# Confidence-Building Measures in Africa

*By*
*Augustine P. Mahiga and Fidelis M. Nji*

## NOTE

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries.

## PREFACE

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) which has been in existence since 1 October 1980, was established by the General Assembly as an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations to carry out independent research on disarmament and related international security issues.

The work of the Institute, which is based on the provisions of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, aims at:

Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States, and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;

Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;

Assisting on-going negotiations on disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

Carrying out more in-depth, forward looking and long-term research on disarmament so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

Paragraph 93 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly addressing the subject of confidence-building measures in the context of disarmament and international peace and security stated: "In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament."

Confidence-building measures have hitherto acquired prominence mainly through their incorporation in the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975, which concluded the First Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. They have subsequently been the subject of a comprehensive United Nations Study. Confidence-building as it applies to Africa has received inadequate theoretical attention. The two authors of this paper, Dr. Augustine P. Mahiga and Mr. Fidelis M. Nji, had the opportunity of working on this subject under the UNIDIR Fellowship Programme which enables scholars and diplomats from developing countries to stay in UNIDIR for brief periods as visiting Research Associates. They were both well equipped to undertake their task. Dr. Mahiga is a senior Tanzanian diplomat who is at present with his country's High Commission in Ottawa, Canada, while Mr. Nji now works in the President's Office in Yaoundé, Cameroon.

This paper falls within the provisions of UNIDIR's mandate and is a timely contribution to the discussion of confidence-building measures.

After a concise overview of the general concept of confidence-building and its implementation in practice, the work concentrates on how the specific needs of Africa can be met by the application of appropriate confidence-building measures. Political, social, economic and military considerations are all taken into account in the light of the historical background and prevailing political and economic conditions and emerging trends.

Although UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed by the authors of its studies, it does assume responsibility for determining whether a work merits publication and hence commends this study to the attention of its readers.

Jayantha DHANAPALA
*Director, UNIDIR*

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# Introduction

The concept and practice of confidence-building measures in its contemporary usage and application has evolved from East-West detente which came into being in the 1970s. It found practical expression and embodiment in the Helsinki Final Act, signed on 1 August 1975 by 33 European nations, the United States of America and Canada as the culmination of the first Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.[1] The Act contains, *inter alia*, military-related measures for reducing the risks of surprise attack through miscalculation and misunderstanding of each others' intentions which have come to be known as "confidence-building measures" (CBMs).

The history of international relations before the Helsinki Conference is replete with examples of confidence-building measures which can be traced from ancient Greece.[2] In modern times, especially in the post-Second World War era, concerns over surprise attack and the need for confidence-building measures among nuclear powers, began in the mid-1950s. After the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 several agreements were entered into between the United States and the Soviet Union, which were aimed at reducing the risks of war through accident or miscalculation or failure of communication.[3] However, it was at the Helsinki Con-

ference that the term *confidence-building measures* came into common usage to describe mutual agreements between and among potential adversaries for reducing the risks of unintended war and especially the risk of surprise attack. The term has subsequently assumed a broader meaning and relevance in arms control and disarmament parlance.

In the context of the Helsinki Final Act, confidence-building measures have essentially a military connotation with particular relevance to the situation in Europe—a region of the world with the highest concentration of nuclear and conventional armaments and armed forces, especially those of the two rival military alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The measures stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act were primarily about the exchange of information on military activities in Europe, especially those of the two opposing alliances. In the wake of Helsinki and through the disarmament initiatives of the United Nations Organization, a wider meaning of confidence-building measures has envolved to include non-military aspects of reducing tension and risks of war which include political, economic and social measures. It has also been found that confidence-building measures have relevance in other regions of the world such as Latin America and Africa.[4] This paper seeks to show the relevance and prospects for evolving and developing confidence-building measures in Africa.

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[1] The signatories include NATO, Warsaw Pact, non-aligned and neutral countries.

[2] *Xenophon*, The Persian Expedition, translated by Rex Warner (Penguin Books Ltd., 1949).

[3] For a survey of the various agreements before 1975, see Ronald G. Purver, *Arms Control: The Regional Approach* (National Security Series No. 1/81, Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 1981), pp. 50-61.

[4] Confidence-building measures were given considerable attention at the First Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978, and were highlighted in 1981 by the United Nations *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures* (A/36/474) (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.82.IX.3).

## I. The concept of confidence-building measures and its theoretical underpinnings

One of the early and oft-cited definitions of confidence-building measures is by J. Holst and K. Melander, which states that "confidence-building involves the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity".[5] In a later refinement, Holst describes confidence-building measures as "arrangements designed to enhance such assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of States and the facts they create".[6] The underlying theme from these definitions is that confinence-building is a process of reciprocal

behaviour among States in the military and security domains. It entails the communication of relevant information among the parties concerned in order to enhance knowledge and to clarify each other's intentions, reduce mutual suspicion and avoid misperceptions. The concept embodies military, psychological and political components which together, can promote mutual trust among States.

The confidence-building measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act are sometimes referred to as "first generation confidence-building measures"[7] which are

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[5] J. Holst and K. Melander, "European Security and CBM", *Survival*, July/August 1977, p. 147.

[6] J. Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A Conceptual Framework", *Survival*, vol. XXV, No. 1, January/February 1983, p. 2.

[7] For an exhaustive discussion on first generation confidence-building measures from the Helsinki Conference and subsequent conferences in Belgrade and Madrid, see James Macintosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective* (York University, Toronto, Ontario, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies, No. 1).

basically related to exchange of military information, notification and observation of out-of-garrison military activities. They are overt measures undertaken on the basis of reciprocity to supplement national technical means of information gathering. Follow-up discussions and negotiations on confidence-building measures in the context of European security and co-operation have been on "second or new generation confidence-building measures" which are militarily more significant because they focus on *restraint* of military postures and deployment of weapons.[8] The *sine qua non* of both categories of confidence-building measures is that they do not limit or reduce force levels and weaponry, but merely serve to diminish the role of military establishments in relations among States and to clear misperceptions about them.[9] The stabilization of the *status quo* and the strengthening of coexistence between actual or potential adversaries is the linchpin of confidence-building measures. They do not resolve conflicts, but may generate a congenial atmosphere for managing and/or resolving conflicts. They are not substitutes for arms control measures, but may facilitate arms control agreements by providing a favourable negotiating milieu. The United Nations *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures* states that

> ... the final objective of confidence-building measures is to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the development of confidence, better understanding and more stable relations between nations, thus creating and improving the conditions for fruitful international co-operation.[10]

The importance of confidence-building measures in easing military and security-related tensions and apprehensions in third world countries needs no emphasis although interest in them is just beginning to develop. All the major military conflicts since the end of the Second World War have taken place between States or within States in the third world. Appropriate confidence-building measures in different conflict situations may be required and incorporated in the various approaches to conflict management and resolution in the different regions of the third world. The European experience in confidence-building measures is a useful

example in the systematic application of confidence-building measures; it also provides the conceptual framework for developing confidence-building measures and their application elsewhere. The definition and application of confidence-building measures outside Europe need to take into account the different conditions and circumstances prevailing in each region and the peculiarities of each situation.

Tensions and armed conflicts in the third world have varied causes. Apart from historical, political and ideological causes, social and economic factors are important and are often the dominant causes of tensions and conflicts within and among States. The economic and social security of a State is as important as military security. A State that cannot deliver economic and social goods to its citizenry is as vulnerable as a State whose external defences are inadequate. In the former case, it is susceptible to internal strife and disorder and in the latter, it can be an easy victim to external aggression. The underdeveloped nature of many third world countries is a major constraint to their economic and social well being and a frequent cause of internal tensions and conflicts. Instability in one country can have a spill-over effect to other countries in the region and can trigger a chain of events such as aggression from powerful neighbours. Conversely, a viable economy can be a source of stability and an incentive for co-operation in the region. Apart from the economic gains of regional co-operation, common endeavours can provide a framework and a forum for defusing discords, engendering mutual trust, and promoting regional security arrangements. Regional co-operation does, therefore, provide an opportunity for developing an array of military and non-military confidence-building measures.

In this broad approach to confidence-building measures, it is necessary, nonetheless, to exercise a judicious selection of inter-State relations which have a high potential for reducing mistrust and generating confidence. In a general sense, almost all relations between States may have some confidence-building value, but some relations are more relevant and crucial than others, depending on the level of tension or amity among the parties involved. The focus and emphasis in this paper is on those relations among African States which have the potential to diffuse tension, forestall conflict and promote overall confidence and mutual trust. The term "measures" as used in the Helsinki Final Act connotes a series of specific military-related undertakings rather than the general interaction among States. In this paper, we employ a broader usage of confidence-building; the "measures" are multidimentional, emanating from the overall behaviour of States as they interact with each other over time.

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[8] The 33-Nation Conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE) negotiated and adopted a set of measures in Stockholm in September 1986 which came into effect on 1 January 1987. They provide constraining provisions and lower thresholds for notification of military activities. They are also politically binding with adequate forms of verification. See C. A. Namiesniowski, "The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence-building", Background Paper No. 14, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa.

