UNIDIR/91/36

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# Confidence-building Measures and International Security

## The Political and Military Aspects: a Soviet Approach

*Igor Scherbak*

UNITED NATIONS
New York, 1991

UNIDIR/91/36

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATION

*Sales No.* GV.E.91.0.7

ISBN 92-9045-052-5

## Preface

UNIDIR has had a long-standing project to undertake analyses of national security concepts and approaches to disarmament. This is based on the premise that the more information we have on the fundamental concepts which guide the security policies of nations the more we are likely to arrive at a common understanding and a shared perception of each other's policies. This will also lead to a more conducive climate for negotiations on disarmament as befits UNIDIR's mandate of facilitating progress toward greater security for all States; promoting informed participation in disarmament efforts; assisting ongoing negotiations and providing insights into the problems involved.

Within the framework of this project on national security concepts we have focused on national approaches to specific issues such as verification. This research report presents a detailed analysis of a Soviet approach to confidence-building measures. Igor Scherbak is well qualified to do this having been in his country's delegation to the Conference on Disarmament for many years.

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) made their advent into the international arena with the Helsinki Final Act of 1 August 1975 which concluded the First Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Since then CBMs, while not being a disarmament measure per se, has acquired considerable importance in the international discussion and negotiation of disarmament and security. It is therefore of considerable interest to have, from a Soviet perspective, an analysis of the role CBMs could play both in the political and military spheres. The author examines the new Soviet approach to CBMs both in bilateral US-USSR relations and in the context of the United Nations. Separate chapters are devoted to the role of CBMs in specific areas of disarmament such as chemical weapons, outer space, conventional weapons and in the field of naval arms control.

The views and opinions expressed in this publication are of course the sole responsibility of the author and not UNIDIR. However, UNIDIR does assume responsibility for determining whether research reports merit publication and, consequently, we commend this report to the attention of its readers.

Jayantha Dhanapala
Director, UNIDIR

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The work of the Institute aims at:

1. Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race, and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, toward greater security for all States and toward the economic and social development of all peoples;

2. Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;

3. Assisting ongoing negotiations in disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments; particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

4. Carrying out more in-depth, forward-looking, and long-term research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

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## Introduction

### The Potential of Confidence-Building Measures for International Security

Increasing importance has been attached of late to confidence building - a relatively new development in international relations. (The definition of confidence-building measures is examined in Chapter I.)

It is safe to say that confidence-building measures have a growing role to play in preventing war, whether nuclear or conventional, stabilizing the strategic and regional situation, settling regional conflicts, and managing various kinds of crises. They are increasingly recognized in foreign-policy departments and academic quarters as a major means of averting a surprise attack and preventing covert war preparations.

Confidence-building measures help one side interpret correctly the actions of the other side in a pre-crisis situation through an exchange of reliable and uninterrupted information on each other's intentions.

Furthermore, the prevention of the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear arms and the decreased likelihood of military incidents resulting from unauthorized actions are becoming an important aspect in carrying out confidence-building measures. It must be stressed here that now, at a time when very up-to-date and often very sophisticated equipment is being rapidly introduced in modern armies, there is a growing risk of accidental or unintentional armed conflict. A recent example of this is the incident in which a United States cruiser shot down an Iranian plane in the Persian Gulf because of an error made by the ship's computers. There is an equally heightened risk of an accidental or unintended outbreak of nuclear war caused by the emergence of strategic and general-purpose offensive systems designed for pre-emptive strikes. This is destabilizing the strategic situation in general and the military and political situation in Europe in particular. The unpredictability of the military strategic situation and the probability of unintentional use of nuclear arms will grow many times over if any SDI version is deployed in outer space.

There are, of course, other factors in the activities of strategic forces directly affecting the stability of the situation and making it unpredictable. Among these are the way strategic forces are deployed and brought into combat readiness, the technical systems for preventing an accidental or unsanctioned

launching of combat missiles. All this can also become the subject of confidence-building measures designed to avert an accidental or unintended outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

Today, the question of confidence-building measures is debated at various multilateral and bilateral forums, ranging from the talks on arms limitation and reduction to negotiations on preventing regional conflicts. There is a steady horizontal and vertical spread of confidence-building measures.

It would be appropriate in this context to cite as an example the talks on banning chemical weapons. Merely two or three years ago, it seems, confidence-building measures would not have been a subject at these talks, whereas now they are rapidly being incorporated into the agenda of the talks and the future text of the international convention banning chemical weapons. What does this mean? Are confidence-building measures in vogue now? The reason is quite different: the participants in the talks were able to see quickly enough that these measures helped create an atmosphere of trust during negotiations and thus bring nearer the signing of the convention.

The talks on banning chemical weapons have shown us that ever new areas of arms control can be covered by confidence-building measures. These measures are becoming a commonly recognized component of major bilateral and multilateral agreements on arms reduction and limitation. The Soviet-American INF Treaty is a very recent example of this. Article IX of the Treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding on Providing Initial Data in Connection with the Treaty regulate the exchange of data and mutual notification. The Protocol on inspections to be conducted under the Treaty determines the procedure for conducting such inspections with due notification.

The Soviet-American Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres, signed in September 1987, is most important for strategic stability, making it more reliable and predictable, and thus lowering the risk of a nuclear war as a result of an accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding.

The limits of strategic stability and predictability have been greatly extended also by the recent Soviet-American agreement of notification of ICBM and SLBM launchings.

It should be noted here that the recent agreements that include confidence-building provisions open up a new chapter in the development of confidence-building measures in the nuclear sphere. The vast potential of

such measures can be seen from the fact that at this stage they are widely discussed at the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet-American talks on reducing offensive strategic arms, and the full-scale stage-by-stage Soviet-American talks on matters related to the question of nuclear testing.

Yet another area where confidence-building measures may be applied is the drafting of an international agreement limiting the dissemination of military missile technology. A new generation of confidence-building measures can be developed to make the existing mechanism regulating the non-proliferation of nuclear arms more effective.

Confidence building can also play a major role in the future in improving the United Nations mechanism for maintaining international security. The chief function of the United Nations as the Centre for settling international conflicts through joint efforts should be restored. The idea of setting up an international observation and verification agency under the auspices of the United Nations, proposed at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is most promising in this respect. In order to implement this idea, it would be advisable to draw up an agreed set of measures for collecting and assessing data on military situations in regions of conflict, outline the procedure for the regular monitoring of situations in potential conflict zones, and plan measures for improving the situation in those regions. It would likewise be necessary to expand the functions of the Secretary-General, allowing him to send United Nations missions promptly to areas of international conflict and hold consultations with the States concerned in order to settle potential crisis situations.

As regards practical ways of settling regional conflicts, one could envisage a combined use of confidence-building measures and the latest technical means of verification in the crisis areas.

The United Nations, naturally, can do a great deal to formulate and promote confidence-building measures by encouraging greater openness and helping to provide an objective picture of the military potential of the sides and the doctrines and intentions of States.

There is much scope for developing confidence-building measures in preventing the use of chemical weapons, investigating cases involving the use of these barbaric weapons and precluding their spread.

I shall now briefly touch upon the European aspect of confidence-building measures. It is here, perhaps, that the most dramatic progress has been made

in institutionalizing these measures. The first generation of confidence-building measures was formalized in the Helsinki accords on such measures. The second was set forth in the Stockholm document. Without going into the details of the second-generation measures it must be stressed that, on the whole, they are obviously aimed at restricting military activities, in particular, large-scale military exercises posing the danger of surprise attack. Another important aspect is that in Stockholm the principle of on-site inspection was formalized. This has made the all-European system of confidence-building measures much more reliable. Because of the Stockholm accords, the activities of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty States became more predictable and verifiable.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and agreement on a substantial new set of CBMs signed at the recent summit of CSCE in Paris gave a powerful boost to further strengthening security and confidence in Europe.

At the present time, it is becoming increasingly imperative to formulate confidence-building measures designed to prevent an arms race in outer space and on the seas.

Another important area in the development of confidence-building measures is the consolidation of regional stability and lowering the level of military confrontation in various regions of the world, such as the Middle East, the Asian and Pacific region or the South Atlantic.

Moreover, confidence building should not be left out of such areas as the environment, international security, prevention of the military uses of scientific and technological advances, disarmament, and development.

The constantly expanding practical uses of confidence-building measures are clear proof that they are necessary and useful for achieving greater international security and strategic and regional stability and preventing war. They are not only useful for concluding and ensuring observance of agreements on disarmament and helping to maintain strategic stability, and so on, but, being highly universal, they are also capable of blocking potential areas of the arms race, preventing a destabilization of the strategic situation, and helping to rule out regional conflicts and explosive situations. In all these cases specific confidence-building measures may help provide a basis for signing appropriate international agreements in future. This accounts for their current popularity.

The continued improvement of confidence-building measures and solving the main problems hampering the emergence of confidence in the military sphere are areas for future work. To that end the biased stereotypes of one side to another, and suspicion will have to be overcome. What is needed is constructive dialogue on military doctrines and the development of defence systems, so that intentions can be interpreted correctly and military and political activities accurately predicted. Unless this is done, the international community can hardly expect confidence-building measures to play a greater role in international security and disarmament.

## Chapter I

## THE CONCEPT OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE MILITARY SPHERE

### 1. The approach to defining confidence-building measures

The increasing use of confidence-building measures as a major means of achieving international security calls for the formulation of a concept of confidence-building measures. This is required, among other things, in order to participate in the future development of confidence-building measures and identify the problems the international community may be faced with when it comes to determining the role of these measures in maintaining international security, in disarmament processes and in preventing critical situations and regional conflicts. A clear understanding of the parameters of confidence-building measures is required for their uniform and correct carrying-out by all the States concerned.

Much thought is being given to elaborating confidence-buiding measures in the military sphere in practically every part of the world for the ultimate goal is a universal concept of confidence building applicable on a global and regional scale, with local specifics, of course, taken duly into account.

Notwithstanding the nuances in the approaches to confidence building in the military field, it is safe to state that a more or less general idea of the concept of confidence-building measures is gradually coming into focus. The first sign of this was the Comprehensive Study on Confidence Building carried out by a team of governmental experts appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General back in 1982. The experts failed to come to terms on a comprehensive definition of confidence-buiding measures but they none the less pointed out in their study the common elements in their approaches to determining the chief components of such measures.

- "... The goal of confidence-building measures is to contribute to, reduce or, in some instances, even eliminate the causes of mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities, all of which are significant factors in the continuation of the international arms build-up in various regions and, ultimately, also on a world-wide scale;
- "Confidence building should facilitate the process of arms control and disarmament negotiations, including verification, and facilitate the settlement of international disputes and conflicts;

- "Measures pursuing these objectives will lead to greater rationality and stability in international relations and contribute, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to inhibiting the use or threat of use of military force." 1/

The Comprehensive Study greatly stimulated work on the modern concept of confidence-building measures, on the basis of the consensus elements set out in that document. This tendency was strongly reinforced by the positive results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which extended the limits of co-operation in this sphere for many States.

It would be wrong to say, of course, that there is no difference in the approach to these matters taken by the Soviet Union on the one hand and Western States on the other. The differences are sometimes fairly large, but the main thing still is that the dialogue on confidence-building measures, is growing deeper despite these differences, and that agreements on confidence-building measures are being drafted. The Soviet-American Agreement on setting up nuclear risk reduction centres and the Agreement between the United States and the USSR on notification of ICBM and SLBM launches are good evidence of that.

In the Soviet approach to confidence-building measures in the military sphere the main stress is on making the political and technical military aspects of these measures mutually complementary. A combination of large-scale political, international, legal and technical military measures can make confidence-building measures really effective. "The Soviet Union is prepared to consider in a constructive way a broad spectrum of confidence-building and security measures. These measures should include major military, political and other measures aimed at building confidence. To confine oneself to one area would be to narrow down the available opportunities", said the Soviet delegate at the Stockholm Conference on confidence-building, security and disarmament measures in Europe. 2/

That confidence-building measures in the military sphere are viewed in a broad political and technical military context is evidenced, among other things, by the Soviet proposals on refraining from the first use of nuclear weapons, on the signing of a treaty on mutual non-use of military force and maintaining relations of peace, and so forth, advanced at the Stockholm Conference.

In the Soviet approach to the concept of confidence building, these measures in the military sphere are viewed by Soviet experts as a moral and psychological guarantee of international security. 3/

As to the Western approach to confidence-building measures, the emphasis there has been traditionally on the technical military aspects. The reason for such an approach was as follows: confidence in the military sphere can be ensured by practical actions that are verifiable and can be properly assessed. This explains why the West rejected the international legal measures (such as non-use of military force proposed by the USSR). Western experts classed these measured among general, "declarative" ones on the grounds that they did not offer a real guarantee against an attack - they were not specific and therefore unverifiable. The degree of confidence in the military policy of States, as viewed by the West, is determined by the degree of openness and "transparency" in military and political activities. In the Western concept, the chief purpose of confidence-buiding measures is to make military and political activities "transparent". 4/

In the opinion of United States expert Richard Darilek, confidence-building measures are requisite in order to lessen the danger inherent in any misunderstanding of military activity, especially when the States involved in a conflict lack any clear or timely information on the nature of that activity. 5/

These different approaches were a result of the sides' opposite views of confidence buiding in the military sphere, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. The Western countries considered that technical military measures involving the provision of specific information on military activity were most effective for confidence building. But in the Soviet Union at that time a cautious attitude to technical military confidence-building measures prevailed because they were associated with openness in military activity and openness in military activity in the context of the arms race and amid international tensions was considered incompatible with national security. However, considering present-day realities, it is time to admit that the Soviet side underestimated the significance of technical military measures concerning confidence and openness in military activity. At the same time, international legal and political measures of confidence building were made absolute priorities in a way that upset the balance between the political and military aspects of confidence-buiding measures. That, in turn, affected the

disarmament talks (for instance, the talks on banning chemical weapons and the Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe).

At present, the attitude of Soviet diplomacy to openness in military activity has changed radically. Now openness is considered to be the main requirement for real and verifiable disarmament. New standards of openness are being introduced in the daily practice of disarmament talks by both sides. This, in turn, opens up new opportunities for greater co-operation between the USSR and Western countries in devising the most diverse technical military measures on confidence building in the context of the key negotiations on disarmament and on the setlement of crisis situations.

It would appear that the modern application of confidence-building measures is tending to strike a reasonable balance between political and technical military measures. These measures are inseparable, since technical military confidence-building measures (mutual notification, visits by military observers, on-site inspections, and other kinds of verification) cannot of themselves provide the necessary level of confidence in the military activities of States in isolation from political moves made to dispel suspicion. To limit confidence-building measures to technical military aspects alone would be to reduce them to passive and restrictive functions. At the same time a broad interaction of political military and technical military elements makes confidence-building measures dynamic. In such circumstances these measures can effectively influence a political military situation, making the necessary corrections to prevent the threat of a conflict and to stabilize the political atmosphere. Interesting in this context are the observations of Polish expert Adam D. Rotfeld who points out that "while military-oriented CBMs have a role to play in alleviating tensions and promoting confidence, they are inherently unable, by themselves, to address the underlying causes of suspicion and mistrust ... Together with a series of broader diplomatic, arms control, and disarmament measures, military CBMs can perform a useful and stabilizing function". 6/

At present, practically all agree, in East and West alike, that the current active pursuit of confidence-building measures would be impossible without the general improvement in the international political climate the considerable positive changes in Soviet-American relations, and the resultant practical agreements on disarmament.

Of late, the dominant tendency has been one of interaction between the sides in devising confidence-building measures. The existing differences are being largely reduced through the practice of formulating understandings on confidence building in the area of disarmament (for instance, at the Stockholm Conference, at the second conference to review the operation of the convention banning biological weapons, within the framework of the Soviet-American INF Treaty, etc.). In fact we are reaching the point at which confidence-building measures will be devised through constructive co-operation and not as a result of confrontation between the positions of the sides.

This would hardly be possible without the changes that have occurred in the Soviet approach to confidence-building measures in the military sphere, changes that take into account the concept of such measures held by the West. The new elements in the Soviet approach were partially analysed in the previous chapter. In addition, reference could be made to the statement made by Mikhail Gorbachev, on 6 October 1985, during his visit to France, in which he described confidence-building measures as a safety device preventing misinterpretation of the actions of the other side in conditions of increased military confrontation. He emphasized their usefulness in ensuring "the predictability of political conduct and clear understanding of the peaceful intentions of States". 7/ In his statement on 15 January 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that confidence-building measures were needed to help "set up barriers in the way of the use of force and secret preparations for war, no matter where it is waged - on land, at sea or in the air". 8/ All this, combined with the Soviet leadership's movement towards openness in military activity, is a sign of change in the USSR approach to confidence-building measures in the military sphere.

So the two approaches are drawing nearer to one another, owing, among other things, to the fact that the confidence-building measures proposed by the Soviet Union respond to the common desire to rule out a surprise attack and make the activities of military-political alliances and individual States predictable.

To achieve this objective on the continent of Europe, the member countries of the Warsaw Treaty have proposed a series of measures, including technical military ones. It has been proposed that large-scale military exercises be limited, that the sides exchange more detailed information on them, including data on the forces and means of warfare brought in from other regions to Europe for the duration of the exercises. Equally important is the

recognition by the member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization of the advisability of observation and monitoring of the military activities of the troops remaining after reductions have been made. Among these confidence-building measures is the proposal to exchange figures, at an agreed time, reflecting the total strength of the land forces and tactical strike aviation in a reduction zone, with separate indications of the troops to be reduced and those to remain after reduction, and lists of military units being reduced, mentioning their names, numerical strength, deployment, and the number of the main agreed types of armaments subject to reduction. 9/

The increased interrelationship between the political military and technical military aspects of confidence building was attested to by the subsequent major initiatives of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty countries, in the Statement issued at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty countries held on 15-16 July 1988, in Warsaw, and in the Document published by the Committee of the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries on confidence-building measures in the military sphere on 29 October 1988. This interrelationship is evident, in particular, from the fact that technical military measures have become part of the large-scale measures to ensure greater stability in Europe and lessen and then remove the threat of a surprise attack there. This is illustrated by the Warsaw Treaty proposal on establishing zones with a reduced level of armaments (for the purpose of lessening the threat of a surprise attack) and on withdrawing from them or reducing more dangerous and destabilizing types of conventional weapons. The Soviet Union's preparedness to make further moves to limit military activity in Europe and extend these measures to the independent activities of air and naval forces may be seen in the same context.

It is therefore safe to say that, on the whole, better prospects are opening up for expanding East-West co-operation in elaborating a package of balanced confidence-building measures. All the more so since there has already been positive experience of such co-operation, in the shape of the Helsinki agreements on confidence-building measures and the document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It should be emphasized in this context that the chances for such co-operation increased greatly after the Soviet Union, at the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly in December 1988, proposed a plan of unilateral reductions in Soviet troops and armaments in Europe.

## 2. Defining confidence-building measures in the military sphere: seeking a possible model

The growing number of consensus elements in the approaches of various countries to the confidence-building concept does not, however, make any easier the task of producing a comprehensive definition of confidence-building measures in the military sphere. Of course, a definition of such measures may simply list their functions. But such a descriptive approach can hardly yield an accurate and complete definition, especially if we remember that the practice of confidence-building measures is the subject of creative experimentation, and that their sphere is expanding, ever extending into new areas in which security and disarmament can be achieved.

It seems that there is a great deal of logic in the observation made recently by James Macintosh about the nature of confidence building. According to his approach "confidence building is both a process and a procedure - a psychological process of perceptual transformation as well as the specific arms control measures that contribute to that process". 10/ Thus he thinks that the "procedure definition" can focus on the scope and objectives of CBMs, while the "process definition" can cater more directly to the causal explanation. 11/

It would appear that our immediate task should be to summarize what has been done to date in terms of using confidence-building measures and anticipating possible new kinds and new spheres in which they could be applied. We should ensure that the boundaries of confidence-building measures remain intact and that they are not eroded. These measures should retain those features that distinguish them from measures of practical disarmament and verification of compliance with agreements relating to disarmament and conflict settlement.

At the same time it would hardly be wise to give up attempts to produce an intermediate definition of confidence-building measures in the military sphere. Such a definition is necessary as a guideline for effective use of these measures and their subsequent elaboration.

In discussing the definition of CBMs, it could be said that the classical distinctions between reductions in arms and measures designed to build confidence and security have begun to blur. In this regard it is very difficult not to agree with prominent American specialist Joseph S. Nye, who considers that all of arms control is a confidence-and-security-building measure because arms control provides reassurances to adversaries by

increasing transparency and communication among adversaries. 12/ Despite striking similarities between CBMs and arms control, this does not mean that CBMs have no special identity or specific functions. It could be argued that arms control and CBMs, i.e. formally negotiated reductions and informal operational-arms control - have the same strategic task - to reassure former adversaries and at the same time provide constructive predictability in their future relations.

At the same time CBMs require their own definition and their own special functions owing to their increasing role in maintaining strategic stability and security and taking into consideration the complexities of the disarmament process, fluctuations in public support and the tendency to rely solely on formal agreements in the disarmament sphere. The possibility cannot be excluded that in specific circumstances CBMs could play a greater role than formal arms-control agreements from the point of view of preventing crisis situations and stabilizing the military and political environment (for example in a crisis situation caused by acute differences over compliance with arms treaties or an unexpected military and political crisis).

The following definition of CBMs could be suggested for consideration.

> Confidence-building measures in the military sphere are unilateral, bilateral or multilateral actions carried out by States through the adoption of special political or military measures to ensure the predictability of the political intentions of States and their military activities with the help of adequate information and verification, so as to rule out the risk of misinterpretation of the military activity of States, and to prevent a surprise attack as well as an armed conflict or an incident occurring as a result of accidents or unauthorized actions. Steps to strengthen international security, stabilize the strategic and regional situation and create a favourable political climate for the conclusion and effective implementation of agreements on arms limitation and reduction are also covered by such measures.

As to the spheres in which confidence-building measures are to be applied, at least three major spheres can be cited: measures applied on the strategic (nuclear) level; measures respecting conventional weapons; and measures to prevent armed conflicts and regional crisis situations. A possible model of confidence-building measures in the military sphere is shown in the diagram below.


CBMs in the military sphere
Soviet-US agreement on setting up nuclear risk reduction centres
Helsinki and Stockholm accords on confidence-building measures
Strategic (nuclear) level of nuclear-war prevention
INF Treaty
Vienna talks on mutual and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe
The level of conventional arms and also chemical and biological weapons
Soviet-US agreements on reducing the risk and prevention of nuclear war
Understandings on hot-line communication between Moscow and Washington, London and Paris
Vienna talks on reducing the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe
Convention banning biological weapons
Soviet-US ABM Treaty, Soviet-US Treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms
Understandings among the USSR, the USA, France and Britain on the prevention of an accidental outbreak of war
Stockholm II
Talks on banning chemical weapons
1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons
Soviet-US talks on nuclear and space arms
Agreement between the USSR and the USA on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas
Prevention of armed conflicts and regional crisis situations
Understandings on normalizing the situation relating to Afghanistan
Egyptian-Israeli Treaty, 1979
UN peace-keeping and security operations in the Middle East, etc.

The above model, of course, cannot be of any functional use and is merely illustrative. It cannot be interpreted as a full picture of all international and bilateral agreements of which confidence-building measures are a component.

3. Classification of confidence-building measures in the military sphere

The United Nations Comprehensive Study on Confidence-Building Measures contains an approximate list of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, which can serve as the basis for their classification:

- information and communication of a military nature (exchange of information on military activities);
- military expenditures (gradual reduction of military budgets);
- prior notification of major military manoeuvres;
- exchanges and visits;
- consultation;
- military conduct;
- easing of military tensions;
- constraints (limitations on or exclusion of certain military activities, establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, de-militarized zones, zones of peace, etc.);
- verification (continued and enhanced elaboration of procedures for verification as an integral part of confidence-buiding measures);
- crisis management (establishment of procedures for improving communication, including the establishment of hot lines; disengagement and separation of forces; and the establishment of observation posts);
- settlement of disputes and conflicts. 13/

The study of confidence-building measures conducted by the Canadians offers the following classification: measures on exchanging information and on maintaining communication (notification procedures regulating the conduct of military observers); measures to limit military activities and prevent a surprise attack (inspection and verification; prevention of an inadvertent armed conflict; measures to limit military activities and restructure the armed forces in specific zones); measures of a "declarative" character (refraining from the first use of nuclear weapons, and so on). 14/

Several Western experts cite, in addition to these categories: regulations on crisis management; openness of information on military budgets, the structure of armed forces, and military research; early-warning measures; measures to disclose war-preparation activities; measures to limit war

preparation by armed forces; measures to settle disputes and normalize confused situations; measures concerning political and military stability and crisis management. 15/

There seems to be a basis for developing a consensus classification of confidence-building measures, taking into account the diversity of opinions on individual elements of that classification. The main point is that classification should reflect the priority tasks in developing confidence-building measures in the military sphere and meet the security requirements of the present stage of international relations. Clearly the classification should strike a better balance between political and technical military confidence-building measures. This would be in keeping with the increased interaction of these types of confidence-building measures in the military sphere. In the light of all this, the following classification could be suggested:

- International-law and political measures (non-first-use of nuclear weapons; non-use of armed force; agreements on preventing nuclear war; establishment of nuclear-free zones, zones of peace and co-operation, etc.).
- Measures to prevent a surprise attack or an accidental or unauthorized outbreak of nuclear war (agreements on setting up centres for reducing the risk of a surprise attack or an accidental outbreak of war).
- Measures to prevent armed incidents on land, at sea and in the air.
- Measures to stabilize the military and political situation and ensure the predictability of military activities in crisis situations (maintenance of communication, consultations, and mutual inspections when necessary).
- Information measures (notification, exchange of data, announcements, etc.).
- Measures to limit military activities and reorganize the structure of the armed forces in specific zones; withdrawal of offensive systems of armaments from such zones; extension of confidence-building measures to the independent activities of specific types of armed forces; limitations on the scope, numerical strength and intensity of military exercises, mobilization capability, etc.
- Measures to limit facilities for the manufacture of specific types of arms and their testing (reduction of military budgets, moratoria on

nuclear tests and on the manufacture of chemical weapons; renouncing the use of scientific and technological achievements for arms manufacture).

- Measures to assist in verifying the effectiveness of understandings on the limitation and reduction of armaments (regulations for conducting inspections, a code of conduct for military observers and inspectors; establishment of observation posts; agreements prohibiting interference with national technical means of verification, etc.).
- Measures to prevent regional crisis situations from arising and to normalize them (procedures for conducting operations by United Nations peace-keeping forces; maintenance of communication; establishment of observation posts and the use of other means of monitoring a situation and so on).

## Notes

1/ Comprehensive Study on Confidence-Building Measures, (United Nations, New York, 1982) p. 6, Doc. A/36/474.

2/ The Struggle of the USSR Against the Nuclear Menace and the Arms Race, For Disarmament Documents and Materials, (Politizdat, Moscow, 1987) p. 90 (in Russian).

3/ See: "Europe of the 20th Century, Problems of Peace and Security", Moscow, International Relations (1985), p. 217 (in Russian).

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## Chapter II

## PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS BETWEEN STATES - THE BASIS OF CONFIDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

### 1. The effect of perestroika in Soviet foreign policy on shaping the concept of confidence in the military sphere

Confidence in the military and political sphere cannot be achieved, unless the participants in international relations change their approach to ensuring security, both national and international. The Soviet Union took this path after the April 1985 Plenary Meeting of the Communist Party's Central Committee, the 27th Congress of the Party and its 19th Party Conference, which formulated and developed the main elements of Soviet foreign-policy strategy in the context of nuclear-age realities.

What then are the new elements in the Soviet foreign-policy strategy which opened the way to restoring confidence?

First, the 27th Congress of the CPSU removed from the Party Programme the definition of peaceful coexistence as a "specific form of class struggle" in which the contradictions between the two social and economic systems are irreconcilable. The conclusion reached by the Party Congress on that score is abundantly clear: "... in the present situation there is no alternative to co-operation and interaction between all countries. ... confrontation between capitalism and socialism can proceed only and exclusively as forms of peaceful competition and peaceful rivalry". 1/

The chief premise of the new approach to international security is the priority of general human values over class and national interests, rejection of confrontation in the competition between socialism and capitalism, and recognition of the growing spirit of understanding among States in the world community. In its foreign-policy strategy the Soviet Union believes that the principle of peaceful coexistence should be the supreme and universal principle governing relations among States.

These ideas are also very important for helping the West to understand the causes of the profound changes in Soviet foreign policy, including the elaboration of a renewed concept of confidence-building measures in the military and political sphere.

Second, in Soviet foreign-policy strategy the emphasis is on strengthening security politically, by limiting and reducing arms, effective and all-embracing verification, confidence building, and the political settlement of regional conflicts.

Third, the renewed Soviet approach to confidence-building measures concerning military and political relations is based on the logical interrelationship and interdependence between the democratization of Soviet society, the radical political and economic reform, and the new political thinking in Soviet foreign policy. Openness in society, or glasnost, which is part and parcel of democracy, influences both the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. Promotion of democracy is the key to making confidence-building measures more effective and increasing their impact on the military and political sphere in international relations.

The changes in Soviet foreign-policy thinking open up new opportunities for constructive co-operation between States with different social and economic systems in building confidence in international relations.

But to make use of these opportunities, there must be a concrete action programme. Precisely such a programme has been formulated in the new Soviet concept of foreign policy. The chief components of this concept are as follows:

- the phased elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000;
- a comprehensive security system;
- a common European and global home;
- defensive sufficiency and a non-offensive strategy;
- national reconciliation and regional security;
- removal on a reciprocal basis of foreign troops and bases in the territory of other countries. 2/

A great deal has already been done within a relatively brief period of time to apply this concept. The Soviet-American INF Treaty has been signed and is being implemented; progress is being made towards the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; and the talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe are also under way. The content of a Soviet-American treaty on a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive arms, provided that the ABM Treaty is observed, was clearly outlined during the latest Soviet-American summit meeting in Mocow. In addition, the Stockholm accords on confidence-building measures, signed in September 1986, have stimulated the further development of confidence-building measures on the European continent.

The Convention Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty was signed at the Paris summit.

The Geneva accords on a political settlement of the Afghanistan question and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country, as well as the cease-fire on the Iran-Iraq front, have helped to improve the climate of confidence. All this is progress towards the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and explosive situations in various parts of the world.

Favourable conditions are being provided for enhancing the role of the United Nations in safeguarding security, both general and regional, averting a nuclear war, and reaching a universal agreement on halting and banning nuclear weapon testing. The task facing us today is to make the United Nations a really unique world centre for promoting confidence and security.

As we all know, confidence is built not so much by declared intentions as by practical steps designed to bring about reciprocal actions on the part of the other side. Recently, the Soviet Union has taken a series of unilateral steps and has proposed a number of constructive initiatives. These include the unilateral moratorium on the testing of nuclear devices, the large-scale initiatives for reducing strategic offensive arms, the plan for substantial unilateral cuts in Soviet armed forces and armaments in Europe by 1991, and other major initiatives relating to international security, the environment and humanitarian co-operation.

Confidence in a State's foreign policy largely depends on whether in its international actions it proceeds in accordance with the primacy of international law and on how well it observes the norms prescribed by that law. For the Soviet Union, the primacy of law is a cornerstone of political renewal. Herein lies the meaning of the democratization process now under way in the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. A democratic mechanism for foreign-policy decision-making is being set up in the country. Questions related to the military budget, the sending of troops abroad, and changes in the deployment of armed forces will be considered in accordance with the Constitution. It is no easy matter, of course, to establish democratic decision-making. It requires time and an in-depth study of the positive experience of other countries. There is also a need to overcome the psychological stereotypes of administrative command methods and the coercive style of decision-making, especially in the military and political field.

A critical assessment of the mistakes and miscalculations in foreign policy and the development of defence which had a negative effect on the international prestige of the USSR and diminished trust in Soviet diplomacy is an equally important aspect of this question.

The documents of the 19th national conference of the Communist Party are most important for understanding this process. It was pointed out at the conference that the effectiveness of Soviet defence should henceforth be ensured, not by the quantity, but rather by the quality of equipment, the level of military know-how and the composition of the armed forces. The development of defence should guarantee security for the Soviet Union and should be strictly in keeping with the Soviet defence doctrine. 3/ It is precisely in this context that one should view the process of discarding the stereotypes of the past, which in the area of defence is seen in the trend to improve quantity (for instance, in the manufacture of tanks and artillery, in the notorious quantity drive in the production of chemical weapons, and so on). 4/ In the past, the country's interests were, in fact, ignored in developing our defence, which caused imbalances in several types of weapons in Europe. All that increased distrust of the Soviet Union.

Those negative consequences were analysed in detail at the Scientific and Practical Conference held by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1988. Addressing the Conference, Eduard Shevardnadze, the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, said: "Serious damage was inflicted on it [Soviet diplomacy] and, by implication, on the country by administrative command methods, disregard of special, professional expertise, an undemocratic, secretive and arbitrary style of taking decisions ..., and giving priority to military means over political means for countering imperialism ... ". 5/

The political consequences of the deployment of Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe in the 1970s, the lack of proper flexibility in the Soviet negotiating position at the Vienna talks on the reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Central Europe and other issues have been assessed precisely in this context.

Openness in society, or glasnost, is not enough to ensure confidence in the international arena. There must also be openness among partners in the field of foreign policy.

As regards the Soviet Union, glasnost is increasingly becoming a norm of conduct in its foreign-policy activities. No significant disarmament agreement can be concluded in the world today without accurate information on the military potential of all sides, and an all-round democratic discussion of possible military and political consequences of decisions. A regular exchange of data on armed forces and armaments, and observance of the principles of

reciprocity are becoming normal practice in negotiations. The accuracy of data is now verified during on-site inspections and by establishing permanent observation and control posts at weapons manufacturing facilities.

The Soviet-American INF Treaty is a clear proof of this. The Treaty provides for 400 mutual inspections. For 13 years inspection teams will be present at missile production facilities in the Soviet Union and the United States.

The relevant data will be provided within the framework of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms and on the limitation and cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

Before the conclusion of the CFE Treaty the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries proposed to the NATO countries that data on the quantitative and, when appropriate, qualitative, aspects of their armed forces and armaments, should be exchanged. They also proposed at the start of the talks that the accuracy of the data should be checked through mutual on-site inspections. 6/

The Soviet side submitted to its partners in the talks data on its chemical weapons, and information on the Soviet Navy was forwarded to SIPRI. United States Congressmen visited the radar station being built near the Soviet city of Krasnoyarsk. Relevant data on the Soviet military budget will be provided when the price reform in the Soviet Union has been completed. 7/

Simultaneously, the secrecy syndrome with the unjustified limitation of information within the country is being overcome. This is demonstrated by the changing attitude regarding the publication of objective information on the correlation between the armed forces and armaments of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the main areas of military and political activities, the military budgets, etc. The extent of secrecy actually required for national security is being widely discussed in the press. In the opinion of some Soviet experts, confidence building in the military-political and military-technical fields would be greatly facilitated if the formula of equal secrecy in the military-political, military-economic and military-technical activities of States was made a principle of international law. 8/

A debate is currently being conducted on the military reform, ways of integrating a democratic military structure into modern society, the transformation of the Soviet armed forces based on principles of sufficiency, and the defensive military strategy. 9/

Confidence building in the world is promoted also by the Soviet Union's firm intention to observe the principle of reasonable sufficiency of armed forces proclaimed in the defensive military doctrine of the USSR. Corrections are also being made in the traditional approach to the use of military force outside our territory and beyond its maritime boundaries; and the expediency of certain foreign-policy decisions and the priorities of our economic interests abroad are viewed in a new way now. 10/

The main objective of all these changes in Soviet foreign policy is to establish entirely new conditions for creating an atmosphere of trust in international relations.

2. Priorities in creating an atmosphere of trust

Having gone a long way in revising its idea of national and international security, the Soviet Union hopes that the West will meet it half-way. A balance of confidence cannot be achieved through the efforts of one side only. This can be done through joint actions, if the Western leaders revise the stereotypes of the security strategy conceived during the cold war under the influence of the power confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Clearly, a climate of confidence cannot be achieved unless each country makes major changes in its notion of security in this interdependent world. The principle of equal security should be adopted as a point of reference. A State's security must not be ensured at the expense of the security of others.

