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	<title>Nuclear disarmament verification → UNIDIR</title>
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	<title>Nuclear disarmament verification → UNIDIR</title>
	<link>https://unidir.org</link>
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	<item>
		<title>Verification Without a Treaty</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/verification-without-a-treaty/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Meyha Sharma]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 08:47:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=23670</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the established practice of nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements, verification provisions are negotiated as part of a treaty to provide States with a mechanism to assess compliance and to deter violations of its terms. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to negotiate new legally binding agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral. In some areas,<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/verification-without-a-treaty/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/verification-without-a-treaty/">Verification Without a Treaty</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the established practice of nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements, verification provisions are negotiated as part of a treaty to provide States with a mechanism to assess compliance and to deter violations of its terms. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to negotiate new legally binding agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral. In some areas, in the absence of a functioning treaty, States assume certain obligations that constrain their behaviour, such as moratoriums on fissile material production or explosive nuclear tests, or a commitment to constrain deployment of some weapon systems. However, without agreed verification mechanisms, it is often difficult to confirm compliance with such obligations. </p>



<p>This report suggests an approach to verifying obligations assumed by States through a mechanism of demonstrative verification, in which a State that wants to demonstrate compliance with its obligations unilaterally implements measures to positively prove its compliance to an international audience. To be effective, these measures must include a detailed verification protocol, rely on open data rather than intelligence estimates, and potentially involve independent observers. This report discusses potential applications of this approach to nuclear arms control and space security.</p>



&nbsp;



<p>Citation: <em>Tamara Patton and Pavel Podvig, &#8220;Verification Without a Treaty. Demonstrative Verification in Arms Control, Disarmament, and Space Security&#8221;, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025.</em> <a href="https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/01">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/01</a>.</p>



<p></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/verification-without-a-treaty/">Verification Without a Treaty</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-reporting-and-interactive-dialogue-options-for-npt-disarmament-obligations/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Meyha Sharma]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Apr 2025 14:36:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=21723</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report provides options for States parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) to consider in developing a mechanism for interactive dialogue in the NPT review cycle. Transparency can play an important role in building confidence in international agreements, including the NPT. While several nuclear weapon States have provided information on Article VI obligations and<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-reporting-and-interactive-dialogue-options-for-npt-disarmament-obligations/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-reporting-and-interactive-dialogue-options-for-npt-disarmament-obligations/">Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This report provides options for States parties to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) to consider in developing a mechanism for interactive dialogue in the NPT review cycle. </p>



<p>Transparency can play an important role in building confidence in international agreements, including the NPT. While several nuclear weapon States have provided information on Article VI obligations and related commitments, limited progress on disarmament has led to increased calls for greater transparency and accountability.</p>



<p>Various proposals have outlined how this might be achieved and what information should be provided, but there is less clarity around the options regarding the format and process of interactive discussion.</p>



<p>To help fill this gap, this report reviews models from other multilateral processes – including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Financial Action Task Force, the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, and the World Trade Organization Trade Policy Review Mechanism – and presents potential options for integrating interactive dialogue into the NPT review cycle.</p>



&nbsp;



<p>Citation: <em>James Revill, Victoria Viana Souza Guimarães, and Luiza Delaflora Cassol, “Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations”, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025. <a href="https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/02" title="">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/02</a></em>.</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-reporting-and-interactive-dialogue-options-for-npt-disarmament-obligations/">Exploring Reporting and Interactive Dialogue Options for NPT Disarmament Obligations</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Strengthening the NPT Safeguards Regime for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Development: Event Summary</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/strengthening-the-npt-safeguards-regime-for-naval-nuclear-propulsion-development-event-summary/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Meyha Sharma]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Apr 2025 15:23:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=21700</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report summarizes the discussions held during a side event convened by Indonesia and supported by UNIDIR on naval nuclear propulsion (NNP), which took place in Geneva on 25 July 2024 on the sidelines of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/strengthening-the-npt-safeguards-regime-for-naval-nuclear-propulsion-development-event-summary/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/strengthening-the-npt-safeguards-regime-for-naval-nuclear-propulsion-development-event-summary/">Strengthening the NPT Safeguards Regime for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Development: Event Summary</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This report summarizes the discussions held during a side event convened by Indonesia and supported by UNIDIR on naval nuclear propulsion (NNP), which took place in Geneva on 25 July 2024 on the sidelines of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).</p>



<p>Indonesia invited countries that had submitted working papers on NNP at the 2022 NPT Review Conference – including those currently developing this technology – as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, to engage in further discussions on the issue. UNIDIR facilitated the discussion and provided background material on the topic at hand.</p>



&nbsp;



<p>Citation: <em>Luiza Delaflora Cassol and James Revill (eds.), “Strengthening the NPT Safeguards Regime for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Development: Event Summary”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025. <a href="https://www.doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/01">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NDV/01</a></em>.</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/strengthening-the-npt-safeguards-regime-for-naval-nuclear-propulsion-development-event-summary/">Strengthening the NPT Safeguards Regime for Naval Nuclear Propulsion Development: Event Summary</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Process</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/taking-stock-of-the-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty-process/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Natalia Mendez Alzate]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 07 Jun 2024 10:13:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=18367</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The pursuit of a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for weapons and other nuclear explosive devices – commonly referred to as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) – has been an important element of efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime for more than three decades. Several initiatives<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/taking-stock-of-the-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty-process/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/taking-stock-of-the-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty-process/">Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Process</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The pursuit of a treaty to ban the production of fissile materials for weapons and other nuclear explosive devices – commonly referred to as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) – has been an important element of efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime for more than three decades.</p>



