It has three core objectives:

• First, it maps the current landscape of official nuclear risk reduction policy proposals.
• Second, it organizes proposed risk reduction measures into a framework of eight overarching categories, enabling the range of measures to be considered within a single, coherent resource.
• And third, it analyses these measures by drawing out the similarities, differences and nuances across the various policy proposals.

The compendium concludes with a list of the official risk reduction documents referenced throughout the publication, totalling over 100 documents. This list provides easy access to over a decade of official proposals by States in their own words.

Citation: Sarah Ruth Opatowski, Nuclear Risk Reduction: An Illustrative Compendium (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026). https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/26/NRR/01.

The post Nuclear Risk Reduction: An Illustrative Compendium first appeared on UNIDIR.

The report also surveys the current security environment, highlighting deteriorating arms control frameworks, strained dialogue among nuclear powers, and expanding arsenals as critical concerns. It emphasizes that arms races sustain or intensify hostility among protagonists, compounding the inherent risks of nuclear weapons through deliberate competitive build-ups that are likely to exacerbate existing tensions. The conclusion explores what approaches can be used to manage these risks.

Citation: Tim Caughley, Racing Towards Risk: The Hidden Costs of Nuclear Arms Build-Up (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025), https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/NRR/01.

The post Racing Towards Risk: The Hidden Costs of Nuclear Arms Build-up first appeared on UNIDIR.

The retreat report defines the various forms of nuclear risks, highlights States’ differing interpretations of precautionary measures, explores potential flashpoints that could lead to nuclear use and examines ways to mitigate these risks.

The report also covers the contrasting views on deterrence, perceptions and misperceptions, the role of norms, challenges in signaling and the risks of escalation. Participants worked to identify islands of convergence amongst them, as well as potential areas of collaboration with non-nuclear-weapon States to advance risk reduction dialogue and measures.

Citation: Andrey Baklitskiy and Sarah Ruth Opatowski, Nuclear Risks: Perceptions and Pathways, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2024. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/NRR/01.

The post Nuclear Risks: Perceptions and Pathways first appeared on UNIDIR.

To this end, UNIDIR convened a two-day virtual workshop with partners from the University of Leicester and Yale-NUS College (Singapore). The workshop brought together members of the diplomatic community and experts in nuclear and cyber policy to jointly explore the cyber-nuclear nexus, identify areas of concern, and consider potential options to reduce risk. The discussion over the course of this two-day workshop is summarized in this report.

Citation: Rinko Kawamoto, Eleanor Krabill, and Harry Spencer (2022) “Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop Series: The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus, Summary Report”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/22/NRR/01. 

The post The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus Summary: Nuclear Risk Reduction Workshop Series first appeared on UNIDIR.

It traces trends both in the development of cyber capabilities and the digitalization of nuclear weapons systems that could drive more frequent interactions at the cyber–nuclear nexus. It considers how these interactions, direct and indirect, might impact on escalatory risk scenarios—drawing upon State doctrines, postures, and capabilities in the nuclear and cyber spheres. It then outlines a series of recommendations for States both to minimize cyber–nuclear interactions and to mitigate their effects when they do occur.

As part of UNIDIR’s ongoing research on nuclear risk reduction, this paper is intended to feed into the dialogue on taking forward risk reduction—and on the development of practical and feasible measures that can help to close pathways to use.

Citation: Wilfred Wan, Andraz Kastelic, and Eleanor Krabill (2021) “The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus: Interactions and Risks” NRR: Friction Points Series, Paper 2. UNIDIR, Geneva, https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/21/NRR/03

The post The Cyber-Nuclear Nexus: Interactions and Risks first appeared on UNIDIR.

It considers the multipolar dynamics between the United States, the Russian Federation, and China, and examines how fundamental mistrust among the three filters into their readings of each other’s nuclear strategies, with the potential to have an impact on escalatory risk scenarios. It then outlines a series of recommendations for the ‘great powers’ to bridge strategic perception gaps and reduce relevant risks.

Part of UNIDIR’s ongoing research on nuclear risk reduction, this study is intended to feed into the dialogue on taking forward risk reduction – and on the development of practical and feasible baskets of measures that can close pathways to use of nuclear weapons.

Citation: Wilfred Wan (2021) “Nuclear Escalation Strategies and Perceptions: The United States, the Russian Federation, and China.” NRR: Friction Points Series, Paper One, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/21/NRR/02. 

The post Nuclear Escalation Strategies and Perceptions: The United States, the Russian Federation, and China first appeared on UNIDIR.