[9] The point is well elaborated by Jonathan Alford in William Epstein and Bernard T. Feld (eds.), *New Directions in Disarmament* (Praeger Publishers, 1981), pp. 133-142.

[10] United Nations, *Comprehensive Study . . . (op. cit.)*, p. 6.

## II. Prerequisites for confidence-building measures

The negotiations and introduction of confidence-building measures in a given region or situation is predicated upon the recognition and acceptance of the imperative of mutual security and the preservation of the *status quo* irrespective of the differences which may

exist among the parties. In Europe, it was the detente reached in the early 1970s which made the Helsinki Conference and its outcome possible. Another basic requirement is good faith in negotiating confidence-building measures by the parties concerned. Confidence-building

measures can become a double-edged sword if one side attempts to take advantage of the other by exploiting unilaterally the information acquired through confidence-building measures. The adherence to and respect of the principles of the United Nations Charter is also an important pre-condition for negotiating confidence-building measures besides being a form of confidence-building in its own right.

The Charter of the United Nations provides a foundation for international co-operation and a régime for conflict resolution in the contemporary international system. Confidence-building measures cannot thrive where the principles of the United Nations are flouted and violated as in situations where colonialism, racism and foreign occupation exist. The situation in Southern Africa, for example, where South Africa is occupying Namibia illegally and is practising the policy of *apartheid* against its black majority is a gross violation of the United Nations Charter. South Africa's policies consitute an irreconcilable difference with the rest of Africa. The situation in the subregion is therefore not amenable to the introduction of confidence-building measures between South Africa and her neighbours. The chasm between South Africa and other States in the subregion has been exacerbated by South Africa's destabilization campaign against the neighbouring independent black majority ruled States which are opposed to the policy of *apartheid* inside South Africa and the occupation of Namibia. Attempts on the part of South Africa to initiate accords with some of ther neighbours have proved unsuccessful because they have been premised on intimidation and forced co-existence with *apartheid*.[11]

The introduction of confidence-building measures between South Africa and her neighbours would imply the preservation of the *status quo* in the subregion at a time when what is required is change; the dismantling of *apartheid* and ending the illegal occupation of Namibia. At the same time, the other countries in the subregion need to strengthen mutual co-operation and solidarity to survive and withstand the shock of change in South Africa which is increasingly taking a violent form. Subregional co-operation in the economic, political and security fields with assistance from the international community would serve to strengthen the position of the countries in Southern Africa which are likely to be adversely affected by South Africa's punitive campaigns.

It has been argued that since the final objective of confidence-building is confidence itself, then its achievement should not be made a pre-condition for the initiation of the confidence-building process.[12] This proposition would be difficult to put into practice in a situation of extreme polarization, as is the case in Southern Africa, except through an international third party such as the United Nations. At some stage in the process of dismantling *apartheid* in South Africa and ending occupation in Namibia, some forms of confidence-building measures may be required—preferably through a third party in order to facilitate the final transition. In the case of Namibia, such an opportunity was lost in 1981 when the Secretary-General of the United Nations tried to implement Security Council resolution 435 of 1978 by arranging a ceasefire and supervision of free and fair elections. South Africa rejected the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia on the grounds that it (South Africa) lacked confidence in the United Nations as an impartial observer of free and fair elections in Namibia.[13] By rejecting the offer, South Africa was not only questioning the credibility of the United Nations, but also defying world opinion and rejecting an opportunity to solve the Namibian question.

Similarly, the recent international initiatives such as that of the Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons to facilitate the peaceful dismantling of *apartheid* was rejected and its proposals were dismissed by the South African régime as an interference in its internal affairs.[14] Meanwhile, the situation in South Africa remains tense and explosive, threatening peace and security in the whole subregion. Under these circumstances, it would be a futile exercise to discuss the prospects for confidence-building measures with South Africa—at least for the time being because there are no convincing incentives for such an endeavour. Furthermore, in addition to the protracted political tension in the subregion, the military equation between South Africa on one hand and the neighbouring States in the subregion on the other, is overwhelmingly in favour of the former. Its military might has been brandished in such a manner as to undermine even that minimum goodwill needed to initiate confidence-building measures.[15]

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[11] The Nkomati Accord between South Africa and Mozambique, which was signed in April 1984, was an example of military and economic blackmail. The Accord has since then been violated by South Africa by increasing military support to rebel groups in Mozambique. For a detailed discussion of the motives and failures of the Nkomati Accord, see Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, *Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War* (Zimbabwe Publishing House for the Southern Africa Research and Documentation Centre, 1986), pp. 1-42. Also see John Saul and Stephen Gelb, *The Crisis in South Africa* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1986).

[12] United Nations, *Comprehensive Study . . . (op. cit.)*, pp. 10-13.

[13] "Namibia Conference Ends after Failing to Agree on Central Issues", *UN Chronicle*, vol. XVIII, No. 3, March 1981, pp. 5-6.

[14] *See Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth Report*, The Findings of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group on Southern Africa (Penguin publication, 1986); especially chapters 5 and 6.

[15] For a statistical comparison of the military power of South Africa *vis-à-vis* other States in the subregion, see SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) *Year Books* and *The Military Balance* (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London).

## III. The case for confidence-building measures in Africa

African States are unanimous in their opposition to *apartheid* and South Africa's policy towards Namibia although their approaches to the issues sometimes vary.

Apart from that, relations among African States have ranged from normal in most cases to hostilities and mutual suspicion in some cases. Many States have also

experienced various forms of intermittent and protracted civil wars. The prevalence of inter-State and intra-State conflicts in various parts of Africa is a compelling reason for the application of appropriate confidence-building measures in containing or resolving such conflicts. However, unlike the situation in Europe, there are no competing and ideologically antagonistic military alliances in Africa and, therefore, the introduction of permanent military-related confidence-building measures is less compelling than the need for non-military-related confidence-building measures for the overall improvement of inter-State relations in the political, social and economic spheres.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) offers a unique opportunity for promoting bilateral and multilateral relations among African States. The Organization has also pre-empted any tendencies towards competing ideological and political blocs which were beginning to emerge before the formation of the OAU in 1963, in the form of the Monrovia and the Casablanca groups. However, the level and scope of interaction among African States and their respective populations is still low. Inadequate communication among people and lack of knowledge about each other is a major impediment in intra-African relations. Most African States joined the community of independent nations in the last twenty-five years and are still in the process of consolidating their sovereignty and developing relations with each other. Figures compiled by William Zartman between 1963 and 1980 show that there has been a steady rise in political interaction among African States when measured by the number of missions and visits exchanged among African States per year. The number of diplomatic missions from one African State to another increased from 164 to 470 and the number of ministerial visits rose from 33 to 109 over the same period.[16] However, he also showed that interaction at subregional levels was higher than at the continental level. The potential for developing all forms of confidence-building measures among African States is wide and imperative especially in political and development oriented relations.

All African States are members of the United Nations Organization whose principles provided the moral force and inspiration for the independence movements. The OAU, whose Charter bears some similarities to the Charter of the United Nations, provides a framework for present and future relations among African States. The OAU Charter stipulates that:

The Member States, solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:

1. The sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States;
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration;
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State;

6. Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent;
7. Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.[17]

These principles endorse the *status quo* in Africa in respect of boundaries and the legitimacy of governments in each State. The Charter articulates universally held principles and spells out a code of behaviour among African States which calls for mutual recognition and endorses the legitimacy of the member States. Furthermore, the Charter advocates co-operation in economic, social, defence and security matters. The OAU provides a useful foundation upon which different types of confidence-building measures can be worked out and implemented in Africa. The United Nations *Comprehensive Study on Confidence-building Measures* cites several examples to illustrate the process of confidence-building which has been taking place in Africa. They encompass declaratory, military and non-military confidence-building measures. The study cites the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969 by 14 African States on peaceful solution of subregional conflicts; the OAU Control Commission of 1978 to normalize relations between Zaire and Angola; and the economic co-operation within the Economic Commission of West-African States.[18] Working from that pioneering premise, confidence-building measures in Africa can be further elaborated in the following contexts:

(a) The international security environment;
(b) Intra-State and inter-State conflicts.

## A. The international security environment

Since the ultimate goal of confidence-building is to create favourable conditions to enhance disarmament, peace and security in the world, regional confidence should be a part of a global endeavour. However, the reality of international politics shows that the easing of tension in one region of the world may create insecurity in other parts of the world and complicate the process of confidence-building elsewhere. For example, the relative easing of tension in Europe has not led to more security in the third world. Indeed, in some cases it has contributed to increased tension and conflicts as the area of competition among the big powers extends to third world countries.

