Cantonment Security			: 03
Disarmament Verification			: 01
Information Collection			: 05
Police Operations (Military policemen)			: 01
Special Operations			: 04
Humanitarian Relief			: 04
Other : Policy analysis and options development			: 01
Other: Coordination with UN and other international organizations			: 01
Other: Civil affairs			: 01

Other: Government liaison	: 01
Other: Quick reaction force operations	: 01
Other: General aviation support	: 01
Other: Medevac	: 01
Other: VIP support	: 01
Other: Motorcade operations	: 01
Other: Presidential security	: 01
Other: Democratic institution development	: 01
Other: Prison operations	: 01
Other: Election support	: 01
Other: Air assaults	: 01
Other: PSYOPS	: 01
Other: City management	: 01
Other: Riot control	: 01
Other: Crowd control	: 01
Other: Looting suppression	: 01
Other: Motorcade operations	: 01
Other: Anti-crime operations	: 01
Other: Crime targeting	: 01
Other: Justice case management	: 01
Other: Demobilization and restoring local government outside Port-au-Prince	: 01

SECTION ONE : SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

(Note to readers: Two caveats should be kept in mind when surveying the respondents' answers to the Practitioner's Questionnaire. First, in answering the questionnaire, respondents were instructed to answer only those questions which pertained to their specific mission and/or function; as a result, most respondents did not answer all of the "yes" or "no" questions. The number of responses for each question, therefore, will not always add up to the total number of respondents. Second, respondents often provided additional commentary for questions they should have skipped -- they may have answered a question with "no", for example, and then elaborated on their answer in the space provided for the "yes" respondents. For this reason, certain questions may contain more responses than the number expected.)

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT:

Q1.1 Was there a disarmament component in the original peace agreement and/or relevant UNSC Resolution?

Yes: 03 No: 04

Q1.2 Was the disarmament component a central feature of the agreement?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q1.3 Describe the desired outcome of the disarmament component vis-à-vis the peace agreement.

(H070) Disarmament of the Haitian military was dictated by the agreement which allowed the permissive entry of the US contingent of the MNF. Disarmament of the population was determined to be allowed by the '-all necessary means .. to establish a secure and stable environment'- clauses of UNSCR 940. The weapons buying program was a means to do that developed after entry of the MNF.

(H121) Weapons buyback - Get weapons off the streets.

(H082) Haiti (between September and November 94) Task force region coming in excess of 10000 weapons. Concentration of weapons held by FAHD.

Q1.4 Was there a timetable planned for implementation?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q1.5 If so, did it go as planned?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q1.6 If not, why? Give three reasons.

(H070) Price for weapons had to be adjusted several times in order to attract weapons. Weapons accountability by the Haitian

military was poor. Paramilitary groups which operated in complicity with the military were difficult to identify for disarmament.

(H082) Rules for weapon security/collection continued to change. With change in mission from forced army was confused. With hub and spoke operation delayed.

Q1.7 If there were delays in the implementation, summarize their impact on the disarmament process.

(H082) Allowed for all amounts of arms to be distributed in the population.

Q1.8 Did, at any time, the existing agreements hinder you from conducting disarmament measures?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q1.9 If so, mention some of the ways in which you felt hindered.

[No responses.]

1. Analyst's Comments :

During UN operations in Haiti, there was no "Peace Agreement" because there was no war. The last minute negotiations by the former President of the United States and the news that an Airborne Division was inbound for Haiti, convinced Cedras-Jonnaissant to bow to a peaceful entry of UN forces, 98% US, and allow the return of President Aristide. As (H070) stated, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, UN intervention into Haiti, was authorized by UNSCR 940. This SCR authorized "the use of all necessary means: An armed intervention... to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors' Islands accords."

This was interpreted during the mission analysis by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff that, the removal of all weapons from the Haitian military and the demobilization of this force would be an implied task to ensure that safe and secure environment.

II. MANDATE:

Q2.1 At the start of your mission, were you informed of the mandate part regarding disarmament?

Yes: 03 No: 03

Q2.2 How was the disarmament component expressed in your mission mandate? (Summarize.)

(H070) It was not expressed- see the 'all necessary means' clause of UNSCR 940.

(H120) We were a log unit and we were not directly involved with disarming. However we did dispose/destroy the weapons.

(H123) We undertook the disarmament mission as a component of our strategy to provide a stable and secure environment.

(H082) Initial mission was a forced entry- which the resistance was to be eliminated. All weapons seized were confiscated. Establish a safe and secure environment. With semi-permissive entry initial FAHD weapons was joint. All crew served weapons were seized, official police were allowed to keep their small arms.

Q2.3 How did you interpret the mandate you received?

(H070) Exactly as it was stated.

(H122) We were to disarm the public. However, initially if an individual was simply carrying a weapon, we could not take the weapon away unless he acted in a threatening manner.

(H123) No mandate received.

Q2.4 Did the way the disarmament component was expressed hinder or assist your disarming task?

Hindered: 00 Assisted: 02

Q2.5 If it was a hindrance, how would you have preferred your mandate to read?

[No responses.]

Q2.6 Were your actions/freedom of action during disarmament operations influenced by external factors other than the mandate?

Yes: 03 No: 02

Q2.7 If so, which ones?

(H070) Some (Haitian President Aristide- and for a while, the SYG) wanted the MNF to do more than was decided appropriate (house -to -house searches). Meanwhile, the Haitian constitution allowed weapons kept in the home for personal protection.

(H123) Disarmament operations were influenced by the government of Haiti requesting that we make every effort to get arms off the street.

(H082) Aristide government - initially government position was that some portion of the military would be retained to include general staff. US military was used to work with Haitian GS on reorganisation of military orders to keep a military/police organisation in being. Aristide government changed the rules in late November.

