ARMS TRANSFERS TO ASIA AND OCEANIA

SIEMON T. WEZEMAN

I. Introduction

United Nations member states are currently discussing the feasibility of an arms trade treaty (ATT), which would seek to create better controls on international arms transfers. To support this process, the European Union (EU) is funding a series of six regional seminars, organized by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), to increase the awareness of an ATT among UN member states, regional organizations, civil society and industry, and to promote international discussions about the proposed treaty.

This paper is part of a series of region-specific Background Papers produced by SIPRI to inform discussions during these meetings. Specifically, this paper provides background information for the regional meeting on Asia and Oceania.1 Section II gives a general overview of international arms transfers to, from and within the region in recent years. Section III gives an assessment of the transparency of these arms transfers. Section IV includes brief conclusions.

II. Arms transfers to and from Asia and Oceania

Arms imports

Asia has high levels of military expenditure and arms procurement. For the period 2004–2008 Asia was the region with the most arms imports: it accounted for 39 per cent of the global imports of major conventional weapons.2 Transfers to East Asia accounted for 67 per cent of the Asian imports, transfers to South Asia for 25 per cent and to Oceania for 7 per cent (see figure 1). Three of the world’s five top importers are Asian countries: China, India and South Korea, which together account for almost a quarter

1 Unless otherwise specified, the term Asia is used here to refer to Asia and Oceania. For the purpose of this paper Asia and Oceania includes East Asia—Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK), South Korea (Republic of Korea), Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam—South Asia—Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka—Oceania—Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Central Asia—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—will be covered in a subsequent paper in this series.

Table 1. Military expenditure in Asia and Oceania, 1999–2008

Figures are in US$ m. at constant (2005) prices and exchange rates for 1999–2008 and in the right-most column (marked *) in current US$ m. for 2008. Figures are for calendar years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>(205)</td>
<td>(249)</td>
<td>[260]</td>
<td>[268]</td>
<td>[266]</td>
<td>[316]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>[21 600]</td>
<td>[23 800]</td>
<td>[28 500]</td>
<td>[33 400]</td>
<td>[36 400]</td>
<td>[40 600]</td>
<td>[44 900]</td>
<td>[51 200]</td>
<td>[57 900]</td>
<td>[63 600]</td>
<td>[84 900]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1 710</td>
<td>2 242</td>
<td>2 367</td>
<td>2 486</td>
<td>3 319</td>
<td>3 653</td>
<td>3 571</td>
<td>3 802</td>
<td>[4 131]</td>
<td>[4 824]</td>
<td>[4 994]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>43 484</td>
<td>43 083</td>
<td>44 276</td>
<td>44 725</td>
<td>44 818</td>
<td>44 476</td>
<td>44 165</td>
<td>43 666</td>
<td>43 460</td>
<td>42 751</td>
<td>46 296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>15 689</td>
<td>16 652</td>
<td>17 133</td>
<td>17 605</td>
<td>18 204</td>
<td>19 004</td>
<td>20 554</td>
<td>21 224</td>
<td>22 119</td>
<td>23 773</td>
<td>24 172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>(21.1)</td>
<td>(16.4)</td>
<td>(15.9)</td>
<td>(14.8)</td>
<td>(12.8)</td>
<td>(12.1)</td>
<td>(11.7)</td>
<td>(11.9)</td>
<td>(11.8)</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1 847</td>
<td>1 677</td>
<td>2 086</td>
<td>2 370</td>
<td>3 022</td>
<td>2 917</td>
<td>3 120</td>
<td>3 054</td>
<td>3 409</td>
<td>3 479</td>
<td>4 362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>853</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>857</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1 034</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1 352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4 788</td>
<td>4 631</td>
<td>4 741</td>
<td>4 999</td>
<td>5 048</td>
<td>5 143</td>
<td>5 464</td>
<td>5 670</td>
<td>5 806</td>
<td>5 831</td>
<td>7 507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>8 412</td>
<td>7 807</td>
<td>7 965</td>
<td>7 256</td>
<td>7 357</td>
<td>7 923</td>
<td>7 725</td>
<td>7 323</td>
<td>7 791</td>
<td>9 498</td>
<td>10 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2 113</td>
<td>1 982</td>
<td>2 063</td>
<td>2 087</td>
<td>2 058</td>
<td>[1 962]</td>
<td>[1 977]</td>
<td>[2 060]</td>
<td>[2 569]</td>
<td>[3 003]</td>
<td>[4 114]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>1 828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>767</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>17 150</td>
<td>17 697</td>
<td>18 313</td>
<td>18 256</td>
<td>18 664</td>
<td>21 660</td>
<td>22 891</td>
<td>23 029</td>
<td>23 535</td>
<td>24 716</td>
<td>30 030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>81.1</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>[142]</td>
<td>[138]</td>
<td>[172]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3 311</td>
<td>3 320</td>
<td>3 553</td>
<td>3 818</td>
<td>4 077</td>
<td>4 248</td>
<td>4 412</td>
<td>4 463</td>
<td>4 468</td>
<td>4 217</td>
<td>4 769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>904</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>1 230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oceania</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>[11 057]</td>
<td>[11 025]</td>
<td>[11 469]</td>
<td>[12 013]</td>
<td>[12 335]</td>
<td>[12 821]</td>
<td>[13 292]</td>
<td>[14 112]</td>
<td>[14 896]</td>
<td>[15 321]</td>
<td>[18 399]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>[39.3]</td>
<td>[48.1]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1 127</td>
<td>1 132</td>
<td>1 107</td>
<td>1 066</td>
<td>1 090</td>
<td>1 105</td>
<td>1 117</td>
<td>1 176</td>
<td>1 225</td>
<td>1 251</td>
<td>1 378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

