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Edited by
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United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNIDIR is an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations. It was established in 1980 by the General Assembly for the purpose of undertaking independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues.

The work of the Institute aims at:

1. Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race, and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States and toward the economic and social development of all peoples;

2. Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;

3. Assisting ongoing negotiations in disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

4. Carrying out more in-depth, forward-looking, and long-term research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

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Preface

Since 1990, UNIDIR has organized one regional conference of research institutes every year. The aim of these regional conferences has been to stimulate and promote thinking and research on questions of disarmament and international security. Thus far, four such conferences have been organized: in Africa, 1990; in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1991; in Asia and the Pacific, 1992; and in the Middle East, 1993.

This volume reproduces the reports and the main sequences of the discussions at the fourth Regional Conference of Research Institutes held in Cairo (Egypt) on 18 and 19 April 1993. This conference was organized by UNIDIR in co-operation with the Egyptian Institute for Diplomatic Studies.

Since the convening of the Conference, important political developments have taken place. Of special significance is the Oslo Accord between Israel and the PLO signed in September 1993. These developments make this publication all the more topical: we hope that by publishing these conference proceedings, we will stimulate further research on the region's security questions at a time of great opportunities as well as severe problems.

For its part, following the Cairo Conference UNIDIR has started a research project on *Confidence-Building in the Middle East*. The project will build on the work of the multilateral arms control group of the Madrid peace process, which has had CSBMs uppermost on its agenda. However, while the arms control group is an exercise in diplomacy and politics, UNIDIR's work will follow the ground rules of independent scholarship. The project will examine a broad range of security policies including CSBMs, arms control, non-offensive defence and disarmament issues.

Thus, it is with a special feeling of gratitude that we are thanking all the participants of the Cairo Conference, and the report writers in particular. Their contributions have been of great help in developing our own thinking on the subject.

UNIDIR is grateful to the Government of Egypt and the Institute for Diplomatic Studies whose generous contributions made the Cairo Conference possible. Special thanks are due to the Ford Foundation which provided the necessary financial support.

This publication was edited by Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Senior Research Associate at UNIDIR, and prepared for printing by Anita Blétry, also on the staff of UNIDIR. The Institute takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed in the papers, which are those of their authors. Nevertheless, UNIDIR considers that such papers merit publication and recommends them to the attention of its readers.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director
March 1994

Message of the Foreign Minister of Egypt

*Amre Moussa**

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research,
Your Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to begin by welcoming you to Egypt at your scientific and academic Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East, which is being organized by UNIDIR, Geneva, in collaboration with the Institute for Diplomatic Studies of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At the outset, I also wish to emphasize Egypt's great interest in the scientific subjects to be discussed at the Conference and which relate to various aspects of disarmament issues in general and regional disarmament endeavours in particular. We have no doubt that the Conference will fully assume its responsibilities in view of the participation of an élite group of negotiators and specialized academics working in the field of disarmament to which they have made outstanding contributions.

The international community has recently witnessed numerous historic changes at the global and regional levels. At the global level, the East-West conflict has abated, the Cold War between the two Super-Powers has ended, their ideological struggle has become less intense and there is now less competition between them for zones of influence which, at various times in the past, faced the world with serious challenges and crises that sometimes pushed it to the edge of the abyss. At the regional level, we witnessed an important turning-point and a positive development in the Middle Eastern question, namely the holding of the Madrid Peace Conference which led to negotiations in various fields, including arms limitation in the region. Accordingly, as one of the principal participants in these negotiations, Egypt must develop, in collaboration with the Arab States and all the other Parties, a joint and comprehensive concept of regional security arrangements, confidence-building measures and stages of arms limitation.

On this basis, in our view, regional disarmament constitutes one of the kingpins of the international community's endeavours to consolidate and promote international peace and security. In particular, Egypt welcomed the increased concern and support that was shown for regional endeavours. In fact, in this field our records are full of initiatives and constructive approaches, the most recent of which was President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak's proposal made in April 1990 to turn the Middle East into a region free of all weapons of mass destruction, in addition to the proposal made in 1974 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

The world is currently witnessing a significant trend towards disarmament and tangible progress towards agreement on its mechanisms and the achievement of its goals, which have long been advocated by developed and developing countries alike. The countries of the Third World, represented by the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77, clearly and categorically insisted on according priority to disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, issues and using the consequent financial savings for purposes of development and the achievement of socio-economic progress.

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* Message delivered in Arabic by Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Rahman Marei.

As part of the international arms limitation endeavours, preparations have begun for the NPT review and extension conference to be held in 1995. That is a treaty to which some States in the Middle East are still refusing to accede. Egypt, being conscious of its moral and historic responsibilities, is endeavouring to preserve the equilibrium, security and interests of the region and will spare no effort to promote concerted international endeavours to achieve universal accession to the treaty.

In conclusion, I wish to refer to our positive approach aimed at the achievement of the goals and objectives of complete and full disarmament and practical implementation of the constructive disarmament initiatives, particularly those seeking to achieve the following:

(a) Increased security for the States of our region at lower levels of armament, particularly since security can be achieved only through peaceful relations, dialogue and political arrangements far removed from the logic of force.

(b) Quantitative and qualitative equality between the military capabilities of each State of the region in view of the fact that a continuation of the present imbalance is unacceptable in a region that is striving for a just and comprehensive peace.

(c) The conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements applicable to all the States of the region, which would be supplemented by effective verification measures and which would ensure equal rights and responsibilities for all the States Parties, and through which the States of the region would co-operate with the international community with a view to formulating arms limitation and disarmament arrangements so that the problem can be dealt with in an integrated and comprehensive manner consistent with the security needs of the States.

(d) The granting of priority to ridding the region of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, consideration being given to conventional arms limitation measures whenever the political situation is conducive thereto after the achievement of peace in the region or, at the very least, when the peace process has made substantial progress towards the achievement of that goal.

In conclusion, I wish your Conference every success. Thank you.

Opening Statement

*Sverre Lodgaard**

Distinguished participants,

In the wake of every previous Middle East war, the arms race intensified. Once again, in the aftermath of the Gulf war, there is substantial arms build-up in the area. However, this time there is also a growing interest in arms control. The end of the Cold War made it possible for the USA and Russia to co-sponsor a peace process where arms control is an explicit, integral part; the principal West European countries are more supportive of multilateral arms control efforts now than before; and there is a growing realization in the area itself that arms control can enhance regional security. It is therefore in a spirit of encouragement and pursuit of new opportunities that I wish you welcome to this conference on security, arms control and disarmament in the Middle East.

UNIDIR is charged with the task of conducting applied research on questions relating to disarmament and international security. In exercising our duties we are drawing on the expertise, insight and experience of a variety of professions. In preparing this conference, we have been keen to secure high-level participation from research institutes throughout the region. However, our subject is interdisciplinary, and the expertise on it extends far beyond the academic domain. Applied research means that politicians, diplomats and military officers are indispensable in our efforts to promote a better understanding of the problems and prospects of international security. I am pleased and honoured, therefore, to see the range of high-level expertise assembled here today.

UNIDIR is a United Nations Institute. Consequently, there is a penchant for multilateral approaches and global perspectives in reference to the principles of the United Nations Charter. As regional politics is gaining momentum, we are increasingly interested also in regional approaches to security, independent of the United Nations as well as pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter: this conference is the fourth in a series of UNIDIR regional conferences. Under the UN umbrella, we enjoy a fair degree of independence and autonomy, safeguarded in our statutes. We have the freedom of expression without the constraints of having to negotiate consensus documents among national representatives. I hope that you will feel free at this Conference to air your views and opinions, it being understood that you are all speaking in your personal capacities and that you will not be quoted without permission.

Arms races do not necessarily end in war. Fortunately for mankind, the most formidable of all arms races - that of the Cold War - did not. However, throughout human history, most arms races went hot. No doubt, rapid growth of armed forces is a bad omen. In particular, recent research suggests that if a crisis is preceded by an arms race, it is more likely to end in war. Another important factor is the ratio of offensive to defensive capabilities. If the offensive capabilities on both sides of a conflict clearly outweigh the defensive ones on the other, there will be strong military incentives to strike first if and when decision-makers begin to think that war is unavoidable. Finally, there is something to say for the old balance-of-power type of reasoning. Even a small deviation from a predominantly defensive posture on the part of a powerful State may present a serious security problem for a much weaker neighbour. Today and tomorrow, we shall examine these and other dimensions of the military security problem at greater length.

We shall do so in a broader context involving non-military threats to security as well. Here, the ongoing peace process is an important frame of reference. In regional politics, there is always

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* Director, UNIDIR.

the option of treating arms control and disarmament issues in a wider setting of inter-State relations. Alternatively, some issues may be singled out for special treatment. The choice of approach is often a matter of contention.

The European CSCE and CFE experiences are often cited as sources of inspiration for security endeavours in other regions. I believe that European solutions have considerable heuristic value: for regions such as the Middle East, they are quite helpful in formulating the right questions. Hence I am sure that tomorrow, when we are turning to institutional mechanisms and CSBMs, references will be made to Europe. However, I believe we are all mindful of the need to discuss Middle Eastern issues on Middle Eastern premises. To say that European experiences have heuristic value is not to say that they have model value. In recruiting participants to this conference, UNIDIR has devoted time and effort first and foremost to securing the best possible participation from the region. Then, we shall benefit from the presence of external expertise as well. In view of the interests that big and small powers take in Middle Eastern affairs, we would have been dangerously incomplete without.

The peace process has an American-Russian co-chairmanship. The United States is by far the most important external player in Middle Eastern affairs. Representing an institution of the United Nations, I should also like to emphasize the growing role of the United Nations in mitigating and solving regional conflicts. Never before have so many countries acted together to confront regional and domestic problems. At the same time, greater United Nations involvement sometimes puts the reputation of the Organization at risk. Representing an autonomous research institute in the United Nations family, I would welcome a frank and open exchange of views on all issues on our agenda, the functions of the United Nations included. UNIDIR wants to facilitate talks among those regional parties who have a limited tradition of dialogue, and those of us who come from other parts of the world may provide guidance on the more technical lessons of arms control experiences of relevance for the Middle East. We have not come to Cairo to preach arms control ideology to Middle Eastern colleagues and representatives.

I am deeply indebted to the Institute of Diplomatic Studies, its Director Ihab Sorour and its Counsellor Laila Eleish for receiving us so generously here in Cairo. My gratitude furthermore goes to Egypt's ambassador in Geneva, Mounir Zahran, and to Director Mahmoud Karem of the Department of Disarmament Affairs of the Foreign Ministry of Egypt. You have all assisted us in a great many ways, and no question has been too difficult or too small for you to help us sort them out. Last not least, my thanks go to the Ford Foundation for its financial support: without it, this conference would not have taken place.

I look forward to the presentations and to the discussions that will follow, and I wish for all of us a fruitful and inspiring meeting.

Opening Statement

Ihab Sorour

Your Excellency, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt, Ambassador Rahman Marei, your excellencies, dear guests and colleagues, my dear friend Mr Sverre Lodgaard, it is my pleasure to welcome you to Egypt, the land of the Pharao's, the cradle of civilization.

I am glad that the Institute for Diplomatic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Egypt has the privilege to co-sponsor this important regional conference of research institutes in the Middle East in collaboration with UNIDIR. We are specially honoured to be chosen for the second time by the United Nations to organize a joint seminar on disarmament and security in Africa and the Middle East. We are really proud therefore to host this distinguished galaxy of politicians, diplomats, academicians, directors and members of research institutes from various parts of the world.

We are all gathered here with the ultimate goal of reaching a common understanding, and hopefully some solutions, to certain security questions which are still unanswered. We consider this conference, held in Cairo, a further evidence and a special tribute to the peaceful role played by Egypt a role which is deeply rooted in our history.

All of you are aware of President Mubarak's initiative on freeing our area of all weapons of mass destruction. We hope to realize this aspiration which is widely shared by the whole world and that your work here will help promoting this goal. It is the duty of our gathering to spearhead the search for peace and security and point out the most feasible, the most logical and the most practical methods to establish that evasive peace.

The discussion will tackle in turn the geo-politics and other aspects of security of the region, then move on to the main issues of security and disarmament, to the dangers of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and finally we will examine possible regional and global arrangements. We in Egypt consider this conference as a special recognition of the merit of our orientations and a confirmation of our efforts calling for a just and lasting peace in the area and for an organic relationship between peace and genuine security for all mankind.

I welcome you and wish you an enjoyable stay in Egypt and the conference all success.

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* Director, IDS.

Introduction

Chantal de Jonge Oudraat

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research organized, with the co-operation, of the Cairo-based Institute for Diplomatic Studies on 18-19 April 1993 an international conference on security, arms control and disarmament in the Middle East.

The Conference was attended by some thirty experts and scholars from the region, as well as a limited number of experts from other parts of the world. In convening the conference, UNIDIR endeavoured not only to examine the current security situation in the region, but also to come up with suggestions for further applied policy research in the field and to facilitate and develop contacts and dialogue among experts and research institutes in the region.

Security in the Middle East: The Parameters

While the conference programme focused on the military dimension of the security equations in the Middle East, *i.e.* the proliferation of both conventional and non-conventional weapons, as well as possibilities for regional arms control and security-building initiatives, some non-military and epistemological aspects of the regions security equations were tackled in the first session of the conference and were highlighted in two introductory background papers. Particularly interesting in this regard was the discussion around the question of how security and threat perceptions were influenced by: (a) the geographical definition of the region; (b) the notion of territory; and (c) the nature of the State.

Concerning the geographical framework of analysis, the question was raised whether the Middle East should encompass all States from Morocco in the West to Bangladesh in the East; Somalia in the South and the Caucasian and Central Asian Republics in the North? Or whether a definition of the region based on more flexible, diffuse, uncertain, incremental, and/or functional boundaries should be adopted? The definition of the spatial dimension of the region is not just a question of delimitation and identification of possible actors, it will also suggest and, indeed, feed different sets of threat and security perceptions.

It was pointed out by some of the participants that when examining security and threat perceptions in the region one should keep in mind that, due to the region's history, notably its tribal and nomadic traditions, the notion of territory as a base for national solidarity is quite alien to the region. It was argued that the different territorial conflicts in the region (*e.g.* those between Egypt and Sudan; Yemen and Saudi Arabia; Saudi Arabia and Qatar; UAE and Kuwait; and the ones between Israel and its neighbours) are but temporary geographical cristallisations of a deeper political, religious, and/or tribal, conflictuality. Threat and security perceptions in the Middle East can hence not be reduced to territorial claims, and are often as much of an internal, as external, nature. It also entails that territorial compromises alone will not be able to bring about durable peace in the region.

In this connection it was recalled that the formation of the State was of quite recent origin. The frontiers of the majority of States, notably those in the Gulf region, had largely been determined by external oil interests prevalent at the beginning of the 20th century. The power base

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* Senior Research Associate, UNIDIR.

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of the States in the region is hence to be understood not so much in terms of fixed national territories as in terms of linage and dynastic solidarities. As was pointed out: *The State in the Middle Eastern region is often but an external and formal skeleton, a geographical limit, of a power, a regime* (*Cf.* Chapter 2 by Ghassan Salamé). In large measure, we are dealing with powers, or regimes, which first and foremost find their legitimization in transborder political myths, ideologies, or past times (*e.g.* panarabism, islamism, the Holocaust), and which remain very much dependent upon oil revenues, extra-regional intervention and protection, including external aid.

In a more long-term perspective, regional stability, or the territorial status quo, is hence also threatened by the structural weakness of the State. The end of the Cold War, and in particular the falling apart of the Soviet Union and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, signal not just the end of US-Soviet rivalry but also the fragility of the State and the permissive nature of its boundaries. The destabilizing long-term effects of current humanitarian interventions were, in this regard, also referred to.

Regional Arms Build up and Arms Control

The more immediate factors shaping security and threat perceptions and contributing to a general sense of insecurity in the region were identified as having to do with, on the one hand, its extra-regional strategic importance, *i.e.* the regions huge oil reserves, and, on the other hand, with the after the Gulf war reinvigorated regional arms built up. While some argued that the end of the Cold War had devaluated the strategic importance of the region, it was also pointed out that, for example, for a country like the United States, the importance of the region had greatly increased, since the US became in the early 1980s an importer of oil. Its active involvement and interventions in the region could to some extent be directly correlated to the above.

As to the main armament and arms control issues in the region, a great deal of attention was devoted to the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies. The possibilities of a conventional High Tech arms race was referred to as a source of concern. Most participants were, however, of the opinion that these issues could only be dealt with within the more general regional security framework, and more in particular the peace process. Indeed, many participants took a critical view of the utility of existing global disarmament agreements, such as the Biological Weapons Convention, the recently signed Chemical Weapons Convention, or still the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Nonetheless, as was pointed out by one participant, what would have been the situation had these universal agreements not existed? Moreover, while the weaknesses and flaws of the NPT were stressed, at the same time adherence of Israel to that treaty would remain on the list of desiderata. In this respect it was also recalled that the majority of Arab States continue to make their adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention dependent upon Israeli adherence to the NPT. Frequent reference was also made to the Egyptian proposal for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction as a long term objective for the multilateral arms control talks.

Considerable critique was voiced with respect to the different existing export control regimes (*e.g.* the London group, the MTCR regime, the Australia group, etc.). Their discriminatory nature, and the possibilities that such regimes would hamper the technological, economic and social development of some of the countries concerned were put forward. A dialogue between recipients and supplier countries was called for in this respect. It was also suggested that these type of regimes are often but a guilt-trip for suppliers and arms producers and that the problem was not so much the arms transfers, but the level of armaments concerned.

The Peace Process - CSBMs

In the discussion on the peace process, and more particularly its multilateral arms control component, great emphasis was put on the idea that this was a multi-step process. In the first instance, States would develop both knowledge and familiarity with the different arms control mechanisms and procedures. The European experience in the field of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) was referred to as having heuristic value. At the same time, though, it was also stressed that the European CSCE experience could not simply be transposed. The importance of defining a general and final objective for the arms control talks, *i.e.* a blueprint of the end result, was also emphasized by some.

A great deal of discussion developed with respect to CSBMs and the relation between greater political stability, on the one hand, and arms control measures on the other. It was pointed out that there is a crisis of confidence in the region. Crisis which was fed by the huge amount of arms purchases in the region, the majority of which could not be justified in terms of real security needs. The desirability of CSBMs needed hence little illustration. It was argued that only two conditions needed to be met for CSBMs to work *i.e.* (a) minimum convergence of interests, and (b) political will to make them work.

The importance of reciprocal unilateral CSBMs was stressed several times. An Egyptian move on the CWC in return for an Israeli move on the NPT was cited as a possible example of such a reciprocal unilateral CSBM. Amongst other possible CSBMs, reference was made to those CSBMs mentioned in the UN Secretary Generals report on the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone (*e.g.* unilateral declarations on activities in the nuclear field, no-test commitment, placing all nuclear facilities under safeguards, etc.). Extra-territorial CBMs, such as those dealing with Outer Space, (*e.g.* prior notification of launches, payload, trajectories, etc.) were singled out as another area in which CSBMs could play a useful function.

References were also made to the instrumentality of the more classical type of CSBMs, such as for instance pre-notification of military exercises. However, in this context it was retorted, by some, that initiatives of this kind have little meaning as long as not all core players of the region were participating in the talks.

Research Priorities

The last session of the conference was devoted to academic co-operation and research priorities.[**] Many participants stressed, in this respect, the importance of research in creating a public opinion receptive to and interested in security and disarmament issues. It was stressed that the peace process could only succeed if, on a more basic societal level, support for this process was created. The representative of the Ford Foundation also stressed this issue and outlined the Foundations activities in the region in this field.[***] In this respect, it was stressed that more research needed to be undertaken concerning the fundamental and regional specific factors shaping the conflictuality of the region. The importance of using in this context a broader, not just military, concept of security was underlined by some.

[**] For a list of Research Institutes working on and in the Region, reference should be made to *UNIDIR Newsletter*, No 21, April 1993.

[***] The Ford Foundation in New York provided financial support for the conference.

Regarding more immediate and operational research topics, great emphasis was put on the importance of elaborating projects relating to national security doctrines in the region. It was pointed out that relatively little knowledge existed about the different security policies and doctrines of the States in the region and that information on these issues had great difficulty circulating in the region. The question of CSBMs, including a variety of transparency and crisis prevention measures, was also named a high priority by most participants. Verification as well as compliance and enforcement issues were also mentioned as being of great importance if any serious disarmament process is to be set in motion in the region. Finally, the importance of regional seminars and workshops, with the participation of academics, military and policy makers, was stressed. It permits for much needed informal exchanges of ideas and opinions, and could have a laboratory function for the official peace process.

Part I

Security and Disarmament in the Middle East: The Parameters

Chapter 1
The Middle East: The System and Power Configurations

*Ali Fuat Borovalı**

I. Definition of the Region

The definition of the region has never been a straightforward matter, but controversial or even problematic.[1] The system that constitutes the Middle East has been defined in various ways but one can assume that it has its core in the Arabian Peninsula - with the Gulf, the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean making up its boundaries (in a loose sense). The system's peripheral limits can be said to extend from Morocco in the west to Afghanistan in the east. For instance, during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Afghanistan clearly had a major impact on the system. Similarly, the Iranian Revolution, starting in 1978 created major repercussions and disturbances all across the system. Later, the Iran-Iraq war became the main security concern during the years 1980-88. And all this time, the disturbances in Lebanon, involving regional as well as extra-regional powers, were in full swing, not to mention the longstanding Arab-Israeli dispute over the status of Palestine. Therefore, in defining and redefining the various boundaries, the inner/outer limits of the system, we might have to identify how disturbances from within the system are carried across toward the outer limits - as with the epicenter of an earthquake or ripples in a lake.

In defining the Middle East as a region, we essentially identify the Arabic, Iranian, Jewish, Turkish and Kurdish elements. When we talk of the Maghreb as part of the Middle Eastern system we can see the Arabic (and Islamic) factor at work. We can, therefore, say that Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco are part of the system in varying degrees, in an issue-dependent fashion. Similarly, recent developments in Somalia, a Muslim country in the Horn of Africa, right along the Bab-el Mandeb, has made that country peripherally part of the system, with the involvement of extra-regional powers. One could go so far as to say that developments in the Caucasus, with particular reference to Azerbaijan (how it relates to Iran, Turkey and even to the reported involvement of Israel), have also involved that part of the region within the dynamics of the system, albeit in a peripheral manner.

II. Systemic Dynamics in Recent Times

If we take a retrospective look at the modern history of the region and the various fluctuations within the system for the past 45 years, we see that different issues and/or conflicts have constituted the tension fulcrum of the system at different times, starting with the establishment of Israel in 1948. Since then, the various tensions within the Arab World, under the over arching idea of Pan-Arabism, have created various faultlines along ideological lines and/or regime-type - among radical

* Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey.

[1] The question "Where is the Middle East?" has been the focus of an 1960 article by Roderic Davison (*Foreign Affairs*, July 1960). Davison raises the question: "Given the hopeless disunity among specialists and governments as to where the Middle East is, how can the term be intelligently employed?" Among the solutions he envisages: "To admit frankly that there is no particular Middle East, but that there are as many Middle Easts as there are problems touching this fuzzy region in any way." If that is the case, the Middle East must, on each occasion, be redefined.

Arab regimes, the moderates and conservative monarchies.[2] Perhaps Syria was the first to radicalize, to be followed by Nasser's Egypt, then Iraq (1958) and Libya (1969). Egypt was to turn moderate later on, while the two Yemens were to be radicalized.

Algeria, starting out with a muted Third World ideology, has retained a certain moderation in its external dealings. Therefore, Iraq, Syria and Libya (perhaps also the PLO) can be seen as constituting the centers of Arab radicalism in recent times. Increased dealings with the Soviet Union, particularly during the 1970s, and radical Arab regimes, the potential for intra-Arab conflict increased. While Syria has obviously been preoccupied with Israel, Iraq and Libya (both OPEC members, bolstered by petrodollars) gained momentum towards confrontation with regional and extra-regional powers.

Within the Arab World, a retrospective look at the two decades since the Yom Kippur War in 1973 would indicate that, apart from the relatively localized Israeli-Palestinian issue and the civil war in Lebanon, the major tensions have developed mainly around problems associated with the two radical Arab regimes: Iraq and Libya. Therefore, one cannot remain indifferent to the observed relationship between radicalization of a regime and an external confrontationist stance.

One could also suggest that, at the fundamental level, most of the conflicts carry the *leitmotif* of Arab unification which, given the ideological/regime diversity, encounter expected resistances. Whether it was Nasser, the Iraqi Baath regime or Khaddafi's Libya, they have included Pan-Arabism in their declaratory policies against the background of skepticism and resistance among the rest of the Arab World.

That the Middle Eastern system was shaken at its foundations by the Islamicist revolution in Iran needs no reiteration here. The revolution and the strategic transformation it brought to bear on the entire regional power configuration, particularly considering its almost simultaneous occurrence with the invasion of Afghanistan, still reverberates across the system. The Iranian threat, perceived and/or actual, had already defined the parameters of strategic assessments across the Gulf and the region as a whole, before and during the Iran-Iraq war. So much that, not only Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries bankrolled the Iraqi war effort in tens of billions of dollar, but the West also devised its Gulf policies with the primacy of Iranian threat in mind. It may be ironic to note that the Iranian threat, which has concerned the GCC Countries throughout the 1980s, might have had the positive effect of constraining Iraq from attacking Kuwait and Saudi Arabia during more favorable times (while the Soviet Union was still a regional actor to contend with). What is stated here is that Iraq's protracted struggle with Iran, though explainable in terms of its own logic, constituted something of a diversion from the ideological/ regime confrontation with its Arab neighbors. Indeed, the delayed action came barely two years after the cessation of hostilities with Iran.

At this point, it may be useful to refer to certain attempts by scholars and journalists to come up with new definitions of the region while trying to work out the implications of the break-up of the Soviet Empire with regard to the systemic redefinition of the Middle East. In his recent article "Rethinking the Middle East", Bernard Lewis argues that with the ending of the Cold War and the formal independence of the six Central Asian Republics, the previous artificial frontiers have been overcome and now the Middle Eastern system can be said to extend as far eastward as Tashkent

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[2] Radicalism, according to Chamber's Dictionary, denotes "wishing for great changes in the method of government." Its emerging meaning has been "to look for solutions from the very roots of the problem." After the Second World War, the term took on an anti-colonialist/liberationist connotation (mainly anti-British and anti-French as the remaining colonial powers). While the anti-Western component staged on the radicalist anger in the Middle East, later was refocused on the United States with particular emphasis deriving from the latter's benefaction of the State of Israel. While espousing the Pan-Arabist cause, Arab radicalism gradually incorporated socialistic elements, as documented in the Baathist program, coupled with criticisms of varying severity directed at "moderate" and "conservative" Arab regimes as well as Pahlavite Iran. More recently, radicalism has assumed an Islamist/fundamentalist character, finding various expressions in Libya, Iran, Sudan, Lebanon and Algeria.

and Alma Ata.[3] As an instance of why Central Asia should be regarded as part of the system, Lewis cites the activities undertaken by Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and even Israel in Central Asia as well as Turkey's close involvement with its Turkic brethren. Lewis makes the point that the newly-independent Central Asians would have to make a stark choice between an elaborated CIS structure, Khomeinism and Kemalism.

Notwithstanding Lewis' historical perspective, one could raise the question whether it is analytically convenient at this stage to conceive Central Asia as part of the Middle Eastern system. Therefore, one could say that the Central Asian factor should receive consideration in an overall redefinition of the system, but not to the extent of significantly impacting the core dynamics of Middle Eastern power configuration.

III. Subregional Dynamics: Conflict Situations

A convenient way of defining and/or identifying subregions in the area would be to focus on conflict situations with varying degrees of intensity. Naturally, the core and peripheral vicinity of the Arab-Israeli dispute would constitute such a subregion - involving as it does Israel, Palestinian areas, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Regarding this chronic conflict situation a relatively recent development has been the initiation of the Mideast Peace Talks. Now that several rounds have been completed, the very fact of the parties coming together has produced certain expectations, currently suspended by the Palestinian expulsion crisis. One could note with some emphasis that since 1979, the Arab-Israeli dispute has conceded its central place to other momentous developments in the region.

The main subregion - if one calls it that - for the last fourteen years has been the Gulf. Whether it was the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf war (up to the present and beyond), with its parallel coastlines ominously facing each other, the gulf has been the most contentious subregion in all these years. The recent US missile attacks into Iraq in the dying days of the Bush administration has, once again, demonstrated the Gulf's status as the pivotal subregion. It should be noted that, after the Gulf war, the Saudi airfields have become hosts to American warplanes and other military personnel. Kuwait has recently asked Britain and France to send troops to bolster the 1500-strong American military contingent already there. Kuwait also asked for and received US Patriot missile batteries.[4] Thus, after more than a decade of almost continual strife and instability, this subregion has attracted apparently permanent extra-regional military presence.

It should not come as a surprise that the Gulf has been the most unstable subregion since it has been the object of threats on a rotative basis from arguably the most militant regional powers in the Middle East. However, it would be wrong to assume that all is well within the intra-Arab framework of the GCC even at a time when Iran has reasserted claims to three islands in the Gulf. Qatar and Saudi Arabia engaged in a dispute over a border outpost in September 1992. An old territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain remains unsettled. Considering that the GCC is composed of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and United Arab Emirates, several of the dyads are seen to be potentially at odds with one another.

Even a cursory look into the cartography of the Gulf (or Khalij-e-Fars in Iranian terms) would indicate the extent of the threat as would be perceived from the southern coastline as the northern landmass seem to be poised almost to descend upon it. Therefore, it is not difficult to explain the uneasiness felt by the GCC Emirates in the face of recent indicators of Iranian rearmament. Given

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[3] Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4.
[4] *International Herald Tribune*, 20 January 1993.

the ongoing trialectical interaction between Iran, Iraq and the GCC countries, it is no wonder that the subregion would continue to be problematic.

The internal developments in Algeria have put the spotlight on that area after a long period of relative obscurity. Given the level of political Islamization in Algeria (as well as Sudan, Egypt and even Tunisia), the North African component of the Middle East system seems to have reinforced its systemic connections. While a conflict situation has intermittently existed between Egypt and Libya (leading Egypt to declare the common border as a potential war zone, establish two air fields and keep up to four divisions in the area, the recent visit of Colonel Khaddafi to Cairo would seem to indicate that things are currently quiet on Egypt's western front.

Yet another subregion could be identified as the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula: Yemen, Bab-el Mandeb (connecting the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean) and, in view of the recent developments in Somalia, the Horn of Africa. It may be premature to elaborate upon the implications of conceiving this area as a subregion of the Middle Eastern system, but indications are there: What happens in this contiguous zone may create repercussions to be felt in the rest of the. system. Another point about identifying subregions is the previously referred point about whether to view the southern Caucasus and Central Asia as an extension of the system.

Last but not least, we could dwell on whether to regard the southern contiguous zone of Turkey, with the transnational ethnic activity and the presence of a rather unique multinational force (referred as Poised Hammer or Provide Comfort), also as a subregion. It is quite obvious that the Poised Hammer, with its main base at Incirlik, owes its raison d'etre to developments emanating from the dynamics of the Middle Eastern system, the Gulf subregion in particular. It is important to note that the containment of the Baghdad regime has been premised upon the twin pillars of Incirlik in the north and Dhahran airbase in the south. Also this structure is supported by the presence of US naval/air forces stationed in eastern Mediterranean and the northern Gulf. The strategic dilemma concerning the partition vs. preserving the unity of Iraq (with Kurds in the north and Shiite Arabs in the south) is very much part and parcel of the problematic pertaining to this subregion.

IV. Security Concerns and Power Configurations

Given the often-quoted complexity of the region compounded by the interdynamics among the subregions, it may not be an easy task to depict the security concerns and power configurations with adequate precision. However, one can refer to certain issue areas such as the proliferation of weapons (both conventional and nonconventional), the search for disarmament and/or other security arrangements, increasing prevalence of transnational ethnic and religiously-inspired political movements, the complexities of intra-Arab disputes, the gathering chorus of fingerpointing towards Iran as the main security threat (the correctness of which is open to debate) and the increasing involvement of extra-regional actors in the regional/subsystem dynamics.

Particularly worrying to some analysts is the growing Russian and Chinese involvement in the supplying of arms to the region.[5] As one example, one could cite the Syrian case. Conventional wisdom would have indicated, that after the collapse of the Soviet Union (and because the Soviets had been the main suppliers of arms to Syria) Syria's military position would weaken. But, because of the extensive dumping of Soviet/Eastern European armaments at very favourable ruble exchange rates, the paradoxical result has been the strengthening of the Syrian arsenal in various categories.

Similarly, Iran is reported to be on an extensive defense procurement/purchasing spree from Russian, Chinese and North Korean sources, including submarines, provoking queries in various

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[5] John C. Gault and John K. Cooley, "The Gulf States Needs Arms Control", *International Herald Tribune*, 21 January 1993.

Western capitals. At this point, one might well pose the question and consider whether Iran's purchasing of arms, reported to exceed two billion dollars last year, should be viewed as legitimate defense expenditure, perhaps as a somewhat opportunistic initiative to try and benefit from the buyer's market of arms as long as it lasts. It should be a research question whether it is necessary to read expansionist intentions into Iran's restoration of its military capacity back to pre-1980 levels. In view of the increasingly prevalent regional and general analytic opinion that Iran is likely to constitute the main strategic threat to the security of the region, it is legitimate to ponder whether that is indeed the case.

The point is crucial and needs a certain elaboration. In terms of historical experience, one might well remember the consequences of previous faulty identifications of main security threats in the region, particularly during the Iran-Iraq war. There are resurfaced notions of setting up a "reformed" Iraq to offset Iran.[6] The controversy seems to be premised on the notion that, for Iraq to balance off Tehran it would have to regain its control over Kurdish and Shiite areas. And, given Iran's manpower advantages and potentially greater military arsenal, Baghdad could hope to compete only by developing nuclear and chemical weapons.[7]

All this shows the importance of establishing clear and correct identifications as to the nature of potential military/strategic threats in the area. In a recent reference to Turkish President Turgut Ozal's assessment of the strategic situation in the region and his track record over the issue, an observer noted the potential pitfalls once again.[8] President Ozal has been on record saying that "though the Iranian regime will try to extend its control to other countries its efforts would not be very convincing." In 1992, Iran had received only $ 12 billion in oil revenue to support a devastated economy. While there was ground for legitimate concern on the part of the regional countries and perhaps the rest of the world, one should not overestimate Iran. Reference is made to "George Bush's disastrous decision to give Iraq's Saddam Hussein the benefit of every doubt until the invasion of Kuwait."[9] As noted on earlier occasions, though it is not difficult to emphasize security concerns of the Gulf countries faced with the growing military power of a resurgent Iran, without the benefit of the former Iraqi bulwark, one should heed Ozal's call for a more circumspect and less impulsive assessment of any security threat emanating from Iran. But that should not constrain the research/ analytic community from seriously questioning the implications of an apparent Iranian military restoration, with particular reference to possible links of Iranians with radical groups elsewhere in the region.

A further qualification might be introduced here. First, Saudi Arabia and other GCC Countries are engaged in an extensive armament program of their own (amounting to several billion dollars in 1992). While this may be perceived as a post-Kuwait traumatic syndrome (never to be caught unprepared again), the GCC rearmament can be viewed as an increasingly credible deterrent force on its own. Adding to this the extensive presence of Western military power (in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Gulf, Oman), one could hesitate in labelling Iran a net strategic threat. It may be an irony to consider that the present accumulation of the military hardware in and around the Gulf,

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[6] See Leslie H. Gelb, "A Reformed Iraq to Offset Iran, Forget It", *International Herald Tribune*, 18 January 1993. Gelb points out that the idea of building up Baghdad into its formerly conceived role as a bulwark against potential Iranian expansionism is once again heard among "some Arabists" in the State Department, in West European foreign ministries and among political leaders in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and elsewhere. According to Gelb, "what binds them in thinking the unthinkable is gathering dread of Iran and their belief that only Baghdad can keep the more dangerous Tehran at bay." Gelb, concedes, however, that "it is scary to contemplate Iran's growing military might and support of Islamic fundamentalists seeking to convert more moderate Arab regimes."

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Jim Hoagland, "Turkey, Not Iran or Iraq, Is the Important Near Eastern Player", *International Herald Tribune*, 4 February 1993.

[9] *Ibid.*, Hoagland notes that "many of the same voices that urged Mr. Bush to go easy on Saddam... are again trying that the top priority in the region must be confronting Iran."

dispatched for the express purpose of dealing with and containing Iraq, may now serve for keeping any latent Iranian expansionism in check.