This policy brief draws from and builds upon ideas from UNIDIR’s April 2020 multi-author volume, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use”.

Citation: Wilfred Wan (2021) “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Engaging non-NPT Nuclear Armed States (Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 5)”, UNIDIR Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/21/NRR/01

Teaser: Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 5

The post Nuclear Risk Reduction: Engaging the non-NPT Nuclear-Armed States first appeared on UNIDIR.

Adapted from her chapter in UNIDIR’s recent volume, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use”.

Citation: Tanya Ogilvie-White (2020) “The DPRK Nuclear Programme” (Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 4), UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/NRR/05

Teaser: Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 4

The post The DPRK Nuclear Programme first appeared on UNIDIR.

Adapted from his chapter in UNIDIR’s recent volume, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use”.

Citation: Ulrich Kühn (2020) “Perceptions in the Euro-Atlantic” (Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 3), UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/NRR/04

Teaser: Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 3

The post Perceptions in the Euro-Atlantic first appeared on UNIDIR.

Adapted from his chapter in UNIDIR’s recent volume, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use”.

Citation: John Borrie (2020) “Strategic Technologies” (Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 2), UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/NRR/03

Teaser: Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 2

The post Strategic Technologies first appeared on UNIDIR.

Adapted from his chapter in UNIDIR’s recent volume, “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use”.

Citation: Ankit Panda (2020) “On ‘Great Power Competition'”, Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 1, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/NRR/02

Teaser: Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 1

The post On ‘Great Power Competition’ first appeared on UNIDIR.

Citation: Wilfred Wan [ed] (2020) “Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/NRR/01

Edited by Wilfred Wan; Contributions by John Borrie, Hassan Elbahtimy, Ulrich Kühn, Tanya Ogilvie-White, Ankit Panda, and Manpreet Sethi

Watch an introduction from UNIDIR Director Renata Dwan and Wilfred Wan below, and see our YouTube Channel for interviews with of the authors — John Borrie, Ankit Panda, Ulrich Kühn, Tanya Ogilvie White, Manpreet Sethi, and Hassan Elbahtimy. Views expressed are the sole responsibility of the individual, and do not reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.

Watch the recording of the event here:

The post Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use first appeared on UNIDIR.

In the case of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the United States has found itself shouldering the burden of its own implementation requirements and those of the former Soviet Union via the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programme, thus leading American critics to question the cost-benefit advantages of arms control. After a detailed examination, it is clear that while unexpected costs arose during the implementation phase, the security benefits far outweighed the costs. Moreover, even with the additional burden of the CTR programme, the United States emerged with savings of US$ 1.52 billion from the START process, once annual savings from the reductions in its strategic arsenal were taken into account.

Today, the security benefits of strategic arms reductions have been eclipsed by the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, which reasserts the centrality of nuclear weapons to American security policy. Such a posture comes at a high cost/risk premium in that it could intensify asymmetries and exacerbate global insecurities. Such proposed nuclear rearmament is occurring at a time when the full human, environmental and financial costs of the nuclear arms race legacy are coming to light in both the United States and the Russian Federation.

To proceed with a new generation of nuclear weapons when the full costs are not taken into account is at best myopic. As the author demonstrated in the first book of the Costs of Disarmament series, many of the costs linked to disarmament are wrongly ascribed, in particular those incurred as part of weapons dismantling which truly belong to the normal lifecycle of weapons.

Costs of Disarmament – Disarming the Costs: Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Rearmament demonstrates that policies that actively seek to control and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons are far more cost-effective and enhance security more than any future decision to develop new nuclear weapons, taking into account all of the costs and risks associated with them.

Citation: Susan Willett (2003). “Costs of Disarmament – Disarming the Costs: Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Rearmament”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

The post Costs of Disarmament – Disarming the Costs: Nuclear Arms Control and Nuclear Rearmament first appeared on UNIDIR.

The publication provides a particular focus on the bilateral relationship with Brazil in nuclear matters. The Brazilian-Argentine system of nuclear controls is considered a model of non-proliferation for other regions of the world.

This study also evaluates the costs and benefits of nuclear regimes in the post-Cold War era on the basis of their impact on national, regional and international security in the context of an increasingly interdependent world.

Citation: Marcelo F. Valle Fonrouge (2003). “Desarme nuclear: Regímenes internacional, latinoaméricano y argentino de no proliferación”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

The post Desarme nuclear: Regímenes internacional, latinoaméricano y argentino de no proliferación first appeared on UNIDIR.

