



NIGERIA

WEAPONS & AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT



INTRODUCTION

In November 2016, the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in cooperation with UNIDIR and the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), implemented a national Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) baseline assessment in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Led by national authorities, the objectives of this round of consultations were to establish a baseline of the existing WAM activities and procedures in place, to identify areas to be strengthened, and to present recommendations for programmatic and policy responses to build a national framework governing the management of arms and ammunition.

The national consultation offered the opportunity for representatives, experts, and practitioners from various Nigerian institutions and security agencies to engage in dialogue, build trust, and improve needed cooperation between them to design and implement a strong national WAM framework. The exchanges and information provided in the course of the national consultation and bilateral meetings with senior representatives of relevant national institutions with WAM oversight, were consolidated into a report and shared with the

Government of Nigeria to support its efforts in improving its national weapons and ammunition framework.

This publication is an extract of the baseline assessment report delivered to the Nigerian national authorities. It is a snapshot of the summary of the main findings and options identified for the enhancement of weapons and ammunition management in Nigeria. **It presents the status of strategic and operational WAM efforts in Nigeria as identified during the baseline assessment and highlights the practical recommendations provided to the Nigerian authorities as of November 2016.**

NIGERIA



POPULATION:	200.9 MILLION
REGION:	WESTERN AFRICA
CAPITAL:	ABUJA
ANNUAL GDP:	375.7 BILLION
DATE OF ASSESSMENT:	NOVEMBER 2016

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

Office of the National Security Adviser
 Defence Headquarters
 Ministry of Defence
 Nigerian Army
 Nigerian Air Force
 Nigerian Navy
 Nigerian Police Force
 National Security and Civil Defence Corps
 Nigerian Prisons Service

ONSA
DHQ
MOD
NA
NAF
NN
NPF
NSCDC
NPS

Nigerian Customs Service
 Nigerian Immigration Service
 Defence Intelligence Agency
 National Intelligence Agency
 Department of State Services
 Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation
 West African Action Network on Small Arms
 Conflict Armament Research
 Mines Advisory Group
 Bonn International Center for Conversion

NCS
NIS
DIA
NIA
DSS
PRESCOM
WAANSA
CAR
MAG
BICC

METHODOLOGY

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal.

This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counterterrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a 'bottom-up' and evidence-based approach.

This Country Insight on Nigeria is part of a series of Country Insights that seek to promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments

with support from UNIDIR. It is aimed to serve as a reference for international partners for providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

Information contained in this Country Insight presents key findings and recommendations of the baseline assessment conducted in November of 2016. It does not reflect the progress made or any changes implemented after the assessment and should be taken to be indicative only of the situation at the time of the assessment.

Building on the multi-year WAM baseline assessments in Africa, UNIDIR in partnership with the African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS Commission aims **to enhance knowledge and dialogue among States, regional organisations, the United Nations and expert NGOs on good practices and lessons learned, as well as on the means and methods to further strengthen national and regional approaches to WAM in Africa.**



NATIONAL CONTEXT

In contrast to some other countries in the region, Nigeria has a long history of codified weapons management policies and practices upon which to draw, particularly within its armed forces, and through its significant experience of collecting, seizing and destroying illicit weapons and ammunition in the Niger Delta and elsewhere. In addition to international standards, these existing national/regional policies and practices can contribute key elements to a comprehensive Nigerian WAM framework.

While Nigeria continues to strengthen its institutional framework for WAM and improve its implementation, various challenges remain as of November 2016. In particular, existing laws and regulations related to WAM in Nigeria did not adequately cover the commitments

from relevant regional and international arms control instruments. For example, weapons management standards exist within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials ("ECOWAS Convention"). However, many of these commitments have yet to be domesticated into national regulations and procedures. At the operational level, as of November 2016 Nigeria lacked a formal national commission to coordinate WAM activities in the country. Furthermore, the country had yet to initiate a comprehensive marking programme for its security forces. Within the ECOWAS context, Nigeria remained one of the few States yet to implement such initiatives.