The overriding security concern in the world today is the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race and the risks of nuclear war. There is a growing apprehesion in many countries outside Europe and North America over nuclear weapons as the number of ships, submarines and bombers equipped with nuclear weapons increases in the oceans and skies of the world as the arms race continues unabated. The global projection of power by the super-Powers necessitates the establishment of bases and staging faciletes in various regions of the world. The military presence of extra-regional Powers introduces a delicate security equation in those regions which may upset the regional balance of power and lead to new fears and mistrust among the neighbouring States.

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[16] See I. W. Zartman and Y. El Ayouty (ed.), *The OAU After Twenty Years*, 1984, pp. 102-104.

[17] OAU Charter, article III.
[18] United Nations, *Comprehensive Study . . . (op. cit.)*, p. 19.

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Rivalry for global influence among big Powers has led to involvement in third world conflicts. The involvement of one outside Power in a regional conflict invariably draws the involvement of a rival Power on the opposite side of the conflict. Super-Power competition to influence the outcome of regional conflicts is assuming greater importance in contemporary international relations. The prospects for introducing confidence-building measures in a given region are considerably reduced when rival outside Powers are involved. Equally dangerous is the increasing possibility of the emergence of regional nuclear Powers and the likelihood of escalating the nuclear arms race in more regions of the world.

In Africa, a proposal to make the continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone has been on the agenda for more than two decades. In 1964 the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity adopted a Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa with the following stipulations:

1. Readiness to undertake, through an international agreement to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or control atomic weapons.

2. Appeal to all peace-loving nations to accept the same undertaking.

3. Appeal to nuclear-weapon States to respect the Declaration and to conform to it.

Resolutions calling for the implementation of the Declaration have been on the United Nations agenda every year, but there has not been much progress mainly because of a lack of commitment and co-operation from some of the nuclear weapon States whose formal support is necessary in an attempt to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The development of a nuclear capability by South Africa has added a new element of apprehension in Africa and has led to new political and technical complications in implementing the declaration. The controversy over South Africa's nuclear capability should, all the same, make the implementation of the Declaration more imperative and urgent in a continent which has hitherto been a *de facto* nuclear-weapon-free zone. The political and moral initiative to keep Africa free of nuclear weapons needs to be sustained and backed by legal undertakings on the part of African States and binding guarantees from the international community.

The presence of nuclear weapons in Africa in any form in any part of the continent would seriously erode the confidence and trust between regional States and undermine the security of the entire region. Possession of nuclear weapons by any would introduce new threat perceptions by other States and create an irresistable urge for other States to acquire similar weapons. The ensuing nuclear arms race would be a disaster to both regional and international security. A nuclear-weapon-free Africa and its surrounding oceans is an essential condition for introducing and sustaining confidence-building measures in Africa.

## B. Intra-State and inter-State conflicts

Appropriate confidence-building measures in security and military-related fields have to evolve from concrete situations in each State and the region as a whole. Africa's security concerns are primarily related to intra-State and inter-State conflicts. Some of the most serious security preoccupations in Africa after independence have been conflicts within States rather than among States. The Nigerian civil war, the incessant war in Chad and the on-going armed conflicts in Angola and the Sudan are among the many conflicts that have entailed military operations whose impact has been felt by neighbouring States. In many cases domestic conflicts and prolonged unrest may have an adverse impact and a spill-over effect into neighbouring States. The most common domestic sources of inter-State conflicts are grouped and discussed under the following categories: (i) national cohesion and State boundaries; (ii) development problems; and (iii) authoritarianism and political instability.

### 1. NATIONAL COHESION AND STATE BOUNDARIES

The process of nation-building in the post-colonial period in Africa had been complex and turbulent in many States. Ethnic, religious and regional cleavages with long historical roots have in some cases been manipulated to challenge and weaken governments seeking to forge unity and cohesion in newly independent States. The task has been particularly difficult where arbitrary boundaries grouped together peoples with diverse histories and culture or where people with one culture and history were split into two or more separate States. Secessionist movements seeking to break away from existing States and irredentist movements seeking to unite the people and territories belonging to different States are some of the present day manifestations of the colonial legacy in Africa.

These movements pose a serious challenge to national cohesion and may precipitate tension and conflict among neighbouring States. Secessionist and irredentist movements are usually accompanied by intense campaigns to win the political, military and diplomatic support of foreign governments and organizations. A neighbouring State may opt to remain neutral, but sometimes sheer proximity to a country with internal strife may lead to unintended involvement. For example, the exodus of refugees and political exiles from a war-torn State to neighbouring States has often led to suspicion between the State of origin and the receiving States for fear of clandestine political activities. In such situations there is a great need for credible confidence-building measures to reduce suspicion and to clarify the intentions and positions of neighbouring States.

The impact of irredentist movements on neighbouring States can be more explosive than the spill-over effect of secessionist movements. Irredentism is a claim to their land and people, it seeks to alter existing boundaries by all means including the use of force. The crux of the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1960s and 1970s and between Somalia and Kenya in the early 1960s was the quest for a greater Somalia. Recently there have been positive developments by the parties concerned to diffuse and resolve their differences after years of ten-

sion and intermittent armed clashes. The situation permits the introduction of various forms of confidence-building measures—both military and non-military—to promote peaceful co-existence of the States in the subregion.

A distinction is sometimes made in the African context between *border* and *boundary* problems. The former refers to the problems of identifying and enforcing a line that divides two or more countries while the latter refers to claims to territory belonging to another State.[19] Border problems are associated with issues related to jurisdiction over refugees, subversive or illicit cross-border trade. Nearly half of African boundaries are loosely delimited and not demarcated physically on the ground. A list compiled by A. S. Reyner in 1969 showed that out of 103 international boundaries in Africa only 55 were demarcated.[20] The first decade following the independence of most African States recorded 32 boundary disputes that were related to clarity of lines.

The distinction between border and boundary problems is one of degree rather than of substance; in the final analysis both border and boundary problems amount to claims to territorial jurisdiction. On the whole, there has been a considerable decline in boundary disputes in the 1970s through the 1980s mainly because of the opprobrium associated with such claims that the OAU has successfully imposed on African States and the increasing acceptance by most States of the reality of the inherited boundaries. Where disputes still exist, some confidence-building measures may be required as a transitory step towards reaching a lasting solution.

## 2. DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS

A looming threat to African domestic security is the endemic state of economic underdevelopment. Most African economies suffer from structural weaknesses which are inherent in dependent economies characterized by export-oriented primary production in an asymmetrical international order. Deteriorating commodity prices, increased oil prices, high interest rates and reduced capital flows are serious constraints which make it increasingly difficult for African States to allocate and distribute requisite resources to economic and social development. Estimates by the International Monetary Fund show that African debt stood at $200 billion towards the end of 1986. The figure has more than doubled in the last ten years. The annual cost of servicing the debt was $3.6 billion in 1978, by 1986 it climbed to $15 billion. The annual servicing of these debts absorbs 28 per cent of Africa's export earnings. The net transfer of capital to sub-Saharan Africa fell from $11.2 billion in 1984 to $3.6 billion in 1986. The downward trend is continuing.[21]

During the 1985 summit of the Organization of African Unity, the Heads of State and Government admitted that over and above the unequal international system and the world economic recession, their respective policies left a lot to be desired in allocating and distributing resources.[22] The distribution of social and economic benefits in countries with a weak economy and little to distribute can be a delicate political exercise. Regional inequalities, sectoral imbalances and widening income disparities among social groups can cause social unrest and political upheavals. These social and political consequences are imminent in many African countries especially during this period of economic crisis in Africa.

The economic problems of many African countries have been compounded by environmental degradation which has resulted in extensive droughts and devastating famines. The drought in the Sahelian region started in the late 1960s, through the 1970s. It became more severe between 1980 and 1985 and spread south of the equator to several countries in southern Africa. It has been estimated that by the beginning of 1985 nearly 200 million people in 24 western, eastern and southern African countries were affected by the drought and nearly 35 million people were on the brink of starvation. Up to 10 million people were on desperate moves in their own countries and across national boundaries in search of food, water and pasture for their animals. The number of those who perished will never be known, but some estimates put it as more than a million.[23] The social and political impact of this catastrophe, unprecedented in modern times, is continuing to unfold.

The immediate consequence was intensified competition between different social groups for diminishing resources, especially among those pursuing competitive modes of life such as the nomadic pastoralists *vis-à-vis* agricultural groups. Sometimes the conflicts spilled across national boundaries and assumed an inter-State dimension. In assessing the impact of famine in the Horn of Africa in recent years, Wallensteen observed that

> In these situations involving neighbouring African States, it was the nomad-dominated societies that seem to have become embroiled in a larger number of conflicts. Indeed, the nomadic societies all become involved in inter-State conflicts following a period of acute starvation.[24]

Even without leading to inter-State tension, a drought of the magnitude which swept across Africa in the last five years can be an enormous economic and political headache for any country, rich or poor. For Africa, it sapped the vitality of all generations and threatened the existence of a vast section of the population. It is a crisis in which Africa needs the combined effort of the inter-

[19] I. W. Zartman, "The Foreign Military Politics of African Boundary Problems", in C. G. Widstrand, *African Boundary Problems* (The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1969), pp. 70-100.