<p>Several initiatives over the past decade have advanced the discussions on an FMCT. In addition, several states have indicated strong support for beginning negotiations on an FMCT, including through a recent initiative led by the Government of Japan.&nbsp;</p>



<p>In December 2023, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution that urged the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a treaty and urged states that possess or produce fissile materials for weapons to engage in transparency and confidence-building measures. However, the prospects for commencing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament remain uncertain.&nbsp;</p>



<p>This paper outlines some of the issues that have complicated progress in the negotiation of an FMCT and lays out options for states to consider in seeking to revive discussions around this important concept. It covers some of the key questions regarding a future treaty, including whether or not the FMCT should be a disarmament treaty – that is, whether it should require the active elimination of fissile materials.&nbsp;</p>



<p>The paper then lays out options for dealing with the related challenge of how to deal with existing stocks before considering issues related to transfers of fissile materials as well as options for transparency and confidence-building measures.</p>



<p>This project is generously supported by the Government of Japan.</p>



<p>Citation: <em>Pavel Podvig, “Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Process”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024: <a href="https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/FMCT/1">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/FMCT/1</a></em></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/taking-stock-of-the-fissile-material-cut-off-treaty-process/">Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty Process</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Menzingen Verification Experiment: Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/menzingen-verification-experiment-verifying-the-absence-of-nuclear-weapons-in-the-field/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 30 Jul 2023 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/publication/menzingen-verification-experiment-verifying-the-absence-of-nuclear-weapons-in-the-field/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Summary of the Menzingen Verification Experiment The Menzingen Verification Experiment&#160;was designed to test practical procedures for verifying the absence of nuclear weapons at a storage site. The experiment, which was conducted on 8 March 2023, was organized by UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/menzingen-verification-experiment-verifying-the-absence-of-nuclear-weapons-in-the-field/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/menzingen-verification-experiment-verifying-the-absence-of-nuclear-weapons-in-the-field/">Menzingen Verification Experiment: Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><u><strong><a href="https://unidir.org/programmes/wmd/mve">Summary of the Menzingen Verification Experiment</a></strong></u></p>



<p>The Menzingen Verification Experiment<strong>&nbsp;</strong>was designed to test practical procedures for verifying the absence of nuclear weapons at a storage site. The experiment, which was conducted on 8 March 2023, was organized by UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, and the Open Nuclear Network. The project was supported by the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland.</p>



<p>This report describes the procedure and the key results of the Menzingen Verification Experiment.</p>



<p>Citation:<em> Podvig, Pavel (ed.). 2023. &#8220;Menzingen Verification Experiment. Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field&#8221;, Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR. <a href="https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/MVE">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/23/MVE</a>.</em></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/menzingen-verification-experiment-verifying-the-absence-of-nuclear-weapons-in-the-field/">Menzingen Verification Experiment: Verifying the Absence of Nuclear Weapons in the Field</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/verifying-disarmament-in-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jun 2022 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/publication/verifying-disarmament-in-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This report explores the concept of the verification of nuclear disarmament in the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The authors show that disarmament in this case will be a cooperative process accompanied by a deep transformation of the disarming state. While technical tools and procedures will continue to play an<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/verifying-disarmament-in-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/verifying-disarmament-in-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/">Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This report explores the concept of the verification of nuclear disarmament in the context of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The authors show that disarmament in this case will be a cooperative process accompanied by a deep transformation of the disarming state. While technical tools and procedures will continue to play an important role, their primary purpose will be to allow the disarming state to demonstrate its commitment to its disarmament obligations.</p>



<p><em>Preview image&nbsp;by&nbsp;<a tabindex="-1" title="http://www.geoeye.com/corpsite/gallery/gallery-image.aspx?2109&amp;g=19" href="http://www.geoeye.com/CorpSite/gallery/gallery-image.aspx?2109&amp;g=19" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" aria-label="Link GeoEye">GeoEye</a>.</em></p>



<p><strong>Sponsor Organizations:</strong> Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute’s activities. This research project of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme is supported by the Government of New Zealand.</p>



<p>Citation: <em>Pavel Podvig (ed.) (2022) &#8220;Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons&#8221;, UNIDIR, Geneva. Switzerland</em>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/TPNW/01">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/TPNW/01</a></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/verifying-disarmament-in-the-treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/">Verifying Disarmament in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Exploring Options for Missile Verification</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-options-for-missile-verification/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Mar 2022 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-options-for-missile-verification/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Missiles are becoming an increasingly prominent element of military arsenals, but the system of arms control that helped provide a check on the missile arms race is under considerable stress. Addressing this challenge will require developing new approaches to missile verification. This report covers various aspects of verification arrangements that could be applied to missiles.<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-options-for-missile-verification/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-options-for-missile-verification/">Exploring Options for Missile Verification</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Missiles are becoming an increasingly prominent element of military arsenals, but the system of arms control that helped provide a check on the missile arms race is under considerable stress. Addressing this challenge will require developing new approaches to missile verification.</p>