OVERVIEW OF WAM ENHANCEMENT OPTIONS



TOTAL NUMBER OF OPTIONS: 55

TECHNICAL PILLAR 1: NATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK



KEY FINDINGS

- As PRESCOM and security agencies underlined, there in November of 2016 there was a strong need to update the national legal framework governing weapons management.
- Replacing the 1959 Firearms Act with a proposed new bill is a priority for at least four reasons: to meet the new reality since 1959 of the widespread illicit traffick-

ing and possession of both military and non-military weapons; to close existing WAM gaps, particularly relating to security agencies' weapons management practices; to implement Nigeria's obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and ECOWAS Convention; and to encompass new technologies.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

1.	Adopt the proposed new firearms bill	FEC; National Assembly
2.	Develop a plan to operationalize the new firearms bill at a practical level	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies
3.	Sensitize high level national authorities on the legal provisions related to arms and ammunition	PRESCOM; Relevant ministries
4.	Sensitize civilians on the new firearms bill	PRESCOM; NOA; Relevant NGOs
5.	Domesticate the ECOWAS Convention and ATT provisions into regulations for each security agency	National Assembly; Relevant ministries; PRESCOM

TECHNICAL PILLAR 2: NATIONAL COORDINATION BODY



KEY FINDINGS

- As of November 2016, Nigeria was the only remaining ECOWAS Convention State Party that had yet to fulfil its obligation to form a National Commission on SALW.
- PRESCOM's coordinating role on WAM issues is vital but limited by the precarity of its Committee status.
- Establishing technical working groups (TWGs) under PRESCOM—bringing together experts from relevant security agencies on specific WAM issues—could help update the national WAM framework and ensure it keeps up with developing WAM challenges.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

6.	Transform PRESCOM into National Commission in line with ECOWAS Convention (adopt bill)	FEC; National Assembly
7.	Develop a roadmap for implementation of existing international and national projects on SALW	ONSA; PRESCOM
8.	Review, adopt and disseminate national action plan on SALW	ONSA; PRESCOM
9.	Adequately resource PRESCOM for its coordinating role	FEC

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

10.	Establish interagency TWG on WAM	PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies
11.	Involve relevant state and local entities in design and review of national action plan	ONSA; PRESCOM; MOJ MOD

TECHNICAL PILLAR 3: TRANSFER CONTROLS



KEY FINDINGS

- In November of 2016, arms transfer controls in Nigeria were procedurally robust, particularly through strict import surveillance and prohibitions on arms exports. However, they did not yet cover all types of transfers and types of weapons encompassed by the international instruments to which Nigeria is party, particularly the ECOWAS Convention and the ATT. Updating (i) control lists and (ii) controlled transfer types (particularly trans-shipment, transit and arms brokering) in the proposed new firearms bill is a priority.
- Participants mentioned several past mechanisms for security agencies to import weapons—including through the MOD, through the ONSA and through DHQ via Presidential authorization. UNIDIR understood that the system remains decentralized (by security forces) but that the procedures are expected to be harmonized. A published law or regulation setting out this harmonized import/procurement system might be valuable.
- Security agencies compile agency level data on arms imports and exports. The NCS also gathers such data, though official weapons imports are in some cases cleared through customs by the security agencies' own clearing agents. Centralizing arms transfer data under a single agency might help Nigeria meet its ECOWAS Convention reporting obligations on imports/exports.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

12.	Harmonize procedures for procurement and import for all security agencies in line with revised national regulations	ONSA; Relevant security agencies; PRESCOM
13.	Review national definitions and categories for national control list (prohibited and controlled items)	ONSA; PRESCOM
14.	Review national regulations of all security agencies to include all activities controlled within ECOWAS Convention and ATT, including brokering, import, export, transit, trans-shipment and measures to prevent diversion	ONSA; Relevant security agencies; Relevant ministries; PRESCOM
15.	Collate information on Nigerian arms transfers to allow reporting according to national, regional and international instruments	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies

TECHNICAL PILLAR 4: WEAPONS MARKING



KEY FINDINGS

- In November of 2016, PRESCOM had plans to initiate a programme to mark security agencies' and civilian-held weapons in conformity with the ECOWAS Convention. However, this had not yet begun at the time of the assessment.
- PRESCOM envisages that a national weapon marking programme will, at a minimum, require the following preparatory work: codifying a single harmonized marking system/format, connecting it to a comprehensive database of marked weapons, developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for marking, planning the marking programme in detail, and establishing a training programme on marking.
- This essential planning might usefully be done by establishing an interagency Technical Working Group (TWG) for the process under PRESCOM, before the marking programme begins.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

