UNIDIR UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks into conflict analysis and prevention

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The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to a variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations.

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Note

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The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks into conflict analysis and prevention

This is a UNIDIR Toolkit, designed to contribute to ongoing efforts to include conventional arms and ammunition-related risks in conflict analysis and conflict prevention, management and resolution efforts. The Toolkit consists of three tools: the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool and the Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool.

This Toolkit should be considered a working document subject to changes, additions, edits and corrections. The working document is meant to stimulate discussion, debate and feedback. The authors may revise and correct the text without announcing the edits or issuing a formal erratum. As such, users are encouraged to use the most up-to-date version of the Toolkit, as posted on the unidir.org website.

UNIDIR welcomes and encourages all feedback on improving the Toolkit and building on it for future iterations.

Users of the Toolkit are encouraged to provide UNIDIR with feedback that can support improvement by completing a short feedback form, available at: https://forms.office.com/r/vpEVX6ae3e

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Abbreviations

DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
GBV	gender-based violence
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IED	improvised explosive device
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
MOSAIC	Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium
Natcom	national commission
NGO	non-governmental organization
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
WAM	weapons and ammunition management

About the authors

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Introduction

Introduction

Since 2001, the number of conflicts worldwide has increased.[1] Conventional arms have been the weapons of choice in almost all these armed conflicts,[2] and it is unsurprising that this increase in violence and armed actors has been matched by an increase in the availability of such weapons globally. There are over 1 billion firearms in the world, the majority of which are in civilian hands.[3] Without these and the millions of other conventional arms and ammunition, there is no such thing as an armed conflict. Their availability, low cost and ease of operation make it relatively easy for conflict parties to initiate and sustain armed conflict, complicating and undermining international efforts to prevent conflict, restore peace and deliver humanitarian assistance.[4]

For the United Nations and other peace and security actors, better accounting for the impact of illicit arms and ammunition on facilitating and prolonging armed conflict brings enhanced understanding of how to leverage arms control to prevent, manage and resolve conflict. The need to do so was reaffirmed through Security Council resolution 2171 (2014), which stated:

> a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy should include, inter alia, early warning, preventive diplomacy, mediation, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, practical disarmament and other measures to contribute to combating the proliferation and illicit trade of arms, accountability measures as well as inclusive post-conflict peace-building.[5]

The United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament noted that "there has been limited engagement within the [United Nations] system on how issues relating to arms, including arms trafficking, and how measures within the disarmament toolkit can be utilized for conflict prevention, management and resolution".[6] Integrating arms control into conflict prevention is therefore not a new concept, but it remains an underexplored and underutilized one.

Against this backdrop, the United Nations has renewed its commitment to conflict prevention, placing a particular emphasis on preventing conflicts from occurring (upstream prevention), in addition to preventing the escalation of conflicts or resolving them.[7] It has also stepped up its conventional arms control activities, at both the global and national levels. For instance, efforts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants have become common activities since their introduction to peacekeeping in Central America in 1989,[8] and the major multilateral conventional arms control instruments have all been introduced since 1991.[9]

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1   Pettersson and Oberg (2020).

2   Security Council Report (2013).

3   Karp (2018, 4, box 1).

4   Duquet (2009, 169–85).

5   United Nations Security Council (2014).

6   UNODA (2018b, 42).

7   "The Security Council further recalls that a comprehensive conflict prevention strategy should include, inter alia, early warning, preventive deployment, mediation, peacekeeping, non-proliferation, accountability measures as well as post-conflict peacebuilding, and recognizes that these components are interdependent, complementary, and non-sequential." United Nations Security Council (2018).

8   The agreement reached on 7 August 1989 by the presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua established a joint plan for voluntary demobilization, repatriation or relocation of the members of the Nicaraguan resistance. An International Support and Verification Commission was established by the United Nations Secretary-General and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States on 6 September 1989 and was tasked to collect the weapons, materiel and military equipment of members of the Nicaraguan resistance. United Nations Security Council (1989).

9   These include the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (1991); the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,

Despite these efforts, the sheer number of conventional arms has meant that global measures to control them have been met with limited success. Conflicts involving conventional weapons still occur, and there is a need to reorient arms control efforts to address this at regional, national and local levels. Practical measures to do so already exist, but they are rarely integrated into conflict prevention strategies. Instead, conflict prevention efforts largely focus on the underlying causes of conflict that drive people to take up arms.

BOX 1

Conventional arms key terms

This Toolkit uses the term "arms" interchangeably with "conventional arms". The types of weapons being discussed in this Toolkit include small arms and light weapons (SALW), military weapons, civilian arms, and firearms, which have different meanings when used in context. The use of "military weapons" or "civilian weapons" does not infer legality in this context.

Military weapons in this context are used by non-State actors in an armed conflict in sufficient quantities to match those held by government forces, as opposed to the use of hunting rifles or shotguns. Military weapons are likely to be used for political violence by armed actors who seek to challenge security forces.

Civilian weapons in this context are intended for personal use outside of the armed service of a State (including by private security companies) or for recreation and are less suitable for insurgency. The legal definition of a civilian firearm varies, as some States allow civilian ownership of certain firearms that are restricted to military use in other States. In most countries, civilian ownership of SALW is limited to small arms, or firearms, meaning "any portable barreled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projective by the action of any explosive".[10] The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms defines seven categories of major conventional arms, in addition to SALW, which are defined in its glossary.[11]

Purpose of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

In the 2018 Agenda for Disarmament, the United Nations Secretary-General called for the integration of conventional arms control into United Nations conflict prevention and management activities and requested that "the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and all other relevant entities … explore how to better integrate an understanding of the impact of arms into assessments, risk analyses and conflict prevention activities carried out by the Department of Political Affairs and other relevant entities".[12] This Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit responds to this call by providing guidance on how to gather and interpret arms-related information for conflict prevention efforts.

Audience for the Toolkit

The target audience for this Toolkit includes the United Nations departments, offices and programmes, and their corresponding field presences, tasked with conflict prevention, as well as other actors undertaking conflict analysis for other purposes. The target audience includes:

- Special envoys
- Special political missions
- Peacekeeping operations

- Regional offices
- United Nations resident coordinators
- United Nations country teams[13]

Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, also known as the Ottawa Convention (drafted in 1997 and opened for signature in 1999); the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2001); and the Arms Trade Treaty (2013).

10   Small Arms Survey (2011); United Nations General Assembly (2001).

11   United Nations Register of Conventional Arms: https://www.unroca.org/categories

12   UNODA (2018b, 42).

13   See UNDPA (2016).

These actors carry out conflict analysis, whether this is directly related to conflict prevention (such as the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs) or peripheral to it (such as some country teams and humanitarian country teams). These structures typically address conflicts in different stages of their evolution:

- **Resident coordinators, country teams and regional offices:** prior to a conflict breaking out and post-conflict (upstream prevention and the prevention of reoccurrence of conflict, respectively)
- **Regional offices, special envoys and peace operations:** in times of conflict (conflict management and resolution)

As a premium is put on upstream prevention, it is particularly important to increase the conflict analysis capacity of resident coordinators and country teams, which are often the least well-resourced to undertake this task.[14] Therefore, this Toolkit has been developed for use with minimal resources and can be used by all United Nations prevention actors, as well as non-United Nations actors undertaking conflict analysis, whether for prevention or other purposes, such as to inform humanitarian interventions.

Methodology

The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit builds on research undertaken by UNIDIR as part of its workstream "Integrating Conventional Arms Control into Conflict Prevention and Management". Launched in October 2019, the workstream consisted of several activities that contributed towards the development of this Toolkit, including:

- A comprehensive literature review of conflict analysis, arms control, and prevention papers
- A preliminary survey of United Nations arms control and prevention actors
- A series of online meetings, across a nine-week period, as part of a community of practice workshop that brought together arms control experts and prevention actors[15]
- Fieldwork in East and West Africa
- A review of 24 United Nations conflict analysis frameworks, guides and policies

Structure of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

This Toolkit is a practical guide that conflict prevention analysts can use to identify and integrate conventional arms-related factors into their work. As such, it does not replace a traditional conflict analysis but complements and expands it. The Toolkit consists of three tools: the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool, and the Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool. It is organized as follows:

Part 1: Why apply an arms control lens to conflict analysis? Provides an overview of conflict analysis and prevention and then explains the benefits of integrating arms-related factors into conflict analysis frameworks for conflict prevention.

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14   Duursma (2017, 823–47).

15   UNIDIR (2020).

Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit: Provides an overview of the main tools that make up the Toolkit (the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool and the Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool) and describes how analysts can apply them to measure arms- and conflict-related risks in practice.

Part 3: Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool: Presents the framework for assessing arms-related risks across the following components:

> **Risk Areas:** Cover different features of how conventional arms affect conflicts.
>
> **Risk Factors:** Represent conditions that increase the risk of (or susceptibility to) the outbreak of, escalation of or return to conflict.
>
> **Risk Points:** Support assessment of the likelihood of the Risk Factor occurring and its impact on conflict dynamics.
>
> **Options for assessing the Risk Point:** Suggest methods to measure the presence of each Risk Point and Risk Area.
>
> **Indicators:** Provide markers against which to measure approximate change to each option for assessing the Risk Point.

Part 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool: Guides analysts in choosing the appropriate arms-related Risk Factors to consider for their conflict analysis.

Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool: Offers information collection methods and suggested information sources to enable analysts to identify appropriate information to be used with the Arms-Related Risk Analysis and Risk Factor Selector Tools.

This Toolkit is the starting point, not a full blueprint. Using this Toolkit, analysts can identify the appropriate arms control-related risks for their context, understand how those risks might affect the situation, and be guided on where to find information to include in their conflict analysis. The suggested Risk Areas, Risk Factors and Risk Points are meant to trigger ideas for more effective conflict analysis by integrating conventional arms and ammunition considerations into the analysis. As more data and information sources related to weapons become available and more analysts use the Toolkit, practices will evolve, ideas may be refined, and this document might be updated.

> Users of the Toolkit are encouraged to provide UNIDIR with feedback that can support improvement by completing a short feedback form, available at: https://forms.office.com/r/vpE-VX6ae3e

Overview of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS	
RISK FACTOR	**RISK POINT**
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition	1.1.1: Number of conventional arms and ammunition available
	1.1.2: Conventional arms and ammunition seizures
	1.1.3: Types of conventional arms and ammunition
	1.1.4: Use of conventional arms to commit violent acts
	1.1.5: Legal sales and ease of access to conventional arms and ammunition
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition	1.2.1: Geographic spread of conflict events
	1.2.2: Geographic spread of conventional arms and ammunition
	1.2.3: Presence of armed actors in a particular location or area
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition	1.3.1: Societal values on conventional arms use
1.4: Levels of militarization	1.4.1: Size and equipping of State security forces
	1.4.2: Presence and formation of armed movements or movements that embrace and promote military values
	1.4.3: Nature and use of State security forces
	1.4.4: Role of the military in politics and public life, and societal acceptance

RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS	
RISK FACTOR	**RISK POINT**
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers	2.1.1: Number and types of conventional arms and systems transferred
	2.1.2: Presence of unilateral or multilateral arms embargoes
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition	2.2.1: Diversion-enabling factors
	2.2.2: Points of diversion and methods used
	2.2.3: History or record of diversion
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets	2.3.1: Involvement of armed groups in illicit trafficking in weapons and military equipment
	2.3.2: State capacity to detect possibly illicit weapons cargos
	2.3.3: State capacity to address illicit weapons transfers
	2.3.4: Availability of illicit conventional arms and ammunition
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms	2.4.1: Civilian acquisition and holdings
	2.4.2: Legal frameworks governing civilian possession of weapons and the ability to ensure their compliance
	2.4.3: Arms dealers
	2.4.4: Perceptions of safety

RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT

RISK FACTOR	RISK POINT
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting	3.1.1: Changes in conflict intensity
	3.1.2: Changes in a conflict actor's tactics and targeting
3.2: Types of conventional arms present	3.2.1: Types of conventional arms present in country
3.3: Who is using the weapons	3.3.1: Armed actors and their levels of cohesion
	3.3.2: Supply and control of arms by and for conflict actors
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used	3.4.1: Territorial control and the deployment of weapons

RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT

RISK FACTOR	RISK POINT
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict	4.1.1: Modalities for ending the conflict
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings	4.2.1: Scope and intensity of post-conflict armed violence
	4.2.2: Perpetrators and targets of armed violence
	4.2.3: Responses to armed violence
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence	4.3.1: Types of conventional arms
	4.3.2: Types and nature of armed incidents
4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons	4.4.1: Signatory State and non-State parties
	4.4.2: Non-signatory parties
	4.4.3: State-sponsored or other armed actors
	4.4.4: Informal security providers and redeployment of State security providers
	4.4.5: Improved use and management of arms and ammunition held by the security forces.
	4.4.6: Arms caches and residual weapons
	4.4.7: Civilian arms control programming
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence	4.5.1: Geographic mapping of armed violence
	4.5.2: Targets of armed violence

RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

RISK FACTOR	RISK POINT
5.1: National regulations for WAM	5.1.1: Legal and regulatory frameworks at the national level
5.2: National capacities for WAM	5.2.1: National structures for WAM
	5.2.2: Integration of WAM into security institutions
	5.2.3: Stockpile management standards and procedures
	5.2.4: Marking and record-keeping systems
	5.2.5: Disposal including destruction
	5.2.6: Community-based WAM

Part 1:
Why apply an arms control lens to conflict analysis?

Part 1: Why apply an arms control lens to conflict analysis?

This section provides an overview of how and why it is important to integrate arms-related risks into conflict analysis frameworks for conflict prevention. It outlines the differences between conflict and armed conflict and discusses how to apply an "arms control lens" to supplement a traditional conflict analysis. Finally, it discusses some of the challenges for integrating arms control into conflict prevention and how these challenges have informed the development of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit.

BOX 2

Conflict and armed conflict

Over 1.5 billion people around the world live in a community affected by armed conflict, armed violence or high levels of crime, and over 526,000 people die each year as a result of violence or conflict.[16] Whereas within the United Nations reference is usually made to "conflict prevention", the focus of most related activities are on armed conflict prevention. Therefore, for the purpose of this Toolkit, references to "conflict" or "conflict prevention" should be taken to mean armed conflict and armed conflict prevention. This distinction is important as conflict is inherent to all societies and can be a constructive driver of positive societal change, although it is also a key precursor to armed conflict.

Armed conflict, however, destroys lives and livelihoods, triggers forced displacement, hinders development efforts, destroys infrastructure and impedes investment in reconstruction, among other undesirable outcomes. It creates a climate of impunity, mistrust and corruption that is a barrier to reconciliation and peacebuilding, undermines vital public institutions and is closely tied to transnational crime. In many countries, realizing development outcomes, including the Sustainable Development Goals, requires dealing with armed conflict first. Therefore, although it may not always be appropriate to avoid all conflict, it is always advisable to avoid armed conflict.

Applying a conventional arms control lens to conflict analysis

Strategies to prevent, manage or resolve violent conflict are more likely to succeed if they are grounded in a clear understanding of the causes and potential trajectory of a conflict.[17] Conflict analysis addresses the relationship of an issue (in this case, conventional arms) with conflict, instability and peace, and it can provide a baseline to evaluate the impact of interventions on a conflict.[18] As without conventional arms and ammunition there can be no armed conflict, or at least no party to conflict armed with sufficient firepower to challenge a State's monopoly of force, it is difficult to undertake a comprehensive conflict analysis without considering the presence and impact of weapons on the conflict. Conventional arms control information is, however, often left out of conflict analyses. Where it is considered, it is usually integrated into conflict analysis during or after a conflict, once arms are visible and have been used.[19] In cases that focus on upstream prevention,[20] arms-related indicators should be used as a part of conflict

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16   Gates et al. (2015).

17   An analysis of 26 case studies and over 1,000 consultations with practitioners found strong evidence that the "more practitioners know about the conflicts they are trying to address, the more likely they are to identify effective avenues for work, and the less likely they are to make mistakes". Likewise, the same study found that ineffective programmes often had something in common: they either were not based on a conflict analysis or were informed by inadequate analyses. CDA Collaborative (2013).

18   Herbert (2017).

19   In many cases, the same is true of the arms control measures used by the United Nations. The United Nations recognized this in General Assembly resolution A/RES/51/45 N of 10 December 1996, which stressed the importance of measures such as the collection, control and disposal of arms, especially small arms and light weapons – coupled with restraint over the production, procurement and transfer of such arms, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, demining, and conversion – for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in areas that have suffered from conflict.

20   Beyond the moral imperative for the international community to prevent armed conflicts from occurring, there is a financial incentive, as prevention is economically beneficial: even in the most pessimistic scenario, the average net savings of prevention are close to US$5 billion per year. In the most optimistic scenario, the net savings are almost US$70 billion. United Nations and World Bank (2018).

analysis that takes place before a dispute becomes an armed conflict[21] and should inform upstream prevention strategies to avoid this from happening.

Applying a conventional arms control lens to conflict analysis can usefully guide the adaptation of an analysis by identifying additional arms-related issue areas and/or questions that could easily be added to existing conflict analysis tools, making them more arms control sensitive. It can improve coherence by focusing attention on a set of challenging issues that reside at the nexus of peace, security and development and can help analysts and prevention actors think through complex issues regarding the causes and effects of armed conflict.[22] Introducing a conventional arms control lens to conflict analysis can also help identify strategic entry points for intervention.

This Toolkit provides a framework for integrating arms-related data into conflict analyses to allow for the formulation of more strategic or targeted interventions.[23]

Addressing challenges to include arms control in conflict analysis

Despite the broad understanding that excessive arms proliferation and acquisition is a driving factor for conflict, analysis of the role and impact of weapons rarely goes deeper than this, and arms control is seldom integrated into conflict prevention strategies. Some of the practical reasons for this have been identified by UNIDIR in its work on conflict prevention.[24] These reasons include:

- Concerns around the political sensitivity of arms control
- A limited understanding of how arms affect conflict settings
- A lack of technical resources or know-how to analyse conventional arms-related issues
- Limited access to information sources and resources

This Toolkit addresses these constraints by providing guidance and a simple method for integrating arms control into conflict analysis. In doing so:

- The data required for the analysis have been kept as simple and non-technical as possible to allow persons with little or no background in arms control to apply an arms control lens.
- Suggestions have been made on information sources and how to collect information required for the analysis (see Part 5).
- The Toolkit focuses on key elements of interest in conflict trend analysis, seeking to support existing conflict analysis data points (such as on armed actors) by bringing in new elements of information.
- The options for assessing the Risk Point provided were designed specifically to support the analysis of conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

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21   This requires conflict analysis to be used in both conflict-affected and high-risk areas.

22   Lucey (2015, 500–11).

23   As a tool of violent conflict, conventional arms can be considered a part of structural conditions (e.g. a factor of militarization of society); however, they are more often viewed as a proximate cause of violence as they can accentuate structural causes and contribute to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation. The Risk Points and options for assessing the Risk Point developed as part of this Toolkit consider arms as both structural and proximate factors. The Toolkit considers that they may be both predictors, that is to say "phenomena or risk factors that are highly correlated with incidence of armed violence" (Kisielewski et al., 2010), and sustainers of armed violence since they allow armed conflict to continue once it has started.

24   UNIDIR (2020).

Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

Part 2: Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

This section provides an overview of the main tools that make up the Toolkit (the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool and the Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool) and describes how analysts can apply them to measure arms- and conflict-related risks in practice. It also provides information on the components for assessing the arms-related risks using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool.

What is the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool?

The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool enables an integrated analysis and risk assessment of arms-related risks. It facilitates the systematic collection of accurate and reliable information for an assessment of arms-related risks in conflict-affected and high-risk areas. While this tool may support other types of analysis, it is primarily aimed at better understanding conflict-affected and high-risk areas as opposed to countries where the threat of an outbreak of conflict is relatively low.

The Toolkit contains three main components for assessing arms-related risks:

- 5 Risk Areas
- 19 Risk Factors
- 54 Risk Points
  - ► 134 options for assessing the Risk Point
  - ► 371 indicators

FIGURE 1 — *The main components of the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool*

5 Risk Areas — *covering different features of how conventional arms affect conflicts*

19 Risk Factors — *representing conditions that increase the risk of (or susceptibility to) the outbreak of, escalation of or return to conflict*

54 Risk Points — *supporting assessment of the likelihood of the Risk Factor occurring*

Risk Areas

Each of the five Risk Areas covers a different feature of how conventional arms affect conflict:

Risk Area 1: Proliferation of conventional arms

Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms

Risk Area 3: Use of conventional arms during a conflict

Risk Area 4: Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict

Risk Area 5: Weapons and ammunition management

The Risk Areas cover a variety of issues that may influence the trajectory of a conflict or shape the type of actors involved, including the types of conventional arms, who holds them, and how they are used.

Risk Factors

Risk Factors are conditions that increase the risk of (or susceptibility to) the outbreak of, escalation of or return to conflict. These factors include arms-related behaviours, circumstances or elements that create an environment conducive to the outbreak, escalation or recurrence of conflict. They provide conflict analysis actors with a broad "menu" of options for including arms-related information in their analysis. Each Risk Area includes several arms-related Risk Factors. Each Risk Factor offers a set of **other considerations**, which may facilitate analysis and stimulate thinking on the use of the indicators.

Risk Points

Risk Points represent specific arms-related issues for consideration by analysts when examining Risk Areas and Risk Factors. The Risk Points are used to evaluate the likelihood of the Risk Factors occurring and their impact on conflict dynamics. The Risk Points consist of the following two elements:

Options for assessing the Risk Point

Options for assessing the Risk Point provide suggestions on methods to measure the presence of a Risk Point in a particular context in order to facilitate information-gathering in situations where reliable data could be limited and to support the triangulation of information when available.

Indicators

Indicators provide markers against which to measure approximate change to each option for assessing the Risk Point.

How to use the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

FIGURE 2 — *Using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit*

STEP 1	STEP 2	STEP 3
Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool	**Risk Factor Selector Tool**	**Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool**
Select Risk Area(s) and Risk Factor(s) of relevance for your analysis	*Consider the Risk Factors of relevance to narrow down the analysis further*	*Complete your analysis using appropriate information sources*

Step 1 - Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool: Select Risk Area(s) and Risk Factor(s) of relevance for your analysis. Decide on which Risk Areas and related Risk Factors are applicable in the context the analyst is looking at and select the ones to use.[25] During this step of the analysis process, the options for assessing the Risk Points and indicators provide information that signals change and allows the analyst to see differences or developments (for example, improvements or deterioration) in a conflict situation. Because in most cases the changes are abstract, the indicators should not be seen as a tangible measure of change, but they can help approximate the change.[26] The options for assessing the Risk Point must be considered as part of the broader context, rather than in isolation, and analysts are encouraged to look at other factors affecting a conflict setting in addition to the variables offered in the Toolkit. Finally, each Risk Factor offers a set of "other considerations", which may facilitate analysis and stimulate thinking on the use of the Risk Points.

Step 2 – Risk Factor Selector Tool: Consider the Risk Factors of relevance to narrow down the analysis further. Decision-making on the selection of Risk Areas and Risk Factors is supported by the Risk Factor Selector Tool and should be used in parallel to, or to complement, the process outlined in Step 1.

Step 3 - Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool: Complete your analysis using appropriate information sources. To conduct the analysis using the selected Risk Areas, Risk Factors and Risk Points, analysts should turn to the Arms-related Information Sources Compendium Tool. An analyst should use the Risk Areas, Risk Factors and Risk Points to guide the collection and assessment of information for a given situation. An integrated and balanced approach to examining arms-related information as part of broader political, security and economic factors is recommended.

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25   Annex A – which disaggregates the Risk Factors by applicability in terms of their impact on conflict parameters, their geographic scope of application and their application at different stages of a conflict – can support in this.

26   "Indicators are inevitable approximations. They are not the same as the desired change, but only an indicator of that change. They are imperfect and vary in validity and reliability." Patton (1996, 159).

Choosing Risk Areas and Risk Factors

Not all Risk Factors need to be present for there to be a significant arms-related risk that might influence the likelihood of armed conflict or the direction of an existing conflict.

The Risk Factors and the indicators are not ranked, as their relative importance will differ according to the context. Depending on the situation being analysed, some Risk Factors will have greater relevance than others or will be manifest more often than others.

