Proceedings of the Beijing Conference

Conference of Research Institutes in Asia and the Pacific

A Guide to the Discussions in
(23-25 March 1992)

NOTE

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UNIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNIDIR is an autonomous institution within the framework of the United Nations. It was established in 1980 by the General Assembly for the purpose of undertaking independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues.

The work of the Institute aims at:

1. Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race, and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States and toward the economic and social development of all peoples;

2. Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;

3. Assisting ongoing negotiations in disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;

4. Carrying out more in-depth, forward-looking, and long-term research on disarmament, so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved, and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

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Preface

The text here below reproduces the majority of communications submitted to the Third Regional Conference of Research Institutes on questions of security and disarmament organized by UNIDIR in Beijing from 23 to 25 March 1992. This Conference differs in a number of ways from its predecessors held respectively in Algiers for Africa and São Paolo for Latin America and the Caribbean.

The region covered is much larger and more heterogenous than the geographical areas dealt with previously. It may even be asked whether there are any common features by which it can be identified. It is a region where very different, ancient civilizations have met and flourished. It probably owes less than others to the old European influence, which was even at the height of colonialism, more fleeting than lasting. Modern decolonization was nonetheless born here. At the same time, former colonial situations led to the existence of States which are simple transpositions of European models. The region has huge continental areas and vast stretches of ocean. It is composed of overpopulated areas, as well as deserts and empty seas, and deeply rooted urban traditions exist side by side with timeless rural civilizations. It combines all political and economic systems. It seems to take on all the weight of history like natural and social constraints while taking to extremes voluntarist attempts to devise fresh solutions and establish new political, economic and social systems. It combines dynamism and stagnation. How could security issues in the region be anything but varied, difficult to grasp and often quite explosive?

The region's homogeneity, which is not yet and may never be a true identity, is in any case more in the realm of projection, or of what might be, than in that of reality. It is benefiting from the shortening of distances resulting from the growth of communications. The major Powers are present in the region or nearby and the human and intellectual resource it represents is drawing it more and more rapidly into universal relations. As the cradle of ancient civilizations and the wisdom of the ages, it is now widely regarded as the future of the entire world, but also as having a potential for immoderation and instability. It has witnessed the most cruel conflicts in the period since the Second World War, the bloodiest internal and international strife, the sharpest ideological clashes, the theory of inevitable war and the doctrine of non violence, while some islands of the Pacific continue to keep the myth of paradise on earth alive.

However, it is not these broad perspectives that are dealt with in this research report. It examines, in a more modest manner, the issues in a subregional context. Even though subregional divisions according to major political and natural influences may be somewhat artificial, the following subregions have been identified: the Far East, Southern Asia, South-East Asia and the Pacific. It also is to be noted that the Conference focused on the traditional issues of security and disarmament. The aim being to determine to what extent a universal or multilateral problem is applicable or suitable in the subregional context and thereby confirming in a more general manner its validity. In more practical terms, UNIDIR, by way of the Conference also aims at providing a forum in which research institutes from this vast part of the world may meet, exchange their views and carry on a dialogue.

We are grateful to the Government of the People's Republic of China whose generous hospitality made this meeting possible. Special thanks also go to the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament for their co-operation and support in the organization of this Conference. We also thank all those who contributed to the discussions: Messers/Ms Moonis Ahmar, Desmond Ball, Ravdangiin Bold, Cai Mengsun, Kevin P. Clements, Dao Huy Ngoc, Abdul Hafiz, Carolina G. Hernandez, Mohamed Jawhar, Michael J. Mazarr, Kenneth McPherson, V.S. Miasnikov, Sukh Deo Muni, Li Songil, Luo Renshi, Mervyn de Silva, Bilveer Singh, Jasjit Singh,

Sandra Tarte, Itaru Umezu, Jusuf Wanandi, This text was prepared for publication by Sophie Daniel of UNIDIR.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views and conclusions expressed in these papers, which those are of their authors. Nevertheless, UNIDIR considers that such papers merit publication and recommends them to the attention of its readers.

Professor Serge Sur
Deputy Director

List of Acronyms

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ACSS	Asian Collective Security Scheme
AFTA	Asean Free Trade Area
ALCM	Air-launched Cruise Missile
AMM	Asean Minister Meeting
ANZUS	Australia/New Zealand/US
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CBMs	Confidence-Building Measures
CER	Closer Economic Relations
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (or Conventional Forces in Europe Talks)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
C³I	Command, Control, Communication, Intelligence
CSBM	Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSCA	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Asia
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
DATARIs	UNIDIR Database on Research Institutes
EAEC	East Asian Economic Caucus
EAEG	East Asian Economic Group
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZs	Exclusive Economic Zones
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCC	Gulf Co-operation Council
GNP	Gross National Product
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD	International Bank for Development and Reconstruction
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDSA	Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPKF	India Peace Keeping Force
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MAT	Missile Abolishing Treaty
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NWFZ	Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PECC	Pacific Economic Consultative Commission
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PMC	Post-Ministerial Conference
R&D	Research and Development
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty or Talks
SANWFZ	South Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone
SAP	Small Arms Proliferation
SBM	Security-Building Measures
SDF	Self Defence Force
SEANWFZ	Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

SLBM	Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLCM	Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
SNDV	Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle
SPF	South Pacific Forum
SRAM	Short Range Attack Missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (Treaty)
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNU	United Nations University
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
VOA	Voice of America
WEU	Western Europe Union
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
ZOPFAN	Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

Opening Address I

Jayantha Dhanapala

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have great pleasure in declaring open this United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Conference of Research Institutes in Asia and the Pacific. May I, on behalf of UNIDIR, cordially welcome the distinguished participants, observers and guests. We have gathered together here in this historic city of Beijing for three days of discussion on the crucial issues of disarmament and security in the Asian Pacific region.

The organization of this Conference has been made possible by the Government of the People's Republic of China whose generous contribution and warm hospitality is deeply appreciated. I would like to thank His Excellency Vice Minister Liu Hua Qiu in particular for his personal role in the decision of the Chinese Government to host this important gathering of research scholars in the region and in kindly accepting my invitation to deliver the keynote address today. I must also thank the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament for their co-operation and support in ensuring the success of this conference. We meet not only in the largest and most populous country in Asia but also in a dynamic and modern nation that is heir to an ancient and rich civilization. Bold and historic political and economic changes aimed at transforming the life of the people have been set in motion and I wish the Government and people of China a life of peace and prosperity to be lived in dignity and freedom. Finally my thanks are due to the Ford Foundation whose grant helped to finance the travel of the participants of this conference.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, the General Assembly of the United Nations has entrusted UNIDIR with a specific mandate embodied in our statute. It consists of undertaking independent research aimed at:

- Providing the international community with more diversified and complete data on problems relating to international security, the armaments race, and disarmament in all fields, particularly in the nuclear field, so as to facilitate progress, through negotiations, towards greater security for all States and towards the economic and social development of all peoples;
- Promoting informed participation by all States in disarmament efforts;
- Assisting ongoing negotiations in disarmament and continuing efforts to ensure greater international security at a progressively lower level of armaments, particularly nuclear armaments, by means of objective and factual studies and analyses;
- Carrying out in-depth, forward looking, and long-term research on disarmament so as to provide a general insight into the problems involved and stimulating new initiatives for new negotiations.

A significant component of UNIDIR's activities relates to the active fostering of disarmament research, building research capacities and improving the conditions and facilities for researchers. The provision of opportunities for research scholars to meet and discuss common problems is thus an important aspect of UNIDIR's work. This "networking" function has manifested itself in the two global Conferences of Research Institutes which we organized in 1981 and in 1988. Following these conferences we were encouraged to organize conferences more sharply focused on specific regions so that more researchers would have the opportunity of meeting their peers, co-ordinating their research and benefiting from this inter-action.

The first of these regional conferences was held in Algiers in March 1990 and covered a wide spectrum of African research institutes. The papers presented at the Conference were published by UNIDIR in a book entitled "Africa, Disarmament and Security." The second Conference was held in December 1991 in Sao Paulo and included more than thirty experts and scholars from Latin America and the Caribbean. A publication containing the papers of this conference is currently under preparation.

This conference in Beijing is therefore the third in UNIDIR's series of regional conferences. We hope that with the support of our donors we will be able to organize a regional conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East and Gulf region next year. This would be both timely and useful in providing academic inputs into the peace process that began in Madrid last year.

We have no doubt that the participants of these regional conferences have unique opportunities of forging links among the institutes and organizations they represent   links which will survive and strengthen well beyond the duration of these conferences. They help to build research communities in regions which could benefit from the pooling of resources and their availability to the policy-makers and diplomatic practitioners. UNIDIR is pleased to be able to provide this forum for research scholars in Asia and the Pacific to meet and enhance their understanding of each other's views.

In addition to the conduct of regional conferences UNIDIR has also been a clearing-house for inter-institute contacts in other ways. We have built-up a computerized data base on research institutes working in the field of disarmament and international security containing comprehensive information on research centres, their programmes of research and their staff. A hard copy of this was published in 1990 as the UNIDIR Repertory of Disarmament Research and was widely distributed. UNIDIR continues to update this data base and is ready to provide information to those interested.

We have also since 1988 published a quarterly Newsletter in French and English. This Newsletter has focused on specific subjects and research in specific regions. In December 1988 the subject of the Newsletter was research in Asia and the Pacific. An updated version of this issue has been specially put out for this conference. You will notice that a number of research centres exist in the region denoting a high level of interest in research on disarmament and security. The growth of regional organizations   SAARC, ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum - and the preoccupation with maritime issues are among the distinct characteristics that emerge from this survey.

Asia and the Pacific as a region is as vast as it is complex. The earliest evidence of human existence and some of the earliest civilizations in recorded history belong here. The great philosophies that have moulded the culture and the way of life of the vast majority of human-kind have had their origin in this region. Great disparities in power, size, population, levels of economic development, and forms of government make general observations about the region a hazardous exercise. A regional identity amidst such heterogeneity and cultural diversity remains an elusive phenomenon. We have in the structuring of the conference chosen to focus on the principal sub-regions of this Asian-Pacific region as a more productive approach to the problems of disarmament and security. As we survey the chequered history of co-operation and conflict in this region we must recognize that global trends have brought us all to a unique juncture in international relations with new challenges and opportunities.

Each region will have its own response to these challenges and opportunities shaped by its political and economic relations, its history, culture, geography and other distinctive characteristics. The path adopted by other regions and the structures for co-operation established elsewhere need not be replicated. But if peace and security are to prevail as a basis for the economic prosperity of the peoples of Asia and the Pacific we have to search for equitable and durable solutions to the conflicts in the region. Security at lower levels of armaments requires that there should be a

reduction in military expenditure and that disarmament measures be implemented on an agreed basis. While global and regional disarmament are complementary, the Asian-Pacific region cannot be the odd man out in a world that is disarming in the nuclear, chemical, and conventional weapons areas. It has a major role to play in the achievement of global disarmament and security. As we strive for global compacts for peace and development we must also achieve regional compacts through self-reliance. A greatly revitalized United Nations stands ready to facilitate this process free from the fetters of the Cold War.

I have no doubt that on the basis of the excellent analytical papers we have before us there will be a stimulating and productive discussion of the issues on our agenda. They will point to general directions that this region might take in the future and provide the policy-makers of the countries in Asia and the Pacific with food for thought and hopefully, for action.

Opening Address II

Lin Huaxuan

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Conference of Research Institutes in Asia and the Pacific, initiated and organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, has convened in Beijing at such a fine time as spring is here again. Please allow me, on behalf of the Chinese participants, to express our warm welcome to Mr. Dhanapala, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, and to the experts and scholars who have come from various countries around the world. I congratulate you all on the successful opening of the conference.

At present, the world is at a crucial turning point. The old pattern is gone, but a new one has yet to take shape. The pace of multipolarization in the world has been accelerated. A certain relaxation is seen in the world situation as the tense confrontation between the two major military blocs has come to an end, and as some regional hot spots have been resolved or are in the process of being resolved. However, this has not brought people the peace that they have longed for. Today's world is far from being tranquil, as factors leading to regional tension and threatening world peace still exist.

In contrast to the turbulent, uncertain situation in Europe, the Asia-Pacific region is relatively stable. It enjoys the highest economic growth rate and is the most dynamic region in the current world economy. The Cambodian and the Afghan issues, and the situation in the Korean Peninsula are moving toward settlement, relaxation, and stability. At the same time, certain progress has been made in arms control and disarmament. Yet, it should be noted that there are still some destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region: enormous armaments still exist, especially armed forces with long-range offensive capabilities; hot spots are in the process of being resolved, but the struggle involved is still complicated; ethnic contradictions in some countries are quite sharp, and there are border and other territorial disputes. Given all these factors, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of the outbreak of new hot spots.

In short, today's world is confronted with both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, favourable conditions and hopes exist, and on the other hand there are unfavourable factors and difficulties. Under these circumstances, it is of great significance that so many well-known experts and scholars have met in Beijing to explore issues of security and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific. We believe the conference will certainly facilitate the study and discussion of issues concerning security and disarmament in the region by the United Nations, and by experts and scholars in various countries, while enhancing mutual understanding and friendship, and contributing to security, stability, and development in the region. The Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament is willing to engage in extensive exchanges and contacts with all of a you. Let us seize this historical opportunity, as the Asia-Pacific region is heading toward relaxation and stability, to push the disarmament process forward, and to promote economic development and safeguard peace and security, so that the people in the region can enjoy happy and prosperous lives.

Message of the Vice-Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China

Liu Huaqiu

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Initiated and sponsored by the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research, the Conference of Security and Disarmament Research Institutes in Asia and the Pacific opens today in Beijing. Experts and scholars from many countries have come to exchange, in great detail, views on security and disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, questions of common concern. This will help promote the cause of disarmament and security in this region, while enhancing mutual understanding and friendship. On behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, I would like to express our thanks to the United Nations Institute of Disarmament Research and its Director, Mr. Dhanapala, for their efforts in the organization of this conference. I also wish to extend a warm welcome to our foreign friends who have come for this meeting. I wish the conference great success.

The present-day world is in a historical period of major changes. The old bipolar structure has been broken apart, and a new world structure has yet to take shape. The world is moving toward multipolarization, and it is not tranquil. While the old contradictions have not been fundamentally solved, new ones are cropping up. The previously hidden contradictions have come to the surface, and some have even developed into violent conflicts. The contradictions between the North and the South have become more acute. Hegemonism and power politics still exist. The two major issues of peace and development are far from being addressed, and the factors which induce world turbulence have increased. These have all helped the world's people to have a better understanding of the world situation.

We are pleased to see that the Asian region is enjoying relative stability. A political settlement has been reached on the Cambodian question. The situation on the Korean Peninsula continues to move toward relaxation and stability. The process of reaching a political settlement of the Afghan question is likely to accelerate. Most countries in the Asia-Pacific region have enjoyed political stability and economic growth at home, and increased mutual confidence and enhanced, good-neighbourly, relations with one another. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that there are still destabilizing factors in the Asia-Pacific region, and that some disputes or conflicts are still awaiting a proper solution.

Following the end of the Cold War and of confrontations between the East and the West, some progress has been made in disarmament. Europe has started the process of conventional disarmament. The two major powers, which possess the largest arsenals with the most sophisticated weapons, have reached several agreements on nuclear disarmament and have reduced their armed forces stationed in the Asia-Pacific region, to some extent. Some countries in the region have adopted confidence-building and security-ensuring measures with their neighbouring countries, and some have even reduced the size of their border troops. Generally speaking, however, arms reduction and control have just started in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world at large. The two major military powers still possess a great number of nuclear weapons of over-killability, and sophisticated conventional arms. They are still working to improve the quality of their weapons, and to develop new, sophisticated weapons. They have maintained a strong military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. A small number of Asia-Pacific countries have maintained an armament level beyond their reasonable defence needs and some countries continue to strive for arms expansion. The security situation remains grave in the Asia-Pacific region. How to capitalize on the current opportunities to conceive timely and practical disarmament and arms control measures, in order to

fundamentally improve the regional security environment, is a major issue which the Asia-Pacific countries must bear in mind and address.

As an Asia-Pacific country, China attaches great importance to safeguarding regional security and stability, and developing friendly and good-neighbourly relations with its surrounding countries. It has made unremitting efforts and due contributions to this end. China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace, persists in developing friendly relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and sticks to its principled position against hegemonism and power politics. China does not seek hegemony or a sphere of influence, nor does it establish military bases or station armed forces abroad. It will never become a threat to any country. China's foreign policy of peace, and its practice in this regard, is an important factor in safeguarding security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and in the world as a whole. China serves as an unswerving force in maintaining world peace.

China stands for effective disarmament and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive, and balanced manner, and for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear, chemical, and outer space weapons. As a nuclear-weapon state, China has, since the very first day it possessed such weapons, made it clear that it will not be the first to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It has also pledged to not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China advocates the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, and the proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction. Likewise, China formally acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons long ago. In addition, China has taken concrete actions to promote conventional disarmament. In recent years, China reduced its armed forces by one million. This was the first large-scale disarmament in the world since the end of the Second World War. To ensure regional peace and development, and to meet the great challenges of the coming century, it is imperative to promote disarmament and security in the Asia-Pacific region. For the purpose of furthering complete regional security and disarmament, I would like to share the following opinions and propositions, concerning comprehensive regional security and disarmament, with you.

1. All of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region should, strictly abiding by the United Nations Charter, maintain and develop friendly relations and co-operation with one another on the basis of the Five Principles of Mutual Respect, for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. No country should seek hegemony or a sphere of influence in the region or sub-regions. No country should try to dominate other countries, infringe upon other countries' sovereignty, or interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in any way or under whatever pretext.

2. All disputes, conflicts, and questions, which remain unresolved, should be settled peacefully through negotiations and in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions and international conventions, without resorting to force or the threat of force.

3. Countries should not form any military bloc against a third country or other regions. No country should station armed forces or set up military bases outside its own territory. All foreign military bases in the region should be dismantled, and all foreign troops should be withdrawn from the region in order to build confidence and remove factors which promote antagonism.

4. All countries should achieve disarmament and arms control in a fair and reasonable manner, to keep their armaments at a proper level, corresponding to their defence needs. Countries with the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals should assume special

responsibilities by taking the lead, drastically reducing their nuclear and conventional weapons, and halting the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear and outer space weapons. The armaments withdrawn from other parts of the world, as a result of a disarmament programme, shall not be transferred to the Asia-Pacific region. All nuclear-weapon states should agree to not be the first to use nuclear weapons, and to not use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear countries or regions. Efforts should be made to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Support should be rendered to those countries which support the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in their sub-regions.

5.   Bilateral, sub-regional and regional, multi-layer and multi-channel, security-ensuring dialogue mechanisms should be gradually established so as to facilitate timely consultations and communication on relevant issues, to increase mutual confidence, and to take preventive measures to remove those factors which are likely to cause insecurity and conflict.

6.   To develop closer economic relations, and strengthen co-operation between the Asia-Pacific countries, for common development on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, serves as an important factor for regional security and stability. Therefore, it is imperative to strengthen, expand, and improve, the regional economic co-operation organizations, so as to bring economic co-operation among the Asia-Pacific countries to a new high.

Mr. Chairman and dear friends, it is the shared aspiration and goal of the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to promote regional disarmament and security, guarantee regional peace and development, and turn the region into a peaceful, stable, and prosperous one, in which all countries in the region live in co-operation and friendship. We believe that so long as all countries are sincere, enhance co-operation, and make concerted efforts, they will be able to march toward this goal with success, thereby making positive contributions to world peace, stability, and development.

Part I

Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: Developments and Perceptions

Chapter 1

Threat Perceptions and Security Requirements in the Asian and Pacific Region

Cai Mengsun

In the past two years, great and drastic changes have taken place in the international situation. Indeed, 1991 witnessed three major events that had strategic impacts on the whole world: the Gulf war, the civil war in Yugoslavia, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The impact of the disintegration of the Soviet Union on the international situation is especially profound. It can now be said that the old strategic pattern characterized by the US-Soviet bipolar system during the post World War II era is no longer in existence. As the collapse of the old strategic pattern was not resulted from war, but from peaceful evolution, it will not and cannot lead to the immediate formation of a new strategic pattern.

At present, the world is progressing toward multipolarization, and all political forces are in a process of division, turbulence, and reorganization. This is a transitional period which will last for quite a long time. During this period, the main trend in the international situation is peace and development, and a world war in particular, seems more remote. However, regional wars and armed conflicts are becoming frequent, and the world tends to be more turbulent and changeable with many unstable factors. All of this makes it more difficult to predict the development of the international situation.

During this turbulent and changeable period, some positive changes have emerged in the security situation of the Asia-Pacific region: with the change of their bilateral relations, the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) have made corresponding strategic adjustments and reduced their military forces in the Asia-Pacific region, thereby lowering the level of their military confrontation in this region; the normalization of Sino-Soviet (Russian) relations has promoted the development of their bilateral political and economic relations, also making their tense military confrontation more relaxed; Japanese-Soviet (Russian) relations have also achieved great improvement through frequent visits between high-ranking officials, which may not easily solve the issue of the northern islands, but which have paved the way for the development of their bilateral political and economic relations in the future; and, Sino-Japanese relations have seen continuous and healthy development since the restoration of their diplomatic relations, except for a short period of difficulties in 1989. However, these difficulties were quickly removed by their joint efforts, and their relations soon returned to normal.

Both sides have realized that their co-operation is of primary importance to the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The high-level dialogues between the north and the south of the Korean Peninsula have made some new progress. The two sides joined the United Nations simultaneously, and signed agreements on national reconciliation, mutual nonaggression, and denuclearization of the Peninsula, etc., having greatly improved the security on the Peninsula. Further, the political settlement of the Kampuchean issue is close to completion, and the dialogues among South Asian countries have also achieved new progress, making their country-to-country relations better than before.

I am convinced that the present security situation in the Asia-Pacific region is at its best during the nearly 40 years since the end of the Korean war. The main trends are peace and development, and the possibility of the eruption of another war or of large-scale military clashes

is very small. This tendency of relative stability and relaxation may continue to develop for a considerably long period in the future. This will be decided by the following factors:

- The Asia-Pacific region is a concourse point of the interests of the four major powers; namely China, the United States, Russia, and Japan. Because of their own national interests, they all hope to maintain peace and stability in this region, not wishing to see new chaos or instability here;
- For nearly 10 years, the speed of economic development in most Asia-Pacific countries is higher than that in other regions of the world. Of primary concern to many countries of this region, and also a main factor that influences the development of the regional situation, are the issues concerning the enhancement of national comprehensive strength and the achievement of faster economic development. Economic contacts among the countries here are becoming increasingly closer;
- Most Asia-Pacific countries and areas were once colonies or semi-colonies in history and they were particularly severely injured during the Second World War. As a result, they especially treasure peace and stability and attach great importance to their national sovereignty and territorial integrity so as to prevent foreign intervention and aggression;
- There is no clear confrontation between different blocks in the Asia-Pacific region. Once, there existed some multilateral organizations and bilateral defence treaties and agreements, but they did not play any significant role in their contention with each other or in influencing the whole regional situation. Each country or area tends to approach issues and make/execute policies by taking its own national interests, not group interests or bipolar politics, as a point of departure. In addition, this region is unlike Europe, which was geographically divided into east and west parts or politically separated into socialist and capitalist countries, constituting a situation of confrontation between hostile camps. In this region, the dividing line between friends and enemies is often changed with the elapse of time and the evolution of specific issues.

Nevertheless, while fully acknowledging these positive factors, we cannot help but note with a sober mind that there are definitely some unstable factors in Asia-Pacific security. Further, their changes and development will influence not only this region, but also, to a certain extent, the security and stability of the whole world. In my view, the unstable factors that are most worthy of our attention and which will constitute a threat to regional security are as follows:

1. Russia has now replaced the Soviet Union, becoming one of the major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Its foreign and domestic policies are still in the process of formation, with many uncertain factors. According to my tentative analysis, Russia's economic centre of gravity may gradually be shifted in the direction of the Asia-Pacific region, and its Far-East area would share an increasingly greater proportion of its national economic build-up. Therefore, its policy toward the Asia-Pacific region will be adjusted in accordance with, but not identical to, its global security policy. The general extent of these adjustments will be smaller than those in Europe. It will maintain its military presence and intensify political, economic, and diplomatic activities in the Asia-Pacific region. As Russia is facing a series of economic, political, ethnic, and social crises, it is very hard to predict its prospects.

2. Both the United States and Russia still maintain a large number of military forces, which actually exceed their defence needs, in the Asia-Pacific region. Although Russia has accepted Soviet obligations to shrink the size of its armed forces and to withdraw

troops from Europe, it still maintains a strong military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Here, its forces were reduced in number, but increased in quality. In particular, its naval and air forces deployed in the region are being modernized, and their combat capability is being enhanced. According to an analysis of people in international strategic circles, Russia is shifting its military forces and modern equipment from Europe to the Asia-Pacific region, and the focus of its naval deployment tends to be similarly shifted to the region. In addition, the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons by the four republics of the former Soviet Union has caused profound concerns among the Asia-Pacific countries. The United States has expressed its readiness to further cut its forces in the Asia-Pacific region, but is unwilling to change its forward deployment strategy or cut its naval forces. Among all disarmament agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, very few have touched on the Asia-Pacific region. As the Asia-Pacific region has become a focus of US-Russian military deployment, this region's security and stability will unavoidably be affected.

3.   Although military confrontation and armed conflicts in this region have found political settlements one after another, related struggles are still complicated and tangled. Through high-level dialogues, a series of agreements have been signed on the Korean Peninsula, and the tense situation there has obviously been relaxed. Still, since their time of political and military confrontation lasted too long, it is hard to build mutual confidence quickly or to achieve breakthroughs in their negotiations for peaceful unification within a short period. In May of last year, the Agreement on Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Kampuchean Conflict was signed in Paris. This symbolized the end of an era characterized by group confrontation in Southeast Asia, and the beginning of a new era of regional co-operation and competition. The political settlement of the Kampuchean issue will definitely exert positive and favourable influences on the political and economic development of Indo-China and Southeast Asia. However, as the Kampuchean Conflict lasted for as long as 13 years, the factions concerned have deep hatred for each other, and their contradictions are complicated and tangled. Moreover, on the issues of forming a government and disposing of their armed forces, different factions still have differences and frictions. The situation on the South Asian sub-continent is even more complicated than that in Indo-China and Southeast Asia and, for the time being, it is hard to reconcile the conflicts of their national strategic interests. With the general trend toward relaxation of the international situation in recent years, the country-to-country relationships in South Asia have witnessed certain improvements, but the basic contradictions remain and, in particular, the situation of heavy military confrontation between India and Pakistan has not been substantially changed. Likewise, the Afghan issue has not been completely solved following the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

4.   In the Asia-Pacific region, while territorial resources and border disputes are complicated, and ethnic and religious contradictions are acute, the possibility of a new regional conflict cannot be excluded. Most Asia-Pacific countries broke away from imperialist and colonial rule, and started to develop after World War II. However, the territorial and border disputes left over from imperialist and colonial rule have always been influencing security and stability in the region. This, combined with ethnic and religious contradictions, have often resulted in regional conflicts, and the political situation of some countries has frequently become turbulent. Presently, with economic development, the contentions for sea resources are becoming increasingly pronounced. The sovereignty of some islands was originally clear, but then conflicts emerged as

sovereignty claims over these islands were raised by several countries. Certain countries even sent troops to occupy islands and hidden rocks belonging to other countries. Since this situation is still developing, it could lead to a regional conflict, and damage the security and stability of the entire region if not handled properly.

5.   After the Gulf War, quite a few countries accelerated their pace of arms expansion and, in some countries, the growth of military spending exceeded 10 and even 20 per cent. There are a variety of motives for arms expansion: some for the purpose strengthening their defence and preventing foreign aggression; some for the purpose of pursuing a policy of regional hegemony; and some for the purpose of enhancing military strength, corresponding to its economic strength, in order to achieve the status of a world political and military power. If their military strength is over-developed without any restraint, it will definitely have a negative impact on regional security and stability, irrespective of their motives for arms expansion.

Since these complicated and tangled security problems exist in this region, the conditions for building mutual confidence and security measures, applicable to the entire region, do not appear very ripe, and it is difficult to meet the specific demands of various areas. The security and confidence-building measures of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were applicable to Europe, which had a heavy military confrontation between two blocks. However, in the Asia-Pacific region where territories are very vast, areas are widely separated, and contradictions are very complicated and different from each other, these measures are not necessarily applicable. Presently, I think that multilateral and/or bilateral arrangements should be made according to the distinct situations of different areas. Further, this should coincide with the establishment of confidence-and-security-building measures of general significance and, particularly, with the creation of norms guiding country-to-country relations so as to eliminate unstable factors which affect security. These are of great necessity for the improvement of the regional security environment.

I believe that the elimination of various unstable factors that affect regional security can be advanced if Asian-Pacific countries could jointly adopt the following rules and regulations, and consider them as security goals:

- To establish among the countries a new regional political and economic order on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference into each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence;

- To solve country-to-country disputes, especially disputes on territorial land, waters, and resources, through negotiations and peaceful means;

- Not to endeavour to force one country's values and ideologies upon other countries, and not to use these issues as an excuse for interfering in other country's affairs;

- To prevent nuclear proliferation. All countries have the right to establish nuclear-free zones or zones of peace. Also, nuclear powers should respect the status of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace and guarantee to not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against them;

- To eliminate military bases, arms, and equipment, deployed in another country's territory, and to withdraw troops from foreign countries - no country should send its military forces abroad;

- All arms and equipment which are cut by arms reduction efforts in other regions of the world should not be shifted to the Asia-Pacific region, so as to avoid creating new unstable factors in this region;

- All countries should guarantee that their military strategies and forces structures are purely defensive, and their military build-up and spending should not exceed the level of their defence needs;
- As the two biggest military powers, the United States and Russia should shoulder special responsibilities for security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. They should also take the lead by reducing their offensive forces, their naval forces in particular, and in reducing the number and size of their military exercises in this region.

Chapter 2

The Role and Policies of the Great Powers in the Asia-Pacific Region

Bilveer Singh

Introduction

Since 1945, at no time has the world witnessed such momentous changes as those that have transpired since 1989. The most rapid and significant developments took place in Europe. Although there were indications of the coming of such changes, since March 1985, the speed with which they occurred served to underscore their dramatic impact. The collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the ricocheting consequences of the political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union, the drift toward the fragmentation of the USSR as evident by the upsurge of ethnic unrest and secessionist movements culminating in the disintegration of the Soviet Union, were clear indications that the communist order in Europe was in deep crisis. The collapse of communist regimes led to the emergence of the post-communist order in Europe, with all its attendant consequences for Europe and the world at large. An important consequence of these changes, especially in Eastern Europe, was the constitutional emasculation of East Germany through German unification.

These changes inaugurated the collapse of the Cold War and its attendant political-strategic order. The "political warming" of Europe had a direct impact on the Asia-Pacific region, especially with regard to the contentious relationships. The warming Sino-Soviet relations, following their summit in May 1989, the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations, the improvement in Sino-Taiwanese and Sino-Indian relations, and the rapidly improving relations between North and South Korea and between ASEAN and Indochina, were important dividends of the "global warming". In Southeast Asia, the breakthrough in the Cambodian impasse, at least in its external dimensions, was symbolic of the emerging post-Cold War order in the region. The restoration of Sino-Indonesian diplomatic ties and the establishment of Sino-Singapore, Sino-Brunei, and Soviet-Brunei ties, further reinforced the new order that was emerging in the region.

The speed of transformation and metamorphosis in the thawing of the difficult relations of the past, reflected the intense outbreak of peace in the region. Notwithstanding this general trend, a counter-development was witnessed in the ascendancy of regional and local conflicts. The Gulf War is a good example. In Southeast Asia, the rise of territorial disputes is further evidence of this new instability.

In view of these torrentous developments, what are the roles and policies of the Great Powers with regard to the Asia-Pacific region? All the Great Powers, namely the United States, the Soviet Union and its successor state, Russia, China, Japan, and even India, have great interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and it would be useful to plot the future political and strategic order in the region, by examining the policies of these regional mammoths.

Super Powers' Competition and the Cold War Legacy

To a large extent, the political texture and the attendant strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific region has been determined by the changing relationships among the Super Powers. Since 1945, the Cold War rivalries, as the were global in nature, conditioned the order in the Asia-Pacific region. The

Korean and Vietnam Wars, as well as the establishment of SEATO and ANZUS, were clear examples of "containment effects" in the Asia-Pacific region.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States were the two leading and contending powers, that had a predominant influence on the world's balance of power. Their adversarial ties in the Asia-Pacific region mirrored their larger global rivalry, of which the strategic focal point remained in Europe. Greater attention was, however, paid to the Asia-Pacific region. Gorbachev reversed the past Brezhnevite expansionist strategy by advancing a more flexible approach, involving a diminished willingness to show-off its military might, with a more adroit use of political, economic, and diplomatic instruments. Gorbachev's peace offensive was, in part, directed at rolling back the negative image of the Soviet Union that was earned in the 1970s.

Being dominant powers, the Soviet-American military competition posed a serious threat to the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. As in Europe, the Soviet Union always regarded the United States as its primary adversary, and the American military presence in the region as the main obstacle to its expansion and search for influence and power and, thereby, a direct threat to the Soviet Union itself. In this context, the American military presence and facilities in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Australia, became a primary focus of Soviet diplomacy aimed at denying and disrupting the United States' military arrangements with states in the region. As part of its general military build-up, Moscow undertook a massive expansion programme of its military capability in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1960s and 1970s. While there had been a steady increase in its military strength in the region since the Second World War, the Soviets main concern from 1945-1965 was to strengthen its power on their Western borders to counterbalance the power of NATO. By 1965, a strategic stalemate was established on the Western front.

Following this, a number of developments forced the Soviet Union to build-up its hitherto neglected "Eastern front" in the Asia-Pacific region. The American escalation of the war in Indochina was, in part, responsible for the growing Soviet orientation toward the region. The British decision to withdraw from the "east of Suez" only helped to increase the Soviet incentives to fill the growing power vacuum in the Indian Ocean. The single most important factor which caused the rapid expansion of Soviet military power was the escalation of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, climaxing in the border clashes of March and November 1969, followed by the Sino-American *rapprochement*. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Brezhnev's doctrine of "limited sovereignty", simply helped to sour relations between China and the Soviet Union. These developments led to a sudden upsurge of Soviet military power in the Asian territories of the Soviet Union, with its ground forces increasing from 210,000 to 410,000, and the arm divisions increasing from 25 to 40, over the decade from 1965 to 1975. The number of combat aircrafts also grew by 35 per cent. The Pacific Fleet expanded by 10 per cent, with modern ballistic submarines distending from 10 to 30. This phase of military expansion took on greater significance in light of the American defeat, and subsequent disengagement, from Indochina in 1975. This, however, did not lead to a halt in the growth of Soviet military power in the region. If anything, Brezhnev accelerated the phase of military expansion, making the Soviet Union a full-fledged military power in the Asia-Pacific by 1978.

Reacting to the perceived growing weakness of the United States, to the increasing political, economic, diplomatic, and military links, between the United States, Japan, and China, and to the growing problems in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in Southeast Asia and Central Asia, the Soviet Union launched six forward movements: the militarization of two of the four Japan-claimed Northern Territories; the rapid modernization, expansion, and forward deployment, of the Pacific Fleet; the alliance with Vietnam, and the acquisition of base facilities in Cam Ranh Bay; the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan; the strengthening of India, through massive armament transfers, and the strengthening of military ties with North Korea, through the provision of modern,

sophisticated, weapons systems. These developments were primarily responsible for the emergence of a broad consensus in the region that the Soviet Union was a "threat" to the security of countries in the region. In other words, the growing military power of the Soviet Union accounted for the perception that it represented a direct threat to the security interests of states in the region. To that degree, Soviet military build-up was counterproductive, as it was not allowed to be translated into political influence in the region.

In view of these developments, the United States was given a new lease on life in the region, allowing her to take counter-measures to maintain a sufficiently credible, power-projecting force in the region. President Reagan set aside the ideas, floated by the Carter Administration, that American troops in South Korea and elsewhere in the region would be withdrawn. Instead, Reagan ordered the strengthening of its military power, with the Seventh Fleet being reinforced, bringing its strength to over 250 warships, more than 2,000 aircrafts, including 6 aircraft carriers and 51 submarines. Even though the United States had fewer vessels in the region than the Soviet Union, it did, however, enjoy firepower and technology superiority. The United States also enjoyed the security co-operation of allies, and friends in the region.

An important consequence of this was the growing willingness of Japan to play a bigger military role in the Asia-Pacific region. The primary strategic goal of the United States was to consolidate the defence line from Japan-South Korea, to the Philippines and Australia. In a way, a semblance of balance of power in the military arena was in place, with the United States enjoying an edge in air and naval superiority. Politically, of greater significance was the ability of the United States to revive the "Soviet threat" in the region. This led to the emergence of a loose "anti-Soviet coalition" in the Asia-Pacific region, in effect, encircling the Soviet Union. While a lack of leadership in the Kremlin from 1982 to early 1985 prevented the emergence of a proper response, all this changed with the coming into power of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985. From then on, it became fashionable to describe the evolving strategic rivalry in new terms. It was argued that a new era was surfacing in world politics, especially in the relations between the two Super Powers. If the Cold War was the era which dominated world politics from 1945 to 1985, then the "Warm War" was said to have begun in 1985. Many have used this to "periodise" the phases of Cold War and Post-Cold War.

George Kenan, in his *The Sources of Soviet Conduct*, argued that the United States:

> Must confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.

This led to the implementation of the "containment" policy, where Kenan was convinced that

> no mystical, messianic movement, particularly that of the Kremlin, can face frustrations indefinitely without adjusting itself in one way or another to the logic of that state of affairs.

These frustrations became more evident in the last years of Brezhnev, with declining economic growth, social malaise, and slowing technological achievements. More important, Gorbachev realised that Brezhnev's foreign policy of relying excessively on military power was counterproductive and fundamentally flawed. The result was, instead of intimidating the West, Soviet missile deployment brought a US and NATO counter-deployment, and a revival of Western high defence spending. Instead of eliciting concessions, the Soviet military build-up in the Asia-Pacific region increased tensions with China, Japan, and the ASEAN states, and provoked increased defence co-operation between the United States and most of these countries. Instead of accomplishing a speedy victory in Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion precipitated a long, costly, and

inconclusive struggle; in effect Moscow's own "Vietnam". Most important of all, the military power of the Soviet Union failed to improve the standard of living of the Soviet people, failed to win friends, and failed to gain her the recognition she wanted. Due to the systemic crisis, change had to come, and this came with Gorbachev.

Change, and the need for reform and "new thinking", were not confined to the Soviet Union alone. In many ways, it infected both the Super Powers. The United States had to come to terms with the growing centrality of economics and "geoeconomics", the rise of new trade and investment patterns, new dynamos of growth, the problems of its "twin deficits", and the sanctioning of the rise of democratization the world over. Many new global trends ensured that both the Soviet Union and the United States had to think anew about their foreign policies, especially *vis-à-vis* the Asia-Pacific. These trends included:

- The bipolar world of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, being sharply eroded by growing changes in the world's balance of power;
- Growing dispersal of scientific and economic power;
- Growing trends toward interdependence and integration in the world;
- Rapid transformation of the state's character, and the new challenges posed to the state as a political-economic-military entity;
- Emergence of a global culture;
- Emergence of political participation and the rise of political decentralization;
- Growth of democratization that shocked the fabric of many societies;
- Success of the free market and private initiative systems;
- Emerging technologies which opened new frontiers for growth, while at the same time spreading insecurity when used in weapon systems;

It was, however, the colossal changes that took place in the Soviet Union that shook the world order. The "second Russian revolution" was more deep-rooted than being merely the result of Gorbachevism. It stemmed from the fear that the Soviet system was becoming outdated, and would be unable to deliver basic goods and shoulder the burden of Super Powerhood. Imperial overreach and internal over-rot forced the new power elites to change, or face imminent collapse. Gorbachev's assumption of power signalled the initiation of a policy of reversing the declining power of the Soviet Union in the Asia-Pacific, with the aim of changing the "correlation of forces" in favour of the Kremlin. Internally, Gorbachev cracked down on crime and corruption, urged greater political democratization, and initiated economic reforms designed to modernise and revitalise the Soviet economy and its technological bases. The object was to release the creative forces of society, for development and progress. To create an external environment congenial for domestic reforms, Gorbachev sought greater peace on its border, and adopted fence-mending policies with Western Europe, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Japan, and, most important of all, the United States. The aim was to reverse the past containment policies of the West by engaging the Soviet Union in political and economic dialogues, as well as in arms control negotiations. In many ways, Gorbachev was quite successful at achieving this, even though, in the final analysis, the changes introduced by Gorbachev were so fundamental that they swept away both Gorbachev and the Soviet Union itself, in December 1991. The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of Russia as the new Great Power in the Asia-Pacific region, even though its preoccupation with internal problems is expected to constrain her external relations.

Asia-Pacific: Security Environment and Shifting Power Balance

Given the fluidity of regional affairs, the strategic order is still evolving. Recent developments, such as the diminishing American presence, the chaotic situation in Russia and the CIS, and the debate over the role of Japan, have shaken security concerns into an indecipherable new arrangement. At the same time, it should be noted that while developments at the global level will result in changes in the security dynamics of a region, the situation of the region should also be appreciated for its own specifics and variants. In the Third World, for instance, Super Power relations alone are insufficient to transform the security predicament, as some sources of conflict may be related to the continuing process of modernization, or to historical rivalries between states.

The end of the Cold War has had different effects in various regions. In the Asia-Pacific, conflicts that ensued in the aftermath of the Cold War are becoming more regionalised in the current context of external disengagement. The US has begun scaling back its forces in the region. By the end of 1992, the Pentagon will have cut back about 10-12 per cent of its troops in the region. The Russians are also expected to curb their naval presence in the Asia-Pacific region, by 1995. Although concern has been expressed over the continuing modernization of Russian forces in the Far East, the Russian threat is considered to be diminishing.

The increasingly warm relations between the US and Russia have affected the security environment in the Asia-Pacific. The attempt to adjust to the changing strategic landscape has resulted in the easing of regional tensions, due to the warming of relations between nations within the region. Relations between Russia and China have been normalised. The normalization of Sino-Vietnamese ties in November 1991 has improved the prospects of permanently solving the Cambodian quagmire. The exchange of unification proposals between North and South Korea offers hope that a breakthrough may be achieved. In Southeast Asia, with the impending resolution of the Cambodian problem, ASEAN-Indochina relations are expected to improve dramatically.

The shifting power balance has also affected the security environment in another way. The easing of regional tensions has not dispelled the rise of new concerns in the region. Uncertainty about American commitment to Asian security has been created by America's pull-back and its growing lack of concern over questions of Asian security. This is especially true as there is no elaborate security network to handle the strain in Asia. Part of the US's solution to this problem has been to call upon Japan to move beyond its chequebook diplomacy, and to play a more active role in the region. However, to countries in the region, Japan is part of the problem because of the fear that Japanese economic and diplomatic assertiveness could become military arrogance. The fear that China and India may fill the emerging power vacuum has done little to alleviate the uncertainty of the situation in the region.

Notwithstanding the improvement in the atmospherics of relations in the region, an atmosphere of suspicion and caution still prevails in the region. This is due to the existence of potential new flashpoints in the region, such as clashes over territorial disputes. As the level of US and Russian engagement recedes, traditional rivalries between countries will resurface with new vigour. As such, the passing of the Cold War could create new tensions as countries seek to adjust to the changing security environment in the region. Thus, it would appear that the Asia-Pacific region is a region in search of peace and stability.

In response to the end of the Cold War and the shift in the power balance, several trends have emerged in the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region. An analysis of these trends is necessary to ascertain the future direction of the Great Powers' role in the security dynamics of this region.

From Bipolarity to Multipolarity

An overextension of the responsibilities and domestic commitments of both the US and Russia has contributed to the erosion of bipolarity. Concomitant with the decline of bipolarity, is the emergence of new power centres in Asia and Europe. In the Asia-Pacific, Japan is an obvious candidate for regional leadership. Its economic might can be easily converted, such that Tokyo could play a more active diplomatic role in Asia. As long as Japan does not revert back to militarist tendencies, its role in aiding in the search for a regional order will be welcomed.

Another major power that will have an impact on the security matrix in the region is China. Its attempts at modernization will ensure that it has a stake in a stable regional environment. Although China can play a stabilising role in the region, the upgrading of its maritime capabilities is vexatious. Likewise, India may influence regional developments, as the Indian naval build-up, designed to project its power beyond the Indian Ocean, is related to its proximity to one of the traditional choke points of its maritime trade - the Malacca Straits. Indonesia, being a natural leader in Southeast Asia, will also play a role in shaping the regional order.

With the introduction of more players in the Asia-Pacific region, an element of unpredictability has been introduced into the security matrix of the region. While the shift to multipolarity may open new opportunities for co-operation, it may also unleash destabilising forces.

Shift from Geopolitics to Geoeconomics

It is believed that trade wars, rather than armed conflicts, may be the real threats to the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990s. Economic power may become more important, and less costly to pursue, than military solutions. As economic groups like ASEAN and the EC grow stronger, a security dimension will be inevitable. In these geoeconomics, nations will try to ensure influence through capital flows, rather than through troop deployments.

The US's Alliance Dilemmas

The US's alliance dilemma concerns the level of American military force projections and basing arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region. To maintain a visible presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the US will have to depend on certain host countries. This can be seen, by outlining US engagements in the Pacific, as a "fan spread wide", with the US-Japan alliance as its central support, and spokes linking it to South Korea, ASEAN, and Australia. The US has also tried to persuade Japan to take on wider global responsibilities as a form of burden-sharing. However, economic strains in their relationship have to be addressed first.

Rather than creating a multilateral security framework in the Asia-Pacific, the US has been content to maintain bilateral defence pacts with Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the Philippines. Since the longevity of basing rights in the Philippines has been terminated, the US will rely on access to military facilities in countries like Singapore. Thus, the alliance dilemma, and the need to maintain a visible presence, rather than the past Soviet threat, are the most pressing challenges for US security policies in Asia. In many ways, the security environment in the region will be contingent on this outcome.

Force Modernization

In the Asia-Pacific region, there has been an ongoing process of modernization and expansion of Asian military power. The most obvious reason for this is that the Asia-Pacific security environment

is in a state of flux, as the bipolar world has been replaced by multipolarity. As such, countries are planning for the future on the basis of the worst case scenario. Certain, less-than-benign developments, have spurred this process, like the nuclear programme of North Korea, the territorial disputes among the ASEAN states, and the conflicting claims to the islands in the South China Sea.

The modernization of armed forces in the Asia-Pacific region is also related to the declining credibility and reliability of the Western strategic umbrella in the region, and to the emergence of new security concerns, like the need to protect maritime exclusive, economic zones. Countries are increasingly taking it on themselves to provide for their own security. This trend is potentially destabilising, as it could result in an arms race in the region.