In today's world, international confidence in the military and political sphere is a combination of elements of confidence with regard to the key issues of foreign and defence policy, disarmament and military doctrines. Confidence is created first within each country and is then projected to the international level. Therefore, as long as foreign and defence policies at the national level are influenced by factors that diminish confidence, it is unlikely that effective confidence-building measures can be devised in the military sphere.

The ideal conditions for building confidence are renunciation of the arms race, restructuring of armed forces along defensive lines and on the basis of the principles of "reasonable sufficiency", halting the production of offensive weapon systems, both nuclear and conventional, and their subsequent reduction, and adoption of defensive military doctrines. This does not mean, however, that all these conditions are to be fully met if we want to have confidence. Confidence building in the military sphere will most probably be a gradual process, speeding up or slowing down depending on

the general changes in the political climate, and the current level of military confrontation, and on whether arms are built up or reduced. Confidence building can be most effective in setting the stage for subsequent major changes in the approach to the key aspects of military and political relations.

To achieve that, however, one has to have a correct idea of how political decisions are taken, the character and aims of the defence policies of States, their military doctrines and the structure of their armed forces. Over-simplified formulas and cold war stereotypes are equally detrimental to the nature of confidence building and stability. Assessments of the intentions of the opposite side, based on this logic, greatly obstruct the shaping of relations based on confidence.

Accurate information about each other's intentions is becoming a key problem today for the future of confidence-building measures on the European continent.

One can well agree with the view of the experts from the Canadian Department of External Affairs who concluded in their study that the prospects for confidence-building measures hinge on a correct assessment of the following factors: 1. what really underlies the concepts and doctrines of the sides in the area of conventional armaments and armed forces; 2. why have they developed the way they have; 3. the degree to which the doctrines are subject to changes resulting from actions by the other side; 4. what the true (and perceived) military balance in Europe is. 11/

Another of their conclusions seems important. It fully coincides with the one reached by the Soviet experts: the attempts by the sides to find one-sided solutions to problems relating to the balance of forces in conventional arms, for instance, by adopting offensive and aggressive military doctrines and concepts like Air Land 2000 Battle Concept (United States of America), will inevitably lead to countermeasures on the part of the Soviet Union. As a result, the régime of confidence-building measures and their very existence will be considerably undermined because in that situation "neither side will feel safe in considering, or be seriously interested in exploring, confidence-building", which in contrast to offensive concepts is designed to limit military activity and impair their responsiveness. 12/ Moreover, when definite operative concepts are applied, like the "follow-on forces attack" (known also as the Rogers Plan) designed for selective and point strikes against troops and military objectives deep in the territory of

a potential enemy, "transparency" and confidence-building measures to increase the exchange of information (on the stationing and the structure of armed forces, types of armaments, etc.) may be regarded as counter-productive, since additional information may be used by a potential aggressor for choosing targets. All this confirms once again how important it is today in confidence building to halt the drive to achieve one-sided advantages and conduct a joint search for possible solutions.

Wishing to create a favourable atmosphere for a suitable dialogue on reducing armed forces and armaments and providing conditions for confidence-building measures to ensure effective implementation of the Stockholm accords, the Soviet leadership has repeatedly proposed that the military doctrines of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO should be compared in terms of their military and technical aspects and that the two alliances should exchange data on the size of their armed forces and the number of weapons in Europe in order to enhance military stability on the continent and dispel mutual mistrust.

A new aspect of the Soviet Union's activities today is that now it wishes to understand the concerns of the other side and carefully consider the proposals, concepts, ideas, and arguments of its partners. For instance, NATO political leaders and experts spoke of a threat posed by the offensive potential of the Soviet Union's armoured units. The USSR is prepared to seek a mutually acceptable compromise on this matter as well. That is why Mikhail Gorbachev has proposed a realistic approach; "... let the West make appropriate reductions in those types of weapons, which it has more of, while we shall not hesitate to eliminate the 'surplus' of those types of weapons which we have more of." 13/ This approach has materialized in the CFE Treaty.

As the USSR comes up with new initiatives with regard to confidence building, it takes into account relevant proposals and concepts advanced by political and public circles in the NATO countries. For instance, the Warsaw Treaty Organization has proposed the establishment - in order to prevent a surprise attack - of a strip (zone) with a lower level of armaments, where the more dangerous and destabilizing types of conventional weapons would be withdrawn or reduced. This proposal is consonant with the ideas and concepts of "unprovoked defence", "defensive defence", and "alternative defence" widespread in some public and political circles in the West. The idea of setting up a European centre for reducing the danger of war, advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev, was prompted by the wish to take due account of current

thinking in Western European political and public circles in favour of measures to reduce the danger of a surprise attack. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's decision to carry out sizeable unilateral reductions of its armed forces and armaments in Europe also takes into account the concern in the West over the asymmetries in specific types of armaments deployed in Europe.

Constructive interaction between the two military and political alliances will diminish mutual distrust, making it unnecessary to act in anticipation of "the worst case scenario". What is needed now is mutual tolerance in analysing differences and assessing each other's interests, rejection of the habits acquired during the period of confrontation, and a business-like discussion of problems. The adoption of this non-confrontational approach will greatly help to create a favourable social and psychological atmosphere for building confidence and undertaking practical measures to lower the level of military confrontation.

Mutual efforts on the part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Alliance to undertake the formation of new structures for security and stability in Europe by transforming both alliances into political organizations and redefining their character and functions will enlarge the scope of constructive co-operation between them in the sphere of confidence building and stability. The framework for this new transformation was established in a Joint Declaration by the 22 leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact released at the Paris summit of CSCE.

3. The role of the institution of summit meetings in confidence building

The Soviet-American summit meetings in Geneva (1985), Reykjavik (1986), Washington (1987), Moscow (1988) and Washington (1990) have shown that direct contacts between Soviet and American leaders are very effective because they greatly help to improve the climate of United States-Soviet relations and so set the stage for building greater confidence. "I would not like to indulge in guesswork as to where confrontation would have led us if it had continued and if the Kremlin and the White House had not had sufficient resolve in good time to steer events in the desired direction - from confrontation to the search for areas of co-operation, towards broader political dialogue", stated Mikhail Gorbachev at a press conference held on 1 June 1988, to mark the completion of the Soviet-United States summit. 14/

Relations were gradually improving with every new meeting, and mutual confidence was increasing. As a result, the political dialogue was followed by the INF Treaty on the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range missiles, opening up possibilities for "breakthroughs" in drafting a treaty on cutting strategic offensive arms by half, reducing armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, and ending nuclear weapons tests. There is a possibility of making considerable progress in solving regional problems in the explosive areas of the world through a political approach and a balance of interests. This was demonstrated by the accords on Afghanistan and the prospect of reaching settlements in the Middle East, Central America, and southern Africa.

The third Soviet-United States summit, held in Washington, is most significant in that it was the first of its kind to bring closer the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States on ways of building confidence in today's world.

The Washington accords offered broader opportunities for the Soviet-American dialogue on confidence-building measures in the military field at a qualitatively new level. The signing of the INF Treaty, which is unprecedented in scope and in its impact on international security since it provides for the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons, has brought about real improvements by lessening the danger of conflict and laying a good basis for confidence building.

Since confidence building is entering an entirely new phase, the Soviet-United States summit-level statement is of paramount importance. It stressed the special responsibility of the Soviet Union and the United States to search for practicable ways to eliminate military confrontation and build a safer world as mankind enters the third millenium. In Washington, the Soviet and United States leaders reaffirmed the solemn Geneva declaration that both sides "are determined to prevent any war between the Soviet Union and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority". 15/ Confidence building was facilitated also by the commitment of the USSR and the United States of America to energetic dialogue - which was also reaffirmed in the Joint Statement covering the entire spectrum of relations between them, including the intensive discussion of strategic stability matters and mutual recognition of the fact that the differences between the two sides on the entire range of Soviet-American relations can be overcome. 16/

In considering the ways to build confidence between the Soviet Union and the United States, the following is of interest.

First, in an interview given to the United States television broadcasting company CBS before his visit to Washington, Mikhail Gorbachev raised an important question: in today's world it is imperative for the politicians and Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to understand the views of their peoples, show greater respect for each other, and gain a better understanding of the history of their nations, because confidence requires a tactful attitude on the part of the members of the world community towards one another, responsiveness to each other's intentions and goals and an awareness of the specific conditions which shaped their military doctrines and defence policies. 17/

A key to confidence building lies in the change in Soviet-American relations, which should be based on non-confrontation and co-operation. No productive dialogue between the two great Powers on confidence-building measures in the area of international security is possible unless the views held in political and public circles are definitely known and the specific characteristics of their historical development are compared and understood.

Second, the Soviet proposal on enhancing the role of scientists in both countries in shaping the foreign and domestic policies of States, and the idea of considering situations from general human and moral positions are worthy of attention. 18/ The Soviet side suggested that it was impossible to formulate a practicable policy unless joint efforts were made by politicians, scientists and intellectuals in the arts.

Third, during the Washington summit meeting the Soviet leadership proposed that the role of diplomacy should be considered in terms of confidence building and the democratization of international relations at the present time. They pointed out among other things that nowadays diplomacy "is called upon to seek islands of agreement even in a sea of differences", and that the evil practice of collusion and using agreements to deceive nations and doom them to actions and sacrifices running counter to their vital interests becomes a thing of the past, giving way to openness in diplomacy. 19/

Fourth, the question of the role of information and the exchange of data on the military potential of each side with a view to building confidence, dispelling mutual distrust and suspicion, and eliminating imbalances in the structures of the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, and of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, was posed in a new way.

Objective and reliable information on the military potential of rivals, making it possible to assess more accurately their political and military intentions and goals, creates the necessary atmosphere in which the conduct of States becomes quite predictable. Such information enables them to predict more accurately the policy of the partners, helping to extend the basis of trust and security.

To reaffirm the Soviet Union's policy of openness, the Soviet leader put forward at the Washington summit meeting the "open cards" concept, which should apply also to comparing the military potential of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO with regard to armed forces and conventional weapons. "We should lay our cards on the table, exchange all relevant data, assess the data, identify areas of asymmetry in arms and armed forces and undertake a search for solutions. This is our approach." 20/

This was the formula for initiating without delay an exchange of information on the military potential of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization in the area of coventional weapons and arms forces. The new element in this approach was that, being radical, it was aimed at obtaining real data and providing an exact idea of the military potential of the opposing alliances, which would remove mutual distrust and suspicion. The Soviet side suggested, in fact, new rules, or guiding principles, for exchanging information on armed forces and conventional weapons in the name of confidence building.

The Washington summit meeting proved that, although confidence and disarmament are interrelated and inseparable, practical disarmament measures are the foundation on which the edifice of confidence is built with ever new storeys added to it. The signing itself of the INF Treaty served to boost confidence-building measures, opening up the real prospect of their improvement, also with regard to specific agreements in the area of disarmament - from the INF Treaty, of which they are a component, to future accords on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, on the prevention of an arms race in space, the reduction of conventional weapons and the elimination of chemical weapons. The growing integration of disarmament and confidence building was once again demonstrated in Washington.

At the Moscow summit meeting, the Soviet and United States leaders took a few more steps towards each other. That helped improve the global and regional situations. A most important element of the joint Soviet-American statement is the provision on the need to broaden political dialogue between

countries and intensify the disarmament talks in order to reach a political settlement of regional conflicts. The Moscow summit meeting confirmed that regular political contacts between the leaders of the two biggest Powers promoted the Soviet-American political dialogue and increased co-operation, mutual self-restraint and trust. This is a fact recognized by leading politicians in the United States. Former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance, wrote recently in the Foreign Affairs journal that "the new American President and the Soviet General Secretary should initiate a wide-ranging discussion of where they want United States-Soviet relations to be at the beginning of the next century and how they propose to contribute to a climate of international restraint". 21/ "... We would favour regular United States-Soviet summits", the influential United States politicians declared. 22/

An interesting proposal was made at the summit meeting by Mikhail Gorbachev; the joint statement should include the idea that no disputes should be settled by military means, that the USSR and the United States of America should regard peaceful coexistence as a universal principle of international relations, and that equality of all States, non-interference in their internal affairs and freedom to make social and political choices should be obligatory for all. 23/

In our opinion, rules of conduct for the USSR and the United States of America in today's world can and should be elaborated jointly. In view of the prestige and influence of the two biggest Powers, this would impart a fresh impetus to shaping civilized international relations on the basis of equality and confidence.

Of course, despite the importance of the Soviet-American political dialogue for constructive interaction in international relations, the efforts by the Soviet Union and the United States to effect radical changes are insufficient. Confidence can be built only if the USSR and the United States of America simultaneously hold political meetings with other countries, both large and small, in all regions of the globe. The institution of political contacts and exchanges of views should be universal, that is, bilateral and multilateral, global and regional, with appropriate use made of the United Nations and other international organizations for this purpose. This pattern of confidence building is widely used by Soviet diplomacy. This was

clearly demonstrated at the recent Soviet-American summit meetings in New York (December, 1988), and the exchange of visits between the leaders of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and France, Britain, India, and China, on the other.

Political contacts at the summit level provide a sound basis for confidence building, helping to find the most appropriate ways of ensuring a balance of interests in international relations.

## Notes

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3/ See Pravda, 29 July 1988.

4/ See, for instance, the Report by Eduard Shevardnadze at the Scientific and Practical Conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The International Affairs Journal, October 1988; Vitaly Shlykov, "Strong is the Armour" (Tank Asymmetry and Real Security) in: International Affairs, December 1988, p. 42.

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10/ See: A. Izymov, A. Kortunov, "The Soviet Union in the Changing World", International Affairs, No. 8, 1988; Andrei Kozyrev, "Confidence and Balance of Interests", International Affairs, No. 11, 1988, pp. 3-12.

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12/ Ibid., p. 108.

13/ Pravda, 8 July 1986.

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## Chapter III

## THE UNITED NATIONS AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

### 1. New areas for confidence-building measures in United Nations activities

Confidence-building measures in the military sphere have traditionally been given much prominence in United Nations activities in the area of maintaining international peace and security, in keeping with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter. The importance of confidence-building measures was recognized in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Paragraph 93 of the Final Document states that a policy of strengthening world peace for which appropriate measures should be taken should be pursued, and an atmosphere of trust among States be created in order to promote the disarmament process.

The United Nations has contributed a great deal to the theoretical elaboration of confidence-building measures in the military sphere. In 1982, the "Comprehensive Study on Confidence-Building Measures" (Doc. UN A/36/474) was conducted by a group of government experts under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General. In their recommendations the group of governmental experts stressed the importance of assistance from the United Nations and its member States to the efforts to study ways of using confidence-building measures with a view to maintaining stable world peace and security. They noted also the advisability of a further extension of confidence-building measures in the military sphere. The study pointed out the expediency of having a voluntary register, to be kept by the United Nations Secretary-General, of types of measures used in international practice.

In the years following that study, confidence-building measures in the military sphere have been regularly debated at the United Nations General Assembly, particularly at its third special session devoted to disarmament. They are also on the agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

The conceptual elaboration of confidence-building measures within the United Nations framework was a kind of a prelude to their practical application by the United Nations in performing its functions of strengthening international security, preventing or settling crisis situations and conflicts and facilitating verification of agreements in the area of disarmament.

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the United Nations role in solving these problems in practical terms increased markedly and the corresponding activities of the United Nations expanded. Suffice it to say that just in the last few years the United Nations has been actively involved in drafting the Geneva accords on Afghanistan and on a settlement in southern Africa. It has also joined in the search for ways of settling the Iran-Iraq conflict, the Cyprus and Lebanon problems, and of normalizing the situation in Namibia, Cambodia, Western Sahara. The United Nations, based on the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, plays an important role in the solution of the Gulf crisis.

The stepping up of the United Nations activities would be impossible without interaction among the United Nations member States, above all among the permanent members of the Security Council to improve the United Nations mechanism for maintaining international security and settling international conflicts. The restoration of the role and prestige of the United Nations is a result of the recognition of the important role it plays in the world today as a centre for stabilizing international security and solving global problems in all areas within its competence: military, political, economic, scientific, technological, environmental and humanitarian. This positive process is associated with a change in the attitude of States to the United Nations, which until just recently was often regarded as an arena for propaganda clashes, a place where political confrontation was cultivated. As a result the United Nations effectiveness declined. There was a time when it was unable to solve in practical terms the problems confronting mankind. The collective security system provided for by the United Nations Charter was paralysed by the lack of resolve among its members to take joint action to stabilize security and settle conflicts. The years of confrontation and the arms race have not passed without leaving their trace in the United Nations. "The Security Council, the primary organ of international peace and security, has, over the years, all too often found itself unable to take decisive actions to resolve conflicts", said Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary-General of the United Nations. 1/

"Let's put it straight: many of us, above all the permanent members of the Security Council, are to blame for the depreciation to some extent of the basic values of the Organization formulated in its Charter. Now that they are

regaining their original image, we must use the bitter lessons of the past for the benefit of the future", observed the USSR Foreign Minister at the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly. 2/

The Soviet Union, in keeping with these considerations, has radically revised its view of the role played by the United Nations in the world today and has produced a concept of priority measures designed to turn the United Nations into a really unique world security centre. It has revised former erroneous notions which had caused it to underestimate the possibilities of an effective use of military observers and United Nations peace-keeping forces, as well as the role of the Secretary-General in monitoring crisis situations and seeing to it that the accords on arms limitation and reduction are observed (for instance, the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, etc.).

At the same time the Soviet Union has proposed new ideas and new approaches with a view to developing the United Nations peace-keeping possibilities and enhancing its effectiveness. In this regard the article "The Realities and Guarantees of a Safe World" by Mikhail Gorbachev and also his speech at the forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly played an important role.

The proposals in question relate, among other things to the setting up of an international agency for observation and control within the United Nations framework (which would include an international satellite observation system and a centre for seismic monitoring of nuclear explosions); the active involvement of the United Nations Security Council, with the participation of the United Nations Secretary-General, in the monitoring and assessment of situations in zones of conflict and crisis management activities (regular sittings of the Security Council at Foreign Minister level, convening of extended meetings of the Council in explosive areas, and so on); the establishment in the United Nations of a register of sales and deliveries of conventional weapons in order to limit the conventional arms race; the conclusion under United Nations auspices of an agreement limiting the proliferation of military missile technology; and the establishment of an international space organization within the United Nations framework.

Many States agree that the United Nations should be made more effective in preventing war and crisis situations and in ensuring compliance with agreements on the limitation and prohibition of arms. In this sphere a consensus is gradually taking shape among various States and priority actions

are being identified. Judging by the speeches of United Nations Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, such priorities may include the prevention of crisis situations and the establishment of a multilateral centre for the reduction of the risk of nuclear war caused by unpremeditated launches of nuclear missiles. In the opinion of the Secretary-General, United Nations participation in the search for mutually acceptable and effective ways of verifying compliance with agreements in the area of disarmament and an expansion of its consultative and information functions in these important areas may in future make possible the establishment of an international control mechanism under United Nations auspices. 3/

That these matters should be given priority in the United Nations activities is accepted also, though with some reservations by some of the Western States. For instance, the Netherlands and Canada have spoken in favour of conducting an in-depth study of possible United Nations activities in connection with verification of compliance with multilateral agreements on arms control and disarmament. They set forth that idea in a joint working document submitted at the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. 4/ At the same time there were nuances in the Western countries' attitudes to establishing a single international verification mechanism under United Nations auspices. Some of them suggested that this task should be accomplished in stages, believing it is as yet too early to establish a single verification body within the United Nations framework. The absence of a developed structure of international agreements on disarmament and the United Nations insufficient experience in the practical aspects of verification were cited by them as the main obstacles impeding the establishment of such a mechanism. 5/ The Western countries have come up with an alternative proposal: the United Nations should concentrate on establishing within the United Nations framework a "data base" for verification in the area of disarmament and on providing for the United Nations member States consultative services and technical information relating to specific verification matters in the area of disarmament. Thus the Western countries insisted on giving priority to developing such United Nations functions in verification as collection and exchange of information, consultative assistance to States and provision of expert services.

It should be stated outright that some differences that exist in the approaches of the Soviet Union and Western countries to United Nations functions in this sphere do not in the least obstruct co-operation between the USSR and the Western countries as far as the United Nations role in verification of compliance with disarmament agreements is concerned. The important point is that both sides recognize the need for radical change. The differences mainly concern the ways of bringing about that change.

The elements of common approach to the problem of establishing international verification systems were reflected in the report of the Group of Qualified Governmental Experts on the Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification which was submitted by the United Nations Secretary-General to the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Group agrees that the United Nations can play a useful role in making research and data relating to co-operative arrangements and verification. A United Nations data collection capability could assist governmental experts and negotiators on verification provisions and confidence- and security-building measures. It was noted in the report that the development of a United Nations verification organization must be seen as an evolutionary process. 6/

There is an interrelationship between the strengthening of the role played by the United Nations as a guarantor of international security and the experience gained by the United Nations in promoting confidence-building measures and openness of information, including military information. Confidence and effective exchange of information, its collection and dissemination, are an earnest of the United Nations effective prevention of crisis situations and verification of compliance with agreements in the area of disarmament. The basic functions of the United Nations simply cannot be performed unless confidence-building measures, primarily the timely and prompt provision of information, its processing and analysis, are used on a broad scale. This applies fully, for instance, to such a United Nations function as monitoring the development of crisis situations and making recommendations on preventing them. It equally applies to the activities of United Nations military observers and United Nations peace-keeping forces.

It is obvious also that the United Nations long-standing participation in considering confidence-building problems and examining the role and extent of the openness of information concerning military activities has created, on the whole, favourable conditions for enhancing the efficiency of the

United Nations practical activities in the key areas of maintaining peace and security. It is largely the profound study given to these problems that has caused the United Nations to become conscious of the need to make the best use of confidence-building measures in order to perform its new functions of safeguarding peace and security and to set new standards of openness in military information. A point to note here is that in the guiding principles for confidence-building measures formulated in a special report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it was pointed out that confidence-building measures were especially needed at a time of political tension and crises, when appropriate measures can have a very important stabilizing effect. 7/ That report also outlined the main areas of activity for the United Nations and its Secretary-General concerning the use of confidence-building measures in the many-sided process of disarmament. According to the United Nations Charter, the report said, the Secretary-General could greatly facilitate the confidence-building process by making proposals on practical ways of building confidence or offering his good offices, especially during periods of crisis. 8/

Obviously, greater effectiveness in the United Nations mechanism for maintaining security and verifying observance of agreements in the area of disarmament will require far more information for the performance of these functions, an extension of confidence-building measures and the use of modern technical means of collecting and communicating information.

2. Confidence-building measures and exchange of information in United Nations activities in the Settlement of crisis situations (the institution of United Nations military observers and United Nations peace-keeping forces)

The prestige and effectiveness of the work done by the United Nations military observers and peace-keeping forces have markedly increased of late. This is due largely to the international community's recognition of the importance of developing the appropriate United Nations institutions and promoting international co-operation in the effort to prevent or settle crisis situations and regional conflicts.

It is sufficient to refer in this context to the activities of groups of United Nations military observers in the Near East (UNTSO), in Kashmir (UNMOGIP) to verify observance of the cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan, in the Middle East (UNIMOG) to monitor the observance of the cease-fire and troop-withdrawal accords between Iran and Iraq, etc. Real

experience has been gained in the use of United Nations peace-keeping forces on Cyprus (UNFICYP), in the Middle East (UNDOF), and in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The United Nations plan for the decolonization of Namibia began to be implemented on 1 April 1989, and the United Nations group to assist the country in the transition period started work that very day.

During this time the most typical functions of the United Nations observers and peace-keeping forces have been: to observe the situation in crisis areas and provide relevant information to the United Nations Secretary-General without delay; to investigate incidents and conduct talks with the parties to an agreement in order to prevent incidents; to verify the observance of cease-fires and the situation in the disengagement zones; to monitor the movement of troops and armaments to specific regions stipulated in agreements, and so on.

The increasing United Nations participation in settling regional conflicts is leading to an expansion in United Nations functions. For instance, the task of the United Nations group set up to render assistance during the transitional period was to control all aspects of the elections in Namibia. Clearly the performance of all these functions implies a wide use of confidence-building measures in the political sphere and in information pertaining to confidence-building measures on the prevention of crisis situations and armed incidents. It is safe to say that confidence-building measures of this type form the basis of United Nations doctrine on operations to control crisis situations and preserve peace. The significance of confidence-building measures for the monitoring and peace-keeping functions performed by the United Nations will grow in future as well, especially when the most up-to-date equipment (sensors, transmitters, etc.) is used by the United Nations in crisis regions as additional means of control and observation.

The logic question could arise: what is the relationship between confidence-building and peace-keeping? Is there any common ground between peace-keeping which in some cases stipulates enforcing the international security by force in accordance with the United Nations Charter and confidence-building?

It should be noted that the aim of peace-keeping arrangements or missions is to ensure peace and security in the given regions by means of creating a favourable environment for transforming crisis situations and restoring peaceful relations between opposing States in the crisis zone. This

transformation of strategic environment could take place only on the basis of confidence between former rivals or opponents. That is why it could be considered that confidence building is a part of any peace-keeping arrangement or missions.

The effectiveness of peace-keeping missions depends on the co-operation of the parties to the agreement on peace-keeping missions concerning the package of applicable confidence-building measures in the course of the peace-keeping mission and their functions. But if to take the scenario of peace-keeping imposed on the aggressor confidence building could be a part of the peace-keeping mission which would govern the restoration of international and regional stability and peace in the after war or post-conflict period.

The key role played by confidence-building measures is largely accounted for by the political specifics of the United Nations' missions of observing and preventing crisis situations and, in particular, by the United Nations' need as a third party performing mediatory functions, to rely increasingly on information provided by the sides involved in a conflict. Collection of information and its assessment by United Nations missions and the subsequent provision of that information to the sides in a crisis region - this is a major element in creating stability in a region and dispelling suspicion or misunderstandings arising as a result of any actions of States involved in a conflict. The United Nations mediatory missions, in which no military force is used, are fairly delicate in political terms, since confidence-building measures are, in fact, the only instrument used by the United Nations in order to effectively verify compliance with given agreements and to prevent crisis situations. Hence the great need for accurate information, its correct assessment and analysis, and for the use of the most up-to-date technical means for that purpose.

Modern armed conflicts are distinct in nature in that they are swift to develop, posing a risk of global conflict, and that the geographical area of conflicts has greatly expanded. This makes it necessary for the observation and mediation missions of the United Nations to use up-to-date means of communication and observation and sensing equipment to permit rapid response to the development of a situation and also to enable timely measures to be taken to avert a conflict. In the opinion of United States expert William M. Stokes, information obtained with the help of modern technical means of observation and monitoring can be used in addition to other measures

traditionally exployed by United Nations missions and so can play an important role in creating an atmosphere of confidence in the zone of a recent conflict. 9/

The use of technical means of observation and their integration into the United Nations' mechanisms for maintaining peace and security demand that questions related to the legal régime governing the use of such technical means of collecting, distributing and storing information as well as questions concerning the effectiveness and cost of such means, be studied most thoroughly.

One can readily agree with William Stokes, who believes that there are several possible ways of using technical means: joint use by the United Nations and the parties involved in a conflict; use by the United Nations of its own technical means of observation in a specific region on condition that information is adequately transmitted to the parties concerned; exchange of information between the United Nations, using its technical means, and the States involved in a conflict. 10/

The forecast offered by this United States expert, who maintains that such institutionalization of technical means of verification as a function of United Nations peace-keeping operations will influence the process of settling conflicts and may help to lay a more solid basis for peaceful settlement of disputes, deserves attention. Indeed modern technical means, especially satellite monitoring, are able to collect information fairly rapidly. Transmission of information such as photographs, maps, etc. to the sides directly involved in a conflict makes it possible to analyse it more reliably, thus building confidence in a region and reducing any possibility of misinterpreting one another's actions.

To be sure, a more detailed study of the advisability and effectiveness of using technical means to assist United Nations observer missions is necessary. One problem of no small importance is that of reaching an all-round assessment of the influence they have on confidence-building measures in a conflict region; that is, whether they slow down or speed up the confidence-building process. In order for the use of such means not to be counter-productive from the point of view of confidence building in a crisis region, factors such as the cost of the technical means involved, their accessibility for developing countries and their effectiveness compared with the traditional methods of observation and monitoring the model of information distribution and transmission and the extent of preparedness of the staff for

using such means are all extremely important. It is worth remembering that since the cost of United Nations observation operations in crisis regions tends to grow, the use of technical means may cause additional heavy spending. For instance, the United Nations mission - UNAVEM - launched on 20 December 1988 following a decision of the Security Council to observe the redeployment and final withdrawal of the Cuban troops during a period ending in 1991, will cost the United Nations $20 million, while it was not envisaged that the mission would use any technical means. 11/

Potentially, any of these factors may undermine confidence if all the questions associated with the integration of technical means into the United Nations mechanism for peace-keeping and security and the observation of crisis situations are not adequately studied in due time. It is desirable that a United Nations list of standard equipment and technical means be drawn up, with the help of experts, for the purpose of observation and control monitoring, together with recommendations on methods of using such means in zones of conflict. It is also important to train skilled personnel for work with such equipment.

However, the answer to the question whether or not it is advisable to use technical means for the purpose of stabilizing a situation in a conflict region and establishing a sufficient level of confidence among the parties involved in a conflict derives in the long run, from analysis of the use of such means. This applies above all, to the series of so-called Sinai agreements on disengagement between Egypt and Israel issued on 18 January 1974 and 4 September 1975, as well as the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of 26 March 1979.

Thorough analysis of the Sinai experiment (1975-1982) has shown that it is possible, in principle, to integrate the most up-to-date technical means into a traditional system of observation and monitoring in crisis regions for the purpose of building confidence, preventing a surprise attack, and settling disputes and musunderstandings arising as the agreements are implemented. A positive assessment of the results of the Sinai experiment prevails among Western experts. 12/

The Sinai experiment was multilateral. Taking part in it were - apart from Israel and Egypt - the United States, as a third party, and the United Nations (through its emergency force: UNEF). In keeping with the Sinai accords, a system of observation and monitoring consisting of three elements (the Sinai field mission and a system of aerial observation - the United States of America, the United Nations observers - UNEF; and the

national observation posts of Egypt and Israel) was designed with a view to clearly dividing the spheres of monitoring and observation and determining their interrelationship.

The United States early warning electronic system (four stations) conducted observations in the vicinity of the Giddy Pass and Milta Pass with a total observation area of 620 sq km and control over the functioning of the national observation posts of Egypt and Israel. In addition, the United States conducted aerial observation of the region (once a week or when requested by either side) at the height of 4,570 m to monitor military activities and investigate possible violations. The results of the flights had to be reported to Israel, Egypt and the chief co-ordinator of the United Nations observation mission in the Middle East as a matter of urgency. 13/

Although, officially, the Sinai accords did not provide for observation of the region from satellites, some Western experts believe that such observation did take place and that the parties to the accords were informed of its results. 14/

In order to monitor the situation in the region and to issue an early warning, the Sinai field mission of the United States used four types of ground-based automatic sensing instruments: the sensitive electromagnetic cable sensor (SECS) to record the momevement of people and transport vehicles; a passive infra-red radar (PIRCS), used for monitoring heat emissions from persons and transport; a miniature seismic detector (MINISID), operating on batteries and registering ground oscillations; and acoustical instruments operating in combination with seismic detectors and transmitting signals to the central control panel (AAU). 15/ In the opinion of Western experts, practically all the technical early warning means effectively detected incursions into a controlled area, and identified whether such instrusions were lawful or not - that is, whether they were a permitted activity or actual violations. On average, up to 200 incursions by motor vehicles, aircraft, helicopters, etc. were registered. But most of the incursions were permitted (aircraft flights and movements of transport vehicles of the participants and United Nations inspectors, etc.). During the four years when the Sinai agreements were in force (1976-1979), 90 actual violations were recorded (of them 67 by Israel and approximately 20 by Egypt). 16/

It is also important to resolve the question of expenditure on the development installation and maintenance of these technical means. There is no clear picture so far, but the data available show that initial spending on the development, manufacture and assembly of these technical means cost the United States Government $25 million, although these means were provided mainly by private corporations highly experienced in developing and servicing reliable sensing devices._17/

According to David Barton, expenditures on the maintenance of the sophisticated equipment which was used on Sinai were insignificant. 18/ This goes to show that the development of sophisticated but reliable observation and control systems is not an impracticable task. Given a certain level of definite material resources and confidence on the part of the parties to an agreement in the practical usefulness of the technical means, this problem can be solved.

The role of the United Nations Emergency Force in conducting monitoring and observation in a region is worth analysing closely in the context of the experience of implementing the Sinai accords. The efficiency of the United Nations observers was largely explained by the fact that their task was clearly outlined in the guiding principles governing the activities of this United Nations force (the report by the United Nations Secretary-General to the Security Council on 27 October, Resolution 341) and also in the mandates of UNEF-II regularly endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (the last of these expired on 24 July 1979).

The United Nations observers (their number ranged from 4,000 to 7,000) had a major role to play in the functioning of the tripartite mechanism of verification and observation, and in making the disengagement and withdrawal of the troops of both sides from the agreed zones effective. They controlled access to the region with the help of observation posts and check-points, conducted regular inspections in the buffer zones and limited-weapon zones, and patrolled those zones on land and from the air. In performing these tasks, the observers maintained close telephone communications with the Sinai field mission (United States of America) and the personnel of the national communication missions of Israel and Egypt (notification of permitted movements of Israeli and Egyptian personnel in the region under observation, etc.). 19/ Proper co-ordination of the tripartite system of observation and monitoring was assured also by the participation of the representatives of Egyptian and Israeli communication missions in on-site inspections conducted

by the United Nations observers. The consultative commission, whose function was to settle disputes and prevent misinterpretation of each other's actions, was headed by the United Nations co-ordinator of the peace-keeping force in the Middle East, which helped to stabilize the situation and to maintain the necessary level of confidence. 20/ According to United Nations estimates, the United Nations force, on the whole, coped effectively with the tasks of observation and verification of compliance with the Sinai accords and also of settling disputes. 21/ The total cost of the United Nations observation and monitoring operations (UNEF-II) was estimated by the United Nations at $446,487,000. 22/

Clearly this model of interaction between United Nations observers and other parties to the agreements, based on a distribution of duties, may be regarded as one of the possible approaches to building a mechanism for monitoring developments in those regions where the United Nations acts as a mediator. In principle, the Sinai model of conducting monitoring and observation of the development of the situation in a crisis region (the stress being laid on employing technical means of observation) could be used when a political settlement in other crisis situations, including those in the Middle East is being put into effect in practical terms. It would be useful to keep some aspects of this experience in mind - observation of situations by technical means, patrolling and on-site inspections, and the work of consultative commissions - when verifying future reductions of conventional arms in Europe and the restructuring of the armed forces of the two military and political alliances on the basis of the principles of reasonable sufficiency and defence.

But one should not forget that this practice was unique in its way. The United States, which had proposed the Sinai agreements, was politically interested in their being effectively observed. This largely determined the size of the United States' political and other investments in maintaining stability along the Egyptian-Israeli border and in the observance of agreements, including the use of new ideas for applying technical means of monitoring and observation of regional situations. In all of this, it was the aim of the United States to prove that the Middle East situation could be stabilized on the basis of separate agreements and outside a comprehensive political settlement in the Middle East that would secure the participation of all the parties concerned. The Sinai experiment itself, although it proved relatively effective within narrow geographical limits, has failed to ease the

political tensions in the Middle East in any fundamental way. This shows that the actions undertaken to build confidence in crisis regions, even when the latest systems of observation and monitoring are used, will not lead, in the long run, to a stabilization of the general regional situation unless large-scale political measures are taken to eliminate the causes of the conflicts and tensions. Clearly the effectiveness of United Nations peace-keeping operations in terms of confidence building and stability in a crisis region is best assured in conditions in which they are most closely tied in with the building of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of conflicts and where necessary, with the resolution of humanitarian problems concerning refugees, prisoners of war, and so forth.

In view of the United Nations' growing involvement in settling conflicts and in providing confidence and stability in crisis regions, the study of the positive experience and practice of conducting United Nations operations is becoming a matter of great urgency. This sphere of United Nations activity includes Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, the Gulf area, South-West Africa (activation of the United Nations transition assistance group, UNTAG), etc.