To say a few things with regard to Turkey over this point, one senses a gathering systemic pressure to engage Turkey within the confrontational front against Iran. This was clearly evidenced during Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel's visit in late January to five GCC Countries (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and UAE). The Turkish delegation has been entreated with demands for Turkish vigilance against a probable Iranian threat. Coming at a time of widespread rumors concerning Iranian-linked terrorist activity inside Turkey there may be a temptation for the Turkish government to involve itself in the formation taking shape against Iran. But, as President Ozal has noted, the temptation should be resisted at this stage, barring a notable increase in hard evidence that Iran seriously is intending to engage in an NBC program, disregarding all manner of nonproliferation rules.

Given this definition of the situation, what kind of security arrangements, if any, might be envisaged? To begin with, there are efforts to introduce non-proliferation measures into the area, as indicated by the chemical weapons convention, that opened for signature in Paris in January of 1993. In Peter Herby's book, *The Chemical Weapons Convention and Arms Control in the Middle East*, it is argued that the chemical weapons treaty gives the Middle East an opportunity to begin confidence-building in the field of arms control.[10] It should be mentioned that Iran has announced its willingness to sign the convention. Apart from confidence-building measures, is there room for a formal or more explicitly structured security arrangement? Would it be possible or indeed necessary to envisage a Middle Eastern NATO? Currently, there is an *implicit* US guarantee to protect the GCC countries from potential Iranian or Iraqi encroachments. Whether, or to what extent, to formalize and institutionalize the current arrangements is a moot point. It seems permissible to suggest that any security arrangements that might conceivably take shape in the region would continue to be on an *ad hoc* basis - probably along the lines of a Poised Hammer structure.

V. The Role of Extra-Regional Powers

Mention of the Poised Hammer may be a convenient point to focus and elaborate upon the role of the extra-regional powers in the region. It would almost be a cliché to say that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the traditional Super-Power rivalry in the region no longer holds, and the parameters of extra-regional involvement would have to be extensively revised. Since the Gulf region have been declared a vital strategic zone for the US ever since the Carter Doctrine, and as the US readiness to intervene in one capacity or another in the affairs of the region has been confirmed over and again since the early 1980s, it is safe to assume that any developments in the area would have to contend with US-designated parameters. However, to engage in a brief analytical exercise, would the US be able to muster the sort of support as it did during the Gulf War, this time against a possible Iranian hegemonic threat?

The readiness of Syria and Egypt to join yet another coalition is highly questionable as evidenced by their ongoing reluctance to engage in a regional security arrangement envisaged by the Damascus Declaration 6 March 1991.[11] Turkey, on the other hand, is saturated with all kinds of demands and obligations emanating from the Balkans, the Caucasus and Northern Iraq. There are perceptions, however, that structural forces exist which may propel Turkey into a so-called "regional Super-Power" role in the Middle East, reluctantly or not. In a recent commentary, an

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[10] Further elaboration on these points can be found in Gault and Cooley, *International Herald Tribune*, 21 January 1993.

[11] These and related issues are extensively treated in Roland Dannreuther, "The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis", *Adelphi Papers* 264, Winter 1991-92.

observer notes: "Whether Turkey is strengthened or weakened by the enormous pressures and opportunities it confronts - from its actual or potential involvement in Bosnia, the Central Asian Republics... is one of the two three most important geostrategic questions on the global agenda for the next five years".[12]

While the Western European involvement in the region should be expected to go along the US footpath in general terms, Britain and France may be expected to conceive and implement slightly different policies and modalities with regard to issues like northern Iraq and the status of Kurds there. All of this, of course, presumes that Russia is unlikely to be resurgent enough to devote diplomatic resources to the area in any significant way.

The one concrete issue that would confront Western powers would be to determine, on an ongoing basis, the legal, strategic and political wrangle concerning the status of Iraq. Whether it is the suspected presence of NBC development programs, currently monitored by UN inspection teams, and whether or not to lift the embargo, however partially, as long as Saddam Hussein remains in governmental authority will continue to be a main preoccupation of Western diplomacy for months, if not years, to come. The decision on the status of Iraq would presumably be put within the larger context of regional stability, involving Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in general. What is clear is that the Iraqi question, when taken in conjunction with the presumed Iranian threat and the religious (Shiite) dimension of the issue, will demand the best analytic, diplomatic and strategic skills of extra-regional powers.

VI. Overall Assessment and Prospects

In his comprehensive analysis of the political and strategic aspects of the Gulf conflict, Roland Dannreuther critically points out that during the first half of 1990, as the peoples of Europe were celebrating the reunification and liberation of their continent and were dancing in the streets, the analytic focus failed to shift gears in tune with the dramatically altered strategic context or paradigm. As such, the Eurocentric focus in 1989, at the end of the Cold War, "tended to obscure the reality that in certain parts of the Third World where the Cold War had long ceased to exert any substantial influence."[13] And, that this was nowhere more true than in the Gulf region and with regard to the two predominant powers in the area - Iran and Iraq.

During the Iran-Iraq war, the two Super-Powers had separately concluded that the Iranian fundamentalist threat was the more serious and that Iraq would have to be implicitly (and explicitly) supported. From 1982 onwards, Iraq was in the favor of both Super-Powers and their allies, as well as the majority of the Arab World. Military and economic aid entered the country from every corner of the world, deliberately encouraging the growth of Iraq's armed forces. The subsequent redirection of Iraq's military power away from Iran towards expansionism elsewhere was the direct consequence of the disproportionate military might developed under the very eyes of the world. For this, Dannreuther concludes, not only the West but also the Soviet Union and the Arab World must share some of the blame. The failure revealed the inherent danger of unco-ordinated international diplomatic and military support directed toward containing one threat, resulting in the creation of other equally destabilizing threats. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait symbolized the ultimate failure of multinational efforts to secure regional stability, and thus constituted, "for the emerging post-Cold War international system...an object lesson in the wrong approach to collective security."[14]

Aside from putting the blame on this or that regional / global actor,the present issue is whether we are in a better position to make the pertinent strategic assessments in the light of past mistakes

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[12] Hoagland, *International Herald Tribune*, 4 February 1993.

[13] *Dannreuther*, p. 71.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

and/or object lessons. Since, in so many ways, many of the world's trouble spots indicate a tendency to go back into a time tunnel (*e.g.* Sarajevo 1914), are we going to be capable of placing the issues in their proper historical and strategic perspective?

In the case of the Gulf there is no doubt that the destruction of the Iraqi bulwark has created a power vacuum in terms of the classical balance of power analysis. However, does this necessarily mean that Iran is both willing and able (or capable) of embarking upon a full scale military adventure barely five years after a colossally costly war which it did not initiate? It is true that its accumulation of arms might lead to the creation of an Iranian diplomatic hegemony in the area (a sort of Pax Iranica) without having to fire a single shot, if it manages to cow the southern/western shore of the Gulf into an uneasy submission. It is quite possible that for this scenario eventually an adequate deterrent capability and/or related security arrangements might have to be contrived. But, before that, an intensive and substantive analysis of Iranian foreign policy/strategic objectives and intentions would have to be undertaken. Otherwise, constant reiteration of an Iranian strategic threat in all and every possible forum might take on a momentum of its own.

Looking at recent developments, Iran has shown a willingness to engage in diplomatic exchanges over the developments in northern Iraq. The foreign ministers of Turkey, Syria and Iran have conducted two trilateral meetings so far - Ankara in November and Damascus in February - with a third planned in Tehran in a couple of months. Tehran and Ankara, long viewed as rivals for the hearts and minds (and the economies) of the newly- emergent Central Asian republics have not clashed over the issue in any significant way so far. Iran clearly has a "southern Azerbaijan" problem, but that could be handled within accepted political norms and diplomatic framework.

For those who feel the metallic chill of Iranian rearmament (and the possibility that it may contain an NBC program), it is entirely legitimate to engage in painstaking analysis and debate over the correct strategic evaluation of the developing situation - especially while the trauma of 1990-91 is still fresh in so many minds. Perhaps this conference will be helpful in sorting out the precise nature of threats involved and working out innovative and procedural ways in dealing with them.

Chapter 2
Security Impossible to Achieve, a Region Impossible to Define

*Ghassan Salamé**

A fundamental review of our approach to security in the Middle East has yet to be carried out. We will hold in this paper that those "experts" in strategic analysis who are ignorant of political matters, ill-informed about the culture of the region, indifferent to social developments and over-confident of the scientific relevance of the concept of the "Middle East" have to date produced a body of literature which, taken together, is often boring to read, rarely imaginative and difficult to translate into political options. Where the Middle East is concerned, appeals for disarmament are so imbued with hypocrisy (given the key role of the region in the arms market) that in most cases they are ridiculous. The four meetings devoted to regional arms control as a part of the multilateral negotiations on the current peace process have hardly led to the emergence of a genuine consensus, in addition to which Lebanon and Syria have declared that they will only participate when real progress has been made in the bilateral negotiations. The available literature is too often repetitive, outmoded, at best a listing of the aircraft, missiles and tanks deployed in the area, a listing which is characterized by greater or lesser alarmism, depending on the prejudices of the authors, and greater and lesser accuracy, depending on the quality of the information used.

"Experts", confident in their calculations, have depicted the Iraqi army as No 4 in the world without having yet explained convincingly what really happened to it when hostilities began in Kuwait. They are generally too obsessed by technological developments to provide us with information on the actual profile and possible behaviour of those handling the technology. Insensitive to economic and social constraints, they quantify the military programmes of the parties while ignoring broader options in the budgetary field. Their minds clouded by States, governments in power and "national" armies, they tend to forget that "reasons of regime" to often prevail over reasons of State, and that armies are more often praetorian than national in nature, and they give excessive weight to official views in security matters.

Their soldiers seem reified, detached from the societies from which they come, counted but ill-understood. A study of the military in the Middle East has yet to be carried out, not so much in terms of their political ramifications (where the ground has already been cleared by Finer, Perlmutter, Abd el-Malek and others) as in their precise function as an apparatus of power and a war machine. Between the politicization of the military (a classical discipline for over three decades now, particularly since the publication of Finer's *Men on Horseback*) and the counting of equipment (in various military balances), there is a still little-explored intermediate zone, that of military decision-making - which is of course indissociable from political decision-making and above and beyond this, that of the precise function of the military in society in terms of the precise perception of threat by those who hold power.

I. Reasons of State and "Reasons of Regime"

Hence the relevance of a number of epistemological prerequisites, the first of which relates to the geographical context of the survey. We will not repeat here the ritual polemics concerning the various possible definitions of "Middle East", which cover such a wide range that some reduce the

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Middle East to no more than the Israel-Arab conflict while others extend it "from Marrakesh to Bangladesh", to use a formula well known in Foggy Bottom. This question is far from academic: to speak of security is to define a threat and hence to pinpoint its alleged source geographically; to define a balance of forces is to determine the participants, governmental or not, that should be included in the equation. The Middle East is an area where it is practically impossible to draw the boundaries, and hence to determine who must be taken into account in dealing with security equations or the causes of a lack of security. Should the Maghreb be included, for example? Does Iran constitute a military threat for Israel, or for Egypt? Is the Horn of Africa really a source of concern for Cairo? Must Turkey henceforth be included in the regional balance of forces? Has the collapse of the Soviet empire really pushed central Asia into Middle East equations? These questions prompt replies which vary greatly from one leader to another, and from one analyst to another, and this covers the area in a geo-epistemological fog which make efforts to define the theatre and list the participants either impossible, or at least always subject to dispute, the wisest approach being no doubt to regard the Middle East - as much as Europe, if not more so - as an elastic concept.

Over an area whose contours are impossible to define, and in the absence of a central balance of forces which would play an organizing role in the region, one might view security in terms of a *powder trail*: once the USSR had developed a nuclear capability, China could do no less, and this led India to develop its own capabilities, thus encouraging Pakistan to do likewise. Iran and Iraq could not but dream of acquiring such weapons now that Pakistan on one side, and Israel on the other, possessed them. Egypt and Syria could not be outdone, nor Libya, and this extended the pursuit of nuclear power westwards, towards Algeria and inevitably Morocco. This is a half-historical, half-imaginary scenario, the essential point being of course that it may easily be imagined. It reflects the reality, confirmed repeatedly but perhaps never as acutely as in this region, of the fluidity of analytical frameworks, the ceaseless mobility of the threat, the inherently diffuse nature of the feeling of lack of security. This geographical diffusion of the threat, in a regional system whose boundaries are uncertain and whose existence is in doubt, obviously leads some participants to fill their speeches, if not their minds, with ever more numerous potential sources of danger: the former Israeli Minister of Defence defined as a danger zone, and therefore a zone of potential intervention, a theatre stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, and in the 1980s his country developed ballistic capabilities that could reach a good part of the territory of the Soviet Union. The USSR, meanwhile, had often put forward the idea that its closeness to the area gave it rights that distant Powers, and particularly Atlantic Powers, could not claim.

Second epistemological prerequisite: arms purchases are not, as a common but false assumption suggests, necessarily linked to their possible or actual use, even as a deterrent. The classical correlation between the acuteness of a perceived threat and the level of acquisition of new weapons is therefore difficult to verify. This is still more true of the correlation between a particular weapons system and the identification of the hostile element. Many factors come into play which have little to do with a genuine military strategy of acquisition. It is true that a rationalization exercise, of technocratic origin, can always come into play, before or after a decision is taken, to justify arms purchases or the choice of one weapons system rather than another. But it would be naive to be satisfied with these justifications, to take them at face value or imagine that they constituted the necessarily crucial factors in the decision. Considerations of prestige or diplomacy or, for the highly placed, the wish to pocket fat commissions on a deal, often play an essential role. This is why the correlation between the acquisition of a given weapon and a long-term military strategy, though commonly drawn all over the world, is still moot. Plainly put, it would be quite hazardous to infer mechanically from a series of military acquisitions an alleged specific threat by the purchaser or the truth about his overall approach to security.

Another epistemological prerequisite: a threat against who, exactly? One of the fundamental weaknesses of the dominant approach is its legal-rational orientation, to use Max Weber's expression. It speaks of States as if those ruling them acted in a framework of "national interests" corresponding to States for which they were responsible. Without going so far as to say that the State is an "imported" structure (to adopt the title of Bertrand Badie's latest work[1]) which has no future, it must be acknowledged that defining "national interests" is a kind of surrealistic exercise in most of the cases in question. For in principle it is reasons of State that govern reasons to acquire arms. But the State, in many cases in the Middle East, is no more than the external formal framework and geographical limit of an authority or a regime whose logic is all the more difficult to define in that it is camouflaged as reasons of State. We will hold here that regimes are more often identified as sources of a threat that States are, which means that a State may suddenly change from being a "friend" to being an "enemy" solely as the result of a *coup d'état* or a change in its ruling élite. Since the State has not properly taken root, but is perceived as a temporary structure, or at least one which is reversible in most cases, the threat stems from the *hic et nunc* policy of a neighbouring regime more often than from the allegedly "eternal" ambitions of a nearby State.

The superficial nature of the States means that interaction between them, with a few exceptions, is strongly influenced by the immediate present or the very near future, and not by the strategic considerations of ancient nations. Historical enmities take non-State-related forms: Sunni/Shia; *dar al-Islam/dar al-harb*; Arab/Persian; Turk/Arab/Persian. These categories are undoubtedly emotionally effective reference points in the collective memory, and that is why they can be effectively manipulated when required by a particular regime in the area. However, the problem is that these are categories out of keeping with the reality of today's States. The myths which are politically most effective thus end up without a State-based political apparatus in which they can take shape, and the States find themselves lacking powerful myths that are proper to them: this is perhaps the central paradox which makes it unreal to draw facile links between a State and its security. Peremptorily asserting that a correlation exists when its two elements are constantly called into question does not necessarily help to make it clearer. The fragility of State boundaries, the absence - or at least the weakness - of modes of democratic legitimation and the persistence of profound nostalgia for supra-State political structures (pan-Arabism, for example, or the Islamic *umma*, or more limited mythical constructs such as "historical Syria" or the Maghreb) prompt the existing regimes to seek a basis for legitimation beyond their borders through interference, military intervention, corruption, various forms of support for opposition forces in neighbouring countries, explicit calls for the toppling of regimes in power, etc. Now, legitimation through expansion immediately requires a regime to pit itself militarily, if possible in a dramatic manner, against its neighbour and rival. In no way will the military effort be explicitly linked with this rivalry between countries and between regimes, but this rivalry will be strongly present in people's minds. The conflict between Arab and Islamic regimes, endemic since these countries acceded to independence, is also a permanent struggle for the appropriation of fertile myths in an environment where States have not really succeeded in transforming themselves into nations and thereby acquiring internal myths that contribute to their social cohesion. The dominance of more or less authoritarian power structures throughout the area exacerbates this search for cross-frontier myths: it always imposes less of a burden on an authoritarian regime to claim to be the repository of a fundamental myth than to represent a given people democratically. This is why those who conclude from the intense inter-Arab rivalry (which sometimes deteriorates into armed conflicts) that the pan-Arab idea is dead are mistaken in their analysis. On the contrary, this idea survives and flourishes in rivalry and conflict, as other ideas feed on co-operation.

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[1] Bertrand Badie, *L'Etat importé*, Fayard, Paris, 1993.

This lack of correspondence between State and myth is by no means specific to Arab and Muslim countries. It is much more acute in Israel, where security considerations inevitably shift from the rational analysis of the actual threat posed to the State of Israel by its neighbours to the invocation of an extremely painful recent past. The fact that this past affected Jews rather than Israelis, that its venue was Europe and not the Middle East, that the Arabs had nothing to do with the Second World War, still less the Holocaust - these are matters which are hard to reconcile with the feeling of lack of security in Israel. As a result, a profound misunderstanding complicates efforts to accommodate the security needs of either side: the memory of the Holocaust reinforces the search for absolute security, which the Arabs, who are fundamentally outsiders to European history, would find it difficult to supply, even if they decided to do so. Yet on the other side, the Arabs are too conscious of Israel's military and technological supremacy and its territorial expansionism (in particular in the shape of its continuing and alarming refusal to fix its own borders) to contemplate the legitimation of this supremacy and this expansionism, a legitimation which would have its roots elsewhere, in other times, in a biblical mythology which they could not accept, still less endorse. Israel's basic position - that there will be no second Holocaust - is practically incomprehensible to its adversaries, while the Israelis appear indifferent to the fact that they are fundamentally viewed as insatiable plunderers from outside the area who invoke past tragedies in order to impose present domination.

This lack of correspondence between myth and State places the regime at the centre of all calculations, and its interests at the focus of any analysis, since it is the regime (and not the State) which can take up a specific myth (the Arab nation, the Islamic nation, the history of the Jewish people, the Persian nation, pan-Turanianism, etc.) and exploit it in a legitimation exercise in which a regime (and often a particular individual at the head of this regime) seeks to present itself as the bearer of a particular myth which is capable of justifying operations on a regional scale, which elsewhere could be readily condemned in the name of the principle of non-interference. Behind the actions taken by Syria, Iraq or Saudi Arabia, it will always be necessary to seek the calculations made by regimes as much as, if not more than, reasons of State, and day-to-day policy takes shape around individual decisions, those of Nasser, Saddam, Khomeini or Hassan II. As a result, vital military decisions may remain inexplicable if "reasons of regime" are not cited, at least as contributory factors, with reasons of State. How else can we explain the manner, surprising to say the least, in which the Iraqis withdrew from Kuwait, the Syrian shilly-shallying in Lebanon or the delays in the introduction of compulsory military service in the Saudi kingdom and the other petro-monarchies? These are steps taken by regimes anxious to survive, rather than positions adopted by States concerned about security.

While "reasons of regime" often prevail over reasons of State, the praetorianization of the army is becoming very common, since the latter is the perfect incarnation of the former. In most of the cases considered here, the essential function of the army is a domestic one. The doubling of the manpower of the Syrian army between 1978 and 1984 was presented by the proponents of the dominant approach as being linked to the Camp David agreements and a Syrian resolve to establish "strategic parity" with Israel after Egypt removed itself from the Israel-Arab military equation. It is true that this official motivation, which was taken at face value by Syria's adversaries, may have underline certain decisions taken at the time (particularly regarding air force and missile capabilities), but it would be naive for an objective observer to fail to connect this effort at the time with the regime's internal problems (particularly the deadly challenge then posed by the Muslim Brotherhood), which had nearly led to its overthrow. The loyalty of the officer corps to the current regime therefore becomes a predominant criterion, and this does not fail to have an effect on the always distorted representation of society within the armed forces (which, in Syria or Iraq, is extreme as a result of the massive over-representation of supposedly loyalist segments of society

in the officer corps), making it impossible in practice to create a genuinely national army of the Valmy type (although in principle every effort is made to do so).

If reasons of State are often merely a mask for "reasons of regime", the location of the threat becomes fundamentally internal while the external threat is credited with a level of gravity commensurate with its potential domestic effects rather than its inherent seriousness. A substantial part of the surrealism surrounding the Israel-Arab conflict (and one of the fundamental reasons for Israel's success in the media) lies precisely in the seriousness with which the redoubtable Israeli propaganda machine pretends to take Arab threats. Israel has intelligently taken to over-valuing the declarations of Arab hostility towards it, not so much because the Israelis are unaware of the domestic functions of this legitimation of Arab armament on the grounds of an external threat, as because these declarations, while internally useful to the Arab regimes, were also useful to Israel externally. The Arab regimes masked an at least partially praetorian logic by brandishing the Israeli threat. Israel brandished the hostile declarations of the Arab regimes in order to secure new arms purchases and new diplomatic successes abroad. Thus the same words could benefit both those delivering them and their adversaries, in a hall of mirrors that some "experts" are slow in condemning, while others are completely taken in by it.

As a result the perception of security is much less territorialized than elsewhere. It can never be stressed enough that public international law, that of Grotius, Vitoria and the ICJ, is strongly influenced by the concept of national territory, frontiers and sovereignty. But this was originally, of course, a very specific (European) cultural tradition, however universal it may have become subsequently. In places where the nomadic tradition (with an attachment to territory which is necessarily less marked than in areas sedentarized at an earlier stage) has been dominant, where political identification has been determined more by lineage than by actual residence, where religious faith has often determined place of residence rather than the reverse, territoriality is a recent category whose roots do not go deep. As a result the perception of security cannot readily be projected on to geographical configurations: there are neither protective Pyrenees nor Vosges, but fundamentally a sort of permanent competition between *asabiyyas*, each seeking to dominate the other or at least render it dependent. A major part of the history of the region may thus be explained in terms of rivalry (and particularly Saudi-Hashemite rivalry) not so much between territorialized countries as between dynasties whose territorial domain was not only undefined but even mobile: for example, the Hashemites succeeded in not only extending but actually shifting their dynastic aspirations from Mecca to Damascus, from Baghdad to Amman, from Basra to Jerusalem over a period of barely two or three decades. They could hardly maintain any hereditary enemy (national if not dynastic) when they were first installed then later removed by the British, and when their relationship with Israel was made up of a combination of "collusions" (to quote from the title of a book by Avi Shlaim) and collisions (as in 1967).

II. A Belligenic Petro-Dinar

Above and beyond these epistemological questions, the lack of security in the region seems to be caused, or at least aggravated, by a series of factors specific to the region which are superimposed on others that may be observed elsewhere (and which will not be enumerated here). We will select a few of these, illustratively rather than exhaustively.

The first of these factors is the reality of the strategic stakes in this part of the world, and particularly that of *oil*. A key correlation in the security field (though one which is far from being spelt out) is to be sought between the discovery of the huge oil deposits of the Middle East and the creation of most of the States in the region at around the same time. These two phenomena are not solely contemporaneous (though this too has not been sufficiently noted) but also strongly interrelated. The northern borders of Iraq were delimited with Mosul oil in mind. Algeria's present

borders may be accounted for in terms of Saharan reserves. Still more important, the system of States in the Gulf, which was largely established by the (British-convened) conference of Uqayr in 1922, was largely determined by oil-related calculations. The result is that oil is the guarantee of the very survival of the oil-producing States as States, and that oil reserves account, for example, for the existence of a State such as Qatar and equally the non-existence of a sovereign State corresponding to the large tribe of the Qawassim. The Kurdish tragedy is more or less linked to the Kirkuk reserves, and the unitary existence of Libya to calculations of the same order.

The consequence is, first, that as oil is a finite product, it is difficult to guarantee the survival of many States beyond the life of their energy reserves. This is a taboo subject, particularly for those directly concerned. But what rulers cannot express, analysts must address. The world has certainly witnessed an almost cancerous proliferation of "sovereign States" since the beginning of this century, a phenomenon which has become further accentuated since the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the USSR and the breakup of Yugoslavia. But this phenomenon would appear to be perfectly reversible if we remember that the previous century witnessed a diametrically opposed trend towards a reduction in the number of States as a result of German and Italian unification and colonial expansion. Above and beyond questions of internal cohesion and chances of survival, such a correlation between the existence of certain States and their function as producers of a finite resource poses a problem, and in fact lies at the very centre of the taboo area in the field of security.

A further consequence, over a shorter term, is that as long as oil flows, and as long as it constitutes a strategic resource, it will be impossible to modify the territorial status quo with impunity. Saddam Hussein learned this lesson to his cost (or rather that of Iraq), as did Nasser before him in his (mis)adventure in Yemen, but Peter Odell had already noted more than 30 years ago that the Western Powers favour the status quo in areas which produce strategic raw materials.[2] Dependence on oil for the creation of certain States (original sin) is thus combined with a client relationship with the same Western Powers which are invited to defend, if necessary by force, a status quo that is under permanent threat. Innumerable reasons may be sought for the spectacular intervention by Washington and its allies in the Kuwait affair; the most banal but not the least convincing remains the fact that 10 per cent of all oil reserves lie under the hot sands of the emirate. We will not deny the existence of other factors, but oil is far and away the least incontestable, the most decisive - and the least discussed.

As nature has caused oil to be so unevenly distributed, it will always constitute a prime source of conflict. We have pursued elsewhere the thesis that the political economy of the region is strongly influenced by the logic of extortion, whereby the oil-producing countries always have a protector/plunderer at hand to force them to pay for the protection it provides, or to plunder their resources by force if they prove too recalcitrant.[3] The example that comes immediately to mind is of course the long-running one of Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which succeeded in obtaining large contributions from the petromonarchies of the Gulf for its military effort to obstruct the exporting of the Khomeinist revolution (1980-1988), before exchanging its role as a protective elder brother for that of a plundering neighbour once the Iranian threat was no longer acute. But this example should not obscure the general rule: this shift from protector to threat is by no means specific to Iraq, still less to Saddam Hussein. Decades earlier, Nasser had protected Kuwait against General Kassem's annexationist ambitions, despite himself posing an immediate threat to Saudi Arabia via Yemen at the same time (1962-1967). The reluctance of the member countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council to implement the famous "Damascus Declaration", which had been wrung from them *in extremis* during the weeks following the Gulf war, is another symptom of the

[2] Peter Odell, *Oil Power*, Penguin, numerous editions.

[3] Ghassan Salamé, "Le Golfe un an après: un pétro-dinar belligène", *Maghreb-Machrek*, No 133, July 1991.

awareness, deeply rooted in the oil-producing countries, that their protectors of today may cost them very dear or even become tomorrow's plunderers.

A last consequence is that the importing countries, many of which have more than adequate military capabilities, will in the medium term retain a special interest in the region and a continuing readiness to intervene there. Here too, there is an interesting correlation between the conversion of the United States from a net exporting State to a net importing State and the rise of American military interventionism in the Middle East region. For many years Washington had avoided military intervention in this part of the world, for complex reasons relating to the sensitive nature of the area, its proximity to the USSR or the existence of local clients capable of defending their own interests and those of the West. With the exception of an extremely limited operation in 1958, the United States - though possessing a military presence in Europe and active elsewhere in the world - lived through the Cold War without really making use of its military power in this part of the world. In 1980, a new state of affairs came into being with a botched attempt to free the Tehran hostages by force, followed by the bombardment of Syrian positions in Lebanon (1983), personally targeted bombing of Qaddafi's Libya (1986), direct attacks against the Iranian navy (1988), a spectacular war against Iraq (1991) and large-scale deployment in Somalia (1992). These interventions obviously differ in their objectives, their scale and their effects. Yet despite their differences they also show a relatively recent readiness on the part of the United States to engage in military intervention in the Middle East; this is historically new and difficult to dissociate from the conversion of the United States to a net oil importer at the beginning of the 1980s.

The oil factor gives rise to a second: the availability, on the spot or from friendly Powers, of generous *characters funding* for military programmes, which in turn play a role in exacerbating the "powder trail" effect suggested above. This funding has very specific characteristics:

1. First of all, these are relatively large, if not downright exceptional sums: no Third World region witnessed a flow of more than $2,000 billion over barely one decade (1973-1982). This is what happened to well under a dozen oil-producing countries in the region. With two thirds of proven world oil reserves concentrated in this area, these revenues, though they have seriously diminished since 1982 because of falls in production and in prices, remain at absolutely enviable levels.

    Above and beyond oil revenues, other, no less substantial, financial flows characterize this region. We will not add up here the hundreds of billions of dollars that Israel has received since its establishment from its friends and protectors, governmental and private, throughout the world, making it undoubtedly the most generously aided country. We will simply mention as an example that American assistance in various forms to the Jewish State in recent years was equivalent to five times total American assistance to almost 50 black African countries together. Since the Camp David agreements were signed, Israel and Egypt between them have monopolized more than 40 per cent of United States external aid. Some countries, such as Egypt, also benefit from what may be called a "strategic rent", as a result of their aligning themselves with the diplomatic stances of their creditors (leading, *inter alia*, to the cancellation of $17 billion worth of external debt following the Gulf war).

2. Secondly, these are funds placed in the hands of authoritarian governments which have very considerable independence in laying down budget priorities in comparison with the needs and aspirations of their societies. We will mention here only for the record the fact that in some cases oil revenues fall under the ruler's own budget, from which a part is then deducted for the operation of the State apparatus. But beyond this extreme case, the facts are there, involving budgets over which the representatives of society have little control, whether the regime is of the patrimonial-traditional or the authoritarian-militarized type. This allows rulers very

considerable room for manoeuvre, which for complex reasons favours military expenditure over civilian expenditure.

3. Lastly, these are funds which the industrialized, oil-importing countries have made every effort to recycle to their own benefit, in particular by encouraging large-scale deliveries of weapons which may or may not be necessary for the defence of the oil-producing countries.

The most obvious effect of the availability of these funds is that the Middle East is in fact a vital market for arms suppliers. For the year 1988, for example, military expenditure in the Middle East accounted for 30.1 per cent of public expenditure (8.8 per cent of GNP), compared with 17.2 per cent in Europe (3.8 per cent of GNP), 13.6 per cent in Africa (4.2 per cent of GNP) and 6.9 per cent (less than a quarter) in Latin America (1.3 per cent of GNP). For the same year, per capita military expenditure stood at $344 for the Middle East, 31 times as much as in Europe ($11) and 13 times as much as in Latin America ($27); the figure for Africa was $25. The Middle East has also recorded the highest ratio of military personnel to population in the world, with 18.3 per thousand, compared with 9.1 in the United States, 11.1 in Europe, 3.7 in Latin America and 2.9 in Africa*. The Middle East outdoes all the regions of the world in terms of the militarization of its economies and its societies, and far outweighs the other regions of the non-industrialized world as an arms market.

Above and beyond these facts, it must be acknowledged that the combination of factors such as the presence of such funds, the technological and military ignorance of the ruling elites, the speed with which pétro-dollars have been recycled to the benefit of the industrialized countries and the continuing nature of conflicts which call the very existence of the States into question exacerbates the lack of correspondence between military programmes and actual defence needs. The Leclerc tank has by no means the same function or the same significance when it forms an integral part of French forces or those of the United Arab Emirates; Israeli Mirages have been used much more often than their French counterparts. Decisions concerning arms purchases have in practice been made in fundamentally different circumstances, even when the weapon is absolutely identical. Hence the very superficial character of compilations of the "military balance" type.

The question of whether these weapons are useful remains a legitimate one. In particular, it may be asked to what extent the weapons sold to Kuwait or Saudi Arabia actually played a role in the "liberation" of the former when Iraq had invaded and annexed it. Beyond this symbolic case, it is legitimate to ask whether it would not be better to equip certain threatened areas with the infrastructure required for the external deployment of protective forces, rather than with over-sophisticated weapons. Indeed, it would seem that this is an issue being hotly discussed both among senior officers locally and in Western capitals. Nevertheless, arms contracts are too serious to be left to generals alone, and considerations of external balance and corporate strategy often prevail over the arguments of the military.

The third factor is an obvious one: the endemic proliferation and specific nature of *civilian and regional conflicts*, with an increasingly disquieting interpenetration of the civilian and regional dimensions, which overlap all the more here since the State is weak and its boundaries largely a formality. Conflicts in the area are not truly territorial in nature. Since in the modern world the lingua franca of claim-making is a territorial one, the participants in conflicts in this area tend to translate their claims, their ambitions and their recriminations into territorial terms. After all, this is what the world finds it easiest to understand: the conflict between Algeria and Morocco is presented as one concerning the future of Western Sahara, and the conflict between Chad and Libya as being about sovereignty over the Aouzou strip. The current conflict between Egypt and the Sudan is crystallized in the contested region of Halayeb. Between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, frontier delimitation would pose a problem, just as between the Saudi kingdom and Qatar (where there was a border incident in December 1992) or the United Arab Emirates or even Kuwait. The Gulf war

was officially a conflict about territory, that of Kuwait, claimed by Iraq and liberated by the coalition. More than any other, the issue of the Arab territories occupied in 1967 lies at the heart of what is known as the Israel-Arab conflict.

Yet it would be wrong to believe that territorial disputes are as crucial as defining regional conflictuality as the region's leaders would have us believe. Here, as sometimes elsewhere in the world, the territorial conflict serves more as a focal point for grievances, a point of crystallization for a conflictuality which is more immaterial and dares not advance overtly. Who could Cairo and Khartoum persuade that it is indeed the zone of Halayeb which lies at the origin of their disagreement? What territorial stakes could account for the acute and permanent conflictuality between Iraq and Syria, both of which are governed in the name of the Ba'ath party? Who could Arabs and Israelis convince that their conflict is primarily territorial? Without wishing to deny the fact, it must be acknowledged that these adversaries speak in territorial terms to ensure that the world understands them, because the territorial issue seems rational, or at least tangible, and in any event circumscribable, an essential characteristic for those who have turned conflict resolution into a kind of profession if not a religion. But often, too often, conflict over a village, a strip or a pass is no more than the localized, small-scale reflection of a political, tribal or even religious conflictuality which, however, would make no sense in today's world.

Although they are not completely unique, it is very difficult to reduce the conflicts in the region to spacial terms. This is why it is always difficult to rely on territorial compromise to guarantee a lasting peace. Such compromises play a major role in reducing tension, restoring non-existent trust and introducing a spirit of mutual tolerance. Hence they are extremely useful and it is impossible to imagine, for example, how progress might be made one day in solving the Israel-Arab conflict if Israel persists in its refusal to return the territories occupied in 1967, specifically the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But the cold peace which has been established between Egypt and Israel has remained cold despite the return of the whole of Sinai, including the Taba area, to Egypt. The point is that the two parties recognize that lasting peace cannot fail to take account of other factors, in particular the fact that Egypt cannot truly normalize its relations with Israel while Israel maintains its hostility to the very principle of self-determination for the Palestinians. In Israel, some people thought that it was possible, and analysts were found in Egypt to say that, after all, the Palestinian question was only a matter which did not involve Egypt, but recent years have clearly shown that that was not the case.

The point is that the citizens of each of these States, even the Egyptians, cannot content themselves with an identity based on the State. A distinguished European Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed surprise that Maghreb Arabs could become so noisily agitated at the Gulf war. "They live 4,000 kilometres away". Yes, but other factors, of common history, language and religion, draw them together still more clearly. Middle East conflictuality thus draws not only on diffuse threats but also on underground solidarities. If these solidarities can be manipulated by one regime or another, it is because they exist in the first place in the political culture. Well before Nasserism and Ba'athism made pan-Arabism a sort of State religion, generations of young schoolchildren had chanted that their motherland stretched "from Baghdad to Tétouan". And if a Khomeinist minister felt able to assert that "Islam knew no frontiers", it is because he could rightly believe that some of his hearers shared his views. There have been too many reports of the death of Arab nationalism or pan-Islamism in recent years for anyone to think today that a system à la Peace of Westphalia has taken firm root in the region.

Hence the extreme seriousness of the recent erosion of which the phenomenon of the State is the principal victim. After decades in which State sovereignty seemed to be self-evident, a new post-Cold War international law is taking shape under our eyes and, in the name of humanitarian missions, the defence of human rights and minority rights, or emergency needs, is in the process of explicitly undermining the sovereignty of States. This development would have been wholly

welcome if it had not been accompanied by a serious erosion of State power within State borders. The welfare state of past decades is now bending under the weight of high population, chaotic urbanization and economic mismanagement which in some cases is irremediable. Therefore it is States with feet of clay that are being attacked by this *new international right of interference*. It is eroding the influence of State machinery which is already collapsing in each of these societies.