Analyst's Comments :

Some of the initial confusion by UNMIH came from the lack of specific language in SCR 940. The term "safe and secure environment" as an end state, leaves a lot to be desired. The MNF was also dealing with the pressures and wishes of Aristide and the "CNN factor" that influenced the ROE and mission.

III. SUBSIDIARY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS:

Q3.1 Did the warring factions enter into a separate disarmament agreement?

Yes: 00 No: 03
(If not, go to question 4.)

Q3.2 If so, describe the agreement.

(H120) No warring factions. Army and police disarmed.

Q3.3 Was the agreement formulated with the mandate in mind or independent of the mandate?

Mandate-oriented: 00 Independent of mandate: 01

Q3.4 Were there any contradictions between the mandate and the agreement?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q3.5 If so, which ones?

[No responses.]

Q3.6 What was the impact of the agreement on the mandate?

IV. TOP-DOWN CHANGES: CONSISTENCY OF THE MANDATE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DISARMAMENT COMPONENT:

Q4.1 Did the mandate change while you were engaged in the UN/national operation?

Yes: 01 No: 05
(If not, go to question 5.)

Q4.2 If so, what was(were) the change(s)? (Describe the most important aspects.)

(H082) See 2.2 / 2.7

Q4.3 Did this(these) change(s) affect your disarmament operations?

Yes: 00 No: 00

Q4.4 If so, how? (Name the three most important effects.)

Q4.5 If disarmament was affected, was it still possible for you to implement disarmament measures as first envisaged?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q4.6 In the context of 4.5, did you have to change or abandon procedures?

Change: 01 Abandon: 00

Q4.7 If you changed procedures, what were the changes? (Mention the three most important ones.)

(H082) Initially joint inventory with weapons locked up in garnison headquarters w/US. Weapons made inoperative and confiscated, recovery of personal weapons.

Q4.8 Were you adequately informed of changes when and as they occurred?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q4.9 Were you able to implement alternative measures immediately?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q4.10 If not, why? (Give the three most salient points.)

[No responses.]

Analyst's Comments :

On 30 January 1995, the Security Council passed Resolution 975. This resolution recognized that a secure and stable environment now exists in Haiti and authorizes the UN CG to terminate the mission of the MNF and deploy the UNMIH. This "Top Down Change" resulted in the withdrawal of a large number of US Combat forces and the deployment of the remaining 30% of the UNMIH to Haiti. Specifically this changed the ethnic make-up of the force and the ROE was significantly altered. MNF ROE authorized:

- a. Offensive military operations, if necessary
- b. Use of deadly force to prevent theft of mission essential property
- c. Did not require warning prior to use of force
- d. Authorized use of force, including deadly force, to prevent serious criminal acts, such as, rape, murder, robbery.

The new DRAFT UNMIH ROE does not authorize offensive operations, requires negotiations prior to use of force and allows deadly force only when there is a risk of death or grievous bodily harm.

V. BOTTOM-UP CHANGES: DISPUTES AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES ARISING DURING THE MISSION:

Q5.1 Was there a mechanism or a provision for the settlement of disputes if and when these emerged?

Yes: 02 No: 03

Q5.2 If so, what type of mechanism/provision did you have (i.e., mission, special agreement, the UN process, special commission, etc.)?

(H119) Apply GOH [Government of Haiti] Legal System.

(H082) The mechanism of common defense by the individual from leader on the ground.

Q5.3 What kind of regulations were agreed between the parties and the peacekeepers for the collection of arms?

(H070) None. Terms were actually instructions which the MNF was empowered to enforce.

(H122) The multinational force in agreement with GOP was to extract weapons off the street, confiscate weapons that previously had belonged to the military. Selected weapons would be returned to the developing police force; the remainder

(H082) No agreements.

Q5.4 What kind of negotiations/regulations were agreed at the top and lower levels with respect to the storage of arms?

(H070) At the top (in a Pantagon policy decision) the MNF commander was instructed to 'demilitarize' the military heavy weapons and then destroy all others except those considered appropriate for re-arming the future police force.

(H122) Weapons were taken to the ASP and destroyed.

(H082) The formal regulation in Haiti was [for] all weapons to be confiscated- old turned in.

Q5.5 Was there a conflict between these *new* agreements and the *original* agreement and/or mandate?

Yes: 00 No : 03

Analyst's Comments:

Concerning Q5.4, the storage of arms, all weapons taken from the Haitian Armed Forces and the police to include the equipment of the Haitian Heavy Weapons Company at Camp d'Appilication was either destroyed or demilitarized by the 8th Ordance Company, US Army in Haiti. Some was shipped to LetterKenny Army Depot, USA for destruction. Several weapons were sent to Anniston Army Depot for final disposition to S&T centers or museums.

VI. PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION DURING THE MISSION:

Q6.1. Did you consider the protection of the population when negotiating disarmament clauses with the warring parties?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q6.2. Was the protection of the population a part of your mission?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q6.3 If so, did you have the means to do so?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q6.4 What were the three most important means at your disposal to achieve this objective?

(H070) The broad interpretation of the mandate. Overwhelming military capabilities. Public information (PSYOPS).

(H119) Presence patrol, Information campaign, Re-inforce GOHIPSF.

(H120) As a support we were concerned with protecting the population but not directly involved.

(H082) An excellent psychological campaign , a good civil affairs effort. A reaction force both on the USS America and located on Port au Prince. A ROE that allowed free individual components on the ground to take the entire action if required.

Analyst's Comments:

Initially, there was some confusion as to when, where, and how MNF soldiers would and could get involved to protect the population from police brutality especially during Haitian crowd control operations. Finally, several weeks into the operation, the MNF took over police functions and disarmed and defanged the military and the police.