As was pointed out in the memorandum on universal security through an enhancement of the role of the United Nations (A/43/629) submitted by the USSR delegation at the Forty-third Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Union deems it important to increase the United Nations' capabilities in the area of taking effective measures to prevent international crises and conflicts, and to conduct a joint search for new ways of making the most of the United Nations' machinery and procedures for the observation and assessment of the situation in crisis regions. 23/

This could be facilitated by measures such as:

- the establishment by the United Nations Security Council, after consultation with appropriate regional organizations, of observation posts in the explosive regions of the world;
- the stationing of United Nations observers along the border in the territory of a country seeking to guard itself against outside interference only at the request of that country;
- the sending by the General Assembly of missions for the purposes of observations and collection of information (civilian, military and mixed missions) following agreement with the Security Council and with the consent of the country, or countries, to which a mission would be sent;

- the sending of missions of military observers for the same purposes, on the initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General and upon his decision with the approval of the Security Council, primarily for the prevention of conflict.

The aim here, in fact, is the development of various models of United Nations missions for observation and monitoring in crisis regions with the purpose of building confidence and ensuring stability in regions of tension. The very fact that it is possible for United Nations member States to choose an acceptable model for an observation and monitoring mission, depending on a given situation and requirements, increases confidence in United Nations peace-keeping operations, since in such a case the tasks of the United Nations and the interests of United Nations members coincide.

Other measures to increase the effectiveness of United Nations peace-keeping operations including co-ordination of the procedures for the conduct of these operations and the dispatch of United Nations observation missions, the study of questions concerning the formation of United Nations forces for the conduct of such operations and a system of personnel training for service in the United Nations forces, as well as providing for the material and technical needs of the United Nations forces and their financing could, no doubt, help to increase confidence in the United Nations's activities in terms of preventing armed conflicts. This, in turn, would have a positive effect on the situation in the regions of tension themselves, which are the subjects of the United Nations operations. The better the planning of United Nations observation operations and the more effective their material and technical support and financing, the more stable will be the situation in which the United Nations observation and monitoring missions carry out their functions.

It is likewise important to secure co-operation among the permanent members of the Security Council in planning, preparing and carrying out United Nations missions. Clearly, it is time for the possibility of direct participation by the permanent member States of the Security Council, including the USSR and the United States of America, in practical United Nations operations to be viewed in a new way. While the understanding between the USSR and the United States of America is tending to improve of late, as they seek peaceful settlements for a number of regional conflicts, direct participation by the great powers in United Nations operations could have a positive effect on the activities of United Nations missions.

The Soviet Union has already begun to change its attitude to direct involvement in United Nations peace-keeping operations. The widely-known memorandum, issued on 22 September 1988, states that the Soviet Union is prepared to take part, together with other countries, in developing a system of training personnel for service in the United Nations forces. The Soviet Union is prepared also to consider sending its military units to assist in executing United Nations peace-keeping operations and taking part in delivering supplies for the United Nations forces (provision of transport vehicles, means of communication, the sending of medical personnel and so on). 24/

The elaboration of the whole series of confidence-building measures associated with the United Nations observation and monitoring missions requires greater attention, especially if we take into consideration a possible qualitiative expansion of United Nations functions and their extension to providing security for maritime communications, preventing nuclear piracy, combatting illegal drug trafficking, and eradicating international terrorism. It is not inconceivable that the need for rapid prevention of regional conflicts will call for the setting up of observation posts in the explosive regions of the world with the use of ground, air and sea transport, as well as satellites for remote monitoring in a region of conflict.

Developments in the international situation, as global problems grow ever more acute, call for greater emphasis on preventing crisis situations. The communiqué of the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Colsultative Committee held on 7-8 July 1989, stated that the United Nations should join in efforts to prevent international crises. 25/

One of the possible actions to that end could be the formation of special United Nations military units for crisis prevention. Such units would act fully in keeping with the United Nations Charter and with due account given to the need to establish and test in the Security Council a decision-making mechanism providing for the prompt dispatch of such units for preventive peaceful settlement of a conflict situation. Developing a model for the formation of such "preventive" units is not an easy task, not only from the international legal point of view, but also from the point of view of supplies. For the activities of such forces to be effective it is necessary to solve problems connected with the permanent stationing of these units (for instance, at United Nations bases) and their provision with rapid

communication equipment and with means of observing the development of a crisis situation. There will also be problems involved in the transportation and rapid transfer of such units. Of equal importance also is the development of the crisis-prevention functions of such units. Obviously the idea of strengthening the United Nations "preventive diplomacy" and stepping up the activities of United Nations forces requires further all-round study and urgent practical action. These efforts would be facilitated if a special meeting of government experts under the auspices of the United Nations could be called to discuss ways of enhancing the role of the United Nations in the 1990s in efforts to prevent international crises.

3. The United Nations and the setting up of a multilateral centre for reducing the risk of accidental or unintentional wwr

Confidence-building measures may be useful in decreasing the threat of a global armed conflict when applied in combination with practical measures on disarmament. United Nations studies on confidence-building measures (Doc. A/36/474) have pointed out the effectiveness of confidence-building measures (for instance, the establishment of permanent direct lines of communication between States) in stabilizing crisis situations and enhancing the effectiveness of existing instruments for regulating international crises.

The United Nations Charter (Chap. I, Art. 1) envisages the parallel solution of two inter-related problems: prevention and removal of threats to peace and adjustment and settlement of international disputes or situations which could lead to a breach of the peace. Accordingly, confidence-building measures aimed at solving these problems may become a part of the United Nations mechanism for averting the danger of a nuclear conflict as a result of miscalculation, unauthorized actions or acts of terrorism.

It is time for such a mechanism to be established under United Nations auspices, in view of the growing probability of mistakes and miscalculations in the activities of the nuclear strategic forces of the States possessing nuclear weapons and the ever-increasing number of States producing nuclear missile carriers, and the large number of potential possessors of nuclear arms, especially in regions of high military and political tension. One must not overlook the danger-hypothetical so far that nuclear weapons may be obtained by terrorist groups.

These considerations clearly underlay the idea, advanced by the United Nations Secretary-General at the forty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, of setting up a multilateral risk - reduction

centre to avoid a mistaken and catastrophic interpretation of unintentional launches of nuclear systems or, in future, of isolated launches of nuclear missiles by those who have acquired nuclear arms illegally (United Nations document A/41/1). It is quite logical to suppose that the practical elaboration of this idea would in future draw on the experience of compliance with bilateral Soviet-American agreements in the area of preventing and accidental outbreak of nuclear war, including the bilateral Soviet-American Agreement on setting up nuclear risk reduction centres (15 September 1987).

So far, the exact model of a future United Nations mechanism for nuclear risk reduction remains unclear. Clearly, two versions may be considered here: the setting up of a nuclear risk-reduction centre under the auspices of the Security Council or the performance of this task by a more universal United Nations mechanism which would produce comprehensive solutions to problems involved in nuclear risk reduction, preventing and settling crisis situations and international conflicts.

These functions could be performed by a mechanism for ensuring broad international verification of compliance with agreements on easing international tensions, limiting armaments and monitoring situations in conflict regions. Such a mechanism could operate by using various methods of collecting information and submitting it promptly to the United Nations.

A key role in developing confidence-building measures that would facilitate effective activities on the part of the United Nations in this sphere would be played by the nuclear powers that are permanent members of the Security Council, by the Security Council itself and by the United Nations General Assembly. In particular, the Security Council and the General Assembly could adopt recommendations and requests addressed to various States concerning the drafting and conclusion of specific agreements on the confidence-building functions of a relevant United Nations mechanism, stipulating the crisis-management and confidence-building measures to be used in the operation of such a mechanism. Real experience has already been gained in the practical use of confidence-building measures when conducting United Nations peace-keeping operations (the sending of peace-keeping forces, provision of information, the functioning of observers and mediators, agreements on cessation of hostilities between States, and so on).

The nuclear States that are permanent members of the Security Council, for their part, could help build such a mechanism under United Nations auspices by effectively implementing the agreements on reducing the risk of

accidental war and also by turning such bilateral agreements into multilateral ones that is, including all nuclear powers. Agreements among them on peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict situations would have a great stabilizing effect. But the main thing is that they should adhere to the principle of refraining from the use or threat of force in practice.

The United Nations Charter, and in particular Article 99, gives wide powers to the United Nations Secretary-General in the sense that the Security Council should not only accept his recommendations on confidence building but may set up a special mechanism for settling international or regional crises. Indeed, in reporting to the Security Council, in keeping with Article 99 of the Charter, on a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security, the United Nations Secretary-General could call for the confidence-building measures required to ease tensions and prevent crisis situations.

Possible parameters for a United Nations centre for the prevention of conflicts and international and regional crises

Obviously such a centre would be set up on the basis of general principles regulating the structure, functions and order of its activities.

It seems indicated that such a centre should have organizational structures enabling it to obtain and analyse rapidly information on the military and political situation in crisis regions; to monitor developments in such regions with the help of observation posts and satellite monitoring; to maintain permanent and rapid communication with the capitals of the permanent member States of the Security Council and regional organizations; to hold urgent consultations in the event of acute crisis situations caused by an accidental or unauthorized explosition of a nuclear device or the threatened use of nuclear devices by terrorists.

The centre should be technically capable of detecting the emergence of situations that could lead to armed incidents in the regions of contact between the armed forces of the military and political groups in confrontation or in regions of crisis. It would be logical for the prevention of the escalation of armed incidents into full-scale conflicts especially as a result of accidental or unauthorized actions or owing to circumstances of force majeure (such as those caused by natural disasters, etc.), to be among the functions of the centre.

In this context attention should be given to the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities signed by the Governments of the USSR and the United States of America on 12 June 1989. This Agreement is designed to prevent the possibility of armed conflicts arising as a result of incidents between armed forces or misinterpretation of the intentions of either side. 26/ The Agreement itself and the supplement to it ("Procedures for Establishing and Maintaining Communications" and "Procedures for the Resolution of Incidents Related to Entering into National Territory") could be used in principle as a model for possible multilateral international agreements on preventing dangerous military activity in crisis regions where the situation is potentially dangerous. The signing of an agreement reducing the possibilities of crisis situations in definite regions would regulate the conduct of the participants in such situations (by, for instance, preventing concentration of the armed forces of foreign States along the border of a conflict region and the use of armed forces in military exercises as a show of force, etc.). Such an agreement would also contain an international legal mechanism for the peaceful settlement of conflicts and could be of great assistance to the United Nations in re-organizing the United Nations forces used for maintaining international security, preventing crisis situations and stabilizing the situation in regions of conflict. In other words, such an agreement would greatly facilitate the solution of problems involved in enhancing the role of the United Nations Secretary-General and the Security Council in preventing crisis situations and, or, as necessary, in monitoring their development, as well as in resolving possible incidents caused by the conduct of the armed forces of the sides in regions of conflict. For example, in the event that such an agreement were drafted and signed, an international commission could be set up under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General as a possible depositary of the agreement. That commission would verify compliance with the agreement. It would be reasonable to suppose that within the framework of that commission an organizational nucleus would be formed, that is, that there would emerge the main elements of a future United Nations Centre for the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts and of international and regional crises. Given such an agreement, it would be easier also to solve problems involved in maintaining communications between the United Nations and the capitals of the permanent member States of the Security Council in crisis situations. It would be easier also to collect the required information on the situation in a

crisis region and on the actions of the sides in an incident or conflict. This would pave the way for speeding up the re-organization of the activities of the United Nations forces and observers dealing with crisis prevention.

In the context, it should be noted that a such centre, using information covering a vast range of topics and analysis of the outcome of urgent consultations, could issue recommendations to the Security Council or the United Nations Secretary-General personally on the best practical way of settling a given crisis situation. Naturally, the activities of such a centre would be concentrated, in the initial stage, mainly on information and consultations.

To enable the centre to carry out such diverse activities, it would be necessary to have clear-cut procedures for collecting and processing relevant information, maintaining constant communication during periods of tension, sending mediators to crisis regions, holding consultations, and so forth. In future it will be impossible to do without standard procedures to be followed in the event of say, nuclear piracy or a threat of the use of a nuclear device by a terrorist group. It would be advisable to have a set of procedures and possible actions, agreed upon in a timely fashion to prevent an armed incident (or the accidental launch of a missile equipped with a nuclear warhead, or the explosition of a nuclear device) from growing into a full-scale armed conflict.

Since the setting up of such a centre under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council would be a fairly complex process, unparalleled in international practice, a gradual approach would be most advisable. At the initial stage, while research concerning an optimal model for the appropriate tasks and functions of the centre is being conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General, it would be advisable to set up, with the permission of the United Nations Secretary-General, the nucleus of such a centre. This could be a small but effective and technically well-equipped unit within the framework of the United Nations Military Staff Committee or the Department for Disarmament Affairs. That unit would deal with preparatory work for the setting up of an appropriate centre. In particular, it could be used, with the help of competent experts of international reputation to formulate recommendations on establishing a data base for a future centre, on the drawing up and computer testing of various scenarios for direct communication centres and consultations in an emergency, such as the accidental explosion of a nuclear device, nuclear piracy, and the like.

At this stage, the unit could collect and analyse information from United Nations observers, mediation missions and the United Nations forces maintaining international security. Should United Nations observation posts be established in crisis regions, it could promptly process information coming from these posts or from sensing devices that operate automatically.

A realistic concept of such a centre implies also that it should be equipped with technical means providing for reception of information from observation satellites which, no doubt, would be used by the United Nations for remote observation of conflict regions. The technical nucleus of the centre could formulate a concept of using remote monitoring from satellites within the framework of the United Nations centre to prevent any accidental outbreak of an armed conflict and at the emergence of regional crisis situations.

In view of the fact that such a centre would be established gradually, stage by stage, preparatory work should be concentrated on training skilled personnel for the future centre collating the experience of bilateral and other agreements on preventing an accidental outbreak of nuclear war, armed incidents and dangerous military activities and studying the activities of the Soviet-American nuclear risk reduction centre.

## Notes

1/ Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. "The Role of the United Nations in World Affairs" in International Affairs, (Moscow, September 1988) p. 90.

2/ See: Pravda, 28 September 1988 (in Russian).

3/ Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. "The Role of the United Nations in World Affairs" in International Affairs, (Moscow, October 1988) p. 99.

4. See: Doc. UN A/S-15/25, 31 May 1988, p. 11.

5/ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

6/ See: Verification in all aspects. Study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification. Doc. A/45/372, 28 August 1990, pp. 82-87.

7/ See: Doc. UN A/S-15/3X, 28 May 1988, p. 34.

8/ Ibid., p. 35.

9/ See: William M. Stokes Technology and the Future of Peacekeeping. Appraisals and Proposals. Ed. by Henry Wiseman (Pergamon Press, New York, 1983), p. 222.

10/ Ibid., p. 223.

11/ See: J. Brook "UN Will Rely on Trust to Verify Angola Exit", International Herald Tribune, 9.1.89.

12/ See, for example, David Barton, "The Sinai Peacekeeping Experience; a Verification Paradigm for Europe", pp. 541-568 in SIPRI Yearbook (1985); The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multi-method Arms Control Verification and Risk Management by Brian S. Mandell, Department of External Affairs (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada).

13/ Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement, Egypt and Israel, 1 September 1975, pp. 566-567 in SIPRI Yearbook (1985).

14/ The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multi-method Arms Control Verification and Risk Management by B.S. Mandell, Department of External Affairs (Ottawa, Canada), p. 3.

15/ David Barton, The Sinai Peacekeeping Experience: a Verification Paradigm for Europe, p. 547.

16/ David Barton, The Sinai Peacekeeping Experience ..., p. 548.

17/ United States Sinai Support Mission Report to the Congress (Washington D.C., Department of State, 13 April 1976), p. 35.

18/ David Barton, The Sinai Peacekeeping Experience ..., p. 553.

19/ C. Annex to the Sinai Agreement (Second Sinai) Disengagement Agreement ..., 1 September 1975, SIPRI Yearbook (1985), pp. 567-568.

20/ Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement ..., p. 565.

21/ The Blue Helmets. A Review of UN Peace-keeping. (United Nations Department of Public Information, New York, 1985), p. 45.

22/ The Blue Helmets ..., p. 333.

23/ Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 20, 1 November 1988, pp. 24-26.

24/ For "Universal Security Through Enhancing the Role of the United Nations" (Memorandum), Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 20, 1 November 1988, p. 26).

25/ (Pravda, 9 July 1989).

26/ (Izvestia, 13 June 1989).

## Chapter IV

## CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND STRATEGIC STABILITY

### 1. Confidence-building measures in ensuring strategic stability

The maintenance of strategic stability, or of a stable military strategic balance, in the world today is inconceivable unless States adopt a series of measures to prevent nuclear war and to lower the risk of its breaking out, including the risk of war occurring as a result of accidental, unauthorized missile launchings or misinterpretation of the actions and intentions of the opposed sides. This reveals the close interrelationship between strategic stability and the reduction of the probability of nuclear war. Various steps to remove the threat of nuclear war, for their part, are by nature confidence-building measures and are playing an increasingly functional role in promoting strategic stability and greater nuclear self-restraint. Viewed together with measures to reduce nuclear arms, they form a code of conduct for States in the nuclear area, which can be expected to ensure the stability of the strategic balance and reduce the threat of an accidental outbreak of a nuclear war, including one due to a technical miscalculation or fault.

Many factors influence the strengthening of strategic stability: the international situation, negotiations on limiting and reducing nuclear and other weapons, the state of the military strategic balance, the vulnerability of or degree of protection provided to the strategic forces, communication and control centres, the structure of nuclear forces and means possessed by the opposing sides, the conduct of States in crisis situations, the machinery for commanding strategic forces, decision-making on bringing them into fighting order, and so forth.

However, it is becoming increasingly obvious that strategic stability cannot be guaranteed solely by maintaining a military strategic balance or by adjusting it, that is, by taking steps that materially influence strategic stability. This has been pointed out in particular by USSR Foreign Minister, who had this to say in his speech at the fortieth session of the United Nations General Assembly: "The higher the level of military confrontation in the nuclear and space era, the more shaky and unreliable is international peace, even if strategic balance is preserved. Nuclear war in these conditions may come as a result not only of a decision but also of attempts at blackmail or misinterpretation by one side of the intentions or actions of the other. It may break out also as a result of a reckless action

caused by an abrupt worsening of a situation or a technical fault in computers which are increasingly used in ensuring the functioning of modern sophisticated weapons systems." 1/

Several Soviet experts believe that reliable strategic stability does not depend directly on great cuts in nuclear arms especially if the nuclear weapons and communication and control centres of the opposed sides become more vulnerable as a result of reductions. 2/ The danger is that the vulnerability of nuclear capabilities can stimulate a pre-emptive strike, which objectively heightens the risk of a surprise nuclear war. Besides, attempts to correct the military strategic balance by deploying new arms that normally have a destabilizing effect (for instance, reduction of the approach time required by a missile to reach strategically important centres of the opposite side) detract from strategic stability. On the other hand, strategic stability can be undermined also by measures to increase the level of protection provided by strategic offensive arms, that is by building up their counterforce potential, inasmuch as this induces the rivals to respond by building up a counterforce of their own. As a result of that competition, which allows one of the sides to lead for a time and to gain an illusory superiority, a strategic situation may become still more unpredictable. This, especially in crisis situations, can cause rash and risky decision-making in the hope of inflicting a surprise attack on the opposite side. Soviet experts have good reason to conclude that, in the final analysis, the counterforce concept not only fails to solve the problem of preventing war, but objectively reduces stability owing to a mutual build-up of such counterforce. 3/

The interdependence of security relations in the world requires not a code of confrontation, but that rules of interaction and co-operation be elaborated to that end. The main components of such a system would be non-military instruments for maintaining peace and strategic stability-measures of confidence, stability, predictability, and openness. But one should not take an oversimplified approach to adopting such an alternative set of measures. It would appear that measures of confidence building and war prevention would for a long period of time develop in parallel with the existing mechanism of nuclear deterrence, playing the role of an additional means of preventing war and strengthening strategic stability. But objectively the weight of all these measures will grow as radical reductions are made in the military potential of both sides and the international situation improves. It is not surprising, therefore, that there

has been an increasing interest in the United States and the Soviet Union in elaborating and signing various agreements and understandings (also within the framework of bilateral and multilateral negotiations on weapon reductions) that attach great significance to measures of confidence building, stability, predictability, and openness in regard to the main aspects of the activities of the armed forces. Reference could be made in this context to the Soviet-American Agreements on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities and on setting up nuclear risk-reduction centres, and also to the memorandum of understanding concerning the bilateral experiment on verification and exchange of data on the military chemical potential of the USSR and the United States of America. During the Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear and space arms and the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe, the sides submitted proposals on the elaboration of measures for stability, predictability and openness of information on military activities. There is a clear logic in the growth of this tendency. The USSR and the United States of America are lowing the level of military confrontation, while levels of armaments are going down also. This and the prospect of a possible restructuring of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on principles of defence and "sufficiency" call for additional measures to ensure strategic stability in this transition period. Admittedly a compensatory role in this case will be played by political co-operation with mutual confidence and stability measures being its main components. This is accepted in the West as well. Significant in this context is a statement by the United States Vice President, Dan Quayle: "We are urging the Soviets to work with us to develop co-operative rules for making this transition, so that predictability and confidence can accompany the reintroduction of defences into our own strategic forces as well." 4/

What is meant here is evidently a gradual shaping of a consensus between the USSR and the United States of America, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, on the importance of confidence-building measures in the transitional period for consolidating strategic stability and preventing an armed conflict as a result of unauthorized actions or mistakes. It was reflected in the recent Joint Declaration of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact made at the Paris Summit of CSCE. This approach makes it necessary to study the experience of bilateral co-operation already gained by the Soviet Union and the United States in preventing war and strengthening strategic stability and developing a new generation of confidence-building measures in this sphere.

2. Stability and confidence-building measures in Soviet-American relations

The core of the initial confidence-building measures on strengthening strategic stability and preventing war was a series of Soviet-American accords signed in the late 1960s and 1970s. Among them were the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War between the United States of America and the USSR (30 September 1971); the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (22 June 1973); the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the USSR (May 1972); the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (25 May 1972); and the 1963 and 1971 Hot Line Agreements. In addition, the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with regard to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on Limitation of Strategic Arms were signed by the leaders of the United States of America and the USSR on 26 May 1972 and 18 June 1979 respectively.

These documents undoubtedly proved useful in the 1970s, helping to formulate the international legal basis for joint Soviet-American actions to prevent war as a result of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and to maintain strategic stability. It is likewise important that under these agreements the initial procedures for the conduct of countries in crisis situations caused by unexplained nuclear incidents were for the first time co-ordinated. The 1972 Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas still serves as an effective model for joint procedures to prevent potentially critical situations and incidents at sea.

Both sides recognized the importance of confidence-building measures in the strategic sphere. They were based on the joint Soviet-American actions to strengthen strategic stability by limiting strategic offensive arms, together with measures to decrease and rule out the threat of a surprise attack. 5/

In the 1980s, however, the emergence of new generations of strategic and conventional weapons and the spread of ballistic missile technology and nuclear arms rendered these agreements insufficient. Despite their importance, they could not meet the new challenges set by strategic stability, prevent crisis situations or guarantee their settlement. These agreements do not envisage the building of a smooth-running mechanism of co-operation and consultation among nuclear powers in the event of the danger of a nuclear conflict as a result of an accident, miscalculation or unauthorized use of

nuclear weapons. They do not address the question of elaborating agreed procedures to prevent a nuclear conflict triggered by possible acts of nuclear terrorism, or by misinterpretation of the activities of the strategic forces of the other side (military exercises, training missile launches, etc.) or actions by each other's armed forces during exercises, incidents, etc. All this called for additional confidence building to close the "windows of vulnerability" in strategic stability.

3. A new stage in the development of confidence-building measures and strengthening strategic stability

The new generation of confidence-building measures has emerged largely as a result of inter-action between the Soviet Union and the United States and of the significant contribution made by the political and research centres of both countries to their theoretical foundation. This co-operation culminated in the signing on 15 September 1987 of the Soviet-American Agreement on setting up nuclear risk-reduction centres.

However, this co-operation did not rule out differences in priorities. To the Soviet side the new generation of confidence-building measures was part and parcel of the Soviet-American accords on the reduction of strategic offensive arms. A number of such measures had been proposed by the Soviet Union in 1982 at the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) (for instance, early notification of the launchings of intercontinental missiles, with the exception of single launches within a national territory, establishment of agreed zones in which flights of heavy bombers and movement of aircraft carriers would be banned; mutual early warning about the take-off of a large number of heavy bombers and theatre-based aircraft, establishment of zones for missile-carrying submarines in which any activities against the missiles of the other side would be banned). 6/

The set of confidence-building measures proposed by the Soviet Union was aimed at limiting specific types of military activity presenting an increased danger of an outbreak of war as a result of miscalculation, an accident, or misunderstanding.

The Americans laid their emphasis on a set of confidence-building measures designed to address two tasks: reducing the risk of a nuclear war as a result of an accident, miscalculation or unpremeditated acts and settling crisis situations. It is intended that the first task would be accomplished with the help of an extended series of stability and predictability measures

falling under the Soviet-American accords on nuclear arms reductions. The second task would be accomplished by drafting independent agreements providing for the setting up of a political mechanism for settling crisis situations (that is, measures to improve communication and understanding with a view to controlling a nuclear crisis, establishment of centres to reduce the risk of nuclear war, etc.). These confidence-building measures are known to have been advanced and substantiated in a series of speeches by former United States President Ronald Reagan in 1981-85 and in the report to the United States Congress made by Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger on 12 April 1982. 7/ So the development of the new generation of confidence-building measures in the strategic area was possible in the United States as a result of close co-operation among the Administration, the Senate and the research centres.

The interest in confidence-building measures in the strategic area, which were formulated as early as the mid-1980s, remains fairly intense, since they are still topical, and this determines to a certain extent the directions taken by further work on them. Some ideas such as the setting up of Soviet-American nuclear risk-reduction centres, the expansion of the parameters for early warnings concerning ICBM launches, the improvement of the hotline between the USSR and the United States of America, and so on, have already been realized one way or another in bilateral Soviet-American agreements.

From the point of view of enhancing the predictability of the development of the strategic situation, an important event was the signing of the bilateral agreement on notification of large-scale exercises of strategic forces, signed at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and the United States of America in Wyoming in September 1989. These measures also include the Soviet-American agreement on notifications of ICBM launches from submarines (signed during the Moscow Summit). As regards ensuring transparency in the activities of Soviet and American strategic forces, a positive factor is the mutual understanding reached between the sides at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons, when they agreed that a future agreement on strategic offensive arms should include a ban on telemetric encoding and the granting of full access to all telemetric information transmitted during a missile flight - for instance, a training flight. 9/

The role of Soviet-American nuclear risk reduction centres

The 1987 Soviet-American Agreement was the first move towards building a mechanism of bilateral co-operation with a view to averting a nuclear war that might break out as a result of mistakes, miscalculations or misinterpretation of the actions of the other side. The centre has a large role to play in ensuring strategic stability and the predictability of the strategic situation, since it performs the functions of a mechanism transmitting notifications of ballistic missile launches, in keeping with the Soviet-American Agreements on measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war (1971) and on preventing incidents in and over the high seas (1972), as well as a mechanism for exchanging information, requests, etc. under the Soviet-American IMF Treaty (1987). However, as is implied by the text of the agreement on setting up the centre, its tasks are mainly confined to transmission and receipt of notifications and information. So the centre is not a body for settling crisis situations or developing appropriate joint procedures aimed at preventing such situations. 10/ This function is still performed by the traditional mechanism designed for settling crisis situations through diplomatic channels and by using the Moscow-Washington hotline in emergencies.

As we know, the sponsors of the original idea of setting up such centres envisaged a broader set of functions to be performed by the centres. Among them were the following:

- to discuss and outline procedures to be followed in the event of a possible incident involving the use of nuclear weapons (e.g. unexplained nuclear detonations, a terrorist threat to explode a nuclear device or scatter radioactive material, and missing weapons);
- to exchange information on a voluntary basis concerning events that might lead to nuclear proliferation or to acquisition of nuclear weapons by "sub-national groups";
- to establish a dialogue about nuclear doctrine, forces, and activities (discussions of strategic practices of the two sides which implicitly pose a danger of misinterpretation or misunderstanding, and also exchange of data on each other's strategic forces, etc.). 11/

Furthermore, in the original concept of nuclear-crisis management centres the stress was on elaborating universal procedures for preventing or settling nuclear crisis both in peacetime and in a conflict situation. To that end, the centres were expected to perform the function of joint elaboration of

procedures for nuclear-crisis prevention or crisis management. The purposes of such joint procedures would be: to determine accurately the character of a nuclear explosion (whether it is accidental, unauthorized, or not); to formulate models of conduct for nuclear powers in a crisis; to devise procedures for talks between nuclear powers in the event of a crisis; to define optimal standard procedures to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation with the help of joint analysis of possible scenarios for a conflict and the conduct of special "games"; to hold consultations with relevant military and political departments on methods and procedures for preventing a nuclear crisis, etc. 12/

The United States experts recognized the real potential of the centres to speed up the exchange of information, verify its authenticity (by means of on-site inspections), make use of the procedures agreed upon in advance (for instance, in the event of explosion of an unexplained nuclear device), and assist supreme political bodies in taking proper decisions on crisis management. In the opinion of Barry Blechman, an outstanding United States expert in this field, both sides could undertake the following actions to prevent the growth of a crisis if it arises:

- inform each other about the military activities that may be misunderstood;
- warn each other about possible military activities which may be considered by others as provocative;
- make mutual inquiries through the centre to find out the character of actions taken by the other side;
- arrange military disengagement to give effect to a political solution on ending a conflict. 13/

The disparity between the original concept of "nuclear-crisis control centres" and its practical implementation through the Soviet-American Agreement on nuclear risk reduction control centres is due to the fact that the only thing both sides were prepared to accept was a more realistic concept of the centres, which would be in keeping with the practical state of Soviet-American relations and the progress of the strategic offensive arms reduction talks. Circumstances did not permit the sides to make a practical move towards setting up such centres on the basis of a model of broad political co-operation between the two countries in preventing crisis situations which could grow into a nuclear conflict, not to mention settling such crises. At that time, they were still a long way from the start of the

process of radical cuts in strategic offensive arms. The strategic situation was still influenced at that time by destabilizing, confrontational factors. That was really a major obstacle preventing the wall of mutual distrust and suspicion from being removed. Moreover, stereotyped and often distorted ideas of military doctrines and the strategic and tactical concepts of the sides, their intentions and plans, were taking shape under the direct impact of the confrontation between the "counterforce" military potentials.

It was clearly no accident that when the final attitude to Soviet-American nuclear risk reduction centres was formulated in the United States the concept of "nuclear-crisis management" centres proposed by a working group of Senators Nunn and Warren was described as "premature". In support of that assertion, it was stated that that concept would hamper political decision-making in crisis situations and detract from the flexibility of the supreme administration when urgent decisions had to be taken, etc. 14/

Some western experts also raise doubts about the utility of crisis management mechanisms in general. In this connection the following view was expressed by M. Peiss:

> "At the most fundamental level, the four assumptions upon which these mechanisms have been justified are at least questionable and at most untrue. First, greater communication might not yield greater understanding. It is possible that too much information might confuse or overwhelm decision-makers, thereby placing a disproportionate amount of emphasis on the adversary's capabilities and not on his intentions. Second, greater understanding might not result in less chance of an accidental/inadvertent nuclear war. It is conceivable that restraint by one party could tempt the other to exploit the situation for relative gain. Third, more advanced communications might mean less, not more, time to resolve a crisis. With instantaneous exchanges of information, participants might feel increased pressure to respond in rapid fashion, in turn increasing the pressure on the opponent to do likewise. Time for deliberation and restraint might be drastically shortened.
>
> The central dilemma in using these arrangements during a crisis is inescapable; the time when there would be the greatest premium on honest and accurate communication between the United States and the USSR would be the time when there would be the greatest incentive to deceive or misinform the other side." 15/

Incidentally, from the Soviet standpoint the idea of developing joint procedures for nuclear-crisis management, which was part of that concept, was associated at that time with the United States concept of a "limited" nuclear war, envisaging the possibility of a pre-emptive "selective nuclear strike" and withdrawal from a nuclear confict on terms favourable to the United States. Their negative attitude to formulating any rules of conduct for nuclear powers during a nuclear conflict was due to the fact that Soviet political thinking and military doctrine totally rejected, and still reject, the very idea of "limited" nuclear war and its central premise that a nuclear conflict is controllable. For instance, Sergei Akhromeyev, Marshal of the Soviet Union, pointed out that "the theory of 'limited' nuclear war is based on a wrong understanding of the matter and on the desire to make the very idea of nuclear war acceptable to public opinion and to make people believe that a nuclear conflict can be conducted according to rules devised in advance for the purpose." 16/ Leading Soviet experts also state that it is impossible to restrict a nuclear war once it has started as a result of a "limited, symbolic" nuclear strike within some definite limits. 17/

At the same time, the diversity of factors which can potentially lead to a nuclear war as a result of accidental or unauthorized actions makes it imperative to devise more flexible solutions to prevent nuclear war and consolidate strategic stability. In modern times it is unacceptable to apply a rigid formula according to which a single unauthorized or accidental launch of a nuclear missile would automatically grow into a full-scale and uncontrollable armed conflict. Hence the need for a mechanism of joint actions and agreed procedures ruling out an outbreak of a nuclear war as a result of an accident or unpremeditated actions. But what is truly indispensable if work is to be begun in this direction is to discard the more dangerous dogmas of military thinking, the "limited" nuclear war concept and strategic and tactical concepts such as the "Air-Land Operation (Combat)" and "a strike at second echelons and reserves", destabilizing the strategic situation and increasing the threat of a nuclear conflict (on strategic and tactical levels). Extremely important in this context would be a common transition on the part of the armed forces of both sides to truly non-offensive defence, rendering their military doctrines and concepts purely defensive.

Development of agreed procedures for preventing accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons can, given the right conditions, become a promising area of activity for a Soviet-American nuclear risk reduction centre and help extend its functions.

It seems that in order to produce effective procedures for joint actions in this area, it would be advisable to carry out extensive preparatory work, using the services of major research centres in the USSR and the United States and West European and other countries, which would study all factors relating to the hypothetical possibility of a nuclear war breaking out as a result of an accident or unauthorized actions (for instance, measures of security or political or technical control over nuclear arms; possible technical faults in technical control and communications systems, early warning of a missile attack; the malfunctioning of computers used in controlling weapons systems; mutual rejection of destabilizing weapons systems; mutual selection of types of preparedness for strategic forces that would not jeopardize strategic stability; improved reliability and safety in launching nuclear missiles, and so on). In this connection, the idea expressed by some American experts concerning the setting-up of research centres to study "accidental" nuclear war problems with a view to devising analytical models for preventing the threat of such a war may be of interest. 18/

Some United States experts believe that devising joint procedures for conduct in cases of nuclear terrorism (explosion of a nuclear device, an attack on a nuclear arms depot for the purpose of theft etc.) is a promising area of activity for nuclear risk reduction centres. In their opinion, there could be the following areas of co-operation:

- exchange of information on measures to ensure the safety of nuclear arms storage;
- measures to protect nuclear facilities from attack in peacetime;
- the elaboration of procedures governing response by States in the event of a threat of nuclear terrorism, including exchange of intelligence on the possible intentions of terrorists, co-operation with local authorities involved in a crisis situation, and so forth. 19/

The activities of the naval component in the strategic triad is a "window of vulnerability" in strategic stability in the sense that there is an increased threat of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear arms. It is

known that the difficulties in ensuring reliable two-way communication between nuclear submarines and between command centres greatly increases the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear missile. 20/ To reduce this danger, many experts suggest various versions of confidence-building measures to be applied ranging from unilateral ones (improvement of communications and installation of safety mechanisms on nuclear weapons - the so-called "permissive action links") to bilateral and multilateral ones (special agreements on limiting the areas patrolled by submarine missile carriers; a prohibition on patrolling close to the territorial waters of the other side, etc.). 21/ Clearly certain confidence-building measures could be used even before the problem of eliminating nuclear tactical weapons deployed on naval ships is solved, in order to reduce the risk of an accidental or unpremeditated launch (for instance, refraining on a mutual basis from participation in large-scale naval exercises involving vessels armed with tactical nuclear weapons, etc.).