This is why this interference is in the process of giving birth to a new conflictuality. In the face of this interference, the countries of the region are experiencing a veritable resurgence of populist and xenophobic sentiment, often draped in religious colours. In fact, the new situation is rather paradoxical, as if the end of the Cold War and the development of Western interventionism in a variety of forms had so far had the effect of introducing a new gap between those calling for yet more interventionism and others clinging to the classical concepts of sovereignty. Regional alliances and organizations are losing impact; the ideal of community in non-alignment, still sacred yesterday, is losing its force before our eyes; the socio-economic gap between North and South and the more cultural gap between East and West are being challenged. And, following this collapse, less spectacular but no less real than the one which occurred in eastern Europe, Arab and Islamic countries are increasingly divided between those who call for help from the West to deal with a bloody dictator, an unscrupulous neighbour, a revolution planning to export its slogans, and others who denounce all this in the name of national independence, anti-imperialism or, more commonly, Islam. On the one side an appeal to the imperial Powers, on the other a slipping into xenophobic chauvinism - the mix of fascination and repulsion that the West has exerted on the peoples of this region is dissolving into an agonized SOS on the part of those who depend on the West for their survival and a hue and cry against the return of the white man on the part of their opponents. A cultural and ideological pupa is hatching under our eyes, leaving the West bewildered, if not simply indifferent.

In this way a disquieting silence, interrupted by new calls for firmness, has settled over the Iraqi question, which has been entrusted in practice to the West and the United States in particular. The relentless pursuit of this country, which is admittedly guilty of invading its neighbour, is likely to exacerbate the feeling of injustice that is sweeping the region. Not that Saddam Hussein is particularly charismatic, not that the invasion of Kuwait was supported by the Arabs. But there remains too great a contrast between the remorseless pursuit of an Arab and Muslim country and shameless complaisance *vis-à-vis* Milosevic, Rabin and other leaders who repeatedly and explicitly admit how little store they set by the resolutions of the Security Council. Thus the 30-nation coalition has shrunk to three Western countries which resumed their attacks against Iraq at the beginning of this year while many of their former allies, particularly inside the region, took care to dissociate themselves from that action. This case cannot be left indefinitely to the bravado of Bush and Clinton. The lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iraq must be taken up again for discussion, since three whole years have clearly shown that the population of Iraq has suffered from them much more than the current regime and that the sanctions were more a matter of private harassment than part of a strategy for the establishment of a "new world order".

In this environment already characterized by a high level of conflictuality, *the Israel-Arab conflict* has added an extremely complex dimension. This conflict displays several features:

1. A continuous oscillation between local and regional aspects: it is true that the conflict began as a localized conflict between the Palestinian population and Jewish settlers. After the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the Palestinian dimension was somewhat obscured by a process of intensive regionalization which turned the conflict into the principal focal point for regional forces and even extra regional forces competing with one another, particularly the two Super-Powers. With the creation of the PLO and above all the beginning of the Palestinian uprising, the local dimension returned to the fore, only to be threatened once again by a

re-regionalization of the conflict through the Islamic movement. This oscillation makes the conflict more difficult to solve, as all its many dimensions must be addressed simultaneously.

2. An excessive propensity to internationalization, which was clearly illustrated in the successful attempts to model it on the East-West conflict during the decades of the Cold War, a tendency which was sharply demonstrated by the nuclear alerts in the United States and the USSR that accompanied the two Israel-Arab wars of 1967 and 1973. Today Israel is moving towards a new form of internationalization by attempting to present its occupation and its repression of Palestine national feeling as an integral part of a universal struggle against "Islamic fundamentalism". It is clear that Israel has an interest in this continuing attempt to "dissolve" its own interests in a broader framework in which it features as an advance bastion of an international coalition - against the USSR yesterday, today against "terrorism" and tomorrow, perhaps, against a "reawakened" Islamic movement.

3. A predisposition to be the cause of exacerbated competition in terms of advanced military technology. The feeling of isolation and fundamental vulnerability which may be observed so extensively in Israel prompts the country to acquire an increasingly advanced arsenal to ensure that "quality can always prevail over quantity". However, since Zionist doctrine is closely linked to territorial expansionism, Israel displays the twin characteristics of clinging very firmly both to its territorial acquisitions and to its technological supremacy. This dual concern makes the conflict hard to handle, since it is difficult for Israel's adversaries to accept that it should prevail on both counts. Pending a different equation involving these two factors (in which, for example, Israeli superiority in technical and military matters would be acknowledged against the return of territory), Israel is a key factor in the arms race and above all to date the sole vehicle for the nuclearization of the Middle East.

4. An unmistakable slippage of national, ideological or political categories into the religious field, which is much more dangerous, and is notable for being resistant to compromise, particularly when it is highly tribalized, which is largely the case. Israel may regard itself as a secular State; it is perceived by both its adversaries and its friends as a Jewish State. On the other hand, the attempts made by the PLO to present the conflict as a national and political one are suffering dangerous competition from the rise of religious movements among the Palestinians and throughout the region. This competition may of course ultimately prevail if a rapid solution is not found.

III. Reasons for Hope?

Despite this relatively pessimistic diagnosis, we may be reasonably optimistic as regards the coming years. New, major trends are emerging before our eyes which give grounds for thinking that the radical changes occurring throughout the world cannot leave this region untouched. Let us rapidly recapitulate some of these new factors and speculate concerning their impact.

1. The decline in oil revenues over the past 10 years or so, combined with large increases in the financial demands placed on States, particularly as a result of very high population growth, cannot but affect their capacity to engage in military spending. This is the central proposition of an excellent paper published recently.[4] Between 1980 and 1990, oil revenues fell by 37 per cent in Qatar, 45 per cent in Kuwait and 62 per cent in Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the external debt of most of the countries in the region has steadily worsened: in 1990 it stood at $16.6

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[4] Yahya M. Sadowski, *Scuds or Butter? The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1993.

billion in Syria, 23.5 billion for Morocco, 26.8 for Algeria and more than 40 billion for Egypt. This is compounded by an average rate of population growth of the order of 3 per cent in the region. Taken together, these factors are likely to lead Governments to curb their military expenditure. Voices are also being raised in the United States calling for an end to the dominance of the Middle East in foreign aid, and asserting that stability in Russia, for example, is at least as important to American interests as the well-being of Israelis. Moreover, the influence of the Gulf war, with a total bill estimated at $170 billion facing the participants in the region, will be felt for a long time to come. Finally, no one forecasts a spectacular recovery in oil prices in the next few years.

Sadowski is right to list these encouraging factors, and does so convincingly. At the same time, this itself also has its price. In the first place, the Gulf war was followed by spectacular purchases of weapons, rather than the reverse. Secondly, the very sensitive Jordanian proposal that the external debt of the countries in the region should be written off in exchange for substantial reductions in their military expenditure has remained a dead letter, like the five-party meetings, the promises made by George Bush or the negotiations within the multilateral talks. It will also be noted that the new Clinton Administration, true for once to its election promises, has undertaken to maintain or strengthen Israel's military supremacy, which by no means reassured the Arabs. Not to mention the fact that external inflows (oil, aid, etc.) remain substantial. And in addition, the same amount of money will buy more arms, particularly in the former Warsaw Pact countries, whose weaponry is currently on offer at very competitive prices.

At a deeper level, this drop in revenues is itself the cause of a new conflictuality, one that will not necessarily take the form of large contracts, which have become difficult to finance, but of an aggressive populism, which has often been characteristic of financially weak regimes all over the world. It should not be forgotten that it was difficulties in securing funding that pushed Iraq, like many other countries before it, into external expansionism. The inability of many countries to get their populations to accept new sacrifices, which until recently was a marginal phenomenon in this well-fed region, could become a permanent concern, especially as the area has already experienced an El Dorado period and the Governments might be unable to tell their peoples that this is now only a memory.

2. The end of the Cold War particularly devalued the strategic importance of the region, but it also enabled the West, and especially the Americans, to secure greater control over deliveries of arms to the region. However, supply-side constraints have failed in the past: there must be a drop in demand, and whatever the Chicago school may say, suppliers do not control the market, especially in military matters. We may feel relieved that, with the disappearance of global bipolarization, the client relationship between certain countries in the region and the major Powers has been diminished, if not completely ended.

But the conflicts in the region were not merely a reflection of the Cold War: the Israel-Arab conflict, for example, predated the Cold War, accompanied and became interwoven with it, and of course survived it. Premature extrapolations should therefore be avoided. As we have clearly seen elsewhere, and particularly in Europe, the end of the Cold War has been a cause of destabilization more often than an opportunity for conflict settlement. The same is true here, especially as arms suppliers are no longer restricted by political or strategic considerations; the pursuit of profit, Chinese or Korean style, could become Russian or Polish or even Czechoslovak.

3. Efforts are being made to settle conflicts, and first and foremost the Palestine conflict. The peace process launched in Madrid holds great promise. However, the initiators of this adventure place less emphasis on "peace" in this expression than on the "process". It will be difficult for good will, confidence-building measures and other diplomatic aids to settle the essential

problem, namely the Palestinians' right to a country. Only the recognition of this fact by their adversaries and occupying forces can speed up this process and deliver its results.

4.   Although one cannot truly speak of democratization, it should be noted that the military is ceasing to be a taboo area. Once a minimum degree of political participation is authorized, public questioning of the usefulness, effectiveness and transparency of military expenditure becomes inevitable. Even in a country like Saudi Arabia, it was noteworthy that the authors of a recent opposition leaflet devoted a whole section to the military issue and the uses of the armed forces. In Lebanon, a public debate has begun on the ideal size and precise functions of the army, which has at last been reunified after years of civil war. In Kuwait, members of parliament demonstrated great courage in questioning the Sabahs concerning the emirate's military expenditure. It is true that military matters, draped in the thick cloak of national security, with its untouchable status, from the last area to fall under the rule of transparency in public information. But it must be noted that this area is no longer so immune from questioning by citizens and leaders of opinion.

These are undoubtedly factors which justify a degree of optimism. But they are ambiguous factors in that they may switch into reverse, or generate a new conflictuality. Widespread impoverishment of governments, a peace process that is failing to produce tangible results, public vying for leadership in the field of security and armaments, a shift to pure profit-seeking on the part of arms manufacturers, a growing gap between rich and poor in the region, a substantial revitalization of the American commitment to Israel - all these are disquieting factors at the present time. But time is of the very essence: if ambitious and resolute steps towards conflict settlement are not taken immediately, stability among the rulers, one of the principal features of the last 20 years, will be called into question, and the world may have to deal with new rulers motivated by limited experience of affairs and probably by ideals, populist if not religious, which it will be difficult to accommodate.

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Chapter 3
Conflict in the Middle East and Displaced Persons

*Karim Atassi**

In this brief report, I would like to develop and to comment on one of the consequences of the conflicts that have afflicted the region for the past 45 years. Specifically, I want to focus on the millions of persons in the Middle East who have been displaced as a result of the conflicts in the area.

I. Displaced Population in the Middle East

Let me begin with a quick overview of the displaced population in the Middle East during the past few decades.

1. Refugees

The term "refugees" implies persons who have been forced to leave their country because of persecution in that country or a fear of persecution.

In the Middle East, in modern times, the outflow of refugees can be traced to the mass exodus of Palestinians into neighboring Arab States after the creation of the State of Israel. The on-going Arab/Israeli conflict has only served to increase the number of refugees in the Middle East. Examples of refugees include the inhabitants of the Syrian Golan heights who fled their homes following the Israeli occupation as well as the citizens of Southern Lebanon who escaped after the Israeli invasion in 1982.

Similarly, conflicts between the Arab States have contributed to the growing refugee population in the region. A recent example is the Gulf War, in 1991, which caused the outflow of Iraqi refugees to neighboring States such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Syria.

2. Internally Displaced Persons

Another major result of conflicts in the Middle East is the internal displacement of citizens within their own country. Refugees and internally displaced persons often share the same painful experience and have many similarities. Unlike refugees, however, internally displaced persons have not crossed an international border from their country into another.

The majority of the internally displaced persons in the Middle East are either located in Iraq or Lebanon. Although the UNHCR mandate does not extend to internally displaced persons, UNHCR has been able to provide them with some relief in certain instances. For example, during repatriation operations, UNHCR has faced situations where circumstances do not permit the repatriating refugee to return to his or her place of origin. In effect, the refugee becomes an internally displaced person in his or her country. Likewise, UNHCR has extended its mandate to include internally displaced persons at the request of the security general of the United Nations in Lebanon, in 1979, and in Iraq, after the Iraqi uprising.

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3. Evacuated Persons

With the outbreak of the Gulf War in 1991, which begun with the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the Middle East has experienced a new type of population movement: massive evacuations. The persons in this category are often known as "displaced persons" or "evacuated persons". Unlike refugees, evacuated persons did not flee from their country of origin. Likewise, evacuated persons cannot be labeled as internally displaced because they crossed an international border.

During the Gulf War, evacuated persons consisted of foreign workers, mainly Asians and Arabs who resided in Iraq and Kuwait before the crisis. From August until December 1990, over 700,000 evacuated persons entered Jordan in order to be repatriated to their home countries. Fortunately, the Jordanian government faced the emergency situation with a great sense of responsibility.

4. Economic Migrants

Economic migration in the Middle East encompasses two opposite movements.

First, oil producing countries attract many foreign workers, mainly Arabs and Asians. The Gulf has a tradition of receiving many workers from the Indian sub-continent. An estimated 5 millions foreigners were employed in the Gulf in the beginning of the 1990s. For the foreseeable future, the Gulf area will remain a major destination for foreign workers although changes in the composition of the foreign labor force both professionally and ethnically are beginning to emerge.

On the other hand, all Arab countries which do not produce oil have and are facing the emigration of many of its professional and highly skilled workers to Europe, North America, Australia and Gulf Arab States. Similarly, many students from these countries who study abroad fail to return home upon the completion of their education. In the long run, these countries are being drained of a precious resource, that is, the ingenuity, leadership, creativity and enterprise of its citizens. This outflow is also increased by those who voluntarily leave their countries for lack of political freedom.

5. Immigration

Currently, Israel is the only country in the Middle East which encourages immigration to that country. Since 1989, Israel is facing its largest influx of immigrants since the late 1940s and early 1950s. The 2 million Jews from the former Soviet Union represent the last largest Jewish community in the diaspora likely to immigrate to Israel.

6. Deportees

Recent world opinion has focused on the 400 Palestinians forcibly deported from the Palestinian occupied territories to Southern Lebanon. It is to be recalled that this is not the first deportation of Palestinians by Israel. Since 1967, Israeli authorities have deported 1,250 persons from the occupied territories.

7. Returnees

The last category, in the make-up of the population movement in the Middle East, is returnees. By this, I mean persons who have voluntarily decided to repatriate to their country of origin. This phenomenon often is the result of the resolution or attempted resolution of a conflict. An increase in the numbers of persons choosing to return home is an indication of the successful resolution of the problems which have devastated the region for the last 45 years. In this regard, it should be

mentioned that the biggest voluntary repatriation operation is now taking place to Afghanistan under the supervision of UNHCR.

II. Necessity of Humanitarian Relief for Displaced Populations

Regardless of the cause, be it war, civil strife, economic or political circumstances, these massive population movements have created a tremendous need for humanitarian relief. To that end, the United Nations has sought to provide assistance as needed. The relief activities undertaken by UN, in the Middle East, include providing assistance to Palestinians through UNWRA, the protection and assistance accorded to refugees by UNHCR, meeting the needs of the internally displaced citizens of Iraq and Lebanon with the help of UNHCR and UNICEF, the repatriation of Afghan refugees that is being co-ordinated by UNHCR and IOM, and the evacuation by UNDRO of some 700,000 third country nationals from Kuwait and Iraq through the neighboring countries during the Kuwait crisis in 1990.

Regional and local NGOs, such as the International Islamic Relief Organization, also play a critical role in providing humanitarian relief to displaced persons in the area which cannot be ignored.

III. Security Concerns as a Result of Population Displacement

Migration and displacement of populations impact directly on the security of both the receiving State and the country of origin. All will recall that it was the outflow of refugees from East to West Germany in the summer of 1989 which helped to bring down the Berlin Wall a few months later. At the 1991 London Conference of G-7 Nations, the most industrialized countries in the world expressed "their growing concern about worldwide migratory pressures".

Because of the connection between security and migration, population movements are now widely considered to be a national security problem. Since 1948, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt have welcomed large numbers of Palestinian refugees. As a result, the massive Palestinian presence in these countries has contributed to the increased tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Likewise, the growth of the Palestinian resistance movement has had a destabilizing effect on the internal security of some countries, especially with regards to Jordan and Lebanon.

Migration also affects the security of the sending State. When migration is the result of unemployment, the sending State may be dependent on its expatriate population as a national source of foreign currency. Jordan, Yemen and Egypt are examples of countries who rely on remittances from nationals abroad. Likewise, migration to other nations can be interpreted by the country of origin as a "safety valve" against internal dissidence.

More recently, the migration of Jews from the former Soviet Union will have a direct impact on the security of the region. This wave of immigrants has raised expectations among Israelis and fears among Arabs. On the one hand, many Israelis believe that these new settlers will enrich their country economically and invigorate the perception of Israel as a homeland for the Jews. On the other hand, many Arabs have not forgotten that Jewish immigration into the area between World War I and II radically altered the demographic population of then Palestine and resulted in a conflict that has plagued the Middle East for the past 45 years. Many Arabs believe that any new influx of Jewish immigrants to Israel will alter the *status quo* and accordingly, do not consider this resettlement operation to be a matter of Israeli internal affairs.

After 45 years of hostilities confidence can hardly be built between all parties unless litigious issues including immigration are clarified and solved.

IV. Prospects for the Resolution of Displaced Persons in the Area

What then are the prospects for the resolution of the problems created by the displacement of populations in the Middle East?

1. One can be reasonably optimistic with regards to the internally displaced population of Lebanon. The implementation of the Taif Agreement is an opportunity for the resolution of the long standing civil war. For the last 2 years, Lebanese can move about freely between East and West Beirut. Eventually, implementation of the Taif Agreement should lead to the return of displaced persons to their homes. Israel's withdrawal from Southern Lebanon will also permit those persons who fled the occupied areas to return home. However, this movement cannot succeed without the reconstruction of destroyed villages and ares.
2. The repatriation of Palestinian refugees is a major topic of the current Arab-Israel peace negotiations. This issue has been discussed in detail at the multilateral negotiations in Ottawa, Canada. While it is still too early to predict whether an agreement can or will be reached by negotiators, any repatriation decision must encompass a mechanism for its implementation. In that context, UNHCR may share with others its long experience in repatriation.

V. Conclusion

With the end of the Cold War, a new era is at hand. However, the legacy of the past must not be ignored. We are witnessing new opportunities to settle regional conflicts. Without a doubt, the resolution of the problems of displaced persons in the Middle East is essential to the stability and security of the region. For the past 45 years, this area has paid a huge human price because of political conflicts which have led to armed conflicts. The population of the Middle East has experienced that history can be tragic and unfair. For the first time in 45 years, all persons in the Middle East are jointly sharing the expectation of a just and comprehensive peace, because peace only may lead to both order and security.

Part II

Regional Arms Build-up and Arms Control

Chapter 4
The Regional Approach

*Mounir Zahran**

The discussions on regional approaches to disarmament cannot be taken in isolation of the global approaches; they are not mutually exclusive but are indeed mutually reinforcing. There is certainly an interrelationship between regional disarmament and global security, arms limitations and disarmament. Regional and global approaches to disarmament complement each other. Both should be pursued in order to promote regional and international peace and security.

It has been recognized that the regional approach to disarmament is considered to be one of the essential elements in the global efforts to strengthen international peace and security. On the other hand, the effective disarmament measures taken at the global level, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, would have a positive impact on regional disarmament efforts. By the same token, any regional measures should take into account the relationship between security in the region and international security as a whole. It is understood that any regional arrangement or measure of disarmament should respect and take into account the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Such arrangement should be made in conformity with international law including the principles of sovereign equality of all States, non-use or threat of use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers, the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

As far as the economic impact of regional disarmament, it has been recognized that earmarking resources for potentially destructive purposes is contrary to the need for sustainable social and economic development. Thus reduction in military expenditure following the conclusion of global, regional and bilateral disarmament agreements could yield resources to serve social and economic development, particularly in developing countries. Such disarmament agreements, including regional measures, should aim at the establishment of a military balance at the lowest level of armament without diminishing the security of each State belonging to the same region. Such measures should also aim at averting the capability for large-scale offensive and preemptive military attacks. Disarmament measures in one region should not lead to increasing arms transfers to other regions or to the displacement of military imbalance or tension from one region to the other. It has been universally agreed that the implementation of regional disarmament arrangements require the adoption, at the international level as well as at the regional level, of confidence-building and transparency measures. Moreover it should be stressed that compliance with disarmament agreements, including regional measures, depends on the adoption and the implementation of verification measures.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission adopted in 1980 "Guidelines for confidence-building measures at the global and regional levels". These guidelines have to be inspired by States in their endeavours to conclude regional arrangements for arms limitation and disarmament. Confidence-building measures comprise notification of large-scale military maneuvers, exchange of military data, reduction of military capabilities, open skies arrangements, dialogue and regular consultations and co-operation including in non-military fields encompassing political, economic,

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social and cultural spheres. Such measures adopted within the context of any particular region would reduce the risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation, thus fostering transparency and openness, ensuring mutual confidence and enhancing friendly relations between States belonging to same region. Such measures contribute to the maintenance of regional and international peace and security. This is the *"raison d'être"* behind the General Assembly's invitation and encouragement comprised in its resolution 47/52 G in its operative paragraph 10; which "invited... all States to conclude, whenever possible, agreements on arms limitation and confidence-building measures at the regional level, including those conducive to avoiding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction".

In addition, General Assembly Resolution 47/54 J in its operative paragraph 5 "Supports and encourages efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at regional and subregional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear-non-proliferation measures at regional and subregional levels".

The negotiation and implementation of disarmament measures in the Middle East has strategic significance because of its conflict potentials and its direct relationship to international peace and security. This is why Egypt stresses the importance of the follow up of paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, of 1978, concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, as a means to enhance international peace and security in the region.

In his report *Agenda For Peace*[1] which was elaborated pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, the Secretary General of the United Nations dealt with the challenges of the post Cold War period in areas of conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peace-building. Under chapter III of the "Agenda For Peace", entitled "Preventive Diplomacy", the Secretary General recommended the adoption of measures which would ease tension and/or create confidence. Among these measures he referred without elaboration to the establishment of demilitarized zones. The establishment of such zones is one of the means for the concretization of "regional disarmament".

Later in October 1992, on the occasion of "Disarmament Week", the Secretary General introduced another report to address the complex issues of disarmament and international security. The new report is entitled *New Dimensions of Arms Regulation and Disarmament in the Post-Cold War Era*.[2] The said report which completes the *Agenda for Peace* report, did not consider in direct terms "regional disarmament" as one of the challenges of the new era in the field of "disarmament and international security". The focus of the above mentioned report was on:

1. The integration of disarmament in the new international environment;
2. The globalization, by enhancing multilateralism; and
3. The revitalization of the role of the United Nation in the fields of disarmament and international security and referred to the UN efforts to deal with weapons of mass destruction, the proliferation of weapons, the arms transfers and, last but not least, the transparency in arms and other confidence-building measures.

While speaking about the multilateral approach to disarmament in the framework of globalization, the Secretary General said: "one can imagine numerous ways in which regional approaches could enhance the process of global arms reduction". He added that "regional and sub-regional organizations can further the globalization of disarmament, both in co-operation with each other and

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[1] Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations, "Agenda for Peace", United Nations, New York, 1992, pp. 13-19.

[2] Document A/C.1/47/7.

with the United Nations".[3] He also recommended to build upon and revitalize the past achievements in arms regulation and arms reduction and referred briefly to the multilateral realization of the experience of Africa, Asia and Latin America,[4] keeping in mind the existence of 11 global multilateral agreements, four regional multilateral agreements and 16 bilateral agreements.[5] These now reach 17 bilateral agreements following the signature in Moscow in January of 1993 of START II.

For its part, the Conference on Disarmament was more elaborate on the question of regional disarmament. The CD highlighted the crucial role of regional disarmament in the course of expressing its views pursuant to the General Assembly Resolution 47/422[6] on the above mentioned report of the Secretary General, entitled "New Dimensions..." In the view of the Conference on Disarmament "there is also a clear complementarity between regional and global approaches to arms limitation and disarmament. In this respect, the regional approach to disarmament is one of the essential elements in the global efforts to strengthen international peace and security, arms limitation and disarmament". The Conference added that "the objective of regional security should encourage universal adherence to global multilaterally negotiated disarmament agreements. In negotiating multilateral agreements, in particular in the field of confidence-building measures, the Conference should take into account all the security concerns of States in their regional context".[7]

For its part, Egypt has expressed its firm conviction of the importance of eliminating the hazards of the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East in order to avert the temptation of the States of the region to acquire such weapons, leading to the squandering of resources and opportunities for achieving prosperity for their peoples. This constitutes a grave threat to peace and security, both in the region and internationally. Against this background, Egypt together with Iran has put forward the initiative in 1974 for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Later, President Mubarak launched an initiative in April 1990 to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East. The latter initiative received wide international support *inter alia* by Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) in its operative paragraph 14. This initiative constitutes the most appropriate framework for a balanced treatment of all weapons of mass destruction on a reciprocal and even-handed basis. In the views transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations regarding his report entitled" New dimensions of arms regulations and disarmament in the post-Cold War era",[8] Egypt expressed its belief that "... the Security Council must assume its responsibilities under the Charter with a view to developing the appropriate framework to ensure the implementation of the two initiatives, for the consolidation of international peace and security.[9] This is one of the responsibilities of the Security Council in conformity with article 26 of the Charter; a role which has been highlighted by the Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations entitled "An Agenda for Peace".[10]

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[3] *Ibid.*, p.6, paragraph 16.

[4] *Ibid.*, p.3, paragraph 6.

[5] *Ibid.* p.7, paragraph 20.

[6] Cf. CD/WP/441 dated 18 February 1993.

[7] *Ibid.*, p.3, paragraph 13.

[8] Doc. A/C. 1/47/7.

[9] Doc. A/47/887/Add.1.

[10] Cf. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York, 1992.

Chapter 5
The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of Ballistic Missiles

*Mahmoud Karem**

Any regional disarmament regime and machinery which aims at limiting and preventing the proliferation of weapons, which aims at prohibiting, or inhibiting arms transfers must take into consideration, the political realities of the region, the need to achieve security in its wider definition for all the parties and the right of all States to live behind secure and recognized boundaries. It should also attempt to arrive at an agreed and mutually acceptable definition of national security.

There are six major issues that have to be kept in mind when considering any possible regional arms limitation/arm control regime.

1. In a time when excessive efforts and pressures are being exerted to convince all Parties and States to join the Chemical Weapons Convention as well as the Biological Weapons Convention, little genuine effort is being exerted to convince significant nuclear threshold countries to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Declaratory statements calling on these threshold States to joint the NPT are not sufficient and must now be coupled with concrete action oriented steps designed to achieve the universality of the NPT regime before its extension in 1995. The fact that a few States have chosen to withstand international attempts to join the NPT is a serious flaw that needs to be addressed especially in light of the fact that the NPT has been in *de facto* existence since 1970. Some scholars argue that the NPT has harboured several nuclear threshold countries and has given them a safe haven to develop their nuclear capabilities by allowing them the benefits of the non-proliferation regime without their formal accession. In the same time other regional parties have renounced the nuclear option and acceded to the Treaty shouldering their commitments and obligations. It is essential, therefore, to address in a symmetrical and balanced manner, the obligation of all States *vis-à-vis* all the legal instruments comprising the juridical regime of weapons of mass destruction namely, the NPT the BWC and the CWC.

2. While transparency and openness emerge as the model and future wave in arms control and disarmament efforts, its treatment is being conducted with a Eurocentric perspective and without taking into consideration the different basic characteristics of different regions around the world. Certainly, basic tenants of the European model may be emulated elsewhere. In other words there are so many lessons we need to learn and draw from the European model for confidence-building and security, but what is good for Europe is not necessarily, nor by definition, good for the rest of the world. What we need to do is to carry out a process of content analysis by elimination namely, to study the documents and proposals presented by various European actors during the process of negotiating a Confidence-Building and Security European Agreement, and select to apply to the Middle East several tailor made, and carefully chosen initiatives. It must be remembered that confidence-building measures relying on transparency and openness succeeded in Europe in the absence of a conventional war. In the Middle East, for example, a region that has undergone the turmoil and destruction of several wars in the past forty years, it may become difficult to start with an ambitious program of

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openness and transparency involving all parties due to the existence of an unresolved political conflict.

3. Concomitantly, it is important to dissipate regional fears that a scheme for transparency and openness, regulating arms transfer by conducting a register, might only lead to the disarmament of needy States and the establishment of regional giants enjoying massive indigenous production and large conventional weapon stockpiles, as well as a qualitative edge, which places them in an advantageous position over the rest of other regional actors and neighbours.

4. Concurrently multilateral arms control cartels are being devised and major weapon suppliers met twice in Paris and in London to discuss regulating arms control policies. While I do not question the *raison d'être* behind these meetings, it remains crucial in my opinion that a process of transparency and consultations, not only between and among the supplier States but also between the supplier and recipients, is necessary to fully comprehend the dimensions of this new system and increase confidence in its operational utility. After all it must be remembered that States, weary of, and seeking to protect their national defense requirements, need to be reassured of the purposes of these high level consultations as well as its objectives.

5. At the same time we are witnessing the emergence of groups such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), designed to combat the dangers of the proliferation of ballistic missiles. This regime - MTCR Guidelines - started with a limited number of States and is now adhered to by 23 States. Little consideration is given, in this regime, to the civilian uses of missiles for the peaceful exploration of outer space which is an inherent right accorded all States Parties to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. It could be argued, therefore, that theses guidelines if extended too far, may run counter to the letter and spirit of this international legal instrument. With the same token we receive reports that other countries are receiving not parts or components of missiles but entire missile systems that far exceed their defensive capabilities. For example, Iran has recently purchased from North Korea medium range, 1,000 km, missiles, which place many Arab capitals in jeopardy. These conflicting procedures create doubts behind the rational of such control regimes and force regional actors to rely on extra regional powers for arms supply which runs counter to the basic objectives of the major weapon suppliers destined to regulate the process and diminish arms sale to areas of regional tension.

6. The same could be said of other groups which have been created in the past few years. Take for instance arrangements such as the ones destined to review the existing nuclear export control policies of supplier States such as the Zanger Committee, the Nuclear Supplier Group, which met in Warsaw recently, as well as the Australia Group, on harmonizing ways and means to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and conforming national export policies on chemical weapon dual use equipment and biological weapons related items and components. Naturally, recipient States with peaceful uses chemical industries, need to be better briefed and consulted on the outcomes of these meeting.

In conclusion, it must be underscored that transparency is highly needed between the respective parties, suppliers as well as recipients. Maintaining international peace and security is no longer the assignment of a single power but is the collective responsibility of all States in our international system.

I. The Middle East Regional Security Setting in the 1990s

The justification of the Middle East as *sui generis* is best exemplified by an introspective layout of the security dynamics, if not dilemmas, that exist today in the region. On one hand, the Arab States devised traditional security alliances and patterns of military co-operation as well as inter-Arab agreements to foster security co-operation. On the other hand, Israel has been moving rapidly

towards accomplishing self-reliance while increasing military co-operation at various intervals with key players in the Western world. The role of guarantor for Israel's security has been assumed at different times by various key actors. However, a quick examination of the present security motivations within the region reveals a striking inconsistency. It could be argued that whereas Israel is moving more rapidly towards self-reliance in the field of national security, some Arabs, in contrast, are beginning to conceive effective national security as based on, and drawing more extensively from, extra-regional support. Whether this could be attributed to the recent Gulf War is a matter that remains beyond the scope of this Chapter. However, what should be highlighted is the fact that Arab and Israeli security perceptions remain opposing in nature. The prevalence, if not supremacy, of the military threat perception between countries of the region in the Middle East constitutes the core of the problem and the primary factor that needs to be evenly and objectively dealt with in any move towards a peaceful settlement.

While the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979 served the purpose of demonstrating how such a vicious circle may be broken, especially between Israel and its largest and most powerful Arab neighbour, the challenge the region still faces is to widen the peace process in order to encompass all other parties concerned. A window of opportunity now exists with the initiation of peace talks (bilateral and multilateral) between the parties concerned.

Hence, security preoccupations and concerns of all States in the region must accordingly be addressed. A system of checks and balances is needed to afford all countries in the region a system of security and protection anchored on international legitimacy, regional co-operation, risk reduction, crisis management and confidence-building.

II. The Military Setting: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Technology and Missile Proliferation in the Middle East

Opposing threat perceptions and concepts of security that separate the Arabs and Israelis seem to be predicated on unmistakable grounds. Israel continues to perceive itself as surrounded by a quantitatively dominant and hostile Arab World, and consequently seeks military superiority by quantum leaps in the domain of high technology. Self-reliance in terms of military research and production offers Israel a bargaining chip and a technological edge used not only to discourage and deter its Arab neighbours, but also to convince its closest extra-regional partners that Israel is a force that needs to be reckoned with. On the other hand Israel promotes this policy so as to demonstrate that its high technology, as well as its pluralistic Western-styled democracy, are two distinct common denominators that fasten Israel to the Western world, thereby presenting Israel as more eligible in safeguarding Western interests in the region. Additionally, these two characteristics are employed to demonstrate to the West that, despite Israel's reliance on excessive foreign aid, it can still survive autonomously and with freedom of decision, without foreign intervention in its internal affairs. All these factors create a revolving network of relationship and interest interdependence between Israel and its extra-regional partners.

However, it must be underscored that the recent Gulf War led many to conclude that the role Israel can play for the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East is limited. The sensitivities and complications associated with an assertive Israeli role disqualified such a contribution. In fact, international efforts were employed to convince Israel to stay out of the battlefield so as not to compromise the basic objectives of liberating Kuwait and maintaining the solidarity of the Coalition Forces. On the other hand, other key States with unique geographic locations, such as Egypt, proved more valuable and helpful in providing for procurement, logistical support and facilities crucial for the implementation of both the letter and spirit of a plethora of successive Security Council resolutions dealing with Kuwait and calling for its liberation. The role

of the Suez Canal, for instance, was pivotal in safeguarding the combat readiness and fitness of the Coalition Forces by reducing both the distance and time needed for their transportation and deployment into the battlefield.

On the other hand, it was reported that long-range Israeli ballistic missiles, able to carry a nuclear weapon, were capable of targeting the Soviet Union. Seymour M. Hersh (1991) says Israel's central strategic doctrine during the 1970s and much of the 1980s was that the Soviet Union should know that it remained under the threat of an Israeli nuclear attack. According to Hersh, Israel used American reconnaissance satellite photos and intelligence data to target Soviet cities.[1]

The Cold War gave Israel the advantage of integration with, and implementation of, policies of containment. However, with the termination of the Cold War, the issue of Israeli nuclear capability may be interpreted as more of a liability rather than an asset. The threat of a recalcitrant, but nuclear, Israel is a matter that will undoubtedly deserve reevaluation and appraisal even by its closest Western partners. It is reported that as early as 1968 Clark M. Clifford, the US Secretary of Defense, told President Johnson:

> Mr President, I don't want to live in a world where the Israelis have nuclear weapons (Hersh, 1991).[2]

Apart from the nuclear threat prevailing in the Middle East, there exist dangers of weapons proliferation, especially weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, there are confounding or intervening variables which deserve to be cited since they are relevant to this assessment of military attributes in the region.

III. Missile Technology

The recent Gulf War underscored the dangers posed by missiles not only to military targets but also to civilian population centres. However, the missiles fired by the Iraqis were not tipped with a weapon of mass destruction. Had this been the case, the Middle East would have possibly witnessed retaliation that may have exceeded proportionality. It is reported that at least eight countries in the Middle East possess surface-to-surface missiles.[3] However, it is necessary to differentiate between countries in the region with missile production capability and others which import or purchase such missiles. The latter are amenable to strict control and subject to the well-known guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). If such a dichotomy is applied, Israel remains the most advanced in the field of missile production capability in the Middle East. The Israeli missile operational inventory includes the Jericho I with a range of 450 km, the Jericho II with a range of 640 km (believed capable of carrying a 100-kg nuclear warhead) and the Jericho II-B with a maximum range of 1440 km (Kemp, 1991: 78).[4] The *Washington Post* of Sunday, 27 October 1991 reported that Israel had smuggled to South Africa components of ballistic missiles, contrary to the guidelines of the MTCR and the 1977 anti-apartheid arms embargo (the *International Herald Tribune*, 29 October 1991: 2). This prompted the US to conclude a bilateral agreement with Israel

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[1] See "Israeli Nuclear Arsenal exceeds earlier estimates, book reports", *New York Times*, 20 October 1991. This article written by Joel Brinkley, reviewed Seymour M. Hersh's new book entitled *The Samson Option*, published by Random House, 1991.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[3] For an in-depth review see *The Missile Monitor*, a quarterly review published by the International Missile Proliferation Project at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA. Also see Martin Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East", *Survival*, International Institute of Strategic Studies, May-June 1989, p. 227.