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 186-189.

[21] These figures are cited by J. Loxley, "Paying Dearly: African Debt", in *Canada and Africa: Common Cause* (The Group of 78) (Ottawa, 1986), pp. 22-23. Also see A. B. Taylor, "The African Debtors", *Journal of Development Planning*, No. 16, pp. 143-164.

[22] "Declaration on the Economic Situation in Africa Adopted by the Twenty-first Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity" (OAU Document No. AHG.Dec/1 (XXI), 1985).

[23] See M. Strong, "Beyond the Famine: New Hope for Africa", *Canada and Africa: Common Cause (op. cit.)*, pp. 5-6. For a broader coverage, see L. Timberlake and J. Tinker, *Environment and Conflict* (London, International Institute for Environment and Development, Earthscan Briefing Document No. 40), 1984.

[24] P. Wallensteen, "Food Crops as a Factor in Strategic Policy and Action" in A. H. Westing, *Global Resources and International Conflict* (Oxford, 1986), p. 154.

national community in providing immediate relief and long-term solutions.

Economic depression can cause strained relations among States, as well as social unrest and political turmoil domestically. For example, in recent years, declining oil revenues in oil-producing countries led to expatriation of large numbers of foreign migrant workers at relatively short notice from Nigeria and Libya. The bulk of the foreign workers affected were from Ghana and Tunisia, respectively. The repatriated workers returned to their countries to swell the ranks of the unemployed: thus becoming a potential source of social unrest. At the same time, they were no longer a source of valuable foreign exchange accruing from their regular remittances to their countries. Although the economic rationale for repatriation of foreign workers can be understood, the manner in which such measures were executed caused diplomatic ruffles between the repatriating and the receiving countries and a bruised national pride in the case of the latter.[25]

The economic recession in the industrialized countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted in an economic depression in most non-oil-producing countries in Africa. The overall GDP of African countries declined from 4.0 per cent in 1979 to less than 0.5 per cent in 1982. The social and political consequences were manifested in food riots, labour unrest and in successful and unsuccessful coup attempts.[26] In times of economic crisis such as that which Africa is going through now, the resources of governments are over-stretched to their utmost. It takes a high degree of political acumen and institutional maturity to rally a people behind a government in difficult economic times without resorting to militarism and force of arms to secure political control.

Long before the onset of the current economic crisis in Africa, there was a growing political trend towards militarization of governments in the continent. By the end of 1986, more than half of the African States were under military rule. The reasons for the militarization of African governments are therefore not to be found in the current economic crisis alone, but in the interplay of various political, economic and social factors.[27] What is most likely to happen in times of deepening economic times is for both military and civilian governments to resort to more authoritarian means in dealing with political and social unrest arising from social and economic deprivation. Militarization of governments entails the expansion of military and security establishments and the acquisition of more arms for enforcing law and order. The absence of public ac-

countability can lead to entrenchment of power and privilege and a disproportionate expenditure of resources to preserve the *status quo*. Resources are likely to be diverted from social and economic developments to the maintenance of expanded military establishments while civil liberties are progressively curbed. The outcome is aggravated deprivation, a growing disenchantment of the people with their government and chronic instability.

There are several factors which have led African countries to expand their armed forces and increase expenditure on arms since independence. There was a need for the expanding armed forces to meet legitimate defence requirements of new sovereign States after the defence umbrella of colonial Powers was withdrawn. Some countries were faced with special problems of consolidating national unity in arbitrarily drawn national borders and had to resort to military means to enforce unity. The ongoing wars and support for national liberation and proximity to hostile and powerful régimes and neighbours as in northern and southern Africa necessitates a continuing expansion of armed forces and expenditure on armaments at the expense of social and economic needs and yet defence may still be inadequate. However, there are countries where military expenditure has escalated primarily because the military has assumed the role of ruling and maintaining itself.

Despite the existence of special security situations in Africa and the relatively high number of military régimes, the comparative figures on military spending and the number of soldiers in relation to population on a world basis remains low. Africa's military expenditure reached a peak between 1976-1978 when it accounted for 25 per cent of total third world arms imports but only 6.5 per cent of all third world military expenditures, and 1.5 per cent of world military expenditures. There has been a steady decline in military expenditure in Africa since 1980 with the onset of the world-wide recession. In 1985, the per capita military expenditure in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) was $21 compared with $463 in the Middle East.[28] One scholar has persuasively argued that

. . . it is precisely the low military means of African States that is the cause of certain types of military hostilities, such as foreign and South African armed intervention.[29]

However, he goes on to argue and to raise a fundamental question on the relationship between the low level of armaments and the frequency of wars and civil strife in Africa. He concludes that there is

. . . the need to shift the focus of analysis from arms as such to some understanding of the social and material conditions underlying the generalization of violence and repression.[30]

The above suggestion highlights the necessity for a more rigorous analysis because in reality the former does not automatically lead to the latter. It very much depends, instead, on the political and ideological context under which disarmament and development are ad-

[25] *Africa Report*, November 1985, pp. 44-45.

[26] There were food riots and labour unrest in Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia after food subsidies were removed at the urging of the International Monetary Fund. For a discussion on the political consequences, see W. Tordoff, *Government and Politics In Africa* (Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 152-180. On the economic trends in this period, see *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa* (World Bank, Washington D.C., 1984).

[27] For a detailed discussion of military inspired coup d'etats and military régimes in Africa, see R. First, *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'Etat* (London, Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 1970); S. Decolo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Studies in Military Style* (New Haven Yale University, 1976), and S. Wiking, *Military Coups in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983).

[28] R. L. Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1985* (Leesburg VA/Washington, D.C.), pp. 40-43.

[29] E. Hutchful, "Disarmament and Development: An African View", *IDS Bulletin* (Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, Brighton), vol. 16, No. 4, October 1985, p. 62.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 63.

vocated and carried out. Nonetheless, there is some correlation between militarism, military expenditure and the incidence of violence.[31] The more resources are spent on military and non-productive ends, the less are the resources left for development purposes and the higher is the possibility of social unrest. A major expansion of military establishments in one State for whatever reasons may also provoke fear and suspicion from neighbouring States and trigger a subregional arms race. There is, therefore, a need for a judicious balance in allocating domestic resources for social and economic developments on one hand and for military requirements on the other in order to minimize the risks of domestic disorder and subregional mutual distrust.

### 3. AUTHORITARIANISM AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

It has been pointed out earlier that authoritarian rule can be exercised under both military and civilian rule especially in times of economic hardship. It entails greater reliance on the coercive apparatus of the State to secure political control and the restriction of political participation and civil liberties. Authoritarian régimes have a tendency to employ force to enforce political compliance and their authority over the people which may result in violation of human rights and loss of life. It is this aspect which makes authoritarian régimes inherently unpopular. They may project a facade of stability in the short run, but in the absence of popular support, the stability can only be transitory. However, while they last, authoritarian régimes can cause terror at home with far-reaching repercussions on neighbouring countries and beyond.

An ubiquitous indicator of domestic unrest is the exodus of refugees and political exiles from the affected country. A neighbouring country is usually the first stop for the refugees from a troubled country as a destination or a transit to safer sanctuaries elsewhere. Receiving and harbouring refugees has sometimes been a cause for mutual suspicion and friction between the country of origin of the refugees and that hosting them because of the presence of suspected subversive elements in their ranks. The fears and allegations of conspiracies and subversion among African countries was raised at the very first summit of African Heads of State and Government in Addis Ababa in 1963. That apprehension inspired the inclusion in the OAU Charter of a clause strongly condemning all forms of political assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other State, but there has been no means of enforcing it so far.[32]

Neighbouring countries can also be forced to bear the brunt of authoritarianism in another country by being targets of hostile propaganda and military attack in order to divert the attention of the people to "an outside enemy". Relations between Tanzania and Uganda during the authoritarian rule of Idi Amin were character-

ized by such a phenomenon. After Amin came to power, his authoritarian methods led to a growing exodus of refugees and political exiles to neighbouring countries, especially to Tanzania where the deposed leader Milton Obote sought political asylum. Tanzania had close historial relations with the deposed leader and his ruling party, the Uganda People's Congress. Furthermore, Tanzania's aversion for military rule was clearly demonstrated by withholding diplomatic recognition of Amin's military régime in Uganda—a country next door. This was taken as a hostile signal by Amin and he started harping on the bogy of subversion from Tanzania from the very beginning of his rule. Clandestine activity against Amin started inside Uganda by troops still loyal to the deposed leader; the first clandestine exile activity was from Sudan and later spread to Tanzania as more exiles crossed to the South.

