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Conventional Disarmament in Europe

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PREFACE

In paragraphs 81 and 82 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the most comprehensive consensus statement on disarmament formulated to date by the international community , it was considered that "Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament". States with larger military arsenals were especially urged to pursue such endeavours and Europe was specifically singled out as a priority region of the globe where agreement on mutual reductions and limitations of military potential could greatly contribute to the enhancement of international peace and security.

The Washington Treaty between the USA and USSR on the Elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range nuclear missiles has given new momentum to discussions for further disarmament measures between the two main military alliances in both the nuclear and conventional fields and brought to the fore the controversial issue of the correlation between nuclear and conventional weapons in securing military stability in Europe.

Situated as they are in the most densely armed region in the world, and having experienced two devastating wars in this century, the European states are the first to acknowledge the fundamental importance of reducing military tensions among themselves. However, divergences remain as to the concrete ways and means for the attainment of their security objectives on the basis of mutually acceptable reductions of their respective forces.

This research report on Conventional Disarmament in Europe, prepared by members of the Institute for International Relations, Potsdam-Babelsberg, GDR, and the Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw, Poland, offers one of many possible perspectives on the subject. It addresses the multifarious elements to be taken into account in the negotiations among the parties , such as the political conditions, the military doctrines, the symmetries and asymmetries of forces, the confidence-building and verification measures needed, and the scope of the negotiations, among others.

UNIDIR expects to publish other perspectives on Conventional Disarmament in Europe in the conviction that the publication of different political and academic views on this complex subject could contribute to a better understanding and evaluation of the concerns and expectations of each side, and thereby assist in the search for an acceptable outcome for all parties concerned.

Jayantha DHANAPALA
Director, UNIDIR

UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNIDIR is an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations. It was established in 1980 by the General Assembly for the purpose of undertaking independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues.

The work of the Institute aims at:

(*a*) Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race, and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;

(*b*) Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;

(*c*) Assisting ongoing negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

(*d*) Carrying out more in-depth, forward-looking, and long-term research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

The contents of this publication are the responsibility of the authors and not of UNIDIR. Although UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed by the authors of its research reports, it does assume responsibility for determining whether they merit publication.

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CHAPTER I

1. OBJECTIVES OF CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

1.1 For a change of the state of security in Europe

At first sight the state of security of European nations seems stable. In contrast to other continents Europe has not been a theatre of war for over 40 years, and in spite of all problems and contradictions Europe seems not threatened by a crisis which is fraught with an increasing likelihood of war.

Nevertheless, there is no European people, no European government that is satisfied with its state of security. The European peoples still recall the two world wars that emanated from their continent in this century, and they know that another military conflict would mean the end of European civilisation because it would unleash a devastating world war. Multifarious fears that a new European war could break out continue to exist and even grow.

The following causes are considered the most important ones:

- Europe, first of all Central Europe, is the region of the world with the highest concentra tion of nuclear weapons, armed forces and conventional armaments;
- This military power is being constantly and increasingly modernized;
- The two military treaty organizations which were set up and continue to work against each other are suspicious of the military endeavours of the other party and therefore mistrust one another.

These and other dangerous developments are expressions of the policy of deterrence.

As a matter of fact, the concept of deterrence, first of all by nuclear weapons but also by a combination of nuclear, chemical and conventional forces, is an extremely unsafe and potentially dangerous basis of security. The advocates of this concept argue that it was nuclear deterrence which prevented a European war during the last 40 years. They use both historical and topical arguments to justify deterrence strategies.

The aggressions and temporary successes of Fascist Germany and its allies are ascribed to a lack of military strength and preparation on the part of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition, and thus to a lack of deterrence. This, however, is merely a half-truth. On the one hand the military potential of Hitlerite Germany's opponents was even greater than the German one. On the other hand and more important was a lack of structures of collective security in Europe. The rejection of relevant Soviet proposals by the Western powers enabled the aggressors to subsequently attack their victims. Anti-communism was the fertile ground on which World War II could develop. Today, too, it is the basis of adherence to nuclear deterrence.

The main argument of these days says that the fundamental contradictions which exist between the two different social systems in Europe do not allow for any other form of

safeguarding peace than to threaten with mutual destruction and far-reaching unbearable consequences.

At first sight this seems logical. But at no time in the history of international relations did a policy of deterrence establish a durable, secure and stable peace. All the coalitions which European states built against each other in the past, claiming that joint military efforts were necessary to safeguard peace, only led to ever new wars.

This is why the threat of deterrence will only be effective if there are military forces to carry it out. Should the threatened party really plan an aggression it would increase its military power so that it is able to carry out its intentions. Should the threatened party not have such intentions it would regard the threat of deterrence as a danger to its security because the other party is busy with developing means to carry out this threat, in order to launch an attack. In both cases the strategy of deterrence produces an arms race. It evokes distrust, confrontation and feelings of threat on either side, limiting in this way the scope of peaceful co-operation between the states involved. Under the conditions of the nuclear and space age the strategy of deterrence means to act in a way which inevitably increases contradictions and leads to an enhanced arms race above all in terms of quality, thus producing ever new and more dangerous weapons and hindering the solution of pressing common tasks by all peoples. Experience over the past four decades has taught, moreover, that attempts at keeping nuclear deterrence at defined, controllable levels can hardly be successful. As long as distrust and confrontation prevail agreements on arms control can help to cut back onlysome elements of the arms race. But at the same time the rapid scientific and technological progress is used for developing ever new weapon systems in the nuclear, chemical and conventional spheres under circumvention of agreements on arms limitation. Finally it should be taken into consideration that nuclear deterrence could not prevent such extremely dangerous crises as the Caribbean one in 1962. Neither is it possible to exclude technical or human failure of nuclear deterrence.

The steady process of including more and more sophisticated systems of warfare has led to a situation, where decisions have to be made on the basis of complex elements and in an ever shorter time. Therefore military decision-making is being passed on to machines and the role of man with his rationality, but alos with his fears and morals, will be minimized even further, but also with his fears and morals, will be minimized even further. Under such circumstances the arms race threatens to get out of control.

There is yet another specific development in Europe. Here World War II claimed nearly 35 million lives and caused tremendous devastation in nearly all countries. Today, Europe is rebuilt. At the same time the living conditions on this continent have been basically changed over the past 40 years. Today, there are about 200 reactors and other nuclear installations, and hundreds of chemical works, which also produce highly toxic substances. For industrial and agricultural purposes large amounts of chemicals are being manufactured and stored. The food, water and heat supply of large parts of the continent, including all big towns, relies on electricity. There is hardly any drinking water untreated.

Any war in Europe would therefore endanger and finally destroy the living conditions on the continent.

In view of these and other circumstances any military conflict is highly menacing today. This renders absurd the idea that nuclear weapons could not be dispensed with because of conventional war becoming more probable again. Even in a Europe rid of atomic weapons reasonable political objectives cannot be achieved any longer by means of war or the threat of

war. Each war would only cause the destruction of all states involved and also of their neighbours and even of the entire continent.

Although the last few years have seen the start of encouraging developments towards new measures of arms limitation and even disarmament, far-reaching nuclear and conventional disarmament in Europe would best be based on fundamental re-thinking and a principally new approach to security.

1.2 Aims of a change in security policy

Departing from the different security concepts of the European states, particularly those of the two military alliances, it is quite possible to take definite steps towards arms limitation. The situation demands to use every opportunity for arms limitation and disarmament. But a real turn to comprehensive and balanced measures of disarmament in Europe would be essentially facilitated and encouraged if the necessity and possibility of developing a new security structure in Europe were understood. Considering the multifarious inter-relations among European states, and the common danger they are exposed to in case of conflict, security cannot be sought any longer through confrontation but only through co-operation. In the past years various political, economic, scientific and religious bodies have submitted concepts, and a special mention should be made of the outstanding Palme Commission Report concerning the establishment of a system of common security in Europe.

This document says:

> "In the modern age, security cannot be obtained unilaterally. Economically, politically, culturally, and - most important - militarily, we live in an increasingly interdependent world. The security of one nation cannot be bought at the expense of others. The danger of nuclear war alone assures the validity of this proposition. But the obvious economic and political interrelationships between different nations and different parts of the world strongly reinforce the point. Peace cannot be obtained through military confrontation. It must be sought through a tireless process of negotiation, rapprochement, and normalization, with the goal of removing mutual suspicion and fear. We face common dangers and thus must also promote our security in common".(1)

The Commission took into account, that differences among nations will not dissappear and that given the ideological contradictions between East and West - no meaningful conver gence can be expected. Also other problems of the present world cannot be expected to be solved overnight. But wars and lasting arms competition are no ways to solve any problem. A system of common security must be based on the following principles:

- All nations have a legitimate and equal right to security;
- Military force is not a legitimate instrument for resolving disputes between nations; The elimination of deterrence;
- Security cannot be attained through military superiority;
- The reduction and qualitative limitation of armaments.

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1. *Common Security, A blueprint for survival.* UN Document A/CN. 10/38 of 8 April 1983, p.12.

The attainment of a system of common security can only be seen as a process. Most of the authors who write about the concept of common security express their conviction that "deterrence and common security are incompatible" and "in the long term, the logic of Common Security implies a System of Collective Security".(2)

The ways and means we see to achieve this end are the subject of the following part of this study.

But it should be clearly stated: Disarmament in Europe including the reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments, has to be embedded in a process in which non-military relations among all European states are extended in every respect. The states' readiness for very extensive military reductions and changes will grow with the political, economic and human dimensions of European security being developed on the basis of equality. Close co-operation having multifarious forms can produce a network of interests which would suffer from any kind of military conflict or tension. The paramount interest in the preservation and development of mutually advantageous relations has to dominate over the military elements of preserving security.

Naturally, this can only be achieved if all states start out from European reality, renounce attempts to employ also non-military means for exerting pressure or even to change national systems. Otherwise this would lead to military confrontation and add to the problems, considering the sensitive and fragile state of European security. The road to real common security is thus a long and complex one. The central issue is to change the military situation through arms limitation and disarmament. What matters is to build a European home for all peoples of this continent enabling them to live in peace and security and with less weapons, irrespective of their social order, size and internal situation, thus offering them greater chances for development and for jointly solving the problems they are all faced with.

1.3 Prospects for conventional disarmament in Europe

Any endeavour to achieve disarmament or arms limitation in modern general-purpose forces presents a unique and complex task. On the one hand, these forces are composed of various categories of military elements, each having a specific internal organization and acting in a particular environment. However, being composed of so many elements the military system of a state is held tightly together by a common political purpose, a common doctrine and structure of command and control. These depend on nationally different political, industrial, social, demographic and also geographic conditions. The present coalition character of the East-West military relations further compounds the intricate assessments needed for negotiations on conventional arms limitation or disarmament. On the other hand, the general terms "disarmament" and "arms limitation" encompass a multitude of possible solutions - from the reduction in forces and weapons, over constraints on various activities, thinning out, withdrawal, zonal redeployment, and restructuring, down to complete or partial restrictions or prohibitions with regard to material or behaviour. Taking all these issues together, it seems understandable to regard conventional disarmament as an issue which surpasses any other field of disarmament in complexity. Here one may find a cause of the difficulty to negotiate

2. D.S. Lutz, *Common Security - the New Concept*, pp. .5-9.

conventional disarmament but, at the same time, also a reason for hope since there may be many ways leading to the desired aim. Everything depends on the ingenuity of negotiators and their political will.

After World War II conventional disarmament was not a primary concern of states. There have been proposals and negotiations on this subject. But at the same time the conventional arms race has continued over the decades and it was, by and large, obscured from the eye of public opinion by concerns about the existence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. This situation was understandable although throughout the post-war period, even in times of most intensive nuclear armament, it was the conventional arms race that consumed most resources and produced the means for countless wars in many parts of the world. However, during the last 10 years or so the interrelationship between nuclear and conventional weapons, especially in the East-West confrontation, and the growing dangers and costs connected with modern conventional armies have become apparent to governments and the general public opinion. Reasons for this are:

- Nuclear parity between East and West, making nuclear arsenals a political and military liability rather than a useful tool of international policy;
- Rapid technological development visible across the board of conventional armoury, with a destructiveness as threatening to urbanized areas as some smaller categories of nuclear weapons and with growing availability to an increasing number of states;
- Exponential growth of costs of conventional weapons.

In the East-West context this increased awareness of the necessity to put restrictions on the conventional arms race ran ahead of the political maturity needed to tackle the problem. Negotiations aiming directly at a reduction in conventional forces in Europe have been held in Vienna from 1973 until now. Apart from this there are efforts which are less directly connected with this issue, e.g. in the framework of the CSCE process. They did not yet bring any results as far as a real limitation of conventional forces and arsenals is concerned.

However, this inability to come to concrete steps in conventional disarmament in Europe seems to fade away at last because of the following reasons:

Firstly, the steady improvement of relations among all European countries and between the Soviet Union and the United States uncovers the senselessness of not only the nuclear but also the conventional arms competition. The public, but also more and more governments realize that the military potentials in Europe are far too great for the achieved level of political and economic relations and put a heavy and unwarranted burden on them.

Secondly, there is a growing interest of general public opinion both in the East and in the West in the improvement of security in Europe, including the redefinition of the role of the military factor therein.

Thirdly, the political and economic reforms in socialist states create a favourable climate for more vigorous negotiations.

Fourthly, after the successful conclusion of negotiations on the elimination of medium and shorter-range missiles from Soviet and American arsenals and with good prospects for further agreements between the two powers on strategic and space weapons the tactical nuclear and conventional weapons have become a priority issue in the European dialogue. Moreover, the

INF treaty has created a favourable climate for this dialogue to be directed to the next disarmament steps instead of compensations for the eliminated categories of weapons. Everything mentioned above points to an important observation: among the many elements of conventional disarmament negotiations in Europe the most important one - the proper political conditions - is improving. This is why we believe that the chances for conventional disarmament are improving in comparison to those of the last four decades. That is why they should not be rejected.