Potential for Regional Disorder

It would be erroneous to assume that the end of the Cold War will result in regional peace in the Asia-Pacific region. Military conflicts could still flare up, even though it is likely that these would be regional and local in nature. Several potential hotbeds of tension remain in the region, and these need addressing. The outcome of the situation in the post-Soviet Union, CIS, must also be closely watched. There have been repeated warnings of inter-state conflicts between the former republics of the Soviet Union, as well as the possible return of hard-line governments, which would not ameliorate the security environment in the region. This is particularly true if one considers the continuing modernization of Russian forces in the Far East. While the Russians still have the capability for power projection, political goodwill and domestic preoccupation has, for the moment, hindered such a possibility. The reduced military presence of the Russians in the Asian Pacific can also be understood within the context of *peredyshka* (breathing space), and the attempt to eliminate American predominance in the region.

In view of these trends, what is the role of the Great Powers toward the Asia-Pacific region?

Withering Russian Military Presence in the Asia-Pacific?

Following the August 1991 coup attempt, the cracking Soviet edifice finally fragmented as a political entity. Developments since the coup attempt indicate that the newly independent republics will be allowed to maintain their own national guard, totalling about half a million personnel, which could come under central command in times of war. The centralised forces will include all nuclear forces, with the armed forces being reduced to about 2 to 2.5 million personnel. The present leadership is also considering withdrawal from all overseas bases by 1995. However, the Russian republic's military power is something that cannot be dismissed, especially its Pacific Fleet.

The present foreign policy objectives of Yeltsin would appear to obtain the best bargain, from a position of relative weakness and of internal instability and uncertainty, in addition to obtaining the traditional goals of securing territorial security and seeking acceptance as a legitimate partner in regional affairs. Foreign policy is also directed at maintaining a stable and secure external environment, to facilitate internal development and rebuilding. The overall goal is to create a collective security system with a greatly reduced US alliance presence. The role of the Russian military in the Asia-Pacific, in times of change and uncertainty, is to maintain the territorial integrity of the homeland, in the face of political and military withdrawals from abroad, and prevailing internal instability. The threat of external intervention, though highly unlikely, remains the primary preoccupation of the military in such an uncertain climate. At the same time, the importance of maintaining a credible military infrastructure is still a priority for the present Russian leadership. Although experiencing financial crises, and promising to abide by disarmament treaty obligations and military personnel reductions, the military continues to acquire modern equipment

with disarmament often meaning nothing more than simply discarding obsolete equipment. Similarly, disarmament in the European sector often means nothing more than shifting equipment to the Asia-Pacific theatre. Similarly, the future status of the Russian Pacific Fleet will have a great impact on regional peace and stability. If it is placed in the hands of an ambitious leadership bent on expansionism, the region's balance of power will be greatly affected, especially in the era of Super Power devolution from the region, and the emergence of regional powers competing for influence in the region. However, if the Russian Pacific Fleet is used to maintain peace and stability, in co-operation with other friendly powers, the region's stability could be further enhanced.

Despite these concerns, the successor to the Soviet Union, especially Russia, will continue to have great interest in the Asia-Pacific region. With the demise of ideology as a strong force influencing foreign policy initiatives, Russia will become more conventional, guided by the dictates of realism and pragmatism. A credible military presence will continue to be maintained, at least to defend the homeland, if not to support its foreign policy initiatives. At the same time, other non-military foreign policy instruments will be used with greater prominence, even though this is an area where Russia, like its predecessor, suffers from deficiency.

The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region in the Post-Cold War Era

The national strategy of the US is to ensure its survival as a free and independent nation, with a health and growing economy, in a world free of threats to its interests. In the Asia-Pacific region, this global strategy was translated into the containment of the Soviet Union, in order to ensure that the strategic waterways and the region itself were not dominated by any single power. Economically, the US promoted free trade with unhindered access to markets and resources in the region. The US also advocated forward deployment, defence bilateralism, and military alliances.

The changing strategic environment has prompted a call for the reassessment of the US as the key player in the region. The strongest argument for scaling down, though not totallyy abandoning, US security commitments abroad, is that Communism is dead. With the collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the *raison d'être* for the deployment of US troops in the Asia-Pacific region is no longer justified. In view of the improving US-Soviet/Russia and US-China relations, the threat of this region being a theatre of competition for the Great Powers is believed to have diminished.

The "isolationists" also argue that, as a result of US-overstretch, it is draining itself through geopolitical entanglements. The US's decreased economic competitiveness, related to excessive budgetary and trade deficits and to high defence expenditures, is believed to have relegated or is relegating the US into a second-rate economic power. As a result of the US's benevolence, while the US is experiencing a decline, the economies in the Asia-Pacific region are believed to be booming.

The response of the Bush Administration to these views has been, in part, to scale down its military involvement abroad, especially in the Asia-Pacific. In February 1990, the US announced a 10 per cent reduction of its forces over the next three years. Twelve overseas installations were closed. The US Air Force was to withdraw from three of its five bases in South Korea, with a phased withdrawal of its 43,000 troops. The Mount Pinatubo eruption, which damaged Clark Air Base, and the failure to renegotiate the leasing of the Subic Naval Base, led to the US withdrawal from the Philippines. In an effort to reclaim the initiative on the domestic front, the Bush Administration announced an US $84 billion cut in defence spending to sponsor more domestic programmes. The above moves have generated fears of American disengagement from, and neglect of, the Asia-Pacific region.

In reaction, the "internationalists" argue that the most striking feature of the post-Cold War era is its unipolarity. This was best exemplified in the Gulf War, where the US took the lead in

spearheading the war against the Iraqis. The geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War, therefore, sees the US as the sole world power, with the rest of the world following its lead. The decline of the US economy is believed to have made it difficult for the US to sustain its unipolar pre-eminence. However, the poor state of the economy is attributed to domestic rather than external causes, and in order to revive its economy, the US cannot shed its role in world affairs. Foreign entanglements are necessary, because the US is a commercial, maritime, and trading nation, which needs an open and stable world environment in which to thrive. The fact that the Asia-Pacific region is economically vital, politically and strategically, makes it all the more important for the US to remain strongly etched and integrated into the region.

In the post-Cold War era, the US military presence is still regarded as relevant. Thus, the US should pragmatically reassess its role in the region in a way that is sensitive to developing Asian realities and to enduring American interests. The concern with Russia remains, especially its Pacific Fleet. The US's role as a deterrent continues to be relevant on the Korean Peninsula. The US-Japanese alliance remains crucial for Asia-Pacific stability. This can also be used to bridge the gaps between Japan and its neighbours, with the US checking against Japanese over-armament, thereby allaying the fear of Japan in the region. Also concerns with China and India remain, especially in Southeast Asia. The fact that the US is trusted as an honest broker, with no imperialist designs, makes the US an attractive partner, thus giving her a valued role in the Asia-Pacific region. So, while the inability of the US economy to shoulder the burden of being the world's policeman, and the collapse of Communism, have made it difficult to justify "Cold War forward deployments" in the Asia-Pacific region, the evolution of the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era continues to call for an American role in the region.

India as an Asia-Pacific Power?

India is the natural leader in the South Asian region. It is the largest country in the region in terms of size, population, GNP, and industrial production. Possessing the world's fourth largest armed forces, its "peaceful explosion" of a nuclear device in 1974 earned her a partial membership in the nuclear club. Compared to her neighbours, India also possesses the most sophisticated armaments in the region.

The most worrisome and tangible evidence of increasing Indian military might has been its naval build-up. The acquisition of long-range aircrafts, a second aircraft carrier, and a nuclear-powered submarine (later returned to the Soviet Union), propelled India to the rank of one of the prominent sea-borne powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Other than this, India is also one of the Third World's largest military-industrial-research complexes.

Since 1947, India has engaged in no less than four wars; three with Pakistan and one with China. The humiliating defeat in the 1962 border war with China had a serious impact on Indian defence policies. Indian decision-makers were imbued with the idea that a decisive Indian military strength was required to shield the country from external aggression. The *Enterprise* incident during the 1971 war also convinced Indian leaders that efforts should be made to build a modernised navy so as not to repeat the flagrant display of US hegemony in the region. Hence, the Indian naval build-up. Pakistan's alignment with the US and China, and Islamabad's military build-up also prodded India's defence build-up.

That India is a Super Power in South Asia cannot be questioned. However, there are doubts as to whether India will be able to make an impact in the wider context of the Asia-Pacific region. This stems mainly from India's internal fragility and her economic weakness. Despite this, concerns have been raised about India's role beyond the South Asian theatre. In Southeast Asia, questions have been raised about the need for India to sanction the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

(ZOPFAN), before it can become a reality. Concern has also been raised about New Delhi's long range naval and air capability. ASEAN states, especially Indonesia, are apprehensive of India's growing power, partly because of their proximity to India and also because of Indonesia's traditional hostility toward extra-regional powers in the region. Australia is another country that has expressed concerns over the strategic implications of the growing Indian presence in the region.

However, as long as India is saddled with mounting domestic crises, it is questionable if India can continue to project its military power as far as the outer reaches of the Asia-Pacific region. There is a difference between harbouring such ambitions, and possessing the actual power to realise one's objectives. Even if India ignores its domestic problems and concentrates on the competition to fill the perceived power vacuum left by the Super Powers, it is, at best, a one-legged regional power. The tragedy of the Soviet debacle and, to a certain extent, that of the US, should be a lesson to emerging powers that aspire to project their influence far beyond their immediate territory.

China and the Asia-Pacific Region: The Dragon's Awakening?

With the power structure at best in a flux in the region, China is increasingly viewed as one of the likely contenders for regional power, by virtue of its size and geographical proximity to region. China's link with the Asia-Pacific, especially to Southeast Asia, is a long-standing one. The end of the Cold War will not see many changes in the objectives of China with regard to Southeast Asia. Its strategic goals include the removal of Soviet (in the past) and Russian influences in the region. The zealous attempt to break out of the Soviet encirclement in the Asia-Pacific region had preoccupied the Chinese mind throughout the "East-East" Cold War since the mid-1950s. The Sino-Soviet *rapprochement* in the mid-1980s did not signal the end of this ambiguous relationship. The collapse of Communism worldwide makes China all the more wary of the CIS and Russia. China also does not want to see the dominance of any one power in Indochina, especially if it is not capable of attaining this dominance.

In terms of political objectives, China wants to be the leader nation in the region. It is anxious to be perceived by the ASEAN states as a friendly and reliable ally, rather than an alien leviathan that is out to subvert the political stability attained by countries in the region. In short, Beijing wants to eliminate the "China threat syndrome" in the region, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia.

Beijing's economic goals are understandable. It needs the resource and technology-rich region of the Asia-Pacific to assist China's modernization. Beijing is also aware of the growing economic importance of the region, as seen in the impressive economic growth chalked up by many countries of the region.

However, it is her military that has caused grave concern among the regional states. Her naval arsenal includes missile-armed frigates and *Luda* destroyers that are armed with surface-to-surface missile launchers. China's naval expansion has been in line with China's doctrine of "naval self-defence at sea", which envisages a more active role in the region and the acquisition of a position to deal with any regional military contingency.

China's influence in Southeast Asia increased as a result of the Soviet and Vietnamese threats in the late 1970s, with Beijing being viewed as an effective counter to Moscow's and Hanoi's regional ambitions. The development of the Sino-Thai "axis" was good evidence of this.

At the same time, the fear of China did not dissipate, and this was clearly evident with China's policy toward the dispute in the South China Sea. China's forcible occupation of the Paracels, and its resort to force in March 1988, to dislodge Vietnamese forces from some islets in the Spratly chain, augmented the fear of China's ability and capability to play the role of a hegemonic power in the region. China's passing of a law in February 1992, to claim the disputed territory in the

South China Sea is not going to win her friends in Southeast Asia, especially in those countries that have been competing such claims, like Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei.

While these concerns are restricted to Southeast Asia, on the whole, the Chinese threat seems more imminent than that posed by the Indians. No matter how greatly it desires a status equal to that of the Super Powers, China is an "unsatisfied" power in some important aspects. At best, it can only qualify as a Middle Power. This is so, when one considers the degree of success of the People's Republic of China's modernization effort, which in turn affects the political stability of the Chinese political system. One also has to consider the degree of acceptance by the various states in the Asia-Pacific region of the emergence of Chinese military power.

As is the case with the Indians, the Chinese have been experiencing enormous difficulties at home. The economic opening of the country has brought about increased agitation for similar openings in the political sphere. This was epitomised by the June 4 incident in 1989, which led to a subsequent straining of relations between China and the West. The embargo on sensitive technology had a noticeable effect on China's modernization programmes.

Another important limitation on the consolidation of Chinese military power rests upon the fact that ASEAN countries are suspicious of Chinese intentions. The Chinese are suspected, as a result of historical, geographical, political, and cultural reasons, of maligned intentions in the region. Of equal significance is the ideological inclination of China *vis-à-vis* the ASEAN states. China's adherence to Communism can be seen in its denunciations of the path taken by the USSR. China claimed that the breakup of the USSR was due entirely to Gorbachev's deviations from Communist ideology, with Gorbachev described as a traitor to the Socialist course. Thus, while the post-Soviet Union Republics veered away from Communism, China reaffirmed its commitments to Communism by renewing ties with the remaining Asian Communist countries, such as North Korea and Vietnam.

Japan and the Asia-Pacific Region: Fearing the Juggernaut

The definition of Japan's role in the Asia-Pacific region is a recurrent topic in regional politics. Japan's self-imposed role as an economic giant and a political-military dwarf is a point of contention in both regional and international politics. With a change in the geopolitical landscape of the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era, there is renewed pressure on Japan to clearly define its position.

For Japan, the Asia-Pacific region is important for three reasons. First, Japan is geographically situated in Northeast Asia, and shares close cultural affinity with many regional states. Secondly, Japan has a poor resource base. The Asia-Pacific region is a key supplier of strategic resources for the sustenance of the Japanese economy. The Asia-Pacific region, in particular, South Korea, Taiwan, and the rapidly developing ASEAN region, is also a promising market for Japanese goods and investments. Additionally, the security of strategic sea lanes of communication in the Asia-Pacific region is a crucial consideration for Japan. It is in the interests of Japan to ensure the free passage of these straits and waterways, as the transportation of resources and trade via these routes is critical for economic survival. Thirdly, the Asia-Pacific region is still characterised, though to a lesser extent, by political turmoil and high-armed stand-offs. An abrupt change in the region can seriously affect Japan's economic life. As the peace and stability of Japan is tied to the continued stability and prosperity of the region, developments in the Asia-Pacific region have great consequences for Tokyo.

The primary goal of Japanese policy in the Asia-Pacific region is to ensure the comprehensive security of the Japanese peninsula. This includes the military, economic, political, and cultural dimensions of security. As Japan's defence policy is essentially minimal, it adopts the necessary posture to keep the US committed to its security and to that of the region at large. An objective

linked to Japanese security is the promotion of growth and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. This is carried out as part of its economic and political strategy in dealing with states in Northeast and Southeast Asia.

The central tenet of Asia-Pacific security is the US-Japan military alliance. This alliance acts as a built-in stabiliser for peace and democracy in East Asia. As part of the Cold War containment policy in Asia, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, revised in 1960, allowed for the setting up of US bases in Japan for forward deployment purposes. This arrangement allowed some 50,000 US troops to be stationed in Japan, and served as a protector of security and stability for Japan and other US interests in the region.

In the post-Cold War era, as the US reached a strategic consensus with the other major powers, Japan, by virtue of its relations with the US, was therefore expected to follow suit. However, Tokyo still continues to believe that the Cold War, or its consequences, are still present in the region. Besides the military tensions on the Korean Peninsula, the instability in the post-Soviet Union, CIS, has had grave ramifications for Japanese security. Territorial disputes over the Kuriles with Russia, as well as the continued modernization of the Russian Pacific Fleet, are major concerns for security-planners in Tokyo. Tensions remain in Chinese-Japanese relations, just as in Korean-Japanese ties. In view of this, the Japanese have not rushed to welcome the peace dividend in the region.

Under these circumstances, the US-Japan alliance is extremely useful. On the Japanese front, it impedes Japan from assuming an autonomous military posture that will destabilise the Asia-Pacific region. A unilateral arms build-up by Japan may trigger parallel responses from North Korea, South Korea, the People's Republic of China, and Southeast Asia. Such trends of arms build-ups in the region would also be damaging for Japan's security. Thus, the US-Japanese security alliance ensures Japan's security, and assures Japan's neighbours against the remilitarization of Tokyo.

In the post-Cold War era, however, the US is overextended in military terms, and less powerful in economic terms. It appears that the US is also less certain about its long-term strategy, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, when confronted by a new international and regional milieu. As such, there has been a re-examination of US forward deployment and operational readiness, with greater emphasis on burden-sharing. In the light of US military cutbacks, and considering Japan's economic position, attempts have been made by the US to encourage Japan to shift away from dependency, and to bear part of the security burden managed by the US. As the stability of the Asia-Pacific region is very much dependent on a continuing American military presence, Japan can work toward the retention of the American presence, in both fiscal and phsical terms. Japan's greatest contribution to regional security is her economic strength. To this end, Japan can offset payments to compensate US military commitments.

Despite economic and political problems, the US-Japanese alliance and the structural complementarity of both countries' strategic interests, remains relevant and fundamental. The US-Japanese alliance will continue to be beneficial to both countries, and to the Asia-Pacific region at large, for diplomatic and geostrategic reasons. This will be premised on the understanding of shared goals between the US, Japan, and other countries in the region. In the middle range, Japan's regional environment will be defined by economic and diplomatic interests, rather than by their military. Japan seeks a more vigorous political role in the Asia-Pacific through political dialogues, and plans to boost ties with the ASEAN countries through economic means. With the downgrading of US military commitments in the Asia-Pacific region, the indigenous states in the region may need to resolve any dispute or crisis by themselves. In this regard, Japan can play an important political role. Due to Japan's economic position, she cannot adopt a role that is significantly too far

from her capabilities. Instead, Japan can use her political influence to facilitate the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts.

With the end of Super Power rivalry and the attainment of a strategic consensus, the security environment in the Asia-Pacific seems less volatile and economically more conducive. The rapid growth of Asian economies, and signs of an emerging Asia-Pacific community, offer a strong rationale for continued US security interests in the region. Thus, Japan has an important role to keep the American presence in the region. At the same time, the Asia-Pacific region of the 1990s will be characterised by insecurity and instability, caused by indiscriminate military build-up. Therefore, the emergence of an economically strong Japan has implications for the region. This is made more critical at a time of strategic retrenchment on the part of the US. With uncertainties surrounding regional military, political, and economic configurations, Japan is in a strong position to fill the leading role. The incessant calls for Japan to assume a greater role and burden in defence may lead to renewed regional fears if Japan rearms itself. In addition, Japan's economic dominance in the region will be strongly resisted and criticised. With her strong economic position, a vigorous political voice, and even military strengthening, are things that cannot be wished away. Given the numerous domestic and regional considerations, it is arduous for Japan to desist from undertaking military expansion in the region. Instead, Japan could make a significant diplomatic contribution by promoting cultural exchanges and fostering deeper mutual understanding in the region.

In the final analysis, Japan is likely to retain a non-interventionist security policy while keeping its armed neutralist option viable. Also, it has to contribute to the retention of the American regional presence, by increasing funding for US forces in Japan and in the region. At the conventional security level, Japan has to enhance its capacity and management of sea lanes of communication from the Sea of Japan to the Pacific. The redefinition of Japan's security role should not pose a military threat to its Asian neighbours, or undermine the stability and balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the US-Japan Cold War alliance should continue to be the main forum for collective security co-operation in the region. The US will continue to assume the leading role in organising and undertaking military actions, while Japan's security enhancement plans will need to develop within a multilateral framework, involving the US and the concerned parties in Asia. Politically, Japan's position will allow her to play an increasingly important role in the region. Besides supporting the initiatives of regional states, Japan can broker the political settlement of various issues that are crucial to the security and stability of the region. In the economic sphere, Japan will continue to dominate the exchanges in the region. It can contribute to the vitality of the region by pledging its support for indigenous economic initiatives, through trade and investments, and through the strategic use of its ODA.

Withering Great Powers in the Asia-Pacific Region?

Unlike the European theatre, the Asia-Pacific region has been characterised by the presence of a plethora of strong and weak states that view each other with fear, animosity, suspicion, and hostility. The Asia-Pacific region has also been witness to "hot wars", in Korea from 1950 to 1953, and in American involvement in Vietnam. Such traditional hostilities have withstood the duration of Super Power rivalry. Despite the end of the Cold War, the "peace dividend" has not materialised in too tangible a form in the Asia-Pacific region. Instead, the contrary may be true; the lack of a compass to guide the region could enhance the risks for countries, with the prospect of a "peace penalty" becoming increasingly real from uncontrolled rivalry and conflict.

With the scaling down of Super Power involvement in the region, like the US withdrawal from Subic and Clark, and the possible Russian withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay, regional powers are seen to be getting ready to pursue a more autonomous and independent course of action from Super

Power control. Economic considerations have tended to take second place during the ideological confrontation. In the new environment, military capabilities have tended to be less important than what was once perceived. The yet to be defined new international order will, however, be marked more prominently by the competition of capital flows rather than flows of weapons, even though some observers have argued that an arms race is in vogue in the region. The end of the ideological competition means that, while economic issues will assume increasing prominence on the world stage, the danger of trade wars cannot be discounted if the countries in the world failed to come to an understanding and compromise under the GATT arrangements.

Next, with the resolution of the Cambodian Conflict, and with the changing regional and international environment, ASEAN needs to find new points of reference. At the same time, the emergence of potential conflicts could enhance instability in the region, such as the claims on maritime boundaries, the issue of the sea lanes, the overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones, and the territorial claims on the Spratlys in the South China Sea. From the above developments, it can be seen that countries in the region stand at the threshold of a new era, but with commensurate costs, if existing problems are allowed to become armed conflicts in a multipolar world.

The end of the Cold War has resulted in some far reaching changes for the countries in the region and in their changing security perceptions. Japan has emerged as the dominant economic power in the Asia-Pacific region, although it has yet to assume a military-security role in Southeast Asia due to the constitutional constraints and public aversion to past militaristic tendencies. Countries in the region have greeted the American concept of burden-sharing, with increased Japanese participation like the patrolling of the 1,000 nautical mile radius of sea lanes, with anxiety, due to past Japanese brutalities in the Second World War, the ambivalent attitude concerning their war time atrocities, and the lack of full apology. The recent arms build-up, to deal with a possible US disengagement from the Pacific, and the prospects of a reduced but modernised Russian naval presence in the region, have been causes of concern for Japan. The increasingly acrimonious relationship with the US over economic matters, and the prospect of trade wars becoming even more ominous, have led Japan to expand on its arms build-up, to ensure that its sea lanes of communication, and access to overseas markets, natural resources, and commodities, are protected. As a result, anxiety over its arms spending, which is currently the third largest in the world, has resulted in a resurgent fear of Japan's future role. So far, the Japanese have viewed international commitments with caution, and they have chosen to thread carefully in the region's attempt for a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian situation, and in the assumption of a more prominent role in the supervision of Peace Keeping Operations, testaments to the increased security and economic interests in the region.

The role of China has also contributed to the uneasiness in the region. Freed from the constraints imposed by the Super Powers, China has worked hard on cultivating and enhancing its ties with the region. These include the halting of material support for local insurgents. China remains a giant in the region, due to its geographic location, population, and its latent economic potential. Under the Four Modernizations, the military has received the least attention, as focus has been more on economic development. In the military realm, there has also been a doctrinal shift from "people's war" to "people's war under modern conditions", with the emphasis on modernity. It would be pertinent to note that in 1990, military spending increased by more than 12 per cent, in real terms. Although his is not indicative of the likelihood of overt expressions of militaristic tendencies, China's naval expansion can no longer be disregarded in regional defence-planners' assessments. In addition, China has embarked on an exceptional naval expansion programme to turn its navy into a blue water force, and embarked on military operations to uphold its claims in its immediate vicinity. Also, China has assured countries in the region of their commitments to the resolution of the Spratly problem in a peaceful manner. However, traditional suspicions in the

region remain over the ethnic, overseas Chinese community, although it is highly unlikely that China will adopt an aggressive stance in the region. More recently, visits by high-ranking Chinese officials were undertaken to reassure the region of China's continued well-being and stability, to restore overseas investors' confidence. The only threat to such a sanguine assessment would be the possibility of internal instability spilling into the region.

The other power that has increased its interests in the region is India, which is already a regional hegemony in South Asia. In recent years, Indian expansion has taken the form of boosting its naval capability from a coastal to a blue-water navy that could project power far from its shores. It has acquired conventional submarines, frigates, destroyers, and aircraft carriers, as part of its defence expansion. Her military operations in Maldives and Sri Lanka, in 1988 and 1989 respectively, projected India as the arbiter of the region. Although the current strength of the Indian Navy indicates an inability for it to project a long term sustained presence, due to a lack of political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific, the Indian presence and expansion have been on the minds of defence-planners. With the end of the Cold War, the prospects for a *rapprochement* with China, its traditional enemy, cannot be discounted, and the fear of two regional hegemonies working in tandem to carve out areas of influence could cause further uneasiness in the strategic landscape.

However, it is the future of the US's role in the region that is causing the greatest concern. Most countries in the Asia-Pacific favour a continued American presence. The fear that a total US withdrawal would lead to instability in the region. Despite the present scaling down, the US's role in the region can be expected to continue for some time. Economically, the Asia-Pacific region is a dynamic region, and it remains as the largest trading partner with more than US $300 billion a year in two-way, trans-Pacific trade. With the opening of countries like China and Indochina, there will be new opportunities for trade expansion. The US could lead the process of building a Pacific Economic Community through the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation.

The US also has a security role to perform. The US force structure, though it could be reduced to reflect the changing geopolitical climate, continues to be relevant. Its presence will prevent the emergence of a power vacuum which could destabilise the region, if a scramble to fill it takes place. The American presence could also accord legitimacy to Japan's increased political and diplomatic role in the region, as countries in the region would be more suspicious if this role is undertaken outside the US-Japanese security alliance system. While the American attitude seems to be that "if it ain't broken, don't fix it", they should also realise that failure to guide the shaping of the regional order in the Asia-Pacific could have detrimental effects, both for the US and for the countries in the region.

Chapter 3

Weapons Proliferation in a Disarming World

Jasjit Singh

We are now passing through a paradoxical era: the dangers of global war have receded, but the risks of regional inter - and intra-state conflicts has increased; major arms reductions have been initiated by the great powers, but the proliferation of weapons has, in fact, acquired an enhanced impetus; cut backs in military force levels and budgets are compensated by increased capabilities based on superior technologies; and world attention is focused on major weapons, although a dramatic proliferation of small arms poses a grave threat not only to the state, but also to society in the modern international system. The complex, inter-related and, in some cases, inter-active issues of peace, security, and disarmament, in Asia and the Pacific, need to be viewed at three levels - *global*, *continental* (the true "regional"), and the *local* (that is, contiguous) levels. While there is a strong linkage between these levels, one can also discern the specific and even special elements and attributes of different levels. Most of the perceptions, positions, and actions of states are shaped by the distinctive character of the issues at each of the three levels and their coupling with each other. The heterogeneity of Asia and the Pacific region adds to the complexity of the issues and approaches to the problems.

The end of the Cold War and the accompanying arms reductions have provided new opportunities for disarmament and establishing durable security at the global, continental, and local levels. At the same time, new challenges have emerged. Proliferation of nuclear weapons has taken place in the most unpredictable manner, consequent to the rapid transformation of the Soviet Union into fifteen independent sovereign states. US President George Bush had identified "uncertainty and unpredictability" as the threats of the future. It needs to be remembered that "uncertainty and unpredictability" are much greater sources of threat for countries other than the US, which has the world's most powerful base to deal with such threats. There is also the tragic paradox that while East-West tensions have relaxed, thereby enabling tentative disarmament measures to be initiated, proliferation of weapons has continued in Asia. Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold, uncertainty about Soviet nuclear weapons increased tremendously, while Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, are reported to have been moving towards nuclear weapon capabilities. Proliferation has also taken place in the area of missiles, both ballistic and cruise varieties. Recent years have also witnessed proliferation of a kind that has unfortunately attracted little attention thus far - small arms proliferation.

Nuclear Proliferation

In the overall context, nuclear weapons have proliferated vertically, horizontally, and spatially, essentially in the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states - the US, (former) USSR, People's Republic of China, the UK, and France. However, during the last quarter century, no state has been officially accepted as a new nuclear weapon state. All the same, "horizontal" nuclear proliferation has taken place in the following categories and countries:

1. Defacto-nuclear weapon states:
   - Kazakhstan
   - Ukraine

- Byelorussia
- Uncertain number of other states of erstwhile USSR

2. Crypto-nuclear weapon states:
   - Israel
   - South Africa
   - Pakistan

3. Threshold States:
   - India
   - Argentine
   - Brazil

4. States hosting nuclear weapons deployment for use by their territory/military systems;
   - South Korea
   - Germany

It may thus be said that at least three nuclear weapon states (US, Russia, Peoples Republic of China), out of five acknowledged ones, more than one defacto weapon state, and seven nuclear-capable states (out of eleven), are in Asia. While there is a great concentration of nuclear weapons in Europe and North America, as a result of nuclear proliferation among the nuclear weapon states, Asia denotes a critical dimension of nuclear proliferation and threat.

The only use of nuclear weapons occurred in Asia. While the use of nuclear weapons would unleash a holocaust, the real utility of nuclear weapons has been in the domain of political coercion, compellance, and hegemony. There is an implicit threat held in the very possession of nuclear weapons. Still, there have been as many as 45 identifiable incidents, when the threat of nuclear weapons was held more explicitly through different forms of signalling (see Appendix 1 for details). It is significant that 31 (out of 45) such incidents related to developments in Asia and the Pacific. The trend toward reduction of nuclear arsenals in Europe and North America, especially in an East-West framework, has had a very marginal, positive impact on the situation in Asia, which has been more than offset by the negative trend. For example, the INF Treaty (1987) removed Soviet intermediate range missiles from Asia. At about the same time, Pakistan crossed the nuclear threshold. The rapid proliferation in Asia, due to the disintegration of the USSR, has created many uncertainties.

The primary focus of US (and Western) attention and concern is with strategic weapons. Yet, for countries in Asia and Pacific, all the 27,000 loose and perhaps unaccounted weapons are a cause for serious concern. The nuclear weapon production facilities of USSR were located primarily in its Asian region. Now, a large number of them are in Kazakhstan and other republics. Given the political and economic problems of the erstwhile USSR, grave uncertainties regarding nuclear proliferation and its future course remain.

Non-proliferation regimes like the NPT, Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, or the MTCR (for delivery systems), have failed to achieve their stated objectives because of the cynical disregard with which the great powers have violated and circumvented them in letter and spirit. The scale of proliferation by the five nuclear weapon states during the NPT regime may be gauged from Figure 3.1. (See Figure 3.1). What is more important is that these measures, especially the NPT, *legitimise* nuclear weapons, even if only in a few countries. The legitimisation is reinforced by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. It was not intended to go into the merits and/or validity of the doctrine. However, it needs to be recognised that the doctrine - especially its "success" in having maintained

Figure 3.1
NPT and Non-Proliferation

peace in Europe after World War II - provides a powerful conceptual base and incentive for nuclear proliferation. The Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff has argued that:

> since we cannot disinvent nuclear weapons, nor for the time being offer an effective defence, it is axiomatic that we must keep our strategic deterrent modernised and ready.

It needs to be recalled that India took the initiative in the United Nations in 1964 to place the item "Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" on the agenda of the United Nations. In 1965, India along with seven other nations, submitted a joint memorandum toward achieving a solution to the problem of non-proliferation. The memorandum called for the negotiation of an international treaty based on, among other things, the following principles:

- The treaty should be void of any loopholes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear powers to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form;
- The treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of nuclear and non-nuclear powers;
- The treaty should be a step toward the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament.

These principles constituted the basis of Resolution 2028 (XX), adopted on 19 November 1965, by the United Nations General Assembly with an overwhelming majority which included the United Kingdom, the US, and the Soviet Union. The NPT, in its present form, thus violated the letter and spirit of the UN General Assembly's direction. It was inevitable, then, that India would refuse to accede to it. All of the eleven points on which India's stand was constructed in 1968, stand validated 24 years later. The more serious problem with the present NPT is that it legitimises nuclear weapons, which operates against non-proliferation objectives.

Arms Reductions

The end of the Cold War and the accompanying changes in the international political-security architecture have made it possible for the first tier states (the US and USSR) to finalise major arms control agreements like the START and CFE treaties. After the August coup attempt in Moscow, President George Bush announced a unilateral offer of cutbacks in US nuclear weapons, and President Gorbachev more than matched the offer. On the face of it, these should provide a strong incentive against proliferation. However, while these steps are welcome, they have come too late, and represent a minor contribution to disarmament, while generating many new concerns.

Against the original commitment to a 50 per cent reduction, *START represents a reduction of strategic warheads by 14.38 per cent to be effected by 1999*. This implies a *5.96 per cent reduction* in the total inventory of nuclear warheads held by the US and (the former) USSR. On the other hand, START will actually permit (as indeed the SALT treaties before it did) the *build-up* of overall levels of strategic nuclear delivery forces. This will be substantive in the areas of air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), with the (former) USSR authorised to build-up SLCMs from *zero* base to the START limit of 880.

The treaty places a limit of 1,600 SNDVs on either side. These include deployed ICBMs and SLBMs (with associated launchers), and heavy bombers with nuclear weapon delivery roles. Over and above these 1,600 SNDVs, each side would be permitted additional strategic nuclear delivery systems as follows:

1. Deployable:
   • Sea-launched Cruise Missiles: 880

2. Non Deployable:
   • Mobile ICBMs launchers: 110;
   • SLBMs on submarines under overhaul: 72;
   • Test launchers at test ranges: 45;
   • Test heavy bombers: 20.

It may be noted that the non-deployable category of delivery systems are currently included in the inventories of SNDVs of the two powers. As shown in the 1991 SIPRI Yearbook, the number of strategic nuclear delivery systems of the US and USSR in January 1991 were 2,243 and 2,354 respectively. Against these holdings, START would permit them a total of 2,727 SNDVs each (see Figure 3.2). In effect, START implies a 21.58 per cent *increase* for the US, and a 15.84 per cent *increase* for the USSR. That is an overall *increase of 18.6 per cent in the permissible levels of strategic nuclear delivery systems*. As may be seen, the reduction is coming only with respect to Soviet heavy ICBMs and SLBMs. Soviet heavy ICBMs had been perceived as highly destabilising, especially since the new, accurate ones, carry 10 warheads each. In a pure ICBM exchange, the USSR theoretically held a substantive 2.56 : 1 superiority, although the US offset this by its strategy of reliance on the nuclear triad of land, air, and sea-based strategic forces. It is not surprising therefore, that START is being projected as an arms reduction treaty which achieves significant "cuts in establishing weapons."

Figure 3.2
Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles

© Jasjit Singh

Most of the attention has been focused on the levels of nuclear warheads and, in this regard, START does imply overall reductions. These are not, however, at the level agreed upon during the 1983 Geneva Summit (for 50 per cent reduction), or the 30 per cent figure established when the Treaty was finally signed. The actual reductions by 1999 are, instead, likely to be around 14.38 per cent (see Figure 3.3).

Figure 3.3
Strategic Nuclear Warheads

Force Levels-1991

Total Warheads
12,081

SLCMs	367
ALCMs	1,600
Bombs & SRAMs	2,608
SLBMs	5,056
ICBMs	2,450

Total Warheads
10,741

ALCMs	720
Bombs & SRAMs	616
SLBMs	2,810
ICBMs	6,595

USA   Soviet Union

Force Levels-1999

Total Warheads
10,971

SLCMs	880
ALCMs	1,900
Bombs & SRAMs	2,736
SLBMs on Subs in Overhaul	576
SLBMs	3,456
ICBMs	1,423

Total Warheads
8,568

SLCMs	880
ALCMs	1,300
Bombs & SRAMs	960
SLBMs	528
SLBMs	1,672
ICBMs	3,228

USA   Soviet Union

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Holdings higher than the START limits are being accomplished through three methods:

1. An ingenuous "counting" system for "accountable" warheads, especially on aircraft carrying air-launched cruise missiles;
2. By exempting SLCMs from the main treaty, although those with ranges in excess of 600 km would be limited to 880 for each side under a separate agreement;
3. By excluding SLBM warheads on submarines in overhaul from START limits.

A most ingenuous "counting" system has been worked out. START places an upper limit of 6,000 nuclear warheads for either side, but the actual figures authorised would be nearly 10,971 for the US, and 8,568 for the (former) USSR. Each ballistic missile warhead would count against START's 6,000 weapon ceiling. Yet bombers, not armed with ALCMs (air-launched cruise missiles) would count as only one weapon, regardless of how many weapons they actually carried. Bombers are loaded in a variety of ways, depending on the mission. The USAF's B-1B strategic bomber normally carries up to 16 weapons (SRAMs and B83/B61 bombs). The B-52 can carry a mix of 8

to 24 weapons, while the F-111 normally carries 6 weapons. The latest Soviet bomber, the Blackjack, can carry up to 14 weapons, while the TU-142 Bear H carries 8 weapons.

The counting system for ALCMs also permits a much higher number of nuclear warheads to be deployed, compared with the START limit. For the purpose of counting against the START warhead limit, each current and future US heavy bomber, equipped for nuclear-armed ALCMs (of more than 600 km range), will count as 10 warheads, but may actually be equipped for up to 20 ALCMs. Each current and future Soviet heavy bomber, equipped with ALCMs, will count as 8 warheads, but may actually be equipped to carry 16 ALCMs. The US may apply the above counting rule to 150 heavy bombers, and the (former) USSR to 180 heavy bombers.

President George Bush, on 27 September 1991, announced unilateral cuts in the US nuclear arsenal. This was followed by President Gorbachev's October 5 offer. Nevertheless, short range nuclear missiles and artillery shells lost their relevance and logic in Europe the day the Brandenberg Gate re-opened in Berlin nearly two years earlier. The proposed withdrawal and destruction of 3,050 tactical weapons by the US, therefore, is more a strategy shift in the face of an altered strategic-technological environment, than indicative of genuine disarmament. The fact that the safer and less capable tactical weapons (1,275 of them) are only to be withdrawn and stored, reinforces this view. Also, the emphasis inevitably shifts from European and Korean scenarios, to global potential application of "tactical" weapons, although in most contingencies their impact would be strategic. The nomenclature of "tactical", however, reduces some of the inhibitions in the possible use of nuclear weapons. The MX and SRAM projects are turning out to be too expensive, without reasonable assurance of performance or utility. The post-START initiatives would seek to keep a balance of 4,700 strategic warheads each, for the US and Russia. The US is unwilling to commit to reductions below that level, although President Yeltsin has proposed a limit of 2,500 warheads each. Even at the proposed limit of 4,700 warheads, the two powers would have over 15,300 strategic warheads between them, as long as the "counting" system of START is in force. This would amount to a 32.0 per cent reduction from the pre-START levels   still a long way from the 50 per cent reduction agreed upon at the height of the Cold War in 1983. It would thus appear that the Cold War was only a lesser factor in the acquisition and build-up of nuclear forces.

The nuclearisation of oceans contiguous to Asia will significantly decline, once nuclear weapons at sea are removed. The trend of START and the new unilateral proposals, however, is still toward an increased geographical spread of nuclear weapons, although the overall numbers would decrease. With over 55 per cent of the total number of strategic warheads on mobile platforms, the load on C31 (command, control and communications, and intelligence) and targeting will increase with the corresponding potential risks.

The new trend toward unilateral moves, as distinct from negotiated agreements, also side-steps the whole issue of verification. Instead, it stipulates that the (potential) adversary, in particular, and the international community in general, should accept the unilateral commitments of states. Two issues emerge here. The risks inherent in such a stipulation are more easily absorbed by states that have enough nuclear and other military power to provide the requisite "insurance". The second, is the very principle of accepting assurances rather than seeking verification, which not only undercuts a strong base for disarmament and arms control, but raises many other issues. Even in the past, states have insisted that assurances should be accepted in preference to inspection and verification processes, especially when the latter are sought to be applied in discriminatory ways - as for example, in the case of NPT. At the same time, it must be remembered that the present commitments visualise reductions by 1999. However, the former Soviet Union's capacity to reduce the quantum offered, within the time-frame visualised, has become highly debatable. Interim uncertainties only emphasise the danger posed by the irresponsible build-up of nuclear arsenals. Even at the end of currently committed arms reductions, the nuclear weapons holdings would be

enormous, and enough to destroy the world a number of times over. The limitations of arms control agreements do not, however, detract from their usefulness. In fact, in the absence of an effective non-proliferation regime, disarmament has become the premier vehicle for non-proliferation. This is why every step toward disarmament is welcome.

Unfortunately, the nuclear weapons reductions of the US and the (former) USSR have not generated a corresponding move toward reduction among the second tier states, of which one - the People's Republic of China - is the third major nuclear weapons state in Asia. Contrarily, these states are actively pursuing modernisation of their nuclear arsenals. It is true that China has now signed the NPT, but NPT has not been the instrumental vehicle for nuclear non-proliferation and/or nuclear arms control agreements. In fact, all such agreements have taken place outside the framework of NPT.

There also seems to be little pressure exerted by the international community on the second tier states to start up the path of arms reduction and disarmament. The bulk of China's nuclear arsenal consists of intermediate range and theatre battlefield weapons. These weapons have lost their rationality and legitimacy in the context of the post-START initiatives, and in the context of developments in the Russian nuclear posture. However, given the uncertainties imbedded in the increased nuclearisation of Asia, it is unlikely that China will forego its weapons without further significant changes in the US (and other nuclear weapons states) posture and nuclear strategy, especially toward Asia. Under the circumstances, it is debatable whether the third tier states would willingly give up their nuclear weapon options.

Crypto-Nuclear Weapons States in Asia

There are now two crypto-nuclear weapons states in Asia: Israel and Pakistan. Israel is believed to possess over 200 nuclear warheads, along with a credible delivery system of manned aircraft, and the Shavit, Jericho I, II, and IIB ballistic missiles (the latter with a range of over 2,000 km). Israel is not a party to the NPT, and virtually no pressure has been exerted (as against some other states) by the international community, on Israel, to sign the NPT. The US does not formally acknowledge Israeli nuclear weapon status, but the way President George Bush's proposals on arms control in the Middle East are formulated, it would appear that the US is seeking to retain, though "freeze", Israeli nuclear weapons capability, in return for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and of ballistic missiles from the Middle East.

It must be conceded that Israel has a genuine and rather unique security problem. Nuclear weapons, thus, constitute an important element in the security calculus of Israel. As long as durable peace and security is not established in the region, there is little prospect of nuclear disarmament by Israel.

Pakistan has achieved a nuclear weapon status through a dedicated clandestine programme. Its government is now on record as stating that it possesses at least one nuclear weapon. Besides the existing delivery systems, it has acquired surface to surface missiles from China. Pakistan's logic, of course, is substantively the logic of the US (and NATO), pursued in the context of the "massive conventional military threat" of the USSR in the decade after Hiroshima. It needs to be recalled that Pakistan embarked on its nuclear weapon programme in full earnest in January 1972, nearly sixteen months *before* the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion. Reports have persisted that China provided Pakistan with the nuclear weapon design (from its fourth nuclear test, with a 20 KT yield uranium device, detonated in 1966). Pakistan's political and military leadership, and the head of the nuclear programme, were claiming by early 1987 that Pakistan had achieved the capability to make nuclear weapons. General Zia-ul Haq acknowledged in 1988 that Pakistan's nuclear programme had a

military role. Pakistan's army chief, General Aslam Beg, acknowledged in 1989 that his country's nuclear programme was designed to provide a "meaningful deterrent" to India.

The US President, finding it increasingly difficult in recent years to certify Pakistan's non-nuclear credentials, was unable in 1990 to issue the certificate, required under the US non-proliferation laws, resulting in the suspension of US military and economic aid to Pakistan since 1 October 1990. Pakistan crossed a critical bench mark in March 1990, when it is believed to have operationalised its weapon(s) under the cover of heightened tensions and threats of war by its Prime Minister, after launching the proxy war in Kashmir. At the same time, it is difficult to believe that Iran, especially with its resurgent nationalism and perceived role in the world, the region, and in Islamic civilisation, would be comfortable with a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic of Pakistan on its borders, or accept the inevitable balance of power implications for any length of time. The uncertainties connected with the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union (especially in Central Asian region), especially after the nuclear proliferation resulting from the disintegration of the USSR, exacerbate strategic instability.

Undoubtedly, India has the potential and capability to acquire nuclear weapons. Over the years it has pursued what can now be interpreted as a dual-track policy: development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, so vital in an energy deficient country; and at the same time, keeping the option open to meet critical security concerns. Superimposed on this, has been India's quest for global nuclear disarmament. It must be noted that, fundamentally, a non-nuclear environment would best serve India's strategic and national interests. This, of course, is hypothetical. Still, a non-nuclear security environment would provide India with the advantage of its inherent superior potentialities, in relation to both China (with its finite limitations caused by logistics) and Pakistan (one-eighth the potential of India). However, a nuclear weapon environment leaves India little choice with respect to its security interests. Here, once again, the optimum choice would be to pursue the "open option" as a conscious strategy which is what India has been doing.

The situation in Southern Asia, thus, can be identified more as a post-proliferation stage rather than a non-proliferated state, and it highlights the proliferation and disarmament linkages. From the Indian point of view, nuclear asymmetry adverse to its national and security interests has intensified. There are two possible avenues for removing the adverse asymmetry:

1. Denuclearisation; or,
2. Acquisition of nuclear weapons by India and adoption of a strategy of minimum deterrence.

On 6 June 1991, Pakistan's Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, put forward a proposal for a five-nation (US, USSR, People's Republic of China, Pakistan, and India) dialogue to negotiate a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) for South Asia. Pakistan's earlier seven proposals, and the new formulation, essentially revolve around the denuclearisation option. It needs to be remembered that, of the seven earlier proposals, four were made in 1978-79 (after the reported Kissinger threat to "make a horrible example" of Z.A. Bhutto, and when martial law administrations were looking for legitimacy), and two others were made in 1987 all six when Pakistan came under pressure from the US concerning its nuclear weapon programme. Thus is the present case. The fallacies in the proposals are far too many. A South Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) proposal completely fails to address India's legitimate security concerns. The argument that Pakistan also would be denuclearised ignores the virtual impossibility of ensuring this at credible levels. It may be recalled that as early as October 1981, the IAEA had reported its inability to certify that diversion from the KANUPP reactor had not occurred. Another eighteen months elapsed before the IAEA could claim (March 1983) to safeguard the KANUPP reactor properly. This was the experience with an installation under safeguards. Kahuta, the main facility for its nuclear weapon

programme, and the two at Sihalla and Godra, have not even been under safeguards. Western strategic thought has maintained that it is not possible to "disinvent" nuclear weapons. The serious difficulties in trying to reach credible levels of denuclearisation in Iraq, in spite of the physical destruction to the nuclear installation during the Gulf War, followed up by (now) more than a year of highly intrusive inspection and verification processes under special UN-sanctioned provisions, only highlight the problems of denuclearising clandestine nuclear weapon programmes.