Amin's campaign against the clandestine activities of the Ugandan exiles strained relations between Tanzania and Uganda from the very beginning and amounted to an undeclared war between the two States. In 1971 Amin publicly claimed that the Kagera salient belonged to Uganda, his forces crossed into Tanzania twice and his air force bombed an industrial plant in the area. Exile activities intensified the following year and retaliation against Tanzania increased. Some African countries condemned Tanzania for interference in the internal affairs of Uganda and for violating the OAU Charter. President Siad Bare of Somalia worked out a peace agreement between Tanzania and Uganda which was signed in October 1972 as the "Mogadishu Agreement".[33]

The Mogadishu Agreement was a good example of confidence-building measures intended to ease tension between two adversary States. It consisted of the following measures:

1. The cessation of military operations against each other's territory and a withdrawal of all military forces to a distance of at least ten miles from the common border.
2. Halting of hostile propaganda.
3. Refraining from allowing "subversive elements" to operate in one country against the other.

After the Mogadishu Agreement, tension between Tanzania and Uganda was considerably reduced, but still there were no diplomatic relations between them. Writing on the military situation between the two countries in the period after the Mogadishu Agreement and the outbreak of the all-out war between the two countries in 1978, Tony Avrigan and Martha Honey noted that

In future, Tanzanian troops were stationed at Kyaka, some thirty kilometres from the border, just on the south side of the Kagera River. The numbers were gradually reduced so that by the time Amin invaded in October 1978 only one company was at Kyaka to defend the entire eighteen hundred kilometres of the Kagera. This seems a clear indication that, contrary to Amin's claims, Tanzania was not, at this time, preparing an assault.[34]

As Tanzania continued observing the Mogadishu Agreement, Amin continued with internal repression

[31] Ruth L. Sivard lists 57 of 114 developing countries as military controlled—27 of which being in Africa. She notes that "in most recent reporting period 1975-1983, over two thirds of all arms exported to the third world went to repressive governments" (*World Military and Social Expenditures 1985 (op. cit)*, p. 25).

[32] Charter of the Organization of African Unity, article III, clause 5.

[33] T. Avirgan and M. Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (London, Zed Press, 1982), pp. 32-48.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

which drove more people into exile. By 1978 there were an estimated 20,000 Ugandan refugees in Tanzania.[35] At the same time there was growing discontent within the various army units which sparked off extensive purges of both officers and rank and file troops, including some of Amin's close lieutenants and relatives. Amin looked for a dramatic strategy of reuniting his army around a common external enemy and diverting attention from his internal troubles. The scapegoat was Tanzania. He invaded Tanzania in a surprising attack and occupied the strategic Kagera salient for some weeks before his troops were driven out and Tanzanian troops mounted a counter-offensive which ousted Amin and led to the collapse of his régime. Tanzania's counter-invasion of Uganda and subsequent ouster of Idi Amin provoked international political and legal arguments for and against the move, but irrespective of the merits and demerits of the arguments, the factor of domestic authoritarianism and its spill-over effect was at the root of the war between Uganda and Tanzania.

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[35] For a general discussion on refugees in Africa and comparative figures of refugees and countries of asylum see T. F. Betts, and S. Pitterman, "Refugees and Integrated Rural Development in Africa", *Africa Today*, vol. 3, No. 1, 1984.

# IV. Useful types of confidence-building measures

There might be more reasons for inter-State conflicts, fears and suspicion among African States than we have described in this paper. Nevertheless, this broad overview, with the examples cited, suffices to show that there is a need for military- and security-related confidence-building measures in such situations to reduce tension, suspicion and misunderstanding. A mixture of political and military confidence-building measures would be required in the various conflict situations. Political confidence-building measures are declarations which are meant to provide mutual assurance among States of their intentions to coexist peacefully while military measures refer to information, movements and relations among military establishments. The two categories are discussed under the following sub-headings:

(a) Declaratory measures;

(b) Information measures;

(c) Communication measures;

(d) Notification measures;

(e) Military socialization and peace-keeping operations.

## A. Declaratory measures

It has been pointed out earlier that the Charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity provide broad principles for inter-State relations globally and in the African context. The most pertinent and relevant principles and provisions in the OAU Charter which have served as confidence-building measures among all States especially in situations of conflict are those related to the following areas: (i) preservation of boundaries; (ii) peaceful settlement of disputes; (iii) non-interference in the internal affairs of States; (iv) condemnation of assassinations and subversive activities, and (v) human rights declarations in various fora. Agreements between and among African States which reiterate these principles provide regular assurance and over time evolve a code of conduct among African States. The following is a review of the declaratory value of each principle:

### 1. PRESERVATION OF BOUNDARIES

The principle of the inviolability of boundaries is not explicitly reflected in the OUA Charter, but it was adopted as a resolution of the OAU in July 1964. It solemnly declared that all member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence. This principle has served to invalidate and resolve many claims and disputes over boundaries and has assisted in preserving the territorial integrity of African States.

### 2. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article III, paragraph 4 of the OAU Charter provides for peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. To that end, a Commission was established as an integral part of the Charter. The Commisison does not have jurisdiction powers, but it makes the OAU a forum where conditions and pressures for reconciliation can be generated and facilitates the identification of mediators and the search for solutions through individuals or *ad hoc* committees. Strengthening the scope and authority of this Commission can make the OAU a more effective instrument of resolving a wider range of regional conflicts. As a confidence-building measure, the principle has a psychological and practical value.

### 3. NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES

This principle emphasizes the sovereign equality of the member States of the OAU. It is a quid pro quo for safeguarding the independence of each State in a region where there is a great diversity in size, population and resources among its members. The relevance and importance of this principle will become more evident as the differentiation in power among African states increases with the emergence of subregional Powers in the different parts of the continent.

### 4. CONDEMNATION OF ASSASSINATION AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

It has been pointed out that domestic disputes can draw neighbouring States into conflict by design or accident. In such circumstances a constant mutual assurance against conspiracies and subversion can provide mutual trust and confidence among neighbouring States. This principle can play a restraining role although its enforcement can be problematic.

### 5. HUMAN RIGHTS

Violation of human rights has been a major cause as well as a result of domestic conflicts which in turn have strained relations with other States. Human rights have their own intrinsic value and as such ought to be observed unconditionally. The preamble of the OAU Charter endorses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it was not until 1970 that the OAU decided to take up the issue of human rights. An African Charter on Human Rights and Freedoms was drafted and approved in 1981. Ratification of the Charter has not been completed, but a big stride has been made after nearly twenty years of silence on the issue by proposing an independent body to protect and guarantee human rights in Africa. The protection of human rights is a major confidence-building measure within States; it guarantees life, liberty and security of the people. It therefore enhances the legitimacy of governments to their respective citizenry and the credibility of States in the international community.

### B. Information measures

Exchange of military- and security-related information is vital in minimizing mutual suspicion in situations where there is political and military tension. It can also reinforce confidence where mutual trust already exists. The content and extent of the information exchanged would depend upon the requirements of the parties concerned and the prevailing circumstances. The underlying purpose of the exercise is to increase knowledge and transparency which can assist to clarify intentions and increase predictability. Military- and security-related information is sensitive and delicate; such exchange ought to be selective and mutual without giving one side an undue advantage over the other. Any party to the agreement should retain the right to refuse or withhold information if it bears no relevance to an appropriate situation and perceived need.

### C. Communication measures

Information needs to be transmitted promptly and reliably if it is to be of any value to the parties involved in a crisis. Regular communication between governments through diplomatic and liaison services may need to be supplemented by direct communication between political leaders and military establishments in times of crisis. Direct communication among most African States is inadequate: where it exists, it is still rudimentary and cumbersome, making a speedy and safe way of communication difficult. The lack of speedy com-munication is a major obstacle to the introduction and implementation of confidence-building measures between some African countries. In some cases, it may be necessary to introduce *at hoc* means of communication for dealing with emergency situations. It is important to keep the lines of communication open between adversaries during a crisis in order to enhance the prospects for a negotiated solution. National and subregional plans should take into account the need for a regional network of communication patterns in order to cater for long-term security requirements for the entire region.

### D. Notification measures

Most of the frontiers of African States are not guarded. The conspicuous absence of regular troops or frontier guards along African boundaries is a reflection of normality among most States and a source of mutual confidence. For the same reason, the presence or unusual movements of troops along a common border can generate apprehension if there is no prior notification. Mutual suspicion would increase if such movements occurred at a time of domestic crisis in a neighbouring country or when relations between neighbours are strained for one reason or another. Once two or more States agree upon the need for notifying each other about the movement of their respective troops on their common border, details can then be worked out and agreed upon on pre-notification time, number of troops and the appropriate verification procedures about the movements. Notification measures may be extended to cover invitations of military observers to military manoeuvres under mutually agreed guidelines.

### E. Military socialization and peace-keeping operations

Africa is a vast geographical land mass; the sheer size makes it difficult for its people to interact. In addition, linguistic barriers and the inadequate means of transport and communication make it difficult if not impossible for ordinary people to have contacts. The regional and subregional fora which exist primarily cater for the leadership stratum, but even then bridging the linguistic barrier across the four major lingua francas in Africa—Arabic, English, French and Portuguese—is not easy. Contacts between military establishments are rendered difficult by the same obstacles and compounded by the different military orientations inherited from the colonial era. It is important for mutual understanding and co-operation to create venues and opportunities for interaction among military establishments in order to promote a regional *esprit de corps*. Military socialization can be a confidence-building measure in itself and can also facilitate the implementation of other confidence-building measures when those charged with the task know each other.