CHAPTER II

REQUIREMENTS FOR CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

2.1 Political background - The necessity of political and military stability

The intended process of a far-reaching reduction in the military potentials of Europe would constitute a basic change in the character of European security. The permanent ensuring and strengthening of international and all-European security on the basis of equality is of decisive importance for the realization of such a disarmament process. The necessary replacement of mutual nuclear and conventional deterrence by gradually advanced elements of common security, trust and disarmament must not lead to political and military instability and to the feasibility of wars in Europe (in any form whatever). Resulting therefrom are, on the one hand, consequences for the concrete organization of a process of arms limitation and disarmament in Europe and, on the other hand, the need for a parallel development or maintenance of stable, peace and security-promoting political, economic, cultural, humanitarian and other relations among the states. The WTO member states stressed this aim in the Berlin document on their military doctrine: "The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty and of each State party is subordinated to the task of preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional".(3)

From this viewpoint and that of strengthening European and global security the following political and military requirements are indispensable for the process of conventional disarmament.

Firstly, the military strategic parity between the USSR and the USA is an indispensable and favourable background for the initiation of conventional disarmament in Europe. A level of this parity as low and stable as possible would have a positive effect on the European situation. Of topical importance would be profound cut-backs of the strategic nuclear arsenals of both states, the observance of the ABM Treaty, as well as a further limitation of the strategic arms race in terms of quantity and quality, inter alia, the cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, the Soviet-American treaty on the liquidation of medium and shorter-range missiles from December 1987 is a first, essential step towards nuclear disarmament in Europe. However, a great number of nuclear weapons still remain on both sides. In the West they are regarded as a necessary part of nuclear deterrence and of the strategy of flexible response. In the opinion of the East they consist of effective weapons for surprise attacks and pre-emptive strikes. They are often also regarded as lucrative targets for a pre-emptive strike. It is for these reasons that they cause tendencies of instability, unpredictability and mistrust as well as escalation compulsions in critical situations.

Further steps towards a reduction in nuclear weapons in Europe are, in our opinion, of great importance for the military stability and security on the continent and for radical cuts in conventional forces.

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3. *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, 30-31 May 1987.

Thirdly, at any stage of the process in conventional disarmament the military security of all European and non-European states must be ensured.

The especially far-reaching prospects of conventional disarmament in Europe require that special attention be paid to political stability in Central Europe. Under no circumstances may disarmament be a vehicle for pursuing aims directed towards a change in the political, social or territorial *status quo* in this region. The character of the relations under international law between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany must not only be respected but also consolidated in the course of conventional disarmament in Europe.

Fourthly, the non-participation of militarily significant states in conventional disarmament negotiations and measures regarding Europe would disturb the whole process seriously.

The most favourable political conditions for far-reaching conventional disarmament will be established once all CSCE states embark on a process of reducing the role of the military factor as an element of their security concepts, based on the Helsinki Final Act. In doing so one has to start out from the existing military balance of power with the aim of reducing its level step by step to a lower balance and of changing its structure into a defensive one.

2.2 The development of military forces in Europe

a) *Problems and criteria of an assessment*

The discussion about the military balance in and for Europe is known to be controversial. Moreover, the assessment of this balance of forces is an extremely complicated matter. However, tendentious, selective and ecxessively technical or purely quantitative methods are often used. In our opinion, a serious analysis requires to take into account the whole complexity of the problem. Part of it are the indivisible interrelations between the strategic parity of the USSR and the USA, on the one hand, and the military balance between NATO and WTO states in Europe, as well as the correlation between nuclear and conventional arms and armed forces in Europe, on the other hand. Furthermore, all services should be considered, i.e. land, air and naval forces but also important regional relationships of forces, geographical and political factors and qualitative questions (technological level and combat capabilities of armaments, standard of training and combat readiness of the armed forces, mobilization capability, quality and experience of troop command, reconnaissance etc.). It is first of all the quality of weapons and troops that play an important role in a military balance. An almost insoluble problem arises here for the East-West discussion and especially for negotiations: The consideration of these and further complex factors would base the assessment of the military balance on a subjectivist estimation of individual aspects (quality of weapons, morale and combat readiness of the armed forces, command qualities etc.), especially since the incalculable conditions of a modern war cannot be put to the test. Carl von Clausewitz was right when he said, "Here thinking leaves the sphere of exact science, of logic and mathematics and becomes, in the broader sense of the word, an art...".(4)

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4. C. von Clausewitz, *Ausgewählte militärische Schriften*, Berlin 1980, p.406.

It is imperative to seek a mutually acceptable objectification of the assessment since it is urgently necessary to evaluate the military balance in Europe, in the individual regions and, regarding the various types of weapons, not unilaterally but, to a certain extent, conjointly (first of all with regard to negotiations). At present, comparisons of figures concerning the main weapon systems, units and manpower are possible under the consideration of some decisive politico-geographical factors.

From a scientific approach, objectivity and mutual acceptance the following criteria are obviously indispensable:

- Quantities, i.e. numbers of weapons alone do not say much, most important are the dynamic factors, the options and capabilities of military forces in the battlefield which comprise quantitative and qualitative aspects, the geographical position of troops and depots, training, doctrines and other questions;
- Consideration of the armed forces and armaments of all WTO and NATO member states, including France and Spain;
  Inclusion in the analysis of both nuclear and conventional forces;
  Comprehensive assessment, i.e. taking into account all services which are of importance to the military balance in and for Europe.

Such an approach to the assessment of the military situation in Europe does not exclude negotiations on a reduction in individual elements and certain areas of this complex issue. A selective approach to disarmament negotiations may even be necessary to achieve anything at all. There are also a number of dangers involved, however, which the negotiating countries should be aware of:

- Demands calling for unequal reductions, disregarding the overall balance of power;
- An accelerated arms race in the fields not included in the negotiations;
- The possibility of new imbalances developing.

Such consequences would not mean a strengthening of stability but rather the opposite.

b) *Essential features of the military balance in and for Europe*

The following factors have a decisive influence on the military balance in and for Europe.

Firstly, in Europe the two world powers with their enormous armed forces and their most sophisticated nuclear and conventional weapons face each other directly. Following therefrom is that, on the one hand, the influence of the nuclear strategic parity between both states is of special importance to the military balance in Europe. On the other hand, it is for this reason that the political and military stability in Europe also plays an important part in global security. The manifold correlations between strategic nuclear, tactical nuclear and conventional weapons in and for Europe are especially close and complex.

Secondly, regarding the total population and industrial output, the NATO states have patent advantages, compared with the Warsaw Treaty states (population 620 and 375 million respectively). The industrial output of the NATO states is by far in excess of that of the WTO states. Moreover, the industrial capacities of the Western countries are used to about 80 per cent at the moment. Account has also to be taken of the fact that US industry cannot be

threatened militarily, except by a strategic nuclear strike, as can important industrial centres in the USSR.

Moreover, NATO states, above all the USA, are closely connected by different political and military alliances with other states with an advanced economic and military capability: these are Japan, Australia, Israel, South Korea, etc.

Thirdly, NATO's expenditure on defence has been permanently higher than that of WTO (according to SIPRI-data, data in million US $ at 1980 prices):(5)

	1980	*1981*	*1982*	*1983*	*1984*	*1985*
NATO	256,301	267,037	283,792	298,822	308,124	327,680
WTO	144,279	146,478	148,974	151,045	155,303	160,132

As the NATO countries are investing double the amount of finances into the same size of military forces, this must be reflected in the quality of the weapon systems, the pay of the personnel, training and exercises. As a matter of fact, NATO does attach great importance to these qualitative factors. A comparison of figures portrays this side of the balance of power only to a certain extent.

c) *Existing quantitative data*

For the time being it is difficult and dubious to compare figures on the balance of NATO and WTO conventional forces in Europe because of the very different data, their mostly incomparable calculation bases and for lack of agreed definitions. The following data taken from different sources demonstrate this situation:

CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF WTO AND NATO IN EUROPE

Manpower (1,000)	**WTO**	**NATO**
Soviet data (a) (world-wide)	4,788	4,933
(ground forces Europe)	1,669	2,123
NATO study 1984 (b)	4,000	2,600
Pentagon 1986 (c)	4,000	2,600
FRG study 1987 (d)	4,000	2,800
ACDA 1985 (e) (world-wide)	5,810	5,587
IISS 1986/87 (f) (world-wide)	6,290	5,412
(ground forces Europe)	2,704	1,858

a) USSR Ministry of Defence, *Military Balance between East and West, Socialism: Theory and Practice*, Moscow, 19854, pp.76-81.
b) NATO Information Service, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Force Comparison*, Brussels 1984, p.8.
c) *Soviet Military Power*, Washington 1986, p.91.
d) *Streitkräftevergleich 1987 NATO-Warschauer Pakt*, Bonn, 20 Dezember 1987, p.13.
e) US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, 1985*, Washington 1985.
f) IISS, *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, London 1986, p.226.

5. SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament*, SIPRI - Yearbook 1986, Oxford/New York 1986, p.231.

Combat-ready divisions	WTO	NATO
Soviet data (a)	78	94
NATO study 1984 (b)	115	88
Pentagon 1986 (c)	113	90
Pentagon 1987 (d)	133	90
FRG study 1987 (e) (divisions' equivalents)	121	102
IISS 1986/87 (f)	90	38
(including cadre divisions)	181	140

a) *Disarmament and Security*, Moscow, 1987, p.208.
b) *Force Comparison*, p.8.
c) *Soviet Military Power 1986*, p.91.
d) *Soviet Military Power, 1987*, p.93.
e) *Streitkräftevergleich, 1987*, p.13.
f) *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, p.226.

Tanks	WTO	NATO
Soviet data (a)	20,000 more than NATO	
NATO study 1984 (b)	26,900	13,470
Pentagon 1987 (c)	32,000	19,600
FRG study 1987 (d)	32,200	17,885
IISS 1986/87 (e)	46,610	20,314

a) D. Yazov, *Pravda*, Moscow, 8 February 1988.
b) *Force Comparison*, p.8.
c) *Soviet Military Power 1987*, p.93.
d) *Streitkräftevergleich 1987*, p.13.
e) *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, p.226.

Armoured vehicles	WTO	NATO
FRG study 1987 (a)	68,450	38,350
IISS 1986/87 (b) (total, world-wide)	82,470	58,799

a) *Streitkräftevergleich 1987*, p.13.
b) *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, addition of the national armed forces' data.

Artillery	WTO	NATO
Soviet data (a)	1	: 1
NATO study 1984 (b)	19,900	11,000
Pentagon 1986 (c)	18,600	14,200
Pentagon 1987 (d)	23,000	8,600
FRG study 1987 (e)	26,920	14,370
IISS 1986-87 (f)	24,035	8,974

a) D. Yazov, *Pravda*, Moscow, 8 February 1988.
b) *Force Comparison*, p.8.
c) *Soviet Military Power 1986*, p.91.
d) *Soviet Military Power 1987*, p.93.
e) *Streitkräftevergleich 1987*, p.13.
f) *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, p.226.

Tactical bombers and ground attack fighters	**WTO**		**NATO**
Soviet data (a)	1	:	1.2
NATO study 1984 (b)	2,250		1,960
Pentagon 1986 (c)	2,740		3,525
FRG study 1987 (d)	2,380		2,245
IISS 1986-87 (e)	2,426		2,380

a) *Disarmament and Security*, p.208.
b) *Force Comparison*, p.11
c) *Soviet Military Power 1986*, p.89.
d) *Streitkräftevergleich 1987*, p.16.
e) *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, p.227.

Combat helicopters	**WTO**		**NATO**
Soviet data (a)	1	:	1.5
NATO study 1984 (b)	1,135		560
Pentagon 1987 (c)	960		650
FRG study (d)	2,265		680
IISS 1986-87 (e) (armed helicopters)	2,085		714

a) D.Yazov, *Pravda*, Moscow, 8 February 1988.
b) *Force Comparison*, p.8.
c) *Soviet Military Power 1987*, p.93.
d) *Streitkräftevergleich 1987*, p.13.
e) *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, p.226.

Navy (world-wide)	**WTO**	**NATO**
Soviet data (a)		
- Aircraft carriers and VSTOL carriers	2	25
- Submarines	385	279
- Battle Ships, Cruisers, Destroyers, Missile Frigates	107	300
- Escorts (Frigates) and smaller ASW vessels	187	319
- Boats and Mine-sweepers	1,059	711
Landing ships and boats	132	541
Fighters and combat helicopters	1,126	3,173
Pentagon data (b)		
Aircraft carriers and VSTOL carriers (including KIEV-class)	1	10
- Helicopter carriers	2	6
- Cruisers	21	16
- Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes	199	303
- Amphibious ships		
- Ocean going	21	50
- Other ships/Coastal craft	181	69
Mine Warfare Ships/Craft	360	264
- Total Submarines	265	209
Sea-based Tactical ASW and Support Aircraft including Helicopters	145	831

a) *Militärbulletin*, Moskau, (1987) 23, p.2.
b) *Soviet Military Power 1986*, p.90.

d) *Assessment of data*

The data provided by the Soviet Union is usually a comparison of all countries in the two military coalitions. That includes all the systems deployed in Europe, as well as those in Turkey, and it shows up asymmetries on both sides.

The data forwarded by NATO countries differs strongly from one another, even with regard to the forces of NATO countries themselves. It is interesting to follow how the data provided by the Pentagon changed between 1986 and 1987. Usually the naval forces are left aside completely. Considering all these points the following conclusions may de drawn:

Firstly, the existing data cannot provide an exact picture of the balance of power in the conventional field between WTO and NATO. A lack of or differences in definition are being used to suggest a situation of threat in some countries with the sole aim of releasing more means for arms projects.

The contradictions between the individual data permit the conclusion that frequently unserious calculation methods are being applied. They are analysed in numerous scientific studies which shall only be mentioned briefly here.(6)

Co-ordinated definitions regarding geographical areas, the forces to be included and the weapon systems to be compared and negotiated, are necessary for talks.

Negotiations have to be based on an exchange of official data of the countries involved, which in turn have to be verified.