. . = data not available; ( ) = uncertain figure; [ ] = SIPRI estimate.

Note: Data for Myanmar is not available in current US$ figures due to extreme uncertainties of the exchange rate. Data is not available for Bhutan, Kiribati, North Korea, the Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

a The figures for Afghanistan exclude military aid.

b The figures for India include paramilitary forces but exclude spending on military nuclear activities.

c The figures for Nepal exclude spending on paramilitary forces.

of global imports for 2004–2008. Almost three quarters of the deliveries to Asia came from Russia and the United States (see figure 2).

Total military expenditure in the region has increased in real terms every year since 1999 (see table I). With nearly 6 per cent of global military expenditure, in 2008 China became for the first time the second largest spender (after the USA, which accounted for 42 per cent). Taking a longer perspective, military expenditure has doubled in real terms since 1988 and the regional share of global military spending has risen from 9 per cent to 17 per cent. Key to this dramatic regional increase in military spending has been the high economic growth rate of many Asian states combined with a high level of international tension (e.g. over the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, between India and Pakistan, and in the South China Sea) and—in the cases of China and India—an aspiration to become a major regional or global power. Extensive force modernization is ongoing in Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan and Viet Nam. All have recently introduced or are scheduled to introduce weapons that give new capabilities for long-distance operations, and many of these weapons are imported.

China was the world’s largest importer of major conventional weapons in 2004–2008, as it has been for many earlier periods. China’s imports accounted for 11 per cent of global imports for 2004–2008. Nearly all (92 per cent) of these imports came from Russia. Deliveries included large warships (8 Type-636 or Kilo submarines and two Sovremenny destroyers), combat aircraft (85 Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft) and air-defence missile systems (18 S-300 air-defence systems) as well as engines, radars and missiles for Chinese-produced combat aircraft and ships. However, Chinese imports during 2007 and 2008 were less than half of the annual volume of the previous five years. It is expected that in the future China will obtain the vast majority of its military equipment from its indigenous arms industry, although it will remain partly dependent on imports for key components and technologies such as engines, transmissions and electronics.


