



**UNIDIR**

# **Towards a National Framework for Arms and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia**

**A narrative report  
2014–2017**

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**UNIDIR RESOURCES**



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## **Acknowledgements**

This report was made possible through the support and cooperation of the Federal Government of Somalia. UNIDIR would like to express its appreciation to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia and the United Nations Mine Action Service in Somalia, which provided exceptional support on this project and consulted with UNIDIR on this report at various stages, encouraged UNIDIR to continue this work, and contributed their valuable inputs. Further, UNIDIR expresses its gratitude to the United Nations Development Programme, the International Small Arms Control Standards Inter-Agency Support Unit, and Conflict Armament Research for providing guidance on this report. Additionally, UNIDIR extends its appreciation to the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States for its contributions to this project's consultative process. The consultative process on national frameworks governing arms and ammunition and this report would not have been possible without the support and close cooperation of all partners mentioned above.

This report was drafted by Jonah Leff and Himayu Shiotani, with research support from Hardy Giezendanner and Daniel Golston.

At UNIDIR, this project was managed by Himayu Shiotani.

Support from UNIDIR's core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute's activities. In addition, dedicated project funding was received from the Government of Finland.

## Abbreviations

AAMSC	Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee
ADN	advanced delivery notification
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CAS	comprehensive approach to security
CC	Custodial Corps
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
CME	captured military equipment
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS	Federal Member States
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
IED	improvised explosive device
ISACS	International Small Arms Control Standards
JVT	Joint Verification Team
MANPADS	Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems
MoIS	Ministry of Internal Security
MoD	Ministry of Defence
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
NISA	National Intelligence and Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
ONSA	Office of the National Security Adviser
OIG	Operational Implementation Group
PDC	post-delivery confirmation
PDN	post-distribution notification
PSC	private security company
PSSM	physical security and stockpile management
RECSA	Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SEMA	Somalia Explosives Management Authority
SEMG	Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group
SNA	Somali National Army
SOP	standard operating procedure
SPF	Somali Police Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WAM	weapons and ammunition management
WAM TWG	Weapons and Ammunition Management Technical Working Group

## Key points

Under extremely difficult conditions and with the support of the international community, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is making important strides towards establishing security, effective and accountable governance, and the rule of law in Somalia. A partially suspended United Nations Security Council arms embargo has enabled the FGS to import arms, ammunition, and military equipment to strengthen its security forces and to help in the struggle against Al-Shabaab. However, the management of state-held arms and ammunition presents considerable challenges to the FGS. These need to be overcome if the process of state-building in Somalia is to be successful.

Since 2014, a national framework to govern weapons and ammunition has been in development. In Mogadishu, significant advancements have been made in this area. However, weapons and ammunition management (WAM) remains underdeveloped in rest of Somalia. The lack of systematic control over state-owned weapons and ammunition down the supply chain, as well as the availability of and access to illicit weapons and ammunition by non-state actors, pose a significant barrier to recovery efforts and remain a priority concern for both the FGS and the international community. Replicating the successes achieved in Mogadishu and rolling out appropriate governance structures and systems at the Federal level, where appropriate with Federal Member States (FMS), and down the supply chain at sector levels are of the highest priority for the FGS in the coming years. This is of critical importance in the context of implementing the national security architecture and further developing the Somali national security institutions and forces, as attention will need to be paid on how the security forces will be supplied and equipped with arms, and how those supplies will be managed and accounted for down the supply chain in order to avoid unintentional diversion in violation of the arms embargo.

The FGS is at a critical juncture in its efforts to achieve sustainable security. The FGS has recognized this challenge and is demonstrating commitment to address the issue. The FGS has developed and implemented a pilot project, with support from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), to establish a comprehensive WAM system to ensure the safe and transparent management of weapons and ammunition—from reception through distribution to use—in compliance with international standards and sanctions obligations. Such efforts have been supported by a nationally-led consultative process on WAM, which has assisted in the design of national policy and plans in this area.

The achievements and gaps presented in this report provide a baseline from which to examine Somalia's remaining WAM challenges, as well as a platform from which to explore its immediate and long-term WAM requirements. Below presents some of the key achievements in the 2014–2017 period and targets for moving forward (see also figure 1):

### ➤ **WAM coordinating mechanism**

Under the National Security Council, an Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee (AAMSC) was created in January 2014 and has met regularly since its inception. The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) chairs the AAMSC, which is supported by an ad hoc technical Operational Implementation Group (OIG). Moving

forward, the FGS plans to establish a formal national body dedicated to coordinating and overseeing WAM. Such a body will also support the roll-out of WAM governance structures and systems to the FMS.

#### ➤ **Transfer controls**

Following the partial lifting of the arms embargo in 2013 (resolution 2093), and in accordance with Security Council resolutions 2182 (2014) and 2244 (2015), the FGS has instituted a temporary structure to centralize the authorization of imports of weapons and ammunition in the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Somali National Army (SNA) is the agency responsible for overseeing imports of arms and ammunition and supporting their distribution to its own forces and to other requesting security and law enforcement agencies (the National Intelligence and Security Agency and the Somali Police Force). Currently, the Halane storage facility in the protected area of Mogadishu International Airport is the central processing point for all imported supplies, which can only be issued to FGS security forces upon authorization from the Chief of the Defence Forces. Moving forward, the FGS plans to codify existing procedures and accountability structures to govern the import and distribution of weapons and ammunition.

#### ➤ **Marking and record-keeping**

Significant progress has been made by the FGS in the area of marking. As of June 2017, over 10,000 weapons have been marked either through a fixed marking programme at Halane and the Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS) or through a roll-out of the mobile marking programme in Mogadishu. Information on marked weapons has been entered into a marking database. Inter-agency marking teams have been established and trained since 2015. A written standard operating procedure (SOP), drafted by the FGS, on marking is near completion. Moving forward, the FGS plans to roll out the mobile marking programme at the sector level, which will be supplemented by a joint verification team and training on the basic registration of arms.

As regards record-keeping, notable progress has been made in Mogadishu since 2016. The review and revision of logbooks, as well as issue and receipt procedures, have been undertaken by the FGS with support from international partners. The FGS is currently in the process of implementing the revised record-keeping procedures. Moving forward, the FGS plans to roll out the record-keeping procedures, including the logbooks and issue and receipt voucher system, to all security forces and along the supply chain. This process is expected to take some time and require adequate training.

#### ➤ **Verification**

The FGS has established a Joint Verification Team (JVT) as required by paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 (2014). The JVT comprises members of the FGS security forces and independent experts. As of June 2017, the JVT has undertaken two verification missions in Mogadishu, with a third mission planned at the sector level in late 2017. Moving forward, the JVT is planned to be integrated into wider FGS efforts to roll out WAM to the FMS.

➤ **Identifying and tracing captured weapons**

The FGS noted that each security agency currently incorporates into its existing stocks any weapons captured during operations. In order to better streamline the processing of captured weapons, including activities involving investigation, marking, registration, and disposal (either integration or destruction), the FGS developed a policy in this area in 2016. Moving forward, the FGS seeks to implement the policy on captured weapons through a roll-out to all security forces, training on the procedures, and agreeing with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on hand-over procedures of captured materiel.

➤ **Physical security and stockpile management**

Enhancement of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of weapons and ammunition remains a key priority for the FGS. There is extremely limited capacity for the safe and secure storage of weapons and ammunition at the sector and field levels, where military operations against Al-Shabaab are ongoing. Further, the FGS currently lacks the technical expertise and infrastructure to safely and securely manage ammunition and explosives. As regards positive advancements in this area, a written SOP on PSSM is near completion by the FGS. Notably, the physical security and training capacity at Halane storage facility is expected to be significantly enhanced in late 2017, with the aim to establish the facility as a centre for excellence. Moving forward, the FGS plans to develop a prioritization plan for storage needs at the sector level, with inputs from its security forces, and where appropriate from the FMS. Moreover, the FGS has indicated that capacity development in the area of ammunition management will remain a high priority in the coming years.

➤ **Civilian and private security company possession of arms and ammunition**


The FGS is currently taking steps to strengthen the national legal framework through drafting two legal documents: the Small Arms and Light Weapons Control Act and the Private Security Companies Act. When adopted, the two acts together aim to regulate the civilian possession of firearms in the country. In the meantime, the MoIS has been undertaking a rigorous registration process for firearms owned by private security companies and government officials. The FGS has also initiated several rounds of stabilization operations in Mogadishu, with an aim to remove illegitimate firearms from the hands of civilians. Moving forward, while recognizing the lengthy process involved in drafting legal frameworks, the FGS plans to push for the two acts to be adopted at the earliest possible date and to sensitize the community on these acts. Further, the FGS plans to provide inputs to the Penal Code review process to ensure offenses concerned in these acts are adequately addressed in the Code, and to also provide inputs relevant to arms control when the Defence and Police Acts are in their respective review process.

➤ **Disposal**

The primary method currently used by the FGS to dispose of captured, serviceable weapons and ammunition is integration into national stocks. So far, only a limited number of obsolete weapons have been identified by the FGS security agencies and subsequently destroyed. Moving forward, the FGS plans to clarify which authorities

can authorize the destruction of military equipment, to establish procedures on assessing serviceability of materiel and on requesting for destruction of items from sector and/or unit level up the chain of command; and to identify potential destruction sites at the sector level to reduce potential logistical burdens.

**Figure 1.** Key progress benchmarks on WAM in Mogadishu



# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Security situation in the Federal Republic of Somalia

Somalia is at a critical juncture in its effort to achieve security and sustainable development. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) faces numerous security challenges as it seeks to end more than 20 years of conflict. Since 2013, the FGS, together with support from the international community, has made considerable progress in stabilizing the country and rebuilding its security institutions. The successful conclusion of the electoral process in February 2017, followed by political agreements between the FGS and the Federal Member States (FMS) in April 2017, reinforced by the establishment of Security Pact following the London Summit in May 2017, represents notable and commendable milestones in the FGS's efforts to provide security to its population, and rebuild the confidence of the international community.

Overall, the security situation in Somalia remains fragile. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) continue their efforts to recover parts of the country, while Al-Shabaab still poses an immediate threat to enduring peace.<sup>1</sup> Stability is yet to be achieved in several parts of the country and Al-Shabaab continues to target AMISOM and government forces with ambushes, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and probing attacks. The capacity of the FGS to police and enforce law throughout the country remains limited.<sup>2</sup>

Re-establishing security and stability in Somalia remains the highest priority of the FGS and the international community. At the national level, on 16 April 2017 a historical political agreement was reached between the FGS and the FMS on a national security architecture capable of gradually taking on the leading responsibility for providing security in the country. This agreement was endorsed on 8 May 2017 by the National Security Council, which represents a crucial step towards re-establishing a national security framework.<sup>3</sup> At the operational level, building on previous operations,<sup>4</sup> offensives by AMISOM<sup>5</sup> and the SNA

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<sup>1</sup> The self-declared Al-Qaida affiliate has demonstrated the flexibility to adapt in order to survive and reframe the terms of engagement, as noted by a recent briefing by International Crisis Group [“Somalia: Al-Shabaab—It will be a long way”](#), International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No. 99, 26 June 2014.

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Security Council, resolution S/RES/2182 (2014), para. 17.

<sup>3</sup> See Security Council Report, May 2017 Monthly Forecast, 28 April 2017, *Somalia*, [http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-05/somalia\\_29.php](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-05/somalia_29.php).

<sup>4</sup> To regain territories in order to consolidate the military gains achieved by AMISOM and the SNA, the FGS announced a campaign—Operation Ocean Build—on 18 November 2014, focused on enhancing stabilization by holding key population centres and protecting their inhabitants and movements along the main supply routes. See the Secretary-General's report on Somalia to the United Nations Security Council, S/2015/51 of 23 January, para. 17. Another joint AMISOM and SNA military operation—Operation Jubba Corridor—entered its final phase in July 2015 with the aim of further degrading Al-Shabaab by removing them from their strongholds in the Gedo, Bakool, and Bay regions of Somalia. See S/2016/919, para. 12.