Secondly, the inclusion of qualitative factors in the assessment, above all the up-to-dateness and combat qualities of individual weapon systems, would clearly alter parts of the individual statements. For example, nearly half of the tanks which WTO possessed in 1986 were developed in the late 1940s, and introduced into the armed forces in the 1950s (T-54/55). WTO tanks are some 10t lighter than those of NATO (T-80: 44t/M-1 and Leopard 2: 55t). This entails quite considerable consequences for loading in weapons and ammunition. The greatly varying consideration of qualitative aspects by individual authors is controversial. Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher arrived at the following result in their 1987 comprehensive study "Is there a tank gap?":

"The Warsaw Pact's superiority in tanks in Europe has in our view been considerably overstated. On the one hand, its numerical advantage is relatively small: ranging from 1.3 to 1 to 1.6 to 1 depending on the stage of mobilization and area examined. On the other hand, the superior quality of NATO tanks as fighting machines largely offsets even this modest numerical advantage, and may even mean that NATO's tank force has greater combat potential".(7)

Thirdly, the number of weapon systems and forces of offensive-capability is extremely high on both sides. This holds true for the more traditional fast armoured units, as well as for fighter

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6. K.D. Voigt, Zahlen sagen nur die halbe Wahrheit, Bonn 1987; M. Chalmers / L. Unterseher, *Is there a tank gap?*, Bradford University 1987; A. von Bülow, Alpträume West gegen Alpträume Ost, Bonn 1984; T. Gervasi, Moskaus Übermacht. Eine amerikanische Legende, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1986.
7. M. Chalmers / L. Unterseher, *Is there a tank gap?*, Bradford University 1987.

aircraft and modern systems such as airborne troops, helicopters, far-reaching artillery and missile systems. This high offensive-capability is viewed by both sides as threatening and destabilizing. Their reduction is the main problem of conventional disarmament in Europe.

Fourthly, a fair comparison which includes all quantitative and qualitative elements of the ground, naval and air forces actually confronting one another in Europe, leads to the conclusion that neither side has a decisive military advantage over the other. There exists an approximate balance of conventional forces in Europe.

In principle, we agree with the assessment of the London International Institute for Strategic Studies: "Our conclusion remains that the conventional military balance is still such as to make general military aggression a highly risky undertaking for either side. Though possession of initiative in war will always permit an aggressor to achieve a local advantage in numbers (sufficient perhaps to allow him to believe that he might achieve limited tactical success in some areas), there would still appear to be insufficient overall strength on either side to guarantee victory. The consequences for an attacker would still be quite unpredictable, and the risks, particularly of nuclear escalation, remain incalculable".(8)

With regard to military options and possibilities there is, in the end, a clear balance in Europe between NATO and WTO. WTO's advantages in some quantitative parameters, mainly regarding ground forces in Central Europe, are by no means sufficient for real and usable military dominance, especially since they are faced with NATO's advantages in Southern Europe as well as in naval forces (quantitative and qualitative) and, at least, qualitative advantages in offensive-capable fighters (numbers of tactical bombers, bomb capacity, range). The existence and role of tactical and, above all, strategic nuclear arsenals of the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France as well as the extreme vulnerability of industrial societies must, in any analysis of forces, be regarded as a factor which evens out individual military advantages and involves an incalculable and unacceptable risk to aggressive aims.

2.3 The correlation between nuclear and conventional disarmament in Europe

The correlation between nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe is as obvious as it is controversial in its concrete consequences. It is in particular the question whether nuclear or conventional disarmament should have priority in terms of substance and time. The socialist states stressed their great interest in nuclear disarmament and simultaneously advocated radical steps towards the reduction of conventional forces. In their Budapest Appeal of 1986 they proposed "a substantial reduction in the land and tactical air forces of the European states and in the corresponding forces of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe. Simultaneously with conventional armaments, tactical nuclear weapons should be reduced".(9) In contrast, most of the NATO states consider the establishment of a conventional balance and a world-wide liquidation of chemical weapons a precondition for reductions in nuclear weapons of shorter range. In view of the current problems in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the relatively long term which the destruction of chemical

8. IISS, *The Military Balance 1986-1987*, London 1986, p.225.
9. *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, 12 June 1986.

weapons would require also after they had been banned as well as the possibility of individual states not allowing such a ban for some time, the matter of a "world-wide liquidation of chemical weapons" alone offers extremely uncertain chances for nuclear disarmament in Europe. Doubtless, the negotiations on conventional weapons will also be lengthy and difficult. Is it justified to make the initiation of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in Europe dependent on the successful completion of negotiations on conventional and chemical weapons? In our opinion, theoretical and fundamental as well as practical problems have to be considered in answering this question.

a) *Nuclear and conventional weapons from the aspect of military strategy*

In general, NATO regards nuclear and conventional weapons as well as the principles of their usage as an integrated whole (unlike the Soviet military strategy which has definitely renounced the first use of nuclear weapons, but is, of course, also prepared for their integrated use if a nuclear strike would force the Soviet Union to react). The Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council of December 11, 1987 says that for the foreseeable future there is no alternative to the concept of the alliance for war prevention, i.e. a strategy of deterrence being based on an appropriate composition of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces, with both elements being indispensable.

Dual-capable weapons and the C^3I systems form a technological basis for this indispensable interrelationship. In the escalation concepts of the strategy of flexible response the indivisibility of conventional, tactical nuclear, chemical and strategic nuclear weapons plays a central part. In view of the realities and the unpredictability of a military conflict in Europe one cannot proceed from the fact that a war between NATO and WTO may be limited to individual regions or individual types of weapons. Following herefrom are two important conclusions: *Firstly*, balances in both nuclear and conventional weapons as low and stable as possible are indispensable for European security. Instability in one of the two fields might become a source of serious tensions and incalculability. *Secondly*, there can be no doubt that the greatest danger emanates from nuclear weapons. Without underestimating the dangers of a conventional war one must start out from the fact that the use of nuclear weapons, even beginning with a relatively small number, would jeopardize the survival of the European nations, above all in Central Europe. Moreover, extremely destabilizing escalation compulsions would emanate from them in critical situations of military tensions. Therefore serious efforts to reduce conventional forces and negotiations on nuclear disarmament in Europe are necessary simultaneously.

This need not be conducted in one form of negotiation only. Various forms of simultaneous negotiations are possible. However a categorical postponement of nuclear disarmament would prove a great burden for the negotiations on conventional stability and a reduction in forces.

b) *Nuclear disarmament and conventional stability*

It is often said that nuclear disarmament would make a war waged with conventional weapons possible in Europe again.

We are of a different opinion. *Firstly*, we proceed from the fact that a comprehensive conventional war in Europe would ultimately make the continent uninhabitable as would a

nuclear war. *Secondly*, nuclear disarmament is a process. Remaining nuclear weapons, even in the case of their radical reduction, will balance certain conventional disparities, which may exist in the conventional field during steps of conventional reductions. *Thirdly*, far-reaching nuclear disarmament in Europe, especially the liquidation of all nuclear battlefield weapons would substantially increase military and political stability. *Fourthly*, we regard it as unrealistic to reach in Europe a usable conventional superiority of one side. Moreover, a strict defensive orientation of the military doctrines and strategies as well as of the armed forces and armaments could decisively contribute to a radical limitation of the offensive capabilities, in fact even to the elimination of the likelihood of war in Europe in general. Our conclusion is clear: nuclear disarmament in Europe does not lead to military instability but to the strengthening of the security of all European states.

c) *Dual-capable systems and negotiations on conventional disarmament*

In Europe there are numerous weapon systems on both sides suitable for the use of nuclear as well as conventional (and chemical) warheads. Among them are tactical missiles, shorter and medium-range bombers, artillery (over 152 mm) and, to an increasing degree, differently based cruise missiles.

These weapon systems can form a material basis for the correlation between nuclear and conventional weapons, but negotiations can be conducted in a flexible way. However, it is impossible to reduce heavy conventional artillery very much suitable for offensive purposes without including the dual-capable systems. Limitation and reduction of especially offensive-capable elements of the air force, i.e. shorter and medium-range bombers, inevitably include dual-capable systems as well. The disregard of such weapons which play an important part for conventional armed forces and conventional offensive capability would question conventional disarmament and defensiveness. This also applies to the problem of control and inspection of armed forces.

d) *Possibilities of considering correlations between nuclear and conventional weapons in negotiations*

The talks between the 23 WTO and NATO member states on a mandate for their negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe (1987/88) have made the practical importance of the problem very clear. On the one hand, the socialist states have always been interested in supplementing negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons and disarmament in Europe by steps to cut back on nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, the agreed negotiations between the 23 states are inevitably faced with the problem of dual-capable systems especially regarding heavy artillery, and also regarding aircraft if such problems are included, as the WTO states seek to do. In view of the portrayed correlation between nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe as well as the different interests and positions of the states concerned a flexible approach to nuclear and conventional weapons seems to be necessary. The following levels of negotiation, which would influence each other more or less, are possible in principle.

Firstly, dual-capable systems would be included in the negotiations between WTO and NATO member states on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals according to the agreed subject of negotiation (which could be extended in future).

Secondly, interested states could enter into negotiations on the reduction and disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons. Both bilateral Soviet-American talks and talks with other countries possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon carriers.

Thirdly, parallel to other negotiations interested countries could discuss and agree the establishment of nuclear weapon free-zones which could become effective as steps towards nuclear disarmament in Europe. They could include the prohibition of all nuclear-capable systems.

Conventional disarmament, as desirable and urgent as it may be, does not have any lasting prospects without negotiations on nuclear disarmament being initiated or continued in Europe. There is no doubt that the specific interests and positions of France and Great Britain have to be taken into consideration. This could be done by disarmament of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe first being initiated by the USSR and the USA and a denuclearization of the continent affecting, for the time being, non-nuclear states. The possible reduction in USSR and US strategic nuclear weapons also constitutes a favourable condition in this respect. At the same time it seems to become necessary to agree on concrete conditions for a participation of the other nuclear weapon states in the foreseeable future.

2.4 Symmetries and Asymmetries

WTO's and NATO's military arsenals facing each other in Europe show both important symmetries and asymmetries. The military capabilities and options are mainly symmetrical, whereas their concrete composition is predominantly asymmetrical. Mention has already been made of the approximate balance of the different advantages of one side or the other. However, increased attention has to be attached to the problem of asymmetrical structures. Substantial asymmetries in Europe result from objective reasons:

- The varying geographical situation of the two alliances including the different geostrategic location of the leading military powers, i.e. USSR and USA;
  The relatively strong geographical concentration of WTO in Central Europe and of NATO in South Europe (besides Central Europe);
- The different climatic conditions in Western and Eastern Europe (which caused, e.g., a stronger orientation of WTO towards ground-launched missiles fit for action also in extremely bad weather conditions).

There are also a great many historical, technological and other reasons which have led to these asymmetrical structures:

- The structures of the armed forces showed a strong tendency of reproduction going back to the time of World War II;
- Soviet experience gained in World War II (importance of large tank units, of quantitative factors etc.);
- Compensation of quantity by quality;
- Different military-technological developments;
- Armies of conscripts in WTO, professional armies in NATO (besides armies of conscripts).

a) *Role of geographical asymmetries*

Geographical asymmetries are of importance to the military balance between NATO and WTO as well as to the development of their military potentials, even if the assessment of this importance greatly varies, at the moment. In Western states the geographical advantages of WTO and the USSR are considered to be very great. These are supposed to be, first of all, the depth of the territory, the territorial cohesion, the advantage of the shorter inner connections and the existence of an advanced system of ground links. At the same time, NATO's disadavantages are stressed: limited depth of the territory, North and South flanks separated from the centre, the great sea distance between Western Europe and the USA, being NATO's leading powers. Quite a number of other aspects are mostly not taken into consideration although they seem to be quite advantageous to NATO and disadvantageous to WTO:

Firstly, NATO's leading power is still a virtual strategic island vulnerable only to strategic nuclear weapons, whereas the Soviet Union is within the reach of other nuclear weapons and, to a growing extent, conventional weapons, too. *Secondly*, the extensive East-West and North-South ground links of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (bridges which are stable targets) are highly vulnerable, whereas NATO's sea routes across the Atlantic can be regarded as fairly safe and indestructible, with the exception of relatively distant ports. *Thirdly*, modern sea links are to a certain extent comparable to rail and road links (10) regarding transport volume and speed. *Fourthly*, there are, mainly on the part of US armed forces, already large storage depots in Western Europe which are intended to be used for rapid reinforcement in times of crises.

There is no doubt that geographical asymmetries are of importance to the military balance and the structure of armed forces in Europe. However, their consequences are much more differentiated and less one-sided than generally portrayed. Amongst these consequences are, on the one hand, the obvious interest of WTo in secured ground links and, consequently, strong ground forces, and, on the other hand, NATO's interest in secure sea and air links, especially across the Atlantic, and correspondingly strong naval and air forces.

b) *Role of asymmetries in conventional forces and weapons*

Firstly, they have to be taken into consideration, of course, in a comparison of forces and in the negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe. *Secondly*, ways of comparing asymmetries have to be found in order to make compromises between the sides possible and to arouse understanding for each other's interests and fears. *Thirdly*, it would certainly be desirable to get rid of important asymmetrical structures to facilitate solutions by way of negotiations, to simplify the comparability of military potentials and to reduce reasons for mutual mistrust.

However, the elimination of existing asymmetrical structures is by no means easy or a matter of course. Quite the reverse, this question is extremely complicated and complex. The states parties to the Warsaw Treaty have proclaimed "their preparedness to have the imbalance that has arisen in certain elements redressed in the course of the reductions proposing that the side which has an advantage over the other side make the appropriate cutbacks".(11)

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10. Mention should be made of the fact that the rail links between the USSR and Central Europe require a switch-over from broad gauge to standard gauge. As compared with railway transport ferry traffic, e.g., from Klaipeda (USSR) to Mukran (GDR) substantially cuts down the time for transport.

11. *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, 30-31 May 1987.

Under the present conditions of an especially high level of military confrontation in Europe and the incessant arms race these asymmetrical structures and their differentiated consideration are of great importance for European security. They can only be overcome step by step, in a mutual process of disarmament. The principle must be that both sides participate in the reduction, but the reduction is asymmetrical so that a symmetrical and at the same time lower level of both sides is the result.

If we speak of substantial military asymmetries in Europe which are to be reduced and eliminated in a disarmament process, we think of those capabilities suitable for a surprise attack and offensive actions:

Firstly, the WTO member states have substantial advantages in the number of tanks in Europe as a whole.

Secondly, NATO states are numerically superior or at least with regard to range and capacity in tactical bombers, fighters and combat helicopters while WTO states possess more short-range interceptors (definitions of different aircraft vary and ought to be agreed upon).

Thirdly, regarding naval forces, above all those for operations on the high seas and for an offensive, NATO has unambiguous advantages in terms of quality and quantity, whereas the WTO states have more coastal craft.