16.	Establish legal requirement for marking of all weapons, both arms in circulation and newly acquired	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant ministries; DICON
17.	Develop marking standards applying across all security agencies	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; DICON
18.	Design marking format in conformity with regional and international standards	ONSA; PRESCOM Relevant security agencies DICON
19.	Utilize interagency TWG for marking procedures and standards	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; DICON
20.	Develop pilot project plan for marking, including requirements for equipment/ machines, logistics, personnel and relevant sensitization activities	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; DICON
21.	Develop training plan for interagency training on marking procedure	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; DICON
22.	Where applicable, develop assistance proposal to support the marking programme, including acquisition of technical equipment	ONSA; PRESCOM
23.	Develop written procedure for marking (SOP to be used by all relevant security agencies)	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; DICON

TECHNICAL PILLAR 5: RECORD KEEPING



KEY FINDINGS

- As of November 2016, there was not yet a unified, centralized database of all SALW held by security agencies and licensed civilians. This complicates management of the national stock and the identification of the origin of illicit weapons.
- The common practice of using painted butt numbers complicates recordkeeping; moreover, the painted numbers can easily be erased. When the assessment was undertaken, recordkeeping practices were not yet consistent across all security forces; some were recording weapons issued by butt number rather than (or in addition to) serial numbers, and not always consistently connecting individual officers to butt or serial numbers at the unit level.
- Many security agencies have strong recordkeeping and armoury audit practices. In November 2016, recordkeeping was not yet harmonized across different security agencies or across headquarters (HQ), state commands and the unit level. Some records were kept in electronic format, others on paper, and the fields used in registers and inventories varied from agency to agency.
- As of November 2016, no security agency recorded ammunition lots (rather than just calibre/type/quantity) in ammunition recordkeeping, limiting the traceability and quality assurance of security forces' ammunition.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

24.	Implement plan for national database/registry, including records from marking programme	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies
25.	Codify unified guidelines for recordkeeping within security agencies and harmonize across security agencies at all levels	ONSA; Relevant security agencies; DICON
26.	Train all relevant security agencies on new marking procedure, and on harmonized ammunition recordkeeping and inventory management	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; International partners, as required

TECHNICAL PILLAR 6: WEAPONS & AMMUNITION DISPOSAL



KEY FINDINGS

- As of November 2016, security agencies rarely identified surplus (as opposed to defective) stocks of weapons or ammunition given widespread perceptions of stock shortages and import difficulties. Obsolete weapon types have previously been transferred from military to paramilitary agencies.
- The NA has the capacity to destroy weapons and ammunition through cutting, burning and open-pit detonation, which it has previously used for destroying collected Niger Delta and Benue State weapons at Enugu and NASME, respectively.
- As of November of 2016, the existing national framework had not established guidelines for destruction, domestic transfer or possible sale of stocks, collected or seized weapons. This is an area that merits further examination by the Government of Nigeria.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

27.	Develop national guidelines for surplus, obsolete, seized and collected arms and ammunition for destruction, domestic transfer or possible sale in line with national regulations on transfer control	ONSA; PRESCOM; MOJ Relevant security agencies
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TECHNICAL PILLAR 7: PROCESSING SEIZED WEAPONS



KEY FINDINGS

- Processing illicit weapons seized by any security agency is technically clear: they should, under existing regulations, be passed to the police for storage, documentation and processing although logistical challenges may prevent this from happening in a timely manner in some places. A separate procedure exists for processing weapons captured in army or joint operations.
- The police utilize the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) iArms and INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network systems to match illicit weapons against weapons lost in other countries, but would benefit from enhanced national weapons identification capacity. The number of times databases have been consulted and how useful they have been to tracing operations remains unclear.
- Other mechanisms to trace (particularly) military weapons seized in operations, such as the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) focal points and the ECOWAS Secretariat, were not yet in use at the time of the assessment. The Nigerian ITI focal point (at PRESCOM/DHQ) had not yet received any international requests to trace weapons, or domestic requests to send tracing requests.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