Another possible area in which co-ordinated confidence-building measures could be applied is the signing of an agreement, or agreements, between nuclear powers providing for mutual notification of accidents or collisions of surface ships and submarines having nuclear reactors and carrying nuclear arms. According to some estimates, 360 different incidents involving nuclear submarines (collisions, destruction of submarines in a fire, technical mishaps, etc.) have occurred since World War II. 22/

A major step in this direction has been taken by the Soviet Union. During the visit made by Mikhail Gorbachev to Finland in November 1989, the Soviet side expressed its readiness to start consultations or talks on signing an agreement providing for mutual notification of accidents on board ships, including nuclear submarines. 23/

The next move could be the elaboration of co-ordinated procedures for the conduct of nuclear powers in cases of collision or accidents involving ships and submarines carrying nuclear arms (mutual notification, rescue measures, contacts along military lines, political and diplomatic measures on the settlement of incidents, etc.). In principle, this kind of confidence-building measure may in future become an additional element in the activities of the Soviet-American nulear risk reduction centres.

Confidence building and co-operation among the nuclear powers - the outlook

The need to increase co-operation among the nuclear powers to prevent a nuclear war as a result of an accident or mistake will not only influence the international legal mechanisms in this sphere but also expand their functions. The Soviet-Amerian nuclear risk reduction centres will also clearly be improved in future. It would appear that the structures, mechanism and functions of the centres will change gradually as the international situation improves and progress is achieved in disarmament negotiations. This implies a transition to a new generation of confidence-building measures, in addition to the traditional ones relating to information and notification. In particular, appropriate procedures could be devised and agreed upon for co-operation with a view to preventing crisis situations posing an increased risk of an "accidental or unintentional nuclear war." Clearly such a new set of measures may also include agreements on models of mutual self-restraint in the activities of the strategic forces of both sides during a political crisis, in order to avoid its escalation (for instance, refraining from massive troop movements and military exercises; strict control on the part of the political and military leadership over the activities of the strategic forces, etc.). In that case it would be important to study the conduct of States in previous crisis situations, as, for instance, during the Caribbean crisis of 1962, "The study of the ways in which crisis situations emerge and the ways in which they are settled by political and diplomatic means has lost none of its urgency, especially now that the new political thinking is evoking ever broader response and is increasingly used in world affairs," said Mikhail Gorbachev in his message of greeting to the delegates of a symposium on the 1962 Caribbean crisis. 24/

Whatever the approach to devising such procedures that is chosen - bilateral or multilateral or with the participation of all nuclear powers - the main emphasis should be on preventing crises and, if they arise, settling them immediately and making effective use of measures capable of stabilizing the strategic situation and the conduct of the strategic forces of both sides.

As to nuclear-war prevention mechanisms, there should be a wide range employed and they should effectively close all the "windows of vulnerability" in strategic stability. Accordingly, the régime of confidence-building measures should be all-embracing and universal. The more far-flung the network of confidence-building measures and the more effectively it meets all

kinds of challenges to strategic stability, the sooner the problem of preventing nuclear war will be solved. Every opportunity should be taken to reach an understanding on confidence-building measures relating to all the activities of strategic forces. A global approach to confidence-building measures and openness, extending to "the skies, land, water expanses and outer space" would be best.

The first stage in building appropriate mechanisms to reduce nuclear danger has demonstrated that mutual openness in military matters and knowledge of each other's military doctrines and of major political and military decision-making processes, as well as the specifics of defence development and the activities of the armed forces concerned, are indispensable if these mechanisms are to be made more effective. This is a more direct way of removing accumulated suspicion and mistrust, of too, understanding one another's concerns regarding military doctrines and concepts, and of gaining a clear idea of possible ways of reaching compromise solutions whenever a crisis situation is about to develop. Nuclear-war prevention while maintaining strategic stability is inconceivable without mutual openness and transparency.

4. Confidence building and openness in military activities

Greater openness as regards military doctrines and concepts, military development and strategic foreign-policy decision-making is indispensable if both sides truly wish to restructure their armed forces so as to make them adequate for defence while ensuring that military policy strictly corresponds to the declared defence goals of their military doctrines. In modern times, a dialogue between the highest military representatives of the opposed sides on the key questions of military development and military doctrines and concepts is very important for maintining strategic stability and dispelling suspicion about a given aspect of military activity.

As the risk of war has increased, whether as a result of possible mistakes and miscalculations by military personnel or in control and communications systems, or due to misinterpretation of a certain aspect of military activity, it has become necessary to build a more stable basis for maintaining contacts with top-ranking military representatives of nuclear powers, including contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The point is that such contacts should be institutionalized and maintained on a regular basis. The involvement of armed forces representatives in the verification of compliance with disarmament accords

(especially the Soviet-American INF Treaty) and in the elimination of mutual concerns and suspicions arising in the process suggests that there should be regular contacts between military representatives on these questions as well.

As for the Soviet Union and the United States, their views on contacts between armed forces representatives have grown much closer of late.

This process was stimulated by the first meeting between the USSR Minister of Defence, Dmitri Yazov and United States Defence Secretary, Frank Carlucci in Berne, Switzerland in March 1988. Subsequently, the visits by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, to the United States in July 1988 and by United States Defence Secretary, Frank Carlucci to the Sovet Union in August of that year laid the foundation for regular contacts in the military sphere. During these visits, the model of such contacts took shape and the range of problems to be considered was determined. The first series of meetings between Soviet and United States military indicated that the discussion would cover a broad range of questions, from the military doctrines of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the main directions in the development of the armed forces of both sides and their military budgets to the state of bilateral talks on nuclear and space arms. The conditions are being created for establishing the organizational basis for broader contacts in the military sphere. According to the plan for 1990, provision has been made for reciprocal visits by the military leaders of both countries (the USSR will be visited by all members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the commanders-in-chief of the land, naval and air forces of the USSR will visit the United States. In addition, reciprocal visits by warships have been planned. 25/

One very important result of these contacts is the understanding on setting up a joint working group to prevent military incidents. The joint work culminated in the signing of the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities on 12 June 1989, by M. Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, and Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This Agreement is important from the point of view of building a structure of co-operation between the top-ranking military of the two countries, with a view to preventing incidents between their armed forces and settling incidents arising as a result of inadvertent acts by military personnel. A new element is the procedure for settling incidents associated

with the entry of armed forces into the territory of the other side (due to circumstances of force majeure or unintentional acts on the part of the personnel concerned). 26/ The Agreement envisages exchanges of relevant information on instances of dangerous military activity or on incidents through the United States attaché for defence matters in Moscow and his Soviet counterpart in Washington. Prompt prevention of dangerous military activity and incidents is assured by the procedures for establishing and maintaining communications between the commander of a warship, aircraft, ground vehicle, or ground unit and the commander of a group of armed forces of the other party. A significant point to note is that the Agreement contains "scenarios" of aircraft conduct with the objective of preventing potential incidents, rendering aid, and ensuring non-interference with the command and control networks of the other side etc. 27/

The elaboration of such agreed rules and procedures of conduct for the sides can be used as a model for concluding other agreements aimed at maintaining stability and preventing crisis situations.

It seems that the establishment of permanent structures for co-ordination, communication and co-operation between armed forces representatives of both sides is a promising approach to preventing crisis situations that may be caused by the activities of the armed forces concerned. For instance, in the past the United States has suggested the idea of establishing a two-way communication line between the supreme command and headquarters centres of the Soviet and American armed forces to ensure prompt exchange of technically complex information required for urgent consultations and for settling a crisis military situation. 28/

Great opportunities would be presented here if the idea of establishing a European centre for reducing the threat of war and strengthening stability were to be implemented. This multilateral centre while complementing the present system of Soviet-American war - prevention accords could also be used to institutionalize co-operation between both political and military leaderships in preventing crisis situations caused, among other things, by the activities of the armed forces.

It would be advisable in this case to have an integrated mechanism for exchanging information on military matters between the USSR and the United States, as well as between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, based on a clear delimitation of the functions performed by the members of the political and military leaderships of each side.

## Notes

1/ Pravda, 25 September 1985. Various causes of an accidental or unintentional nuclear war are set forth in detail in: UNIDIR, Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War, Daniel Frei with the collaboration of C. Catrina, (Geneva, 1982).

2/ See for instance: A.A. Kokoshin, In Search of a Way Out, (Moscow, 1989), pp. 79-80 (in Russian); A. Arbatov, "Deep Cuts in Strategic Arms". World Economics and International Relations, No. 4, (1988).

3/ A.A. Kokoshin, A.V Kortunov, "Stability and Changes in International Relations", The USA-Economics, Politics, Ideology (1987), No. 7, p. 9; G.K. Lednev, "A Way out of the Nuclear Impasse?", The USA-Economics, Politics, Ideology, No. 7, (1989), p. 7 (in Russian).

4/ "American Defense Preparedness Association Speech", 29 June 1989, Daily Bulletin, United States Mission in Geneva, 29 June 1989.

5/ See: The Joint Statement by the Leaders of the USSR and the United States of America on 18 June 1979 in Vienna, For Peace on Earth, The Soviet-American Summit in Vienna, 16-18 June 1979, (Moscow, 1979), p. 57 (in Russian).

6/ See, for instance, "Washington's False Stance", Pravda, 16 January 1984; B. Allyn, "Soviet Views of CBMs" in: Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age, ed. by J. Borawski (Westview Press, 1986), pp. 117-127.

7/ For more detail see Nuclear Risk Reduction, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 98th Congress, Second Session, (Washington, April 1984).

8/ See, for instance: A. Carnesale, J. Nye, "An Agenda for Action" in Hawks, Doves and Owls, An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War, ed. G. Allison, (New York, 1985), pp. 223-246, Beyond the Hotline: Controlling a Nuclear Crisis. A report to the United States Arms and Disarmament Agency by W. Ury and R. Smoke - Nuclear Negotiations Project (Harvard Law School, 1984); Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age, Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability, ed. by J. Borawski (Westview Press, 1986).

9/ "USSR-USA, Official Visit by US President Ronald Reagan to the USSR", Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. No. 11, 15 July 1988, p. 25,

10/ See: The Text of Agreement between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres together with the Two Protocols, signed at Washington on 15 September 1987, CD/815 (8 March 1989), pp. 2-8.

11/ S. Nunn, J. Warner, "Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War", The Washington Quarterly, Georgetown University, Vol. 7, No. 2, (Spring 1984), p. 6.

12/ See: Beyond the Hotline; Controlling a Nuclear Crisis. A report to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency by W. Ury and R. Smoke - Nuclear Negotiation Project (Harvard Law School, 1984), p. 63.

13/ Barry M. Blechman, "A Minimal Reduction of a Major Risk", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 44, No. 3, (April 1988), pp. 44-46.

14/ See: Congressional Record; Proceedings and Debates of the 98th Congress First Session, Washington, Vol. 129, Tuesday, 12 April 1983, No. 45, p. 54365.

15/ See: M. Peiss,, "Crisis Management Mechanisms: How Much is Enough", Arms Control, Vol. 10, No. 2, September 1990, pp. 112-113.

16/ Bulletin of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1983), No. 9, p. 48 (in Russian).

17/ See: A.A. Kokoshin, In Search of a Way Out (Moscow, 1989), pp. 90-95 (in Russian); V. Zhurkin, No to Nuclear War Concepts. A New World Order and Political Community (Moscow, 1983), p. 12 (in Russian); G.A. Trofimenko, Peaceful Coexistence in the Nuclear Age (Znaniye Publishers, Moscow, 1989) (in Russian); O.N. Bykov, Confidence-Building Measures, (Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1983), p. 55 (in Russian).

18/ See: Dean Babst R. Aldridge, D. Kreiger, The Nuclear Time Bomb. Assessing Accidental Nuclear War Dangers through the Use of Analytical Models (1988), No. 4.

19/ See: "Report on Nuclear Terrorism". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 42, No. 10 (December 1966), pp. 38-44.

20/ See, for instance: A.G. Arbatov, Military Strategic Parity and US Policy (Moscow 1981) (in Russian); Y.P. Velikhov, "Science and the Pressing Problems of Combating the Threat of Nuclear War", Vestnik (MID SSSR 1983), pp. 25-26 (in Russian).

21/ See: 18th Pugwash Workshop on Nuclear Forces: "Accidental Nuclear War", Pugwash, Nova Scotia (Canada), 17-20 July 1989; Crisis Stability and Nuclear War, Hart Gottfried and Brice G. Blair (Oxford University Press, New York, 1988), pp. 302-303.

22/ See: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (July/August 1989), pp. 21-24; Shaun, Gregory and Alistair: Book of Nuclear Weapons Accidents, Peace Research Report, No. 20 (January 1988) (School of Peace Studies, University of Bradford), pp. 112-159.

23/ Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, Pravda, 27 October 1989.

24/ Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 4 (38), 1 March 1989.

25/ "Sprouts of Confidence. On the Visit by the Soviet Military Delegation to the USA and the Programme of Further Contacts with the Pentagon", Marshal of the Soviet Union, S.F. Akhromeyev, Izvestia (August 1988).

26/ For more detail see: the Agreement between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States of America on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, CD/942, 4 August 1989.

27/ See: Section III, Annex I (Procedures and Maintenance of Communication), CD/942, pp. 5-7.

28/ See: Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 98th Congress, First Session, Washington, Vol. 129, Tuesday, 12 April 1983, No. 45, pp. 343-365.

## Chapter V

## CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

### 1. The place and role of confidence-building measures in the future multilateral convention

Confidence-building measures play an important part in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons conducted in Geneva within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. They have been integrated into the text of the future convention (exchange of information, declarations and notifications pursuant to the various articles of the convention; procedures for confidential information handling; guidelines for the behaviour of international inspectors; procedures for consultations; the filing of requests for fact-finding missions, etc.). Confidence-building measures have a prominent place in the so-called "preliminary" text of the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons (CD/1033 of 10 August 1990), which is the basis for the current talks. Confidence-building measures have been incorporated into virtually all the key articles of the future convention. For example, article III of the "preliminary" text refers to declarations to be submitted by each State party not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force. Chapters IV and V provide a detailed list of declarations to be submitted by the States parties on chemical weapons and chemical-weapon production facilities.

The confidence-building measures relating to declarations, plans and information are dealt with in even greater detail in the Appendix to article IV, which provides a description of a chemical-weapons storage facility, the requisite steps to effectively close such a facility and general and detailed plans for the destruction of chemical-weapons stockpiles, etc. 1/ The Appendix to article V describes the content of declarations on general and detailed plans for the destruction of chemical-weapons production facilities, and defines co-ordinated measures to close such facilities (de-activation of equipment directly related to the production of chemical weapons; destruction of protective devices and equipment used exclusively for maintaining the safety of operations at the facility; the blocking of railways and roads leading to the facilities, etc.). 2/

The most detailed and intensive régime of annual and other declarations, advance notifications, information, submission of lists of chemicals, etc. is detailed in article VI and the Appendix thereto, which regulate activities

that are not banned by the convention, i.e. the production of chemicals for purposes allowed under the proposed convention (research, medicine, protection, etc.). 3/

In addition to the above list of declarations, notifications, information and other data, the confidence-building measures relevant to the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons further include the provisions of article IX, which regulate the holding of consultations between States parties to clarify and settle situations which are likely to raise doubts about compliance with the convention. The general provisions and procedures contained in the articles focus on the development of relations of trust and co-operation among the States parties, and between them and the Executive Council, the governing body of the future Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in clarifying doubtful situations. Specifically, they state that the principal procedures will be exchange of information, consultations and the forwarding of additional information and clarifications in response to the Executive Council's requests, etc. 4/

From the point of view of creating a favourable atmosphere of trust, to permit international inspections in keeping with the provisions of the future convention, much importance attaches to the basic principles elaborated in the "preliminary" text of the convention (Addendum to Appendix I) regarding the international inspectorate (privileges and immunities of inspectors; general rules governing inspections and the conduct of inspectors, etc.). The detailed regulations concerning the conduct of inspectors and the actual carrying out of international inspections and on the separation of the duties and responsibilities of international inspection teams and the host State party are intended to make international inspections effective and ensure that there is constructive co-operation between international inspectors and the State party receiving the inspection. 5/

Articles X and XI of the "preliminary" text of the future convention (assistance and protection against chemical weapons, and the economic and technical development of States parties in the field of peaceful chemical activity) may be regarded as providing an additional element of trust and a guarantee of security for the signatory States of the convention (for example, in the event that chemical weapons are used against them, etc.). 6/ At the same time, if such articles are incorporated into the future convention, this will be an incentive for a larger number of developing States to join the convention.

The "preliminary" text of the future convention therefore contains a fairly ramified system of confidence-building measures covering virtually all the key provisions of the future convention. Moreover, at the present stage of the talks the participating States are showing an interest in expanding the volume and parameters of information and data included in the scope of confidence-building measures. This interest stems in large measure from the scale of the future convention and the need to have a reliable data and information base to monitor effectively compliance with the convention, which will also cover the non-production of chemical weapons in the civilian chemical industry. To some extent, this trend accords with the participating States' frame of mind, which is inclining towards the formula: "the higher the level of information the greater the trust and the lower the level of distrust".

However, in view of the fact that confidence-building measures of an informational nature are closely linked to verification, i.e. checking and testing the accuracy of the information provided this linkage logically leads to a proportional increase in the volume of verification under the future convention. Obviously, the key to the solution of this problem lies not so much in the contraction or expansion of the volume of information or its parameters as in the creation of an atmosphere of trust essential for the successful operation of the convention. Even the most sophisticated and all-embracing system of verification and information cannot compensate for mistrust and suspicion regarding compliance with the convention. It would seem that the creation of such an atmosphere would be promoted by balanced and rational information and verification measures which should, among other things, be sufficient within reason and not burdensome to States parties.

2. Formulation of the concept of confidence-building measures relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons

The evolution of the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons shows that today it is possible to pinpoint four major areas of application for confidence-building measures:

1. The development of confidence-building measures of a technical and informational nature (exchange of information, providing annual plans, etc.) at the talks themselves;
2. The use of openness and "glasnost" measures in the chemical weapons field to foster a favourable political atmosphere leading up to the signing of the convention (bilateral and multilateral exchanges of visits to

chemical-weapons facilities; familiarization visits to chemical-industry enterprises; unilateral declarations concerning possession or non-possession of chemical weapons, etc.);

3. The formulation of confidence-building measures of a regulatory type, covering rules of conduct for States parties with respect to the activities of the international inspectorate, inspection procedures, preparations for enforcing the convention and the protection of confidential information. Measures under this heading may include developing basic principles to be followed in drawing up lists of chemicals, methods of revising them, models of agreements on chemical-weapons storage facilities, etc.;

4. The application of measures to promote the resolution of the thorniest issues at the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons (the holding with this aim in view of various symposia, seminars and conferences, the organization of national and international experiments to test the verification system, etc.).

These priorities in the development of confidence-building measures provide a basis for the formulation at the talks of a constructive concept of confidence-building measures. It may be argued, in principle, that the positions of the parties involved in the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons are largely identical with respect to confidence-building measures and the approach to their continued improvement. Nearly all participating States recognize the stimulating and useful role played by confidence-building measures and their ability to speed up the signing of the convention and to create an atmosphere of goodwill and co-operation in the work on the convention.

The USSR and the United States of America have drawn closer together in their approaches to confidence-building measures under the impact of changes in the attitudes of the participating countries towards greater openness in the chemicl weapons field. To corroborate this, suffice it to recall the well-known Soviet-American summit statement made in Washington on this issue. 7/ The transition the USSR and the United States of America have made towards co-operation in the field of confidence-building measures on chemical weapons means that the time is past when the discussion of openness and the need to submit preliminary information on chemical-weapons potentials could be used to whip up confrontation and provide a pretext for one side to accuse the other of "unpredictability" in its actions, plans, etc.

Today, there is a steady trend towards extending the range of information to be submitted by the participating States, on a voluntary basis, before the completion of the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Two States, the USSR and the United States of America, have made declarations concerning possession of chemical weapons, and more than 20 States have announced that they do not have chemical weapons. 8/ The fact that such announcements have become systematic and that the level of mutual trust has risen at the talks is due, in large measure, to the Memorandum on Multilateral Exchange of Data in Connection with the Development of a Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, tabled by the Soviet Union in February 1988 at the Conference on Disarmament.

The Memorandum provided for each participating State to submit in the first half of 1988, as a gesture of goodwill, information on chemical-weapons stockpiles in its possession (indicating their approximate volume), the facilities producing them, details of transfers or acquisition of chemical weapons, and the processes and equipment used to produce them. 9/ At the next stage, the States would submit, in accordance with a mutually-acceptable timetable, information on the number of chemical-weapons storage facilities, chemical-weapons production facilities, laboratories developing chemical weapons, commercial facilities producing key precursors and similar dual-purpose chemicals for peaceful purposes. 10/ It must be emphasized that the Memorandum did not imply a full-scale exchange of information, which would be the objective of a future convention, but envisaged a preliminary exchange of data on mutually-agreed parameters designed to be optimal for the preparatory stage. This implication was clarified at the Conference on Disarmament by the Soviet delegation, which emphasized that multilateral exchange of data should not be a key precondition for drafting the convention but that it could be beneficial as both a contribution to the solution of practical issues relating to the preparation of the convention and a confidence-promoting measure. 11/

Such preliminary multilateral exchange of data would be useful because open information on chemical-weapons stockpiles, chemical-weapons production facilities, the number of commercial facilities manufacturing key precursors and dual-purpose chemicals for peaceful purposes, etc., allows the participants to have some idea, even before the convention goes into effect, of the parameters and volume of verification required under the future convention, and of the numerical strength of the requisite technical

secretariat of the international inspectorate and the expenses involved in implementing the convention. The main impact of a multilateral data exchange at this stage, however, would be felt on the political level. It would expand the scope of trust between the participating States and help draw more and more other States into the negotiating process. Significantly, the Soviet motion on a multilateral data exchange has stimulated interest in this confidence-building measure at the talks. Some participating States, including the Soviet Union, Hungary (document CD/452 of 29 March 1988), and Czechoslovakia (CD/878 of 18 January 1989), submitted data in line with the main provisions of the Memorandum.

The fact that alternative approaches to information exchange were advanced at the talks - for example in the Federal Republic of Germany's document CD/828 of 12 April 1989 - should not be seen as a sign of differences in position. Although the Soviet and Federal Republic of Germany's documents did differ to some extent (the Federal Republic of Germany wanted data to be exchanged in a single stage, information being immediately provided on the total number of facilities for the manufacture and storage of chemical weapons, on the types of chemical weapons in storage, etc.), there is, in principle, the possibility that an acceptable general approach may be found at the talks to the issue of multilateral data exchange. In fact, the participating States have developed a practical consensus concerning the need for a voluntary preliminary multilateral exchange of data. This consensus was strengthened by the fact that the Soviet Union submitted data in the format proposed in document CD/828. 12/

Among these confidence-building measures, a key role is played by unilateral steps being taken by participating States to provide information on their chemical-weapons potentials or their intentions in the field. An example of these measures is the Soviet Union's statement that its stockpiles of chemical weapons do not exceed 50,000 tons in terms of the weight of poison agents, 13/ and that the USSR has stopped production of chemical weapons and does not keep any chemical weapons outside of its borders. 14/ The United States has provided data on chemical-weapons production facilities in the United States that are scheduled to be destroyed, 15/ as well as a programme for the destruction of chemical weapons. 16/ In April 1988, the United States made public data on the types of chemical weapons in the service of the United States Armed Forces. 17/ These data did not, however, contain information concerning the total quantity of chemical weapons in the United States.

The speeches made at the Conference on Disarmament by Foreign Ministers Hans. D. Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany and Giulio Andreotti of Italy 18/ are examples of unilateral statements revealing the participating States' attitudes to chemical weapons and their long-term intentions in this area. The Italian Foreign Minister said that "Italy does not have chemical weapons, has no plans to develop them and does not accept them on its territory". 19/ According to some sources, 22 States have announced that they are not planning and are not contemplating plans to acquire chemical weapons. 20/ Twelve States have indicated that they would never possess chemical weapons. 21/

3. The Soviet Union's approach to confidenc-building measures in the chemical weapons field

The change in the Soviet position on confidence-building measures, openness and "glasnost" in the chemical weapons field has played a prominent role in boosting the role of confidence-building measures at the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons and in formulating an effective concept of confidence-building measures. Indeed, the Soviet position has undergone a rapid evolution in recent years, from the production of chemical weapons to a total renunciation of their manufacture; from concealment of exact stockpile figures to the publication of relevant data; and from an obsession with hiding manufacturing and storage facilities from outside view to a recognition of the concept of all-embracing verification and invitations to foreign observers to monitor the destruction of chemical weapons. 22/ This evolution results from a range of factors, and in particular the new Soviet leaders' conviction that security must be maintained by political means, including arms reductions; the realization of the catastrophic consequences of the use of chemical weapons, in particular, in the densly-populated European theatre of operations, and understanding of the fact that continued production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, the so-called "chemical weapons surplus" undermines the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons and precludes any agreement on the banning of those weapons. Apart from anything else, continued chemical-weapons production was damaging the Soviet Union's reputation, and becoming increasingly counterproductive from the viewpoint of the Soviet Union's long-term security prospects and the international community's need for a prompt signing of a convention on the banning of chemical weapons and conclusion of tangible agreements at other arms-reduction talks.

The Soviet Union approaches confidence-building measures at the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons from several angles. First, the Soviet stand has been modified to resolve deadlocks and speed up the signing of the convention. Secondly, this country is applying "glasnost" and openness in respect of chemical weapons, and particularly its chemical-warfare potential, engaging in the talks on a platform of predictability and trust. And, thirdly, it is looking for common ground with Western and other negotiating partners in order to create an atmosphere of trust at the talks.

Beginning in 1986, essential amendments have been made in the Soviet stand in order to expedite the destruction of chemical weapons, halt the operation of facilities (plants) producing them, and destroy them under strict international verification. Within the context of general trust, great significance attaches to the change in the Soviet Union's approach to the need to disclose the location of chemical-weapons storage facilities and their structure, and to check the reliability and accuracy of such disclosures. In order to prevent violations of the convention, such as concealment of chemical-weapons stockpiles, their movement to secret areas, etc., the Soviet proposals have paid particular attention to effective procedures for the closure of chemical-weapons storage sites and the establishment of regular international on-site inspections to forestall illegal movements of chemical-weapons stockpiles.

The Soviet Union's support for a universal and all-embracing application of inspection on request, i.e. the juridical codification of the principle of mandatory inspection on request, without the right of refusal in such instances has had great significance in maintaining the trust necessary for the implementation of the future convention. 23/

The transformation in the Soviet stand on a number of key issues has created favourable conditions at the talks for a search for mutually-acceptable solutions to intractable problems, including the entire spectrum of issues relating to the destruction of chemical-weapons stockpiles and chemical-weapons production facilities and verification.

It may be argued, of course, that the steps taken to accommodate the interests of the main partners at the talks were belated. It will be remembered, however, that they did not spring from narrow, short-term considerations, but stemmed from an endeavour to overcome out-dated stereotypes and the new approach aimed at hastening along the development of the convention. Moreover, the magnitude of the changes in the Soviet position

and the degree of openness the Soviet Union has achieved in an unprecedented time period in respect of chemical weapons are regarded as having offset, to a degree, the errors of the past. Most significantly, the Soviet Union has reached the advanced stage of the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons exactly in step with its Western partners, with which it shares common views on ways to promote trust and openness. It is safe to say, therefore, that the USSR, the United States and other participants are at the same starting point in the talks with respect to confidence-building measures, as the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons move towards a conclusion.

This development was made possible to a large extent by the USSR's adoption of an active concept of openness and "glasnost" with regard to chemical weapons. During his visit to Prague in April 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union had discontinued production of chemical weapons, that it did not keep any chemical weapons outside of its territory, and that it had started building a special facility to destroy them. 24/ At the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Soviet delegation followed up this announcement with a declaration that the Soviet Union had never used chemical weapons, or transferred them to any other State, and intended to begin destruction of existing chemical-weapons stockpiles in advance of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. 25/ On 15 March 1988, the Soviet delegation submitted information to the effect that the Soviet Union did not have chemical weapons belonging to other States on its territory and that from 1 January 1946 onwards the Soviet Union had not received any chemical weapons or know-how or equipment required for their manufacture from any other countries. 26/

In line with its policy of openness, "glasnost" and predictability of intention, the Soviet Union invited participants in the talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons to pay the first-ever visit to its chemical-weapons facility at Shikhany, where the visitors could see standard samples of Soviet chemical munitions and the procedures used for destroying chemical weapons in a mobile facility. 27/ Soon afterwards, a Soviet delegation visited a United States facility in Tuela, Utah, where chemical weapons are destroyed. The Soviet Foreign Minister invited experts taking part in the talks to tour a stationary facility for the destruction of chemical weapons, which will become operational near the city of Chapayevsk, Kuibyshev Region. 28/ This series of measures laid the groundwork for reciprocal visits on a bilateral basis by participants in the talks to one

another's military facilities, to inspect chemical-weapons stockpiles before the signing of the convention. The fact that information is being provided on procedures used for destroying chemical weapons stockpiles has been of major importance in building trust. This fact is especially significant in view of the need to develop procedures that are absolutely safe for the environment.

In March 1988, the Soviet delegation at the Conference on Disarmament expressed its readiness to hold consultations on the technical aspects of chemical-weapons destruction. In the course of the Paris Conference, the Soviet Union made public its plans to conduct a seminar to exchange experience on the destruction of chemical weapons. 29/

It would seem clear that the adoption of common optimal approaches by all the participants in the talks to procedures for destroying chemical-weapons stockpiles and the pooling of the efforts of all interested parties with a view to ensuring that chemical weapons are destroyed in a safe and speedy way promise well for the success of the talks.

It is in the interests of all participants in the negotiations that the preparation of the material and technological basis for the actual destruction of chemical weapons and of national programmes for the destruction of chemical weapons should be the focus of wide-ranging CBMs and "glasnost". Furthermore, providing information on problems and hindrances arising in connection with the implementation of planned measures is part and parcel of this openness and of these trust-promoting arrangements. For example, wide coverage was given in the Soviet press to the events that preceded the Government Commission's decision not to open the plant for the production of chemical weapons in Chapayevsk, which was ready for operation, and to convert it into a training centre in industrial methods of chemical-weapons destruction. 30/

Creating an atmosphere of trust requires that all partipants in the talks give more attention to the formulation and conceptual interpretation of confidence-building measures. In the case of the Soviet Union, its open attitude towards chemical weapons stems from its general policy of openness and "glasnost" in the military field. Openness, as Soviet diplomats understand it, is a sign of a country's true intentions and a key prerequisite for genuine and verified disarmament. As a confidence-building measure, openness must be reciprocated and balanced. 31/

The statement made by a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman on 20 April 1989 said that "the Soviet Union is pursuing a determined policy of consolidating trust and promoting openness with respect to chemical-weapons

stockpiles.... In the field of chemical weapons, we regard openness as a major catalyst in the talks on the banning of chemical weapons." 32/ Clearly, the boundaries of openness are set by the progress of talks, that is, the level of openness is determined by the stage reached in the talks. As a rule, its level rises towards the completion of the talks and the signing of agreements on disarmament, when States give international legal commitments to provide the information needed to implement the convention. In the case of the multilateral talks on chemical weapons, openness has begun to be broadly demonstrated before the end of the talks. This is largely explained by the fact that confidence-building measures and openness play a key role in overcoming mistrust and suspicion between different groups of States on the chemical-weapons issue (those that have chemical weapons and those that have none). The level of openness attained at the talks on chemical weapons provides greater opportunities for an increasingly large number of States previously outside the framework of the talks to be involved (the number of observers at the talks is steadily growing with each passing year). Furthermore, the constructive role of these measures is borne out by the fact that they are assisting in the development of some key aspects of the future convention (holding of inspections, more efficient monitoring of compliance with the convention, etc.).

It can be said, in principle, that openness restrains the "competition" in chemical weapons among States possessing them and keeps in check the ambitions of certain other States to acquire a chemical-weapons capability. In these conditions, any step to improve chemical weapons or to acquire a chemical-weapons capability is spotlighted by the international community, with considerable political and moral damage to the reputation of the State in question. This explains why a steady trend towards still higher levels of open information is emerging at the talks. For example, the openness of information on national experiments that test monitoring techniques is setting a precedent for a substantive discussion of the efficiency and adequacy of planned monitoring methods at the talks, leading to amendment of the existing concepts of monitoring techniques, etc. 33/ There is thus a clearly identifiable link between information openness and the successful consideration of some of the crucial aspects of the future convention. In a sense, this breaks down the customary notions of information openness in a negotiating process. Openness regarding military potentials and the

intentions of the sides concerned should obviously outstrip the pace of the talks, speeding up the search for solutions and the signing of agreements.

4. Soviet-American contacts and confidence-building measures

In the past few years, there has been a growing convergence between the approaches taken by the USSR and the United States to confidence-building measures within the framework of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The joint Soviet-American statement issued in Washington at the end of the summit meeting, 7-10 December 1987, announced that "the USSR and the United States advocate greater openness and intensification of confidence-building measures in the field of chemical weapons on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis". 34/ In line with the Soviet-American accords reached in Geneva in November 1985, bilateral Soviet-American consultations have been held regularly since January 1986, with confidence-building measures among the top priorities discussed at these meetings. Characteristically, bilateral exchange of data on chemical-weapons stockpiles and production facilities has invariably been among the items on the agenda of these consultations. Bilateral data exchange is intended to expedite the signing of a multilateral convention on the banning of chemical weapons and its acceptance by the USSR and the United States. Similar data exchange could enable the interested parties to check the accuracy and completeness of data on chemical-weapons potentials that would be submitted under the provisions of the future convention. Also, it would build up trust and predictability in the concluding stage of convention drafting. Moreover, the bilateral data exchange would encourage the other participants in the talks to join in a multilateral data-exchange process.

The examination of other issues, such as procedures for inspections conducted on request and for the destruction of chemical-weapons storage and production facilities, undoubtedly promotes trust between the USSR and the United States and, to some extent, reinforces the overall atmosphere of trust at the multilateral talks. Moreover, favourable conditions are thereby created for the resolution of key problems encountered in the talks. The relationship among all these processes is self-evident, especially considering the fact that a clear-cut trend has emerged for the bilateral accords to be brought to the attention of the Conference on Disarmament with a view to their being taken into consideration in the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In particular, this has applied to the definition of a chemical-weapons production facility, developed jointly by the USSR and the

United States during the eighth round of bilateral consultations. Prior to and after the twelfth round of consultations, the sides made public their intention to submit to the Conference on Disarmament documents developed in the course of that round on some procedures for on-site inspections on request and on the destruction of chemical-weapons storage and production facilities. 35/

The record of multilateral talks shows that it is in keeping with the spirit of the times that the Soviet-American dialogue on the prohibition of chemical weapons should gather momentum and generate joint initiatives. This is especially important at a moment when the negotiating process on a chemical weapons ban is marking time. Rather than supplanting the negotiating process at the Conference on Disarmament, bilateral initiatives should serve to back up the multilateral talks. At the meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the United States Secretary of State in Paris, on the eve of the twelfth round of consultations, the Soviet side presented its American counterparts with a memorandum dated 29 July 1989, which outlined its plans for Soviet-American co-operation in achieving an early conclusion of the convention. In keeping with its policy of promoting trust and having information on the two sides' chemical weapons potentials published on identical terms, in both quantity and quality, in the USSR and the United States, the Soviet side proposed the following compromise to its American counterpart in Paris. The Soviet Union is prepared to publish information on the location of its chemical-weapons production and storage facilities, and also to provide detailed information on the composition of its chemical-weapons stocks, if the United States, on a basis of reciprocity, declares the volume of its chemical weapons stocks, as the USSR has already done, and the location and composition of all its chemical weapons. Thus both sides would publish adequate information on their chemical-warfare potential in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 36/

As a result of the eleventh and twelfth rounds, the sides succeeded in advancing significantly towards agreement on a two-stage exchange of data and data verification before the conventions are initialled.

An entirely new stage in the progress of bilateral Soviet-American co-operation was opened by the joint Soviet-United States statement on chemical weapons at the conclusion of the talks between the two countries' Foreign Ministers in Wyoming, 22-23 September 1989. In particular, they signed the first-ever memorandum of understanding on a bilateral experiment

involving verification and exchange of data on the Soviet and United States chemical-weapons potentials. The first stage of the experiment envisages exchange of general data on the sides' potentials and a series of visits to the respective military and civilian facilities in their territories. It was assumed that at the second stage the sides will exchange detailed data and permit on-site inspections to check the accuracy of the information they have received.

By laying down general guidelines for co-operation between the two countries in the area of trust and openness, the Soviet-American statement creates very favourable conditions for the development of these processes within the framework of multilateral talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States of America culminated in the signing on 1 June 1990, during the summit meeting between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev, of a bilateral agreement that calls for the destruction of the vast bulk of the United States and Soviet declared chemical-weapons stockpiles, with on-site inspections to confirm that destruction has taken place.