Fourthly, there are great asymmetries rooted in regional factors. So WTO has certain quantitative advantages in Central Europe (the French armed forces being excluded from this sub-region) whereas NATO has advantages in Southern Europe.

The analysis of these and other asymmetries as well as the attainment of common definitions and data deserves great attention. Above all, realistic ways of eliminating such asymmetries in a long-term process have to be found and agreed on. They must consider the mutual security interests. In this connection one cannot assume that military symmetries alone strengthen the security of the European states. The existence of symmetrical, offensive-capable and nuclear-equipped armies in East and West, for instance, cannot be regarded as stabilizing. Symmetry is security-producing if on a defensive basis and together with a process of disarmament.

CHAPTER III

MAIN ELEMENTS OF CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

Among all elements of conventional disarmament negotiations in Europe the most important one, that is the proper political conditions, has reached a more favourable stage, as it was already described. This creates more favourable conditions than in the past for finding solutions also for the other elements of conventional disarmament.

3.1 Elements of conventional disarmament in the previous debates

One way to find out what these other elements of conventional disarmament are is to look to the past. The historical experience with regard to conventional disarmament after World War II may be of help, since several problems and methods of their solution that were discussed in the course of time remained to be or are similar to those confronting us today. That none of the problems was solved and none of the methods successful shows once more the truth of the principle of the supremacy of the political element over all other elements of conventional disarmament.

The problem of conventional disarmament was dealt with most comprehensively by various forums of the United Nations from 1946 to 1958, particularly during the deliberations of the Commission for Conventional Armaments (1946-1950), the Disarmament Commission (1952-1957, the meetings of which were later on devoted to more general items), and the Five Powers Sub-Committee (1954-1957). Closely related to the debates in the United Nations framework were discussions on the ideas presented at the meeting of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960) and the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962-1963, the debates of which were later on devoted to other matters). (12) Only a few of the proposals which were put forward during these debates were specifically directed towards the European continent but all of them concerned mainly the armed forces and armaments of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty states.

a) *The post-war period*

The Soviet Union, in 1946, proposed far-reaching measures of disarmament. In the proposals of that time it stressed the necessity of a reduction by one third of the ground, naval and air forces of the permanent members of the Security Council under international control *together* with the establishment of the complete prohibition of atomic weapons.

The Western powers preferred separate negotiations. A characteristic feature of their position was their resolution in the Commission for Conventional Armaments from 1948 in

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12. *The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970*, United Nations, New York 1970.

which they stressed that the atmosphere of international confidence and security is an indispensable condition for any reduction of armaments and armed forces, and that they insist on limiting these forces only to levels which are consistent with and indispensable to the maintenance of international peace and which do not exceed those that are necessary for the implementation of states' obligations and the protection their rights. A typical Western position has become part of United Nations resolution 192/III/ which says that "no agreement is attainable on any proposal for the reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces so long as each state lacks exact and authenticated information concerning the conventional armaments and armed forces in other states".

In 1952, in the Disarmament Commission, the three Western powers proposed common numerical ceilings for the Chinese, Soviet and American forces of 1.5 to 1 million personnel, and for the British and French forces of six to seven hundred thousand men, whereby the ceilings for other countries were to be fixed with a view to avoid a disequilibrium of power and would amount to preferably less than 1 per cent of the population of these states. Later this proposal was supplemented by the idea that the five permanent members of the Security Council would tentatively agree, within the established overall ceilings and on the basis of principal categories, on a distribution of their forces, the types and quantities of armaments for their support and at the same time the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission regional conferences of all governments having substantial military forces in the respective regions were to be held with a view to negotiate similar tentative agreements. They were to be incorporated into a general treaty which was to encompass all the reductions and eliminations of armaments and bring them into a balanced relationship by progressive synchronized steps all of this *after* having established an international control authority to ensure the execution and observance of such a treaty.

In the Five Powers Sub-Committee France and the United Kingdom presented a paper in 1954, which was accepted in principle by the Soviet Union and in which they stated that various measures of reduction, prohibition, disclosure and verification had to be linked together, as far as conventional forces were concerned, in order to increase the security of all parties at all stages and that transitions from one stage to another should proceed automatically, subject to the competence of the control organ verifying the next stage. One of the measures proposed was to limit the overall military manpower and military expenditures to the levels existing at the end of 1953 and, after the control organ would report its capability to enforce this measure, to reduce the existing forces in two stages down to the agreed levels of (1.5 to 1 million for the USSR and the USA and of 650,000 for the United Kingdom and France). In 1955 the Soviet Union further developed this proposal by stating that the prohibition of nuclear weapons could be postponed until 75 per cent of the reductions in the armed forces were executed, that ceilings for other states should be established at the World Disarmament Conference, and that military bases on the territory of other states should be eliminated.

In the aftermath of the Geneva Summit Conference of Four Powers in 1955, several new propositions were issued at the Sub-Committee floor. The United States suggested aerial inspection to be prepared against a possible large-scale surprise attack and proposed an exchange of information between the USA and the USSR about strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea, and air forces, as well as a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations together with their geographical positions. Verification of this information would be secured by ground observers, adding to the potential of aerial inspection. The Soviet Union proposed to establish a system of ground control posts in conjunction with the reduction of arms and prohibition of nuclear weapons. France raised a proposal for a financial supervision of disarmament. The United Kingdom put

forward an idea of mutual inspections, as a practical test of verification and as a means of increasing mutual confidence.

During the debates in 1956-1957 the Soviet Union proposed in addition to reductions in armed forces to the agreed ceilings, an establishment of a European zone of limitation and inspection and called for reciprocal unilateral reductions similar to those announced and executed by the Soviet forces in 1955 and 1956 (demobilization of 600,000 and 1.2 million soldiers respectively). These proposals were extended by the inclusion of a call for a gradual liquidation of foreign bases, a reduction by one third in the armed forces of the Four Powers stationed in Germany, a reduction in the forces of three Western powers stationed in NATO countries and of the Soviet forces stationed on the territories of Warsaw Treaty countries by a mutually agreed number. The Soviet proposal also foresaw the establishment of a control organ under the UN Security Council, together with a system of control posts and aerial inspection of European territories and other regions.

b) *The various elements of conventional disarmament were naturally prominent in the plans for general and complete disarmament* which were prepared by the Soviet Union and the United States and tabled at the conference of the Ten- and the Eighteen-Nation Committees on Disarmament in 1959-1962. Some of the ideas and concepts embodied in these plans are certainly worth recalling. The Soviet Union proposed the elimination of all ground, air and naval forces in three stages.

The first stage envisaged a reduction in conventional forces to the ceilings discussed a little earlier on, by disbanding entire units, withdrawing all troops from foreign territories, dismantling bases and destroying the arms of these units. The following stages contained the complete disbanding of all armies and the destruction of all nuclear weapons.

In case a comprehensive solution to the question of disarmament was not possible, the Soviet Union outlined the most important tasks for immediate steps in Europe:

- To establish a control and inspection zone in Central Europe;
- To set up a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe;
- To withdraw all foreigng troops from the territories of European countries;
- To conclude a treaty on the prevention of surprise attacks.

The plan for general and complete disarmament presented by the United States contained several elements similar to those proposed by the Soviet Union although some of them put particular emphasis on the exchange of various types of military data prior to the execution of any concrete measure. Accordingly, declarations on inventories of armaments existing at an agreed date were to be exchanged in the first stage. Afterwards armaments were to be reduced by 30 per cent within specified categories of various aircraft, missiles, tanks, artillery, armoured cars and ships. The reductions were to take place in three consecutive steps, each lasting one year. The armaments thus eliminated were to be placed under supervision and later destroyed or converted for peaceful use.

During this time assurance would have had to be given that retained armaments would not exceed the agreed levels. The production of armaments were to be limited to agreed amounts, the testing and production of new types of armaments was to be prohibited. As for the armed personnel, the reductions to prescribed levels was to be preceded by notification of the relative strength existing before such reductions, and these were to be carried out in three steps. As the end of each step reports on military expenditure were to be published. In addition, the plan

envisaged measures designed to reduce the risk of war in the form of notification of military movements and manoeuvres, establishment of observation posts, exchange of military missions, direct links of communication as well as an international commission on the reduction of the risk of war as a subsidiary body of the International Disarmament Organization.

A special and telling experience in the international efforts for conventional disarmament in its general sense was the Geneva Conference of experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attacks (1958).(13) Again, without judging the usefulness or correctness of a given proposal and without commenting reasons for the fiasco of the Conference it seems worthwhile to recall some of the ideas presented.

According to the declaration of the Soviet Union (28 November 1958), which was accepted as a document of all socialist states, a system of observation posts was to be set up at all communication junctures, consisting of 28 posts in the Warsaw Treaty states and 54 in NATO states plus Iran. A zone of aerial inspection in Central Europe was proposed, covering a territory of 800 kilometres on both sides of the demarcation line. Together with these measures foreign armed forces were to be reduced by one third in the aerial inspection zone and nuclear weapons were not to be allowed in the German states. Later on, in another document, the socialist states determined precisely all tasks and functions of the observation posts and the aerial inspections as well as their communication with the international control organ.

In the six working papers presented by the Western states there was no mention of any reduction in forces. All attention was given to the description of possible means of attack and the technical characteristics, which indicate their readiness for an attack; to the instruments which could be used for the observation from air and from outer space together with the specific features needed for an effective observation of various military activities; to methods of observing and inspecting long-range air forces; ballistic missiles, both stationary and mobile and land forces - covering all military units, their logistics, bases, transport means, and depots. This short excerpt from the Western documents shows that a surprise attack was to be prevented solely through concentrating on the observation and inspection of the operational means of attack.

c) As a third historical experience we would like to mention the *Vienna Negotiations* on a mutual reduction of forces and armaments. Various elements of conventional disarmament have been debated at this forum over the last fourteen years.(14) We would like to emphasize the following:

- Reductions to be executed in stages,
- Foreign forces to be partially withdrawn first,
- Reductions to be executed by whole units (Eastern position), including ground and air forces
- Or by reducing the numbers of soldiers inside units (Western position), after being with drawn from the zone of reduction the units are to be disbanded,
- Armaments of the reduced units to be withdrawn (Socialist states' position) or stored in the zone (Western position),

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13. Documents on Disarmament 1945-1959. Volume II, 1957-1959, Department of State, Washington 1960.
14. Rokowania Wiedenskie 1973-1978. Wybor Dokumentow W. Multan, Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowych 1980 - Vienna Negotiations 1973-1978. Selected Documents by W. Multan. Polish Institute of International Affairs 1980; T. Strulak: Rokowania Wiedenskie. Rozdzial IX, Negocjacje Rozbrojeniowe po II Wojnie Swiatowej. Vienna Negotiations, Chapter IX in: Disarmament Negotiations after World War II, Polish Institut of International Affairs 1985.

Common ceilings on ground and air forces to be established, with sub-ceilings on national forces determined,

- Freeze on numbers of forces and armaments,
  Reductions to be asymmetrical or proportional,
- Packages of various numbers of forces and armaments including some nuclear weapons, different for either side, were at times proposed as a reduction method,
- Data on existing forces were exchanged, with great effort devoted to establishing the methods of calculation of respective numerical potentials,
  Several related measures were proposed: such as notification of out-of-garrison activities exceeding a given numerical level, exchange of observers of such activities (inside and outside the zone of reduction), notification of rotation of forces in and out of the zone, aeriel inspection and ground inspection - on a part or on the entire area of the zone, permanent observation posts, periodic exchange of information on the level of forces, limitation of the number of military exercises, establishment of a consultation mechanism and a standing commission composed of both sides,
- A "gentleman's agreement" was proposed on national sub-limits to not derange the existing proportion of forces within the zone.

3.2 Main purposes of conventional disarmament in Europe - past and present

The multitude of ideas related to the various aspects of conventional disarmament and embodied in the past and on-going negotiations presents a valuable resource for current and future endeavours. It seems that all proposals on conventional disarmament revolve around a few basic elements, although it is visible that emphasis put on some of them differs over time and that there is a tendency away from the simple, quantitative elements towards more sophisticated ones, which are more concerned with the operational capabilities of conventional forces. *At first* the states considered mainly the numerical parameters of armed forces and armaments, dislocations of these two elements, military budgets, and verification of any measure concerning the limitations imposed on these elements. *Later* the qualitative factors, the activities of the armed forces and confidence building in the military domain were in the forefront of attention. *At present* such elements as the process of acquisition of modern military technology, military structures and military doctrines are added to those already mentioned.

Each of these elements has a great number of components, which may be subject to many changes negotiated and agreed upon. There are some possible purposes for these changes, the main one being invariably to increase the security of states, that is their trust that there is no threat of a surprise attack and large-scale invasion, and to increase the crisis stability of military relations between the opposing alliances in Europe that is to turn away from the existing arms race stability over the last four decades because this is considered too costly and danger-prone. Any measure directed to a limitation of the armed forces and armaments should therefore be analyzed in view of these main purposes. All elements enumerated above have retained their importance. Today a new one, the strictly defensive character of armed forces, is being discussed and requires increasing attention.

3.3 Numerical reductions in conventional forces

Reductions in armed forces and armaments are regarded by the authors of this study as the main way to diminish military confrontation and to increase European security.

a) *Ways of reduction*

The reduction of armed forces can be carried out in three ways basically, by equal quotes, by percentages or down to defined ceilings. *The first* clearly favours the side which was numerically superior at the beginning, especially if the reductions cut the overall number of forces radically and the resulting ratio of forces may seem highly destabilized in contrast to that of the superior side. *The second* approach looks more promising as far as stability is concerned. If the disproportion between the opposing forces is not too large at the beginning this form of reduction may lead to nearly equal ceilings. If this disproportion was large before the reductions then such a method may settle two kinds of problems: firstly, the superior side would have to reduce far more than the other side which might be politically difficult; secondly, the inferior side may feel that a further reduction of its forces would undermine its "operational minimum", however defined. *The third* way of reduction means, theoretically speaking, to even out the number of forces of the superior side and that of the weaker one. Thus, only one side is actually reducing. This eventuality cannot be ruled out though it would demand a great measure of good will on the part of the reducing side and might require a compensation in other fields of disarmament. The far more probable way of achieving common ceilings would be that both sides undergo reductions simultaneously at different percentages. This approach seems to be the most reasonable one to us since it enables the parties to reach a balanced and thus most profitable result.

b) *Problems of data*

It is apparent that any numerical reduction in forces calls for an advance solution of data problems. This matter is far more important with regard to the first two forms of reduction mentioned above. What matters most in the third case is to know how to verify the actual result of reduction and less how big the numbers were before it. As the experience of MFR talks in Vienna shows this matter is compounded by several methodological problems and by the different nature of national military forces, whether they are professional or conscript, fluctuating over years due to demographic phenomena, or numerically fixed, undergoing structural changes or rotating between different geographic locations, employing civilians or not. Without belittling the importance of data for successful negotiations of reductions in forces it is worthwhile to put the matter against the background of the overall military situation in which a given reduction step is to be taken. The military importance of some numerical disparities may be negligible whereas political costs for a transgression of agreed limits, if found out and exposed publicly, are always serious. The problem of finding out whether the prescribed limits were actually reached depends, of course, on the quality of the applied verification methods and on the actual modalities of the reductions: that is whether they were connected with a reduction in weapons, the destruction of living quarters, a general limitation of the military presence in a given region and so on. It seems that small numerical reductions without any other changes of the patterns of military presence and activities would be extremely difficult to verify, no matter how stringent the verification system may be.

