I. Introduction

United Nations member states are currently discussing the feasibility of an arms trade treaty (ATT), which would seek to create better controls on international arms transfers. To support this process, the European Union (EU) is funding a series of six regional seminars, organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), to increase the awareness of an ATT among UN member states, regional organizations, civil society and industry, and to promote international discussions about the proposed treaty.

This paper is part of a series of region-specific Background Papers produced by SIPRI to inform discussions during these meetings. Specifically, this paper provides background information for the regional meeting on the Middle East. Section II gives a general overview of international arms transfers to, from and within the Middle East in recent years. Section III discusses a number of issues raised by arms transfers: use of arms in conflicts, small arms and light weapons (SALW), and transparency. Section IV includes brief conclusions.

II. Arms transfers to and from the Middle East

Imports

The Middle East is a region of high military expenditure relative to gross domestic product (GDP), and it has correspondingly high levels of arms imports. Indeed, concern regarding arms supplies by a range of countries to Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq during the 1980s was among the factors that led to the creation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA).2

Military spending in the Middle East rose by 34 per cent over the period 1999–2008.3 With the exception of Turkey, all countries in the region for which data is available increased their military spending over this period (see table 1). However, the average military burden (i.e. the share of military expenditure in GDP) fell slightly. Nonetheless, 7 of the 10 countries with the highest military burdens in 2007 were Middle Eastern.4

1 For the purpose of this paper the Middle East includes Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, the Palestinian territories, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
3 Unless otherwise stated, all information on military spending is taken from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/milex/>.
4 These countries are Oman (10.7%, 1st place), Saudi Arabia (9.3%, 2nd), Israel (8.6%, 4th), Jordan (6.2%, 5th), Lebanon (5.1%, 6th equal), Yemen (5.1%, 6th equal) and Syria (4.4%, 9th).
The Middle East accounted for 21 per cent of world imports of major conventional weapons during 2004–2008, almost the same as during 1999–2003.\(^5\) However, the volume of deliveries to the Middle East was 20 per cent higher in the period 2004–2008 than in the period 1999–2003.

The largest recipient of major conventional weapons in the region during 2004–2008 was the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with 29.6 per cent of the regional total (see figure 1). The UAE was the third largest recipient worldwide (after China and India), up from 16th place for 1999–2003. The next largest recipients in the region were Israel (with 19 per cent of the regional total, Turkey (with 12.7 per cent of the regional total) and Egypt (with 12.3 per cent of the regional total). Israel was the sixth largest recipient worldwide for 2004–2008, up from 12th place for 1999–2003; Turkey was eighth worldwide, down from fourth place; and Egypt was ninth worldwide, down from eighth place.

The increases in military expenditure and arms imports in the region have been driven by a combination of strong economic growth, high oil prices, and increasing insecurity due to the various armed conflicts and regional tensions. Tensions in the region have been increased by the 2003 invasion and

\(^5\) Unless otherwise stated, all information on transfers of major conventional weapons is taken from the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/>.  

### Table 1. Military expenditure in the Middle East, 1999–2008

Figures are in US$ m. at constant (2005) prices and exchange rates for 1999–2008 and in the right-most column (marked \(\ast\)) in current US$ m. for 2008. Figures are for calendar years.

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<td>337</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>486</td>
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<td>2 721</td>
<td>2 740</td>
<td>2 585</td>
<td>3 774</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran(^b)</td>
<td>3 200</td>
<td>4 731</td>
<td>5 220</td>
<td>3 926</td>
<td>4 594</td>
<td>5 816</td>
<td>7 213</td>
<td>7 811</td>
<td>6 486</td>
<td>6 089</td>
<td>9 174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq(^c)</td>
<td>. . .</td>
<td>. . .</td>
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<td>. . .</td>
<td>(1 120)</td>
<td>(972)</td>
<td>(828)</td>
<td>(1 926)</td>
<td>(5 283)</td>
<td></td>
<td>[16 194]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel(^d)</td>
<td>9 299</td>
<td>9 574</td>
<td>9 996</td>
<td>11 087</td>
<td>10 421</td>
<td>9 931</td>
<td>10 303</td>
<td>11 075</td>
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<td>[12 135]</td>
<td>[16 194]</td>
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<td>586</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>655</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>964</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>948</td>
<td>[970]</td>
<td>[981]</td>
<td>[1 155]</td>
<td>[1 067]</td>
<td>[1 301]</td>
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<td>Oman(^e)</td>
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<td>2 562</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia(^f)</td>
<td>18 260</td>
<td>20 125</td>
<td>21 434</td>
<td>20 147</td>
<td>18 956</td>
<td>21 074</td>
<td>25 393</td>
<td>28 926</td>
<td>33 320</td>
<td>33 136</td>
<td>38 223</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria(^g)</td>
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<td>5 353</td>
<td>5 627</td>
<td>5 841</td>
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<td>UAE(^h)</td>
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<td>Yemen</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>701</td>
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<td>793</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>1 196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