Selecting Risk Points

The choice of Risk Points will be determined by the analysts applying them and might be dictated by the areas in which information is sought; the availability of data or other information to measure a Risk Point; the ability to triangulate data; and whether the data is representative by location, time and theme. For this reason, there are different options for assessing the Risk Points and indicators provided for analysts.

Many of the Risk Points used in this tool do not neatly fit into specific categorizations, and some are therefore situated within more than one Risk Factor. There are also several Risk Points that do not directly aim to measure progress in conflict prevention or arms control but that could be regarded as proxy indicators on these themes. Caution should also be given to the selection of Risk Points to avoid making simplistic associations that disregard the broader context.

Conducting the assessment

There may be situations where, although the data gathered point to the presence of an arms-related risk, this does not materialize in the assessment. This could be due to the absence of a triggering event or the presence of a strong mitigating factor. These mitigating factors can fade or disappear, and triggers can occur unexpectedly leading to a sudden change in the situation and the need for a new assessment.

Analysts will need to be flexible when considering and weighing all the elements in this framework and situate them within a broader political, contextual, historical and cultural analysis. An analysis using the Risk Points should not be conducted in isolation from these contextual factors. In addition, given the emergence of new trends and patterns of conflict-related violence, assessments should be open to new elements that might surface over time.

Risk Factor Selector Tool

Analysts can use the Risk Factor Selector Tool to support their analysis. This tool guides decision-making on which Risk Factors and Risk Areas are appropriate for a specific analysis, based on their relevance according to the following parameters:

- ☑ Assessment according to conflict parameters (likelihood, duration, intensity, type and actors)
- ☑ Assessment according to geographic scope of application (regional, national and local)
- ☑ Assessment according to different stages of a conflict (before, during and after)

Analysts should review the suggested applicability columns within each table to identify the Risk Factors pertinent to their context. The assessment of the applicability of each Risk Factor to a certain parameter is indicative and may vary within different contexts. The Risk Factor Selector Tool, therefore, provides suggestions or a starting point for further nuanced, context-specific research as to how arms may influence a given situation. It can support decision-making but should not be seen as a replacement for more in-depth analytical processes and consultations required for planning purposes.

Considerations for using the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

Weighting and aggregation

Weights represent an informed assessment of the importance of each Risk Point that an analyst needs to decide on. The weights of each individual Risk Point can then be aggregated to provide an overall weighting for an issue. The aggregation involves a further value judgment on how important an individual Risk Point is in relation to the other Risk Points chosen. This is highly subjective and dependent on the context analysts are considering. As a result, weights have not been pre-established in the Risk Points suggested in the Toolkit, although analysts are free to develop their own context-relevant weightings when assessing them.

In many cases, the data suggested in the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit are aggregated and analysed to establish trends over time, and the Risk Points are likely to be ordinal, meaning that they give information in terms of "more or less", but not precisely how much more or less. This methodological approach was chosen as it was felt that it complements the nature of the sources and types of information required for the analysis.

Gender-sensitive conflict analysis

A conflict analysis that is gender blind fails to account for the different roles and diverse needs of people of all genders, ages, including children and youth, and can lead to the exacerbation of risks. Therefore, undertaking a gender-sensitive conflict analysis is the first – and a vital – step in bringing a gender lens to conflict prevention programme design and monitoring and evaluation. Women, men, boys, girls and people of different gender identities will have different experiences, opportunities and constraints due to gender norms in their society. Consequently, gender-sensitive conflict analysis recognizes that the causes and impacts of armed conflict are gendered. Applying a gender lens can enhance a conflict prevention actor's understanding of the situation by analysing the differentiated impact of armed conflict on people of all ages and genders, and their multiple roles in such conflict. This more nuanced understanding of a conflict supports the ability to respond by involving new perspectives, actors, entry points and opportunities for positive change. In addition to collecting gender- and age-disaggregated

data on the impacts of a conflict, conducting gender-sensitive analysis requires systematic efforts to understand the gendered causes, structures, stakeholders and dynamics of a conflict, including discriminatory or exclusionary practices that lead to targeted violence against certain groups.

Integrating gender considerations into arms control risks for conflict analysis may appear less obvious, but many of the Risk Points proposed as part of this tool support an analysis not just of arms flows but also of perceptions of security or safety, the acceptance of weapons and armed violence, the use of these weapons to perpetrate different types of violence, the perpetrators and victims or target groups, all of which are gendered. Finally, it should be remembered that "paying no specific attention to gender in interventions does not make these interventions 'gender-neutral'; rather, they may reinforce the status quo or even advance inequality".[27]

BOX 3

Typology of conventional arms and ammunition

In addition to looking at the number of weapons, a typology of conventional arms and ammunition to disaggregate data by make, model, origin, calibre and age of weapons is encouraged across all Risk Areas to provide deeper insights on conflict dynamics. Data on both the number and type of weapons could be indicative of new sources of illicit supply and heightened demand. Variations and sudden shifts in the types of weapons and ammunition circulating might indicate a changing risk or aggravation of conflict. This consideration may be applied across all Risk Areas, depending on the prevalence of arms in your setting.

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27   Tielemanns (2015, 12).

Part 3:
Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool

Part 3: Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool

The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool presented in this section is composed of five Risk Areas for use in analysis. These provide analysts with a choice of Risk Factors that may be applicable in the contexts they are working on, as well as options for assessing them and indicators for measuring each one. These are supported by the Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool, which provides a non-exhaustive list of information sources and data collection methods to support the analyst in using this tool.

ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOL: OVERVIEW OF THE RISK AREAS AND RISK FACTORS

RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS	RISK FACTOR
	1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition
	1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition
	1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition
	1.4: Levels of militarization
RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS	**RISK FACTOR**
	2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers
	2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition
	2.3: Illicit transfers and markets
	2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT	**RISK FACTOR**
	3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting
	3.2: Types of conventional arms present
	3.3: Who is using the weapons
	3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used
RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT	**RISK FACTOR**
	4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict
	4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings
	4.3: Types of arms and armed violence
	4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons
	4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)	**RISK FACTOR**
	5.1: National regulations for WAM
	5.2: National capacities for WAM

Risk Area 1: Proliferation of conventional arms

Armed conflict is most likely to occur in countries where the inputs for armed conflict, including weapons, are present. This section looks broadly at what the presence of conventional arms and ammunition indicates with regard to the likelihood of conflict and how their presence can shape a conflict. To do so, this section examines four Risk Factors relating to conventional arms proliferation.

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 1

RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Risk Factor	Risk Point
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition	1.1.1: Number of conventional arms and ammunition available
	1.1.2: Conventional arms and ammunition seizures
	1.1.3: Types of conventional arms and ammunition
	1.1.4: Use of conventional arms to commit violent acts
	1.1.5: Legal sales and ease of access to conventional arms and ammunition
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition	1.2.1: Geographic spread of conflict events
	1.2.2: Geographic spread of conventional arms and ammunition
	1.2.3: Presence of armed actors in a particular location or area
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition	1.3.1: Societal values on conventional arms use
1.4: Levels of militarization	1.4.1: Size and equipping of State security forces
	1.4.2: Presence and formation of armed movements or movements that embrace and promote military values
	1.4.3: Nature and use of State security forces
	1.4.4: Role of the military in politics and public life, and societal acceptance

RISK FACTOR 1.1: AVAILABILITY OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION

The availability of weapons indicates the capacity that actors may have to initiate, continue or resume armed conflict. Greater availability of weapons reduces the barriers for actors to arm themselves, and the presence of a high number of military weapons has been shown to be a strong predictor of the incidence of civil wars.[28] Moreover, the availability of such weapons provides a greater ability to inflict casualties and thus can affect the intensity of violence, a key factor in triggering an armed conflict. Although conflicts can be started with a small number of weapons, continued access to weapons, and especially ammunition,[29] is necessary to sustain armed conflict. The key measure for assessing the number of weapons will be the increase or decrease in the number, type and use of arms and ammunition, with an increase signalling a higher risk and/or intensity of conflict and a decrease signalling a lower risk and/or intensity of conflict.[30]

RISK POINT 1.1.1: NUMBER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION AVAILABLE

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Number of weapons and ammunition acquired by a country over time	Arms and ammunition production facilities present in the country, including information on production capacity (type of items, volume, etc.), primary customers (civilian or security forces, for domestic consumption or export), and market (civilian or military).
	Increase or decrease in the number and types of weapons and ammunition imported into a country over time: an increase in the number of weapons imported increases the overall availability of weapons in a country.
	Changes in national acquisition plans and increase or decrease in orders of conventional arms: an increase in the number of weapons ordered increases the overall availability of weapons in a country.
b) Illicit market price monitoring[31]	Increase or decrease in the typical price[32] of weapons in the illicit market over time: a decrease in the price of weapons may indicate greater availability of and/or demand for weapons and ammunition; an increase may signify lower availability and/or demand.

28   Killicoat et al. (2007, 256–87).

29   Florquin (2014); Small Arms Survey (2013c).

30   The relationship between the number of weapons available and the likelihood of conflict is still debated in academic literature. For example, while Gallea (2019) finds "a positive effect of arms import on the number of internal conflicts, the onset of internal conflict, the number of battle-related deaths, and the number of refugees fleeing the destination country", Bara (2016, 41) posits that "although ongoing conflicts lead to the emergence of illicit arms markets in the first instance, the mere existence of these markets does not automatically translate into an increased availability of weapons, at least not until the end of a conflict leads to a market oversupply". See also Bourne (2012, 33–34).

31   Although Killicoat et al. (2007) argue that "cheaper weapons prices lead to an increased risk of civil war, independently of other conflict risk factors", ongoing research suggests there is a lack of comparable data and information to be able to consistently use illicit arms price trends as an indicator of their availability (Florquin, 2014). Nevertheless, the value of monitoring illicit market prices for weapons and ammunition to improve our understanding of illicit markets and conflict dynamics is important (Bara, 2016; Small Arms Survey, 2013c).

32   The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2020a) defines this as "The typical price paid for a specific weapon in the street or black market. This may refer to the median (or alternatively, the average) price derived from several observations obtained through intelligence operations (e.g., undercover initiatives), or it may be obtained from knowledge derived from

| c) Ease of access to small arms and light weapons | Increase or decrease in ease of access to small arms and light weapons within a particular country over time as measured by a perception survey: a perceived increase in access signifies greater availability of weapons; a perceived decrease in access signifies lower availability. |
| | Public perception and awareness surveys indicating the availability and use of weapons: survey questions on the frequency of gunshots being heard, including celebratory gunfire, and the frequency of open carrying of firearms may indicate evolving trends in weapons availability and use or misuse. |

RISK POINT 1.1.2: CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION SEIZURES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Number and types of illicit weapons seized[33]	Increase or decrease in number and types of illicit weapons and ammunition seized: an increase in the number of weapons and ammunition seized can indicate an increased supply; a decrease in the number of weapons and ammunition seized can indicate a decrease in supply.
b) Date of production (or "age") of seized weapons	Monitoring of the age of production of seized weapons, which can demonstrate new channels of supply and availability of new weapons: new weapons can indicate new supplies; old weapons can indicate legacy supplies or recirculation of weapons from other areas and sources (domestic or international supply).
c) Changes in arms and ammunition seizures from armed groups or groups of interest	Increase or decrease in seizures of weapons from a particular group or segment of society: changes in certain types of weapons may indicate new access to supply chains or sources of supply and increased or decreased logistical capacity of armed groups to access weapons.

RISK POINT 1.1.3: TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Changes in the types of conventional arms and ammunition present	Increase or decrease in a particular type of weapon and ammunition, which can provide indications about the possible use or end user of the weapons. Military weapons are likely to be used for political violence by armed actors who seek to challenge security forces; civilian weapons are less suitable for insurgency and more likely to be for personal use (security, recreation, armed crime, etc.).
b) Presence of new or unusual types of weapons and ammunition	Presence of new or unusual weapons for the local context (based on type, model, age and calibre), which can be indicative of new sources of illicit supply and heightened demand.

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professional expertise in the field."

33   See Box 4, Analysing arms and ammunition seizures.

RISK POINT 1.1.4: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TO COMMIT VIOLENT ACTS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Casualty recording	Increase or decrease in the number of victims with gunshot wounds (as a proportion of all violent injuries), which reflects changes in the availability of arms used to commit these acts: higher numbers of victims with gunshot wounds indicate a higher presence and use of weapons; lower numbers of victims with gunshot wounds indicate a lower presence and use of weapons.
b) Armed criminal activity[34]	Increase or decrease in the levels of armed criminal activity, which may reflect changes in the availability of arms used to commit these acts: higher levels of armed criminal activity indicate greater availability of arms and ammunition; lower levels of armed criminal activity indicate lower availability of arms and ammunition.
c) Rates of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) or number of incidents involving a firearm[35]	Increase or decrease in the levels of SGBV or incidents involving a firearm, which are linked to greater availability of weapons: higher levels of SGBV or incidents involving a firearm indicate greater availability of arms and ammunition; lower levels of SGBV or incidents involving a firearm indicate lower availability of arms and ammunition.
	Monitoring of specific types of violence, such as SGBV, which can be a broader indicator of a breakdown of social controls.
d) Presence of an effective criminal justice response to armed violence	The enactment of an effective criminal justice response to armed violence and its application, as demonstrated by the number of persons arrested, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced for crimes involving arms.

RISK POINT 1.1.5: LEGAL SALES AND EASE OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Laws to exercise effective control over the production, export, import, transit or retransfer of conventional arms and ammunition	The presence and application of laws to regulate access to weapons during the production, export, import, transit or retransfer of arms and ammunition, which indicates a desire to limit this supply. Changes in the laws or in their application can indicate a change in stance regarding access to weapons (loosening or tightening of legal barriers to acquiring weapons).

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34   Braga et al. (2021); Cook (2013); van Kesteren (2014).

35   Hemenway (2002).

b) Legislative measures to establish as criminal offences under domestic law the illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of conventional arms and ammunition	Increase or decrease in the presence and application of laws to criminalize the illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling and trade of conventional arms and ammunition; loosening of such laws decreases the penalty for these actions and can increase the likelihood of their occurring; tightening of the legislative penalty can discourage these activities.
c) Ease and accessibility of acquiring a firearm licence and regulations on arms ownership	The presence and application of laws to regulate civilian access to weapons (permissive or restrictive) and the types of arms that can be legally acquired, etc.: restrictive legislation on firearms ownership is likely to limit legal ownership and indicate a desire to limit civilian firearm holdings; permissive firearms regulations can facilitate legal access to weapons and indicate a desire to stimulate or ease civilian arming.
d) Civilian firearms possession	Increase or decrease in the number of civilian licences granted, which reflects an increase or decrease in the number of legal weapons available.
e) Weapons dealers or markets	Increase or decrease in the number of weapons dealers or markets, which indicates changes in supply and demand for weapons: a higher number of weapons dealers or markets is likely to indicate both increased availability and facilitated supply of weapons; a lower number of weapons dealers or markets signals more limited availability and access.
	Increase or decrease in the number of applications for licences and permits, and the number of weapons and ammunition in these applications to be imported or purchased by dealers for sale in the country.
	Increase or decrease in the number of weapons and ammunition sold by weapons dealers or in markets, which indicates changes in supply and demand for weapons and ammunition: higher sales indicate increased demand for weapons and ammunition; lower sales signal more limited demand.

Other considerations

- In pre- and post-conflict settings, the information to be gained from an increase or decrease in the presence and use of conventional arms in a particular region may be most revealing when combined with information that may indicate possible stress points where conflict may erupt (for instance, information on societal divisions or the presence of and competition over natural resources).

- Where conflict is already ongoing, changes in the number of weapons and ammunition may provide information on the belligerents' ability to sustain the conflict, while disaggregation by the types of weapon available may provide indications about the nature of violence or the levels of intensity for an ongoing conflict. For instance, the sudden appearance of new or unusual types of weapon that can provide a tactical advantage, even if not significant in numbers, can be a game-changer in an evolving conflict. In post-conflict settings, the continued presence of or an increase in weapons and ammunition is linked to a higher possibility of resumption of conflict (see Risk Area 4).

- When paired with data on ethnic, religious or linguistic identity, the presence of large numbers of weapons can provide insight into the likelihood of there being additional or fewer armed movements. A greater availability of weapons facilitates the formation of more numerous and diverse groups. In a similar context, limited or restricted access to weapons may provide for a smaller number of armed groups with a more diverse membership.[36]

- Casualty data should be disaggregated by gender and age of casualty and type of conventional weapon to give a better understanding of the availability and impact of certain kinds of conventional weapon, which can support analysis on weapon origins and flows.

BOX 4

Analysing arms and ammunition seizures

Changes in information on the number of weapons and ammunition seized, or even the number of actual seizures, should be put in context. When assessing the number and types of illicit weapons seized, attention must be given to the impact of special operations targeting illicit arms flows and the issue of arms trafficking. Significant changes may be due not only to a change in supply or availability of arms but also to other factors, such as improved or decreased reporting, targeted operations to eradicate illicit arms trafficking, or an "unusual" one-off seizure. While data on the number of weapon seizures is useful for tracking trends over time, images of seized items often provide more detailed qualitative information about the type, end users and proliferation patterns of the seized items. [37]

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36   Marsh (2007, 29).

37   Schroeder and Shumska (2021, 23).

RISK FACTOR 1.2: GEOGRAPHIC PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION

The geographic proliferation, or spread, of weapons indicates the ability of actors in a particular area or areas to control territory and to access and use weapons. Monitoring the geographic proliferation of weapons can indicate the actual or potential spread of conflict into new areas and the likelihood of violence erupting or intensifying. It can also indicate possible areas of contention where different armed movements may seek to control the same zones. As weapons permeate into border areas, this can have implications at the local, national and regional levels as the risk of spillover of arms and conflict can heighten the likelihood of further armed violence in neighbouring areas or States.[38] The simplest measure of the spread of weapons may be the spread of fighting involving those weapons to new areas or fronts.

RISK POINT 1.2.1: GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF CONFLICT EVENTS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Geographic location of militarized disputes, armed clashes or other conflict events	Mapping of the location of military disputes, armed clashes or other conflict events, indicating a spread or a decline of conflict locations and a change to a conflict's intensity in a given region or area.

RISK POINT 1.2.2: GEOGRAPHIC SPREAD OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Presence of weapons in a particular location or area	Increase or decrease in the number of weapons per capita in a particular location or area compared with other regions, which can reflect perceptions of insecurity: higher numbers of weapons indicate a greater perception of insecurity or anticipation of violence; lower numbers of weapons indicate a greater perception of security.
	Increase or decrease in the number of arms and ammunition seized per location over time: higher numbers of arms and ammunition seized indicate a greater presence of weapons in a particular area; lower numbers of arms and ammunition seized indicate a lower presence of arms and ammunition. Changes in the number of weapons seized can also indicate that a State is particularly concerned about arms reaching specific geographically based groups.
	Increase or decrease in a particular type of weapon or ammunition (e.g. military or civilian weapons), which can provide indications of the risk of aggravation or de-intensification of violence in new locations.

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38   "Countries with more porous borders tend to have lower weapons prices." Killicoat et al. (2007).

RISK POINT 1.2.3: PRESENCE OF ARMED ACTORS IN A PARTICULAR LOCATION OR AREA

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Geographic spread of military and other security forces	Mapping of the presence and areas of operation and/or control of military armed police and other security forces, including armed private security companies, paramilitary forces or militias, indicating a military presence and/or control, or lack thereof, in a certain region.
	Increase or decrease in the number and locations of military depots, barracks and other operating bases, including arms and ammunition storage, which reflects changes in the presence of security forces or other armed actors: establishment of new military installations signals an increased presence; abandonment or conversion of military installations signals a decreased presence.
	Tracking the formation and/or disbandment of paramilitary forces or militia to identify the impact on their areas of control and operation.
b) Geographic spread of non-State armed actors	Mapping of the presence and areas of operation of non-State armed groups.
	Tracking of the formation, disbandment, merging or fracturing of non-State armed groups that may affect their areas of control and operation.

Other considerations

- Combining data on State presence with the spread of weapons can support information on the formation of armed movements. Areas where there is a lack of State presence may provide shelter for insurgents and support mobilization when other movements fill the gap left by the State. Moreover, wherever State authority is missing, communities may organize locally to provide security for themselves.[39]

- Understanding the various actors' motivations and conflict drivers allows analysts to understand why conflict may break out or spread to certain areas. Motivating factors may include control of resources, for example access to water and pastures; the illegal exploitation of natural resources; control of trafficking or logistic routes or hubs of strategic and financial value; and the capture of weapons and military equipment from security and defence forces (Including Troop Contributing Countries of United Nations Missions).

- The geographic spread of weapons may also affect conflict in the following ways: the emergence of new armed actors as previously peaceful communities gain access to weapons; changes in the balance of power between communities or armed groups. This also holds true for voluntary weapons collection or disarmament programmes, which can also affect the balance of power in geographic areas unless applied evenly and simultaneously.

- Changes in the deployment (positions and numbers) of armed actors is likely to trigger changes in the locations (growth in numbers or differences in locations) of militarized disputes, armed clashes or other conflict events.

- Military weapons are likely to be used for political violence by armed actors who seek to challenge security forces, whereas civilian weapons are less suitable for insurgency and more likely to be for personal use (security, recreation, etc.).

39   Yin (2020).

RISK FACTOR 1.3: SOCIETAL VALUES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION

The presence of high numbers of conventional arms, including within private or civilian hands, is linked to higher levels of armed violence and a general weakening of the social fabric in conflict-affected and at-risk settings.[40] Lower levels of acceptance of conventional arms by a population can reduce a culture of violence, while higher levels of acceptance of arms can support such a culture. Societal values on conventional arms use can have an influence on the numbers and types of conventional arms within a society by making it more or less acceptable to hold arms and can also be a factor in a society's ability to implement conventional arms control measures. Such values may change over time and can be a reaction to other factors, such as key events or perceptions of security or insecurity, that may influence the acceptance or rejection of weapons.

RISK POINT 1.3.1: SOCIETAL VALUES ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS USE

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Shifts in cultural values resulting in a weaponization of society and/or acceptance of armed violence	Public perception of security surveys,[41] disaggregated by gender and age, to gauge increases or decreases in the population's acceptance or rejection of weapons, which might affect people's desire to own weapons or the acceptability of doing so. Survey questions on open use and carrying of weapons could indicate societal acceptance or rejection of weapons in the community.[42]
	Public perception of security surveys to assess how people of all gender identities different age feel about the security environment: perceptions of improved security can indicate a lower need to hold weapons for personal security; perceptions of a worsening security situation can increase the desire to own weapons for personal safety.
	Analysis of the forces promoting violence and/or a culture of weapons and how they may draw on gender expectations and identities.
b) Calls for regulations or restrictions on arms ownership or holdings by certain groups or segments of society[43]	Monitoring of public calls for new rules and regulations restricting arms ownership by certain groups within a society, which may indicate a targeting of specific groups within a society by limiting their access to weapons. Increased calls for restricting ownership in areas where particular groups are dominant (e.g. local disarmament activities) may indicate increased vulnerability of such particular groups compared with others.

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40   See UNDP (2005).

41   Public perception of security surveys measure changes in how people understand or feel about the security situations or environment by assessing how the population feels about levels of security and insecurity and the role of different actors present in the community and their impact on security. See MOSAIC 05.10 (2012a).

42   See SEESAC publications (Table 1); Small Arms Survey (2014b).

43   Depending on the context, groups or segments of society may refer to groups defined by ethnicity, cultural attitudes, religious beliefs, political beliefs or political party affiliation.

c) Calls for arming certain groups or segments of society	Monitoring of public calls to arm particular groups or actors within society. An increase in such statements may indicate a willingness to resort to armed violence as a means to express grievances, affecting the likelihood of an armed conflict. A decrease may signal a reduction in tensions.
	Monitoring of calls for populations to defend their homes (usually against an internal or external "threat" or "enemy"), which provides an indication of increasing fractures in society, the targeting of persons or groups (the "enemy") or a broader fear of conflict, giving an impetus to populations to seek weapons to defend themselves, their community or their country.
d) Legal measures on the formation of militias or other armed movements	Monitoring the establishment and/or application of legislation banning or allowing the raising and maintenance of militias or other armed movements: relaxed legislation can support an increase in the ease and acceptability of forming such movements; tightened legislation can restrict the formation of such movements.
	Existence of laws or decrees establishing self-defence or paramilitary groups that would remove barriers to the formation of such movements and officially sanction their presence and support: permissive laws can facilitate the ease of access to weapons and increase the capacity of armed groups to engage in armed conflict.