On 24 March 1993, the incumbent South African President, Frederick De Klerk, announced that South Africa had indeed built some nuclear weapons, but had subsequently destroyed them. He added that South Africa was ready to support and cooperate with other African states to negotiate a legal instrument on the denuclearization of the continent and promised his country’s cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. This statement provided further incentive for the pursuit of the African NWFZ and facilitated the invitation of South Africa to participate in the negotiations of a legally binding instrument, which commenced in Harare in April 1993.

Authored by Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, The Treaty of Pelindaba: On the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone provides a detailed account of the negotiating history of the Treaty of Pelindaba. Ambassador Adeniji, who was Chairman of the Group of Experts that negotiated the Treaty and who enjoys vast experience in the diplomacy of arms control and disarmament, is particularly well placed to recount the proceedings of the series of discussions that led to the conclusion of the Treaty. The book, which is perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty, should prove very useful to both students of arms control and disarmament as well as to future negotiators of additional NWFZ.

Citation: Oluyemi Adeniji (2003). The Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

The post The Treaty of Pelindaba on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone first appeared on UNIDIR.

The Russian Federation and the United States still hold thousands of them (exact figures are unknown) scattered across a host of locations. The latter, combined with their portability, make TNWs more vulnerable to theft and more susceptible to falling into the wrong hands than their strategic counterparts, and hence particularly dangerous.

Moreover, unlike strategic nuclear weapons that are controlled by a number of legally binding treaties, TNWs are governed solely by an informal regime comprising unilateral pledges to partially eliminate them and restrict their mode of deployment exchanged by the Presidents of the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States some ten years ago. Ingenious at the time, this formulation now looks increasingly lacking. Implementation ambiguities resulting from its unilateral basis and lack of accompanying transparency measures that would provide confidence that commitments have been fulfilled plus a growing interest in potential military uses of TNWs in both the Russian Federation and the United States are clouding the future of the regime.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time for Control brings together some of the foremost international experts on TNWs to examine the state of the TNWs regime ten years on and explore practical options for strengthening and revamping it to more adequately address current and future arms control needs. In particular the study recommends that the Russian Federation and the United States re-affirm their 1991/2 declarations regarding TNWs and work out suitable complementary monitoring and transparency measures, as well as pledge not to develop any new TNWs or to resume testing and not to use or threaten to use TNWs.

Citation: Taina Susiluoto (ed.) (2002). “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time for Control”, UNIDIR, Geneva.

The post Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time for Control first appeared on UNIDIR.

The post Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century first appeared on UNIDIR.

The post Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990’s first appeared on UNIDIR.

In the past, successful Review Conference outcomes – such as an agreement on a final document comprised of some combination of a review of the operation of the treaty, and conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions – have been achieved in difficult circumstances. This commentary provides an overview of the various forms of consensus achieved at past NPT Review Conferences, which can be clustered into comprehensive consensus, partial consensus, and conditional consensus.

2000: Achieving comprehensive consensus

To date, only one of the ten NPT Review Conferences has managed to agree on a final document, based on comprehensive consensus without caveats. The 1995 decision on strengthening the review process established the forward-looking part of the document, in addition to the review of the implementation of the treaty in the preceding five years.

In 2000, the Review Conference was the first and the only one to achieve consensus on both. It is widely considered the most significant substantive success with the adoption of the “13 Practical Steps” for systematic and progressive implementation of Article VI on disarmament, following various concerning international developments in the preceding review cycle. The steps included significant language on:

• nuclear disarmament commitments,
• the principle of irreversibility,     
• the elimination of nuclear arsenals, and
• accelerated efforts toward the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Negotiations were complex and required significant compromise on language related to key issues, leading some to note that consensus was only possible because “deep differences between States on several crucial matters were papered over” and the wording used was “sufficiently ambiguous to enable all sides to claim victory.”

Accordingly, the prospect of implementation of the agreed upon steps was already perceived as “bleak” at the time. Such concerns were later confirmed by the disavowal of the “13 Practical Steps” by several nuclear-weapon States (NWS) at the following Review Conference in 2005, as well as the persistent implementation gaps that continue to impact upon the NPT regime today.

1995 and 2010: Years marked by partial consensus

States Parties have achieved partial consensus twice to date; at the highly consequential 1995 and 2010 Review Conferences, the latter which remains the last one to have adopted a consensus final document. In both cases, comprehensive consensus could not be achieved, but diplomatic skill and procedural openness enabled consensus on key issues.     