SECTION TWO: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS**VII. FORCE COMPOSITION AND FORCE STRUCTURE**

Q7.1 Was the force composition for your mission area unilateral or multilateral?

Unilateral: 01 Multilateral: 07

Q7.2 Describe the three most important advantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.

Multilateral force composition:

(H070) Made the mission an international one - although US organised and led. Which set the stage for transition to UNMIH. Not sure there was a third advantage - unless you consider opportunities we took to conduct standardization training of MNF contributors before deployment and staff training for those to be later included on the UNMIH staff.

(H119) Broader support base. Multinational effort/support. Easier to deploy required manpower.

(H120) A united effort of many nations make a big statement.

(H121) Joint/multinational effort. Shows commitment to nation in need. Spreads the demands/requirements on forces.

(H122) It gave the appearance that actions in Haiti was a united front and set the condition for UN take over.

(H123) World community supporting the operations. No one country over committed to supporting the operation. The ability to bring the strength of each nation military force to bear on the problems.

(H082) Unity of command, unity of effort. National intelligence. Compatibility of all BOS [*Battlefield Operating Systems i.e. Command & Control, intelligence etc.*].

Unilateral force composition:

[No responses.]

Q7.3 Describe the three most important disadvantages in acting in the manner described in 7.1.Multilateral force composition:

(H070) Getting contributions that match requirements (in both units and equipment). Poor control over coordinating deployment dates. Delays because of domestic politics of contributors.

(H119) Lack of multinational doctrine. Cultural differences in interpreting standards. Unity of command.

(H120) Difference in equipment, diet, etc.

(H121) Difficulty in working together. Language barriers. Conflicting agendas.

(H122) Difference in operational techniques, equipment, compatibility and language difference. Graduated responses difficult to synchronise.

(H123) Logistic support for the different nations (especially nation requirements). Lack of understanding of each nation's operational procedures. Lack of common doctrine.

(H082) Unilateral in the best course of action- the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare, operating procedures, C3I are not prudent.

Unilateral force composition:

[No responses.]

Q7.4 If you worked in a multilateral context: how important was consensus (with peacekeepers from other countries) for the achievement of disarmament and demobilization components during the operation?

(H070) Not at all-consensus was high.

(H119) Important - but operationally other components deferred to US C2.

(H121) Very important.

(H122) Did not appear to be a problem since we were disarming the entire country.

(H123) Missions (disarmament) were decided by the multinational commander and executed by all the national forces.

(H176) There was only consensus that local security must be a priority and disarmament was among the priorities. This mission counterbalanced the need to begin demobilizing.

(H082) Operation Provide comfort. All five commanders were US.CG JTF. [*Operation Provide Comfort was the UN operation to protect and feed the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq.*]

Q7.5. Was adequate consideration given to the disarmament component as the mission evolved?

Adequate: 08 Inadequate: 00

Q7.6 If it was inadequate, explain how this affected your mission (mention the three most important issues).

(H082) PIRS [Priority Intelligence Requirements] were given to national intelligence to explain as to the number and composition of weapons. Different forces were on good weapons concentration areas. Distribution were used .

Q7.7 Did the force composition identify a specific structure to support the disarmament component of the mandate?

Yes: 05 No: 02

Q7.8 If so, what was it?

(H120) US infantry, cavalry, mech, MP's etc.

(H121) Specific weapon buyback locations.

(H122) Infantry unit primarily established weapons buy back locations.

(H123) Infantry, cavalry, military police.

(H082) 10th Mtn. division was responsible for DAP ord. VTF which I commanded was responsible for rest of the country-camp.

Q7.9 Did the force composition allow for verification and monitoring measures for the control of weapons and disarmament?

Yes: 05 No: 01

Q7.10 If so, what were they?

(H119) Checkpoints.

(H120) We maintained exact accountability by serial number of all weapons turned in.

(H121) Light infantry.

(H123) Check point operations to search for weapons. Weapons buy-back sites manned by infantry units.

(H082) Troops in 27 location continued earlier police or army garnisons or both, weapons were collected.

Q7.11 Was the chosen force structure appropriate for executing the mission?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q7.12 Were the units efficient for the mission given?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q7.13 Were the units appropriate for conducting the disarmament operations?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q7.14 Were your units augmented with specific personnel and equipment for the disarmament mission?

Yes: 03 No: 04

Q7.15 If so, what additional capabilities did they provide? (List the five most important ones.)

(H070) In some instances military police units did checkpoint searches for weapons but routinely conventional units did it in their own areas of operation.

(H122) At times, when specific locations were searched dog teams and MP were used.

(H082) Augmented for buy back program. Augmented w/class A agents - buy back prices subsequently. Transportation units to pick up weapons. Tracks to remove weapons.

Q7.16 If you were a commander, were you briefed by HQ's prior to your disarming mission and before your arrival in the area of operations?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q7.17 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q7.18 If not, what steps were required in order to establish and maintain a secure environment?

[No responses.]

Q7.19 Did these force protection measures affect the accomplishment of the disarmament operations positively or negatively?

Positively: 05 Negatively: 00

Q7.20 Elaborate on the impact mentioned in 7.19 above.

(H119) Getting weapons off the street reduced crime, violence, and threat to the force.

(H120) We had so much visible presence that no one wanted to cause a problem.

(H121) Force was respected causing locals to feel safe in turning weapons.

(H082) Civil affairs ROE- troops in the culture, active colonnel source operation.

Q7.21 Were command and control/operational procedures adequate for your task?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q7.22 If not, mention three examples which demonstrate their inadequacy.

(H082) Commands well forwarded. Every day I visited 4 to 5 locations as did the Group commander. All locations had UHF/TACSAT.

Q7.23 Summarize your salient experiences with command and control/operational procedures while on this mission.