Other considerations

- Societal values around weapons, and especially the acceptance of conventional arms as a part of everyday life, are closely related to the level of diffusion of weapons in a society (how far weapons have permeated a society). Studying these values can also provide an understanding of who is holding weapons, or is perceived to be holding them, and whether this changes over time. Coupling such analysis with an analysis of groups within a society, including intersocietal dynamics, rivalries, hostilities or alliances, can help better understand the fault lines along which armed movements may develop, who the armed parties may be, who they represent, what their values and grievances may be and what measures may be taken to prevent them from using arms to express their grievances.[44]

- Levels of diffusion and availability of weapons to civilians and armed movements have been found to be linked. Where civilian and military weapons are available to both civilians and armed movements in large quantities, there are likely to be more diverse and fractured armed actors. Where civilian and military weapons are available to armed movements, but not to the civilian population, the armed movement is likely to be dominated by one group.[45]

- Societal values around weapons may draw on gender expectations and may facilitate gender-based violence (GBV). An assessment of the levels of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) or GBV, including violence against women and femicide, may support a better understanding of this type of violence and how to tackle it. This assessment should also include consideration of the societal attitudes towards such acts. Consideration of the type and sources of weapons used can inform arms control programmes to support efforts to tackle GBV.

- Perceptions of security may also be different depending on the gender and age of the persons interviewed or surveyed. It is important to undertake inclusive surveys that provide gender- and age-disaggregated data to better understand how different parts of the population may perceive security and safety.

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44   This statement should not be taken to signify that highly diverse societies are necessarily more conflict prone. "Rather, states characterized by certain ethnopolitical configurations of power are more likely to experience violent conflict. First, armed rebellions are more likely to challenge states that exclude large portions of the population on the basis of ethnic background. Second, when a large number of competing elites share power in a segmented state, the risk of violent infighting increases. Third, incohesive states with a short history of direct rule are more likely to experience secessionist conflicts." Wimmer et al. (2009).

45   Marsh (2007, 29).

RISK FACTOR 1.4: LEVELS OF MILITARIZATION[46]

The level of militarization indicates a propensity to seek military solutions or an intent to engage in a conflict as opposed to seeking more peaceful means of conflict prevention or resolution. High levels of militarization are commonly seen as a factor of increased likelihood or intensity of conflict.[47] The levels can be assessed by looking at the relative size and equipment of armed forces and how they are deployed, the presence of other armed movements, or perceptions of the security forces and their role in society. High levels of military spending have also been linked to an increased likelihood of conflict, and it has been revealed that military expenditures increase as a government gravitates towards armed conflict or seeks to protect itself from it.[48] At the same time, high levels of militarization do not necessarily result in a higher likelihood of conflict and can be offset by other factors. For instance, there is evidence that a society with a well-established, mature democracy is less likely than others to foster a culture of violence,[49] and militarism has been associated with low to middle levels of economic development.[50]

RISK POINT 1.4.1: SIZE AND EQUIPPING OF STATE SECURITY FORCES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Size of the State security forces in relation to the population	Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 (vertical proliferation): higher numbers represent a higher level of militarization; lower numbers indicate a lower level of militarization.
	Number of police per capita: higher numbers represent a higher level of militarization; lower numbers indicate a lower level of militarization.
	Expansion of voluntary or forceful recruitment into the security forces. Expansion of the security forces will drive higher levels of militarization.
b) Military expenditure and arms procurement plans	Changes in military expenditure and share of gross domestic product: higher levels of expenditure are linked to higher levels of militarization; lower levels of expenditure are linked to lower levels of militarization.
	Analysis of national conventional arms acquisition plans, which can support forecasting of the types and number of weapons that may be available in the future and can signal militarization tendencies.

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46   The Bonn International Centre for Conversion publishes a Global Militarization Index that assesses militarization according to six factors: military expenditures as percentage of gross domestic product; military expenditures in relation to health spending; military and paramilitary personnel in relation to population; military reserves in relation to population; military and paramilitary personnel in relation to physicians; heavy weapons in relation to population.

47   Carlton-Ford (2010, 864–89).

48   Castillo et al. (2001) found that perceived threats may be the most significant factor contributing to increases in military expenditure.

49   Kisielewski et al. (2010, 18).

50   Mayer (2008).

| c) Numbers of conventional weapons held in national stockpiles | Levels of arms and ammunition imports and exports: higher numbers of, and also more advanced or capable, weapons and ammunition imports and exports are a factor driving higher levels of militarization. See also Risk Points 1.1.1 and 2.1.1. |
| | Number and type of heavy weapon systems: increases in the number of, particularly of more advanced or capable, heavy weapons drives higher levels of militarization; lower numbers of heavy weapons over time indicate decreasing levels of militarization. |

RISK POINT 1.4.2: PRESENCE AND FORMATION OF ARMED MOVEMENTS OR MOVEMENTS THAT EMBRACE AND PROMOTE MILITARY VALUES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Presence of non-State armed actors	Number of non-State armed opposition groups, vigilante groups, private security companies or others: higher numbers of such groups indicate a higher level of militarization; lower numbers of such groups indicate a lower level of militarization.
	Presence of programmes for the distribution of arms to civilians (e.g. proxy forces, militias and community security groups): the presence of such programmes increases the levels of militarization of society as the number of weapons increases and ownership diffuses through society; the lack of such programmes decreases the levels of militarization of society as weapons ownership and diffusion through society are restricted.
	Analysis of forced recruitment or abduction into armed movements, including who is being recruited or most vulnerable to recruitment, disaggregated by gender and age.

RISK POINT 1.4.3: NATURE AND USE OF THE STATE SECURITY FORCES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Modernization of the military	The acquisition of new equipment and technology by the military and other State security forces, indicating political and financial support for them.
b) Militarization of police	The equipping and use by the police service of military equipment in its functions: an increase in police access to military equipment indicates a higher level of militarization; a decrease or limited access indicates a lower level of militarization.

b) Militarization of police (cont.)	Increase or decrease in the number of incidents involving the use of lethal force and/or armed responses to civilians by police or security forces: increases in such incidents indicate higher levels of militarization; decreases in such incidents indicate lower levels of militarization.
c) Military doctrine	Review of the military doctrine to consider the fundamental set of principles that guide military forces as they pursue national security objectives. Considering the military doctrine can help to understand national security policymaking, the use of force, and the role of the different armed security actors within a society.
d) Transparency and openness of procurement and weapons holdings	Participation in international confidence-building measures that provide for information-sharing on weapons acquisition, which indicates levels of transparency of State security forces. Increased sharing of information on planned military acquisitions and defence budgets with other States indicates higher levels of transparency; decreased sharing of information on planned military acquisitions and defence budgets indicates lower levels of transparency.
	Participation in transparency measures, which indicates trends in the government's approach to national and regional security: reporting under international instruments (including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms) and with other international and regional organizations that publish data on international arms transfers, military spending, etc., indicates transparency; the absence of such reporting indicates secrecy and increased regional or global uncertainty.
	Existence of procedures or systems for disclosing information on defence spending or weapons acquisition plans to parliament or government agencies, which indicates higher levels of oversight of State security forces. Secrecy around defence spending or weapons acquisition plans indicates lower levels of oversight of State security forces and regional or global uncertainty.

RISK POINT 1.4.4: ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE, AND SOCIETAL ACCEPTANCE

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Military presence in everyday life	Presence of military personnel in high-level government posts usually reserved for civilians.
	Deployment or presence of heavily armed police or soldiers on the streets: large numbers of police or soldiers deployed indicates higher levels of militarization; small numbers of police or soldiers deployed indicates lower levels of militarization.

a) Military presence in everyday life (cont.)	Presence of political structures and institutions that provide an alternative or counterbalance to military influence in society and government: strong counter-balancing institutions can support in limiting the role of the military; weak counterbalancing institutions can encourage the military to take a stronger role.
	Assessment of changes in attitudes (increased disen-chantment or satisfaction) towards military rule or the presence of the military in positions of power.
	Assessment of gender composition of the military and police forces as this relates to society support for and perceptions of security forces in everyday life.
b) Support for or promotion of the security forces	Use of language and rhetoric by government authori-ties regarding the security forces in public statements: more frequent positive statements indicate increased political support for the security forces; decreased or more negative references to security forces indicate a decrease in political support for them.
	Increase or decrease in the number of military displays, parades or other symbolic activities to promote the armed services: an increase indicates greater support for the military; a decrease indicates less prominence given to their role in society.
c) Support for military action or intervention	Monitoring of societal perceptions of the military, including views of military intervention and the use of military force to resolve existing conflicts: positive attitudes held towards the military and/or military inter-vention may indicate popular support for and acceptance of military intervention; negative attitudes towards the military and/or military intervention may indicate popular support for and acceptance of conflict prevention, mediation or resolution activities.
	Monitoring of threats, displays of force or use of force against perceived enemies (States, political opposition, communities, individuals): frequent threats may indicate a willingness to engage in armed conflict; the absence of threats may indicate a willingness to prevent the outbreak of conflict.
d) Extension of military influence and priorities into civilian life	Presence of programmes for the provision of military training to civilians: their presence increases the number of persons trained to use weapons and indicates a possible greater acceptance of military action or activity.
	Analysis of factors promoting recruitment into forces or security services or militias, including perceptions of gendered roles.
	Public perceptions of security surveys to assess attitudes and values around militarization within the population: surveys that confirm the presence of milita-rized values among civilians may indicate higher levels of militarization.

d) Extension of military influence and priorities into civilian life (cont.)	Assessment of perceptions of the military in relation to their role in perpetrating, facilitating or concealing acts of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): support for military forces despite their role in facilitating acts of SGBV indicates support for the military forces; opposition to military forces due to their role in facilitating acts of SGBV indicates resistance to or decreased support for military forces.
	Context analysis of the history of military coups or other overt examples of military involvement in the economic and political life of a country, which may provide insight into the acceptability of such activities.

Other considerations

- Post-conflict levels of military spending, including on arms, have been shown to be a predictor of a higher rate of return to conflict. Military spending increases during conflict, typically by 50% during a civil war.[51] Once a conflict has ended, military spending may be difficult to return to its former level due to the influence of continued risks of conflict, enhanced political power of the military in non-democratic regimes, reluctance on behalf of the military to reduce its budget, and efforts to integrate rebel forces into the army, which creates pressures for military expansion.[52] This increased military spending reduces economic growth, and increased military spending has not been shown to be a deterrent to rebellion.[53] Military spending may also remain high when efforts to reform the security forces also involve the procurement of new weapons. (See also Risk Factor 4.4.)

- Militarization can have destabilizing regional effects. It has been demonstrated that a country's illicit weapons prices will tend to drop if neighbouring countries increase their military spending because of resulting proliferation.[54] If cheaper weapons lead to an increased risk of civil war, militarization within a State may support an increased risk of civil war beyond the borders of that State.[55]

- Civilian actors or police with military training and access to weapons might be considered more likely to resort to military means (use of force and/or armed responses) when challenged, and there is a likelihood of escalation of violence as opposed to a de-escalation.

- A society's level of militarization may be influenced by the presence of a "gun culture", which may include the association of guns with power, pride and masculinity. This can be addressed through programmes to challenge norms of violent masculinities and offer alternatives; encourage social customs dissociating guns from power, pride and masculinity; and increase capacity for non-violent conflict resolution. Where the possession of arms is deeply embedded in society, efforts can be made to control arms, including by restricting the types of weapon that can be legally held and mandating registration of ownership.

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51   Collier et al. (2003, 86).

52   Collier et al. (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 3).

53   "Thus, although governments increase military spending in an effort to deter rebellion, the expenditure appears to be ineffective…. During the inception stage of rebellion a large military response might be ineffective, or event counterproductive: excessive repression by government forces assists rebel recruitment and appears to be a common error of counter-insurgency." Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 13).

54   Killicoat et al. (2007).

55   Killicoat et al. (2007).

Risk Area 2: Channels of access to conventional arms

The acquisition of weapons is one of the pre-requisites for the formation of armed movements. Looking at how armed actors access weapons can provide a measure of an armed actor's ability to undertake and sustain armed activities, and can provide an indication of the types of armed actor that may emerge in a conflict. This section looks at four Risk Factors relating to different means by which State and non-State conflict actors can obtain weapons.

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 2

RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Risk Factor	Risk Point
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers	2.1.1: Number and types of conventional arms and systems transferred
	2.1.2: Presence of unilateral or multilateral arms embargoes
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition	2.2.1: Diversion-enabling factors
	2.2.2: Points of diversion and methods used
	2.2.3: History or record of diversion
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets	2.3.1: Involvement of armed groups in illicit trafficking in weapons and military equipment
	2.3.2: State capacity to detect possibly illicit weapons cargos
	2.3.3: State capacity to address illicit weapons transfers
	2.3.4: Availability of illicit conventional arms and ammunition
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms	2.4.1: Civilian acquisition and holdings
	2.4.2: Legal frameworks governing civilian possession of weapons and the ability to ensure their compliance
	2.4.3: Arms dealers
	2.4.4: Perceptions of safety

RISK FACTOR 2.1: GOVERNMENT-AUTHORIZED ARMS TRANSFERS

International arms transfers provide actors with the means to engage in armed conflict, and the associated high levels of military spending on arms have a statistical correlation with an increased likelihood of conflict.[56] Moreover, large-scale arms transfers can be a source of tension in peacetime and generate high levels of casualties once hostilities begin. Information on government-authorized transfers[57] can provide an indication of the number and types of licit weapons that may be available in a country, which can in turn provide information on the weapons that may be diverted from the intended end user to unauthorized end users, including armed movements[58] (see Risk Factor 2.2). Information on international arms transfers for many States is openly available, and considering the weapons distributed and transferred within the legal realm can provide analysts with insight into the weapons that may be available on the illicit market.

RISK POINT 2.1.1: NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND SYSTEMS TRANSFERRED

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Number and types of conventional arms and systems transferred to a country over time	Analysis of arms acquisition and holdings, indicating whether the country acquires arms via domestic manufacture or imports and helping indicate the impact of restrictive measures (i.e. arms embargoes) on the ability of armed actors to sustain their forces during armed conflict.
	Increase or decrease in imports or exports of certain weapon types over time as an indication of a State's militarization and ability to engage in conflict. See also Risk Point 3.2.1.
	Increase or decrease in arms acquisition of nationally produced arms and ammunition: increased domestic production can indicate increasing capacity of a State to sustain a conflict.
b) Level of external support provided to conflict actors in a country (State or non-State)	Existence of and/or levels of external support from a country with capacity and experience or channels for an extensive arms supply: higher levels of support indicate increasing capacity and resources of either State or non-State actors to engage in armed conflict.

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56   Collier et al. (2003, 86).

57   Assessing the flows of conventional arms has been made easier with the launch of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and other instruments, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's reporting on small arms and light weapons. Other sources of information include the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

58   The diversion of weapons from legal stockpiles is one of the main sources of illicit weapons for armed movements. See Conflict Armament Research (2018, 9).

RISK POINT 2.1.2: PRESENCE OF UNILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL ARMS EMBARGOES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Existence of multilateral sanctions, including arms embargoes, against a State	Imposition of mandatory or non-mandatory unilateral or international arms embargoes against a State, a government or non-governmental forces active in a country.
	Existence of a United Nations panel of experts or group of experts established to monitor sanctions or arms embargoes, providing information on the illicit transfer of weapons.

Other considerations

- For States that do not have a domestic arms manufacturing base, imports are their only method of acquiring weapons. For States that do have the ability to manufacture and produce arms domestically, and especially ammunition, these capacities should be taken into account when thinking about conflict dynamics and the ability of the State to sustain a conflict.

- The legal transfer of weapons has been recognized as an issue by the United Nations, and arms embargoes are one of the tools for preventing conflict actors from legally accessing weapons.[59]

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59   It can be said that there are three categories of end goal to be achieved through United Nations arms embargoes: (a) addressing threats against global security (conflict prevention), (b) strengthening legitimate government authority, and (c) achieving the peaceful political settlement of a violent armed conflict through conflict management (conflict management and resolution). Strandow and Wallensteen (2007).

RISK FACTOR 2.2: DIVERSION OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION

Diversion of arms and ammunition, or the point at which a weapon or ammunition moves from the legal to the illicit realm, can take many forms[60] and can provide an indication of an armed group's ability to arm itself at the expense of the government, including by acquiring weapons from government stocks. The diversion of arms can also indicate the existence of other conflict-related risks or vulnerabilities, such as corruption, international trafficking routes and supply chains, or institutional weakness or fragility. Diversion from government stockpiles can be difficult to measure as governments are often reluctant to admit that such diversion occurs or are unable to measure it reliably. A key determinant of an armed group's ability to access weapons will be the government's ability to control and secure its stockpiles (see Risk Area 5), and factors such as whether a government maintains strict and effective control over its arms and military equipment and their further transfer can support in assessing the likelihood of diversion occurring.[61]

RISK POINT 2.2.1: DIVERSION-ENABLING FACTORS[62]	
Options for assessing the Risk Point	**Indicators**
a) Institutional weaknesses and failure contributing to diversion	Increases or decreases in levels of cross-border trafficking in arms and ammunition throughout a region following State collapse or fragmentation, as indicated by changes in the number of weapon seizures at borders or other ports of entry. See Risk Factor 2.3.
	Assessment of the end user's capacity to maintain and deploy imported arms or ammunition following the downsizing, dissolution or reorganization of security forces: higher capacity indicates more likelihood that the end user will retain the arms or equipment; lower capacity indicates a higher risk that the arms or ammunition will be diverted.
	Contextual analysis looking at the prior history of government-sponsored unauthorized transfer or retransfer, for example to national or foreign armed actors. A history of government-sponsored unauthorized transfer or retransfer may indicate a higher risk of arms ending up in the hands of unauthorized armed actors.
	Assessment of the type, quality and quantity of arms and ammunition supplied and how it matches the stated end user's military requirements (e.g. its existing inventory and force structure): a good match indicates a higher probability that the weapons will be retained; a poor match can indicate that the equipment is not intended for the stated end user and could be retransferred.

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60   Points of diversion throughout the transfer chain and the life cycle of arms include diversion from manufacture; diversion during transfer; diversion from stockpiles (State-owned and private); diversion during active use and deployment; diversion by regularization and through gaps in national controls; and diversion by unauthorized cross-border movement. Baldo et al. (2021). See also, Conflict Armament Research (2018, 8).

61   For further information on preventing diversion, see Wood and Holtom (2020).

62   Risk Points for diversion from government stockpiles may be measured in two ways: (a) the ability of a government to control its stockpiles, as measured through the weapons and ammunition practices in place (see Risk Area 5), and (b) diversion-enabling factors, or circumstances that facilitate or exacerbate diversion.

a) Institutional weaknesses and failure contributing to diversion (cont.)	Contextual analysis looking at prior history of diversion as a result of deliberate choices or due to negligence of government authorities (e.g. military commanders) or individuals within the security forces. A history of such diversion may indicate a higher risk of arms ending up in the hands of unauthorized armed actors.
	Assessment of levels of corruption that may facilitate diversion. High levels of corruption and impunity for offences committed by public officials can facilitate diversion.
	Presence of effective legislation for investigating and punishing theft, corruption and other diversion-related offences.[63] Diversion will be made more difficult if such legislation is in place and enforced, and the supply of actual and potential weapons available in illicit markets will also be limited.
b) Deception of State and non-State actors contributing to diversion	History of known or suspected unauthorized transfer or retransfers of arms or military equipment by a recipient to a third party using fake, forged or altered import or export licences and end user documentation. A history of transfers or retransfers to a third party using false end user documentation may indicate a higher risk of diversion.
	History of physical alteration of arms and their marking requirements to avoid identification or tracing in contra-vention of domestic legislation, which indicates a higher risk of diversion.

RISK POINT 2.2.2: POINTS OF DIVERSION AND METHODS USED

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Diversion from stockpiles (State-owned and private)	Increase or decrease in domestic incidents of diversion due to loss through negligence in stockpile management: Frequent reports of domestic incidents of diversion from stockpiles can indicate weaknesses in a State's ability to effectively manage weapons as well as weak control mechanisms over State-owned stockpiles, which increase the likelihood of diversion.
	History of theft and violent capture from stockpiles in the recipient country, which may indicate a risk that diversion may occur in the future (particularly if the analysis does not also show the strengthening of weapons or stockpile management procedures; see Risk Area 5).
	History of government-supported community-based security providers (community police, self-defence groups etc.). Frequent cases of such occurrences can indicate a high risk of diversion if weapons are given to such groups as a part of a formal or informal policy to arm them.

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63   Arms Trade Treaty (2018, 23).

a) Diversion from stockpiles (State-owned and private) (cont.)	Presence of adequate procedures for safe and secure stockpile management, including for surplus or obsolete weapons and ammunition.[64] Diversion from stockpiles will be made more difficult if such procedures are in place, and the supply of actual and potential weapons available in illicit markets will also be decreased. Lack of adequate procedures for effective stockpile management and the existence of vulnerabilities in State-owned stockpiles can be exploited by armed actors, enabling the diversion of weapons. See Risk Point 5.2.3.
	Existence of programmes to distribute weapons to civilians, which indicates the ease of access to illicit weapons by civilians and the risk of diversion to unauthorized end users.
b) Diversion during transfer	Presence of an effective arms transfer control system (import, export, transit and trans-shipment). Diversion during transfer will be made more difficult if such procedures are in place, and the supply of actual and potential weapons available in illicit markets will also be limited.
c) Diversion during active use and deployment	Frequency of attacks on military garrison and police stations, patrols and other deployments that may provide opportunities for diversion during active use and deployment, including by violent capture in conflict-affected settings (battlefield capture). Frequent occurrences can indicate a high risk of diversion.

RISK POINT 2.2.3: HISTORY OR RECORD OF DIVERSION

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Arms tracing information establishing a record of the diversion of arms and ammunition	Inclusion of the country under study in reports on arms tracing by organizations that track changes in ownership of weapons to identify the point in the transfer chain at which the weapon entered the illicit market.[65] This information can indicate a history of diversion within the country or can demonstrate measures taken to mitigate or prevent diversion by the State.
	Existence of past and/or current tracing requests and other investigations into trafficking and transfer control violations, such as lists of persons and entities convicted of trafficking and related offences and those named in United Nations arms embargo violation reports.
	Levels of cooperation of national authorities with tracing requests received, as per reporting by United Nations and other entities issuing such requests. High levels of cooperation indicate lower risks of diversion; low levels of cooperation indicate higher risks of diversion.

64   International standards recommend destruction as the preferred method of disposal for arms and ammunition identified as being surplus to the requirements of the armed services of a State (MOSAIC 5.50, 2012c). See also MOSAIC 5.20 (2012b) and specific and relevant International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (https://unsaferguard.org/un-saferguard/guide-lines).

65   See Small Arms Survey (2014a).

<u>Other considerations</u>

- Diversion from State-owned stockpiles can be difficult to measure as governments are often reluctant to admit that such diversion occurs or are unable to measure it reliably, and/or the local media do not investigate due to lack of interest or due to risks for journalists; therefore, reliable information sources and reporting may be limited. In addition to factors that can help prevent diversion, such as those listed in Risk Area 5, there are some that may encourage it, including:

  ▶ Irregular payment of security forces' salaries, which might provide an incentive to sell weapons or ammunition

  ▶ A market for illicit weapons, which can facilitate the sale of diverted weapons

  ▶ Ongoing conflict or tensions, which provide a demand for weapons

  ▶ Individual control of weapons by fighters (as opposed to a centrally managed system), which can weaken control over arms and facilitate onward sales

- Battlefield capture can be difficult to track, but it can be inferred that attacks on government security installations and forces or other forces (peacekeepers, training missions, etc.) provide an opportunity for armed groups to capture weapons. The types of forces involved in actions where weapons may have been lost could provide a further measure of the likelihood of battlefield loss, as elite forces have been found less likely to lose weapons than other types of forces.[66]

- Analysing government-sponsored diversion can serve the dual purpose of allowing prevention actors to intervene with the States responsible to shut down the supply of arms into a conflict area and support an understanding of outside parties who support and may carry influence with the conflict parties.