<p>This report covers various aspects of verification arrangements that could be applied to missiles. The authors look at the experience of past arms control and disarmament efforts, provide an overview of existing verification tools, and initiate a discussion of potential arrangements that could make future arms control agreements possible.</p>



<p>The general conclusion of the report is that there is a variety of options to consider. Most verification arrangements would require a fairly high level of transparency, but that is what makes them stronger and more reliable. The path to building an effective verification arrangement is to design it in a way that facilitates cooperation and transparency.&nbsp;</p>



<p>Citation: <em>Podvig, Pavel (ed.) (2022) &#8220;Exploring Options for Missile Verification&#8221;, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. <a href="https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/Misver/01">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/)2/Misver/01</a></em></p>



<p><em>Listings image: Detail of &#8220;<a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/tobiasbegemann/31948081370/in/photostream/">Topol TEL in Military Historical Museum of Artillery, Engineers and Signal Corps St. Petersburg</a>&#8221; by <a href="https://www.flickr.com/photos/tobiasbegemann/">Tobias Begemann</a>, <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/">CC BY 2.0 licence</a></em></p>



<p><strong>Sponsor Organizations:</strong> Government of Germany.</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/exploring-options-for-missile-verification/">Exploring Options for Missile Verification</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Freeze and Verify: Ending Fissile Material Production on the Korean Peninsula</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/freeze-and-verify-ending-fissile-material-production-on-the-korean-peninsula/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Sep 2020 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/publication/freeze-and-verify-ending-fissile-material-production-on-the-korean-peninsula/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Progress towards denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula critically depends on finding a way to constrain and roll back the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A freeze on its fissile material production would be the first essential step, provided that it can be made effectively verifiable. This requirement presents a significant technical as<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/freeze-and-verify-ending-fissile-material-production-on-the-korean-peninsula/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/freeze-and-verify-ending-fissile-material-production-on-the-korean-peninsula/">Freeze and Verify: Ending Fissile Material Production on the Korean Peninsula</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Progress towards denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula critically depends on finding a way to constrain and roll back the nuclear programme of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. A freeze on its fissile material production would be the first essential step, provided that it can be made effectively verifiable. This requirement presents a significant technical as well as political challenge. This study proposes an arrangement for a verified freeze of fissile material production through a new mechanism to verify the suspension of all production activities in the early stages of the denuclearization process. It would also provide a mechanism for building confidence and trust and create a path to expanding the verification programme. In the longer run, this freeze verification arrangement would ensure that all material, military as well as civilian, will be accounted for and placed under appropriate safeguards.</p>



<p><strong>Sponsor Organizations:</strong> France, New Zealand, The Republic of Korea</p>



<p>Citation: <em>Pavel Podvig (2020) “Freeze and Verify: Ending Fissile Material Production on the Korean Peninsula”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. <a href="https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/TV/01">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/TV/01</a></em></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/freeze-and-verify-ending-fissile-material-production-on-the-korean-peninsula/">Freeze and Verify: Ending Fissile Material Production on the Korean Peninsula</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Watch Them Go: Simplifying the Elimination of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/watch-them-go-simplifying-the-elimination-of-fissile-materials-and-nuclear-weapons/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 14 Aug 2019 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/publication/watch-them-go-simplifying-the-elimination-of-fissile-materials-and-nuclear-weapons/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>This publication&#160;describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear-armed States to verifiably dispose of fissile materials that are no longer required for military purposes or to dismantle and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key advantage of the proposed arrangement is that it won’t require access to classified information about fissile materials or<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/watch-them-go-simplifying-the-elimination-of-fissile-materials-and-nuclear-weapons/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/watch-them-go-simplifying-the-elimination-of-fissile-materials-and-nuclear-weapons/">Watch Them Go: Simplifying the Elimination of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This publication&nbsp;describes a new approach to nuclear disarmament verification that would allow nuclear-armed States to verifiably dispose of fissile materials that are no longer required for military purposes or to dismantle and eliminate nuclear weapons. The key advantage of the proposed arrangement is that it won’t require access to classified information about fissile materials or weapons, which greatly simplifies the disarmament verification process.</p>



<p>Citation: <em>Pavel Podvig and Ryan Snyder (2019) “Watch Them Go: Simplifying the Elimination of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons&#8221;, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. <a href="https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/19/NuclearVer01">https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/19/NuclearVer01</a></em></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/watch-them-go-simplifying-the-elimination-of-fissile-materials-and-nuclear-weapons/">Watch Them Go: Simplifying the Elimination of Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Survey of Verification Mechanisms</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-disarmament-verification-survey-of-verification-mechanisms/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Oct 2016 22:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-disarmament-verification-survey-of-verification-mechanisms/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The objective of this survey is to provide a general overview of past and present verification activities and proposals relevant to the elimination of nuclear weapons. We look beyond the current debate on nuclear disarmament towards the development of the mechanisms required to provide assurances that a nuclear-weapon-free world can be achieved and maintained. Reaching<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-disarmament-verification-survey-of-verification-mechanisms/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-disarmament-verification-survey-of-verification-mechanisms/">Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Survey of Verification Mechanisms</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The objective of this survey is to provide a general overview of past and present verification activities and proposals relevant to the elimination of nuclear weapons. We look beyond the current debate on nuclear disarmament towards the development of the mechanisms required to provide assurances that a nuclear-weapon-free world can be achieved and maintained. Reaching these objectives will be challenging, but, as the paper shows, feasible.</p>