(H119) Clear operational command. Daily operational and staff coordination meetings. Use of LNO's from components. Use of coalition support teams. Required backbriefs from every component for every mission.

(H123) Doctrinal C² control measures were used. Multinational forces HQ to Bde HQ- to BNHQ-to COHQ- to Plt.

(H082) Unilateral US CaI Cnds CP on cases in PAP harbor, 10 Mtn. division -P AP, JTF.

Q7.24 What additional support (special capabilities/force multipliers) did you receive which helped the disarmament mission? List the three most important ones.

(H070) Linguists-no; more money-yes, after we figured out how much we needed;more human intelligence-no, but progressively got better.

(H119) Information support element. Civil affairs. Military police.

(H122) Dog teams when required.

(H123) PSYOPS.

(H082) Psyops campaign. Ready reaction force.

Q7.25 Were they adequate?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q7.26 If not, what other capabilities would you have needed to make your mission more effective? (List the most relevant.)

[No responses.]

Analyst's Comments:

Its clear that all the respondents felt that they had the right mix of personnel and equipment to execute their disarmament mission. Overwhelming force is a US doctrinal mandate for a forced entry mission like Uphld Democracy could have

been. One force not mentioned, Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF-HAITI), 3d Special Forces Group, played a key role in the disarmament and weapons buy back program. The ODB and ODAs (Special Forces 12 man A-Teams) along with Rangers became the civil authority in the hundreds of towns that they operated in. Their discovery of many of the FRAPH, Attache and Tom Tom Macute weapons caches was key to the initial disarming efforts.

The SF brought to UNMIH: language capability, medical specialists, intelligence capability, foreign weapons expertise and extensive knowledge of Civil Affairs operations. Operating with 70% of the Haitian people in rural areas, the SF teams executed the Buy Back programs which they rated as "marginally successful." One observation about the buy back program was that, ex-FAD`H soldiers were selling back their issue weapons and the flow of weapons had slowed to a "a trickle not a flood." This could be viewed as a indicator of success.

VII. OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES/RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Q8.1 Did you abide by national or UN rules of engagement/operational procedures during the pursuit of your mission?

National: 06 UN: 01

Q8.2 Were these rules/procedures adequate for the performance of your task?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q8.3 If not, what other rules should you have had?

Q8.4 If and when the situation changed, were your rules altered accordingly?

Yes: 03 No: 02

Q8.5 If so, summarize the relevant changes.

(H070) We modified how the MNF would handle searches of vehicles and under what conditions house and building searches would be conducted. Actually, this should all be considered mission clarification and in all clarifications the search authority was clarified to be more liberal.

(H123) Situation did not change; used same ROE entire mission.

(H082) Chaos from force entry to some primitive environment. Aristide's arrival in Country. Aristide's acceptance of governmental responsibility. Disestablishment of the military police. Lifting of sanctions.

Analyst's Comments:

As the second phase of the UNHIIH is being executed, April 95 - February 96, the ROE and Operational Procedures have changed. As described earlier, proposed ROE will be a lot less aggressive and operational procedures will require negotiation and communications prior to demonstrating force.

IX. COERCIVE DISARMAMENT AND PREVENTIVE DISARMAMENT

Q9.1 Did you have to use force (coercive disarmament) to achieve the mission as mandated?

Yes: 03 No: 04

Q9.2 Judging from your experience, is it possible to use coercive disarmament in these types of operations?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Q9.3 Do you believe that force can and should be used to enforce the disarmament components of an agreement?

Can: Yes: 07 No: 00
Should: Yes: 07 No: 00

Q9.4 **Mention three reasons why force can/cannot and should/should not be used to enforce the disarmament component of an agreement.**

(H070) It is a given that force can be used if the mandate provided for the use of force. It is a given that force protection must allow disarmament when threatened. When population protection is in the mandate or mission, force must be authorised.

(H119) Use of force ('all means appropriate'). Should be authorised within definitive ROE if threat level requires, key issue - control of weapons critical to security.

(H120) Do not want a soldier in jeopardy. Do not want missions impeded. Make sure civilian population is secure.

(H121) More respected if aggressive vs passive.

(H122) In our case the availability of weapons directly related to the level of violence. We were building a new police force w/basic small arms weapons.

If weapons were not removed, the police force would be in a significant disadvantaged position.

(H123) Force has to have an option to use force. Without the capability to escalate the use of force you may not be able to conduct effective disarmament.

(H082) There is always an element that will not voluntarily turn in weapons; disarmament mandates showed the rule of law. Those elements that are in violation of the mandate showed to be forced to turn over weapons.

Q9.5 **If fighting was an ongoing process, was it possible for you to continue with your disarmament tasks?**

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q9.6 **If so, describe how it was possible to continue with your disarmament tasks.**

- Q9.7** Were you involved in any preventive deployment operations (i.e., as an observer, preventive diplomacy official, etc.)?
- Yes: 00 No: 05
- Q9.8** If so, was disarmament a major concern of this deployment?
- Yes: 00 No: 00
- Q9.9** If so, were there already arms control agreements (i.e., registers of conventional weapons, MTCR, etc.) in place within the country where you were operating?
- Yes: 00 No: 01

Analyst's Comments :

Unlike UN "peacekeeping" operations in Central America, (ONUCA in Nicaragua and ONUSAL in El Salvador,) both, of which relied on voluntary disarmament by all parties. UNMIH mandate, SCR 940, approved the use of force and any other measures including coercive actions, to restore the government of Haiti. Due to its use of force and coercive measures to obtain the stated military objectives, Operation Restore Democracy was more like the conventional Desert Storm and Operation Southern Watch (enforcing no fly zones over Iraq), than any of the UN "peacekeeping" operations to date.