Key provisions of the bilateral chemical-weapons destruction agreement are as follows:

- destruction of the vast bulk of declared stocks to begin by the end of 1992;
- destruction of at least 50 per cent of declared stocks by the end of 1999;
- declared stocks to be reduced to 5,000 agent tons by 2002.

The agreement envisages the following CBMs:

- both countries agree not to produce chemical weapons upon entry into force of this agreement and thereafter without waiting for the global ban;
- annual exchanges of data on stockpile levels to facilitate monitoring of the declared stockpiles (the initial step in this direction was taken in December 1989);
- co-operation in developing and using safe, environmentally-sound methods of destruction.

The agreement signed in Washington reflects the fact that the two Powers have achieved a definite state of mutual confidence. However, this is due not only to the improved political relations between them but also to the whole set of CBMs that were employed within the framework of the chemical-weapons negotiations and on the bilateral level.

Exchange visits by parliamentarians of the two countries and contacts between their military establishments are playing a major role in fostering trust between the USSR and the United States of America as far as the chemical-weapons ban is concerned. For example, during a visit by members of the House Armed Services Committee to the USSR, the United States Congressmen were shown around the chemical-weapons destruction plant about to be put into service in the city of Chapayevsk, where they were told about processes used to destroy chemical weapons. The visit laid the groundwork for common approaches to the prospective exchange of know-how on the destruction of chemical weapons between the USSR and the United States of America. 37/ Without a doubt, such exchanges would boost trust and encourage the construction of facilities for the effective destruction of the existing chemical-weapons stockpiles. A promising step in this direction was taken in the joint Soviet-American statement of 23 September 1989, in which the two sides agreed on reciprocal visits to observe the destruction of chemical weapons and on an exchange of information on previous, current and planned destruction steps and procedures. 38/

5. Other factors promoting trust at the negotiations

It seems that adherence by the participating States in the talks to the "code of conduct" (mutual renunciation of steps that could impede agreement; discontinuation of the production of chemical weapons, including their binary variety, and the stationing of chemical weapons on foreign territory; unconditional compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons; refraining from the threat to use chemical weapons even in retaliation, etc.) is crucial for maintaining an atmosphere of trust and for reaching an early conclusion of the convention. It will be recalled that out of these considerations the Soviet Union discontinued the production of chemical weapons. Similar considerations whose concern was to strengthen the atmosphere of trust motivated the French Government, which reversed its previous concept of "security stocks" with regard to a chemical-weapons convention. 39/

A unique role in terms of reinforcing mutual trust at the talks was played by the Paris Conference on the prohibition of chemical weapons, held in January 1989. By reaffirming its unequivocal support for the ban on the use of chemical weapons imposed by the 1925 Geneva Protocol and for the conclusion of a convention, the broadly-representative international conference in Paris encouraged many more States to join in the talks and speed up the resolution of some remaining problems. The Paris Conference demonstrated the world community's increasing ability to reach agreement on complex military and political issues involved in a chemical-weapons ban within a short time period. This alone is a sign that the level of trust at and around the talks has risen immeasurably. A major result of the conference is that many of its participants made political statements in support of an early prohibition on chemical weapons and strict compliance with the Geneva Protocol.

The Conference also revealed that the spread of chemical weapons is increasingly becoming a problem that has an adverse effect on the talks, arousing suspicion and mistrust. Obviously, the problem of the non-proliferation of chemical weapons can be resolved only through the early conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons, because the future convention would, among other things, outlaw the production and transfer of poison agents.

The non-proliferation problem will be very difficult to tackle unless the production of chemical weapons is stopped straight away and unless plans for chemical "rearmament" are abandoned. It should be added that the arms race, including its "regional" variants, together with military and political instability and tensions in some areas of the world (the Middle East, for example) fuel the spread of chemical weapons. A political settlement of such critical regional situations would arrest the proliferation of chemical weapons and boost the Geneva talks towards a successful conclusion.

Mutual trust at the talks on the banning of chemical weapons could be strengthened if national parliaments and public and scientific organizations were to speak out in a louder voice in favour of an early ban on chemical weapons and the removal of the threat of chemical warfare. An example of this approach is the appeal addressed by the Parliamentary Group in the USSR to parliamentarians around the world on 3 August 1989, with an invitation to commit the potential of interparliamentary co-operation inherent in the

Interparliamentary Union (the participation of MPs in talks, the holding of symposia, seminars, meetings among parliamentarians, etc.) to preparing the ground for the future convention to come into force. 40/

The fact that major research centres are concentrating their efforts on finalizing the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and making a real contribution to the development of the convention is having a positive effect on the progress of the talks and broadening the framework of trust and openness. The growing number of publications on chemical-weapons bans put out by well-known research centres in recent years is undoubtedly a favourable factor. 41/

The dialogue that has recently been started between participants in the talks and representatives of the chemical industry is an important means of fostering trust at the talks. The need to co-operate with industrialists stems from the fact that their position is crucial for an effective and realistic arrangement to be worked out to monitor non-production of chemical weapons by commercial chemical-industry enterprises. The policy of co-operation and relations of trust with chemical industry representatives is being pursued by means of consultations held with them within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. 42/ The conference against chemical weapons convened in Canberra, Australia, in September 1989 was a major step in promoting a dialogue between representatives of the Governments involved in the talks and their counterparts from industrial circles in many countries. By outlining the principal ways to promote trust at the talks - disclosure by States of their military chemical potentials, the bilateral and multilateral exchange of data on chemical-weapons stockpiles and production facilities, trial inspections for verification purposes, exchange of know-how on chemical-weapons destruction procedures, renunciation of chemical-weapons acquisition, and the provision of information to States outside the scope of the talks on progress in the drafting of the convention - the conference underscored the importance of confidence-building measures in preparing and implementing the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The recommendations contained in the conference chairman's statement urge both Governments and industrialists to start preparatory work in the period leading up to the signing of the convention. Specifically, the industrial circles should contribute to the development of effective verification methods, the solution of complex technical problems, and the establishment of national bodies to prepare and implement the provisions of the future convention. The

constructive involvement of industrial circles in drafting recommendations on the security of confidential information and on the carrying out of the actual destruction of chemical weapons (from the viewpoint of ecological safety) could generate a degree of trust that would allow harmonious co-operation to be achieved between Governments and industrialists in drawing up the convention.

The conference extended still further the boundaries of openness in matters relating to the banning of chemical weapons. For example, the Soviet delegation announced its intention to speed up preparations for chemical-weapons destruction and the efforts under way in the USSR to draw up a programme on the construction of several facilities to destroy chemical weapons. Trust and openness were given added impetus by the Soviet Union's readiness, stated at the conference, to develop international co-operation in chemical-weapons destruction projects through exchange of information on the know-how and procedures used to destroy chemical weapons. 43/

CONCLUSIONS

The talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons are unique in terms of the scale of confidence-building measures and openness associated with them, and the degree of information exchange well in advance of the signing of the convention, i.e., directly at the negotiating stage. The confidence-building measures play a beneficial role at the talks in that they promote a favourable political atmosphere at the negotiating table and facilitate the solution of complex technical problems connected with the preparations for the implementation of the future convention and the organization of verification procedures.

Positive trends towards the formulation of a conception of "advance" confidence-building measures, that is, measures which, to a certain extent, run ahead of the negotiating process, have emerged at the talks. This conception implies greater openness and disclosure on the part of the participating States regarding their chemical-weapons potentials, co-operation in enhancing the efficacy of bilateral and multilateral data exchange, and a desire for a mutually-acceptable resolution of complex problems that have hindered progress at the talks.

The close linkage between the progress of the Soviet-American dialogue on confidence-building measures and the future of the multilateral talks is a factor that has fostered trust at the talks. Soviet-American co-operation plays a stimulating role in extending the framework of trust and openness at

the talks. The precedent of confidence-building measures applied at the talks demonstrates that they can have a restraining effect on the chemical-weapons race and on the proliferation of chemical weapons. The "restraining" role of confidence-building measures is in many respects dependent on the level of "glasnost" and openness at the talks, with the efficacy of these measures keeping pace with the growing level of openness.

Such factors as the general strategic situation prevailing in the world, the headway made at other disarmament talks, current military doctrines and concepts, effective compliance with the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons, and the situation in crisis and conflict-ridden areas around the world are having a telling effect on the development of confidence-building measures and openness.

The experience gained at the talks in developing and implementing confidence-building measures and openness, especially where they promote the resolution of verification and inspection issues, and the question of protection of confidentiality, etc., can also be applied at other talks on arms reductions and disarmament.

## Notes

1/ See document CD/952, pp. 81-90.

2/ See document CD/952, pp. 97-100.

3/ See document CD/952, pp. 113-130.

4/ See document CD/952, pp. 44-45.

5/ See document CD/952, pp. 135-144.

6/ See document CD/952, pp. 213-218.

7/ Pravda, 12 December 1987.

8/ See "Multilateral arms control efforts" by Heinz Gärtner, SIPRI Yearbook (1989), p. 429.

9/ See Document CD/808, pp. 1-2.

10/ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

11/ See Conference on Disarmament, document CD/PV.448, 15 March 1988, p. 13.

12/ See document CD/CW/WP.264, 21 November 1989.

13/ Statement by a Spokesman of the USSR Foreign Ministry. Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Forein Affairs, No. 9 (43), 15 May 1989, p. 23.

14/ Statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in Prague. Pravda, 11 April 1987.

15/ See document CD/849 of the Conference on Disarmament, 28 July 1988.

16/ See document CD/711 of the Conference on Disarmament, 9 July 1986.

17/ See document CD/830, 19 April 1988.

18/ See document CD/PV.491 of the Conference on Disarmament, 2 March 1989.

19/ See document CD/491, p. 13.

20/ Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin. Published by the Federation of American Scientists Fund, Issue No. 5 (August 1989), p. 14.

21/ See ibid., p. 14.

22/ See Speech by Eduard A. Shevardnadze at the Paris Conference, Pravda, 9 January 1989.

23/ See Speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, CD/PV.428, 6 August 1987, p. 11.

24/ Pravda, 11 April 1987.

25/ See Speech by Eduard A. Shevardnadze at the Paris Conference, Pravda, 9 January 1989.

26/ CD/PV.448, 15 March 1988, p. 13.

27/ See Document of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/789, 16 December 1987.

28/ See CD/PV.428, 6 August 1987, p. 12.

29/ Pravda, 9 January 1989.

30/ See "Pickets Around a Plant", Izvestia, 26 August 1989, and "Plant Closed, Pickets Remain", Izvestia, 29 August 1989.

31/ See Report by Eduard A. Shevardnadze, "Thought and Will Should Promote Restructuring", at a scientific and practical conference sponsored by the USSR Foreign Ministry. Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 15 (1988); and E.A. Shevardnadze's speech at the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Pravda, 9 November 1989.

32/ Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 9 (43), 15 May 1989, p. 23.

33/ By the end of 1989, 18 States had carried out experimental inspections and submitted final reports on their results. Analysis of these reports is contained in document CD/CW/WP.248, Rev.1, of 23 June 1989.

34/ Quoted from: Visit by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to the USA, 7-10 December 1987. Documents and Materials (in Russian) (Political Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1987), p. 148.

35/ See "Friedersdorf Sees Progress Toward a Chemical Weapon Ban", Daily Bulletin, United States Mission in Geneva, Wednesday, 30 August 1989, pp. 1-2.

36/ See Speech of the USSR Representative of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.525, p. 21.

37/ See: "Parliamentarians Are Pleased", Izvestia, 19 August 1989.

38/ "Let's Exchange Know-how", Izvestia, 12 August 1989. Pravda, 25 September 1989.

39/ See Fitchett, J., "At UN, Mitterrand Ties France to Initiatives on Arms Control and Debt", International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1988, p. 2.

40/ See Pravda, 4 August 1989.

41/ The scope of this work can be gauged from UNIDIR Newsletter, Chemical Weapons Research Projects and Publications, vol. 2, No. 1, (March 1989).

42/ The latest consultations of this kind were held in Geneva on 26-30 June 1989, and 27-29 June 1990.

43/ See speech by the head of the Soviet delegation at the conference against chemical weapons in Australia.

## Chapter VI

## SOME ASPECTS OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN OUTER SPACE

### 1. The beginnings of confidence-building measures

The past few years have seen a noticeable growth of interest in the practical application of various confidence-building measures that influence the activities of different States in outer space. The range of these measures includes both the peaceful programmes undertaken by the international community and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

It would appear that, by creating an atmosphere of openness and predictability in the various countries' activities in outer space, confidence-building measures promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space. Confidence-building measures open up prospects for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and facilitate the conclusion of practical accords in this field. There is a strong hope that CBMs (such as the collection and processing of remote-sensing data, etc.) will have a great effect if the existing proposals on the establishment of an international space monitoring agency (ISMA) or an international outer space inspectorate to monitor compliance with agreements on disarmament and the settlement of regional conflicts are implemented.

A survey of basic international legal documents regulating States' activities in outer space shows that, beginning in the 1970s, there has been a steady trend towards an ever-greater role for confidence-building measures in this key area of the international community's concerns. In other words, the current interest in confidence-building measures rests on the solid foundation of the record of their application in the past.

For example, the 1967 Treaty on the Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Utilization of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, places a special emphasis on such confidence-building measures as exchange of information. Article XI of the Treaty requires all States parties to notify the United Nations Secretary-General, the public and international scientific community of the character, progress, location and results of activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. 1/ Article XII of this Treaty provides for advance information from States parties about planned missions to the Moon or other celestial bodies. 2/ An important component of the confidence-building measures codified in the Treaty is the need for

States parties to hold consultations in certain situations (in the event of for example, practical activities or experiments in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, etc. - Article IX). The treaty on the Moon created a precedent for such confidence-building measures as, for example, giving States parties the opportunity to watch the flight of space objects launched by other States parties (Art. X).

A ramified system of information-type confidence-building measures is outlined in the 1967 agreement on the rescue of astronauts and the return of astronauts and objects launched into outer space. In particular, the agreement requires notification to be given to States parties and to the United Nations Secretary-General of any accidents or disasters befalling spacecraft crews, and of the measures taken by the international community or individual States to help or rescue the astronauts (Arts. 1, 2 and 3).

A similar model of confidence-building measures is incorporated into the International Convention on the Registration of Objects launched into Outer Space (5 December 1979). For example, Articles 5, 7, 9 and 15 of the agreement require information to be provided in the following instances: exploration and exploitation of the Moon; launching of missions to the Moon and the results of these missions; any phenomena detected in outer space, including the Moon, that could threaten the life or health of man; all instances of radioactive materials being placed on the Moon and the purpose of such actions; location of manned and unmanned stations on the Moon, etc.

In addition, Article 15 of the agreement lays down procedures for convening consultations among the participating States to resolve any dispute to mutual satisfaction, and for the provision of information on the results of such consultations. 3/ Analysis of the confidence-building measures contained in these accords shows, however, that they do not form an integrated framework of trust and security in outer space which could encourage peaceful space activities and help prevent an arms race in outer space. Moreover, the present-day standards of space programmes and the need to ensure the safety of space objects make new demands on confidence-building measures. Today the emphasis is on ways to step up the volume of available information and the speed with which it is provided, together with certain other measures to ensure greater openness in space activities.

2. Peaceful co-operation in outer space stimulates trust

The confidence-building measures contained in the above-mentioned international agreements on outer space have been developing side by side with

efforts to promote international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space. The more intensive the degree of bilateral or multilateral co-operation, and the larger the number of States involved, the higher the level of trust as regards both the intentions and the practical activities of States in outer space. In fact, international co-operation in outer space is a powerful factor stimulating an atmosphere of predictability and openness with regard to the outer-space activities of the various States concerned.

In the first place, this applies to Soviet-American co-operation in space on the basis of the two countries' space-exploration programmes. The highlights of international co-operation include the joint Apollo-Soyuz flight, the launching of the Vega-1 and Vega-2 space missions to Venus by the Soviet Union in 1984, and the European Space Agency's Giotto programme. Co-operation in outer space received a further boost in 1989 when the Mars-Phobos space-research missions were launched.

In this area, a key role is played by the joint development of peaceful space programmes by the USSR, the USA and Western European countries. In particular, NASA and the European Space Agency have joined forces on a series of projects (Ullis, the Space Telescope, Spacelab, the European reusable carrier rocket, the Eureka space platform, Columbus, etc.). 4/

The growing competition in the launching of commercial objects into space is a factor that has a negative effect on the trust concept. Here, too, there are ample opportunities for keeping competition under control and removing mistrust and suspicion towards potential rivals. This can be done by providing detailed information on space programmes and co-ordinating the efforts of the various States and international organizations engaged in space research.

International trust in this area will undoubtedly be enhanced by among other things, the adoption by the Soviet Union of a new practice of providing detailed information on the exact terms of contracts for the launching of commercial satellites by means of its Proton carrier rocket, and the procedures the Soviet Union has adopted in order to allow access to its launch sites. In the view of the United States periodical Aviation Week and Space Technology, this approach not only strengthens trust in the Soviet Proton carrier rocket programme, but is also attractive from the viewpoint of multilateral business co-operation. 5/ Along the same lines, the USSR has

signed a number of agreements with the ESA, and offered to launch a Hermes spacecraft using its Proton rocket and arrange for the Hermes to dock with the Soviet orbital station Mir. 6/

By providing a plausible alternative to the drain of resources for military uses of outer space, continued bilateral and multilateral co-operation in peaceful exploration of the cosmos may have a positive effect on the orientation of space programmes to peaceful ends and foster trust among States carrying out space research programmes.

3. Confidence-building measures and prevention of an arms race in space, as discussed at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament

Since 1985, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, within the framework of an ad hoc committee has been conducting talks on the conclusion of a multilateral agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Concurrently with this multilateral action, ways to prevent an arms race in space are being considered at the Soviet-American nuclear- and space-weapons talks. 7/

The logical question now is how bilateral and multilateral talks relate to one another and whether they complement each other. Notwithstanding the importance of the bilateral Soviet-American talks on this subject, an acceptable balance can be found between these two forums. In principle, the current situation favours intensification of the multilateral talks within the Conference framework to prevent an arms race in space. Should the Soviet-American talks encounter snags, the Geneva Conference could, in a sort of separation-of-functions approach, undertake to guide the process stage by stage towards the conclusion of comprehensive accords on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, by preparing a package of measures to foster greater trust and openness. In this way, the formulation of confidence-building measures and concepts of openness could furnish a real basis for the Ad Hoc Committee's efforts to prevent an arms race in space. While they are not disarmament measures in themselves, these steps could ultimately help translate into reality radical measures designed to prevent a space arms race.

An analysis of the Ad Hoc Committee's progress shows that the most realistic approach is to shift focus to the elaboration of measures to promote trust and openness. In the first place, this shift would reflect the true situation at the multilateral forum - its inability to begin any substantive talks on preventing an arms race in space because of the position of some of

its participants. Second, the current situation is unique because for the first time in years a consensus is emerging among the participating States on the need to develop measures encouraging trust and openness. Third, the formulation of a concept of confidence-building measures with respect to the prevention of an arms race in space holds out great promise from the point of view of both the role of confidence-building measures in maintaining a strategic stability in space and the potential scope of a constructive search for such measures. This field, in fact, has until recently remained largely unexplored.

The existing consensus on the need to improve confidence-building measures is embodied in the participating States' positions.

For example, the delegations of a group of countries, including the Soviet Union, hold that careful consideration must be given to some of the concepts involved in confidence-building measures. In particular, they have proposed that a multilateral code of conduct ("rules of the road") for States in outer space should be developed and that remote-sensing facilities deployed in space should be used to monitor compliance with international agreements. 8/

In the view of some non-aligned countries, including Sri Lanka, "the second alternative approach would concentrate for the time being on confidence-building measures, and here there is an abundance of material on which to work profitably and productively". 9/ A number of developing countries including Argentina, Brasil, India, Iran, Mexico, Peru submitted to the forty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly the draft of the resolution (A/C.1/45/L.22/Rev.1, 12 November 1990) in which they reaffirmed the importance of confidence-building measures as means conducive to ensuring the attainment of the objective of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They requested the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the specific aspects related to the application of different confidence-building measures in outer space and to report to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.

A similar approach is taken by the majority of Western States participating in the Conference on Disarmament. A significant contribution to the elaboration of the concept of confidence-building measures at the Conference has been made by the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada and Australia. In the view of the Australian delegation, "we should be able to identify and reach agreement on the range of measures that can be taken to

ensure better compliance with the existing legal régime, and compile a list of confidence-building measures relevant to outer space .... In this respect, identifying measures for greater transparency in military and military-related uses of space would make a valuable contribution to our collective search for creating better conditions for collective stability." 10/

The existence of considerable convergence in the parties' positions on confidence-building measures is a crucial prerequisite for broad international co-operation in developing a mutually acceptable concept of confidence-building measures relating to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

It seems that a possible concept of confidence-building measures in this area should seek to set up a system of confidence-building and security measures in space patterned on the 1986 Stockholm accords on confidence-building measures, security and disarmament. However, it should not be a carbon copy of the Stockholm accords, because confidence-building measures and openness as applied to the prevention of an arms race in outer space have specific characteristics of their own. The parallel is appropriate only in the sense that, as in the case of the Stockholm accords, the development of confidence-building measures must precede the adoption of specific measures to limit armaments and to achieve disarmament. Accordingly, a comprehensive framework of confidence-building and stability-promoting measures could stimulate the adoption of effective and specific steps to prevent an arms race in outer space and reinforce strategic stability in space. Confidence-building measures and practical measures designed to keep arms out of space should preferably be worked on concurrently.

Apparently, a system of confidence-building measures and security in space would have the highest efficacy if it is comprehensive in scope, i.e., embraces all sources of potential threats to stability and security in space. It must be flexible to shut out any likely avenues of an arms race and stationing of weapons in space.

Simultaneously, ways must be sought to maintain a strategic stability in space and preclude crisis situations developing as a result of misinterpretation of specific actions undertaken by some States in outer space.

Monitoring the existing and future agreements on disarmament and hostilities in conflict-ridden areas could become an important function of the would-be system of confidence-building and security measures, one that could help stabilize the political situation and enhance the efficiency of measures aimed at promoting strategic stability in outer space.

The diversity of functions that could be assigned to a system of confidence-building and security measures in preventing an arms race and maintaining strategic stability in outer space assumed that such a system's basic components would cover a wide range.

Tentatively, a system composed of such measures could include:

1. Measures to ban anti-satellite weapons (including a moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons, declarations concerning the non-stationing of weapons in space on a permanent basis, etc.) combined with ways of ensuring the security of artificial Earth satellites;

2. Measures to ensure transparency and openness with respect to States' activities in space (various kinds of notification and registration procedures); reciprocal visits to space centres, on-site inspections of space facilities, etc.

3. Measures to develop "rules of the road", or a code of conduct for States in relation to the operations of other States' space objects; and

4. Measures to establish a system of remote sensing of the Earth to monitor compliance with disarmament agreements and developments in the situation in conflict-dominated regions of conflict and to provide early warnings of likely conflict situations.

The above are certainly no more than tentative suggestions. The most important point, however, is that any approach to the development of confidence-building and security measures in outer space should be comprehensive in nature, i.e., it should address simultaneously all the components of a system. Ideally, attention should focus first on consensus elements on which more or less general agreement has been reached, and then shift to other components of the system as approaches to them converge. In other words, the individual components of the system should be worked out by the most flexible methods possible and be all dedicated to a single goal - enhancing the efficiency of confidence-building measures and strategic stability in space.

Prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and immunity of artificial Earth satellites

This is one of the most critical components of the future system of confidence-building and security measures, because it concerns prevention of the launching and deployment of weapons in space and the maintenance of strategic stability in space.

There is already a precedent for the practical application of confidence-building measures. In particular, on 18 August 1983, the Soviet Union declared a moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons as long as the other side showed restraint in this field. The moratorium was soon joined by the United States of America. The prohibition on anti-satellite weapons, like the confidence-building measures preventing their deployment in space, have an added importance because of the relationship that exists between anti-satellite and space-based anti-missile weapons. In the view of some Western experts, most of the new ASAT systems are part of the strategic defence initiative (SDI) programmes being considered in the United States of America. 11/ These experts voice concern that with the two space powers' moratorium in precarious balance, against the background of plants to develop new anti-satellite systems (for example, the IRIS interceptor in the United States of America, etc.) and growing interest in anti-satellite systems, the moratorium on the launching of anti-satellite weapons could collapse any moment. 12/ Soviet experts, too, draw a parallel between anti-satellite and space-based anti-missile weapons and believe that anti-satellite weapons should be banned in order to reinforce the existing strategic stability and to prevent an arms race in space. 13/ In the estimation of experts at the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, technologically speaking ABM and anti-satellite weapons have a dual nature. The new generations of anti-satellite weapons based on directed energy systems have much in common with space-based ABM systems. The targets to be destroyed by ABM and ASAT weapons are similar in many respects - in character, dimensions, velocity, etc. The same is true of the medium in which space vehicles orbit and in which ballistic missiles travel for the greatest part of their trajectory. 14/

The UNIDIR publication entitled "Disarmament Problems Related to Outer Space" points to many common features shared by anti-satellite and anti-missile weapons despite their different operational requirements. 15/

It would be desirable to regard steps to reinforce the current Soviet-US moratorium on the testing of existing specialized anti-satellite weapons as a possible option. The effectiveness of the moratorium could be enhanced by, for example, incorporating in it additional declarations on mutual renunciation of the testing and development of new anti-satellite systems, and on the use of piloted spacecraft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes. In this respect, special consideration should be given to Sweden's

proposal that the two main space powers' present moratorium on testing existing specialized anti-satellite systems should be made official and that the development and the testing of such systems should be banned immediately and the existing anti-satellite systems should be scrapped. 16/ Sweden's approach, which covers bans on the testing of non-specialized systems in an anti-satellite configuration, actually embraced the whole range of possible modifications in anti-satellite weapons. 17/

While admitting that the efforts to draw up an accord on the limitation of anti-satellite activities face complex problems, some Western experts have called for a comprehensive ban on the testing of anti-satellite systems to prevent the development of any system of this type, regardless of where it is deployed. Under an alternative agreement that they put forward, the ban would extend to the testing of anti-satellite systems with the greatest destabilizing effect (space-based systems, "space mines", etc.). 18/

Without a doubt, complete prohibition of anti-satellite weapons is the most efficacious way of preventing an arms race in outer space, a view that is shared, to varying degrees, by many States, including the Federal Republic of Germany 19/, the USSR, nations of Group 21 (India, Indonesia, Venezuela, Egypt, Morocco, etc.), and China. 20/

Some of the proposals advanced at the Conference on Disarmament to limit anti-satellite weapons may be classified as CBMs of restraint. For example, the French delegation made a proposal that steps be taken to conclude a multilateral agreement on the limitation of anti-satellite systems, including, in particular, a ban on all such systems capable of striking satellites in high orbits. At the same time, the French delegation called for a prohibition for a renewable period of five years on the deployment on the ground, in the air or in space of laser-weapon systems capable of destroying ballistic missiles or satellites at great distances and, as a corollary to this, a ban on the corresponding testing. 21/ Similar views were voiced by the delegations of Sri Lanka and the Netherlands (CD/PV.418 of 2 July 1987).

Such confidence-building measures are closely related to a proposal put forward by the Argentine delegation that the statement by the member States' participants in the Conference on Disarmament to be released by the Conference on Disarmament should contain a declaration by the member countries to the effect that none of them has permanently deployed weapons in outer space. 22/

This proposal was, in principle, backed by the delegations of the USSR, Sri Lanka and Sweden. Of course, the efficacy of this measure must depend on the accuracy of the information submitted by the member States in this respect.

Ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites

The comprehensive approach allowing two inter-related tasks - banning anti-satellite systems and ensuring the immunity of artificial Earth satellites - to be performed simultaneously could lay the groundwork for continued efforts in this direction. The delegation of Mongolia, who master-minded the comprehensive approach, call for the signing of a treaty banning anti-satellite weapons and laying down guidelines for maintaining the immunity of space objects. The treaty should:

1. ban the use of force against any space object;
2. prevent the deliberate destruction or damaging of space objects;
3. prohibit interference with the normal functioning of any space object;
4. ban the development, production or deployment of ASAT weapons; and
5. provide for the destruction, under international controls, of any ASAT weapons that may already exist. 23/

The prevailing mood at the Conference on Disarmament is in favour of a régime to ensure the immunity of artificial Earth satellites. A number of delegations, including the Soviet one, hold that this can be done by formulating an international agreement that grants immunity to artificial Earth satellites that do not carry weapons of any sort on board. 24/ The Federal Republic of Germany delegation, too, exempts from legal immunity "other, combat-related, satellites which in their strictly military function would be subject to the law of war. 25/ The Conference on Disarmament continues its quest for co-ordinated approaches to the categorization of artificial Earth satellites with a view to elaborating a legal régime for their protection. 26/

There is much logic in the Federal Republic of Germany delegation's idea that the formulation of a satellite protection régime should address two aspects: ensuring the legal immunity of satellites (on the basis of an agreement) and developing parallel confidence-building measures within the framework of an agreement on "rules of the road". 27/

In this case, confidence-building measures would, by and large, be developed as part of the "rules of the road".

"Rules of the Road", a code of conduct in space

A code of conduct in outer space is a crucial and promising component of a future system of confidence-building and security measures in space. The overwhelming majority of States participating in the Conference on Disarmament recognize the need for such a code of conduct as a way to reinforce the strategic stability, reduce the threat of possible incidents in space and lower the risk of misinterpretation of the activities of space objects launched by States both in peacetime and in critical situations.

The broadest possible concepts of a code of conduct in outer space have been advanced at the Conference on Disarmament by the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and France. According to the Federal Republic of Germany concept, the code of conduct would be a set of agreed rules on non-interference with the operation of other States' space objects and on the "linear conduct" of orbital systems (speed limits for space objects, minimum distances between them, etc.). The Federal Republic of Germany listed the following additional rules that could be incorporated into such a code:

- restrictions on very low-altitude overflights by manned or unmanned spacecraft;
- new stringent requirements for advance notification of launch activities;
- specific rules governing agreed and possibly defended no-entry zones;
- the granting of or restrictions on the right of inspection;
- a limitation on high-velocity fly-bys, the tracking or trailing of foreign satellites; and
- established means of obtaining timely information and of consulting concerning ambiguous or threatening activities. 28/

The French approach to a code of conduct focuses on such measures as minimizing the danger of accidental collision of space objects; regular up-dating of data on deliberate manoeuvres or drifting that depart from the orbital co-ordinates declared at the time of registration; maintaining a minimum distance between any two satellites placed in the same orbit; monitoring close-range passing, preventing the close-range co-orbital pursuit, etc. 29/

In conceptual terms, the French and the Federal Republic of Germany approaches have in common a recognition of the close linkage between the code of conduct and the régime of registration and notification requiring an

exchange of information on the launching of space objects and their flights in outer space. They regard the registration régime and the code of conduct in space as the core of the "rules of the road".

It is a fact that it would require extra effort to develop a code of conduct in the absence of information on the launching of particular space objects, or their activity in space, or emergency situations involving space objects. Exchange of relevant information on the basis of international co-operation would have a constructive role to play in promoting trust, reducing suspicion and uncertainty about space objects, preventing likely incidents, and enhancing the predictability of States' activities in space. In a sense, timely information is a key pre-condition for the formulation of an efficient code of conduct in outer space. However, the parameters and format for the submission of information (on a voluntary or mandatory basis) are a subject that has to be discussed in detail within the framework of the respective international forums.

A comprehensive approach to the formulation of a code of conduct for a régime of confidence-building measures naturally implies the need to explore a mechanism allowing rules of conduct to be implemented in space, i.e., a tool to strengthen the confidence-building régime. An alternative approach to this problem was proposed by France, which put forward the idea of a trajectory registration centre (trajectography centre) open to all States to be set up within the United Nations' international Secretariat. Such a centre could receive and store information, without publishing it, on orbits declared at the time of registration, up-dated upon subsequent changes in trajectory. To preserve the confidentiality of the data, the data collection and storage system could operate, according to the French proposal, on a "black box" principle. The centre could calculate predictable trajectories for all users and warn the States concerned about the danger of their objects colliding because of the very close distance between them or the intersection of their orbits. Also, in the case of possible disputes resulting from, for example, the suspicion that a collision was deliberate, the centre could serve as a consultation machinery. The centre's basic dual task would be to avert incidents and prevent such incidents from being interpreted as hostile acts that could cause, or serve as a pretext for, retaliation. 30/ France's proposal deserves close consideration because it is an attempt to make a

systematic study of the possibility of establishing a machinery to implement an international confidence-building and security régime within the framework of a code of conduct in space.

Some Western experts urge that the code of conduct should incorporate the concept of so-called alienation zones for satellites in space, that is, special zones of predetermined size, within which satellites of any one State could operate without interference from space systems of other States. The establishment of "alienation zones" on the basis of multilateral accords would interdict unauthorized intrusion by "alien" space vehicles into the zone. Another advantage highlighted by these experts is that "alienation zones" would facilitate protection of a satellite (against close-range weapons, unauthorized inspection manoeuvres, the use of satellites to "constantly track" other countries' satellites, etc.). 31/ They also acknowledge that there are possible complications involved in such an idea (incompatibility with Art. II of the 1967 Space Treaty which disallows claims to any region and prohibits the extension of national sovereignty to specific sectors of outer space; the technical complexity of developing multilateral agreements to allocate areas of outer space to any group of States, etc.). 32/

It would appear that a confidence-building measure such as non-interference with peaceful space activities, i.e., the operation of space objects that do not carry any weapons, could become a component, embodied in one juridical form or another, of the code of conduct.

This measure is already contained in the French proposal, which provides for the explicit formalization of the principle of non-interference in non-aggressive space activities, i.e., those that employ objects that do not themselves have a capacity for active interference. 33/ Some specialists call for the banning of laser beams targeted from the ground or the air on satellites of other countries, or the use of special devices or technologies inhibiting the normal operation of satellites by electromagnetic energy. 34/

Registration and notification procedures

For the "rules of the road" to be effective, entirely new demands would undoubtedly be made on CBMs associated with registration of space objects and notification of their activities, and in particular the promptness, volume and parameters of available information. In the absence of steps promoting the transparency of space activities, a code of conduct in space can hardly be expected to work.

Many of the approaches to this problem call for an improvement in registration procedures (by upgrading the 1975 Convention on Registration) and for an expansion of the parameters governing advance notification of the launching of space objects. Some experts favour converting the Convention into a Treaty that would significantly extend the range of the parameters for space activities subject to registration. 35/ An attractive idea has been raised by Poland and Sri Lanka - the Convention on Registration would be supplemented with a protocol envisaging an expansion of data exchange and the holding of ad hoc inspections of announced launches of objects into space. 36/ A noteworthy attempt to develop the concept of a three-stage notification procedure has been made by Heinz Feigl, an expert from the Federal Republic of Germany. The first of its three stages (annual notifications of intent) provides for the publication once a year of lists of satellite launches planned over a period of 12 months, with approximate dates and purposes of launches. At the second stage (final notification), a few days before, or on the day of, the launch, more accurate and detailed information on objectives and routine operations would be submitted. The third stage, following the satellite launch, requires information to be submitted on the actual flight situation and any unscheduled changes (orbit modifications, emergencies, failures, etc.). Information on orbit variations would preclude manoeuvres for the purpose of taking unauthorized actions against other countries' objects in space. 37/ The principle of advance information on satellite launches is part of the Soviet Union's approach, which envisages, within the framework of its proposal for the creation of an international space inspectorate, that advance information about each approaching launch, including the site, type of carrier rocket, and general data about the object to be launched and launch date, would be submitted to an inspectorate representative responsible for inspecting launch facilities. 38/

France's attitude to the notification and declaration régime seeks to ensure the openness and clarity of data on satellite orbits and manoeuvres of space objects in order to ensure the predictability of space activities and to maintain stability in space. 39/

It would appear to be appropriate to work out a special régime of detailed notification concerning satellites carrying nuclear reactors, because abnormal situations involving such objects in space (accidents, etc.) are fraught with extreme danger in ecological terms. 40/

It could be said that the objective needs for transparency and predictability in space activities will dictate the nature of a future régime of confidence-promoting measures as respects notification and announcements of the launching and operation of space objects. Clearly, progress towards this goal will be made by gradually building up the volume of information available to the international community on a set of agreed parameters.