.. = data not available; () = uncertain figure; [ ] = SIPRI estimate.

\(^a\) The figures for Bahrain do not include extra-budgetary spending on defence procurement.

\(^b\) Figures for Iran exclude spending on the Revolutionary Guard.

\(^c\) The figures for Iraq should be seen in the light of the unstable security situation and high rate of inflation.

\(^d\) The figures for Israel include military aid from the USA, which in 2008 was $2.38 billion.

\(^e\) The figures for Oman are for spending on defence and national security and exclude capital expenditure.

\(^f\) The figures for Saudi Arabia are for the adopted budget, rather than actual expenditure, and are for defence and security.

\(^g\) The figures for Syria are based on the official exchange rate of $1 = 11.225 Syrian pounds.

\(^h\) The figures for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) exclude the military expenditure of its 7 constituent emirates.

The high level of arms imports by Israel and Egypt is partly a result of military aid from the USA. Iraq—which was subject to a complete UN arms embargo before 2003—is set to become a significant importer again and is making a major effort to re-equip its army with armoured vehicles, helicopters and transport aircraft, helped by aid from the USA.6

The large-scale imports by the UAE are a relatively new development, beginning in 2004. The UAE's imports cover the full range of conventional weapon systems. The largest deals have been a $5 billion deal with the USA for 80 F-16E combat aircraft and associated weapon systems and avionics; and a $3.4 billion deal with France for an estimated 62 Mirage-2000-5 Mk2 combat aircraft and associated systems along with 390 Leclerc tanks and other equipment. Israel’s acquisitions have focused mostly on air power. Its largest recent deal is the $5 billion two-stage Peace Marble programme for the licensed production of F-16I combat aircraft. Another major Israeli acquisition is for two Dolphin submarines from Germany, worth $1.2–1.3 billion. Many other states in the region, including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, are modernizing the inventories of their armed forces. Iran has concentrated on missile technology and on improving air defences. Numerous countries in the region have sought to acquire long-range strike capabilities, either through combat or ground attack aircraft or through medium- or long-range missile capabilities.

**Suppliers**

The United States was by far the largest supplier of arms to the Middle East during the period 2004–2008: it accounted for 53 per cent of the volume of deliveries of major conventional arms, up from 46 per cent for 1999–2003. The next largest supplier was France, with 16 per cent, followed by Germany with 8 per cent and Russia with 7 per cent. These four countries thus accounted for 84 per cent of all deliveries to the region (see figure 2).

The USA was a major supplier to most countries in the region, in particular Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the UAE. The USA did not sell to Iran or Syria. The biggest recipients of US arms in the period 2004–2008 were Israel (which received 35 per cent of all US deliveries), the UAE (29.5 per cent of all US deliveries) and Egypt (16.6 per cent). The USA supplied nearly 99 per cent of Israel’s major conventional weapon imports.

Almost all of France’s major conventional weapon deliveries to the Middle East in the period 2004–2008 went to the UAE (79 per cent of deliveries) or Saudi

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Arabia (20.5 per cent). Germany’s deliveries were dominated by Turkey, which received 92.6 per cent of the volume of German deliveries to the region. Four countries received almost all of Russia’s major conventional weapon deliveries to the region: Iran (59 per cent), Iraq (16 per cent), Egypt (15 per cent) and Syria (10 per cent). Iran and Syria were both largely dependent on Russian arms supplies, although Iran also received significant quantities of equipment from China.