The US, Russia, and China, who have supported the idea of a South Asian NWFZ and a five-nation meeting to discuss this, have not been forthcoming in expressing how they propose to denuclearise South Asia. Serious problems of inspection and verification would leave enough nuclear weapon capability with Pakistan to pose a grave threat to India at any future date. No prudent defence planner can henceforth discount the possibility of some nuclear weapons in Pakistan, even if a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone was to be established in South Asia. Therefore, serious thought must be given to finding ways and means of speeding up global nuclear disarmament, and at the same time looking for disarmament and arms control measures in Asia and the Pacific.

Denuclearisation and Stability

In the larger context, nuclear disarmament is the only reliable and viable non-proliferation regime. In the international context, although some tentative steps toward nuclear disarmament have been initiated, the nuclear weapon states remain firmly committed to the philosophy and strategy of reliance on nuclear weapons. Arsenals and delivery systems are being persistently modernised. Strategic doctrines continue to rely on nuclear weapons and deterrence. Even the (former) USSR, and now Russia, which had been strongly advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century, appears to have veered around to the view favouring minimum deterrence. In spite of the end of the Cold War and the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the US and NATO continue to rely on nuclear weapons. Dual-capable systems, in fact, increase the ambiguity and political challenge.

India had proposed a comprehensive Action Plan for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the Third UN Special Session on Disarmament, in June 1988. The international community had cynically dismissed it out of hand, at that time. In reality, the rapid changes in the international geopolitical architecture have pushed the arms control process into initiating many of the steps visualized in the Plan, though bilaterally, by the US and the (former) USSR. The Action Plan deserves serious consideration as the basis of a credible and effective non-proliferation regime.

While we work for global disarmament, interim steps need to be considered to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, at least from Asia and its contiguous seas. The search for a regional (as distinguished from global) solution will need to meet two essential criteria: it must meet the legitimate security interests of all countries in the region; and secondly, it must form an integral interim element of the larger universal nuclear disarmament process.

It would appear that if a continental approach is adopted, and based on the principles and norms of disarmament already accepted (as in the INF Treaty), it may be possible to formulate workable solutions to the threat of nuclear weapons and proliferation in the region. In this context, a Zero Option for Asia offers the greatest potential for attaining the ultimate objective of global nuclear disarmament, and in the interim, for achieving substantive denuclearisation in Asia, while meeting the legitimate security concerns of all states, at least in Asia. The Zero Option for Asia would imply:

- Elimination of all medium to shorter range (5,500 to 500 km range) and battlefield (less than 500 km) range, land, sea, and air-launched nuclear weapons from;
- The continental land mass of Asia; and the Pacific and Indian Oceans up to a distance of 5,500 km from the Australasian land mass;
- Non-development and non-acquisition of nuclear weapons of the non-strategic variety by states in Asia and elsewhere, to be brought within the framework of multilateral negotiations, to progressively reduce such weapons with the aim toward their ultimate elimination;
- Pending the elimination of strategic weapons, states in possession of strategic weapons must give politically binding assurances that such weapons will not be used, or threatened to be used, against states which are parties to such a Zero Option   agreement;
- Multilateral verification and inspection mechanisms to ensure compliance with the non-deployment and non-development of nuclear weapons, by every state.

At the outset, it must be recognised that many difficulties will be encountered in reaching such an agreement. Many countries have objected to regional approaches to such issues. However, the Asian Zero Option is not a regional solution in the traditional sense. It is really a continental solution, as much as the INF Treaty was, with the additional advantage that, unlike the INF Treaty, it is a multilateral concept with great potential for applications in Africa, Latin America and, eventually, North America and Europe.

The fundamental strength of an Asian Zero Option lies in the fact that, unlike other multilateral and bilateral proposals (including the NPT and NWFZs), and short of universal and complete nuclear disarmament, it may be the only way in which the essential, legitimate, and credible security concerns of all countries can be adequately met, while moving toward the ultimate objective of global nuclear disarmament. Even at the sub-regional levels of South Asia, South-East Asia, South Pacific etc., it would meet the parameters of the concept and requirement of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones since it essentially links them to a continental whole. Adoption of an Asian Zero Option by the states concerned is perhaps the only option now available to reverse the proliferation incentives and pressures in Asia. At the same time, there is a need to institute specific measures to support and reinforce strategic stability. These would have to be constructed around confidence-building measures, in relation to both nuclear issues and conventional forces. Multilateral as well as bilateral steps could be advanced simultaneously. Some of the specific issues and proposals (and this is by no means meant to be exhaustive) which need to be put on the agenda include:

- Multilateral or bilateral agreements on the non-use of nuclear capabilities against each other in Asia;
- Convention signed by Asian states to ban the use, and threat of use, of nuclear weapons;
- Agreements banning nuclear testing in Asia and Pacific region;
- Agreements pertaining to non-attack on nuclear and chemical installations;
- Bringing about greater transparency in relation to military power in Asia and the Pacific;
- Agreements for offensive conventional forces reductions.

Missile Proliferation

There has been increasing concern about missile proliferation in recent years. Missiles (surface-to-surface and cruise) essentially constitute a long-range weapon delivery system, where technological momentum would keep improving the range, accuracy, and payload combination, thereby expanding

the role of missiles and the choice of warheads, ranging from nuclear to conventional. Historically, improvements in weapon range, accuracy, and payload have increased strategic (and tactical) instability, especially since incentives for preemption increase. Thus, missiles intrinsically enhance strategic instability. At the same time, the inevitable march of human progress also implies an inevitable "technology cascade" - both from the developed "North" and the developing "South". This technology cascade is vital to the South from a developmental aspect. Yet, missile proliferation is itself a phenomenon resulting from this cascading effect and the special attributes of missiles, of which the short flight time and assured penetration capabilities give them a particularly attractive strike role. The absence of a viable defence system necessitates reliance on deterrence strategy for defence. Attention also must be paid to cruise missiles, whose early varieties started proliferating in the 1970s.

Missile proliferation has achieved serious proportions in Asia and the Pacific. In part, this has happened as a compensatory process for the limitations of combat aircraft. However, the real incentives have also come from the successes in the employment of missiles in recent years - including the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the defence of Jalalabad (1989), and the Gulf War (1991). The psychological and political shock effects of missile attacks, especially on population concentrations, has enhanced the strategic importance of missiles. The likelihood of ballistic missile use in future conflicts appears high. Except for the US, Russia, China, India, and Israel, all other countries in Asia and the Pacific have acquired (or are acquiring) missiles through imports. In some cases, missile capabilities have been assimilated through technology transfer. The primary suppliers have been (the former) Soviet Union, China, and North Korea (which itself acquired said capability from the former two). Among these supplier states, China has played the leading role. In fact, it appears to have resorted to significant semantic jugglery to pursue the export of missiles and missile technologies in the face of Western pressures. The most important transfer of missiles, of course, was the sale of 120 intermediate range CSS-2 ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988. Of similar importance, is the transfer, in whole or in parts, of M-11 and M-9 missiles to Pakistan and Syria. Pakistan's 600 km Hatf III ballistic missile is believed to be the Chinese M-9 acquired as sub-assemblies. Missiles constitute one of the critical sources of insecurity and instability in this region.

The US and its allies have sought to meet the challenge of missile proliferation, predictably, through a "control" regime (the MTCR) reminiscent of the NPT. This approach suffers from six fundamental shortcomings:

1. The selectivity and discrimination, inherent in the control regime, makes it less attractive and acceptable;
2. It is not in a position to control proliferation based on indigenous efforts;
3. Substantive control leaks can continue to take place, because of the dual/multiple applications of technologies involved, and the high supplier-recipient incentives to exploit leakage potential;
4. The regime does not address (and in fact intensifies) missile asymmetry, and thereby enhances strategic instability;
5. Severe adverse effects on development activities because of technology denial to developing countries, as a result of the control regime; and
6. Like the NPT, the control regime *legitimizes* missiles, places no control on those already possessing them, and thus defeats its own non-proliferation objectives.

As deterrent strategy is the only credible response available against missile attacks, urgent steps are needed to circumscribe the role of missiles, which at the same time work toward missile disarmament. Almost all developing countries lack the technologically sophisticated targeting

capabilities at ranges which the missiles are capable of. The choice of targeting, therefore, would inevitably concentrate on population centres and other area targets, like industrial installations. The psychological shock effect of missile attacks on such targets raises the political impact of the missile attack disproportionately. The answer obviously lies in working for a universal or continental ban against missile attacks on cities and economic targets. This would significantly reduce the utility of ballistic missiles and, hence, the incentive to acquire them. Progress can be made in this direction by negotiating bilateral agreements on the non-use of missile attacks on population canters and economic-industrial complexes. The Indo-Pak mutual agreement involving non-attack on nuclear installations is a good example.

A more durable and effective solution to the dangers of missile proliferation can only come through disarmament. The INF Treaty holds the promise of the disarmament solution through its universalisation. At the same time, missiles with ranges from 30 km (range of artillery weapons), to 500 km (left out of INF Treaty), would need to be included. Strategic missiles with ranges in excess of 5,500 km would be normally employed as strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and could be considered part of the strategic arms reduction agreements. In essence, therefore, negotiations need to be initiated to conclude a Missile Abolishing Treaty (MAT), which would broadly include:

- Agreements on the non-use of missiles against population canters and economic-industrial complexes;
- Elimination of ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 30 km and 5,500 km for military purposes;
- Negotiations to reduce and, ultimately, eliminate all missiles;
- Multilateral inspection and verification mechanisms to ensure compliance.

Conventional Weapons

There are two aspects of conventional military weapons that deserve attention: the insecurity and uncertainty arising out of the veil of secrecy covering military power; and the small arms proliferation problem.

States inevitably guard information about their military power and capabilities. This, in itself, tends to increase the uncertainty and insecurity of other states. In fact, some states only provide the sketchiest details of their military posture. Details of military expenditures are not given, and in cases like China, raise serious questions. Similarly, assessments of arms acquisitions can be highly misleading, unless they are constructed on a reliable base. For example, India is believed to have imported arms worth US $16.989 billion from 1986 to 1990 (at 1985 constant prices), as per SIPRI calculations. Still, even a cursory glance at published budgetary data would show that the actual figure is likely to be closer to less than a quarter of this. This only emphasises the need for greater transparency in the military power of states. The action of the UN to ultimately establish a register of international arms transfers, to also include information on military holdings, procurement through national production, and relevant policies, is a seminal step in the right direction. It was unfortunate that 8 out of the 9 countries that abstained at the First Committee voting, where the resolution was supported by 106 states, were from Asia. Further, even in the final voting in the General Assembly, China did not participate. The decisions of the General Assembly are not binding on the members, but the agreement is still an important step on which to build greater transparency in the military postures and capabilities of states. States in Asia and the Pacific need to actively participate in this process. Other measures to increase transparency in the military power of states must be instituted.

Small Arms Proliferation

Small Arms Proliferation (SAP) has received very little attention in the international and national security calculus of states. The reality is that this form of weapons proliferation (true to the meaning of the acronym) has been insidiously undermining the security and stability of states. The impact of this ranges from violence in schools in the US, to civil wars across the globe. Progress in technology has made minor and small weapons highly accurate, lethal, portable, and usable, by a large variety of people. The Kalashnikov is symbolic of the sophistication, quality, and capability, of such weapons. Proliferation of such weapons has been taking place through governmental sales and transfers, while strong "black" and "grey" markets have been operating. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Myanmar, Angola, Central America, and many other states/regions, have received large quantities of minor weapons. Pakistan is now believed to have large holdings of sophisticated weapons, proliferated into the society at large.

The world is also witnessing the rise of ethnic and religious resurgence, with political activism superimposed on it. Many of the ideologies emerging out of this combination rely heavily on violence and armed militancy. Transnational support complicates the paradigm. At the same time, narcotics and terrorism have exacerbated the weapons, and ethnic and religion-based political activism have brought transnational criminal activity into the equation. SAP has received a strong impetus from narco-terrorism. This form of weapons proliferation is not easy to check and stop. However, the primary problem rests in the very limited international attention which has been focused on the subject. If SAP is not checked, it will continue to grow like a cancer.

Appendix-I: Incidents of Threat of Employment of Nuclear Forces

Date	Incident (Threatening State)
1946	Iran (US)
1946 November	US aircraft shot down by Yugoslavia (US)
1947 February	Inauguration of the President in Uruguay (US)
1948 January	Security of Berlin (US)
1948 April	Security of Berlin (US)
1948 June	Security of Berlin (US)
1950 July	Korean War: Security of Europe (US)
1950 November	Korean War: Entry of Chinese troops (US)
1953 April/May	Korean War: To compel Chinese acceptance of cease-fire (US)
1953 August	Security of Japan/South Korea (US)
1954 May	Guatemala accepts Soviet bloc support (US)
1954 July	Vietnam: Seige of Dien Bien Phu (US)
1954 August	China-Taiwan conflict: Tachen Islands (US)
1955	Quemoy (US)
1956 October	Suez Crisis (US)
1956 October	Suez Crisis: To compel withdrawal of British and French troops from Suez (USSR)
1957/58	In connection with the Berlin crisis (USSR)
1958 July	Political crisis in Lebanon (US)
1958 July	Political crisis in Jordan (US)
1958 July	China-Taiwan conflict: Quemoy and Matsu (US)
1959 May	Security of Berlin (US)
1961	Laos (US)
1961 June	Security of Berlin (US)
1961	Berlin crisis (USSR)
1962 September	Emplacement of missiles in Cuba (USSR)
1962 October	Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba (USSR)
1963 April	Withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey (US)
1963 April	Confirmation between Indonesia and Malaysia (UK)
1964	In connection with China's nuclear weapons programme (USSR)
1967 June	To compel the termination of Israel's offensive on the Golan Heights (USSR)
1968 January	Pueblo sized by North Korea (US)
1968	Vietnam: Seige of Khe Sanh (US)
1969	To compel termination of Chinese initiated incidents on the Sino-Soviet border (USSR)
1969-72	Vietnam War (US)
1971 December	Indo-Pak War 1971 (US)
1971 December	Bangladesh War (US)
1972	Vietnam Negotiations (US)
1973 October	Arab-Israeli War (US)
1973 October	In connection with the Middle East War (USSR)
1980	Security of Iran (US)
1982 May	The Falkland Islands War (UK)
1990 April	Kashmir Crisis (Pakistan)
1991 January	Gulf War (UK)
1991 January	Gulf War (US)
1992 February	Kashmir Crisis (Pakistan)

Chapter 4

Responses

First Response

Itaru Umezu

Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and the Role of Japan

The time is ripe to give serious consideration to how to ensure long-term stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In view of the vast differences in the geopolitical conditions and strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific region from those in Europe, the approaches to achieving stability in this region are considerably different from those in Europe. First of all, in sharp contrast to post-war Europe where the reduction of military tensions, including the threat of nuclear war, was the major preoccupation, the policy priorities of countries in the Asia-Pacific region are directed toward economic development, due to the fact that most countries in the region are developing countries.

Secondly, while in the European scene an East-West relationship in the form of bipolar confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization had been dominant, the Asia-Pacific region contains a variety of factors, including the presence of China, which do not fall into a clear-cut East-West dichotomy. Also, the international, political power relationship is multi-polar. In addition, the alliances are mostly bilateral, the conflict of interests among nations is complex, and their threat perceptions are diverse all of which make the overall security configuration extremely complex.

Thirdly, in contrast to Europe where border issues and other post-war problems had been settled before the process of CSCE was initiated, in the Asia-Pacific region there are still various unresolved disputes and conflicts, such as the North-South confrontation in the Korean Peninsula and the Northern Territorial issue between Japan and Russia.

Additionally, while there is a major trend toward unification in Europe, both politically and economically, led by the movement of EC integration, the Asia-Pacific region is pursuing economic interdependence based on political, social, and cultural diversity among nations and areas, and their differences in stages of economic development.

In view of these features that characterize the Asia-Pacific region, the processes and mechanisms that developed in Europe under the CSCE are not appropriate for securing stability in this region - or at least they are not realistic for the time being. What the Asia-Pacific region needs to do therefore, is to ensure its long-term stability by making the best use of the various arrangements and frameworks for international co-operation, and fora for dialogue, that already exist, in an integrated and multilayered manner.

Such an approach is possible mainly in three areas, i.e., economic co-operation, diplomatic efforts, and security. I would like to discuss what can be done in those three areas and the role that Japan can play therein.

First and foremost, in the area of economic co-operation, which is a most vital element in regional security, there are such fora as ASEAN, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), APEC, and PECC. Economic co-operation has been, and will continue to be, the main means by which Japan can contribute to the economic development of the region. Economic development is not only the primary concern of the countries in the region, but also the prerequisite for their political stability.

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In this connection, it is worth mentioning that the Japanese government announced in April 1991 new guidelines for ODA, and that Japan will pay attention to the implementation of ODA regarding the following points in the recipient countries:

1.   Trends in military expenditure;
2.   Trends in development, production, etc. of weapons of mass destruction, such as atomic weapons and missiles;
3.   Trends in the export and import of weapons; and
4.   Efforts for promoting democratization, the introduction of a market-oriented economy, and the status of basic human rights and freedom.

With the collapse of the Cold War structure, the countries of the world are now in the process of groping for a new international order, and the Japanese public has become increasingly interested in what the ideal form of Japanese assistance to the world will be. The changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as well as the Gulf Crisis, led the Japanese people to pay more attention to the importance of democratization and economic reforms, military expenditure in developing countries, and the necessity of further efforts on the part of the international community in the field of arms control and disarmament. It was in this context that active discussions took place in Japan as to how ODA, the mainstay of its foreign policy, should be used for those issues.

While Japan's stance of maintaining its basic principles of humanitarian considerations, and the recognition of interdependence in the international community, will remain unchanged, the above-mentioned four points will be considered guidelines for future ODA implementation. Obviously, arms control and disarmament are things that cannot be realized by Japan alone, or simply by means of economic assistance, but the new ODA guidelines should be interpreted as the expression of Japan's political will to enhance the international awareness of the problem, and to show the general direction in which Japan thinks the world as a whole should be moving.

In the field of economics, more generally, Japan should continue to contribute to the economic development of the Asia-Pacific region by further opening its markets and expanding its domestic demands, so that the countries of the region can increase their exports to Japan. This is the kind of role that the United States has been playing by offering its vast markets for exports from this region. Japan will not be able to replace the United States on this score, because of a sheer difference in the size of the respective economies, but certainly Japan should do its share by offering a larger market to the countries of the region.

The second area of regional co-operation for security relates to the frameworks that are now emerging from diplomatic efforts to solve conflicts and disputes in this region, including the approach taken by the UN and the countries concerned for a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian problem, and a framework for international co-operation centering on North-South dialogue on the Korean Peninsula. Through these processes, dialogue and co-operative relations could be strengthened on sub-regional bases, with a view to attaining long-term stability in areas such as Northeast and Southeast Asia, and Japan should stand ready to extend its helping hand in whatever way it can. In this regard, it is important that Japan be in a position to be able to co-operate in the Peace-Keeping Organization of the United Nations.

Thirdly, in the area of security there are a broad range of arrangements and networks for co-operation. There is a set of alliance relations that the United States maintains in the Asia-Pacific region. The network of co-operation is growing among ASEAN countries in the area of intelligence, training, and standardization of weapon systems. There exists the so-called Five Power Defence Agreement, involving Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and the UK. Also, there is the

arrangement for military co-operation between Russia and China. All of these arrangements and networks for security co-operation are forces for the stability of the region, especially in our rapidly changing times. Japan is part of these arrangements with the US-Japan alliance, which is by far the most important bilateral relationship in this region. It provides an indispensable basis for security assurances the US extends to many countries in the region. Further, more broadly, close policy co-ordination and co-operation between the US and Japan is essential for the economic development and political stability of the region. Japan contributes a great deal to the enhancement of American deterrence in the region, by means of defence co-operation between the two armed forces, a package of host-nation support amounting to US $3 billion per annum (about 40 per cent of the total cost needed for an American presence in Japan), and the transfer of military technology. Japanese support is essential for the American commitment to the defence of South Korea. Home-porting of an American aircraft carrier and other naval vessels in Japan, facilitates the American naval presence in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

If there is anything more to add to the mechanisms and frameworks for co-operation in the three areas of economic co-operation, diplomatic efforts, and security, it would be a variety of the processes for political dialogue, in which friendly countries in the region can get together and engage in frank exchanges of views on matters of mutual interest. ASEAN-PMC can certainly serve as one good example of such a forum, and there are many other fora, formal or otherwise, that would provide a useful process for political dialogue.

It is essential for Japan, as it sets out to play a larger political role in the region, commensurate with its economic strength, to make conscious efforts to get itself engaged in those fora or processes of political dialogue so that it can not only articulate its position and thinking, especially its commitment to the policy of not becoming a military power, but also so it can place itself in multilateral venues, where the countries of the region that are worried about the future direction of Japanese defence policy can express their concerns. This will be an important way in which Japan can be instrumental in increasing the sense of security and strengthening the political foundation of the mutually co-operative relations among the countries of the region.

Part II

Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: Developments and Prospects - North East Asian Perspectives

Chapter 5

New Russia and International Security in East Asia

V.S. Miasnikov

The 20th century is evidently a special phase in the world's historical evolution. Our complicated and divergent world is undergoing transition in its history. Two world wars and two revolutions of global importance, in Russia and in China, have driven mankind to the realization of new political values. Mankind is renovating and seeking new ideals, and people are developing a new world view. The new "global order" is supposed to channel this process into a well-designed and well-functioning system. The Community of Independent States that replaced the Soviet Union does not signify the mechanical transformation of the former federated state into an alliance of independent state units, performing as sovereign actors on the international stage, but rather it leads to a transformation of the entire structure of international relations. The global changes can be explained by the radical renovation of the geopolitical and geostrategical characteristics of all the participants in the aforementioned process. As far as Russia is concerned, the qualitatively new situation at its western (European) and southern (Black Sea-Caucasian and Central Asian) borders objectively will lead to a "shifting" of is interests toward the Asian-Pacific region.

The scientific and technological progress in the world has revealed new opportunities to mankind, while setting clear-cut limits for applying force as a political device. New trends are gaining momentum in international relations: arms reduction, banning of mass destruction weapons, economic integration, and the general humanization of the international political process. Being an active participant in the international community, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia supports and furthers efforts to strengthen and support these new trends that mark international development in the world.

Philosophers, historians, and political scientists, try to perceive regularities and specific features of the current transitional period to determine the most likely directions along which events could proceed in the global arena. They necessarily take into account such new factors of international relations as the end of the Cold War and the formation of a new type of Russian relations with the United States and the leading European powers. Still, one cannot ignore the fact that the process of disintegration in the former Soviet Union has not yet stopped. Actually, the diffusing separatism can lead to an unpredictable aftermath, and could cause further changes in the geopolitical and strategic situation. A noteworthy point is that geostrategical dimensions are changing not only for the CIS member-states, but also for their partners in the international community. Turkey, Iran, and other Islamic states, seem to be the first among those seeking to explore the space in the Caucuses and Central Asia, from where Russia is now supposed to be leaving. In the Asian-Pacific region, the vacuum of power is being filled by Japanese interests.

The key question that puzzles the minds of scholars and the hearts of the public is: which model of international relations will become domineering? This does not imply models like "Pax Americana" or "Pax Nipponica", though everybody agrees that the United States has remained the only Super Power on the globe, and Japan, with its growing economic power, has become the leader of scientific and technological progress in the world. Still, it can be easily seen that the models mentioned above are obsolete and can only remind us of "Pax Romana" or "Pax Britannica" imperial arrangements. So, the question is: will the world's inter-system contradictions remain, or will the world acquire a new, mutually integrated make-up? Or, which of these two models will prevail in the new structure of international relations? Evidently, at the current stage of

development, neither of the two existing socio-political systems has exhausted its potential. Proof seems to be found in the development of the People's Republic of China. Proceeding from its own plans of modernization in all the key aspects of the social and economic system, China is successfully integrating into the world economy and while contributing to the international division of labour.

Traditionally and retrospectively, the new "global order" was established after each clash among the major actors on the international stage. For example, after World War I the Versailles-Washington system was established. Similarly, the end of World War II was crowned by the establishment of the Yalta-Potsdam system. Today, a view is recognized which essentially suggests that the Cold War, the end of which was jubilantly welcomed by every continent, was a sort of World War III caused by contradictions between the two systems or the two camps on the global stage. Total, though rather specific methods were used in this war. Military confrontation took the form of an arms race. Local wars together with crisis and conflict situations were the main "battles" of the more than 40 year long Cold War. But, the ghost of the nuclear holocaust set limits that must not be surpassed. The expenditures for the Cold War actually exceeded the expenditures for the previous world wars. Secretary of State J. Baker confessed at congressional hearings that the US spent trillions of dollars toward a Cold War victory.

In this confrontation, special attention was paid to subversive activities against each other, and among the "other sides'" allies and spheres of influence. The strategy of such warfare was suggested by a prominent Chinese philosopher, Sunzi. He explained that:

> Among the rules of war, the best is to preserve the state of the adversary, and the second is to destroy his state. The best is to preserve the army of the adversary intact, and the second is to destroy it... Therefore the best war is to frustrate the plans of the adversary; the next is to destroy his alliances, and the following is to destroy his army... .

The Cold War, interpreted by some observers as an ideological confrontation executed psychological warfare means, was in reality a multifaceted phenomenon that involved the spheres of policy, economy, and ideology. Further, by the end of this war the opposing sides had strategic parity, and to go on sustaining that parity could lead to undesirable social, economic and political consequences.

These detrimental consequences have already been realized by at least one of the sides, having confirmed the old axiom - wars never end in a draw. The new "global order" must reflect the outcomes of this war, and transform them into a new system of international relations. On the international stage, each state performs in a certain environment. The system of international relations forms a structure for this environment. The transformation of the Soviet Union into a conglomerate of sovereign states possessing nuclear weapons; the new position of the US in an international scene where only one Super Power remains; the fact that together with its allies this Super Power takes the leading political and economic positions in the world - these all lead to both stabilization and disturbances of the environment, which thus will complicate the foreign political processes. The unification of Germany and the growth of comprehensive power in Japan, have not as yet had stabilizing effects. There are now many discussions about the fate of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal. From my point of view, the new "global order" is more dependent on the question: what should America's military posture be? The quick US victory in the Gulf War made it obvious that there are no other powers that can rival America's military might. As the "Los Angeles Times" reported:

One draft scenario under discussion in the Pentagon - and released prematurely to the press -proposes to maintain a defence establishment so big, costly and daunting that US foreign policy, backed by the might of the world's sole Super Power, wouldn't need to bother with allies, alliances, or even the United Nations. Washington could more or less do whatever it liked because no one would be able to stop it.[1]

The external political environment or, as the Chinese political scientists put it, the "architectonics of the world", is marked by the two most important factors of destabilisation. First, the global balance of forces is violated. Here, we don't mean simply the Russian-American parity of nuclear and conventional weapons. Instead, we mean the breakdown of the former system of international relations, where the developing Third World countries were a reserve of the Soviet Union. Further, at the same time the Soviet Union was also a reserve of political, economic, and military support for the Third World along the way to the development of dozens of sovereign states, represented today in the United Nations. It is the violation of that former balance that is a matter of considerable concern, because the division of the world by the watershed of the rich North and the poor South can become a dominant line of international relations for some time to come.

The second factor is the omniconcernful multiplication of foreign political interests in the political space that was previously mapped as the Soviet Union. Even if the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) will co-ordinate activities aimed at a certain objective and at the realization of common interests, its foreign political activity will be remarkably different from that of the former Union. The fact is that the logic of sovereignisation led the former Union's republics to the status of full-fledged actors in international relations, including their individual membership in the United Nations. And this also will influence the balance of forces and the balance of interests at the global level, making the international situation more much unpredictable.

It appears that the transitional period, not only with regard to the national scales but also at the global level, can be characterized by multidimensional economic and social structures. This, in turn, is seemingly compatible with the theory of a multipolar world which was actively elaborated by political scientists in China. However, the theory of a multipolar world is based on the notion of the comprehensive might of the state and was developed as a sort of response to the past global domination of the two Super Powers, i.e. the Soviet Union and the United States. But, proceeding from the experience of the 20th century, mankind is seeking to create the nonviolent and nuclear-free world. To reach this objective, it is necessary to replace the balance of forces with the balance of interests. In this context, the models of the bipolar or multipolar world, like the dictate of one power, would probably run counter to the trend of humanization in international relations. The multistructural nature of socio-economic forms in the world arena corresponds to the right of nations to chose the means of development and does not necessarily lead to antagonism and confrontation if the priority of universal human values is recognized by all the members of the global community.

It is obvious that these values form the interests common to all people. Also, it appears necessary to consider the problem of correlation between universal human interests and national interests, as well as the hierarchy of the national and state interests, and the main stages of the search for the balance of interests.[2] At present, the East Asian states are at the stage of optimization of interests. To a certain extent, this region lags behind Western Europe, where the development

[1]   Los Angeles Times, NewsFax, Moscow edition, 13 March 1992.
[2]   Miasnikov, V.S., " Balance of Interests in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Experience of Sino-Soviet Normalization". *The Transformation of the Asian-Pacific Region: Prospects for the 1990s*, Stanford, CA., 1991, pp. 21-29. Also, see, Miasnikov, V.S., "Problems of Optimization and Balance of Interests in the USSR-PRC-DPRK-ROK Relationship", *Sino-Soviet Affairs*, Vol. XV, No. 2, Summer 1991, The Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies of Hanyand University, Seoul, Korea, 1991, pp. 179-185.

of inter-state political and economic interests has reached the stage of establishing a balance of interests. The Europeans started this way in Helsinki, and the Asians, even earlier, in Bandung. The principles of the United Nations, the principles of peaceful co-existence, as well as the principles of Bandung-Helsinki and the Delhi Declaration, comprise a precious experience for all mankind that must be considered when building the new global order. So far, mankind is moving half-blindly toward such order.

The optimization of interests presupposes the active process of integration and convergence. The process of integration pertains first and foremost to the sphere of economic interests, and can take place between and among states within the same system, as well as between economic structures belonging to different establishments. In East Asia, several proposals have already been advanced concerning economic integration in the region. The idea of an economic community in East Asia, the projects for the economic zone in the Sea of Japan, and the so-called Tumenjiang project, are all macro-economic plans that attract the attention of Russia, which is willing to actively participate there while integrating its economy into Asian-Pacific economic structures. The model of the integrated structure of the "Larger China" is also quite interesting to Russia.

It must also be noted that the presently-planned integrated systems or sub-systems, include states belonging to different economic arrangements. Economic integration is based on the mutually beneficial division of international labour, resources, and energy-bearers. This would promote a general economic rise, and accelerate development in the countries taking part in the integration process. Besides, the integration of national interests would also be stimulated by regional interests, and the ever stronger desire to not lag behind the pace of development in other regions.

The convergence case seems far more complicated. First, convergence pertains to states belonging to different systems. The very idea of alleviating contradictions through convergence, i.e. by borrowing the best achievements from each system, meets both the universal human and the national interests. On the other hand, the correspondence to the interests of co-existence must not be violated by attempts to forcefully export even the best elements, however progressive they may seem, from one system to another. Any forceful intrusion will cause nothing but a painful reaction of alienation.

While seeking to create a new structure of international relations that would guarantee security for all the participants, we understand that, apart from its economic basis, the political principles for the new international order should also be clarified. Here, the most difficult task seems to be to combine the state's natural struggle for sovereignty and their right to national independence, with the functions of the superstate control as exercised by the UN in critical situations. As evidenced by recent experience, people are prepared to stand resolutely by the principle of non-interference in their domestic affairs. Further, theoretical thinking again resorts to the general principles of international relations as stipulated in the UN Charter, and the principles of peaceful coexistence born in Asia. Non-interference is one of the guarantees for stability and, consequently, security.

However, for East Asia the processes of convergence are not reduced only to interaction among states with different socio-economic systems. Taking into account the differences in formations, we cannot close our eyes to the specific features of East Asian civilization. These features, like those that existed hundreds of years ago, continue to have an impact on the relations between the states within the European system of values (Russia, the United States, and European countries) on the one hand, and China, Japan, Korea, and the countries of Indochina on the other hand, the latter's representing the immense world where Confucianism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Taoism and other religious and philosophical views still prevail. To consider the differences between civilizations would not simply be a tribute to tradition. The very relations between the states of East Asia and their European (in the broad sense of the term) partners are a form of contact between civilizations.

Therefore, the processes of convergence pertain not only to the inter-system relations, but also to relations between civilizations. The principles and values of any given civilization can be much more stable than those of a system - at least, numerous social cataclysms did not deprive the East Asian and other civilizations of their basic distinctions and qualities. At the same time, one should not overlook the fact that the modern achievements in the fields of science and technology are such that they are forming a universal civilization common to all mankind. The contribution of individual civilizational complexes to this common civilization must not be underestimated. The countries of East Asia, that develop on the basis of the synthesis of their own traditions and the most advanced achievements of mankind in the fields of science and technology, are making amazing break-throughs in their transition to a new stage of civilizational evolution.

However, their successful economic performance does not automatically lead to the equally swift change of ethno-cultural stereotypes, which form the political culture in East Asian societies. This aspect is particularly important for understanding the complexity of inter-civilizational convergence. A good example of how substantial the differences are between the ethno-cultural stereotypes of East Asian and European societies is seen in their attitudes toward democratic institutions, the rights of the individual, and the latter's role in society. Another example can be found in the vertical system of international contacts which have been is existence for millennia.

Russia is the only historically-formed bridge between the European and Asian (East Asian) ethno-cultural complexes. Thus, Russia is able to accumulate the achievements of other civilizations, and thereby has already become a sort of independent "inter-civilizational civilization". On the other hand, in the course of its history Russia has proven that it is capable of not only borrowing, but also of sharing the achievements of its own moral and material culture. This is likely to be fully manifested at the next stage of co-operation between Russia and East Asian states, including co-operation in mutual security matters.

Apart from theoretical understanding, the problem of international security requires a consideration of the concrete historical conditions. According to Dr. Tian Zhongging, it would take from 10 to 20 years for the Asian-Pacific region to make the transition from the Yalta system to a new structure of international relations. The Shanghai scholar noted that, by 1991 the (former) USSR had tangibly reduced its armed forces in the region by 200 thousand troops, which included 12 divisions, 11 air-squadrons, 16 ship pendants in the Pacific Ocean (9 big surface-ships and 7 submarines), and 430 missiles including SS-20s. Also, all airborne and naval forces were withdrawn from the Camran Bay. The Chinese expert views the measures taken by the United States and its allies as efforts that would not stand to comparison with Russian reduction programmes.[3]

One might dispute the views of Tian Zhongging, or have a different approach to the growing military power of Japan and the latter's strive for becoming a global political force, but one would hardly refute the fact that the militarist trends in the region are, so far, the main obstacle on the road to optimization of interests in the Asian-Pacific countries.

By itself, the high level of militarization in the Northwestern Pacific reduces the extent of confidence in the inter-state relations in the region. The absence of military blocs, however paradoxically, also hampers the optimization of interests in this area of the world. In Europe military power was organized within the framework of the two groups, NATO and WTO. The member-states of these two blocs somehow managed, to a certain extent, to balance their interests. Also, optimization of military and political interests took place at the bipolar level. Contrarily, there exists in East Asia a multipolar military and political structure, evidently coupled with a certain degree of megalomania. Actually, China, India, Japan, Russia and the United States, are all power

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[3] Tian, Zhongging, *Northeast Asia in Transition: Features and Trends*, SIIS Paper No.2, March 1991, pp. 3-5.

giants. This fact ensures them great manoeuvral freedom in global political affairs, while reaching a consensus with such giant partners appears a more difficult task.

The multipolar structure of international relations in East Asia manifests itself not only at the purely military-political level, but at the system level as well. Here, US policy seems to depend on the impact of the "Japanese factor", to a larger extent than it depends on German, British, or French factors in Europe. Equally, Russia must consider more attentively the interests and possibilities of China, than those of any state in the "European orchestra".

Observers note that East Asia has entered a time of reconciliation. The Sino-Soviet normalization was followed by tangible improvement in China's relations with India, Mongolia, the two Koreas and Vietnam. North and South Korea made a historical breakthrough in their relations. Russia is driving to the further improvement of its relations with East Asian states. We understand that the Vladivostock programme has actually exhausted its potential, and we are prepared to undertake new programmes both at the national and international levels, and thereby contribute to Asian-Pacific security.

Chapter 6

Responses

First Response

Dao Huy Ngoc

Two papers on the question of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region and Northeast Asia have been presented by two respected participants from the Russian Federal Republic and Japan.

Security and disarmament have always been matters of common concern and interest to countries in the region, particularly at this juncture, when they are synonymous with economic development in individual countries and in the region as a whole. While numerous suggestions have been put forth and there is broad consensus on a series of issues, there still remain some questions that require further analysis and discussion.

It is generally agreed that recent important events in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific region, have had profound impacts on the development of international relations and on security and disarmament processes in various regions. It is impossible to ignore the changes taking place in the former Soviet Union, which had comprised one sixth of the area of the earth. These changes in the former USSR have created a major strategic vacuum, and they present new challenges to the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region.

From the end of World War Two to the mid-80s, military and political confrontation between two security blocs, led respectively by the Soviet Union and the United States, characterized the political and security situation in the world and in the Asia-Pacific region. But from the mid-80s, much progress has been witnessed in the global and regional security situation due to US-USSR, Sino-Soviet, and Japan-Soviet, negotiations on the improvement of relations and disarmament. The beginning of the 1990s is marked by a further strengthening of regional peace and stability, with an end to the danger of war among the super-powers and a promotion of détente, while ideological contradictions are no longer a substantial obstacle to good relations among nations.

As the importance of the military and security aspects is reduced, economic development assumes a higher profile and greater importance. Today, it is accepted by many that a nation's strength and global role depend not only on its military capacity, but largely on its economic position in its region and in the world.

Over the past few years, détente among the major powers has encouraged the Asia-Pacific region, and Southeast Asia in particular, to make substantial progress toward détente, relaxation of tension, settlement of regional conflicts, and promotion of co-operation. The signing of the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia created a condition for the emergence of an independent and neutral Cambodia. The contents and mechanisms of that Agreement, also constitute an important factor that will help ensure peace in the Southwestern border areas of Vietnam, and create favourable conditions for Vietnam to use political and diplomatic means to guarantee its security and development. Thus, Vietnamese markets will be more easily opened to all countries in the region and in the world. Relations between Vietnam and ASEAN countries can also be normalized, and gradually shifted links of friendly co-operation can be advanced, though one cannot say that all mutual suspicions and doubts have been definitely dispelled.

However, the implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia still faces many difficulties. Thus, its effective execution in the future will require goodwill and efforts from all parties concerned, and especially from the Khmer Rouge.

Despite numerous difficulties and issues that demand solutions, the Cambodian problem is entering its concluding phase. In the context of détente among the great powers of the world, and in the Asia-Pacific region, the peace agreement on Cambodia will create favourable conditions for Southeast Asia to end a long period of confrontation, while entering a phase of peace, in conformity with the desires for security and development which are shared by Vietnam and other countries in the region.

The normalization of relations between Vietnam and China, achieved during the November 1991 meeting in Beijing, not only created more favourable conditions for the peaceful development of both countries, but also constituted an important contribution to the promotion of a healthy political atmosphere in the region.

The vigorous development of new relationships between Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and ASEAN countries, and the trend toward regional co-operation in Southeast Asia are noteworthy changes in the region.

Thus, after several decades of fierce wars and confrontations, the developing trend of co-operation among the countries in the region reveals new possibilities: Southeast Asia will become a zone of peace, stability, friendship, and co-operation.

"The Thaw" in relations between India and China, the two most populous Asian countries, also creates a new situation in our vast region.

The end of the Cold War also creates favourable conditions for the settlement of bilateral disputes among the big powers. China and the former Soviet Union have signed an agreement delimiting their mutual border, and there is hope that the territorial disputes between Russia and Japan may also be solved in due course.

The situation on the Korean Peninsula still contains potential dangers, but some happy developments have reduced tension and the danger of war there. After the admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations, the trend for dialogue has been further promoted, resulting in the meeting of the two Korean Prime Ministers in February 1992, and the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression. Greater exchange and co-operation between the two Koreas will also help to strengthen stability in the peninsular. Together with the Korean Declaration of intention to turn the Korean Peninsular into a nuclear-free zone, there has been important progress in the relations between the two Koreas, though one cannot say that all uncertainly has been removed. Positive contributions can still be made to the cause of peace and co-operation in North-East Asia, and the whole Asia-Pacific, by both Koreas, the big powers, and other the countries involved.

Thus, security in the region is faced with new opportunities and new challenges.

The dramatic changes in the power balance over the past two years have caused the US to become the only super-power in the world. As a result, many countries are concerned that the US will take advantage of its position to impose a new world order which only serves its own interests, and which could run counter to the desires of the world community for a new, just, and equitable world order.

Yet, the Gulf crisis has also shown us that the US no longer occupies the unique position it did in the past, and it can no longer impose its will on others. In economic terms, the balance of power between the US, Japan, and Western Europe, has been changing at the expense of the US.

Further, all countries, however big or small, must take into account the trend of peace and development which now determines the direction in which the world is moving, and in which it will continue to move.

There are still worries, however, that the balance of forces in the region will continue to change and, after 10 to 20 years, a new power gap will emerge that might encourage some other countries to fill that gap, with serious consequences to peace and security in the region.

Partly due to that fear, some Southeast Asian countries have increased their defence expenditures while also striving to modernize their military forces, in spite of the settlement in Cambodia and the increasing trends of peace and co-operation among the countries in the region. While these efforts on the part of a number of countries, including some medium-sized and small ones, reflect to some extent their desire to strengthen their defence in the face of the major changes taking place, these actions may cause chain reactions in neighbouring countries. This would also give rise to suspicion and rivalry. If left unattended, these developments may ultimately lead to the use of military force to settle problems.

More than ever, disarmament and confidence-building measures must be priorities.

With the end of the Cold War, more favourable conditions have been created for nuclear and conventional disarmament, between the US and Russian Federal Republic, in Asia and the Pacific region, because the US no longer faces the danger of losing its military superiority. US-Russian disarmament will create favourable conditions for the disarmament of other countries in Northeast Asia and, if China, India, and Japan, could also join these disarmament efforts, this would put other, small, and medium-sized countries at ease, thereby allowing them to reduce their armed forces in Northeast and Southeast Asia, encouraging them to increase confidence-building measures and to shift their military industries to civilian purposes.

To ensure long-term peace, stability, and development, while also preventing the emergence of a "strategic gap", it is necessary to consider two active measures: Strengthening regional co-operation, and establishing a common security structure for the whole Asia-Pacific region, initially in the sub-region, in the future. In Southeast Asia, for example, Vietnam, and some other countries of Indochina, are parties to the 1976 Bali Treaty. Such sub-regional co-operation will promote the economic development and security of each country, and each sub-region will influence the situation in the whole region. For example, the economic development in Northeast Asia has a great impact on Southeast Asia because Northeast Asia constitutes an important source of investment and economic relations for Southeast Asia. A future common security structure for the whole Asia-Pacific region must include all the countries in the region, whether this structure be a forum, a council, or a general agreement.

However, an urgent issue now is the need for all countries to co-operate in promoting national economic development and reducing the development gap, in order to prepare for greater and more comprehensive co-operation in the future. It should not be forgotten that, at present, there still remain certain historical legacies, such as ideology, different view-points on security, and big differences in development levels, which may be a threat to regional security.

All of these issues mentioned above should be the subject of continuing efforts to harmonize national and regional interests, taking into consideration the interests of the parties concerned and the common trends of our times.

Both Northeast and Southeast Asia have disputes over land, islands, and the continental shelf. In Northeast and North Asia, China and Russia have reached agreement on their mutual borders. This is a happy development for both countries and for all of us. Tension between Russia and Japan, with regard to the territorial issue, is being reduced, and we hope that both countries will be able to solve this problem in the future.

At present, Southeast Asia is confronted with many disputes over territorial waters, the most difficult of which concerns the archipelagoes in the South China Sea. So far, the countries concerned have agreed to temporarily put aside the issue of sovereignty and to undertake joint exploration and exploitation, with a view of turning the potential for dispute into the potential for

co-operation, and proceeding in this course toward the gradual solution of the sovereignty issue. This represents important progress, though uncertainty still remains. Therefore, wisdom and self-control are required from all countries concerned, both in statements and actions.

Vietnam hopes that the situation in Northeast Asia, as well as in Southeast Asia, wil. improve further where peace, security and co-operation are concerned, because both regions are of great importance for the general economic development of the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

In recent years, Vietnam has been actively reducing its military expenditures, and promoting economic development and economic relations with foreign countries. We believe that, "with a strong economy, a sufficiently strong defence, and expanded international co-operation, our country will be able to efficiently defend its independence and successfully build socialism". (Resolution issued on 5th May 1988 of the 6th Congress).

The year 1991 marked a very important change in the Asia-Pacific region, especially in Southeast Asia, with new opportunities and challenges for each country, including Vietnam. In July 1991, the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam discussed and adopted an important document, "Strategy for Economic and Social Stabilization and Development to the Year 2,000", the comprehensive goal of which was to struggle for socio-economic stability and development, improvement of people's living conditions, and national advancement. In order to fulfil that goal, Vietnam needs stability and a favourable international environment.

In carrying out reforms, Vietnam sincerely wants to become the friend of all the countries of the world, while promoting economic and cultural co-operation with them, yet first and foremost, with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Regarding the United States, Vietnam wants to put an early end to the present, extremely normal situation the war ended 18 years ago, but relations between Vietnam and the United States have not been normalized as yet.

It is Vietnam's wish that the Southeast Asian countries have reasonable knowledge of one another's defence policies, as this is very important for confidence-building and for the prevention of an arms race in the region. Vietnam wants to establish relations of friendship and co-operation with ASEAN countries, and to build with them a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia, for the benefit of security and development.

We hope that in the near future, co-operation in the spirit of peaceful co-existence will prevail among countries, and the trend of peace and development will prevail in the development of international relations.

Second Response

Luo Renshi

Security and Disarmament in Northeast Asia

1. *The present situation in the Northeast Asia region is advantageous to promoting relaxation and disarmament.*

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States and Russia have been continuing to develop relations of consultation and co-operation. Northeast Asia had been one of the areas witnessing the most serious direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now, the Cold War state has come to an end here. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has diminished its naval force's range of movements, and its ground force will likewise follow a reduction plan. The United States will also moderately reduce its first-line troops, and has withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea.

The situation on the Korean peninsula is moving in the direction of relaxation and stability. The North and the South have signed agreements on non-aggression and denuclearization on the peninsula. The disturbing omen of nuclear proliferation in the region is unlikely to be a concern.