A considerable degree of political trust among States has to prevail before military interaction can be initiated. Sometimes interaction could be linked to a specific joint security concern which involves joint plan-

ning, follow-up operations and military diplomacy.[36] Opportunities with lasting results are those which arise from joint experiences such as the exchange of officers in military academies and staff colleges. The operational problems which faced the OAU peace-keeping force in Chad in 1982 demonstrated the need for some military standardization in Africa to meet such contingencies in the various parts of the continent. Military socialization in Africa can also be a useful prelude to the oft sought, but elusive, goal of creating an African high command.

In Africa, it has been demonstrated in several cases in domestic and intra-State conflicts that peace-keeping forces can play a crucial role in constraining warring factions if a credible and operational peace-keeping force can be mobilized and deployed. After two decades, the disillusionment with the United Nations peace-keeping operations in the former Congo, now Zaire, has given way to a renewed interest in Africa in the concept and practice of peace-keeping in regional and subregional African conflicts in order to facilitate regional solutions to regional problems without outside interference. An African high command would have been the appropriate instrument for such a function, but the idea has not found practical expression because of various political reasons and legal shortcomings of the OAU Charter which does not give enough supranational authority to the Organization. However, it has proved possible within the limited mandate of the OAU Defence Commission to initiate measures and coordinate peace-keeping operations involving national troops of different member States of the OAU in Chad.

The Chad conflict was first brought to the OAU in 1977 by the successor of the late President Tombalbaye, General Malloun. The OAU initial effort was to mediate between the warring factions through an *ad hoc* committee which failed even to convene a single meeting of the parties concerned. Peace conferences were organized by Chad neighbours and Nigeria offered to send a peace force to Chad in 1979 to overseee the Lagos-Kano Accords reached earlier in the year, but the force had to be withdrawn because the incumbent régime in Ndjamena then violated the Accords.[37] The OAU initiative to have a peace-keeping role in Chad came at the end of 1981 when 3,000 troops from Nigeria, Zaire, Senegal and Togo were dispatched to Chad under Nigeria's command.

The peace force was beset with problems from the very beginning. The OAU had requested six countries to supply a total of 6,000 troops, but only four were able

to do so and only half of the required troops were made available. With the exception of Nigeria, the other supplying States had to depend on logistical and financial support from outside (Western) Powers. The logistical problems delayed the arrival of the peace-keeping force by four weeks after the withdrawal of Libyan troops which allowed the warring factions to gain comparative advantages *vis-à-vis* each other, thus rendering the enforcement of a cease-fire and the peace-keeping operation very difficult.

Above all, the terms of reference for the force were subject to conflicting interpretations. The OAU wanted the force to maintain a neutral stance *vis-à-vis* the warring factions while the government of Weddeye expected the force to legitimize his tenuous position to render support to his coalition forces against Habre's forces. The growing strength of the Habre forces, the failure to effect a cease-fire and the mounting cost of the peace-keeping operation changed the political and military situation and made it increasingly difficult for the peace-keeping force to continue its stay in Chad. It pulled out in March 1982—three months before the end of its mandate.

Operationally, the OAU sponsored peace-keeping force in Chad was not a success, but it was a political landmark for the OAU. It demonstrated that the OAU could muster enough political will and consensus among its members to endorse the idea of an African peace force to deal with an African conflict. It was demonstrated that it is possible to mobilize and raise an African peace-keeping force under one command provided certain crucial requirements can be met, especially those of finance and logistics. From this experience, the OAU can continue in its search for ways of developing its peace-keeping capability which could include the possibility of enlisting the financial and logistical support of the United Nations under mutually agreed conditions.

The operational and political limitations of peace-keeping forces are well known from the experience of the United Nations peace-keeping operations. Peace-keeping cannot be effective without the consent of the warring factions. Peace-keeping forces are susceptible and vulnerable to political pressures from various interested parties which may want to influence the outcome of the conflict. However, peace-keeping is a form of conflict management which can facilitate the resolution of a conflict. The forces serve as a restraining buffer between the combatants and thus constitute an important confidence-building measure as a prelude to a negotiated settlement. In the absence of a regional or global collective security system, peace-keeping forces are an essential second alternative in facilitating conflict resolution.

In a situation where there are normal relations between States it is desirable and possible to adopt measures to reinforce relations. Such measures may include mutual restraints in the size of armed forces and

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[36] Military diplomacy is a practice which has evolved among military régimes in Latin America; it entails the involvement of high-level military offices in conducting military- and security-related negotiations. For an elaboration of this concept see Alexandre de S. C. Barros, "Confidence-building Measures in South America: Some Notes on Opportunities and Needs", in Karl Kaiser (ed.), *Confidence-building Measures: Proceedings of an International Symposium, 24-27 May 1983 at Bonn*, December 1984, pp. 185-200.

[37] For details of the role of the OAU *ad hoc* committee and the peace conferences, see Amadu Sesay, Olusola Ojo and Orobola Fashehun, *The OAU After Twenty Years* (Westview Press, Boulder and London, 1984), pp. 40-43.

restraints in the acquisition of destabilizing weapon systems in the region. Joint military and security commissions can serve useful roles in pre-empting misperceptions through regular meetings to review the security situations among neighbours and to adopt appropriate measures to reinforce the peaceful relations. Precautionary measures can also include the strengthening of law and order agencies such as police, immigra-

tion and customs services in border areas.[38] The biggest potential for promoting mutual confidence and enduring peace and security among African States lies in schemes for social and economic co-operation.

[38] In most of the sub-regions in Africa, frequent good neighbourly meetings are held to discuss issues related to cross-border problems such as smuggling, cattle rustling, poaching, customs and immigration matters.

# V. Economic and social co-operation

Economic and social co-operation among States entails the pooling of resources and a measure of consensus over issues of mutual benefit. In the process of co-operation disagreements and conflicts may arise, but the chances of resolving such differences are greater in an environment where States are engaged in some form of co-operation than in a situation where there is no co-operation at all. The more areas of co-operation, the greater are the opportunities for developing a community feeling and for developing confidence and mutual trust among States. As a bottom line, some degree of political good will has to prevail before States embark on co-operative schemes and in order to sustain and propel forward the joint endeavours.[39]

It has been pointed out earlier that the level of interaction and integration among African States is low because of historical and geographical barriers and the low level and scope of existing regional and subregional organizations. There have been several initiatives by African States to promote regional integration schemes—some predated independence—but their success has been limited because of the structural weakness of African economies. Intra-African trade is low and mainly confined to neighbouring countries. Most African trade is oriented towards the industrialized countries, especially the former metropoles. African countries produce a narrow range of competitive primary commodities and subsistence or near subsistence production accounts for more than half of the gross domestic product. The industrial base is still low and predominantly linked to extractive industries; productivity is low and there is not enough sectoral interaction to generate self-sustaining and complementary economic activity within States and among States especially in sub-Saharan Africa.[40]

The existing weakness of African economies would have to be overcome before the full advantages of common markets could be realized. At this stage, inter-African schemes for economic integration can only yield limited benefits, but they can also serve to lay the institutional foundations for future co-operation. The experience of some of the defunct common markets such

as the former East African Community can provide useful lessons for avoiding past pitfalls and defining new schemes. Two crucial aspects have to be taken into account. One is the devising of flexible mechanisms for the distribution of the costs and benefits of co-operation among the members of the given scheme. The other is the harmonization of the centrifugal forces of separate nationalism in relationship to the autonomy and powers of regional institutions.

## A. The Economic Community of West African States

One of the promising sub-regional organizations with integrative and confidence-building potential is the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which was established in 1975. It consists of 16 States, making it the largest economic integration grouping in the world in terms of number of countries.[41] The ECOWAS Treaty envisages the establishment of a Common Market encompassing various sectors such as trade, finance, immigration, agriculture, industry, transport and natural resources. The aim of ECOWAS is to promote economic development leading to the rapid and balanced development of West Africa and ultimately to the unity of the countries of West Africa "by stages".[42] To start with, it seeks to eliminate customs and other duties on trade among member countries.

Like most third world and other African countries, the member countries of ECOWAS share the structural weakness of underdeveloped economies. Their economies are primarily dependent on agricultural production and extractive industries for export to the industrialized countries. Manufacturing accounts for only 8 per cent of the GNP. Intra-regional trade is still low, averaging about 3 per cent of total exports and 4 per

[39] On conceptual formulation on co-operation and integration among States, see J. S. Nye, Jr., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston, Little Brown Company, 1971), chapters 1-3.

[40] For a general survey of African economies, see the World Bank Annual Reports on Africa and especially that of 1984, *Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program of Action* (World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1984).