<p>Citation: <em>Tim Caughley (2016). &#8220;Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Survey of Verification Mechanisms&#8221;, UNIDIR, Geneva.</em></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/nuclear-disarmament-verification-survey-of-verification-mechanisms/">Nuclear Disarmament Verification: Survey of Verification Mechanisms</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from Space: A Preliminary Study</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/publication/verification-of-a-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-from-space-a-preliminary-study/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Nov 1994 23:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/publication/verification-of-a-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-from-space-a-preliminary-study/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Citation: Bhupendra Jasani (1994). &#8220;Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from Space: A Preliminary Study&#8221;, UNIDIR, Geneva.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/verification-of-a-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-from-space-a-preliminary-study/">Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from Space: A Preliminary Study</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Citation: <em>Bhupendra Jasani (1994). &#8220;Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from Space: A Preliminary Study&#8221;, UNIDIR, Geneva.</em></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/publication/verification-of-a-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-from-space-a-preliminary-study/">Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty from Space: A Preliminary Study</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>The Case of Nuclear Diplomacy in Geneva (Geneva Policy Outlook, Switzerland)</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/the-case-of-nuclear-diplomacy-in-geneva-geneva-policy-outlook-switzerland/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicole Kwan Kiu Leung]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Jan 2026 08:10:07 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[In the media]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/?p=25464</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[]]></description>
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		<title>A Study Suggests New Approach to Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/a-study-suggests-new-approach-to-denuclearization-of-the-korean-peninsula/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Sep 2020 10:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Press release]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/a-study-suggests-new-approach-to-denuclearization-of-the-korean-peninsula/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>An end of fissile material production can be reliably verified and prepare ground for more comprehensive measures. GENEVA,&#160;16 SEPTEMBER 2020&#160;—&#160;A UNIDIR report&#160;published today suggests a new approach to resolving the key technical hurdle on the way toward an arrangement that would stop the production of fissile materials in the Democratic People&#8217;s Republic of Korea. The<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/a-study-suggests-new-approach-to-denuclearization-of-the-korean-peninsula/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/a-study-suggests-new-approach-to-denuclearization-of-the-korean-peninsula/">A Study Suggests New Approach to Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<table>
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<p><em>An end of fissile material production can be reliably verified and prepare ground for more comprehensive measures.</em></p>
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<p><strong>GENEVA,&nbsp;16 SEPTEMBER 2020</strong>&nbsp;—&nbsp;A UNIDIR report&nbsp;published today suggests a new approach to resolving the key technical hurdle on the way toward an arrangement that would stop the production of fissile materials in the Democratic People&#8217;s Republic of Korea.</p>
<p>The report,&nbsp;Freeze and Verify: Ending Fissile Material Production on the Korean Peninsula, explains that a freeze of fissile material production is widely seen as an essential element of any future agreement to constrain and roll back the DPRK nuclear program. &#8220;The key technical issue is how to ensure reliable verification of the freeze in a situation when inspectors do not have access all nuclear facilities in the State,&#8221; said Pavel Podvig, the author of the study. He added that while in the past the DPRK expressed readiness to close some of its nuclear sites, it is difficult to expect that it will disclose locations of its military facilities.</p>
<p>The arrangement described in the report shows that even in this case it is possible to build an effective verification programme. This programme would verify the end of production and would eventually account for all nuclear materials. The verification programme could support the political process leading to elimination of all nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>This project is part of a broader UNIDIR research programme that explores various aspects of nuclear disarmament verification. &#8220;Developing ideas that can help advance practical disarmament is the core of the Institute&#8217;s mission,&#8221; said Dr. Renata Dwan, Director of UNIDIR. &#8220;This report identifies pragmatic paths to overcome technical obstacles and help create greater political space to address the challenge of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula.&#8221;</p>
<p><strong>ABOUT UNIDIR</strong></p>
<p>UNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. For more information about UNIDIR, visit:&nbsp;<a href="http://www.unidir.org/" title="http://www.unidir.org">www.unidir.org</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Follow UNIDIR on&nbsp;<a href="http://www.facebook.com/UNIDIRGeneva">Facebook</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.instagram.com/un_disarmresearch/" title="https://www.instagram.com/un_disarmresearch/">Instagram</a>, and&nbsp;<a href="http://www.twitter.com/UNIDIR" title="http://www.twitter.com/UNIDIR">Twitter</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</td>
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<p><strong>MEDIA CONTACT </strong></p>
<table>
<colgroup>
<col />
<col />
	</colgroup>
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<th align="left">Aaron J. Buckley</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th align="left">Pavel Podvig</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Communications<br />
			Officer</td>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<td>Senior Researcher, WMD &amp; Other<br />
			Strategic Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+41 76 691 10 74</td>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<td>+41 78 798 79 68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="mailto:buckleya@un.org">buckleya@un.org</a></td>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
<th>&nbsp;</th>
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<th>&nbsp;</th>
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<td><a href="mailto:Pavel.podvig@un.org" title="mailto:Pavel.podvig@un.org">Pavel.podvig@un.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/a-study-suggests-new-approach-to-denuclearization-of-the-korean-peninsula/">A Study Suggests New Approach to Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Transparency and accountability in the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/event/transparency-and-accountability-in-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-process/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nicole Kwan Kiu Leung]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2026 13:15:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/?post_type=event&#038;p=26903</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>UNIDIR, in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, is organizing a series of nuclear-related events in the lead-up to the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The conference is central to evaluating the implementation of the treaty and shaping its future direction. These events aim to enhance understanding of key issues and<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/event/transparency-and-accountability-in-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-process/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/transparency-and-accountability-in-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-process/">Transparency and accountability in the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>UNIDIR, in collaboration with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, is organizing a <a href="https://unidir.org/preparing-for-the-npt-review-conference/" title="">series of nuclear-related events</a> in the lead-up to the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The conference is central to evaluating the implementation of the treaty and shaping its future direction. These events aim to enhance understanding of key issues and deepen engagement with the NPT review processes, procedures and potential outcomes. The series is sponsored by Switzerland.</p>