The Japanese-Russian relations and the Sino-Russian relations are in the process of continuous development. There has been an exchange of visits by leaders of Japan and Russia. Also, their political and economic relations are developing. The Sino-Russian relations are moving in the direction of normalization, as begun between China and former Soviet Union. An agreement has been reached between the two nations concerning the disputed eastern sector of the boundary line.

Propelled by common wishes, gradual development in regional economic co-operation in Northeast Asia is possible. The equal and mutually beneficial co-operative economic relations are conducive to promoting peaceful and friendly relations among the nations in this region.

Generally speaking, elements in favour of peace are increasing in Northeast Asia. Such an opportunity should be grasped to positively influence arms control and disarmament in the region.

2. *Unstable factors still exist in the Northeast Asia Region, which may possibly result in new tensions and conflicts. Arms control and disarmament remain to be an important and imperative task.*

To begin, the most disturbing fact is that the United States and CIS both maintain quite powerful forces, with offensive capability, in Northeast Asia. The United States insists on its "military presence" in the Asian-Pacific region, with no intention of having any basic changes relating to "forward deployment" in the region. The number of first-line troops the United States plans to reduce will account for only 11 per cent of its 135,000 troops presently garrisoned in the Asian-Pacific region. The priority of US military deployment in the Asian-Pacific region is in Northeast Asia. The armed forces of the former Soviet Union in Asia will experience a reduction of 200,000 troops, but there will still be as many as 1,000,000 troops remaining. It should be noted that these forces are also undergoing modification with MIG-29s, MIG-31s, and vessels of new types. Therefore, the combat capabilities of the naval and air forces have actually been enhanced. All of these factors display a sharp contrast with the general regional situation of relaxation.

Secondly, North Korea and South Korea are moving toward relaxation in their relations through high-level dialogues, yet much remains to be accomplished before achieving peaceful reunification. Neither of them has made any changes in their military deployment. On the narrow peninsula, more than 1,000,000 troops, over 5,000 tanks, over 10,000 artillery pieces, and over 1,000 combat aircraft are in confrontation. Owing to the existing differences in social systems between the North and the South, the long-standing contradiction and antagonism can not be easily erased. The Korean peninsula remains an area with potential dangers.

Finally, it is unlikely that the dispute over the Northern islands between Japan and Russia will be settled in the near future. Japan believes that the major military threat it faces is from the north, so it is necessary to further enhance its Naval and air strength. While, on the other hand, the armed forces of the former Soviet Union maintain the view that the development of the Japanese Naval force will block the Soviet far-east area's outlet to the sea, imposing a threat to the submarine shelter zone in the Sea of Okhotsk. Under this new situation, suspicion and a sense of insecurity, from the strategic point of view of both sides, cannot be removed unless disarmament measures are taken.

3. *Some preliminary ideas about arms control and disarmament in the Northeast Asia region.*

A relaxed situation is conducive to disarmament, as disarmament actions will further promote relaxation. It is possible to open a new prospect of a positive circle, relaxation-disarmament-

relaxation, in the Northeast Asia region. The following basic aspects can be considered with regard to the steps to be taken:

1. US and CIS taking the lead in disarmament is crucial for the promotion of relaxation and disarmament in the Northeast Asia region. The United States and CIS possess the largest nuclear arsenal and number of conventional weapons in Northeast Asia. Their initiative actions of large-scale disarmament will significantly propel the process of relaxation and disarmament in Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia had been seen as a major battle ground by the United States and the former Soviet Union and, thus, their military deployment in the region surpasses the needs of peace-time defence. Now that the possibility of an all-out war has disappeared, both sides may considerably reduce their armed forces. Taking into account their existing armaments, CIS should continue to reduce its massive ground and air forces. Through bilateral agreements or unilateral actions, the United States and CIS may reduce their naval forces, which possess blue water offensive capability, in the northwestern Pacific. CIS's ocean-going attack submarine force and US antisubmarine forces used for guarding sea lanes in the Pacific (including anti-sub submarines, surface anti-sub vessels, and anti-sub aircraft), both deployed against each other in the past, have no reason to exist now, and therefore may be given priority in their reduction efforts. With these actions as an example, other reductions may follow.

2. Regional disarmament in Northeast Asia may begin with bilateral agreements, followed by a gradual realization of arms control and disarmament in the whole region. The specific process might be:

   • First, the countries concerned should be encouraged to take confidence-building measures through consultation, including border meetings by military personnel; setting up hot lines, limiting the scale and scope of military manoeuvres and exercises, and prior notification of plans for military movements, etc. Thus, a confidence-building view, relaxing tension, and conflict avoidance, could be the first steps toward arms control and disarmament.

   • Next, in places with a high concentration of arms and where there has been direct military confrontation, especially between North and South Korea, agreements on large-scale disarmament should be reached through positive consultation, with the aim of realizing low-level military equilibrium. All of the nations in this region should take a restrained attitude toward military build-up and military expenditure, and should not seek arms beyond the need of defence purposes. Unilateral reductions in the size of armed forces, and lowering of their readiness level on the basis of keeping necessary defensive capability should also be advocated. All of these actions will be conducive to security and stability in Northeast Asia.

   • Lastly, the existing issues in the Northeast Asia region, such as the dispute over the Northern Islands between Japan and Russia, and the reunification of North and South Korea, should be gradually and properly resolved through peaceful consultation. All the parties concerned should respect other countries' political and economic systems, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. The regional political new order should be established on the basis of peaceful co-existence, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. Finally, the new regional economic order can also be established with the development of economic co-operation based on equality and mutual benefit. Then, the effective combination

of these factors can promote security, co-operation, and development, in the Northeast Asia region.

Third Response

Michael J. Mazarr

I am faced with a difficult challenge: following the previous speakers, each of whom has provided a comprehensive survey of the issues and challenges facing Asian nations. My purpose, therefore, will not be a point-by-point analysis. I will rather focus on one specific topic, one that runs in a consistent thread through both papers and binds them together - the role of the United States in Asia. My conclusions will stand in stark contrast from what you have heard so far.

Hardly surprising, some will say. You are an American. But let me take pains to note at the outset that my philosophical principles, theoretical basis, and policy views differ widely from those of the present Administration in many cases. Not so much in Asia, where I think US security policy is generally sound; but on nuclear weapons policy, our approach to regional security institutions, our level of support for reforms in former communist states, and a host of other questions, I share little if anything in common with the views of the current government. My arguments will therefore reflect the perspective of someone whose purpose is not in any way to defend current US policy. I feel no need or natural inclination to do so.

And yet, I am disturbed by the implications of both preceding speakers. One suggested that the US presence in Asia is unnecessary and increasingly unwanted, the other that US policy might be based on some sinister residue of imperialism. I disagree on both counts.

A robust US military presence in Northeast Asia is still very much in the interest of all Asian powers. For Japan, there is simply no palatable alternative; military vulnerability would not be acceptable to its people and assertive military strength would alienate its neighbours. In the recent debates over the PKO bill, we have seen how powerful and widespread pacifist sentiment remains in Japan today. In the simplest terms, the US security commitment makes it unnecessary for Japan to rearm, thus avoiding new arms races and instabilities that would certainly risk war.

And without a US security tie, where would Korea turn? South Korea - or a unified Korea, some years from now - could try neutrality, or perhaps a backbreaking military build-up, or a new alliance with some regional power like China. None of these options is very attractive, for Korea or the other countries of Northeast Asia. Neutrality would offer a meagre guarantee of security for Korea and the potential for a new vacuum of power in the region; a military build-up would spark a regional arms race and provoke Korea's neighbours, perhaps proving utterly counterproductive; and alliances with China and Japan have proven empirically suspect. No, for Korea there is no better option than security through alliance with the United States, a distant and reliable friend which, apart from trade, steers clear of meddling in Korea's internal affairs.

What is true for Northeast Asia is also true for much of the rest of the region. Southeast Asian nations, for example, appreciate the US role in retarding Japanese military expansion and providing a counterbalance to Chinese influence.

Some complain, however, that US influence sometimes becomes onerous. What of the US imperialist history, some ask? And what of this leaked Defence Policy Guidance that claims the United States is determined to keep its friends as well as enemies down and remain the primary power on earth?

My answer is simple: the American people never had, and certainly today do not have, the stomach for true imperialism. Certainly, we have thrown our weight around a bit, as all major

powers will. China has done so, as have Japan and Russia - in much more impressive fashion that the United States. India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and a host of other Asian nations, in their own way and in their own time, have staked out a regional zone of influence and adopted policies that could rightly be called "imperialist". Let the nation that is without such a history cast the first accusation.

But like most of these states, the United States has never truly become an imperial power, obtaining and maintaining a worldwide network of colonies and dependencies. To the extent that we did, moreover, it was during the Cold War, and was based in a reflexive reaction to what was perceived as a monolithic Communist threat to US security, and not out of any aggressive urge to empire. That we have eschewed a true empire is demonstrated conclusively by one simple fact: the United States has withdrawn from virtually all nations it has ever conquered, from Mexico in 1848 to Panama one hundred and fifty years later.

Why have we done so? Because the American people are fundamentally isolationist. Only when galvanized by some extraordinary threat to our way of life do we react, as, for example, in 1918 and 1941. Even during the Cold War, the two major conflicts we fought to enforce containment - Korea and Vietnam - were enormously controversial at home, and the second was simply abandoned because of the public outcry. Americans are thoroughly sceptical of all foreign entanglements, ranging from security commitments to humanitarian aid.

Now that the Cold War is over, this mindset is emerging once again. Battalions of politicians are calling for our allies to "pay their fair share" and bills are rushing through the Congress to slash US troop strength abroad. The US defence budget is falling like a stone, from roughly $300 billion in 1990 to perhaps as low as $220 billion by 1997. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors, and airmen are being mustered out; US bases abroad, including those in the once-irreplaceable Philippines, are being closed down and abandoned; dozens of weapons systems are being cancelled or delayed. The American people want their peace dividend, and they want it now.

This is why, fundamentally, there is nothing to fear in the draft Defence Policy Guidance. Even if it reflected the consensus of thinking in Washington - and it certainly does not - it does not offer a policy with a prayer of being approved by the American people. It argued against further cuts in defence, yet dozens are happening and will continue to happen. It called for US domination of the world security environment, but most Americans do not even approve of stationing troops in Europe.

What I have brought us to, of course, is a dilemma - the opposite dilemma posed by the authors of the preceding papers. The US presence in Asia is not needed and not wanted, they argued; but it will likely stay, because the United States is intent on foisting its wishes on other countries. In fact, I believe the exact opposite is true: a strong US commitment to the security of its allies in Northeast Asia is indispensable for peace and stability, but it will be increasingly difficult to maintain that presence in the years ahead.

And so I end with a warning. Sometimes I am reminded by Asian friends that, with some countries and some analysts, one cannot exactly take their words literally. (I am not suggesting this is true of the paper writers on this panel). Some say they want the US out, but they really do not; they are merely saying that for effect. But given the current mood in Washington, this much is crystal clear: if you ask the United States to leave, this time it just might do so.

Fourth Response

Li Songil

The Creation of a Security Co-operation Area Which Suits the Conditions in Northeast Asia

The end of the Cold War between East and West bipolar blocs gives rise to the formation of a new multipolar international relations and this, in turn, increases the demand that the security, disarmament, and confidence issues be solved by regional processes. Such a trend does not exclude Northeast Asia, and the ideas and proposals for the solution of regional problems are expressed in various forms.

It should be considered, in viewing the disarmament and security issues in Northeast Asia, that the security conditions in this region are different from those of Europe, in which mainly two blocs were confronted. Northeast Asia is the only region where the old structures of the Cold War remain unchanged. In this region, there is a large concentration of foreign forces, and numerous bilateral disputes, such as the disarmament issue between Russia and the US, the North-South issue in Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-US issue, and the Russia-Japan territorial issue, which are yet to be solved. Proceeding from such a regional character, where the security interests of nations are tangled, priority should be given to the bilateral issues rather than to the establishment of a multilateral security system in this region.

It is realistic for us to consider, in the light of this regional situation, gradually establishing the security and co-operation area in this region by developing regional negotiation with bilateral contacts and dialogues as basic processes. In this view, it is also important to advance political détente, parallel with disarmament and economic co-operation, for the establishment of peaceful circumstances and for the realization of common prosperity.

It is premature and unrealistic to form a multilateral security organization before a bilateral solution, of such acute national problems as the Korean problem, is reached between the parties concerned.

Korean Question

Solving the disarmament and security issue in the Korean Peninsula is a main key to ensuring the peace and security in Northeast Asia. Without the solution of such a pending problem, regional peace and security, as well as world peace, will not be able to be realized.

The Korean Peninsula has been turned into the most dangerous area in Asia, where huge armed forces are confronted in an unstable armistice state of neither peace nor war.

In February 1992, the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Co-operation, and Exchange between North and South" came into effect. This agreement denies, by itself, the justification of the arms race, and it creates a starting point for confidence-building and disarmament processes as premises for peaceful reunification.

The effectuation of this agreement also creates a favourable situation for legally fixing the peace in the Korean Peninsula, by replacing an armistice agreement with a peace agreement. Further, the effectuation of this agreement has a great confidence-building value, as the agreement contains political reconciliation, as well as many-sided co-operation and exchanges. It is significant even for the peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The assistance of the countries concerned is needed in carrying out the North-South agreement, along with the main efforts of the North and South parties of Korea.

Since the North and South have made a legal promise to not militarily attack each other, there is no reason for the US to keep its troops in the Korean Peninsula under the pretext of so-called "deterrence to invasion from the North". The US should respect the North-South agreement, and contribute to it by withdrawing their troops from the Korean Peninsula.

We will make every effort to develop negotiations on the reduction of armed forces, in a balanced manner, to low levels of a truly defensive nature.

We expect that the countries concerned will respect the sprit of the agreement and pay attention to creating the conditions and circumstances for its implementation.

I would like to explain the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, focusing on two points.

The first point is that the effort made by the government of our republic, concerning the solution of the nuclear problem in the Korean Peninsula, cannot be thought apart from that of making Northeast Asia a nuclear weapon-free zone. The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the most important question for creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in Northeast Asia.

The accession to NPT by the government has acted as an important lever for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Since its accession to the NPT, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, has insisted on the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, negotiated the settlement of the nuclear problem between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the US, and put forward the advancing of reasonable proposals.

Secondly, respecting independence and ensuring equality and fairness, are main keys to the solution of the nuclear problem.

In December 1991 South Korean authorities announced a "Declaration on the Absence of Nuclear Weapons", and the US welcomed it and informed that they had withdrawn their nuclear weapons from South Korea, even indirectly.

The "Team Spirit" joint military exercise, a clear war exercise, was also suspended, and high-level talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the US were held in New York in January 1992. Under these circumstances and conditions, the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea signed the Nuclear Safeguard Accord with IAEA on 30 January 1992, and it has been submitted to the 3rd session of 9th Supreme People's Assembly for deliberation, which will be held on 8 April 1992. Then, we will accept nuclear inspections without delay, according to the working procedures agreed upon with the IAEA.

There is no doubt that the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea will, in the future too, make continuous efforts to solve the problem of the principle of respecting independence, and ensuring fairness and equality.

Part III

Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: Developments and Prospects - South Asian Perspectives

Chapter 7

Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: Developments and Prospects - South Asian Perspectives

Moonis Ahmar

Introduction

Détente between North and South Korea, cessation of hostilities among waring groups in Cambodia, thaw in relations between Moscow and Tokyo, and China's readiness to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, account for a substantial reduction of tension in the vast Asia-Pacific region.

The undercurrents present in the global system, however, depict a pessimistic picture - particularly with regard to the power vacuum created as a result of Soviet disunion, the US attempts to maintain a predominant naval-military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, the Indo-Pakistan tug-of-war over conflicting issues, and the continued lack of political understanding between Beijing and Washington on the latter's role in the "New World Order". The Gulf War and its implications also raised questions regarding the role of small and weak states in a unipolar system.

Despite such a state of affair, one can see relaxation of tension in North-East and South-East Asian regions, whereas, in South Asia a marginal breakthrough has been achieved for peace, disarmament and conflict resolution.

Security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region should be examined in the dichotomy of unresolved conflicts and proposals for conflict resolution. Exposed to inveterate territorial, political, and security conflicts, leading to unprecedented arms race, the Asia-Pacific region is now witnessing a gradual shift, from decades of confrontation, to co-operation.

The post-Second World War international system, which institutionalised the politics of alliances and the Cold War, has ceased to exist. Because of the collapse of Soviet power and the demise of the USSR, the East-West power tussle seems to be over. The only possibilities of disorder in the Asia-Pacific region may be found with regard to US-North Korean squabbling, particularly on the nuclear issue, resurgence of territorial disputes among some ASEAN member countries, failure of the peace process in Cambodia, probable assertion of China against the US-dominated world order and Indo-Pakistan tension on the Kashmir dispute.

On these grounds, threats and challenges to peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific may not diminish. The US has closed its military base at Clark and has been asked by Manila to shut down its Subic base by the end of 1992. As a result of bilateral accord with Singapore, the United States has been allowed to get a military foothold in that country. In the case of the Indian Ocean, there exists a remote possibility of the US withdrawal from the ocean. Notwithstanding the Soviet disunion and the disappearance of credible security threats, the United States will maintain its naval-military presence in the Indian Ocean because of the fact that its strategic interests in the oil rich Gulf region are closely linked with its symbolic deterrence in the ocean.

This paper attempts to examine the issues of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region by answering the following questions:

1. What are the proposals and plans presented on the issues of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region?
2. Can there be a linkage between the Helsinki model of peace and co-operation and proposals for security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region?

3. What are the developments and prospects for security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region?

4. What are the South Asian perspectives with regard to security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region?

The report is based on the examination of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region with particular reference to Gorbachev's proposals of the Asia-Pacific security scheme and prospects of the success of such proposals in the changing global scenario. One cannot deny the fact that Gorbachev has made a worthwhile contribution in unfolding a new security framework for the Asia-Pacific region based on co-operation, collective security, mutual trust and arms reduction. For the South Asian countries, Gorbachev has provided a clear sense of direction equipped with practical ambitions to resolve conflicts. His proposal for a Pan-Asian Conference called for the adoption of Confidence-Building Measures as practiced in Europe during the post-Helsinki Accords period.

However, the South Asian countries also lack a common perspective with regard to the issues of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region. This is primarily due to entrenched socio-economic, political and security problems faced by the people of South Asia and divergent perceptions among the SAARC countries, particularly between India and Pakistan on matters relating to security and disarmament.

Security and Disarmament: Proposals and Plans

The power structure of the Asia-Pacific region can be divided into the following categories:

- China, US, Russia and Japan in Northeast Asia;
- China, US, Vietnam and the ASEAN bloc in Southeast Asia;
- US, Australia, Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines in the South Pacific Ocean;
- US, China, India and Pakistan in South Asia.

The inherent contradictions in the sub-system of the Asia-Pacific region has led to political, economic and security groupings. In addition, Cold War polemics and unresolved territorial and political disputes further divided the region. The result was the outbreak of wars (in Korea, Indo-China and South Asia) and a conventional and nuclear arms race supported by the powers involved in various types of conflicts. Heavy deployment of weapons threatened peace and security in the Northeast and South Asian regions.

Brezhnev's proposal

On 8 June 1969, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev launched his Asian Collective Security Scheme (ACSS) by saying: "The course of events has placed on the agenda the task of creating a Collective Security Scheme in Asia"[1]

Brezhnev's proposal of ACSS, however, did not receive support from the majority of the Asian countries, since it was aimed at containing the People's Republic of China.

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[1]   Elaborating his Asian Collective Security Scheme (ACSS) proposal, Brezhnev in a speech delivered at the 15th Congress of Soviet Trade Union in 1972 said that "a Collective Security System in Asia must be basedf on such principles as renunciation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for sovereignty and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and wide development of economic and other forms of co-operation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit." For furhter information, see V. Pavlovsky, "Collective Security: the way to peace in Asia" in *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1972, p. 25.

Mongolia's proposal

Besides the USSR, another country - Mongolia - also put forward a proposal for Asian security. The proposal was made in May 1981 and called for a:

> convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force in relations among the countries of Asia and the Pacific region.

It was also "to be supported by corresponding guarantees by the permanent members of the UN Security Council."[2] Interestingly, most of the proposals and plans for the Asia-Pacific region were presented by the Socialist and non-Western bloc countries, but their implementation required consent from the United States and its allies.

Gorbachev's proposal

Gorbachev's style with regard to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region was practical and he announced substantial unilateral cuts in his country's Pacific fleet. His Asia-Pacific security scheme was viewed with interest and anxiety as it also included Beijing as an equal partner and had broadened the geographical dimension of his proposal to the Pacific region. He also rejected the idea of hegemony in Asia by saying:

> No state would be in a position to take on the role of a guarantor of strategic socio-economic and political security of Asia.[3]

1.　*First Initiative, February 1986.*

As far as the conceptual framework of Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific scheme is concerned, one can quote his speech before the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986. The questions of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region were discussed by hin in detail. As he said:

> The significance of the Asian and Pacific directions is growing. In that vast region, there are many tangled knots of contradictions and, besides, the political situation in some areas is unstable. Evidently, it is expedient to begin with co-ordination and pooling of efforts in the interests of a political settlement of painful problems so as, in parallel, on that basis, to at least take the edge off the military confrontration in various parts of Asia and stabilise the situation there.[4]

In his initative, Gorbachev proposed peaceful settlement of disputes in the Asia-Pacific region and cessation of military confrontation.

2.　*Second Initiative, July 1986.*

Concepts and ideas regarding peace, security and disarmament on the Asia-Pacific region were again presented by Gorbachev in his speech at Vladivostok on 28 July 1986. His speech carried solid suggestions for conflict resolution and co-operation among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region. The initiatives taken by Gorbachev for arms control and disarmament were not limited to

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2　*Indian Express*, New Delhi, 15 December 1986.
3　*Dawn* (Karachi), 18 May 1989.
4　*Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: The Soviet Approach, Documents and Materials*, Moscow, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1988, p. 14.

Europe or the super power level but also included other strategic areas of the world. Given the relevance of Gorbachev's model for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, an important excerpt of his Vladivostok speech is quoted below:

> Our views about security in the Asia-Pacific region did not come out of thin air. They take into account the experience of the past and today. We have witnessed the efforts of a number of states to solve in practice common economic problems and the attempts to somehow regulate conflicts. For an objective, however remote, we would like to propose a conference, in the model of the Helsinki Conference, to be attented by all countries gravitating towards the ocean. When an agreement is reached on its convocation it will be possible to establish the place for this conference. Hiroshima is a possible option. Why should that city, the first victim of nuclear evil, not become a "Helsinki" for Asia and the Pacific Ocean?[5]

Two important suggestions were given by Gorbachev in his Vladivostok speech. First, he poroposed the convening of a Helsinki-type conference to discuss steps for conflict resolution, and second, he called for a consensus among the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, regardless of their political cleavages on matters of peace and security. In its essence, Gorbachev's Vladivostok proposal called for the following:

- Nuclear states surrendering the option to use nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific region;
- The acceptance of the non-nuclear principles - i.e. not to have, not to produce and not to export nuclear weapons to states having no such weapons;
- Signing of the NPT by those Asian states which have not done so;
- Complete cessation of nuclear tests in the region;
- Prevention of forming new military blocs;
- Freezing the level of military activity in the region;
- Dismantling of foreign military bases.

Three important tension areas were covered in Gorbachev's Asia-Pacific security scheme - Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia. In Northeast Asia, he called for an end to the nuclear and conventional arms race, peace between North and South Korea, and an end to confrontation between China and Japan. He also suggested measures to ameliorate conflict-ridden ties between Moscow and Beijing. In Southeast Asia, he had encouraged *détente* between Communist Indo-China and the ASEAN member countries. His Southeast Asian security plan also included cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, particularly with regard to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from that country. In South Asia, Gorbachev's vision of a tension-free region consisted of Indo-Pakistani *rapprochement* and Sino-Indian normalisation of ties.

3.   Third Initiative, September 1988.

By 1988, Gorbachev had made his intentions quite obvious and was moving step by step toward the accomplishment of his foreign policy goals, particularly those related to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. His ideas had given a conceptual framework to his overall initiatives, and he took practical measures to give legitimacy to his proposals. In his speech delivered at the Siberian town of Krasnoyarsk on 16 September 1988, Gorbachev proposed a seven-point peace programme for the Asia-Pacific region. In many ways, his proposal at Krasnoyarsk was an extension of his Vladivostok speech and included the following important points:

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[5]   Ibid, p. 24.

1. The Soviet Union would not increase the quantum of any nuclear weapons in the region. Similarly, the US and other nuclear powers should not make any additional deployments in the region;

2. The question of lessening of military confrontation in the areas where the coasts of the USSR, the People's Republic of China, Japan, North and South Korea converge would be discussed on a multilateral basis, with a view to freezing and lowering the levels of naval and air forces and limiting their activity;

3. The main rival powers of the region should hold consultations on the non-increase of naval forces in the region;

4. If the US agrees to the elimination of military bases in the Philippines, the Soviet Union will be ready, by an agreement with the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to give up its fleet's materials and technical supply stations in Cam Ranh Bay;

5. A suggestion was made to jointly elaborate measures to prevent incidents on the high seas and airspace over the region. The experience of already-existing bilateral Soviet-American and Soviet-British accords, as well as the US and USSR-Japanese bilateral accord, should be used during the elaboration of these measures;

6. An International Conference on making the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace would be held no later than 1990;

7. A discussion would be held concerning the creation of a negotiating mechanism for the security of the Asia-Pacific region. It could be started between the USSR, the People's Republic of China, and the US, as permament members of the UN Security Council.[6]

Gorbachev's speech at Krasnoyarsk should be seen in the perspective of unilateral measures taken by Moscow to reduce its military presence in the Pacific. In 1988, the Soviet Union had cut back its naval activities in the Pacific by 50 per cent.[7] However, it was during Gorbachev's visit to China in 1989 that a substantial reduction in the Soviet arsenal was announced. Gorbachev's deep cuts in Moscow's Pacific fleet included the withdrawal of 120,000 troops from the region, 436 medium-range missiles, 12 army divisions, 11 air force regiments and 16 warships.[8] In some of the points of Gorbachev's speech at Krasnoyarsk there was an emphasis on a *quid pro quo* with other powers of the Asia-Pacific region, particularly with the United States. With regard to the withdrawal of US military bases from the Philippines, Moscow offered to withdraw its naval presence at the Cam Ranh base in Vietnam.

4. *Fourth Initiative, April 1991.*

In his last comprehensive analysis of Asian security since September 1988, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev unveiled a major proposal for the Asia-Pacific security scheme during his address to the members of the Japanese Parliament on 18 April 1991. In essence, his proposal called for a continent-wide security framework for Asia. He said,

Asia and the Pacific, whose inhabitants make up half of the world's population, face a host of economic, ethnic, social, religious, environmental, and other highly complex problems. No country can cope with

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6　See reference in *Kessing's Record of World Events*, Vol. XXXIV, September 1988, pp. 36193-36194. Also see A.M. Sadullah, "Impact of Gorbachev's peace initiative", *Dawn*, 17 December 1988. Rajan Menon, "New thinking and Northeast Asian security", *Problems of Communism*, March-June 1989, p. 1-11.

7　"Gorbachev Casts his Net Again", *The Economist*, London, 24 September 1988, pp. 26-27. Gombyn Miyeegombe, "For Peace and Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific Region", *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1987, pp. 35-37.

8　See "Demilitarisation Plea to China: Gorbachev Announces Cuts in Pacific Fleet", *Dawn*, Karachi, 18 May 1989.

them single-handedly. Therefore, we feel that the idea of a multilateral forum on security and co-operation remains as relevant as ever. Sooner or later, life will make us accept that idea.[9]

He presented five recommendations for the Asia-Pacific security scheme:

- As a first step, a five-nation Conference, to be attended by China, India, Japan, (former) Soviet Union and the US, to precede the 1993 convening of a previously-proposed meeting of foreign ministers of all nations of Asia and the Pacific;
- Trilateral US-Soviet-Japanese consultations "to remove suspicions and build confidence through concrete agreements";
- Creation of a "Zone of Co-operation" in the Sea of Japan and Northeast Asia, which would link the resource-rich but underdeveloped Soviet Far East and Siberia to the "emerging economic complex of Asia and the Pacific";
- Conclusion of a formal peace agreement between Moscow and Tokyo - it is totally unacceptable that the USSR and Japan should still have no peace treaty to legally conclude World War II;
- A formal dialogue between the Soviet Union and Japan on military matters.[10]

Commenting on Gorbachev's proposals, Haruki Wada, Director of the Social Science Research Centre at Tokyo University, said that "his proposals for arms withdrawal from Asia and the Pacific are not new to us".[11]

Incidentally, the Soviet disunion has paved the way for the implementation of some of the proposals which Gorbachev forwarded for demilitarisation in the Asia-Pacific region, and the United States is also under pressure to cut its naval presence in the region. On account of serious talks held on the Korean peninsula and in Cambodia to reduce tension, the overall political scenario of the Asia-Pacific region has changed.

Some of the credit for strengthening the process of peace, security, and disarmament goes to Gorbachev. His articulate judgement, supplemented with a practical approach, paved the way for co-operation and accommodation in various conflict-ridden areas of the world. The price which he paid for going ahead with demilitarisation, denuclearisation, and withdrawal of the Soviet presence from different countries was the eventual collapse of the USSR as well as his personal loss of power. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's initiative for peace and disarmament in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region was linked to the adoption of Confidence-Building Measures in military and non-military fields. On these grounds, he clearly stated in his Vladivostok speech that

it is high time to switch to practical disarmament and Confidence-Building Measures and the non-use of force in the region. The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the radical reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Asia.[12]

Gorbachev's framework of Asia-Pacific security was divided into the following two main points:

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[9]   John-Thor Dahlburg, "Soviet Plan for Asian Security Unveiled", *The Los Angeles Times*, reproduced in *Dawn*, 19 April 1991.
[10]   Ibid.
[11]   Ibid.
[12]   *Security in the Asian-Pacific Region: The Soviet Approach. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, Novosti Agency Publishing House, 1988, p. 26.

- *Conceptual* proposals and plans suggesting steps for arms reduction and conflict resolution;
- *Practical* measures, which were taken with particular regard for normalisation of relations with China and Japan, as well as support for the Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia. He also announced reductions in the Soviet Pacific fleet, thereby inviting other powers to follow suit.

Institutional Arrangements

The institutional arrangements mentioned here refer to the process of peace and co-operation in Europe since the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975. Some of the concepts of the Helsinki framework may be applicable to the Asia-Pacific region.

The Helsinki framework for peace and co-operation in Europe was quoted by Gorbachev as it applies to the turbulent Asia-Pacific region. The following important excerpts of Gorbachev's speech, which he delivered in honour of the Prime Minister of India at the time, Rajiv Gandhi, in Moscow on 21 May 1985, will show how the Helsinki model was relevant for him in the Asia-Pacific region:

> The concept of *détente* came into existence in Europe. It will soon be ten years since the day when a historic document was signed in Helsinki, a document which summed up, as it were, what people imply by this meaningful word. Much of what was built on this basis has been destroyed by the icy winds blowing across the ocean. In Asia, the problems of peace and security are today no less and, in some areas in Europe, even more acute and powerful. It is understandable, therefore, that a number of new important and constructive initiatives on some aspects of the security of the Asian continent and its individual regions have been put forward in recent years. Is it not advisable, considering Europe's experience, to think of a common, comprehensive approach to the problems of security in Asia and, if possible, pooling of efforts by Asian states in this direction? Of course, the way to this is complicated. But the road to Helsinki was not smooth either. Here numerous methods are evidently possible - from bilateral talks and multilateral consultations to holding a pan-Asian forum for an exchange of opinion and a joint search for a constructive solution to some points in the future. One thing appears to be indisputable: the poeples of Asia are no less interested in ensuring peace and peaceful co-operation than are the peoples of any other continent, and they can do much to achieve this aim.[13]

Two important conclusions can be drawn from Gorbachev's emphasis on the Helsinki framework of peace and security and its adoption in the tension-ridden areas of Asia - first, the holding of bilateral talks, and second, the formation of a pan-Asian forum for conflict resolution in the Asia-Pacific region. But here some reservations are being expressed with regard to institutional arrangements or the application of the Helsinki model in other regions of the world outside Europe. The progress in security and co-operation in Europe was achieved under the particular circumstances. Experiences gained in Europe thus hardly apply to other regions, where the situation and conditions differ from those in Europe.[14]

It has also been argued that the CSCE process cannot be applicable to the Asia-Pacific region, at least under the present circumstances. As pointed out by one scholar:

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[13] Ibid, pp.47-48.
[14] Qim Huasan, "Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region", *Disarmament*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, New York, 1991, pp. 149-150.

Frontiers are still disputable - such as the northern territories between Japan and the (former) Soviet Union, sovereignty over the Spratlys and the Paracels in the South China Sea, the issue of the Korean peninsula, the unsettled Taiwan question *vis-à-vis* the People's Republic of China, and the Philippines' claim to Sabah. Only when such disputes are resolved can a *status quo* be established adn confirme.l in the Asia-Pacific region and thus be acceptable to all the nations concerned. This presents another aspect for CSCE's consideration - the free flow of ideas and people across national boundaries.[15]

Some of the disputes mentioned by that scholar are near settlement, particularly with regard to the Korean peninsula and disputes between Tokyo and Moscow. The rest can be dealt with at the appropriate time.

Developments in Security and Disarmament

The Treaty of Rarotonga

In the course of security and disarmament developments in the South Pacific region, an important step was taken when the Treaty of Rarotonga was approved at the 16th Session of the South Pacific Forum held at Rarotonga (Cook) Island on 3 August 1985. Signed by 10 of 13 SPF member states, it came into effect on 11 December 1989. The treaty provided for renunciation by signatories of production, acquisition, and deployment on their territories of any nuclear explosive devices, and prohibits any nuclear explosion and burial of radioactive waste or other radioactive materials within the zone stipulated by the treaty. The treaty was supplemented by three Protocols which were open for signing by Member powers and which presented an obligation on their part to observe the nuclear-free states of the zone. Protocol-I of the treaty provided for an obligation for Britain, France and the US to apply appropriate provisions of the treaty to those parts of this zone which were under their control. Protocol-II contained a commitment not to use nor to threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states party to the treaty, whereas Protocol-III prohibited the testing of any nuclear explosive devices in the Treaty's zone of operation.

Settlement in Cambodia

Under the terms of a peace control accord signed in Paris on 23 October 1991, the four rival factions of Cambodia agreed to form a Supreme National Council with Prince Norodom Sihanouk as its president. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) will make necessary arrangements for general elections in 1993, monitor the ceasefire arrangements, demobilise 70 per cent of the four fighting forces, and halt the repatriation of Khmer refugees in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border. Settlement of the Cambodian dispute will encourage co-operation between the two diverse power blocs in Southeast Asia - ASEAN and the Indo-Chinese countries.

Relaxation of tensions between Russia and Japan

As a result of steps taken by Moscow and Tokyo to normalise their ties and settle territorial disputes by a dialogue, one can expect a thaw in their tense relations. The future Russian regime will act decisively to settle disputes and conflicts with Japan. Such a step will have a positive impact on the Asia-Pacific security framework.

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[15]   J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "The Security of Southeast Asia in a Changing Strategic Environment: A View from Indonesia", *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1991, p. 253.

Peace Pact between North and South Korea

The peace accord between North and South Korea replaced the 38-year-old armistice reached at the end of the Korean War. The joint statement before the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact said that:

> There should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. Under the pact, the two sides agree to end interference in each other's internal affairs, respect their different political systems, renounce the use of force, reduce arms and establish a liaison office in the border village of Panmunjom.

The Pact also agreed to end mutual slandering, attempts to subvert one another, and to open economic, personal and press exchanges and direct phone lines between military authorities.[16] Breakthrough in ties between North and South Korea will have far-reaching implications for the security environment of the Northeast Asian region. It may eventually lead to the unification of Korea.

Given the fact that profound changes are taking place in the global politico-security system, the future course of events in the Asia-Pacific region also appears to be unpredictable. Notwithstanding some obscure patterns in the existing world system, one can expect some positive breakthrough as far as the questions of peace and security in that region are concerned. Washington-Moscow accords on arms control, particularly with reference to European security, is a case in point. Eventually, other disturbed areas of the world, including Asia and the Pacific, may institutionalise the process of security and disarmament.

The South Asian Perspectives

Perspective on Gorbachev's model of Asia-Pacific Security

For the South Asian countries, Gorbachev's proposal of an Asia-Pacific security scheme at Vladivostok was significant for the following two main reasons:

1.   His emphasis on the regulation of conflicts; and
2.   His idea to convene a Helsinki-type conference of Asia-Pacific countries, which carried some hope for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

The problems of security and disarmament are viewed differently by India and Pakistan. For Pakistan, the signing of the NPT is tied up with its stand that New Delhi should follow suit, whereas India considers any formal adherence to Non-Proliferation linked with global trends and patterns on this issue. Pakistan has suggested holding a conference on the nuclear question, which should be attended by the parties involved, particularly Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. India is countering Pakistan's initiative by suggesting bilateral negotiations instead of settling the nuclear issue in some multilateral forum.

On account of such a vast perceptional gap between India and Pakistan on the nuclear issue, the model of peace and security envisioned by Gorbachev needs some serious reconsideration. Unlike Northeast and Southeast Asia, South Asia is the only sub-region of the Asia-Pacific region where much is required to be done and achieved for security and disarmament. Notwithstanding the fact that most of the problems faced by the South Asian countries are similar and require collective endeavours for their proper settlement, there exists wide cleavage on security matters. Given such

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16   See "North and South Korea Sign Peace Pact", *Dawn*, 12 December 1991.

impediments for establishing a conflict- and tension-free environment in South Asia, the question arises as to whether it is possible to practically implement the proposals of Gorbachev? What are the obstacles and hurdles on the way to peace and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region?

It goes without saying that the implementation of Gorbachev's proposals would require a deep commitment by the South Asian countries to shun the politics of conflict and embark on a path of co-operation. India and Pakistan, as the two core countries of South Asia, will not abandon their nuclear programmes until and unless the areas of insecurity are neutralised. The cause is historical and political differences; the effect, an arms race and propaganda warfare. The eventual outcome of 47 years of confrontation is the deepening of economic crises and underdevelopment in these two countries. India and Pakistan cannot eliminate the political and historical source of their confrontation by resorting to a military solution. That will further exacerbate the problem and lead India and Pakistan nowhere but to anguish and disaster. New Delhi and Islamabad should draw lessons from the Soviet disunion and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact.

The logical argument following an examination of such events is that endless confrontation may lead to unpredictable disaster. India and Pakistan may meet the same fate as did the former USSR if a consensus between the two neighbours is not reached to resolve their disputes peacefully. On these grounds, Gorbachev's proposals for disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region have not been applied in South Asia. It will require political will on the part of the regimes of South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, to recognize the state of unabated confrontation and agree on co-operation. Some positive signs of conflict resolution and disarmament are emerging in Southeast Asia, the South Pacific region and Northeast Asia. Except for a few areas of conflict, the overall picture of those regions is reasonably bright.

Regional consensus

Contrary to Northeast and Southeast Asia, where a relative understanding has been reached with regard to security and disarmament, South Asia is still in a perpetual state of tension and conflict. The two major countries of South Asia   India and Pakistan   are engaged in relentless warfare on conflicting matters, particularly with regard to the Kashmir and Siachen disputes and the nuclear issue. There are also notable unsettled territorial and political disputes between New Delhi and its neighbours besides Pakistan   particularly Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Indo-Nepalese relations were also not tension-free. The South Asian perspective on security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region is based on the need for consensus among the countries of that region to initiate dialogue for conflict resolution. Military or political aspects of security are of secondary importance as long as economic, historical, and psychological disputes remain unresolved. For a large contingent of the South Asian people, the real issue is not conventional or nuclear deterrence, but rather their own economic survival. The entire South Asian security framework will remain unstable and fragile as long as current patterns and trends go unchanged. When the political environment is conducive to dialogue, then one can expect the security phenomenon to be handled in a broader framework. The need is to change the political course of events in South Asia by abandoning a conventional approach to security and power. Regardless of imbalance in the Indo-Pakistani power structure, the psychological and historical mistrust could dissipate if the two parties go ahead with their normalisation process as equals and adhere to the recognised norms of international law.

Institutional framework

The South Asian perspective on security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region is also based on the adoption of an institutional framework for monitoring the process of peace and security. It

is not essential that all the sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific region should have similar institutional arrangements. Southeast Asia may follow a different model of conflict resolution than does Northeast Asia. But in essence, the eventual outcome of such an arrangement should be the accomplishment of goals like co-operation, peace, collective security, and disarmament. Apart from the Helsinki model of peace and co-operation, Gorbachev's proposals for a pan-Asian conference may also be considered as a basis for a future Asia-Pacific security framework. Moreover, the entire exercise of conflict resolution in the Asia-Pacific region will require the adoption of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in military and non-military fields. The process may take decades and would require revamping of the political, economic, and security systems of the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in South Asia.

Confidence-Building Measures

As far as South Asia is concerned, disarmament is an elusive goal. In a situation where the political atmosphere is charged with tension and mistrust, the task of achieving peace and disarmament seems arduous. Optimism would suggest that despite impediments to conflict resolution in South Asia, the process of dialogue on the governmental and non-governmental levels should continue. Against this background, the question arises - what steps have been taken towards the relaxation of tension in South Asia, particularly between India and Pakistan? It is interesting to note that the processes of conflict and co-operation are going on simultaneously in South Asia. SAARC has emerged as a forum for strengthening the bonds of regional co-operation, whereas unresolved disputes, on the other hand, vitiate the regional environment with suspicion, mistrust, hostile propaganda, and arms buildup. At one point, the threat of war was avoided by New Delhi and Islamabad. Intending to defuse tensions, India and Pakistan undertook several measures in 1990-1991 for trust-building and avoidance of an accidental war. For instance, in 1990, India and Pakistan initiated the process of holding Foreign Secretaries' talks, in order to keep the dialogue option open. On 6 April 1991, New Delhi and Islamabad signed two accords. The first dealt with advance intimation of troop movement. Both countries also agreed to allow the other's aircraft to fly over and land in their territories through specified air corridors. The second accord pledged not to carry on military exercises near the two countries' borders without first informing their counterpart.[17] Apart from the April accords, another step was taken by India and Pakistan with regard to CBMs and war avoidance. On 27 August 1991, the Directors-General of Military Operations of India and Pakistan agreed to defuse tensions in the Poonch sector. The agreement was reached when the Pakistani Director-General contacted his Indian counterpart and conveyed his country's serious concern over an unprovoked Indian attack on a Pakistani post in the Poonch sector. The Indian military official was told that such incidents would affect CBMs taken by the two countries over a period of time.[18] The Indo-Pakistani trust-building process also included agreements not to attack one another's nuclear installations, signing of a cultural agreement, and formation of a Joint Commission.

At the fifth round of Indo-Pakistani Foreign Secretaries' talks held on 31 October 1991, the two countries agreed to inform one another about the location of their nuclear installations and facilities. On 1 January 1992, India and Pakistan handed over all relevant information with regard to their nuclear installations and facilities. Such an act proved their readiness to go ahead with the practical aspect of their CBMs. In the fifth round of talks, Islamabad and New Delhi also discussed

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[17] See news item, "Accords with India Signed", *Dawn*, 7 April 1991. Also see editorial, "Agreements welcome but still inadequate", *The Muslim*, Islamabad, 8 April 1991.

[18] *The Muslim*, 28 August 1991.

issues relating to disarmament and the banning of weapons of mass destruction. They agreed to convene a meeting of experts of the two sides at mutually-convenient dates, to exchange views on a bilateral agreement to ban the development, production, deployment, and use of chemical weapons.[19] One important aspect of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan is that the two sides cannot discuss their disputes under the aegis of SAARC, which is a primary reason to keep the dialogue option open.

A South Asian political order?

The South Asian perspective on security and disarmament also includes changes in the global system. According to some analysts of this region, changes in the world order have not led to any positive outcomes in South Asia. Their perception is that there is a need to replace the existing order in South Asia with a new order that will meet the legitimate demands of the people of this region, particularly those related to economic development, political constancy, social stability, environmental protection, debt burdens and the arms race. It is indisputable that the real problems faced by the South Asian countries pertain to democracy, peace, and development. In a recent seminar in Lahore, Pakistan, eminent Indian journalist Bhabani Sen Gupta remarked:

> The rulers of the area (fired) their guns not only at another state but also upon their own people, and spent huge resources for the maintenance of law and order... The end of the Cold War and changes in the (outside) world... have not brought the countries of the region closer, but instead they (have) remained as isolated as ever. The result was that they were spending...huge resources in building and strengthening their armies, as if they wanted to maintain the conflict and tension. There is no way out except to turn to each other and start a dialogue in order to rectify the wrongs they (have) done in the past.[20]

With regard to political order in South Asia, it was also maintained by another speaker of the seminar that:

> Our order will be based on peace, friendship, and progress. Not only the South Asian states, but those in the Third World, in Asia and Africa, could also be attracted to the regional entities. Our resources and potentials must be utilised for prosperity, for which peace is essential.[21]

The optimistic school of thought asserts that eventually the South Asian countries will find a recourse to co-operation. Given the fact that the bulk of the South Asian population is exposed to such ills of society as poverty, underdevelopment, ignorance, and malnutrition, the only way to achieve the goals of progress and prosperity is through conflict resolution. Such a task requires elimination of mutual mistrust and suspicion on all levels and the involvement of NGOs to bring the people of the region together on minimum levels of co-operation - particularly in education, science and technology, health, environmental hazards, etc.

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[19]   "Pakistan, India to reveal N-Locations", *Dawn*, 1 November 1991.

[20]   "Seminar Calls for Regional Order to SAARC States", *Dawn*, 10 September 1991.

[21]   Ibid. It was pointed out by Mr. Radhika Cmmarswami, Associate Director of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies in Colombo, that "peace must be within the regional states and among them. For this, trust and faith (will) have to be created, and it can be achieved (quickly) if intellectuals and non-government organisations (take) up the challenge."

Lack of common perspective

The South Asian role towards security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region is so obscure and ambivalent that it is questionable whether there is any real perspective at all. Due to the fact that the SAARC countries are deeply engrossed in their own internal predicaments, their common perspective has not emerged on many vital external issues. India and Pakistan have different perceptions on the issues of security and disarmament, particularly on nuclear non-proliferation.

The SAARC has not collectively responded to the issues of security, disarmament and intra-regional conflicts in various sub-regions of Asia and the Pacific. However, on the non-governmental level, a common South Asian perspective begins to appear. There has emerged a relative degree of consensus in South Asia that some experience can be shared with those countries of the Asia-Pacific region who have successfully achieved economic prosperity and are also trying to resolve security issues. It is essential that the SAARC countries should adopt a common perspective on matters relating to security, disarmament, unresolved conflicts, and economic development. In this way, their responses to developments in the Asia-Pacific region will be uniform and consistent.