It may be assumed that the data problem is basically a stumbling block in the early stages of disarmament, that is when the mutual confidence of the negotiating parties is at the lowest. Because of the present development of the attitude of the socialist states to the matters of openness and exchange of military information and because of the overall improvement of the political atmosphere between East and West this problem may soon be overcome. Leaving these issues for a discussion below it should be stressed, however, at this juncture that there is a difference between the problem of data on numbers of armed forces and weapons and the problem of an assessment of military potentials as well as between the matter of common ceilings and the matter of military parity or military balance. The assessment of military potentials depends ever less on an advance knowledge of numbers. And common ceilings are not tantamount to military parity. Even with the solution of quantified data problems at hand the negotiators will certainly find it very difficult to agree on the qualitative features of these numbers of forces and weapons. Thus it might happen that not one mathematical formula is acceptable to every negotiating party and that the only way out would therefore be to adopt political solutions which give less emphasis to the intricacies of numbers and qualities.

c) *Limitation of military potentials*

The general term "reductions" may apply either to a reduction through an actual demobilization of military personnel or to a reduction through the withdrawal of forces from a given area beyond its boundaries. The second option produces a number of questions like: how easy would it be to return the forces in case of need, how would the security of other regions be influenced by a redeployment of these forces, how strictly would a verification system have to be checked against a surreptitious reintroduction of these forces? It is clear that the demobilization of forces, as a higher form of disarmament, is easier to be verified and leaves less military options. However, the actual situation depends on the method applied in such a reduction namely whether it is executed by disbandment of the entire units or by a reduction in the number of their personnel only. Numerically it may produce the same result but from the point of view of the operational capability of the forces reduced the results might differ widely. That is why we think that the best way to carry out these reductions is to disband entire units.

Apart from numerical reductions imposed on armed forces there are numerous other ways to limit their potential. These are, inter alia: to decrease the number or change the qualities of weapons in units, shorten the duration of service, decrease the intensity of exercises, change the character of exercises, change the organizational structure of forces, decrease the proficiency of logistical systems, avoid the enemy-image indoctrination of soldiers and decrease the frequency of training for reservists. It may well be that the impact of some of these measures on the military potentials of states, may be greater than that of numerical reductions, since these measures clearly influence the readiness of forces and their ability to fulfil some military tasks. Therefore an adoption of some of these measures by states, on agreement or unilaterally, can be taken as an unequivocal sign of well-meant intentions.

3.4 Reductions in arms - quantity and quality as two inseparable elements

It seems that in the past governments and the public opinion attached greater importance to comparisons and reductions in numbers of soldiers of opposing states. At present, they are focusing their attention on the weapons themselves in their assessment of military potentials,

thereby critically influencing the opinions about the balance of forces as well as about the state of stability between them.

a) *Growing role of reductions in weapons*

This tendency will certainly grow due to the increasing importance of the technological factor for the effectiveness of weapon systems. The qualitative aspect of weapon arsenals greatly complicates the prospects for their limitation, irrespective of whether such a measure would be aimed at a single category of weapons or at several simultaneously. Identical numbers of weapons of the same category on either side could mean, that quite a different military potential is reduced or limited, because of qualitative differences. What complicates the issue even more is the fact that the process of weapon modernization is being accelerated and this makes the assessment of their operational features by the opposing side ever more uncertain. If the negotiations on weapon reductions or limitations are to result in carefully balanced measures the data exchange between states has to be extensive and methods of measuring the comparative strength have to be established. Thus, the importance of weapons being included in conventional disarmament measures unquestionably grows on the one hand, but their inclusion might seriously complicate the process of agreement on the other hand. Such a complication does not justify their exclusion, though, since they are of increasing importance for the maintenance of the security of states and overall security.

The quantitative limitations of armed forces usually relate to reductions in weapons. The linkage, however, is not obligatory. The weapons may be taken away from their crews with the latter assuming different military functions, or vice versa, the personnel may be reduced or withdrawn and their weapons stored or given to other units. The reduction in weapons may entail their physical destruction, the conversion of some of their parts for civilian uses or their mothballing under national or international control. Some weapons, like aircraft and helicopters, create special problems, due to their high mobility, when being withdrawn from a given zone. Others, cannot be easily monitored, because of their small size.

The technological factor complicates the issue of weapon reduction in yet another way. The modern arsenals are composed of many weapon systems which are interoperable, that is both support each other and if necessary substitute each other in a potential battlefield. Since the respective arsenals of states are subdivided in an asymmetrical way the reduction of one category of weapons on either side could have a different impact on either entire potential, because the possibility of compensation is different.

b) *Arms reductions and the problem of stability*

One of the practical means of a limitation of conventional weapons would be to adopt measures which result in a decrease of the efficiency of the weapon or its operational readiness, including its capability of high concentration. Modern weapons consume enormous amounts of fuel, lubricants, spare parts. They must be checked, repaired and overhauled often. For their effective use large stocks of ammunition have to be close at hand. Because of their complex structure and the fact that they act in close combination with other weapons and technical systems their crews need extensive training. All these elements of modern military arsenals can be subject to various regulations or restrictions, including zonal arrangements.

A limitation of conventional weapon systems would not be militarily significant without an agreement to check their modernization. This necessitates first of all some constraints to be imposed on the R and D activities and resources as well as on ground and flight testing of new models of weapons. So far such measures have been rarely considered at the negotiating table between East and West. Without taking them up, however, the constant development of conventional weapons into more potent and efficient, with serious destabilizing effects, would not be stemmed. Among the conventional weapons existing today some are considered more threatening than others - threatening in the understanding of the states which are potentially exposed to their use in case of a conflict and threatening because of their destabilizing operational characteristics. These weapons should be a priority concern in Europe. Such categories of dangerous weapons include strike aircraft, tanks, long-range artillery and rocket artillery, and missiles not used in defence against tanks and helicopters. To demonstrate why these weapons belong to this special category, we would like to list some more objective criteria: long-range of action, short time of arrival at a target, large area covered by fire, impact of a single salvo, load-factor, kind of ammunition and weapons carried on board, invulnerability to observation means and to electronic countermeasures.

A special case with regard to the limitation of conventional weapons as well as destabilizing effects is, naturally, the case of dual-purpose weapons. It is extremely difficult to differentiate in a given category of weapons between those with a nuclear mission and those which are strictly conventional ones. If a disarmament measure covers only the latter, it would be difficult for any system of verification. If disarmament efforts were directed at both categories simultaneously, the political process leading to an agreement might be much more difficult but in some cases unavoidable, for example concerning heavy artillery. The conventional weapons which are already deployed, or will be deployed soon in Europe possess operational qualities that were not displayed a decade ago. This process comprises:

Firstly,
technologically

- The tendency towards "computerizing" the armed forces;
- The comprehensive application of microelectronics;
- The introduction of qualitatively new C^3I-systems;
- The development of "exotic" weapons;

militarily/operationally

- The ability to strike at targets with highest accuracy even at long distance, including "intelligent" munition;
- Independence of weather conditions and daylight;
- Far-reaching coincidence of target discovery and attack;
- Enormous increase in manoeuvrability and speed of fire;
- Area weapons;
- Increased abilities for deep strikes;
- Very specific weapons designed for different targets, whether point and hardened, area and soft, surface or underground stationary or mobile.

Secondly, though the development of such weapons is often regarded as part of the modernization of deterrence, they also lead to the strengthening of capabilities for a successful surprise attack, especially for excluding hostile air forces on the ground.

They increase in particular the threat and the theoretical effectiveness of pre-emptive strikes. If such capabilities are simultaneously developed on both sides, the military balance in Europe will be equally undermined because this would lead to an increase in the "pre-emptive bonus" for a surprise attack.

Thirdly, some of the conventional weapons (with high precision) reach the operational effect of tactical nuclear weapons. It is against this background that in some influential strategic views problems of a war in Europe limited to conventional weapons are gaining in importance again.(15) From our viewpoint, such developments are alarming, as they ignore essential realities of the European and the global situation.

Fourthly, recently, new technological possibilities in the military field have been generally accompanied by developments in regard of the military strategies or individual elements thereof which we consider to be destabilizing. Among them are, in particular, ideas of "deep strikes" (FOFA) which inevitably require offensive capabilities, the development of concepts of warfare, tendencies of intensifying forward defence (with an offensive intention) the military means of which are, to a large extent, identical with offensive means.

Apart from the new weapons, some of the weapons which already exist in Europe may also be considered destabilizing because of their qualities as well as their dislocation and structure. This category includes some particularly capable strike aircraft and large tank formations in the vicinity of the borderlines. As a rule, such new and old weapons are destabilizing firstly because, they are capable of a surprise strike and, secondly, because their destruction becomes a matter of priority in times of serious crises since they are extremely powerful. They must be used before they are destroyed. They must be destroyed before they are used. These particularly threatening weapons cannot be limited by restricting their operational qualities - such a measure would be technically dubious and impossible to verify. The better way is to eliminate certain types of weapons altogether, or to reduce their number, or to withdraw them from a specified area, with the preference for the first.

NOTIONS OF PARITY AND STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS AND ON DEFENSIVE STRUCTURES

As seen above states do not achieve more security from just any form of reduction but only from more specific ones, which take into account their security concerns precisely. Furthermore, it seems that the problem of enhancing the stability between the two military groupings in Europe is at present considered a priority issue. But it should be noted that a stability in military relations between modern armies does not simply arise from a quantitative parity. Exactly the numerically same arsenals, consisting of powerful weapon systems, would be extremely unstable in times of crises. The way of striving for common ceilings and a strict balance of military power is, historically, a classical, orthodox method of enhancing the states' security in disarmament. However, as said above, a balance of forces can never be measured precisely due to the difficulty in assessing the qualitative characteristics of weapons, and many kinds of asymmetries and disproportions in the military forces. Moreover, once a military balance is achieved it is not maintained by itself over a long period too many dynamic technological factors influence the developments in the military forces, and the parity which exists in some elements of the military potentials becomes meaningless. It does not enhance the

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15. Discriminate Deterrence, Report of the Commission on integrated long-term strategy, Washington D.C. 1988.

states' security. What seems to be necessary are, *firstly*, measures which rule out the ability of states to launch surprise attacks (in contrast to a large-scale invasion) and, *secondly*, measures which profoundly change the national military systems of the states in Europe and which would clearly enhance their mutual security.

a) *Arms limitation and surprise attack*

WTO and NATO declare officially that they are not willed to attack each other. But at the same time they feel that either side has more or less strong elements and a military structure of its armed forces that does not fully correspond with this declaration. Surprise attack means that there are no signs of its preparation or they are discovered too late. The degree of readiness to launch such an attack depends on its military purpose - either to conquer the enemy, to capture part of its territory, or to demonstrate one's resolve to obtain some political concessions. According to the purpose the military means are gathered and made ready. The readiness to attack depends objectively also on the degree of preparedness of the threatened side. In order to execute a surprise attack the armed forces must be constantly on the alert (full manning of weapons and units), well trained in the operations planned during the attack and close to the crossing line. The logistic system must be fully ready to supply all necessary means (ammunition, petrol, oil, lubricants, repair shops, medical treatment, food) and the structure of forces must be in accord with the task (enough fire support, transport capacity, reconnaissance, means of radioelectronic warfare and so on). All these elements must be continuously in place. To counter the possibility of a surprise attack several measures can be designed; lowering the quantitative level of forces and weapons adjacent to the demarcation line, withdrawing them or dispersing some units over a larger area (thinning them out), separating the logistic support facilities from the operational units, reducing or limiting otherwise the most offensive-prone weapon systems, improving the observation capabilities by agreements on aerial inspections, on non-interference with reconnaissance means of the other side, on exchange inspections and on various forms of notification.

It is worthwhile to note that an ability to launch a surprise attack does not necessarily mean an ability to launch a large-scale invasion. In the latter case the preparations are more apparent; a national system of mobilization would probably be set in motion, the whole national economy would have to be oriented to war conditions in advance, and reinforcements would have to be ready and on their way for some time. Such extensive preparations for war are absolutely incompatible with an arms limitation régime.

b) *Reductions and the transformation of military systems as a source of European security*

Another postulate related to achieving a desired situation of security for all states in Europe presupposes in addition to reductions and limitations the transformation of armed forces into strictly defensive potentials. It is known that the socialist states have proposed to base these transformations on the principle of reasonable sufficiency, that is on a military strength and armaments which meet the requirements of a reliable defence only and on structures which are designed in such a way that they can provide everything needed for the repulsion of a possible aggression but cannot be used for offensive purposes. The principle of reasonable sufficiency should not be understood as a permission to expand the military potential at will but should be understood as we do it, namely as leading to a real non-offensive posture on either side.

It is apparent that reasonable sufficiency has much in common with various forms of alternative defence options, such as non-offensive defence, defence superiority, structural defensiveness and the like. But it is hard to compare the socialist concept with one of them or the other.

A number of such plans still have a few setbacks, which include:

Emphasizing unilateral changes, whereas the socialist countries are working for a joint process of transformation in Europe;
Favouring far-reaching conversion and modernization plans aimed at defensiveness, whereas the socialist countries regard disarmament as the main way for implementing such a concept of defensiveness;
- Fixing distant goals, which often lack realistic measures of achieving them, whereas the socialist countries, based on the existing realities, are proposing concrete steps towards reducing military confrontation under strict adherence to the principle of equal security;
The dominance of a technical and military-tactical approach, whereas the socialist countries stress joint political determination as the main element for a transformation towards common security.