Confidence-building measures and space activities in the area of disarmament verification and crisis control

It is common knowledge that the idea of using satellites to monitor compliance with multilateral agreements on CBMs, arms limitations and disarmament, as well as accords concerning the settlement of regional conflicts and the development of the situation in areas of tension, has been repeatedly advanced by many countries. At the First Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament in 1978, France proposed establishing an International Space Monitoring Agency (ISMA). At the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament in 1988, the Soviet Union, pursuant to the French proposal, urged that the work of setting up an International Space Monitoring Agency should be begun. In April 1987, the Canadian representative at the Conference on Disarmament called for the PAXSAT-B concept developed by the Canadians to be used for monitoring agreements on CBMs and limitation of conventional arms within a regional context. 41/ In August 1989, the Soviet Union submitted to the Conference on Disarmament a working paper which defined in detail the tasks, status, principles and functions of an International Space Monitoring Agency (Document CD/OS/WP.39 of 2 August 1989).

From the viewpoint of confidence-building measures, the basic aim of satellite monitoring and observation is to collect space monitoring information and disseminate it in order to facilitate the monitoring of international arrangements and agreements on conflict settlement. For this information to be effective in specific problem management, steps must be taken to make it accurate and to use procedures to process and interpret it that facilitate the comprehension of diverse information provided by national space-monitoring facilities.

Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the Soviet Union's idea that the Centre for Processing and Interpreting Space Photographs, within the

framework of the technical body of the International Space Monotoring Agency, could be entrusted with this task. The Centre would be made responsible for adapting the initial data to a form suitable to users. 42/

This idea is close in spirit to the French proposal to set up an image-processing and interpretation centre (IPIC) that would have at its disposal satellite data retransmitted by States possessing remote-sensing satellites. 43/

Collection and distribution of information gathered by satellites on ground-based and space objects could become a possible means of contributing to the enhanced effectiveness of the régime of measures to promote trust and stability in space. In such a case, satellite monitoring operations would go hand in hand with steps to reinforce the code of conduct - "rules of the road" - in space. The Soviet Union's working paper indicated that as a follow-up to the French and Canadian proposals, the Soviet Union is ready to agree to joint research and the deployment by ISMA member States of satellites to monitor objects on the ground, in the air and in outer space. 44/

4. Confidence-building measures and the space debris problem

The problem of space debris is directly related to the security of space flights and outer space in general. A code of conduct in space, or "rules of the road", must give due attention to this problem of growing magnitude and implications. According to data contained in the Report on Orbital Debris by the Inter-Agency Group (Space) (issued in February 1989), existing space debris consists of: nearly 7,000 objects more than 10 cm in size; 17,500 objects measuring 1 to 10 cm across; and 3.5 million smaller particles, under 1 cm. The total weight of the debris is some 3 million kilograms. 45/ The technical and legal problems relating to the origins of space debris, its evolution and the effects of its continued proliferation have been researched in detail in several fundamental reports and publications. 46/

The common theme running through these reports and studies is the need for prompt international co-operation to prevent pollution of outer space, and in fact for a code of conduct for space powers to prevent the deliberate proliferation of space debris. Otherwise, with the growth of space debris running out of control, there is a long-term threat to space flights and to peaceful space activities, including astronomical observations and missions to outlying space systems. There will be an increasing danger of accidental

collision between space debris and space objects, with the consequent possibility of misinterpretation of space activities and a higher risk of armed conflict. Moreover, space debris will damage the space environment. 47/

In this context, confidence-building measures are one of the most promising tools in a future régime of measures aimed at preventing the pollution of outer space. As applied to this particular problem, such measures would have a dual function: restrictive (limitation or prohibition of some types of debris-generating space activities) and informational (exchange and provision of information on space pollution sources, techniques to control space pollution, etc.).

It is important to activate confidence-building measures in order to begin effective international co-operation in this field and to involve all States that carry out space programmes in this project. It is to be assumed that confidence-building measures would serve as a starting point for the gradual formulation of an international régime aimed at preventing space pollution. This régime is certain to be comprehensive in scope, i.e., combining diverse informational, economic, technological and legal measures.

Such a régime could take various forms: an international agreement sponsored by the United Nations Secretary-General, or a bilateral or multilateral intergovernmental accord between States or with the group of "space powers". Speaking at the Third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze spoke in favour of joint efforts to work out rules and procedures to prevent the pollution of outer space, as a step towards this goal. 48/

It is also possible to envisage other forms of co-operation and co-ordination of action among space-related organizations such as NASA, the USSR Space Committee and the European Space Agency.

Some of the guiding principles and norms that would underly a future régime of measures to prevent the pollution of outer space follow naturally from the existing international agreements. For example, article IX of the Treaty on the Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed in January 1967, calls on States to be circumspect about conducting experiments in space that could interfere with the activities of other States or have adverse effects on the Earth's environment. In particular, this provision could, in principle, be the basis for introducing restrictive confidence-building measures seeking to prevent tests in space that involve the

deliberate destruction of space objects and generate abundant debris. From the informational viewpoint, a régime of confidence-building measures could be seen in the context of article V of the same Treaty, which places individual States under the obligation to inform all other States parties to the Treaty and the United Nations Secretary-General about any developments hazardous to the life and health of astronauts (such as accumulation of debris in space, debris movement, etc.) that they detect while carrying out their programmes.

The following are possible restrictive confidence-building measures that could be incorporated in the régime of measures to prevent the pollution of outer space:

- a prohibition on the testing of space systems involving the deliberate destruction of space objects and the generation of a large mass of debris in space (tests of the ASAT system, SDI components, etc.);
- a ban on the artificial modification of space debris configurations for the purpose of damaging space objects;
- the adoption of measures to restrict the placing in orbit of space objects carrying nuclear power units or measures to improve the safety of such objects, and
- the adoption of rules to curb ejection of debris from spaceships and space stations.

The following steps could be taken to develop informational confidence-building measures:

- the collection of information, including that gathered by space monitoring facilities, concerning the origin, size, location, velocity and movement of space debris;
- the compiling of a catalogue and systematic collation of data about space debris; the formation of an international data bank;
- notification and announcement of all instances of space-debris production (accidents involving space objects, destruction of objects);
- the development of technical standards to enhance the reliability of space objects and their immunity from collision with debris, and
- exchange of information about debris collection and storage techniques and the transportation of space debris (the creation of "space graveyards", etc.).

Naturally, this is only a tentative list of possible CBMs. They could be supplemented in the light of the results of the various studies, symposia and consultations organized to address complex new situations and settle them by mutual agreement.

5. Strengthening the régime of the Soviet-American ABM Treaty and confidence-building measures

Reinforcing the régime of the ABM Treaty is a key to maintaining strategic stability, preventing an arms race in outer space and fostering relations of trust in space. The collapse of the ABM Treaty would signal a new round of the arms race and the disintegration of the system of confidence-building and security-promoting measures in space that has taken so much time and effort to put together. The extent to which the Treaty is upheld will, in many respects, set the tone for work on a régime of confidence-building and security measures relating to space activities.

The drastic changes which have taken place of late testify to the fact that confidence-building measures are being increasingly woven into the fabric of issues relating to the maintenance of the Treaty and the prevention of an arms race in space. Such measures are intended to boost the efficiency of the Treaty.

In particular, an understanding has been reached at the Soviet-American nuclear and space talks (NST) that an ABM agreement should contain a protocol providing for measures ensuring predictability and confidence. These include measures to guarantee the predictability of the sides' ABM activities (exchance of data on activities, regular meetings of experts and visits to test sites). In the Soviet experts' view, "despite the fundamental differences which still exist regarding the substance of the agreement proper, there is a certain measure of proximity in the parties approaches to the nature of certain measures that would be included in the protocol". 49/ In the view of the Soviet experts, CBMs and predictability measures can be useful where they are aimed at enhancing trust and maintaining the confidence of the parties in their mutual compliance with the obligations they undertook under the ABM Treaty. 50/

In order to promote an atmosphere of trust with respect to the ABM Treaty this protocol, in the Soviet delegation's view, should provide for consultations to consider situations that, in the view of one of the parties, pose a threat to its higher interests. 51/

Having paid tribute to the constructive spirit of the joint work on a draft protocol, the American side proposed that the above predictability measures should be supplemented with exchanges of visits by experts to laboratories (not necessarily at test ranges); observation of tests (not necessarily at test ranges), and observation of other activities (not

necessarily observable by national technical means). The United States also wishes to exchange data on research activities conducted prior to the commencement of the format development stage. In the Americans' view, the Soviet-American Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres would provide a channel for the annual exchange of information on the two sides' activities relating to the development, testing, deployment, modernization and replacement of the strategic ballistic-missile defences. According to Ambassador Cooper, the United States negotiator at the Soviet-American talks on defence and space issues, "the United States believes these measures are practical only if they are carried out on a voluntary, reciprocal and comparable basis". 52/

The Soviet and American approach to predictability and confidence-building measures within the framework of the ABM Treaty, presented at the Conference on Disarmament, is the indication that an energetic process is under way to formulate a mutually-accepted concept of confidence-building, transparency and predictability measures.

Prospects for expanding the range of application of confidence-building measures have improved since the meeting between the Soviet and United States foreign ministers in Jackson, Wyoming, where the Soviet side expressed readiness to sign and ratify a START treaty agreement even should there be no agreement on the ABM problem in time for the completion of the treaty. The sides would however continue to observe the ABM Treaty as signed in 1972. 53/ In the Soviet side's view, "the parties could draw up appropriate confidence-building and verification measures, including exchanges of data and on-site inspections to be carried out prior to the launch of certain devices into outer space, so as to rule out any unclear situations which might arouse concern on either side as regards compliance with obligations under the ABM Treaty". 54/ First of all, however, it would be essential to bring the parties positions concerning the general thrust of predictability measures closer together, and then to give some thought to the actual conduct of such measures. The Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and the USA of 24 September 1989, on sustained efforts to discuss ways of ensuring the predictability of Soviet-American strategic relations within the framework of strategic stability, in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war, was a crucial contribution to the continued development of confidence-building measures.

There is a growing tendency to employ confidence-building measures in creating a favourable atmosphere for the successful operation of the ABM Treaty. Many of these measures have been initiated by the Soviet Union.

Foremost among them was the first-ever publication of data on allocations for military space programmes. 55/ In July 1989, a group of American Congressmen was given an opportunity to visit the Soviet Defence Ministry's test range at Saryshagan, in Kazakhstan, where the delegation members could see at first hand that no work was being done at the range to develop or test prototypes or specimens of combat anti-space or ABM laser weapons. 56/

To allay suspicions concerning compliance with the ABM Treaty and to promote trust, the Soviet Union has decided to dismantle completely the radar station at Krasnoyarsk. 57/

At the ministerial meeting in Wyoming, the sides agreed that the American invitation to Soviet Government experts to visit two American facilities engaged in strategic defence research will be discussed at the Soviet-American nuclear and space-weapons talks in Geneva. 58/

Some conclusions:

Confidence-building and predictability measures are being used increasingly frequently to prevent an arms race in space and to promote effective international co-operation in outer space. The confidence-building measures are most effective in the context of the endeavour to draw up a code of conduct, or "rules of the road", in space so as to allow space activities to be carried out in a normal way and to prevent pollution of outer space. The scope of confidence-building and predictability measures is extending against the background of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The openness, publicity and predictability measures with regard to space activities that are being drafted at various international meetings are in effect laying the foundations for an entirely new international régime of confidence-building and security measures in outer space. The growing transparency of space activities can play a key role in restraining and preventing an arms race in space and maintaining strategic stability. An indispensable pre-requisite for this régime to be effective in practice is banning a space arms race and maintaining and reinforcing the ABM Treaty. Stability and security in modern times can only be reciprocal, and will be achieved not by the continuation of the arms race but rather through steady reductions in strategic offensive weapons, together with strict curbs on strategic defensive systems, a ban on the placing of arms in outer space and the expansion of confidence-building and predictability measures.

## Notes

1/ See Space Activities of the United Nations and Other International Organizations (United Nations, New York, 1986) Document A/AC.105/358, p. 219.

2/ Ibid., p. 220.

3/ Space Activities of the United Nations ..., pp. 234-244.

4/ Space Activities of the United Nations ..., pp. 134-150.

5/ M. Lenokovitz, "Soviet Offer Commercial Leases of Gorizont Communication Satellites", 8 December 1986, p. 25.

6/ Ten ESA Member-Nations Join Hermes Spacelab Programme, Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9 December 1986, p. 27.

7/ This paper does not seek to examine the progress at the Soviet-American nuclear- and space-weapons talks.

8/ See: Document of the Conference on Disarmament CD/954, 24 August 1989, p. 21.

9/ See: CD/PV.511, 22 June 1989, p. 13.

10/ See: Speech by Australia's representative, CD/PV.497, 23 March 1989, p. 7.

11/ See: SIPRI Yearbook (1989) John Pike, "Military Use of Outer Space", p. 72.

12/ See, e.g.: J. Pike, "Military Use of Outer Space" in SIPRI Yearbook (1989), pp. 70-72.

13/ See, e.g.: A.A. Kokoshin, In Search of a Way Out (Politizdat, Moscow, 1989), p. 192.

14/ "Disarmament and Security" (1986) Yearbook, Vol. 1, published by Novosti Press Agency (Moscow, 1987), p. 81.

15/ Disarmament Problems Related to Outer Space, United Nations, UNIDIR, No. 4, 1987.

16/ See: Document of the Conference on Disarmament CD/OS/WP.36, 26 August 1989. Proposals by Sweden Relating to Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, pp. 2-3.

17/ Ibid, p. 3.

18/ See: "Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures and Arms Control", OTA Report (Washington, 1985), p. 56.

19/ See e.g.: Speech by West Germany's representative on 6 March 1986 (CD/PV.345).

20/ See: Speech by China's representative (CD/PV.423, 23 July 1987).

21/ See: France's proposals (CD/PV.263 of 12 July 1984).

22/ Argentina's motion of 21 July 1987 (CD/PV.423).

23/ See: Document CD/PV.425 of 18 July 1987.

24/ See: Document CD/905, 21 March 1989, p. 8

25/ See: Document CD/905, p. 10.

26/ See: CD/905, p. 9, on this point.

27/ See: Speech by West Germany's representative on 6 March 1989 (CD/PV.345).

28/ See: Speech by the Federal Republic of Germany representative at the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.318 of 26 July 1985, and CD/PV.345 of 6 March 1986.

29/ See: France's working paper CD/937; CD/OS/WP.35, 21 July 1989, pp. 7-8.

30/ See: France's working paper CD/937; CD/OS/WP.35, pp. 8-9.

31/ See. e.g.: Speech by Dr. Hubert Feigl, the Federal Republic of Germany, Science and Politics Foundation (Ebenhausen am Isar). Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, Conference on Disarmament, 11 July 1989.

32/ See: Ibid.

33/ See: France's working paper CD/937, 21 July 1989.

34/ See: Speech by Dr. H. Feigl...

35/ See: Speech by Dr. H. Feigl...

36/ See: CD/PV.511, of 22 July 1989; CD/PV.514, of 4 July 1989.

37/ See: Speech by H. Feigl to the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space...

38/ See: Speech by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze on 6 August 1987 (CD/PV.428).

39/ For more details, see France's working paper CD/937, CD/OS/WP.35 of 21 July 1989.

40/ In May 1988, the Soviet Scientists for Peace Committee and the American Scientists Federation proposed a ban to be placed on satellites equipped with nuclear reactors. Some scholars, however, see a direct link between continued space flights and the progress of nuclear power engineering.

41/ See: CD/PV.410 of 30 April 1987. More detailed information surveying satellite modifications for controlling and monitoring purposes is contained in the book Outer Space - A New Dimension of the Arms Race, ed. by B. Jasani (SIPRI, London, 1982); and Satellites for Arms Control and Crisis Monitoring, ed. by B Jasani and T. Sahata (SIPRI, London, 1987) etc.

42/ See: Working Paper of the USSR, CD/SO/WP.39, 2 August 1989, p.7.

43/ See: Working Paper of France, CD/945; CD/OS/WP.40, of 2 August 1989, p.8.

44/ See: Document CD/OS/WP.39 of 2 August 1989, p.8.

45/ See: Space Debris 1989, William B. Wirin Webster University. University of Colorado. Colorado Springs, 40th Congress of the International Astronautical Federation, 7-12 October 1989, Malaga, Spain.

46/ See e.g.: ESA Report of the Space Debris Working Group, November 1988; The US Administration Report on Orbital Debris by the Interagency Group (Space) submitted to the National Security Council in February 1989. United States Space Foundation: Space - A New Era. Fifth National Space Symposium. Proceedings Report, 1989, Colorado Springs.

47/ According to some authorities (e.g., F. Kenneth Schwetie), proliferation of space debris may result in a debris ring forming around the Earth. See: US Space Foundation, Proceedings Report (1989), p.26.

48/ See: Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 12, 1 July 1988.

49/ See: Speech by the head of the Soviet delegation at the Soviet-American NST talks at the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.523, 3 August 1989, pp.8-9.

50/ See: CD/PV.533, 19 April 1990, p.15.

51/ Ibid., p.7.

52/ See: CD/PV.523, pp.20-21.

53/ See: Press conference of Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Isvestia, 15 September 1989; CD/PV.553, p.14.

54/ See: CD/PV.523, p.8.

55/ Report by Nikolai I. Ryzhkov "On the Programme of the USSR Government's Future Activities", Sovetskaya Rossia, 7 June 1989.

56/ "In the USSR Defence Ministry", Krasnaya Zvezda, 12 July 1989.

57/ "From Mutual Understanding to Interaction", Izvestia, 25 September 1989.

58/ "Joint Ministerial Statement", Pravda, 25 September 1989.

## Chapter VII

## CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND STRATEGIC STABILITY WITH REGARD TO CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS

### 1. The potential of confidence-building measures as "regulators" of strategic stability in Europe

In our day, increasing importance is being attached to confidence-building measures in maintaining military strategic stability in Europe, primarily in terms of reduced offensive potentials on the opposing sides and of radical reductions in conventional armed forces. These measures are designed to reduce the threat of a sudden attack, and to prevent an armed conflict from breaking out and escalating into a full-scale nuclear war.

There is no doubt about the future constructive role of CBMs in the establishment and operation of possible structures to promote co-operation between the various military and political alliances and also, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), to prevent and defuse crisis situations.

Confidence building and predictability are increasingly regarded as effective tools with a view to improving strategic stability in the light of the tremendous breakthroughs in the development of conventional weapons, which have almost as destabilizing an effect on the strategic situation and as devastating a power as weapons of mass destruction. The latest conventional weapons systems ("precision" guidance systems, reconnaissance and strike complexes, military robots, mobile armoured reconnaissance units, etc.), combined with the high speeed of operations and troop mobility and the offensive concepts of combat operations (such as "follow-on-forces attack", or "deep strikes against second-echelon forces", "air/land battle", and "strategic mobility") pose unprecedented challenges to strategic stability and increase the threat of irreversible escalation in a crisis situation. The decision that compensatory confidence-building measures should be used to fill the strategic-stability vacuum springs from the fact that even the likely accords on a radical reduction in conventional armed forces in Europe cannot close all the "windows of vulnerability" in strategic stability. Moreover, the fact is that the pace of the talks inevitably lags behind the dynamic improvements in the performance of the latest systems of conventional armaments. Also, there is the possibility of new avenues opening up for the arms race that are not covered by the talks in progress (such as, for example, naval armaments). In such circumstances, owing to the simple procedures by

means of which they operate (including co-ordinated unilateral steps) and their functional flexibility, confidence-building measures can perform a "restraining" role in controlling the strategic situation and the non-confrontational nature of the behaviour of the opposing sides' conventional forces. The strategic situation is "controlled", in order to ensure its stability and predictability, by means of such procedures as consultation and rapid communication and exchange of information, which reduce the danger of erroneous political and military decision-making in crisis situations. Confidence-building measures are thus becoming a safeguard against any misinterpretation of the other side's actions.

It is self-evident, however, that confidence-building measures can adequately perform their functions only when they are constantly improved upon and take account of the dynamic political processes unfolding on the European continent. This presupposes an innovative approach to the future development of confidence-building measures and a shift of focus from efforts to maintain non-confrontational relations between the two military and political alliances in Europe to steps to reinforce political stability in Europe within a broader continental context that goes beyond the framework of relations between the military and political groups. Such confidence-building measures should centre on maintaining a stable situation in Europe at a time of sweeping changes on the continent and on forestalling and settling crisis situations. Presumably, in the longer run, these measures should operate on a broad European scale and be implemented through permament structures or multilateral working bodies within the CSCE framework. This would be a logical development since the fundamental issues of European security and political stability must be resolved by all the European States, i.e., within the CSCE framework, rather than on the lower level of the two opposing military and political groups. A desirable option in the continued evolution of confidence-building measures would be a combination of two trends: maintaining military strategic stability amid radical reductions in the sides' conventional armed forces, and preserving political stability. The complementary evolution of these two trends would enhance the role of confidence-building measures and make them more effective in maintaining peace and stability in Europe.

A consensus seems to be emerging among the participants in the European process in this area. As indicated by the speech made by the United States Secretary of State, James Baker, in West Berlin on 12 December 1989, "A New Europe, a New Atlantism: an Architecture for a New Era", for example, the United States views the CSCE process as the most promising field for

co-operation between East and West and collaboration with transatlantic institutions. The future model for the development of confidence-building measures is conceived of in the United States as one capable of providing "a predictable pattern of military interaction between the sides' armed forces in order to remove the risk of war and to promote openness". This traditional approach to the role of confidence-building measures has, however, been supplemented recently in the form of statements by American representatives regarding the new role to be given to confidence-building measures in the 1990s, a role that is aimed at maintaining security and ensuring predictability within the European context. 1/

It may be assumed that the new tasks for NATO outlined at the NATO Foreign Ministers' conference in Brussels, including the establishment of a new security framework in Europe through the negotiation and implementation of accords in the field of disarmament, provide for a wide-ranging application of confidence-building measures in this area. In particular, entirely new confidence-building measures could be applied in the context of the proposal made by the United States and NATO concerning setting up an "open skies" régime, which would provide for extensive openness and for the exchange of information gathered by aircraft of one participating country when flying over the territory of any of the others. 2/

The Soviet Union's position on this issue also seeks to give confidence-building measures a new role in the process, according to which confrontational military structures would be dismantled, with the simultaneous setting-up, within the CSCE framework, of integrated structures in a number of areas, including those of security and stability. 3/ The Soviet Union's top military leaders regard the development of a system of confidence-building measures as a prerequisite for a new security model. Soviet Defence Minister, D. Yazov, has said: "In our view, transparence in the military field, that is the maximum possible openness and clarity in relations is capable of playing a stimulating role in the formulation of a new model of security. Moreover it could guarantee, as far as possible, the efficiency of this model". 4/ Quite a few Soviet experts are inclined to regard a system of CBMs, alongside reductions in troops and armaments, the dismantling of offensive infrastructures and the restructuring of armed forces for the purposes of a defensive role, as a building block in future, truly stable military structures pitched at significantly lower levels of military confrontation. 5/

2. Prerequisites for an entirely new model of confidence-building measures on the European continent. Formation of a non-confrontational model of confidence-building measures

The successful completion of the Stockholm Conference on "second generation" confidence- and security-building measures showed that the participants in the European process have a considerable potential for co-operation in using confidence-building measures as an effective tool for the prevention of war and consolidation of strategic stability in relation to conventional armed forces in Europe.

The Stockholm Conference in 1986 adopted a series of interrelated political and military measures that have stabilized the military and political situation in Europe. Providing as they do for advance notification of large-scale military exercises, movements, concentrations and transfers of troops (exceeding a certain number), the imposition of some restrictions on military exercises and the exchange of information on annual calendars of military activities, the Stockholm accords have without question improved the predictability of the activities of the sides' armed forces, reduced the threat of sudden attack, and allayed mutual suspicions about the other side's military and political intentions. It is particularly significant that the Stockholm document supports the principle of non-use of force or the threat of force. 6/ It should be noted that it was possible for agreement to be reached in Stockholm on confidence-building measures as a result of the common interest of the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and NATO in drawing up new-generation measures to reduce the risk of sudden attack and to lower the level of military confrontation. Furthermore, in the Western experts' view, the Soviet Union and the WTO made greater concessions than NATO, including some in areas of special concern to the North Atlantic alliance, with reference, in particular, to reducing the risk of a sudden attack, more widely-available information on military exercises and mandatory on-site inspections. The Soviet Union's readiness to be accommodating in Stockholm, wrote the prominent British expert Avril Carter, mirrored its long-term loyalty to the CSCE process and its desire to establish itself as a key partner in the context of European security. 7/

Notwithstanding the importance of the Stockholm agreements on confidence- and security-building measures, they would not - in the absence of a major breakthrough in the solution of the central problem of European security, namely a radical reduction in general-purpose troops and their reorganization

on the principles of reasonable sufficiency for defence - be able effectively to prevent an armed conflict and maintain a stable military and strategic balance in Europe. In fact, radical reductions in conventional armed forces and revision of military doctrines, military policies and armed-forces personnel training in accordance with defensive principles, i.e., the elimination of the physical conditions for a sudden armed conflict, could prove to be the most significant prerequisite for the successful operation of CBMs in this area.

It may legitimately be argued that the new prospects for the use of confidence-building measures as a tool in stabilizing the strategic situation and rendering it predictable were generated by the Soviet Union's generally-acclaimed unilateral steps to reduce its armed forces, including some of those stationed in Europe, and to restructure them along defensive lines. The effect of these positive changes in the role of the confidence-building measures was enhanced significantly by United States President Bush's proposal in January 1990 for significant reductions in Soviet and American troops in Europe.

Pursuant to the reductions announced by the Soviet leaders, the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces is to be decreased by 500,000 personnel, plus 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 820 warplanes. 8/ According to USSR Defence Ministry figures, troop and arms reductions will be accompanied by a restructuring of the Soviet armed forces along defensive lines. As offensive forces are reduced, the proportion of defensive units will rise. Theatre-based mobile groups are to be eliminated. The size of the forces stationed in the territory of the Warsaw Treaty countries is to be reduced - more than 50,000 troops, over 3,000 tanks, and other weapons have been withdrawn. Simultaneously, tactical strike aircraft, bridge-building units and other types of offensive armaments and combat equipment are being removed from these countries together with their weapons and hardware. The general-purpose divisions remaining in the territory of the WTO countries are being reorganized (among other things, large numbers of tanks are being withdrawn from them), and the divisions are being given a defensive structure. 9/

In parallel with these processes, major changes are being made in the Soviet Union's defence budget, arms production, armed forces personnel training and contemporary military doctrine. In particular, weapons production is to go down by 20 per cent in the course of 1989 and 1990.

Defence spending is being reduced in a planned manner. A proposal was made at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies for a further cut of 10 billion roubles, or 14 per cent in defence expenditure in 1990 and 1991.

Training programmes for armed forces personnel are being reviewed from the standpoint of defence-sufficiency principles in order to prevent deliberate hostile acts from starting a war or a minor incident from developing into a major armed conflict. According to M.A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' General Staff, these programmes now provide for action to repulse a probable enemy attack and inflict a defeat that would prevent an enemy incursion into Soviet territory, in the course of defensive operations. 10/

It must be acknowledged that the predictability of the sides' military and political intentions largely depends on the nature of their military doctrines. The previous discrepancy in Soviet military doctrine between its declared defensive orientation at the political level and its emphasis, at the military and technological levels, on decisive offensive operations in the event of a war being started against the USSR and its allies was in fact a cause of suspicion concerning the real thrust of Soviet military doctrine. The inconsistency between the political and the military and technological aspects of Soviet military doctrine hardly encouraged trust or improved the predictability of the existing military and political situation in Europe. To judge by the statement made by the Soviet armed forces' top leadership, this discrepancy has been effectively eliminated from the military doctrine that came into force in 1987. Its defensive spirit is now reflected in the principles that the development and personnel-training programmes of the Soviet armed forces are now geared to preventing war, that the Soviet Union will not, under any circumstances, initiate hostilities against any other State, that it has no territorial claims on anyone, and that it will never, in any situation, be the first to employ nuclear weapons. 11/

The unilateral reductions in armed forces and armaments made by the Warsaw Treaty countries and the adoption of entirely new parameters in their defence programmes will help to bring the military and technological aspect of the doctrine and the structure of the armed forces and armaments into line with the political element of the Warsaw Treaty's defensive doctrine. 12/

The greatest possible openness and transparency with respect to unbiased information on military matters is a critical prerequisite for the establishment of a fundamentally new level of trust and stability on the

European continent. Openness regarding the sides' defensive potentials helps to enhance the predictability of the strategic situation developing in Europe, diminish the possibility of misinterpretation of the States' actions and intentions and create conditions for the taking of drastic measures to limit and reduce conventional arms. With this aim in view, on 30 January 1989 the Defence Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Treaty countries made public its figures concerning the size of the armed forces and numbers of the basic types of weapons held by the Warsaw Treaty States, together with its own estimate of the NATO armed forces in Europe and adjoining sea areas, in response to the data submitted by NATO in November 1988. 13/ It was clear from the Warsaw Treaty Ministers' data that, taking all the circumstances into account, the military balance in Europe can be defined as approximate parity that gives neither party the opportunity to secure a decisive military advantage. In general, the WTO's initiative stimulated the formation of realistic approaches to the opening of talks on significant reductions in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, and development of new-generation confidence-building and predictability measures. To consolidate further the tradition of transparency in the military field, the Soviet Union is regularly submitting information on the ongoing unilateral reductions of its armed forces and restructuring of Soviet forces on the territory of its allies in Europe on an exclusively defensive basis.

In the view of Western experts, the Soviet Union's unilateral steps to reduce its armed forces and promote the predictability of its troops' activities in Europe have reduced the Soviet threat to Western Europe and increased the chance of agreement being reached on reductions in the two sides' armed forces in Central Europe. 14/ CIA Director, W. Webster, admitted that, as a result of the practical reduction in the USSR's military potential and the accompanying steps to restructure the remaining Soviet forces in Eastern European countries, the Soviet capacity to launch a sudden attack with little warning would be reduced significantly. 15/ His view is shared by United States Defense Department spokesmen, who maintain that because of the Soviet Union's openness in the military field and unilateral armed forces reduction the warning time for the United States to prepare for a possible attack has grown to three months. 16/

According to the estimates of the London-based Institute of Strategic Studies, even unilateral reductions, once completed, would virtually remove the threat of surprise attack which has been a matter of long-standing concern for NATO strategists. 17/

The initiatives launched by the Soviet Union and the other WTO States have created a generally favourable atmosphere for the WTO and NATO to begin unprecedented practical co-operation in the development of new-generation confidence-building measures that could help maintain stability and prevent war, given the reductions in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe.

This atmosphere was well in evidence during the preparations for and in the course of the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and on confidence-building and security measures in Europe (talks involving the 23 WTO and NATO States and the 35 States participating in the CSCE process, respectively). 18/

The concept of confidence- and security-building measures put forward by the Soviet Union and other WTO States called for a wider application of such measures in order to achieve progress at the Vienna talks between the WTO and NATO on conventional armed forces (the CFE Talks), and to foster openness and predictability in military activities.

The principal components of this concept were as follows:

1. Regular (at least annual) exchange of information, including data on the numerical strength, structure and stationing of land, naval and air forces, down to the brigade/regiment level or equivalent unit (regiment/squadron for the air forces, and brigade/task force for the navies);

2. Bona fide provision of other, additional information on armed forces components and military activities that are not covered by agreed confidence-building and security measures;

3. Periodic discussion and correlation of the political, military and technological aspects of the military doctrines and other issues of the defence policies of the participating States and their military and political alliances in various forums.

4. Extension and improvement of the practice of reciprocal visits by military delegations and individual military representatives and exchanges of armed forces personnel, including military diplomatic officers of the participating countries;

5. The holding on a regular basis (or at the request of any one of the participating States) of bilateral or multilateral consultations on problems to be tackled within the context of the aims and objectives of the talks on confidence-building and security measures;

6. The use of the latest automatic (remote) monitoring techniques for verifying compliance with confidence-building and security measures already adopted;

7. The establishment of a Centre, informational and consultative in nature, to reduce the threat of war and prevent a surprise attack in Europe; and

8. The organization of a special liaison service to provide mutual clarification of situations giving rise to suspicion or apprehensions on the part of either side. 19/

A prominent feature of the WTO concept of confidence- and security-building measures is the idea of setting up trust and security zones in which stringent restrictions would be imposed on various kinds of military activities (for example, troop shipments, concentrations or alerts). According to this idea, the structure of armed-forces units stationed in these zones should be defensive in nature achieved by gradually withdrawing or reducing certain types of powerful, highly-destructive weapons intended for offensive operations). The proposed approach would seek to stabilize the military and strategic balance and lessen the threat of surprise attack. It was formulated on the basis of analogous ideas voiced on this subject by influential political and official circles in Western Europe, as well as in Eastern Europe (e.g. Jaruzelski's plan to reduce armaments and promote trust in Central Europe). 20/

Another conspicuous feature of the WTO's package of confidence- and security-building measures is their comprehensive character, since they cover the independent activities of air and naval forces as well as those of ground forces. Confidence-building measures can be truly effective if they make provision for all potential sources of threat to the stability of the military and political situation. The powerful strike potential of the United States and NATO tactical air and naval forces which are capable of launching a surprise attack, added to NATO's supremacy over the Warsaw Treaty Organization in tactical air and naval forces (in view of their absolute superiority in aircraft carriers), poses a tangible threat to military and political stability in Europe and heightens the risk of crisis situations arising in the

region. 21/ The régime of confidence-building measure should not be selective; rather it should be universal so as to create adequate conditions for lessening military confrontation in Europe, and enabling the sides to adopt a non-offensive stance and to reform their armed forces on the basis of reasonable sufficiency for defence.

"The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty called for the extension of notification, observation and limitation measures to all types of activities of States, including those of their naval and air forces", stated the Communiqué of the Political Consultative Committee for the WTO member States in Bucharest on 7 and 8 July 1989". 22/

The confidence- and security-building measures put forward by the WTO member States contained some restrictions (e.g. limitations on the scale, number and duration of major exercises). In particular, they provide for limitations on the scale of notifiable military activities (exercises, and relocation and concentration of troops and hardware), including activities that do not require advance notification of the forces involved, at a level of 40,000 troops, and other measures. 23/

Thus the package of confidence- and security-building measures advanced at the Vienna talks was a blend of traditional steps (notification and observation of and limitations on military activities) and new-generation measures (zones of reduced arms levels; predictability and consultation measures; the establishment of a centre for the reduction of the threat of war and the prevention of surprise attacks; the establishment of liaison to clarify controversial situations; an exchange of views on military doctrines, etc.).

In the light of deep cuts in armed forces and conventional arms and their restructuring on the principles of reasonable sufficiency, the confidence-building measures are called upon to maintain the stability of military structures so as to prevent war and to "control" (through information exchange, consultations and hot-line communications) a possible crisis or armed conflict, i.e., to de-escalate it at the earliest possible stage. This explains the expansion of informational and consultative confidence-building measures including the WTO concept. In the circumstances, the sides are demonstrating a significantly greater desire to acquaint each other with the specifics of their defence policies and military doctrines and the process of military and political decision-making in crisis situations with a view to ensuring the maximum possible predictability with respect to each other's

political and military intentions. In this respect, a thought-provoking study was conducted by a group of Soviet experts, who explored four hypothetical scenarios of confrontation at the level of general-purpose forces and conventional armaments. In particular, the study sought to identify the optimal structure for the opposing armed forces that would guarantee strategic stability and prevent possible crisis situations from developing into a full-scale armed conflict. 24/

The authors of the study have reached the conclusion that strategic stability can best be maintained in a scenario in which each of the sides involved opts, on a co-ordinated basis or on the basis of mutual example, for a strictly defensive course of action on the strategic and theatre level, without any material conditions being set for the launching of offensive or counter-offensive operations. Battlefield mobility would be mutually acceptable only for tactical units (a battalion, regiment or, at most a division) that could be used for counter-attacks. In these experts' view, such troop groupings should not be equipped with strike aircraft, surprise-effect weapons or high mobility or striking power (e.g. tank and air assault divisions), and should not possess the forces or weapons to effect deep penetrations. 25/ In other words, the optimal scenario is that of the most consistent "non-offensive" defence.