<sup>5</sup> AMISOM continues to operate closely with the SNA and to provide the FGS with the necessary support needed to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and to expand and consolidate control of the FGS over its national territory. See the African Union Mission in Somalia mandate, <http://amisom-au.org/amisom-mandate/>. In May 2017, the Security Council decided to authorize the member States of the African Union to maintain deployment of AMISOM until 21 August 2017. See S/RES/2355 (2017). The Security Council requested that, in line with the recommendations of the Joint AU–UN Review, the

against Al-Shabaab are ongoing. On 6 April 2017, the President of Somalia announced a new offensive against Al-Shabaab and called on Al-Shabaab fighters to lay down their arms and surrender within 60 days in exchange for amnesty.<sup>6</sup>

At the international level, the Security Pact agreed by the FGS and the international community in May 2017 during the London Conference<sup>7</sup> provides a valuable framework for enabling sustainable, long-term security based on mutual accountability in Somalia. Specifically, the Security Pact sets out a political agreement between the FGS and FMS on a national security model and architecture for Somali forces, a plan and conditional commitments for Somali security sector reform as part of the comprehensive approach to security, an agreement on AMISOM's role and transition plan, as well as implementation and review mechanisms. In operationalizing the Security Pact, the FGS and the international partners—including donors and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)—have endorsed a Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS), which provides a conceptual framework for international support to the FGS in this area. In particular, strand two of the CAS, dedicated to accelerating the development of Somali national security institutions and forces, is expected to play a key role in enabling the FGS and its security forces to achieve stability and security in the country.

## **1.2. Security situation as it relates to arms and ammunition**

The United Nations Security Council has continued to express concerns regarding the security situation in Somalia as it relates to the uncontrolled proliferation of arms. In 2016 the Security Council expressed its concerns by “condemning flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia and to Eritrea in violation of the arms embargo on Eritrea, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region”.<sup>8</sup> Al-Shabaab and its affiliates continue to benefit from a steady flow of illicit arms and ammunition which remains a significant concern for the FGS.<sup>9</sup> This illicit flow of weapons, often intended for Al-Shabaab and its affiliates, not only threatens peace and security in Somalia, but fuel conflicts in other countries throughout the region and subregion.

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African Union enable a surge in its efficiency and ensure AMISOM is configured to conduct the full range of required operations effectively. See S/RES/2297 (2016), para. 9. The Security Council recalled its request that inter alia the African Union generate without delay specialized units and ensures that all force enablers and multipliers operate under the command of the AMISOM Force Commander, while requesting for a reflection of these requirements in the revised Concept of Operations and regular updates on force generation through the Secretary-General. See S/RES/2297 (2016), para. 10.

<sup>6</sup> See S/2017/408, para. 17.

<sup>7</sup> Second of its kind, the Conference—co-chaired by the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Somalia, the United Nations, and the African Union—brought together 42 high level national authorities and representatives of the international community. Recognizing the close inter-linkage between security, politics, and development, the Conference adopted in two key documents—a “Security Pact” and a “New Partnership for Somalia for peace, stability and prosperity”. The Conference's outcomes are expected to be followed up by a Security Conference in October 2017. For more information, see <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/conclusion-of-the-london-somalia-conference>.

<sup>8</sup> United Nations Security Council, resolution S/RES/2317 (2016), para. 4.

<sup>9</sup> See United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2015): Somalia*, S/2016/919 of 31 October 2016.

While the Somali security forces, with the support of AMISOM, have made significant progress in stemming the threat of Al-Shabaab and related clan-based militias since 2013, insecurity fuelled by the uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of arms persists in some areas of the country. Moreover, since Somali forces have reclaimed greater control of the capital Mogadishu in 2013, insurgents have adapted their modus operandi by moving from urban combat to increased asymmetrical warfare tactics such as suicide bombings and use of increasingly sophisticated IEDs.<sup>10</sup> Despite the closing of the Bakaara arms market, once the central artery for weapons in Mogadishu, arms, ammunition, and related explosives remain available either through underground sources<sup>11</sup> or from other illicit arms markets.<sup>12</sup>

In parallel to the persistent security threats posed by Al-Shabaab, the lack of systematic controls over state-owned weapons and ammunition during the early stages of state-building efforts by the FGS posed a significant challenge to re-establish stability and security in Somalia. Years of war and unrest have left Somalia with limited institutional and operational capacity to oversee and manage the full lifecycle of arms and ammunition. In the context of the arms embargo modification in 2013, the Somali authorities initially faced many challenges ranging from limited national management frameworks to a near total absence of adequate infrastructure (such as armouries and safe storage facilities for arms and ammunition), as well as a lack of general technical capacity, including for the codification of relevant regulations and procedures.

The FGS was quick to recognize these challenges and its impact on operational readiness. The lack of adequate systems for the management of arms and ammunition posed a significant challenge to Somalia's security forces in their ability to be operationally ready—including to distribute, receive, use, and securely store arms and ammunition during operations—and to ensure that arms were not diverted or lost during non-operational periods.

Since 2013, the FGS has taken significant steps to define and establish an institutional and operational framework for WAM oversight and implementation in Mogadishu. In particular, in 2014 the FGS, led by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) together with international partners—namely UNSOM, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and UNIDIR—initiated a process of national consultations on WAM in an effort to strengthen coordination and to develop a clear roadmap for establishing a national framework for WAM. The national consultative process has supported the formulation of national WAM policies and plans in the period 2014–2017. At the operational level, the FGS, together with UNSOM and UNMAS, initiated a pilot WAM project which focused on developing and rolling out practical WAM activities and systems in Mogadishu. This project has enabled the development of a WAM system in Mogadishu which serves as a potential model for the rest of the country.

While the current WAM institutional structures and approaches in place constitute a temporary framework to meet the operational and sanctions requirements in Somalia,

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid., para. 123 and annex 8.6.

<sup>11</sup> See United Nations Mine Action Service programme in Somalia, <http://www.mineaction.org/programmes/somalia> (updated July 2015).

<sup>12</sup> See United Nations Security Council, *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2244 (2015): Somalia*, S/2016/919 of 31 October 2016, para. 124 and annex 8.8.

discussions are under way between the FGS, FMS, and relevant international partners to design and implement a longer-term national framework to govern arms and ammunition throughout the country. Such a framework must not only account for immediate requirements, such as sanctions obligations, but also for future WAM planning needs, such as consolidation and enlargement of Somalia's security forces or a lifting of the arms embargo and the consequent enlargement of national weapons and ammunition stockpiles. National WAM frameworks and solutions adopted today must consequently prepare Somalia for safe, secure, and accountable WAM well into the future. This should be a primary responsibility not only for the FGS, but also the international partners involved in WAM planning and evaluation. In this context, the development of a robust WAM framework and system is a critical need to improve overall security and create conditions for stabilization in Somalia.

### **1.3. About this report**

The purpose of this narrative report is to present the progress made by the FGS in the area of WAM in the 2014–2017 period, and to outline the FGS's proposed targets for the 2017–2020 period to develop a sustainable national WAM framework in Somalia. The report offers practical targets for the FGS to consider in its effort to develop such a national framework. It is based on a four-year process of national consultations on WAM in Somalia, henceforth called the *consultative process*. This report is part of a multi-year engagement with the FGS and United Nations partners, namely UNSOM, UNMAS, and UNIDIR, under the guidance of ONSA, to put in place a comprehensive WAM system in Somalia.

This report situates its findings within the set of questions:

- What is the current status of WAM implementation in Somalia?
- Which actors are involved in WAM initiatives and what capacity do they have to implement WAM requirements?
- What opportunities exist for the FGS to enhance its capacity to design and implement WAM frameworks and requirements?
- What options are available to the FGS in developing a comprehensive WAM framework in Somalia?

Throughout the consultative process, considerable commitment was demonstrated by the FGS with consistent, high-level representation from a wide range of agencies as well as transparency of the information shared. Such activities reflect a high degree of political will within the FGS to enhance its ongoing work on WAM, as well as a clear desire to continue to work with international partners in this area.

This report is supplemented by two additional documents. The first supplementary document is a national policy document which provides clear guidance to relevant security services in Somalia on their roles and responsibilities as they relate to WAM. The second supplementary document is a technical document which elaborates on relevant technical processes to establish and roll out WAM in Somalia. The achievements and targets presented in this report build on previous UNIDIR findings, and provide an updated baseline from which to examine Somalia's remaining WAM challenges as well as a platform to explore its immediate and long-term WAM requirements.

## 2. Partial suspension of the arms embargo on Somalia

### 2.1. United Nations Security Council arms embargo status

#### 2.1.1. Background

With the passage of resolution 2093 (2013), the Security Council amended the general and complete “embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia” imposed by resolution 733 (1992) and elaborated in resolution 1425 (2002). Specifically, paragraph 33 of resolution 2093 (2013) stipulates that the arms embargo:<sup>13</sup>

[S]hall not apply to deliveries of weapons or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Security Forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, and to provide security for the Somali people ...

This partial suspension of the arms embargo on Somalia has been extended by the Security Council in subsequent resolutions 2111 (2013), 2142 (2014), 2182 (2014), 2244 (2015), and 2317 (2017).<sup>14</sup>

The 2013 Security Council decision was not without conditions, however. In order to promote accountability and transparency on the part of the FGS, and to keep abreast of Somalia’s weapons imports, the Security Council imposed a number of reporting and notification requirements on the FGS.

On 24 July 2013, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2111 (S/RES/2111), which extended the partial suspension of the arms embargo until 6 March 2014, introduced an advance approval requirement by the Security Council Sanctions Committee (“the Committee”) for certain types of arms and ammunition,<sup>15</sup> and specified that primary responsibility rested with the FGS to notify the Committee in advance of any deliveries of weapons or military equipment, or provision of assistance for its security forces.<sup>16</sup>

On 5 March 2014, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2142 (S/RES/2142), which extended the partial suspension of the arms embargo on Somalia until 25 October 2014,<sup>17</sup> and imposed more stringent notification requirements on the FGS than previous

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<sup>13</sup> In the annex of the resolution, the Security Council provided a list of arms, ammunition, and military equipment and materials which are not covered by this modification of the arms embargo. United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2093 of 6 March 2013; United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1425 of 22 July 2002.

<sup>14</sup> See United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2111 (2013), operative para. 6; S/RES/2142 (2014), operative para. 2; S/RES/2182 (2014), operative para. 3; S/RES/2244 (2015), operative para. 2; and S/RES/2317 (2016), operative para. 2.

<sup>15</sup> See S/RES/2111 (2013), annex, p.7.

<sup>16</sup> As an alternative, the delivering entity (i.e. Member State, or international, regional, or subregional organization) may notify the Committee. See United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2111 (2013), operative para.15. See also S/RES/2142 (2014), operative para. 4.

<sup>17</sup> See United Nations Security Council, *Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2142 (2014), Partially Lifts Weapons Ban on Somalia, Agreeing to End or Suspend It on Basis of Full Compliance*, SC/11307, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11307.doc.htm>. Small arms and ammunition and other military equipment, as well as advice, assistance, and training intended for the development of security forces of the FGS, are included in the extension of the arms embargo suspension, while exceptions exist

resolutions (2093 and 2111). In addition to bearing the primary responsibility to notify the Committee in advance of deliveries, the FGS was required to confirm to the Committee that deliveries had actually arrived, and to provide information on the details of their distribution within Somalia.<sup>18</sup>

### 2.1.2. Current status<sup>19</sup>

On 10 November 2016, the Security Council adopted resolution 2317 (S/RES/2317), which inter alia renewed the extension of the partial lifting of the arms embargo on Somalia until 15 November 2017.<sup>20</sup> There are various obligations that the FGS must follow in order to remain compliant with this resolution and other resolutions related to the arms embargo. Under the partial suspension of the arms embargo, the FGS has the right to import “weapons, ammunition or military equipment” and may receive “advice, assistance or training” which are “intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces”.<sup>21</sup> The FGS, however, may not import the following types of arms and ammunition without first receiving advance approval by the Committee on a case-by-case basis:<sup>22</sup>

- surface to air missiles, including man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS);
- guns, howitzers, and cannons with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm, and ammunition and components specially designed for these (This does not include shoulder fired anti-tank rocket launchers, such as rocket-propelled grenades or light anti-tank weapons, rifle grenades, or grenade launchers);
- mortars with a calibre greater than 82 mm;
- anti-tank guided weapons, including anti-tank guided missiles and ammunition and components specially designed for these items;
- charges and devices intended for military use containing energetic materials;
- mines and related materiel; and

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in relation to deliveries of items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013). See S/RES/2142 (2014), para. 2; and S/RES/2111(2013), annex.

<sup>18</sup> Notifications concerning the provision of weapons or military equipment should include, among other things, details of the manufacturer and supplier of the arms and ammunition, as well as a description of such material. No later than 30 days after the delivery of arms and ammunition, Somalia should submit to the Committee written confirmation of the delivery’s completion and within five days of its distribution, inform it, also in writing, of the destination unit in the Somali National Security Forces or place of storage. See requirements as set out in S/RES/2111(2013), paras. 3–7.