[4] See Geoffrey Kemp's excellent treatment of the issue in *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race*, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC. 1991, pp. 77-86 and 185-193.

in which the latter undertook not to sell or transfer missile technology to any third party.[5] The Secretary General of Israel's Ministry of Defence stated that Israel would soon join the MTCR. It is surmised that such a move was meant to pre-empt the application of sanctions against Israel for its surreptitious dealings with South Africa and at the same time to ensure smooth continuity for the progress of its own national ballistic missile programme.

Other countries with reported missile development programmes are Iraq, Iran and Egypt. It is known, however, that Resolution 687 of the Security Council has established adequate machinery to deal with and dismantle Iraqi missiles.[6] As for Egypt, the *Washington Post* reported on 20 September 1989 that Egypt had dropped out of its missile project. Jane's *Defence Weekly* of 30 September 1989 authenticated the same information in an article under the title "Egypt has pulled out of (missile) Condor programme".[7] The Condor II missile was a joint Argentine-Egyptian project known as the Badr-2000 missile in Egypt. It is reported that Egypt withdrew from the project in 1989. The Argentine Defence Minister pledged to conform to the guidelines of the MTCR and stated on 28 May 1991 that far from contributing to security, the Condor II made Argentina more vulnerable, raised the level of instability in other regions of the world and seriously affected Argentine national prestige (*Disarmament Newsletter*, 1991: 5).[8] As for Iran's missile production, it remains confined to early generation short-range missiles (Kemp, 1991: 80). However, it is reported that Teheran purchased a 1,000 km range missile from North Korea.

Israel is also reported to be developing (with financial help from the United States) an anti-tactical ballistic missile known as the Arrow which will have "greater speed, range, and maneuverability allowing it to intercept more advanced surface to surface missiles at greater distances from civilian and military targets" (Kemp, 1991: 85). This project is designed to lessen the degree of reliance on American patriot systems which were hurried to the region to protect against Iraqi missile attacks against civilian population.

However, any regional framework for arms control or disarmament in the Middle East would be remiss if the issue of preventing the proliferation of missiles and missile production technology were to be ignored. Hence, it is imperative to assess the implications of missile proliferation to the region so as to ensure the co-operation of all the parties involved, whether exporters or recipients or those with indigenous missile production capabilities in the Middle East. Countries such as North Korea in need of oil and hard currency must not be allowed to play the role of the supplier and compromise the tenants of the MTCR regime.

IV. Outer Space Technology

The line separating a military missile production programme and a missile for peaceful purposes that is capable of placing a satellite in orbit is indeed thin. It is understood that the knowledge accrued from the manufacture of a missile used for a space programme could be easily converted for the production of a long-range military ballistic missile. The only country in the Middle East with space capabilities is Israel. It has managed, until now, to place two satellites in orbit. Israel, however, has ratified the 1967 Outer Space Treaty which stipulates in Article IV that parties undertake not to place in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons

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[5] Recently it has been reported by the *International Herald Tribune*, 21-22 March 1992, that Israel sold Patriot technology to China in violation of Israel's obligation not to transfer cutting edge US technology to others. It is argued that such an act, if proven correct, is dangerous because knowledge of how the Patriot works could be used to design missiles to defeat it. It was also reported that Israel was negotiating with China the sale of a missile named STAR that is manufactured in Israel but contains priceless high technology which Israel obtained from the US.

[6] Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st meeting on 3 April 1991.

[7] Kemp, pp. 79-80.

[8] *World Disarmament Campaign Newsletter*, Vol. 9, No. 4, United Nations, New York, August 1991, p. 5.

of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

V. Chemical Weapons

The spectra of chemical weapons use against coalition forces in the recent Gulf War raised worldwide apprehension. Significantly, chemical weapons were used before in the Iran-Iraq War and led to a military overturn. Little international pressure was applied in the wake of the use of chemical weapons in Halabja or against the Kurds. Chemical weapon precursors and agents were exported to the region without being subject to effective national export control policies, a matter the Australia Group is now destined to prevent. Had the international community stood firm to force parties to respect their obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and coupled this with strict governmental controls, the proliferation of the chemical weapons industry would have been arrested.

However, the question that warrants our attention concerns the reasons behind the development of such regional chemical weapons capabilities in the Middle East. It is theorized that one of the basic reasons for developing a chemical weapons deterrence force - or a poor man's nuclear weapon - is to offset the Israeli nuclear deterrent. It is not important to explore or to test the validity of such an hypothesis at this stage. However, what is important is to ensure the total elimination of chemical weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East by establishing a regional framework that would ensure the attainment of this lofty objective. Conventional wisdom leads us to conclude that as long as an Israeli nuclear threat persists unabated in the region, there will be no permanent guarantee restraining other regional actors from seeking security by whatever means. In an interview distributed by the official Iranian Press Agency, IRNA, Deputy President Ayatollah Mohajerany stated:

> Because the enemy has nuclear facilities, the Moslem States too should be equipped with the same capacity... Moslems should strive to go ahead. I am not talking about one Moslem country, but rather the entirety of Moslem States.

United States officials remarked that such statements represent a significant reflection of Iranian intentions (*Herald Tribune*, 31 October 1991: 4).

In the absence of effective international control comprising credible assurances, sanctions as well as viable monitoring and verification measures, the threat both to national and international security persists. The credibility of a watertight verification regime in particular will be an essential factor. It is hoped that with the entry into force of the CW Convention such a threat would be avoided.

VI. Biological Weapons

The Gulf War highlighted the spectra of the use of biological weapons. Security Council Resolution 687 entrusted a UN team to search for and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This Special Commission identified a number of sites to be placed under long-term scrutiny, despite the lack of evidence that would directly contradict Iraq's claims that it had no biological weapons (UN report, 31 October 1991). An emerging monitoring regime seemed to gain momentum.

On the eve of the Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in Geneva (August/September, 1991) the BBC aired a report that alleged the presence of eleven countries in the Middle East with biological weapons capabilities; however, targeting the development of bacteriological diseases such as Anthrax or Tularemia is not the only threat. Kemp (1991: 77) cautions against advances in biotechnology which will facilitate mass production of toxins such as

rattlesnake venom which, if mass produced, could act as a destructive weapon for which there is no antidote.

VII. A Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East

The idea of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East is novel. This idea has been brought to centre focus by the accumulation of such lethal weapons in the Middle East, thereby creating a destabilizing environment that endangers international peace and security.

In this context it is appropriate to recall one of the earlier definitions of weapons of mass destruction that dates back to 1948 when the UN Commission of Conventional Armaments advised the Security Council that it considered weapons of mass destruction to include:

> atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to those of the atomic bomb or the other weapons mentioned above.[9]

Despite the somewhat generic nature of this definition, it could nevertheless be used as a point of departure. The phraseology of the definition is neither rigid nor exhaustive. As a result it could be extended to incorporate missiles, for example. Article VII of the NPT States:

> Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.

On 8 April 1990, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announced an initiative to establish a Zone Free From Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East.[10] The rationale behind this proposal was to spare a region already fraught with tension the scourge of possible recourse to any types of weapons of mass destruction. Its three components are:

1. that all Weapons of Mass Destruction without exception in the Middle East be prohibited, nuclear, chemical or biological;
2. that all States of the region without exception make an equal and reciprocal commitment in this regard;
3. that verification measures and modalities be established to ascertain full compliance by all States in the region with the full scope of that prohibition without exception.

This initiative enjoys several paramount characteristics. It is intra-regional, takes account of the present complex configuration, cautions against the spectra and the future stockpiling of these lethal weapon systems of mass destruction, and has acquired a well established international status. The Security Council, for example, adopted Resolution 687 which recognized in operative paragraph 14 the necessity to establish such a zone:

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[9] Until the present this remains the only UN definition available on what constitutes weapons of mass destruction. The use of the term "any weapons developed in the future" is convenient enough to incorporate missiles, missile components and warheads tipped with a weapon of mass destruction. This definition, therefore, could conveniently be used as a point of departure in future negotiations.

[10] In the spring of 1990, the Egyptian delegation to the Arab Summit Meeting held in Baghdad negotiated a text included in the final communique of that extraordinary event calling for the establishment of a Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. The strongest opposition to the insertion of the Egyptian draft came from Iraq.

takes note that the actions to be taken by Iraq in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 of this resolution represent steps towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons.[11]

Additionally, and following the meeting held in Paris on the 8th and 9th of July 1991 by the five permanent members of the Security Council, a communique outlined their agreement on arms transfers and non-proliferation. In that statement, the five affirmed the following:

They also strongly supported the objective of establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East. They expressed their view that critical steps towards this goal include full implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 687 and adoption by countries in the region of a comprehensive programme of arms control for the region, including:

> a freeze and ultimate elimination of ground-to-ground missiles in the region;
> submission by all nations in the region of all of their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards;
> a ban on the importation and production of nuclear weapons usable materials;
> agreement by all States in the region to undertake becoming parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention as soon as it is concluded in 1992.[12]

A cross section examination of the three components of Weapons of Mass Destruction   namely nuclear, chemical and biological - could help explicate the efforts designed to limit their proliferation.

In the nuclear field, Algeria, Oman and Israel remain outside the Non-Proliferation regime. Conflicting arguments keep parties divided. Arab fears of an Israeli nuclear weapon are augmented by periodic revelations concerning Israel's nuclear capabilities. In addition Israel's refusal to join the NPT and place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards deepens Arab anxiety. On the other hand, Israel unofficially contends that Arabs have learned, over the years, to co-exist with a latent but undisclosed Israeli nuclear posture.

Since 1974 there has been an ongoing initiative presented by Iran and Egypt to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in the Middle East (NWFZ).

It is interesting to note that all countries of the region, including Israel, support this initiative in the UN and since 1980 by consensus. Israel's policy in this regard is anchored on a proclamation that Israel shall not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region and calls for direct negotiations between the parties.

In 1988 the General Assembly requested the Secretary General to appoint a group of experts to study the modalities, effects, application and possible implementation of this resolution.[13] This study, already published, contains numerous thought-provoking policy recommendations on how to implement this UNGA resolution and how to circumvent difficulties by isolating that disarmament initiative from the intricacies of the Arab-Israeli conflict.[14]

Some scholars argue that this initiative to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East should be allowed to spill over into a larger area of co-operation between the Arabs and Israelis in order to expedite the peace process in the region. Others argue that a NWFZ in the Middle East is not

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[11] It is reported that the insertion of this reference came as a result of the initiative and extensive effort of Egypt's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, Mr. Amre Moussa, who in 1991 became Egypt's Foreign Minister.

[12] See document CD/1103 dated 19 August 1991 entitled: "Letter Dated 19 August, 1991 From the Representative of France addressed to the President of the Conference on Disarmament transmitting the text of the *Communique issued following the meeting of the five on arms Transfer and Non-Proliferation (Paris, 8 and 9 July, 1991).*

[13] Resolution 43/65, 7 December 1980. The group of experts included former Ambassador James Leonard from the US, Jan Prawitz from Sweden and Benjamin Sanders from the Netherlands.

[14] Study A/45/435, 10 October 1990.

achievable unless sufficient progress is made in the realm of a political settlement. Only then will consideration of this zone become realistic.[15]

Chemical weapons is the second component of weapons of mass destruction. The tragic history associated with the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war led to a military fact. Simply stated, chemical weapons were not only used in this war, but were used to change its course and outcome. This constituted a serious violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare.[16]

The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has concluded a comprehensive and universal convention prohibiting the use, development, stockpiling and production of chemical weapons.[17]

The Treaty on a comprehensive and universal prohibition of the use, development, stockpiling and production of chemical weapons was signed in January 1993.

However, the basic problem facing negotiators is how to decouple the issue of nuclear weapons from chemical weapons, especially within a Middle East context. Arabs maintain that a spoken or unspoken linkage exists. They claim that the international community would be remiss not to address the nuclear issue, while calling on all parties in the Middle East to accede, without reservations, to the Chemical Weapons Convention.[18] Others argue that the two issues are separate and should therefore be decoupled and treated on their own merits in due course. Some even argue that an overwhelming Arab accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) might in the long run create circumstances conducive to progress in the nuclear field. Arabs, on the other hand, await proof and tangible commitments that this ultimately may turn out to be the case. None of the interlocutors at present seems willing to offer such a commitment. Instead accession to the CWC is seen in isolation, separate from the nuclear dimension. Increased expectations remain levied on the negotiators in the multilateral arms control peace negotiations in order to solve this enigma.

VIII. Recommendations on How to Implement the Initiative

On the geographic definition of the zone, every effort must be exerted to avoid a diluted and confusing definition. Maybe an incremental, step-by-step definition is needed at the outset. Hence, we can start with a narrow geographic definition of the zone and allow that to widen as the regime proves successful. As mentioned earlier, the UN study on *All Aspects of Regional Disarmament* outlines in paragraph 152 that

> a flexible approach to the concept of a region must be adopted... thus two or more neighbouring States can constitute a "region" for disarmament purposes.[19]

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[15] This opposing approach exemplifies a traditional dilemma for disarmament efforts. Could disarmament initiatives lead to a relaxation of world tension and crisis avoidance, or is it necessary to create the necessary politically conducive conditions at first, so as to allow such disarmament initiatives to materialize? For an interesting treatment of this dichotomy see the UN study entitled *Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival*, United Nations, New York, 1983). That study group was presided over by Sweden's late Prime Minister Olof Palme and its report came to be known as the Palme Commission Report.

[16] Conflicting assessments and reports deal with this issue. Some believe that the use of chemical agents did little to change the military outcome in the combat theatre, and that world media inflated the issue out of proportion. The author believes that in the context of the Iran-Iraq War, which involved armies poorly equipped for protection against chemical weapons warfare, the effects of use of chemical weapons have been measurable. Additionally, the use of mustard gas agents against civilian populations caused serious casualties. Naturally, had this been the case against a modern and highly equipped army, the effects would have been less decisive. It is known that coalition forces involved in the war to liberate Kuwait were combat ready against chemical warfare. No such use took place.

[17] See rolling text of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, which is under periodic change at the CD as negotiations advance. By Fall 1992, the CD had achieved a Final Text.

[18] The Arabs took this position in the International Conference on Chemical Weapons convened in January 1989 in Paris upon the initiative of President François Mitterrand.

[19] Study Series 3, United Nations, New York, 1981.

Another approach suggests a geographic analysis of the region in terms of key *"core"* countries. Later on, other *"peripheral"* States could be invited to join. Which countries could join as *"core"* States should be left to regional consensus. A report by the IAEA entitled *Technical Study of Different Modalities of Application of Safeguards in the Middle East* (1989) gives the following outline:

> This IAEA definition of the zone may provide a working list of core countries, although any potential zonal State would have the right to put forward its own list of minimum essential parties in such an undertaking. It may be useful, in that connection, to think in terms of two lists of core countries: a smaller group essential to the initiation of any serious action for the establishment of the zone and a some-what larger group whose accession to the arrangement establishing that zone might be necessary to bring it into force.[20]

It may prove useful for practical reasons, however, to exclude certain States from the geographic definition of such a proposed zone: Turkey, for instance, because of its membership in NATO, as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan, who have their politico-military preoccupations directed elsewhere. Their inclusion could confound the implementation of the zone. Naturally due to their contiguity, these countries must be assigned a special role in the early stages of the process of implementation as a means of respecting the geographic delimitation and supporting the regime of a zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Accordingly, the most viable geographic definition under these listed circumstances should include all the Arab States Members of the League of Arab States in addition to Israel and Iran.

Since the study conducted by the Secretary General on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East has been presented to the General Assembly in autumn 1990, it may be feasible to consider reviving the mandate of the group of experts in order to allow them to conduct a further and a wider study on the Establishment of a Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East. We may envisage dispatching a Special Representative of the Secretary General to tour the region and discuss with the countries concerned the necessary mechanisms and modalities for the implementation of this proposal. It might also be feasible to convene a special session of the Security Council to discuss the Mubarak plan.

The security preoccupations of countries in the region must be addressed. A system of checks and balances is needed to demonstrate to all countries in the Middle East that a viable framework may replace worn-out theories. In other words, what needs to be formulated is a self-fulfilling argument encouraging all countries in the region to adhere to this Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East as an added measure towards enhancing their own security.[21]

Some argue that there is no reason for Israel to relinquish its policy of unavowed, non-declarative, unilateral and ambiguous policy of psychological deterrence. This policy, I argue, has deepened mistrust in the region and exacerbated fear between and among its members. Most recently we witnessed growing concern among Israeli public opinion on how to deal with the ageing Dimona plant. Some argued for its total shutdown; others advocated a partial phase out. Questions such as who will cover the expenses of "cleaning" Dimona have risen. Other Israelis have expressed deep concern over the systematic dumping of nuclear waste in the Negev desert that has caused serious trans-boundary effects on surrounding States, as well as on valuable water resources. The Bush initiative of 29 May 1991 addressing a Middle East arms control regime stipulated:

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[20] IAEA General Conference, Vienna. GX(XXXIII)/887, 29 August 1989.

[21] War in the Gulf proved that no country in the region was immune from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. While Iraqi Scuds landed in populated areas inside Israel, causing casualties and fear, Egypt too was reported to have been under the threat of an Iraqi missile attack against its strategic centres including its High Dam in Aswan.

The initiative builds on existing institutions and focuses on activities directly related to nuclear weapons capability. The initiative would call on regional States to implement a verifiable ban on the production and acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material (enriched uranium or separated plutonium,

Reiterate our call on all States in the region that have not already done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty;

Reiterate our call to place all nuclear facilities in the region under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards; and

Continue to support the eventual creation of a regional nuclear weapon-free zone.

The issue of Israeli nuclear weapons will remain the most intractable question facing upcoming regional arms control negotiations. The two most prominent Israeli lines of thought operate from two distinct points of departure. Shai Feldman (1982) argues for "Israeli Greater Deterrence in exchange for serious territorial concessions".[22] This implies Arab recognition of Israel's nuclear deterrence posture and acceptance of a new formula, *i.e.* land for nuclear weapons instead of Security Council Resolution 242's formula of land for peace. Two other Israeli thinkers, Yair Evron and Avner Cohen, stipulate that Israel's nuclear weapons should remain undisclosed and that they should only become a weapon of last resort.[23]

Hence, the issue of Israeli nuclear weapons will remain a serious problem as long as Israel perceives them to be an asset and a guarantor for its own national security while Arabs perceive them to be a grave liability, as well as a destabilizing factor that coerces other regional actors to achieve parity through non-conventional means.

Encourage all States in the Middle East to adhere to the international legal instruments that comprise the juridical regimes regulating weapons of mass destruction. These legal instruments are the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, and the Chemical Weapons Convention which is now under preparation at the CD. The successful employment of confidence-building measures in the Middle East will undoubtedly be augmented through the adherence of all parties in the region to these important legal instruments.

Call on all countries in the Middle East that have not yet done so to sign a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It must be underscored that other threshold countries such as Argentina and Brazil signed agreements with the IAEA independent of their well-known positions on the NPT. A special and tailor-made system of accounting and of verifying the authenticity of the data provided by Israel may be contemplated. Naturally such a system would be designed to create regional confidence and allow for transparency and openness. On the other hand, the case of South Africa's agreement with the IAEA could serve as a useful model. Many lessons from this particular case could be emulated, especially South Africa's revelation of production of six nuclear warheads before it acceded to the NPT. Some blame South Africa for not announcing possession when it adhered to the NPT.

Work on security assurances from the nuclear weapon States in general, and the Security Council in particular, providing protection to any State in the Middle East that becomes subject to a threat of use of nuclear weapons, by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Hence security assurances may provide countries in the region with high-level guarantees from the five permanent members of the Security Council in case of a threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Use the model enshrined in the protocols of Tlatelolco, in which nuclear-weapon States presented security assurances to countries which have joined this nuclear weapon-free zone. Similar

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[22] Feldman, *ibid.*, 1982.

[23] Most of these views were offered the author by Mr. Evron and Mr. Cohen. Mr. Evron also presented these ideas in his paper: *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East* for a Quaker-organized international conference entitled: "Towards a Threat Reduction and War Prevention Regime in the Middle East" held in Jongny-sur-Vevey, Switzerland, from 19-22 September 1991.

assurances could be tailored to all countries joining the proposed Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East.[24]

Draw lessons from East-West arms control agreements and confidence-building measures. While several lessons could be employed from the European model, such as transparency, aerial reconnaissance and open skies, not all measures may be transferable to the region of the Middle East. It must be remembered, however, that peace between Egypt and Israel brought about a system of international verification including the establishment of demilitarized zones.

Study and develop a regional missile non-proliferation regime that would not hamper the right of all States in the region for the peaceful uses and exploration of outer space consonant with the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

Concomitantly, the rational for the Establishment of a Zone Free Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East gains topicality. All international efforts should be geared towards its implementation since it strives to replace a fragile security system with an enduring one. Contractual agreements between the parties in the region could be achieved, and security based on internal and legitimacy under effective international verification, could be worked out.

The broad parameters of this proposal lie in regional arrangements which are the key to realizing this objective. States will have to engage in an arrangement, probably through the Security Council, in order to put together the basis on which their respective regions will cede their mass destruction options. It is only through a series of such arrangements all around the world, that we may achieve a comprehensive ban on these deadly weapons. It is important, therefore, to consecrate time and effort to such a regional approach.

By way of concluding a Zone Free From Weapons of Mass Destruction could overcome the problem of linkage between chemical and nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This framework has not been rejected by any particular country in the region. On the contrary, international support is geared towards it. Such a framework may prove useful in the present multilateral arms control and disarmament track of the Middle East peace talks. This framework offers a possible solution and a sense of direction and hope. The challenges for any peace advocate will remain in the allocation of security for all countries in the region as well as in arriving at an agreeable definition for what national security should ultimately entail. If a collective and pragmatic definition of security, based on international legitimacy, justice and peace was to be agreed upon, and the issue of solving threat misperceptions and border problems were solved peace, will become more and more attainable.

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[24] See Additional Protocols of the Tlatelolco Treaty; particularly Additional Protocol II, Articles 1 and 2.

Chapter 6
Conventional Weapons and Arms Transfers in the Middle East

*Saleh Al-Mani**

I. Introduction

This paper seeks to study the structures of conventional Arms imports in the Middle East during the past decade. The paper is divided in three parts; the first outlines military expenditures and arms flow into the region from 1979 to the present, it studies the attributes of such imports in bilateral and multilateral regression framework, identifying possible immediate and lagged arms races in the region. We rely on statistics provided by the Stockholm Institute for Strategic Studies (SIPRI) and on statistics published by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USACDA). Prior to analysing regression equations for each State, the figures are standardized into constant $ US million prices and transformed into Log10 scores for easier comparisons and correlation.

The second part of the paper attempts to analyse the outcome of the correlation and regression across time of nine major importers and their impact on other potential competitors. The nine selected States are Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey. The introduction of the UAE is because of its islands dispute with Iran, and because it is a newcomer to the field. Turkey's inclusion is due to its renewed strategic interest in the region particularly after the Gulf War.

We also wanted to see if there is any relationship between its military expenditures during the past decade and the expenditures of neighbouring States. It is hoped that we will be able to identify major arms race leaders in the region and the immediate and the lagged impact of those leaders' expenditures and/or arms acquisition on competing dyads. We will also examine such relationship and whether it is one-way or reciprocal. Results of the statistical analysis will be compared with qualitative survey of available literature to confirm or deny our results. The third part of the paper will question some of the prevailing wisdom of regional arms control and see if the available evidence augur well with this wisdom, and whether we should revise our view of regional disarmament in light of the available evidence from studying this epoch and perhaps of other studies examining the same phenomenon in earlier periods.

It is the thesis of this researcher that imposed arms control regimes tend to discredit most civilian elites which may help in the long run to bring to fore new military leaders more responsive to the idea of directing a larger portion of the State revenues towards military spending and arms acquisition, at the expense of the civilian sectors of the economy; thus obliterating the original goal of regional disarmament.

Secondly, Middle East instability and wars are not the result of arms races, but paradoxically are the result of unilateral freezing of arms purchases, and/or declining military expenditures by one State while the competing State tends to continue its previous arms build-up.

Thirdly, militarization by demonstration effect has been the most salient factor in Middle Eastern armament policies. And unlike other regions, where arms races tend to lead to war, wars in this region tend to exacerbate and renew existing arms races.

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II. Arms Expenditures in the Middle East

In the 1970's, the Middle East witnessed a huge increase in defense spending to the point that military budgets became the largest of its kind in the Third World. Such increases were due to internal push as well as external pull by selling companies and States to rectify imbalances in the balance of payments, and help to recycle excess Arab petrodollars. By the middle of the 1980's, and despite enormous funds earmarked for sustaining the conflict between Iran and Iraq, a new group of countries began to replace the Arab States. South East Asian States were experiencing a similar phenomenon of excess trade balances, and were pulled once again by arms manufacturers to buy new weapons systems. Today, South East Asia and South Asia account for one-third of the values of imports of major conventional weapons in the world. While the Middle East accounts for one-fifth of total world imports. On the other hand, military expenditures of the Middle Eastern States in 1991 surpassed those of South East Asia by US$ 50 billion; a third of Middle Eastern and Gulf outlays was earmarked for the 1991 war effort.

At US$ 99 billion in expenditures for 1991, Middle Eastern and Gulf States were spending less money on defense than they did in 1983 (a level which reached US$ 109 billion). If we exclude Turkey, which was spending in the 1980's some US$ 2 billion on defense, and today spends US$ 4 billions a year, we see a real declining rate of defense spending in the region. (Table 1 at the end of this Chapter.)

Saudi arms expenditures declined through the period of 1982 to the present by an average of 3 to 4% per annum. Egypt's defense outlays declined through the same period by an average of 40%. Israel by 40% (which in both countries did not account for US$ 2.6 billion a year in US foreign military assistance (FMA) for Israel, and US$ 1.3 billion for Egypt in annual (FMA). Syria's expenditures fell by 11% annually, Iran by 40% (which did not account also for Iran's tendency to engage in counter-trade with other countries), and Iraq by two-thirds.

When one looks at Middle Eastern defense budgets, one recognizes a system wide tendency to lower those expenditures, with the sole exception of the Gulf war effort. This decline is due to weakening of the market for oil, cessation of hostilities between Iraq and Iran and to the debt burden. Most Gulf States, which in the past enjoyed surplus and growth of revenues, are currently experiencing budget deficits on the order of six to seven billion dollars a year. A similar phenomenon is affecting also Iran and Israel.

Despite reliance on capital intensive armies and shortages of manpower, the Gulf States are not too far down the line where it may become more expensive to substitute a single unit of capital in armament hardware for a single unit of soldier's power.

Other countries in the region are relying more on internal manufacturing and/or assembly of weapons systems, as well as on sharing training and maintenance and upgrading and rectifying existing systems to minimize costs and to save on external inputs.

Throughout the studied period and as shown in Figures 1 and 2, we see that 1991 was the most prominent year for arms expenditures for each of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey. This reflects the burden of the second Gulf war. For Iraq, 1984 recorded the highest level in its annual defense spending. This when its war with Iran was at a stalemate, and Iraq was eager to halt the Iranian offensive against Basrah. Iran's expenditures for 1979 were the highest in the recent past. It may, perhaps, show a carryover from the Shah's era of big defense budgets. For Israel, 1980 was the most prominent. This was due largely to its increasing offensive posture on the Lebanese front, and to a military preparation for its major invasion of 1982. The increasing tenacity of the Israeli offensives may have alerted the Syrians to increase their defense budgets, particularly when about ten per cent of the Syrian army was on peace keeping duties in Lebanon; 1980 was also the most important year for Syria's arms expenditures accounting for 10.9% of its eleven-year expenditures.

Egypt in the early Eighties was moving-away from President Sadat's unilateral disarmament policies, which he adopted after 1977, to a more active role following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Additional factors related to a change of weapons systems away from the cheaper Soviet and Eastern European systems to a more expensive US and French hardware; 1984 was therefore the most prominent year, for Egypt's expenditures, throughout the thirteen-year period.

III. Analysing Bilateral and Multilateral Arms Expenditures in the Region

When we attempted to correlate and regress the arms expenditures of the nine States of the region, namely Egypt, Israel, Syria, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Turkey, for the period of 1979 - 1991, we found very little immediate relationship (in the same year)between their expenditures. Only the dyads of Israel - Syria, Israel - Iraq and Saudi Arabia had moderate to strong relationship. In fact, when we attempted to regress Israeli arms expenditures multilaterally to those of the Arab States, we confirmed Israel's defense budgets to be responsive immediately to any changes in the budgets of the surrounding Arab States. Even Egypt's annual military spending after it had signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1980 affected the defense budget of Israel. Egypt, on the other hand was not immediately responsive to changes in Israel's defense budget. Two year however, lapsed (as shown in Table 2A) before Egypt's defense budget began to reflect earlier changes in Israel's arms expenditures.

Such lagged impact was seen for most Arab States and also for Iran *vis-à-vis* Israel. This perhaps suggests an Israeli lead in any possible arms races in the region. There was also a lag in the Iran-Iraq dyad. Iran was feeling the impact of Iraq's expenditures four years later, while Iraq had a two-year lapse of impact. A study of this period as well as earlier periods, by this author, and studies by other public scientists suggest that Iraq may have led Iran in the past in an apparent regional arms race.[1]

Saudi Arabia on the other hand was in a league by itself. The only other State that had a strong sensitivity to changes in its defense budgets was Iraq, which at the time was an ally of, and major recipient of Saudi aid. It is interesting that Turkey, despite its proximity, did not influence the expenditures of its Arab neighbours except Syria and Iraq, and both negatively (see Table 1A).

Turkey's expenditures remained stable throughout the period of 1979 - 1985. After 1985, however, it began to increase by one to two per cent per year. By 1991, Turkey's new role in the Gulf region and in the Caucasus as well as its internal ethnic strife indicated a possible increase in its annual defense spending.

Since 1985, Iran and Iraq decreased their defense outlays. Syria reduced its annual military budget by US$ 1 billion, Israel apparently by US$ 1.4 billion, Egypt by US$ 1.5 billion.

Most Arab forces in the Mashreq region, with the exception of Iraq, seem to have retained the same number of troops since 1985. Iran seems to have increased its standing army by 200,000 soldiers, since 1990. Its forces increased from 305,000 in 1990 to 504,000 in 1992. Other paramilitary troops (Pasadran Inqilab) were cut in size, but the quality, training and organization of these troops have been enhanced to the point that those Revolutionary Guards have now their own naval and marine forces. Other Arab countries (while they largely remain outside the scope of this paper) tend to decrease their military budgets (*e.g.* Algeria, Morocco, and Yemen), and to cut the level of their troops after 1991 (*e.g.* Yemen cut its troop size by 20,000 soldiers, Algeria

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[1] See: Saleh AL-Mani, *The Correlates of Arab Military Expenditure and the Onset of the Arms Race: 1971-198*, Journal of the Social Sciences (Kuwait), Vol. 16, No 4, Winter 1988, pp. 17-46 (in Arabic); also S. Majeski and D. Jones, "Arms Race Modelling", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 25, No 2, 1981, pp. 259-288.

cut its troops by 50,000 soldiers). Military budgets in the region still, however, accounted for a major percentage of those countries Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 1990 they accounted for 2.6% each of Turkey and Iran, 5.6% for Egypt and Morocco, 9% for Syria, 13% for Israel, 12.5% for the Yemen, 15% for Oman, 29% for Iraq, and 36% for Saudi Arabia.[2]

IV. Arms Imports of Middle Eastern States

Just like arms expenditures, arms imports in the region have declined more sharply over the past few years. According to US Arms control and Disarmament Agency, total values of military imports in 1979 reached US$ 15,127 billion for the region, including Turkey. Total values of imports for the region (including Turkey) reached US$ 11,865 in 1989, a decline of four billion dollars over an eleven years period.[3]

Statistics published by SIPRI in 1992 for the period of 1982 - 1991 (at constant US$ 1990 prices and excluding Turkey) show a decline of nine billion dollars over a ten-years period. This large decrease reflects changes in economic condition in the region that lowered the military imports, despite the 1991 Gulf War.[4]

If we examine the period between 1980 and 1983 (Table 2), we see an increasing trend, reflecting Israeli invasions of Lebanon and the heightened tensions in the Gulf region. Another factor which contributed to this increase in the flow of arms was the so-called peace-dividend, creating more weapons transfers for Israel and Egypt. While Syria's arms imports seem higher than those of Israel in 1980, its imports have declined ever since by an average of 8.8% per annum. Israeli imports of arms tend to decrease from its height of 1981 through 1986; it had decreased since then by an average of 1.37% per annum. Jordan's arms imports increased slightly between 1979 and 1981; they had declined at the end of the period (1989) to almost the same level they had in 1979. Turkey's arms imports tend to increase slightly since 1979 by 2% to 3% a year until 1987, when they began a sharp growth of 4% per year, reaching its height in 1989. Turkey's imports since 1989 continued to grow as a result of its major participation in the 1991 Gulf war. Turkey was also the benefactor of armaments transfers from the US, Germany and the Netherlands, due to the ceilings imposed on conventional weapons in Europe by the 1990 Conventional Arms Reduction Agreement (CFE), and it was engaged in a major arms modernization effort.

In the Gulf region, Iraq was the major importer of arms until 1986. Saudi procurements since then may have surpassed monetarily those of Iraq. Saudi Arabia accounted for 35% of the total arms flow to the region, while Iraq accounted for 16%. Most Saudi purchases are not necessarily in military hardware, in as much as paying for training and other services associated with the procurement of high technology conventional systems.

Iran's imports tended to have been largely stable throughout the period, averaging around US$ 2 billion per year. It is however evident, from Table 2, that Iran was forced by the Iran-Iraq war to abandon the revolution's earlier pledge to forsake the military build-up of the Shah. The cessation of hostilities with Iraq in 1988 dampened arms acquisitions temporarily. After the second Gulf war Iran seems to have returned once again to its traditional posturing in the Gulf region, buying more and better quality weapons, building a submarine force, enhancing its missile technology and moving into Research and Development for a non-conventional military capability. Arms imports and military expenditures bottomed out in 1989, and began to increase ever since. Expenditures in Iran tend to increase by an average of one billion dollars a year, since 1989.

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    [2] IISS, *The Military Balance*, 1991-1992, London, Autumn, 1992.
    [3] US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (1990)*, Wash.: USGPO, November 1991.
    [4] *SIPRI Yearbook*, 1992, Table 8B. 1.

V. Analysing Bilateral and Multilateral Arms Imports in the Region

When we analyse the time series of arms imports of the Middle Eastern States between 1979 and 1989, we tend to see a correlation of immediate (same year) imports among the countries receiving weapons from the same source. This suggests, perhaps, the effect of offset arms deliveries to Israel, when Saudi Arabia buys weapons systems from the US (of course to placate Israel's supporters in the US congress). We see similar trend in the Israel-Egypt dyad.

We found small positive correlation between Syria's arms imports and those of Turkey. A moderate negative correlation characterizes the relationship of Syrian and Iraqi arms imports.

Unlike the strong relationship between military expenditures between Syria and Israel, we found almost no correlation between Syrian immediate military imports and those of Israel. Allied Middle Eastern States during the period of 1979   1989 tended to exhibit a strong lagged positive relationship (*e.g.* Saudi Arabia and Iraq). The same phenomena was evident in competitive dyads (*e.g.* Iran-Iraq). It took one year for Egyptian arms imports to affect those of Israel, and two years of Israeli imports to influence those of Egypt. Lagged Israeli imports also affected those of Syria (one year lag), however no discernable influence of Syrian imports was seen to affect those of Israel. Once again, the earlier conclusion of military expenditures regression was validated by arms imports correlations - namely that Israel appeared as an arms import leader in the region. Those imports affected (with lag) those of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Saudi lagged imports had almost no relationship to those other military importers, with the exception of Iraq, an ally at the time and recipient of Saudi aid. Lagged Iranian imports did have an impact on other regional States   Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and also on Turkey. Yet the impact of Iraqi imports on those of Iran was faster by one year to those of Iranian import impact on Iraq, suggesting once again that during the period under study Iraq was the arms race leader in the Iran-Iraq dyad. Lagged Turkish imports did affect positively those of Israel, suggesting perhaps that military imports are affected by similarity of origins of those imports.