<p>The sixth and final event in this series will focus on transparency and accountability, which are essential to building confidence in international agreements, including the NPT. All nuclear‑weapon States (NWS) have provided information regarding their obligations under Article VI and related commitments, including those contained in the 2010 NPT Action Plan. Over the course of the current review cycle, however, calls have grown for NWS to demonstrate greater transparency and accountability in the fulfilment of these obligations and commitments. This event will bring together experts to examine the role of transparency and accountability in the context of NPT disarmament obligations and commitments, and to consider potential steps for strengthening these practices at the upcoming conference and beyond.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Agenda</h4>



<p>Please include the following list of speakers:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Nobumasa Akiyama</strong>, Professor, Graduate School of Law,  Hitotsubashi University</li>



<li><strong>Alice Spilman</strong>, Policy Fellow, British American Security Information Council</li>



<li><strong>Dmitry Stefanovich</strong>, Research Fellow, Center for International Security at the Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences</li>
</ul>



<p>Moderated by <strong>James Revill</strong>, Head of the WMD Programme, UNIDIR.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">When and where</h4>



<p><strong>Thursday, 23</strong> April 2026 | 13:15 – 14:45 CEST | Online </p>



<p>Check your local time&nbsp;<a href="https://www.worldtimebuddy.com/">here</a>.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Participants</h4>



<p>The event is open to State representatives and experts working on or interested in issues pertaining to the NPT.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">RSVP</h4>



<p>Please register to attend online <a href="https://unidir-org.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_VpvRFS6dRt-giRu-edw9Dg#/registration">here</a>.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Further information </h4>



<p>For any questions, please contact Victor Calero at <a href="mailto:victor.calerogranda@un.org">victor.calerogranda@un.org</a>.</p>



<p><a id="_msocom_1"></a></p>



<p></p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/transparency-and-accountability-in-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-process/">Transparency and accountability in the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Pathways to nuclear disarmament verification</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/event/pathways-to-nuclear-disarmament-verification/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mireia Mas Vivancos]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2025 12:07:02 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/?post_type=event&#038;p=23741</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Verification is a key element in arms control and disarmament processes, taking various forms depending on context and objectives. To explore pathways for advancing verification amid today’s geopolitical tensions, this event examined current opportunities and future directions for strengthening verification mechanisms. The event began with an overview of the potential role of a group of<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/event/pathways-to-nuclear-disarmament-verification/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/pathways-to-nuclear-disarmament-verification/">Pathways to nuclear disarmament verification</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Verification is a key element in arms control and disarmament processes, taking various forms depending on context and objectives. To explore pathways for advancing verification amid today’s geopolitical tensions, this event examined current opportunities and future directions for strengthening verification mechanisms.</p>



<p>The event began with an overview of the potential role of a group of scientific and technical experts on nuclear disarmament verification in building capacity and generating knowledge in this field. This was followed by a presentation of a new UNIDIR digital repository of resources related to disarmament verification. Next, the event highlighted findings from UNIDIR’s latest research report, “<a href="https://unidir.org/publication/verification-without-a-treaty/" target="_blank" rel="noopener" title="">Verification Without a Treaty</a>.” The report introduces the concept of demonstrative verification &#8211; an approach that enables States to actively showcase compliance with arms control or disarmament commitments, even in the absence of formal treaties.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Event recording</h4>



<p><iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/4FODIJZSrXc?si=_isQcoRLsKQ5i_P9" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Agenda</h4>



<p>Welcome remarks: Ambassador <strong>Marcelo Paz Saraiva Câmara</strong>, Director of the Department of Strategic Affairs, Defence and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil</p>