Conclusion

There are two possibilities as far as the future scenario of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region is concerned. First, the failure to settle regional conflicts may lead to unpredictable results. It will provide a pretext for a continued military involvement of the "Big Powers" in the Asia-Pacific region and will preclude efforts for co-operation, collective security and disarmament. Second, the process of conflict resolution in Northeast and Southeast Asia will continue to result in the relaxation of tensions. Much depends upon the outcome of changes in the global power structure.

The road to security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region will not be smooth, however. It will take some time to stabilise the ongoing process of co-operation in different critical areas of the Asia-Pacific region, with particular attention being given to conflict resolution and confidence-building. The scope of a proposal like the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) should be extended to South Asia, and a consensus on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) should be reached among the regional countries. Such steps are essential for accentuating the process of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region. Minimal co-operation from significant military powers, especially the United States, for disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region includes Washington's naval and military withdrawal from that region. As long as the United States maintains a deterrent posture in the Asia-Pacific region, it will be difficult to implement plans for disarmament and a viable security system. The post-Cold War era should witness substantial reductions in arms build-up, not just the maintenance of the *status quo*.

Chapter 8

Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific Developments and Prospects - South Asian Perspectives

Mervyn de Silva

So much is in a state of flux, that a discussion on the post-Cold War processes of global change can hardly keep pace with the far-reaching, diverse, and often unpredictable consequences of such change. Ours is one such exercise, and it is right that this colloquium is held under the auspices of the UN, since the future of the UN, in what has been introduced to us as a "New World Order", is itself a critical issue.

"From the outset of the actual war in the Gulf, the role of the UN was diminished almost to zero," observed Richard Falk. "Is this the way", he asked, "the UN was expected to work on behalf of international peace and security?" Recently, the UN has assumed a direct role as a "peace-keeping force" in two regional conflicts in Asia, and one in Europe.

This paper[1] is almost exclusively devoted to the Sri Lankan conflict, which involved India, the major regional power, in sundry roles, finally including a 50-60,000 strong peace-keeping force. Attention is paid to the genesis of the armed conflict, and to the salient features of its evolution, its cross-border consequences which externalised the problem, the remarkable rise in defence spending, with the involvement of the big neighbour, and how the conflict tended to be "regionalised."

The fast-changing nature of armed conflict, and therefore, the character of likely challenges in the immediate future, provide the focus of this paper. In no way is this a diversion from such urgencies as nuclear proliferation, or the specific question of the NPT in the South Asian context. The IDSA Director, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh and other Indian defence spokesmen, make a valid point when they argue that Indian security needs cannot be discussed in an exclusively South Asian context. India and China, an extra-regional nuclear power, have gone to war over a territorial dispute which remains unresolved.

A reference to Kashmir, an oppressive legacy of both India and Pakistan from independence and the region's generic conflict, is made in a recent statement of the CIA Director, Robert M. Gates:

> In South Asia, the arms race between India and Pakistan is a major concern. Not only do both countries have nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, but they have recently pursued the acquisition of chemical weapons as well. These weapons are particularly worrisome because of constant tension and conflict in Kashmir.

Arms Trade

Weaponry, however awe-inspiring, should not be elevated into a mystique that is unrelated to conflict, or to the assertion of will by states and non-state actors, anti-systemic or secessionist. In arguing that NATO needs structural alterations, Henry Kissinger says that:

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[1] The material printed and distributed by UNIDIR was submitted by the writer in several instalments. The material needed more rigorous editing than the writer was able to undertake. For this lapse, and the inclusion of a footnote in the body of the text, the author must accept responsibility. The above is a much shorter version, presenting the main arguments, and edited for final publication.

A more flexible NATO structure is desirable because the more likely dangers are ethnic conflicts, as in Yugoslavia, or crises among the republics in the former Soviet Union, or an upheaval in the Moslem world...

"More likely dangers" need to be underlined. From perceived danger to "security" is a snort step. What is it that makes regions, or elites, insecure?

It is surely some perceived threat which leads regimes to seek "security" in armies, armouries, and military pacts. The "twin engines" of the arms race are this "insecurity", coupled with "the ability to pay", said Gerald Segal. Again, Sri Lanka presents a stimulating study.

Before independence, Ceylon was Britain's "best bet", and "model colony." In the first post-independence decade, food, education, and health were subsidised; the political system was open, democratic, and vigorous; defence expenditure was minimal, and the army was ceremonial.[2]

Sri Lanka's defence budget ranked fifth in the Asia-Pacific region, notes the Military Balance 1991-1992 of the IISS (London). At 5.9 per cent of its GNP, the island's military expenditure was only below North Korea, Pakistan, Burma, and Brunei. It has now become a regular target, not just of the IMF and the World Bank, but of many members of the AID SRI LANKA CONSORTIUM. A new threat faces the state, the threat to cut off or reduce development assistance unless the government reaches a negotiated settlement of the (separatist) Tamil conflict. The "threat", then, is not merely to the island's territorial integrity, but to the free exercise of its national sovereignty. The old assumption that a threat to a state's sovereignty, independence, and unity, can be posed only by a militarily powerful neighbour, is now an illusion.

It takes two to keep a "war" ("low" or "mid-intensity") going, for not all parties to a conflict are arms manufacturers. Two former SIPRI Directors, Frank Barnaby and Frank Blackaby, together with ten western activists of the Peace and Disarmament campaign, issued a press statement which noted:

> The invasion of Kuwait highlighted the danger of the conventional arms trade, and elevated the issue on the international agenda.

Observing that the 5 permanent members (the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China) accounted for 85 per cent of the world's arms exports, the signatories pointed out that a top-level conference in London, in October, 1991, had set out the guidelines for arms sales. The US delegate had hoped there would be a reduction in sales to Middle East. "The reality is different", said the signatories, "from the rhetoric. Despite the talk of restraints, Europe and the US are competing to sell weaponry."

What of the situation in this region, South Asia and Southeast Asia? The New York Times reported:

> In sharp contrast to the rest of the world, South Asia is on the brink of a nuclear arms race, according to senior western diplomats and foreign political personalities who have recently visited Delhi...

More interesting was another observation:

> The arms race is viewed with particular alarm because of the continuing tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir...

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[2]   "In no other country in the whole of South and Southeast Asia, from the Persian Gulf to the Arc of Indonesia, had there been such public peace. The imminence of violence diverted neither men nor materials from more productive uses"- Howard Wriggins, *Dilemmas of a New Nation*, 1960.

Admittedly, the prevailing climate, both political will and public opinion, is helpful. Yet market forces, supply and demand, seem to be stronger. Can control mechanisms be devised? Will sovereign states, Members of the UN, agree to comply, if the threat to their territorial integrity is real and serious? Imperilled regimes, often fighting for survival, are unlikely to agree to neutral inspection. Will the global arms bazaar agree to go out of business, in these times of recession and unemployment?

Roots of Revolt

In any event, non-state belligerents, from insurgents to terrorist groups, will remain an attractive market as long as domestic conflicts   political and social, but chiefly ethnic - plague the "Third World." Lately, this type of conflict could erupt, not just in the former "Socialist" countries, but even in the socially disturbed "First World."

A report on two TIME-sponsored seminars held quite recently in Delhi and Singapore, concluded:

> Yet, as elsewhere around the world, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have swept like an eraser across the blackboard of South Asia's security equations, the only exception being Sri Lanka's bitter feud between Tamils and Sinhalese.

Sri Lankan exceptionalism, as this paper has already noted, was founded on its post-independence record, its first phase. The island's enormous investment in social welfare - subsidised food, health services, and non-fee paying state education - helped to sustain political stability and parliamentary democracy. Yet, it did unwittingly foster "revolution", the revolution of rising youth expectations. In an increasingly competitive party system, each contender promised more of the same. The welfare budget was soon beyond the capacities of an essentially dependent economy, resting on a tripod of tea, rubber, and coconut.

A steady drop in export earnings, a growing population, and the aspirations of a new, more demanding generation, exploded in a Sinhalese-Buddhist (JVP) insurrection, more comic-opera than romantic Guevarism.

The JVP insurrection was swiftly quelled. India came to the pro-Delhi Bandaranaike government's help promptly. While India was supportive, Pakistan was sympathetic. These responses were to change radically in the next decade, when President Jayawardene's government was challenged by the separatist LTTE, the Tamil "Tigers." The "Tigers", and other Tamil militants, were in fact trained in India, in special camps, and armed.

Security Equation

However, 1971 was far more crucial in terms of the region's security equation. East Pakistan raised the banner of secessionist revolt and independence. The *mukti bahini* launched a liberation struggle against the Pakistani army. India intervened, the huge refugee flow providing a *casus belli*. A new state came into being - Bangladesh. Identity, based on language, prevailed over religious (Islamic) allegiance.

In the same year, Henry Kissinger, helped by Pakistan, made the historic breakthrough to China, a China that had thrashed the Indian army a decade earlier over a territorial issue that remains unresolved. Also in 1971, India, the authentic founder of the nonaligned movement (not Tito's Yugoslavia), signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty, seemingly insensitive to the implications of a pact

whereby the leading light of "Non-alignment" enjoyed a treaty-based relationship with a Super Power. Its real implications, of course, were geo-strategic, not ideological.

Thus, the unique "security equation" involved the two major South Asian powers, the most important extra-regional Asian military power, and the two Super Powers. With the end of the Cold War, this equation has unravelled. The former Indian Defence Minister K.C. Pant, confessed:

> The old co-ordinates are suddenly gone and we seem to be groping for direction ...

The internal turmoil in the sub-continent, caused primarily by several separatist insurgencies and mobilised ethnic identity, coincides with the collapse of a once stable security equation. The conceptual frame of policy-makers and advisers is in pieces. The discomfiture of the supportive academic community is all too evident. Great disorder under the heavens!

The significant stages in the evolution of the conflict need to be explained briefly. Sri Lanka's exceptionally lively parliamentarian was nourished by, and in turn promoted, a highly competitive party system. Since votes mattered most, majority Sinhalese interests claimed the highest priority. Sinhala replaced (the neutral) English as the sole official language. That gave the Sinhalese a head-start in the race for civil service jobs, providing security and reasonably good pay. For both communities, nationalism was not totally divorced from economic self-interest.

Tamil parliamentary criticism was ignored or smothered. All attempts at extra-parliamentary (non-violent) agitation were crushed. The character of the Tamil "struggle", its stated aims, and its vanguard, soon changed from non-violent protest to terrorism and insurgency, and from federalism to separatism. Leadership slipped steadily from the middle-class English to unemployed Tamil youth. A program in the Sinhala South, and a full-scale police action followed by army operations in the Tamil North, constituted the state's response.

As the killings in the North increased, to make news in the Indian and world press, and the refugee exodus to Tamilnadu inflamed opinion in that politically important South Indian state, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi saw a "target of opportunity", as inviting as that which East Pakistan presented in 1970-71.

Indian Response

Internal socio-political change in Sri Lanka, and the radical transformation of its foreign policy were perceived as direct and serious challenges to Indian domestic and regional security interests. Meanwhile, the armed forces and defence budget expanded dramatically, acquiring some of the general characteristics identified by political sociologists, like Nicos Paulantzas. Soon, the island's much admired polity would reveal some of the features of the "National Security State." And, as Johan Galtung observes in his preface to *Global Militarization*, a military system is "ultimately intended to be used, and used in a conflict."

> But a conflict can be analyzed as a conflict formation, consisting of parties and a conflict issue. To analyze the military system without taking this factor into account would be a little bit like analyzing a hospital without any reference to patients or diseases... .

From "conflict formation" in Sri Lanka, we turn to the Indian reaction.

In 1945, K.M. Pakikkar, an eminent pre-independence Indian writer on strategic issues, was the first to,

advocate the concept of the Indian Ocean as *mare nostrum* for India, justifying an extended Indian security sphere in the Indian Ocean area.[3]

On the essential needs of Indian naval defence, another Indian specialist wrote:

The first and primary consideration is that both Burma and ceylon must form with India the basic federation for mutual defence whether they will or not.[4]

This was written just two years after independence. In the same year (1949), the president of the Congress Party, that has governed India almost without a break, said:

India and Ceylon must have a common strategy and common defence strength and common defence resources. It cannot be that Ceylon is in friendship with a group with which India is not in friendship - not that Ceylon has no right to make its own alignments and declare its own affiliations - but if there are two hostile groups in the world, and Ceylon and India are with one or the other of them and not with the same group, it will be a bad day for both."[5]

"Ceylonese statesmen can count on a lively future", Howard Wriggins observed (1960),

Because of their exposed nodal position in the Indian Ocean, they cannot expect to be ignored unless the Indian Ocean itself becomes irrelevant in world political developments.

With "security" as a focal point of this discussion, and the "Asia-Pacific" region its parameters, it should be remembered that Colombo and Trincomalee figured prominently in the Indo-Lanka exchange. It may be asked then, whether Indian security concepts are part of the imperial inheritance? In 1776, British forces dislodged the Dutch from Ceylon's maritime provinces, beginning with strategic Trincomalee, and finishing with Colombo. After the Treaty of Amiens (1802), William Pitt proudly proclaimed to Parliament that Ceylon,

The most valuable colonial possession on the globe was now British... giving to our Indian Empire a security it has not enjoyed from its first establishment.

New Relationship

Foreign policy was Sri Lanka's first line of defence against a mighty neighbour that may turn hostile or too exacting in its demands, at the expense of Sri Lankan sovereignty and independence. India did have a legitimate reason for "interference" the presence in the island's heartland of one million Indian Tamil plantation workers in the central highlands. Tea, the main commercial crop, is the largest hard currency-earner. There was also a minor territorial dispute over some islets.

A foreign policy, congruence and personal friendship between Mrs. Gandhi and Mrs. Bandaranaike, brought Sri Lanka quite ample rewards on both of these unsettled issues.

The rewards of the transaction were not always one-way. It was Mrs. Bandaranaike, not Mrs. Gandhi, who presented the resolution to make the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace", free from big power rivalries, at the Nonaligned Summit in Lusaka, in 1970. This had a direct bearing on bases such as Diego Garcia, which proved to be of such immense value to the US in the Gulf War. The

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[3] Cited by Prof. Shelton Kodikara in "Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka."
[4] Cited by Prof. Shelton Kodikara in "Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka."
[5] Cited by Prof. Shelton Kodikara in "Foreign Policy of Sri Lanka."

British had leased Diego Garcia to the US, having moved much of the island's small population to Mauritius. On the same grounds, the resolution was successfully introduced in the UN General Assembly in 1971, the same year that Indian help proved useful to the Bandaranaike, leading the United Front to crush the Sinhala youth insurgency. The United Front included the pro-Moscow Communist party. The anti-US or pro-Soviet tilt was common to both Colombo and Delhi, in the very year that Mrs. Gandhi signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty.

Indo-Sri Lanka relations worsened rapidly with the new Jayawardene government's adoption of both a new economic strategy and foreign policy. On both, Jayawardene's model was Singapore. Jayawardene persisted in questioning the very basis of Nehruvian non-alignment and "Socialism." Jayawardene threatened to create a "second Singapore" on India's doorstep. This was taken as an intolerable act of defiance, a challenge to India and its regional supremacy.

Coercive Diplomacy

Coercive diplomacy was Delhi's retaliatory reply. Training and arming the Tamil separatist militants in a CIA-style covert operation was the initial move. Their infiltration across the Palk Straits was the next. Propaganda and diplomatic pressure on Colombo, directly and indirectly, provided back-up support. The refugee flow and the destabilising effect on South India legitimised Indian reactions, converting these to "benign intervention."

Only Pakistan's President Zia was prepared to defy Delhi. His reasons were not, of course, entirely altruistic. Indeed, the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict and the Tamil insurgency acquired the features of a shadowy Indo-Pak "proxy war." China's assistance to Colombo could also be broadly interpreted in this manner.

On a visit to the US, the staunchest of America's long-standing friends in the Third World, President Jayawardene, nicknamed "Yankee Dicky" by the left movement, was offered little. Unwilling to alienate India, President Reagan (and his roving trouble-shooter, General Vernon Walters) set up an "Israeli interests section" in the US Embassy in Colombo, a unique arrangement. Israeli military instructors and intelligence advisers arrived in Colombo, but operated mainly in the island's eastern province, which the North-based Tamil "Tigers" claimed was "part of the traditional homeland."

The eastern province is ethnically mixed   42 per cent Tamils, 33 per cent Muslims (Tamil-speaking), and the rest Sinhala. Plainly, militarily and politically, the "East" is the real battle-ground. It is hardly a coincidence that the sudden appearance of Israeli advisers should result in Moslem mobilisation. Quite suddenly, the Moslem youth produced their own militia. Who gave them the weapons and the money? Was the Arab-Israeli or Israel-Islam conflict thrusting itself into the Sri Lankan imbroglio, activating the hitherto uninvolved Muslim community, the vital "third factor" in the Sri Lanka equation? Foreign help complicated and deepened the conflict, given its nature and political geography.

An India-brokered "peace talks", in a neutral capital (Thimpu), failed. So did Delhi's efforts at managing the conflict by exerting pressure on both parties, the government, and the Tamil militants. Already, Delhi had lost control over the "Tigers", partly because of LTTE intransigence, and partly because of the fact that Delhi had extended greater patronage to more amenable anti-LTTE groups.

For his part, Jayawardene was forced to reconsider the military option. With a larger army, more and better weapons purchased at high prices, and foreign intelligence advisers and instructors in the field, Jayawardene decided he could no longer resist the pressures of a demanding Sinhala constituency and an aggressive opposition.

When *Operation Liberation* appeared to be scoring some successes in the strategic northern Jaffna Peninsula, the Tamil heartland and the LTTE's main base, India intervened militarily.

Indian MIGs flew over Jaffna. An air-drop of food and medical supplies was the mildest warning of what could come next. Nonetheless, it was a blatant violation of international law.

The Indo-Sri Lanka "peace accord", a shotgun wedding, was presented by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi as

an agreement that ushers back peace and tranquillity. It secures justice for the Tamil minority; it provides autonomy that is approximately that of an Indian state... It safeguards the Tamil identity, their language and their culture.

Mr. Gandhi added:

Apart from the agreement which looks to Tamil interests in Sri Lanka, we also had an exchange of letters between President Jayawardene and me. It is in this exchange of letters that we have addressed the security problems in the region. With this exchange of letters we will ensure that such hostile forces are not allowed to come into our region.

The main points were:

- Trincomalee, or any other parts, will not be given for military use in a manner prejudicial to Indian interests. Restoring and operating "an oil tank farm" in Trinco will be a joint Indo-Sri Lanka venture;
- Sri Lanka will make sure that foreign broadcasting organisations will use such facilities only for public broadcasting and not for any military or intelligence purposes. (This referred to the VOA);
- Sri Lanka and India will also reach an early understanding on "the relevance and employment" of foreign military and intelligence personnel." (A reference to the Israelis).

India failed to persuade the "Tigers" to accept the accord. A new war started, with an Indian Peace-Keeping Force, 6,000 strong, pitted against the "Tigers." It should be a short, sharp exercise and our boys should be back home soon, said Mr. Gandhi, plainly insensitive to any "Vietnam" overtones. 60,000 troops, and more than three years later, the IPKF was persuaded to go home by a newly elected Sri Lankan President, Mr. R. Premadasa, who had seen how the presence of such a formidable foreign force from India had allowed the Sinhala-Buddhist *ultras* to launch a "Holy War" in the South.

As I write this paper, Sri Lankan newspapers carry advertisements, placed by the Indian authorities, seeking information and assistance to apprehend Velupillai Prabhakaran, the "Tiger" Supremo, held guilty by an Indian court of planning the brutal assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the world's largest democracy, the scion of one of the modern world's most illustrious dynasties. He was the casualty of a small neighbouring island's ethnic conflict. India has still not banned the LTTE, though the Chief Minister of Tamilnadu is pressing Delhi to do so.

In the final twist of irony, the Indian navy will conduct joint exercises with the US in the Indian Ocean. India will has not only establish full diplomatic relations with Israel, but will seek Israeli counter-terrorist expertise, particularly cross-border terrorism, and technology.

India's most famous general, Sam Manekshaw, the hero of Bangladesh, and two IPKF generals, have blamed "poor political direction" for the IPKF's large looses in this "low-intensity conflict."

This is a sound corrective to current approaches which concentrate entirely on weaponry. As the Chinese would say, "politics in command." Or policy first, particularly when an authoritative observer of Mr. James Schlesinger's standing, says:

The world order of the future will revert to that which existed before 1939, most notably, after World War I. It will be marked by power politics, national rivalries, and ethnic tensions.

Chapter 9

Responses

First Response

Abdul Hafiz

In his article , Moonis Ahmar attempts to examine the issues of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War Era. His inquiry on the subject revolves round the following:

- First, proposals and plans presented on the issues of security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific region;
- Second, any linkage between such proposals and the Helsinki model of peace and co-operation;
- Third, the developments and prospects for security and disarmament in this region; and
- Lastly, a South Asian perspective on the whole issue.

On the first issue, Moonis Ahmar concentrates his discussions on a series of well-known proposals, forwarded by former Soviet leader Gorbachev, with a view to promoting peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region. He looks at Gorbachev's proposals with high hopes, as most of the analysts did prior to Soviet disunion. He is less aware of the changed context. Obviously, most of the plans and proposals are no longer relevant in the present circumstances, and the author fails to take into account many changes and realities of the post-Soviet era. Gorbachev's proposals were aimed at transforming the bipolar international order into, more or less, a multi-polar one, while securing an important place for the (former) Soviet Union in the new order, second only to the US. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has become the virtual arbiter of world developments, while Russia - at least for the time being has become a non factor. On the other hand, new poles of power are emerging in the international arena, including in the Asia-Pacific region. The political situation in the Asia-Pacific region remains rather fluid. While US influence in the region is being quietly undermined, uncertainties loom large, particularly with regard to the relations among the regional powers themselves, and their relations with the US. Under the circumstances, a departure from the Gorbachevian approach, that would take into account not only the post-Cold War realities, but also the post-Soviet realities of regional and international politics, is a *sine qua non* for formulating any realistic proposal for Asian security.

On the second issue, Moonis Ahmar is more realistic, as he argues that the Helsinki model of peace and co-operation, as implemented in Europe, cannot be applicable to the Asia-Pacific region because of the quite different circumstances prevailing in the latter.

Following his evaluation of a series of recent developments, Moonis Ahmar concludes that in Northeast and Southeast Asia, a relative understanding has been reached with regard to security and disarmament, while South Asia is still "in a perpetual state of tension and conflict." His discussions on South Asia turn to the Indo-Pakistan conflict over a number of issues like Kashmir, and nuclear arms race, in particular. There is no discussion on India's relations with Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. As a matter of fact, the conflict scenario in South Asia in the 1990s was dominated by India and Sri Lanka, not Pakistan. In the view of the deadlock in Indo-Pakistan relations, lack of common perspectives on security, and others, disarmament in South Asia is an

illusive goal. Nonetheless, on-going processes of co-operation with the framework of SAARC, and a number of measures aimed at building confidence in Indo-Pakistan relations, make Ahmar, like many South Asia analysts, optimistic about a positive turn in inter-state relations in the region.

Second Response

Sukh Deo Muni

First of all, I must express my sincere thanks to UNIDIR in general and its Director Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, in particular, for inviting me to participate in this conference, both the timing and the theme of which are apt and significant. I am also thankful to our Chinese hosts who have taken great care in ensuring a warm and generous hospitality.

I have greatly enjoyed reading two very well written papers of my colleagues from Sri Lanka and Pakistan. The titles and arguments of these papers, however, put me in some confusion regarding the thrust of this session as to whether we are discussing:

1.   Perspectives of South Asian Scholars (and countries!) on the problems of Asia-Pacific Security as a whole; or
2.   Perspectives on the Security of the South Asian segment of Asia-Pacific region.

These two questions are very different and the Chairman of this session Professor Ryukichi Imai, Former Ambassador and Visiting Professor, Sophia University, Tokyo, has very rightly underlined the confusion in his opening remarks. The question is pertinent to my discussion because while Dr. Moonis Ahmar's paper covers both aspects of the problem, that of Mervyn de Silva focuses sharply on the South Asian, nay Sri Lankan internal security problem. Both papers put together, however, raise many important issues regarding South Asian security which deserve close scrutiny.

Dr. Ahmar has devoted considerable space and attention to Gorbachev's proposals, starting with his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, for Asia-Pacific security. He has described various stages in its evolution and subsequent moves. But any one who is discussing these issues in 1992 cannot avoid a critical examination of the shortcomings and failures of Gorbachev's initiatives. For example his idea of an Asian Helsinki, as a forum for resolving conflicts and building confidence in the Asia-Pacific region was a non-starter from the beginning. This is also somewhat disturbing that Dr. Ahmar does not take into account other factors and forces that are emerging to re-define strategic equations and power balance in the region.

Dr. Ahmar's discussion of South Asian security issues does not go beyond the identification of known strategic contradictions between India and Pakistan. There are a number of platitudes, pious sentiments and lament about the SAARC's (South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation) failure to act as a security forum, but these do not fulfil the need for an in-depth scrutiny of many complex security problems of South Asia.

Mervyn's paper is narrowly focused on Sri Lanka. The arguments range between the general thrust of Sri Lanka's foreign policy to its unhappy interactions with India, particularly in the context of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict. The thrust of his arguments is to hold Indian policy responsible for most of Sri Lanka's ethnic predicaments and the charge is not unfounded. But this provides only a partial answer to the Sri Lankan security (internal) dilemma, which started long before India's unwelcome involvement; first in 1971 in the form of JVP insurgency and then during the eighties as a result of ethnic conflict, and the dilemma persists even after India's near complete dissociation

with the island's political problems. More than two years after the withdrawal of Indian Peace-keeping Forces, the Sinhala-Tamil conflict continues as intensely as ever.

Since Mervyn de Silva decided to concentrate on Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, it was expected of him to go into the root-cause of this conflict   the discrimination against Tamils since the late forties. This discrimination was the outcome of the majority community's ill founded sense of insecurity *vis-à-vis* Tamils. Mervyn should also have devoted some space to the changing context of South Asian strategic equations in the post-cold war period, where India's relations with China and the US are undergoing significant political changes. It would have been better if in the background of these changes, prospects of Indo-Sri Lanka relations could be analyzed.

It was indeed disappointing that the papers on a session devoted to the South Asian dimension of Asia-Pacific security did not take into account the consequences of the outcome of the Gulf War and the Soviet Union's disintegration. Some of the emerging trends in this respect deserve attention from the point of view of the region's security. One is that traditional patterns of strategic equations are no longer stable. Hence the changes in the interaction between regional actors (India and Pakistan in particular) with the major economic and military powers (like the US, China, EC and Japan). The situation is still in flux and will perhaps remain so for some time to come. During this period of transition, foreign and defence (including military procurement) policies of the South Asian major actors will pass through different phases of ambiguity and disorientation.

Secondly, there is both horizontal and vertical intensification of internal turmoil in the South Asian countries. This is due to three mutually reinforcing factors, namely:

1. Sharpening of the nation-state hiatus (subnational and ethnic conflicts and insurgencies);
2. Strengthening of democratic movements (Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Bhutan); and
3. Explosion of economic aspirations; while international developmental support is becoming hard to come by.

These problem are making South Asia's security problem more and more inward looking. The problems of Kashmir, Punjab and Assam in India, of Sindh in Pakistan, of Tamils in Sri Lanka and of Nepalis in Bhutan clearly underline this fact. Similarly the difficulties being faced by the fragile democratic forces in getting them stabilised and consolidated in Nepal and Bangladesh keep the political situation uncertain and inherently unstable in these countries.

The third consequence of post-cold war changes relevant to South Asian security is the emergence of Central Asian republics as sovereign, independent States, from the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Though these new States, after initial hesitation and uncertainty, signed a mutual defence pact to let the Russian Federation have the overall control over their nuclear arsenal, the presence of nuclear weapons in the territories of South Asian neighbourhood has complicated the nuclear question in South Asia. Fears have also been expressed about the unguarded sale, clandestine transfer of nuclear technology and material from these new States, and also perhaps the Russian Federation, to other countries.

Fears have also been expressed about the potential for Muslim fundamentalism and the emergence of a new Islamic bloc with the help of Turkey, Pakistan, Iran or Saudi Arabia in the Central Asian region. There do not seem to be any immediate prospects of such a development but if political and economic chaos in these States continue, emergence and assertion of fundamentalist forces in the due course of time cannot be ruled out. Adjacent countries like China (with restive Muslim minority in Xinxiang) and India (with an active insurgency in Kashmir) have already become concerned about it. China had in fact cautioned Pakistan about the role of some of its Islamic fundamentalist groups in inciting similar forces in Xinxiang and Central Asia.

Last, but not of least significance, for the South Asian security is the role of the only post-cold war Super Power, the US. There are identifiable moves on the part of the US to construct a new and amenable strategic balance in the region by building parallel equations with major regional actors like China, India and Pakistan. Growing Indo-US co-operation in the defence field is a typical example of such new equations. The instruments of technology transfers, investments, economic assistance and political pressures and incentives are being subtly used in this exercise. There are both positive as well as negative implications of this US role for the security concerns of the South Asian States. Positively, the US has sought to moderate the traditional bilateral conflicts in the region such as between India and Pakistan and India and China. Between India and Pakistan, the US has emphasized the need and urgency for confidence-building measures and asked Pakistan, in no uncertain terms, to desist from aiding and encouraging insurgencies and separatist forces in India's kashmir and Punjab areas. This peace-making role of the US is in keeping with its post-cold war strategic and economic stakes wherein tensions and conflict between India and Pakistan can seriously disturb the US interests in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean regions.

Negatively, the US is exercising considerable pressure on India and Pakistan to make them fall in line on the questions of non-proliferation and missile technology control regime. There are also difficulties being experienced by India and Pakistan in obtaining other sophisticated military technologies and equipments due to US pressures. The West in general and the US in particular expects the South Asian countries to reduce their defence expenditures and liberalize their economics to admit US products and investments. Reduction in India's defence spending over the past couple of years is generally viewed as the result of such pressure. There is some uneasiness on this account in India since there is no reduction in the defence expenditure of its adversarial neighbours; Pakistan and China.

The breakdown of the global strategic balance of the Cold War origin has provided impetus to the local and regional roots of conflicts to surface in South Asia. Attention may be drawn to three of such conflicts. One is of course the continuing internal war in Afghanistan. The Geneva accords between the two erstwhile Super Powers and the withdrawal of Soviet forces hardly added any thing to the prospects of peace in the unfortunate country. Western analysts and policy makers were hopeful that Najibullah's removal from the political scene in Afghanistan would facilitate restoration of peace and order in the country. This has not happened and many would admit now that he had a better understanding of contending forces arrayed against him. It appears that in the post-Najib Afghanistan, struggle for power has been defined along ethnic rivalries with neighbouring Islamic countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia linked to various contending factions. It is truely a regional-cum-internal struggle for power and influence, that is raging in Afghanistan. It has become further complicated due to the emergence of new States in the former Soviet Central Asia because Afghanistan provides a vital physical link from the South to these new States.

The second conflict is of a different nature; within Burma and its spill-over effect on neighbouring countries like India, Bangladesh (the two South Asian States) and Thailand. The emergence of a democratic order in Burma has been successfully throttled by the military junta. Some of the ASEAN countries, Pakistan and China continue to support the dictatorial military regime in Rangoon to serve their specific strategic and economic interests. China, for instance, is reported to have supplied US $1.8 billion worth of arms and is planning to develop a naval servicing and repair facility in the basin of the Hangai River. The old Burma-China road is being strengthened and reactivated for economic and military uses and China also wants to link up with the Burmese north-east for economic exploitation. All these developments have emboldened the Burmese junta to ignore the cries for democracy and human rights from its own people as well as many parts of the world: creation of naval facilities for China and reinforcement of transport and

communication links between China and Burma, will, in the long run help China in its attempt to project power in the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia.

The pressure of spill-over of Burma's internal political conflict is being felt by India and Bangladesh whose borders with Burma have been activated with reports of clashes and tensions. There has also been an influx of refugees from Burma into India and Bangladesh. Attempts of Bangladesh to send back more than 250,000 Muslim (Rohingas) refugees from Burma through diplomatic negotiations have not yielded any results so far. Bangladesh media have also resented that even Pakistan's sale of arms to the Burmese junta which were used in pushing the Muslims out of Burma was a most undesirable act on the part of another friendly and Muslim South Asian neighbour.

The most persisting and complex conflict rooted into local and regional factors has been the one between India and Pakistan. This is the third such conflict to become more intense and intractable in the context of the post-cold war developments. There are many manifestations of this conflict; the Kashmir question, the continuing low-intensity war in the Siachin sector; Pakistan's support for Kashmir and Punjab insurgencies and the Pakistani counter allegations of India's involvement in creating chaos and instability in Sindh and the rivalry between the two neighbours in the nuclear field. Constraints of time and space do not permit us to go into the causes of these conflict manifestations which among other factors, involve the legacies of partition in 1947, characters of the two States as they emerged then and the dynamics of ethnic and religion based politics within each of them for the past forty five years.

Of all these manifestations of conflict between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir question and the nuclear rivalry may be identified as the most important and explosives ones. On Kashmir, Pakistan's claims to be a party are historically and legally untenable.[1] It was an interventionist State which committed an aggression and subversion to grab Kashmir militarily but failed except keeping one third of the Kashmir territory under its control militarily. That too, because it was backed up by the Western powers, the US and UK in particular, under the cover of the UN, in 1948-49. The holding of Plebiscite in Kashmir by India which was a part of those UN resolutions was clearly subject to Pakistani troops and irregulars vacating the part of Kashmir under their possession. Since then, India has been making several moves (in 1953, 1960, 1963-64, 1972 and 1980-81) to seek an amicable bilateral political resolution of the conflict but Pakistan has not responded.

It instead, tried to disturb *status quo* militarily twice in 1965 and 1971. The present manifestations of the conflict is in the form of Pakistan's exploitation, through covert operations, or India's political mismanagement (from the central government) in Kashmir State's political and developmental affairs. While India cannot escape scrutiny and criticism for this mismanagement, Pakistan has no *locus standi* in the situation whatsoever.

Nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan has emerged as one of the serious issues of security in the region. While India exploded its nuclear device in 1974; Pakistan has gradually acquired its capability, faster since the beginning of the 1980s, inspite of the so called restraints and non-proliferation incentives (in the form of the sale of hi-tech arms) provided by Pakistan's main supporter, the US. Now the situation is that both India and Pakistan stand as undeclared nuclear weapon powers who are busy developing delivery systems and other relevant infra-structure. They, in all probability, will continue to pursue their mutual capability race. It is a matter of time when both the countries will declare their formal status as nuclear weapon powers. What is needed to halt and reverse the nuclear race is not the directives from great powers like the US for non-proliferation, but efforts to encourage them to have viable confidence-building measures in the

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[1]   See S.D. Muni, "South Asia" chapter in Mohd. Ayoob, ed., *Conflict and Intervention in the Third World*. Croom Helm, London, 1980, Sisir Gupta, *Kashmir: A Study in India Pakistan Relations*, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966.

nuclear field. Their own efforts in this direction yielded a positive result in the form of a bilateral Agreement of non-attack on each other's nuclear installations which was ratified in January 1992. They may now think of agreeing to make no first use of nuclear devices and commit themselves to no-nuclear tests. There is also a possibility of bilateral mechanism being developed to have greater transparency, at least *vis-à-vis* each other, in their nuclear programmes by organising greater and freer interaction between the nuclear scientists, strategists and opinion makers of the two countries. All this however, is easier said than done since political atmosphere between them is not conducive for this purpose.

While talking about non-proliferation restraints on India and Pakistan, one can not fail to mention the initiative of a five-nation (the US, the erstwhile Soviet Union, China, India and Pakistan) conference. This proposal was advanced by Pakistan through the prompting and guidance by the US. India has had reservations about such a meeting on account of a number of factors. India is not clear about the specific agenda of the meeting; is it to restrain India and Pakistan in their nuclear programmes or to take collective decisions binding on all the participants? What then would be the role of the three great powers (the Soviet Union has already disintegrated since the proposal was first made in 1990)? Will this meeting bring about any restraints on China's nuclear arsenal which constitutes a major security concern for India? What about other clandestine or inactive nuclear weapon states in South Asia's neighbourhood like Israel and the new Central Asian States? In view of these questions, India may not find it easy to accept the proposal and thus the five nation meeting appears as a non-starter.

Nevertheless, South Asia in general and India and Pakistan in particular cannot close their eyes to the increasing pressures for non-proliferation emanating from the post-cold war global changes. China and France have acceded to the NPT and there is a drastic reduction in the nuclear arsenal of the US and the former Soviet Union. World public opinion is gaining momentum against political and military utility of nuclear weapons. How will these global pressures reconcile with the regional dynamics is the critical question in the emerging security situation in South Asia.

Part IV

Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: Developments and Prospects - South East Asian Perspectives

Chapter 10

Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: Developments and Prospects - Pacific and South East Asian Perspectives

Kevin P. Clements

The end of the Cold War has not, so far, resulted in any extra guarantees of, security, stability or peacefulness in international relations. On the contrary, the collapse of the bipolar order has generated profound anxieties about emerging regional orders and their connection to the development of a new world order.

(The two levels, regional and global, are not necessarily complementary. In fact, they may be quite contradictory unless emergent regional organisations commit themselves to responsible and creative internationalism as well as regionalism. If they do not, there is a very real danger that the old negative features of nationalism may be replaced by equally negative regional impulses resulting in threatening patterns of inclusion and exclusion).

In any event, the world at all levels - national, regional and global - is in flux which represents dangers and opportunities for peoples and nation states. The dangers lie in the reassertion of outmoded and inappropriate international relations paradigms. The positive opportunities lie in the conscious negotiation of more appropriate paradigms which will enable peoples, communities and nations to live in peace (in both negative and positive terms) and turn their combined attention to problem-solving[1] rather than the aggressive promotion of national or regional interest. One of the most important aspects of this task is a movement beyond judgmental politics to a more inclusive no fault approach to solving common problems.[2]

This is the vision. There is considerable uncertainty about how to achieve it and what a world order based on it would look like. In the meantime, communities and peoples long oppressed by totalitarian regimes are reasserting their ethnic and cultural identities and these movements are challenging nation states to address questions of sovereignty and government long-assumed resolved.

The questioning of old orders manifests itself in challenges to arbitrary and repressive government, an upsurge of tribal sentiments, secessionist impulses, and challenges to the validity of old defence and security doctrines particularly those based on the assumption of permanent bipolar confrontation and nuclear deterrence.

Since the Asia-Pacific region is a microcosm of the world as a whole an evaluation of the processes at work here may help us understand what is or is not likely to generate stable regional and global peace. The region straddles the North-South divide. It is highly heterogeneous, ethnically, politically and economically and poses a series of interesting challenges to scholars concerned with an end to militarisation, non-violent resolution of conflict, and whether or not economic processes are capable of integrating diverse ethnic and political systems.

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[1]　See John Burton, *A Regional Strategy: From Strategic deterrence to Problem Solving*, Plenary address prepared for APRA Conference 1992 on Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region.

[2]　*Ibid.*, p. 5.

Positive Processes

Some of the positive processes facilitating new holistic thinking about the Asia-Pacific region and the world in general are as follows.

1. The end of the Cold War and bipolar confrontation provides a unique opportunity for a diminished reliance on military force in international relations. Although the United States continues to adhere to a global projection of power it is reducing its *direct* military involvement within Asia while retaining an active communications and logistic presence. (Some US bases have now been withdrawn from Korea and the Philippines, for example, and are being replaced by smaller communications and logistic facilities in centres like Singapore). The new Russian government has not yet spelled out its Asia-Pacific strategy in detail but Russian naval exercising and force deployments are diminishing and there is no immediate prospect of any major military expansion. These are very positive signs as is the recently completed non-aggression pact between North and South Korea and signs of flexibility in relation to Japanese-Russian relations.

2. Modern communications and transport systems have annihilated space through time. This has made Asia and the world more transparent, immediate and knowable. This information explosion challenges old concepts of relatively impermeable national borders and boundaries. Enhanced awareness of other realities generates new political possibilities for all citizens. Some of the old conceptions of national identity and sovereignty, for example, rested on relatively exclusive control of information by political elites. The power based on this sort of exclusive knowledge is being challenged by the information explosion which is blurring rigid boundaries between states and citizens. This has both positive and negative features - the negative being that familiarity sometimes does breed contempt the positive being that transparency makes it much more difficult to commit gross violations of human rights behind the sanctity of national borders. As the Indonesian government discovered in relation to the 1991 massacre in Timor, nations cannot hide such events from international scrutiny and condemnation. This in turn challenges such things as the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of nations. This issue has been highlighted by the United Nations in recent months. Perez de Cuellar, for example, in his valedictory address to the UN General Assembly in 1991 indicated that nations could not use national sovereignty as a cover for the violation of minority rights or human rights in general.[3] While this is a very sensitive issue it is now well and truly on the international agenda and is generating new political thinking about what lies beyond the nation state. It is also

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[3] Perez de Cuellar stated inter alia:"It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-interference with the essential domestic jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively or systematically violated with impunity. The fact that, in diverse situations, the United Nations has not been able to prevent atrocities cannot be cited as an argument, legal or moral, against the necessary corrective action, especially where peace is also threatened. Omissions or failures due to a variety of contingent circumstances do not constitute a precedent. The case for not impinging on the sovereignty,territorial integrity and political independence of States is by itself indubitably strong. But it would only be weakened if it were to carry the implication that sovereignty, even in this day and age, includes the right of mass slaughter or of launching systematic campaigns of decimation or forced exodus of civilian populations in the name of controlling civil strife or insurrection. With the heightened international interest in universalizing a regime of human rights, there is a marked and most welcome shift in public attitudes. To try to resist it would be politically as unwise as it is morally indefensible. It should be perceived as not so much a new departure as a more focused awareness of one of the requirements of peace". Javier Perez de Cuellar, *Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization*, September 1991, (A/46/1) p.12.

challenging regions to define the norms of acceptable behaviour in ways that make sense of national, regional and global values.

3. The emergence of regional and global processes transforming world business and politics. These processes manifest themselves in:

- A new trilateralism, which means all the economic and political interests centred on and dominated by Europe, North America and Japan (Japan and Germany being the two most important national actors).

- The emergence of regional economic institutions. The EEC being the most advanced example, but the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), Closer Economic Relations between Australia and New Zealand (CER), The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (APEC), and the Pacific Forum being important Asia-Pacific examples.

- Multilateral economic and social solutions to problems under the auspices of the UN. The activities of the GATT/UNCTAD being two notable examples. This multilateral tendency is challenged very dramatically by the first two processes. But the consequence of all three is that the integrated and interdependent nature of the world capitalist economy is challenging advocates of independent national solutions to economic problems and raising important questions about the validity of narrow national security doctrines in an interdependent world. It is no longer possible, if it ever really was, for any nation in the Asia-Pacific region (or for that matter the rest of the world) to insulate itself from these regional and global economic and political processes.

Problematic Processes

The first problem is how to think holistically about a region as diverse as the Asia- Pacific. What is it that ties it together? Is it simply common geographic proximity or more complex trade, commerce and communications patterns? Is there anything that connects Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, Christian cultures? What is the common thread that ties political systems as diverse as Thailand's monarchy and military junta, China's gerontocracy, Indonesia's miliary technocracy and Australia and New Zealand's parliamentary democracies? Other than the ocean - and this maybe more of a danger than a source of security - what is it that links the three sub-regions of the Pacific rim, namely the Northeast, Southeast Asian, and the Southwest Pacific? Where does South Asia fit into the regional scheme. What new mental maps are needed to help those living within the Asia-Pacific region to come to terms with their geography? And what is the significance of all of this for the development of peaceful and secure relations between nations and peoples within the region? The Asia-Pacific region poses very specific challenges in relation to all of these issues. It is probably the most ethnically and culturally diverse region in the world and has very specific features created by the Pacific ocean. The development of a coherent sense of regional identity, (or more realistically transnational regional identities), which facilitate trade, co-operation, and peaceful relationships is a major task facing all peoples in the region. But this problem has more than regional significance. If the states and peoples of the Asia-Pacific region can combine the diverse European, Oriental, Malay, Melanesian, Polynesian, South Asian components in ways that do justice to all these cultures this would be an important model of how to move toward the emergence of a pluralistic, global culture and community.

For example, the North-South Divide between Europe, Africa, Latin America and the developing countries in Asia is comparable to the ethnic and cultural divide between the

predominantly European peoples of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States and Asian peoples within the Asia-Pacific region. These white settler colonies are still coming to terms with their altered role in the world. The citizens of these countries do not, by and large, feel an immediate cultural rapport with the Asia-Pacific Region. On the contrary, most feel distinctly ambivalent if not suspicious and antagonistic toward Asian and Pacific cultures and people. There is a grudging recognition that Asian states and peoples are indispensable to future economic prosperity but there is a more visceral recognition that they (Asian-Pacific peoples) are definitely not us (European-Asians) in terms of natural affinity and sentiment. This ambivalence is reciprocated by leaders such as Sir Ratu Kamisese Mara of Fiji, who in a recent interview indicated that he felt Fiji needed to develop closer links with the ASEAN nations than with Australia and New Zealand because these two countries did not understand the Fijian way.[4] This transfer of Fijian sentiment from Australia and New Zealand to the Pacific rim has been confirmed by new Fijian trade links with Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Japan.

Japan and Malaysia, for example, buy Fijian sugar, and Fiji has recently signed a deal to buy oil from Malaysia instead of Australia, the traditional supplier.[5]

The Fijian desire to diversify from former colonial powers that are languishing economically resonates with the aspirations of other countries to establish close links with the more dynamic economies. Whether these moves result in more security rather than insecurity, diminished or expanded threat hinges on who is included and who is excluded from the new regional and global economic order being developed.

In so far as the European parts of the Asia-Pacific region continue to see the region as a site of plunder this is going to prove an irritant to Asian nations and peoples. Werni Levi, writing about the 18th and 19th century, quotes colonial officials who viewed Asia as a

Market for the colonial products, supplies of labourers and immigrants, and such conveniences as women for the settlers and bases from which "powerfully" to annoy Holland and Spain in case of war.[6]

It is interesting how similar this is to the ways in which many modern Euro-Asians view Asia. It continues to be seen as a market for products, a source of now relatively rich migrants, sex tourism and a place within which to confound one's enemies. What is different now, however, is that the superiority and racism that flowed from colonial times has been replaced by anxiety and uncertainty in the face of the economic vitality of the region.

Economic Imperatives Override Cultural Preference

The Pacific rim is seen by many in the West as the elixir for the sagging world economy. As the economies of the North America, Australia and Europe have moved rapidly into recession, the Pacific Rim Asian economies have very dramatically enlarged their share of world trade.[7]

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[4]   See interview, *Pacific Islands Monthly*, December 1991.

[5]   Michael Perry, *Reuters Report*, 14 February 1992.

[6]   Werner Levi, *Australia's Outlook on Asia*, Angus and Robertson, Melbourne, 1958, p. 1.