The 1995 conference is often considered the most unique and significant in the history of the NPT’s review process. The treaty’s initial 25-year duration was ending, making its extension a priority for many States Parties, who successfully adopted a package of four key decisions. These included:

• the indefinite extension of the NPT,
• the adoption of “principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,”
• the strengthening of the review process, and
• a resolution on the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The package of decisions was passed without a vote but required careful and clever drafting to ensure that key demands of different groups were satisfied in the bargain. The NWS strong interest in indefinite extension of the treaty gave the non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS), especially the Non-Aligned Movement, a significant bargaining chip, which was used to progress the Middle East Resolution. While a deal was struck for the forward-looking package of decisions, consensus was not achieved on the review part of the document as fundamental disagreements prevailed. These tensions were bypassed by not insisting on a traditional comprehensive consensus final document, allowing the important package of decisions to be passed.

The case of 1995 stands out because of its procedural creativity. Yet, the choice to adopt a package of decisions was less revolutionary at the time than it seems today, as States Parties had submitted draft resolutions, decisions and even protocols to the NPT at previous Review Conferences, showing that States Parties then considered a broader scope of possible outcome formats.

The 2010 Review Conference was the last one to date to adopt a consensus final document, though consensus was achieved only on the forward-looking action plan, while the review instead became a “President’s reflection” without necessarily representing the views of all the States Parties. Nonetheless, the outcome was significant with a 64-point Action Plan covering all three pillars of the NPT and including specific steps for the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, endorsing a 2012 conference.

The 2010 Action Plan also reaffirmed the “13 practical steps” of the 2000 conference, embedding them into a larger, more complex political bargain that went beyond disarmament to also include non-proliferation and peaceful uses.

1975 and 1985: Establishing conditional consensus

The Review Conferences in 1975 and 1985 both managed to achieve consensus on a final document, but introduced notable conditionalities.

The short 1975 Final Declaration (which is under 5000 words) was drafted primarily by the President of the Conference. Consensus was only achieved by attaching various interpretive statements and reservations to the record, reflecting the differing views of delegations. This required flexibility on the part of the delegations, who chose to not block consensus, and of the President, who accepted the inclusion of national and group statements. Because of the caveats attached to the final document, the conference was not necessarily seen as an unequivocal success by all parties at the time.

In 1985, a similar approach was taken, ensuring that a consensus final document could again be adopted despite significant rifts. Explicit disagreement was noted around the lack of progress on a CTBT, in much stronger terms than in the 1975 final document. While formal consensus was thus preserved, the readily apparent lack of unanimity on the CTBT led one scholar to describe this as a “bogus consensus”.

Past pathways to success

A variety of approaches have contributed to meaningful outcomes and final documents at past NPT Review Conferences – yet no single method offers a guaranteed recipe for success. Only one Review Conference (in 2000) produced a fully negotiated, consensus-based and comprehensive final document—suggesting that such an outcome should be regarded as the exception rather than the norm.

Furthermore, the size and scope of Review Conference final documents have varied considerably. While discussions during the conferences may be wide-ranging, the issues explicitly captured in the final documents have, in practice, often been relatively narrow.

Table 1. Inclusion of language related to selected issues in NPT Review Conferences

Lessons for future NPT Review Conferences

Most NPT Review Conferences with successful outcomes were characterized by a degree of flexibility regarding the format of the final document. Examples of this begin with the very first Review Conference in 1975, which produced a final document written primarily by the President and which included the reservations of State Parties to specific statements.

Similarly, the 1985 final document included explicit mentions of disagreement on key issues, allowing formal consensus to be achieved despite intense substantive disagreement. The 1995 Review Conference pushed this further by not adopting a final document at all, instead passing a set of important decisions that continue to define the NPT Review Process today.

The most recent successful outcome at a Review Conference occurred in 2010 and whilst a final document was agreed and the forward-looking conclusions and recommendations achieved consensus, the review segment was not agreed by consensus and instead reflected the President’s views. Even as a President’s document, the review section featured language that qualified the degree of agreement on issues, rather than suggesting consensus.

Taken together, these cases show that successful NPT Review Conference outcome documents vary in terms of length, scope, focus and the type and route to consensus. While the goal of comprehensive consensus has presented a challenge at all Review Conferences, flexibility and procedural creativity have enabled past successes, even in tense international environments.

Nick Arndt was a Graduate Professional with UNIDIR’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programme. He holds a Master of Philosophy in International Relations with distinction from the University of Oxford and a Bachelor of Arts in History and a minor in International Relations from the University of Groningen, where he graduated cum laude.