4 The spending of North Korea, Myanmar and Viet Nam is excluded from these calculations.

India was the second largest arms importer in 2004–2008 and it has traditionally been one of the three largest globally. The vast majority of India's imports come from Russia (78 per cent), including combat aircraft (70 Su-30 aircraft) and tanks (150 T-90S tanks). However, the country is keen to diversify its suppliers and has also bought major weapons from several European countries, Israel and the USA. Despite India's long-existing policy of self-sufficiency in arms and the establishment of an extensive arms industry, it remains heavily dependent on imports of arms and military technologies.

While South Korea was the fourth largest importer over the period 2004–2008, in 2007 and 2008 it was the world's largest importer of major conventional weapons. It imported 61 per cent more in 2004–2008 than in 1999–2003. The vast majority (73 per cent) of South Korean imports comes from the USA. South Korea is investing heavily in high-technology weapons for all three of its armed services, and deliveries or orders in 2004–2008 included long-range strike aircraft (61 F-15K combat aircraft from the USA), submarines (9 Type-214 submarines from Germany), and air defence or anti-ballistic missile systems (including Patriot missile systems from Germany and associated radars from Israel), as well as components such as engines and radars for indigenously manufactured warships, light combat aircraft and armoured vehicles.

**Arms exports**

Several countries in the region have significant indigenous arms industries and the development of indigenous arms industries is actively promoted throughout the region. A number of countries (e.g. India, South Korea and Malaysia) have procurement policies that make purchases of military equipment from abroad dependent on local, licensed production and transfers of technology to boost the domestic industry. The indigenous industries currently cater mainly to the domestic market but have the potential to export more.

SIPRI identified 12 states in the region as exporters of major conventional weapons in the period 2004–2008 (see figure 3), but these states account for...
just 2.4 per cent of all exports of major conventional weapons.\textsuperscript{6} China is by far the largest arms supplier in Asia.

A little more than half of the exports of major conventional weapons from Asian suppliers went to other countries in the region (see figure 4); these were mostly deliveries from China to Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Another substantial proportion was delivered to the Middle East, mainly Egypt, Iran and Turkey (see also box 1). Most of the recipients are countries in regions of high international tension, are involved in internal conflicts, have severe economic problems or have been accused of using weapons in violations of international humanitarian law.\textsuperscript{7}

**Transfers of small arms and light weapons**

Information on the total numbers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the region is limited but it is clear that there are extensive stocks of SALW for military, police and other security forces. In many countries there are also substantial numbers of legal or illegal small arms in the hands of private citizens and rebel forces.\textsuperscript{8} Such widespread availability of SALW facilitates the numerous internal conflicts in the region and carries a risk of diversion to crime within and outside the countries (see box 2).\textsuperscript{9}

Much of these arsenals are the result of legal imports of SALW but data on flows of SALW to the region is scarce. Many countries in the region also

\textsuperscript{6} SIPRI identified 63 states worldwide as exporters of major conventional weapons in the period 2004–2008.

\textsuperscript{7} See e.g. International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Weapons and international humanitarian law’, <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/section_ihl_weapons>.

\textsuperscript{8} E.g. there are an estimated 40 million legal and illegal firearms in India; and according to official estimates, there are 1.1 million legal and 100 000 illegal private weapons in the Philippines (but this is believed by researchers to be a serious underestimate). Chenoy, A. M., ‘India and the arms trade treaty’, *Imphal Free Press*, 14 June 2007; available at <http://www.iansa.org/campaigns_events/woa2007/asiapac.htm>; and ‘Guns in the frame: urban violence in the Philippines’, *Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007), p. 145.

\textsuperscript{9} Since 2001, Asia has been the region with the largest number of major armed conflicts; in 2008, 7 of the 16 such conflicts were in Asia, all of them intrastate. In addition, numerous smaller intrastate conflicts have taken or are taking place. Harbom, L. and Wallenstein, P., ‘Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1999–2008’, *SIPRI Yearbook 2009* (note 5), p. 70; and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Database, <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/database/>.