[7]   The Asia-Pacific region, for example, increased its share of world trade from 30 per cent to 37 per cent between 1965 and 1988 and also increased the amount of intra regional trade from 50 to 64 per cent over this same period. See Andrew Elek, "The Evolution of Asia Pacific Co-Operation", *Backgrounder*, Vol.1, No.17, June, 1990, Canberra Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. p. 5.

As an article in Fortune magazine put it,

California in the 1850s, Europe in the 1960s. Asia in the 1990s. The latest entry on the list of boom markets that no company wants to miss couldn't be clearer and the smartest companies are hard at work there. In the coming decade, the Pacific powerhouses-running from Japan and Korea through Southeast Asia - will be the centres of global growth and the hottest markets on earth.[8]

Both Australia and New Zealand smart at the fact that they have been identified as "Anglo Saxon anachronisms in the South Pacific" and they have made strenuous efforts to rectify this impression by boosting trade with the region. Japan, for example, has been a major trading partner of New Zealand's for many years, but in the year to October 1991 New Zealand's overall exports to Asia increased by 12 per cent. Some countries recorded more dramatic increases: 41 per cent to China, 43 per cent to Malaysia, 26 per cent to South Korea, 35 per cent to Taiwan and 31 per cent to Singapore.[9]

Ross Garnaut highlights a similar story for Australia and underlines why the Australian government seeks to become incorporated in the region.

Never before in human history have economies grown so fast for so long as in Northeast Asia over the past four decades. As a result, there has been an historic shift in the centre of gravity of economic production and power toward Northeast Asia.[10]

It is trade, therefore, rather than desire or sentiment that is shaping the views of Euro-Asian countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Russia and the United States) toward the region. Cultural factors only assume importance in so far as they aid or hinder commercial deals.

One of the principal consequences of the economic vitality of the Northeast and Southeast Asian regions has been a flurry of proposals aimed at the emergence of an Asian Pacific Economic Community at some stage in the future. (e.g. The APEC, East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) proposals and the bilateral overtures made to different countries by the United States about linkage to the North American Free Trade Area NAFTA which aims at linking the US, Canada and Mexico. The Heritage Foundation, for example, a Washington right wing think tank, in a spirit of old fashioned WASP racism, suggested that New Zealand be invited to join the North American Free Trade Group as a counter to any specifically Asian grouping that might emerge).

These contradictory pressures raise some important questions for the future. Will these different initiatives be good or bad for stable peace and security? What are the connections between the processes resulting in economic interdependence and narrower defence and strategic debates? Which is leading? Is it possible for trade pressures alone to forge an Asian economic community equivalent to the EEC or does there have to be social political and cultural pressures directed to this end also? To what extent do the economic imperatives override ethnic and racial factors?.

While Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States for example, wish to ensure a sizeable chunk of the economic action in the region, other countries, such as Malaysia seem equally determined to minimise the role of these countries in any economic grouping.

As a counter to the APEC proposals, for example, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamed proposed an East Asian Economic Grouping. He stated that this was a direct "Asian" response to the unification of Europe in 1992 and United States plans to include Mexico in its Free Trade Pact with Canada. This Malaysian plan would include Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan,

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8   Louis Kraar, "Strategies That Win In Asia", *Fortune Magazine*, 7 October 1991.

9   Philip Burdon, Minister for Commerce, speech to Christchurch Business Luncheon, 22 November 1991, p. 8.

10   Ross Garnaut, *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy*, Government Publishing Service, Canberra, p. 36.

Burma, Indo China and ASEAN with Japan as the natural motor for the whole bloc. It deliberately excluded North America, Australia and New Zealand, however, signalling that Malaysia did not see these countries as an integral part of their regional economic calculations.

The Malaysian proposal met with a chilly reception when it was first mooted in May 1991, and was firmly rejected by Foreign Minister Alatas of Indonesia. It has been responded to more positively by countries such as Singapore and the Philippines, as long as it does not infringe GATT rules, or upset the fledgling Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Council which includes the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Nevertheless, it does not seem likely to develop as envisaged by Prime Minister Mahathir.

The EAEG and APEC initiatives, illustrate how something as functional as trade can fall victim to the central social and political contradictions in European-Asian relations and how ethno-national sentiments may determine which nations are included and which are excluded in economic trading groups.

The vexed question, lurking beneath these more general issues is whether the predominantly European populations of the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand belong in the Asia-Pacific region, for any reason other than geographical location and economic necessity. It is likely that this issue will assume more importance in the future. (Especially given the recent spats between Canberrra, Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur over Australia's criticisms of Malaysia's Human Rights record and Indonesia's gross violations of human rights in East Timor).

One thing is certain, however, as narrowly conceived political and military questions diminish in importance, economic and trade questions will increase in importance and these will provoke different sorts of conflicts and tension within the region.

Whether these will be resolved amicably or not hinges to a very large extent on whether or not there is a wider willingness to come to terms with some of the other realities of the Asia-Pacific region.

Other Factors Affecting Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

While trade and commercial factors integrate different firms and countries within the region there are contradictory tendencies as well. It is these which reinforce the desire of the most powerful nations to enhance "traditional" defence and security arrangements.

In the first place, there has been an increased number of secessionist movements throughout the region: In the Southwest Pacific, for example, this tendency has been particularly noticeable.

1. In recent years there has been a violent Bouganivillian secessionist movement in Papua New Guinea, two military coups in Fiji, internal conflicts in Vanuatu, struggles for independence in French Polynesia, and a continuing struggle in East Timor (given additional impetus by the recent military massacre). Further afield there are continuing civil wars in Sri Lanka and Myanmar (Burma).

2. The Asia-Pacific is host to a variety of political regimes. There is a tendency for those that share a Westminster or European style parliamentarism to develop close ties with each other and ambivalence to those that do not. The more autocratic regimes have a similar ambivalence toward the democracies. The recent massacre of democratic protesters in Thailand highlights this central contradiction between Asian autocracy and Western democracy.

3. When this political ambivalence is linked to narrower military judgements the Asia-Pacific region is identified by some defence and security decision makers as a potentially threatening environment. There are objective as well as subjective reasons for this. Some

are residual and date back to the Second World War others to more recent events. The fact is that this region is relatively heavily militarised in terms of potential external threats and social expenditure forfeited to the military. The growth in Asian defence spending especially in the North Pacific is one of the highest in the developing world and stands in stark contrast to military expenditure in other parts of the world. Apart from some of the global disarmament agreements that place some constraints over such expenditure, e.g the MTCR, the NPT, the new Arms Register etc., military expenditure in most of the region continues to expand. For example:

> Japan is the sixth largest military spender in the world. In 1990 its defence spending exceeded US $30 billion (1988 prices). From 1980-1989 its military growth rate was 4.3 per cent per annum. Significant weapon stocks have been built up since 1985, with major weapon procurement costs of over US $8 billion in 1990 placing the country fifth in the world in terms of militaria purchases.[11]

Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, North and South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan have all expanded their defence expenditure also.[12]

The region is also host to a particularly active arms trade. This is led by China,[13] India, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. There are no institutional mechanisms governing this arms trade. There are still no discussions about developing such mechanisms and there are no regional mechanisms for the non-violent resolution of conflict either.

There are a variety of reasons why there are no such discussions. In the first place the dominant military powers, (the United States and Japan in particular) don't want them. Second, there are no cultural and political links that bind the diverse units of the Asia-Pacific together. Third the region remains a focus of economic and political contention. Despite the considerable economic integration, for example, there are military and political tensions that could generate confrontation some stage in the future. (e.g. the Spratly islands, North and South Korea, The Kurile islands, (although the new Commonwealth of Independent States might be willing to do some sort of deal in return for economic assistance) and there is long-standing conflict between the Philippines and Malaysia over Sabah. All of these could still become sources of very intense and hot conflicts even it the prospects seem currently remote. There is, therefore a pressing and compelling need for all nations in the region to review national military doctrines, deployments and defence postures to determine whether or not these are beneficial for the long term future of the region as a whole.

Future Prospects: Toward Common Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

One can see from this brief *tour d'horizon* of the Asia-Pacific region that there are very powerful centripetal and centrifugal pressures at work. When these economic, military and political pressures

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[11]   *SIPRI Yearbook*, World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991, p. 159.

[12]   Malaysia is expanding its navy and airforce purchasing from the UK and South Korea. Thailand is purchasing weapons from South Africa after the United States cut off military aid after the coup. Brunei, the Philippines and Singapore are also actively expanding their military hardware as well. See Derek de Cunha, *Trends*, November, 1991, ISEAS, Singapore.

[13]   China... now ranks as the world's fifth largest arms exporter. For certain items, China now ranks as the world's fifth largest arms exporter. For certain items, Chinese exports occupy an even higher position. In 1981-1985 China became the fourth supplier of supersonic combat aircraft and armoured personnel carriers; the third supplier of field artillery; and the second supplier of tanks, missile attack boats, submarines and anti-air artillery", P. Jones, *The Global Arms Trade: Arms Transfers Growing in South and East Asia*, unpublished MS, 1991, p. 6.

are added to important environmental factors the region is subject to all sorts of cross cutting tension. Each one of these pressures is capable of inducing anxiety and apprehension.

Overarching all of these is a very profound clash between occidental and oriental cultures; between systems emphasising obligations rather than rights, and hierarchy rather than egalitarianism.

It is not easy, therefore, to think about what a new regional or global peace paradigm would look like. Some of the obvious features however would include:

- A comprehensive and inclusive view of peace and security based on perceived connections between internal and external processes and between economic, social and political variables. This means extending the concept of security to include economic and environmental factors as well as traditional military and defence considerations.
- Developing a notion of species or human identity which transcends narrow conceptions of national identity. For this to occur we need to develop new political institutions and vehicles to give expression to units that transcend the nation state. What sorts of institutions, for example, would facilitate identification with the Asia-Pacific region?
- A non-zero sum view of peace, security and sustainable economic activity. One of the positive consequences of a shrinking interdependent world is the recognition that the world is too small for a winner take all approach to politics, either we all win or we all lose. this recognition, is having a profoundly corrosive effect on old hegemonic views of the world. Nations which wish to adopt such policies are now widely perceived as exerting a negative influence which is why there is such a healthy scepticism of hegemonic and imperialist thinking.

So what is happening within the Asia-Pacific region? I have already mentioned some of the moves to develop regional economic units. I now want to focus a little attention on some of the political and military equivalents. Although there is nothing comparable to the CSCE process in Asia there have been a number of initiatives that have endeavoured to place some of these proposals on the Asia-Pacific Agenda. The most recent examples have been the innovative and bold suggestions by Senator Gareth Evans (Australia), and former Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark for an Asia-Pacific Common Security Regime. Senator Evans has even suggested a name for these discussions namely a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Asia (CSCA).[14] These are only the most recent proposals. There have been a variety of others aimed at making the Asia-Pacific region a safer and more secure environment. The South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, the Zone of Peace Freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN) proposals, and the recent suggestions for an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace are all initiatives aimed at enshrining concrete multilateral steps toward a Common Security Regime in the Asia-Pacific Region. In addition as Findlay mentions in his excellent paper on this subject there are broader agreements in existence already which also enhance regional peace and security e.g. the Soviet Union's Incidents At Sea agreements with Canada and the United States, the 1988 regional Air Safety agreement between the US, the Soviet Union and Japan, the agreement on Notification of Ballistic Missile Tests, and Strategic Exercises and the US, Soviet agreement on Dangerous Military activities. These will undoubtedly have beneficial spin off effects for the Asia-Pacific region.[15] More recently in response to perceptions of a build up in naval units in the East and Southeast Asian region scholars such as Sam Bateman and Des Ball

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14   For a detailed account of these and national reactions to them see Trevor Findlay, *Asia-Pacific CSBM's Prospectus*, Peace Research Centre, ANU, Working paper No.90. Also *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Report Vol.150, No.50, December, 1990.

15   See Trevor Findlay *op.cit*. pp. 21-23 for details of these agreements.

have been urging the development of regional maritime safety and surveillance mechanisms to control waterways, sea lines of communication.[16] In addition considerable attention has been devoted to linking environmental and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. (e.g. joint US-New Zealand initiatives in relation to the banning of drift net fishing in the Pacific).

These are positive initiatives that need to be encouraged rather than discouraged. Because of a negative United States and Japanese reaction to many of these regional suggestions, however they have often not received the official attention that they deserve.

The fact is that the economic interdependence flowing from Japanese dominance is not resulting in pressure for multilateral solutions to regional peace and security problems which is why Japan and the United States have been very negative about most calls for regional or multilateral disarmament and security arrangements. Powerful states and economies prefer bilateral arrangements which inevitably reinforce their dominance rather than risk being disciplined by regional economic institutions or institutions aimed at disarmament, confidence and trust building. The United States and Japan have also demonstrated a contempt for efforts to build regional conflict resolution institutions preferring to solve such problems on a national basis also.[17]

While there are some existing forums for such discussions, e.g. the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and the economic forums mentioned above, e.g. APEC, as well as ASEAN and the Pacific Forum mechanisms, there has been a reluctance to initiate explicit peace and security discussions in these institutions.

There have, however, been one or two recent attempts to put some of these items on the regional agenda. But they have normally originated with small to medium nations, e.g. Australia in relation to APEC discussions, and the regional Security discussions organised by the Thai and Philippine Foreign Ministries in Manilla July 1991. The ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference also enables ASEAN leaders to discuss bilateral and regional concerns with other countries. But it has largely been left to non-governmental organisations, academics and others to try and develop alternative discussions on defence and security in the hope that sooner or later governments will realise that there are alternative ways of organising international behaviour. The Institute of Strategic and International Studies in Malaysia, for example, has had a number of conferences that focus on the issue of a regional security regime.[18] Griffith University's Centre for the Study of Australia - Asia relations had a conference on Security in the Asia-Pacific Region from 15-16 July

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[16]   D. Ball and W.S.G. Bateman, "An Australian perspective on Maritime CSBM's in the Asia Pacific Region", Paper to the Workshop on Naval Confidence Building Regimes for the Asia Pacific Region, ANU Peace Research Centre ISIS Malaysia 8-10 July 1991. This initial paper was elaborated further at the APRA conference on Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region by Sam Bateman. In a paper on "Maritime Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Area" he elaborated the regional maritime surveillance and safety regime and a regional avoidance of incidents at sea regime and argued their importance in terms of a general" building block "approach to enhancing confidence and trust within the region while delivering very positive outcomes - *e.g.* planning for the naval control and protection of shipping in the area, monitoring illegal activities, combating piracy, enhancing maritime safety, combatting marine pollution and sharing maritime information and intelligence, pp. 10-11. Starting at this level seems a very positive way of generating momentum towards a common security regime in the region although it clearly will not satisfy those who want to negotiate one from the top down. See also the interesting suggestions by Michael Pugh for the development of a United Nations involvement in maritime peacekeeping. "Multinational Maritime Peacekeeping: Scope for deep blue berets?" unpublished paper presented to APRA Conference 31 January to 4 February 1992.

[17]   This whole question of bilateralism versus multilateralism will undoubtedly be a pivot of many discussions in the future - especially as individual nations (even the strongest players in the region) are afflicted by problems for which there are no national or bilateral solutions *e.g.* the regional management and conservation of the Pacific Ocean, challenges to the environment, regional drug trafficking, development,human rights,etc. These issues need to be addressed in regional forums and within generally agreed frameworks if stable peace and security is to be achieved within the Asia Pacific region.

[18]   *e.g.*, M. Alagappa (ed.), *In Search of Peace: Confidence-Building and Conflict Reduction in the Pacific*, 1987, Proceedings of the first Asia Pacific Roundtable.

1991 which continued many of these discussions and the Asian Peace Research Association, in conjunction with the UNU had a conference at the University of Canterbury in January 1992 which brought peace researchers and officials together to discuss Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: Post Cold War Problems and Prospects-where among other things considerable attention was devoted to ways in which a Common Security Regime might be developed in the Asia-Pacific Region.[19] All of these official and academic discussions are contributing toward the emergence of a greater sense of Asian community although there are still many centrifugal and contradictory forces at work which make this process a slow and incremental one.

So what of the future? Sub-regional integration seems likely to continue with the South Pacific Forum countries and ASEAN countries consolidating their economic ties and directing more attention toward peace and security issues as they become more tightly connected economically.

The North Pacific continues to remain a special case with both Japan and the United States resisting multilateral pressures so that they can retain maximum manoeuvrability in relation to the two Koreas, China and the new Russian Commonwealth. While the two Koreas remain a potential tinder box, the recently agreed non-aggression treaty and continuing discussions between North and South make this an improbable source of immediate military confrontation.

Interestingly, the United States, while rejecting the idea of a CSCA arrangement for Asia,[20] seems to believe that economic factors will bind the region thereby allowing Japan and the United States to sustain old defence and security arrangements and stall the development of moves toward a Common security regime in the region. Stressing functional economic relations is not problematic unless such co-operation results in some nations, sub-regions, classes or minority groups being excluded and marginalised from the benefits of such economic activity in which case military and security questions will undoubtedly climb higher on the political agenda.

It seems fanciful to think that economic integration alone will result in the emergence of a coherent regional identity. For this to occur there will have to be a series of unofficial and official discussions aimed at establishing the "idea" of an Asia-Pacific region sharing common interests as well as a common geographical tie to the largest ocean in the world. This "idea" however should not blind individual Asia-Pacific nations nor the region as a whole to consider their connections to other parts of the world and their responsibilities to the globe as a whole. (This is why the notion of regional internationalism needs to be elaborated since there is a real danger that prosperous buoyant regions will pursue their collective interests in ways which antagonise those that are not).

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[19]   The Canadian proposal for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue was further advanced and developed at this meeting. (See paper by its director David De Witt 1992 "The Changing Dynamics of North Pacific Security" unpublished paper delivered to APRA Conference 31 January - 4 February 1992). While this official and non governmental initiative still has a long way to go and currently only concerns China, Japan, North and South Korea, the Soviet Union, the US and Canada, it does provide an interesting model for other nations in South East Asia and the Pacific in relation to promoting security and trust in the region. Such discussions are seen by the Canadians as a precursor or accompaniment to disarmament and arms control negotiations. There was considerable support for encouraging "habits of dialogue" and for the incremental building bloc approach favoured by Ball and Bateman (*ibid.*). Once again, however, there is a concern that the United States remains the major obstacle to multilateral security arrangements preferring what Paul Kreisburg calls" synthetic consultation and co-ordination" rather than multi sided defence arrangements. "Containment's Last Gasp" *Foreign Policy*, p. 159 quoted in David De Witt *op.cit.* p. 6.

[20]   See Richard Solomon, "Transcript of Solomon Press Conference", quoted in T. Findlay, *Pacific Research*, November 1991, p. 26.

The pursuit of Common security for the Asia-Pacific region is not an optional extra, or an academic luxury it is an essential component for developing and maintaining stable peace in the region.[21]

President Bush's five nation Asia-Pacific visit (January 1992) signalled the continuing importance of the region for the United States. The United States security relationship with Japan ranks as its most important outside of that with Europe and the United States sees itself as the "balancing wheel" in the region. In a 1991 speech in New Zealand Assistant Secretary of State Richard Solomon, stated:

> Our East Asia Strategy initiative - presented to the Congress early last year - outlined force adjustments we are now undertaking in order to sustain an adequate, forward deployed security presence in the region into the coming century. The vast majority of countries in East Asia and the Pacific continue to look to the US to play the role of regional balancer, honest broker and ultimate guarantor of stability and security. We share this view and accept the responsibility. And while the form of our security engagement will adjust to new realities, I can say unequivocally that we intend to retain the substance of this role and the bilateral defence relationships which give it structure. Our adaptation to new circumstances should not be misinterpreted as withdrawal. America's destiny lies across the Pacific. Our engagement in the region is here to stay.

He then traversed the stress points in the region, e.g. Korea, Cambodia and reiterated the central importance of the US-Japan relationship.

> This relationship between the two largest and most technologically advanced economies - which together produce nearly 40 per cent of the world's gross national product is multifaceted and vital to the effectiveness of the emerging international system... We are also updating our other bilateral security alliances in the region - with the Republic of Korea, Philippines, Thailand and with Australia.[22]

This posture is one which has been generated by regional anxiety about a resurgent militarised Japan but it also reflects a long standing US concern to maintain military and political dominance in the region. There is no doubt that this posture inhibits movement toward Common security in the region and the emergence of newer and more innovative paradigms. It is also a policy that undermines the ability of small and medium sized nations to ensure that their interests are taken account of in regional forums. The United States position continues to be aimed at controlling potential threats to their regional hegemony. Now that there is no Soviet threat to deter, US official doctrine is aimed at "nuclear reassurance" or deterrence against all uncertainty. Although it is not stated publicly, privately US officials argue that this policy in the Asia-Pacific region is aimed at controlling Japan and countering any other threat when and as it arises.

For its part, Japan wishes to retain close ties with the United States in order to discourage regional fears of resurgent Japanese militarism and ensure the most intimate access to top decision makers in Washington. The Japanese government would like to join with the United States in shaping the opening decades of the 21st century, both economically and politically. (Together they already produce 40 per cent of the gross world product and almost 85 per cent of cutting edge technology). As Lewis Hoskins points out, the issue confronting both nations is whether they wish

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21   In this regard Gareth Evan's December 1989 statement on Regional Security reiterated many of these ideas, summed up in the idea of "comprehensive engagement" based on expanding all sorts of links with Asia, supporting the regional institutions and participating in the development of a regional security community based on a sense of shared security interests. *Australia's Regional Security*, 6 December 1989, p. 5.

22   Richard Solomon, speech to American Chamber of Commerce, Auckland, New Zealand, 6 August 1991, p. 3.

to confront each other or develop a cooperative approach to regional and global leadership.[23] Small and medium sized nations view either of these two scenarios with suspicion for different reasons. Confrontation would clearly jeopardise regional integration processes and overly close economic and political co-operation poses challenges relating to Japan-US hegemonic aspirations. A number of countries have recently expressed opposition to the Nakayama proposals, for example, which would have encouraged regional nations to discuss security issues within established fora like APEC etc., but under the benign oversight of Tokyo and Washington.

The fact is that the one country, capable of providing an adequate counter to the United States and thereby generating space for the development of an integrated economy and a regional common security regime is Japan. Thus, a crucial aspect of moving toward Common security and stable peace in the region is for Japan to deprive the United States of any excuse to be the balancing wheel by pursuing peaceful policies negating the justification the United States needs for maintaining this role. Paradoxically, US pressures on Japan to expand its defence expenditure and absorb more of the regional "defence burden" provides the major justification for the United States maintaining its close security relationship with Japan.

Japan can help the movement toward a Common security regime in Asia by re-emphasising its three non-nuclear principles, banning weapons exports and adhering to strict military budget ceilings. It would also be very stabilising if Japan opted out of high-tech military development and declared itself opposed to the new "smart weapons" arms race.[24] Finally if Japan, in addition to maintaining its "four principles of development assistance" (whereby it allocates aid on a basis of the recipient country's military expenditure, development and production of arms of mass destruction, import and export of arms, democratisation) were to take a lead in calling for regional demilitarisation and the promotion of human rights much regional anxiety would be allayed.

Similarly, if Japan could also see its way to advocate regional arms control in the context of a multilateral common security regime in the region, it would exercise very positive and creative leadership in the task of achieving stable peace regionally and globally.

This, common security will be achieved by nations and peoples in the region continuing to ask for it, by those same nations giving some concrete expression and meaning to the idea of the Asia-Pacific region, by the United States adopting a less interventionist role in the security affairs of the region and by Japan taking a lead in the direction of demilitarisation and withdrawing from a high-tech arms race in smart weapons.[25]

In the end, however, stable peace and security in the region will only come about it all the nations and peoples who happen to share this common geographic space attend to the meaning of partnership and commit themselves to imagining what an Asian-Pacific Community would look like. This means much greater attention to processes advancing confidence, communication and co-operation between the different parts of the region toward one which is much more expressive and intrinsically meaningful. Nations and peoples have to discover themselves in and through the region and develop regional identities that make sense of the constituent parts. If this happens, a regional paradigm for pluralistic problem-solving and non-violent conflict resolution may emerge, which will be useful to the development of a global civic culture and community at some stage in the future.

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[23]   Lewis Hoskins, *1992 Changing US Policies in the Asia Pacific Region*, unpublished MS presented to the APRA Conference Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region: Post Cold War Problems and Prospects, p. 3.

[24]   In fact one of the major challenges to all disarmament effort is the tendency for all countries as a result of the Gulf War to move towards leaner and meaner more offensive weapons. These weapons themselves may prove very destabilising in the future.

[25]   For an interesting discussion on these and other points see John Dower, "Japan and the US Samurai Spirit", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1991, pp. 29-30.

Chapter 11

Developments and Prospects of Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: Pacific and South East Asian Perspectives

Jusuf Wanandi

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has clearly affected the Asia-Pacific region, but its impact has not been as dramatic as that in Europe or the Middle East. However, sources of great instability are present in the Asia-Pacific region, not only because of re-alignments among the great powers, in response to the changing security environment, but also because of developments on the economic front. The Taiwan issue, the conflicting claims on the Spratly islands, the conflict in the Korean peninsula, and Russo-Japanese disputes over the Northern Territories are imminent sources of regional instability. In addition, internal developments in various countries, as in China or Indonesia in relation to generational change in their political leadership, could have regional implications.

The region does not, however, have regional institutions or mechanisms that can effectively deal with such issues. The Asia-Pacific region is far behind Europe in this respect. In Europe such regional institutions abound: NATO, CSCE and WEU (Western European Union) in the politico-security field, and the European Community (EC) in the economic field. Thus, while Europe is likely to face many problems in the medium term, it does have the institutions that could help to prevent them from becoming an open conflict.

The challenge to the Asia-Pacific region now is to make use of the relative stability that prevails in the region today to develop the kind of regional institutions that can effectively deal with future sources of instability, both in the politico-security arena and in the economic field.

Disarmament will definitely be an important item on the region's agenda. However, it needs to be repeatedly emphasized that security problems in the region are not simply of a politico-military nature. The concept of security that is appropriate for the region is that of "comprehensive security", which includes economic, social, and cultural aspects. It should also encompass the new issues in international relations such as human rights, political pluralism and the democratization process, environmental problems, migration, AIDS and other contagious diseases, and drug trafficking.

This paper will first discuss developments in the Asia-Pacific region, while focusing particularly on the evolving relations between the major powers, as each of them tries to adjust to the new realities. This will be followed by a discussion of ASEAN's responses.

Developments in the Asia-Pacific Region

As mentioned above, the end of the Cold War has not had a significant impact on developments in the Asia-Pacific. Nonetheless, considerable developments have taken place, which include: normalization of Sino-Soviet relations; reduction of the Soviet military threat, especially in the Pacific; greater efforts at CBMs; normalization between North and South Korea; and the resolution of the Cambodian conflict.

Developments in the economic field and the emergence of regional economic co-operation have also had a positive impact on regional stability. Economic interests have been an important

factor in the normalization of relations between China and Indonesia, the Soviet Union and South Korea, and between China and Taiwan to some extent. Support for regional economic co-operation mechanisms, such as APEC and PECC, has been increasingly strengthened and broadened. The pragmatic policies adopted by the various governments in the region have positively influenced the region's remarkable economic development. Indeed, economic development has become a main preoccupation of many governments in the region, including those in the socialist countries.

In the Asia-Pacific region, Marxist-Leninist states continue to exist and they appear to have survived largely because the adoption of Marxism-Leninism was an integral part of their nationalism in the struggle against colonialism. However, it is unlikely that these countries can prevent inevitable changes in their political system. Clearly, it is questionable whether these countries can continue to undertake economic reforms without political reforms which will necessitate greater popular participation in their respective systems.

Let us now turn to an examination of the role of the major powers in the region and the relations which exist between them in the post Cold War era.

United States

In the coming decade, the US will give priority to coping with its many domestic problems: the economy, infrastructure development, R&D, education, and a host of social issues. However, the US cannot afford to adopt isolationist policies as in the 1930s, thereby becoming a "Fortress America", because it has become significantly more economically dependent upon its interactions with the rest of the world.

This suggests that the US will no longer perform the role of a world policeman as in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, it will involve itself in world affairs by forming alliances, as it did during the Gulf War. The US could also form such an alliance in the Asia-Pacific region, but presently that initiative will not come from the US as it is more preoccupied with Europe and the Middle East. Therefore, the initiative must come from countries in the region.

It is in their own interest to secure a continuing US presence in the region because its involvement since World War II has enhanced the stability of the region. The US is currently seen as a benign superpower. Of primary importance is the increased American economic presence in the region. This will depend primarily upon America's ability to restructure its domestic economy, but it is also important that the rules governing competition in the region be strengthened.

In the field of arms control and disarmament, in September 1991 the US unilaterally abolished its tactical nuclear weapons, including those that are sea and submarine-based. This is an important development for the Asia-Pacific region. However, this decision was mainly designed to prevent a dissolution of the Soviet Union and the subsequent uncertainty that such a development would create with regard to the control of nuclear weapons, including tactical nuclear weapons, which are stationed in the various republics. In January 1992, the US also announced the abolishment of tactical nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. This action was meant to prevent North Korea from developing its nuclear weapons, as it is believed that it will have the capacity to do so in the near future.

These developments have paved the way for greater efforts toward arms control and disarmament in the region, which the US has traditionally opposed because of the strategic asymmetry that exists between the Soviet Union, a continental power, and the US which has to rely on its naval power in the region. With the end of the Cold War, this situation has changed, and it is now possible to again pursue the idea of a nuclear weapon free zone, including in Southeast Asia (SEA-NWFZ).

On the issue of American presence in Southeast Asia, questions have been raised concerning the effect of the Philippines' decision to not extend the bases agreement. Now, it is widely believed that the US no longer needs the extensive base facilities that Subic offers. Other much smaller facilities, such as those provided by Singapore or other ASEAN countries, would be sufficient for its logistical, training, and repair needs. Therefore, the US presence is not in much jeopardy.

Japan

Japan plays a significant economic role in the region, and it is in the region's interest that this role be maintained. Understandably, Japan must also play a global role commensurate with its economic might. It is in the interest of the region to assist Japan in its search for a global economic and greater political role. Japan has recently stepped up its economic role through its significant contribution to the financing of the Gulf War, and assistance to the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

It seems more difficult to define Japan's political role, especially in view of prevailing Japanese public opinion and the public opinion of Japan's neighbouring countries. The latter's concerns relate not only to the experience of World War II, but also to Japan's dominant economic presence in the region today. Clearly, performing a political role will also lead to a military role for Japan. ASEAN has supported the participation of Japan's SDF (Self Defence Forces) under the UN collective security actions. Next, maintenance of the US-Japan alliance is also important for Japan's credibility. China and South Korea continue to oppose a military role for Japan. With this in mind, it is important that Japan shows genuine regret for its past actions toward these countries, in order to gain credibility and trust which will ultimately enable it to play a greater political role in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan's increased role in international economic institutions, such as IMF and IBRD, should be acknowledged. The possibility of granting Japan a permanent seat in the UN Security Council should also be seriously considered.

In anticipation of Japan's future international role the US should review its alliance with Japan, in which Japan is currently seen, more or less, as a junior partner. With the need for greater sharing of the burden, Japan should also be allowed to play a greater political role in the region, and globally within the US alliance. Bilateral economic relations between Japan and the US will be far from smooth. Although the two economies have become highly integrated, competition and frictions will remain severe. The impact of conflicts on the US-Japan alliance will also remain uncertain despite the efforts of both sides to cope with them. Japan, as its own leaders admitted, can be dangerous if left on its own.

From this perspective, it is also important that the region places Japan in regional structures that are jointly developed by the countries in the region. In the economic field, such regional structures are provided by PECC and APEC, both of which are pursuing the idea of open regionalism. In the politico-security field, the ASEAN-PMC offers a vehicle for a regional, multilateral dialogue. Japan supports this idea, and it has also actively participated in PECC and APEC. Japan has taken a more cautious attitude toward the idea of an EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus), but it is important that ASEAN itself be unambiguous about the idea.

Finally, Japan should be involved in the regional efforts concerning arms control and disarmament, since its involvement will restrain Japan from developing armaments that it might not need.

China

China is in the process of modernization, particularly of its economy. Thus, it needs a stable and peaceful environment. It has greatly enhanced its relations with ASEAN and other countries in Southeast Asia. Currently, China feels a greater need to strengthen its political relations with ASEAN, Japan, and Korea, so as to be able to face the strong pressures, which it feels are being exerted by the Western countries, to change its political system. On the one hand, China understands that it needs to maintain openness in its economic relations, including with Western countries, but it strongly opposes interference in its domestic affairs.

Developments in the Asian Marxist-Leninist states differ from those in Eastern Europe. Socialism in Asia is indigenous in nature and was adopted during the struggle against colonialism by the generation that is still in power. In China and Vietnam, economic development is now given priority and this has brought about greater results in some parts of the country (China's southern provinces, and the southern part of Vietnam) than in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. Both China and Vietnam appear to be attracted by the so-called Korean political-economic model of development, in which economic reforms are aimed at a more open and market-oriented economy, but its political system remains rigid. It is often questioned, however, whether this system can be maintained when the political leadership is taken over by the younger generation in the near future when the challenges will be more complicated and the pace of the changes becomes significantly more rapid than ever before.

With the end of the Cold War, China can be rather relaxed in its foreign policy. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the uncertain development of the former Soviet republics along the Chinese borders is a cause for great concern. Relations with the US remain tense because of human rights issues and China's arms sales to Pakistan, Iran, and a number of Arab countries. President Bush is trying to improve the relations but there are severe opposition from the American public.

China is not opposed to the American presence in the Pacific, in part because it considers it important that Japan be placed in a military alliance structure with the US. Based on this view, China supports the idea of a regional political-security dialogue which could lead to the establishment of additional regional structure in the future. China is eagerly participating in regional economic co-operation efforts through PECC and APEC. It is important that China involves itself in a number of regional structures.

China will soon become a dialogue partner of ASEAN. This suggests that China-ASEAN relations are indeed quite good following the normalization of China's relations with Indonesia and Singapore. China's image in Southeast Asia has also improved because of its co-operation in the efforts to resolve the Cambodian conflict and its willingness to participate in a regional semi-official dialogue on the South China Sea. Nonetheless, it is important that China further improves its image in the region by engaging itself in various CBMs in the region. Problems have arisen that might cause friction between China and ASEAN in the future, if not discussed thoroughly and openly. One such problem is the legislation of last March concerning the South China Sea, including the Paracels and Spratlys (and the Senkaku island claimed by Japan), as approved by the National People's Congress (China's legislative body).

Although the preparations for the legislation have spanned several years, the timing of it, after some consensus at the semi-official seminar held by Indonesia in Bandung last year, will raise questions concerning China's true intentions in the future. This is particularly disturbing when combined with the information published by the Asian Wall Street Journal, 21 March 1992, which suggests that China now has air refuelling capabilities with an airstrip on Paracel island. Another problem lies in the arms sales, totalling US $1.2 billion, to Myanmar which is no longer using these

funds for domestic purposes, but rather has created problems for Myanmar's neighbours, Bangladesh and Thailand, in the form of border incursions and skirmishes, and refugees.

While ASEAN may have taken a so-called "constructive engagement" policy before, since the problems are considered domestic, now three ASEAN members, namely Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia have called on Myanmar to stop these activities which are causing miseries and instabilities on their borders.

Here China and ASEAN should work together to nudge Myanmar's military regime into more responsible policies and more open regional relations. Here, the model of Cambodia comes to mind.

Finally, as a permanent member of the Security Council, China can perform an active role in articulating the desires of the developing world, which is not given sufficient attention in current international efforts to develop a new world order.

Russia

It is difficult to predict the future of what was formerly the Soviet Union. Of great importance to the world and to the region is certainty control over its nuclear arsenal. China, as an immediate neighbour, could feel the impact of problems that may arise in the Central Asian republics. For Japan, there appears to be a greater opportunity now to resolve their claims over the Northern Territories. This would depend upon President Yeltsin's resolution. The claim remains a fundamental issue for Japan and its urgency continues unabated. Therefore, it is unlikely that Japan will be ready to improve its relations with Russia prior to a resolution of the issue concerning the Northern Territories.

The Russian fleet in the Pacific is no longer seen as a major threat for the region in view of the drastically reduced resources that are available for its continued operation. Russian economic interest in the Asia-Pacific region remains high, but its ability to participate in the region's dynamic economic development is still very limited. However, it is also in the region's own interest to bring Russia into the regional economic co-operation processes. Based on such a consideration, PECC has accepted Russia as a full member since September 1991. It is also desirable, and indeed likely, that Russia will be invited as a regular guest to the annual ASEAN ministers meeting.

India

India is now in a process of transformation which is important for its future. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Rao, India has embarked on a program of wide-ranging economic reforms. If these efforts succeed, India will undoubtedly become an economically important player in the region and globally. In the political field, the transition from the Gandhi era is not yet completed, and the situation is still characterized by a fluid period of new alliances and realliances.

India's policies toward Pakistan, China, and the US, are also undergoing changes. On the military front, it is believed that India will no longer continue its naval build-up because of economic constraints. There is now less concern about India's regional ambitions in Southeast Asia. ASEAN has invited India to become one of its so-called sectoral dialogue partners. This suggests an improvement in India's relations with the countries in Southeast Asia in particular, and the Asia-Pacific region in general. It remains unclear, however, whether India will be invited to the regional political security dialogue mentioned above. The general assessment is that India still faces numerous problems internally and in the Indian sub-continent that will require considerable attention.

ASEAN's Responses

From ASEAN's perspective, the Asia-Pacific region is currently quite stable and peaceful compared to the situation in Europe or the Middle East. However, a number of challenges and uncertainties loom ahead, and a failure to deal with them effectively will cause great instabilities to arise in the region. As mentioned earlier, the region does not as yet possess established regional institutions. APEC is new and still vulnerable, and it confines itself to economic co-operation. The region has only begun to talk about a regional multilateral forum for politico-security dialogues.

The challenges that the region faces in the medium and longer term are summarized below. First is the uncertain effect on the region of new alignments among the major powers - the US, Russia, Japan, China, and India. The previous discussion suggests that the US will continue to play a security role in the region although its military presence will be significantly reduced in the next 5 to 10 years. It will no longer have full-fledged military bases in the Western Pacific, but will rely mostly on its home ports in Hawaii and along the Pacific coast of its mainland.

Russia will also greatly reduce its presence although it will maintain some defence capabilities along its Pacific shore, which also could be reduced to half of what it is presently in the next 5 years or so. This leaves Japan, China and India as the three indigenous powers that could increase their influence in the region. This depends, of course, on the policies that these countries will adopt, the support of their people, their economic capabilities, and the consent of the countries in the region. A military threat has not manifested itself as yet, and may not come about in the future. However, it is the uncertainty of the direction of this development that poses a potential "threat" to ASEAN.

Further, the situation in several sub-regions is still a source of instability. Although progress has been made in the Korean Peninsula through CBMs, and possible co-operation between the two Koreas in a number of areas, the problem of unification remains unresolved and the questions of denuclearization and arms control have not been settled. Instabilities could arise in North Korea if Kim II-sung's successor cannot cope with the country's internal situation.

Another source of conflict is found in the overlapping claims in the South China Sea which involve a number of countries. The approach that has been taken so far is that all the claimants should set aside the question of jurisdiction and sovereignty, and they should instead focus on areas of co-operation, such as navigation and shipping, resources development, and weather and ecological research. Presently, however, this has been pursued at the semi-official level, and the modalities for resolving the problem remain undefined.

The unification of China and Taiwan poses another serious problem for the region. Approaches have been made by both sides, and economic relations have increased, but there is still great uncertainty as to how the problem will be resolved. Also, in Taiwan there is increased popular support for independence, and this could complicate the problem.

Still another possible source of instability is the leadership succession in a number of the larger countries in the region, especially China and Indonesia.

Above all, global and regional economic developments could be a source of instability. This may result from the fragmentation of the world economy into regional blocs that are highly discriminatory in nature. Likewise, this may also be brought about by increased economic tensions within the region itself.

The uncertain economic environment poses a clear threat to ASEAN's economic survival and national development. Therefore, ASEAN has given priority to strengthening its economic co-operation internally as well as with its main economic partners. In the recent Summit in Singapore, the ASEAN heads of governments have endorsed a proposal to form an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This is a far-reaching decision, since the idea of regional economic integration was

strongly opposed in many quarters of ASEAN until recently. ASEAN has also agreed to strengthen the Secretariat and ASEAN's mechanisms in order to accelerate intra-ASEAN economic co-operation efforts.

Another important decision made at the Summit was in the politico-security field. It is the first time that consultations and co-operation in the field of security is explicitly put in ASEAN's agenda. At the working level, representatives of defence ministers and of the intelligence community could henceforth be included in ASEAN senior officials meetings.

A third important decision was related to ASEAN relations with the Indochinese countries. Vietnam and Laos were invited to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, which provides a legal basis for the creation of a regional order in Southeast Asia. ASEAN will seek for a UN recognition of the Treaty.

Further progress is found in the decision to offer the ASEAN-PMC (Post-Ministerial Conference), which is held annually and which involves most of the countries in the region, as a vehicle for conducting a regional multilateral politico-security dialogue. As of today, the ASEAN-PMC is the only existing forum which has already dealt with a number of regional politico-security issues, such as the Cambodian problem and the Indochinese refugees. China and Russia, which have already attended the ASEAN Ministers Meeting (AMM) in Kuala Lumpur last year, could be invited by the ASEAN-PMC to participate in the dialogue. Participation by Vietnam and Laos will not pose any serious complications either.

The existence of a forum for dialogue at the regional level does not necessarily mean that limited efforts which are already underway, like those designed to resolve the Cambodian problems, the Korean issue, and the problem of the Spratly's, should not continue. In fact, the regional forum could complement these efforts. Moreover, the results of the smaller meetings could be discussed in the ASEAN-PMC forum and thus, would receive wider regional support. The ASEAN-PMC forum could be started with discussions on issues of common interest, and developments in the region in the post-Cold War era. This could later be followed by discussions of ways to enhance CBMs in the region, and at a much later stage the forum could also examine ideas dealing with regional arms control.

A Concluding Note

Thus far ASEAN, as a regional organization, has successfully overcome and prevented conflict among its members. Its members have developed confidence in each other, and as a result they have maintained low defence budgets. In addition, they have been able to build a foundation for a Southeast Asian regional order. Now, it is in ASEAN's interests to expand the idea of a regional order to the wider Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, the situation is most opportune since today the region is relatively stable. This opportunity may not come again if it is lost today.

Chapter 12

Responses

First Response

Desmond Ball

Change in the Asia-Pacific region is currently more dynamic than in any other part of the world. It is less dramatic than that which has fundamentally transformed the geopolitical relations between Washington and Moscow, or the collapse of the Communist *régimes* in Eastern Europe, or the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, the pace and scope of change in the Asia-Pacific region, and the implications for regional security, are quite extraordinary. The most important change is economic. Northeast Asia, and to a lesser extent Southeast Asia, have experienced economic growth unprecedented in the world's economic history. As a result, there has been an historic shift in the centre of gravity of economic production and power toward Northeast Asia. Economic factors are quite clearly determining the shape of the security architecture which the Asia-Pacific region will obtain in the twenty-first century. Several developments which were regarded as inconceivable only 2-3 years ago are now in progress. The maritime competition between the American and Soviet Pacific Fleets in the North Pacific, which became quite provocative in the late 1980s, has simply dissipated. Thousands of naval tactical nuclear weapons, previously based in the Pacific, have been withdrawn. The concept of the regional mechanism for institutionalising regional security dialogues is now being implemented through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) process. On the economic front, Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), dismissed as a non-starter only three years ago, is up and running. APEC is not only an important mechanism for dialogue and co-operation in its own right, it also provides something of a model for the development of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is true that some of these positive developments have had little direct connection to the end of the Cold War. Indeed, it has been a common lamentation, expressed even in this forum yesterday and today, that the dramatic features of the end of the Cold War, so apparent at the global level and in Europe have not been reflected in the Asia-Pacific Region. I do not find this particularly disconcerting. Security issues in the Asia-Pacific region were not dominated by the Cold War to the extent they were in Europe. This is not to say that the Cold War was unimportant in Asia - far from it, as evidenced in Korea and Indochina. But in the Asia-Pacific region the Cold War was more an exacerbator of local issues, rather than a determinant of them, as in Europe. To expect that the end of the Cold War would have the same dramatic consequences in the Asia-Pacific region as in Europe is, therefore, a Eurocentric expectation that does not do justice to regional dynamics.

These regional dynamics have been comprehensively described and assessed in the paper by Jusuf Wanandi. I will not say anything further about Jusuf's paper here - there is little in it with which I disagree.

So let me move on to Kevin Clements' paper, with which I do have some more serious problems. I would like to make four points:

- The first is the question of the paradigm which determines, or should determine, the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. One of the problems with the discussion

of paradigms is the lack of distinction between the descriptive and the prescriptive. The paradigmatic "vision" which Kevin outlines - what he calls the "regional paradigm for pluralistic problem solving and non-violent conflict resolution" is clearly prescriptive, but I do not know what to make of the reference to "outmoded and inappropriate paradigms". Is the present framework of regional security deemed "inappropriate" because it fails to satisfy the prescriptive requirement of enabling "peoples, communities and nations to live in peace", or is it "inappropriate" because it fails to reflect the objective economic, military, and geostrategic conditions in the Asia-Pacific region?

It seems to me that the defining characteristics of the evolving security environment in the Asia-Pacific region are quite clear. First, there is the unprecedented pace and scope of change - change produced by economic dynamism, the Super Power drawdowns, and defence modernisation programs. Second, there is the increasing complexity of security concerns in the region - complexity enhanced by the increasing number of actors in the region as bipolarity is replaced by a much more pluralistic scene, and by the broadening of the very concept of security itself, to include economic and even environmental factors, in addition to the traditional military dimension. And, third, the combination of increasingly rapid change and increasing complexity produces increasing uncertainty. It seems to me, therefore, that the critical requirement is to establish some mechanism or some variety of mechanism for managing this increasing uncertainty. Confidence and security-building measures are essential to this exercise.

• Second, the discussion of the growth of defence spending in the Asia-Pacific region, on pages 96-97, needs some qualification. The picture is really quite mixed, but, in any case, it is becoming clear that the general expansion of defence expenditures in the region has slowed considerably since around mid-1990. More particularly, Australian defence expenditure - which amounts to that of all the ASEAN countries combined - has experienced no real growth since 1989. Defence spending is decreasing in Indonesia and the Philippines. Malaysia's budgetary circumstances mean that, despite the increase projected in the current Five-year Program, there has in fact been no real increase. In Japan, the rate of increase has been curtailed and it is likely that future defence budgets will be pegged to zero real growth.

In any case, far more important than the question of whether or not defence spending in the region "continues to expand", is an explication of the reasons for this expenditure and the implications of it for regional security.