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66   Felter (2007, 37).

RISK FACTOR 2.3: ILLICIT TRANSFERS AND MARKETS

Illicit weapons transfers represent one of the primary sources of arms for non-State actors, who usually do not have access to legal channels for acquiring weapons. Illicit transfers and markets facilitate the formation and activities of non-State armed actors, fuel crime and insecurity at all stages of a conflict, and often contribute to high levels of post-conflict violence. As it is impossible to measure the exact number of illicit arms in circulation, proxy indicators must be used to gauge the presence and levels of illicit arms. This includes looking at historical examples of illicit transfers and at factors that can facilitate illicit transfers, such as:

- The ability to raise funds to purchase arms via black markets[67]
- Access to territory or infrastructure that facilitates illicit trafficking in weapons
- Weak State capacity to control borders or otherwise stem illicit flows of weapons
- The presence of armed conflict in neighbouring countries

Each factor will positively or negatively affect the ease with which illicit arms might be obtained by belligerents, making their access to enough of the types of illicit arms required for armed conflict more or less likely.

RISK POINT 2.3.1: INVOLVEMENT OF ARMED GROUPS IN ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN WEAPONS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Involvement of armed opposition groups engaged in illicit trafficking in weapons and military equipment	Increase or decrease in the number and types of illicit arms seized[68] from traffickers linked to armed opposition groups: an increase in the number of arms seized can indicate higher levels of trafficking; a decrease in the number of arms seized can indicate lower levels of trafficking. See Risk Point 1.1.2.
	Increase or decrease in the number and types of seizures of weapons linked to armed opposition groups: an increase in the number of seizures can indicate higher levels of trafficking; a decrease in the number of seizures can indicate lower levels of trafficking.
	Contextual analysis of prior history of armed opposition groups engaging in illicit trafficking in weapons and military equipment,[69] which indicates the capacity of armed groups to procure weapons and/or sustain armed conflict.

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67   Sustainable Development Goal 16.4 includes illicit financial and arms flows ("By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime"). See Bromley et al. (2019) on how to measure Sustainable Development Goal 16.

68   See Box 4, Analysing arms and ammunition seizures.

69   Data on past conflict trends can be used to generate projections about future conflict. Such data can generate baseline projections of the likely incidence and intensity of future conflict. Data on past conflict trends assume that conflict in the future will continue to follow whatever trend line has characterized its incidence in the past; however, such data do not allow for possible or probable changes at the global, regional and national levels. See Szayna et al. (2017, 73–96).

b) Involvement of armed opposition groups in illegal resource exploitation or other revenue-generating activities that allow them to purchase weapons	Contextual analysis of prior history of armed opposition groups' engagement in illegal resource exploitation or other revenue-generating activities, which indicates the capacity of armed groups to raise funds to support their military activities (including procuring weapons and ammunition) and/or sustain armed conflict.
c) Armed opposition groups' access to territory or infrastructure that facilitates illicit trafficking in weapons and resources	Armed opposition groups' presence in or occupation of territory (e.g. border areas) or infrastructure (e.g. ports or airports) that could increase their ability to engage in the illicit trafficking of arms and ammunition; loss of territory or access to infrastructure could impede their ability to engage in illicit trafficking.

RISK POINT 2.3.2: STATE CAPACITY TO DETECT POSSIBLY ILLICIT WEAPONS CARGOS[70]

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Ability of the government to control borders and airspace	Level of State control over ports, transportation routes, infrastructure, border crossing points and supply chains: high levels of control can discourage trafficking in illicit weapons and ammunition; low levels of control can encourage such trafficking.
	Assessment of resources deployed to monitor authorized entry points in relation to the nature of national borders (maritime borders, length of border to monitor, etc.): higher levels of resources in relation to the length of the border and number of authorized entry points indicate greater control; limited resources in relation to the length of the border and number of authorized entry points indicate limited control.
	Percentage of arrests for illicit border activity leading to convictions: higher levels indicate better capacity to enforce border controls; lower levels indicate limited capacity to enforce border controls.
	Increase or decrease in number and types of illicit conventional arms seized or found at borders or entry points: an increase in the number of weapons seized or found can indicate an increase in trafficking and/or in capacity for counter-trafficking; a decrease in the number of weapons found or surrendered can indicate a decrease in trafficking and/or in capacity for counter-trafficking.[71]

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70 Risk Point and measures drawn from Garcia (2009).

71 Increases and decreases in number of weapons seizures can indicate higher levels of supply but may also be due to other factors such as a strengthened or weakened capacity to intercept arms and ammunition.

RISK POINT 2.3.3: STATE CAPACITY TO ADDRESS ILLICIT WEAPONS TRANSFERS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) National legislation relating to illicit weapons transfers	Existence of national laws on illicit weapons transfers that would put in place barriers or disincentives to engaging in illicit weapons trafficking. The absence of such laws, or the existence of permissive laws, can facilitate illicit weapons transfers.
	The ability to enforce national laws on illicit weapons transfers as demonstrated by the number of persons convicted for illicit conventional arms trafficking or the unauthorized use of small arms and light weapons.
b) Participation in regional efforts to limit illicit weapons transfers	State participation in regional efforts to limit illicit weapons, as measured by the ratification of or accession to regional instruments to combat illicit weapons transfers.
	State funding allocated to implementing regional efforts to limit illicit weapons transfers.
	Membership of regional bodies and instruments seeking to limit illicit weapons transfers and active participation in them, which can support exchanges of information that reduce arms trafficking.

RISK POINT 2.3.4: AVAILABILITY OF ILLICIT CONVENTIONAL ARMS AND AMMUNITION

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Presence or availability of illicit conventional arms and ammunition	Increase or decrease in the number of illicit arms seized as indicated by information from specialized reporting or official press releases on illicit weapons seizures: a higher number of weapons seized indicates greater availability of illicit arms; a lower number of weapons seized indicates lower availability of illicit arms.[72]
b) Price of illicit conventional arms and ammunition on the black market	Increase or decrease in the typical price[73] of weapons in the illicit market over time: an increase in the price of weapons signifies lower availability of weapons; a decrease indicates greater availability.
c) Presence of illicit markets where weapons are sold	Increase or decrease in the number and/or size of known illicit arms markets: a greater number or size of the markets indicates greater availability of and ease of access to illicit weapons; a lower number indicates lower availability of and ease of access to illicit weapons.

72   Increases and decreases in number of illicit arms seized can indicate higher levels of supply but may also be due to other factors such as a strengthened or weakened capacity to intercept arms and ammunition.

73   The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime defines this as: "The typical price paid for a specific weapon in the street or black market. This may refer to the median (or alternatively, the average) price derived from several observations obtained through intelligence operations (e.g., undercover initiatives), or it may be obtained from knowledge derived from professional expertise in the field." UNODC (2020a).

c) Presence of illicit markets where weapons are sold (cont.)	Assessment of the types and calibres of arms and ammunition for sale or purchase at known illicit black markets, which provides some indication of the types of weapons available and possibly the intended use of those weapons.[74]
	Assessment of illicit production of conventional arms by or for armed groups, which provides information on the ability of the groups to access locally produced weapons as well as on the types of weapon that may be available to them.[75]
d) Levels of armed violence	Increase or decrease in levels of armed violence, including crimes committed using conventional arms, which indicates a greater or lower availability of arms. These levels can be tracked using casualty recording (see 1.1.4 a), crime statistics (see 1.1.4 b) or data on gunshot victims from hospitals and other medical facilities.
	Increase or decrease in levels of armed violence, disaggregated by type of weapon: an increased proportion of casualties inflicted by the weapons of concern indicates increased access by groups to those weapons.
	Responses to armed violence in the form of prosecutions or convictions of perpetrators of different types of armed violence, which may support an understanding of attitudes and tolerance towards various types of armed violence, including sexual and gender-based violence.

<u>Other considerations</u>

- The legal or illicit nature of firearms and their movements is closely linked to the regulatory framework that applies at national, regional and international levels, which can vary significantly from country to country (see Risk Point 1.1.5). National firearms control regimes are influenced by social, cultural and political circumstances and contexts (see Risk Factors 1.3 and 1.4), particularly as control regimes may relate to civilian ownership, possession, and manufacturing, as well as transfers and disposal of arms and ammunition.

- Illicit transfers or arms trafficking can range from large-scale arms trafficking, sometimes facilitated by governments engaged in proxy wars, to smaller amounts of firearms and ammunition being trafficked in relatively constant flows (the "ant trade"). It may involve the dissemination of military weapons into civilian hands in the aftermath of wars or regime changes, or illegal commerce motivated by criminal gain.

- Seizures of small consignments of one or two firearms may be linked to individual use and most commonly include handguns. Seizures of larger quantities of conventional arms seem to relate to conflict actor demands. Seizures of military small arms and light weapons (SALW) generally involve larger quantities, as armed conflicts are usually fought using these weapons and require them in large numbers.[76]

- The modes of transport used to move illicit weapons may influence the size of the shipment (the ability to move more arms in one shipment) and the number of shipments. The mode of transport can vary, for instance as suppliers of illicit arms change modes to avoid detection or in response to supply and demand. Levels of demand can therefore influence the size of shipments and the choice of mode of transport.

- Illicit transactions are easier when there is little or no State control, such as in areas of rebel influence and where transborder cooperation with friendly populations or governments in neighbouring countries is possible. Considering State presence and control of borders and other access routes as part of an analysis can therefore provide information on an armed group's ability to acquire arms.

74   Non-State actors in an armed conflict need military arms. Civilian weapons (such as hunting rifles or shotguns) may be sufficient to maintain high levels of criminal violence.

75   See Schroeder (2014).

76   UNODC (2020a, 10–11).

RISK FACTOR 2.4: CIVILIAN PURCHASE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Civilian possession is usually not considered a strong indicator of armed conflict due to the type (usually hunting rifles or pistols) and quantity (often single items) of weapons available for purchase. However, the civilian purchase of weapons can signal perceptions of insecurity and a militarization of society (see Risk Factor 1.4), as populations experiencing fear arm themselves for protection.[77] The increase in legitimate acquisition of weapons by individual citizens can be a proxy predictor of actual increased violence or perceptions of violence in a society, perpetuating instability and facilitating armed conflict.

RISK POINT 2.4.1: CIVILIAN ACQUISITION AND HOLDINGS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Levels of civilian acquisition or holdings of weapons	Review of national firearms registries to assess the number of firearms and ammunition licensed to civilians and private security companies, indicating increases or decreases in weapons acquisition by individuals and/or private security providers.
	Number and types of firearms held by civilians indicated by civilian holdings surveys: high numbers indicate a wide diffusion of weapons in a society and an increased likelihood of armed violence; low numbers indicate a limited diffusion of weapons in society and a lower likelihood of armed violence. Increased purchase of specific types of firearm, such as handguns, can indicate increased civilian ownership of firearms for self-protection.
	Analysis of firearms-related crimes to determine the distribution between legally owned firearms and illicit ones in criminal incidents, including disaggregation by type of crime and target gender and age group.

RISK POINT 2.4.2: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS GOVERNING CIVILIAN POSSESSION OF WEAPONS AND THE ABILITY TO ENSURE THEIR COMPLIANCE[78]

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) International and regional systems (formal and informal) to regulate firearms	State participation in regional efforts to regulate firearms as measured by the ratification of or accession to regional instruments to combat illicit weapons transfers.

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77   "When the State loses control over its security functions and fails to maintain the security of its citizens, the subsequent growth of armed violence, banditry and organized crime increases the demand for weapons by citizens seeking to protect themselves and their property." United Nations (1997, para. 42).

78   Options for assessing this Risk Point are drawn from the Firearm Regulation for the Purpose of Crime Prevention and Public Health and Safety. ECOSOC (1997).

b) National legislation on civilian possession	The presence or absence of national laws regulating civilian possession that would put in place barriers, disincentives or incentives for civilian possession and the legal ownership of all or certain types of conventional arms by civilians.
	The ability to enforce national laws regulating civilian possession, as demonstrated by evidence of criminal investigations for violations.
c) National regulations relating to firearm safety and storage	The existence of a system to regulate firearms safety and storage that supports stronger firearms safety and storage measures and makes it more difficult to access firearms that are safely stored.
	The ability to enforce firearms safety and storage regulations, as demonstrated by evidence of criminal investigations for violations.
d) Appropriate penalties and/or administrative sanctions for offences involving the misuse or unlawful possession of firearms	The State's adoption of legislative measures that establish as criminal offences activities involving the misuse or unlawful possession of firearms.
	The ability to enforce legislative measures that establish as criminal offences activities involving the misuse or unlawful possession of firearms, as illustrated by prosecutions under these penal codes.
e) A record-keeping system for firearms, including for the commercial distribution of firearms, and a requirement for appropriate marking of firearms at manufacture and at import	The establishment of a record-keeping system for firearms to ensure the proper marking and registration of firearms and, where required, ammunition.
	The ability to enforce legislation on record-keeping, as demonstrated by measures to prosecute those not in compliance with the record-keeping system.

RISK POINT 2.4.3: ARMS DEALERS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Legal frameworks regulating arms dealers	The existence of regulations for the licensing of arms dealers.
	The application of regulations for the licensing of arms dealers, as evidenced by criminal investigations and convictions for violations.
	The existence of systems for ensuring that arms transfers by dealers are subject to government approval.
	The application of systems for ensuring that arms transfers by dealers are subject to government approval, as demonstrated by criminal investigations and convictions for violations.

b) Databases of licensed weapons, ammunition production facilities and commercial arms traders	The existence and maintenance of national databases listing licensed weapons, ammunition production facilities and commercial arms traders.
c) A licensing system including the licensing of firearms trading businesses	The enactment of a system to license firearms businesses.
	The application of a system to license firearms businesses, as demonstrated by evidence of criminal investigations for violations.

RISK POINT 2.4.4: PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
d) Perceptions of security or insecurity that may drive the civilian purchase of weapons	Assessments of whether civilians purchase and rely on weapons within a particular country over time as measured by perception surveys: a perceived need for weapons may indicate increased insecurity; the perception that weapons are not needed indicates positive perceptions of security.
	Perceptions of safety surveys, disaggregated by gender and age, to measure how segments of society feel about the level of security or insecurity, which may indicate attitudes within different parts of society about weapons ownership and use.
	Perception surveys, disaggregated by gender and age, to measure the level of confidence different segments of society have in security forces, which can indicate attitudes held about the need to possess weapons.

Other considerations

• The establishment of mechanisms to address grievances (for instance, judicial institutions, human rights commissions, peace commissions) and policies to address grievances and divisions – such as punishment of perpetrators – can address some of the underlying reasons that civilians hold weapons and can support civilian disarmament. Likewise, the ability of the State to control its territory, protect the lives and property of citizens from crime and violence, and enjoy a legitimate monopoly of force reduces the requirement for civilians to organize and hold weapons for personal or community security.

Risk Area 3:
Use of conventional arms during a conflict

Photo Credit: UN Photo/Nektarios Markogiannis

The use of weapons during a conflict can provide information on escalation or de-escalation and provide a yardstick by which to measure progress, for example in a ceasefire, or compliance with a peace agreement. This Risk Area can help identify hotspots that may require greater attention, changes in the military capability of armed actors, or changes in tactics. The Risk Area can also assist in identifying logistical support and supply chains, proxies or backers who may be given or who may provide weapons to conflict parties, all of which can be useful in supporting prevention strategies. This section considers four Risk Factors related to the use of weapons during a conflict.

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 3

RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT

Risk Factor	Risk Point
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting	3.1.1: Changes in conflict intensity
	3.1.2: Changes in a conflict actor's tactics and targeting
3.2: Types of conventional arms present	3.2.1: Types of conventional arms present in country
3.3: Who is using the weapons	3.3.1: Armed actors and their levels of cohesion
	3.3.2: Supply and control of arms by and for conflict actors
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used	3.4.1: Territorial control and the deployment of weapons

RISK FACTOR 3.1: CONFLICT INTENSITY, TACTICS AND TARGETING

The types of weapons and ammunition deployed in conflict settings can affect the intensity of a conflict, as they alter the fighting party's ability to inflict casualties, including civilian casualties. The deployment of more powerful weapons and ammunition and the ability to target strikes using those weapons will affect the intensity of a conflict. Changes in tactics or the use of new types of weapon may indicate a shift in the capacity or position of the armed actors, both militarily and politically, as such changes may be linked to a hardening or softening of positions, including, for example, on adherence to international humanitarian law.

RISK POINT 3.1.1: CHANGES IN CONFLICT INTENSITY

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Changes in intensity of fighting	Assessment of the intensity of fighting by measuring the number of battlefield deaths over time, disaggregated by gender and age: a higher number of battlefield deaths and casualties indicates an intensification of a conflict; a lower number indicates a decrease in the intensity of a conflict.
	Assessment of the types of weapons deployed, which may support in assessing a party's ability to intensify a fight by deploying more numerous or powerful weapons or types of ammunition, or the party's intent to de-escalate by withdrawing certain conventional arms.

RISK POINT 3.1.2: CHANGES IN A CONFLICT ACTOR'S TACTICS AND TARGETING

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Changes in targeting	Evidence of broadening or narrowing of the scope of targeting practices to include or exclude certain groups (ethnic, religious or other armed actors) or individuals (e.g. religious or community leaders, civil servants, or journalists).
	Evidence of targeting civilians, including through indiscriminate attacks, as measured by casualty recording, disaggregated by gender and age.
	Assessment of the targets of armed violence, disaggregated by gender and age, so as to establish whether specific gender or age groups have been singled out in acts of violence.
b) Changes in tactics	Evidence of the acquisition, deployment and/or use of new types of weapon, indicating shifts in tactics.
	Evidence of the use of weapons in new ways, such as complex coordinated attacks.

	Monitoring of statements or engagements by armed actors that they will adhere by international humanitarian law.
c) Use or misuse of weapons by conflict actors	Monitoring of outreach activities to armed actors to raise their awareness of international humanitarian law.
	Evidence of violations of human rights and humanitarian law by armed actors, including sexual and gender-based violence.

Other considerations

- A change in the weapons used can provide information on new alliances or supporters[79] that supply these weapons. The options for deploying and using different types of weapon may change as armed groups acquire new weapons, and knowledge and experience in how to use them.

- Insurgencies may start with small numbers of weapons and ammunition, but prolonged conflicts can offer armed groups an opportunity to diversify their sources of acquisition of conventional arms and ammunition. Diversification may also occur as channels of supply are shut down, for example through the imposition of arms embargoes or through the increased ability of a State to interdict illicit arms transfers.

- Armed groups may vary their use of weapons over time and location, and the types of weapon used will usually depend on the objectives of the armed group at a point in time. The use of weapons may be adapted depending on, inter alia, the group's military goal, the geography and topography of the conflict area, and available finances. Use of weapons may also be influenced by factors such as a desire to escalate or de-escalate a situation.

- In situations of prolonged peace negotiations, there may be lulls or increases in the intensity or geographic spread of fighting as armed actors seek to demonstrate a willingness to engage, or a show of force, in advance of peace talks resuming.

- Conflicts are dynamic and, over time, patterns of violence may emerge, often related to changes in the intensity of fighting. These patterns may be linked to events that affect the intensity of fighting, such as climate (wet–dry seasons), agricultural calendars, seasonal population movements (transhumance), religious holidays or progress in peace talks.[80] Once identified, conflict patterns can represent an entry point for prevention actors to introduce preventive measures.

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79   See ICRC (2021).

80   For example, as Barnett Koven (2017) summarizes, "a confluence of three factors — the conclusion of poppy cultivation, improved weather conditions and recesses in madrassas in neighboring Pakistan — have made spring Afghanistan's 'fighting season'."

RISK FACTOR 3.2: TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS PRESENT

The types of conventional arms used during conflict can be an indicator of the conflict parties' relative military strength and ability to escalate a conflict.[81] Information on the types of arms used in a conflict provides a way to differentiate between the parties to the conflict with regard to the weaponry employed, which in turn can provide information on the types of unit on the ground and the differences in the armed actors' military capabilities. Such information can also provide indications on the duration of a conflict,[82] the tactics, or the type of conflict that is likely to occur.[83] The presence of new weapons can signal new capabilities or alliances, which in turn may mean a change in the balance of power or ability to escalate a conflict.[84] Assessing the types of conventional arms used requires considering the availability of the weapons (Risk Factor 1.1) as well as their location and use in a conflict (Risk Factor 3.4). A basic understanding of the capabilities of the weapons deployed can support analysts in considering possible trends in terms of battlefield advantage and intensity of conflict, as well as indicate potential external suppliers.

RISK POINT 3.2.1: TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS PRESENT IN COUNTRY

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Presence of different types of conventional arms in country	Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against baseline) of different types and categories of major conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons and corresponding ammunition.[85]
	Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against baseline) of weapons prohibited or banned by international humanitarian law (e.g. cluster munitions or mines).
	Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against baseline) of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
	Assessing the level of sophistication (against baseline) of IEDs and the manufacture of IEDs (knowledge and training are needed to manufacture sophisticated IEDs).
	Presence and use (increase or decrease) of dual-use vehicles (i.e. "technicals") or other dual-use goods and items.
	Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against baseline) of specific types of armed uncrewed aerial systems.

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81   This is, however, only one measure of military capacity and may vary according to the generation of equipment deployed. Other measures may, for instance, touch on force capability, structure or readiness.

82   Armed actors that use a mix of different arms (e.g. mechanized infantry, armour and aircraft) make short conflicts more likely. This relationship was shown to apply equally to insurgencies. See Caverley and Sechser (2017).

83   For instance, an insurgency with access to small arms and light weapons facing an organized force with a full range of conventional weapons is more likely to engage in unconventional warfare. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2021, 223).

84   Forestier-Walker (2020).

85   The glossary (Annex B) lists the major categories of conventional arms.

a) Presence of different types of conventional arms in country (cont.)	Reporting on the use (increase or decrease against baseline) of industrial versus artisanal production of weapons.
	Evidence of the use (increase or decrease against baseline) of less or non-lethal equipment.
	Monitoring on the reported sighting and/or use of particular weapons.
	Assessment of government records of firearms and ammunition seized in situations of armed conflict through the review of existing databases.
b) Order of battle assessment	Analysis and categorization of military units by echelon, type and equipment to provide information on the types of equipment that may be used by the units present in a conflict area.

Other considerations

- The presence or use of new types of weapon can signal a new supply or new alliances with groups that have access to and knowledge of how to deploy new weapons platforms.[86] This can result in changes in the balance of power on a battlefield as one side benefits from more modern or more powerful weapons, potentially providing that party with an incentive to seek an armed solution, as the more powerful weapons reduce the potential cost to them of going to war by increasing their chances of victory.

- The availability of different types of weapon also provides armed actors with more options for their use. Well-resourced or supported actors may have access to specialized weaponry that may, for instance, allow for more precision when it comes to targeting. Armed groups with fewer resources have little choice but to use the most easily available, usually less sophisticated, weapons.

- Certain weapons, means and methods of warfare are prohibited.[87] Assessing a conflict party's use of weapons and tactics can therefore provide a measure of that party's ability or willingness to adhere to international humanitarian law.

- Information on the types of weapons present in a conflict setting can be used by prevention actors to consider options such as sectoral ceasefires, which may seek to limit the use of certain types or categories of weapons or engage with armed actors to uphold international humanitarian law and the use of proscribed weapons.[88] As a part of more formal ceasefire discussions, information on the types of weapons present can provide a baseline from which to verify a declaration of forces by the parties.

- Changes in the deployment of weapons by conflict parties may indicate a change in the intensity of conflict in that location as certain types of weapons may be used for offensive manoeuvres and others may be more suited to occupation of existing territory. Likewise, monitoring the deployment of weapons may provide information on the conflict party's intentions. Weapons may be redeployed in anticipation of or response to violence (opening of new fronts, attempts to take new territory or protect existing territory from attack) or, for instance, away from a front line in accordance with provisions for disengagement as a part of a ceasefire.

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86   See ICRC (2021).

87   "The requirement that the legality of all new weapons, means and methods of warfare be systematically assessed is arguably one that applies to *all* States, regardless of whether or not they are party to Additional Protocol I. It flows logically from the truism that States are prohibited from using illegal weapons, means and methods of warfare or from using weapons, means and methods of warfare in an illegal manner." ICRC (2006).