The post Unpacking the challenge of consensus at the NPT Review Conference first appeared on UNIDIR.

The post Norm Contestation and Compliance in the Chemical and Biological Weapons Prohibition Regimes (CBWNet, Germany) first appeared on UNIDIR.

GENEVA, 20 APRIL 2020 — A UNIDIR report released today analyses intensified risk of potential nuclear weapons use across several regions, and links this trend to geopolitical competition, strategic mistrust, and other security developments. It calls for “drastic action” by States, and presents a series of concrete policy recommendations to reduce that risk, including the preservation of extant agreements such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and the enhancement of crisis avoidance and management tools to prevent escalation.

The report, Nuclear Risk Reduction: Closing Pathways to Use, offers a range of expert insights on potential strategies to reduce risk of nuclear weapon use, across select geopolitical regions—the Euro-Atlantic, Northeast Asia, Southern Asia, and the Middle East—and in the context of technological developments and multipolar dynamics, including great power competition.

“Understanding the risks of nuclear weapon use in different situations can contribute to ideas and new thinking on practical ways to address them,” said Dr. Renata Dwan, Director of UNIDIR. “Many States have expressed their support for nuclear risk reduction efforts as means to enhance international security and reinvigorate arms control and disarmament. This study provides a blueprint for taking this important work forward.”

The report lists a host of actions that States could take in the short and long term to reduce nuclear weapon risk, including in the context of the postponed 2020 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It also calls for a widespread commitment by all stakeholders to develop practical, feasible, and contextually appropriate risk reduction measures.

ABOUT UNIDIR

UNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems. For more information about UNIDIR, visit: www.unidir.org. Follow UNIDIR on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.

MEDIA CONTACT

The post “Drastic Action” Required to Address Increased Risk of Nuclear Weapons Use first appeared on UNIDIR.

UNIDIR report sheds light on paths to nuclear weapon use and calls for joint action on developing practical and feasible measures to reduce nuclear risk.

GENEVA, 27 JUNE 2019 — A UNIDIR report released today identifies the range of risks of the use of nuclear weapons and outlines approaches for reducing these. The report sets out ways nuclear-armed states could narrow the situations in which they would consider nuclear use, take actions that will enhance restraint in volatile circumstances, bolster security to deny physical and digital access to nuclear weapons systems, and enact safeguards to limit human and technical errors.

The report, Nuclear Risk Reduction: A Framework for Analysis, examines different scenarios for the potential use of nuclear weapons in the current environment, including use linked to crisis conditions and acquisition and use by non-State actors. Drawing upon ideas and proposals from across the research and policymaking communities, it elaborates risk reduction principles to inform policy.

“Governments have recently expressed widespread support for efforts to reduce nuclear risks in forums like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle,” said John Borrie, UNIDIR Programme Lead, WMD and Other Strategic Weapons Programme. “The challenge is to translate that desire into concrete action, and this study presents important new ideas in that regard.”

ABOUT UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is an autonomous institution within the United Nations that conducts independent research on disarmament and related problems, particularly international security issues. UNIDIR supports Member States, the United Nations and policy and research communities in advancing ideas and actions that contribute to a more sustainable and peaceful world. For more information about UNIDIR, visit: www.unidir.org. Follow UNIDIR on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter.

MEDIA CONTACT

The post Nuclear Risk Reduction: A Framework for Analysis first appeared on UNIDIR.

While the success of NPT Review Conferences has often been judged by the adoption of a consensus Final Document, the form and focus of successful outcome documents have varied considerably. This side event will explore how these foundational understandings have fared across past review cycles, where their limits have emerged, and what they suggest for the future direction of the NPT in the years ahead.

Agenda

Opening remarks

• Kazumi Matsui, Mayor of Hiroshima and President of Mayors for Peace
• Izumi Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs
• Kimitake Nakamura, Director-General and Assistant Minister of Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

Presentations

• Peaceful uses of nuclear energy by Shun Oshita, Senior Lecturer of Hiroshima Peace Institute, Hiroshima City University
• Nuclear non-proliferation by Chen Zak Kane, Head of Project, Middle East WMD-Free Zone, UNIDIR
• Nuclear disarmament by Randy Rydell, Honorary Advisor, Mayors for Peace

Moderated discussion

Audience Q&A

When and where

Wednesday, 29 April 2026 | 10:15 – 11:45 EDT | Conference Room A, UN Headquarters, New York

In partnership with

The post Taking stock of the NPT: Achievements, persistent challenges and emerging opportunities first appeared on UNIDIR.