This approach concurs with the view of the top Soviet military leaders, who maintain that in military, technological and strategic terms "defence sufficiency" implies the minimum possible level of the military potential of a country (or coalition of countries). The size and structure of its armed forces should fulfil the task of reliable defence of that country (or alliance of countries) while at the same time precluding it from launching an attack or conducting large-scale offensive operations. 26/

A correlation of the approaches taken by WTO and NATO member countries to the continued development of confidence-building measures and to their role suggests that they fit into the framework of the non-confrontational model of co-operation, agreeing - despite obvious differences - on the main point: a mutual desire to enhance predictability and strategic stability at the level of general-purpose forces and to prevent a surprise attack at a reduced armaments level.

It can be claimed in principle that the two sides have started moving towards each other in developing a new generation of confidence-building measures that are designed to reflect the opposing side's positive intentions

in the military field and the mutual readiness to act in a timely manner to check a brewing crisis situation that could degenerate into an armed conflict.

In NATO's comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament, adopted at the session of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 29-30 May 1989, the confidence-building measures focus on, inter alia, ways to achieve transparency concerning the structure of armed forces and transparency and predictability in military activities, contacts and liaison.

NATO's official position at the Vienna talks to promote confidence-building measures centered on the need to provide more detailed information in connection with notification of military exercises, to improve conditions for monitoring military activities, and to promote openness and predictability in military activities. NATO attached special importance to contacts and liaison in the military field, to greater knowledge of each other's military capabilities, to the behaviour and deployment of the armed forces and to exchanges of view on military doctrines. The North Atlantic alliance's concept of confidence-building measures provided for immediate notification of troop movements from station to station in peace-time and of the call-up of a large number of reservists. Moreover it envisaged exchanges of information on the basic conventional weapons systems with which the sides intend to equip their forces in areas covered by the talks. 27/

Pointing to the common components in the NATO and WTO positions in the field of confidence-building measures, Western experts indicate that the differences relate essentially to the coverage of naval and air-force activities and to confidence-building measures restricting military activities.

Unlike NATO's stand, the Warsaw Treaty Organization's position provided for rigid constraints on military activities, and stipulates the coverage of independent naval and air-force activities by confidence-building measures. The Soviet Union attaches crucial importance to limitations on troop movements and concentrations, in the belief that one of the principal objectives of stabilizing measures is "to monitor any significant troop movements and concentrations". 28/ This viewpoint is logically linked to the WTO concept of zonal limitations (i.e., the allocation of arms according to zones), which makes it possible to prevent any dangerous concentration of armed forces and arms at the dividing line between the two military and political alliances or their transfer from the hinterland to the line of contact.

The two sides' different approaches to confidence-building measures were largely explained by the different views taken by the sides as a result of the specific structure of the armed forces of each alliance and of the threat to their security and the possible scenarios inherent in a surprise attack once major cuts have been made in the conventional arms and armed forces. According to statements made by NATO spokesmen, confidence-building measures covering naval activities would undercut NATO's ability to defend its sea and ocean lanes. Meanwhile, the exclusion of naval activities from the régime of confidence-building measures would, in the view of the Soviet Union, intensify the unpredictability of the strategic situation and pose a real danger of surprise attack due to the destabilizing character of present-day naval armaments.

It would appear necessary, under the circumstances, for the two military and political alliances to work carefully to expand the area of agreement and to find mutually-acceptable solutions to the most involved issues. Undoubtedly, the need to ensure reliable strategic stability in Europe and to provide for maximum predictability in the military and strategic situation requires that any future régime of confidence-building measures should reliably eliminate any potential threat to the strategic stability at the level of general-purpose forces: that is, it should be all-embracing. Any omissions would be counter-productive because they would leave intact a source of suspicion and mistrust, thus generating a crisis. This is especially relevant against the background of the dynamic political changes sweeping the Eastern European countries, changes that make extra demands on the stabilizing role of confidence-building measures.

It is to be hoped that the unquestionable benefits of the establishment of an effective régime of confidence-building measures in Europe to prevent, in combination with drastic reductions in conventional arms and armed forces, war and crisis situations and to promote strategic stability will outweigh the differences in the two sides' positions.

It is important to stress that the historical Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty signed at the Paris summit of CSCE created powerful incentives for further development of a new generation of confidence-building measures. The signature of the CFE treaty represented a major contribution to the common objective of increased security and stability in Europe, affirmed the end of the era of division and confrontation.

3. Discussion and correlation of military doctrines

Discussion and correlation of military doctrines is one of the central issues associated with efforts to ensure predictability in the military strategic situation and the sides' intentions. An exchange of views on this issue could certainly help the sides overcome mutual suspicion and abandon the most dangerous dogmas of military thinking. The importance of a substantive dialogue on this issue is recognized by virtually all the States participating in the common European process. As a result of the third round of the Vienna talks, concluded on 20 October 1989, the participants agreed to hold a seminar in Vienna between 16 January and 5 February 1990, to discuss and compare their military doctrines. The agenda adopted by the seminar's preparatory committee provided for the participating States to present and discuss their military doctrines, relating them closely to the structure of their armed forces, the models applied to exercises and personnel combat training, their defence budgets and their defence expenditure planning. 29/

Predictability in the military and strategic situation in Europe can be attained by ensuring the complete compatibility of the political and military (military-technological) components of military doctrine, i.e., by bringing the strategic and theatre concept in line with the statements made by the alliances' leaders concerning the defensive character of their military doctrines. The divergence between public political declarations and the actual purpose of armed forces activities is the chief source of the suspicion that impedes consolidation of strategic stability. The dialogue on military doctrines is intended to remove the States' mutual concerns about specific conceptual views of military policies and strategy, and in particular arms programmes, defence budgets, etc. For example, according to statements by Soviet military leaders, the Soviet military doctrine was completely overhauled in 1987 and 1988 to give it a consistent defensive character, so as to allay the Western countries' apprehensions about "the offensive spirit of the Soviet military strategy". 30/ For its part, the Soviet Union is uneasy about NATO's strategic and theatre concept of attack on second-echelon forces (FOFA), the American theatre concept of Air-Land Battle, and the United States naval concept of forward sea frontiers, which provide for a first-strike capability and are regarded as offensive and destabilizing factors. 31/

The West, too, has weighty reasons for anxiety about Soviet military doctrine, its components, the meaning of "reasonable sufficiency for defence", the planning of Soviet armed forces activities and their personnel training

programmes. 32/ All these concerns are quite natural, considering the fact that the dialogue on military doctrines is just getting off the ground, whereas the suspicion and mistrust have accumulated over decades.

With this in mind, regular seminars to correlate military doctrines within the framework of the European process provide a suitable forum for resolving mutual concerns and questions relating to military doctrines. Naturally, there is a useful role to be played here by bilateral contacts between the military leaderships (for example, visits and meetings of defence ministers and other top military leaders, etc.).

Judging by the results of the first seminar on military doctrines, which was attended by the chiefs of the general staffs of the European States, and also of the United States and Canada, the participants are gradually coming to a realization of the fact that the basic factor determining the essence of military doctrines is the degree to which the structure of the armed forces, the practice of military exercises and personnel combat training, the size of the defence budget and the scale of arms production conform to public statements concerning the defensive orientation of military doctrines.

The fact that both the WTO and NATO consider prevention of war as the overriding purpose of defensive military doctrines is a favourable development. As Major General John Robinson, representing the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated at the Vienna military-doctrine seminar, "war prevention must be our collective goal in the context of defensive doctrine". 33/ This goal is shared by the Soviet military doctrine. 34/ The orientation of military doctrines towards prevention of war is especially important from the perspective of strategic stability and confidence building. Defensive military doctrines could play a still greater stabilizing role if they provided simultaneously for ways to forestall crisis situations and to resolve them at the earliest possible stage so as to prevent a crisis situation from evolving into a large-scale armed conflict. Furthermore, the mechanism for preventing war and crisis situations must be woven into the fabric of military doctrines and brought into play by means of mutual consultation and other political steps (exchange of information, rapid communication between armed forces commands, on-site inspections to dispel suspicion, etc.), rather than by "deterrence" (nuclear or conventional forces) or threats to use force.

Obviously, as the range of threats to strategic stability in Europe expands as a result of the interrelationships among military, economic and social crisis situations and of the proliferation of nuclear or chemical weapons, entirely new demands are being made on military doctrines. First and foremost, they must be adapted to provide for early detection and prevention of crisis situations in the military field, and furnish a basis for the formulation of a "code of behaviour" for armed forces in crisis situations and procedures, enabling armed forces to stay out of conflict situations. There is a clear need for a mechanism to allow for interaction between military doctrines and international agreements (patterned on the Soviet-United States Agreement on the prevention of dangerous military activities of 12 June 1989) so as to prevent threatening military activities. An ideal approach would be the establishment of an international framework of multilateral agreements in Europe (similar to the 1986 Stockholm agreements on confidence-building measures) to restrict or ban the most dangerous types of military activities that provoke crisis situations. With guidelines and procedures for the behaviour of the armed forces in crisis situations incorporated into the armed forces' plans of operation, such military doctrines could become effective tools for preventing war and crisis situations. One of the elements of such procedures is probably the renunciation by the armed forces of any show of force or military activities that could cause concern to the other side (exercises, mobilization measures, etc.). It is important in this respect that plans of operation should not envisage any pre-emptive strikes against objectives on the territory of the hypothetical enemy, or the launching of attacks that would carry hostilities beyond the country's own territory or that of its allies.

The restructuring of military doctrines along defensive lines and the active role they could play in preventing crises and armed conflicts are acquiring added importance in the context of radical reductions in conventional forces, dynamic political changes in Eastern European countries, the lessened military weight and even the possible future dissolution of the WTO and NATO, and the reunification of Germany. It may be assumed that the transition from bloc-centred structures to new common European structures and permanent political institutions, responsible for maintaining stability and security in Europe, would be the most complex period from the point of view of

the stability and predictability of the strategic situation. Military doctrines, if drastically modified, could play a key stabilizing role during this critical period.

4. The outlook for confidence-building measures. The possible role of a European Conflict Prevention Centre

The original approach taken by the Soviet Union and other WTO States at the Vienna talks on confidence-building measures and security included the establishment of a centre to reduce the threat of war or a surprise attack in Europe. The centre's functions would be informational and consultative. 35/ The idea of such a centre has emerged as a result of the search in both East and West for optimal organizational structures that could co-ordinate the activities of individual States and military and political alliances so as to prevent surprise attacks and crisis situations. 36/

This idea was supported by the United States of America and other NATO States in the joint declaration at the London summit (on 5-6 July 1990) of NATO after the United States position on the CSCE's future underwent an important evolution. The consensus on this crucial question was made due to mutual understanding that there is a vital need for specific mechanism to prevent conflicts and maintaining stability in Europe in the light of the sweeping changes taking place in the strategic situation in Europe and of new challenges to the European stability. Europeans need new forums to which they could turn for conflict avoidance, crisis management, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In addition to it the idea of the centre fitted well into the concept of "new security architecture" for Europe advanced by both West and East and based on the recognition of the priority role of common European structures and institutions in maintaining security and preventing the destabilization of the strategic situation in Europe.

The next logical step was made at the Paris summit of CSCE. The Paris declaration established a conflict prevention centre alongside with the first permanent CSCE institutions: regular summits and Ministerial meetings, secretariat, Election Observation Office, etc.

Now the common task is to develop the concept, organizational structure and functions of this centre. There are different ideas concerning those aspects of the centre. One of the possible approaches could be to set up the centre in stages, under the auspices of the Foreign Ministers Committee. In the first stage, the centre could transmit and collect notifications, in keeping with the 1986 Stockholm agreements on confidence-building measures and

security (notifications concerning annual plans of military activity, exercises, inspections, etc.), and serve as a consultative body to address controversial situations or suspicions of a threat of surprise attack.

The centre's functions could expand with the growth of the structure of international agreements in Europe on arms reduction and limitation. In future, the centre could carry out verification of the entire set of multilateral accords and agreements in the disarmament field and assist in preventing dangerous military activities (on the basis of a multilateral agreement patterned after the Soviet-American accords of 12 June 1989).

In the longer run, the centre could be made responsible for monitoring the development of the military and political situation in Europe, issuing early warnings of potential crisis situations, and drafting recommendations on ways to prevent and rectify such situations.

Creating such a centre is justified since the growing list of threats to strategic stability in Europe requires the European States to co-ordinate their efforts to "control" crisis situations on the continent. Such a co-ordinating body seems indispensable, in view of the interrelationship, complexity and danger inherent in crisis situations in Europe, since such situations, as a rule, acquire a general European dimension irrespective of their origins (within a country, between two countries, on a subregional scale, between the military and political alliances, etc.).

In specific terms, depending on its organizational structure (for example, a data bank, a special communication system between the centre and participating countries' Governments, satellite monitoring of the military and political situation, etc.) and the joint code of behaviour in crisis situations, together with pre-arranged standard procedures to deal with them, such a centre could realistically prevent the development of crisis situations, promote their settlement and help maintain strategic stability. Recent trends towards political change in both alliances would undoubtedly widen the range of CBMs that could be applied for the purpose of crisis prevention.

Possible functions to be added subsequently would relate to the need to continue the practice of discussing and correlating military doctrines and to restructure armed forces on the principles of "reasonable sufficiency" for defence. There also is a need to discuss and co-ordinate the armed-forces command structures (control and communications) in peace-time, the mechanism of decision-making machinery with respect to armed-forces mobilization and

alerts, the planning of armed-forces operations in crisis situations, etc. Openness and publicity on these critical issues are both desirable and necessary to the success of the next step of drawing up a code of behaviour for the opposing sides in a crisis situation with the aim of dealing with it effectively.

The centre's functions of preventing and dealing with crisis situations could probably be supplemented by United States President Bush's "open skies" idea, according to which unarmed aircraft could overfly the opposing sides' territories in order to monitor their military activities. Worked out jointly, the open skies régime could enhance the efficiency of the centre's activities in terms of forestalling and settling potential crisis situations that pose a threat to strategic stability and security in Europe.

There is also a view that the concept of the centre should be supplemented by establishing a standing European peace-keeping force that shall be available for deployment on any peace-keeping or enforcement assignment in Europe (patrolling borders and frontiers, separating ethnic groups or belligerent armies, maintaining law and order during ecological disasters, containing armed conflicts, etc.). 37/

## Notes

1/ See: The transcript of Ambassador Maresca's speech at Texas A and M University, "Time to Think, Beyond the Assumptions of the Past", Daily Bulletin. United States Mission in Geneva, Story EU 40104, 01/04/90.

2/ See: Baker: "NATO meeting Produced Concrete Achievements" (Transcript: Baker Press Conference 12/15, Daily Bulletin, United States Mission in Geneva) 12/15/89.

3/ See: Speech by Eduard A. Shevardnadze before the Political Commission of the European Parliament: "Europe: A Time of Change", Pravda, 20 December 1989.

4/ D. Yazov, "A New Model of Security and the Armed Forces", Kommunist (December, 1989) No. 18, p. 68.

5/ See: A.A. Kokoshin, A.A. Konovalov, V.V. Larionov and V.A. Mazing, Stability as a result of radical reductions of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe (Moscow, 1989), pp. 6 and 7.

6/ See: Appendix 10A. Stockholm Document. SIPRI Yearbook 1987 (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 355-369.

7/ Avril Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiations (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 252.

8/ See: Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the United Nations on 7 December 1988.

9/ USSR Defence Minister D. Yazov, "A New Model of Security and the Armed Forces", Kommunist (December 1989), No. 18, pp. 66-67.

10/ See: D. Yazov, "A New Model of Security and the Armed Forces", pp. 67-68, and M. Moiseyev, "Reductions of Armed Forces and Armaments, a Guarantee of Security for All", International Affairs (August 1989) No. 8, p. 10.

11/ D. Yazov, "A New Model of Security and the Armed Forces", p. 66.

12/ See P.G. Lushev, "In the Interests of a Lasting Peace", Krasnaya Zvezda, 3 March 1989.

13/ For more details, see: Statement by the Defence Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Treaty States "On the Correlation Between The Sizes of the Armed Forces and Armaments of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe and Adjoining Seas", January 1989, Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 4 (38), 1 March 1989, pp. 28-36.

14/ Henry Owen and Edward C. Meyer, "Central European Security", Foreign Affairs (Summer 1989), Vol. 68, No. 3, p. 26.

15/ See: Smith, R.J., "CIA Chief Sees Reduced Risk of Surprise Attack", International Herald Tribune, 14 December 1988.

16/ The Arms Control Reporter, Vol. 8, 12 December 1989, ISSN 0886-34-90, p. 407, B. 258.

17/ The Military Balance 1989-1990, (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London), p. 231.

18/ The talks opened on 6 March 1989.

19/ See: Proposals tabled at the Vienna talks on confidence-building and security measures in Europe by the delegations of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and supported by the delegations of Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union on 9 March 1989, Vestnik, USSR Foreign Ministry Herald, No. 7 (41), 15 April 1989, pp. 59-62.

20/ For example, the alternative defence ideas advanced by the group called Generals for Peace and Disarmament; the proposal of the Independent Commission on Security Matters to establish a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons in Western Europe on both sides of the border between East and West Germanies; the establishment of a reduced arms concentration zone, suggested by A. von Bulow and H. Funk of the Federal Republic of Germany, etc.

21/ See: The SIPRI 1988 Olof Palme Memorial Lecture - "Arms Control and Arms Reduction: the Agenda Ahead", Marshal S.F. Akhromeyev, SIPRI Year Book (1989), p. 464.

22/ See: Communiqué of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held at Bucharest on 7 and 8 July 1989, Document of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/93, 19 July 1989, p. 18.

23/ Proposals of the Warsaw Treaty member States of 9 March 1989. Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 7 (14), 15 April 1989, p. 60.

24/ For more details, see: A.A. Kokoshin, A.A. Konovalov, V.V. Larionov, and V.A. Mazing, Stability Through Radical Cuts in Armed Forces and Conventional Arms in Europe, (Moscow, 1989) pp. 9-14.

25/ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

26/ See: M. Moiseyev, "Armed Forces and Arms Reductions, a Guarantee of Security for All", International Affairs, No. 8, (1989) p. 9.

27/ See: Strategic Survey 1988-1989 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), pp. 53-54.

28/ See: Press Conference by Eduard A. Shevardnadze on 23 September 1989, Bulletin of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 19 (53), 15 October 1989, p. 11.

29/ See: "Arms Reporter" Chronology 1989. Seminar on Military Doctrines, p. 402, B. 241-242.

30/ See: "The General Staff: Changes" by Marshal S. Akhromeyev, Moscow News, No. 5, 29 January 1989.

31/ For more details, see: A.A. Kokoshin, "In Search of Solution, etc.", pp. 81-98; Lieutenant-General V. Starodubov, "Strategic Equilibrium. On the Need for Talks on Naval Forces", Izvestia, 8 January 1990.

32/ See: Remarks of Major-General John Robinson of the United States Chiefs of Staff at the Military Doctrine Seminar in Vienna, 22 January 1990. Daily Bulletin. United States Mission in Geneva, EU 1040122, 22 January 1990, p. 21.

33/ See: "Robinson Remarks in Vienna: Challenge of Military Force Planning is Increasing". Daily Bulletin. United States Mission, Geneva, EU 1040122, 22 January 1990.

34/ See: D. Yazov, "A New Model of Security and the Armed Forces", p. 66.

35/ See: Communiqué of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held at Bucharest on 7 and 8 July 1989. Document of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/93, 19 July 1989, p. 18.

36/ The idea of a crisis control centre in Vienna or Helsinki originated with the United States Senators Sam Nunn, Henry Jackson and John Warner (Beyond the Hotline. How Crisis Control Can Prevent War, Ed. by M. Linsky and W.L. Ury (Boston, 1985) pp. 58-73).

37/ See: "Limited Collective Security" by Gregory Flynn and David J. Scheffer, "Foreign Policy", N 80, Fall 1990, p. 99.

## Chapter VIII

## POSSIBLE WAYS OF USING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN NAVAL ARMS CONTROL

Interest in the most appropriate ways of reducing the unpredictable effects of the naval arms race on strategic and regional stability and of preventing an armed conflict at sea as a result of misinterpretation of naval forces' actions has increased of late in political and scientific circles. This is largely due to awareness, in both East and West, of the fact that the modern navy, armed with strategic and tactical nuclear arms, presents an increased threat to strategic stability, in the sense that an armed conflict at sea may escalate into a nuclear one and that naval might and naval presence may influence the military and political situation in some regions. 1/

The best way to instil stability into the strategic balance, to make naval activities predictable and to rule out the risk of an uncontrollable arms buildup at sea and the consequent destabilization of regional situations would be to extend arms control to the navies, accompanied by discussion of certain confidence-building measures in the naval sphere. The exclusion of naval forces from arms control and from measures concerning predictability and openness hampers the achievement of strategic stability and efforts to prevent the risk of an uncontrollable armed confrontation at sea. It seems quite paradoxical that naval activities and security at sea are outside this process at a time when intensive negotiations, bilateral and multilateral, are in progress on disarmament and the reduction of strategic offensive arms, together with conventional weapons.

Analysis of the trends at the disarmament talks indicates that the forces that already play a significant role in the overall balance of the armed forces of the two sides NATO and the Warsaw Treaty, will play a still more decisive role if they are withdrawn from the dialogue on naval arms control. In the opinion of Soviet experts, as far as Europe is concerned, any levelling-out of the combat abilities of ground and air forces, whatever the form it may take, would mean that the side having a more powerful navy would be superior. 2/

There are apprehensions that the deployment of sea-based nuclear systems in the ocean and sea areas adjacent to Europe may prolong the risk of conventional war and large-scale offensive actions even after big cuts are made in conventional armaments and forces. Such a prospect could undermine to

a certain extent the results of future Vienna accords, however positive in terms of stability, and hamper subsequent reductions and the elaboration of a new generation of confidence-building measures for Europe. 3/

Western experts stress the need to consider the interrelationship between progress at disarmament talks, covering both nuclear and conventional arms, and the dialogue on matters connected with the activities of naval forces. 4/

The main differences between the USSR and the United States, in this sphere, are well known. The active position of the Soviet Union in favour of starting talks on the limitation and reduction of the activities of naval forces and naval armaments and a discussion of confidence-building and stability measures has failed, so far, to bring about any positive change in the approach of the other side. The stance of the United States, as a major naval power, is still motivated by traditional arguments against any limitation on the operational flexibility of global and regional naval activities and in favour of preserving unlimited access for the Navy to sea lanes, in the security interests of the United States and the West as a whole. This stance is manifested most clearly in connection with the question of extending confidence-building measures to the independent activities of the navies within the framework of the Vienna talks.

In recent times, however, a more realistic and thoroughly considered approach has been taken - on an unofficial level - in the United States and NATO to the question of including the naval forces in the arms-control sphere. In particular, United States Admiral William Crowe spoke in favour of considering the possibility of removing tactical nuclear weapons from United States sea-going surface ships and submarines or of reducing the United States Navy in exchange for Soviet concessions in terms of strategic offensive force cuts. 5/ Similar statements concerning the Navy and the elimination of sea-based tactical nuclear arms have also been made in other NATO countries. 6/ The naval aspects of disarmament are a global concern and should be speedily integrated into the disarmament process. A series of measures may be envisaged in this context: tactical naval nuclear disarmament, whether by unilateral, bilateral or multilateral means; a reconsideration of the principle of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on board naval vessels; and confidence-building measures. 7/

At the same time, the present differences in the approaches of the two sides should not obstruct the search for ways of ensuring the predictability of naval forces' activities and lowering the risk of war at sea as a result of misinterpretation of naval actions or unintentional missile launching. It would appear that nowadays, when for various reasons there are practically no real possibilities of starting negotiations on the limitation and reduction of naval armaments, one of the approaches could be the joint elaboration of a non-confrontational model of conduct for the confronting naval forces around Europe. The functioning of this model would be based on a wide use of confidence-building, stability and predictability measures, especially since a precedent for such measures already exists: the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, adopted in 1972. 8/ One should not forget, however, that although that Agreement has proved effective in preventing clashes between naval ships at sea and reducing the risk of an armed conflict, it has been regulating in fact the conduct of the naval forces, without addressing the mounting dangers inherent in rivalry between naval forces, the deployment of naval strategic and tactical nuclear arms, and the development of the offensive capabilities of naval forces.

It may be supposed that in the present conditions a model of non-confrontational conduct for the navies of both sides should be different; that is, it should be aimed at preventing the whole set of threats to strategic stability stemming from naval forces' activities. Evidently the "open seas" concept, that is, the idea of making extensive use of various confidence-building measures, aimed at ensuring restrained and predictable conduct on the part of naval forces and eliminating mutual concerns over naval programmes and doctrines and the practical activities of naval units and individual warships and submarines, could well form one component of that model. In that case special attention should be paid to the nuclear component of a navy, which should be covered by special confidence-building and transparency measures.

The sides could exchange information on, for instance, the deployment of tactical nuclear arms, the movement of naval forces armed with such weapons, decision making concerning use of such weapons, security measures to avert the accidental or unauthorized use of tactical nuclear arms, notification concerning the presence or absence of nuclear arms on board warships, including cases in which ships call at the ports of "third countries", and so on. It is important also to envisage a series of confidence-building and

transparency measures in respect of any incidents on board naval ships and submarines equipped with nuclear weapons in order to avert any risk of misinterpretation of such incidents and render prompt assistance to victims. 9/

The reciprocal elimination of naval tactical nuclear weapons would undoubtedly be the easiest and most effective way of radically reducing the risk of a nuclear conflict.

As to the specific CBMs that could become the main components of a non-confrontational model of conduct for naval forces, many of them are already envisaged in the proposals made by various States.

A number of confidence-building measures in the naval sphere have been listed in a comprehensive study on naval arms conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Secretary-General (Document A/40/535). In our view the catalogue of confidence-building measures presented in the study (confidence-building measures can be political and/or military; they can be global, regional or subregional; co-ordinated on a multilateral or bilateral basis, or put into effect as unilateral initiatives) reflects, on the whole, a preference for a widely-varied and comprehensive use of confidence-building measures in the naval sphere, depending on the specific characteristics of the region of the world's oceans and seas in which these measures are to be applied. 10/

The most highly-developed structure of naval confidence-building measures has been suggested in the Soviet initiatives of recent years. The Soviet approach is based on a combined use of various confidence-building measures (such as notification of given naval activities, exchange of information, and the like), and CBMs of a restraining character (operational measures) applicable only in specific areas of the world's oceans and seas (limitations on numbers of large-scale naval exercises; limitations on the range of ships carrying nuclear arms; mutual restraint in naval exercises in international straits; a reciprocal limitation on rivalry in limitations on naval activity by means of an agreement, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) systems etc.). 11/ Such a comprehensive approach to elaborating future confidence-building measures is the best one, in our view, since it seems impossible to ensure the non-confrontational conduct of naval forces and reduce the risk of armed conflicts at sea unless confidence-building measures are used to limit naval activity in certain regions.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to applying confidence-building measures in order to guarantee the safety of sea lanes in peace-time and to safeguard military and political stability in various regions of the seas and oceans.

Furthermore, some Western countries are showing a greater interest in confidence-building measures, expecting them to guarantee the safety of sea lanes during naval exercises and meanoeuvres. Thus Greece and Turkey in 1988 agreed to refrain from halting navigation in specific regions for long periods during naval exercises and from conducting exercises when navigation was intensive etc. 12/ Sweden, Finland and other countries have made proposals on the drafting of a multilateral agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea (similar to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas).

It is safe to say that a sufficient number of proposals has been submitted to date on naval confidence-building measures to allow their practical application to begin.

Clearly the best approach would be to hold talks with a view to reaching an understanding on the practical application of confidence-building measures. The Stockholm understandings on confidence-building measures have indicated that the signing of multilateral international legal agreements, which make confidence-building measures binding on the signatories, could guarantee that such measures were put into effect. In our view, such agreements could be global, regional or subregional and could be concluded during relevant talks between major naval powers and States in specific regions or areas of the world's oceans and seas. The Soviet proposal to start concrete talks on the Pacific, Indian and Atlantic Oceans, the Persian Gulf and international straits, with a view to formulating global guarantees for the safety of maritime communications are an example of a possible model for such an agreement.

There is good reason to believe that the initiation of practical talks on formulating a code of conduct for naval powers on the basis of confidence-building measures would greatly stimulate the further development of the confidence-building concept in the military sphere and the search for a new generation of these measures.

Bearing in mind, for instance, the interrelationship between the problem of ensuring the safety of sea lanes and that of preventing terrorism, piracy and the illicit trade in drugs, there is reason to consider the possible

formation of a United Nations mobile naval force which would initially be concerned with measures to prevent piracy and drug trafficking along major sea lanes. This is a matter of especial urgency now that the United Nations is turning its attention to radical measures to combat drug trafficking and terrorism. If the United Nations accepts the concept of using a United Nations naval force for these purposes, it will need to draft, under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council, special agreements clearly defining the functions of the United Nations naval units, the composition of that force, and the procedures governing its interaction with the navies of the main naval powers. It is immediately plain that the effectiveness of the United Nations naval units will largely depend on the availability of a hot line to United Nations Headquarters, on the extent of their interaction with the navies of the great maritime powers and also on reliable and prompt information from United Nations member States. Moreover, the activities of the permanent member States of the Security Council in collecting data to facilitate the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations naval force will need to be co-ordinated.

Thus an appropriate agreement under United Nations auspices would, without doubt, stimulate the development of a new generation of confidence-building measures for safe maritime navigation, which would also help to solve other related problems.

As to the practical application of confidence-building measures in the naval-disarmament sphere, the first possible step may be the joint formulation by the WTO and NATO of the concepts of a practical use of confidence-building measures aimed at co-operation in assuring greater strategic stability, the non-confrontational conduct of the navies of the two alliances, the prevention of armed conflicts at sea, the safety of sea lanes, etc. This approach would, no doubt, facilitate the gradual initiation of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of naval arms.

Confidence-building measures in the naval sphere could be made more effective if combined with the application of the "open skies" concept, with a view to observing naval activities and monitoring compliance with the accords on confidence building in the naval sphere. As regards the observation of naval activity by means of unarmed aircraft flights, this could be based on the possible model of the "open skies" agreement, the talks which began in 1990 in Ottawa, within the framework of the "open skies" conference of the 23 member countries of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

A dialogue between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO on naval doctrines, further study of each other's naval activities (exchange of visits by warships, etc.), the removal of concerns caused by naval programmes, and so forth, would also help in formulating concepts of co-operation in devising and applying confidence-building measures in the naval sphere. At the same time, the unilateral adoption by naval powers of measures limiting the activities of their fleets and the partial or complete withdrawal of their naval units from specific areas of the world's oceans amd seas would also foster a lessening in military confrontation at sea and help to reduce the risk of an armed conflict.

CONCLUSIONS

In this research report an attempt has been made, by citing examples of the practical application of confidence-building measures, to demonstrate their growing value as an instrument in stabilizing the strategic situation and preventing war and also as a vital component of agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament. Today's intense international activities have, without doubt, extended the area of application of confidence-building measures. At present there is practically no sphere of military activity in which confidence-building measures could not play a constructive role. It is safe to say that the effectiveness of accords concerning disarmament and arms-race limitation largely depends on the degree of development of the structure of confidence-building measures in each of the accords. The higher the level given to such a structure the more effective will be the preparations for drafting an agreement and the future verification of parties' compliance with it.

Given their flexibility, confidence-building measures are an important stabilizing factor in disarmament talks. This is most evident at the multilateral talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons, where CBMs have not only helped to stabilize the negotiating process and increase trust in the actions of States, but have also helped to create the requisite conditions for completing the talks and moving on to the conclusion of an international convention banning chemical weapons.

Moreover, the extension of the parameters of confidence-building measures and their wide application at multilateral and bilateral talks on banning chemical weapons facilitated the signing on 1 June 1990 of the Soviet-American agreement on mutual commitments for the period preceding the coming into force

of the international convention, including commitments on the destruction by the USSR and the United States of America of the vast bulk of their declared chemical-weapons stocks, to begin by the end of 1992.

The activities of the United Nations in the prevention and settlement of crisis situations are a comparatively new area in which confidence-building measures are being used. These measures have a real chance of being widely applied by the United Nations to provide greater international security, making United Nations peace-keeping operations more effective, and to prevent crisis situations at an early stage.

Why are confidence-building measures so actively used in the main disarmament talks and for safeguarding international regional security?

This is attributable, above all, to the flexibility of such measures and the fact that the application of a variety of confidence-building measures does not require full-scale talks. They may be brought into play either through unilateral actions by States or on the basis of bilateral or multilateral understandings.

Confidence-building measures offer great possibilities also in terms of ensuring military strategic stability, primarily in the new conditions marked by lessened offensive capabilities in strategic arms as well as in conventional weapons, as a result of their radical reduction. In such circumstances confidence-building measures have an important role to play in lowering the risk of a surprise attack, preventing an accidental or unauthorized use of a weapons system, and reducing the possibilities for the emergence of crisis situations that may grow into a full-scale armed conflict. Confidence-building measures have clearly proved constructive in the establishment and functioning of the structures of co-operation between the different military and political alliances (primarily between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO) and also within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) with the purpose of preventing crisis situations or for crisis management. Confidence-building measures will increasingly play the role of "regulator" of a military and political situation on the level of strategic arms and conventional weapons and ensure the non-confrontational conduct of the armed forces of the opposed sides.

It is foreseeable in this connection that confidence-building measures will play a major role in "controlling" a strategic situation so as to render it stable and predictable, and that this will be achieved through

consultation, communication and the exchange of information, thus reducing the risk of misguided political and military decision-making in crisis situations.

As regards European security and the role confidence-building measures are likely to play in safeguarding it, these measures will clearly play an ever greater role in maintaining stability on the continent of Europe and in preventing crisis situations or settling them. The establishment by the Paris summit of the Conflict Prevention Centre and the institutionalization of pan-European structure contribute to the expanding role of CBMs in maintaining European stability and security.

In our view, a promising area for the use of confidence-building measures is the establishment of international and regional centres to stabilize the strategic situation, and specifically the possibility of establishing, under United Nations auspices, an international centre for the prevention of surprise attacks and crisis situations.

There is good reason to believe that in modern times a non-confrontational, co-operative model of confidence-building measures in the military sphere is taking shape. This is evidenced, among other things, by the practice at international talks on disarmament and the broad discussion in progress in political and research circles concerning the prospects for using confidence-building measures as a major instrument in maintaining international security and preventing war. This tendency is confirmed also by the fact that the very definition of confidence-building measures is changing radically. In fact, the sides are now moving towards devising a new generation of confidence-building measures that are designed to demonstrate that the opposite side has positive intentions in the military and political sphere and is prepared to take timely steps to prevent crisis situations that could grow into an armed conflict.

The co-operative and peace-keeping character of modern confidence-building measures indicates that the practical application of these measures could be extended horizontally and vertically, so to speak. The experience of applying them in practice, for instance, on the European continent, could be made use of in other regions as well. In particular, there are definite and growing prospects for confidence-building measures in preventing and settling conflict situations as the United Nations becomes ever more effective in settling and preventing crisis situations in the "hot spots" of the world.

The experience gained in devising a model of co-operation in confidence building makes it possible to advance to a new and better application of confidence-building measures. In particular, it is becoming possible to use these measures in accordance with the concept of "deterrence through transparency". For instance, a code of conduct could be elaborated for the military activities of States in order to prevent crisis situations, maintain strategic stability and avert war. The concept of "deterrence through transparency" could clearly be applied within the framework of the current talks on the prohibition of certain types of weapons. This concept implies the utmost openness and transparency in military activities and in the military and political intentions of States. It should envisage the establishment of an atmosphere of maximum predictability in relation to certain talks or matters subject to negotiation. One of the possible applications for this concept could be naval arms control. Tranparency and predictability measures relating to naval forces could be designed so as to greatly reduce the destabilizing factor inherent in the activities of modern navies possessing strategic and tactical nuclear arms.

Another promising area to which the "deterrence through transparency" concept could be applied is the prevention of crisis situations, specifically on the continent of Europe or in the explosive areas of the world where the danger of a regional armed conflict is real.

The concept of "deterrence through transparency" could, perhaps, have several dimensions. It could be used, depending on a situation, on either a permanent or a temporary basis. For instance, in the event of a threatening regional conflict or crisis situation, or when a potentially dangerous situation needs to be defused, predictability and confidence-building measures could be introduced on a temporary basis, provided the sides involved in a conflict so agree. In the case of settlement of an actual conflict situation, confidence-building measures could be used in full measure, or to an extent required by the situation in a region. In any event the very fact that confidence-building measures were used, providing an entirely new basis on which to ensure the predictability of a situation in a region, would have a positive effect on a given military and political situation.