VI. Factors Affecting Arms Expenditures and Arms Imports in the Middle East and the Gulf Region

When we examine the ebb and flow of arms expenditures and arms imports charts in the Middle East and the Gulf region, we notice that there is definitely a discernable and identical trend affecting both curves. While expenditures are almost always higher in monetary value than those of military imports or transfers, they tend to follow the same trend. Military spending and arms imports experienced a marked growth in the early 1980's in the region. As alluded to earlier, this indicated the posturing of Israeli military might in Lebanon. Syria and Egypt responded to this challenge. The first almost immediately responded in 1980 by increasing its military budget and its arms acquisition; Egypt did not react until 1984. The country was tied to President Sadat's policy of unilateral freeze on defence spending and it took some time for President Mubarak to reverse those policies. Other structural factors were also in place, affecting the change-over from purchasing Soviet weapons to those of acquiring US weapon systems. In the shift-over period, Egypt was forced to buy Chinese systems compatible with, and perhaps of an inferior quality to those of the USSR. Even the earlier shipments of US weapons were not modern equipments and included F-4 phantom fighters, which were already becoming absolute by that time. Later on, Egypt would use those Chinese systems like the F-7 fighters after assembly in Egypt and sell them to Iraq during its war with Iran. By the middle of the eighties, Israel on its part was getting rid of some old F-4 fighters and was selling them to a multitude of countries including Argentina, Chile and Singapore. South Africa was also buying Israeli built fast attack crafts (Reshef Class) equipped with Scorpion

and Gabriel ship-to-ship missiles. The latter as well as other Israeli air-to-air missiles such as Shafrir-2 were also popular due to their cheaper price among arms purchasers in Taiwan, Singapore, Chile and Argentina. Later on the decade, Israel began to export its Kfir C-7 fighter aircraft to those countries.

Despite declined defense expenditures towards the end of the decade, Egypt was finding some success in exporting some of its own license-produced weapons such as the Brazilian designed Tocano trainer, France's Alpha Jet and the Gazzelle helicopter as well as its own designed and produced ACP, the Fahd. Egyptian factories were also licensed to produce other advanced systems like the Abrams tank, the Swingfire anti-tank-missile and the AN/TPS-63 US surveillance radar. But these systems were mainly manufactured for Egypt's own requirements and have not yet been made available for export.

In the Gulf region, both arms expenditures and arms imports were experiencing a phenomenal growth in the middle of the decade. This was due to the stalemate developed between the two combatants Iran and Iraq. The two countries later were frenzied with the so-called war of cities, in which each side bombarded the cities of the other side with ballistic missiles. While such bombardment had little affect on the battle-field, it reinforced each side's eagerness to build its own long-range missile systems. Other powers in the region, like Saudi Arabia, acquired their own conventional surface-to-surface missiles (SSM). Later on during the second Gulf war Saudi Arabia and some of the Arab Gulf States acquired the Patriot ABTM, to stem incoming Iraqi long-range Scud missiles.

In addition to factors including the need to upgrade old models, export obsolete ones and offset the costs of those imports, Middle Eastern nations were attempting to follow a regional arms imports leader. When Iran began to use surface-to-surface missiles on the front with Iraq, the latter followed suit. When Israeli planes were fitted with the latest air-to-air missiles, the Arab States followed suit. The use of electronic jamming and warfare in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and in its strikes against Syrian SAMs forced the latter as well as other regional powers to upgrade their early-warning systems. This attempt to find an equilibrium with Israel was largely motivated by Israel's onslaught on its neighbours. Other countries in the region were fearing a similar fate, they therefore rushed to find similar systems. Israeli weapons systems, however, remained of higher quality and fire power, Arab weapons being largely defensive and of lower quality. A fourth factor affecting Arab armament is that Arab weapon systems, except those in the Gulf, were largely labour-intensive land-based weapons. Israel emphasized air and naval superiority with more capital and technological inputs than Syria, Egypt and Jordan. Missiles and missile technology has always been the hallmark of Israel's acquisition and/or manufacturing capabilities. Those missiles served also Israel's doctrine of taking over the battle to its enemies land. Along with advanced modern aircrafts, they were also vital as a possible delivery vehicles for nuclear and non-conventional arsenals (*e.g.* Jericho-2 and Lance missiles).[5]

At present Israel is moving forward from being a ballistic-missile and nuclear power-State to also acquiring a home-grown anti-ballistic system. Despite their enormous costs, the Offeq-2 satellite system and the Arrow anti-ballistic system would provide Israel with the capability of using conventional and non-conventional arsenals to strike of surrounding States without fearing any retaliation. If those space technologies are linked to an emerging growth of naval and submarine force, the impact of Israel's force structure would not only be felt in adjoin Arab lands but may as well jeopardize the strategic stability of Southern Europe.

As far as the Gulf region is concerned, shortage of manpower has forced those States to choose capital-intensive hardware. Despite their high costs, the second Gulf war proved that these systems

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[5] For Israeli delivery systems, see Mahmoud Karem, *A Nuclear - Weapon - Free Zone in the Middle East*, Westport, CT: 1988, pp. 81-85.

were cost-effective. Gulf armies remain however too small to cope with future strategic challenges, despite the attempts to increase the number of troops, their training and balance between the services. The Gulf States also have attempted to link their arms acquisition with an economic offset program. Some of the major regional arms manufacturers committed themselves to invest up to 30% of the purchasing value of their contracts into civilian sectors within these countries. The process of using part of the arms sales to reinvest into the civilian sector is a long and tedious process. One also should mention that an important facet of defense expenditures in the Gulf region is not necessarily targeted towards weapons acquisition, but earmarked for building military cities that largely serve entire civilian populations adjoining them by providing schools, electricity and water to those regions. Another portion of those outlays pays for salaries, services and other non-military external costs.

VII. Arms Transfers and Arm Control

Almost every single book on arms control and disarmament begins by analysing the three goals of arms control, namely to minimize the likelihood of the occurrence of war, to make it less destructive, and thirdly to lower the economic burdens of arms manufacturing and procurement. Others tend to reify the notions of arms control and disarmament to the point approaching a pacifist ideology.[6]

If we study the likelihood of arms expenditures leading to arms races that in turn make war more likely to occur, we should distinguish between two possible postures by a State's military policy: one of deterrence and the other of lateral expansion. Each of these policies sets forth a certain procurement approach, the first stressing defensive weapons systems, and the second seeking delivery vehicles, electronic warfare and non-conventional arsenals.

The second point one would like to raise is that not every arms race is likely to lead to regional wars, but primarily those arms races, in which one of the dyads opts to halt his procurement approach while the second partner of the race continues to proceed with his earlier demarcated path, may bring about the eruption of a regional war.

According to this study, this constellation had almost always led to direct war, or the onset of war between one of the dyads and a former ally or proxy of the second dyad. This was the case in 1979, when Iran decided to lower its defense budget, while Iraq choose to increase it. The same happened in 1977 when Egypt decided to freeze its arms purchases and lower its defense budget, while Israel decided to continue its arms-race path. The tragic result were three invasions by Israel to Lebanon, a former ally of Egypt. Such invasion occurred consecutively in 1978, 1980 and 1982.

Another feeble point (one should be on guard against) is the mechanical conception, each round of arms race would have the so-called "multiplier-effect", making the political viable options open to a decision-maker so wide as to include the use of force to solve an existing or potential conflict.

I think this mechanical approach is not necessarily appropriate. If we would like to bring about a real reduction of tensions in a certain geographic area, we must have the courage to address the real political problems that lag beneath the surface and cry out for political solutions. By neglecting these problems and directing our attention merely towards arms control issues, we tend to put the cart before the horse. We cope out, and merely postpone, the tedious and needed work to find solutions for outstanding problems.

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[6] For literature on Arms Control, see John Barton and Lawrence Weiler (eds), *International Arms Control*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1976; and Paul Jubber, *Not By War Alone, Security and Arms Control in the Middle East*, Barkeley University of California Press, 1981; and Carl Jacobsen (ed.), *The Uncertain Course, New Weapons, Strategies, and Mind-sets*, Stockholm: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1987.

VIII. Arms Imports and War

If we examine the historical evolution of arms procurement in the Arab Mashreq region, we see it arising as a direct consequence of regional wars and conflicts, not the other way around. Nadav Safran has shown that the earliest round of armaments occurred in 1949 as a result of the Arab loss in the Palestine War of 1948. The Arab States may have been eager on one hand to build their small armies, as showed the case of Syria. Building an army was tenement to building a State institution, particularly for a newly independent State.

For other States such as Egypt and Jordan and perhaps Iraq there was an attempt to modernize their forces and introduce some weapon systems, such as combat aircrafts, as the other side was clearly enjoying from the inception more advanced capabilities compared to their own backward armaments. Attempts by the Western powers to deny the Arab States the hardware required to modernize their armies in the early fifties did not stop those States from acquiring the needed weaponry; it merely delayed its acquisition. And such denial was one-sided, it gave a strong feeling throughout the Arab World, that the West was bent on aiding their enemy and preventing them from acquiring the needed systems to deter future Israeli aggression. The natural outcome of the Western Arms Embargo of the 1950's was the disillusionment of the masses and the armed forces in the abilities of their national leaders to fulfil a State vocation, namely deterrence and defense. This disillusionment led to popular uprisings and military coups, thus undermined the old regimes and brought about new military rulers. The first duties of those new rulers were to respond to the growing demands of their lieutenants and rebuild their armies. Thus, arms embargoes disguised under an arms control regime paradoxically brought forth the opposite of its original intention - namely regional military build-up. As with other forms of arms acquisition, the Arab States sought to acquire weapons that would match the weapons of their foes, quantitatively and qualitatively. As underdeveloped States and for a long time in the fifties and sixties, with limited military budgets, they opted for quantity rather then quality. Given the limited expertise of its acquisition personnel, those armies relied on the seller's recommendation for the appropriate defense systems. These were largely fourth or fifth generation systems, stripped of most of its original sophisticated gear. Unlike the Israeli lieutenants who may have served in Western armies and who had been more familiar with those systems, Arab military personnel lacked the expertise and technological know-how to upgrade and perhaps even maintain those systems. Thus, while succeeding in increasing their hardware, Arab military planners faltered in matching the quality of their foes weapon systems. This phenomenon remained the rule in most Arab States; intervening powers in the region saw fit to maintain this qualitative gap.

If were view the military acquisition of most Arab States, we can distinguish between four main cycles. The first started in 1955 and continued until 1967. It emphasized organizing the armies and equipping them with basic arsenals. The second phase started in 1968 and stressed the need to provide the armies with tanks, aircrafts and drafted a new generation of literate soldiers into active service. The quality of training at this stage, particularly in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, was improved. The planning and conduct of the 1973 war testified to the success of this approach. A third phase began after the 1973 cease fire, Arab military planners were confused. They had the money to buy new systems, but they lacked a military doctrine to fulfil. Post-war negotiations with Israel served to give those States a false sense of security. Such was the case with Egypt's decision to freeze its armament. Military policy became subordinant to foreign policy. This process was also evident in Syria, as well. Only the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 alarmed those States to the gravity of adopting a form of unilateral disarmament. This linkage between military policy and diplomatic approach in the Arab confrontation States continued to affect those States during periods of diplomatic negotiations with Israel. Israel, on the other hand. had succeeded in divorcing diplomatic negotiation from its military policy. It continued acquiring weapons systems and building advanced weapons

while still negotiating peace with the Arab States. It succeeded in obtaining more weapons from its patrons for any small apparent diplomatic concession. Even after signing a peace treaty with Egypt, its defense expenditures were sensitive to any changes in Egypt's defense outlays. In short, peace with the Arab States brought Israel more weapons, negotiation with Israel lulled the Arab States into a false sense of security and resulted sometimes in a freezing of military spending.

A forth cycle began after the second Gulf war, and it emphasizes naval and submarine power, as well as anti-ballistic systems. In this regard Israel was buying missiles and submarines from Germany, Apache helicopters, F-15 fighter planes from the US and continuing its star-war related co-operation with the US; this will avail Israel with a satellite-based Anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM), while Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are trying to enhance their early warning-systems. Egypt is buying Apache helicopters and F-16 fighters and enhancing its surveillance radars. Syria is trying to supplant Russian weapons with those from North Korea and China. Iran, on the other hand, has taken the opportunity to engage into a massive re-armament effort. In 1991, it received 300 battle tanks from Czechoslovakia as well as 100 T-72 tanks from Russia. Additional Mid-29 fighters, and Kilo-3 diesel submarines were ordered from Russia. The missile development co-operation with China and North Korea is also continuing with a strong pace. Press reports coming from Iran in 1993 reported that Iran is developing its own miniature submarine, which is difficult to track, and it would operate them in the shallow waters of the Arabian Gulf.

Other Arab States almost ceased to purchase any new weapons systems in 1991 and 1992. Iran was also spending some two billion dollars to upgrade its four nuclear test sites, and to build a major nuclear power station in Bandar Abbas.

The interaction of the Middle East with other regions also affected the armament picture in the Middle East. In the past it was fashionable to State that bipolar competition in the Cold War induced more competition and arms acquisition at the regional level. Unfortunately, with the end of the Cold War, we find that arms control regimes applied only to the Arab States, while Israel continues to be privileged with more conventional and unconventional weapon systems. Furthermore, conventional arms reduction in Europe under the 1990 CFE treaty did not result in less weapons in the Middle East. Two States in the region, Israel and Turkey, received large numbers of tanks and missiles almost free of charge from Germany, the Netherlands and the USA, as those States strove to comply with levels of the European theatre arms reduction treaty. German intelligence was shipping illegally former East German weapons to Israel. Thus, while some Arab States were not allowed to buy defensive weapons on the international market, Israel was saturated with excess weapons, that Israel can use to destabilize this region and other regions as well. In the final analysis, any meaningful regional disarmament policy must address the legitimate defense needs of the Arab States and not be biased or selective. Such policies must not also divorce conventional weapons from nuclear and non-conventional arsenals in the region. It also must address solving existing political problems through bargaining and negotiation. Posturing by a regional power will only lead to a similar policy by the competing States, and a relaxation of tensions in the area will have a system-wide effect on the political and strategic milieu.

Table 1: Arms Expenditures in the Middle East and Gulf Region: 1979-1991
(in US$m at 1988 prices and exchange rates)

Country	Egypt	Israel	Syria	Jordan	Iran	Iraq	South Arabia	UAE	Turkey
1979	1981	7831	3199	531	18239	13822	13605	1445	1976
1980	0	10551	4142	487	14731	14126	16078	2059	1871
1981	4341	7466	3676	534	11818	15318	18531	2407	2315
1982	5442	7314	3526	557	10230	21952	21614	1955	2528
1983	5889	8000	3511	581	8523	28596	20899	1966	2393
1984	6070	8420	3582	562	8082	31590	19513	2091	2325
1985	5252	5249	3152	607	9705	23506	18666	2211	2467
1986	5013	4318	2573	673	9339	16531	16684	2004	2772
1987	4607	4134	1601	703	7679	17073	16384	1587	2647
1988	4089	3811	1482	689	7353	12868	14887	1580	2664
1989	4023	3830	2070	539	5747	10720	14522	1464	3082
1990	3672	3801	2427	516	5306	9268	14798	1586	3725
1991	3183	3909	3134	502	6125	7414	26227	1634	3870

*Sources*: SIPRI Yearbooks (1989-1992).

Table 1A: Correlates of Military Expenditure in the Middle East (1979-1991) - LOG10

	Egypt	Israel	Syria	Jordan	Iran	Iraq	South Arabia	UAE	Turkey
Egypt		No relation	No relation		Very small negative relation	Very small positive relation	Very small positive relation		No relation
Israel	No relation		Moderate positive relation	No relation	Moderate negative relation	Strong positive relation	No relation		Moderate negative relation
Syria	No relation	Moderate positive relation		Small negative relation	Small positive relation	No relation	Small positive relation		
Jordan	Small positive relation	Negative relation	Small negative relation		No relation	Small positive relation	No relation	No relation	No relation
Iran	Very small negative relation	Moderate positive relation	Small positive relation			Moderate negative immediate relation	No relation	No relation	Strong negative relation
Iraq	Small positive relation	Strong positive relation	Small positive relation		Negative immediate relation		No relation		Small negative relation
South Arabia	Very small negative relation	No relation	Small positive relation	No relation	Strong positive relation	No relation			
UAE					No relation	Moderate positive relation			
Turkey	No relation	Moderate negative relation	Very small negative relation		Strong negative relation	Moderate negative relation	No relation		

Table 1B: Correlates of Arms Imports in the Middle East (1979-1989) - LOG10

	Egypt	*Israel*	*Syria*	*Jordan*	*Iran*	*Iraq*	*South Arabia*	*UAE*	*Turkey*
Egypt									
Israel	Moderate positive relation								
Syria	Small negative relation	Very small negative relation							
Jordan		Very small relation	No relation						
Iran	No relation	No relation	Very small relation	No relation					
Iraq	No relation	No relation	Moderate negative relation	Strong negative relation	Moderate positive relation				
South Arabia	Small positive relation	Moderate positive relation	Small positive relation	Small positive relation	Strong negative relation	Small negative relation			
UAE		No relation			No relation		Small positive relation		
Turkey	No relation	No relation	Weak but positive relation	Strong positive relation	No relation	Strong negative relation	Small positive relation		

Table 2: Arms Transfers in the Middle East and Gulf Region: 1979-1989
(in US$m at 1988 prices and exchange rates)

Country	Egypt	Israel	Syria	Jordan	Iran	Iraq	South Arabia	UAE	Turkey
1979	965	772	3376	161	2411	4983	1929	241	289
1980	921	1179	4862	383	619	3536	2357	250	457
1981	1210	1613	3495	1479	1243	5646	3629	325	497
1982	2400	1168	3284	1074	2021	8841	3536	63	594
1983	1824	608	4256	1338	1003	8269	4621	49	638
1984	1993	909	2579	270	3165	10670	3869	223	586
1985	1708	1138	1821	683	2163	5237	4326	216	512
1986	1332	555	1332	499	2885	6325	6103	166	694
1987	1828	1936	2151	355	2151	5808	7529	207	1022
1988	807	2082	1353	468	2394	5101	2811	62	1015
1989	600	725	1000	190	1300	1900	4200	850	1100

Sources: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer (1990), Wash. DC: USGPO, November 1991.

Table 2A: Correlates of Lagged Military Expenditure in the Middle East (1979-1991) - LOG10

	Egypt	Israel	Syria	Jordan	Iran	Iraq	South Arabia	UAE	Turkey
LAG Egypt		No relation	No relation	1 year small positive relation	No relation	1 year weak positive relation	No relation	No relation	No relation
LAG Israel	2 years positive relation		1 years positive relation	3 years positive relation	2 years strong relation	3 years strong relation	1 year small relation	1 year strong relation	2 years strong relation
LAG Syria	No relation	1 year moderate relation		No relation	1 year moderate relation	1 year moderate relation	1 year small relation	1 year moderate relation	1 year small negative relation
LAG Jordan	No relation	1 year moderate negative relation	1 year strong negative relation		No relation	No relation	1 year moderate negative relation		No relation
LAG Iran	4 years strong relation	3 years moderate positive relation	1 year small positive relation	No relation		4 years strong positive relation	3 years small relation	1 year small positive relation	1 year strong positive relation
LAG Iraq	1 year moderate positive relation	No relation	No relation	1 year small positive relation	2 years positive relation		No relation		1 year small negative relation
LAG South Arabia	1 year strong positive relation	1 year small positive relation	No relation	Small positive relation	No relation	1 year strong positive relation		Very small positive relation	No relation
LAG UAE									
LAG Turkey	No relation	1 year small negative relation	1 year small negative relation	No relation	1 year strong negative relation	Small negative relation	No relation		

Table 2B: Correlates of Lagged Arms Imports in the Middle East (1979-1989) - LOG10

	Egypt	Israel	Syria	Jordan	Iran	Iraq	South Arabia	UAE	Turkey
LAG Egypt		1 year strong positive relation	1 year moderate negative relation	1 year moderate negative relation	No relation	1 year moderate positive relation	No relation	1 year small positive relation	1 year strong negative relation
LAG Israel	2 years strong positive relation		1 year strong negative relation	2 years strong negative relation	2 years moderate positive relation	1 year strong positive relation	2 years small positive relation	1 year small positive relation	1 year negative moderate relation
LAG Syria	1 year strong negative relation	No relation		1 year moderate positive relation	No relation	No relation	No relation		1 year positive moderate relation
LAG Jordan	No relation	1 year moderate positive relation	No relation		1 year negative moderate relation	No relation	1 year small positive relation	No relation	No relation
LAG Iran	No relation	2 years moderate positive relation	1 year strong positive relation	2 years small positive relation		2 years small negative relation	1 year strong positive relation	No relation	2 years moderate positive relation
LAG Iraq	No relation	1 year negative moderate relation	No relation	No relation	1 year moderate positive relation		No relation	No relation	No relation
LAG South Arabia	No relation	No relation	1 year small negative relation	No relation	No relation	1 year moderate positive relation		Very small negative relation	No relation
LAG UAE					No positive relation	1 year small positive relation	No relation		No relation
LAG Turkey		1 year strong positive relation	No relation	No relation	1 year strong negative relation	No relation	1 year small positive relation		

Figure 1: Arms Expenditures in the Middle East
(in US$m at 1988 prices and exchange rates)

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1989-1992.

Figure 2: Arms Expenditures in the Gulf Region
(in US$m at 1988 prices and exchange rates)

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1989-1992.

Figure 3: Arms Transferts in the Middle East
(in US$m at 1988 prices and exchange rates)

Source: US Arms Control & Disarmament.

Figure 4: Arms Transfers in the Gulf Region
(in US$m at 1988 prices and exchange rates)

Source: US Arms Control & Disarmament.

Chapter 7
A Realistic Approach to Arms Control: An Israeli Perspective

Gerald Steinberg

In the wake of the creation of the multilateral working group on regional security and arms control, and other activities in this area, Israeli defense analysts and policy makers are increasingly examining the potential impact of arms limitations. The evolving Israeli policy is based on a realistic assessment of the impact of various confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and mutual restraints on regional stability and Israeli national security.

In developing this policy, four essential requirements can be identified: 1) CSBMs and arms limitations are seen to be inextricably linked to peace agreements encompassing all the major States in the region, including Syria, Libya, Iran and Iraq; 2) as long as a threat to national survival exists, the potential benefits of mutual restraints will be balanced against immediate weakening of Israeli deterrence; 3) this process is dependent on the development of regional verification mechanisms based on mutual inspection (without international organizations as intermediaries); and 4) the maintenance of an appropriate response in the event of unilateral abrogation and "breakout".

This framework has produced an Israeli policy based on a number of stages, beginning with CSBMs and conventional arms limitations, including the arsenals and standing armies of Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Israeli policy views Arab acceptance and implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention as essential for progress, including the development of a framework for mutual verification and inspection. Restraints on strategic systems, including ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons are longer term goals, requiring an end to threats to national survival. In addition, given the failures of the NPT and the IAEA with respect to the Iraqi nuclear program, Israeli spokesmen and policy makers emphasize the development of regional frameworks for mutual inspection and verification before constraints on strategic systems. External pressures for unilateral concessions, particularly in the nuclear realm, will be strongly resisted.

Introduction

Historically, Israeli political and military leaders have viewed efforts to reach arms limitation agreements in the Middle East with great skepticism. The Tripartite Declaration of the 1950s, involving the US, France, and Britain, made it difficult for Israel to purchase weapons, while the major powers found ways to provide weapons to the Arabs.[1] The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the international conventions have failed in the Middle East, particularly in the case of Iraq. At best, arms control was seen as an idealistic irrelevance to the Middle East; at worst, it was a means of weakening Israel militarily and isolating the government politically.

However, the growing importance of arms control in the international system in recent years has led to a cautious Israeli reappraisal. Policy makers have begun to examine and compare the potential impacts of specific proposals with respect to political and military requirements.

From the Israeli perspective, the Middle East continues to be highly unstable, and the Jewish State remains vulnerable. A significant reduction in the Israeli deterrent could quickly lead to an increase in the military threat and in the probability of a major war in the region. Israel is very small, lacks strategic depth, and there are many potential enemies, from Algeria to Irany.[2] In the Middle East, war is still seen as primary instrument of policy, and for many States, such as Iraq, Libya, or Iran, limitations and global regimes are marginal obstacles to be overcome, or are simply ignored.

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[1] Michael B. Oren, "The Tripartite System and Arms Control in the Middle East: 1950-1956", in *Arms Control in the Middle East*, Dore Gold (ed.), Boulder, Colo., Westview, 1990.
[2] For a detailed discussion of the boundaries of the region and the radius of conflict, see Gerald Steinberg, "Arms Control in the Middle East", *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, Richard Dean Burns (ed.), Charles Scribner's Sons, March 1993.

Furthermore, arms control in the region is highly complex, with over 20 States involved, and numerous and overlapping conflict zones. With the exception of demilitarized regions and some other minor measures, bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt or Syria do not provide Israel with very much security. For example, if Israel were to give up its missile capability in exchange for similar limits on Egypt, other States, such as Iraq, Iran, Syria or even Algeria would quickly gain an advantage. Arms control must therefore be multilateral, with simultaneous adoption of restraints involving all the relevant players.

Given these constraints, as Israeli policy has developed, four requirements have been defined. First, CSBMs and arms control are directly dependent on the peace process. Progress is closely linked to the negotiations, and major limitations on Israel's nuclear capability will come at the end, after all the States in the region explicitly accept the legitimacy of the Jewish State, and formal peace agreements are signed. Second, limitations must provide tangible reduction in the military threat, conventional and unconventional, to Israel. Third, limitation agreements must include realistic provisions for verification, in contrast to the existing NPT/IAEA system. Fourth, agreements must be structured so that if any country were to suddenly abrogate the terms, such actions would not endanger Israeli security or survival.

1. Arms Control and the Peace Process

Israel has developed all of its military capabilities in response to continuous efforts to destroy the Jewish State, beginning in 1948, and significant arms control agreements can only be implemented when all States accept, without reservation, Israel's legitimacy and end the state of war.

The Israeli government's program for arms control in the Middle East was outlined by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in January 1993 upon the signing of the CWC. He emphasized that "No nation in the region will enjoy genuine security unless all nations feel secure. Accordingly, we have formulated our policy on regional security and arms control, once peace has been attained."[3] In other words, the implementation of significant major arms limitations will wait until formal peace treaties are signed.

Ambiguous and easily reversible measures, such as an end to the state of belligerency, are insufficient to ally Israeli security concerns. Shalheveth Freier, who served as Israel's representative in international arms control conferences and has had a major role in formulating policy, noted that proposals that call for military restraints by Israel, particularly in the nuclear realm, "can only be credible once war against Israel has been renounced as a way of settling differences with it."[4]

While the peace process has created some momentum in this direction, there is still a long way to go. Effective arms control in the Middle East must include over 20 States, from North Africa to Iran.[5] Many of these States remain entirely outside and are active opponents of the current peace negotiations. It is clear that in certain areas, including missiles and nuclear weapons, significant limitations are not possible as long as the leaders of States such as Iran declare themselves to be committed to the destruction of Israel. Thus, before serious substantive negotiations can begin, Iran and Libya must be brought into the negotiation process, and this process must produce revolutionary

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[3] Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993.

[4] Shalheveth Freier, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and its Ambience", unpublished manuscript, 1992.

[5] When missiles and nuclear weapons are considered, Pakistan is generally included in the region as well. See, for example, "Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East Study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon- free zone in the Middle East", report of the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, A/45/435, 10 October 1990.

agreements that bring the Arab-Israeli conflict to an end. In the meantime, CSBMs can be implemented to create the foundation for eventual limitations on strategic systems.

2. The Impact of Arms Control on Israeli Deterrence

Israeli national security and arms control policies are based on a realist approach to the use of force and threat perception. Israeli deterrence doctrine was formed in response to Arab rejection of the concept of a Jewish State, and with full cognizance of the narrow borders and total absence of strategic depth. The combined invasions of 1948, which seriously threatened the survival of the new State, the Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi preparations for attack in 1967, and Nasser's threats to "slice Israel in two", and the very costly surprise attack in 1973 all contributed to Israeli strategic culture and policies.

Even under the most optimistic scenarios, it is hard to imagine a peace agreement that will completely remove the military threat to Israel in the foreseeable future. As in other ethno-national conflicts, the potential for revanchism and renewed efforts to destroy the Jewish State can remain for years and generations. In the absence of democratic regimes throughout the region, the role of the military will continue to be dominant. Governments that sign peace agreements will be vulnerable to radical groups calling for renunciation of the treaties. Therefore, Israeli policy makers will seek CSBMs and arms control arrangements that are consistent with these conditions.

Indeed, any peace agreements that involve territorial withdrawal, whether on the Golan Heights or the West Bank, could increase the dangers of military attack, requiring expanded Israeli deterrence and defensive capabilities.[6] The geographic and demographic asymmetries that have characterized the Arab-Israeli conflict will become even more pronounced. Israel will always be a micro-State without strategic depth, and with a very small population. If there are changes in the defense lines, Israel will again appear be highly vulnerable to large-scale surprise attack. Thus, even with peace treaties, arms limitations measures must allow Israel to maintain sufficient military capability to deter against and defend all attacks that threaten national survival.

Although some measures, such as early warning, buffer zones, and increased emphasis on defense can reduce the dependence on deterrence, the effectiveness of these measures is problematic. Syrian divisions stationed near Damascus, a short distance from the Golan Heights, will continue to threaten Israeli positions below, with clear access to Tel Aviv. Thousands of the most modern Iraqi tanks and artillery (equipped with chemical shells) survived the Gulf War, and will be able to move through Jordan and within range of Israel in a period of a few days, with or without buffer zones in between. Israel is too small to effectively defend against such large scale conventional attacks, and the need for deterrence and pre-emption will remain long after any peace agreements are reached.

3. Compliance

Verification of compliance is essential to any realistic arms control regime, and, for decades, this issue played an central role in US-Soviet negotiations. In closed societies, which are the norm in the Middle East, (with the exception of Israel, and, to a lesser degree, Egypt and Jordan) verification is particularly difficult. As became clear in the case of Iraq, and seems to true for Iran as well, in highly closed societies, it is possible to hide major weapons development programs, both internally and from outside inspectors and even overhead reconnaissance.

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[6] For a detailed analysis of the role of territory in Middle Eastern arms control, see Geoffrey Kemp, *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race*, Carnegie Endowment, Washington DC, 1992 and Alan Platt (ed.), *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East*, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC, 1992.

As a result, it is not surprising that the Middle East has a poor track record in this area. Iraq blatantly violated the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons, and ignored its commitments under the NPT. IAEA inspections and safeguards were a complete travesty in Iraq, both during the 1980s, and even after the 1991 war when IAEA inspectors were sent to destroy the Iraqi program. (The IAEA employs only 200 inspectors, and most of their time is spent on inspections in countries such as Canada and Sweden.) As long as this situation continues, such loose international regimes that present the illusion, but not the substance of verification, will be rejected by Israel.

The IAEA and NPT clearly failed to prevent the proliferation of materials and technology to Iraq (which was a member of the Board of Governors of the IAEA), Algeria, Iran, and other States. Shalheveth Freier notes that Israeli concerns with the Iraqi nuclear weapons program "were brushed aside" by the IAEA and the supplier States "on the grounds that Iraq was a signatory to the NPT." In international organizations such as the UN and IAEA, the Arabs "dispose of majorities" and "majority resolutions take the place of negotiations, envisaged in the multilateral talks." Freier concludes that Israel should not allow verification to be "arrogated by international organizations..."[7]

As a result, Israeli policy makers stress regional institutions, with mutual verification and inspection regimes (including challenge inspections).[8] In his January 1993 outline of the Israeli perspective, Peres emphasized that "Arms control negotiations and arrangements be mutually agreed upon and include all the States of the region. The implementation and verification mechanisms, the establishment of comprehensive and durable peace, should be region-wide in their application."[9] In their present form, global institutions and regimes are not acceptable, and the negotiation and implementation of a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone is seen as a necessary condition prior to Israeli accession to the NPT.

4. The Problem of "Breakout"

No international agreement is guaranteed, and unilateral renunciation of arms limitations is always possible. After World War I, Germany circumvented the restrictions that it had accepted under the peace agreement, giving it a major military advantage. American analysts worried about "breakout" scenarios, in which the Soviet Union would suddenly announce that it had succeeded in developing a capability that had been subject to mutual restraints, (such as ballistic missile defense) or had produced a large number of delivery systems and warheads. In 1993, North Korea withdrew from the NPT, rather than accept the inspections demanded by the IAEA.

In the Middle East, the problem of "breakout" is particularly acute. The sudden acquisition of a nuclear capability by Iraq, Iran, Libya, or Syria would change the balance of power in a fundamental way. If intermediate-range ballistic missiles were banned, but one of these States managed to develop, acquire or upgrade shorter range missiles (as Iraq did with its Scud-Bs) this would immediately threaten Israeli security. The IAEA claims that its verification system provides "timely warning" of a potential breakout, to allow for political and military responses before the State in question succeeded in going nuclear. However, it is now clear that the IAEA's small and timid inspection regime cannot, in fact, provide timely warning.

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[7] Freier, *ibid.*

[8] Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993.

[9] Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993.

In response to the threat of "breakout", Israel cannot be expected to place any confidence in the UN or other international agencies. The US might seek to provide explicit guarantees, but these would be treated with some skepticism. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the US prepared for six months before going to war. Six months would allow more than enough time for a well-prepared State that had developed its infrastructure carefully to finish work on a nuclear device, and if Iraq had succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, many analysts argue that the US would not have attacked Saddam Hussein. Israeli policy is based on the conclusion that arms control agreements must allow for the maintenance of an independent capability to respond to unilateral abrogations.

Specific Policy Options

Given the existing military and political conditions, and the requirements discussed above, Israeli proposals for Middle East arms control can be described in terms of four-stages. The first phase will consist of extensive CSBMs to establish a framework for co-operation; the second stage will include controls on conventional weapons; the third stage will move to regional inspection and verification of limits on chemical and biological weapons, and perhaps missiles; and the final step, after all the other steps have been accomplished and peace agreements had been tested, limits on nuclear weapons can be implemented.

1. Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs)

In the US-Soviet and CSCE arms control processes, the development of small scale and incremental CSBMs provided an indispensable foundation for progress towards more extensive agreements on strategic systems. Such measures, by definition, do not involve significant risks to national security or deterrence, and do not require verification or inspection, and all the complications that are included in these processes.

In the Middle East, with its history of conflict and the absence of co-operation, CSBMs are even more necessary before other limitations can even be considered. In discussing the objectives of the multilateral working group on regional security and arms control, US Secretary of State James Baker proposed that following the first phase of seminars, the process should move to "considering a set of confidence-building or transparency measures covering notifications of selected military activities and crisis prevention communications." For the Israeli government, this phase is critical. In his January 1993 outline of Israeli policy, Shimon Peres gave priority to measures designed "to build and nurture mutual confidence between States" and "to diminish the levels of suspicion, hostility and conflagration", and discussed applications in preventing surprise attacks and in crisis management. Pre-notification agreements regarding large-scale military maneuvers, as well as regular communications between military commanders are considered to be primary areas for CSBMs.

Further development of this framework has led to the proposals for a center to respond to naval incidents in the Red Sea, which would involve Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia (and has the advantage of not requiring the participation of Syria, which has not joined the multilateral talks.) For Israel, the degree of co-operation and direct, frequent and visible contact with the Arab States is critical; unilateral measures will not build confidence that the era in which Israeli legitimacy was denied has finally and irrevocably ended. Ariel Levite, a member of the Israeli delegation in the working group, has noted that from the Israeli perspective, CSBMs are "a symbol of co-operation, sending a broad political message of willingness to move beyond confrontation and competition to

co-operation and reconciliation."[10] At this stage, the active participation of the Saudis, who have been seen to be a primary source for religious and ethnic rejection of Israel, is essential.

2. Conventional Limitations

Following the CSBM stage, the Israeli program envisions the negotiation of limitations on conventional weapons.[11] The massive conventional forces in the region continue to present a major threat to Israeli security. Combined Arab attacks in 1948 and 1973 (and the preparations for attack in 1967) posed threats to the survival of the State, and this scenario continues to be a major factor in military planning. The peace treaty with Egypt, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the 1991 Gulf war, which lowered the Iraqi military capability by almost 50%, have reduced this threat. However, the possibility of an attack on the Eastern front, involving Syria, with potential support from Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, remains.[12] With the limited participation of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, Israel would face a disadvantage of 1:2 in tanks, 1:3 in guns and mortars, and 1:2 in combat aircraft.[13] A surprise attack before Israel could mobilize its reserves would greatly increase the Arab advantage.[14]

Despite the political changes in the region and the world, in the past two years, Saudi Arabia and Iran have purchased billions of dollars of advanced weapons. Syria has used the $2 billion it received from Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War to purchase hundreds of T-72 tanks, combat aircraft, and other systems.[15] Advanced weapons technology sold to Saudi Arabia diffuses quickly throughout the Arab World, leading to an erosion of Israel's technological advantage which has been used to offset the quantitative advantage of the Arabs.[16] Israeli military planning for "worst case scenarios" includes the offensive potential role of these forces.