<sup>19</sup> As of 10 November 2016. United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2317 (2016); Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2, *Summary of arms embargo restrictions in place for Somalia and Eritrea, including exemptions*, 14 March 2016.

<sup>20</sup> Resolution 2317 (2016), adopted by a vote of 10 in favour and 5 abstentions (Angola, China, Egypt, Russian Federation, Venezuela). The Council also extended the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group until 15 December 2017. The previous resolution was adopted in October 2015—resolution 2244 (2015), adopted by a vote of 14 in favour and 1 abstention (Venezuela). See United Nations Security Council, *Adopting Resolution 2182 (2014), Security Council Extends Arms Embargoes on Somalia, Eritrea, Adopting Resolution 2317 (2016) by 10 Votes in Favour, with 5 Abstentions*, SC/12584, <https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12584.doc.htm>.

<sup>21</sup> S/RES/2317 (2016), para. 2. See also S/RES/2244 (2015), para. 2, and S/RES/2182 (2014), para. 2.

<sup>22</sup> S/RES/2111 (2013), para. 7 and annex.

- weapon sights with a night vision capability.

The FGS has the primary responsibility to provide advance delivery notification (ADN) to the Committee five days in advance of any delivery into Somalia of weapons, ammunition, or military equipment, or advice, assistance, or training intended for the development of the security forces of the FGS.<sup>23</sup> Alternatively, the supplying entity (State, or international, regional, or subregional organization) may notify the Committee, also five days in advance of delivery, but must do so in consultation with the FGS.<sup>24</sup>

The FGS must also provide post-delivery confirmation (PDC) to the Committee no later than 30 days after the delivery of arms or ammunition.<sup>25</sup> Further, within five days of distribution of imported arms or ammunition, the FGS must provide a written post-distribution notification (PDN) to the Committee stating the destination unit in its security forces or the place of storage.<sup>26</sup>

Reiterating a provision of resolutions 2093 (2013), 2182 (2014), and 2244 (2015), resolution 2317 (2016) imposes an end-use restriction, noting that weapons or military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the FGS security forces may not be resold, transferred, or made available for use by any individual or entity not in the service of the security forces of the FGS.<sup>27</sup>

Resolution 2182 of 2014 introduced two new obligations which, from the perspective of WAM, merit greater attention. First, following the United Nations Secretary-General's recommendation letter to the Security Council in 2014 (S/2014/243) and the Security Council Presidential Statement dated 22 May 2014, the resolution called for the establishment of a Joint Verification Team (JVT) on arms and ammunition.<sup>28</sup> The FGS, with support from international partners, has established a JVT with international experts, focusing on the physical verification of arms and ammunition provided to the FGS, the systems of control in place for WAM, and supporting the FGS in complying with the decisions of the Security Council and the Committee, in particular with respect to WAM. The purpose of the JVT is to conduct routine inspections of FGS security forces' stockpiles, inventory records and the supply chain of weapons for the purpose of mitigating the diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside the security services of the FGS. The Council reiterated

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<sup>23</sup> S/RES/2317 (2016), para. 8. See also Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2, *Summary of arms embargo restrictions in place for Somalia and Eritrea, including exemptions*, 14 March 2016, p. 3, para. 15.

<sup>24</sup> S/RES/2142 (2014), para. 4. For information to be included in the ADN, see para. 5. See also Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), Implementation Assistance Notice No. 2, *Summary of arms embargo restrictions in place for Somalia and Eritrea, including exemptions*, 14 March 2016, p. 3, para. 15.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. para. 6.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. para. 7.

<sup>27</sup> See S/RES/2317 (2016), para. 4.

<sup>28</sup>The original call to establish JVT was made in the Statement on Somalia by the President of the United Nations Security Council, S/PRST/2014/9 of 22 May 2014; see also S/RES/2182 (2014), para. 7.

the request in resolution 2244 (2015)<sup>29</sup> and in resolution 2317 (2016) welcomed the efforts of the FGS in establishing the JVT<sup>30</sup>.

Second, by resolution 2182 (2014) and subsequent resolutions, the FGS has an obligation to document and inspect captured military equipment (CME). The resolution requests the SNA and AMISOM to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates.<sup>31</sup> Further, the SNA and AMISOM are to facilitate inspection by the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) of all CME before its redistribution or destruction. This obligation has been maintained in the resolution 2244 (2015) and reaffirmed in resolution 2317 (2017).<sup>32</sup>

Resolution 2244 (2015) introduced one new obligation for the FGS, calling on the FGS to “conduct a baseline inventory of military equipment, arms and ammunition in the possession of the security forces of the FGS, assessed against their respective strength and needs”.<sup>33</sup>

The FGS is called upon to cooperate with the SEMG, to ensure the safety of its members, and to provide them with unhindered access to persons, documents, and sites that the SEMG deems relevant to the execution of its mandate. The SEMG, for its part, is called upon to provide the FGS with feedback on the reports provided by the FGS to the Committee.<sup>34</sup>

With regard to reporting, the FGS was called on to report to the Security Council by 30 March 2017, and again by 30 September 2017 on: (a) the current structure of the FGS security forces, including the status of regional and militia forces; (b) the infrastructure in place to ensure the safe storage, registration, maintenance, and distribution of military equipment by the FGS security forces; and (c) the procedures and codes of conduct in place for the registration, distribution, use, and storage of weapons by the FGS security forces, and on relevant training needs.<sup>35</sup> The Security Council also called upon the FGS and regional administrations to “prioritize a sustainable and comprehensive agreement on the composition of the Somali Security Forces based on the National Security Policy”.<sup>36</sup>

Lastly, the Security Council has stressed in 2014 in resolution 2182 and the previous resolution 2141 (2014) that “any decision to continue or end the partial suspension of the arms embargo on the FGS will be taken in the light of the thoroughness of the FGS’s implementation of its requirements as set out in this and other relevant Security Council resolutions”.<sup>37</sup>

### **2.1.3. Arms embargo implications for WAM**

With the Security Council decision to extend the partial suspension of the arms embargo on Somalia, the FGS will continue to procure arms, ammunition, and military equipment, as

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<sup>29</sup> See S/RES/2244 (2015), para 6.

<sup>30</sup> See S/RES/2317 (2016), para. 6.

<sup>31</sup> See S/RES/2182 (2014), para.6.

<sup>32</sup> See S/RES/2244 (2015), para 10; see also S/RES/2317 (2017), para. 1.

<sup>33</sup> See S/RES/2244 (2015), para 6.

<sup>34</sup> See S/RES/2142 (2013), paras. 11–12; see also S/RES/2182 (2014), para. 51.

<sup>35</sup> See S/RES/2317 (2016), para. 7; see also S/RES/2244 (2015), para. 7, and S/RES/2182 (2014), para. 9.

<sup>36</sup> See S/RES/2317 (2016), para. 7.

<sup>37</sup> See S/RES/2142 (2014), preamble; S/RES/2182 (2014), preamble.

well as advice, assistance, and training. In this context, there are four distinct yet related challenges related to the WAM framework in Somalia:

1. the lack of adequate registration systems for imported, captured, stored, and disseminated arms and ammunition;
2. the lack of oversight capacity to monitor and verify all imported, captured, stored, and distributed arms and ammunition;
3. the lack of codification of operating procedures for all security forces in key WAM functional areas, including for import processing, marking and record-keeping, and PSSM; and
4. inadequate infrastructure for safe and secure storage and transport of weapons and ammunition at sector and field levels.

The FGS faces a number of challenges as it endeavours to build structural and operational capacity within its security forces. While notable progress has been made to mark and register all newly imported weapons passing through the Halane storage facility in Mogadishu, a critical challenge remains for the FGS to institute an adequate record-keeping system for the systematic storage and issuance of its arms and ammunition at the sector and field levels. In the absence of such a system, the risk of arms and ammunition being diverted into the wrong hands remains a concern. Developing a comprehensive accounting and record-keeping system for Somalia's national stockpiles would introduce the necessary checks and balances needed to prevent the deliberate or accidental leakage of arms and ammunition into the illicit sphere.

The difficulties faced by the FGS in storing its armaments safely and securely at the sector and field levels is another concern in light of the potential expansion of its military operations and related arsenal over the coming years. Without an adequate number of storage facilities available at the sector and field levels, the FGS security forces face a critical challenge to ensure their operational readiness, to protect their strategic assets and to mitigate the risk of arms and ammunition being diverted or lost. Explosive ammunition, in particular, can be extremely hazardous if stored in inadequate conditions. As the FGS makes requests for support to construct new armouries, it must also carefully consider the types and quantity of ammunition to be stored in relation to its distance from vulnerable buildings, civilian populations, and public transportation routes, in order to minimize the risks posed to people and buildings in case of an unplanned explosion at a munitions site.

Furthermore, the improving but still weak capacity of the FGS to maintain oversight and properly account for the distribution of arms and ammunition is a reason for concern with regard to WAM. In this regard, the obligation of the FGS to establish and implement a JVT, as set out in resolution 2182, is an important component in helping to establish an accountable WAM system in Somalia.

Lastly, as the FGS takes steps to establish an effective national framework on WAM, it will become increasingly important to put in place a regulatory and procedural framework to help codify WAM requirements for its security forces. In particular, in relation to arms embargo obligations, the FGS would greatly benefit from the documentation and codification of standard operating procedures (SOPs) in all areas of WAM, but in particular for the import and internal distribution of arms and ammunition, marking and record-keeping, stockpile management (including weapons accounting), and the processing of

captured weapons and ammunition. The drafting and application of written regulations and operating procedures would not only help to put in place systematic WAM rules and practices, but would also allow for consistent training of the security forces, which would contribute positively towards increasing their operational capacity. Further, the establishment of regulations and procedures would contribute significantly to building the confidence of the international community regarding the ability of the FGS to effectively manage and oversee the arms, ammunition, and military equipment in its stockpile. In this regard, the current efforts by the ONSA to finalize the draft SOPs for various aspects of WAM is a welcome development.

### 3. International, regional, and national instruments

The following sections provide information on relevant national laws, in addition to regional and international instruments, which are applicable to WAM in Somalia. As of June 2017, a number of international, regional, and national laws and instruments on WAM apply to Somalia. In addition to opportunities for the review of relevant national laws, there remain further improvements to be made in reporting on existing international instruments. Since the last UNIDIR report of this kind, released in 2015, the FGS has submitted a second national report to the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and has begun to revise its national law on civilian possession and private security companies (see section 5.7). The improvements in reporting and efforts to revise its national law demonstrate the commitment of the FGS to putting in place an effective national WAM framework. Nonetheless, the FGS is encouraged to join the existing international and regional arms control agreements and to continue to participate in other relevant reporting exercises in order to bolster international confidence in the FGS to following arms control norms.

#### 3.1. International conventions and agreements (arms control)

At the international level, Somalia is party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (signed 16 April 2012, entered into force 1 October 2012),<sup>38</sup> as well as the Convention on Cluster Munitions (signed on 3 December 2008, entered into force 30 September 2015).<sup>39</sup> Somalia is not party to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons<sup>40</sup> nor the United Nations Firearms Protocol.<sup>41</sup> While Somalia voted in favour of adopting the Arms Trade Treaty at the United Nations General Assembly in April 2013, it has yet to sign or ratify it.<sup>42</sup>

With regard to sustained progress made, Somalia, through ONSA, in 2015 submitted its first, and in 2016 its second, report under the United Nations Programme of Action against the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW)<sup>43</sup> and the International Tracing Instrument.<sup>44</sup> Opportunities for improvements in reporting remain for the United Nations

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<sup>38</sup> Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, 18 September 1997.

<sup>39</sup> Convention on Cluster Munitions, 30 May 2008.

<sup>40</sup> Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 10 April 1981 (as amended on 21 December 2001).

<sup>41</sup> United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, A/RES/55/255 (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001, entered into force on 3 June 2005).

<sup>42</sup> Arms Trade Treaty, A/CONF.217/2013/L.3 (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 2 April 2013, entered into force on 24 December 2014). Somalia voted in favour of the Arms Trade Treaty at the United Nations General Assembly on 2 April 2013.

<sup>43</sup> United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, A/CONF.192/15, 2001.

<sup>44</sup> International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 2005).

Register of Conventional Arms.<sup>45</sup> Table 1 presents the current status of Somalia in relation to international agreements and Table 2 reflects the relevant reporting mechanisms.