SECTION THREE: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

X. INFORMATION: COLLECTION, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, AND THE MEDIA

- Q10.1** Did you receive sufficient relevant information prior to and during your disarming mission?
- Prior: Yes: 05 No: 01
 During: Yes: 05 No: 01
- Q10.2** Was information always available and reliable?

Yes: 04 No: 01

Q10.3 How did you receive/obtain your information prior to and during the mission? (Describe the three most important ways.)

(H119) VTC with unit that we relieved Site survey. Higher HQ's coordination and planning.

(H123) Intelligence reporting. Coordination with the government of Haiti and the US embassy.

(H082) National intelligence systems. Local LLSO [*Low Level Source Operations i.e. Covert collection through human sources*] . Forum in the US embassy.

Q10.4 Was there a structured information exchange between HQ's and the units in the field?

Yes: 05 No: 00

Q10.5 And between the various field commanders?

Yes: 04 No: 01

Q10.6 Did you use sensor mechanisms for verification/information purposes?

Yes: 02 No: 03

Q10.7 If so, list which ones and for what purpose. (Mention not more than three.)

(H123) HUMINT, SIGINT, Video.

(H082) ELINT ASSETS. SIGINT ASSETS.

Q10.7.1 Was the use of on-site and remote sensing an adequate tool for verifying and monitoring weapons control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q10.7.2 **In your opinion, could sensor systems (acoustic, radar, photo, video, infrared, etc.) play a useful role in monitoring the weapons control and disarmament aspects of a peacekeeping operation?**

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.7.3 **If so, give some examples of phases of the peacekeeping process in which such sensors could be used.**

(H122) It is difficult to hide weapons in control zones when multi means of monitoring are used.

(H123) Phototelsis to monitor crowds thereby picking out armed individuals.

(H082) Central 2nd generation helicopter with 3rd flds with video camera unpubl. -helo. OPS w/NGOS border control etc.

Q10.7.4 **What would you suggest about the possible organizational set-up of the use of such sensor systems (i.e., UN, regional organization, national, etc.)?**

(H123) I believe most of the senior systems will be nationally owned.

(H082) Whatever organisation.

Q10.8 **Do you think that normal information collection assets (i.e., intelligence) could and should be used for peacekeeping and disarming purposes?**

Yes: 05 No: 00

Q10.9 **Why? (List three reasons.)**

(H070) To know how effectively you are disarming. Do determine when force should be used (i.e. against paramilitaries). To know when you can stop disarming.

(H119) Uses assets that we are trained with. Need to apply all assets available to know what is going on - to obtain required information.

(H122) Compliance must be verified. These methods seem to work in Haiti.

(H123) Best means of reliable information.

(H082) Intelligence is a key in these type of operations. Allows force convergence.

Q10.10 Is there a need for satellite surveillance in peacekeeping/peace enforcing operations?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q10.11 Did you use the local population for information collection purposes?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q10.12 Did you implement any transparency measures to create mutual confidence between warring parties?

Yes: 02 No: 01

Q10.13 If so, did you act as an intermediary?

Yes: 01 No: 01

Q10.14 Was public affairs/media essential to the disarming mission?

Yes: 05 No: 01

Q10.15 Were communication and public relations efforts of importance during your mission?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q10.16 If so, give three reasons why this was so.

(H070) An example - prices for weapons were advertized in the media. Missions of MNF units were publicized to control public alarm. Media and public information were used to control rumors.

(H119) People were hungry for information. Rumor did not depend on fact. Most people responded favorably when they understood.

(H120) Keep locals informed-passive. Get weapons turned in. Stop rumours.

(H122) The people had to believe that we could enforce a safe and secure environment before they would turn in weapons.

(H123) The primary means of getting our information and our story out to the populace.

(H082) Accurate information communication is essential in these types of operations, must build trust and confidence. Once trust is established - individual commander on the ground can infect program. Intermediary and negotiations at the lowest level are absolutely essential.

Q10.17 Was there a well-funded and planned communications effort to support and explain your activities and mission to the local population?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q10.18 If not, should there have been one?

Yes: 00 No: 00

Q10.19 Did media attention at any time hamper or benefit your disarming efforts?

Hamper: 01 Benefit: 04

Q10.20 Summarize your experience with the media.

(H119) Overall media helped to inform the people. Important to keep local media informed, otherwise they will "speculate" to get a story out.

(H120) They are going to be there! Tell the truth they can be of benefit.

(H121) Publicize info on weapons buyback.

(H122) The media was generally favorable to what we were trying to accomplish. The media would support location and terms that MNF would buy back weapons.

(H123) Positive interaction with the media.

(H082) The media in Haiti, was most responsible - generally forces received excellent press, fair and concise, accurate. Since I was located out of PAP - I generally provided the helo transport to the most remote locations. I could well choose who would accompany me.

Q10.21 Was there sufficient briefing to the general public in the conflict area on the disarming process?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q10.22 If so, who organized this and who carried it out?

Organized:

(H070) US Military Information Support Teams in coordination with Embassy Public Affairs Office.

(H119) My MNF staff.

(H120) PSYOPS and CA.

(H121) MNF HQ.

(H123) PSYOPS.

(H082) Task force.

Carried it out:

(H070) Embassy public affairs office.

(H123) PSYOPS.

(H119) Info supt element.
(H121) PHYSOPS Units.
(H082) PSYOPS, national radio.

Q10.23 Was there cooperation with the local media in explaining the steps of disarmament you were carrying out?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q10.24 Were leaflets distributed?

Yes: 07 No: 00

Analyst's Comments:

This invasion employed strategic, operational and tactical SIGINT, ELINT, HUMINT, PHOTINT and All Source Analysis and dissemination at all levels.