Conventional arms control, with respect to both weapons and manpower, is consistent with the four requirements listed above. Such measures could be incorporated within the peace process, can be readily verified, and the risks of sudden abrogation are minimal. Major conventional platforms, including tanks, artillery, combat aircraft, and perhaps naval systems, can be limited or even frozen in the major confrontation States (Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Iraq) and small changes in these forces will not effect the military balance significantly.[17]

Some Israeli analysts have also proposed that Arab States (particularly Syria) move to a force structure similar to the Israeli system, based largely on reserve forces.[18] Such a structure is inherently less threatening and its offensive potential is greatly reduced. If Syria and Iraq require

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[10] Ariel E. Levite, "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Middle East", draft of paper presented at the UNIDIR Conference, Cairo April 18-20, 1993.

[11] See Shalheveth Freier, "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and its Ambience", unpublished manuscript, 1992; and Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993.

[12] Michael Eisenstadt, "Arming for Peace? Syria's Elusive Quest for 'Strategic Parity", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Paper No. 31, 1992.

[13] *Middle East Military Balance*, 1989-1990, Joseph Alpher, Zeev Eytan, and Dov Tamari (eds), Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1991.

[14] A worst-case scenario involving full participation of the major confrontation states would leave Israel at a 2.6:1 disadvantage in tanks, 4.6:1 disadvantage in guns and mortars, and 2.2:1 deficit in combat aircraft. See *Middle East Military Balance 1990-1*, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1992, p. 404-5.

[15] Gerald M. Steinberg, "Opportunities for Conventional Arms Limitations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf", in Andrew Pierre (ed.), *Conventional Arms Sales in the 1990s*, (forthcoming).

[16] Dore Gold, "US Policy Toward Israel's Qualitative Edge", Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Report No. 36, September 1992, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv.

[17] For a detailed discussion of this proposal, see Steinberg, "Opportunities for Conventional Arms Limitations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf".

[18] Shai Feldman, "Pikuach V'Bakarat Neshek: Seder Yom L'Yisrael", Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, November, 1991.

24 to 72 hours for mobilization, Israel would have the equivalent time to call-up its reserve forces, thereby reducing the fear of surprise attack. (The threat from Egypt is reduced by existence of the demilitarized buffer zone in the Sinai Peninsula. Unless Syrian troops are withdrawn far to the north of Damascus, such a buffer zone will be difficult to reproduce on this front.)

3. Chemical and Biological Weapons

In January 1993, Israel became one of the charter signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). From the Israeli perspective, the CWC contains both potential risks and benefits. The major test of the CWC is whether it can verify the destruction of the chemical stockpiles and production facilities of Iraq, Libya, Syria and other Arab States.[19] The efforts by some Arab representatives to link acceptance of the CWC with Israeli adherence to the NPT, or other steps to reduce the nuclear deterrent capability are unacceptable to Israel.

From the Israeli perspective, the enforcement of the terms of the CWC will be an important test of the effectiveness of a broader verification system in the region, and of the international community in response to non-compliance. The world stood impotently in the face of Iraqi use of chemical weapons, in total violation of the 1925 Geneva Convention, to which Iraq was a signatory. In addition, the CWC regime provides an opportunity to demonstrate an end to the anti-Israel bias that has characterized the United Nations, IAEA, and other bodies.[20] For the CWC to work in the Middle East, a regional verification system, involving mutual inspection, will have to be negotiated. The CWC is thus a test case, by which the degree with which arms control can be applied to other areas, including nuclear weapons, will be measured.

4. Missiles

Many proposals for "confidence- and security-building measures" for the Middle East are based on limits on the acquisition, deployment, and testing of ballistic missiles. From the Israeli perspective, such proposals are problematic. Mutual restraints could increase Israeli security, particularly after the experience of the 1991 Gulf War, in which Israeli cities were shown to be vulnerable to Iraqi missiles. Many analysts, including General (Res.) Aharon Levran and General (Res.) Israel Tal, have expressed concern about the threat posed by these missile forces.

At the same time, the Jericho long-range missile is an important component of the Israeli strategic deterrent and retaliatory capability, which is seen as necessary to guarantee the survival of the State. As the offensive threat has extended as far as Iran and Algeria, the Jericho has provided an assured second strike capability in the event of "a worst case attack". Limits on Israeli missile capabilities would therefore have a major impact on the Israeli deterrent, and the tradeoff between costs and benefits will be difficult.

Given the centrality of this capability to Israeli national security, CSBMs or unilateral and informal restraints, are not applicable to this area. In this area, as in others, effective compliance and verification is difficult. Missile forces based on imports of major components (as in the case of Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Libya), or on a combination of technology imports and local production and upgrading (as in the case of Iraq, Iran, and Egypt) may not require testing or visible deployment before use. Supplier agreements in this area, as in others, have failed in the past, and

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[19] Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993.

[20] In his speech at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993, Foreign Minister Peres stressed "the principles of universality and equality among nations", and declared that "we expect equal rights of geographic membership in the institutions established by the convention."

Israel will also demand much greater evidence that any agreed limits will be implemented. The Missile Technology Control Regime, that was established under American leadership in 1987, included the participation of all Western European States, and other suppliers, including the Soviet Union and China agreed to accept the export limitations established in the MTCR. The performance of this regime in the Middle East has been somewhat problematic. Apparently as a result of US pressure, China has not delivered the M-9 missile to Syria to date, and the Condor project, (involving Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq) seems to have been stopped (although questions remain). However, the MTCR did not prevent Iraq from upgrading its Scud-B missiles, with technology and assistance provided by signatories such as Germany, Britain, and the US.[21] Syrian and Iranian missile programs are growing constantly, and the major suppliers are either powerless or unwilling to intervene. In March 1992, North Korean Scud-C missiles, launchers, and equipment to manufacture these missiles, reached Iran and Syria.

The "cat and mouse" game between Saddam Hussein and the UN inspectors after the 1991 Gulf War has also not provided much assurance to Israel in this area. Prior to and during the war, the US asked for Israeli "restraint" in response to the Scud missile attacks. The Bush administration pledged to destroy Iraqi missiles, as well as the chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 of April 1991 specified a period of 120 days in which all of Iraq's non-conventional weapons, related materials, and production facilities would be destroyed under the verification of the United Nations. However, over two years have passed, and hundreds of Scud missiles, an unknown number of launchers, and large-scale production facilities continue to exist.

As a result of all these factors, Israel can be expected to treat proposals to restrain missile development and deployment with caution. The possibilities for the negotiation of mutual limitations exist, but not in the context of CSBMs or informal agreements, and only after limitations on conventional systems are concluded. Such agreements are likely to be feasible only after a network of CSBMs have been implemented, conventional weapons limitations are adopted, and key States, such as Iran and Iraq, agree to participate.

5. Nuclear Weapons

The Israeli government has endorsed the objective of ridding the Middle East of the threat of nuclear weapons, and this goal has been included in policy statements on regional security and arms control for some time.[22] However, the Israeli nuclear capability was developed to deter threats to national survival, and as long as the threats continue, and the legitimacy and permanence of Israel is questioned, nuclear weapons will continue to be seen as the ultimate guarantor against existential threats. Israeli policy places nuclear weapons at the end of the process, and as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict continues, even if the Israeli nuclear monopoly is ended, and other States in the region develop nuclear forces, Israel is likely to maintain its nuclear deterrent.[23] Indeed, public

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[21]   Mike Eisenstadt, *The sword of the Arabs: Iraq's Strategic Weapons*, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC 1990; Gary Milhollin, "Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb", *New York Times Magazine*, 8 March 1992.

[22]   Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993. This objective was also included in a joint Israeli-Jordanian declaration negotiated in the context of the bilateral talks in 1992.

[23]   Some analysts claim that, as the case of the Super Powers, the development of a regional "balance of terror" can be stabilizing, and Kenneth Waltz argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would inhibit conventional as well as nuclear war. According to this view, by greatly increasing deterrence and the risk of total destruction, the spread of weapons of mass destruction will decrease the proclivity towards war in the Third World. Shai Feldman has also argued that a nuclear Middle East would be stabilizing, and Geoffrey Kemp has claimed that "On some occasions, weapons proliferation has led to greater caution between adversaries, and may have strengthened deterrence." He cites the specific example of Saddam Hussein's failure to use chemical weapons against Israel, attributing this caution to the fear of massive retaliation promised by Israel. This view is rejected by

Israeli concession to pressure the other States in the region, including Iran and Egypt, to abstain from obtaining nuclear weapons, and in gaining support for extension of the NPT in 1995.

However, Israeli policy makers reject links between nuclear capabilities to preliminary CSBMs.[30] In addition, few believe that unilateral Israeli restraint will effect Iranian policy, and Teheran is likely to continue to pursue nuclear weapons regardless of the status of the Israeli program. With effective enforcement, the NPT, IAEA, and supplier limits can delay the Iranian nuclear program for a few years, but, as the Iraqi and North Korean cases demonstrate, supplier limitations are of limited effectiveness.

Some critics argue that an Israeli "freeze" could spur to the efforts of the other States, who might see an opportunity to obtain a position of nuclear superiority. In addition, in response to Israeli concessions, the Arab States may then demand more limitations, including an end to the Israeli deterrent capability.

The Israeli position calls for negotiation of Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free-Zone (MEWMDFZ), based on the model provided by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the proposed African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Such a zone, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as long-range missiles, would have to be negotiated directly by the States in the region, and include mutual inspection.[31] Given the interdependence between these different weapons and technologies, such a multi-dimensional approach to arms control in Middle East may provide the most realistic path to progress.

Conclusions

To be effective, arms control must meet the security requirements of all the States involved. The Israeli nuclear program, which is the major target of most Middle East arms control proposals, was developed to meet specific security requirements, and the threat to the survival of the State, in particular. The only way to gain Israeli restraints in this area is to reduce the threat which has made the nuclear capability seem necessary in the first place. This threat is based primarily on massive Arab acquisition of conventional forces, with increasing technological sophistication, as well as chemical and biological weapons, and long-range missiles.

Many Israelis, including Prime Minister Rabin, remain skeptical about the degree to which arms control can contribute to Israeli national security in the foreseeable future. As Freier has noted, "The continued insistence that Israel be internationally controlled in the nuclear realm, (conveys) to Israel [the message that] the Arab States wish to retain the option of waging wars against Israel, with nothing to worry about."[32] There is a broad consensus in Israeli on this issue, and external pressures for unilateral concessions are unlikely to gain significant support. If Israeli policy is to change, Arab leaders must act clearly and unambiguously to demonstrate that this conclusion is false.

If the Arab States are seriously interested in bringing an end to Israel's nuclear option, they must begin by visibly ending the threat to Israel's existence. Formal peace treaties involving all the States in the region (including Iran and Libya), exchange of embassies, tourism, and the full

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[30] See Freier.

[31] Shalhevet Freier, above; Address by the Foreign Minister of Israel, Mr. Shimon Peres at the Signing Ceremony of the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, Paris, 13 January 1993.

[32] Freier warns that "As we approach the 1995 NPT Review Conference, ... the Arab states will make their support for an indefinite extension of the NPT dependent on Israel's accession. Under present circumstances, I cannot conceive that Israel can yield to pressure. It continues to be sole guarantor of its security. If the Arab states will hold the extension of the treaty or Israel to ransom, they should not, in my view, be permitted to do so."

package of normalization are necessary conditions for movement on this issue. As long as some States and national leaders call for the destruction of the Jewish State, and others continue to hesitate and send mixed signals, Israelis will feel a need to maintain a nuclear deterrent.

Chapter 8
Discussion

Shafeeq Ghabra

Following what has been said by Mr Karem and Mr Al-Mani, I would like to make some remarks with respect to the Gulf crisis.

As far as I am concerned the Gulf crisis is the result of: a lack of leadership, adventurism, dominance of personal leadership in the Arab World, and misunderstanding concerning the intentions of each of the Parties, all faced with an economic crisis. The problems in Iraq, as well as elsewhere in the region, produced a magnified crisis that may again arise in the foreseeable future if we do not really learn from that experience. When State leaders are pessimistic, feel threatened and vulnerable and consider that the *status quo* should be destroyed, then you have a crisis scenario at hand. War is caused by subjective and objective realities, it may quickly escalate and get out of hand. There is a certain practice of brinkmanship by leaders in the region. Some of the lessons we have to draw are related to the issue of leadership, and personal leadership.

We also have to realise that no one is immune, and no border is immune. The Gulf War provided an apt example. We are obsessed with borders, but in reality there are no borders. Today after 40, 50, 60 years of independence we have to cope again with the West, as if we did not acquire independence. We have to cope again with a reality we have rejected the last 40 or 50 years. It underlines the need for a better understanding in the region, of both the West and the world around us. The Gulf crisis has shown that we cannot really be an independent system. Our region is a subsystem of the world system, and the issues that we are talking about today: armament, disarmament and arms races, are to be referred back to the question of how our subsystem fits into the global system. We cannot function as a system opposed to, or in confrontation with the world, we will need to develop instead new relations with the global system.

With respect to the issue of arms transfers, it should be stressed that these transfers are a symptom and a reflection of a deeper problem in the region. Military spending is huge. In 1983 (?) 40 per cent of the weapons sold in the world went to Iraq, Egypt, Iran, Saudi-Arabia and Israel. The arms build up in our part of the world leads to authoritarianism, lack of respect for the individual, and corruption. A lot of the weapons bought are not really needed. Arms purchases drain existing resources, even in the Gulf States, and prevent those countries from building political networks, a scientific environment, and democracy.

There is in the region a direct relationship between, on the one hand, military expenditures, and, on the other hand, authoritarianism and a lack of democracy. Today's situation is a result of a failure to build a science-oriented infrastructure, the failure to build a creative, opinion-oriented status for the individual. Our culture and our civilisation fears democracy. It fears all kinds of creativity and even fears studying its history and past in a creative and scientific way. In the Middle East, one is not attuned to the modern mentality of science, tolerance and research and this has resulted in our failure to build democratic structures.

Consequently we have occasional crises. Once in a while we have a rebellion, are confronted with fundamentalism, or have someone who takes things into his hands in a fanatic way and challenges the system. Meanwhile our intellectuals become passive, pessimistic or simply emigrate. Time has however come to mobilize. The continuing crises can only be avoided by creating greater democracy within the States of the region.

Hassan Ghahvechi Mashhadi

I would like to touch briefly upon the role of external powers in the Middle East. I will refrain from defining the Middle East, where it stands, or how Iran would geographically define the Middle East.

In physics there exists the so-called cybernetic approach; it is used, for example, in thermometers or thermostats in houses. Suppose you want a critical temperature of 20°C. When the weather is cold *i.e.* below 20 °C your system will automatically turn on, and when the weather is warm *i.e.* over 20 °C it will automatically turn off. This cybernetic system will automatically have things happen without any outside interference at the critical level of 20 °C. It seems that the external power's approach towards the Middle East is based upon this cybernetic system. The critical level being in this case the national interests of these powers. Therefore you cannot rely on them when they assert that they have a unified and equal approach towards the problems in the region. Examples abound, take, for instance, Wilson when after the First World War he came with the idea of Nation States. It was argued that each Nation should have a State. However, when he came to the problem of the British in the Middle East he stopped short of doing anything. The Middle East was an exception to his rule. The example is far from isolated. It undermines the credence of these powers in the region, and the reliance the countries in the region can put on these powers. A more recent example can be given by comparing the two wars in the Persian Gulf. One may note that one invasion led after eight years to nine resolutions, while the other one, the second Persian Gulf war, produced twelve resolutions in only four months. It illustrates how the cybernetic system rules the relationships and the attitudes of the big powers. I do not want to go into the details or the reasons of the difference, we all know them. It is nonetheless pertinent and very axiomatic for the relationships in general.

Let me turn to the issue of the arms trade, arms transfers and arms purchases. If we take the figures provided by Mr Saleh, we see that in all the figures, whether from SIPRI, the IISS in London, or the US ACDA, Iran's arms purchases are not more important than those of the other countries. In fact they are lower than Saudi Arabia, lower than the Persian Gulf Co-operation Council members, and lower than many others. At the same time, the cybernetic system tells that one should criticize one country, but not criticize another. The reason is that if you buy from the West it is good (if you buy 16 billion dollars of arms it is no problem), but if you buy arms from non-traditional suppliers like North Korea, then you are labelled as disturbing the balance in the region, as trying to somehow cow neighbours. I can give you an example from American sources which says that the Russian Defence Industry Trade Union has claimed, I underline this point, that the United States has increased its arms sales by 2.2 times since 1989, largely at the expense of Russia, and in some cases, China. There are figures here that show that while we are pushing and labelling the countries which purchase arms, we don't do anything about those countries which are selling arms. For those traditional suppliers of arms there is a need for a code of conduct. We know very well that four fifths of the weapons provided to Iraq were supplied by the three Permanent Members of the Security Council *i.e.* by those which are responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. We need a code of conduct for the suppliers of arms, it's not just the purchasers that have to be dealt with. The cybernetic system that these suppliers seem to adopt creates imbalances, lack of credibility and reliability in the international system. Indeed countries cannot rely on the international community, they cannot say "Ok, we do not buy arms, but we trust that the international community will take care of our security if it is in danger".

The other issue which poses a problem has to do with the fact that there is no unified approach. For instance, there are countries in the region, which are not Party to the NPT but do not encounter any problem, while others, who are members of NPT and who are subject to AIEA safeguards, are being blamed for developing a nuclear capability. Similarly, there are States which are not Party to the Biological Weapons Convention, and there are those who are Party to the Convention but

which are labelled, blamed, and in fact punished, because others have not joined. One should treat all States equally. All States should join the CWC or the NPT. The continuing discrimination in this field will undermine any other disarmament agreement in the future.

The third problem is that extra-regional powers justify their actions by saying that the security requirements of this country in the region requires that we sell arms and that security requirements of another country requires that no arms be sold to them. The security requirements of the States in the region should be determined by the States themselves, possibly with the co-operation of the regional countries. It should not be the extra-regional countries which determine the security requirements of each State only to justify their sales or any other action they might take. When the regional States reach an agreement, all extra-regional powers should be obliged to lend their support to these agreements and they should not try to change them according to their wishes, likes and dislikes.

Roberto Aliboni

Concerning the extra-regional presence in the Middle East, I think that it needs to be stressed that this presence has always been strongly invited. Ten years of war in the Gulf, first the Iran-Iraq crisis, then the Iraq-Kuwait crisis and then the inability of Iraq to respect the Kurdish minority in the North (we should not forget that they used gas against their own people) illustrate this. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the region, particularly the Gulf region, was unable to guarantee an orderly flow of oil to importers. I do not think that we can overlook the fact that there is a strong interest from oil importers in stability in the region *i.e.* the possibility of importing oil freely and without disruptions. I share the point made by Mr Salamé concerning the importance of the fact that the United States shifted from being an oil exporting to an oil importing country. But I do not see why we should refuse or deny the United States' interest in having an orderly flow of oil. It must be admitted that unless new regional conditions of order and stability are created, this extra-regional presence in the Middle East will probably have to be accepted.

I also share with Mr Salamé the point about non-interference policies. The interference policies may be very dangerous for a number of reasons. At the same time, however, we have to accept the fact that interference is necessary today for a number of reasons. The point is probably not to refuse interference, but to make interference acceptable by framing it within the United Nations context. The interventions thus far made within the framework of the United Nations have proved somewhat ambiguous, but the debate is open and it is an important point to consider for the future of stability and security in the area.

Ariel Levite

I would like to take up some of the issues so candidly and competently presented by one of our colleagues. Quite frankly I am somewhat puzzled by this position, at least the declaratory position as it was presented to us. What the Egyptians were saying was that they have reservations about export controls, about chemical and missile control regimes, and also that they wish to postpone dealing with conventional arms until the very end of the arms control process. Moreover, they wish to separate the resolution of the conflict from the arms control process by advocating nuclear disarmament through international organs prior to anything else. Why is this position so astonishing? For four complementary reasons.

One, because it runs counter to the experience in the region. It was stressed that we should not just borrow models that were developed elsewhere. Fine, but let's look at the experience in the region. What has caused suffering, destruction and casualties in World War II, was this not

chemical and conventional weapons; was this not ballistic missiles? In all the conflicts in the region, and not just the Arab-Israeli one, it was not nuclear arms that have inflicted suffering. These have never come into play in any of the conflicts of the region.

Secondly, concerning the nuclear option in the region, namely the Israeli one, it has to be stressed that it is opaque and not explicit or undeclared (this being a fundamental difference), and also that it has been stabilizing. Notably because Israel has repeatedly stated that it would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region. It has also repeatedly explained its exclusive reliance on conventional arms as the cornerstone of its deterrence and war-fighting doctrine. This Israeli posture is strongly supported by the Israeli population, and public opinion surveys suggest that the political cum psychological deterrence has worked beautifully. There is also strong evidence to suggest that the Israeli nuclear option has had a lot to do with limiting wars against Israel and with encouraging the Arabs to embark on the peace process as well, by putting the very destruction of Israel.

Thirdly, a position that is trying to separate the arms control issue from the territorial issue is surprising because it can probably be advocated only by those that do not have any territorial claims at the moment, or feel that their territorial claims have been taken care of. Other Arab States that are involved in the peace negotiations do not make and definitely do not press such a case. The Syrians, Jordanians and the Palestinians have been quite explicit about the order of priorities in which they see things.

The fourth reason why such an Egyptian position is surprising is because what is presented here as a declaratory position of Egypt it is at odds with repeated statements by the highest ranking Egyptian government officials such as President Mubarak, his Minister of Defence or the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. Permit me to provide two quotes to illustrate the point:

In October 1992, the Egyptian Minister of Defence was asked by an interviewer about the Israeli nuclear bomb. In substance he said:

> I think the solution to this issue is finding an overall, just, comprehensive and stable peace in the region, because under these conditions it would be the easiest, because in such a situation no State in the region will have the incentive of holding such weapons. Because it will represent a danger for that State and a danger for all the other States. I don't think that the Israeli position in the implementation of the peace process is to hold nuclear weapons.

The second quotation is from the Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff. In a recent interview he talked about the Egyptian strategy as being based on a deterrent capability, directed at anyone from any direction. He said:

> The deterrent capability of Egypt is the basis for its self-defence. Without it Egypt will be subject to threats and will not be able to assist a neighbour or a brother.

President Mubarak and Ossama Al Baz repeatedly acknowledge that the resolution of the bilateral conflicts should take precedence over arms control issues, the Minister of Defense suggests that the nuclear issue will resolve itself once peace breaks out, and the Egyptian Armed Forces Chief of Staff points to the critical importance of a broad base defense and deterrence capability until that time. I am in full agreement with all of them.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that a declaratory Egyptian position as outlined here in this forum is unhelpful. It creates misplaced expectations and does not lead to genuine arms control discussions that go hand in hand with the process of peace-making in the Middle East.

Mounir Zahran

I would like to refer first of all to the remarks by my colleague Mr Karem when he refers to the MTCR. I share his apprehension of the MTCR. It is a club of suppliers, it has no international verification regime, it has no transparency. To satisfy all parties in this equation, it would be much better to have a dialogue not only between the suppliers, but between the suppliers and the recipients, so as to ensure the peaceful uses of these technologies.

We are told that the MTCR was set up because ballistic missiles may carry weapons of mass-destruction, and that this means of delivery may endanger peace and security because it is very difficult to detect and to stop it from reaching its target. One hence neglects that there are anti-missile systems like the Patriot as well as the fact that there are other possible means of delivery such as aircrafts.

Secondly, I would like to remind the audience of the existence of the Nuclear Supplier Group, in addition to the Australia Group. We question the need for any country to acquire nuclear weapons. This is why we are astonished that Israel insists in having the nuclear option, or at least that it does not adhere to the NPT. I would like to quote an eminent personality, and excellent arms negotiations, negotiator Ambassador James Goodby from the United States, who said:

> In the final analysis it is not the nuclear weapons that guarantee the safety, or the survival of the world, or the prestige of any State.

Recalling that we have agreed in the 1978 First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, that the first priority of disarmament is nuclear disarmament, and recalling Article VI of the NPT which states that we, and in particular the Nuclear Powers, should work for nuclear disarmament, there is no reason at all for any country, not even the Nuclear Powers, to keep and maintain their nuclear capabilities, the more so since the Cold War has come to an end. We should consider this matter seriously while we are preparing for the 1995 NPT Extension Conference.

Süha Umar

In his presentation, Mr Al-Mani gave us a very good picture of the conventional arms transfers in the Middle East.

My country, Turkey, is seen in his paper as one of those countries which has been spending more and more on armaments. The reasons he mentions for this attitude are the new role for my country in the Gulf region, the Caucasus, and also the ethnic strife in Turkey. In fact, none of them is true. In the Gulf, we were helping the coalition at the expense of our economic interests, and the expense was rather great from which we have still not recovered. As to the Caucasus, the latest developments there are quite good illustrations of the fact that we have no other intentions than establishing peace and security. We would like to see that region stabilized and we do not intend to intervene militarily. Not internal strife but terrorism in Turkey is a concern. Moreover, it may be stressed that the internal strife in a country can not be dealt with weapons of high calibre or by what is called in CFE terminology, Treaty-Limited Items, such as heavy tanks and armaments. On the other hand, small arms do not count when we talk about threat perceptions of other countries.

The second point raised by Mr Al-Mani concerns the increase in Turkish military expenditures. The reason for the raising figure has to do with the fact that about six years ago, we have started modernizing our Army. So the increase has nothing to do with the quantity of armaments and number of personnel of the Army, but is due to the replacement of obsolete armaments. Last year, approximately 2.6% of the Turkish GNP was spent on military expenditures. Of this amount, only

1 to 2% of the total was spent on new armaments. I refer you in this context to the figures we have transmitted to the United Nations.

I am afraid that one important flaw in Mr Al-Mani's paper results from incomplete information about the CFE mechanism. Yes, we are receiving armaments from our allies, but these do not accumulate because when we receive one tank we have to destroy one tank of ours. Let's say we receive 1,000 tanks in total, than we have to destroy 1,000 tanks from our existing inventory, because we cannot have more than approximatively 3,000 tanks in Turkey - in the area of application. So, unlike Middle East countries, it is not possible for my country to obtain more armaments than it is allowed to.

My last point, which is maybe even more important, concerns our relationship with Syria. Mr Al-Mani suggests that we are trying to match it. We are not, although we do take into consideration what Syria is doing, and this is only natural. It brings me to another point, which is very much relevant to Saudi Arabia. For the last couple of years, one can see that the more armaments your neighbours receive, the more others are inclined to get, at least as many armaments so as to match the neighbour.

Gerald Steinberg

If we take a step back and examine what we have heard this afternoon, there is good news and there is bad news. The good news is that we have a dialogue, beginning with Mr Karem's presentation, who gave a very clear presentation of the Egyptian position. It is important that we hear it. Tomorrow Mr Levite will present the Israeli perception and it is important that he be heard. This is a major step forward.

The bad news is that it is a dialogue of the deaf. We are repeating over and over the same positions. We do not seem to progress, there does not seem to be any reflection on the other side's perceptions. I am sure that we share the same goals, that we have the same fears of a nuclear Middle East, of a Middle East that is in conflagration. The question is how do we avoid this?

One of the important things I would like to ask my Egyptian neighbours is to try to better understand Israeli perceptions. Mr Karem said that he thought that the Israeli fear of a conventional threat had gone, and you were surprised to find out that it was still there. If you thought it was gone that is a very bad misreading of the Israeli political climate. In 1991 and during the Gulf War, close to 90 per cent of the Israeli population supported the maintenance of the Israeli nuclear capability. Today, the number is a little lower, between 50-60 per cent, but over half of the Israeli population strongly supports maintaining the *status quo*, no matter what. And the reason is that they fear conventional and non-conventional destruction. This is a very palpable fear. It is not a worst case analysis. It is compounded by the Saudi acquisition of weapons and the fear of instability in Saudi Arabia. There is also fear on the Eastern front. Now, you may say that these are irrational fears, you may say that the fear of Syria joining with Iraq and Saudi Arabia will never materialize. But the fact is that these fears exist and are shared by a large portion of the Israeli society.

In the 1950's, David Ben Gurion created the foundation of the Israeli strategic infrastructure by worrying about the days in which Arabs will gain enough conventional capability to overwhelm Israel. In the 1970's, Moshe Dayan, when he retired from public life, publicly said that the Arabs are close to gaining that capability and Israel should develop an overt nuclear capability. His policy was rejected and it is still rejected by most decision makers. Most Israeli officials would like to see an agreement which would phase out the need for nuclear weapons. But the point is that those concerns regarding the military threat exist and that we cannot simply wave them away.

So what we need to have is a dialogue, an active dialogue, and not a dialogue of the deaf. We need to have Egyptians taking into account the Israeli concerns, we need to have everybody else in the region understanding each others concerns, just as in Israel we must understand the Egyptian

concerns. We understand the importance of Egypt not to be confronted with a monopoly or a biopoly of nuclear weapons States and sitting silent. We understand the problem and therefore we have to develop a program on a step by step basis. We cannot dispense with confidence- and security-building measures. That cannot come after any kind of move on the nuclear issue. We have to come up with a different approach other than the NPT. The NPT has failed, it has failed in Iraq, it has failed in North Korea, and while the evidence is still uncertain, there are many reports of it failing in Iran. So there are many problems with the NPT. We need to talk about a regional structure. I hope that the Egyptians will talk to us, and to other countries in the region and come up with some approaches that could deal with these issues on a step to step basis. Otherwise, if we simply throw proposals at each other back and forth, we will have an interesting ping-pong game, but we will not make any progress. That would be very tragic.

Mohammed Al-Hassan

I would like to refer to the initiative which was put forward in 1974, and again in 1980, by President Mubarak, concerning the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass-destruction in the region of the Middle East. Today, there are three international agreements which deal with these weapons. One agreement is the NPT, the others being the BWC and the CWC. The latter was recently signed at Paris. In the region there are basically two types of problems, namely nuclear and chemical. If we look at the Parties to the NPT and the CWC, we see that most countries of the world are Parties to both Conventions. If we look at the Parties in the region of the Middle East, we see that there are a few countries in the region that are not yet Parties to the NPT: Algeria, Israel and Oman. If we look at the CWC, we see that Egypt and some other countries which are neighbouring Israel have not signed the Convention. We know the legitimate reasons why those countries have not done so. My question is: How do both Conventions relate to the Egyptian initiative to create a zone free of weapons of mass-destruction and what international pressure can be mounted to persuade countries to sign these Conventions?

Mohamed Shaker

I want to comment on the two proposals put forward by Egypt, the nuclear weapons free zone proposal, and the proposal for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass-destruction. These are two general proposals. One of them may give the impression that we have given up the first one, but this is not the case. If we manage to achieve a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, we will go ahead with it. If one wishes us to have a zone free of weapons of mass-destruction, then we will go for it too. Both are very general proposals and we have linked them with the Peace Process. It is not true that we are putting forward these proposals and discussing them in isolation of the Peace Process. In fact, during the first meeting of the working group on arms control and security of the multilateral talks in Washington, which was intended to be just a briefing session where delegates would sit and listen to the Russians and the Americans speaking to them about arms control, Egypt presented a paper. It entailed substantive proposals and was the only paper presented by any delegation in the first meeting of the multilateral talks of this working group. In it the proposals were linked with the Peace Process. It is hence not right to say that we are not linking these two proposals with the Peace Process.

I also want to comment on the supply control groups. We have heard about the MTCR, there is, however, also the London Group, *i.e.* the Nuclear Suppliers Club, and the COCOM group. All these groups meet in isolation of the recipient countries. It is very important that in the future we have a dialogue between the supplier countries and the recipient countries. The recipient countries

feel that the supplier countries have no right to meet in isolation and to decide what the recipients should get and what they should not get. At least they should have the right to dialogue with the suppliers. For example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group takes certain decisions. COCOM makes certain decisions, the MTCR makes still another set of decisions. The recipient countries feel that these decisions should not be taken like this in isolation. They feel that there should be a certain dialogue, and consultations with those affected by the decisions.

Saleh Al-Mani

Mr Ghabra brought out the relationship between imports of conventional weapons and the ability of the recipient State to absorb these conventional weapons. There is no argument about it, there is a lack of ability, technical and otherwise, to take in these weapons and use them in the right way or use them in a deterrent mode.

The point presented by Mr Mashhadi is also very important. He referred to some sort of systemic inability to understand the legitimate national interests of Iran and its buying of new weapons systems. There is absolutely a need in each and every country to buy new weapons systems in a rational way. A State should not arm itself to the point that it becomes over-armed, or to the point that such armaments would be destabilizing to its neighbours. Unfortunately, in the last two years since the Second Gulf War, we witness an increasing militarisation and arms build up in Iran. If IISS statistics are true, it has about 200,000 men in its troops. So when you combine such a large increase in military personnel and when you also look at new exotic weapons systems which are being brought in, when you moreover witness the possibility of a nuclear capability, than it is not surprising to find a sense of insecurity on the other side of the Gulf. We would like to have a more stable Gulf region, but the problem is that these huge increases in times of peace create anxiety on the other side of the Gulf. Mr Mashhadi was right in saying that other Gulf States also arm themselves. To a very large extent I agree with him, yet there is a general tendency of looking at arms expenditures and economic growth as an anti-thesis of one another. Sometimes, however when you take countries like Saudi Arabia, a lot of the military expenditure goes not into military weapons. I think it is less than 1 or 2 per cent that is devoted to weapons. Most of the expenditures are indeed directed at building cities, digging wells, serving the Bedouins in the regions, establishing new areas of growth into remote areas, etc. So it's not really directed towards military spending. I wish, and hope, that the same thing is happening in Iran; that despite the deficits in the Iranian budget, military spending will have also a civilian impact.

Another point concerns Mr Aliboni's remark that an extra-regional presence might be worthwhile since the States in the Gulf region have not been able to secure the free-flow of oil to the West. This is a problematic statement. It really brings us back to the old debate that "we'll govern them until they can govern themselves". There is a tiny line here between the presence of foreign troops on your own soil for your defence and the presence of foreign troops on your soil for their own national interests and perhaps against the national interests of the population. We really should not think of the Gulf States or the Gulf region as an area where we can milk all the oil we can get and bring all the ham that would help us in this milking. We have to ask instead how much support there is within these States for the existence of extra-regional forces. In some areas there might be strong support, others look at it as a temporary measure, still some others would like to see a declining presence of these troops.

Mahmoud Karem

In order for the dialogue not to be a dialogue of the deaf, I would like to clarify the following. The basic thesis of my intervention is two-fold. One that it is impossible to start to enunciate a comprehensive arms control agreement and a framework of regional co-operation in the Middle East without the participation of certain key countries; I cited Israel along with Iran. The second point I mentioned is that we should all be sensitive to the security preoccupations of each other, the important thing is to remove the misperceptions in order to start the dialogue.

We should not be oversensitive to statements made which were directed perhaps to other local constituencies audiences. Having said that I thank Ambassador Zahran for reminding me of the Nuclear Supplier Group. We should remember that when I first presented the general introduction or outline of my presentation, it was not totally tailored within the rubric of weapons of mass-destruction. I said that I personally had six or seven, caveats on what seems to be unfolding at present in terms of a masterscheme of an arms control regime. What I said is important because as we proceed from now until 1995, the date of the extension Conference of the NPT, we have to place all our problems on the table.

Ambassador Shaker made reference to a few cartels, one of them is the MTCR, which met in Australia a few days ago. While we nowadays hear talk about transparency and openness, it is to be noted that we have not been informed of what happened in those meetings. We do not know what the contents of the discussions were, and we ask, where is the transparency and openness when we come to deal with these matters of mutual concern? It is important to understand the light in which I presented these statements.

Mr Steinberg advanced the notion of having a dialogue. Absolutely. I am all for a dialogue, but a dialogue takes two or more. If we are serious about a dialogue, then why not listen to an Israeli speak on the implementation of safeguards in the Middle East at an informal session in Vienna next month. I tell you that I will be one of those who would be extremely happy and jubilant to see an Israeli official governmental delegation along with many other countries in the region participate in this workshop organized by IAEA in Vienna. This is what the Israelis have been calling for throughout, to sit with the Arab Parties and talk. Well, here is an opportunity, next May, and this is a message I leave to you and I hope you take back to your establishments. We would be happy and delighted to see the presence of the Israeli delegation in Vienna to discuss modalities of applications of safeguards in the Middle East. But again, it is difficult to keep calling for a dialogue, to keep requesting progress to take place in different fields, such as in the field of the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, when you do not want to translate this in practical and concrete realities. We understand and we take into consideration Israeli national preoccupations and we hope that this coming round of multilateral talks will create a conducive atmosphere for a better dialogue.