**Table 1.** International conventions and agreements

Legislation / Agreement	State Party		Detail	
	Yes	No		
<b>Extant Conventions and Protocols</b>				
Arms Trade Treaty		X	Signatory date: Entry into force:	
Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban Convention	X		Signatory date: Entry into force:	16 Apr 12 01 Oct 12
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons		X	Signatory date: Ratification date:	
Convention on Cluster Munitions	X		Signatory date: Ratification date:	03 Dec 08 30 Sep 15
United Nations Firearms Protocol		X	Signatory date: Ratification date:	

**Table 2.** Reports submitted to international instruments

International Instrument	Reported		Detail	
	Yes	No		
<b>Extant International Agreements</b>				
International Tracing Instrument	X		Submission dates over the last five years:	2015 2016
United Nations Programme of Action	X		Submission years:	2015 2016
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms		X	Submission dates over the last five years:	n/a

### 3.2. Regional conventions and agreements (arms control)

At the regional level, Somalia is a signatory of the Nairobi Protocol<sup>46</sup> (signed 24 April 2004) but has yet to ratify the agreement. The FGS is encouraged to continue its dialogue with the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSEA) with a view to ratifying the Nairobi Protocol.

<sup>45</sup> For more information, see United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, <http://www.un-register.org/Background/Index.aspx>.

<sup>46</sup> Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa, 21 April 2004.

**Table 3.** Regional conventions and agreements

Legislation / Agreement	State Party		Details	
	Yes	No		
Nairobi Protocol		X	Signatory date: Ratification date:	24 Apr 04

### 3.3. National legislation and instruments (arms control)

Somalia's Public Order Law of 26 August 1963 (Law No. 21) establishes the regulatory framework for the management of arms, ammunition, and explosives in the country. While this legislation is outdated, there is currently a review process initiated by ONSA, with support from MoIS, to revise the law on civilian possession and private security companies (see section 5.7 for more details). National legislation applicable to weapons, ammunition, and explosives is shown in Table 4.

**Table 4.** National legislation

Title	Reference (Chapter)	Reference (Act)	Comment
26 August 1963 Public Order Law	Unknown	Law No. 21	Concerns trade and ownership of firearms <sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> For the full text of Law No. 21, see Public Order Law of 26 August 1963, [http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Public\\_Order\\_Law\\_1963\\_full\\_copy.pdf](http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Public_Order_Law_1963_full_copy.pdf).

## **4. FGS WAM Project Framework**

### **4.1. FGS pilot WAM project**

In 2015, the FGS began developing a pilot project, with support from UNSOM and UNMAS, to establish a comprehensive WAM system to ensure the safe and transparent management of weapons and ammunition from receipt to distribution, in compliance with international standards and United Nations sanction obligations. The pilot project is a national initiative, owned and led by the FGS. The aim of the project is to establish a comprehensive WAM system in Mogadishu, with support from the international community. Project activities are focused on supporting the FGS in developing and delivering standards, procedures, and training on the components listed below. International support has been coordinated by UNSOM and UNMAS.

The WAM pilot project comprises the following pillars:

1. national framework;
2. weapons and ammunition receipt and initial storage;
3. marking and registration of newly imported weapons;
4. marking and registration of old weapons;
5. distribution of weapons and ammunition;
6. verification; and
7. reporting (to the United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee).

#### **4.1.1. Pillar 1: National framework on WAM**

Measures to establish or strengthen national frameworks governing weapons and ammunition are the basis for creating accountability for the FGS, which is a fundamental step towards achieving stability and a sustainable, secure environment. The purpose of a national framework governing arms and ammunition is to establish national norms, standards, regulations, strategies, and plans to effectively design, develop, implement, monitor, and evaluate WAM in Somalia. The framework should accurately reflect the current priorities, needs, capacities, and challenges in relation to WAM, and put in place the necessary legislative, regulatory, and administrative procedures and/or practices in order for the FGS and its security services to effectively control their stockpile and address illicit proliferation concerns.

The establishment of a national framework is led and owned by the FGS. It is an incremental process to address the fundamental aspects of arms and ammunition control in Somalia. WAM is a complex and multidimensional task that affects the government, people, and communities in a range of ways. Effectively establishing a national framework therefore requires that the full lifecycle of WAM be examined, and that a multi-sectoral approach—which provides a wide variety of measures and approaches—be considered.

Given the array of stakeholders and activities involved at the local, national, regional, and international levels in establishing a national framework, it is crucial for arms and ammunition control efforts to be coordinated by the FGS at the national level. It is also

important that such process be inclusive of relevant national actors, and that it be based on consultations and dialogue among these stakeholders.

## **4.2. UNIDIR and FGS project: National consultative process on WAM**

Recognizing the importance of a national framework, since 2014 the FGS and UNIDIR have implemented a project to support the design and development of such a framework in Somalia through a national consultative process. Since 2015, the FGS–UNIDIR project has been aligned to support Pillar 1 of the FGS WAM pilot project.

The objective of the joint FGS–UNIDIR project is to enhance the capacity of national authorities tasked with supporting or leading the development and review of national frameworks—including regulatory and procedural measures—related to WAM in Somalia.

The specific objectives of the joint project are to support the FGS to:

- understand the basic requirements and recommendations of international and regional instruments related to weapons and ammunition;
- assess the relevance and comprehensiveness of actors and the existing national framework governing weapons and ammunition;
- assess whether all issues governing the transfer (import, export, transit, trans-shipment, and brokering), marking and record-keeping, stockpile management, tracing, possession, disposal, and surveying of weapons and ammunition are covered or at least considered in the framing of the national framework; and
- address any potential deficiencies within existing national frameworks, including by assisting the FGS in the development of materials, such as national action plans and procedural documents.

This project has, in turn, helped establish capacity among relevant national authorities, in particular those entities represented in the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee (AAMSC, see section 5.1.2), in their efforts to review, assess, and consider the development of appropriate national frameworks, policies, and procedures dealing with the full lifecycle management of arms and ammunition. Phase I (2014) of UNIDIR’s work served as the basis for the development of this joint project.<sup>48</sup>

### **4.2.1. Achievements from the national consultative process on WAM**

In the period 2014–2017, the FGS, led by ONSA, together with UNIDIR, UNSOM, and UNMAS, organized one initiation workshop and a total of four rounds of national consultations on WAM in Mogadishu, Somalia. Each consultation was designed jointly between the FGS and United Nations partners. This section presents an overview of the initiation workshop and each of the consultative meetings and their achievements.

On 21–22 January 2014, the FGS hosted a Weapons and Ammunition Management Initiation Workshop in Mogadishu, in cooperation with UNSOM, UNMAS, UNIDIR, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This workshop aimed to highlight WAM

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<sup>48</sup> For more information, see Bevan J. et al., *Weapon and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia*, UNIDIR, June 2014. <http://www.unidir.org/programmes/weapons-of-societal-disruption/weapons-and-ammunition-management-in-somalia-phase-ii>.

requirements, to review the scope of existing WAM activities, and to identify WAM capacity-building requirements. The workshop also had two key objectives—first, to clarify the obligations and responsibilities of the FGS in relation to WAM; and second, to profile international partners and resources available to assist the FGS in meeting these obligations and responsibilities.

The workshop was structured along several themes. First, it provided a general introduction to WAM, including relevant United Nations Security Council resolution obligations, as well as existing regional and global instruments, standards, and practices. Second, the workshop provided the FGS with a platform to present its existing achievements, current objectives, and ongoing needs in relation to WAM. Third, a wide range of international partners presented their WAM enhancement activities in Somalia, including the construction or rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, efforts to develop weapon accounting systems, and general support provided to the FGS in terms of future WAM planning. Finally, and of critical importance to future WAM achievements in Somalia, the workshop included the inauguration of the AAMSC. The initiation workshop was attended by the National Security Adviser to the President of Somalia, representatives of the FGS and the security forces,<sup>49</sup> the United Nations,<sup>50</sup> AMISOM (military and police), the European Union, bilateral partners,<sup>51</sup> and non-governmental organization partners.<sup>52</sup>

Following the initiation workshop, the FGS hosted the first set of consultations on national frameworks for WAM in Mogadishu in June 2015. The consultations were led by an inter-agency team which comprised members from ONSA, UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research, the ISACS Inter-Agency Support Unit, and RECSA. Chaired by the National Security Adviser, the consultations included high-level officials from the MoIS, the Ministry of Defence (MoD), SNA, Somali Police Force (SPF), National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA), and the Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA). The first consultation produced a draft national roadmap aimed at establishing a national framework. A report, prepared by UNIDIR, presented the findings from the first consultative process and focused on progress made by the FGS, opportunities for enhancement, options for FGS action, and potential sources of support available to implement the options.

The FGS, together with United Nations partners, carried out the second consultations in Mogadishu in February 2016. The second consultations were technical in nature, focusing on identifying a range of operationalization options to develop national marking and record-keeping systems. The second consultations supported the design of a national marking and record-keeping programme, which assisted in the operationalization of the FGS WAM pilot project, in particular Pillars 3 and 4.

The third consultations were held on 12–14 March 2017 in Mogadishu. These consultations focused on technical processes related to the distribution of arms and ammunition, PSSM, as well as a national coordination body on WAM. The results of the consultations contributed to the FGS's plan to enhance the capacity of its security forces to manage

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<sup>49</sup> The Ministries of National Security and of Defence, Somali National Army, Somali Police Force, Custodial Corps, and the National Intelligence and Security Agency.

<sup>50</sup> UNSOM and UNMAS.

<sup>51</sup> Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.


<sup>52</sup> Mines Advisory Group, Danish Deming Group, Norwegian People's Aid, and HALO Trust.

explosives and ammunition, and clarified distribution procedures down the supply chain in support of operationalizing the FGS WAM pilot project’s Pillars 2 and 5.

The final series of consultations was held on 18–20 June 2017. The fourth consultations sought to support the FGS in the drafting of a national WAM document which consolidates progress made in the area of WAM in the 2014–2017 period, and outlines the FGS’s WAM targets for the 2017–2020 period. As a result of the fourth consultations, the FGS will produce a national WAM policy document which will support ONSA in sensitizing all Somali security forces on WAM requirements, and help in rolling out WAM initiatives beyond Mogadishu, including, where appropriate, with the FMS.

Throughout the consultative process, the FGS demonstrated a strong commitment through consistent high-level representation from a wide range of agencies as well as transparency of the information shared. Such activities reflect a high degree of political will within the FGS to enhance its ongoing work on WAM, as well as a clear desire to continue to work with international partners in this area. Figure 2 presents the overall process and achievements from the national consultative process on WAM in the 2014–2017 period.

**Figure 2.** FGS–UNIDIR-led national consultations on WAM (2014–2017)



FGS WAM Outputs following first consultation	FGS WAM outputs following second consultations	FGS WAM outputs following third consultations	FGS WAM outputs following fourth consultations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revision for programme of work for the AAMSC</li> <li>• Establishment of plan to establish national framework governing arms and ammunition</li> <li>• Baseline data on the full lifecycle management of arms and ammunition by FGS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of ad hoc Operational Implementation Groups</li> <li>• Operationalization of FGS WAM project</li> <li>• Initiation of systematic marking and record-keeping by FGS</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expansion of systematic marking and record-keeping system by FGS (including mobile marking)</li> <li>• Initiation of activities by FGS to establish systematic procedures over reception and distribution of arms and ammunition</li> <li>• Initiation of planning to manage ammunition and explosives</li> <li>• Initiation of planning to establish a national WAM commission</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Revision of programme of work for the AAMSC</li> <li>• Revision of plan to strengthen national framework</li> <li>• Revised baseline on the full lifecycle management of arms and ammunition by FGS</li> </ul>

## **5. Full lifecycle management of WAM: Current status and areas for enhancement**

This section presents the current status of WAM, as well as progress made by the FGS in this area in the 2014–2017 period. It also contains targets defined by the FGS for developing and enhancing the national framework on WAM in the 2017–2020 period. Eight functional areas are addressed in this section:

1. national coordinating mechanism;
2. transfer controls: import and distribution;
3. marking and record-keeping;
4. verification;
5. PSSM;
6. processing and tracing of captured weapons;
7. possession by civilians and private security companies; and
8. disposal of weapons.

### **5.1. National coordinating mechanism**

#### **5.1.1. General**

Creating, implementing, and enforcing effective national controls over the full lifecycle of arms and ammunition requires cooperation and coordination among a wide range of actors, including government agencies, civil society, the private sector, and intergovernmental organizations. A national coordinating mechanism on WAM can help to ensure that all relevant parts of the government work together with national and international partners to conceive, direct, monitor, and evaluate safe, relevant, efficient, and effective arms and ammunition control measures.<sup>53</sup>

Relevant regional and international instruments recommend that Somalia designate or establish a government entity (e.g. ministry, agency, etc.) to take the lead in providing overall political coordination and policy direction for national arms and ammunition control efforts. Such an agency may be considered the national authority or body on weapons and ammunition management.