<p><strong>Panellists</strong></p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>Laurence MacFaul</strong>, Executive Director, Verification Research Training and Information Centre</li>



<li><strong>Luiza Delaflora Cassol</strong>, Research Assistant, Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, UNIDIR</li>



<li><strong>Pavel Podvig</strong>, Senior Researcher, Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme, UNIDIR</li>
</ul>



<p>Moderated by: <strong>James Revill</strong>, Head of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Space Programmes, UNIDIR</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">When and where</h4>



<p><strong>Thursday, 30 October 2025, 14:00 – 15:15 CET or 09:00 – 10:15 EDT</strong>, online via Zoom.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">Further information</h4>



<p>For any questions, please contact <a href="mailto:luiza.delafloracassol@un.org">luiza.delafloracassol@un.org</a>.</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/pathways-to-nuclear-disarmament-verification/">Pathways to nuclear disarmament verification</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/event/taking-stock-of-the-fmct/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Asa Cusack]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2024 09:56:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/?post_type=event&#038;p=17408</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>A treaty to ban the production of fissile materials has been an important element of efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime for more than two decades. Despite significant support for commencing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), progress remains deadlocked. To explore options and opportunities to revitalize the<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/event/taking-stock-of-the-fmct/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/taking-stock-of-the-fmct/">Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A treaty to ban the production of fissile materials has been an important element of efforts to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime for more than two decades. Despite significant support for commencing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), progress remains deadlocked.</p>



<p>To explore options and opportunities to revitalize the FMCT process, UNIDIR organized a panel event to provide States with a range of strategies that could help revitalize the debate and address some of the issues that have stifled progress towards the start of negotiations.</p>



<p>The event included the presentation of a UNIDIR working paper on unblocking the FMCT, followed by a panel discussion and a question-and-answer session with participants.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">EVENT RECORDING</h4>



<p>A recording of this event is available on our <a href="https://youtu.be/8yddTatPwdI" title="">YouTube channel</a>, and below.</p>



<iframe width="560" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/8yddTatPwdI?si=BU6Z65yZPR_RXhu6" title="YouTube video player" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen=""></iframe>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">SPEAKERS</h4>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>H.E. Amb. Ichikawa Tomiko</strong>, Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament (Welcome Remarks)</li>



<li><strong>Dr. Pavel Podvig</strong>, Senior Researcher in the WMD Programme at UNIDIR</li>



<li><strong>Mr. Thomas Fetz</strong>, Deputy Permanent Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, Permanent Mission of Canada&nbsp;to the United Nations</li>



<li><strong>Mr. Alonso Martinez Ruiz</strong>, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations</li>



<li><strong>Prof. Nishida Michiru</strong>, Professor at the School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki University</li>
</ul>



<p>The event was moderated by <strong>Dr. James Revill</strong>, Head of the WMD Programme, UNIDIR.</p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">WHEN &amp; WHERE</h4>



<p><strong>26 March 2024</strong> | <strong>13:15 – 14:45 CEST</strong> | Room VIII, A Building, Palais des Nations, <strong>Geneva</strong> and <strong>Online</strong>. </p>



<h4 class="wp-block-heading">PARTICIPANTS</h4>



<p>The event was open to State representatives and experts working on or interested in issues pertaining to nuclear disarmament and a fissile material cut-off treaty.</p>