88   See ICRC (2018).

RISK FACTOR 3.3: WHO IS USING THE WEAPONS

To know with which entities one should engage for prevention efforts, it is essential to understand who the parties to an armed conflict are. Knowing who holds weapons and is using them[89] can support the identification of the parties to a conflict (this may include State forces, non-State armed groups, militia and paramilitary groups, or criminal gangs). This includes not only those with weapons but potential allies who may be providing them with arms and ammunition (see also Risk Area 2). Contemporary conflict settings feature both State and non-State armed groups (rebel groups, militias, community-based armed groups and criminal networks). Effective arms control and conflict prevention therefore depends not just on the identification and cooperation of States and local governments but also on the successful engagement of non-State actors. Understanding the levels of cohesion of the armed actors present in a conflict also supports arms control programming. It is important for analysts to understand the risk that these armed actors could splinter, resulting in the formation of new armed groups.

RISK POINT 3.3.1: ARMED ACTORS AND THEIR LEVELS OF COHESION

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Identification of armed actors present in a country[90]	Conflict party analysis, including analysis on gendered division of roles in a conflict party and narratives towards people of all gender identities and different ages.
b) Command and control and levels of cohesion of armed actors[91]	Contextual analysis looking at historic evidence of a conflict party's ability to exercise command and control (vertical cohesion) over its troops. This is weak when leaders cannot control their fighters and strong when they can.
	Degree of unity among leaders (horizontal cohesion). This is weak when leadership includes competing and disjointed factions and strong when leaders have consensus over goals and are coordinated in action.
	Size of the group. Larger rebel movements with intra-organizational diversity may be less unified than smaller groups.
	Historical analysis looking at patterns of alliance building and breaking by armed actors.
	Level of access to weapons: increased access allows subsets of large movements to arm themselves and act independently, potentially facilitating the splintering of armed groups.

89   Conflict analysis usually involves an assessment of the actors and their competing interests and motivations, which can help explain why they hold weapons, although not necessarily where they obtain them from or how they deploy and use them.

90   This should include actors or parties directly involved in a conflict and armed actors that are not currently conflict parties but that are present and could join the conflict.

91   Weak cohesion within nonstate armed groups (NSAGs) has often threatened to undermine negotiated transitions from conflict. This can have an impact at any time—when parties are deciding on whether to join a process, during negotiation of peace agreements, and into implementation. [This also applies to State actors.]

RISK POINT 3.3.2: SUPPLY AND CONTROL OF ARMS BY AND FOR CONFLICT ACTORS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Weapons supply routes for armed actors	Contextual analysis looking at prior external support to conflict actors, including sources of supply of arms and ammunition. Changes in external support may increase or decrease the ability of parties to engage in the conflict and affect their willingness to seek a mediated solution.[92] See Risk Point 2.1.2.
	Analysis of armed actors' alliances that may support the transfer between armed groups of weapons and knowledge on how to use them.
b) Ownership or control of weapons within an armed conflict party	Information and analysis on internal control over weapons. Strong hierarchical control of weapons (controlled or owned by the group) can support arms control initiatives; individual control or ownership of weapons can make arms control initiatives more difficult to institute.
	Analysis of weapons per combatant ratios within armed movements to support an understanding of the weapons holdings of armed actors and provide a baseline for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration or similar initiatives. See Risk Point 4.4.1.
c) Arms storage and management	Analysis of armed actors' ability to control territory, including vulnerability to air raids or other attacks: high levels of control or low levels of vulnerability support the development of secure stockpiles and facilities; low levels of control or high levels of vulnerability limit the development of secure stockpiles and facilities.
	Analysis of size and types of deployments: larger deployments facilitate robust and centralized arms and ammunition management practices and facilities; smaller, temporary deployments (including caches) limit arms control practices.

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92   The withdrawal of military support has been shown to push parties to enter into a peace process (Lindberg et al., 2011, 36); however, the diversification of supply chains can reduce the effect of such a withdrawal of support.

Other considerations

- Conflicts with multiple groups tend to be more intense and last longer, suggesting that they are harder to settle and that it is harder to implement a settlement once one is reached as there are more actors to be disarmed and the possibility of splintering is higher. In such a context, managing weapons becomes both more important and more difficult.

- Armed groups have distinct patterns of internal weapons distribution depending on their organization. In conflicts with multiple, decentralized non-State actors, their weapons stocks will likely also be decentralized, and command and control (including on the ownership and use of weapons) may be hard to impose. This makes identifying and accounting for weapons difficult and creates logistical challenges for collection. Decentralized groups also usually have decentralized weapons stocks and may find it hard to apply good practices in weapons and ammunition management.

- Centralized armed groups rely on clearly established rules and values, which are likely to be imparted to the rank and file through indoctrination and training.[93] Their hierarchy allows for a top-down approach, including on arms control as part of ceasefires and on the final peace agreements facilitating arms control and disarmament. This control can extend to internal arms and ammunition management practices and facilities as it allows for clear procedures for such practices and for the development of secure stockpiles and facilities.

- Understanding the level of cohesion of armed movements can help in assessing the possibility that they will splinter as they engage in prevention efforts that may not be well received by all parts of the armed group. This may result in factions of groups that continue to fight and/or a shift in the group's positions as new leadership emerges. An armed group's ability to exercise command and control over troops can also have implications for their ability to deliver on any engagement the leadership makes.

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93   ICRC (2018, 23).

RISK FACTOR 3.4: WHERE (IN WHICH REGIONS AND AREAS) CONVENTIONAL ARMS ARE BEING USED

The regions or areas in which conventional arms are used during a conflict can support peace efforts by, for instance, providing a basis for ceasefire negotiations. Whereas arms proliferation analysts more generally look at the number of weapons entering into a conflict and how those weapons affect the intensity or likelihood of a conflict, the analysis of geographic distribution of weapons used *within* a conflict can support the identification of hotspots – areas of particular tension – and provide a basis for where to focus efforts for de-escalation. These efforts can form the basis for geographic ceasefires that take place in a geographically limited area, such as a region, operational front or city. These ceasefires may be instituted for various reasons, including to test goodwill, test a model, address specific hotspots, de-escalate conflict in a location, build trust and protect populations.

RISK POINT 3.4.1: TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF WEAPONS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) How areas of control of armed movements may influence a conflict	Mapping of where armed groups are located and in which areas they can be said to be responsible for violence.
	Assessment of whether there are interfaces with areas of control of other armed actors that may create flashpoints and increase the risk of conflict.
	Assessment of whether the control of territory facilitates the group's ability to obtain weapons, for example by providing access to borders, transport infrastructure or resources with which to purchase weapons. See Risk Points 2.3.1(b) and 2.3.1(c).
	Mapping of changes in areas of control that may reflect a change in the balance of power between armed movements, or access to new resources or channels for weapons acquisition as territory changes hands.
	Identification of areas or locations that are or are likely to be the target of fighting (e.g. towns, critical infrastructure and areas rich in natural resources).
b) How military goals or incidents are shaped by the location in which they are occurring (terrain and tactics)	Analysis of how environmental factors including topography, climate and specific weather events may influence armed actors' ability to store, manage and deploy and/or use weapons.[94] See also Risk Point 3.4.1(c).

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94   For instance, steep terrain may constrain the use of certain usually heavier conventional arms, rainy seasons may make movement of troops and equipment difficult or influence the storage of weapons and ammunition, and dense forest canopy may hinder the use of aerial surveillance or bombardment, while also allowing for the establishment of larger arms depots that would otherwise be vulnerable to aerial attack.

c) Control of territory and deployment of troops and equipment	Assessment of whether the ability to control territory allows armed groups to organize and sustain themselves, for example by raising funds with which to purchase arms and ammunition; establish camps, arms depots (see also Risk Point 3.3.2(c)) and training centres for recruits; or use heavier weaponry.
	Assessment of whether territorial control allows armed actors to increase their armed capabilities by attracting more recruits and holding safe areas from which to launch more deadly attacks.
	Tracking the deployment of weapons in a group's areas of control to support an understanding of their military intentions, for instance where they may be seeking to concentrate their strength for an offensive.
	Analysis of changes in areas of control that can result in changes in tactics, for example use of heavier or more conventional weapons as groups control more territory, or use of improvised explosive devices and more indiscriminate weapons as control of territory weakens.

Other considerations

- Most conflicts involve contestation over territory as a conflict driver. In some conflicts, as actors move to fight along new fronts, the original locations see a de-escalation in violence, while previously unaffected areas experience increased violence. This occurs as weapons and combatants are redirected to new fronts or locations, resulting in a reduction in the intensity of violence in the areas the weapons have been moved from. Violence can also expand to new locations, with the original areas not seeing a reduction in violence. This is more common where armed groups rely on violence to extract resources within the territory they control, resulting in violence behind front lines in the original areas of control.[95]

- An understanding of the types of weapons held by conflict parties, and where they are located, can support peace efforts by providing a basis for ceasefire negotiations. This information is key to the cessation of hostilities and ceasefires, which are built around the control of weapons and putting them beyond use, often first through disengaging them and then removing them altogether from the battlefield.

- Information on the types of weapon present and where they are deployed can also support in the identification of hotspots – areas of tension, providing information on where to focus efforts for de-escalation. This information can form the basis for ceasefires that take place in a geographically limited area such as a region, operational front or city. Such ceasefires may be instituted for various reasons, including to test goodwill or to address specific hotspots, de-escalate conflict in a location, build trust or protect populations.

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95   See Schutte and Weidmann (2011).

Risk Area 4:
Use and management of conventional arms after a conflict

Close to half of all conflicts between 1989 and 2018 have recurred, with 20% recurring three or more times.[96] Significant stocks of poorly managed arms and/or the illicit recirculation of legacy arms and remnants of conflict provide a readily and easily available resource for a group seeking to start or resume an armed conflict. The use of arms, however, also occurs outside of conflict, including in post-conflict settings. Around 82% of firearms-related deaths globally occur outside of battlefields.[97] This violence may take many forms, and the changing nature of armed movements has blurred the line between armed conflict and crime, and between politically motivated and economically motivated violence. High levels of armed violence in a post-conflict setting can negatively impact a peace process and contribute to a relapse into conflict; they can also undermine economic recovery, drain State resources, spark retaliatory cycles of violence, and create fear and mistrust among the population, thus fuelling the grievances and fragilities that often underlie violent conflict.[98] The use and management of arms and ammunition remain key factors in the continuation of armed violence, whatever its form, and this section examines five Risk Factors related to the management of arms and ammunition after a conflict as a measure of reducing armed violence.

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 4

RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT

Risk Factor	Risk Point
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict	4.1.1: Modalities for ending the conflict
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings	4.2.1: Scope and intensity of post-conflict armed violence
	4.2.2: Perpetrators and targets of armed violence
	4.2.3: Responses to armed violence
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence	4.3.1: Type of conventional arms
	4.3.2: Types and nature of armed incidents
4.4: Managing the current and former armed actors and their weapons	4.4.1: Signatory State and non-State parties
	4.4.2: Non-signatory parties

96 Jarland et al. (2020).

97 Direct conflict deaths accounted for 18% of all violent deaths in 2016, a confirmation that a large majority of victims of lethal violence continue to lose their lives off the battlefield. Small Arms Survey (2017).

98 World Bank (2011, 35).

4.4: Managing the current and former armed actors and their weapons (cont.)	4.4.3: State-sponsored or other armed actors
	4.4.4: Informal security providers and redeployment of State security providers
	4.4.5: Improved use and management of arms and ammunition held by the security forces
	4.4.6: Arms caches and residual weapons
	4.4.7: Civilian arms control programming
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence	4.5.1 Geographic mapping of armed violence
	4.5.2: Targets of armed violence

RISK FACTOR 4.1: MODALITIES FOR ENDING THE CONFLICT

The manner in which a conflict ends may have a strong influence on whether it will reoccur or whether a new conflict may take place in the same area. The nature of the agreement and whether it is comprehensive and addresses the underlying reasons why conflict actors took up arms may be a factor and "a majority of recurring conflict episodes are over the same (64 percent) or overlapping issues or grievances (27 percent)".[99] Likewise, the inclusivity of an agreement will signal whether there remain conflict actors who are not part of the process and who may continue fighting despite the signature of a peace agreement. This may stretch to other parts of society who, if excluded from negotiations, may be motivated to turn to violence to ensure their inclusion in the peace process and the achievement of their goals.

RISK POINT 4.1.1: MODALITIES FOR ENDING THE CONFLICT

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Modalities for ending the conflict	Assessment of the implications of the means of ending the conflict – clear victory by one side, negotiated settlement, imposed peace by outside actors – on the sustainability of peace.[100]
	Assessment of the scope of the political agreement. A comprehensive agreement that addresses the underlying grievances of the armed movements may be more sustainable than a "stand-alone" preliminary ceasefire that only seeks to stop the fighting without addressing the causes for it.[101]

99   Jarland et al. (2020).

100   "Intrastate conflicts are less likely to recur after government victories or after the deployment of peacekeepers." Kreutz (2012, 26).

101   Preliminary ceasefires and comprehensive peace agreements are not mutually exclusive, and the former may often be instituted to allow for a de-escalation in tensions while a comprehensive agreement is negotiated.

	Number of armed actors: the higher the number of armed actors involved in a conflict, the more difficult the implementation of the agreement may be and the more likely it is that these groups could splinter and return to conflict.[102]
	Level of inclusivity of the peace process: the exclusion of certain armed actors from, or their refusal to join, the peace process indicates that those actors will continue the armed conflict.
b) Inclusivity of a peace process or agreement	Level of cohesion of the signatory parties and likelihood that the parties may splinter into factions of those who support the peace process and those who are opposed to it. See Risk Point 3.3.1.
	Exclusion from the process of certain groups or segments of society. This can signal the formation of new armed movements aligned to these excluded actors if they feel the only way they will be given a role in or benefit from the peace process is if they take up arms.
	Meaningful participation in the peace process of people of all genders and different ages. Agreements reached after a negotiation process that includes meaningful participation of women, youth and people of different gender identities are more likely to hold because they include a more representative reflection of society.[103]

Other considerations

- A society that has experienced armed conflict is more likely to experience continued violence based on the outcome of that conflict. This includes, for example, which faction or actors prevailed (such as opposition groups or rebels, or the government in power) and whether the previous conflict was concluded with a negotiated settlement or a definitive victory by one of the sides in that conflict.

- The nature of armed violence often changes after a conflict, as the end of a conflict can lead to shifts in the balance of power. This shift in the balance of power may be linked to the outcome of the conflict (one clear winner able to dictate their terms or a negotiated settlement where some parties may feel excluded) as well as to efforts to manage armed forces after a conflict, such as through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), which can often be one-sided, leaving one conflict party more vulnerable than another.[104] In some situations, shifts in the balance of power may also be linked to the political economy of war, where the economic basis on which armed groups are formed continues to act as a factor for maintaining the group post-conflict and the organization shifts into the criminal realm.

- The failure by a State to reassert control over weapons in its territory may damage its legitimacy, and high levels of armed crime may reduce general support for a peace process. Moreover, what starts out as non-political crime can soon be met with a vigilante-style response, leading to organized centres of violence. Such situations can develop with the politicization of the groups involved and the outbreak of civil war. The reassertion of control over weapons is thus an important component of peacebuilding.[105]

- Organized violence targeting civilians predominantly takes place in the context of intra-State conflict.[106] Whereas conflicts between signatories may be addressed through a peace agreement or ceasefire, violence against civilians (or between armed groups) may continue. Therefore, even when intra-State conflicts end – temporarily or permanently – armed violence involving these groups may continue.

102   See Kreutz (2012, 23).

103   Security Council resolution 1325 on Women and Peace and Security, adopted in 2000, was the first resolution to link women to peace and security, acknowledging that armed conflicts impact women and girls differently from men and boys. The subsequent resolutions urge mediators to have women and women's civil society organizations effectively represented in peace processes and institutions and to ensure adequate protection and funding for their needs. See UN DPA (2017).

104   See IDDRS 2.20 (2019a).

105   Kreutz et al. (2011).

106   Jarland et al. (2020).

RISK FACTOR 4.2: USE OF ARMS IN POST-CONFLICT SETTINGS

Peace agreements can bring a formal end to a conflict, but this does not mean that they will address all forms of armed violence. In post-conflict settings, the nature of violence often changes; for example, violence often transforms from organized conflict between recognized parties into other forms of armed violence – such as political violence, disorganized criminal violence or gang-related turf wars – or to land disputes or communal tensions turning lethal. Morphed violence may involve some of the same actors as in the conflict as well as new groups, sometimes spun off from conflict actors (such as breakaway or dissident factions, or the shift of armed movements into criminal activities), or armed individuals in contravention of the law. It may also change in intensity or shift location (see Risk Factor 4.5). It is often facilitated and intensified by the availability of conventional arms used during the conflict, for instance by the diffusion of military weapons into the hands of criminal groups. The perpetrators and targets of violence may also shift as the armed structures and their motivations change, with some targets being considered more political – and therefore more likely to signal a return to political conflict – and others more criminal, resulting in different types of arms-related instability. Furthermore, State responses to post-conflict armed violence can manage or aggravate the situation. For example, armed violence tends to be characterized by vicious cycles of retribution. Such cyclical dynamics thrive in the absence of effective justice systems, which should provide closure, resolve disputes and bring perpetrators to account. Effective justice systems that reduce impunity can help consolidate peace; however, heavy-handed State response to violence can undermine the population's confidence in government structures.

RISK POINT 4.2.1: SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF POST-CONFLICT ARMED VIOLENCE

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Political violence	Number of incidents of political assassination or attempted political assassination, disaggregated by gender: higher numbers represent higher levels of political violence and a sustained campaign to use violence to effect political change.
	Number killed or wounded in political assassinations or attempted political assassinations, disaggregated by gender: higher numbers represent higher levels of political violence and a sustained campaign to use violence to effect political change.
	Number of attacks on State military, police, paramilitary and intelligence targets by new armed groups: higher numbers represent higher levels of political violence and a sustained campaign to use violence to effect political change.
	Number killed or wounded in attacks on State military, police, paramilitary and intelligence targets, disaggregated by gender, where possible by new armed groups that may indicate a change in the armed actors.

a) Political violence (cont.)	Number of violent political demonstrations or protests in which conventional arms are used and/or present, which provides information on the type of arms available and signals a willingness to use them.
	Estimated number of participants in violent political demonstrations or protests in which conventional arms are used and/or present, which can support an assessment of the levels of discontent and strength of the political opposition.
	Number of incidents where the government used repression or violence against participants in the event: higher levels of repression may reduce government legitimacy and fuel more extreme responses by opposition actors.
	Number killed or wounded by conventional arms in situations where the government used repression or violence against participants in the event.
	Evidence of incidents in which the threat of violence is used for political purposes.
	Evidence of violent clashes between two or more non-State groups.
	Number and type of terrorist acts or attacks involving conventional arms.
b) State violence	Reporting on summary executions or extrajudicial killings, which indicate the acceptability of violence within State institutions (this may be tacit and possibly linked to militarization or part of a directed campaign).
	Civil rights violations by security forces, including unlawful use of deadly force.
	Reporting on attacks against civilians (including demobilized combatants) by military, paramilitary, police or other State security forces.
	Reporting on death squads within State security forces.
	Existence and application of rules and regulations on the use of force and firearms against persons by law enforcement officials as a benchmark to measure excessive use of force and firearms.
	Levels of use of force and firearms in the dispersal of assemblies, whether lawful or unlawful, that are non-violent.
	Existence of legislation to punish as a criminal offence the arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials.

b) State violence (cont.)	Number of convictions of law enforcement officials under laws to punish as a criminal offence the arbitrary or abusive use of force and firearms.
	Perceptions of government legitimacy among the population or segments of the population, disaggregated by gender and age.
c) Criminal armed violence	Number of firearms-related homicides per 100,000 population, disaggregated by gender and age.
	Presence of an effective criminal justice response to armed violence, as measured by the number of persons arrested, prosecuted, convicted and sentenced for crimes involving arms. Alternatively, rate of firearms-related crimes remaining unresolved, with no perpetrator brought to account.
	Increasing or decreasing number of illicit firearms and ammunition seizures reported by law enforcement. Alternatively, as a measure of illicit arms flows, increasing or decreasing prices of firearms and ammunition on the black market.
d) Number of armed incidents per location	Increase or decrease in the number of armed incidents in a particular location or region: an increase in incidents involving arms signals a higher intensity of violence; a decrease in incidents involving arms signals a lower intensity of violence.

RISK POINT 4.2.2: PERPETRATORS AND TARGETS OF ARMED VIOLENCE

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Perpetrators and targets	Reporting on the social, political or identity group (i.e. actor, perpetrator or victim) of armed violence, disaggregated by gender and age.
	Reporting on the proportion and relationship between perpetrators and victims (i.e. is one group targeting another group disproportionally?).
	Reporting on levels of violence against women and, where possible, the types of weapon used.
	Reporting on the State or other institutions or entities targeted (e.g. central, regional, provincial or local government or institutions linked to political opposition).
	Reporting of attacks on demobilized combatants. A higher number of attacks or other security concerns may provide ex-combatants with incentives to remobilize.

RISK POINT 4.2.3: RESPONSES TO ARMED VIOLENCE

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Government actions	Establishment and progress in weapons collection programmes targeting weapons that have been held by former combatants (weapons amnesties, voluntary collections, weapons-for-development initiatives, gun-free zones and other efforts to put guns beyond use).
	Government strategies designed to reduce armed violence, with rigorous success criteria and regular impact evaluations.
	The creation or empowerment of a firearms focal point or gun crime centre devoted to understanding, resolving and preventing incidents of armed violence. Similarly, appropriately staffed, funded and empowered government structures (i.e. agencies, task force) designed to combat armed violence, with rigorous success criteria and regular impact evaluations.
	Rise in vigilante, paramilitary or law enforcement agencies operating on the margins of the law. Unlawful responses to armed violence, whether by the State or permitted by inaction from the State, yield counterproductive results.
	Perceptions of public security and perceptions of government effectiveness.

Other considerations

- Crime is a particularly difficult aspect to address in conflict prevention and management. In many cases, criminal violence falls outside conflict resolution efforts, and the separation made between conflict and crime means that criminal actors who may have played a critical role in a conflict are left out of conflict resolution efforts or that the criminal aspects of armed factions, and the concerns these actors may have about criminal activities (which can include concerns about legal pursuits or the need to continue criminal activities to raise funds and maintain payrolls), are often not included in the peace effort. This leaves few alternatives to violent criminal organizations in the post-war period.

RISK FACTOR 4.3: TYPES OF ARMS AND ARMED VIOLENCE

Armed violence is often transformed in post-conflict situations as it changes from conflict-related to political or criminal violence. Whereas the latter may destabilize a post-conflict setting, it is political violence that is more likely to signal a return to armed conflict as parties continue to deploy armed violence to both signal and achieve political goals. The types of arms involved in post-conflict armed violence may indicate the different channels of illicit arms (such as military arms left over from the conflict or civilian weapons, which are less likely to be related to the stocks or caches from the conflict). Likewise, the way these weapons are deployed or used may indicate the intent of the armed actors as well as their level of sophistication and ability to destabilize a fragile post-conflict situation. These motivations may further be assessed through statements put out by the perpetrators or an analysis of the targets or victims, which provide information on the intent of the armed group or the motivation behind the use of armed violence.

RISK POINT 4.3.1: TYPES OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Types of conventional arms used in post-conflict armed violence	Assessment and trend analysis of the type (e.g. civilian arms or military weapons) and calibre of weapons involved (small arms and light weapons or larger). See Risk Areas 2 and 3.
	Analysis of recovered and traced firearms to determine their last known legal owner. Tracing efforts will inform authorities of the possible origin of the diversion. See Risk Factor 1.1.
	Analysis of an ammunition profiling study to determine trends and patterns in the use of ammunition and discover any new inflows of previously unseen brands or types of ammunition.
	Analysis of the use of explosives, including improvised explosive devices, to determine the perpetrators behind the attack and the sources of the explosives used.