#### **5.1.2. Progress made since 2014**

Since January 2014, the FGS has taken important steps to define an institutional framework for WAM oversight and implementation. On 22 January 2014, the FGS established the AAMSC—a high-level body to coordinate and monitor implementation by FGS of (1) its obligations under the partially lifted arms embargo, and (2) work under seven pillars, namely:

1. national framework;
2. weapons and ammunition reception and initial storage;

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<sup>53</sup> See ISACS 03.40, National coordinating mechanisms on small arms and light weapons control, introduction (p. v), [www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0340-en.pdf](http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0340-en.pdf).

3. marking and registration of newly imported weapons;
4. marking and registration of old weapons,
5. distribution of weapons and ammunition;
6. verification; and
7. reporting.

ONSA chairs the Steering Committee which meets quarterly under the auspices of the National Security Council. The Steering Committee is made up of representatives of the FGS,<sup>54</sup> the United Nations,<sup>55</sup> AMISOM (military and police), the European Union, bilateral partners,<sup>56</sup> and non-governmental implementing partners.<sup>57</sup> The role of the Steering Committee is to “provide strategic guidance on the Federal Government’s management of arms and ammunition in accordance with the Constitution and international law”.<sup>58</sup> The Steering Committee is responsible for:

- a) identifying priorities of the FGS relevant to WAM;
- b) providing guidance on the establishment of a national framework governing arms and ammunition;
- c) ensuring compliance with Security Council resolutions;
- d) providing strategic guidance to all relevant national authorities responsible for WAM;
- e) overseeing operational aspects of WAM;
- f) recommending public awareness and educational activities to improve community safety and security;
- g) identifying future training requirements related to weapons and ammunition management; and
- h) mobilizing resources in support of WAM projects.

ONSA maintains an up-to-date list of focal points from each agency which participates in the Steering Committee.<sup>59</sup>

At the operational level, in the period 2013–2015, the FGS had established a Technical Working Group on WAM (WAM TWG) to act as the implementing body for WAM-related activities. In this period, SEMA, an agency located within the MoIS, chaired the WAM TWG. The WAM TWG, however, faced several operational challenges during this period, including in the area of coordination and implementation. Since 2016, an ad hoc WAM Operational Implementation Group (OIG) replaced the WAM TWG. Unlike the WAM TWG, which had an undefined membership list and timeline, the OIG operates on needs basis with a clear timeframe linked to deliverables, under the ownership of ONSA.

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<sup>54</sup> The Ministries of National Security and of Defence, the SNA, SPF, the Custodial Corps, and NISA.

<sup>55</sup> UNSOM and UNMAS.

<sup>56</sup> Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

<sup>57</sup> Mines Advisory Group, Danish Deming Group, Norwegian People’s Aid, and HALO Trust.

<sup>58</sup> Arms and Ammunition Steering Committee, terms of reference, UNSOM ROLSIG, 18 January 2014.

<sup>59</sup> For further information on the Steering Committee and its terms of reference, see UNIDIR’s report *Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia*, 2014.


The primary role of the WAM OIG is to implement decisions taken by the AAMSC and to assist in the mobilization and coordination of technical expertise on WAM at the national level. Specifically, the WAM OIG is responsible for:

- a) providing expert technical advice to ONSA and AAMSC on operational aspects of WAM;
- b) implementing relevant programme of work on WAM assigned by ONSA and/or AAMSC;
- c) identifying future training requirements and coordinating the delivery of training; and
- d) involving FGS officials in all activities to grow and develop capacity so that the FGS can eventually assume total responsibility for WAM.

The WAM OIG's composition is defined by the programme of work assigned by ONSA or AAMSC, but generally involves all security services of the FGS (SNA, SPF, NISA, and the Custodial Corps (CC)) and often operates in an inter-agency team. This approach allows for enhanced inter-agency cooperation and information-sharing, as well as capacity-building across the security forces in a harmonized manner.

Figure 3 provides an organizational overview of the current WAM institutional structures within the FGS and indicates the specialized roles and responsibilities of various institutional bodies.

**Figure 3.** Current WAM institutional structure of the FGS (operational and strategic levels)<sup>60</sup>



<sup>60</sup> Adapted and updated from UNIDIR, *Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia*, 2014.

### **5.1.3. Opportunities moving forward**

With regard to opportunities for enhancement, the FGS indicated during the consultative process that it seeks to further strengthen the national coordination of WAM through exploring the establishment of a national body dedicated to overseeing WAM in Somalia. National consultations are currently ongoing to design such a national body and to define its scope, its placement within the Government, and its eventual roles and responsibilities. The FGS recognizes that such an undertaking is likely to be a lengthy process, involving multiple national stakeholders (see technical document).

Concretely, in continuing to strengthen the national coordination of WAM, the FGS identified the following targets for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Continue to organize AAMSC while the arms embargo is in place;
- 2) Continue to implement the ad hoc WAM OIG, as required; and
- 3) Design, review, and establish a national coordinating body on WAM.

## **5.2. Transfer controls: import processing and initial distribution**

### **5.2.1. General**

Effective national controls over the import of weapons and ammunition are necessary to prevent excessive, destabilizing, and illicit transfers of weapons and ammunition, which can pose a serious threat to peace and security, especially in areas beset by conflict, and political and social tensions.

Illicit transfers can also fuel conflict, violent crime, and instability, undermine sustainable development, and facilitate grave abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law. It is, therefore, a legitimate and urgent concern of the international community that Somalia maintain effective national controls over the international transfer of arms and ammunition.

Existing relevant regional and international instruments<sup>61</sup> recommend that laws, regulations, and administrative procedures to control the import of arms and ammunition be in place at the national level. These would enable the FGS to exercise effective control over all arms and ammunition entering and remaining in its jurisdiction. Furthermore, national controls over the import of arms and ammunition must be sufficient to minimize the risk that the weapons and ammunition could be diverted.

### **5.2.2. Progress made since 2014**

In order to comply with the United Nations Security Council obligations under the partial lifting of the arms embargo, the FGS has established a temporary procedure to centralize the imports authorization of weapons and ammunition. There are, at minimum, six procedural steps the FGS implements to control arms imports. First, prior to the import of arms or ammunition, an advanced delivery notification (ADN) is provided by ONSA to the

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<sup>61</sup> See ISACS Module 03.20, National controls over the international transfer of small arms and light weapons, <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0320-en.pdf>; and IATG Module 3.30, International transfer of ammunition, <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/docs/IATG03.30.pdf>.


Security Council Sanctions Committee (five days in advance of any delivery into Somalia). Second, authority to import arms and ammunition has been centralized in the MoD—i.e. security services send a request for supplies to their respective ministries, which subsequently transmit the request to the MoD. SNA has been designated as the responsible entity for overseeing the receipt of imports for all security services. Third, upon receipt of the arms supplies, a post-delivery confirmation (PDC) is provided by ONSA to the Security Council Sanctions Committee (within 30 days of the delivery). Fourth, newly imported weapons or ammunition are processed for marking and record-keeping at the Halane storage facility in the Mogadishu International Airport protected area, which acts as a central repository for all new supplies (see section 5.3). Fifth, weapons and ammunition can only be issued to FGS security forces upon authorization from the Chief of the Defence Forces. An issue and receipt system has been developed by the FGS at the Halane storage facility to adequately control and oversee the initial distribution of imported arms supplies. Finally, as a sixth procedural step, once arms have been distributed, a post-distribution notification (PDN) is provided by ONSA to the Security Council Sanctions Committee (within 5 days of the distribution). Figure 4 presents an illustrative flow of FGS's effort to control its imports and distribution of arms.

This centralized system allows for more efficient channelling of information to ONSA for the purpose of Security Council notifications. As welcomed by the Security Council in resolution S/RES/2317 (2016), reporting on the arms embargo requirements by the FGS has improved significantly since 2013, which reflects both an increased capacity on the part of ONSA, as well as an improved system for processing and reporting on arms imports.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> See S/RES/2317, operational para. 7 under Arms Embargo.

**Figure 4.** Temporary process for imports of arms and ammunition in Somalia<sup>63</sup>



<sup>63</sup> Adapted and updated from UNIDIR, *Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of Somalia*, 2014.

### **5.2.3. Opportunities moving forward**

The current system for processing imports of arms and ammunition could be further enhanced by embedding the transfer authorization process in a national legal or administrative framework. In practical terms, first, the FGS could consider establishing a legal or administrative framework to delineate the sources of import authorization and other procedures related to importing arms and ammunition into Somalia, and to criminalize the unauthorized import of arms or ammunition. Second, the FGS could elaborate a written SOP for processing imported weapons and ammunition, including procedures to be followed with regard to the reception of imported arms and ammunition at ports/airports, and the distribution of arms and ammunition to security services throughout Somalia. In this process, particular attention should be paid to establishing relevant regulations and procedures for the safe and secure transport of arms and ammunition.

Concretely, in strengthening the national control of international transfers, the FGS identified the following targets for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Codify international transfer authorization process (i.e. end use/r control system, focus on import controls); and
- 2) Continue to centralize information on international transfers and report on relevant Security Council obligations as required.

With regard to providing enhanced oversight of the distribution of supplies down the supply chain, the FGS identified the following targets for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Codify distribution procedures for all forces, including down the supply chain (i.e. from sector to unit levels); and
- 2) Establish transport regulations and procedures, including for road, air, and sea transport, and roll-out to sector levels.

## **5.3. Marking and record-keeping**

### **5.3.1. General**

The primary purpose of marking and recording weapons<sup>64</sup> is to enable national accounting systems to record the chain of custody of a particular weapon as it is transferred from one unit to another within national defence and security forces, and to trace weapons when they are recovered from illicit circumstances. The FGS can only effectively account for its arsenals when weapons are identifiable with unique markings, and recorded at every step of the transfer process.

Effective marking and record-keeping not only dissuade members of the security forces from diverting (stealing or selling) state-owned weapons, but also enable national authorities to maintain an up-to-date inventory of weapons in its national stockpile.

Existing relevant regional and international instruments recommend that all weapons be marked at the time of import and indicate, at a minimum, the country and the year of import, and, if the weapons are not already marked with a serial number, a serial number

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<sup>64</sup> Marking of ammunition is not considered in this report as Somalia is currently focusing on implementing a marking process for all of its newly imported weapons.

unique to the country and year of import.<sup>65</sup> Furthermore, the standards stipulate that all weapons and ammunition shall be recorded the moment that they come under government control (either through import or in-country acquisition). For weapons that have had import marks pre-applied at the time of manufacture, this should occur when the weapons are unpacked. If import marks have not been pre-applied, recording of the weapons should occur at the time of import marking. The national registry must record all information necessary to identify the weapon and associated (and regularly updated) information on its past and current custodians while under the jurisdiction of the importing State.<sup>66</sup>

### **5.3.2. Progress made since 2014**

#### **5.3.2.1. Marking**

In October 2014, the United Nations Security Council expressed disappointment that a weapons marking and registration process had not yet commenced, despite the Security Council's appeal in its Presidential Statement of 22 May 2014, and urged the FGS to implement this process without further delay.<sup>67</sup> Since then, the FGS has made significant progress in the area of marking, and its efforts have been widely recognized by the international community.<sup>68</sup>

As of June 2017, since the commencement of the marking programme in 2015, over 10,000 weapons have been marked across all Somali security forces as well as in private security companies operating in Somalia. Approximately 8,000 of those weapons were marked at the time of import and over 2,000 weapons held by the security forces or private security companies (i.e. those already in stock or in circulation) were marked utilizing a mobile marking programme.

The marking programme is currently implemented in two ways: first, all newly imported weapons are marked at the Halane storage facility by the SNA marking team prior to their distribution to relevant security forces. There are three marking machines at Halane storage facility—one is currently functional to mark all newly imported weapons, while the other two machines are planned for use in future mobile marking programmes. Additional office space was established in 2016 at the Halane storage facility in order to support marking operations. Second, all existing weapons in Mogadishu are marked either through a mobile marking programme or by relevant actors bringing their weapons to be marked at a designated location. In the case of weapons held by the SNA in Mogadishu, an SNA mobile marking team is deployed to SNA units to mark their weapons. For those weapons held by SPF and NISA in Mogadishu, relevant SPF/NISA units visit the MoIS Headquarters to mark their supplies. The MoIS currently holds three marking machines. The same procedure is applied to mark weapons held by private security companies (PSCs) and government officials. As an exception to this procedure, based on needs, MoIS is able to deploy a mobile marking team to mark weapons held by SPF/NISA outside of Mogadishu.