**Exports**

Few countries in the Middle East have significant indigenous defence industries. Israel has by far the most advanced industry and is the only state in the region that is able to produce a wide range of major platforms. However, it remains largely dependent on the USA for some systems. In some areas, such as unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technology, Israel is a world leader. Israel was the 11th largest arms exporter worldwide in the period 2004–2008 and the volume of major conventional weapons delivered was 23 per cent higher than for 1999–2003. Israel’s major customers in 2004–2008 were India (24 per cent of deliveries), Turkey (19 per cent), the USA (9 per cent) and Mexico (9 per cent).\(^7\)

Turkey is the only other significant exporter of domestically produced major conventional weapons in the Middle East. However, its deliveries in 2004–2008 were only one-tenth the level of Israel’s. Turkey is seeking to develop its defence industry and has considerable capabilities in areas including armoured vehicles and military electronics. Its major conventional weapon exports were 69 per cent higher in 2004–2008 than in 1999–2003, although some of these exports consisted of second-hand equipment. Albania, Iraq and Pakistan were Turkey’s largest customers.

Jordan and the UAE are both actively developing their defence industries, especially in the areas of armoured vehicles and, in the case of the UAE, naval vessels. Exports of locally produced equipment are, however, limited, but both countries have exported significant volumes of second-hand equipment.

**III. Issues regarding arms transfers to and from the Middle East**

**Use of imported arms in conflicts**

Every war fought in the Middle East in recent decades has involved the extensive use of foreign-supplied armaments.

Most recently, US-supplied equipment—including F-16 aircraft, Hellfire missiles, guided bombs and white phosphorous shells—was used by Israel in its

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\(^7\) A significant proportion of Israel’s arms exports consist of high-tech subsystems and components, which are not classed as major conventional weapons and are therefore not included in the SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (note 5).
assault on the Gaza Strip in December 2008 and January 2009. It also made extensive use of US-supplied equipment in the war in Lebanon in 2006 and uses US-supplied armoured vehicles to maintain its occupation of the West Bank.\(^8\) Israel has been accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law during the conflicts in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, including specific allegations of the use of US-supplied equipment.\(^9\) Israel denies these accusations and insists that its forces have behaved in accordance with international law.\(^10\)

The rockets used against Israel by the Palestinian militant group Hamas include locally produced Qassam rockets, Russian-made Grad rockets, Iranian-made Al-Fajr rockets and possibly Chinese-made rockets. These weapons are not necessarily supplied by the manufacturing country. Weapons are frequently smuggled through tunnels linking the Gaza Strip with Egypt and there is very little hard evidence of the identity of the original supplier.\(^11\)

The major conventional weapons of the Lebanese opposition movement Hezbollah have almost all been supplied by Iran and Syria. These include short- and medium-range rockets and anti-tank, anti-ship and surface-to-air missiles. In 2006 UN Security Council Resolution 1701 imposed an embargo on arms transfers to all non-governmental, non-UN groups in Lebanon.\(^12\) However, Lebanon, the USA and the UN have alleged that arms for Hezbollah have continued to cross the border from Syria, although Syria has committed itself to stopping these flows.\(^13\)

Hamas, Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups have been accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law in the course of their conflicts with Israel, through the indiscriminate firing of rockets into areas populated by civilians. These groups defend their actions as legitimate resistance.\(^14\)

**Small arms and light weapons**

There are extensive stocks of small arms and light weapons in the Middle East, including large stocks for military, police and other security force and, in many countries, a high level of individual ownership. In many cases the wide availability of SALW carries a high risk of diversion to conflicts within and outside the countries of origin. However, information on total stocks and on international flows, both licit and illicit, is limited.\(^15\)

The conflict in Iraq has been facilitated by the easy availability of small arms and widespread private ownership. Following the disbanding of the Iraqi Army by the US-run Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003, control of


\(^11\) Amnesty International (note 8).

\(^12\) UN Security Council Resolution 1701, 11 Aug. 2006.


\(^14\) Amnesty International (note 8); and Amnesty International (note 9), pp. 66–78.