Part III

Security and Disarmament in the Middle East: Perspectives

Chapter 9
Strengthening and Creation of Institutional Mechanisms for Middle Eastern Security and Disarmament

*Abdullah Toukan**

The end of the Cold War can be said to have freed Super-Power energies towards international peace, nuclear disarmament, elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and the settlement of regional conflicts. It has also allowed the United Nations to overcome its paralysis and gain the authority necessary to maintain international peace and security as envisaged by its charter. For over four decades the Arab-Israeli conflict has been perceived as part of the global US-Soviet Super-Power struggle. Today the US and Russia can co-operate with other regional countries towards promoting peace and security in the Middle East.

There is no logical rationale for anything other than the final achievement of a regional peace in the Middle East. It is a political, economic and sociological necessity for any contemplation of the future. The prospects for preserving peace and reducing the dangers of war, thus rest equally on political, military and economic stability. As was stated in the first Middle East Peace Negotiations held in Moscow in January 28, 1992, the multilateral negotiations are complementary and support the Palestinian - Israeli and Arab - Israeli bilateral tracks. Clearly it is the Bilateral negotiations that will determine the political settlement of the basic issues of conflict based on UNSCR 242 and 338 will provide us with the reduction of any motivations for the initiation of war.

Arms transfer to the Middle East are not the sole cause of regional problems. In fact the acquisition of arms has been the product of the unresolved political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as other regional conflicts. Over the past four decades there have been a number of arms control proposals and attempts for the Middle East. Starting with the Tripartite (US, France and UK) declaration in 1950 to limit arms to the region, to the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) first put forward in 1974 to the UN General Assembly by Egypt and Iran, ending with the US arms control initiative of 1991.

One main weakness of these proposals was that they were not integrated into a political process. The continued Arab-Israeli conflict made it practically impossible to formulate and implement formal arms control agreements, resulting in a failure from the beginning. Therefore, in any move towards arms control and regional security in the Middle East, the linkage between multi-issue negotiations in both conventional and unconventional weapons and the ongoing peace process must be made. A peaceful political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict should proceed alongside any arms control negotiations, specially in the establishment of a WMD Free Zone in the region. It is quite evident that peace cannot be achieved while still being threatened by a weapons of mass destruction capability of a neighboring country, nor can a WMDFZ be achieved without the context of a comprehensive peace settlement. The ongoing M.E. peace process should provide us with the opportunity of achieving these objectives. It should be further emphasized that political issues must precede arms control measures, both structural and operational. The political component is highly significant for it will provide us with a broad structural security framework for the various steps and measures towards regional arms control.

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Arms Control and Non-Proliferation is at the heart of the new strategic security environment that we need. Weapons of Mass Destruction (Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical) must be dealt with as a major item on the agenda for non-proliferation in the '90s. Within the present asymmetrical balance, Israel possesses a nuclear capability while on the other side some Arab States possess chemical weapons. The fact of the matter remains in that most countries in the Middle East will not accept any form of an arms control agreement or even a freeze on their own force structure, until some form of a regional peace process is well under way thereby removing any fears of military aggression. Any massive rearmament will surely create an unrestricted arms race in the M.E. which will automatically be accompanied by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.Unless controlled this arms race will, in the near future, give rise to another military conflict with catastrophic human and environmental consequences, contrary to some arguments based on the US-Soviet model that this could lead to a relatively safe environment of mutual deterrence between States or group of States in the region.

The fear is that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction could give rise to States announcing a so-called "in-kind" deterrence or "the right to retaliate in kind", which in effect could cause an arms race in the region. With the long range capability of delivery systems, these weapons can also be used as a first strike against centers of mobilization, airbases, cities and other civilian centers.

During the ten year period between 1980 and 1990, before the start of the 1991 Gulf War, the Middle East underwent a boom in military weapons procurement which is reflected in the amounts of money spent. According to the SIPRI 1991 annual book, the total military expenditure of the GCC States amounted to around $224 Billion (Saudi-Arabia accounted for $177 billion, Kuwait $13.6 billion, UAE $18 billion and Oman for $13.1 billion). Iraq's military expenditure amounted to about $186 billion and Iran to $84 billion. Israeli military expenditure was $56 billion, Egypt $49 billion, Syria $25 billion and Jordan $6 billion.

Between 1989 and 1991 the world arms deliveries dropped from $48.7 billion to $28.8 billion, the M.E. accounted for $12 billion by end of 1990. Between 1990 and 1991 there was a general 30% reduction in the exports of the five big arms exporters (US, Russia, UK, France and China). However only the US had a 40% increase in its sales from $9.6 billion in 1990 to $13.5 billion in 1991.

Today's Middle East accounts for about 3% of the world's population, contains about 60% of the world's oil reserves, and accounts for about 30% of the world's arms imports. This trend has certainly not changed in the past decade as a matter of fact it could very well be said to be increasing in the 90s, especially after the recent Gulf War of 1991 against Iraq, where the US and the coalition forces have proven the success of their advanced technology weapons systems under combat conditions and has provided all potential international customers (in particular the Middle East) with real time product demonstrations.

The economic structure of the region has been fundamentally altered as the States began to dissipate national resources into weapons procurement and arms industry, thereby depriving other sectors of the economy from such needed resources. This had a correspondingly powerful impact on the underlying causes of instability in the region as short term security considerations gave way before long term basic requirements, such as economic growth and the political stability needed for such growth. By their very nature these factors can either help or undermine peace and stability in the region.

The rapid advances in new weapons technology developments have become an intrinsic part of military weapons procurement and operations planning in the Middle East. These developments have given States greater strategic depth in the region, and at the same time has highlighted and reinforced the linkages among States, or subregions. The current danger is that most countries in the region will not accept any form of arms control until some form of a regional peace is fully

established. This stems from the perception that nations in the region still consider military forces as the only viable source to achieve their policy goals. For this very reason and due to the complexity of sources of conflict, the growing number of participants inside the region, as well as the involvement of peripheral countries and extra-regional countries, a Conference on Security and Corporation in the Middle East (CSCME) forum could provide the required platform for the discussion of various regional security requirements and arrangements. We should strive to move towards the emulation of the European CSCE model as our ultimate goal; which has achieved all the initial conditions of stability, general understanding and regional consensus.

Some might argue that it is too early to discuss a CSCE approach such as the European model due to the following geopolitical factors:

- In Europe there exists a general consensus as to where geographical boundaries of the region are and where the territorial borders of States within the region should be. Whereas the Middle East region is ill-defined geographically, and the ongoing Arab Israeli peace negotiations are based upon Israel trading Arab land - it is presently occupying - in exchange for peace;
- In Europe it was generally agreed that the use of military force is an illegitimate instrument of policy when utilized as means to changing borders among States. Whereas in the Middle East, military force is still considered as an acceptable means of changing territorial borders, and as an instrument for achieving policy goals;
- In Europe the approach to security is less dependent on military strategies and arms procurement but more linked to political and economic co-operation;
- In Europe the Institutional Infrastructure is far more stable which makes it easier for the various parties to have faith in bilateral and multilateral agreements and treaties;
- The Middle East region has diplomatic, economic and military instruments to prevent and resolve potential crises and disputes such as: The Arab League; The Gulf Co-operation Council; The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries; to name a few. However, as events in the region have recently demonstrated the effectiveness of these available Institutional instruments have been rather limited. Hence the requirement to strengthen and establish an "inter-locking network" between them.

The above geopolitical factors are certainly valid, however the argument is not that of trying to establish a CSCE kind of a process as a starting point, but the importance of Institutional building to start in parallel with the on-going peace negotiations, in preparation for the stage when bilateral and multi-lateral agreements and treaties are signed. We should be asking ourselves what would be the final nature of the M.E. peace process, and what security arrangements will partially or completely meet the agreements reached. What level of guarantees are possible to maintain these agreements, for whom and by whom? These basic factors should initially guide us in starting to think about a parallel third track for the creation of Institutions and Mechanisms for Security and Co-operation in the Middle East *i.e.* a CSCME.

The Peace Process basically will encompass: negotiations; agreements; implementation and verifications. The final phase for example can be envisaged as a major confidence-building measure with implications for the entire region, in addition to the reduction of the arms race and possible future conflicts. The main objective of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) is to provide transparency and thereby predictability which could prevent hostilities due to misunderstanding or miscalculation. CSBMs also serve to prevent surprise attacks and even, if possible, to prevent the use of military force for political intimidation.

During the implementation period, there will be a gradual phasing and implementation of a political, economic and security regime, within the Bilateral negotiations framework. Linking this

to the regional Arms Control and Regional Security framework, typical steps that could lead to Institutional building, not merely for the enhancement of ones own national interest, but also for establishing a stable environment in the region, could be:

- exchange of military information;
- a communications network system;
- an official register of all arms transfers to the region;
- agreements on all quality and quantity of the acquisition of certain types of weapons, and banning the re-export of certain types of weapons;
- regulating domestic arms production;
- regional agreement to freeze and eventually ban the acquisition, production, and testing of ballistic missiles;
- a comprehensive approach to signing and ratifying all conventions and treaties pertaining to weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological), as well as accepting all IAEA safeguards;
- a ban on the production and acquisition of enriched uranium, separated plutonium, and other elements used in nuclear weapons production;
- establishment of a Weapons Of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ);
- Establishing a Conflict Prevention/Resolution Center to assist in defusing tension between States to reduce the possibility of escalation into conflict, and the early resolution of an actual conflict.

Coupled to structural arms control measures such as: a freeze on military arms build-up with a partial change to the military structure; could certainly lead to deep reductions in armed forces and thereby reducing the possibility of armed conflict in the region.

The second part of CSBMs is the verification process, as defined by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) " the process of determining the degree to which parties to an agreement are complying with the provisions of the agreement". Verification agreements are an essential condition for any arms control agreements. Verification and On-Site inspection are complex issues, and will require an intra-regional organization in the Middle East. This Institute could assist States within the region in matters pertaining to the gathering, processing/collation and dissemination of information, from national technical means, on military activities and structural arms control agreements.

In conclusion we should emphasize that arms control is only one dimension in the ultimate aim of establishing strategic stability and a "collective security" regime in the region. Other elements such as democratization, human rights, demography, economic, environmental and political co-operation play an equally important role. Multi-Lateral Institutions can reinforce a collective security arrangement, which in general should defend the strategic stability status quo against any violent changes.

Chapter 10
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Middle East

*Ariel Levite**

I. Introduction

At the outset of the Multilateral Negotiations on the Middle East in Moscow (January 28, 1992), US Secretary of State James Baker set forth the outline for the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS). He defined it to be as follows:

In the first instance, we envision offering the regional parties our thinking about potential approaches to arms control, drawing upon a vast reservoir of experience stemming from attempts to regulate military competition in Europe and other regions.

From this base, the group might move forward to considering a set of confidence-building or transparency measures covering notifications of selected military activities and crisis prevention communications. The purpose would be to lessen the prospects for incidents and miscalculation that could lead to heightened competition or even conflict.

In our view, and again, based upon our experience with arms control, we believe such an approach offers the best chance for success.[1]

This paper seeks to explore the basis for an approach to the Middle East ACRS process that is so heavily inspired by the European experience, and puts such strong emphasis on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) as the principal vehicle for progress at the early stages of the process. In so doing, the paper will address, albeit briefly, five basic questions. First, how we ought to define CSBMs for purposes of the Middle East ACRS process?; Second, what, if any, are the universal pre-conditions for CSBMs implementation?; Third, how relevant can CSBMs be outside the European context in which they have originally emerged?; Fourth, What role could and should CSBMS play in the Arab-Israeli context?; and Fifth, what role might CSBMs play in the Middle East beyond the Arab-Israeli context?

II. Defining CSBMs

Definitions of CBMs and CSBMs abound in the professional literature.[2] Moreover, in many cases the two concepts are (mistakenly) used interchangeably. For purposes of this paper it is essential

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[1] US Department of State Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman "Remarks by Secretary of State James A. Baker, III before the Organizational Meeting for the Multilateral Negotiations on the Middle East", House of Unions, Moscow, 28 January 1992.

[2] For some of the more salient studies of confidence-building, see Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence-building Measures", *Survival* 19, No. 4 (July/August 1977): 146-154; Jonathan Alford, *Confidence-building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects*, Adelphi Paper No. 149 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979); Johan Jorgen Holst, "Confidence-building Measures: A conceptual Framework", *Survival* 25, No. 1 (January/February 1983): 2-15; Stephen Larrabee and Dietrich Stobbe (eds), *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe* (New York, Institute for East West Security Studies, 1983); Rolf Berg and Adam-Daniel Rotfeld, *Building Security in Europe: Confidence Building Measures and the CSCE* (New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1986); R.B. Byers, F. Stephen Larrabee, and Allen Lynch, *Confidence-building Measures and International Security*, Institute for East-West Security Studies, East-West monograph series No. 4, (New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987); Igor Scherbeck, *Confidence-building Measures and International Security-The Political and Military Aspects: A Soviet Approach*, UNIDIR/91/36 (New York, United Nations, 1991).

to draw a clear distinction between CSBMs and CBMs. The exclusive focus of this paper will be on CSBMs, by which we refer strictly to the confidence and security measures of the type that has been recognized and institutionalized in the CSCE process, most explicitly in and after the Stockholm accords.

Adopting such definition obviously does not mean to deny the relevance of confidence-building experience in other regions or contexts; in fact quite the opposite is true. Much pertinent experience, both bilateral and multilateral in nature, has accumulated outside the European context, most notably between the US and the former USSR as well as between India and its neighbors, Argentina and Brazil, and North and South Korea. Yet, for the purposes of this paper it is expedient to consider only the cumulative experience with measures of the type that has, since the Stockholm accords, come to be labeled CSBMs.

Leaving aside the issue of a precise definition, it does seem useful to highlight some of the key defining characteristics of CSBMs modeled after the European type. First, CSBMs pertain to the security, principally military, domain. Second, they must involve at least a modest degree of co-operative behavior between the concerned parties themselves. As such they can not be imposed from the outside, and require a measure of understanding and co-ordination between the concerned parties, facilitated by some direct contacts among them. Third, they are based, at the minimum, on a measure of reciprocal conduct, and where and when possible on joint activity as well. Unilateral gestures simply do not qualify as CSBMs. Fourth, CSBMs neither jeopardize nor fundamentally affect the key security assets of any of the parties. Nor, for that matter, do CSBMs harm in any way the national dignity of any of the parties involved. Fifth, CSBMs do not prejudice any of the parties' position on the broader political issues. Finally, CSBMs are designed to have some (however small) direct positive contribution to the situation at hand, in addition to their long term potential for building trust between the parties.

III. Pre-Conditions for CSBMs

What pre-conditions, if any, exist for concluding and implementing CSBMs agreements? Judging from the cumulative experience, there appear to be only two important conditions that must be met for CSBMs to become an acceptable tool of inter-state statecraft. First, there ought to be not only much conflict but also some common interest between the parties directly concerned. The common interest could be minimal and pertain exclusively to the short term (*i.e.* not to see the present degree of stability, however imperfect, further undermined) or could be somewhat broader, more ambitious, and longer term in perspective (*e.g.* to see relations between the parties transformed to reconciliation and peace). Second, there has to be at least some direct contact between the parties, but it could be shallow and narrowly circumscribed.

Contrary to widespread beliefs, there are no additional pre-conditions for CSBMs. An agreement on a territorial status quo, and/or even a willingness to forego the use of force against the other party (or parties) clearly are fertile breeding grounds for CSBMs. But as the Indo-Pakistani and the European experience teach us, neither is necessary to facilitate CSBMs. Thus, CSBMs do not presuppose peace, nor even require a mutual commitment to see peace and reconciliation emerge as the ultimate result of the confidence-building process. moreover, they assume relevance and utility only when much conflict and distrust prevails between the parties.

IV. The Transferability of the European CSBMs Experience[3]

Even if the cumulative experience suggests that no additional pre-conditions have to be met for CSBMs to become viable, it could still be argued that CSBMs are somehow uniquely tailored to the European context in which emerged. According to this line of reasoning, conditions prevailing in other regions, most notably those presently existing in the Middle East, are inherently different.

It is further asserted that current conditions in the Middle East are also much less hospitable or desirable grounds for establishing CSBMs than those prevailing in Europe in the 1970s or even the early 1980s. The principal case here rests on the argument that the contemporary Middle East, contrary to Europe of the 1970s, is still beset by a "complex mosaic of active and recently buried political disputes", complicated and unstable military balances, and active territorial disputes.

The skeptics would have us believe that the above picture of the present situation in the Middle East is both exhaustive and valid. If this is indeed the case, then the basis for the entire US approach to the Middle East ACRS process would seem to be flawed, and should be abandoned. But is such a conclusion warranted?

Upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that such skeptics' arguments do not stand up to a thorough analysis of either the European experience or the current Middle Eastern conditions, let alone to a systematic comparison of the two. To begin with, there is no evidence to sustain the proposition that CSBMs are an inherently European construct. After all, they have been applied elsewhere as well, not in the least between the Super-Powers as well as between India and Pakistan or the PRC, Turkey and Bulgaria, Argentina and Brazil, South and North Korea, etc. The Middle East itself has also had some relevant experience in this area.

Furthermore, if there is one thing that stands out when we try to analyze the cumulative global experience with CSBMs, it is that they have always emerged in rather similar circumstances to those presently prevailing in the Middle East. For one thing, CSBMs have always been initially implemented in periods and contexts in which profound distrust prevailed between the parties. They have generally preceded a genuine political transformation of their relationship. In fact, they have usually come about in the aftermath of a traumatic or unnerving experience, vividly illustrating some of the risks inherent in the situation existing at the time in the region.

When originally introduced, CSBMs have been the forerunners of peace and arms control accords, not their product. Moreover, relations between the parties to the CSBMs have been typically characterized by critical symmetries and structural imbalances. These commonly ranged from asymmetries in resources, to vast differences and disparities in military force structures and other security assets, territory, population, and natural resources, and sharp disparities in levels of education and technology.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the broad applicability to other regions of the European CSBMs experience has already been widely acknowledged. Interestingly enough, subscribers to this viewpoint have been not only interested parties and independent researchers but also the United Nations Disarmament Commission (1980) and the United Nations General Assembly.[4] But the case for the relevance of the CSBMs' experience to the Middle East does not rest solely on arguments of a general nature. It is reinforced by an analysis of the conditions currently characterizing the Middle East. Such analysis leads to the conclusions that at least some significant parts of the

[3] For an excellent collection of essays on the issue of the European CSBM experience and its potential adaptability to other regions, see United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, *Confidence- and Security-Building Measures: From Europe to Other Regions*, Disarmament: Topical Papers No. 7 (New York, United Nations, 1991).

[4] United Nations Disarmament Commission, "Guidelines for Confidence-Building Measures at the Global and Regional Levels", 1980. This logic has found its way into the UN General Assembly resolution 47/52G which explicitly endorsed CBMs on the regional level.

Middle East are ripe for CSBMs, none more so than the Arab-Israeli context. Several observations that support such conclusion are listed below.

The costs of war and risks of escalation are widely apparent in the region, especially in the aftermath of the second Gulf War. Exhaustion from war and common interest in arresting the arms race and diverting resources to deal with some of the region's most acute problems (economic development, shortage of water, settlement of refugees, polluted environment) are widespread. Sufficiency in defense capabilities also seems to exist among all of the prospective key players to a Middle East security regime. Moreover, the relevant extra-regional players, (which in the European case have been negligible but in the Middle East are of considerable importance), are for the first time in more than a generation, committed to a joint effort to foster peace and co-operation in the Middle East.

Even more importantly, Egypt, the largest and most important Arab State, already maintains peaceful relations with both Israel and the other Arab States. Moreover, Egypt is strongly committed to promoting the broader cause of Arab-Israeli peace making. As such, Egypt is ideally suited to play a pivotal role in fostering a Middle East confidence- and security-building process, a role similar in nature to (but possibly even more important than) the one undertaken by the neutral European States in the European CSCE context.

Finally, not only a broad (though not, unfortunately, universal) desire exists in the region to reorient itself toward peace and stability, but the guiding principles for doing so (UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 have apparently been accepted by all the parties to the process. Even the institutional mechanisms to negotiate and implement CSBMs are already in place, in the form of the both the bilateral and multilateral peace processes initiated in Madrid (October 1991) and Moscow (January 1992) respectively.

Thus, the Middle East presently seems to be in a situation that in some truly important respects is reminiscent of the onset of detente in Europe, and the initiation of the CSCE process. Many important and dangerous problems do exist. But for the first time there is also a ray of hope that something useful can be done to address them, and at least a general sense of direction on how to go about doing so.

V. What Role For CSBMs In the Arab-Israeli Context

Generally speaking, CSBMs can be said to have four complementary roles. First, they can serve as a litmus test for intentions over time. Second, they can serve an educational role, familiarizing the parties with each other, both in the immediate area of concern and far beyond it. In addition, they can make a uniquely important contribution in disseminating a co-operative mentality (non-zero sum way of thinking) on security within among the relevant constituencies in each of the participating States. These include the involved bureaucracies and interest groups, and in the case of democracies the general public as well. Third, CSBMs can be ends in themselves, rather than merely means to a higher end, by helping in crises management, conflict prevention, and in some cases provision of humanitarian assistance as well.

Finally, if and when desired, CSBMs could also serve as a symbol of co-operation, sending a broad political message of willingness to move beyond confrontation and competition to co-operation and reconciliation. This last function does not automatically accompany CSBMs. But such arrangements, like other forms of co-operative behavior, do lend themselves to this type of use. They are, in some respects, especially appropriate for such application, given the special public appeal of security co-operation.

CSBMs thus are modest steps and flexible arrangements. They are relatively easy to negotiate and entail few, if any, risks in implementation. Yet they have considerable utility and potential in several complementary areas. At the present state of Arab-Israeli relations, CSBMs have an

especially important role to play in virtually all of the above mentioned areas. They could help defuse some of the present tensions and risks. They could lay the ground, psychologically and physically, for more ambitious undertakings in the area of regional security co-operation and arms control in the future. Just as importantly, they may serve as one building block toward overall peace and historical reconciliation between the Arabs and Israel.

The last point does warrant some elaboration here. Virtually all of the Arab parties to the peace process demand from Israel far reaching territorial concessions. In addition, Israel is simultaneously being called upon by its Arab rapporteurs to make additional concessions in the areas of arms, doctrine, military posture, and defense-industrial base. Yet the Arab demands are made at a time in which Israel's acceptance into the region is still being challenged, and even openly rejected by some forces in the Arab and Moslem World. Worse still, some of these forces are actively engaged in a brutal, often indiscriminate, struggle against Israel and Israelis wherever they may be.

The peace process coupled with the day to day security realities with which Israel lives thus confront Israel with rather painful choices. Making the necessary choices on how to deal with them obviously is an internal Israeli affair. Yet, the Arabs clearly have a vested interest in these choices systematically going in one direction rather than the other. It follows, therefore, that they must assist Israel to reach the "right" conclusions and make the desired fateful choices. To do so, it is in the Arab self-interest to engage Israel in a variety of CSBMs directed at all of the above functions. Co-operation of Arab States with Israel in the area of CSBMs would surely serve as a litmus test for Israel regarding Arab intentions.

Over time CSBMs could help Israel alter its traditional security calculus. Furthermore, they would solidify the Israeli public's confidence in and active support for its government's choices in favor of peace. The latter is of utmost importance since Israel is a vibrant democracy and the required choices would inevitably involve sacrifices of tangible of security assets. These do not come lightly to a nation whose very existence has been repeatedly threatened, and to a State that is locked into structurally inferior, highly vulnerable, geo-strategic position. Arab co-operation with Israel in the area of CSBMs and beyond, therefore, logically seems to be a sine que non for Israel for it to be able to take such painful decisions responsibly. The peace process with Egypt in the post Yom Kippur War bears witness to both sides of the equation. The "political price" of CSBMs to the Arabs thus seems well worth paying.

Here it must be emphasized that the Arab and Israeli vested interest in establishing CSBMs actually goes even further. It clearly extends to the need to avoid, to the extent possible, misunderstandings and miscalculations, and to economize, wherever possible, on defense expenditures. CSBMs are of critical importance precisely during the precarious transition time from a state of war to relations of peace, since such periods are typically characterized by real, graver than before, threats, but initially few, if any, dividends of peace. It is essential that these risks be jointly dealt with swiftly and effectively, lest they set back the entire peace process. Furthermore, the gravest contemporary challenges to the security of the region do not discriminate well between Arabs and Israelis. Confronting them necessitates joint or at the very least co-ordinated Arab Israeli responses, and CSBMs can go along way toward facilitating them.

VI. CSBMs in the Middle East Beyond the Arab-Israeli Context

CSBMs have an important role to play in the Middle East also beyond the Arab-Israeli context, and for several complementary reasons. First, the region does not easily lend itself to a straightforward geographical delineation. In security terms it stretches all the way from the Horn of Africa and Persian Gulf (and perhaps even beyond it), to the Maghreb, to southern Europe, and to some of the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Second, this vast area is afflicted by numerous cross-cutting rivalries, some within the Arab or Islamic Worlds, others that involve extra-regional parties

as well. Third, many extra-regional powers have a vested interest in the security situation in the region. At times they also have a significant presence in, and/or influence on developments in the region. Fourth, the States of the Middle East could surely benefit from the experience, the good services, and the resources of some of the extra-regional States in dealing with the regions' diverse problems.

For all of the above reasons, one should consider devising and implementing CSBMs in the region above and beyond the Arab-Israeli context. Some of these could be region wide, others sub-regional, then others having extra-regional participation as well, whether by additional Mediterranean States or others. Some of these arrangements may also start more modestly and expand or undergo transformation thereafter.

CSBMs, unlike other tools of diplomacy and arms control, do have this wonderful quality to them of being both flexible and modular. The CSCE process which has dramatically grown, greatly expanded, diversified, and modified its original CSBMs inventory has so vividly demonstrated this quality. There is a sole criterion that must be adhered to at all times for all of these arrangements to succeed. This criterion is that all CSBMs be directly negotiated, and consensually agreed upon, by all the regional States taking part in the process.

Chapter 11
Discussion

Nabil Fahmy

I would like to comment briefly on the general schemes that were mentioned in both Mr Toukan's and Mr Levite's paper, and then add some comments from my personal experience to the points they have raised.

What we really witness here is the essence of the debate taking place in the arms control and regional security working group of the peace process. The debate in the working group has been very business like, very diplomatic, very pleasant. In most circumstances the debate may look to an outsider as if there is no difference in what is being said as the positions are always presented in such a common and measured manner. There is a desire on the part of all Parties to find ways to bridge the gap between our positions. This is a very positive development which we did not have a couple of years ago. There are nuances, however, and the nuances are important. There are nuances in how we approach the issue.

The first salient point in the ongoing debate, which is evident also in the papers presented this morning, is the question: do politics come first or arms control? Is it the bilateral Middle East negotiations that come first, the territorial aspect, the political dimension of the problem, or do we start with arms control discussion? Generally speaking the Arabs have emphasized priority for the political aspect of the process. Israel, on the other hand, has generally been a proponent of the concept of normalisation of relations between Israel, consequently she was the main supporter of having multilateral working groups on economic co-operation, the environment and therefore, while not enthusiastic about arms control has Israel attempted to use the ACRS working group as yet another vehicle for normalization.

There is a slight variation on the Arab theme with respect to the Egyptian position. This variation stems from the fact that Egypt has been very forthcoming and very aggressive on arms control issues for a great many years as well as the fact that Egypt has a Peace Treaty with Israel. The variation, and I say it is a slight variation, is that Egyptians have argued that we should do what we can, that there are some areas in arms control that we can indulge in, and that this would have a beneficial effect on the bilaterals. In other words, "Yes, there is a political reality. We will not be able to reach fundamental collective security agreements on security issues without solving the political problem in the Middle East, but there are some areas in arms control which we can deal with in the Middle East and that will help the process".

The second point I would like to make relates to the discussion we have had here on the definition of Confidence-Building Measures. The discussion which also took place in the working groups, namely, are CSBM's technical, political or functional? Personally, I do not have a definition of CSBM's that I am at ease with. No academic definition of CSBM's is exhaustive enough. I would simply prefer, in very simple language, to refer to CSBM's as anything that provides confidence in security, whether it is political, military, technical or anything else of the sort. What works in any particular context is what can be defined as a CSBM for that particular context. What works in the Middle East will definitely be different from what has worked in Europe or in other areas. At the same time, there is no reason to say that what worked elsewhere can not work in the Middle East just because they come from another region or area. We should learn from the experiences of other areas, even though we should not focus on those regions and assume that they can provide the best way to proceed in all cases.

In this respect, it may also be noted that the main distinction between the situation in Europe and in the Middle East is, that in the Middle East there is a situation of occupation. And with this territorial dimension, which has been subject of open conflict for many years, you cannot realistically expect to just jump over that hurdle and to arrive at collective security measures. What we are witnessing is that the CSBM's being suggested by extra-regional parties are not commensurate with the problem, they are basically symbolic measures. We must develop CSBM's or CBM's that are commensurate with the degree of the problem we have at hand and which comprise not only a political dimension, which is the occupation, the political rights and so on, but also a commensurate military dimension with tremendous overarmament and asymmetry in the area which is detrimental to security. We should try to be on the one hand realistic and on the other hand more ambitious. In this respect particular attention should be devoted to unilateral CSBM's. At this preliminary point in the process, we should develop in the Middle East a series of reciprocal unilateral CSBM's where the different States in the region deal with the issues that are of importance to the other States in the region. At this stage, we should not jump into contractual agreements, jump into collective measures from the very beginning, even if they are of a technical nature.

Let me conclude with a general comment inspired from listening to the speakers and from having participated in the working groups on arms control. The problem that the region faces is that the Parties have not yet, and I direct this particularly to the regional participants, they have not yet been able to believe that peace is possible on a regional level. They have not yet been able to look towards the future and envisage some general framework for what is necessary in terms of regional arms control and security and then work slowly but surely towards that framework. Again, it is a bit idealistic and naive to draw a blueprint completely from the top, but the approach of the regional Parties means an approach of States that are encumbered by many long years of animosity, of having lived as adversaries, and as enemies for a long period of time.

The problems that we face whether it is the CSBM issue or the arms control measures which should be dealt with are arising from the fact that when one talks to Israel and forwards the principle of equal rights and responsibilities it is initially received with tremendous sensitivity on the part of the Israelis, because, again, they are sensitive to security concerns which result from all these years of conflict. They continue to assume that all the Arabs will gang-up on them indefinetly. On the other hand, and to be fair, when one talks to the Arabs about of co-operative measures, this is also received with sensitivity. They cannot yet envisage collective measures with Israel. It is on the other hand to their credit that neither side ultimately refuses to discuss these issues, because frankly it would not make sense to pursue this whole process if it is assumed that it will not result in collective measures between the Arabs and the Israelis or, on the other hand, that party will continue to preserve superiority or special rights which are not accorded to others. Indeed there is simply no way we will have collective security measures if there is a special status for any State in the region, or if States shy away from collective measures.

Simply stated CSBM's should be pursued. They should be defined as steps or measures that provide confidence for all the Parties involved. Given the particular sensitivities of the region. At this stage they should involve both technical CSBM's as well as unilateral CSBM's which traditionally fall in the arms control domain. A considerable amount of work on this account can be done on a unilateral and reciprocal basis.

Süha Umar

First of all, I would like to comment on whether the situation and circumstances in Europe, when the CSBM's process started, were all that much different from the situation that now reigns in the Middle East. I personally think that this was not the case, even when it comes to claims related to

territory, or territories. There are quite a few similarities. For example, when the CSBM's process was going on in Europe and was at its peak, there was a good amount of fighting not with arms, but at a political level between Turkey and Bulgaria with regard to the large Turkish minority in that country. Another example of disagreement between the West and the former Soviet Union including the Warsaw Pact concerned the human right of Soviet subjects. And the case of the Baltic States is another similarity. The West never recognized the occupation of those States by the Soviet Union. There is yet another similarity which relates to armaments and imbalances in armaments between the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. For some items this imbalance was as high as 5 to 1, in favour of the Warsaw Pact. So I believe that there are a couple of nice similarities between the situations in Europe then and in the Middle East now. None of these issues prevented us, however, from going forward with this process. Why? The answer is quite simple. We should examine how CSBM's work and why they work. Let us leave aside how they work, because that is a rather technical matter which can be dealt with at a later stage, but concentrate instead on why they worked.

CSBM's, and I say CSBM's deliberately, taking the definition or the approach of Mr Levite in his paper, work because, first of all, they represent a convergence of a minimum interest by all the concerned States. No matter how minimum this convergence is, or could be, it is important. CSBM's work because they depend on the political will of all the States concerned. They have nothing to do with legally binding documents and intentions, they are based on purely political intentions and political applications. One can easily forget about them if they no longer fit into the situation, or one can continue implementing them, or even developing them into more complex CSBM's if the situation proves feasible or preferable. Now, let us turn to the situation in the Middle East. It is reassuring to see that all of the speakers and all of the discussants refer to the issue of arms transfers as a matter of utmost urgency and priority. This is also our view because there is not just a lack of confidence in the Middle East, but there is a crisis of confidence. Why? Part of the answer is the ever increasing transfer of armaments to that region. It is important to understand, and past experience, not only in the Middle East but also in Europe, proves that the more one continues with this craze of buying arms and armaments, the more one will feel unconfident. First of all not only of oneself but also of others, because the others will be encouraged to do the same. And this is what is happening in the Middle East. But there is good hope that the tide can be turned. The Register of the United Nations may, to some extent, be instrumental and at least give a slight idea of who is selling what and to whom. The Register could be elaborated in the future and could also include military holdings and procurement through national production. There is also much work going on within the context of the CSCE, which includes at least four of the five major arms exporters. Some initiatives in the Middle East could be built upon this example of the CSCE. Even though in the Middle East the problem is, of course, not with the exporters but with the buyers. It seems that much of the armaments purchased do not stem from real security interests or real security needs. Some of the speakers yesterday referred to this phenomenon and made it very clear that there is much more to it than merely the need to feel secure or to protect of national interests.

There is also the question of weapons of mass-destruction in the Middle East which is an additional factor contributing to the confidence crisis in the region. It is not acceptable and it does not make any sense that the countries of the Middle East be reluctant to adhere to the various existing instruments which ban possession of these weapons, and attempt to put an end to their proliferation. Of course, they are not flawless. For example, we all know that the NPT is not a success story. It was designed to try to put an end to proliferation. But what happened? At least, for the case of Iraq and North Korea it did not work. But, as far as the NPT is concerned, we have the possibility of remedying its flaws before 1995.

There is another point which I would like to raise with my colleagues around this table. It is related to the linkages between a CSBM regime and the wider perspective of your national interest

or the settling of political and territorial questions. There is a good motto we use in CSBM circles which says: *"Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"*. Many things can be done, and if one wants to tie them to other things, one can do so. But most of the time one realizes that whatever is achieved is both good and in the interest of our countries so the process continues and a start is made implementing the different measures before tying them or making unnecessary linkages with the other issues. Because, as I said, CSBM's are politically binding and if need be they could easily be left aside.

What could be done in the Middle East? First of all, the most important thing is to have the political will of doing something about the security or confidence crisis in the region. The armaments build-up, the question whether one country is party to the NPT and others not, or whether they are signatories to the CWC, are all rather secondary matters. They are important, but they should not block the way for other developments. All countries must be willing to tackle this confidence crisis in the region. How can this be done? There are various ways and we have enough examples to draw upon. We have bilateral and multilateral examples, examples within the framework of the United Nations or the CSCE. For instance one could start by declaring national armament holdings. This could be done within the context of the UN Arms Register but it could also be expanded for the region. The most important thing is to do something about the arms transfers, because everyday it adds more fuel to this confidence crisis in the region.

Another point that could be taken into consideration is the idea of notification of intentions. If action is planned in the field of military activities, make it known to others beforehand. Allow others enough time to assess the situation and to decide whether this kind of activity is harmful, or will be harmful to their interests. Most of the time one does not come to the conclusion that it is harmful or that it will put one's national security in danger. In this respect I would like to give an example. At the time when Turkey was at odds with Bulgaria, Turkey never moved any military units near the Bulgarian border, not towards it nor away from it. It always complied with the commitments deriving from the CSBM regime of the Stockholm and the Vienna Document. At the end of this crisis, between Turkey and Bulgaria, the top authority of the Bulgarian State made it very clear that this behaviour of Turkey was crucial in making Bulgaria feel secure enough not to do anything more drastic than they were doing at that time.