RISK POINT 4.3.2: TYPES AND NATURE OF ARMED INCIDENTS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Types of armed incidents	Analysis of the types of armed incidents to inform the use of tactics or the motivations for armed violence.
	Rise in incidents of robberies, home invasions or "common crime" involving an armed perpetrator and/or illicit discharges. This indicator could be compared against previous documented cases of the same type of criminal activity to gauge if there has been an increase in the level of violence.

b) Nature or complexity of the incidents involved	Assessment of the sophistication and ability to deploy weapons platforms, which may indicate the armed groups' or individuals' strength, ability to intensify violence and knowledge of how to effectively use weapons, including the deployment of complex attacks and the use of grenades.
	Frequency of armed incidents to determine if they are isolated incidents or part of a sustained campaign.
	Assessment of the number of persons involved or the level of target, disaggregated by gender and age.
	Type of target – soft or hard – and result of the attack, which may reveal information on the motivation and ability of an armed movement.
c) Motivation behind incidents of violence	Claims by armed groups or movements following an incident.
	Analysis of the expected reason for violence – for example, to show presence; to obtain weapons, ammunition or other equipment; or to seize property or claim territory.
	Target of armed violence – for example, State security forces, a segment of the population, or other armed gangs or groups – which may help assess the reason behind an armed incident and the nature of the violence (political or criminal). See also Risk Point 4.5.2.
	Mapping of exacerbating or conflating dynamics (alcohol, late hours, gender norms and violent masculinities, economic gains, etc.) behind incidents of armed violence.
	Analysis of the socioeconomic situation of perpetrators of armed violence.

Other considerations

- The type of weapons used in post-conflict settings can provide information on the success of the efforts to manage weapons as well as on the nature of the movements. Non-regularized weapons and caches from ex-combatants remaining in their possession after a demobilization process without authorization are often a source of post-conflict armed violence or secondary diversion into other unauthorized hands.[107] As such, systematic tracing efforts could provide information on whether the weapons present in local crimes or neighbouring communities could have recirculated from a determined conflict. In addition, systematic diversion monitoring efforts could shed light on the origin or last legal owner of the diverted arms and related items.

- Ammunition is the oxygen of armed violence. Ammunition is a consumable item that must be replenished once used, as opposed to arms, which are not consumable and are reused over time. As such, restricting the flow of ammunition can have an immediate impact in reducing lethal outcomes (without ammunition, firearms are only instruments of coercion or blunt force). In addition, calibres are also an important, but often overlooked, consideration. Simply put, the higher the calibre the more lethal a shooting can be. It is thus crucial to monitor firepower capabilities and revise regulations that permit unrestricted access to ammunition. The availability of ammunition of a specific calibre is also important when considering that different types of weapon can only be used with certain calibres of ammunition.

- Armed violence is multicausal. As such, it should be understood as part of the larger societal context and analysed in conjunction with other dynamics, including prevailing gender norms, that may enable, facilitate or exacerbate lethal outcomes. It is therefore important to consider weapons as instruments of violence while not losing sight of the enabling factors that lead to the final shooting scene.

107   See Project Divert of the Flemish Peace Institute: https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en/divert

RISK FACTOR 4.4: MANAGING CURRENT AND FORMER ARMED ACTORS AND THEIR WEAPONS

The presence of large stocks of uncontrolled weapons can support a return to conflict or to regional instability as they move across borders and fuel instability elsewhere. Weapons belonging to signatory armed groups after a conflict are usually managed through two processes: final cease-fires and the disarmament component of a DDR programme. Studies have shown that without DDR there are large groups of former fighters still tied into organized structures and therefore easily able to be mobilized and armed if there is an abundance of readily available arms in the society.[108] Such conditions are likely to result in a rapid recurrence of conflict and may be aggravated by uneven or scarce post-demobilization economic opportunities. Post-conflict arms control, however, is often applied to a limited number of parties to a conflict, usually the signatory armed opposition or rebel movements, whereas it is important to consider the weapons of all armed actors, including signatory non-State armed groups, non-signatory movements, militias and paramilitary groups, State security forces and informal security providers. For example, the presence of militias and paramilitary groups can make a conflict last longer, produce increased levels of violence[109] and make the post-conflict period more volatile;[110] however, such groups may not be included in peace processes and may be excluded from measures to disarm and demobilize or dismantle armed groups. This results in large bodies of armed persons, often in diffuse locations and with weak command and control, still present in post-conflict contexts, representing a threat to the peace process and the possibility that they will involve themselves in political or criminal armed activities.

RISK POINT 4.4.1: SIGNATORY STATE AND NON-STATE PARTIES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Identification of parties to a peace process or signatory parties to a peace agreement	Incident, evidence or existence of a peace process.
	Review of peace agreements to establish signatory groups.[111]
	Monitoring of public declarations of armed movements to assess their position vis-à-vis the peace agreement.
	Incident tracking disaggregated by armed group.
b) Provisions on arms control or disarmament in the peace agreement	Assessment of provisions on arms control or disarmament in the peace agreement.
	Assessment of the implementation of provisions on arms control or disarmament in the peace agreement.

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108   Kreutz et al. (2011).

109   Although they possess only a small proportion of the world's small arms, because paramilitary groups and militias typically use their weapons in ambushes, surprise attacks and against "soft" targets, their "arsenals tend to be far more deadly and destructive" than those of their government adversaries. Small Arms Survey (2001, 77).

110   Day (2020, 3).

111   See also Risk Points 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 to assess the cohesion of armed movements and their control of weapons to support an assessment of the likelihood that the movement will fracture or how well it may manage to control arms in a peace process or post-conflict setting.

c) Inclusion of clauses in peace agreements on the need to disarm or disband armed groups	Assessment of peace agreements to assess the inclusion of clauses on the need to disarm or disband armed groups.
	Level of inclusion of the agreement: Does it include all armed actors or only some?
	Monitoring of the implementation of clauses on arms control or disarmament of armed groups.
d) Implementation of arms control or disarmament activities	Programme reporting on the number of weapons handed in as part of a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process, disaggregated by group or party to the conflict.
	Programme reporting on the number of weapons collected as part of a DDR programme that have been destroyed.
	Physical characteristics of arms collected or surrendered (old or new compared with baseline information on armed groups' previous holdings).
	Programme reporting on the number of combatants disarmed and demobilized who have entered reintegration programmes, disaggregated by group or party to the conflict, gender, and age.
	Programme reporting on the number of child soldiers released and reintegrated, disaggregated by gender and age.
	Ratio of arms to combatants. In the disarmament component of a DDR effort, the ratio of arms to combatants compared with previous ratios, should be informative if the current process is in line with documented experiences.
	Programme reporting on number of weapons surrendered pre-DDR and community violence reduction.
	Reporting on former combatants involved in armed violence, which would indicate whether they still have access to arms and ammunition.
e) Movement of conventional arms and combatants to other theatres	Reporting on the movement of conventional arms and combatants to other countries experiencing conflict or high levels of armed violence.
f) Monitoring of former fighters and their weapons	Economic opportunities and/or levels of formal employment of former fighters. Alternatively, evidence of former fighters participating in reintegration schemes to gain market skills.
	Reports of former fighters involved in criminal violence and/or gender-based violence, including domestic violence and violence against women, with firearms.

f) Monitoring of former fighters and their weapons (cont.)	Reports of former fighters joining other violent organizations and/or migrating to areas controlled by rebels to the peace agreement.
	Military or law enforcement reports of hidden armed caches or former fighters caught illicitly armed.
	Analysis of recovered and traced weapons seized from former fighters to determine if their weapons are remnants of the conflict or newly acquired.

RISK POINT 4.4.2: NON-SIGNATORY PARTIES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Identification of holdout armed movements or non-signatory parties to a peace agreement	Reporting on the peace process.
	Review of peace agreements to establish the non-signatory groups.
	Monitoring of public declarations of armed movements.
	Incident tracking involving non-signatory parties, disaggregated by armed group.
	Estimate of the ratio of arms per combatant in the non-signatory group.

RISK POINT 4.4.3: STATE-SPONSORED OR OTHER ARMED ACTORS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Identification of State-sponsored or other militia and paramilitary groups	Armed actor analysis that includes militia and paramilitary groups.
b) Provisions on arms control or disarmament of militias in peace agreements	Review of peace agreements for provisions on arms control or disarmament of militias.
	Review of the implementation of provisions on arms control or disarmament of militias in peace agreements.
c) Inclusion of clauses on the need to disarm or disband militias or other allied movements in peace agreements	Review of peace agreements for provisions on disarmament of militias or other armed groups associated with signatory parties.
	Monitoring of implementation of provisions on disarmament of militias or other armed groups associated with signatory parties.

d) Establishment of programmes to manage and collect the weapons of militias and other non-signatory groups	Establishment of a national policy and programme, as well as capacity, to manage and collect weapons of militias and other non-signatory groups.
	Number of weapons collected through programmes to disarm and dismantle militias and paramilitary groups.
	Programme reporting on the number of weapons collected as part of programmes to disarm and dismantle militias and paramilitary groups that have been destroyed.
	Number of incidents of armed violence attributed to militias and paramilitary groups.

RISK POINT 4.4.4: INFORMAL SECURITY PROVIDERS AND REDEPLOYMENT OF STATE SECURITY PROVIDERS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Identification of informal security providers	Armed actor analysis that includes informal security providers.
b) Peace agreements stipulate the demobilization of certain State forces or, where appropriate, their demilitarization	Review of peace agreements for clauses on the disarmament or control of State security forces.
	Monitoring of the implementation of clauses on the disarmament or control of State security forces.
c) Peace agreements include clauses on the agreed security providers post-conflict and on their redeployment throughout national territory	Review of peace agreements for clauses on the interim and final security arrangements.
	Monitoring of the implementation of clauses on the interim and final security arrangements.

RISK POINT 4.4.5: IMPROVED USE AND MANAGEMENT OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION HELD BY THE SECURITY FORCES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Security sector governance and reform initiatives are instigated, which include the training of State security forces in the appropriate use of firearms (encompassing respect for human rights and non-lethal crowd control)	Inclusion of training of State security forces in the appropriate use of firearms in security sector governance and reform programmes.
	Existence and application of rules and regulations on the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials. See also Risk Point 4.2.1(b).

| b) Armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold conventional arms establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks | Effective stockpile management measures. See Risk Point 5.2.3. |
| | Establishment of programmes for responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of surplus conventional weapons, and adequate safeguarding of these stocks until disposal, in line with international standards. See Risk Point 5.2.5. |

RISK POINT 4.4.6: ARMS CACHES AND RESIDUAL WEAPONS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Use of arms caches by signatory parties to hide weapons and ammunition or otherwise prevent them from being handed over	Contextual analysis of any prior history of armed groups maintaining weapons caches during the conflict.
	Review of peace agreements and monitoring of the implementation of clauses on the need for conflict parties to hand over information on arms caches.
	Reporting on the discovery of undeclared arms caches.
b) Operations to mop up residual weapons in the hands of former combatants	Establishment and progress in weapons collection programmes targeting weapons that have been held by former combatants (weapons amnesties, voluntary collections, weapons-for-development initiatives, gun-free zones and other efforts to put guns beyond use).
	Number and condition of illicit weapons, munitions and equipment seized from persons associated with different armed groups.
c) Presence of demining activities to clear mines and explosive remnants of war	Contextual analysis of conflict history and the use of mines, improvised explosive devices and other explosive devices by the conflict parties.
	Requirement to declare minefields in peace agreements.
	Formal square miles demined. It is important to complete a thorough demining process to preserve life and to keep mines that could be misused to fabricate improvised explosive devices from falling into unauthorized hands.

RISK POINT 4.4.7: CIVILIAN ARMS CONTROL PROGRAMMING[112]

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Presence of programmes to encourage citizens to surrender illegal, unsafe or unwanted firearms	Existence of programmes to encourage citizens to surrender illegal, unsafe or unwanted firearms. The existence of such programmes can indicate positive perceptions of security and a willingness to disarm; the lack of such programmes can indicate the need to possess weapons for personal or community safety.
	Number of arms collected from or surrendered by civilians, disaggregated by gender and age, over a specific time period in a defined geographic area: high numbers can indicate a decrease in civilian weapons holdings; low numbers can indicate limited changes in civilian weapons holdings.
	Establishment of clear regulations and guidance for the collection, registration and disposal of arms collected, ensuring transparency and building confidence in the process.
b) Presence of programmes to support the regularization of illicit weapons	Existence of programmes to encourage citizens to regularize illicit firearms by allowing them to register such firearms and facilitate their return to the licit realm. The existence of such programmes can indicate positive perceptions of security and a willingness to control arms.
	Number of arms regularized as the result of an arms regularization programme. This may provide information on the number (estimated range of the problem) and type of illicit arms present in a country.

112 Civilian arms control programming does not only apply to post-conflict settings. For more general considerations on weapons in the hands of civilians, see Risk Factor 2.4.

Other considerations

- Most post-war security processes focus on "politically motivated" armed movements, usually those that have signed a peace agreement. The widespread availability of weapons in post-conflict settings means that DDR processes that only target combatants will not achieve comprehensive disarmament and weapons control.[113] Additional measures are necessary to manage the weapons belonging to other groups.

- Post-conflict disarmament of militias and paramilitary groups can be complicated, as these informal security providers may not be part of a peace agreement and subject to DDR programmes. In cases where a peace process is not inclusive, governments may choose to maintain possibly inflated security structures. Governments may also seek to retain paramilitary groups and militias as they continue to serve a purpose in fighting non-signatory armed groups,[114] or paramiltary groups and militias may keep a role as traditional armed security providers.

- Community-based armed groups, such as vigilantes, militias and criminal gangs, that are embedded within communities and whose delineation can be defined by territory, blood ties or shared identities[115] are more likely to respond to efforts to engage in prevention activities based on a local approach that includes persons of influence within the communities from which the community-based armed groups draw their support.

- Paramilitary groups and militias often form out of intercommunal disputes, which continue to fuel violence well beyond the end of a conflict. Expending resources on conflict resolution can create a helpful feedback loop, reducing tensions and drying up the recruitment opportunities into armed groups.[116]

- High military spending post-conflict may reflect a correct perception of an unusually high risk of further conflict as post-conflict governments that prioritize military spending are inadvertently signaling that they will renege on the peace settlement and those that prioritize social spending are signaling that they will adhere to it. The former signal increases the risk of conflict, while the latter builds private sector confidence and thereby accelerates growth.[117]

- Under the Programme of Action on Small Arms and its International Tracing Instrument,[118] States must ensure that the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold SALW establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons that include appropriate locations for stockpiles, physical stockpiles and security measures, regular review of stocks of SALW held by security forces, and programmes for the responsible disposal of such stocks. (See Risk Area 5.)

- Armed movements and civilians may retain weapons as a means of guarding against violations of an agreement and a resumption of conflict. There is often a requirement to also manage or collect these weapons, for example through searches for arms caches or similar programmes, or to bring them into the legal realm through registration and licensing.

- Civilian arms control programming must include social, political, and economic and gender programming considerations to reduce the perceived or real requirement or motivation for civilian possession of conventional arms. The programming must be implemented in a transparent and inclusive manner that builds trust and confidence in all stakeholders, including people women, girls, boys, men and people of different gender identities, and does not leave communities vulnerable. Understanding why communities are being asked to disarm, how their security will be ensured once this is done and what will happen to the weapons is key to building trust in the process.[119]

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113   A "DDR process will thus not address the problems of an abundance of small arms in post-conflict countries as such, since a large share of those weapons are found among the civilian population." Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006, 15).

114   Day (2020, 20).

115   Schuberth (2015).

116   Day (2020, 23).

117   Day (2020, 23).

118   See Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw/programme-of-action, and International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/salw.

119   De Tessières and Shiotani (2019, 17).

RISK FACTOR 4.5: GEOGRAPHY AND TARGETS OF ARMED VIOLENCE

The changing causes of post-conflict violence can be accompanied by changes in intensity and in the spread of armed violence to new areas.[120] Violence could also morph into hyperconcentrated localized violent incidents, also known as hotspots. It is therefore important to map patterns of armed violence and cross-reference incidents against a spatial analysis so as to determine geographic focus, thematic priorities and entry points for programmatic intervention. Armed violence is often restricted to specific geographic areas of a region, country or municipality, while other areas of a country or city may function normally. A spatial analysis of armed violence may also be matched by the targets of armed violence, which considers the proportion of the population subjected to abuse (such as targeted and selective violence, or indiscriminate abuse).

RISK POINT 4.5.1: GEOGRAPHIC MAPPING OF ARMED VIOLENCE

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Mapping political armed violence	Geographic distribution of incidents of political armed violence.
	Geographic holdouts and rebel-held areas after a peace agreement.
	Geographic distribution of government entities or garrisons targeted by political armed violence.
b) Mapping State armed violence	Regional distribution of levels of State repression or areas with increased presence from the armed forces, national guards or law enforcement.
	Perceptions of the State's presence and effectiveness.
c) Mapping criminal armed violence	Reported alliances between criminal groups and other organized armed actors (insurgencies, rebel groups, etc.).
	Mapping the location of firearms-related fatalities and attempted homicides.
	Mapping the location of criminal firearm discharges and non-lethal incidents involving firearms.
	Levels of gang-related disputes over territory involving firearms.
	Mapping of armed incidents including robberies.
d) Dispersion of violence	Internal levels of armed violence, measured at the city, community or town level and nationwide, compared with the prior reporting period. These levels can be tracked using hospital data on armed incidents. See Risk Point 2.3.4.

120   Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008, 49).

d) Dispersion of violence (cont.)	External levels of armed violence, measured in neighbouring countries at the city or town level, in neighbouring countries nationwide, and in other countries from the region, compared with the prior reporting period.
	Clustering of armed violence near State lines and near national borders.
e) Concentration of violence	Mapping of hotspots within a city or town and spatial analysis to determine risk variables.
	Comparison of current hotspots with previously documented ones to determine changes and evolution of armed violence.
	Comparison between perceptions of violence and officially reported incidents of armed violence.

RISK POINT 4.5.2: TARGETS OF ARMED VIOLENCE

Options for assessing the Risk Point	*Indicators*
a) Political armed violence	Emergence of armed "self-defence" groups.
	Types of government entities or garrisons targeted by violence.
	Number of former combatants targeted by armed violence or extrajudicial killings.
b) State armed violence	Distribution of the religious, ethnic, racial and political identification of the victims of armed violence.
	Distribution of the religious, ethnic, racial and political identification of the incarcerated population.
	Distribution of the religious, ethnic, racial and political identification of the displaced population.
c) Criminal armed violence	Distribution of the socioeconomic status of the victims of armed violence.
	Percentage of victims of armed violence with a firearms-related criminal record.
	Analysis of the main victims of violence, disaggregated by gender and age.

Other considerations

- The return of State security providers to areas where there may have been informal or other security providers can be seen as a threat or provocation to local non-State authorities. Civil wars often erupt in the regions with the presence or return – not absence – of State security forces.[121]

- In some settings, peripheral, marginal and historically neglected regions, such as border areas and city slums, are often undergoverned and vulnerable to the growth of informal and/or predatory power structures, resulting in high levels of armed violence and instability that is not necessarily considered to be armed conflict.

- Post-conflict societies may encounter a shift in violence as weapons, combatants and armed violence move from front lines or disputed areas to other geographic zones, including urban areas. The targets of armed violence may also change. Post-conflict contexts may see high levels of GBV, including domestic violence and violence against women.

- Armed violence can exhibit regional and transnational dimensions. For example, it can rapidly spread across territorial borders when involving mobile groups (including nomads or pastoralists) or criminal groups that traffic arms from country to country.

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121   Yin (2020).

Risk Area 5: Weapons and ammunition management

At any stage before, during or after a conflict, effective weapons and ammunition management (WAM) capacities play a critical role in preventing:

- The destabilizing transfers of arms and ammunition to conflict-affected and high-risk areas
- Diversions from national stockpiles to unauthorized end users
- Illicit trafficking, possession and misuse of weapons and ammunition

WAM contributes to reinforcing post-conflict recovery strategies by supporting the regulatory, operational and technical components of security sector reform and DDR in mission and non-mission settings, as well as supporting the implementation of the obligations of arms embargoes. By supporting better arms control and preventing diversion, transitional WAM as part of a DDR process can be a strong component of the sustaining peace approach and contribute to preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflict.[122] This section examines two Risk Factors related to effective WAM.[123]

OVERVIEW OF RISK AREA 5

RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

Risk Factor	Risk Point
5.1: National regulations for WAM	5.1.1: Legal and regulatory frameworks at the national level
5.2: National capacities for WAM	5.2.1: National structures for WAM
	5.2.2: Integration of WAM in security institutions
	5.2.3: Stockpile management standards and procedures
	5.2.4: Marking and record-keeping systems
	5.2.5: Disposal including destruction
	5.2.6: Community-based WAM

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122   See IDDRS 2.40 (2019b); IDDRS 4.11 (2020)

123   See Giezendanner and Shiotani (2021).

RISK FACTOR 5.1: NATIONAL REGULATIONS FOR WAM

The creation and implementation of national regulations for WAM in line with international standards is a primary component of a comprehensive WAM framework and can indicate the level of institutional capacity needed to prevent the illicit proliferation and diversion of arms. In peace operation contexts, WAM is increasingly relevant. In recent years, there has been an increase in United Nations Security Council resolutions mandating United Nations missions to provide WAM support to States.[124] The absence of national regulations over State stockpiles presents vulnerabilities that may be exploited by non-State armed groups engaged in armed conflict and may increase their ability to sustain a conflict.

RISK POINT: 5.1.1: LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) National implementation of relevant legally and politically binding arms control instruments	Submission by the State in question of reports on the implementation of politically binding conventional arms control instruments, such as the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the International Tracing Instrument; and, submission of reports on the implementation of legally binding instruments to which the State in question is a State party, including the Arms Trade Treaty, the Firearms Protocol, and relevant legally binding regional and subregional instruments.[125]
	Engagement in countering illicit arms proliferation as measured by the State's participation in regional and international arms control frameworks.
	Change (increase or decrease) in bilateral development assistance devoted to direct and indirect armed violence prevention and weapons and ammunition programmes.
b) Maturity of national legislation to enforce arms control measures	Degree to which a State's national legal framework on arms and ammunition is in line with international obligations, as measured by national reports submitted under instruments to which the State is party and other appropriate standards and guidelines (i.e. use of the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines and the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium).
	The presence or absence of national laws on illicit weapons transfers, including relevant provisions in the Criminal Code.

124   UNODA (2018a).

125   The obligations contained within legally binding instruments (like the Arms Trade Treaty and the Firearms Protocol) and politically binding instruments (like the Programme of Action on Small Arms) carry a different weight on the State. Therefore, the measures included to assess this Risk Factor may vary depending on the arms control instrument and the obligations this creates for States in terms of reporting.

b) Maturity of national legislation to enforce arms control measures (cont.)	Assessment of the State's ability to comply with transfer control requirements (including, as and where applicable, exports, imports, retransfers, transit and trans-shipment, as well as brokering), as measured by the presence of a system for import licensing or issuing end user certificates and/or reporting on international transfers of conventional arms.
	Assessment of the ability to enforce national laws on illicit arms transfers, as demonstrated by the number of persons convicted for illicit conventional arms trafficking or the unauthorized use of small arms and light weapons: higher levels indicate better capacity to enforce national laws on illicit weapons transfers; lower levels indicate limited capacity to enforce these laws. See also Risk Point 2.3.3.
	The presence or absence of national laws regulating civilian possession (including firearms dealers and private security companies).
	Assessment of the ability to enforce national laws regulating civilian possession, as demonstrated by evidence of criminal investigations and sanctions for violations: higher numbers of investigations and sanctions indicate better capacity to enforce national laws regulating civilian possession; lower numbers indicate limited capacity to enforce these laws. See also Risk Point 2.4.2.
	Presence of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) or comparable documents or regulatory framework (armed forces acts, police service acts) regulating State-owned weapons throughout their life cycle.
	Ability to enforce the regulatory frameworks on State-owned weapons, as demonstrated by evidence of investigations and appropriate sanctions for violations. Higher numbers of investigations and sanctions indicate better capacity to enforce the regulatory frameworks; lower numbers indicate limited capacity to enforce the regulatory frameworks.
	Existence of a national legislative framework clearly identifying the national authorities responsible for regulating or exercising conventional arms control through all stages of the life cycle.
	The presence or absence of national laws establishing a basis for weapons collection.
c) Focal point for conventional arms control	Existence of a national commission (Natcom) or other coordinating government ministry, agency or department for conventional arms or small arms, as identified and provided for with a clear mandate by national legislation.
	Assessment of the gender balance of the Natcom, if such a commission exists.