\textbf{Box 1. Diversion of weapons to non-state actors: Chinese missiles to Hezbollah}

In July 2006 an Israeli warship operating off the coast of southern Lebanon during the Israeli assault on Hezbollah was attacked by anti-ship missiles fired from Hezbollah-controlled territory.\textsuperscript{a} The missiles were variously identified as C-802 or Kowsar. A C-802 is a Chinese missile that has been delivered to several customers, including Iran; it may also be produced in Iran (under the name Noor). Kowsar is the Iranian name for two different Chinese-designed missiles (PRC C 701 and TL 10A) produced in Iran. The missiles (as well as other weapons of Chinese and other origin) were most likely delivered by Iran.\textsuperscript{b} In 2007 Israel provided the United Nations with information of additional deliveries of C-802 missiles to Hezbollah.\textsuperscript{c}

The diversion of the missile or technology from the legitimate end-user to an armed non-state actor highlights the problem of supplies to non-state groups and the issue of post-delivery responsibilities and controls.


Box 2. Gaps in export procedures: Indonesian rifles ‘disappearing’

In August 2009 the Philippine authorities searched a merchant vessel that made a suspicious call in a small Philippine harbour. On board they found 54 rifles and a number of empty cases, which raised the suspicion that more, possible up to 200, rifles had been off-loaded before the ship arrived in harbour. The rifles found were SS-1V1s, a Belgian-designed weapon produced under licence in Indonesia by the state-owned company PT Pindad. Indonesian officials claimed that the ship was carrying 100 SS-1 rifles ordered by Mali as well as 10 pistols destined for a Philippine shooting club. The Indonesian defence minister maintained that Pindad had complied with all rules. The captain claimed that the ship was carrying rifles and pistols for Philippine customers, covered by correct papers and loaded under the guard of Indonesian police or military. According to the Philippine police, the papers found were false. Indonesian authorities suspected that the missing weapons had been diverted illegally to extremist groups or private armies linked to politicians in the Philippines. An investigation is ongoing in Indonesia and the Philippines. While the story indicates gaps in export controls and transport procedures, it also shows a willingness for authorities to publicly comment, to investigate and to cooperate internationally on SALW trafficking.

b Agustina, W., ‘Pindad akui kirim senjata ke Filipina dan Mali’ [Pindad acknowledges sending arms to the Philippines and Mali], Tempo (Jakarta), 28 Aug. 2009.

deal and export SALW. According to customs data, China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand exported SALW in 2005. China is thought to be one of the largest producers and exporters of SALW, and has exported to state forces in Asia and Africa. India, North Korea, Pakistan and Singapore are also known to produce and export SALW, but details about numbers and destinations are vague.

III. Transparency

In 1991 the UN General Assembly established the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA) to prevent excessive and destabilizing accumulations of arms. States are requested to report annually on their imports and exports of certain types of major conventional weapons; since 2006 they have also been invited to provide similar data on SALW.

With the exception of Afghanistan, North Korea, Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka, all UN member states in the region participated in UNROCA at least once between 1999 and 2008. Most of these states have reported for most of the period, but only nine have consistently reported for all 10 years (see table 2). The rate of participation is about the same as the global average; while it is far below the European level, it is much higher than in Africa and the Middle East.

Regional discussions on transparency have taken place in the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF). In 1995 ARF participants agreed to publish defence White Papers.

10 However, customs data is inconsistent and often unclear or unreliable. See Bromley et al. (note 2), table 7; and Dreyfus, P., Marsh, N. and Schroeder, M., ‘Sifting the sources: authorized small arms transfers’, Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of War (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009).

11 ARF participants are the 10 ASEAN member states—Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam—and Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and the USA.
Table 2. Participation by states of Asia and Oceania in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, 1999–2008

The table lists only those states that reported at least once during the period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Nam</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x‡</td>
<td>x‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>o†</td>
<td>x†‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
<td>x†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>x†‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>x†‡</td>
<td>x†‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
<td>o‡</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional total</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: In addition the Cook Islands and Niue, which are not UN member states, reported between 1999 and 2005.

x = import or export report submitted; o = nil report submitted; * = report includes background information on imports and exports of small arms and light weapons; † = report includes additional information on arms holdings; ‡ = report includes additional information of procurement from national production.