<p></p>



<p>For any questions, please contact Ms. María Garzón Maceda at <a href="mailto:maria.garzon@un.org">maria.garzon@un.org</a>.</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/taking-stock-of-the-fmct/">Taking Stock of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<title>Nuclear Disarmament Verification in Practice: A Field Exercise to Verify the Absence of Weapons</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-in-practice-a-field-exercise-to-verify-the-absence-of-weapons/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Jul 2023 05:45:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-in-practice-a-field-exercise-to-verify-the-absence-of-weapons/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Removing nuclear weapons from their delivery systems can be an effective nuclear arms control and disarmament measure. It can also be an important step in reducing nuclear risks in times of crisis or military conflict. Verification of the removal of weapons does not require access to sensitive information, which greatly simplifies verification procedures and makes<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-in-practice-a-field-exercise-to-verify-the-absence-of-weapons/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-in-practice-a-field-exercise-to-verify-the-absence-of-weapons/">Nuclear Disarmament Verification in Practice: A Field Exercise to Verify the Absence of Weapons</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p paraeid="{b3255c3b-57ab-4386-a9ca-2aa89037fa12}{168}" paraid="1388949543">Removing nuclear weapons from their delivery systems can be an effective nuclear arms control and disarmament measure. It can also be an important step in reducing nuclear risks in times of crisis or military conflict. Verification of the removal of weapons does not require access to sensitive information, which greatly simplifies verification procedures and makes a removal agreement easier to implement.&nbsp;</p>
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{4}" paraid="1682981030">At this <strong>side event to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – Preparatory Committee for the Eleventh Review Conference</strong>, co-sponsored by the Governments of the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland, UNIDIR will present a research report that describes the Menzingen Verification Experiment, which took place on 8 March 2023. The experiment was designed to test practical procedures for verifying the absence of nuclear weapons. It modelled an on-site inspection of a nuclear weapons storage site, represented by a former air defense site near Menzingen provided by the Swiss Armed Forces. The experiment was organized by UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, and Open Nuclear Network.&nbsp;</p>
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{28}" paraid="766025578">The panelists will discuss the following topics:&nbsp;</p>
<ul role="list">
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-aria-level="1" data-aria-posinset="1" data-font="Symbol" data-leveltext="" data-list-defn-props="{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559684&quot;:-2,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}" data-listid="27" role="listitem">
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{38}" paraid="386789091">Removal of nuclear weapons as an arms control and disarmament tool,&nbsp;</p>
</li>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-aria-level="1" data-aria-posinset="2" data-font="Symbol" data-leveltext="" data-list-defn-props="{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559684&quot;:-2,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}" data-listid="27" role="listitem">
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{45}" paraid="210909007">Verifying the absence of nuclear weapons and the design of the Menzingen Verification Experiment,&nbsp;</p>
</li>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-aria-level="1" data-aria-posinset="3" data-font="Symbol" data-leveltext="" data-list-defn-props="{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559684&quot;:-2,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}" data-listid="27" role="listitem">
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{56}" paraid="1616943118">An account of the model on-site inspection,&nbsp;</p>
</li>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-aria-level="1" data-aria-posinset="4" data-font="Symbol" data-leveltext="" data-list-defn-props="{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559684&quot;:-2,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}" data-listid="27" role="listitem">
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{63}" paraid="520454154">The use of satellite imagery to support on-site inspections.&nbsp;</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{74}" paraid="1651825092">A brief account of the Menzingen experiment has been published on the <a href="https://unidir.org/programmes/wmd/mve" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">UNIDIR website</a>. The full report will be available online before the event.&nbsp;</p>
<h4 paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{74}" paraid="1651825092">SPEAKERS</h4>
<p>The event will be moderated by <strong>Andrey Baklitsky</strong>, Senior Researcher, UNIDIR, who will present the following speakers:</p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><strong>H.E. Robert in den Bosch</strong>, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Conference on Disarmament, and Disarmament Ambassador at large for Disarmament Affairs</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Silvia Greve</strong>, Political Affairs Officer, Arms Control and Disarmament Policy, International Defense Relations, Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection and Sport, Switzerland</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Pavel Podvig</strong>, Senior Researcher, UNIDIR</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Jaewoo Shin</strong>, Analyst, Open Nuclear Network, One Earth Future Foundation</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Ana de Velde Harsenhorst</strong>, Senior Policy Advisor on Nuclear Affairs, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands</p>
</li>
</ul>
<h4 paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{101}" paraid="1449299855">WHEN &amp; WHERE</h4>
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{101}" paraid="1449299855"><strong>Monday 31 July 2023</strong> | <strong>13:15–14:30 CEST</strong> | <strong>Room M7, Vienna International Centre</strong>, <strong>Vienna, Austria</strong>. Light lunch will be provided at 13:00.&nbsp;</p>
<h4 paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{159}" paraid="506081894">PARTICIPANTS</h4>
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{159}" paraid="506081894">This is an in-person event that is open to all participants of the NPT Preparatory Committee.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p paraeid="{846ffd1b-bd7b-4357-af55-87171f28ee04}{179}" paraid="2033988863">For any questions, please contact Pavel Podvig at <a href="mailto:pavel.podvig@un.org" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank">pavel.podvig@un.org</a>.