However, despite all these criticisms, we strongly support this direction of thinking of various intellectuals, scientific groups and institutions that work hard to further develop these ideas.

There is no need for arguing that "defensiveness" is not a feature of any weapon but of the entire defence system of a state, including its foreign policy, military doctrine, kind of military training, dislocation of forces, the numerical level of forces, their structure. If the purpose of a change of the existing military systems is to establish an unequivocal defensive posture then the reductions across the board could not change the existing characteristics of these systems. What is needed are gradual reductions directed first of all towards the offensive capabilities of the forces while the defensive element of either side would be preserved. This would lead to mutual defensive sufficiency.

The process could be started by simple signs like: decreasing the numbers of troops and weapons in the most exposed zones at the dividing line between the two alliances or withdrawal of elements of the military equipment or logistic systems. Subsequently, various zonal arrangements could be introduced.

One of the disadvantages of the zonal approach would be an eventual concentration of forces in new areas of deployment thus complicating the maintenance of security in the adjacent states. That is why zonal solutions are facilitated once they are aimed at interacting with a general European process.

c) *Structural changes*

Finally, the transformation of the military systems of states would lead to more permanent structural changes. The term "restructurization" is often used in Western literature without an attempt to clearly define it. It seems to us that structural transformations may encompass:

- Changes in the proportions among specific categories of forces (air force to ground force, operational force to territorial force etc.);
- Changes in the proportion of foreign and national forces on a given territory (in Central Europe);
- Changes of technical nature (composition of weapon stock in a given type of unit, number of bridging equipment per unit, number of heavy artillery pieces compared to light ones etc.);
- Changes in the organization of forces (number of companies in battalions, number of battalions in regiments etc.);
- Changes in the dislocation of units and weapons in a given area.

These changes may be agreed on mutually in some cases. However, because of national particularities of existing armed forces their structural characteristics may vastly differ, even in the framework of the same alliance. In this situation it would be in vain to expect an agreement on any kind of a model of military forces, exactly the same on both sides. Each state has particular geographic features, different configuration of terrain, various possibilities in using natural obstacles and, therefore, the matter of transforming one's military forces into a "defence sufficient" system has to be based on common basic principles. It is at the same time desirable that the changes are really acknowledged by the other parties as being truly well-meant from the point of view of their security.

While carrying out these transformations the same states might be exposed to constant pressure exerted by industrial, administrative and scientific circles to make them apply as much new military technology as possible. A modernization of the weaponry and the technological basis of the military forces should be clearly limited and only directed towards an upgrading of their defensive nature in the process of restructuring military systems. However, some ways of modernizing armed forces may be misconstrued by other states and may create strong impulses to re-open the technological arms race, especially during the period of transition. Much depends once again on the prevailing political atmosphere in East-West relations and on the level of overall co-operation. What may be helpful, although admittedly politically very difficult, is a consultation mechanism which makes possible more open discussions of acquisition plans and a mutual assessment of the arms control implications of these plans. Our group has even more ambitious intentions. We endeavour to use these consultation mechanisms to achieve restrictions on weapon modernization and promote technological co-operation between East and West.

CHAPTER IV

CONFIDENCE BUILDING AND VERIFICATION

We have to distinguish between confidence-building measures in the military-political field and verification measures, though they are interrelated in various ways, in certain respects also overlapping. While verification mainly concerns and indirectly influences the behaviour of states towards a given disarmament measure the CBMs could and should more and more - include rules of military conduct in times of peace, of mutual military restraint as well as military constraining measures.

But, putting aside these distinctions, there is one legitimation for considering them conjointly. Despite the different and often controversial approaches towards arms control and disarmament among all reasonable political and military forces and under the circumstances of military confrontation and of the still continuing arms race, interests win ground to enhance a minimum stability and political control over the military situation by diminishing at least the dangers which might arise from misperceptions or from being deceived as well as the danger of an accidental war. These security goals cannot be achieved by unilateral measures alone but require common, negotiated undertakings - confidence building and/or verification measures.

The implementation of such common measures has a logic of its own, step by step broadening the area of experience how to jointly meet common security interests. Thus, the accelerated pace in negotiating and implementing CBMs and stringent verification measures could help to pave the way for substantial conventional disarmament.

4.1 Confidence building as a condition of conventional disarmament

a) *Experience gained as point of departure*

Conventional disarmament is a new field in international relations. And it is considered to be an especially complex and complicated issue. Therefore, particular attention has to be paid to every experience related to it. While we have to keep in mind their distinctions in comparison with disarmament proper, the value of experiences gained by negotiating and implementing confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) must not be underestimated. From the point of view of the disarmament negotiations some aspects of confidence-building measures (CBMs) especially their second generation, the confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) agreed at the Stockholm Conference in 1986 and favourably implemented since, are of special interest. At least the following seem worth mentioning:

- Up to now these measures have provided the only extensive experience in diminishing the dangers of military confrontation, related to the conventional sphere;
  The CSBMs cover the whole of European territory thus consisting of operational stabilizing instruments which make disarmament considerations in an all-European context easier; if

the concrete disarmament measures will be applied to the whole of Europe or to certain subregions only, the CSBMs will work as a link to all-European security;

- The Stockholm Conference provides negotiation experience on multilateral level; the par ticipation of 35 states, having quite different military potentials and distinguishable by belonging or not belonging to politico-military alliances, has not turned out to be an obstacle but has turned, in certain cases, even into a promoting factor in negotiations;
- In the CSBM context first solutions have been found though still limited - of some sophisticated verification problems in the conventional field: this has given an impetus to the solution of more complex verification problems in the conventional disarmament con text;
- The implementation of CSBMs provides some valuable experience on co-operation in the sphere of military related fields of international security which, exceeding the subject proper of CSBMs, is of principal significance for conventional disarmament negotiations to come and for the implementation of disarmament measures.

The significance of the second generation of confidence-building measures in Europe for conventional disarmament in this region is also proven by the fact that all 35 states expressly confirmed the necessity and obligation of disarmament in the Document of the Stockholm Conference.

The CSBMs adopted in Stockholm concentrate on an obligatory system of notification, information and observation of military activities. The implementation of these measures has only limited and indirect effects on military activities, thus, possibly causing concern.

A further development of CBMs concentrated on questions of perception (Stockholm 1 A) would therefore only yield a limited increase in stability for Europe in military and security fields. However, the political objectives of the mandate adopted at the Madrid follow-up meeting for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe will offer extended opportunities for an agreement on and the application of a third CBM-generation (probably at Stockholm 2), if supplemented by stipulations on the further development of CSBMs.

b) *Functions of CBMs and the importance of constraining measures*

In order to promote security by confidence building, the latter must be made a continuous process in which elements of confidence already built, are being permanently affirmed by practice and in which the potential of confidence is being steadily supplemented and enhanced. Therefore, CSBMs being in force in Europe are only the beginning of a road on which we can advance efficiently to promote security and disarmament in Europe.

Regarding the content of CBMs as determined in the Madrid mandate, these measures are to:

Gradually restrain and, finally, eliminate such military options and activities that have a destabilizing effect on security or are felt by one side as having such an effect;

- Possibly avoid the wrong assessment of specific military activities and eventually ensue wrong military reactions having grave consequences;
- Create favourable conditions for co-operation in military and security fields with a view to eliminating acute dangers to international security.

These functions cannot be performed by CBMs alone and often not primarily by such measures. Major steps to confidence building in the politico-military sphere are arms reduction and disarmament. CBMs do not modify military potentials in their entirety. They focus on a connection between military activities (and, partly, deployment and structures) and military options. Regarding CBMs, attention is given to actual options expressing themselves in concrete military activities and also to their perception by the other side. This is done to ensure that military activities are clearly non-threatening, non-provocative, and exclusively defence-oriented and to counteract wrong perceptions which might lead to dangerous misreactions. This approach to CBMs contains, from the very outset, the element of co-operative security and stability. However, since the agreement on and implementation of individual CBMs alone cannot perform this function of ensuring cooperative security, it is necessary to subordinate CBMs to corresponding political aims, to integrate them into a corresponding security concept which serves as an orientation for applying CBMs and as a yardstick for judging their effects. Concerning the Stockholm CSBMs, the political stipulations of the conference document provide such a common orientation which is binding on all participants. Being of growing significance for the political direction of the further development of CBMs, the notion security stability is taking shape. The discussion of this notion and the search for a generally acceptable definition is also of eminent practical importance for conventional disarmament in Europe, all the more since it has been introduced into the dialogue on confidence building and disarmament at government level.

There are a number of starting points in international relations for further developing CBMs in Europe to the end of strengthening and promoting disarmament. Further-going measures, as agreed on in Stockholm, for perceiving military activities, establishing their non-dangerous character, and avoiding wrong assessments would be appropriate and feasible for applying the Stockholm CSBMs, as would be the further development of the geographical parameter.

It is necessary and possible to complete the inclusion of restrictions provided for in the Document of the Stockholm Conference - from the aspect of restricting or reducing certain kinds of military activities, and from the aspect of restrictions to be applied in particular regions/zones. Negotiations in this respect could, for instance, refer to a range of proposals submitted by socialist states but also by NN states at the Stockholm Conference. As the Soviet Union and the Western nuclear weapon states are parties in negotiations on conventional disarmament and CBMs in and for Europe, their experience in applying bilateral CBMs could possibly be used in Europe as well. There is a direct connection between some Soviet-American CBMs and some Soviet-American agreements on arms reduction. All CBMs agreed on between the nuclear-weapon powers serve to lessen the danger of a military conflict, especially of an accidental nuclear war. The feasibility of appropriate measures accompanying agreements on cuts in conventional arms should be considered. It should also be discussed whether analogous measures could be agreed on to lessen the danger of military conflicts in Europe. To prevent incidents at and above the high sea it would be useful to consider if and, possibly, how corresponding Soviet-American and Soviet-British measures could be supplemented by agreements of all states which maintain naval forces in or around Europe.

In general, to make confidence-building measures meet the above-mentioned functions it is necessary to develop them towards a third CBM-generation, the main characteristics of which will be effective constraining elements and elements of mutual self-restraint, as well as strong features of co-operative conduct. For the reason that there are more deep-rooted anxieties and fears about the way weapons and armed forces might be used than about their absolute numbers, especially constraining CBMs will be necessary to ensure conditions favourable to conventional disarmament in Europe:

"... force reductions must also be accompanied by 'constraints'; that is, agreed measures that restrict the deployment and activities of military forces - for example by limiting the size of out-of-garrison for ce concentrations. Reductions need to be accompanied by intrusive mutual verification. Neither constraints that leave combat capability untouched, nor reduc tions without constraints, would be adequate in themselves".(16)

c) *The aim of promoting conventional disarmament and a possible third CBM-generation in Europe*

CBMs can pave the way for, accompany or support negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe and the implementation of disarmament measures. One of their peculiarities is that they offer all states of the region the chance to take part in the disarmament process.

What is necessary is to establish a close, and possibly institutionalized correlation between the negotiation of CBMs and their application, on the one hand, and between the negotiation and implementation of disarmament measures, on the other hand. This correlation is apt to add to the dynamics of the overall process of reducing military confrontation in Europe, provided that two threats are being countered: CBMs must neither be treated as a package deal for disarmament steps nor as their substitute. "Confidence-building measures cannot, however, replace measures which would directly limit and reduce military potentials. If one were to misunderstand confidence-building measures as a substitute for disarmament measures one would not only over-estimate their inherent positive potential, but might also run the risk that they are used as a pretext for avoiding real progress in arms control and disarmament or even to legitimize a continuing arms build-up".(17)

Emphasis has to be placed particularly on four aspects which are of direct significance for negotiations on conventional disarmament and for the implementation of appropriate measures.

a) The relationship between conventional and nuclear disarmament must be strengthened through through CBMs which possibly exclude an early use of nuclear weapons in case of conflict (renunciation of first use, stipulations on zones or corridors, withdrawal of weapons of dual capability and, in general, of nuclear battlefield weapons).

b) CBMs of various kinds which extend from measures of information and observation to the reduction and limitation of military activities which directly facilitate disarmament negotia tions and agreements in respect of defined types of weapons.

c) CBMs which counteract the emergence of security gaps or security concerns which might arise from the necessity to work step by step in the sphere of disarmament. Such security concerns could emerge owing to asymmetries between individual services of the armed

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16. J. Dean, Military Security in Europe, Foreign Affairs, New York, Fall 1987, p.86.
17. United Nations, Comprehensive Study on Confidence-Building Measures, New York 1982, p.8.

forces and types of weapons upon which the European balance of military forces is built. CBMs which limit threatening options or options felt to be threatening, especially with respect of those types of weapons which are not yet included in the given stage of disarmament, could counteract such concerns and facilitate the gradual coming into force of disarmament measures.

However, security concerns can also arise when cuts in one type of weapon or one service of the armed forces are compensated or overcompensated by increased armament in spheres which are not included in negotiations. Therefore, to accompany and promote disarmament negotiations and agreements, CBMs are also necessary which go beyond the narrow subject of disarmament negotiations and counteract the compensation of disarmament measures, which are possibly pursued in fields not covered by the disarmament negotiations, due to their tendency to factually limit military options.

d) CBMs may also be helpful in making the solution of some problems of asymmetries easier.

In some cases a first means to diminish the anxieties connected with asymmetries could well be asymmetrical restraining or constraining CBMs - asymmetrical as regards their geo graphical extension or the arms and services on one side or the other. This seems feasible, if mutual security requirements and the close connection with disarmament are guaranteed.

What matters in the further development of confidence-building measures in and for Europe is, first of all, to pay greater attention to the close connection between CBMs and disarmament as well as to the fact that they complement each other, to prevent any type of weapon and any service of the armed forces from being left out, and, thus, to bring about stable security at an ever lower level of military confrontation:

Firstly. Measures of dialogue and communication to gear military doctrines and concepts exclusively to defensive objectives. These measures could help to remove security concerns of one side or the other through clearing up facts and adapting concepts, and discussing questions of the connection between negotiations and agreements on disarmament, confidence-building and verification which are the matter of different negotiating bodies.