Iraq’s arms stockpiles was weak, which enabled arms to reach a variety of armed groups. US officials have alleged that arms have been smuggled across Iraq’s borders with Syria and Iran, but no hard evidence has been provided as to the identity of the suppliers of such arms; indeed, identifying suppliers in such cases is extremely difficult.

The USA has itself supplied large quantities of SALW to the new Iraqi Army but has failed to exercise effective monitoring and control over these weapons. A 2007 report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense had lost track of around 190,000 weapons supplied to the Iraqi Army since 2004, around 30 per cent of total supplies. This raised concerns that some of these arms may have fallen into the hands of insurgent groups. The Turkish Government has seized US-supplied arms from the rebel Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) which are likely to have been intended for Iraqi security forces but subsequently diverted.

Since these problems came to light, the USA has imposed stronger controls on M-16 and M-4 rifles supplied to Iraqi troops by using a centralized database and biometric information to link each rifle to its user.

Yemen has one of the highest rates of private gun ownership in the Middle East, according to the Small Arms Survey. Eighteen public arms markets operated freely until they were officially banned in June 2008. These arms

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**Table 2. Middle Eastern states participation in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, 1998–2007**

The table lists only those states that reported at least once during the period.

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<tr>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>117</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
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x = report submitted; o = nil report submitted; * = report includes background information on imports and exports of small arms and light weapons; † = report includes additional information on arms holdings; ‡ = report includes additional information on arms production.


21 Small Arms Survey (note 15).

markets are believed to be a significant source of arms for many parties to
the conflict in Somalia, despite a UN arms embargo against all parties there.
In December 2008 the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia reported that the
Yemeni Government has tightened regulation and increased coastal patrols
but that illicit flows of SALW to Somalia had continued.\textsuperscript{23}

One positive sign on this issue was the passing of a resolution by the League
of Arab States in September 2004 on combating the illicit trade in SALW.\textsuperscript{24}

**Transparency**

Transparency in arms transfers in the Middle East is poor. Since 1998 only
Israel, Jordan and Turkey have regularly submitted substantive reports to
the UN Register of Conventional Arms, detailing their imports and exports
of major conventional weapons (see table 2). Turkey is the only country to
have submitted additional information on transfers of small arms and light
weapons, as well as information on holdings and production. Most Arab
states boycott UNROCA since they believe that, as well as information on
transfers of major conventional weapons, it should include information on
weapons of mass destruction and on arms holdings.

No state in the Middle East publishes an annual report on its exports of
conventional weapons.

**IV. Conclusions**

The Middle East is a region of high military expenditure and arms imports
relative to its economic and demographic size. In common with most other
regions worldwide, military expenditure and arms imports have been on an
upward trend in recent years. The United States has increased its dominance
of the Middle East arms market; it accounted for over half of all major con-
ventional weapon deliveries between 2004 and 2008. France, Germany and
Russia are the other major suppliers. Many countries engaged in major mili-
tary modernization programmes over this period, spurred by strong eco-
nomic growth, high oil prices and high levels of tension. Few Middle Eastern
countries have significant indigenous arms industries; Israel dominates
exports from the region.

Both legal and illicit arms transfers to and within the Middle East raise
concerns regarding the potential for fuelling conflict and for use in violations
of international humanitarian law. However, most states in the region
remain uncertain as to the merits of an arms trade treaty. In December 2008
only 4 Middle Eastern states—Jordan, Lebanon, Oman and Turkey—voted in
favour of the UN General Assembly resolution on establishing an ATT, with
the other 11 abstaining.\textsuperscript{25} Transparency in arms transfers is limited and few
states participate in the UN Register of Conventional Arms on a regular
basis.

\textsuperscript{23} United Nations, Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council
\textsuperscript{24} League of Arab States, Ministerial Council, ‘Arab coordination for combating the illicit trade in
SIPRI BACKGROUND PAPER

ARMS TRANSFERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

SAM PERLO-FREEMAN

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SIPRI is an independent international institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, especially those of arms control and disarmament. It was established in 1966 to commemorate Sweden’s 150 years of unbroken peace.

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