</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-in-practice-a-field-exercise-to-verify-the-absence-of-weapons/">Nuclear Disarmament Verification in Practice: A Field Exercise to Verify the Absence of Weapons</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>Nuclear Disarmament Verification: From Mistrust to Cooperation (First Committee Side Event)</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-from-mistrust-to-cooperation-first-committee-side-event/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Oct 2022 05:45:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-from-mistrust-to-cooperation-first-committee-side-event/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Robust verification is an important element of arms control and disarmament. With time, verification procedures have become quite elaborate and intrusive, reflecting the increasingly ambitious disarmament goals and the generally favorable international environment of the past. More recently, however, the international situation became more complicated as cooperation between key participants in the arms control and<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-from-mistrust-to-cooperation-first-committee-side-event/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-from-mistrust-to-cooperation-first-committee-side-event/">Nuclear Disarmament Verification: From Mistrust to Cooperation (First Committee Side Event)</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Robust verification is an important element of arms control and disarmament. With time, verification procedures have become quite elaborate and intrusive, reflecting the increasingly ambitious disarmament goals and the generally favorable international environment of the past. More recently, however, the international situation became more complicated as cooperation between key participants in the arms control and disarmament process has all but ended and their relationships became characterized by a considerable degree of mistrust. These developments appear to make new verifiable arms control agreements virtually impossible. However, the practice of arms control shows that even in a rather adversarial environment properly designed verification mechanisms should be able to provide sufficient confidence in compliance with obligations assumed by states.</p>
<p>The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Government of New Zealand are pleased to invite you to the virtual side-event “Disarmament Verification: from Mistrust to Cooperation” on the sidelines of the 77th UNGA First Committee. This event will discuss the importance of national and cooperative verification tools, the potential role of open-source information, and adversarial vs. cooperative approach to verification.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>A recording of the event is available on the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTJ3J2lDlTE">UNIDIR Youtube Channel</a>&nbsp;(or see below).</em></p>
<p><iframe allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/rTJ3J2lDlTE" title="YouTube video player" width="560"></iframe></p>
<h4><strong>WHERE &amp; WHEN</strong></h4>
<p>This event will be held online on Monday, 17 October 2022, 13:15-14:30 New York / 19:15-20:30 Geneva&nbsp;</p>
<p><em><strong>Speakers</strong></em></p>
<ul>
<li>
<p><strong>Amy Woolf</strong>, RUSI and Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Nick Ritchie</strong>, University of York</p>
</li>
<li>
<p><strong>Pavel Podvig</strong>, UNIDIR</p>
</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>&nbsp;</strong><br />
<em><b>Participants</b></em></p>
<p>UNIDIR encourages the participation of diplomats, national representatives, policymakers, as well as academics, practitioners and other experts working on or interested in issues pertaining to disarmament and arms control.</p>
<h4><strong>RSVP</strong></h4>
<p>Please register through Eventbrite <a href=" https://DisarmamentVerification.eventbrite.com">here</a>. The link to access the meeting will be emailed to registered participants prior to the event.<br />
&nbsp;</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-from-mistrust-to-cooperation-first-committee-side-event/">Nuclear Disarmament Verification: From Mistrust to Cooperation (First Committee Side Event)</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>Nuclear Disarmament Verification Workshop</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-workshop/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Apr 2022 05:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-workshop/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Experts on nuclear disarmament verification will meet for a closed two-day workshop as part of our project on &#8220;New Approaches To Transparency And Verification In Nuclear Security And Disarmament.&#8221; UNIDIR’s research in this area is focused on overcoming challenges in nuclear verification, contributing to progress on nuclear disarmament and risk reduction measures, and strengthening current<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-workshop/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-workshop/">Nuclear Disarmament Verification Workshop</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Experts on nuclear disarmament verification will meet for a closed two-day workshop as part of our project on &#8220;New Approaches To Transparency And Verification In Nuclear Security And Disarmament.&#8221;</p>
<p>UNIDIR’s research in this area is focused on overcoming challenges in nuclear verification, contributing to progress on nuclear disarmament and risk reduction measures, and strengthening current agreements to curb weapons of mass destruction.<br />
&nbsp;</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/nuclear-disarmament-verification-workshop/">Nuclear Disarmament Verification Workshop</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Exploring Prospects for Missile Verification</title>
		<link>https://unidir.org/event/exploring-prospects-for-missile-verification/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[devx]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Oct 2021 06:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<guid isPermaLink="false">https://unidir.org/event/exploring-prospects-for-missile-verification/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Advances in missile technology, as well as the proliferation of missile-related technologies, have already resulted in significant changes to the international security landscape. If left unconstrained, these advances could cause further instability and heighten existing tensions. Efforts to address this challenge include proposals to establish limits on the number of missiles, their areas of deployment,<span class="excerpt-read-more">... <a class="btn--link" href="https://unidir.org/event/exploring-prospects-for-missile-verification/">Read more</a></span></p>
<p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/exploring-prospects-for-missile-verification/">Exploring Prospects for Missile Verification</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Advances in missile technology, as well as the proliferation of missile-related technologies, have already resulted in significant changes to the international security landscape. If left unconstrained, these advances could cause further instability and heighten existing tensions.</p>
<p>Efforts to address this challenge include proposals to establish limits on the number of missiles, their areas of deployment, or their characteristics. However, success in these efforts depends on the development of effective missile verification measures.</p>
<p><em>A recording of this&nbsp;event is now available on the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.youtube.com/c/UNIDIR">UNIDIR YouTube channel</a>&nbsp;(and below).</em></p>
<p><iframe loading="lazy" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture" allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_csgtqBBKsM" title="YouTube video player" width="560"></iframe></p>
<h4>
AGENDA</h4>
<p><strong>Welcoming Remarks</strong></p>
<p>Thomas Göbel, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.</p>
<p>
<strong>Panellists</strong></p>
<p>Pavel Podvig, Senior Researcher, UNIDIR&nbsp;</p>
<p>Dmitry Stefanovich, Institute of World Economy and International Relations&nbsp;</p>
<p>Almudena Azcarate Ortega, Associate Researcher, UNIDIR</p>
<p>
The web seminar included a question and answer session with the audience.</p>
<h4>&nbsp;</h4>
<h4>WHEN &amp; WHERE</h4>
<p>October 19 2021 13:30-14:45 EDT | Online.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><img decoding="async" alt="Germany" data-align="left" data-entity-type="file" data-entity-uuid="dd0d8bdf-6d11-4f17-8ca3-ec56f5c482da" src="/sites/default/files/inline-images/Genf_CD_engl_o_c.jpg" width="400" /></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><p>The post <a href="https://unidir.org/event/exploring-prospects-for-missile-verification/">Exploring Prospects for Missile Verification</a> first appeared on <a href="https://unidir.org">UNIDIR</a>.</p>]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
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