28.	Develop written procedures (SOPs) for identification and recordkeeping of captured and seized weapons for all relevant security agencies	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; DICON
29.	Conduct training on identification and recordkeeping of weapons for all relevant security agencies	PRESCOM; International partners; Relevant security agencies
30.	Establish standard data collection criteria for captured/seized weapons across all relevant security agencies	PRESCOM; International partners; Relevant security agencies
31.	Utilize additional facilities for international tracing of captured and seized weapons, including ITI	PRESCOM; International partners; Relevant security agencies
32.	Conduct training on international tracing, with particular focus on providing adequate information and correct identification	PRESCOM; International partners; Relevant security agencies
33.	Centralize documentation of captured and seized weapons	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies

TECHNICAL PILLAR 8: PHYSICAL SECURITY & STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT



KEY FINDINGS

- Nigerian security agencies are particularly aware of PSSM risks following the 2002 Ikeja armoury explosion—the most lethal unplanned munitions explosion recorded to date in the world.
- Since early 2016, PRESCOM, with the assistance of international partners, has begun substantial activities to train stockpile management personnel and rehabilitate armouries/magazines.
- In the future, PRESCOM intends to develop a coordinated national plan to prioritize PSSM work.
- The PSSM training being undertaken in 2016 by PRESCOM/BICC/MAG could contribute to a national roster of trained PSSM experts, both for domestic and international deployment, which could also be used to conduct a training-of-trainers programme on PSSM in Nigeria.
- Training curricula on various aspects of PSSM also exist within military and police training institutions, including the Army Ordnance Corps School (Lagos), the Army Infantry Corps Centre (Jaji), the Nigerian Army School of Military Engineering (NASME) in Makurdi, and armament officer courses run by the NAF in Kaduna. Reviewing these curricula and sharing them between agencies would help ensure domestic provision of PSSM training is being fully utilized, and harmonized with regional and international standards.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

IMMEDIATE	34.	Develop a PSSM prioritization plan on storage facilities, armouries and depots, and on refurbishment as well as trainings, based on nationwide assessment	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; International partners
	35.	Sensitize national authorities (high level and policy level) on their responsibility for risks related to arms, ammunition and explosives in storage	ONSA; PRESCOM
	36.	Utilize interagency TWG to coordinate and oversee development of PSSM policies and SOPs, and implementation of PSSM related activities	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies
	37.	Design training-of-trainers programmes on PSSM for trained personnel across all security agencies	PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; International technical partners
SHORT -MEDIUM TERM	38.	Periodic review (through TWG) of existing training curricula and harmonize training provision across relevant security agencies, including ISACS (now MOSAIC) and IATG	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies
	39.	Where applicable, develop assistance proposals to strengthen physical infrastructure of arms/ammunition storage at state and local levels for all security agencies in need of improved storage capacity	PRESCOM
MEDIUM TERM	40.	Establish a roster of trained national experts on PSSM and make the list available based on need to all security agencies	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies

TECHNICAL PILLAR 9: WEAPONS COLLECTION



KEY FINDINGS

- Nigeria has a recent history of weapons collections/ amnesties, beginning at federal level with the 2009 Niger Delta amnesty programme. More recently, state level disarmament committees constituted by state governors have initiated state-wide amnesties linked to weapons collections in Benue State and Imo State during 2016; and similar committees have begun preparations in Kaduna State, Rivers State and elsewhere. In addition, the United Nations Development Programme and PRESCOM are supporting community sensitization activities in six northern states under a European Union–ECOWAS project as a prelude to eventual weapons collection.
- As of November 2016, no formal guidelines or SOPs existed for conducting state level collections, nor for integrating civil society and community safety, including community policing, into the planning of activities.
- Storage facilities for collected weapons vary, and not all personnel involved in collections are trained to handle explosive items such as grenades or light weapons munitions, though these are frequently handed in by civilians (and during 2016, destroyed at NASME).
- Inventories of collections in Benue State indicate that some 15–20 per cent of collected weapons are technically traceable, but no procedure existed in November of 2016 to trace them to establish the origins and supply routes for illicit weapons. A package of training and standardized documentation forms/ procedures for future collection programmes would help Nigeria to take advantage of this potentially valuable information resource.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