Secondly. Measures to promote or accompany disarmament negotiations and agreements, among them for instance:

Measures of information, observation and inspection which provide experience for the solution of problems of verification in the context of concrete disarmament problems or anticipate, fully or partly, the solution of definite problems of verification;
Measures to limit and reduce military activities in specified regions and with specified types of weapons/services of the armed forces which lead to a certain restriction of an option and can thus make compensation of disarmament regulations through rearmament in respect of these types of weapons or services unattractive (e.g. restriction of definite operations by the airforce or navy, prohibition of operation in specified zones, disengagement regulations).

Thirdly. Measures to lessen the danger of surprise attacks and of an accidental outbreak of military conflicts, with measures of communication and consultation serving the prevention and limitation of conflicts being included.

To this end there could be negotiations and agreements on the following measures:

- Rules which apply in general or in concrete terms to military activities, that is rules of military restraint, of clearly non-provocative conduct and information - including measures concerning conduct in case of encounters with armed forces at the high sea or in the air;
- Limitations and reductions of military activities in certain regions, including the prohibition of defined operations in concrete areas, provisions on disengagement and zones concerning land, sea and airspace;
- Measures for the purpose of crisis prevention and crisis management in the form of "hot l ines", and consultative bodies of a politico-military character.

Basically, definite CBMs can serve several political and military aims at the same time. Nevertheless, it is necessary that they are compatible, complementary and guided by supreme political objectives. The main thing is that they promote the disarmament process, are not separated from it, and are not abused to slow it down.

4.2. Verification - aims and requirements

Substantial arms reduction and disarmament means to base part of the security of the countries concerned on a political ground, on a certain degree of confidence, to let the undertakings of the partners be guided by non-hostile intents and restraints. This produces the need to develop additional legal and political guarantees parallel to disarmament measures. In the complex framework of legal and political instruments serving this objective, verification has to be considered an especially important and indispensable one.

a) *Functions of verification*

The authors of this Study see verification as a mainly political security instrument, the main functions of which are as follows:

- To demonstrate convincingly the fulfilment of the disarmament obligations in good faith;
- To refrain from non-compliance;
- general confidence building;
  To contribute to defining further disarmament goals by assessing the results of the given agreement.

Today there seems to be no disagreement that a most stringent verification becomes one of the "most important means to guarantee security" when far-reaching reductions in the military forces and their armaments or even the abolition of whole categories of weapons will be agreed. (18) This idea, expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev, seems to be close to positions which are held by Western countries. The Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, for instance, explained that verification "has become the single most important element in international arms control and disarmament negotiations".(19) Promising also is the latest practical experience concerning this matter (INF Agreement) though it was not connected with the especially

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18. *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, 11-12 April 1987.
19. Answer of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the UN, referring to UN resolution 40/152 (o), 14 April 1986.

complicated issue of verifying conventional disarmament proper. Verification has ceased to be a main obstacle to disarmament though many concrete technical and even political questions have to be solved in future negotiations.

A substantial breakthrough was reached when the states agreed on obligatory observations of major military activities of the ground forces and related military activities as well as on-site inspections in the Document of the 1986 Stockholm Conference. This is of great importance for all questions concerning the verification of agreements on reducing military confrontation. Basically new in quality are the comprehensive regulations on observation and verification, including production sites, in the Soviet-American INF Treaty. Without wanting to blur the basic distinctions with regard to the content and importance of the two agreements it seems worth noting: in botrh cases verification provisions go beyond the extent which is necessary for verifying the agreed CSBMs resp. disarmament measures, thus paving the way for further confidence-building and disarmament measures. Thereby, the principle of adequate control, which has to accompany every step towards lowering the level of military confrontation, is completed by the possibility to transmit additional functions to verification in the process of mutually strengthening security and confidence.

In general, the political importance of verification goes beyond its actual subject. By showing the parties how to behave in the sensitive military field according to the given agreement verification may basically strengthen the political preparedness for comprehensive co-operation in the field of security policy, promote confidence in the reliability of the parties and, thereby, essentially improve the climate for resolving security questions by political means.

While stressing the far-reaching political potential verification may have, we should not overlook the fact that verification as an instrument of security policy has some limits. It does not consider the question of consequences in the case of misconduct and deals with perception problems only - in contrast to the path CBMs are developing.

But it is important enough. In a climate of mistrust, suspicion and fear verification can help to rebut unjustified accusations, resolve misunderstandings and objectively establish a state of compliance.

b) *Basic assumptions and principles*

The complex and especially complicated undertaking of conventional disarmament in Europe makes it even more necessary to follow agreed political lines in the negotiation and implementation of verification measures. Due to the fact that it is impossible to count each soldier and every single gun and it is also easier to stir up anxieties than to prove compliance, especially with regard to the various conventional disarmament issues, we should be aware of the great responsibility the handling of verification procedures requires. Additional complicated problems will have to be considered whenever conventional asymmetries are partly abolished by deeper cuts on the side which had an advantage in one field of conventional forces or another. Therefore, it seems necessary to start from at least four basic political assumptions when handling the particular conventional verification problems in Europe:

Firstly. Necessary mutual verification is connected with mutual reductions, no matter how the dimensions of reduction on one side or the other may differ.

Secondly. The methods of verification have to show the reliability of the parties to the contract, not more and not less, therefore they must feel sure that the reductions are carried out.

Thirdly. Verification should serve mutual security purposes and consider the legitimate security interests of either side.

Fourthly. Verification should be carried out as part of a complex system of co-operative security undertakings which consist of various political elements, including disarmament itself in the military field, compliance procedures and a variety of confidence-building measures.

Following this line, it is of decisive importance to agree on political principles and rules which ensure that the different forms of verification actually serve the objectives agreed on, do not lead to one-sided security advantages or disadvantages for individual states and promote, altogether, a climate of mutual confidence and trust in the international relations. These political guidelines for verification, which should be further elaborated, might comprise the following:

- Observance of the rules of international law;
- Sufficiency, i.e., illustrate what the major verification matters and verification methods are, convincingly to show the compliance of the parties to the agreement provisions as a whole;
- Universality and efficiency;
- Equal access to relevant information for all parties; this is especially important, when different parties disposing over different verification potentials negotiate and agree on disarmament measures multilaterally, as will be the case in conventional disarmament in Europe;
- Co-operative evaluation and co-operative completion of verification results for the reason that the many pieces of information which will be gathered by verification means especially in the field of conventional forces and armaments need compilation and interpre tation to be correctly evaluated;
- Efforts to settle doubtful questions first of all in a co-operative way to conform to the purposes of the agreement.

c) *Methods of verification*

Verification of conventional disarmament is, like conventional disarmament itself, new ground in international relations and there is no practical experience in this respect.

Though it will depend on the concrete disarmament measures, what methods of verification should be applied, we think that, in principle, no method should be excluded to verify the complex issues of conventional disarmament. Considering the different methods of verification it seems necessary to underline the basic correspondence of verification in the nuclear and conventional fields. Nevertheless, verification of conventional armaments appears to be more complicated and requires more intensive methods of control. This is due to certain characteristics of the conventional forces, as, for instance, their mobility, the multitude of their weaponry and possibilities of hiding conventional forces and arms in the shelter not only of military but also civilian installations.

In contrast to the verification of nuclear disarmament one has to distinguish above all between the ways and means of a more military option-oriented verification. In the conventional sphere the area of deployment plays a decisive role in distinguishing between offensive or defensive capabilities. If a more option-oriented approach was chosen, verification might have to be pushed through first of all in certain areas only. This would make verification procedures much more feasible than trying to push through everything everywhere at once. If such an approach was combined with possibilities to request information or inspections in a flexible way, it might be possible to avoid overburdening the countries concerned according to the verification method applied.

Having in mind the above-mentioned distinctions of the verification problem in the conventional field the following verification methods seem to be applicable:

- Use of national technical means (NTMs);
- Voluntary supply of relevant information to the other side;
- Right of demanding specific information;
- Invitation of observers;
- On-site inspections
  a) by reasonable demand, or
  b) by rights; on a periodical basis (time table) or on a quota basis, i.e., certain inspections in a certain period of time;
  Control/observation posts;
- Common supervision with technical means (satellites);
- Permanent liaison or control missions with defined rights of movement, access and commu nication;
- Collateral evaluation of data and other information.

In the end we come to the conclusion that a greater variety of verification methods should be adopted for verifying conventional disarmament than is needed for verifying nuclear disarmament. It is a generally established fact that the verification of compliance with deployment obligations requires greater emphasis on observation methods and especially on on-site inspections. In this respect the problem of the frequency of necessary inspections to enhance confidence must be solved, possibly on the basis of distinctions between different areas in connection with the question of permanent observation and perhaps permanent liaison missions. The experience gathered with regard to observations and on-site inspections within the framework of the Stockholm CSBMs will be of specific value to this matter.

4.3. CBMs, verification and defensive structures

As mentioned earlier on, we are of the opinion that the process of fundamental conventional disarmament in Europe should lead to a situation where both sides are unable to conduct an attack. This poses new demands on CBMs and verification. *On the one hand*, such an objective can only be achieved once confidence-building has progressed and there is experience in the verification of disarmament steps. *On the other hand*, a new level of CBMs and verification should form a firm basis for practical common security.

Firstly, Europe is not isolated in the world. Disarmament leading to a non-aggression capability must be backed up by measures which ensure that forces from outside Europe cannot be brought in quickly and thus destroy the defensive balance.

Secondly, such a far-reaching renunciation of the use of the military factor as an instrument of security is only possible if a system of far-sighted and stabilizing measures provide the parties involved with the opportunity of reacting well in time to violations of this status by others, which may be in the offing. This ability of launching timely counter-measures minimizes the temptation of a violation as there are no guarantees for a safe advantage.

Thirdly, CSBMs in the broad sense, in the political, economic, cultural and humanitarian fields, must supplement the military ones and even develop into a priority, so that a violation of the system of common security becomes a vital issue. These very complex perspectives seem to be still very distant from the present point of view. However, it is well worth our while to have them in mind when planning current steps.

CHAPTER V

AREAS, STRUCTURES AND CONTENT OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CONVENTIONAL DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

It is a very complicated task to establish a stable balance of conventional military forces, to reduce its level step by step with reductions in forces and armaments and at the same time to change the structures on both sides towards exclusive strategic defensiveness. Thus it is highly unlikely that this task can be completed at one forum of negotiation only. The question arises which levels of negotiations are probable and what should they contain.

5.1. The all-European approach

Europe consists of 34 states which belong to two principally different social systems, 21 of them are members of the two politico-military alliances, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO, the latter also including the United States and Canada. The distinction between the different social systems and the two alliances as well as between them and the European countries with a neutral or non-aligned status respectively must not be considered a factor inevitably dividing Europe into hostile blocs, as the experience of developing détente and peaceful coexistence shows. European security is indivisible and the conditions which brought about this situation are increasing.

a) *Why all-European negotiations?*

At present it seems undisputed that conventional disarmament has to be considered in a broad context, covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm) from a positive point of view, and the Vienna MFR talks from a more negative one produced valuable experience with regard to the necessity and feasibility of considering the whole of Europe when wanting to diminish military confrontation in this region in all its aspects.

In their 1986 Budapest Appeal, the WTO member countries proposed to start negotiations among the CSCE member countries on disarmament measures from the Atlantic to the Urals. With the term "from the Atlantic to the Urals", they took up an idea formulated in France's Memorandum to the 1st UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978.

There are historical, political, military-strategical and military-technological as well as security political reasons for such an all-European approach.

Firstly, we have to realize that arms reduction and disarmament are not self-sufficient objectives, but rather means for strengthening the security of the European countries. Security has to be understood as a common task for all European nations as, under present conditions, every conflict, especially one of military nature, carries the inherent danger of extending to the whole of Europe and even beyond, all European nations would be heavily involved. The reduction in armament, including conventional arms, is a central task in strengthening the security of all European countries. They all have the right and the obligation to participate in this process.

Secondly, the conventional forces and arms of both military coalitions are concentrated in and around Europe. These forces facing each other are the decisive element of the tense military situation in Europe. The military doctrines and strategies of both alliances are based mainly on precisely these forces.

Thirdly, Europe forms the framework for an important level combining conventional, chemical and nuclear forces.

Fourthly, even in possible regional and other partial solutions the all-European approach is of significance. Problems caused by partial solutions may be compensated in an all-European framework.

Fifthly, the all-European approach to negotiations is the best way of combining European disarmament problems with those in the strategic field. As all-European negotiations include both alliances, they also close the circle to the two main powers of the coalitions with their strategic forces aimed at each other and those military forces they keep for tasks outside Europe.

Summing it up, all-European negotiations would be the adequate forum to bring about fundamental and decisive changes in the military confrontation between the two military alliances, to negotiate a third generation of military CBMs and to create the framework for manifold regional and structural measures.

b) *Problems and difficulties*

The all-European approach is apparently in the interest of all states and peoples concerned. The authors of this Study strongly support this approach. Nevertheless, we have to admit that there are some serious difficulties connected with this comprehensive way of handling conventional disarmament problems in Europe.

Firstly, the most difficult question to be considered is that of the complexity of the various aspects of conventional disarmament and its linkage with the nuclear weapons. Up to now the pace of disarmament negotiations does not at all keep up with the pace of the arms race. This applies in particular to conventional forces. The speed of qualitative developments in conventional armament is picking up fast. This creates a complicated task for the negotiations, not only do they have to deal with numerical limitation and reduction, but also to seek for solutions to the difficult problem of counter-acting compensation for agreed reductions or even an arms build-up alongside disarmament measures.

Secondly, the negotiations are going to be attended by countries whose territory is partly outside Europe (USSR) or even entirely beyond the borders of Europe (USA, Canada). These nations only introduce a certain part of their military potential into the negotiations whereas all other states offer their entire armed forces for negotiation. The problems of delimiting the forces outside Europe and of finding guarantees for ruling out a redeployment of forces to Europe must be brought to a permanent and stable solution.

Thirdly, the all-European negotiations will produce a variety of complicated problems concerning definitions. Apart from defining geographical areas, this also includes definitions for military units and main weapon systems. Experience gained during the MFR talks should be made use of here.

Fourthly, the manifold questions of definition correspond with the complicated verification and control measures.