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<sup>65</sup> See ISACS Module 5.30, Marking and recordkeeping, clauses 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0530-en.pdf>.

<sup>66</sup> For more information on records to be kept, see *ibid.*, clause 6.2, <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0530-en.pdf>.

<sup>67</sup> See S/RES/2182 (2014), para. 5.

<sup>68</sup> See S/RES/2317 (2016), operational para. 5.

The marking codes and methods utilized by the FGS are in line with the Nairobi Protocol and the recommendations of the ISACS. Marking databases are utilized for both fixed and mobile marking programmes to record information of the marked weapons. In codifying the marking procedures, an SOP is currently in its final stages of drafting by the ONSA, with support from UNMAS. Once finalized, the SOP is expected to greatly facilitate the implementation of, and training on, marking programmes.

With regard to training, extensive training efforts were undertaken by the FGS, with support from UNMAS and UNSOM, at the early stages of the marking programme. For example, in February 2015, at the request of the FGS, UNMAS and UNSOM jointly supported the delivery of a two-week training course for 12 SNA personnel on using the marking machines. A follow-up training was undertaken in September 2015, where additional weapons marking and registration training was provided to 12 participants from the SNA, NISA, SPF, CC, and ONSA. During this course, a training of trainers programme was provided to three assistant instructors from SNA, NISA, and ONSA. Recent training programmes in 2016 and in 2017 have integrated marking and record-keeping as part of a broader WAM training for all security forces, utilizing instructors from training of trainers programmes.

#### **5.3.2.2. Record-keeping**

Establishing an adequate record-keeping system that can track and account for all supplies, including down the supply chain, remains a high priority for WAM in Somalia. While basic registration, including issue and receipt procedures, for arms and ammunition existed primarily in Mogadishu between early 2014 to early 2015, the system was not comprehensive enough to establish adequate accounting of supplies and was not exercised by all security forces. Recognizing these challenges, in late 2015 the FGS with support from international partners undertook a review process to revise the existing procedures and practices for record-keeping.

Following this review process, new sets of logbooks have been designed and rolled out to all security forces in Mogadishu. Furthermore, each security force has developed a revised issue and receipt system in order to obtain better oversight of the movement of weapons and ammunition through the chain of custody. The revised record-keeping system is designed specifically for the Somali context, while drawing on recommendations from relevant regional and international standards. In codifying record-keeping procedures for security forces, an SOP is currently in its final stages of drafting by ONSA, with support from UNMAS. Once finalized, the SOP is expected to greatly facilitate the implementation of, and training on, the record-keeping system.

Finally, since 2016, the MoIS has intensified its effort to register arms in the possession of civilians (i.e. government officials who are authorized to possess weapons) and PSCs. For example, in June 2017, the Office of the Minister from the MoIS issued an order for all government officials to register their firearms at the Ministry.<sup>69</sup> Similar measures have been undertaken by the MoIS to register weapons held by PSCs in Mogadishu.

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<sup>69</sup> See Letter from the Office of the Minister, MoIS, reference WAG/XW/035/17, dated 13 June 2017.

### **5.3.3. Opportunities moving forward**

With regard to opportunities for marking moving forward, ONSA has indicated its plan to roll out mobile marking programmes beyond Mogadishu. The initial roll-out plans include mobile marking programmes in Sectors 3 and 4 of Somalia. In the longer term, the FGS plans to establish a fixed marking programme at the sector level in order to facilitate the marking of existing weapons held by all relevant security forces. The FGS recognizes that such a roll-out plan would require support from regional and international partners, mainly logistic support from AMISOM and equipment support from United Nations partners.

Concretely, the FGS has identified the following targets for marking for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Continue to mark all new imports at Halane in line with existing SOPs;
- 2) Roll out the mobile marking programme to the sector level, beginning with Sectors 3 and 4;
- 3) Establish marking centres and develop marking and record-keeping capacity (trained teams) at the sector level. This may also be considered as part of outreach and consultations with the FMS; and
- 4) Integrate and centralize marking databases in Mogadishu and at the sector level.

With regard to opportunities for record-keeping, the FGS recognizes the importance of implementing the revised record-keeping system across all forces and along the supply chain. In this regard, further training needs are envisaged at the sector level. In facilitating this process, it is critical that the FGS roll out the revised logbooks and provide oversight over issue and receipt practices for the security forces. Such oversight may also be provided through a rigorous internal auditing and verification mechanism to regularly check stocks against existing records (see section 5.4). With the records related to arms growing incrementally (for both security forces and PSCs), the FGS also expressed a keen interest to develop and deploy centralized databases in the near future.

Concretely, the FGS has identified the following targets for record-keeping for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Continue to roll out logbooks to all security forces in Mogadishu and at the sector and unit levels;
- 2) Where procedures do not adequately exist, establish issue and receipt procedures for security forces at the sector level and unit levels;
- 3) Examine the feasibility of a centralized database system for imports, stock records, and issue and receipt, to be administered by ONSA; and
- 4) Explore the feasibility for a centralized database system for weapons held by civilians and PSCs, administered by MoIS.

## **5.4. Verification mechanism**

### **5.4.1. General**

In accordance with the Secretary-General's letter to the President of the Security Council dated 3 April 2014 and the Statement by the President of the Security Council of 22 May

2014,<sup>70</sup> the Security Council called for the FGS to establish a JVT in paragraph 7 of resolution 2182 of 24 October 2014.<sup>71</sup> The resolution calls on the FGS to establish a JVT to conduct routine inspections of government security forces' stockpiles, inventory records, and the supply chain of weapons for the purposes of mitigating the diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside the FGS security services.

#### **5.4.2. Current status**

Under the overall authority of the AAMSC, in August 2015 the FGS selected Conflict Armament Research to work jointly with it on the JVT. In March 2016, the JVT conducted a preliminary baseline assessment of weapons and ammunition that the FGS had imported into Somalia since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in October 2013. In November 2016, the JVT commenced the verification phase of its work: conducting inspections of weapons and ammunition with deployed FGS forces in order to verify that weapons imported for the FGS had been delivered to the intended end-users.

The JVT has undertaken six verification site visits since November 2016. These missions examined and inventoried arms and ammunition in the custody of SNA units. The JVT has spot-checked a total of 210 weapons and 182,610 rounds of ammunition across these six units. Complete inventories were not available for verification since the majority of weapons and ammunition in service with the units were deployed with soldiers throughout Mogadishu and were not stored at their respective bases.

#### **5.4.3. Opportunities moving forward**

In 2017, the JVT intends to align its activities with the mobile marking team to conduct verification of weapons in the FMS. ONSA further noted on the interest to build further national capacity to conduct internal inspections and verification of records moving forward. Concretely, the FGS identified the following targets for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Continue to roll out the JVT programme beyond Mogadishu; and
- 2) Build the national capacity of the JVT through training programmes.

### **5.5. Physical security and stockpile management**

#### **5.5.1. General**

Effective PSSM of weapons and ammunition is a critical requirement in ensuring the operational readiness of the national security forces, protection of national strategic assets, prevention of unexpected or accidental explosions of ammunition, and preventing state-owned stocks from being diverted to unauthorized or unintended end-users for illicit purposes.

One of the main sources of illicit weapons and ammunition is inadequately managed stockpiles from which weapons and ammunition leak, through loss or theft, into the illicit

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<sup>70</sup> See United Nations Security Council, *Letter Dated 3 April from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council*, S/2014/243 of 3 April 2014; United Nations Security Council, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*. S/PRST/2014/9 of 22 May 2014.

<sup>71</sup> See United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2182 of 24 October 2014; see also S/RES/2244 (2015), para 6.

market and from there to illicit end-users. Stockpile management of weapons and ammunition is the term used to describe those procedures and activities necessary for the safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation, and handling of arms and ammunition. The effective and efficient management of weapon and ammunition stockpiles is, therefore, an essential element of any security force and its operations—since it protects the national strategic assets, reduces the risk of accidental explosions of ammunition and loss and theft of weapons (and, thereby, their illicit proliferation), and can be used to identify obsolete or surplus weapons and old and unstable ammunition, as well as future procurement requirements.

The systematic control of weapon and ammunition stockpiles is in keeping with a philosophy of “due care” and requires that States take a proactive, rather than reactive, approach to ensuring that weapons and ammunition are adequately accounted for, secured, and safely stored.

### **5.5.2. Progress made since 2014**

Enhancement of PSSM of weapons and ammunition remains a key priority for the FGS. While progress has been made in this area, in particular at the Halane storage facility as well as at the headquarters of the security forces in Mogadishu, significant challenges remain for the FGS to establish storage capacity and procedures throughout the country.

In Mogadishu, the Halane storage facility is the central storage site for all newly imported weapons and is operated by SNA. The SPF reportedly have dedicated storage capacity for weapons in 17 districts of Mogadishu. The SPF storages, including the main storage at the SPF headquarters, are built to store small arms and their ammunition, not explosives or higher calibre ammunition. With regard to NISA, it currently has four storage sites: two at its headquarters in Mogadishu, one at the sector level, and one at its investigation division in Mogadishu. Similar to SPF, these storages are suitable to store small arms and their ammunition only.

Since 2014, the FGS has made several positive steps to strengthen PSSM in Somalia with a primary focus on improving procedures and infrastructures in Mogadishu. First, dedicated SOPs for PSSM are currently in their final drafting stages by ONSA, with support from UNMAS. Once finalized, these SOPs are expected to support the implementation of, and training on, PSSM for all security forces. Second, notable progress in the area of PSSM is expected at the Halane storage facility in late 2017. During the fourth consultations, held on 18–20 June 2017, ONSA and international partners elaborated a plan to establish Halane as a Centre for Excellence, which included enhancements in physical security measures (such as new guard towers, and a brick wall around store houses), a new training facility, a new workshop site for weapons repair, and the possible extension of the Halane facility to accommodate for small arms ammunition storage which would allow for separation of weapons from ammunition. Once finalized, such enhancements are expected to enable the FGS to adequately process its arms (including import reception, marking and record-keeping, weapons repairs, and destruction) and to train its security forces on WAM.

While recognizing these positive developments, several key challenges remain. Addressing the lack of documentation and procedures for reporting on loss and theft is a critical challenge in preventing diversion of arms. The current lack of secure storage sites at the

sector and unit levels, where operations are being conducted, poses a practical challenge in implementing wider WAM activities, including record-keeping and verification. Furthermore, ammunition management, including technical and personnel capacity, remains extremely limited throughout the security forces. The FGS has also expressed concerns regarding the lack of sustainable training programmes dedicated to WAM.

### **5.5.3. Opportunities moving forward**

#### **5.5.3.1. Ammunition management**

Due to the current status of the arms embargo, the FGS is restricted from importing large-calibre ammunition and explosives into the country without advance approval by the Sanctions Committee (e.g. ammunition specific to weapons with a calibre larger than 12.7 mm and mortars with a calibre larger than 82 mm).<sup>72</sup> In this regard, at present, the security forces of the FGS mainly possess and store small arms ammunition and specific types of explosive ammunition which are exempt from the arms embargo. This ammunition—specifically the explosives—is a hazardous commodity that requires the appropriate planning and management of storage facilities and personnel in order to ensure that the risks they pose to populations, vital physical infrastructure, and operational strategic assets are minimized in the event of an explosion which may be caused by negligence, accident, or sabotage.

Effective ammunition management is not only necessary for explosive safety requirements, but is also the only cost-effective method of efficient stockpile management. Ammunition is an expensive commodity with long production lead times. This means that it must be procured in advance in order for it to be available on demand. Ammunition inventory management systems should not only be capable of accounting for ammunition in detail to support explosive safety and to detect diversion (loss or theft), but they should also be designed to ensure that the best “value for money” is obtained from the ammunition.<sup>73</sup>

Many of Somalia’s purpose-built ammunition and explosive stores have been damaged by war and insurgency. Most have been destroyed beyond repair and the few remaining facilities are out of use due to disrepair, or to being sited in insecure locations. This problem is compounded by the lack of personnel qualified and trained to handle and manage ammunition in Somalia at this time, including technical capacity to assess ammunition and determine its serviceability. While the FGS, with support from international partners, has built a number of storage facilities to house small arms and small-calibre, low-explosive ammunition, none of these facilities are designed to accommodate high-explosive ammunition. While the quantity of explosive ammunition remains low in Somalia due to the restrictions imposed by the partially suspended arms embargo—as well as the need to rapidly distribute and use ammunition during operations—Somalia’s security forces store ammunition recovered from operations in a range of unsuitable facilities, most of which are situated in urban areas. Moreover, capacity to securely and safely store ammunition

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<sup>72</sup> It is unclear whether the FGS has ever made a request for importation of large-calibre ammunition to the Sanctions Committee.