As far as disarmament talks are concerned, measures related to the concept of "deterrence through transparency" could be an element in such negotiations. In particular, confidence-building measures could be introduced with respect to specific areas of negotiation. Clearly such a series of

confidence-building measures would be devised so as to take due account of the experience already gained in the practical application of CBMs. In the European context, we have the 1986 Stockholm agreements on confidence building. There have been precedents for applying confidence-building measures on a broad scale in connection with the talks on banning chemical weapons, as well as at the Soviet-American nuclear and space weapons talks, etc. The new set of CBMs contains in the CFE Treaty and in the agreement on confidence- and security-building measures.

The concept of "deterrence through transparency" should be elaborated in the context of a global approach to confidence-building measures, to enable them effectively to meet all challenges to strategic stability and prevent crisis situations.

In other words, the régime of confidence-building measures should be universal and cover all areas of military and political rivalry, thus helping to prevent crisis situations.

The "open skies" concept proposed by the United States of America can be regarded as a major element fostering trust in the area of observing military activities, preventing crisis situations and ensuring early detection of such situations, and could therefore be viewed as a major element in the concept of "deterrence through transparency".

The set of confidence-building measures concerning the "open skies" concept would logically be complemented in future by a similar set of measures within the framework of the régime of "open outer space", "open seas", and so on. In this case the practical task would be to expand the scope of international openness.

A combination of comprehensive CBMs and the concept of "deterrence through transparency" could create entirely new conditions for the application of confidence-building measures and for strengthening international security. Rapid progress in developing confidence-building measures should be led up to by United Nations studies of confidence-building measures, paying due attention to the modern practice of using such measures in various areas associated with the avoidance of war, the stabilization of the strategic situation, and the prevention or settlement of crises.

## Notes

1/ See, for instance: P.K. Bayev, V.V. Zhurkin, S.A. Karaganov, and V.S. Shein, Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, (Moscow, 1990), A.A. Kokoshin, In Search of a Way Out: the Military-Political Aspect of International Security, p. 108 (in Russian); Richard Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka, Superpowers at Sea, An Assessment of the Naval Arms Race; SIPRI, (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 133-169; Sverre Lodgaard, "Threats to European Security: the Main Elements", in: Overcoming Threats to Europe: a New Deal for Confidence and Security, ed. by S. Lodgaard and K. Birnbaum, SIPRI, (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 20-24.

2/ See: V. Starodubov, "Strategic Balance, The Need for Talks on Naval Forces", in: Izvestia, 8 January 1990.

3/ See: P.K. Bayev, V.V. Zhurkin, S.A. Karaganov, and V.S. Shein, Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, The Problem of Reduction and Elimination, (Institute of Europe, USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1990) p.26 (in Russian).

4/ See, for instance: Admiral Crowe, "US Expects Soviet Run on Navy", in: International Herald Tribune, 2-3 July 1988; Mr. Bruce George, Special Report on Conidence-Building Measures: Next Steps for Stability and Security, North Atlantic Assembly, pp. 43-45; Richard Fieldhouse and Shunji Taoka, Superpowers at Sea, An assessment of the Naval Arms Race, SIPRI, (Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 167.

5/ See: L. Barber, "Crowe in Favour of Deal Over Naval Nuclear Arms", in: Financial Times, 9 January 1990.

6/ For more detail see a statement by Rear Admiral Elmar Schmaeling of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Council for Arms Control Bulletin 9.89 (The Arms Control Reporter, pp. 850, 267).

7/ See: Statement by Ambassador Maj. Britt Theorin, MP, Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission in the Conference on Disarmament, 12 June 1990.

8/ For more detail see: Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Avoiding Incidents at Sea", in Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age, Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability, ed. by John Borawski, (Westview Press, 1986), pp. 72-86.

9/ According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1989, p. 22, as many as 212 incidents with nuclear-powered ships were registered between 1945 and 1988.

10/ For greater detail see: The Naval Arms Race, Department for Disarmament Affairs Report to the Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, 1986, pp. 75-76.

11/ For greater detail see: V.P. Abarenkov and B.P. Krasulin, Disarmanent, Reference Book, Moscow, International Relations (1988) pp. 250-256 (in Russian).

12/ For greater detail see: North Atlantic Assembly Political Committee, Special Report on Confidence-Building Measures: Next Steps for Stability and Security, by Bruce George (November 1988), p. 43.

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3. Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age. Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability, ed., by John Borawski (Westview Press, London, 1986).
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## ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF RECENT DOCUMENTS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE PREVENTION OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Confirming their desire to improve relations and deepen mutual understanding,

Convinced of the necessity to prevent dangerous military activities, and thereby to reduce the possibility of incidents arising between their armed forces,

Committed to resolving expeditiously and peacefully any incident between their armed forces which may arise as a result of dangerous military activities,

Desiring to ensure the safety of the personnel and equipment of their armed forces when operating in proximity to one another during peacetime, and

Guided by generally recognized principles and rules of international law,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

For the purposes of this Agreement:

1. "Armed forces" means, for the United States of America: the armed forces of the United States, including the United States Coast Guard; for the Union of Societ Socialist Republics: the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Border Troops of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

2. "Personnel" means any individual, military or civilian, who is serving in or is employed by the armed forces of the Parties.

3. "Equipment" means any ship, aircraft or ground hardware of the armed forces of the Parties.

4. "Ship" means any warship or auxiliary ship of the armed forces of the Parties.

5. "Aircraft" means any military aircraft of the armed forces of the Parties, excluding spacecraft.

6. "Ground hardware" means any material of the armed forces of the Parties designed for use on land.

7. "Laser" means any source of intense, coherent, highly directional electromagnetic radiation in the visible, infra-red, or ultraviolet regions that is based on the stimulated radiation of electrons, atoms or molecules.

8. "Special Caution Area" means a region, designated mutually by the Parties, in which personnel and equipment of their armed forces are present and, due to circumstances in the region, in which special measures shall be undertaken in accordance with this Agreement.

9. "Interference with command and control networks" means actions that hamper, interrupt or limit the operation of the signals and information transmission means and systems providing for the control of personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a Party.

ARTICLE II

1. In accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, each Party shall take necessary measures directed toward preventing dangerous military activities, which are the following activities of personnel and equipment of its armed forces when operating in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party during peacetime:

(a) Entering by personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party into the national territory of the other Party owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure, or as a result of unintentional actions by such personnel;

(b) Using a laser in such a manner that its radiation could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party;

(c) Hampering the activities of the personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party in a Special Caution Area in a manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment; and

(d) Interfering with command and control networks in a manner which could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party.

2. The Parties shall take measures to ensure the expeditious termination and resolution by peaceful means, without resort to the threat or use of force, of any incident which may arise as a result of dangerous military activities.

3. Additional provisions concerning prevention of dangerous military activities and resolution of any incident which may arise as a result of those activities are contained in Articles III, IV, V and VI of this Agreement and the Annexes thereto.

ARTICLE III

1. In the interest of mutual safety, personnel of the armed forces of the Parties shall exercise great caution and prudence while operating near the national territory of the other Party.

2. If, owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure or as a result of unintentional actions, as set forth in Article II, subparagraph 1(a) of this Agreement, personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party enter into the national territory of the other Party, such personnel shall adhere to the procedures set forth in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party, in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party, intend to use a laser and that use could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of that other Party, the personnel of the armed forces of the Party intending such use of a laser shall attempt to notify the relevant personnel of the armed forces of the other Party. In any case, personnel of the armed forces of the Party intending use of a laser shall follow appropriate safety measures.

2. If personnel of the armed forces of one Party believe that personnel of the armed forces of the other Party are using a laser in a manner which could cause harm to them or damage to their equipment, they shall immediately attempt to establish communications to seek termination of such use. If the personnel of the armed forces of the Party having received such notification are actually using a laser in proximity to the area indicated in the notification, they shall investigate the relevant circumstances. If their use of a laser could in fact cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of the other Party, they shall terminate such use.

3. Notifications with respect to the use of a laser shall be made in the manner provided for in Annex 1 to this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

1. Each Party may propose to the other Party that the Parties agree to designate a region as a Special Caution Area. The other Party may accept or decline the proposal. Either Party also has the right to request that a meeting of the Joint Military Commission be convened, in accordance with Article IX of this Agreement, to discuss such a proposal.

2. Personnel of the armed forces of the Parties present in a designated Special Caution Area shall establish and maintain communications, in accordance

with Annex 1 to this Agreement, and undertake other measures as may be later agreed upon by the Parties, in order to prevent dangerous military activities and to resolve any incident which may arise as a result of such activities.

3. Each Party has the right to terminate an arrangement with respect to a designated Special Caution Area. The Party intending to exercise this right shall provide timely notification of such intent to the other Party, including the date and time of termination of such an arrangement, through use of the communications channel set forth in paragraph 3 of Article VII of this Agreement.

ARTICLE VI

1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party, in proximity to personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party, detect interference with their command and control networks which could cause harm to them or damage to their equipment, they may inform the relevant personnel of the armed forces of the other Party if they believe that the interference is being caused by such personnel and equipment of the armed forces of that Party.

2. If the personnel of the armed forces of the Party having received such information establish that this interference with the command and control networks is being caused by their activities, they shall take expeditious measures to terminate the interference.

ARTICLE VII

1. For the purpose of preventing dangerous military activities, and expeditiously resolving any incident which may arise as a result of such activities, the armed forces of the Parties shall establish and maintain communications as provided for in Annex 1 to this Agreement.

2. The Parties shall exchange appropriate information on instances of dangerous military activities or incidents which may arise as a result of such activities, as well as on other issues related to this Agreement.

3. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States shall convey information referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article through the Defense Attaché of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington, D.C. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall convey such information through the Defense Attaché of the United States in Moscow.

ARTICLE VIII

1. This Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under other international agreements and arrangements in force between the Parties, and the rights of individual or collective self-defence and of navigation and overflight, in accordance with international law. Consistent with the foregoing, the Parties shall implement the provisions of this Agreement, taking into account the sovereign interests of both Parties.

2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be directed against any Third Party. Should an incident encompassed by this Agreement occur in the territory of an ally of a Party, that Party shall have the right to consult with its ally as to appropriate measures to be taken.

ARTICLE IX

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties hereby establish a Joint Military Commission. Within the framework of the Commission, the Parties shall consider:

(a) Compliance with the obligations assumed in this Agreement;

(b) Possible ways to ensure a higher level of safety for the personnel and equipment of their armed forces; and

(c) Other measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Agreement.

2. Meetings of the Joint Military Commission shall be convened annually or more frequently as may be agreed upon by the Parties.

ARTICLE X

1. This Agreement, including its Annexes, which form an integral part thereof, shall enter into force on 1 January, 1990.

2. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party six months after written notice thereof is given to the other Party.

3. This Agreement shall be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on the twelfth of June, 1989, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Chief of the General Staff of
the Armed Forces of the USSR

## Annex 1

## PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING COMMUNICATIONS

### Section I

### Communications Channels

For the purpose of implementing this Agreement, the armed forces of the Parties shall provide for establishing and maintaining, as necessary, communications at the following levels:

(a) The Task Force Commander of the armed forces of one Party present in a special caution area and the Task Force Commander of the armed forces of the other Party in the same area;

(b) Commander */ of a ship, aircraft, ground vehicle or ground unit of the armed forces of one Party and the Commander */ of a ship, aircraft, ground vehicle or ground unit of the armed forces of the other Party; and

(c) Commander */ of an aircraft of the armed forces of one Party and an air traffic control or monitoring facility of the other Party.

### Section II

### Radio frequencies

1. To establish radio communication, as necessary, the following frequencies shall be used:

(a) between aircraft of the Parties or between an aircraft of one Party and an air traffic control or monitoring facility of the other Party: on VHF band frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz, or on HF band frequency 4125.0 kHz (alternate 6215.5 kHz); after initial contact is made, the working frequency 130.0 MHz or 278.0 MHz, or 4125.0 kHz should be used;

(b) between ships of the Parties and ship-to-shore: on VHF band frequency 156.8 MHz, or on HF band frequency 2182.0 kHz;

(c) between a ship of one Party and an aircraft of the other Party: on VHF band frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz; after initial contact is made, the working frequency 130.0 MHz or 278.0 MHz shall be used; and

(d) between ground vehicles or ground units of the armed forces of the Parties: on VHF band frequency 44.0 MHz (alternate 46.5 MHz), or on HF band frequency 4125.0 kHz (alternate 6215.5 kHz).

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*/ "Commander" means the individual with authority to command or lead a ship, aircraft, ground vehicle or ground unit.

2. The Parties agree to conduct the necessary testing to ensure reliability of the communications channels agreed by the Parties.

Section III

Signals and Phrases

1. The Parties recognize that the lack of radio communication can increase the danger to the personnel and equipment of their armed forces involved in any incident which may arise as a result of dangerous military activities. Personnel of the armed forces of the Parties involved in such incidents who are unable to establish radio communication, or who establish radio communication but cannot be understood, shall try to communicate using those signals referred to in this section. In addition, such personnel shall attempt to establish communications with other personnel of their armed forces, who in turn shall take measures to resolve the incident through communications channels set forth in this Agreement.

2. Ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore communications shall be conducted using signals and phrases as set forth in the International Code of Signals of 1965 and the Special Signals developed in accordance with the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas of 1972. Aircraft-to-aircraft communications shall be conducted using signals and phrases for intercepting and intercepted aircraft contained in the Rules of the Air, annex 2 to the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention). The additional signals and phrases contained in paragraph 4 of this section may also be used.

3. Whenever aircraft of the Parties come into visual contact with each other, their aircrews shall monitor the frequency 121.5 MHz or 243.0 MHz. If it is necessary to exchange information, but communications in a common language are not possible, attempts shall be made to convey essential information and acknowledgement of instructions by using phrases referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of this section. If radio communication is not possible, then visual signals shall be used.

4. The following table contains additional signals and phrases for communications between aircraft, ships, ground vehicles or ground units, in accordance with this Agreement:

## ADDITIONAL SIGNALS, AND APPROPRIATE RESPONSES

| A. MEANING OF SIGNALS/PHRASE | B. VISUALS SIGNALS FOR AIRCRAFS | C. PHRASE | D. PRONON-CIATION | E. APPROPRIATE RESPONSE |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| You are in close proximity to our national territory | Day and night - The intercepteing aircraft, flying above and parallel to the intercepted aircraft, rocking wings, and flashing navigation lights at slow regular intervale, followed by a series of shallow bank "8" turns, in the horizontal plane, approximately 10 degree either side of line of flight. | "CLOSE TO TERRI-TORY" | Close-to-terr-i-tory | Intercepted aircraft turns away from national territory. |
| You have entered into our national territory | Day and night - The intercepting aircraft, flying above and parallel to the intercepted aircraft, rapidly flashing navigations lights while rocking wings, followed by a shallow turn executed in the horizontal plane, with a 15.20 degree beam in the direction of the intercepted aircraft. The approach shall be accomplished with great cautions and not closer than one wing span. Repeat until intercepted aircraft acknowledges or radio contact is established. | "TERRI-TORY ENTERED" | Terr-i-tory en-tererd | Intercepted aircraft shall follow the appropriate instructions of the intercepting aircraft. |
| I need to land | Day and night - The aircraft flashes its navigation lights repeatedly and rapidly while rocking wings, followed by a gentle porpoising of the aircraft. | "REQUEST LANDING" | Re-quest lan-ding | Intercepting aircraft assiste intercepted aircraft. |
| I request radio communications on 130.0 MHs or 270.0 MHs (Initial contact is established on 121.5 MHs or 243.0 MHs) | Day and night - If 121.9 MHs and 243.0 MHs are inoperative, aircraft continuously alternates one long with one short flash of navigation lights while rocking wings. | "RADIO CONTACT" | Ra-di-o con-tact | Acknowledge requesting aircraft, ship, or air traffic control or monitoring facility with phases "RADIO CONTACT". After contact is made, tune to 130.0 MHs or 270.0 MHs. |
| My airecraft requests radio contact with your ship on 121.5 MHs or 143.0 MHs. | Day and night - Aircraft circling the ship is a left hand turn, at a safe distance and altitude until radio contact is established. | "RADIO CONTACT" | Ra-di-o con-tact | The aircraft and ship establish radio contact by exchanging the phrase "RADIO CONTACT"; then both shall switch to 130.0 MHs or 270.0 MHs, as appropriate, for further radio communications. |
| I am experiencing a dangerous level of interference with my command and control network. (Transmit phrase on contact frequency). | None | "STOP INTER-FERENCY" | Stop In-ter-fer-ency | Investigate the circumstances and, as appropriate, terminate any activities which may be causing the dangerous interferences. |
| My planned use of a laser may create danger in this area. (Transmit phrase on contact frequency). | None | "LASER DANGER" | Las-er dan-ger | Take appropriate measures to prevent harm to personnel or damage to equipment. |
| I am experiencing a dangerous level of laser radiation. (Transmit phrase on contact frequency). | None | "STOP LASER" | Stop la-ser | Investigate the circumstance and , as appropriate, terminate any use of a laser that could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment. |

## Annex 2

## PROCEDURES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF INCIDENTS RELATED TO ENTERING INTO NATIONAL TERRITORY

This annex sets forth the procedures for the expeditious resolution, by peaceful means, of any incident which may arise during entry being made by personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party into the national territory of the other Party owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure or as a result of unintentional actions, as set forth in Article II, subparagraph 1 (a) of this Agreement.

### Section I

### Entering into national territory owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure

1. When personnel of the armed forces of one Party are aware that, owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure, they may enter or have entered into the national territory of the other Party, they shall continuously attempt to establish and maintain communications with personnel of the armed forces of the other Party, as provided for in annex 1 to this Agreement.

2. Upon receiving a communication from personnel of the armed forces of a Party who are aware that they may enter or have entered into the national territory of the other Party, personnel of the armed forces of that other Party shall provide them appropriate instructions as to subsequent actions, and assistance to the extent of existing capabilities.

3. If personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a Party enter into the national territory of the other Party, the personnel shall take into consideration any instructions received from the personnel of the armed forces of the other Party that are appropriate to the existing circumstances and, subject to the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 1 of this Agreement, shall either depart the national territory or proceed to a designated location.

4. Personnel of the armed forces of a Party having entered into the national territory of the other Party, upon arrival at the location designated by personnel of the armed forces of that other Party, shall be:

(a) accorded an opportunity to contact their defence attaché or consular authorities as soon as possible;

(b) cared for properly and their equipment protected; and

(c) assisted in repairing their equipment in order to facilitate their departure from the national territory, and in departing at the earliest opportunity.

## Section II

### Entering into national territory as a result of unintentional actions of personnel

1. When the personnel of the armed forces of one Party establish that personnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other Party may enter into their national territory as a result of unintentional actions or that such an entry has already taken place, the personnel who have made this determination shall continuously attempt to establish and maintain communications with the personnel of the armed forces of that other Party, as provided for in annex 1 to this Agreement. The purpose of such communications is: to alert personnel of the armed forces of that other Party of the possibility of entry or the fact of entry into national territory; to clarify the reasons for and circumstances of their actions; to recommend that they take measures to prevent such an entry, if possible; or to render them assistance as appropriate.

2. Personnel of the armed forces of a Party, having been alerted that they may enter into the national territory of the other Party, shall, if possible, undertake measures so that their actions do not result in such an entry.

3. If personnel and equipment of the armed forces of a Party enter into the national territory of the other Party, the personnel shall take into consideration any instructions received from the personnel of the armed forces of the other Party that are appropriate to the existing circumstances and, subject to the provisions of Article VIII, paragraph 1 of this Agreement, shall either depart the national territory or proceed to a designated location. With respect to personnel and equipment which have arrived at a designated location, the procedures provided for in section I, paragraph 4 of this annex shall be applicable.

## AGREED STATEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE PREVENTION OF DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES

In connection with the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, the Parties have agreed as follows:

First agreed statement. In the case of any entry by personnel and equipment of the armed forces of one Party into the national territory of the other Party owing to circumstances brought about by force majeure or as a result of unintentional actions by such personnel, as set forth in Article II, subparagraph 1 (a) of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, the procedures set forth in annexes 1 and 2 to this Agreement shall apply regardless of whether that other Party has been made aware of the circumstances of such entry.

Second agreed statement. As indicated in Article VIII of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, this Agreement does not affect rights of navigation under international law, including the right of warships to exercise innocent passage.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR 1/

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1/ Source: Conference on Disarmament, Document CD/943 of 4 August 1989.

# AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DESTRUCTION AND NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties",

Determined to make every effort to conclude and to bring into force at the earliest date a convention providing for a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, hereinafter referred to as "the multilateral convention",

Aware of their special responsibility in the area of chemical weapons disarmament,

Desiring to halt the production of chemical weapons and to begin the destruction of the preponderance of their chemical weapons stockpiles, without waiting for the multilateral convention to enter into force,

Recalling the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on 23 September 1989, hereinafter referred to as "the Memorandum",

Recalling the bilateral commitment to co-operate with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons, contained in the joint statement on chemical weapons issued at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on 23 September 1989, and

Mindful of the efforts of each Party aimed at the destruction of chemical weapons and desiring to co-operate in this area,

Have agreed as follows:

## ARTICLE I

## GENERAL PROVISIONS AND AREAS OF CO-OPERATION

1. In accordance with provisions of this Agreement, the Parties undertake:

(a) to co-operate regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons;

(b) not to produce chemical weapons;

(c) to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels;

(d) to co-operate in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection procedures; and

(e) to adopt practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable States to become parties to the multilateral convention.

2. Each Party, during its destruction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each Party shall destroy its chemical weapons in accordance with stringent national standards for safety and emissions.

ARTICLE II

CO-OPERATION REGARDING METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF DESTRUCTION

1. To implement their undertaking to co-operate regarding the destruction of chemical weapons, the Parties shall negotiate a specific programme of co-operation. For this purpose, the Parties may create special groups of experts, as appropriate. The programme may include matters related to: methods and specific technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons; measures to ensure safety and protection of people and the environment; construction and operation of destruction facilities; the appropriate equipment for destruction; past, current and planned destruction activities; monitoring of destruction of chemical weapons; or such other topics as the Parties may agree. Activities to implement this programme may include: exchanges of visits to relevant facilities; exchanges of documents; meetings and discussions among experts; or such other activities as the Parties may agree.

2. Each Party shall, as appropriate, co-operate with other States that request information or assistance regarding the destruction of chemical weapons. The Parties may respond jointly to such requests.

ARTICLE III

CESSATION OF THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Upon entry into force of this Agreement and thereafter, each Party shall not produce chemical weapons.

ARTICLE IV

DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than 31 December 2002, and thereafter, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 5,000 agent tons. In this Agreement, "tons" means metric tons.

2. Each Party shall begin its destruction of chemical weapons by no later than 31 December 1992.

3. By no later than 31 December 1999, each Party shall have destroyed at least 50 per cent of its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons. The aggregate quantity of chemical weapons of a Party shall be the amount of chemical weapons declared in the data exchange carried out on 29 December 1989, or declared thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum, as updated in accordance with paragraph 6 (b) of this article.

4. In the event that a Party determines that it cannot achieve an annual rate of destruction of chemical weapons of at least 1,000 agent tons during 1995, or that it cannot destroy at least 1,000 agent tons during each year after 1995, that Party shall, at the earliest possible time, notify the other Party, in accordance with paragraph 10 of this article.

5. Each Party, in its destruction of chemical weapons, shall also destroy the munitions, devices and containers from which the chemicals have been removed. Each Party shall reduce and limit its other empty munitions and devices for chemical weapons purposes so that, by no later than 31 December 2002, and thereafter, the aggregate capacity of such munitions and devices does not exceed the volume of the remaining bulk agent of that Party.

6. Thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement, each Party shall inform the other Party of the following:

(a) its current general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement and its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force. The detailed plan shall encompass all of the chemical weapons to be destroyed during the calendar year, and shall include their locations, types and quantitites, the methods of their destruction, and the locations of the destruction facilities that are to be used; and

(b) any changes, as of the entry into force of this Agreement, in the data contained in the data exchange carried out on 29 December 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum.

7. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than 30 November, of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the following calendar year.

8. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than 15 April, of the following:

(a) any further changes, as of 31 December of the previous year, to the data contained in the data exchange carried out on 29 December 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum;

(b) the implementation during the previous calendar year of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons; and

(c) any update to the general and detailed plans provided pursuant to paragraphs 6 (a) or 7 of this article.

9. Each Party shall limit its chemical weapons storage facilities so that, by no later than 31 December 2002, and thereafter, the number of such facilities does not exceed eight. Each Party plans to have all such facilities located on its national territory. This is without prejudice to its rights and obligations, including those under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

10. If a Party experiences problems that will prevent it from destroying its chemical weapons at a rate sufficient to meet the levels specified in this article, that Party shall immediately notify the other Party and provide a full explanation. The Parties shall promptly consult on measures necessary to resolve the problems. Under no circumstances shall the Party not experiencing problems in its destruction of chemical weapons be required to destroy its chemical weapons at a more rapid rate than the Party that has experienced such problems.

## ARTICLE V

## INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

1. Each Party shall provide access to each of its chemical weapons production facilities for systematic on-site inspection to confirm that production of chemical weapons is not occurring at those facilities.

2. Each Party shall identify and provide access to each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons holding areas within these destruction facilities for systematic on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons. Such inspection shall be accomplished through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments.

3. When a Party has removed all of its chemical weapons from a particular chemical weapons storage facility, it shall promptly notify the other Party. The Party receiving the notification shall have the right to conduct, promptly

after its receipt of the notification, an on-site inspection to confirm that no chemical weapons are present at that facility. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year of the notification and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility for which it has received a notification pursuant to this paragraph, to determine that chemical weapons are not being stored there.

4. When a Party has completed its destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement, it shall promptly notify the other Party. In its notification, the Party shall specify the chemical weapons storage facilities where its remaining chemical weapons are located and provide a detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each of these storage facilities. Each Party, promptly after it has received such a notification, shall have the right to inspect each of the chemical weapons storage facilities specified in the notification, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons at each facility.

5. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year in which destruction begins and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility of the other Party that is not already subject to annual inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this article, to determine the quantitites and types of chemical weapons that are being stored there.

6. On the basis of the reports of its inspectors and other information available to it, each Party shall determine whether the provisions of this Agreement are being satisfactorily fulfilled and shall communicate its conclusions to the other Party.

7. Detailed provisions for the implementation of the inspection measures provided for in this Article shall be set forth in the document on inspection procedures. The Parties shall work to complete this document by 31 December 1990.

## ARTICLE VI

## MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION

The Parties shall co-operate in making every effort to conclude the multilateral convention at the earliest date and to implement it effectively. Toward those ends, the Parties agree, in addition to their other obligations in this Agreement, to the following:

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than the end of the eighth year after entry into force of the multilateral convention, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 500 agent tons.

2. Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of States parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, inter alia, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years.

3. The Parties shall intensify their co-operation with each other and with other States to ensure that all chemical weapon-capable States become parties to the multilateral convention.

4. The Parties declare their intention to be among the original parties to the multilateral convention.

5. To gain experience and thereby facilitate the elaboration and implementation of the multilateral convention, the Parties agree to conduct bilateral verification experiments involving trial challenge inspections at facilities not declared under the Memorandum or subsequently. The detailed modalities for such experiments, including the number and location of the facilities to be inspected, as well as the procedures to be used, shall be agreed between the Parties no later than six months after the signing of this Agreement.

## ARTICLE VII

## CONSULTATIONS

The Parties, in order to resolve questions related to this Agreement that may arise, shall use normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as they may agree.

## ARTICLE VIII

## RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DOCUMENTS

1. After the multilateral convention enters into force, the provisions of the multilateral convention shall take precedence over the provisions of this Agreement in cases of incompatible obligations therein. Otherwise, the

provisions of this Agreement shall supplement the provisions of the multilateral convention in its operation between the Parties. After the multilateral convention is signed, the Parties to this Agreement shall consult with each other in order to resolve any questions concerning the relationship of this Agreement to the multilateral convention.

2. The chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, and chemical weapons production facilities subject to this Agreement are those that are subject to declaration under the Memorandum.

ARTICLE IX

AMENDMENTS

Each Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Agreement.

ARTICLE X

ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; WITHDRAWAL

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of instruments stating acceptance of the Agreement by each Party.

2. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration, unless the Parties agree to terminate it after the entry into force of the multilateral convention.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this first day of June, 1990, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

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| s/G. Bush | s/M. Gorbachev |
| FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA | FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 1/ |

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1/ Source: Conference on Disarmament, document CD/1001 of 12 June 1990.

AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DESTRUCTION AND NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Paragraph 2 of Article VI of the Agreement stipulates that, "Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of States parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, inter alia, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years".

In this connection, the Parties agree that an affirmative decision would require the agreement of a majority of the States parties that attend the special conference, with such majority including those States parties attending the special conference that had taken the following three steps:

(a) presented officially and publicly, before 31 December 1991, before the Conference on Disarmament, a written declaration that they were at the time of that declaration in possession of chemical weapons;

(b) signed the multilateral convention within 30 days after it was opened for signature; and

(c) became a party to the multilateral convention by no later than one year after its entry into force. 1/

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1/ Source: Conference on Disarmament, document CD/1001 of 12 June 1990.

## United States-USSR Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation

Washington, D.C.

1 June 1990

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics oppose the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles capable of carrying such weapons, and certain other missiles and missile technologies. The more nations that possess such weapons, the more difficult it will be to realize the desire of people everywhere to achieve effective arms control and disarmament measures and to reduce the threat of war. Weapons proliferation can provoke or intensify insecurity and hostility among nations, and threatens mankind with warfare of unprecedented destructiveness.

Our discussions over the past months point the way to a new era in relations between our two countries. We have taken major steps toward concluding agreements to reduce our own strategic nuclear arsenals, to bring limits on nuclear testing into force, and to reach a global ban on chemical weapons. Together with the nations of Europe, we are taking unprecedented steps to reduce existing conventional weaponry as part of a process of building a lasting structure of European security. The progress we are making and the commitments we have made in these bilateral and multilateral arms control efforts clearly demonstrate that arms reductions can contribute to increased security, even when there have been long-standing and deep-seated differences between countries.

The historic steps we have taken to improve United States-Soviet relations and to co-operate in the interests of international stability create the possibility of even closer and more concrete co-operation in the areas of nuclear, chemical, and missile non-proliferation.

With these considerations in mind, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Declare their commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and missiles capable of carrying such weapons and certain other missiles and missile technologies, in particular those subject to the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR);
- Agree to work closely together and with other members of the international community to develop and put into action concrete measures against the proliferation of these types of weapons; and

- Call on other nations to join in a renewed commitment to effective non-proliferation measures as a means of securing international peace and stability and as a step toward the effective limitation worldwide of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, and missile technology.

The two sides have taken specific actions to advance these commitments.

Nuclear weapons non-proliferation

In order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Reaffirm their steadfast and long-lasting commitment to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to strengthen the international nuclear weapons non-proliferation régime;
- Reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and agree that it continues to make an invaluable contribution to global and regional security and stability;
- Urge all countries which have not yet done so to adhere to the NPT;
- Urge all NPT parties to implement scrupulously their International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards obligations under the Treaty;
- Affirm their intention to co-operate together and with other treaty parties to ensure a successful 1990 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which would reaffirm support for the objectives of the Treaty and its importance to international security and stability;
- Support the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and urge all countries in the region to bring it into force at an early date;
- Reiterate their continuing commitment to strengthening the IAEA, whose unique system of safeguards has contributed to the widespread peaceful use of nuclear energy for social and economic development;
- Support increased international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards;
- Call on all non-nuclear weapons States with unsafeguarded nuclear activities to place these activities under international safeguards;
- Agree on the need for stringent controls over exports of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology, to ensure that they will not be misused for nuclear explosive purposes, and urge all other nations capable of exporting nuclear-related technology to apply similarly strict controls;

- Continue to support efforts to improve and strengthen the international nuclear export control régime;
- Support discussions among States in regions of nuclear proliferation concern for the purpose of achieving concrete steps to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, and, in particular, join in calling on the nations of the Middle East, southern Africa, and South Asia to engage in and pursue such discussions;
- Agree to continue their regular, constructive bilateral consultations on nuclear weapons non-proliferation.

Missile and missile technology non-proliferation

In order to stem the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Have signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, demonstrating that controls on - indeed the elimination of - such missiles can enhance national security;
- Reaffirm their intention that the START treaty be signed by the end of the year;
- Affirm their support for the objectives of the Missile Technology Control Régime, covering missiles, and certain equipment and technology relating to missiles capable of delivering at least 500 kilograms of payload to a range of at least 300 kilometres and they call on all nations that have not done so to observe the spirit and the guidelines of this régime;
- Are taking measures to restrict missile proliferation on a world-wide basis, including export controls and other internal procedures;
- Have instituted bilateral consultations to exchange information concerning such controls and procedures and identify specific measures to prevent missile proliferation.
- Agree to work to stop missile proliferation, particularly in regions of tension, such as the Middle East;
- To this end, affirm their intent to explore regional initiatives to reduce the threat of missile proliferation, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives;

- Recall that they favour international economic co-operation including co-operation aimed at peaceful space exploration, as long as such co-operation could not contribute to missile proliferation;
- Appeal to all countries - to exporters of missiles and missile technology as well as purchasers - to exercise restraint, and express their willingness to continue their respective dialogue with other countries on the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology;
- Are resolved, on their part, to continue to work to strengthen such international restraint with respect to missile and missile technology proliferation.

Chemical weapons non-proliferation

In order to stem the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union:

- Declare that a multilateral, effectively verifiable chemical weapons convention banning the development, production and use of chemical weapons and eliminating all stocks on a global basis is the best long-term solution to the threat to international security posed by the use and spread of chemical weapons, and that non-proliferation measures are considered a step toward achieving such a convention;
- Will intensify their co-operation to expedite the negotiations in Geneva with the view to resolving outstanding issues as soon as possible and to finalizing the draft convention at the earliest date;
- Have instituted bilateral confidence-building measures, including chemical weapons data exchange and reciprocal site visits;
- Have just signed a trailblazing agreement on destruction and non-production of chemical weapons and on measures to facilitate the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;
- Commit themselves, in that agreement, to take practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons capable States to become parties to the multilateral convention;
- Having declared their possession of chemical weapons, urge other States possessing chemical weapons to declare their possession, to commit to their destruction, and to begin immediately to address, through research and co-operation, the need for chemical weapons destruction capability;
- State that they themselves will not proliferate chemical weapons;

- Have instituted export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons. These measures are not intended to hinder or discriminate against legitimate peaceful chemical activities;
- Have agreed to conduct bilateral discussions to improve the effectiveness of their respective export controls to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;
- Conduct regular bilateral consultations to broaden bilateral co-operation, including the reciprocal exchange of information on the problems of chemical weapons proliferation;
- Confirm their intent to pursue political and diplomatic actions, where specific cases give rise to concerns about the production, use or spread of chemical weapons;
- Join with other nations in multilateral efforts to co-ordinate export controls, exchange information, and broaden international co-operation to stem the proliferation of chemical weapons;
- Reaffirm their support for the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical weapons in violation of international law;
- Are taking steps to strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol by:

  Encouraging States that are not parties to accede;

  Confirming their intention to provide active support to the United Nations Secretary-General in conducting investigations of reported violations of the protocol;

  Affirming their intention to consider the imposition of sanctions against violators of the protocol, including those under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;

  Agreeing to consult promptly in the event of a violation of the Protocol to discuss possible bilateral and multilateral actions against the offender, as well as appropriate assistance to the victims of such violation;
- Agree that the presence and further proliferation of chemical weapons in areas of tension, such as the Middle East, is particularly dangerous. The two countries therefore affirm their intent to explore

regional initiatives in the Middle East and other areas, including the possibility of offering their good offices to promote such initiatives as:

Efforts to broaden awareness of the dangers of chemical weapons proliferation and its negative impact on implementation of the multilateral convention on chemical weapons;

Bilateral or multilateral efforts to stem chemical weapons proliferation, including the renunciation of the production of chemical weapons;

Efforts to destroy chemical weapons in advance of the multilateral convention, as the United States and the Soviet Union are doing.

The United States and the Soviet Union call on all nations of the world that have not already done so to join them in taking comparable, effective measures to stem chemical weapons proliferation. 1/

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1/ Source: Conference on Disarmament, document CD/1001 of 12 June 1990.

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