An extensive PHYOPS force consisting of radio talk shows leaflet drops, loud speaker teams and television were used to persuade and inform the different "target" audiences. It is interesting to note that in UNMIH, the media was seen as a tool and asset to reinforce mission objectives. In the majority of the eleven case studies there was not a "well funded and planned communications effort to support and explain your activities and missions to the local population" (Q10.17).

SECTION FOUR: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XI. EXPERIENCES IN THE CONTROL OF WEAPONS AND IN DISARMAMENT DURING YOUR MISSION:

Q11.1 Describe, by order of importance, your specific tasks, if any, in weapons control and disarmament during this mission.

(H119) Establish and maintain secure environment. Disarmament in terms of getting guns off the street was key.

(H120) Weapons were turned in to my unit and secured. We did not get involved in the actual disarmament. We destroyed or shipped out all weapons for disposal.

(H121) None.

(H122) When location of suspected caches were identified we sent elements to search. If found, we confiscated.

(H123) Conducting weapons buy back program. Conducting check point operations searching for weapons. Conducting search operations.

(H082) Location of weapons. Inventory to include civil members. Weapons under US control. Crew served weapons, automatic, semi automatic, initially destroyed. All weapons confiscated given to PAP for destruction.

Q11.2 Did the security situation in the mission area allow for arms control and disarmament operations?

Yes: 06 No: 00

Q11.3 If not, what steps were required to establish and maintain a secure environment?

[No responses.]

Q11.4 Do you think your weapons control and disarming tasks could have been handled more efficiently?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.5 If so, mention three ways in which your task could have been improved.

(H082) During mission change - force entry to semi permissive environment - we were slow [to] establish presence in the whole country. Quick presence. Intelligence late in establishment. Weapons buy back program.

Q11.6 Were opportunities missed to take advantage of, or implement weapons control and disarmament measures?

Missed: 00 Not missed: 04

Q11.7 If opportunities were missed, mention the main reasons why this happened.

[No responses.]

Q11.8 Did you find the national diversity of contributed troops a problem for command and control during disarmament operations?

Yes: 00 No: 05

Q11.9 If so, mention the three problems you considered most challenging.

(H120) We must learn to work together.

Q11.10 Was the disarmament process reversible (i.e., were there instances where devolution was foreseen or requested)?

Yes: 01 No: 04

Q11.11 If so, were there provisions to this effect in the mandate, mission or agreement?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q11.12 Which types of weapons were in use, and by whom (e.g., your own unit(s), warring parties, individuals, irregular units, national officials, etc.)? (If applicable, list the five principal ones for each category.)

(H119) Weapon: M16, MGO MG, SAW, 9MM
 Whom : MNF
 Weapon: 38, rifles, explosives
 Whom : Populace
 Weapon: M16, MGO MG, SAW, 9MM
 Whom : MNF

Weapon: 38, rifles, explosives
Whom : Populace

(H122) Weapon: Small arms (rifles, handguns, machine guns)
Whom: MNF
Weapon: Handguns
Whom: IPM (International Police Monitors)
Weapon: Uzis, handguns, hand grenades
Whom: Criminals

(H123) Weapon: Rifles M1/M16s, handguns 38cal/9mm, machineguns M60 shotguns
Whom: Haitian Military/Police
Weapon: M16, M60, 50 cal, MK19
Whom: MNF

Other comments:

(H122) The heavy weapons of the former military were confiscated.

Q11.13 Were you given priorities as to the type of weapons you should disarm first?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.14 If so, how were priorities assigned (i.e., on what basis)? (List three reasons.)

(H082) Mortars could do the most damage/force protection. LMG, artillery, 3rd day in country took over camp application. Weapons camping - self explanatory. Semi-automatic rifles.

Q11.15 At the beginning of your mission, were you able to have sufficient information on military capabilities in regard to numbers and quality of equipment used by warring parties?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q11.16 Did you have the impression that there were caches of weapons in your sector or adjoining sectors?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q11.17 **Were illicit weapons a problem for you (illicit as in: not in your inventories)?**

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q11.18 **Was there evidence in your sector that the warring parties continued to have access to weapons through external channels of supply?**

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.19 **Could you control external channels of weapons supply in your sector?**

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.20 **How important was the control of external channels of supply for the success of the mission?**

Very Important: 00 Important: 00
Unimportant: 04

Q11.21 **In your experience, do weapons continue to flow during the conflict even after sanctions, inspections, and checks have been applied?**

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q11.22 **Were there any security zones established?**

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.23 **If so, were you able to control your sector effectively?**

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q11.24 **Depending on your answer under 11.23, elaborate on How (i.e., how were you able to control the sector?) and Why (i.e., why were you unable to control it?).**

(H119) Saturation Presence Patrols. Checkpoints. Reinforcing IPSF.

(H123) Control-overwhelming force and lack of organised threat.

Q11.25 Were you involved in any monitoring of arms embargoes/sanctions?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.26 What was your experience in this respect?

[No responses.]

Q11.27 Were any weapons collected for cash or land during your mission?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Q11.28 If so, comment on the effectiveness of this incentive.

(H119) Initially effective, then slow. Concern only the really poor turned weapons in or money. Criminals retained weapons. Same could have been so for anti-government personnel.

(H122) It worked real well. The people were extremely poor. The money offered was really significant for them. However you had to be careful that you did not encourage weapons smuggling across the border.

(H123) Very successful - weapons buy back program netted 13,501 weapons.

(H082) Cash for weapons program was ill conceived. Initially not well thought out. As time progressed it became better.

Q11.29 Were national police involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q11.30 Were other organizations involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.31 If so, which ones?

[No responses.]

Q11.32 If involved in chapter VI operations (peacekeeping), were military observers used in the collection of arms?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.33 If so, what type of military observer was used (i.e., UN, regional, other organization, etc.)?

[No responses.]