Fifthly, the difficult problem arises of establishing the necessary relations and connections between the various all-European forms of negotiation already in existence (conventional stability and reductions) (confidence-building measures) and forms which have to be established at a later date, covering subjects now exempt from negotiations and regional talks.

All of these and other problems all-European negotiations have to deal with make a step by step approach necessary. One should start with simple solutions in order to set the disarmament process in motion. At the same time a realistic and clear medium-term objective has to be found.

c) *Ideas on the content of conventional disarmament negotiations from the Atlantic to the Urals*

There are two ways of defining the content of conventional disarmament negotiations for the whole of Europe - either based on the necessities or the possibilities.

We are of the opinion that it would be in the interest of strengthening European security through disarmament measures if all-European negotiations dealt with the complex of all forces and armaments in Europe - conventional and nuclear, all conventional forces (ground, air and naval forces) and thus closely connecting them with the development of CBMs. All CSCE states would have to take part in such negotiations. This approach was suggested by the WTO member countries. However, the NATO members prefer a selective approach. The future will tell whether that is the best way of serving European security interests. The practical result is that negotiations are only possible on such a basis at the moment. This leads us to expect two relatively independent rounds of negotiations:

Firstly, negotiations of all 35 CSCE states on the further development of military CBMs on the basis of the mandate drafted in Madrid.

Secondly, negotiations on conventional stability and reductions among the 21 countries of the two military alliances.

Already in the previous chapter we introduced our point of view on the drafting of a third generation of CBMs. We will not repeat this now. As regards the content of the second level of negotiations, we hope that questions of dual systems and air forces will be included, regardless of the way in which this is done.

The decisions adopted by the WTO Political Consultative Committee have clearly shown the concept for negotiation put forward by this alliance. However, the NATO countries have not yet produced such a detailed concept. The authors of this Study are of the opinion that the negotiations should concentrate on the following main issues:

Firstly, improving conventional stability between the coalitions, especially by dismantling significant asymmetries on both sides in such a way that the side with an advantage reduces its forces or armaments to the level of the other side.

Secondly, agreeing on a reduction on both sides especially in those forces with a high offensive-capability and which are regarded as particularly threatening by the other side.

Thirdly, planning significant reductions in troops and armaments on both sides in the medium-term.

The various possibilities of approaching a solution of these tasks, the necessary accompanying measures and verification have already been discussed in chapters three and four of this Study. We have already outlined the methods and ways we prefer and this needs no repetition.

Favourable conditions for such negotiations would be created if mutual understanding was to grow in the discussion of the respective military doctrines, strengthening trust in the purely defensive aims and at the very best if threatening elements contained in the doctrines were changed. Such talks could be conducted independently, outside the negotiations, or as an integral part of them.

A realistic view regarding the areas open for discussion at the all-European level in the near future shows that important questions for strengthening European security (nuclear short-range systems and naval armaments etc.) will remain open. This leads us to two conclusions:

Firstly, it will be the task of political and theoretical discussions to search for suitable forums at which to negotiate such issues.

Secondly, efforts will have to be stepped up to discuss and solve some of them at a bilateral or regional level.

5.2. Changes in Central Europe

At present possibilities, for regional and zonal steps aimed at improving security are being discussed in many European countries. There are initiatives for Northern Europe and the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea. They all contain measures geared towards reducing the nuclear threat and instability, at strengthening trust and reducing confrontation and the possibility of a surprise attack.

The Central European region is of special significance for increasing all-European security and peace. It is the region with the highest concentration of conventional and nuclear forces and with the only border along which the two military pacts face each other on a stretch of about 1,000 kilometres. In this region there are still areas and points with a potential for crisis in East-

West relations. At the same time, nearly all political forces of the countries concerned have a growing understanding of the necessity to reduce military confrontation and increase trust and security and to cut the high concentration of military forces on both sides. Apart from that alternative defence concepts have been put forward which are aimed at exclusively defensive structures. This issue calls for more theoretical debate on whether such concept can be implemented in one country or a certain area of Europe, as well as on the conditions and effects the development of such structures would entail for the whole of Europe and the two alliances. Whatever the results of such deep analysis, the emergence of such concepts in Central European countries must be regarded as a reflection of a special security and threat situation in the region calling for radical change.

a) *What is Central Europe?*

Central Europe does not have any natural border. It cannot be deliminated in geographical, historical, cultural or socio-political terms. As practice shows, it must therefore be defined differently. The most important criterion for defining it for the purpose of security measures is its special situation of threat which is felt by either side. However, a certain territorial harmony and equality of military levels must be ensured. From this angle, Central Europe could either be viewed in its spatial extent as covered by the MFR negotiations (Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland - FRG, Benelux) or could be extended by Hungary, on the one side, and Denmark, on the other side, as provided for in the Jaruzelski plan. All these variants on defining this region which have been proposed by European socialist states represent a great concession, in as much as they do not envisage the inclusion of France or, at least, its eastern parts, despite the specific threats emanating from there to the socialist countries of the region, and new ones which might emerge in the future owing to the military co-operation between France and the FRG.

Furthermore, there are ideas for special zones within the region, subject to the following part of this chapter. In our view, these different approaches should not be an obstacle to the assumption of new serious talks and negotiations.

b) *Central Europe and all Europe*

As early as in 1986, the states parties to the Warsaw Treaty suggested in their Budapest Appeal that specific measures be taken in the context of reductions "from Atlantic to the Urals" with a view to "lessening the danger of a surprise attack and to strengthen ... military stability". In May 1987 the Warsaw Treaty members expressed in the Berlin Declaration their support for all initiatives which were launched by their Central European members regarding this region. Such measures, as mentioned above, would help strengthen all-European stability and further all-European disarmament steps. From this point of view the inclusion of specific measures for Central Europe in the all-European negotiations would, therefore, be a logical step in many respects.

Such a solution, however, simultaneously raises a number of questions which are of interest to the Central European nations. Will the mandate for the negotiations of the 23 cover all the urgent problems of a sensitive nature in Central Europe? The attempt at questioning the natural connection between conventional and nuclear disarmament, between disarmament and CBMs,

at envisaging minimum reductions of conventional forces for the near future only has a crucial influence on Central European security. There are justified fears that the all-European negotiations need their time. At the same time, however, changes in Central Europe are more and more urgently needed. In view of this a multitude of concrete ideas and proposals were drawn up, including joint East-West initiatives. Under these circumstances changes of the Central European situation at large and agreement on first individual steps should neither be made dependent on all-European negotiations nor rejected on grounds of these negotiations. We are of the opinion that the discussions of all-European solutions as well as of specific issues of Central Europe or a zone of direct contact between the blocs do not exclude each other. For really enhancing the state of European security all initiatives and all forms of negotiations possible must be used for making headway. In this respect, regional solutions and all-European progress are interrelated, further each other, and should be possible simultaneously. This is not only true for Central Europe but also for initiatives concerning other areas of Europe.

c) *Initiatives for a change in Central Europe*

There are many ideas and proposals for a change in the military situation of Central Europe. They are both components of all-European conventional disarmament concepts as well as individual solutions. As we have mentioned before, most of the ideas put forward by the Western European countries on alternative, non-offensive defence concentrate on Central Europe. We have not the space to comment on and assess every proposal. Summing them up one can say that they represent a way of thinking which is close to our own.

The official NATO documents put forward to date, however, contain no specific and detailed draft for this area. At best one can say that they recognize certain specific characteristics of the security situation in Central Europe, which should be negotiated within the framework of all-European talks. Until now the governments of the NATO countries of this region as well as the main powers within NATO have rejected the necessity and possibility of specific negotiations and solutions for Central Europe (with the exception of the MFR talks).

In this situation the leading politician of Poland, General Jaruzelski, put forward a plan in May 1987. In July 1987 this plan was extended by a memorandum issued by the Polish government. The plan envisages the withdrawal of a certain amount and categories of nuclear and conventional weapons from the territories of Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and Poland in the East and from the territories of Belgium, the FRG, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the West. This measure should cover such conventional weapons which are regarded as especially dangerous and destabilizing. The states involved should exchange their opinions on their respective military doctrines. The plan includes far-reaching CBMs, some of which are difficult to implement in the whole of Europe. It also proposes the joint search for a solution to the modernization problem, to prevent the replacement of withdrawn weapons by new and offensive-capable systems.

The Jaruzelski Plan has met with the approval of the other Warsaw Treaty member countries, including the ones situated in Central Europe.

The special feature of this plan is that it contains a programmatic approach to the start of a disengagement process in Central Europe. At the same time the plan is flexible enough to include other ideas as well. This negotiation-orientated nature distinguishes it from other one-sided or very comprehensive concepts developed by West European states. At the same time

the implementation of such a disengagement idea would start a process which could lead to the establishment of purely defensive structures.

The same or similar notions have been included in the proposals for a smaller area, namely that where the two alliances confront one another, put forward by Czechoslovakia and the GDR. As a rule they include the possibility of extending the measures to the entire Central European region. Some of these ideas have already been turned into proposals to Central European governments as a joint initiative of political forces in East and West. It would be in the interest of the nations of this region and the whole of Europe if the governments agreed to start special negotiations on these proposals soon.

5.3. The Central European zone of direct contact between the two military alliances

What was said about the specific role of Central Europe under the previous point is true especially of the zone of direct contact between the two military alliances.

a) *The significance of the zone for the prevention of surprise attacks*

A surprise attack by one of the two military alliances on the other could be seen theoretically as a strategic "first strike" or as an offensive "from a standing position" in the Central European region. Even if there were the intention of starting a local military action in the flank areas, these would doubtlessly escalate into a general conflict with the main theatre being Central Europe.

Both sides say that they do not intend such an attack. At the same time NATO circles still point to what they think are WTO abilities for such an attack and the WTO mistrusts the extension of such abilities on behalf of NATO under the FOFA concept.

It is of elementary importance for the further development of a process of peaceful coexistence in Europe and mutual readiness for fundamental conventional disarmament that steps are undertaken to assure both sides that the other does not want to and cannot stage a surprise attack. As the surprise element can only be guaranteed if an attack starts practically from a standing position, measures to prevent it would have to affect particularly the zone of direct contact between the two military coalitions. The following measures could contribute to this:

Firstly, negotiations which prevent the escalation of manoeuvres, other forms of military movements and a concentration of forces into surprise military actions.

Secondly, joint extension of measures covering information, control and verification with the aim of making surprise attacks futile, as they would be identified as such well in time and could be counteracted.

Thirdly, establishment of co-operative means of contact, concerning the exchange of data preventing crises, wrong interpretations and mistakes.

Fourthly, renunciation of all military planning containing a surprise attack or which could lead to the assumption of such an intention.

Fifthly, withdrawal of forces and weapon systems from the immediate zone of contact which is especially prone for a surprise attack, including one with nuclear battlefield weapons.

The measures outlined and additional ones would serve the strengthening of mutual trust and the general readiness to promote conventional disarmament measures in Europe. At the same time the general extension of good-neighbourly relations between the states of this region, especially between the FRG, Czechoslovakia and the GDR could help reduce tension even further and create a conducive atmosphere for further measures.

b) *Problems of specific measures in a zone of direct contact*

There have been a number of objections regarding specific measures in a zone of direct contact between both military alliances. The general argument is that such measures and such a zone would create areas of differing levels of security in Europe. As a matter of fact the zone of direct contact is an area of *less* security than other parts of Europe. There is next to no chance of survival for such a zone.

It shows a concentration of particularly many and dangerous weapons and they in turn are the first targets for an attack. A change in the military situation of this area would heighten security there and in the whole of Europe.

There are problems regarding the definition for this zone. Obviously a pragmatic and flexible approach is called for, a rigid fixing of the specific width of such a zone on both sides for all measures and weapon systems to be withdrawn would create difficulties. That is why the fixing of such a zone should always be determined by the aim of the measures.

Difficulties may arise when troops and/or weapon systems are withdrawn as new areas of concentration could develop, which would neither help strengthen all-European security nor the interests of the area and the countries involved. That is why agreement on a reduction in troops and certain weapon systems should contain the following points:

- The troops and weapons of the states in this area are to be reduced by the number of systems to be withdrawn from the zone, i.e. the units have to be disbanded and the weapons destroyed;
- Withdrawing troops and weapons are to be pulled back to their national territories either totally or the main part of them.

Thus the development of new areas of concentration is counteracted and zonal measures would include elements of genuine disarmament for the countries of this zone.

c) *Initiative for a zone of direct contact*

At the Berlin meeting in May 1987 the Warsaw Treaty members developed and specified their ideas further relating to the area of direct contact with NATO. They expressed their

readiness to establish "zones of thinned-out arms concentration and increased mutual trust". In this context they demanded, *inter alia*, "the returning of their armed forces to their national territories, the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous categories of offensive weapons from the zone of direct contact between the two military alliances, and measures to lower the concentration of armed forces and armaments in this zone to an agreed minimum level".(20)

This jointly agreed line is supported by a number of activities by Czechoslovakia and the GDR.

These two states proposed to the FRG to enter into negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe. This proposal is based on a joint document in which the GDR's Socialist Unity Party and the Social Democratic Party of the FRG developed common principles for such a zone. This document envisages that all nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems are eliminated on a trip of 150 kilometres in width on both sides. This would heighten the nuclear threshold. At the same time this proposal contains important limitations of conventional weapons as it calls for the withdrawal of all dual-capable missiles, artillery and aircraft from this zone. The nuclear-weapon-free zone may be extended even further on the initiative of the countries involved or other interested parties. The proposal for a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe would also eliminate dangerous weapons from this area of direct contact.

A comprehensive proposal going even beyond the military field for the area of direct contact was put forward by Czechoslovakia (Jakesh Plan). Apart from steps aimed at strengthening trust in the military sphere it includes special measures of co-operation among the countries of this area in the economic, scientific-technological and cultural fields, in order to improve the atmosphere for disarmament steps. Within the scope of their talks on security policy the GDR's Socialist Unity Party and the Social Democratic Party of the FRG have proposed new steps for security and confidence-building for the zone of direct contact. They view this as measures to prepare and facilitate steps geared towards a reduction in military confrontation in this area and fundamental changes towards exclusively defensive structures.

After discussing possibilities and problems, conditions and structures of conventional disarmament in Europe and the manifold ideas and proposals in this field, the authors of this Study want to express their conviction that it depends on the determination of the states to start negotiations in a good spirit and lead them to success step by step.

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20. *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin 30-31 May 1987.

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