There are many reasons. In part, it reflects nothing more than the remarkable economic growth in the region, which permits an increasing allocation of resources to defence programs. There is the requirement, under the UN Convention on Law of the Sea, for them to monitor and police activities in their European Economic Zones (EEZs). There is prestige attendant on the acquisition of modern technology. And the acquisition of advanced weapons systems is an important means of keeping abreast of new technological developments.

In fact, it can be argued that, at least in the case of the ASEAN countries and Australia, the current arms acquisition programs are contributing to greater national self-reliance and regional resilience. Indeed, the national self-confidence which is generated by the acquisition of these advanced capabilities is itself a source of confidence-building in the region. It is critical, however, that these acquisition programs do not lead to a regional arms race.

Incidentally, I have a quibble about the list of regional arms exporters on page 97. Australia's total annual arms exports amount to the equivalent of less than two modern fighter aircraft. If this is "leading" the regional arms trade, then that trade would be of very little concern.

- Third, I have difficulties with the argument on page 102 that Japan should forego development of reliance upon high-tech smart weapons. It seems to me that whether weapons are high or low-tech, smart or dumb, is irrelevant. The real issue is whether the weapons are offensive or defensive. There is a fairly widespread consensus in the strategic studies community that smart weapons tend to favour the defence over the offence. I prefer to shy away from such generalisations. It really depends on the particular weapons system, the strategic doctrines and operational concepts for their employments, and the geostrategic circumstances. Nevertheless, Japan's posture remains defensive, and so long as high-tech weapons remain supportive of this posture, I see little cause for concern.

- Fourth, and final, Kevin states (page 98) that,

  There is nothing comparable to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process in Asia.

This may be true for Northeast Asia. The development of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference process into a mechanism for regional political and security dialogues, in fact, provides an Asian means of accomplishing the functions of the CSCE, and I would expect that in a very few years the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference process will prove even more successful in addressing regional security issues than the decades-old Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

What we need to consider now, is the type of mechanism which might be established in Northeast Asia, and how this might relate to the emerging forms of security co-operation in Southeast Asia.

Part V

Security and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific: Prospects and Proposals

Chapter 13

Zones of Peace and Weapon-Free Zones in Asia and the Pacific: Problems and Prospects

*Mohamed Jawhar**

Introduction

If "Asia and the Pacific" is taken to denote the whole area from Afghanistan to the eastern Pacific rim, then the post-Cold War era presents a mixed picture for the future of arms control and confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the region. This contrasts with the situation in Europe and the Western theatre, where the prospects have definitely become significantly brighter.

This paper will look at the evolving strategic environment, and will touch briefly upon the problems and prospects for zones of peace and weapon-free zones in general before going into more specific detail with regards to the prospects for the zones in the various sub-regions of Asia and the Pacific.

The Evolving Strategic Environment in Asia and the Pacific

The Decline of the Cold War and Arms Reduction

The post-Cold War situation is having a positive impact on the prospects for arms control and CBMs in some respects. The most important is the end of the Cold War itself, as well as the termination of super power rivalry and the East-West conflict. This has vastly improved the climate for co-operation on global security issues and conflicts and for massive arms reductions among the major protagonists of the conflict, who now find themselves with surplus stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons. An arms race driven by Cold War imperatives and considerations is now coming to an end.

This has also had a positive impact on Asia and the Pacific, where long-standing American maritime supremacy has discouraged the consideration or credible implementation of meaningful arms control and CBMs, including nuclear weapons reductions, zones of peace, and weapon-free zones.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) of 1991, and Bush's weapons-reduction initiatives of September 1991 and February 1992 - which have been reciprocated by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - have all resulted in commitments by the two powers to make major reductions in their intermediate, strategic, and tactical nuclear weapons stockpiles.

In Asia and the Pacific this has involved the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea, and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from submarines and surface ships in the Pacific. In the case of the CIS, in addition to the reduction, and the likely eventual termination of its presence in Cam Ranh, a reduction of land-based nuclear weapons will remain dependent upon their actual destruction. However, there is no doubt that the CIS, given the necessary resources, will carry out its end of the bargain.

Agreements on further reductions between the two nuclear Super Powers are not unlikely, though it will take several years before the destruction of the weapons and warheads is actually completed.

Notwithstanding the commitments for deep and very significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the US and CIS, however, several factors must not be forgotten. Both the US and CIS are committed to sustaining sufficient stocks of nuclear weapons in order to maintain their relative superiority over other nuclear powers. Strategic submarines of the US and CIS navies will still be armed with long-range ballistic missiles. Further, their air forces will continue to be nuclear-armed. Finally, although the CIS has called for a permanent ban on nuclear testing, the US has stated that it will continue its testing, though on a reduced scale. This will likely prompt the CIS to reserve the right to continue its testing, as well.

It must also be noted that no other nuclear power is reducing its stocks, and that nearly nuclear states, or states aspiring for nuclear status are not forsaking their relevant plans. The post-Cold War era, therefore, remains firmly nuclear with no sign of global and complete nuclear disarmament.

The end of the Cold War and its related economic problems and domestic financial constraints are also having a favourable impact, in some cases, on conflict control and CBMs, by precipitating cutbacks in conventional forces and arms among nations whose defence planning was basically designed according to Cold War threat perceptions. In addition to the US and the CIS, these countries include their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies, and others like Australia. Thus the US is reducing its military budget and forward presence in Korea, Japan, the Philippines (where the Pinatubo incident and the non-renewal of the bases agreement have also been instrumental in expediting reductions), and in the Pacific. Likewise, the USSR/CIS has pulled back most of its forces, retrenched many of its troops, and made severe cuts in its defence expenditures.

On the other hand, where conventional arming has been motivated by factors other than essentially Cold War considerations, arms acquisitions and defence expenditures continue at their previous levels or show an upward trend. Thus, where the primary security or defence concerns revolve around issues such as internal conflict (in the forms of insurgencies, civil war, and perceived *régime* instability, such as in Myanmar), bilateral conflict, perceived threats from neighbouring states (as in the case of some ASEAN countries), and the need to police additional maritime territory due to the declaration of Exclusive Economic Zones under the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (as is the case in Malaysia), there is little inclination to curb conventional armaments or engage in arms control exercises. Arms acquisition and spending are often simply related to the ability to acquire or spend. That is to say that states which are prospering appear to be spending more on arms, while those facing financial constraints are reducing expenditures, at least for now. India is a good example of the latter.

From the foregoing, it is generally clear that, in the current post-Cold War situation, states and regions driven most by the Cold War conflict are reducing their nuclear arms or defence expenditures, while states and regions driven largely by other security considerations are not. This factor will greatly influence the prospects for zones of peace and weapon-free zones in Asia and the Pacific.

The Decline of the Cold War, the Primacy of Economics, and Inter-State Co-operation

This leads us to our second point: in Asia and the Pacific, the decline of the Cold War's ideological conflict and the primacy of economics are, on the one hand, removing the barriers to political relations, and to economic and even security co-operation among former Cold War

"friends", relations which were previously moderated and suppressed only by overriding Cold War considerations.

Thus the USSR/CIS' relations with China, Japan, South Korea, and other countries, China's relations with South Korea, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian states, relations between North and South Korea, and relations between the Indochinese countries and ASEAN, are all improving, thereby providing opportunities for conflict control and CBM arrangements including zones of peace and weapon-free zones.

On the other hand, however, tensions between Japan and the US are growing with regard to trade and economic issues, North-South issues over development, and technology and debt are becoming more inflammatory. Further, bilateral and intra-regional friction and conflict over territory, resources, and cross-border circulation of people and goods is increasing in some instances. These do not always generate an atmosphere conducive to co-operation around these very difficult and complex security issues.

Changing Security Concerns and Zones of Peace and Weapon-Free Zones

The economic vulnerability of open but weak economies; trade disputes and economic friction; fears of protectionism, managed trade and the breakdown of the current round of the GATT talks; a sharpening of the conflict between North and South caused by the disappearance of the East-West conflict, and more specifically the widening gap in income and resources between the two groups, with growing debt burdens and technological disparities; threats from environmental degradation, a very real and present problem in many South Pacific island-states; population flows destabilising the socio-economic and political conditions in recipient states and sometimes leading to strains in the relations with the population-outflow states; and killer diseases are all rapidly becoming critical national and regional security concerns.

Given this development, traditional security constructs and mechanisms, especially those focusing on weapons and physical conflict, are becoming inadequate to address wider security concerns. While the relevance and momentum for weapon-free and peace zones will continue and remain important for many nations, they contribute less to security perceptions in the minds of many states. For these states, economic weakness and vulnerability, massive burdens of debt, hunger and disease, and developing environmental threats appear more immediate, threatening, and vital to their security interests than do the horrors of a nuclear war or armed conflict.

Continued Shortcomings and Inadequacies of Zones of Peace and Weapon-Free Zones

Zones of peace and weapon-free zones such as nuclear weapon-free zones can be useful and do indeed contribute to zonal and global security. At the very least, they are declarations of intent and commitment by zonal members which in turn help to bring contiguous members together into the deliberative process, while enhancing transparency among them and contributing to confidence-building. In addition, while outside nuclear powers are also tied to the treaties through protocols, various restrictions also apply to them in the exercise of their nuclear options in the areas concerned. Zones of peace and weapon-free zones, however weak and diluted in terms of catering to the existing interests of zonal states and major powers, are nevertheless better than nothing.

Yet this cannot obscure the inherent weaknesses and shortcomings of the zones that presently exist, and the inadequacies that will continue to plague future zones, given the current world order and outlook. These weaknesses and inadequacies seriously undermine the relevance and usefulness

of the zones as strategies and devices to promote peace and security. Some of these problems are detailed below:

- The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is now more than two decades old and has steadily acquired what is today near-global membership. Yet the NPT *régime* by itself has only helped check horizontal, not vertical proliferation, and about two thirds of the world's population are found in nuclear or nearly nuclear states. The United Nations itself focuses more on horizontal than on vertical proliferation. Where vertical proliferation is being reduced, as is now the case in the US and CIS, it is more a result of the changed strategic situation and its effects on the two super powers rather than a result of the NPT *régime* itself.

- Nuclear states remain nuclear. While they vehemently condemn and attempt to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons, they jealously preserve their own nuclear status and indeed seek to enhance it, except in the case of the US and CIS today, which in any case have stockpiles far in excess of any other nuclear states and will not reduce these to a level where their comparative advantage would be threatened. Only Russia/CIS has offered to halt nuclear testing, which is critical to the reduction of the global nuclear threat.

- The inability of zonal states or even the international community to enforce strict adherence to zonal provisions among nuclear states or major powers, even when the latter are bound by protocol obligations. Thus, the British are suspected to have violated the Treaty of Tlatelolco during the Falklands War.

- The existing nuclear-free treaties all have built-in limitations which compromise the extensiveness and effectiveness of their *régimes*. Thus, both the South American and South Pacific treaties do not prohibit the transit of nuclear weapons through their zones, and zonal states reserve the right to allow port calls for nuclear-armed ships.

The Prospects in Northeast Asia

To date, Northeast Asia has been considered as holding little prospect for zones of peace or nuclear-free zones. However, this view should now be reconsidered. The prospects for such zones in the area have greatly increased of late. The Sino-Soviet hostilities have long since cooled, despite temporary strains caused by the democratization process in the Soviet Union which was viewed negatively by China. Unilateral, bilateral, informal and formal arms limitations measures have also been introduced by both parties along their common border.

Russian-Japanese relations have also improved remarkably with the end of the Cold War, despite the ongoing dispute over the Northern Islands. Russia/CIS is now viewed by Japan as less threatening. Besides Japan's non-nuclear status and its defensive military doctrine, it has also announced cutbacks in its defence budget. Also, Japan is now displaying greater interest in arms control measures, and has begun more vigorous initiatives in this direction in international fora.

US-CIS agreements on reducing their respective nuclear arsenals (including those on naval vessels) are also having a favourable impact on the prospects for peace and nuclear-free zones in the area.

On the Korean peninsula dramatic progress has been made in the area of political reconciliation and denuclearization, with the commencement of the peace accord and nuclear ban treaty on 19 February 1992. A joint nuclear control committee was also established on 19 March 1992. This progress has been all the more remarkable given the fact that the Korean issue appeared to be one of the most intractable problems only a year ago.

A nuclear-free zone covering the two Koreas can only become a reality when North Korea ratifies the safeguards accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), allows the Agency to conduct inspections, and when bilateral inspections are also performed by the two countries in accordance with their nuclear-ban treaty. Presently, North Korea appears to be dragging its feet on this issue. If the issue is resolved quickly, it bodes well for peace and a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula. If not, and if North Korea is indeed intent on a nuclear programme, it could trigger similar responses in the South and even in Japan, and the prospects for a zone of peace and a nuclear-free zone on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia will fade.

Faithful observance and implementation of the peace and nuclear-ban accords will also advance the possibilities for unilateral or bilateral conventional arms reductions in North and South Korea. Certainly the present level of militarization on the peninsula will be found excessive and burdensome, especially for North Korea, when the two Koreas are reconciled.

If the two Koreas become nuclear-free in the near future, the prospects for a nuclear-free zone covering the two countries and Japan will also become brighter. The prevailing strategic relationships among the three countries and the nuclear powers in the area suggest that Russia/CIS, the United States, and China, might also find it in their interest to recognise and respect such a nuclear-free zone. If this indeed transpires during the course of this decade, the major threat to security in the Asia Pacific region since the 1950s will have been resolved.

However, the United States' security pacts with Japan and South Korea may complicate the successful conclusion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty involving Japan and the two Koreas. North Korea is unlikely to agree to the US-South Korean arrangements, even if it is prepared to acquiesce to the Japan-US agreement. A protocol which allows zonal states to continue their security arrangements with outside nuclear states may therefore prove to be difficult unless South Korea severs its security links with the US. The attitudes and positions of the three Northeast Asian countries have to be examined further before the problems and prospects of this area can be more clearly gauged.

The Prospects in Southeast Asia

ASEAN's intention to create a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia is now 21 years old, while its efforts to work out a nuclear-weapon-free zone (SEANWFZ) within the framework of ZOPFAN are now in their seventh year. Progress has been slow mainly because of the Cambodian problem that began in 1979 and the ambivalence or "lukewarm" commitment of some ASEAN members to the ZOPFAN concept.

Recent developments however, appear to have made conditions more conducive to the realisation of both zones. Southeast Asia is no longer divided by either the Cambodian conflict or the Cold War, although Vietnam and Laos remain communist. There is a definite trend toward reconciliation and *rapprochement* among the ASEAN and Indochinese countries, and Vietnam and Laos may well accede to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation within the year. If the peace process is successfully implemented in Cambodia, that country may also become part of the Treaty *régime*. All three Indochinese countries are unlikely to object to ZOPFAN or even SEANWFZ, though confirmation will have to be sought here. Myanmar is the only odd country out, and its participation in regional processes is unlikely unless there is a dramatic policy change in Yangon.

The American withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines by the end of the year, and the expected Russian withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, will also make a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia less problematic for these two powers. Both the former Soviet Union and China have already expressed their support for ZOPFAN. The United States is now viewing peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia more favourably, and may view SEANWFZ

similarly, albeit subject to some conditions - namely, the continuance of its security pacts with Thailand and the Philippines, access to base facilities in some ASEAN countries, and port calls for its naval vessels, including those with nuclear arms. However, the US has yet to give any concrete indication of such a favourable disposition toward SEANWFZ. Also, its concern over a proliferation of such zones elsewhere, should it support SEANWFZ, may ultimately dissuade it from doing so.

It was perhaps with the knowledge of such changing trends that this year's ASEAN Summit in Singapore decided that it,

> Will seek to realize ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ in consultation with friendly countries, taking into account changing circumstances.

In some ways, a carefully-drafted SEANWFZ treaty and protocol which (like the Treaty of Rarotonga) would allow Southeast Asian states to continue their existing security linkages with outside powers, allowing freedom of navigation on the high seas and passage of nuclear-armed ships, has more likelihood of success than does the realisation of the ZOPFAN concept. ZOPFAN, born as it was in the midst of the Cold War and among major power conflicts in Southeast Asia, is encumbered by the need for all states in the region to sever their military links with outside powers and gradually expel all existing foreign military presence. This may not prove acceptable to some of the small regional states who seek to bolster their discerned security, through just these kinds of linkages and foreign military contingents, against perceived threats from larger neighbours within and adjacent to the region. The "neutrality" component if ZOPFAN is also becoming rather irrelevant in the post-bipolar world, where security is assuming a new meaning beyond the conventional threats to security (to now include such issues as economic vulnerability and the environment), and where constructive and comprehensive engagement, rather than an exclusionary mind-set, would best serve regional security and stability.

Similarly, with regards to ZOPFAN, it must be noted that unlike the United Nations' two declared zones of peace, namely in the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic, the Southeast Asian Zone includes the land territories of the states concerned. This in itself would be of little significance were it not for the fact that several countries in the region, namely Myanmar, Cambodia and the Philippines, face major threats to their internal peace. Thus, it could be argued that a zone of peace which succeeds in rendering Southeast Asia free from inter-state and major power conflicts, but which contains large pockets of turmoil within national boundaries, is greatly flawed and hardly merits its name.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that elements of ZOPFAN, notably its "peace" and "freedom" components, have already been given treaty expression in the form of the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia. The Treaty seeks to promote peace and security in the region through co-operation in the political, economic, social, and security spheres. Similarly, ZOPFAN has been endorsed by the Commonwealth, the Non-aligned Movement, and the European Community, in 1979 and 1980. The road to progress for Southeast Asian security lies in the strengthening of its Treaty *régime*, and its extension to all regional states, rather than in pursuing the vexing question of actualising ZOPFAN in its entirety.

Arms Control or Demilitarization in the South China Sea

Of related interest is conventional arms control or demilitarization in the South China Sea, particularly in the Spratlys, where there are conflicting claims between six littoral states, four of which have beefed up their military presence in and adjacent to the area. Following the diminution of the Cambodian conflict, there has been much speculation that the Spratlys could emerge as the

next focus of regional conflict, and in this context the increased militarization of the area is viewed by some with considerable alarm. This is also linked to the general increase in defence expenditures, with an emphasis on enhancing maritime defence capabilities, particularly on the part of Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei.

A close examination of the factors motivating the defence build-up among ASEAN countries indicates that there should be less cause for alarm. The defence build-up in the area is motivated by several factors, depending on the country concerned. These factors include: the need for additional maritime capabilities to police and protect resources in the recently acquired 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ); the swing from an emphasis on internal security and land-based conventional defence, to long-neglected maritime defence, following the collapse of insurgencies in Thailand and Malaysia and the decline in a perceived overland threat from Vietnam; and the increased availability of resources for defence accruing from dynamic economic growth. To some extent, increased military expenditures on the part of the relevant states is also a positive contribution to their national and regional security, because it makes them feel less vulnerable to external threats.

Nevertheless, there is indeed some cause for legitimate concern over the military build-up in the area since it is also conditioned by a certain degree of competition among the states concerned, and further by the need to deter attacks on positions occupied in the Spratlys. The purchase by some states of "offensive" arms, such as helicopter "support ships", can also be destabilising.

The prospects for conventional arms limitation in the region, however, are minimal. In fact, most of the regional states have very modest maritime capabilities, which provide little margin for reduction. There is also a great disparity in the naval strengths of the regional states, which is not particularly conducive to multilateral arms limitation. Freezing or reducing maritime build-ups will also handicap the ability of states with large EEZs to police their waters and protect their resources.

Reducing tensions and limiting the potential for conflict in the South China Sea is presently best approached through CBMs rather than through multilateral arms control measures. Greater transparency, co-operation in various non-military spheres such as joint surveys and maritime research, and even possible joint exploration and resource-exploitation in selected areas, without prejudice to territorial claims, would all seem to be highly appropriate avenues for addressing security problems in the region. Indeed, these areas of co-operation are being explored by the "Workshops On Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea", initiated by Indonesia in January 1990.

The Prospects in South Asia

The South Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SANWFZ) has been on the UN agenda for nearly two decades now, with little substantive progress made in its actualization. The UN declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace reflects a similarly dismal record. However, the decline of the Cold War and of major power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, the improvement in relations between India and China, reduced military assistance from the US and CIS to Pakistan and India respectively, and greater US pressure in addition to CIS support for nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia, should now all contribute to improving the prospects for both zones in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. In fact, in November 1991 India agreed to consider a proposal for a conference on a NWFZ which would include the US, the CIS, China, India and Pakistan.

Notwithstanding this, both the NWFZ and zone of peace initiatives are likely to continue to face problems in the near future. India has traditionally objected to a regional NWFZ or a global NPT, alleging among other things that such *régimes* discriminate against the South and the nuclear have-nots, that the South Asian region cannot be divorced from other regions of the world, and that

proposals for a NWFZ, as submitted to the UN by Bangladesh and Pakistan in 1990, did not have the consensus of all the states in the region. More importantly, a NWFZ in South Asia could only become a reasonable proposition if India and Pakistan are able to resolve or sensitise their outstanding bilateral issues, and if India begins to view China as a lesser threat and a andons competition with that country.

Conclusion

The climate for zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones has definitely improved in Asia and the Pacific. This decade may see some significant progress, particularly for NWFZs in the regions of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Success would appear more likely in Southeast Asia, where none of the zonal states yet possess a nuclear military capability and are unlikely to gain one in the near future. In other words, success is most likely where it is least meaningful. In Northeast Asia, a nuclear-free zone is more likely, especially on the Korean peninsula, provided that North Korea is not approaching nuclear capability or, alternately, is prepared to abandon its nuclear programme if it already possesses one. The prospects for South Asia appear to be relatively less than those for Southeast Asia or Northeast Asia.

However, the prospects for NWFZs in the region are also tied up with larger issues concerning the nuclear question. The most important will be the future of the NPT *régime* itself, after 1995. Other issues include, the complete and comprehensive banning of all nuclear weapons, the continued existence of nuclear weapons and the nuclear threat from nuclear states, basic questions of inequity between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states, strengthening verification, and banning nuclear-testing. These issues will continue to engage states and the global community in the foreseeable future.

Chapter 14

Implications of the Emerging Environment for Asia and the Pacific CSBMs

Ravdangiin Bold

To understand the necessity for multiple and diverse approaches to Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in Asia and the Pacific, we need only to look at a simple political and geographical map of the region.

I would like to focus on the emerging environment for CSBMs in Asia and the Pacific, and provide a few thoughts of my own concerning the implications of this for Confidence-Building Measures in the area. Then, I intend to touch on some aspects of the military environment for Security-Building Measures.

There is commonly a perception that it would be premature to establish CSBMs covering the whole region for several reasons: the countries of the area are at different levels of development, and there are political, social, and cultural diversities among them. In particular, the historical and geographical differences of each country create a wide variety of contradictions.

However, as the European experience has shown, the consistent search for new measures to ensure stability and co-operation between the states in the area may give much hope for potential CSBMs, at least at both the sub-regional and bilateral levels if not at the regional level.

The world security environment has undergone a major transformation. This means that any attempt to establish Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) and Security-Building Measures (SBMs) will be done in an era of changing security strategy, where many threats are ambiguous.

In the current environment of rapid change, the opportunities and challenges of these uncertain times remind us of two things. Firstly, there is a certain urgency to make efforts to build confidence measures, and secondly, since it is becoming more difficult to build confidence, we need more sophisticated efforts to build confidence measures.

Regional Co-operation is the Door to CBMs

Firstly, in these times of dramatic change, when the world situation is determined by a transformation period from bipolarity to multipolarity, the ultimate shape of the new security environment in Asia is still unknown. However, the impact of that transformation on security thinking in the concerned countries at the national and sub-regional levels are all known.

Certainly, any outstanding issues of the region should not be considered in isolation of world changes or the post-Cold War security environment. It is nevertheless true, that the politico-military issues of the area are no longer viewed in global ideological or strategic competition.

The extent of these changes, particularly in the weakened links between regional issues and world confrontation, has enabled the countries of the area to work toward defining a new strategy, without being influenced by an external actor, for the emerging security environment of Asia and the Pacific.

This new strategy increases the possibility of co-operation among the countries of the area. On the other hand, in connection with a comprehensive approach to security, the role and significance of political-diplomatic means to ensure security at national and international levels have been growing. Hence, the current, rapid change of international security has led to significant and positive shifts in the approach of countries toward CBMs.

As for my second point on the emerging environment, the potential in Asia and the Pacific for development had been growing during the East-West confrontation, in the 1970-80s. The foundation of a relatively faster rate of growth was laid down at that time, and the region has become one of the dynamic developing parts of the world. Consequently, the breaking down of the Cold War and the weakening influence of external actors have made it possible for regional countries to concentrate on their economic and social progress.

Given the stage of development of the area, which includes few developed countries, a majority of developing countries, industrialized and rapidly developing, as well as less developing or even stagnant countries, there is a greater need to focus on political, social, and other forms of non-military co-operation.

The end of the Cold War has made dramatic changes in the threat assessment of the regional countries concerning their security. The main focus of that assessment has shifted from the threat of world confrontation, to local threats within regional affairs. Local threats are assumed to be non-military, e.g., domestic social and ethnic instability, even though such unrest extends their influences beyond their sources.

My own view is that for the region, it is more convenient to talk about the broader concept of co-operation, which applies to all spheres rather than to purely military-related CBMs. The political exchanges and discussions which have occurred in the bilateral relationships demonstrate that they are not immediately bringing the desired confidence that we expected them to bring. Hence, CBMs in the area cannot be considered separately from specific social-economic development. Such an approach will provide greater potential for CBMs in the region, and it could lead to an awareness of regionalism. That is why regional co-operation and communication in all spheres should be a prerequisite to CBMs at the sub-regional and regional levels.

Thirdly, the specific character of security policies pursued by the countries of the region to counter external threats in the post-second World War is their reliance on bilateral security treaties with major Powers instead of multilateral alliances among themselves, as in Europe.

Certainly, it was a result of the principle of "security-building measures through confrontation" determined by bipolarity. External reliance, however, has enhanced the security of individual countries, depending on the situation, and was conducive to the needs of some countries. Indeed, many of them still value their security treaties with the major Powers. Nonetheless, the external actors, through security treaties, involved individual regional countries in their own confrontations against their rivals. This in turn created various obstacles to the development of regional co-operation.

Global, military-strategic competition is no longer relevant. Consequently, the value of these bilateral security treaties is either on the decline or becoming ambiguous. This leads the majority of the countries in the area to search for more independent security policies which are as free as possible of external influences, and which are conducive to their own national interests by expanding co-operation and communication among themselves. Eventually, confidence between and among the countries of the region should exceed confidence with external actors, and appropriate measures to build regional confidence should go ahead of those with external actors.

In terms of my understanding, Northeast Asia is the overlap of such subregions as the Korean peninsula, Northern Pacific, and Central Asia, which is a re-emerging geopolitical arena. Even though there is a heavy concentration and deployment of armed forces in the area, there is a need to take into account the specific geopolitical environments of the above-mentioned subregions. Consequently, there is a need for different approaches to CBMs, tailored to each situation. Given the nature and problems of the area, arms control agreements should be an urgent, but not a desperate need of the concerned countries.

Although there have been a series of unilateral steps to limit the military presence along the Sino-Soviet border, the military potential of both sides along the border, including Russia-Mongolian and Sino-Mongolian, remains rather heavy.

Frequent bilateral talks between China and the former Soviet Union on the mutual reduction of troops, and on the building of military confidence along their border, since 1989, have now stagnated, and have not yet made any concrete progress which would in fact be expected by regional countries including Mongolia - the land-locked country between them.

Since 1985, the People's Republic of China, the former Soviet Union, and Mongolia, have reduced their armed forces. These cuts have been primarily the result of unilateral actions rather than bilaterally or multilaterally negotiated arms control agreements. In my view, the troop deployments along the Sino-Russian and Sino Kazakhstan border, and the building of military confidence along it, should be considered in the context of the Central Asian political environment. In this case, the troop reductions and CBMs along their border will go beyond the bilateral discussions.

Given past experience and the approaching potential instability around Central Asia, it appears that in Central Asia the attempt to eliminate the influences of major actors, by another major actor, is similar to "the balance of presence" which exists in Southeast Asia.

The building of military confidence in the Korean Peninsula should be considered mainly in the context of the political issues of peaceful reunification. Here we are not talking about CBMs between two states, but rather between the same nationalities whose priority is unification. CBMs are viewed as a prerequisite to this. However, the approach to creating CBMs in the Korean Peninsula will depend much on the determination to solve the peaceful unification as free as possible of the so-called "legitimate interests" of external actors, despite close links of the problem to their behaviour.

Southeast Asia has gained relatively sufficient experience in establishing CBMs in terms of activity and organization. It seems that there are two trends in the area, in relation to external actors, which effect the approach of countries to CBMs. One trend is the elimination of external actors in the region. Another trend is for the "balance of presence". In spite of those different approaches toward external actors, I believe that in essence they are same trends directed at limiting the influence of external actors. They differ in means, thereby causing less obstacles to negotiations for CBMs.

Given the present growing regionalism, the presence of major Powers in Southeast Asia has assumed a more "artificial" character than "legitimate interests", in comparison with other regions.

By solving the Cambodian problem and expanding ASEAN, there should be potential to bring sub-regional integration to a level which will lead to the destruction of intra-regional polarization, in terms of sub-regional balance of power, thereby facilitating CBMs within the framework of Southeast Asia.

The fourth point I would like to make is that CBMs and SBMs in Europe were well interlinked, and concurrent with processes within the Conference on Security and Co-operation. Contrarily, there are not any sub-regional institutions which could provide a security umbrella, either in combination with or independent of the process of CSBMs in the region. Despite the absence of a broad umbrella regional institution, a large number of regional and sub-regional institutions with special purposes and functions have been established. This was not in response to any broad conceptual approach, but rather to the process of economic growth. Still, they have carefully defined functions of an economic nature and neither has become a focus for an active regional program beyond this limited scope. Nonetheless, they are very active in a variety of specialized sectors and are still in a formative stage.

It should be noted that efforts to organize a broadly-structured, security-oriented institution have failed, for well known reasons, in the past. The only sub-regional institution which deals with common political and security issues on a periodic base is ASEAN.

One area for initial exploration, in my view, may be that encouragement has been given to some sub-regional institutions to press forward with their efforts to reveal potentially effective resources for facilitating future CBMs in Asia and the Pacific. In this regard, the United Nations should to do something.

Fifthly, it should be noted that CBMs are not something new for Asia and the Pacific. They have been camouflaged, not contained in such terminology as CBMs at the bilateral or sub-regional levels. Because of several factors   there are a number of unresolved disputes in the region, including territorial disputes involving around ten countries, bitter experiences of long-time colonialism, whose grave memory is still alive in the minds of people - they have no less profound implications for international peace and security in the region.

Nonetheless, I would like to point out that significant improvements and *rapprochements* have been taking place in the bilateral relationships of the region. This process should not only facilitate communication among states or between divided countries like Korea and China, but also should provide additional possibilities for promoting the development of traditional culture, customs, and contacts, for divided nations throughout the region. Thereby, the bilateral *rapproachements* could provide the concerned countries with the potential to reveal the above mentioned, camouflaged, confidence-related measures.

As for my sixth point, in the light of the above, I wouid like to point out that the "Good neighbourly relations" concept is an extremely effective way to facilitate CSBMs. Asia and the Pacific region is marked by vastness and distances which impact significantly on the structure of politics.

Consequently, the extremely long borders between states have enhanced the importance of bilateral relationships among the states of Asia and the Pacific, especially if we take into account such lengthy borders as Sino-Russian, Sino-Mongolian, Sino-Kazakhstan, Sino-Indian, and India-Pakistan.

"Good neighbourly relations" are more important not only in declaratory terms, but also at the practical level. This phrase contains many CBM elements. As for its broader functions, the "Good neighbourly relations" sense is not an institutionalized framework within which many elements of CBMs could be implemented without very complex techniques.

Since 1986, when direct air flights were opened between Mongolia and the People's Republic of China, both sides have been taking mutual steps to put the "good neighbourly" concept into practice. Particularly, border-crossing trade, and communications between local officials of that area, provide a simple and effective channel for information exchange.

Finally, my last point, it was often said, recently, that with increasing interdependence in the world and with the end of the Cold War, the significance of neutrality and non-alignment has decreased and consequently their role in CBMs is minimal. Furthermore, the concept of non-alignment appears irrelevant to the emergence of a multipolarity and becomes meaningless. On the one hand, it may sound reasonable for somebody. On the other hand, it depends much on how they perceive non-aligned policy and how to apply it to specific conditions of the area.

Non-aligned policies which are conducive to specific geopolitical areas should become a framework for CBMs in military field. "Limited" non-aligned policy, depending on between whom, how, and when, could be used in bilateral relationships as a means of establishing CBMs with regard to a third party.

Military Environment for Security-Building Measures in Asia and the Pacific

Firstly, in contrast with the European theatre, there are a number of local and sub-regional balances of power across this vast region. Sub-regional balances of power in turn are divided into separate theatres due largely to geopolitical conditions which further complicate SBMs. Such multiple conglomerations of power balances in the region have led to different asymmetries, calculations, and criteria in the estimation of the countries, starting from simple front line deployment to long-term strategic evaluation.

Given this situation, a framework for SBMs in the area should not be very detailed and, in the first stage, should provide for basic consultations including dialogue among defence scholars to facilitate understanding each country's diversity. Furthermore, these local and sub-regional balances of power have been linked to each other through "stealth" type logic, which is of course heavily influencing long-term strategic planning. In addition to the so-called strategic triangle relationships, we should take into account the potential future emerging of balances of power, particularly in Northeast Asia, such as Sino-Japanese or Sino-American at both the global and regional levels.

Secondly, there is little room for multilateral arms control negotiations at the sub-regional level, due largely to existing imbalances of power in the area. How, for instance, are arms control negotiations conducted among great and weak powers when the weaker keeps in mind that in any case the mightier is to be left with a predominance of military might over it?

With the decline of bloc politics, for many countries the area of arms control becomes less urgent, while their defence expenditures are increasing. In recognizing the need to contribute to reducing tension, there is a common trend among countries in the region to improve their own defence capabilities to meet this uncertain era, although the majority of the countries, as I believe, don't see any immediate military threat.

Misunderstanding, distrust, and apprehension unfortunately still exist among the countries of Asia and the Pacific as a consequence of historic antagonism, colonialism, and nationalist or ethnic tensions, rather than immediate military threats or arms control issues. These factors, combined with an imbalance between large and lesser powers, and the widening gap of developing and less developing countries, have been playing a significant role in the threat assessment of the regional countries. This kind of thinking can not be changed by simple diplomatic talks or by signing documents. Instead it will require long-time mutual co-operation.

Thirdly, in addition to the different strategic environment which the countries of the area belong to, great distances separate them from each other. This situation makes their military strategic thinking focus mainly on their own areas or sub-regional concerns, rather than on the concerns of the whole region to which they belong. For this and other reasons, power structures, in terms of organizational set-up and trained purpose, are quite different from each other. There have also been shifts in military strategy, both from an emphasis on internal order to one of external direction, and from reliance on bilateral security treaties with major Powers to a defence relying on self-reliance and collective security. Without greater clarity in defence policies, a road to SBMs is unlikely. With this in view, an attempt to compare the military doctrines in Asia and the Pacific will not be easy, but there is need for such comparison.

A very short fourth point is that the deployment of nuclear weapons in the region, particularly in Northeast Asia, makes arms control issues and the possibility of SBMs in the military field more difficult and complicated. There are the strategic offensive nuclear forces of Russia and the US, and the independent nuclear force of the People's Republic of China in Northeast Asia. While it is

hoped that the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the US will be considered in the context of a reduction of strategic offensive nuclear forces, how will the "independent" nuclear power be co-operative?

I would, now, like to touch on some remarks for CSBMs by outlining European experiences. The most important thing is that European states, both big and small, have had a mutual desire to avoid nuclear and conventional war because of past grave experiences and simply being tired of confrontation. Therefore, at the first stage, CSBMs in Europe were directed at solving the following three interrelated aims:

1.   Enhancing military security such as by inhibiting the use of force for political intimidation;
2.   Lessening the risk of war caused by misunderstanding and miscalculation; and,
3.   Making surprise attacks less likely.

The agreement to limit armed forces and conventional arms in Europe on the next stage has the same purpose to strengthen military security at the regional level. Meanwhile, the solution to technical character issues of establishing CSBMs in the military field in Europe have taken much time within the framework of the CSCE process. CSBMs in Europe were advanced as an inalienable part of arms control policy. It means that the major positive changes in the politico-military field taking place in Europe were largely the result of arms control agreements.

It should be noted that the establishment of CSBMs in Europe was actually a process for restructuring political relations, or a process of political reconciliation in the atmosphere of the Cold War. This aspect of the process, in my view, is very important to the governments in Asia and the Pacific. The CBMs and SBMs are closely tied together, and at same time they become concurrent processes. In the context of sub-regional affairs, they could be implemented either in combined form or independently.

With this view, if arms control is to play an important role in Asia and the Pacific, it will probably have to focus on Confidence-Building Measures rather than on troop reductions. For this reason, informal meetings should be encouraged for expanding the channels of communication for both civilian and military officials to discuss mutual security concerns and how to build a foundation for co-operation in the security field. A further purpose would be to seek comprehensive security measures rather than one-sided ones. Furthermore, we could identify some zones of limited deployments in the area to provide CBMs with additional resources.

Therefore, there is a need to develop extremely effective mechanisms for permanent dialogue and frequent consultation, among scholars and experts, within which problems will be addressed individually. So we should pay attention to sub-regional approaches and bilateral CSBMs systems for the time being, instead of aiming for an Asian collective type security.

Even though CSBMs are closely linked with enhanced military security, they should be considered within the framework of preventing military conflicts, both immediate and long-term. We would be addressing mostly technical issues rather than political or broad strategic issues.

The CSBMs are for us, first of all, broader political and strategic issues connected with survival of the country. The military planning of the concerned countries is based on political will and includes: defence of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, national ambitions, and protection of "legitimate vital interests". It should be noted that the process of creating CSBMs, essentially in the military area, will face potential obstacles due to growing national ambitions. My understanding of CSBMs is that they go beyond military considerations, and can be much more than merely military-related measures, and rather more about the broader concept of co-operation, which supplements all spheres of human contact.

Chapter 15

Strengthening, or Creation of New, Institutional Mechanisms for Asian Pacific Security and Disarmament

Kenneth McPherson

Introduction[1]

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have changed the complexion of international relations dramatically in the last two years.[2] Since World War II, questions of international peace, security, and disarmament, have been dominated by the rivalry of the US and the USSR, and the relationship between these Super Powers, their allies, and client states. The Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union have disrupted this international ordering, highlighting the need to reassess those institutional mechanisms which evolved during the Cold War to deal with questions of international security and disarmament.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has also exacerbated immediate problems relating to conventional arms transfers to so-called Third World countries, and to the spread of technologies relating to nuclear weaponry, missile technology, and the production of chemical and biological weapons. In much of the Third World there is a new "Arms Bazaar" centred upon the dissolution and sale of Soviet military equipment and technology, and the emigration of Soviet experts in military technology and research.

The demise of the Soviet-American rivalry has shifted the focus of international concerns about security and disarmament to the Third World, and it is the purpose of this paper to explore these issues in the context of the Asian-Pacific region, with particular focus on the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. There are various institutional mechanisms in place which relate to security and disarmament in this region and this paper will assess their effectiveness and suggest measures for strengthening their activities.

Causes of Conflict

Before examining institutional mechanisms for security and disarmament it is necessary to explore the factors which contribute to instability and arms proliferation in the Asian-Pacific region. Broadly speaking such factors can be divided into two categories: sub-state tensions and inter-state tensions.

Sub-State Tensions

At the sub-state level, ethnic, religious, social, and economic conflicts cause instability. There is frequently a linkage between these sources of tension, which are exacerbated by the failure of political systems to integrate the interests of different groups within state political structures. This failure is a major cause of instability in a number of states in the Asian-Pacific region.

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[2]   Buzan, Barry, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.3, July 1991, pp. 431-52.

In the Middle East, there is sub-state tension in Iraq between the government in Baghdad, Kurds, and Shi'ite Muslims. Similar tensions exist between Kurds and central authorities in Turkey. In Israeli-occupied territories the *intifada* is evidence of the alienation of Palestinians.

In South Asia, there is an on-going civil war between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, whilst in India there are a plethora of sub-state tensions. Some of these are based on regional disaffection (*e.g.* the current dispute between the state of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu over the waters of the Cauvery has led to ethnic conflict); some on demands for independence (*e.g.* in the Punjab, Kashmir, and Assam); some on economic and social conflict, which has given rise to civil unrest in Bihar and national protests in 1991 when attempts were made to improve employment and educational opportunities for low caste Hindus; and some on widespread Hindu-Muslim tension, heightened by the rise of overtly Hindu political parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party.

In Bhutan there has been tension between the Bhutanese and the large Nepalese minority reflecting similar tensions in Assam in India between locals and immigrant Bangladeshis. In Pakistan, sub-state tensions have been manifested in regional conflicts between Sindhis and Punjabis, and between *muhajirs* (immigrants from India) and local groups in various parts of the country. In addition, Islamabad's determination to change the legal *régime* of the republic has led to growing agitation on the part of organisations such as the Women's Action Forum which is concerned about the erosion of human rights.

In Southeast Asia, Myanmar (Burma) has been dogged by civil war between the central authorities and disaffected ethnic groups since the late 1940s, whilst since 1991 there has been growing nationwide agitation in support of sweeping democratic reforms. In Indonesia, recent unrest in Aceh and East Timor is evidence of disaffection with Jakarta's policies, whilst in parts of the Philippines there is virtual civil war based on a variety of causes: Communist opposition to Manila, right wing objections to economic and political reform, and Muslim irredentism in the South. Cambodia is still recovering from a catastrophic civil war which decimated its population and destroyed most of the state infrastructure.

All these sub-state tensions and conflicts have contributed to national insecurity and to arms proliferation, as central governments have reacted to perceived internal threats by increasing their defence, paramilitary, and police establishments. Such tensions and conflicts form a backdrop to, and feed, a broader level of insecurity and tension - leading to further arms proliferation - at the inter-state level.

Inter-State Tensions

At the inter-state level, insecurity and arms acquisitions are currently exacerbated by traditional rivalries, concerns regarding the interests and ambitions of neighbours, and heightened levels of economic conflict.

Across the Middle East, the most obvious cause of inter-state tension is the bitter divide between Israel and the Arab states. Yet, this well of bitterness exists alongside the legacy of ideological differences between Syria and Iraq, and the results of a decade of warfare between Iraq and Iran which have been compounded by the recent Gulf War which bitterly divided formerly friendly Arab states from one another. In addition, the states of the Middle East are divided by glaring disparities in national wealth, and by increasing concern over such a basic resource as water, in an area where rivers and aquifers are few and precious.

In South Asia, inter-state relations have been dogged by the partition of British India into the independent states of India and Pakistan in 1947. Indo-Pakistan relations have been scarred by three wars, the continuing dispute over the status of Kashmir, and general mutual suspicions of one

another, which are often given voice in recriminations concerning interference in each other's internal affairs.

In general, India's relations with its smaller neighbours - Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Bangladesh - have been good, but there are signs of strain due both to general concerns regarding India's leverage in South Asian affairs and to more particular issues. Indian intervention in Sri Lanka's civil war, although officially welcomed, has raised concerns in Sri Lanka about the overwhelming might of its neighbour, exacerbated by Indian intervention to prevent a coup in the Maldives.[3] In Bangladesh, gratitude for Indian support in its struggle for independence against Pakistan in 1971, has been weakened by a long-standing dispute over control of river waters, and the treatment of Bangladeshi immigrants in the Indian state of Assam. Additionally, Indo-Nepali relations have been strained over disputes concerning trade between the two countries and the transit of Nepali exports and imports across Indian territory.

In comparison with the Middle East and South Asia, Southeast Asia is remarkably free of inter-state tensions, with the exception of border confrontations between Myanmar and Bangladesh over the question of the treatment of Burmese Muslims, and the Cambodian issue, which raised tensions across the area, but which is now being monitored by a UN Peace-Keeping Force. The inter-state tensions which existed between Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Viet Nam, Cambodia, and the Philippines, in the 1960s and 1970s, appear to have been abated. Still some states, most notably Singapore and Myanmar, maintain a high level of defence expenditures, and there are counter claims by many states in the area over potentially oil-rich islands in the South China Sea.

Collectively across the Asian-Pacific region, this combination of sub-state and inter-state tensions contributes to a high level of insecurity and arms acquisitions, as reflected in high levels of defence expenditures which divert monies from much needed economic and social development.

Throughout the region, conventional arms acquisition programmes are fed by suppliers from within and from outside of the region. Currently, the sale of conventional weapons to Third World countries is worth about US $30 billion annually: in 1989, the USSR accounted for 38 per cent of arms transfer agreements, the US for 26 per cent, Western Europe (France, the UK, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy) for 17 per cent, China for 4 per cent, and various others for 15 per cent, with 70 per cent of these arms delivered to the Middle East and South Asia between 1986 and 1989.[4]

With respect to the Asia-Pacific region, the majority of arms transfers originate outside the region, although Israel, Singapore, China and Australia, have developed markets in the region.[5]

In addition to conventional arms acquisition programmes, there is a proliferation of nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological warfare technology in the region, with nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation of most immediate and worrying concern with respect to Israel, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and India. As yet, the problem of the proliferation of chemical and biological weaponry has been confined to Iraq, although the opinion exists that these systems, despite their arguably limited tactical utility, may gain greater currency as the "poor man's" answer to nuclear weaponry.

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[3]   See Gamini Keerawella, *Sri Lanka and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean*, Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, Occasional Paper No. 8, Perth, 1991.

[4]   Nolan, Janne E., "The Conventional Arms Market After Iraq: Prospects for Control", *Disarmament*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991, 12; Pierre, Andrew J., "Regional Arms Restraint after the War in the Persian Gulf", *Disarmament*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991, p. 29.

[5]   See Saravanamuthi, Johan, "Militarization in ASEAN and the Option for Denuclearization in South-East Asia", *Interdisciplinary Peace Research*, Vol. 2, No. 1, May/June 1990, p. 41.

Managing Security and Disarmament: the Current Situation

Some institutional mechanisms for security and disarmament already exist. Such mechanisms can be divided into two types: international treaties and conventions, and sub-regional associations.

International Treaties and Conventions

In this category, the most relevant are:

1. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in association with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
2. The Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR);
3. The Biological Weapons Convention;
4. A chemical weapons agreement.

The thrust of all these treaties and conventions is either to restrict and control the spread of a particular military technology, or to prohibit their spread completely. They are all dependent upon voluntary accession, some contain verification procedures, and all lack any means of direct enforcement.

1. *The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)*

Signed in 1968, the NPT was designed to halt the spread of nuclear weapons by the five powers possessing them at the time. Embodied in the treaty is a commitment by the USSR, the UK, and the US, to work toward global nuclear disarmament. Currently, more than 140 nations have signed the treaty. Non-nuclear states undertake to conclude safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) hoping to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear devices.