[41] There are other organizations in West Africa which preceded ECOWAS such as the Organization of Senegal River States, the River Niger Commission, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Mano River Union, the Conseil de l'entente, the Customs Union of West African States (UDEAO), and the Francophone Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO). ECOWAS is the latest and the largest in membership and scope. It consists of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

[42] The Treaty of Economic Community of West African States, article 2.

cent of total imports.[43] It was this reality of underdevelopment and the shared perceptions of the problem among the leaders of west Africa which impelled them to pool their resources in dealing with the problem. The initial inspiration for the creation of ECOWAS came from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). After some initial halts and starts, a decisive breakthrough was initiated in 1972 when the Presidents of Nigeria and Togo set a commission of experts to draft a Treaty for the creation of ECOWAS which was later signed by the original fifteen members on 28 May 1975. The first five protocols annexed to the Treaty were signed on 5 November 1976. The birth of ECOWAS was a crystallization of the collective political good will and mutual trust among the members of the organization. It also set the stage for more interaction and confidence-building among the ECOWAS partners.

Like most regional schemes in developing countries, ECOWAS has its own share of problems which militate against integration and have to be contended with. The grouping of anglophones, francophones and lusophones poses a linguistic hurdle but it has been possible to overcome it with modern means of translation. There is considerable diversity in size and power among the ECOWAS countries which in some regional schemes has been a cause for uneasiness among the smaller and less prosperous States, especially with respect to the distribution of benefits of co-operation.[44] ECOWAS has addressed itself to this crucial issue by the establishment of a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development to serve as an equalizing mechanism in the distribution of benefits to its lesser endowed member States.

The question of diversity in size and power goes beyond the equalization of benefits, it involves the sensitive issues of sovereignty and national identity vis-à-vis each other member in the Organization. This issue is an unavoidable challenge in any regional scheme especially one of the size of ECOWAS. The same will and trust which impelled the ECOWAS members to enter into a Treaty of Co-operation would be required to accommodate and harmonize the sovereignties of its members irrespective of their size or power. The same spirit should apply to any ideological differences which may arise among its members. If the ideological blocs of the East and the West can have commercial relations and other forms of interaction without compromising their respective ideological beliefs, it should be much easier for developing countries to engage in joint economic activities because their ideological differences may be more apparent than real. Their differences often represent different manifestations of nationalisms. Another

common problem found in regional schemes of developing countries is the degree of autonomy and power of regional institutions. In the ECOWAS Treaty, there is a conscious effort to give its institutions adequate supranational autonomy in order to minimize the centrifugal forces of separate nationalisms and to strengthen the institutions of the Organization.[45]

In 1978 a Protocol of non-aggression was adopted in order to create a "friendly atmosphere, free of any fear of attack or aggression of one State by another to facilitate co-operation".[45] This Protocol was necessary for promoting mutual confidence and trust among member countries. It was later recognized that in order to ensure peace and stability in the community as a whole, there had to be some insurance against external aggression and externally supported insurrection against any member of the Community. In May 1981, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence Matters which established a Joint Defence Commission comprising Defence Ministers and their Chiefs of Defence Staff of the member countries and a Defence Council of the Heads of State.[47] The ultimate goal is to create an Allied Armed Force of the Community (AAEC) using assigned units of national armies when the need arises to deal with emergency situations.

The Protocol on Defence identifies three categories of hostile military action which the Defence Commission is to deal with:

1. Aggression from a non-member State where the AAEC would be required to take appropriate action.
2. Conflict betwen two States where mediation would be undertaken and the AAEC would be deployed as a peace-keeping force.
3. Internal conflicts with external support would be dealt with as external aggression, but if the conflict is internal, Community forces would not intervene.

It has been pointed out that the main problems which beset the OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad were those related to the financing of the operation and of forming a unified command. An ECOWAS force could face similar problems in the event of a peace-keeping operation. However, the mere fact that the idea of a Community force to deal with emergencies has been accepted by the majority of its members and incorporated into the ECOWAS Treaty, is a major step in the search for a mechanism for promoting sub-regional security in West Africa.

Two new organizations for subregional co-operation similar to ECOWAS have been created in recent years in Southern and Eastern Africa. The first one was the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) formed in 1980. It consists of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The other is the Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern

[43] For an overview of regional integration schemes and analysis of ECOWAS, see. J. E. Okolo, "Integrative and Cooperative Regionalism: The Economic Community of West African States", *International Organization*, No. 39, vol. 1, 1985, pp. 122-153.

[44] For a discussion on the problems of diversity in power and size in the Latin America Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) and its successor, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), see M. S. Wionczed, "The Rise and Decline of Latin American Economic Integration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, No. 9, September 1970, pp. 46-66. On CARIFTA and CARICOM, see W. A. Axline, "Integration and Development in the Commonwealth Caribbean: The Politics of Regional Negotiations", *International Organization*, No. 32 (Autumn 1978), pp. 953-973.

[45] See J. E. Okolo, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-145.

[46] ECOWAS, "Development of the Community, 1977-1981", p. 26.

[47] Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Mali did not sign the Protocol because the implications of the military alliance with outside which some members have were not agreed upon. Mauritania signed only after the Protocol was amended to call for the withdrawal of foreign troops once ECOWAS could guarantee mutual defence.

African States (PTA) which was formally established in 1982. Its membership falls within the territorial scope of the Economic Commission for Africa which covers eighteen countries, but only fifteen have so far signed the PTA Treaty—Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Both organizations seek to promote economic development in the subregions in order to attain economic liberation and self-reliance.

## B. The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

The formation of SADCC was preceded by an informal political grouping of independent States in the early 1970s which geographically were in the front line of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, hence the name "front-line States". Initially, it consisted of Tanzania and Zambia. Its objective was to co-ordinate and render diplomatic, political and military support to the liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. Angola and Mozambique joined the front liners after their countries were liberated in 1975.

As the liberation front line moved further south, Botswana became the fifth member in 1978. Zimbabwe joined the group soon after its independence in 1980. The six front-line States continue to exist as a distinct group, but it was also the nucleus of SADCC. In 1979, they began exploring the possibility of establishing a formal group to promote economic co-operation in the subregion and to minimize their dependence on South Africa. It was considered necessary to include the other independent States of Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland because of their geographical proximity and shared economic dependence on South Africa.

In April 1980, the nine majority-ruled countries of southern Africa met in Lusaka and adopted the Lusaka Declaration entitled "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation" as well as a Programme of Action covering co-operation in various economic sectors. The declaration spelled out four main objectives:

1. The reduction of economic dependence, particularly, but not only, on the Republic of South Africa.
2. The forging of links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration.
3. The mobilization of resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies.
4. Concerted action to secure international co-operation within the framework of a strategy for economic liberation.

SADCC is an organization which seeks to overcome the structural and organizational shortcomings of previous economic groupings in the region. It emphasizes regional co-ordination in the production of goods and services in the member countries. It does not, at this stage, focus on trade-creation, an approach which tends to reinforce the economically stronger members of the organization at the expense of the weaker member and to hamper regional planning. The SADCC approach is to plan in such a way that bilateral and multilateral trade in the region would grow from co-ordinated national and regional development and would be a logical outcome of investment in transport and production. The SADCC strategy is to promote regional consultation and co-ordination of the respective national plans and projects of the member States in specific sectors.

The sector which has received top priority since SADCC's inception is transport and communication because of its crucial linkage to other areas and its leading dependence on South Africa. Other sectors covered under the SADCC programme include food and agriculture, energy, manpower development, industry, mining and tourism. Co-ordination of national plans in these sectors helps to reduce duplication, wasteful competition and permits complementarity. The individual member States are assigned a sector to co-ordinate through their relevant ministries. Since SADCC is only a co-ordinating conference and not yet a common market, it does not require elaborate regional institutions. It has a headquarters of less than ten people headed by an executive secretary.

The devolution of responsibility for co-ordinating SADCC activities to individual national governments is consistent with its strategy of preserving the national sovereignties of its individual members while developing closer political and economic co-operation. Through SADCC's activities, a community of interests is gradually developing in the sub-region. SADCC is an economic organization with a strong political backing from its members. It was born in response to a hostile environment created by the economic, military and political blackmail by the *apartheid* régime in South Africa. It is at the same time a collective endeavour to overcome underdevelopment in the region. The strategy of co-operation through co-ordination of economic activities is already bringing together the technocrats of the various sectors of the respective countries. The development and improvement of the means of transport and communication among the member countries will eventually permit similar interaction among ordinary people and contribute to the strengthening of a community feeling within the Organization.

The perception of a comon security threat from the *apartheid* régime and its proxies is very strong among the SADCC members, especially those which are outspoken against the policy of *apartheid*. In order to safeguard security and their territorial integrity, the SADCC member States adopted a code of conduct in 1981 which calls for an "avoidance of territorial expansionism and occupation of each other's territory and refusal by each country to serve as a base for subversion and destabilizaton by another member country".[48] The South African threat may be perceived differently by the SADCC members depending on the grip and economic leverage exercised by South Africa, but it is generally accepted that collusion with South Africa or her proxies against a member State is a violation of the Code.