Another measure which could be helpful is to devise mechanisms which enable a country to get in touch with other States immediately when a need arises. I am not talking about a dialogue which entails getting together around a table and discussing things in a routine manner, but about setting up emergency situation mechanisms. If something is going on the other side of the border of a country, and if that country can immediately get in touch with someone with enough authority of the former, ask questions and get answers, it will avoid a lot of unintentional damage to their relations and be very helpful. Regardless of what will be done in the region, one should keep in mind a couple of other principles and thoughts. The most important thing is that, whatever CSBM's are going to be developed in the region, one should do one's best to try to preserve the integrity of these measures. By integrity, I mean that any measure should be devised in such a manner that it would be applicable. It should be useful for those who are going to implement it. As a consequence, any measure should include all those who may contribute to the implementation of the measure. It should not leave out anyone who could contribute to or harm the implementation of it. And here we come back to our discussion of how the region should be defined, although in this respect I think that one should adopt a practical and pragmatic approach.

Sverre Lodgaard

I was pleased and inspired by the four interventions this morning, which complemented each other beautifully and added up to a picture which I found promising in more than one respect. I would like to make four comments.

I will start with the definitional issue, where I recognize Nabil Fahmi's problem in finding an adequate definition of CSBM's. I have tried myself in other contexts to provide such a definition: I am ready to go along with you and say that a confidence-building measure is a measure that provides confidence, and that from there we should proceed to characterize them by their functions.

One such function that CSBM's were supposed to have in Europe was to raise the threshold of crisis. Confidence-building measures were measures which were designed to extend normal peace-time conditions for as long as possible, in the phase of an emerging crisis. The point here is that if a major military exercise were to coincide with growing tension, with an emerging crisis in the region or outside the region, then all Parties concerned would have good reason to believe that this was by chance and not by design if the military exercise had been notified a long time in advance. I am thinking primarily of the annual calendars that were developed in the European context. In the European setting, this function rested primarily on the provisions for prior notifications and observation - and I did not hear this morning any references to that in the Middle Eastern context. My first question to my Middle Eastern colleagues is, therefore, whether prior notification and observation of military exercises is something that could be contemplated and be of good use in the Middle East? Or does it not fit the Middle Eastern setting?

Second, it is exactly 20 years ago that CBM's were first conceived in Europe. There was a clearly perceived link between CBM's and disarmament. The reasoning was that transparency produces predictability: predictability is conducive to confidence; and confidence can in turn facilitate disarmament. That ideology, so to speak, lingered on. It was there all the time, and some observers would say it came to fruition in 1986 with the Stockholm Agreement, which was a small revolution from the point of view of transparency. Now, you might say - with good reason - that we got the Stockholm 1986 Agreement on CSBM's first of all because of the domestic changes in the USSR and the changes in the political priorities there under the leadership of Michail Gorbatchov. I agree that this is the main point to be made in this regard. Nonetheless, when those changes came about in the USSR, the institutional apparatus - the CSCE and the CDE - was there to make the maximum use of the new opportunities that appeared. I am turning this, as you can imagine, into a case for strengthening the peace process and the possibility of creating a CSCME, a Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East.

My third point has to do with the remark by Ariel Levite that CSBM's do not presuppose any willingness to forgo the use of force. Strictly speaking, he is right. But as he emphasized himself it would be quite helpful if the Parties were to enter CSBM's in good faith. Indeed, it would be very helpful if CSBM's could be made operational in the context of unambiguous commitments to peaceful change. And as you know, the commitment to peaceful change was ironed out in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. I find all the more reason to emphasize this point because in recent years we have seen a few cases in the arms control field where some party or other have used agreements for purposes contrary to their declared objectives. Iraq is a case in point and North Korea raises some questions   even though it would be premature to say that the NPT has failed in the case of North Korea, while in the case of Iraq the situation has been corrected. There are, however, more examples of this kind. Today, one might also point to Cambodia or Yugoslavia as examples where agreements have not been implemented, but simply ignored. Mr Umar said that in the Middle East there is not a lack of confidence but a crisis of confidence. Indeed, there is a lot of uncertainty, and a lot of suspicion regarding intentions. Against that background I would say: go ahead with CSBM's and make them a test of intentions.

A final remark on the very important question of arms transfers. Supplier restraints will never do the trick by themselves. What is called for is also some kind of agreed restraint on the recipient side. I very much agree with what Mr Karem said yesterday, that when it comes to the negotiation of restraints there has to be openness. What could be the first step in this direction? What could be the first modest step on the recipient side? We probably have to seek it in the field of transparency, as some kind of CBM. For instance, we might think in terms of extending the information exchange to include information on planned military acquisitions through both domestic production and by import from abroad. The issue must be approached in pragmatic fashion. Mr Fahmy spoke about the importance of unilateral CBM's. Going on from there, one might conceive of sub-regional exchanges of information on planned arms acquisitions for, say, the next year.

Saleh Al-Mani

There are three points that I would like to raise. The papers this morning were very important because it made it very clear that there is a need to bring about a much more advanced level of agreement on the political side before we engage in the technicalities of arms control mechanisms. Mr Fahmy, also emphasized that point. There is a general consensus in the Arab World that we should not jump into the disarmament phase or hurry up with CBM's until we see some sort of concrete results in the peace negotiating process.

The second point that I would like to mention was raised by Mr Levite. It touches on the idea of sufficiency of security needs. How do you define this? Does it have to be asymmetrical as it is in the existing situation? Must we therefore freeze the qualitative gap between the Arab States and Israel at this level? Or is there a way, and are there means, whereby this gap can be bridged?

The third point concerns the link between the will and opinion of the people and State policies. We cannot really divorce State policies, even in arms control and disarmament issues, from public opinion. There is a need to link the popular opinion with arms control issues including CBM's. It is very difficult to engage in arms control negotiations when at the same time the people see daily violence on TV by one State against the rest of the States in the region. There should be some sort of political elan. The concept of unilateral gestures is very important, not only in themselves or as symbolic gestures, but also in creating the political elan for the relaxation of tensions. The relaxation of tensions is the cornerstone of the whole process.

Shafeeq Gabhra

I would like to see how the concept of CSBM's or confidence-building measures, relates to the Gulf, and in particular Kuwait. Kuwaitis live today in a set of fears. On the one hand there is the fear of Iraq and its potential might in the future. While speaking with an Iranian friend, he told me that there are no borders between Kuwait and Iran. I said that this is precisely what the Iraqis told the Kuwaitis. They indeed left strove for a situation in which there were no borders between the two. Kuwaitis are also fearful of the intentions of the Iranians. There is water between Iran and Kuwait, but Kuwaitis know that Iranians are good at crossing water. A country like Kuwait also has a real security dilemma, namely that of a small State. The issue for a country like Kuwait is how can a small State survive in a very complex environment? It needs Western protection and it is told that the best way to guarantee this is through further arms sales. It hence ends up buying and stockpiling. Most of the time it is not sure whether it is ever going to use these weapons or how it would use them. But it is part of a deadly dance.

At others times countries, such as Egypt, will get annoyed with Kuwait, for they consider that the country is moving too quickly in a certain direction, so it compensates and veers closer to the Egyptian position. Small States are truly caught up in a very tough dilemma. I would appreciate some comments and help in this direction. Will open politics, or politics of reassurance work? What can be done about misperceived intentions from both sides (Iranian and Arab, Gulf and Iraq)? Can one ever have security without addressing some of the most deep-rooted problems and conflicts in our region *i.e.*: the Arab-Israeli, the Iraqi-Gulf or the Iranian-Arab Conflict. What will make it easier for States to believe that the solution lies not in the stockpiling of arms. Is it through the creation of political networks? One might not need a solution, but a process that will provide certain assurances, and a certain level of confidence. At this stage a hotline, a red-line, could be inductive in creating some confidence within the context of existing problems. It could reduce tension slightly and provide some breathing space for small States that feel insecure.

Mounir Zahran

I would like to comment on the reports presented this morning and I would like to argue that at this particular juncture it is very difficult to apply the CSBM experience gained in other regions to the Middle East. Reference was made in particular to the experience of the CSCE. We have to bear in mind, however, that while creating this kind of co-operation, Europe was in a state of peace. There was peace even if it was perhaps a cold peace. There was no open war between East and West, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. So, both the circumstances and the environment are different. The European experience may become useful in the future when one will have a comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East. Another difference is the fact that the CSCE has three baskets: a security, an economic co-operation and an humanitarian basket. It is too early for some countries to speak about regional economic co-operation at this particular moment in the Middle East. Indeed regional economic co-operation, humanitarian issues, and cultural exchanges will come later on with the comprehensive peace.

As far as security is concerned, we have to differentiate between two sets of measures. One set of measures which would enhance and accelerate the peace process and another set of measures which could be adopted once the peace process is concluded. Guidelines for such measures were adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1980, and reference to them is also made in the paper by Mr Toukan. The first set of measures which relate to creating an environment which would enhance and accelerate comprehensive peace in the Middle East are also referred to in UNGA Resolution 47/52G and I quote: "The GA supports and encourages efforts aimed at promoting CBM's at regional and sub-regional levels in order to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation measures at regional and sub-regional levels". This is the key to the Middle East. These kind of measures are very important to enhance peace and security in the Middle East.

When peace will be at hand, when all countries in the region will agree together in a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, then we can come to the other set of measures. Among such other measures are the establishment of a Centre for the Prevention of Conflict in the Middle East. I also want to refer to what another participant said earlier namely that all countries in the area should report to the UN Register of conventional arms transfers. I am sorry to say that this is not enough. The Register is not comprehensive and it does not give a clear picture about the excessive and destabilizing accumulation of arms in any given country in the Middle East. It does not encompass holdings nor procurement through national production. It deals neither with the transfer of technology nor with weapons of mass destruction. The recommendation referred to in Mr Toukan's paper, namely that all countries in the area should engage in a parallel process of adhering to all instruments related to weapons of mass destruction, is the key issue here. In this

respect, I would like to refer to two proposals, one for creating a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and the earlier one for creating a zone free of nuclear weapons. This would really be a CBM which would create confidence and which would encourage all countries in the region to accelerate a final and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

Gerald Steinberg

We have made a lot of progress since yesterday. I would not at all call today's discussion a dialogue of the deaf. I would like to comment on what was said concerning the "crisis of confidence" concept. One of the reasons for the crisis of confidence is that the issue cannot be reduced to merely an Egyptian-Israeli dialogue. The Middle East is much more complicated as we heard yesterday morning and as we all know ourselves. Even before we talk about CBM's, we have to acknowledge that there are three countries that are not participating in the arms control process and they must be brought in before we can go anywhere. Pre-notification, the Register, etc. are all meaningless unless Syria is involved in the multilaterals, and unless Iran and Iraq are involved in the peace process. We cannot envision a peace process and arms control measures when in Teheran we continue to hear the same calls we heard from other States back in the 1940's and 50's about the destruction of the Jewish State. The two just do not go together. It would be very useful for the people sitting around this table to exercise a leadership role in at least reducing that part of the question of confidence, in bringing in those other countries. Just to be more concrete, take the issue of pre-notification. Let us say that Israel and Egypt agreed on pre-notification. Without bringing in Syria in that process, it would have very limited effects on Israeli national security. We have to think in regional terms. The same is true in dealing with the Gulf, and the problem Kuwait faces.

The second point concerns the issue of superiority and special rights. This is a very difficult set of terms. As pointed out, superiority, the question of balance, who defines what sufficiency is, are all important issues. Experience in the history of international relations shows that there is no widely accepted definition. Each side worries about the others, and claims sufficiency for its side, while accusing the other of planning offensive capabilities, and of having an excess of arms. We have learnt from the history of the East-West negotiations that there are concepts that might be more applicable. Most military planners rightly use worst-case analysis. For example, while from the Egyptian perspective Israel may enjoy superiority, from the Israeli perspective the Arab States enjoy superiority. This is not mutually inconsistent because both sides base estimates on worst-case analysis.

The problem of the security dilemma is also central. What kind of weapons are we talking about? Mr Lodgaard distinguished between offensive versus defensive systems, but how do we define the balance of power in terms of offensive versus defensive capabilities? In many cases, one nation's defensive forces can be used to attack a neighboring State. We have to look in detail at the types of weapons that are involved, and understand this difficult problem of security dilemmas. So, I would suggest dropping the use of terms such as superiority, or special rights, as well as attempts to apply those definitions to the other side. Instead we should be talking about the regional situation which is one of security dilemmas, worst case analyzes, and all the instabilities that flow from that. Let us try to conquer these problems and deal with them in terms of regional rather than on a state versus state basis.

Finally, the third point concerns the question of unilateral CBM's. They were also developed in the US-Soviet context. In fact, I wrote my dissertation on reciprocal unilateral moves in the area of the development of space weapons. There is quite a bit of interesting literature on the issue of reciprocal unilateral CBM's. Emphasis, however, must be put on the fact that this should be a process. Unilateral measures that do not go anywhere are not, in fact, CBM's - they do not build confidence. It would be interesting to hear what sort of unilateral but reciprocal stages and measures

might be implemented. It would be interesting to hear not only what the Egyptians propose the Israelis do, but what sort of steps the Egyptians would propose doing themselves to limit or place restraints unilaterally on their capabilities, and what measures they would suggest in the broader region that would be applied so that it could not be simply a one-way street. Reciprocal unilateral reduction in tensions have to be viewed in a dynamic context and not in a static context, and have to be seen in a regional context, rather than on the basis of individual States.

Nikolai V. Sofinsky

I would like make two brief remarks. My first remark relates to the correlation between security and arms control. This is a rather controversial question in relation to the Middle East. There are, of course, many experiences in this field. If we take for instance the European example, one can see that before the various arms control efforts in Europe started, a basis for political stability and a so-called, security system was established. No matter how bad it was and taking into account that it was based on a bloc to bloc confrontation, this political security system provided for a certain political stability which facilitated the arms control negotiations and process. The position of the majority of Arab countries is to give priority to the issue of political stability in the Middle East before getting involved in arms control efforts. However in his paper Mr Toukan emphasizes that arms control is the only way to establish strategic stability and collective security in the region. From Mr Toukan's paper, I understand that the establishment of the security-system is viewed as the final goal. The arms control efforts are considered to be a means of protecting the way to these security systems. That is to say that arms control efforts should go ahead of the security measures. Personally, I see justification for both approaches and I even see reason to adopt a third variant, as both spheres are so interrelated in the Middle Eastern context that it simply seems useless to try to separate them. The most useful thing to do might hence be to try to take actions simultaneously.

My other remark is related to the so-called extra-regional presence, or even interference, in the region. I agree with Mr Aliboni who said that the extra-regional presence is a reality. Moreover, the political context of the Middle Eastern region is much larger than its geographical frame. Much the same as the political context of Europe goes beyond its purely geographical parameters and includes the US, Canada, the Eastern parts of Russia, and Turkey, the political framework of the Middle East includes a number of extra-regional countries, whether we like it or not. The problem is not of rejecting this presence, but of making this presence acceptable for both the regional States and the extra-regional countries.

Mahmoud Karem

There are three points I would like to make. One relates to the criticism of the NPT. I scratch my head whenever I hear accusations such as the "NPT showed to be a failure in Iraq". Accusations should point to the IAEA safeguard system. It is because of recent experience with this international inspection system that the issue is now being reexamined and reevaluated. We have recently seen the upsurge and emergence of the right for special inspections. Conversely speaking, the accession of South Africa to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State, amidst the reports we are receiving now, is a clear indication of the success, and not of the failure, of the NPT.

The second point deals with confidence-building measures. Some speakers were right in saying that the concept is very fluid and undetermined. The type and scope of CBMS is not very clear in our minds, maybe because the Middle Eastern region is so volatile in nature, maybe because emulating other examples from other regions needs to be tailored to the realities and political characteristics of the region. But as we proceed we see that certain measures definitely need to be

taken into consideration. One of these important measures is verification. There are three modes of carrying out verification. One is the bilateral mode arrangements, for example the provisions for joint inspections in the INF treaty. Secondly, there are verification measures carried out by international agencies such as the IAEA, or the OPCW the projected verification agency of the CWC. Thirdly, there are regional verification mechanisms such as Euratom and OPANAL.

Nonetheless Mr Fahmy was right in adding another dimension when he made reference to reciprocal unilateral CBM's. Why are they important? They are important because they take into consideration the basic characteristics of the region. Indeed, in the Middle East region we may not really need a verification and regional institution. Maybe in the future, but not now. The way to increase confidence between the parties in the region will, as suggested, have to start with reciprocal unilateral CBM's.

My third and last point, as we engage into the definition of CBM's I suggest that we also consider extra-terrestrial CBM's, notably those dealing with outer-space. Whenever we design an agenda for CBMs it is important to include CBMs that would cover the activities of States in the region of the Middle East in the pursuit of peaceful use of outer-space. Some of these measures could perhaps include prior notification of space vehicles, launch date changes, information on the payload, the definition of the trajectory and the type of mission etc.

Serge Sur

It is evident that the Middle East remains a region of insecurity, despite the fact that the tensions have greatly diminished. Nonetheless, what is striking is the fact that the improvement of the general climate and of the regional processes goes in hand in hand with a criticism, or at least a devaluation, of the multilateral arms control instruments. I am thinking, in this respect, particularly of the Non Proliferation Treaty. Sverre Lodgaard has referred to it, Mahmoud Karem mentioned it, but I would like to come back to it, by making one observation and posing one question.

The Non Proliferation Treaty is a multilateral instrument. It is the basis of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We have heard different participants in this conference stating that the treaty was not really adapted to the problems of the region. Some even affirmed that it had failed in its objectives. Coming from outside the region, I have the feeling that this is a very harsh and possibly even premature judgement. It has to be admitted that the NPT is confronted with challenges, but it is also capable of dealing with them, at least we should hope so. What is clear, is that the NPT review and extension conference of 1995 risks being far more complex than initially envisaged.

Without wanting to go into a detailed analysis of the different difficult situations with which we are confronted these days, as for instance in Iraq or in the DPRK, one might wonder what would have happened had the NPT not existed. This negative demonstration of the value of the NPT seems to me extremely convincing. In this respect, it also has to be noted that often contradictory statements and judgements are passed. As was pointed out by Mahmoud Karem, a great number of the weaknesses of the system are in fact not weaknesses of the NPT, but weaknesses of the safeguards system. So, while on the one hand one points to the weaknesses of the NPT, on the other hand, one deplores Israel's non-adherence to the NPT and demands that it joins the treaty. This leads me to a question addressed maybe more to our Israeli friends, particularly to Gerald Steinberg who seemed to be the most critical with respect to the NPT. My question is what would be the necessary conditions that would need to be met for Israel to adhere to the NPT, or is it adherence altogether to be excluded?

Ariel Levite

I think we tend to belittle the role of UN Security Council Resolution 242 as the general charter for the Middle Eastern process of an equivalent stature as the Helsinki Accords. What principles do we have in resolution 242? I remind you some of these principles were very painful for Israel to accept, but it nonetheless did. In the first instance, there is "the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace". "The termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force". "Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarised zones". I do not want to imply that resolution 242 is perfect, and I know that the Palestinians have reservations about it, that I hope will be adequately dealt with. The point I would like to make, however, is that for purposes of a CSCE type process, *i.e.* the kind of process which we are beginning to have, we already have a charter, an agreement on basic principles. I would like to see an expanded circle of Middle Eastern countries that actually sign on to it. As far as the institutional mechanisms are concerned we also have a regional forum, we have both the bilateral and multilateral peace talks. So, the differences should not be overstated.

The second point concerns some of the fundamental changes that have taken place in the Israeli security package over the past decade. Very briefly: the defence industry has shrunk by more than 30 percent. The process is ongoing and I expect it to continue to decline by a further 20 percent in the next three or four years. The force structure has declined dramatically, but even more important, and I do not know if you are fully aware of it, the fundamental changes that are now taking place in the area of military technology are ones that have enormous potential in making the defence doctrine less dependent on territory. This should not be underemphasized. The emphasis on high technology is designed to partially compensate for non-possession of territory. This point is of fundamental importance if we want to make territorial concessions. The defence budget has shrunk by about a third of what it was in terms of GNP and government expenditures. Israel has signed the CWC and has adhered to the MTCR. It has proposed a suppliers-recipient dialogue on conventional transfers and has made a gesture to Egypt in agreeing to define a vision of the peace process in the Middle East in a way that is very close to the Egyptian definition. Israel has repeatedly emphasized that its security doctrine relies on conventional weapons as the cornerstone of both its deterrence and war-fighting capability. This goes a long way towards meeting some of the concerns.

Concerning the issue of sufficiency, I would like to say the following. One position, such as the one presented by Egypt, says the ratio should be one for one. At the opposite extreme is the position that advocates that the ratio should be 23 for one, if we include all Arab States and Iran, versus Israel. We are not proposing either the one for one nor the a 23 for one, as the desired ratio. Just as Egypt legitimately feels that it has to deter aggression, not just on its own territory, but also from the part of its friends and neighbours, so does Israel legitimately considers that it should be able to defend itself against a potential regional coalition. In this respect, it should be born in mind that Israel was not only attacked in the past by Arab coalition, but in the course of the Gulf War was also attached by Iraq even though it was not involved in the war. I would even go further and remind you that after Egyptian probing, Israel went a long way in reassuring Iraq that it harbored no hostile intentions against it. It was President Mubarak who appealed to Israel to issue these reassurances to Iraq after the April 1990 speech of Sadam Hussein. Despite the fact, that Israel had no hostile intentions or made any provocative statements, it was nevertheless attacked by Iraq at that time. So, it is perfectly legitimate that Israel sees the need to defend itself on a just basis. What

this exact basis is remains to be negotiated. I suggest that it is sufficiency, in other words a formula advocating equal margins of security for everyone.

A very important point was made by Mr Nabil Fahmy about the tension between ambition and realism. He proposes a way of being very ambitious and yet realistic a formula which I accept. But we have a different formulation of striking this careful balance between ambition and realism. I have a difficulty understanding why it is that we can be ambitious in disarmament and not ambitious in confidence-building.

Mr Sofinsky raised the issue of extra-regional presence in the Middle East. First, an extra-regional presence may be useful in not making the process a strictly Arab-Israeli process if that poses a problem for the Arabs. Second, it could also help by providing some technical expertise, by doing some things on the other side's territory, etc. In addition, there is a special category of extra-regional involvement, namely quasi-regional presence, by states adjacent to the region. We ought to widen our horizons to the Mediterranean and/or the Red Sea. For example, participation of States like Turkey with some regional presence is important. I do not wish to belittle in any way the role Egypt can play in regional settlements and arrangements. I therefore wish to repeat the fact that, like the neutrals in Europe, in the Middle East we have Egypt that could serve as a bridge-head between the sides playing an absolutely critical and very useful role.

I want to conclude my remarks by addressing the issue of the NPT. It is one thing to argue that the NPT is not a valid instrument. It is a position that I for one do not share. It is fundamentally different thing to say that the NPT (similar to the arguments that our Egyptian colleagues have been making in the context of CBMs) is ill-equipped to deal with unique problems existing within the Middle East. The Egyptians can fairly well understand why it is that some European measures are inapplicable to the Middle East. I would argue that the NPT is not only inapplicable as such, but also inapplicable to other areas which are highly problematic. And it is in these regions, whether it is the Korean peninsula, the Argentine-Brazilian context, or the entire Latin-America continent, context, or even between India and Pakistan, that a consensus prevails that it is only a certain version of a nuclear free-zone that can address the nuclear challenges in these areas. Once a nuclear free zone is established, one can adhere to the NPT. So, there is sequence here which says that we must first solve the problems within the region. The question is not further proliferation of the technology, the question is how to deal with the problems of these regions. The NPT was originally designed to deal with Japan and Germany. It is not the NPT that has stopped Taiwan and South-Korea from embarking on nuclear programs, they were only stopped by American intervention. It was not the NPT that stopped South Africa from going in that direction. India and Pakistan are other examples. In the same vein the Swedish decision to abandon a nuclear weapon programme was made prior to the conclusion of a NPT. The answer to the problem, thus is in nuclear weapon free-zones, and there are four basic reasons why. First, because they bring in and involve all the relevant parties; second, because they deal with verification in a matter the NPT does not do and cannot do. Third and fourth, because NWFZs deal also with two other issues that are not dealt at all within NPT. One is the issue of compliance, the other is that of enforcement.

Nabil Fahmy

The question was raised whether prior notification of military exercises is possible in the Middle East. The degree of CSBM's that already exist between Egypt and Israel has not been given enough public exposure. There are many different kinds of technical CSBMs that already exist, such as notification of exercises when they are large and in areas near to borders. So I do not see why there could not be prior notification of other exercises. It would make sense once the process gets on its way.

Concerning the issue of arms transfers, the problem is over-armament, and not arms transfers as such Mr Zahran quite eloquently explained the details of the arms transfers proposal. And since we are here in an academic forum, I will be very frank and say that the way the arms transfers issue is being dealt with, is often as if it is a guilt trip by the producers. One cannot simply talk about weapons that are brought and sold and ignore those that exist. One has to talk about the overall capacity of States and one cannot ignore in this respect the ability to produce weapons domestically. Now, as far as an overall package of military capacity, arms transfers would fall within this area. It would be useful as part of the overall armament control package but it does not have that much of an effect independently.

Mr Lodgaard referred to the issue of transparency. This is going to be one of the crucial points in the Middle East arms control process. It is very important that we develop the process of transparency. The stumbling block will not be whether we submit the facts and figures to the UN Register *i.e.* whether we submit data on what we buy, data which is already known, but rather do we submit data on issues of concern to others? The litmus test will be, do we adopt those measures of transparency that work across the board in all the areas that concern the different parties. The details of that can become very difficult, but the point is that we have to open up in all the different areas as an indication of political will. Mr Ghabra referred to the question of how we reach this full security package. I agree with you, it is a process. There is no formula on how to get there. But I want to emphasize that if we assume that at the end of the process we will still be in a situation of Arabs versus Israelis, Israelis versus Arabs, we are not going to get there. There is no way to develop collective security measures if what we will do at the end is still based on the same premise which we have now, or which we had prior to the peace process. That is why Egypt made the point that, while we do not feel we can draw a clear cut and exclusive blueprint of the end result, it is important to understand the parameters of what we are talking about and that at the end, hopefully the Arab-Israeli conflict will no longer exist. How we go from where we are now to that point is the process that we are trying to develop.

My only comment in addition to what has been said by many of my colleagues from Egypt on the NPT is that no global treaty is made to cover regional concerns. The NPT was not, the CWC was not, neither was the MTCR, nor the Partial Test Ban. So, the argument that is being used for not adhering to the NPT can be used for not adhering to anything. The point is that by adhering to the NPT, the CWC, or any other disarmament agreement, you are reducing the threshold of terror, or put differently you are lowering the magnitude of the problem. So, I find this argument, that because it does not satisfy regional concerns we should not adhere to the NPT, very difficult to accept. Mr Levite did not exactly say that. His position was that we need more than the NPT, but that is a diplomatic answer to the question that was addressed to him. I agree, in the end, we will need more than the NPT in the Middle East, but the NPT is a very good start. And I would be encouraged if the process of negotiating what is more than the NPT could start earlier rather than later as long as the problem is how do we get more, rather than do we get the NPT.

There was also a comment related to Iranian and Iraqi participation, whether or not arms control can be seriously discussed in the Middle East in their absence. In responding to that point, let me take the situation in the working group dealing with "water" as an example. Syria and Lebanon are absent from that working group, yet it continues to meet. How can one talk about water rights in the water group without Syria? The reason we are talking about water rights without Syria is that we are at the very beginning of the process. There is a lot of work to be done before we can get into contractual agreements. Hopefully, we will get to the point where all of the regional parties can participate and where Israeli legitimate and perceived concerns, whether we share them or not, may be met. But the argument is that we are very far from the sensitive point where we have to say yes or no. There is a lot of work which can be done at this point in the process without Iraq or Iran.

Concerning the issue of military superiority, I shall be extremely candid again. If there is no Arab-Israeli conflict, there is no reason to base one's security on superiority of one nation versus a coalition. I do not see where the large scale confrontation or anti-Israeli coalition is if peace is at hand. If we are talking about deterrence, we all define deterrence in terms of what we consider to be a threat. When we argue that there is a coalition from the very beginning, then you are making the mistake I referred to at the beginning namely; that the parties have not yet reached the point where they are convinced that there actually is a possibility for full peace and collective security measures between the major parties.

As far as the reciprocal unilateral CSBM's are concerned, I would like to give you some examples of what Egypt has done: Egypt signed the NPT in 1968, we waited 13 years for reciprocal measures but they did not come. In spite of that, we ratified the NPT because it was in our interest and that of the region as a whole to do so.

If you want a specific example of what we mean by unilateral and reciprocal, of what we mean when we say that we have to address the concerns of regional parties lets take the example of the Egyptian proposal in 1991 to establish in the Middle East a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction nuclear, chemical and biological. Our feeling was that Israel at one point had serious concerns regarding Arab chemical and biological capabilities. We, on our own part, were concerned about Israelis nuclear capability. That is the reason and the rationale behind the proposal made in 1991 to establish a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the region. It tackled both our concerns as well as the Israeli concerns. We could have just stuck to our earlier regional proposal which simply focused on the nuclear issue.

We are also ready to move on the CW Convention if Israel moves on the NPT. That is a unilateral reciprocal measure. It is not a collective agreement between two States or regional States. We will move towards one international treaty if you move to wards another and that respond to our concerns. I am not talking about declarations or statements once you have peace with the other Arab neighbours. What I am talking about is a commitment Israel makes to an international treaty and commitments that Arabs make to other international treaties. That is what I meant by unilateral but reciprocal.

Annex I

Enhancing Information Exchange
Between Research Institutes in the Middle East

*Péricles Gasparini Alves**

I. Introduction

In this age of computer sciences, the application of database techniques has been developed to assist with organizing an ever increasing documentation and with gaining a clear view of the numerous and diverse activities of modern society. UNIDIR has dedicated itself to co-ordinate the growing documentation in the field of disarmament and international security, and is fully aware of the fact that in order to facilitate this tremendous task, both today and in the future, it is necessary to have recourse to advanced computer technology. It is with this in mind that UNIDIR has developed a flexible and user-friendly database management application system which regroups, *inter alia*, information on research institutes and their activities for the former's internal use. The experience gained with the UNIDIR Database on Research Institutes (DATARIs) is most positive and encouraging, and fully confirms our conviction that modern and thorough research efforts would greatly benefit from computer assistance. At present, UNIDIR is envisaging the possibilities of enlarging the scope of its in-house DATARIs, as well as the ways and means to make this data more readily available. It follows, therefore, that co-operation among research institutes would gain substantially from some kind of computerized information and interactive documentation system.

The timing of the present Conference is therefore quite suitable to ponder the question of how database techniques could assist us all with integrating the joint efforts of research institutes, having particularly in mind the interests of the Middle East region. A comprehensive answer to this question would of course require more than the time allocated to this *exposé*, because this is a very wide ranging issue, and also because it encompasses highly technical aspects. I shall therefore not dwell on technical implications but focus on the fundamental topics related to the establishment of a database.

II. Benefits

In the first place one should clearly identify the benefits a database system has to offer. In a time of budgetary restraints, where the relationship between productivity, man hours and work load are of utmost importance, the use of a database system becomes essential for two major reasons. A database system enables the creation of a new form of communication among research institutes: that of an electronic non-verbal communication for both direct communication and the exchange of machine language data. It furthermore permits a quantitative as well as a qualitative expansion and intensification of existing links between research institutes. From the management standpoint, *real* time or *almost real* time communication among institutes is useful in the co-ordination of special data of utmost interest to all. For such an electronic linkage is efficient not only as a tool to exchange data, but also as a means of avoiding overlapping of research project themes, conference timetables, and other activities which should be complementary but not repetitious. This type of communication is, in other words, much more than a simple working tool for quick reference access.

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The second point that needs to be addressed is the aspect of system control: *who* would manage this type of database? In fact, there exist several approaches to operating a database system on research institutes. However, we will explore only a few of these avenues since our perspective should consider a regional database system relating to research institutes in the Middle East.

One could, for instance, think in terms of a database network run by a single manager who would centralize the system and distribute the data throughout the Middle East as demonstrated in Diagram A. Due to its nature and character, a United Nations regional centre is one of the organizations which readily come to one's mind for carrying out such a task. However, depending on the needs expressed by potential users, one could also envisage the development of a system (as a network or an internal database system) operated by private institutes or other organizations.

Diagram A

Single Manager Approach

Database Central Unit

In such a case, any effort made to create a database should conceive the system (both as regards the choice of the hardware equipment and software application) with a view to expanding its utilization and data transfers to other systems. This is necessary to avoid creating a handicap for future collaboration with other institutions in the region.

Finally, a combination of the above approaches could also be a plausible configuration as it can be seen in Diagram B. In this instance, early co-operation among potential users would be essential

to ensure system compatibility both in terms of the purchase of hardware equipment and software. Collective efforts leading to a division of the tasks envisaged could yield the following advantages:

- Decreasing the cost of the design and development phases.
- Decreasing the cost of hardware equipment.
- Diminishing the overall time needed to develop the system.
- Avoiding useless repetition of software applications.
- Creating a particular regional network, where cultural, political, and other concerns are generally quite similar.

Diagram B

Multiple Manager Approach

Database Central Unit

Updator

Operator

Manager

Functions

Consulter

Research Institutes

Governmental Organizations

Non-Government Organizations

General Public

This option appears therefore as the most plausible strategy to be pursued. It is important to keep in mind that the credibility and efficiency of efforts geared towards a regional database system would depend, to some extent, on the degree of the exchange of information which could flow from and to the institutes. If full collective operation is not technically or otherwise possible, some kind of co-operation in terms of consultations should be contemplated. In this regard, UNIDIR is prepared to assist, with the co-ordination, the conception and the development phases of a regional database in the Middle East. In fact, an analogous network system was proposed by UNIDIR in the occasion of similar conferences on regional research institutes in Africa (1990), Latin America and the Caribbean (1991), and Asia (1992). Initial discussions have already began with some institutions and UNIDIR, is considering to conduct a feasibility study on how best to approach the creation of a computer-aided database in these different regions.

III. Conception Phase

The conception of a database system basically encompasses the definition of the objectives to be attained by the system, adequate hardware equipment, and the possibilities of access to the system. At an initial stage, a Middle East database system could have as its objective the design of an application which would permit, for example, the development of a directory of all research institutes and other organizations working in the area of disarmament and international security related to the region as seen in Diagram C. Subdivisions of this directory could, for example, list a detailed index of all experts working in Middle East institutes and/or on Middle East security matters, their field of specialization and contacts. A complementary subdivision could contain an index of research projects, publications, and conferences or meetings dealing with security in the Middle East. Analytical studies delineating the status of research and the areas in which research would need to be more emphasized would certainly result from the collection of data.

Diagram C

Middle East Institutes Database Basic Structure

A regional database application would therefore allow for a quick reference to know *who* is doing *what* on Middle East affairs, and *when*. In addition, it would have an academic value in the sense that it would not merely store information in a purely statistical or numerical form, but it would also lay the grounds for analytical considerations and decision making as regards both the conception and orientation of research in the field of regional and international security.

The choice of hardware equipment would largely depend on the complexity and type of the tasks to be performed by the software application and the overall objectives of the network itself. One fundamental element to be studied, however, is that any computer configuration to be developed for such a purpose should be technically capable of allowing the interaction of different desktop devices, operating environments and systems. Diagram D is a rather simplified but quite descriptive illustration of an integrated system to be considered, where a central database unit is linked to multiple hardware and software environments and systems. It would be useless to advance any figures on the cost of such a system. The financing required for a single management system may differ greatly from that of a multiple management network. Whatever the solution opted for may be, a feasibility study should be undertaken.

Access to the information in a single or multiple management network could be obtained via requests sent through the postal system, or via direct electronic communication supported by modem and fax-card. Or yet, via a direct link using the X-25 liaison principle. The variety of means to access the system, as well as the possible roles to be played by different institutions, is better illustrated in Diagram E. Depending on the objectives of the database and the resources available, access could be free of charge or payable either on a case-by-case basis or through a membership fee. In addition, the use of the database application in the electronic communications mode could be protected by restricting access through a password system.

IV. Reflections

There lies ahead a new and challenging opportunity for research institutes in the Middle East to enhance exchange of information and co-operation among them. This new opportunity entails the creation of a unique collection of data with the aid of database techniques which could be undertaken either individually or collectively.

The benefits offered by a database system should be evaluated in terms of its inter-institute communication (including the exchange of data) advantages, which will thus serve to improve the current co-ordination of the various activities performed by and among the institutes themselves.

To sum up, the establishment of a regional Middle East database system would be a valuable and unique contribution to research in the field of disarmament and international security. Furthermore, the pursuit of this idea is also stimulated by R&D on the creation of analogous systems in other areas of the world.

Diagram D

Multiple Hardware/Software Environment Integrated System

Diagram E

Participation in and Access to Data Bases on International Security

## V. Suggested Reading

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Annex II

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Under an arrangment concluded with the Dartmouth Publishing Company (UK), selected UNIDIR *Research Reports* are published by Dartmouth and are distributed through their sales network (books indicated by •; see also at the end of the list *How to Obtain UNIDIR Publications*).

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