Other considerations

- Gaps in the implementation of conventional arms control instruments may leave a region vulnerable to illicit arms proliferation despite the existence of national controls. Similarly, loose or inadequately enforced regulation in one State can affect neighbouring States if significant numbers of weapons acquired by civilians can flow illegally across borders.

- Conventional arms control instruments support positive norms in the international arms trade, promote transparency and confidence-building measures between States, and enhance multilateral cooperation to effectively manage the risks of conventional arms. As such, the implementation of these instruments can be indicative of political will to prevent and reduce armed violence.

RISK FACTOR 5.2: NATIONAL CAPACITIES FOR WAM

The maturity of national capacities, including structures and action plans to manage weapons, can help in determining the ability of a State to resolve or manage an ongoing conflict through arms control-based measures. Within this Risk Factor, stockpile and management standards and procedures provide an indication of the risk of diversion,[126] of the theft or loss of arms and ammunition from storage sites, and of their onward proliferation, which in turn can be a catalyst for armed conflict.[127] This Risk Factor covers the oversight of the full life cycle of arms throughout their supply chain stages, from manufacture to final use. The existence or lack thereof of a holistic approach to WAM can indicate an inability of a State to respond to different types of violence and conflict dynamics and can equally offer opportunities for conflict prevention strategies. Examining stockpile management practices more specifically can support conflict analysis through an assessment of diversion risks (see Risk Factor 2.2) and channels of access to conventional arms (see Risk Area 2).

RISK POINT 5.2.1: NATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Capacity of the national commission (Natcom) on small arms and light weapons (SALW)	Increases or decreases in the budget allocated to the Natcom for work on WAM and small arms control.
	Increase or decrease of international support and financing provided to the Natcom.
	Contextual analysis looking at existing and prior history of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and WAM initiatives supported by the Natcom.
b) Mandate of the Natcom on SALW	Scope of the Natcom's mandate to address issues relating to small arms, ammunition, explosives and/or other weapon types.
c) Competent national authorities for exercising control through the life cycle	Capacity (ability, knowledge, know-how, resources) of the competent authority to address issues relating to regulating or exercising control through all stages of the life cycle.

126   The United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament recognizes that "Inadequate physical security can also result in diversion of arms to illicit markets, including to non-State armed groups, terrorists and transnational criminal organizations. Fragile States are particularly susceptible to problems posed by improper stockpile management practices." UNODA (2018b).

127   Conflict Armament Research found that the most common cases of diversion documented in conflict-related cases involved some kind of State failure or role, including ineffective physical security and stockpile management. See Conflict Armament Research (2018, 9); Group of Governmental Experts (2020); MOSAIC 5.20 (2012b); Wood (2020).

c) Competent national authorities for exercising control through the life cycle (cont.)	Existence of specialized units on small arms, ammunition or explosives in the security sector.

RISK POINT 5.2.2: INTEGRATION OF WAM INTO SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) National action plans and road maps on SALW	Existence of a national action plan or road map on SALW to set priorities and objectives for action and define necessary resources. Assessment of gender considerations in SALW road maps.
	Existence or evidence of monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the action plan or road map.
b) Integration of SALW and arms control issues in law enforcement agencies	Contextual analysis looking at prior history of awareness-raising and advocacy initiatives conducted on arms control in-country (i.e. does the State promote SALW amnesty campaigns, International Mine Awareness Day, and other global initiatives on armed violence, sexual and gender-based violence awareness, etc.?).
	Capacity-building and training for law enforcement and security personnel related to arms control and WAM in line with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium, and the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, as measured by reporting under relevant arms control instruments.
	Assessment of whether domestic and international tracing operations have been conducted and/or are conducted by law enforcement and security agencies.
c) Border security capacity to address small arms proliferation (see also Risk Point 2.3.2)	Frequency of cross-border trafficking incidents of arms, ammunition and explosives, as measured by reporting on the number of conventional arms seized or found at borders or entry points.
	Average volume of illicit flows in the region, as measured by illicit price monitoring (see Risk Point 1.1.1(b)) seizure data (see Risk Point 1.1.2), use of firearms in violent acts or crimes (see Risk Point 1.1.4), and/or official reports or press releases. See also Risk Factor 2.3.
	Increase or decrease in resources and funding for border security forces and/or counter-trafficking operations.
	Capacity-building and training for border security personnel related to detection and investigation of illicit small arms proliferation.

RISK POINT 5.2.3: STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Compliance of State stockpiles of weapons with international guidelines and best practices	Existence of a designated national security force authorized to manage (i.e. possess, store, handle and transport) weapons.
	Reporting on arms diversions and lost or stolen arms and ammunition from government stockpiles, as demonstrated by evidence of investigations, prosecutions or corrective action.
	Reporting on the frequency of attacks on armouries, which may demonstrate weakness in physical security and stockpile management practices and indicate that armouries may be deliberately targeted as an easy supply of weapons.
	Frequency and lethality of unplanned explosions at munitions sites resulting from inadequately managed conventional ammunition stockpiles: frequent unplanned explosions can indicate poor or inadequately secured stockpiles; infrequent unplanned explosions can indicate effective stockpile management.

RISK POINT 5.2.4: MARKING AND RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEMS

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Compliance of weapons marking and record-keeping system (inventory management and national accounting system) with international standards and guidelines	Existence of national practices and legal requirements on marking and recording State-owned weapons, including an analysis of the types of arms and ammunition that requirements apply to, which affects the ability to track and trace diverted weapons.
	National marking programmes and training conducted for armed forces and security forces on weapons marking and record-keeping.
	Number of functioning marking machines available.
	Existence of procedures and trained personnel for record-keeping.
	Number and types of civilian-owned weapons marked and recorded in national databases, disaggregated by gender of owner.

RISK POINT 5.2.5: DISPOSAL INCLUDING DESTRUCTION

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Disposal of illicit arms and ammunition, surplus stocks, unwanted or obsolete weapons and ammunition in compliance with international standards and guidelines[128]	Number, type and, where possible, condition of weapons and ammunition disposed of or destroyed as part of an official DDR programme.
	Number, type and, where possible, condition of weapons and ammunition disposed of or destroyed as part of an official weapons collection programme.
	Number, type and, where possible, condition of weapons and ammunition disposed of or destroyed after identification by the government as being surplus to requirements.
	Conduct by the government of public weapons and ammunition destruction activities, including an analysis of the scope (weapons and/or ammunition) and method of disposal (destruction, sale, gifting or other).

RISK POINT 5.2.6: COMMUNITY-BASED WAM

Options for assessing the Risk Point	Indicators
a) Community-based WAM engagement with local populations (see also Risk Point 2.4.2)	Contextual analysis looking at prior history of community violence reduction programmes.[129]
	Programme reporting on number of beneficiaries of community violence reduction programmes, disaggregated by gender and age.
	Number of civil society organizations and local stakeholders undertaking activities, initiatives and programmes on WAM and small arms control. Assessment of inclusion of women and youth groups and other vulnerable groups.
	Inclusion of conventional arms control issues and activities in development plans and programming.
	Programme reporting on number of youths, women and vulnerable groups who are beneficiaries in WAM activities.

128   There are specific risks associated with conventional ammunition as they may become damaged unless correctly stored, handled and transported. See International Ammunition Technical Guidelines modules on risk management here: https://un-saferguard.org/un-saferguard/guide-lines; see also UNIDIR (2019).

129   Community violence reduction activities include awareness-raising and education on the risks of arms, the creation of community-based storage facilities and gun-free zones, development of weapons management capacity, and encouragement of the handover of a certain quantity of serviceable weapons. Through such activities, community violence reduction aims to build intra- and inter-community relations and decrease levels of armed violence.

Other considerations

- Where States are under international sanctions, strengthening their national capacity for the governance of weapons and ammunition can help enable those States to move towards an incremental lifting of punitive measures against them and improve control over the full life cycle of weapons and ammunition.[130]

- WAM activities, like support for stockpile management or community-based registration of firearms and ammunition, can establish security within and between communities by reducing the open availability and visibility of weapons and can provide increased information on and knowledge of armed groups holdings. A stockpile inventory can provide additional detailed information on the weapon types contained in stocks, and this may be available from national authorities, past technical assessments or DDR programmes.

- During conflict, WAM may serve as a confidence-building measure between parties to a conflict, while also keeping communities and United Nations personnel secure by mitigating the risk of diversion and unplanned explosions. During peacekeeping operations, a secure system for managing weapons and ammunition reduces the risk of looting, theft or diversion by spoilers.[131]

- Through mitigating the risk of diversion from national stockpiles, WAM measures can effectively disrupt one of the primary sources of supply of materiel for non-State armed groups and criminal networks, including terrorist groups. By limiting the availability of military materiel, WAM contributes to restricting the firepower of such armed groups, thereby potentially helping de-escalate conflict.

- WAM may also take place in the context of a DDR process, for example transitional WAM activities are increasingly integrated into DDR processes.[132] In contexts where a peace agreement has been signed and the necessary preconditions for a DDR programme are in place, transitional WAM can be used before, during and after the DDR programme as a complementary measure. However, WAM may not be applicable at all stages of a conflict; for example, it may take place in a more phased approach as part of a DDR process.

- Risk Point 5.2.3 on stockpile management can be analysed in conjunction with the Risk Points on geographic distribution of weapons (see Risk Factor 1.2), points of diversion and methods used (see Risk Point 2.2.2), types of conventional arms present (see Risk Factor 3.2), and armed actors (see Risk Factor 3.3).

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130   De Tessières and Shiotani (2019).

131   United Nations General Assembly (2018, para. 82).

132   UNDPO and UNODA (2018); IDDRS 4.11 (2020).

Photo Credit: UN Photo/Marco Dormino

Part 4:
Risk Factor Selector Tool

Part 4: Risk Factor Selector Tool

The Risk Factor Selector Tool has been designed to complement the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool featured in Part 3 of this document. It does so by supporting analysts in their decision-making on the Risk Factors they may want to consider in a particular context, depending on the aspects of conventional arms and armed conflict they are interested in analysing. The tool is designed to steer practitioners towards a more comprehensive conflict analysis and subsequent prevention responses.

This tool suggests Risk Factors based on their relevance, according to the following three parameters:

- ▶ Assessment according to conflict parameters (likelihood, duration, intensity, type and actors)
- ▶ Assessment according to geographic scope of application (regional, national and local)
- ▶ Assessment according to different stages of a conflict (before, during and after)

Each of the three parameters is represented on a table to assess the applicability of each Risk Factor. The assessment of the Risk Factors' applicability is measured on the following scale:

Assessment of applicability

Strong

Medium

Low

Analysts should review the suggested applicability within each table to identify the Risk Factors pertinent to their context. The assessments of the applicability of each Risk Factor to a certain parameter is indicative and may vary within different contexts. The Risk Factor Selector Tool therefore provides suggestions, or a starting point, for further nuanced, context-specific research as to how arms may influence a given situation. The tool can support decision-making but should not be seen as a replacement for more in-depth analytical processes and consultations required for planning purposes.

To facilitate analysts in selecting their own indicators, blank versions of the tables used in the Risk Factor Selector Tool are included in Annex A.

The Risk Factor Selector Tool represents an initial attempt at steering people with limited knowledge of arms control issues towards the Risk Factors most relevant to their work. It can also guide future research that aims to disaggregate and further unpack the role of conventional arms control in conflict prevention, management, peacekeeping and conflict resolution throughout the conflict continuum. Suggestions for changes or how to improve this tool are welcome and can be provided through the feedback form (https://forms.office.com/r/vpEVX6ae3e) and directly to cap-unidir@un.org.

Assessment of Risk Factors according to conflict parameters

An assessment of Risk Factors according to their impact on conflict parameters can support the identification of Risk Factors that can apply in various contexts. The parameters, listed below, which characterize the nature of an armed conflict, were identified because of the impact that arms will have on each of them. Armed conflict requires certain "inputs", without which the likelihood of a conflict occurring is either diminished or increases. Access to and the use of weapons (availability) is one of the key requirements, or inputs, for an armed conflict to occur, for armed groups and actors to form, and for conflict to be prolonged for extended periods of time. By tracking one of the main armed conflict facilitators – the presence and proliferation of weapons – analysts can develop an indication of the level of risk of conflict, the type and intensity of conflict and armed violence, and the role of armed groups or movements. This in turn informs the type of conflict.

Because such parameters of armed conflict may vary according to numerous variables (such as the number of actors, the types of actor, the type of conflict, the balance of power between actors, and the belligerent's ability to access supplies required for conflict, including arms and ammunition), the parameters should be considered a basic framework or starting point for conflict analysis.

Conflict parameters:

- **Likelihood of conflict:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the likelihood of a conflict arising or a conflict reoccurring?
- **Duration of conflict:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the continuation and prolonging of a conflict?
- **Intensity of conflict:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the intensity of a conflict (usually measured in the number of deaths; for example, deaths per 100,000)?
- **Type of conflict:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the number and type of armed violence incidents and armed movements?
- **Armed conflict actors:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to the formation of an armed group or movement, and the number and type of armed actors in a conflict?

APPLICABILITY

RISK FACTOR	Likelihood of conflict	Duration of conflict	Intensity of conflict	Type of conflict	Armed conflict actors
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS					
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition					
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition					
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition					
1.4: Levels of militarization					
RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS					
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers					
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition					
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets					
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms					
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT					
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting					
3.2: Types of conventional arms present					
3.3: Who is using the weapons					
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used					
RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT					
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict					
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings					
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence					
4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons					
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence					
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)					
5.1: National regulations for WAM					
5.2: National capacities for WAM					

Assessment of Risk Factors according to geographic scope of application

An assessment of Risk Factors according to their geographic scope of application supports the identification of Risk Factors that can apply at different geographic levels of conflict. This set of parameters was chosen because the geographic dimensions of weapons in a conflict can be an important factor in understanding and preventing the spread of conflict within States and regionally between States. Monitoring the movement of arms and armed actors across borders can be an indicator of the spread of conflict into new areas ("spillover") and the likelihood of a conflict breaking out or intensifying. Information on the geographic scope and regions in which arms are used can also provide a basis for ceasefire negotiations, identify hotspots of violence, and target efforts to de-escalate a conflict. This section of the Risk Factor Selector Tool can also support analysts according to their role within an organization (regional office, country-level office, local-level office), which is often linked to the type and level of analysis they will carry out.

This assessment of Risk Factors is based on three geographic levels, namely:

- **Regional level:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to conflicts that affect a region (that is, beyond a single State's borders)?
- **State level:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to State-wide conflicts?
- **Local level:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to conflicts at a subnational level?

RISK FACTOR	APPLICABILITY		
	REGIONAL LEVEL	STATE LEVEL	LOCAL LEVEL
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS			
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition			
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition			
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition			
1.4: Levels of militarization			
RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS			
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers			
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition			
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets			
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms			
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT			
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting			
3.2: Types of conventional arms present			
3.3: Who is using the weapons			
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used			
RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT			
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict			
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings			
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence			
4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons			
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence			
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)			
5.1: National regulations for WAM			
5.2: National capacities for WAM			

Assessment of Risk Factors according to different stages of a conflict

This assessment of Risk Factors at different stages of a conflict supports the identification of Risk Factors that apply before, during and after a conflict. This set of parameters was chosen because conflict prevention programming and responses can be considered at all stages of a conflict. Consideration of weapons and ammunition should be given in a consistent manner at all stages of a conflict. Some Risk Factors may be more useful when considering early warning and preventive interventions; others may provide a different perspective, depending on when in the conflict continuum they are used. These parameters are also useful depending on the analyst and their role within an organization as this relates to interventions undertaken prior to a conflict breaking out (upstream prevention and the prevention of reoccurrence of conflict), during a conflict (conflict management and resolution), or after a conflict (peacebuilding).

This assessment of Risk Factors is based on three temporal stages of conflict, namely:

- **Prior to a conflict:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to preventing an outbreak of conflict or resolving disputes before violence breaks out (preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention)?
- **During a conflict:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to reducing the levels of violence (peacemaking, peacekeeping, conflict management, conflict resolution)?
- **After a conflict:** To what extent does this Risk Factor apply to consolidating and preserving peace once it is attained (peacebuilding)?

APPLICABILITY

RISK FACTOR	PRIOR TO A CONFLICT	DURING A CONFLICT	AFTER A CONFLICT
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS			
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition	red	red	red
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition	red	red	red
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition	red	red	red
1.4: Levels of militarization	red	red	red
RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS			
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers	red	orange	orange
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition	orange	red	orange
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets	orange	yellow	red
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms	orange		orange
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT			
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting	orange	orange	orange
3.2: Types of conventional arms present	orange	orange	orange
3.3: Who is using the weapons	orange	orange	orange
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used	orange	orange	orange
RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT			
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict	yellow	yellow	red
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings	yellow	yellow	red
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence	yellow	yellow	red
4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons	yellow	yellow	red
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence	yellow	yellow	red
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)			
5.1: National regulations for WAM	red	red	red
5.2: National capacities for WA	red	red	red

Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool

Part 5: Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool

The Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool offers a non-exhaustive list of information sources and data collection methods to support the analyst in using this Toolkit. Specific and specialized information sources are suggested; however, analysts may decide to gather additional information based on their conflict analysis needs. These decisions are left to the discretion of the analyst. Analysts should collect reliable information from a variety of sources to assess whether any of the chosen indicators are valid or have changed. Analysts should also develop their own sources, especially at country level.

Selection of information sources and collection methods

Systematic data collection in conflict-affected settings may be particularly challenging and politically sensitive due to limited data gathering capacity, stigmatization and underreporting of certain types of violence, and logistical challenges of household surveys, particularly in high-violence regions. Guidance on how to gather and generate conflict-related data is available from:

- UK Department for International Development, *Compendium of Tools for Measurement, Monitoring and Evaluation*, March 2013
- United Nations Development Programme and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Measuring and Monitoring Armed Violence: Goals, Targets and Indicators*, April 2010
- Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict. "Chapter 4: Gathering Information", in *Conflict Analysis Framework: Field Guidelines and Procedures*, November 2017

In addition to the suggested sources, analysts may consider the following data collection methods and types of source:

Desk-based Research
- Governmental and inter-governmental offices
- UN agency reporting
- Existing analyses performed by governments, NGOs, civil society organizations at country level
- Academic reports, studies, literature
- Media archives
- Programme and research reports
- Think tank and research institution analysis
- Civil society organization reports

Media monitoring
- Mainstream media
- Social media
- Newspaper, print journals, blogs
- National radio, television
- Editors and journalistic sources

Surveys & workshops
- Survey methods
- Interviews with community informants or experts
- Focus groups
- Workshops

List of information sources by theme

This Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit is a living document. The list of information Sources by theme is not exhaustive, and users of this Toolkit are encouraged to support UNIDIR in expanding and updating this list by suggesting new or alternative information sources to: cap-unidir@un.org

Table 1: Information on national legislation and controls	
Title	**Link**
African Union, Database on Silencing the Guns	http://stgpeaceau.org/en
Arms Trade Treaty Monitor	https://attmonitor.org/en
Arms Trade Treaty Annual Reports	https://thearmstradetreaty.org/annual-reports.html
Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Small Arms and Light Weapons Guide	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/salw-guide
Expertise France	https://www.expertisefrance.fr
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Disarmament, Mine Action Intelligence Tool	https://www.gichd.org/en/resources/tools-and-applications/detail/publication/mine-action-intelligence-tool-mint
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards	https://www.unddr.org/the-iddr
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines	https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/ammunition/iatg
International Mine Action Standards	https://www.mineactionstandards.org
Mines Advisory Group	https://www.maginternational.org
Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC)	https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/mosaic
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee	https://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	https://www.osce.org/arms-control
Reaching Critical Will, First Committee Monitor	https://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga
Saferworld	https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/search
SEESAC Publications	https://www.seesac.org/publication
Small Arms Survey, Global Firearms Holdings	https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/global-firearms-holdings
Small Arms Survey, research on regulations and arms control	http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/regulations-and-controls.html
Small Arms Survey, Unplanned Explosion at Munition Sites from 2019 (by request only)	http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/stockpiles/unplanned-explosions-at-munitions-sites.html

UNIDIR, Supporting Policies and Frameworks for Weapon and Ammunition Management	https://unidir.org/projects/supporting-policies-and-frameworks-weapon-and-ammunition-management
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Comparative Analysis of Global Instruments on Firearms and Other Conventional Arms	https://att-assistance.org/sites/default/files/2018/10/UNODCComparativeAnalysisPaper.pdf
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Relevant Background reports and papers submitted to the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (COP) and relevant COP resolutions	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/fr/firearms-protocol/the-firearms-protocol.html
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Working Group on Firearms	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/working-group-on-firearms-2020.html
United Nations Programme of Action, National Reports	https://smallarms.un-arm.org/national-reports
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	https://www.unrec.org
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific	https://unrcpd.org
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, Resource Center	http://unlirec.screativa.com/en/recursos/
University of Sydney, Gunpolicy.org	https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/home
US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, National Firearms Act Division, Data on firearms registration	https://www.atf.gov/firearms/national-firearms-act-division

Table 2: Information on government-authorized arms transfers and militarization

Title	Link
Bonn International Centre for Conversion, Global Militarization Index	https://www.bicc.de/de/research-clusters/project/project/43
Bonn International Centre for Conversion, War and Peace database	http://warpp.info/en/data-tables
Correlates of War Project	https://correlatesofwar.org
Correlates of War Project, Militarized Interstate Dispute Locations	https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDLOC
Correlates of War Project, National Material Capabilities	https://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities
Economist Intelligence Unit	https://www.eiu.com/n/
European External Action Service, Arms Export Control Database	https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/87534/arms-exports-control-launch-online-database-increasing-transparency-eu-arms-exports_en

European Union, Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) Online System	https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/overview
Forum on the Arms Trade	https://www.forumarmstrade.org
Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report	https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2020	https://www.iiss.org/publications/the-military-balance
Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers	http://nisat.prio.org/Data-Visualization/Arms-Trade-Mapper
Peace Research Institute Oslo and Igarapé Institute, Mapping Arms Data	http://nisatapps.prio.org/armsglobe/index.php
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Arms Transfers Database	https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers
SIPRI, fact sheets on international arms transfer trends	https://sipri.org/publications/2021/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2020
SIPRI, Military Expenditure Database	https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
Small Arms Survey, Resource Library	https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/resources
Small Arms Trade, Transparency Barometer	https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/trade-transparency-barometer
Transparency International, Government Defence Integrity Index	https://ti-defence.org/gdi
United Nations Comtrade Database	https://comtrade.un.org
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Military Expenditure Database (use by authorized governments only)	https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/milex
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms	https://www.unroca.org
United Nations Report on Military Expenditures (MilEx)	https://milex.un-arm.org/
United Nations Secretary-General, reports on objective information on military matters (transparency of military expenditures)	https://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/milex
United Nations Security Council, Sanctions Monitoring Team	https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/monitoring-team/reports
World Bank, DataBank	https://databank.worldbank.org/home
World Bank, Military expenditure data	https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS

Table 3: Information on illicit arms and ammunition transfers, seizures and diversion

Title	Link
Armament Research Services	https://armamentresearch.com
Bellingcat	https://www.bellingcat.com/news
C4ADS, ConflictID	https://conflict.id/data
Calibre Obscura	https://www.calibreobscura.com
Conflict Armament Research	https://www.conflictarm.com/publications
Conflict Armament Research, Diversion Digest reports	https://www.conflictarm.com/digests/diversion-digest-issue-1
Conflict Armament Research, ITRACE	https://conflictarm.com/itrace
Conflict Awareness Project	https://www.conflictawareness.org
Flemish Peace Institute, Project Divert	https://vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/en
INTERPOL, news on seizures	https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events
National firearms registration data	n/a
Sustainable Development Goals Indicator 16.4.2 on portion of seized arms	https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?-Text=&Goal=&Target=16.4
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) data	https://dataunodc.un.org
UNODC, Global Firearms Programme	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/index.html
UNODC, Global Study on Firearms Trafficking	https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Firearms/2020_REPORT_Global_Study_on_Firearms_Trafficking_2020_web.pdf
UNODC, Illicit Arms Flows Questionnaire	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/iafq.html
United Nations Panel of Experts and Monitoring Groups	n/a
US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives data	https://www.atf.gov/resource-center/data-statistics
World Customs Organization, Illicit Trade Report	http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/enforcement-and-compliance/resources/publications.aspx