2. *The Missile Technology Control Régime (MTCR)*

The *Régime*, established in 1987 and now comprising 16 members[6], restricts the sale of ballistic missiles, "and has proven workable largely because of the association of these missiles with nuclear or chemical delivery" with some success in impeding technological proliferation in the Middle East[7], at least in relation to medium and larger weapons of mass destruction. The focus of the *régime* is deliberately on nuclear-capable missiles, rather than on the widespread technology of short-range missiles.

3. *The Biological Weapons Convention*

The convention was the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire class of weapons and was signed in 1972 by the Soviet Union, Britain, and the US, with currently more than 110 members. The primary purpose of the convention is,

to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons.

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[6]   Canada, the US, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, New Zealand, Austria, Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain.

[7]   Nolan, Janne E., *op.cit.*, p. 11.

4. *A Chemical Weapons Agreements*

There is no universal convention on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, but exporter groups, of which the "Australian Group" (formed in 1987) is the most prominent,

have been set up with the primary purpose of ensuring that the supply of chemicals and   most recently - technologies from member countries of such groups do not lead to the proliferation of chemical weapons.[8]

The "Australia Group" now also covers biological warfare.

Sub-Regional Associations

There are three major sub-regional associations of states, active in the Asian-Pacific region from the Middle East to Southeast Asia:

1. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC);
2. The South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC);
3. The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN).

The origins and objectives of each of these associations, whilst different in particular detail and chronology, are similar in that they all began as associations without any overt political or military objectives and were based initially upon economic co-operation. However, in recent years, there have been increasing pressures within these organisations to shift their attention toward more overt forms of co-operation, which may more positively influence those issues concerning security and disarmament in the Asian-Pacific region.

1. *GCC.* Established in 1981 with a membership of six states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), with the aim of realising co-ordination, integration, and co-operation in all economic, cultural, and social affairs. Of special importance are its initiatives for regional security, which were not envisaged in the original constitution, but were later undertaken seriously and resulted in the adoption of a joint security policy. The Council undertook diplomatic initiatives in proposing plans for Peace in the Middle East, mediation in the Iran-Iraq War, and in rallying Arab forces against Iraq following the latter's invasion of Kuwait.[9]
2. *SAARC.* Established in 1985, SAARC's overall objectives are identical to the original objectives of the GCC although it has not evolved the political initiatives subsequently developed by the GCC. Membership comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, with the association's headquarters located in Kathmandu.[10]
3. *ASEAN.* Established in 1967 ASEAN now comprises Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. In 1967, the Bangkok Declaration of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, which announced the establishment of the association, outlined its primarily

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[8]   Batsanov, Serguei B., "Hi-tech Weapons and Proliferation Concerns, *Disarmament*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991, p. 4; Kemp, Geoffrey, "The Middle East Arms Race: Can It Be Controlled?", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 441-56.

[9]   Ahmed, Hisham H., "Arab Political and Economic Integration, The Case of the GCC", a paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, September 1990.

[10]   Mendis, V. L. B., *SAARC. Origins, Organisation & Prospects*, Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, Monograph No. 3, Perth, 1991, *passim*.

economic objectives and disavowed a political or miliary role for the grouping, pledging non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and dedicated itself to the peaceful solution of bilateral disputes, and the promotion of a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia. But ASEAN's political performance, particularly with respect to Indo-China, has so far outstripped its economic achievements.

Managing Security and Disarmament: Current Problems

International Treaties and Conventions

The essential problem with all the conventions and associated organisations discussed above is that they lack, apart from the pressure of the Super Powers and international opprobrium, any means of enforcement. In addition, they all operate in an environment where there are few mechanisms to control and police the spread of technologies. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of free-enterprise technological development have unleashed a pandora's box of readily accessible technologies ranging from nuclear bombs, to chemical weapons and conventional arms. Some are costly, some are not, but all are increasingly accessible and there is an urgent need for the tightening of existing conventions to control both their proliferation and use.

It seems improbable that, in the wake of the Soviet breakup, there will be a direct proliferation in the form of bombs and technology. All the former Soviet republics are likely to become NPT parties, but chaos and lack of regulation may assist in the dissemination of knowledge through the emigration of Soviet scientists.

In the current situation, the most difficult area of arms control to police is not nuclear proliferation (which may be the most worrying), or chemical and biological weaponry proliferation (which may be the most horrifying), but rather the proliferation of conventional arms, where the production technology and expertise is not dominated by a few, but is widespread around the world.[11] None of the above conventions address this issue.

1. *The Nuclear Weapon Non-Proliferation Treaty*

Among the greatest problems facing the NPT has been the failure of France to accede to the Treaty (although it has recently declared a moratorium on its nuclear testing programme in the Pacific), and the argument of developing nuclear powers, such as India, that the treaty is

unjust because it restricts nuclear weapons to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council

particularly in light of the failure of the Super Powers to make much progress, until recently, toward their own nuclear disarmament.[12] On the other hand, the other great nuclear power in Asia, China, acceded to the Treaty in March 1992, whilst Argentina, Brazil, France, and South Africa, which until recently resisted membership, now appear ready to accede to the Treaty. In addition, North Korea has agreed to IAEA inspection of its nuclear sites. These developments are partially a result of the impact of the Gulf War, and more specifically of the end of the Cold War which, with the end of Super Power rivalry, has removed the screen behind which non-participatory states could quietly build their nuclear capabilities.[13]

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[11]   Nolan, Janne E., *op.cit.*.

[12]   *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 November 1991; Kemp, Geoffrey, *op.cit.*; Buzan, p. 443; Mack, Andrew, "North Korea and the Bomb", *Foreign Policy*, No. 83, Summer 1991, pp. 87-104.

[13]   Simpson, John, "NPT Stronger after Iraq", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 8, October 1991, p.12.

The NPT also suffers from inadequate safeguards. Iraq is a signatory of the NPT, yet was able to improve its nuclear capability because the IAEA never had the support of member states to initiate "challenge inspections", which are among its inspection powers.[14] Accession to the *régime* does have to be accompanied by an agreement with the IAEA, within eighteen months, and the whole problem with North Korea, for example, is that whilst it has acceded to the NPT, it has thus far refused to sign its safeguards agreement. An additional weakness in gaining support for the NPT has been the opposition of both the UK and the US to a comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, reinforcing doubts about their commitment to global nuclear disarmament.

The attitude of both the UK and the US toward the NPT remains ambiguous. The US has recently encouraged wider accession to the treaty, but at the same time both the UK and the US appear to have abandoned hope of bringing India and Pakistan into the treaty mechanism, and they are now proposing a South Asian nuclear free zone which would involve China, India, Pakistan, Russia, UK, and the US.[15]

2. *The Missile Technology Control Régime*. The general problems with this *régime* are:

- It is extremely difficult to make a distinction between military and peaceful space technology;[16] and,
- In addition, the major technology and hardware suppliers to the Middle East - what was the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China   do not belong to the MTCR.

China, however, has recently agreed to halt sales of missiles and missile technology to the Middle East within 24 hours of the US lifting a trade embargo on the sale of high-speed computers and satellites to China,[17] whilst the former Soviet Union has agreed to abide by MTCR guidelines. The *régime* has also been weakened by the fact that it contains no provisions for the reduction of existing arsenals,[18] and it is essentially an export control agreement rather than a formal treaty.

3. *The Biological Weapons Convention*

The major problems associated with this convention are that biological agents and toxins may be used or retained for a variety of peaceful purposes, and it is practically impossible to determine the peaceful needs of individual countries. Whilst the Convention does contain a clear prohibition of the use of such weapons, it has practically no effective verification mechanisms.[19] There is also a loophole in the convention which allows investigation into the properties of biological and toxin agents "in the name of defence,"[20] although it can be argued that a ban on defensive research is problematic as it prevents the development of antidotes and protective equipment. The Convention also contains no verification procedures although at the Review Conference in September 1991 an *ad hoc* committee was set up to examine possible verification measures.

14   Weiss, Leonard, "Tighten Up on Nuclear Cheaters", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 4, May 1991, p. 11.

15   *The Weekend Australian*, 18-19 January 1992.

16   Batsanov, Serguei B., *op.cit.*; Nolan, Janne E, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

17   *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 April and 28 November 1991; *The Australian*, 28 February 1992.

18   Kemp, Geoffrey, *op.cit.*, p. 446.

19   Batsanov, Serguei B., *op.cit.*; Goldblat, Jozef and Bernauer, Thomas, "Proposals for Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention", *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, Vol. 22 (2), 1991, pp. 235-40.

20   Wright, Susan, "Biowar Treaty in Danger", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 7, September 1991, p. 36.

4. *A Chemical Weapons Agreement*

No universal convention on their prohibition and elimination exists, but its conclusion is not impossible, given "the less than compelling military utility of these weapons and the moral opprobrium raised by the grave risks they pose to non-combatants", as evinced by their recent use in Iraq.[21] There is, however, some concern that the "Australia Group" represents Western interests as it currently comprises no developing states among its members,[22] although this will be irrelevant once the new Convention comes into being.

A more general problem encompassing all these treaties and conventions concerns the lack of public involvement with, an understanding of, most of them. Apart from the NPT which has, to an extent, captured the public's imagination, these mechanisms for peace and security are little understood by the general public. This is a serious weakness in that it limits widespread public debate concerning such vital issues, and undermines informed support for their objectives.

Sub-Regional Associations

The central problem with existing sub-regional associations is their reluctance to directly address security and disarmament issues within their membership. None of the associations have an official position *vis à vis* any of the agreements mentioned above, which are dealt with on an individual national basis. Similarly, discussions within these associations, concerning any of the agreements or their objectives, are conducted on a one-on-one national basis with no mechanisms in place for the associations to address such issues as a grouping of states. With respect to nuclear technology and proliferation, for example, India and Pakistan have only recently (1 January 1992) signed a treaty to ban attacks on each other's nuclear facilities and have exchanged lists of such facilities, whilst within SAARC there are no mechanisms to facilitate multi-national discussions and agreements concerning these issues. In the same vein, there is no mechanism in SAARC to discuss common security interests and disarmament with member states, evolving defence policies in isolation from one another.[23] Take for example India's involvement in Sri Lanka and the Maldives, which happened without any reference to existing SAARC consultative processes. ASEAN has been, until very recently, similarly and deliberately devoid of mechanisms to deal with common security issues.

There are, however, indications of change. The Gulf War prompted the GCC to expand its incipient political role, which had begun to evolve during the Iran-Iraq War, by taking a more overtly political stance with respect to Iraq, although the War itself bitterly divided the Arab world leaving a legacy which may still undermine the viability of the GCC.[24] Currently, there is increasing pressure within SAARC to develop mechanisms to facilitate a common approach to security issues, most particularly nuclear proliferation and facilities inspection, which may assist processes of disarmament.

In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, India is entering an era of defence co-operation with the United States, which is at odds with Pakistan over its nuclear weapons capability. Such co-operation might be useful in giving the US leverage over Indian weapons decisions. Within

[21]   Nolan, Janne E., *op.cit.*, p. 11; Meselson, Matthew, "The Myth of Chemical Superweapons", *The Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 3, April 1991, pp. 12-5.

[22]   Kemp, Geoffrey, *op.cit.*.

[23]   Keerawella, Gamini, *Sri Lanka and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean*, Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies, Occasional Paper no. 8, Perth, 1991.

[24]   Sayigh, Yezid, "The Gulf Crisis: Why the Arab Regional Order Failed", *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991, pp. 487-508; Akins, James E., "The New Arabia", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 3, Summer 1991, pp. 36-49; Jahanpour, Farhang, "A New Order for the Middle East?", *The World Today*, Vol. 47, No. 5, May 1991, pp. 74-77.

ASEAN, there are signs of increasing pressures to adopt greater measures for regional defence co-operation, and a weakening of the tendency of countries to take unilateral action, given the different alliances individual members of ASEAN have with extra-regional powers. There appears to be a growing move for co-operative action between the member states of ASEAN, as for example with Singapore's recent decision to provide the US with logistic support (repair, maintenance, supply etc.), following its evacuation of the Subic Bay base in the Philippines, which has gained the support of both Indonesia and Malaysia; a reaction which might not have been expected in previous years.

Managing Security and Disarmament;
Future Directions and New Initiatives

In view of the various problems associated with existing regional institutional mechanisms for strengthening security and disarmament, how can the situation be improved? With respect to international conventions and organisations, the basic problem is that they lack any direct power to impose accession to, and compliance with, their objectives. Additionally, there are loopholes in their existing provisions. With respect to sub-regional organisations, the central problem has been an unwillingness to discuss matters of common security and, *ipso facto*, disarmament.

International Treaties and Conventions

1. *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty*
   Currently, the US estimates that as many as nine Third World countries could possess nuclear missiles by the year 2000.[25] Iraq's nuclear programme is an illustration of the central problem that such activity can occur within the safeguards system of the current NPT/IAEA arrangement. The arrangement obviously needs to be expanded to give the agency more than the authority to apply safeguards to material: it needs, the right to report on facilities,

   including research facilities and plants that manufacture nuclear components or nuclear facilities",[26]

to conduct challenge inspections of suspect countries, greater financial resources for safeguards, and greater political support for the IAEA from the Security Council. In addition, the maintenance of a registry of transferred nuclear items by the UN would obviously reinforce the role of the IAEA. The indications are that, in the wake of the Gulf War and the demise of the Soviet Union, a new international environment is emerging in which the UN/IAEA, with the new consensus in the Security Council, can take a more central role in monitoring the Treaty. In addition, the Super Powers need to look to their own disarmament commitments and procedures, as the Treaty approaches its 1995 renewal conference, and to encourage regional inspection *régimes* modelled on Euratom.[27]

2. *The Missile Technology Control Régime*
   Given the difficulties of distinguishing between peaceful and military uses of this technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency (established in the 1950s to deal with, among other things,

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[25]   *The West Australian*, 15 January 1992.

[26]   Weiss, Leonard, *op.cit.*, p. 12; Cousins, Ian, "The Continuing Irreducible Importance of the NPT", *Backgrounder*, Vol.2, No. 18, 25 October 1991, pp. 7-9.

[27]   Buzan, Barry, *op.cit.*, p. 443.

the provision of materials, services, and equipment, under safeguards) may provide the model for a similar agency to deal with the problem of the diffusion of medium and larger missile technology. If such a mechanism is to be successful, the *régime* needs to be converted into a formal treaty and contain provisions for reducing existing arsenals, which does seem to be happening now in the US and the former Soviet Union. In addition, the establishment of an arms register under UN supervision could reinforce the work of such an agency. Such attempts to achieve universal agreement on such a treaty to limit proliferation will, however, need the active support of the major suppliers of new technology.[28]

3. *The Biological Weapons Convention*

This convention needs to be backed by a register of production and use, perhaps through the World Health Organisation (WHO); a prohibition on investigation into biological and toxin agents for defence purposes; and more effective internal mechanisms to handle complaints and to promote enforcement. The latter objectives could be met by the creation of:

- An interim committee which would meet regularly, rather than the occasional review conference, to develop verification protocols;
- A consultative committee to handle complaints, with the power to carry out verification of compliance and on-site inspections; and,
- Processes of scientific exchange as a mechanism for confidence-building.[29]

4. *A Chemical Weapons Agreement*

The primary need is for an international convention. Support for a comprehensive chemical weapons ban treaty, actively pursued by Australia, appears to be growing amongst developing countries, with India being a major advocate since negotiations began. An inspiration to negotiations has undoubtedly been the revelations concerning Iraq's chemical weapons arsenal.[30] In September, 1991, the Conference *ad hoc* Committee, for the first time since the negotiations began, set 1992 as the time limit for the conclusion of a convention, although important questions relating to verification of compliance and verification of civilian chemical industries still need to be addressed.[31]

Sub-Regional Associations

Events of the last two years have created a greater urgency for such associations to broaden their areas of interests. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union have altered patterns of alliances between regional states and extra-regional powers. Many of the old tensions between and within regional states remain, but they must now be played out in a new international ordering in which there is a unique consensus amongst extra-regional powers to achieve greater international security and to address questions of disarmament.

Regional tensions need to be addressed more directly by regional states who   in the GCC, SAARC, and ASEAN - have organisations which could be used to promote greater and broader

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[28]   Heller, Mark A., "Coping with Missile Proliferation in the Middle East", *Orbis*, Vol. 35, Winter 1991, pp. 15-28; Fetter, Steve, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What Is the Threat? What Should be Done?", *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, pp. 5-42.

[29]   Goldblat, Jozef and Bernauer, Thomas, *op.cit.*; Wright, Susan, "Biowar Treaty in Danger", *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 7, September 1991, pp. 36-40.

[30]   *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 December 1991.

[31]   *Disarmament Newsletter*, Vol. 9, No. 5, October 1991, p. 6.

consultation between member states concerning common security interests and disarmament. Such consultation could both address interests of immediate concern to member states, and be directed toward broader issues relating to conventional arms control, nuclear proliferation, and the questions of missile, chemical, and biological warfare technology and programmes.

The GCC needs to build links with other organisations in the Middle East (for example, the Regional Co-operation Council, the Arab League, and the Islamic Conference) to increase its scope for confidence-building measures and more broadly based discussions concerning peace and security.

SAARC desperately needs to address security issues of common concern in the area of conventional arms control and nuclear proliferation.[32] India and Pakistan remain at loggerheads over the question of nuclear capabilities and nuclear disarmament, and there needs to be serious consideration of reorganising SAARC to provide some mechanisms for security consultation and military confidence-building in South Asia.

ASEAN may provide a model for SAARC. Singapore, in the context of its ASEAN membership, is currently attempting to improve its defence ties with its regional partners, through closer consultation rather than through formal defence pacts, given that it retains strong defence links with Australia, Britain, Malaysia, and New Zealand through the Five-Power Defence Arrangement which was inaugurated in 1971.[33] ASEAN contains the structure known as the Post Ministerial Conference (PMC), which is held each year after the formal ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting, and involves the foreign ministers of ASEAN's dialogue partners: Australia, Canada, the EEC, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the US. At the February, 1992 PMC, Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to follow Singapore in providing logistic support to the US in Southeast Asia. Malaysia is to provide the main Malaysian navy base whilst Indonesia has agreed to be involved, in principle, with a specific offer currently being worked out.

Thus, the ASEAN/PMC arrangement brings together "one of the most formidable arrays of international diplomatic firepower in the world,"[34] and is currently central to the moulding of the "New World Order" of the US. If ASEAN leaders seriously turn their attention to regional security structures, as they agreed at the ASEAN summit in Singapore in January 1992, the PMC will provide an ideal mechanism for a new, internationally recognised and supported, regional security dialogue. It is possible that the PMC could, among other things, consider reviving the Southeast Asian Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept, although it can be argued that there is no need for a ZOPFAN treaty given the intent of the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (1976).

The ASEAN/PMC mechanism provides SAARC with a model to link the organisation as a whole in a dialogue with the non-South Asian partners of individual SAARC states (the US, China, Russia, Australia, and various Southeast Asian nations). Such an arrangement could provide a new forum for a regional security dialogue and confidence-building measures which might break the current security and disarmament impasse in South Asia.

All of these associations provide the ideal framework for processes of confidence-building between member states within existing mechanisms. Peace is not simply the absence of war, but it is a positive state underpinned by economic, social, and political progress, which all of these organisations are currently well-equipped to promote, given commitment to increased consultation and common action by member states.

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[32]　Joeck, Neil, "Tacit Bargaining and Stable Proliferation in South Asia", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 3, September 1990, pp. 77-91.

[33]　*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 February, 25 July and 5 December 1991.

[34]　Greg Sheridan in *The Weekend Australian*, 18-19 January 1992.

Additionally, such organisations are the ideal agency to promote the idea of Zones of Peace. The record of the UN has not been particularly impressive in this area, which is not due so much to deficiencies in the UN, but rather is due to the monumental difficulties inherent in attempting to create very large Zones of Peace and Nuclear Free Zones, *e.g.* the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. The GCC, SAARC, and ASEAN, comprise more closely-knit areas in which the existing associations may be the better agency to address the question of Zones of Peace, NFZs, and the verification of the proliferation of nuclear technology, than an international organisation such as the UN, although the UN would be the ultimate sponsoring and verification agency.[35] In the case of SAARC, however, when Pakistan and Bangladesh sponsored a proposal for a NFZ in South Asia at the UN late in 1991 it had, despite Indian opposition, the support of the Soviet Union, causing considerable consternation in New Delhi and revealing one of the inherent weaknesses of SAARC as it is presently constituted.[36]

As previously noted, the US and the UK are promoting the establishment of a South Asian nuclear free zone outside the mechanisms of both the NPT and SAARC. Whilst the objective may be admirable, such a proposal (which does not include the other members of SAARC, apart from India and Pakistan) may weaken the viability of both the NPT and SAARC as global and regional mechanisms for encouraging multilateral approaches to security and disarmament.

Undoubtedly, the problems associated with closer and more wide-ranging consultation between member states are great. There are mutual suspicions regarding interference in the internal affairs of member states, historical rivalries, and the legacy of extra-regional alliances forged during the Cold War. But, by steadily increasing the range of consultations, and by developing new organisational mechanisms within existing regional associations, it may be possible to encourage greater confidence in the effectiveness and utility of such organisations to promote the common interests of its members.

New Institutional Mechanisms

The central problem with existing international agreements and sub-regional associations, with respect to security and disarmament, is the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of securing universal agreement and co-operation. Given the realities of the human condition, it would be both naive and counterproductive to assume that each international agreement can be equipped with enforcement powers, or that regional organisations are going to rapidly gain powers at the expense of the powers of member states. However, this problem might be addressed by the creation of new supra-national and supra-regional organisations under the aegis of the UN, which could sponsor confidence-building measures in the Middle East and South Asia in particular, and address specific security and disarmament issues in the international context removed from particular alliance and ideological systems.[37]

One of the most positive roles the UN can perform in the not-too-distant future, is to commission an *International Arms Register* and an associated *Arms Watch Programme*, perhaps through existing independent agencies around the world, to monitor and record both conventional arms transfers and the diffusion of military technologies, including transferred nuclear items.[38] In

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[35] For ASEAN see Saravanamuthu, Johan *op.cit.*; Acharya, Amitav, "The Association of Southeast Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defence Community'?", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 64, No. 2, Summer 1991, pp. 159-178.

[36] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 November 1991, p. 22.

[37] Fisher, Cathleen S., "Build Confidence not Weapons", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 47, No. 5, June 1991, p. 11, p. 42.

[38] Nolan, Janne E., *op.cit.*, p. 21; Batsanov, Serguei B., *op.cit.*, p. 6.

addition, it may be feasible for the UN to consider, in association with the above mentioned monitoring agencies, the establishment of a series of arms *régimes* (most particularly in the Middle East) to encourage agreements between suppliers and recipients of arms as a means of regulating the flow of arms.[39] As we have seen in the above discussion relating to treaties and *régimes*, one of the central problems is accurate accounting of weaponry, arms transfers, and verification procedures. An International Arms Register, in association with an Arms Watch Programme, would go part of the way to helping reduce these deficiencies.

Supplementary Measures

It is obvious that all attempts to strengthen institutional mechanisms relating to regional security and disarmament cannot succeed unless they are linked to measures which can encourage compliance.

Undoubtedly, a considerable amount of conventional arms transfers has been associated with the foreign aid programmes of various states. An International Arms Register and Arms Watch Programme could provide a more public and accurate record of such transactions than we currently posses, and could be an instrument to focus public debate and concern on the ethics of arms production and the arms trade, as well as the issue of the relationship between foreign aid and arms transfers. In addition, the involvement of NGOs in both the Register and Arms Watch Programme would help address the problem of increasing public interest in, and understanding of, the various treaties and conventions associated with processes of disarmament and security in the Asian-Pacific region. Given the end of the Cold War, such a Register and Programme could be organised under the aegis of the UN, with the support of the members of the Security Council, in an era when the UN,

increasingly is being seen as a mechanism for international mediation and conflict resolution."[40]

In addition, now may be the time to update the role of existing UN agencies and the UN Peace-Keeping Force as mechanisms for helping defuse sub-state tensions.[41] In the wake of the collapse of the USSR and the *rapprochement* between the US and Russia, there are

promising new elements in the geo-political equation [with both parties having] a common interest in containing regional instabilities - in particular, by restraining arms sales"[42]

and by supporting the various peace-keeping and disarmament activities of the UN. This is obviously an area fraught with difficulties due to the sensitivities of states regarding their internal affairs, but, given the linkage between sub-state and inter-state tensions, the idea merits serious consideration. An alternative approach to handling this linkage may also be in the area of developing confidence-building measures, particularly where states are not willing to accept external institutional interference, and where mutual consultation may be a more fruitful means of defusing tension and encouraging moves toward disarmament.[43]

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[39]   Pierre, Andrew J., *op.cit.*, pp. 32-4.
[40]   Nolan, Janne E., *op.cit.*, p. 14.
[41]   See Bustello, R. M. and Alston, P., *Whose New World Order?*, Centre for International and Public Law, ANU, Federation Press, 1991, for a discussion of possible reforms to the UN.
[42]   *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[43]   *Ibid.*, p. 24; Jawhar, Mohammed, "Confidence- and Security-Building Measures: Their Applicability Outside of European Contexts", *Disarmament*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991, pp. 85-103.

The success of all these suggestions is dependent upon the willingness of the major extra-regional states and international economic institutions to act as brokers. They can apply indirect forms of leverage in support of the UN to encourage steps toward improving regional security, in association with disarmament, by finding ways "to link financial incentives and military restraint", to which may also be added trade incentives.[44] In the case of Japan, Germany, the US, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, there is considerable potential leverage in terms of their economic aid programmes.

Japan has indicated a willingness to overtly link aid to a reduction in defence expenditures,[45] which the US did in 1990 when it suspended all military and new economic aid to Pakistan after Pakistan refused to reveal its nuclear capabilities. In addition, the US has attempted to link trade deals to the transfer of technology which may be turned to military purposes, in both China and India.[46] Indeed, the US has formidable leverage in this area, and the signs are that it is prepared to exert a variety of pressures in both the Middle East and South Asia to link trade, aid, and accession to international treaties and conventions concerning disarmament.[47] In a similar vein, Germany, late in 1991, announced that development aid to India for 1992 would be cut by 25 per cent because of "excessive armament" although, in fact, India's projected defence expenditures for 1992 represents a decline in real terms from expenditures in 1991.[48]

It may also be possible for a major lending agency such as the IMF to ensure that,

assessments of a country's eligibility for credits and loans take into account the influence of its military, including the nature and relative burden of weapons development and production programmes.[49]

Certainly, the IMF has indicated recently that the time had come when certain Asian countries "could negotiate their defence spendings and divert money to the starved social sector".[50] Such action would be that much easier to implement if the UN created an International Arms Register and encouraged the establishment of an independent Arms Watch Programme (perhaps utilising existing NGOS?), a move which is most appropriate given that both the US and the member states of the EEC are considering steps "to tighten their oversight and control over arms exports."[51]

Whilst there will be many difficulties implementing these suggested new institutional mechanisms, the current international political situation is such that conditions are more favourable than ever before for consensus within the UN Security Council. This new climate can facilitate the establishment of more effective institutional mechanisms, to assist in the enforcement of existing agreements, and institutions concerned with security and disarmament in the Asian-Pacific region.

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[44]   Nolan, Janne E., *op.cit.*, p. 23.
[45]   *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 April 1991.
[46]   *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 November 1991 and 5 December 1991.
[47]   *Congressional Quarterly*, Vol. 49, 25 May 1991, p. 1390, p. 1596.
[48]   *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 November 1991.
[49]   *Ibid.*.
[50]   *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 5 December 1991.
[51]   *Ibid.*.

Chapter 16

Responses

First Response

Carolina G. Hernandez

At the outset, let me congratulate the three main speakers for their incisive and comprehensive analysis of various proposals related to security and disarmament, among them zones of peace, nuclear weapons-free zones, confidence- and security-building measures, and institutional mechanisms for security and disarmament, relevant to the region. On the whole, I agree with the main conclusions they made. Among these are:

1. Zones of peace and nuclear weapons-free zones can only be possible with the resolution of internal and external conflicts facing states in the region on the one hand, and on the other, on the willingness of nuclear powers and near nuclear powers to disarm or abandon their nuclearization programs;
2. Confidence and security-building measures have varying degrees of workability and success because conditioning factors in the sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific vary widely, and various sectors like media, education, etc., have important responsibilities in this regard; and,
3. While existing institutional mechanisms for dealing with security and disarmament are fraught with problems, there are alternative avenues for developing new mechanisms or for reforming existing ones to deal with current security and disarmament issues.

In addition, I wish to reiterate the observation that the Asia-Pacific region is not a cohesive, homogeneous region, and its confines remain largely undefined. One only has to examine the three papers in this session to realize how widely spread the region is, and how it is lacking consensus about its proper scope. Kenneth McPherson even includes West Asia in the region's scope.

My own view is that the region might be roughly divided into 4 sub-regions:

*   Northeast Asia;
*   Southeast Asia;
*   Southwest Pacific; and,
*   South Asia.

Southeast Asians consider Myanmar as a part of their sub-region. Afghanistan is perhaps more properly West Asian, rather than South Asian.

Let me also stress the observation that these global and regional changes that are taking place, particularly the end of the Cold War, the dismemberment of the former Soviet Union, and the opening of former Socialist states, are a two-edged sword, bringing with them both benign and potentially malign consequences. If mismanaged, our responses to the challenges brought by these fundamental and sweeping benign changes, could usher in malign implications. Change almost always means uncertainties that can have destabilizing and threatening implications. Precisely because of the destruction of the old global power structure, and the unclear shape of its replacement, states are now faced by the challenge of defining a new order, whether it be global

or regional. It is in this context that the board consensus in North and Southeast Asia of a continuing US political and military presence in the region must be understood. Perceived as a benign Super Power, the US is expected to prevent the region from being dominated by any one of the regional powers, including China, Japan, and Russia/CIS.

The Gulf War is a grim reminder that, while big power confrontations of the sort the world knew during the Cold War may be over, peace can so easily be disrupted by smaller states; hence, a condition of military readiness is still required by states to feel secure. In preparation for a reduced US military presence in the region, some states will devise alternative or substitute security arrangements, including the building of self-reliant defense systems through arms modernization and arms procurement, as well as through the creation of regular security dialogues and consultations. Joint patrols have been proposed as an alternative to arms procurement in Southeast Asia. Such an alternative is also an important step toward greater transparency confidence-building among the states in this sub-region.

The Asia-Pacific region also has no consensus on what security means. For ASEAN and Japan, security is not confined to defense and military fields. Security encompasses the whole array of desired values in the political, economic, socio-cultural, psychological, and even environmental fields. This is why, with the end of the Cold War and the reduction of tensions in the region, the continuing emphasis among these states is on regional economic co-operation and development.

In ASEAN, security concerns have also been largely internal. They remain so for countries such as the Philippines, where internal strife prevents it from becoming part of a zone of peace. In fact, this condition prevents Southeast Asia from becoming a zone of peace at the moment, although there are zones of peace within the Philippines in areas previously marked by strife. Yet even in internal strife, the solution is not military; it can only be meaningful social, political, and economic change (The Philippines role in NWFZ).

The Philippines has, however, made a very significant contribution toward the eventual realization of a nuclear weapons-free zone in Southeast Asia through its constitutional commitment to such a zone. The termination of its military bases agreement with the US will also mean the pull-out of US military facilities, troops, vessels, and aircraft from the Philippines, by the end of 1992. Any likelihood of nuclear weapons entering Philippine territory through US naval ships, or the storage of nuclear weapons in Philippine bases, will come to a halt at that time.

For those states whose security threats derive from external sources, reliance on military solutions is likely to persist, unless confidence-building measures (CBMs) are effectively put in place. In my view, it is everybody's responsibility to engage in CBMs, but there is a heavier responsibility on the big powers to initiate these measures, because they have the greater capability to threaten smaller states in the region or sub-region. Hence, the US and Russia should lead in the Asia-Pacific region, China and Japan in Northeast Asia, Indonesia in Southeast Asia, India in South Asia, Australia and New Zealand in the Southwest Pacific.

ASEAN has evolved into a security community in Southeast Asia; none of its members would resort to the use of force to settle a dispute with another member. But in the past, it also had its own history of intra-regional conflict and tension. Its members, however, have committed to submerging these intra-regional conflicts under the higher goal of regional co-operation and stability. Without meaning to flatter Jusuf Wanandi, and speaking from the perspective of the weakest state in the association, Indonesia's adherence to the policy of good neighbourliness has been a major factor in this process. Instead of flexing its muscles and emphasizing the obvious, Indonesia has tried to respond to regional sensitivities in many instances.

ASEAN's dialogue process has been very effective in building confidence where before there was little or none. Hence, dialogues should be encouraged among states in the sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific. It is only through this process that CBMs can be initiated, in some cases, or the cause

of peace advanced. Getting to know each other, and building personal friendships among decision-makers, can demystify many of our stereotype images of one another.

Japan provides another example of the successful healing process between former enemies. With regard to Southeast Asia, conscious efforts have been undertaken to build confidence through dialogue and co-operation in various fields. In the shaping of its future role in the region, it has taken the trouble to consult a wide cross-section of public opinion in Southeast Asia. Of course, Japan needs to do more, such as fully accepting the burden of historical truth, instead of reforming history, and assuming whatever consequences might flow from that history. However, it has taken initial steps in the right direction through forging co-operative relations with its former enemies.

Because of the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region, it may not be wise nor realistic to have a region-wide mechanism for dealing with security and disarmament issues. In the meanwhile, sub-regional and cross sub-regional dialogues should continue, where they are ongoing processes, or be initiated where they don't exist. I am a great believer in communication as an integrating, homogenizing, and confidence-building agent. But communication is not only done through dialogues, it includes the whole array of transnational movements of people, goods, services, and ideas. We are witness to these rapid transnational movements within and across regions. I meet my ASEAN colleagues more often than my brother, who lives only 35 km from my home. It is ironic that I can be in Hong Kong faster than I can motor to his home. This is only one aspect of our inter-connectedness, making us members of one community, rather than many communities. These inter-connections make Northeast and Southwest Asia really one larger sub-region of the Asia-Pacific. The Southeast Pacific is already part of ASEAN's dialogue system. We await the inclusion of South Asia when it is able to sort out its intra-regional problems. Perhaps some of our experiences in the rest of the Asia-Pacific can have relevance and meaning for South Asia.

Second Response

Sandra Tarte

There is an old saying in politics: "Where you stand depends on where you sit". This seems to apply particularly well to discussions of security and disarmament in the Asia Pacific region.

In defining "the region", where you stand does depend on where you sit. In the South Pacific, for example, we talk about "the region" all the time, and we have no trouble placing ourselves at its centre. There is a tendency to make the rather grandiose assumption that the world revolves around ourselves.

In defining threats, where you stand also seems to depend on where you sit. To use the South Pacific as an example again, it is not military threats that we fear most; nor do we fear our neighbours. As small, weak, countries, what we fear is the threat of being marginalised; of being dispensable; of disappearing beneath the waves (literally and metaphorically), and no one noticing. That is the essence of vulnerability.

In this short intervention I would like to address my comments to one theme only; a theme that has been prominent not only in today's papers but throughout the discussions of the past two days. That theme is "regionalism and globalism": the need to approach security and disarmament at two principal levels. One is the global level, the other is the regional. By regional, I refer to the separate "security complexes" (or sub-regions) of Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, Southwest Pacific, and South Asia.

We cannot hope to build a "new world order" unless regional security systems are in place. Conversely, building regional security cannot proceed without the foundations of a global security

system. (The discussion of nuclear weapons-free zones and zones of peace reflects this interdependence of regional and global orders most clearly).

At the global level the United Nations must remain the basis of collective security. We have heard discussions (at this conference and other fora) about the need for collective security arrangements in Asia and the Pacific. No such arrangement can work unless there is a global, collective security *régime* to which all states are parties. Any future arrangement in the Asia Pacific region should seek to build on the collective security mechanisms of the UN. (By collective security I refer to the non-use of force principle, supported by the pledge to use force against an aggressor).

Peace-keeping is another task that needs to be pursued at the global level. In this way, peace-keeping operations may involve all states (irrespective of size and military might). Fiji is a small country that is an active participant in peace-keeping operations. The fact that such participation is partly done for money is beside the point.

Problems relating to the environment also need to be dealt with through global fora. The UN has already assumed a leading role in this area.

But it is in the area of disarmament that global *régimes* are particularly vital. Such *régimes* have been the subject of discussion throughout this conference. Some are already in place (eg. the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Others have been mooted (eg. a Missile Technology Control Régime, a Chemical Weapons Agreement, a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and an Arms Register).

In all these areas, the UN, or global *régimes*, are necessary and must be strengthened. Yesterday, one speaker referred to the creation of a UN-polar world. I would endorse this concept.

But these *régimes* must be sustained by (and, in turn sustain) regional security systems. Regional organisations that may promote security co-operation exist in some regions (eg. South Pacific and Southeast Asia). In other regions (eg. Northeast Asia), such organisations have yet to be created.

Regional organisations can play a political-security role in addition to the political-economic role they are primarily concerned with. In particular, regional organisations may foster dialogue and information exchange; promote greater transparency; facilitate dispute settlement; and oversee essential security functions (eg. maritime surveillance).

Regional co-operation has two fundamental rationales. On the one hand, there is an economic rationale: a pooling of resources by states, too small or economically weak to stand entirely on their own. On the other hand, there is a political rationale: to promote regional cohesion and solidarity, and provide a counterweight to outside powers.

Regionalism and globalism also need to be joined, at times, by the bilateral approach. This has particular relevance where two states have a long history of conflict, tension, and mistrust. One such relationship is that between Japan and Russia. Here, it is arguable that the two countries need to pursue a bilateral approach to security. In 1990, while on a visit to Japan, the former Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, proposed a bilateral confidence-building arrangement. This would include an agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea, an invitation to observe military exercises, and exchanges of visits by military personnel. The time is perhaps ripe for such an arrangement to be worked out.

To conclude, what we need in order to promote security and disarmament in the Asia-Pacific, is to build a climate of trust, and a commitment to dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. This is perhaps stating the obvious. The most appropriate course is the multilevel and incremental one; building global, regional, and bilateral arrangements that combine as complementary security *régimes*.

Part VI

Research and Teaching in Asia and the Pacific on Questions of Security and Disarmament

Chapter 17

Enhancing Information Exchange Between Research Institutes in the Asian and Pacific

Péricles Gasparini Alves

Introduction

In this age of computer sciences, the application of database techniques has been developed to assist with organizing an ever increasing documentation and with gaining a clear view of the numerous and diverse activities of modern society. UNIDIR has dedicated itself to co-ordinate the growing documentation in the field of disarmament and international security, and is fully aware of the fact that in order to facilitate this tremendous task, both today and in the future, it is necessary to have recourse to advanced computer technology. It is with this in mind that UNIDIR has recently developed a flexible and user-friendly database management application system which regroups, *inter alia,* information on research institutes and their activities for the former's internal use. The experience gained with the UNIDIR Database on Research Institutes (DATARIs) is most positive and encouraging, and fully confirms our conviction that modern and thorough research efforts would greatly benefit from computer assistance. At present, UNIDIR is envisaging the possibilities of enlarging the scope of its in-house DATARIs, as well as the ways and means to make this data more readily available. It follows, therefore, that co-operation among research institutes would gain substantially from some kind of computerized information and interactive documentation system.

The timing of the present Conference is therefore quite suitable to ponder the question of how database techniques could assist us all with integrating the joint efforts of research institutes, having particularly in mind the interests of the Asian and Pacific region. A comprehensive answer to this question would of course require more than the time allocated to this *exposé*, because this is a very wide ranging issue, and also because it encompasses highly technical aspects. I shall therefore not dwell on technical implications but focus on the fundamental topics related to the establishment of a database.

Benefits

In the first place one should clearly identify the benefits a database system has to offer. In a time of budgetary restraints, where the relationship between productivity, man hours and work load are of utmost importance, the use of a database system becomes essential for two major reasons. A database system enables the creation of a new form of communication among research institutes: that of an electronic non-verbal communication for both direct communication and the exchange of machine language data. It furthermore permits a quantitative as well as a qualitative expansion and intensification of existing links between research institutes. From the management standpoint, *real* time or *almost real* time communication among institutes is useful in the co-ordination of special data of utmost interest to all. For such an electronic linkage is efficient not only as a tool to exchange data, but also as a means of avoiding overlapping of research project themes, conference timetables, and other activities which should be complementary but not repetitious. This type of communication is, in other words, much more than a simple working tool for quick reference access.

The second point that needs to be addressed is the aspect of system control: *who* would manage this type of database? In fact, there exist several approaches to operating a database system on research institutes. However, we will explore only a few of these avenues since our perspective should consider a regional database system relating to research institutes in the Asian and Pacific region.

One could, for instance, think in terms of a database network run by a single manager who would centralize the system and distribute the data throughout the Asian and Pacific region as demonstrated in diagram A. Due to its nature and character, the United Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, in Kathmandu, Nepal, is one of the organizations which readily come to one's mind for carrying out such a task. However, depending on the needs expressed by potential users, one could also envisage the development of a system (as a network or an internal database system) operated by private institutes or other organizations.

In such a case, any effort made to create a database should conceive the system (both as regards the choice of the hardware equipment and software application) with a view to expanding its utilization and data transfers to other systems. This is necessary to avoid creating a handicap for future collaboration with other institutions in the region.

Finally, a combination of the above approaches could also be a plausible configuration as it can be seen in diagram B. In this instance, early co-operation among potential users would be essential to ensure system compatibility both in terms of the purchase of hardware equipment and software. Collective efforts leading to a division of the tasks envisaged could yield the following advantages:

- Decreasing the cost of the design and development phases;
- Decreasing the cost of hardware equipment;
- Diminishing the overall time needed to develop the system;
- Avoiding useless repetition of software applications;
- Creating a particular regional network, where cultural, political, and other concerns are generally quite similar.

This option appears therefore as the most plausible strategy to be pursued. It is important to keep in mind that the credibility and efficiency of efforts geared towards a regional database system would depend, to some extent, on the degree of the exchange of information which could flow from and to the institutes. if full collective operation is not technically or otherwise possible, some kind of co-operation in terms of consultations should be contemplated. In this regard, UNIDIR is prepared to assist, with the co-ordination, the conception and the development phases of a regional database in the Asian and Pacific region. In fact, similar network systems were proposed by UNIDIR at the occasion of the Regional Conferences of Research Institutes held in Africa (Algiers, Algeria - 1990) and Latin America and the Caribbean (Sao Paulo, Brazil - 1991). In the case of Africa, for example, initial discussions have already begun and UNIDIR is conducting a feasibility study on how best to approach the creation of a computer-aided database in the African continent.

Conception Phase

The conception of a database system basically encompasses the definition of the objectives to be attained by the system, adequate hardware equipment, and the possibilities of access to the system. At an initial stage, an Asian and Pacific region database system could have as its objective the design of an application which would permit, for example, the development of a directory of all research institutes and other organizations working in the area of disarmament and internationalsecurity related to the region as seen in diagram C. Subdivisions of this directory could,

for example, list a detailed index of all experts working in the Asian and Pacific region institutes and/or on Asian and Pacific security matters, their field of specialization and contacts. A complementary subdivision could contain an index of research projects, publications, and conferences, or meetings dealing with security in the Asian and Pacific region. Analytical studies delineating the status of research and the areas in which research would need to be more emphasized would certainly result from the collection of data.

A regional database application would therefore allow for a quick reference to know *who* is doing *what* on Asian and Pacific region affairs, and *when*. In addition, it would have an academic value in the sense that it would not merely store information in a purely statistical or numerical form, but it would also lay the grounds for analytical considerations and decision making as regards both the conception and orientation of research in the field of regional and international security.

Diagram A
Single Manager Approach

**Diagram B**
Multiple Manager Approach

Database Central Unit

Updator

Operator

Manager

Functions

Consulter

Research Institutes

Governmental Organizations

Non-Government Organizations

General Public

Diagram C
Asia and the Pacific Institutes Database Basic Structure

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                        ┌─────────────────┐
                        │  Directory of   │
                        │Research Institutes│
                        └─────────────────┘
                                 │
   ┌──────────────┬──────────────┼──────────────┬──────────────┐
┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────┐
│Research Institute│ │List of Experts│ │ Activities │ │Publications│ │ Statistics │
│  Records   │ │            │ │            │ │            │ │            │
└────────────┘ └────────────┘ └────────────┘ └────────────┘ └────────────┘
                                 │
                   ┌─────────────┼
             ┌────────────┐ ┌────────────────┐
             │ Conferences │ │Research Projects│
             └────────────┘ └────────────────┘
                                 │
                         ┌────────────┐
                         │Round-Tables│
                         └────────────┘
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The choice of hardware equipment would largely depend on the complexity and type of the tasks to be performed by the software application and the overall objectives of the network itself. One fundamental element to be studied, however, is that any computer configuration to be developed for such a purpose should be technically capable of allowing the interaction of different desktop devices, operating environments and systems. Diagram D is a rather simplified but quite descriptive illustration of an integrated system to be considered, where a central database unit is linked to multiple hardware and software environments and systems. It would be useless to advance any figures on the cost of such a system. The financing required for a single management system may differ greatly from that of a multiple management network. Whatever the solution opted for may be, a feasibility study should be undertaken.

Access to the information in a single or multiple management network could be obtained via requests sent through the postal system, or via direct electronic communication supported by modem and fax-card. Or yet, via a direct link using the X-25 liaison principle. The variety of means to access the system, as well as the possible roles to be played by different institutions, is better illustrated in diagram E. Depending on the objectives of the database and the resources available, access could be free of charge or payable either on a case-by-case basis or through a membership fee. In addition, the use of the database application in the electronic communications mode could be protected by restricting access through a password system.

Reflections

There lies ahead a new and challenging opportunity for research institutes in the Asian and Pacific region to enhance exchange of information and co-operation among them. This new opportunity entails the creation of a unique collection of data with the aid of database techniques which could be undertaken either individually or collectively.

The benefits offered by a database system should be evaluated in terms of its inter-institute communication (including the exchange of data) advantages, which will thus serve to improve the current co-ordination of the various activities performed by and among the institutes themselves.

To sum up, the establishment of a regional Asian and Pacific database system would be a valuable contribution to research in the field of disarmament and international security. Furthermore, the pursuit of this idea is also stimulated by proposals to develop of analogous systems in other areas of the world - as is the case on the African and the Latin American and the Caribbean continents.

Diagram D
Multiple Hardware/Software Environment Integrated System

Diagram E

Participation in and Access to Data Bases on Research Institutes

Diagram E

UNIDIR

Member A
Analytic Central Unit and Data Base Management

Member B
Local Data Processing Unit

Member C
Different types of hardware systems

Member D
Different means of information exchange

Different types of hardware systems

Mail Orders

Hardware Connections
Modem   X-25   FaxCard

Access to Data Bases
Local computer network
International computer network
Non-computer network

Members' Role/Activities
- A) Manager, operator, updator, consulter
- B) Co-manager, operator, updator, consulter
- C) Updator, consulter
- D) Consulter

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