<sup>73</sup> See IATG Module 03.10, Inventory management, introduction, <https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/convarms/Ammunition/IATG/docs/IATG03.10.pdf>.

remains extremely limited at the regional and field levels, where operations against insurgents are ongoing.

#### **5.5.3.2. Storage at sector and field levels**

With regard to the enhancement of capacities to better manage arms and ammunition at the sector and field levels, there are several prerequisite considerations. First, the safe and secure storage of arms and ammunition at the sector and field levels would require a location that is controlled, secured, and policed by the FGS and, where appropriate, the FMS. Second, adequate infrastructure—including storage buildings that can safely and securely store arms and ammunition—would be needed to allow the security forces to remain operationally ready, while at the same time mitigating the risk of diversion through loss, theft, or sabotage. Finally, given the ongoing military operations, some of the storage facilities may need to be temporary or mobile in their configuration to allow for rapid deployment and movements in operations. These enhancements would entail not only the need for detailed strategic and operational planning, including where appropriate the FMS, but also the need to secure the necessary resources to implement such a plan. In this connection, a clear prioritization plan for storage at the sector level is needed, and subsequently support from the international community would be needed to implement such a plan.

Concretely, in further strengthening PSSM efforts in Somalia, the FGS has identified the following targets for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Implement Halane enhancement plans and establish it as a Centre for Excellence;
- 2) Establish storage prioritization plan for all forces with inputs from the sector level, including, where appropriate, from the FMS; and
- 3) Develop ammunition management capacity, including by:
  - a. Developing technical surveillance procedures;
  - b. Establishing relevant safety regulations and procedures specific to ammunition management; and
  - c. Training personnel on ammunition management over the long-term.

### **5.6. Processing and tracing of captured weapons**

#### **5.6.1. General**

Most illicit weapons and ammunition begin their lives as legally manufactured or imported items but then are subsequently diverted to the illicit sphere. Tracing is the systematic examination of tracking information related to illicit weapons and ammunition from their point of manufacture or most recent import, through their supply chain, to their last legal title-holder, in order to determine the point, in space and time, at which they became illicit.

Reliably identifying the point of diversion is crucial to preventing the future diversion of arms and ammunition. Tracing the origin of weapons and ammunition which are recovered from illicit circumstances enables law enforcement officials to develop investigative leads that may link a weapon to a suspect in a criminal investigation, identify suspected arms

traffickers, or detect patterns of domestic and international arms trafficking. Similar benefits accrue from tracing illicit weapons and ammunition recovered in the context of armed conflict, however the challenges are far greater.

Successfully tracing a weapon or ammunition involves the following steps:

1. Identifying a weapon or ammunition based on markings and physical characteristics;
2. Conducting a domestic tracing operation to establish whether the weapon/ammunition (a) became illicit while under the jurisdiction of the State that recovered it (e.g. following its domestic manufacture or import), or (b) possibly entered the country by illicit means;
3. Conducting an international tracing operation, if the weapon is suspected of having entered the country by illicit means;
4. Identifying the point in time and space at which the weapon became illicit;
5. Taking action to prosecute those responsible for diverting the weapon, and to prevent similar diversion from re-occurring; and
6. Including data from the tracing operation in a biennial national report on tracing illicit SALW.

#### **5.6.2. Progress made since 2014**

The FGS, led by ONSA, has undertaken extensive efforts to establish procedures for processing captured weapons since 2014 when the United Nations Security Council resolution obligated the FGS to document and inspect captured military equipment (CME). The FGS has continued to demonstrate transparency in sharing information on captured weapons. Since 2015, the FGS has granted access to NISA's armoury to international partners, including members of the SEMG. Given the extensive outreach conducted by ONSA, all security forces present during the consultative process were aware of the requirement to document CME and allow its inspection by the SEMG (in accordance with S/RES/2182, paragraph 6, and S/RES/2244, paragraph 10).

The FGS established a clear procedure for processing captured weapons in August 2015. These include weapons captured on the battlefield or following terrorist attacks and seized from arms traffickers. At the time, NISA was designated lead authority on investigating and processing captured weapons from Al-Shabaab and other armed groups. Since 2016, SPF has also begun to conduct operations and to investigate and process captured weapons in Mogadishu. The basic process established by the FGS in 2015 is as follows:

- Arms seized by FGS security forces are taken to the NISA Criminal Investigative Division (CID) at Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, where information on the weapons and the circumstances of seizure are entered into a database. CID keeps any weapons for which further criminal investigation and prosecution is required, ultimately using them as evidence.
- Any other weapons (such as those captured in a terrorist attack for which there are no remaining suspects) are transferred to the Halane storage facility for further processing and storage. SNA records the serial number, type of weapon, and

location where the weapons were seized in their local weapons account at the storage facility.

Following this process, those weapons determined to be serviceable are marked and recorded by the SNA team, prior to integration into government stockpiles. Weapons determined to be unserviceable are recorded and subsequently destroyed at the facility. All information regarding captured weapons are shared with ONSA, which reports to the Security Council Sanctions Committee as required.

While noting the progress made by the FGS, several challenges remain regarding the processing of captured weapons in order to contribute to a meaningful tracing operation. First, the FGS acknowledges that many weapons seized by AMISOM at the sector or field levels may not be handed over to SNA to be processed up the chain to the Halane facility. Second, even if captured by SNA at the sector or field level, logistical challenges may inhibit SNA's ability to transfer the captured equipment to Mogadishu. Third, given that, at minimum, three national security services are capturing and processing weapons from operations (SNA, SPF, and NISA), further clarification and specification in the procedures may be needed to capture actors involved and context under which they operate. Finally, in the absence of a robust national accounting system at the sector and field levels, the FGS would not be able to effectively account for all weapons held by its security forces, complicating the effort to identify the sources of arms diversion in the country.

### **5.6.3. Opportunities moving forward**

With regard to opportunities for enhancement, the FGS plans to further revise the existing procedures and begin implementing them. In this context, capacity should be built to ensure the application of such procedures. Furthermore, capacity should be developed within the FGS to properly identify, document, and conduct analysis of captured weapons for tracing purposes. Lastly, in late 2017, the FGS plans to finalize an agreement with AMISOM on a hand-over process for captured weapons.

Currently, the majority of captured weapons are redistributed to FGS forces to aid in their fight against Al-Shabaab. This is an acceptable practice as long as captured weapons are properly marked, recorded, and accounted for in FGS stocks, inspected by the SEMG, and duly notified to the Sanctions Committee. Once recorded, captured weapons should be analysed in order to enable mapping of their possible illicit source. Currently, the accounts being kept on captured weapons are held by each security service. It would seem sensible to arrange for database sharing or transfer of relevant information both to reduce duplication of processing steps, and to ensure that full details are available for the purpose of tracing. More exploration is necessary to understand what database system would be most appropriate to record and share relevant information as captured weapons are processed.

Furthermore, currently, there is no capacity to fully trace captured weapons. Doing so identifies patterns in illicit arms flows within, as well as in and out of, Somalia. In several cases, NISA was able to identify that captured weapons came from the same shipment. This has raised suspicions that organized, mass shipments of illegal weapons are making their way into Somalia. Currently, however, the capacity does not exist within NISA and SPF to identify weapons beyond the original country of manufacture. With support of international

partners, the FGS plans to conduct further training on weapons identification and tracing in order to aid in the combat against illicit arms flows.

Concretely, to strengthen efforts to investigate, process, and trace captured weapons, the FGS has identified the following targets for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) All security forces will seek to implement existing FGS policy on processing captured weapons;
- 2) Plan logistic arrangements for implementing the FGS policy;
- 3) Agree, with the African Union and AMISOM, to a coordinated and accountable procedure for processing captured weapons;
- 4) Clarify the authorities responsible for investigation and tracing at state, federal, and international levels; and
- 5) Further build capacity to investigate and trace weapons through implementing training programmes.

## **5.7. Possession by civilians and private security companies**

### **5.7.1. General<sup>74</sup>**

The illegal ownership of weapons and ammunition by civilians is one of the key factors that contributes to their illicit proliferation and misuse, including to unlawfully kill, injure, or intimidate, in organized and petty crime, intimate partner and family-related violence, gang violence, terrorism, and other illegal acts of aggression. The impact of such misuse is devastating to victims, their families, and communities.

When improperly stored or misused, weapons in the possession of civilians can put at risk individuals, including children. When widely misused in a particular area, weapons can cause significant damage to the lives, livelihoods, and health of individuals, families, and communities and can create a pervasive environment of fear and insecurity that hinders social well-being and sustainable human development.

Inadequate national regulation of civilian access to weapons and ammunition is a factor in their global illicit trade. Loose or inadequately enforced regulation in one State can affect neighbouring States if significant numbers of weapons acquired by civilians are allowed to flow illegally across borders. While effective import, export, and border controls are essential to preventing the illicit trade, it is also essential that regulatory mechanisms be in place to ensure that privately held weapons and ammunition are legally owned and that civilians are held accountable for illegal possession, misuse, and trafficking.

### **5.7.2. Progress made since 2014**

The FGS is taking steps to strengthen the national legal framework governing possession and ownership of arms by civilians and PSCs. The current legal framework, defined by the Public Order Law of 1963, is obsolete and inadequate to address the security challenges faced in Somalia today.

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<sup>74</sup> Based on ISACS 03.30, National regulation of civilian access to small arms and light weapons, <http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0330-en.pdf>.

The FGS is currently drafting two legal documents which relate to the civilian possession and ownership of firearms. The first legal document is dedicated to regulating the possession and ownership of SALW by civilians in Somalia (hereafter referred to as the SALW Control Act). The second legal document is dedicated to regulating the possession and use of firearms by private security companies operating in Somalia (hereafter referred to as the PSC Act). Once adopted, together, the two legal documents are expected to adequately address issues related to the illicit proliferation and misuse of arms by civilians and PSCs in Somalia.

The FGS recognizes the extensive process involved in establishing a legal framework governing civilian possession of firearms and that such a process may take time. With regard to the process involved in adopting draft legal documents, the following steps are envisaged (indicative):

- Step 1: Drafting of the SALW Control Act and the PSC Act;
- Step 2: Conducting of a legal and technical evaluation(s) and consultations by ONSA with relevant FGS authorities. Where necessary, incorporate feedback by returning to Step 1;
- Step 3: ONSA presenting the draft Acts to the National Security Council (NSC). Based on consideration by the NSC, the draft may be recommended by the NSC for adoption by the Office of the President (see Step 5). The draft may also be recommended by the NSC for review by Council of Ministers for review and feedback. If the Council of Ministers have feedback, feedback and inputs are incorporated by returning to Steps 1 and 2;
- Step 4: Presenting the draft Acts to Parliament, once approved by the Council of Ministers. If approved by the Parliament, Step 5 follows. If the Parliament members have feedback, this is incorporated by returning to Steps 1 and 2; and
- Step 5: Signing and adopting of the Acts by the President of Somalia.

In a parallel process to the drafting of relevant legal documents under the ownership of ONSA, the MoIS since 2016 has taken progressive steps to regulate firearms possession and ownership by PSCs and government officials. The MoIS has issued the following requirements to PSCs:

- PSCs are only allowed to stockpile pistols and assault rifles.
- All PSC weapons are to be registered and marked by the MoIS. In conducting the registration, PSCs are asked to visit the MoIS.
- The process for registering and marking firearms owned by PSCs involve the following steps:
  - Weapons owned by the PSC are checked by the CID for any diversion/crime-related records. If the weapon has been cleared by the CID, it is marked, provided that the individual carrying the weapon is cleared to possess a firearm.

- A background check is conducted by the CID on the individual working for the PSC. The criteria for the background check have not been disclosed. If the individual is cleared by the CID, the individual is assigned a “biometric ID”.
- At this stage, once both the weapon and the individual have been cleared by CID, the MoIS issues a license to the individual working for the PSC.
- The MoIS conducts routine monthly monitoring of the PSCs to ensure that there are no violations related to the possession of firearms. Notably, should an individual from a PSC be found carrying an unlicensed firearm, that individual would be detained by law enforcement and the firearm confiscated.