Table 4: Use of conventional arms and ammunition in armed conflict and armed violence

Title	Link
ACCORD, conflict trends reporting	https://www.accord.org.za
Action on Armed Violence (AOAV)	https://aoav.org.uk
AOAV, Explosive Violence Monitor and data	https://aoav.org.uk/explosiveviolence
AOAV, Explosive violence in schools	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/explosive-violence-in-schools-2011-2017
AOAV, Impact of explosive weapons on health facilities	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/explosive-weapons-on-health-facilities
Afrobarometer, surveys on crime	https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online
Amnesty International	https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news
Armed Conflict and Intervention Datasets	http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)	https://acleddata.com/#/dashboard
ACLED & UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Education and Conflict Monitor, attacks on education in Africa and the Middle East	https://data.humdata.org/organization/education-and-conflict-monitor
BTI Transformation Index	https://www.bti-project.org/en/home.html
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Drone strike statistics	https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/drone-war https://dronewars.github.io/data
Carter Center, Syria conflict mapping project	https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/conflict_resolution/using-conflict-data-for-demining-in-syria.html
Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, Drone Databook	https://dronecenter.bard.edu/projects/drone-proliferation
CIRI Human Rights Dataset	http://www.humanrightsdata.com
Conflict and Environment Observatory	https://ceobs.org
Council on Foreign Relations, Global Conflict Tracker	https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker
Cross-National Time-Series, Data Archive (domestic conflict event data)	https://www.cntsdata.com
ETH Zurich, GROWup, Geographical Research on War, Unified Platform	https://growup.ethz.ch
GDELT Project, Global Database of Events, Language and Tone	https://analysis.gdeltproject.org
Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, Global Burden of Armed Violence report and country-level assessments	http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence.html
Human Rights Watch, World Reports	https://www.hrw.org

Igarapé Institute, Evidências sobre Violências e Alternativas para mulheres e meninas	https://eva.igarape.org.br
Igarapé Institute, EarthTime	https://earthtime.org
Insecurity Insight, data on attacks on civilians, aid workers, and "people in danger"	https://data.humdata.org/organization/in-security-insight
Institute for Security Studies Africa	https://issafrica.org
Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research, Center for Systemic Peace, High Casualty Terrorist Bombings	http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research, Armed Conflict and Intervention Datasets	http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
International Committee of the Red Cross	https://www.icrc.org/en
International Crisis Group, CrisisWatch	https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Survey	https://www.iiss.org/publications/armed-conflict-survey
International Network for Explosive Weapons	http://www.inew.org
INTERPOL, IBIS database	https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Fire-arms-trafficking/INTERPOL-Ballistic-Infor-mation-Network
Land & Cluster Munition Monitor	http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/home.aspx
Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments	https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/MPICE_final_complete%20book%20%282%29.pdf
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), Global Terrorism Database	https://start.umd.edu/gtd
Office of the Special Representative of the Secre-tary-General for Children and Armed Conflict	https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org
Office of the Special Representative of the Sec-retary-General for Children and Armed Conflict reports	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/com-piled-reports-of-the-secretary-general-for-children-and-armed-conflict-of-years-2015-through-2017
PAX	https://www.paxforpeace.nl
Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Battledeaths Dataset	https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths
PRIO, Conflict Site Dataset	https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/Conflict-Site
PRIO, GEO-SVAC dataset, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict Dataset (SVAC)	https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/GEO-SVAC
Political Instability Task Force, Worldwide Atrocities Dataset	http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/atrocities.html
Political Terror Scale	http://www.politicalterrorscale.org
ReDHumus conflicto tierras y territorios	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/conflic-to-tierras-y-territorios

Safeguarding Health in Conflict	https://www.safeguardinghealth.org/
SIPRI, Global Registry of Violent Deaths	https://www.grevd.org
Small Arms Survey	https://www.smallarmssurvey.org
Small Arms Survey, Global Violent Deaths charts or armed violence indicators	https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/database/global-violent-deaths-gvd
UNHCR, Global Trends reports	https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2019
UN Human Rights, Guidance on Casualty Recording	https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Guidance_on_Casualty_Recording.pdf
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Colombia, Attacks against Civilians in Colombia	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/attack-sagainstcivilianscolombiamun
OCHA Colombia, Armed actions in Colombia 2012–2019	https://data.humdata.org/dataset/arme-dactionscolombia
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Measuring Violence against Women and Other Gender Issues through ICCS Lenses	https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/ICCS/Gender_and_the_ICCS.pdf
UNODC, National Survey of Crime Trends	https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/Crime-Monitoring-Surveys.html
United Nations Panel of Expert reports	https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/751/work-and-mandate/reports
United Nations Peacemaker, Peace Agreements Database	https://peacemaker.un.org/document-search
United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions	https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/executions/pages/srexecutionsindex.aspx
University of Edinburgh, Peace Agreements Database	https://peaceagreements.org/amnesties
University of Edinburgh, Amnesties, Conflict and Peace Agreement dataset	https://www.peaceagreements.org
University of Maryland, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset	http://www.mar.umd.edu/mar_data.asp
University of Notre Dame, Peace Accords Matrix	https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/search-pam
UN Women, Global Database on Violence against Women	https://evaw-global-database.unwomen.org/en
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Conflict Encyclopedia	https://ucdp.uu.se
US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices	https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-civilian-security-democracy-and-human-rights/bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor
World Health Organization, Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care database, with information on attacks on health care by weapons type	https://extranet.who.int/ssa

Table 5: Information on armed actors

Title	Link
CIA World Factbook	https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, CTC Sentinel	https://ctc.usma.edu/ctc-sentinel
ETH Zurich, Ethnic Power Relations dataset	https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/core
Geneva Call	https://www.genevacall.org
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, Conflict Barometer	https://hiik.de/conflict-barometer/current-version/?lang=en
International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC engagement with non-State armed Groups	https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/Activities/Humanitarian-diplomacy/icrc_engagement_with_non-state_armed_groups_position_paper.pdf
Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project	http://www.mar.umd.edu
Mapping coercive institutions: The State Security Forces dataset, 1960–2010	https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343320913089
University College London, Pro-Government Militias Database Project	https://militiasdb.sowi.uni-mannheim.de/militias-public
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, External Support Data	https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads

Table 6: Information on correlates of armed conflict and proxy indicators

Title	Link
African Union Commission, Youth development indicators	https://data.humdata.org/organization/auc
Amnesty International, The State of the World's Human Rights	https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/3202/2021/en/
Carleton University, Country Indicators for Foreign Policy	https://carleton.ca/cifp
Eurostat	https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT	http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data
Fragile State Index	https://fragilestatesindex.org
Freedom House, Country data	https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores
Gallup News	https://news.gallup.com/home.aspx
GDELT Project (media monitoring)	https://www.gdeltproject.org
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global Internal Displacement Database	https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data
International Border Agreements Dataset	https://www.andrewowsiak.org/international-border-agreements-dataset.html
Reporters without Borders, Annual press freedom survey	https://rsf.org/en/ranking
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index	https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nzl
UN Comtrade, International Trade Statistics Yearbook	https://comtrade.un.org/pb
UNHCR, Statistical Yearbook	https://www.unhcr.org/statistical-yearbooks.html
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Open SDG Data Hub	https://unstats-undesa.opendata.arcgis.com
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Data Exchange	https://data.humdata.org
OCHA, World Humanitarian Data and Trends (annual report)	https://interactive.unocha.org/publication/datatrends2018
Vision of Humanity, Global Peace Index and maps	https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#
Worldwide Governance Indicators	https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi

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Part 6:
The Way Forward

Part 6: The way forward

The inclusion of arms control data in the analysis of an armed conflict remains underserved. It is hoped that the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit will support analysts in remedying this and in including key information on one of the main facilitators of conflict in their work and that, in turn, this information will allow for more inclusive strategies for conflict prevention.

The Toolkit represents a first effort in this direction. It is a living document and will be adjusted as it is rolled out and tested. Efforts have been made to make the Toolkit as approachable and comprehensive as possible as well as to facilitate its use by including the compendium of publicly available information sources that analysts can draw from in their work.

So as to support the refining and further development of this Toolkit, users are encouraged to provide feedback to UNIDIR. This can be done by completing a short questionnaire on the tool, available at: https://forms.office.com/r/vpEVX6ae3e

UNIDIR would also welcome recommendations from users with regard to additional Risk Areas, Risk Factors and Risk Points, as well as other or alternative indicators and/or information sources that could be included in a second version of this Toolkit. Such suggestions can be sent to: cap-unidir@un.org

Annex A:
Templates for the Risk Factor Selector Tool

Assessment of Risk Factors according to conflict parameters

RISK FACTOR	APPLICABILITY				
	Likelihood of conflict	Duration of conflict	Intensity of conflict	Type of conflict	Armed conflict actors
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS					
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition					
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition					
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition					
1.4: Levels of militarization					
RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS					
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers					
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition					
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets					
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms					
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT					
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting					
3.2: Types of conventional arms present					
3.3: Who is using the weapons					
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used					
RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT					
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict					
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings					
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence					
4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons					
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence					
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)					
5.1: National regulations for WAM					
5.2: National capacities for WAM					

Assessment of Risk Factors according to geographic scope of application

RISK FACTOR	APPLICABILITY		
	REGIONAL LEVEL	STATE LEVEL	LOCAL LEVEL
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS			
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition			
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition			
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition			
1.4: Levels of militarization			
RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS			
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers			
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition			
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets			
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms			
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT			
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting			
3.2: Types of conventional arms present			
3.3: Who is using the weapons			
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used			
RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT			
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict			
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings			
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence			
4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons			
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence			
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)			
5.1: National regulations for WAM			
5.2: National capacities for WAM			

Assessment of Risk Factors according to different stages of a conflict

RISK FACTOR	APPLICABILITY		
	PRIOR TO A CONFLICT	DURING A CONFLICT	AFTER A CONFLICT
RISK AREA 1: PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS			
1.1: Availability of conventional arms and ammunition	■	■	■
1.2: Geographic proliferation of conventional arms and ammunition	■	■	■
1.3: Societal values and conventional arms and ammunition	■	■	■
1.4: Levels of militarization	■	■	■
RISK AREA 2: CHANNELS OF ACCESS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS			
2.1: Government-authorized arms transfers	■	■	■
2.2: Diversion of arms and ammunition	■	■	■
2.3: Illicit transfers and markets	■	■	■
2.4: Civilian purchase of conventional arms	■	■	■
RISK AREA 3: USE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS DURING A CONFLICT			
3.1: Conflict intensity, tactics and targeting	■	■	■
3.2: Types of conventional arms present	■	■	■
3.3: Who is using the weapons	■	■	■
3.4: Where (in which regions and areas) conventional arms are being used	■	■	■
RISK AREA 4: USE AND MANAGEMENT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS AFTER A CONFLICT			
4.1: Modalities for ending the conflict	■	■	■
4.2: Use of arms in post-conflict settings	■	■	■
4.3: Types of arms and armed violence	■	■	■
4.4: Managing current and former armed actors and their weapons	■	■	■
4.5: Geography and targets of armed violence	■	■	■
RISK AREA 5: WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT (WAM)			
5.1: National regulations for WAM	■	■	■
5.2: National capacities for WA	■	■	■

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Annex B:
Glossary of key terms and definitions

Glossary of key terms and definitions

Ammunition: The complete round or its components, including cartridge cases, primers, propellant powder, bullets or projectiles, used in small arms or light weapons. This includes cartridges (rounds) for small arms and light weapons; explosive shells, grenades and missiles for light weapons; and mobile containers with missiles or shells for anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems.[133] Ammunition is the largest authorized traded small arms category at the global level, accounting for 41% of reported small arms exports for the period 2015–17.[134]

Armed conflict: There is no widely accepted definition of armed conflict, although the Use of Force Committee of the International Law Association determined that all armed conflicts have a minimum of two necessary characteristics: (a) the presence of organized groups and (b) the engagement of those groups in intense armed fighting. Through such measures, the use of weapons by the conflict actors serves to distinguish between "non-violent" conflicts (disputes or crises) and violent armed conflicts.[135]

Armed group: A group that (a) has the potential to employ arms in the use of force to achieve political, ideological or economic objectives; (b) is not within the formal military structures of a State, State alliance or intergovernmental organization; and (c) is not under the control of the State(s) in which it operates.[136] The International Council on Human Rights Policy describes armed groups as "groups that are armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not under state control."[137]

Armed incidents: Armed incidents can include raids, ambushes, bombings, targeted assassinations, gang-related incidents, communal disputes, kidnappings and other incidents in which the use or threat of use of conventional arms is involved.

Arms control: The imposition of restrictions on the production, exchange and spread of weapons by an authority vested with legitimate powers to enforce such restrictions.[138]

Arms dealer: An entity or person involved in retailing, wholesaling, buying and selling quantities of arms and related items obtained from producers according to the demand of users and that operates under national legislation and jurisdiction.[139] Such activities may be closely associated with brokering in arms and related items but do not necessarily constitute brokering activities; they might be undertaken by brokers as part of the process of putting a deal together to gain a benefit.[140]

Arms exports: The sending of weapons, guns and ammunition from one country to another, often closely monitored and controlled by governments.[141]

Battlefield loss or capture: Battlefield loss or capture can be described as the "seizure [of arms and

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133 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).

134 Small Arms Survey (2020, 52).

135 See International Law Association (2010).

136 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

137 International Council on Human Rights Policy (1999).

138 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

139 Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms (2001, 19).

140 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).

141 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).

ammunition] from state forces by unauthorized users during fighting".[142]

Broker: The natural person or legal entity that carries out a brokering activity; anyone who directly performs an activity defined as a brokering activity in the exercise of their own commercial or legal relations. The acts of natural persons, especially employees, are to be ascribed to the legal entity.[143]

Brokering: Activities carried out by a broker in the context of arranging or facilitating an international transfer of small arms or light weapons. Brokering activities include serving as a finder of business opportunities to one or more parties; putting relevant parties in contact; assisting parties in proposing, arranging or facilitating agreements or possible contracts between them; assisting parties in obtaining the necessary documentation; and assisting parties in arranging the necessary payments.[144]

Ceasefire: A bilateral or multilateral halt in all or select offensive military actions among parties engaged in official war, guerrilla warfare or violent exchanges with one another. Ceasefires sometimes lead to more stable or permanent military or political agreements, but they minimally aim to reduce immediate tensions and extreme losses while providing opportunities for the initiation of other forms of conflict resolution or management.[145]

Ceasefire agreement: A binding, non-aggression pact to enable dialogue between conflicting parties.[146]

Community disarmament or small arms limitation: In the context of peacebuilding, community disarmament or small arms limitation advocates a change of public attitude towards the possession and use of weapons, as well as the benefits of weapons control measures within the community.[147]

Conventional arms: Conventional arms are described by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs as "all weapons not considered WMD [weapons of mass destruction], including small arms and light weapons". Conventional arms therefore encompass a wide range of equipment not limited to armoured combat vehicles, combat helicopters, combat aircraft, warships, small arms and light weapons, landmines, cluster munitions, ammunition and artillery. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms defines seven categories of major conventional arms:

> Category I: Battle tanks
> Category II: Armoured combat vehicles
> Category III: Large-calibre artillery systems
> Category IV: Combat aircraft and unmanned combat aerial vehicles
> Category V: Attack helicopters
> Category VI: Warships
> Category VII: Missiles and missile launchers

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR): A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants,

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142 Conflict Armament Research (2018a).

143 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

144 MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).

145 Miller (2015, 18).

146 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

147 IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods.[148]

Disarmament: Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.[149]

Demobilization: Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion.

Reinsertion: Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs and can last up to one year.

Reintegration: Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance.

Disposal: The removal of ammunition and explosives from a stockpile using a variety of methods (that may not necessarily involve destruction). Logistic disposal may or may not require the use of render safe procedures.[150]

Diversion: Although there is no internationally agreed definition of "diversion", it denotes "any loss of weapons or ammunition from state control and their resulting acquisition by unauthorized users, including insurgent and terrorist forces and other non-state armed groups".[151] In the Arms Trade Treaty context, diversion is the rerouting and/or appropriation of a transfer of conventional arms or related items contrary to relevant national and/or international law leading to a potential change in the effective control or ownership of the arms.[152]

Femicide: Femicide is generally understood to as the intentional murder of women because they are women, but broader definitions include any killing of women or girls. Femicide is usually perpetrated by men. Most cases of femicide are committed by partners or ex-partners and involve ongoing abuse in the home, threats or intimidation, sexual violence or situations where women have less power or fewer resources than their partner.[153]

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148   IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

149   IDDRS 1.10 (2014).

150   IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

151   Conflict Armament Research (2018, 3).

152   Wood and Holtom (2020, 3).

153   MOSAIC 06.10 (2017); WHO (2012).

Firearms Protocol: The United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, defines illicit trafficking as "the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition from or across the territory of one State Party to that of another State Party if any one of the States Parties concerned does not authorize it … or if the firearms are not marked in accordance with … this Protocol".

Gender analysis: The collection and analysis of gender-disaggregated information. Men and women perform different roles in societies and in armed groups and forces. This leads to women and men having different experience, knowledge, talents and needs. Gender analysis explores these differences so that policies, programmes and projects can identify and meet the different needs of men and women. Gender analysis also facilitates the strategic use of distinct knowledge and skills possessed by women and men, which can greatly improve the long-term sustainability of interventions. In the context of DDR, gender analysis should be used to design policies and interventions that will reflect the different roles, capacities and needs of women, men, girls and boys.[154]

Geographic proliferation: Geographic proliferation refers to the spread of weapons and indicates the ability of actors in a particular area or areas to control territory and to access and use weapons. It is a measure of not only the actual or potential spread of conflict but also the likelihood of violence erupting or intensifying.

Illicit trafficking: Illicit trafficking in weapons is understood to cover "that international trade in conventional weapons, which is contrary to the laws of States and/or international law".[155]

Illicit transfer: The import, export, transit, trans-shipment or brokering of (a) small arms or light weapons with the intention to supply a State under a United Nations Security Council arms embargo or where any one of the States involved does not authorize the transfer, or (b) small arms or light weapons that have been illicitly manufactured, have been stolen or otherwise illicitly acquired, or have been unmarked, inadequately marked or have had marks removed, obliterated or falsified.[156]

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs): A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract. It may incorporate military stores but is normally devised from non-military components.[157]

Indicators: Predictors, precursor events or other telling signals used in forecasting. The following is one set of indicators: (a) *systemic causes*: general, underlying, structural, deep-rooted background preconditions; (b) *proximate causes*: specific situational circumstances; and (c) *immediate catalysts*: idiosyncratic contingent triggers.[158]

Legal transfer: Legal transfers "occur with either the active or passive involvement of governments

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154   IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

155   UNDC (1996, para. 7).

156   MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).

157   UNMAS (2016).

158   Schmid (1998).

THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKIT

or their authorized agents, and in accordance with both national and international law."[159]

Light weapon: Any human-portable lethal weapon designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew (although some may be carried and used by a single person) that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive.[160]

Militarization: Militarization should be understood as the process whereby "military values, ideology, and patterns of behaviour achieve a dominating influence on the political, social, economic, and external affairs of the State".[161]

Non-State armed groups (NSAGs): There is no internationally agreed definition of NSAGs in international treaties. Hofmann and Schneckener (2011) define them as "distinctive organizations that are (i) willing and capable of using violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) not integrated into formalized state institutions such as regular armies, presidential guards, police, or special forces. They, therefore, (iii) possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure. They may, however, be supported or instrumentalized by state actors either secretly or openly, as often happens with militias paramilitaries, mercenaries, or private military companies."[162] NSAGs are distinct from the armed and security forces of a State and do not have authorization from the State in which they are based or operate to possess and use conventional arms. NSAG is used in this report as a synonym for armed non-State actor.[163] The various subgroups that could be categorized as NSAGs often have overlapping operational characteristics. The following list is a compilation of terms describing actors that could be considered armed non-State actors, based on the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict:[164]

- Armed groups
- Armed elements
- Armed forces of a de facto governing authority
- Armed movements
- Armed national liberation movements
- Armed opposition groups
- Armed rebel groups
- Armed terrorist groups
- Armed units
- Armed vigilante groups
- Belligerents
- Dissident armed forces
- Factions
- Foreign elements
- Gangs
- Guerrillas
- Illegal armed groups
- Insurgents
- Organized armed groups
- Organized criminal groups
- Political armed opposition groups
- Rebel groups
- Terrorist groups

Political violence: Violence used for explicitly stated political ends, violence that undermines and

159   Small Arms Survey (2001, 141).

160   MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).

161   Churches Commission on International Affairs (1982, 5).

162   Hofmann and Schneckener (2011).

163   Ruaudel (2013) defines armed non-State actors (ANSAs) as "Organized armed entities that are primarily motivated by political goals, operate outside effective State control, and lack legal capacity to become party to relevant international treaties. This includes non-State armed groups, national liberation movements and de facto governing authorities. ANSAs are usually engaged in armed struggle against State forces or other ANSAs in the context of non-international armed conflict or other situations of violence".

164   Burniske et al. (2017).

challenges the State's legal monopoly over the legitimate use of force, or violence that implicates the State and its repressive apparatus.[165]

Post-conflict: Situation following an armed conflict, characterized by a clear victory of one party, a declared cessation of war (that is, a peace agreement or ceasefire), a stalemate or a significant reduction in armed violence.[166]

Proliferation: Proliferation relates to the increased accumulation and spread of weapons within an area or society. It is a measure not only of the number of weapons but also of the potential availability of weapons within a society and of the militarization of that society.

Risk: Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm.[167]

Risk Area: Covers different features of how conventional arms affect conflicts.

Risk Factor: Conditions that increase the risk (or susceptibility to) the outbreak of, escalation of or return to conflict. These conditions include arms-related behaviours, circumstances or elements that create an environment conducive to the outbreak, escalation or recurrence of conflict.

Risk Point: Can be used to evaluate the likelihood of each of the Risk Factors occurring and their impact on conflict dynamics.

Security sector reform: Involves the design and implementation of strategy for the management of security functions in a democratically accountable, efficient and effective manner to initiate and support reform of the national security infrastructure. The national security infrastructure includes appropriate national ministries, civil authorities, judicial systems, the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, intelligence services, private military companies, correctional services and civil society "watchdogs".[168]

Small arm: Any human-portable lethal weapon designed for individual use that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive.[169]

Stockpile destruction: The physical activities and destructive procedures towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile.[170]

Stockpile management: Procedures and activities designed to ensure the safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation and handling of small arms and/or light weapons, including their parts, components and ammunition.[171]

Trigger(s): Immediate event that accelerates the outbreak of a conflict. A sudden catalyst or spark (for example, the assassination of a leader, election fraud or a political scandal) can "ignite" the conflict.[172]

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165   Krause (2019).
166   Geneva Declaration Secretariat (2008).
167   IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
168   IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
169   MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
170   IDDRS 1.20 (2006).
171   MOSAIC 01.20 (2018).
172   Schmid (1998).

 Violence against women or gender-based violence: Defined as "any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private. Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following: (a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation; (b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution; (c) Physical, sexual and psychological violence perpetrated or condoned by the State, wherever it occurs" (United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 1993).[173]

Weapons and ammunition management: The oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout their lifecycle, including establishment of frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, tracing and disposal.[174]

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173   IDDRS 1.20 (2006).

174   de Tessières and Shiotani (2019, 2).

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THE ARMS-RELATED RISK ANALYSIS TOOLKIT

The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit

Practical guidance for integrating conventional arms-related risks into conflict analysis and prevention

The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit is a UNIDIR Toolkit designed to contribute to ongoing efforts to include conventional arms and ammunition-related risks in conflict analysis and conflict prevention, management, and resolution efforts. The Toolkit consists of three tools: the Arms-Related Risk Analysis Tool, the Risk Factor Selector Tool; and the Arms-Related Information Sources Compendium Tool. The Toolkit responds to the United Nations Secretary-General's call for the integration of conventional arms control into United Nations conflict prevention and management activities by providing guidance on how to gather and interpret arms-related information for conflict prevention efforts. The Arms-Related Risk Analysis Toolkit builds upon research undertaken by UNIDIR as part of its workstream on "Integrating Conventional Arms Control into Conflict Prevention and Management".

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