The code of Conduct may serve as a restraining factor among the SADCC members, but so long as *apartheid*

[48] Record of the Southern African Development Coordination Summit Conference, held in the Republic of Zimbabwe on 20 July 1981, p. 41.

persists, the threat from South Africa will continue to be a constant danger. As such, a formal defence and security provision may have to be included in the SADCC manifesto in order to counter South Africa's aggression.

On the economic front, during the first five years of SADCC, the growth of the economies of SADCC countries has been adversely affected by South Africa's policy of destabilization, drought and the world-wide economic recession. Intra-SADCC merchandise remained low—estimated at 4.5 per cent of total trade. About 7 per cent of SADCC total exports went to South Africa and 30 per cent of total imports originated from there. The rest of the trade was with countries outside the African region. On the whole however, the SADCC 1986 Macro-Economic Survey concluded that the trend was towards an increase in trade between SADCC countries as a proportion of their total foreign trade, but South Africa continued to be a major economic force in the subregion.[49]

Since 1980, there has been an increase in transport dependence on South Africa by SADCC States as most of the alternative transport routes to the sea have been rendered inoperative by proxy sabotage financed and directed by South Africa in its destabilization campaign against the SADCC countries. It has been estimated by the SADCC Secretariat that between 1980 and 1986 the South African destabilization campaign cost the SADCC countries a total loss of $US 9,780 million, the equivalent of almost one third of all SADCC exports or a tenth of total gross domestic product.[50]

The economic and military threat from South Africa shows the need for the SADCC countries to close their ranks and to strengthen their mutual defence and the need for collective self-reliance. The assistance of the international community in this area is crucial not only because the military budgets of most SADCC countries are already over-stretched, but also because the logic of the situation demands more assistance to SADCC States. It is futile to finance expensive development projects in the region and leave them vulnerable to attacks by South Africa and her proxies.

Although there is considerable preoccupation at the moment in SADCC with security and the pervasive economic grip by South Africa, this is only an immediate and a partial response to the underlying problems of underdevelopment and dependence in the region. It has often been emphasized by the leaders of

SADCC countries that the Organization was not formed as specifically "anti-South Africa". The long-term objective and strategy of SADCC was summarized by President Kaunda from the very beginning in the following statement:

In our view this regional grouping is being established despite and not merely because of South Africa and her concept of a regional constellation of States ... Our task is to link up our economies in order to strengthen ourselves. Of course, this is important in the strategy for self-defence against possible attempts by South Africa to undermine the independence of various countries in the region.[51]

Referring to the future of SADCC a year later, the then President of Tanzania Julius Nyerere said:

... our purposes are not simply greater independence from South Africa. If South Africa's *apartheid* rule ended tomorrow, there would still be need for states of Southern Africa to cooperate.[52]

A non-racial South Africa that respects the independence and territorial integrity of her neighbours would be a welcome and a vital member of a future collective in the region.

## C. The Preferential Trade Area

The Preferential Trade Area is a step towards the establishment of a common market and eventually an economic community for the eastern and southern African States.[53] The PTA Treaty specifies a ten-year transition period for eliminating tariff duties on an agreed common list of commodities by permitting its members to protect their infant and strategic industries. It contains provisions for emergency measures to relieve balance-of-payment difficulties, and other compensatory and corrective mechanisms.

The crucial differences between the two organizations, i.e. SADCC and PTA, are in their approaches to co-operation, priorities and above all the circumstances under which they were created. SADCC seeks to promote sectoral co-ordination with a priority on the development of infrastructural projects especially in transport. The next priority is co-ordinated investment in production which would eventually lead to more intra-regional trade. The PTA is first and foremost a trade-creating organization based on existing levels of production and utilizing the available means of transport and communication. The ultimate goal of the PTA is also the overall development of the region. Some of its protocols are related to the development of the regional infrastructure, agricultural and industrial production in order to enhance the intra-regional trade.

The circumstances under which the two organizations were created explains and reflects their different character. SADCC was created in a beleaguered political environment and since its inception it has existed in a state of political and military siege through destabilization by South Africa. SADCC was therefore a political response to a pressing economic necessity. The PTA on the other hand, is the brain-child of the Organization of African Unity and the Economic Com-

[49] *SADCC Macro-Economic Survey 1986*, pp. 39-44.

[50] This aggregate loss consists of:
Damage to property and productive capacity = $US 1,610 million;
Total loss in output or gross domestic production = $US 3,480 million;
Total adverse effect on the balance of payments = $US 1,650 million;
Extra defence expenditure = $US 3,060 million;
Expenditure on refugees = $US 660 million;
See *SADCC Macro-Economic Survey 1986*, pp. 23-25. Other sources consider this estimate conservative and put it at $US 12-13 billion at the end of 1984 while by 1985 the annual loss was running at $US 4 billion a year. Besides the loss of property and loss of productivity, it is estimated that nearly 250,000 people lost their lives due to the combined effects of economic destabilization, military aggression and famine. For details see P. Johnson and D. Martin, *Destructive Engagement:Southern Africa at War* (Harare, Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), chapter 9, especially pp. 173-271.

[51] Statement by President Kenneth Kaunda, Lusaka, 1 April 1980. Reproduced in *Southern African Development Coordination Conference Handbook*, p. 9.

[52] *Ibid.*

[53] PTA Treaty, article 2.

mission for Africa (ECA). Even before the adoption of the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980 which urged the creation of subregional organizations, the ECA had already laid down the foundation for increasing regional trade in Africa on a subregional basis. Although the supreme organ of the PTA is the Authority consisting of the heads of State and government of the Treaty member States, the PTA was essentially a technocratic initiative to promote subregional integration in the various parts of the continent.

In 1977 the ECA set up five subregional institutions known as multinational programming and operational centres ("mulpocs") with a view to increasing trade in Africa. It was recommended that preferential trade areas within each subregion be created not later than December 1984. The mulpoc for eastern and southern Africa is the PTA based in Lusaka. One scholar has summarized the differences between the two organizations in the following words:

SADCC is overtly political and has an explicit political project of economic disengagement for which it mobilizes external and domestic resources. The PTA is much more technically economic, more market and less state interventionist.[54]

The two organizations have, in the long run, the potential to complement each other especially in those areas where memberships overlap. Although they start at different ends of the scale, they both seek to promote integration and the overall development of the subregion. They offer an opportunity for several African countries in the subregion to work together in solving common problems and in the process they develop mutual confidence and trust in each other.

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[54] For an analytical comparison between the two Organizations, see D. G. Anglin, "Economic Liberation and Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa: SADCC and PTA", *International Organization*, No. 37, vol. 4 (Autumn 1983), pp. 683-711.

# Conclusion

It has been the central argument of this essay that the meaning and relevance of confidence-building measures in Africa and other third world regions ought to encompass both military and developmental aspects because of their inseparable relationship and direct bearing on security or insecurity in these regions. Confidence-building in Africa is a concept and a process that ought to address itself to both the manifest symptoms of tension and conflict as well as some of their underlying causes. The former refers to military-related situations that already exist or are about to develop while the latter refers to preventive measures by building on and boosting existing good will and confidence through co-operation.

The discussion on the role of economic and social co-operation as a framework for promoting mutual confidence and trust among African States is based on a limited coverage of western, eastern and southern Africa of relatively new organizations in those subregions, but there are other bilateral and multilateral organizations in the continent which offer similar opportunities, such as the Senegambia Confederation, the Customs and Economic Union of Central African States, the Economic Community of West Africa (CEAO) of the francophone countries, as well as economic and political relationships in northern Africa and the Maghreb, despite their shifts in form and composition over the years.

Other kinds of economic co-operation in Africa are built around specific projects among two or more countries which have common boundaries and shared resources. Some of the promising joint projects are the Senegal River Commission in West Africa, which in-

cludes Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, for the development of irrigation schemes. Similarly, there is the Kagera River Authority in East Africa which includes Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania for the development of hydroelectric power and the agricultural potential of the Kagera Basin. The Nubian sandstone aquifer shared by Egypt, Sudan, Chad and Libya in northern Africa also has great potential for agricultural development but, unlike the first two projects cited above, this one has not yet been given an institutional framework. Projects centered around shared resources can create a measure of mutual confidence among the parties involved and can also serve as regulatory mechanisms in the event of any dispute or conflict in the exploitation of joint resources.

Since confidence-building is a gradual, cumulative process, there is need for subsequent studies to focus on the dynamics of co-operation over a relatively long period to show empirically how confidence builds up among States through interaction and co-operation. The experience of previous and present co-operative endeavours in Africa reveals that political will alone is not enough to initiate and sustain co-operation among States, especially on economic matters. While African States have to mobilize their domestic resources, they also need to augment them with resources from the international community, particularly in capital and technology, in order to finance regional and subregional programmes and projects. The role of the international community in facilitating confidence-building in Africa through development, is equally as crucial a factor as global disarmament for creating the necessary preconditions to achieve regional security and regional disarmament.