41.	Establish national guidelines on physical collection, documentation, storage and disposal of weapons and ammunition collected under amnesty programmes	ONSA; MOJ; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies
42.	Sensitize all relevant actors at all levels on the planning and implementation objectives and requirements of collection programmes	ONSA; PRESCOM; NOA; CSOs/NGOs
43.	Conduct periodic sensitization and awareness programmes for all communities to be involved in a collection programme, including perception and distribution surveys	PRESCOM; NOA; CSOs/NGOs
44.	Draft SOPs and model data collection forms for documentation of collected weapons and ammunition to ITI standard	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; International technical partners, where relevant
45.	Conduct domestic, and where relevant, international tracing of weapons recovered in collection programmes	ONSA; PRESCOM; NPF (INTERPOL)
46.	Integrate civil society and community safety, including community policing, into the planning of collection programmes for communities that have undertaken disarmament	PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; CSOs/NGOs; Community
47.	Establish and utilize interagency TWG to oversee collection programmes, including drafting of its Terms of Reference	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies
48.	Establish national strategy for civil disarmament programmes in order to ensure that weapons collection has adequate planning and resources, and does not create security vacuum or instability in communities involved	ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies
49.	Carry out a national mapping exercise to identify relevant actors at national, regional, state, and local levels that should be involved in the collection programme prior to implementation	ONSA; PRESCOM

TECHNICAL PILLAR 10: ARTISANAL WEAPONS



KEY FINDINGS

- Unlicensed production of firearms, including of craft revolvers and well-machined long guns, is prohibited under S.22 of the 1959 Firearms Act, but is widely practised to high levels of sophistication. These constituted approximately 80 per cent of weapons collected from civilians during 2016 in Benue State, for instance. In November of 2016, PRESCOM was conducting a national SALW survey which sought to map the extent and nature of production and civilian possession.
- Participants in the consultations could not agree on the pros and cons of the regulated legalization of firearms production. All agreed on the need to find alternative livelihoods for skilled illicit firearms makers, including perhaps recruitment to the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON). In this regard, there would seem to be value in conducting national level consultations on this issue, with the aim of establishing a clear strategy to prevent the illicit production of SALW.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

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| 50. | Conduct further research on craft weapons distribution and production to develop counter policy | PRESCOM; DICON |
| 51. | Carry out consultation to develop craft weapons conversion/counter-production policy, including methods to curb illicit and unlicensed manufacturing of weapons | PRESCOM; DICON; Relevant security agencies |

TECHNICAL PILLAR 11: BORDER SECURITY & COUNTER-SMUGGLING



KEY FINDINGS

- Participants identified detection and interdiction of cross-border weapons trafficking as a major priority, particularly along vulnerable long northern borders and at maritime points of entry.
- NCS mandates 100 per cent inspection of pre-notified imports of arms and ammunition, and risk-based inspection of other cargoes via the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) customs system. Personnel cannot, however, cover all crossing points.
- NCS and NIS participants stressed the need to identify unapproved border crossing routes and authorize them as approved ones, to allow personnel to be deployed there.
- When this assessment was conducted, Nigeria was exploring technological enhancements to border management, including airborne border patrols and satellite surveillance, as well as joint operations with neighbouring countries.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

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|-----|---|--|
| 52. | Utilize interagency TWG to improve cooperation, coordination and information sharing on counter trafficking of SALW across borders with relevant security and border community agencies | ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; BCDA |
| 53. | Conduct confidence building and sensitization programmes on risk posed by arms and ammunition to human security in border communities | ONSA; PRESCOM; Relevant security agencies; BCDA |
| 54. | Identify and authorize change of unapproved border crossing routes to approved border crossing routes | FEC; ONSA; Ministry of Interior; National Boundary Commission; PRESCOM |
| 55. | Conduct needs assessment as it relates to integration of emerging technology and use of existing technical equipment in border management | ONSA; PRESCOM; BCDA; Relevant security agencies |

NIGERIA



LOOKING AHEAD

The exchange of good practices and lessons learned in strengthening WAM policy and practice in Africa seeks to enhance the knowledge of States, regional organisations, and international partners on ways to establish and implement comprehensive national and regional frameworks governing the full lifecycle of arms and ammunition.

This publication presents a holistic approach to weapons and ammunition management with a special focus on the Federal Republic of Nigeria. This holistic approach to WAM contributes to achieving broader

peace, security, and development goals including but not limited to conflict prevention, armed violence reduction, accountable security sector, protection of civilians, and advancing the Agenda 2030.

UNIDIR encourages the Community of States, regional organisations, and relevant international partners to examine the options suggested for enhancing WAM in each Country Insight and use them as a basis to inform the planning, implementation, and assessment of future WAM projects in the relevant country.

ABOUT UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

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