Q11.34 Answer if applicable: was there satisfactory coordination between military observers and yourself as unit commander/chief of operation?

Yes: 02 No: 00

Q11.35 Were the warring factions themselves involved in the collection of arms?

Yes: 00 No: 03

Q11.36 Did you use opposite party liaison officers so that all factions were represented in the collection of arms and the disarming process?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q11.37 If so, reflect upon your experiences in this issue.

[No responses.]

- Q11.38** With regard to the UN/national mission you participated in, do you believe arms can be effectively collected?
Yes: 04 No: 00
- Q11.39** Were you involved in the disarming of individuals, private and irregular units, and/or bandits?
Yes: 04 No: 0
- Q11.40** Was the UN police involved in these tasks?
Yes: 00 No: 04
- Q11.41** Were local authorities involved in disarming individuals?
Yes: 02 No: 02
- Q11.42** If so, what was their role?
(H119) Legitimizing through Government of Haiti Laws and Legal System.
(H123) Haitian Interim police disarmed criminals.
- Q11.43** Were there regulations in the mandate or peace agreement with respect to how to deal with private and irregular units?
Yes: 01 No: 02
- Q11.44** If not, do you think your task would have improved if there had been such an accord?
Yes: 00 No: 01
- Q11.45** Did you experience problems with snipers?
Yes: 00 No: 04
- Q11.46** If so, how did you counter this?
[No responses.]

Analyst's Comments:

As mentioned the Heavy Weapons Company inventory of weapons was first priority for the MNF Commander. In some areas of Haiti the weapons buy back program became a major economic boost to a population that the majority of the people had no jobs.

SECTION FIVE: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS**XII. DEMOBILIZATION EXPERIENCES**

Q12.1 Did the disarmament component of your mission include or infer demobilization?

Yes: 04 No: 02

Q12.2 If so, what types of demobilization operations were conducted during this UN/national operation (i.e., cease-fire monitoring, weapons cantonment, etc.)?

(H070) A netting process was conducted to select acceptable members of the military to press into service as interim police. The rest were allowed to enter a jobs training program to help them transition to civilian jobs.

(H122) In Haiti, the military was dissolved.

(H123) Demobilization of the Haitian military to include monitoring and providing support to a jobs retraining program.

(H176) Haiti was unique because the army first demobilized into a civilian police. Only after an interim police force created did a serious demobilization begin.

(H082) The habitual police and military went from approximately 7000 to 3000 to 1500, including 3000 police to whatever figure now.

Q12.3 Was the demobilization process accompanied by a national reintegration process involving government forces and opposing forces?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q12.4 If so, were sufficient means available for an effective reintegration process?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q12.5 If not, elaborate on the problems you experienced with this task.

(H082) My forces become all government to local populations-departs may be police, school admionistrators - humanitarian coordination.

(H176) There was no former combatants.

Q12.6 Which organizations assisted you in demobilizing (i.e., other services, international organizations, national organizations, or nongovernmental organizations)? List by order starting with most assistance to least assistance.

(H070) A Haitian military commission was formed to conduct the netting process which was submitted to the US Embassy for review. The jobs program was run by USAID and was available upon application.

(H122) The GOH demobilised its military. The MNF enforced this move. Former military were retrained(ex police force).

(H123) USAID - set up jobs retrain program.

(H176) We contracted with the International Organization for Migration.

(H082) None.

Q12.7 Was there a person or a branch responsible for plans for demobilization?

Yes: 02 No: 03

Q12.8 If so, who or which branch was it?

(H070) See 12.6

(H176) The demobilization was jointly planned by the multinational force, USAID's Office of Transitions Initiatives and the International Organization for Migration.

Analyst's Comments:

Reference Q12.1. In fact there was a UN Program designed to reintegrate the 5,500 soldiers that were "vetted" from the Army. Among them the senior military leadership. The Reintegration Program is designed to provide assistance to the government in the design, implementation and operation of a program to reintegrate former soldiers onto civilian life. It provides professional training, electrician, computers, mechanical etc. commensurate with their skills. 18 training centers have already been established. By March 27, 1995, over 3,048 former FAD, H soldiers have been enrolled. The course has a 90 percent attendance rate to date. This six month course provides food and money for transportation to all members. Of course, that begs the question, If 3,048 former soldiers are in daily training daily, what are the other 2,452 up to?

XIII. DEMINING EXPERIENCES**Q13.1 Did you experience mine problems?**

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q13.2 If so, what did you do to counteract them?

[No responses.]

Q13.3 Was there an exchange of maps of minefields at the outset when the agreements were signed?

Yes: 00 No: 02

Q13.4 If not, was it feasible to have such maps?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.5 If so, do you think there should have been an agreement for the exchange of maps at the outset as part of the agreements signed?

Yes: 00 No: 00

Q13.6 If no maps were available and it was not feasible to chart the location of minefields, did you consider yourself adequately prepared to deal with the demining of haphazard minefields?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.7 Did your unit play a role in the demining process?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.8 Was the UN involved in demining?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.9 Was the UN interested in becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.10 Was the host nation involved in demining or interested in becoming involved in demining?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.11 Were local groups/militias involved in demining?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.12 Do you think local groups and militias should be encouraged to undertake demining tasks?

Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.13 Why?

[No responses.]

Q13.14 Were humanitarian organizations or private firms involved in demining?

Humanitarian Organizations: Yes: 00 No: 01
Private Firms: Yes: 00 No: 01

Q13.15 In your opinion, who should undertake demining processes and why?

(H119) Host nation. Private contractors under UN supervision.

Analyst's Comments :

The MNF and PHASE two forces of UNMIH have participated in few if any demining operations to date.

SECTION SIX: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XIV. TRAINING

Q14.1 Prior to deployment, did your units undertake specific training programs related to disarmament operations?