Similar vetting and licensing procedures are currently exercised by the MoIS on government officials who wish to possess a firearm.

In 2017 the FGS also began to carry out operations to remove illicit weapons from Mogadishu. While public disarmament initiatives are not considered an appropriate option at this time due to the prevailing security situation, recent stabilization operations in Mogadishu aim to seize all unlicensed firearms from households with the goal of reducing the availability of illicit arms in the community. ONSA is currently establishing procedures to mark and register all seized weapons from these stabilization operations. In the near future, the FGS may plan and initiate similar initiatives in other Somali cities.

### **5.7.3. Opportunities moving forward**

With regard to opportunities for enhancement, the FGS, led by the MoIS, plans to continue the firearms registration process in order to regularize the possession of firearms by civilians and PSCs. In a parallel process, the FGS is planning to undertake an awareness-raising and sensitization campaign to help civilians better understand their rights and obligations under the revised law. A similar educational campaign could be initiated with registered and authorized arms dealers or PSCs. Furthermore, in the long term, the Penal Code would need to be adequately revised by the FGS to effectively address the offenses identified in the Acts.

Concretely, to better regulate civilian and PSC possession and ownership of firearms, the FGS has identified the following targets for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Complete the drafting, review, and adoption process for the SALW Control and PSC Acts;
- 2) Provide technical inputs for the review of the Penal Code as it relates to the offenses under the two Acts; and
- 3) Plan and conduct public sensitization on firearms possession and ownership in relation to the relevant Acts.

## **5.8. Disposal**

### **5.8.1. General<sup>75</sup>**

The destruction of illicit, surplus, and obsolete weapons and ammunition constitutes an important element of a comprehensive WAM programme. Destruction is an effective

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<sup>75</sup> Based on the introduction to ISACS 05.50, Destruction: Weapons, [www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0550-en.pdf](http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0550-en.pdf).

method for ensuring that weapons do not return to the illicit market or users. Destruction, in contrast to other methods of disposal, such as integration into security force stocks, ensures that weapons will not find their way (back) into the illicit market and can thus build confidence in overall efforts to prevent, combat, and eradicate the illicit trade.

A weapons destruction programme can involve the destruction of weapons relinquished by the civilian population as part of a weapons collection programme, recovered in criminal investigations or activities, or identified as being surplus to the requirements of the armed services of a State. The success of WAM is directly related to the means by which weapons are ultimately disposed. Cooperation and coordination among all parties to destroy surplus or unwanted weapons can build confidence in the lifecycle management of arms and ammunition.

Weapons destroyed after being collected in a post-conflict setting can send a clear message that war is over and can bring hope to those who are seeking to rebuild their lives. Weapons destroyed after being recovered in crime can never again find their way into the hands of criminals. Weapons destroyed after being identified as surplus to national requirements can result in reduced costs to the State associated with their long-term storage, management, and security.

#### **5.8.2. Progress made since 2014**

The primary method of disposal by the FGS of captured serviceable weapons and ammunition at this time is integration into national stocks. There are limited numbers of obsolete weapons held by various security forces. Such obsolete weapons, at the request of the relevant security forces, have been destroyed with assistance from UNMAS. The method of destruction currently being used by the FGS is cutting using hydraulic shears.

In July 2015, officers from SNA and NISA completed a one-week training programme on the destruction of SALW. Fifteen personnel attended the training which was conducted jointly by UNSOM and UNMAS. A follow-up disposal training course was conducted by UNSOM and UNMAS for the SPF and CC. Three “training of trainers” instructors were trained during this course to build the national capacities of the Somali forces to conduct training courses themselves in the future. A total of 150 weapons were destroyed during the courses which were held in July and August 2015.

The FGS is currently drafting an SOP for the destruction of arms, to be utilized by its security forces. This SOP is expected to be completed in 2017. Furthermore, additional hydraulic shears are expected to be procured with support from UNMAS in 2017, which would increase the capacity to destroy unserviceable weapons at the Halane storage facility.

The FGS is not currently engaged in ammunition disposal. This is primarily due to the current situation that no surplus or obsolete ammunition has been identified by the security forces.

#### **5.8.3. Opportunities moving forward**

With regard to opportunities for enhancement, the FGS has identified three clear areas moving forward. First, in order to dispose of military equipment, a clear authority that can authorize the destruction of materiel for the security services will be required. Second, a clear procedure for requesting destruction of arms or ammunition from the unit level up the chain of command would need to be established. Third, appropriate destruction sites at the

sector level would need to be identified in order to ensure that destruction processes do not place heavy logistical burdens on the security forces.

Concretely, to enhance the capacity to dispose of weapons and ammunition, the FGS has identified the following targets for the 2017–2020 period:

- 1) Establish authorities that can authorize destruction of military materiel;
- 2) Establish and operationalize a destruction request process from the unit and sector levels; and
- 3) Identify potential destruction sites at the sector level.

## 6. WAM beyond Mogadishu

The political agreement between the FGS and the FMS on a national security architecture in April 2017, followed by the Security Pact agreed by the FGS and the international community in May 2017, represent crucial frameworks for enabling sustainable, long-term security in Somalia. In this context, elaborating on the relevance and applicability of WAM is crucial: first, in the context of implementing the national security architecture and further developing the Somali national security institutions and forces (CAS strand 2), attention will need to be paid on how security forces will be supplied and equipped with arms, and how those supplies would be managed and accounted for down the supply chain. This is particularly critical in light of the obligations the international community has placed on Somalia to ensure that weapons are not being diverted to unauthorized end-users in violation of the arms embargo. Second, in the absence of an adequate and functioning WAM governance system at the FMS level, which can manage and account for weapons already in stock or in circulation, there is a risk that the influx of new supplies, without adequate oversight, may contribute to the unintentional proliferation of arms throughout the country. In short, it is imperative that WAM is considered part of the discussion on implementing the national security architecture and developing the national security institutions and forces, in order to mitigate the risk that weapons supplies intended to strengthen Somali forces do not lead to the unintended proliferation of arms, which may destabilize the country or even the subregion.

In recognizing the importance of rolling out WAM beyond Mogadishu, including, where appropriate, with FMS, ONSA has proposed the following plans in the near future:

- 1) Upon approval by the FGS, ONSA will carry out outreach and consultations on WAM by visiting the FMS; and
- 2) Outreach and consultations will include the roll-out of practical WAM initiatives with FMS based on established FGS WAM policies and procedures, including:
  - a. A sensitization on United Nations Security Council obligations and the relevant national legal framework;
  - b. The roll-out of marking, record-keeping, storage, and verification programmes in FMS in line with established SOPs; and
  - c. The involvement of the FMS in WAM coordination efforts.

In the near term, the FGS plans to roll out practical WAM initiatives at the sector level through the deployment of mobile marking teams which will be accompanied by an inter-agency team of trained officers on WAM, as well as the JVT. This roll out is envisaged in late 2017.

## **7. Conclusion and next steps**

The FGS has demonstrated sustained commitment to enhancing its WAM system and governance. While challenges remain, the FGS should be commended on its efforts to define an institutional framework for WAM while improving its implementation. Nevertheless, a large amount of work remains if the State is to achieve a comprehensive national framework governing arms and ammunition.

As demonstrated by the progress made since 2014, the FGS is well situated to initiate various WAM activities with the support of its regional and international partners, which have significantly improved the status of its WAM procedures and practices. Specifically, the establishment and implementation of the FGS pilot project, under the leadership of ONSA, proved a crucial starting point for the vast amount of progress made in the past four years. Notable achievements include FGS's procedures to centralize imports, establish and undertake a rigorous marking programme, as well as efforts to increase transparency and accountability through its verification programme.

To ensure that progress by the FGS is not halted and that consistency is maintained on efforts to improve WAM in Somalia, including at the sector level and with the FMS, it is critical that the FGS continue its respective WAM programmes. In this endeavour, where requested, the international community should be available to provide FGS with the necessary technical and financial support to pursue this.

In order to make further concrete measurable progress in the establishment of a national framework on WAM, the FGS has proposed a set of targets for the upcoming years. These targets may not be achieved quickly nor with ease. However, with sustained commitment and leadership by the FGS, together with support from the international community, these targets may be achievable over time. Annex 1 presents the consolidated list of targets identified by the FGS in moving forward on WAM.

## **Annex 1. FGS WAM targets beyond 2017**

- I. Roll out WAM activities beyond Mogadishu, including engagement with FMS.**
  1. Upon approval by the FGS, ONSA will be designated to carry out outreach and consultations on WAM by visiting FMS.
  2. Outreach and consultations to include the roll-out of practical WAM initiatives with FMS based on established FGS WAM policies and procedures, including:
    - a. The sensitization on Security Council obligations and national legal framework;
    - b. The roll-out of marking, record-keeping, storage, and verification programmes in FMS in line with established SOPs; and
    - c. The involvement of FMS in WAM coordination efforts.
  3. In the meantime: implement relevant existing WAM programmes at the sector levels.
  
- II. Establish a revised legal framework and develop an implementation plan.**
  1. Complete drafting, review, and adoption of the SALW and PSC Acts.
  2. Review and provide inputs for the Penal Code as it relates to WAM.
  3. Review and provide inputs for Defence and Police Act to ensure adequate WAM component integration.
  4. Plan and carry out public sensitization activities on firearms possession and ownership as it relates to the relevant Acts
  
- III. Continue to strengthen national coordination.**
  1. Continue to organize AAMSC while arms embargo is in place.
  2. Continue to implement an ad hoc operational group, as needed.
  3. Design, review, and establish a national coordinating body on WAM (i.e. WAM Commission or equivalent).
  
- IV. Codify international transfer controls.**
  1. Codify international transfer authorization process (i.e. end use/r control system, focus on import controls).
  2. Continue to centralize information on international transfers and report on relevant Security Council obligations, as required.
  
- V. Provide oversight on the physical distribution of arms and ammunition supplies.**
  1. Codify distribution procedures for all forces, including down the supply chain (i.e. from sector to unit levels).
  2. Establish transport regulations and procedures including for road, air, and sea transport and roll these out to the sector levels.

**VI. Continue the marking of new imports and existing weapons.**

1. Continue to mark all new imports at Halane in line with existing SOPs.
2. Roll out the mobile marking programme to sector levels, beginning with Sectors 3 and 4.
3. Establish marking centres and develop marking and record-keeping capacity (trained teams) at the sector level. This may also be considered as part of outreach and consultations with the FMS.
4. Integrate and centralize the marking database in Mogadishu and at the sector level.

**VII. Strengthen accountability through improvements in record-keeping and verification.**

1. Roll out logbooks to all forces in Mogadishu and at sector and unit levels.
2. Establish issue and receipt procedures for all forces in Mogadishu and at sector and unit levels.
3. Continue to roll out JVT programme and expand its locations.
4. Build national capacity of the JVT through training programmes.
5. Explore the feasibility to establish a centralized database system for imports, stock records, and issue and receipt, administered by ONSA.
6. Explore the feasibility to establish a centralized database system for civilian- and PSC-owned firearms, administered by MoIS.

**VIII. Implement proposed processes for captured weapons and build capacity for tracing activities.**

1. Implement, in all forces, government policy on processing captured weapons.
2. Plan logistic arrangements for implementing government policy.
3. Agree, with African Union and AMISOM, a coordinated approach for processing captured weapons.
4. Clarify the appropriate authority responsible for investigating and tracing at state, federal, and international levels.
5. Build capacity to investigate and trace weapons.

**IX. Establish Halane as a Centre for Excellence, roll out storage plan at sector level, and enhance ammunition management capacity.**

1. Implement Halane enhancement plans.
2. Establish storage prioritization plan for all forces with inputs from the sector level.
3. Develop ammunition management capacity, including by:
  - a. Developing technical surveillance procedures and capacity to support the determination of serviceability and condition of ammunition;
  - b. Establish relevant safety regulations and procedures on ammunition management; and

c. Training personnel on ammunition management over the long-term.

**X. Establish a system for destruction of unserviceable arms and ammunition.**

1. Establish a destruction authorization process.
2. Establish a destruction request process from unit/sector level.
3. Plan and determine destruction sites at the sector level.

**XI. Build safer communities through the collection of illegitimate arms.**

1. Plan and implement, as appropriate, collection activities of illegitimate arms as part of stabilization programmes.
2. Ensure collection programmes implement existing procedures for marking, record-keeping, tracing, and destruction (when applicable to unserviceable weapons).



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