Yes: 01 No: 04

Q14.2 If so, were these training programs based on guidance from the UN forces already in the field, from the UN in general, or from your national authorities?

UN forces in field: 00 UN in general: 00
 National authorities: 01 Other: 00

Q14.3 Were your units trained specifically for the collection of arms and cantonment of factions?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q14.4 Were you and/or your units trained in on-site inspection and observation techniques?

Yes: 00 No: 04

Q14.5 Have you been trained in verification technologies nationally?

Yes: 02 No: 02

Q14.6 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific weapons control and disarmament operations (i.e., weapons searches, inventories, elimination, etc.)?

Yes: 03 No : 01

Q14.7 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demobilization operations?

Yes: 01 No: 02

Q14.8 Were you trained and prepared to conduct specific demining operations?

Yes: 01 No: 03

Q14.9 On the whole, did you consider yourself technically and tactically prepared for the accomplishment of your mission?

Technically : Yes: 04 No: 00

Tactically : Yes: 04 No: 00

Q14.10 Was there anything done at the end of the mission to gather lessons learned?

Yes: 04 No: 00

Q14.11 Back in your own country, were you debriefed?

Yes: 03 No: 01

Analyst's Comments:

It is interesting that there were so many no answers to the specific demobilization and disarmament questions. Yet for the majority of the "combat force" i.e. 10th MTN Division and 3SF Group these tasks like, Cordon and Search are common COMBAT training missions. The US military refers to these as Mission Essential Task List or METL requirements. I do believe that the majority of UNMIH soldiers were fully trained and capable to perform this operation. That is why Q14.9 was answered in such a positive manner. UNMIH Phase II is much more of an international force it will be interesting in March of 1996 to attempt to draw conclusions concerning their training and performance compared to a basically unilateral force for UNMIH Phase one.

SECTION SEVEN: SUMMARY OF ANSWERS

XV. INTERACTIONS

Given that there are three common elements to a UN mission -- the military, the humanitarian agencies, and the political branch:

Q15.1 Would you consider the relationship between humanitarian elements/organizations and the military personnel during the mission to have been very good, adequate, or inadequate?

Very good: 05 Adequate: 01
Inadequate: 01

Q15.2 If you think it could have been improved, specify three ways in which this could have been achieved.

(H119) Funding constraints for humanitarian projects created conflicts in expectations.

(H120) The NGO's etc. need a supply and especially a maintenance capability or contract.

(H122) It was difficult to know what humanitarian elements were doing. Each batalion had civil affairs actions going . They were trying to pull into organisations that could help. It was difficult getting information.

(H123) Improved by better coordination and a better understanding of each other requirements.

Q15.3 How was the overall cooperation of the three elements of the UN components achieved during your mission? Summarize.

(H119) Daily coordination. Use of CA assets.

(H120) Not there during UN phase/take over.

(H121) Daily MNF command and staffs. Interaction with agencies officials. Providing support to components.

(H122) At my level I could not comment effectively.

(H123) No UN involvement during our mission.

(H176) USG took coordination role for various activities with the government in Haiti.

Q15.4 Did cooperation exist between the UN military, private and irregular elements, and existing police forces (UN or local)?

Yes: 03 No: 00

Q15.5 If so, describe which components cooperated with whom and the level of their cooperation.

(H119) All cooperated through various regular coordination meetings.

Analyst's Comments:

At the MNF headquarters level the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) that was established, coordinated major humanitarian and relief program and projects. The formal CMOC process is an excellent way to coordinate, prioritize and redefine NGO/PVO requirements and balance them against the military mission and assets available.

XVI. PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

On reflection,

Q16.1 What was the overall importance of the disarmament task for the overall success of the mission?

Very important: 05 Important: 03
Not important: 00

Q16.2 What were the three major lessons you learned from your field experience?

(H119) Scope of responsibilities expanded into political dimension and civil military operations. Transportation key to light infantry. Information campaign key to keep people informed.

(H121) Peacekeeping is costly. A nation must want to help itself. Good training prior to deployment is critical. People respect power/authority.

(H122) Rebuilding a country from scratch requires disarming. The criminal element will undermine efforts if you can reduce available weapons. weapons buy back program will work if country is economically depressed.

(H123) Coordinations with local government official is critical to mission accomplishment. Coordination and support to US embassy is critical. Highly trained and motivated soldier will find a way to accomplish any task.

(H176) There needs to be clear commitment to demobilization apart from the other security concerns of one mission. US military has much to learn about demobilization.

(H082) Disarmament is an overt action that is under control to indigenous population. It reinforces the fact that the soldier is the central mechanism, it ensures a safe and secure environment.

Q16.3 What other question should we have asked here and how would you have answered it?

Questions:

(H121) What was primary mission of your unit and how did it contribute to the success of the operation?

(H176) How do NGO's participate actively with civilian organizations in demobilization?

Answers:

(H121) Support the MNF with all forms of aviation rotary wing support. Missions included quick reaction force operations, attack helo, scout/recon, utility and medium lift. Timely and consistent aviation support was critical to the MNF in Haiti, since the country has an extremely poor infrastructure.

(H176) The civilian development agency role in demobilization is a critical component of demobilization processes. It must work cooperatively with military institutions to ensure objectives of mission function as planned. Too often the civilian agencies mandated to assume transition roles are given second class treatment.

To be answered only by those who participated in completed UN/national peacekeeping missions:

Q16.4 Do you think that the disarmament-related tasks which you undertook had an impact on the national reconstruction processes which followed the end of the mission?

Yes: 01 No: 00

Q16.5 If so, briefly explain how and why:

(H082) Disarmament of adversaries of Aristide will make the playing field a little more level, as he tries to establish infrastructure and the architecture of government.