However, few have been consistent in their publication and most of the White Papers produced so far are limited to general explanations of defence policies.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite the general acceptance in the region of the principle of transparency, only Australia has published a public national report on arms exports. However, this has not been published for some years.\textsuperscript{13} In contrast, transparency in arms procurement data and processes and military budgets is relatively high for several states in the region (e.g. Australia, India, Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines). Furthermore, such matters are often discussed in parliament or in the media and scrutinized by official accounting agencies and non-governmental organizations in these countries. Most states in the region are gradually improving their transparency and accountability on arms procurement, as well as increasing opportunities for broader participation in and influence on decision making.

IV. Conclusions

Asia still has numerous potential and active interstate and intrastate conflicts. While some of the interstate disputes over boundary demarcation have been resolved peacefully in recent years, several others have seen renewed tension.\textsuperscript{14} There is an awareness among states in the region that arms procurement may be potentially destabilizing. Many states in the region have therefore either bilaterally or multilaterally developed or participated in confidence-building measures, including transparency mechanisms. However, the level of transparency on arms acquisitions and the reasons behind the decisions remain in some cases inadequate to prevent worst-case scenario reactions.

The military modernization that many states in the region have engaged in during the past decade and the currently known or likely plans for further modernization indicate that the volume of transfers to the region will remain high for the foreseeable future. Of potential concern for regional stability are acquisitions of new capabilities for long-distance operations.

The region is not fully united on the potential merits of an arms trade treaty. Several states have actively supported the process and 25 of the 38 UN members in the region voted in December 2008 in favour of the UN General Assembly resolution on an ATT. However, three important states—China,


\textsuperscript{13} The latest report is Australian Department of Defence, \textit{Annual Report: Exports of Defence and Strategic Goods from Australia, Financial Years 2002–2003, 2003–2004}. This and other national reports are available at \texttt{<http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/researchissues/transparency/national_reports>}

\textsuperscript{14} E.g. Malaysia and Singapore resolved a maritime boundary conflict with international arbitration in 2008 and continue to jointly seek solutions for outstanding boundary issues. Unresolved disputes include boundary disputes between India and China, India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, and Myanmar and Thailand and several disputes in the South and East China seas, all of which have led in the recent past to incidents involving armed forces.
India and Pakistan—abstained.\textsuperscript{15} As the world’s biggest arms-importing region and as a region with exporters of growing importance, Asia and Oceania has a significant role to play in the development of an ATT and other regional and global measures to increase security through arms control and transparency.

**Abbreviations**

ARF \hspace{4mm} ASEAN Regional Forum  
ASEAN \hspace{4mm} Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
ATT \hspace{4mm} Arms trade treaty  
EU \hspace{4mm} European Union  
SALW \hspace{4mm} Small arms and light weapons  
UN \hspace{4mm} United Nations  
UNIDIR \hspace{4mm} United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research  
UNROCA \hspace{4mm} UN Register of Conventional Arms

\textsuperscript{15} UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/63/240, 24 Dec. 2008. The other 10 UN members in the region were absent from the vote and Taiwan is not a UN member.
OTHER PAPERS IN THIS SERIES

**Recent trends in the arms trade**
SIPRI Background Paper
Mark Bromley, Paul Holtom, Sam Perlo-Freeman and Pieter D. Wezeman
SIPRI, April 2009

**Arms transfers to Central, North and West Africa**
SIPRI Background Paper
Pieter D. Wezeman
SIPRI, April 2009

**Arms transfers to the Americas**
SIPRI Background Paper
Mark Bromley
SIPRI, June 2009

**Arms transfers to the Middle East**
SIPRI Background Paper
Sam Perlo-Freeman
SIPRI, July 2009

**Arms transfers to East and Southern Africa**
SIPRI Background Paper
Pieter D. Wezeman
SIPRI, forthcoming

**Arms transfers to Europe and Central Asia**
SIPRI Background Paper
Paul Holtom
SIPRI, forthcoming

OTHER RECENT SIPRI PUBLICATIONS

**SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security**
Oxford University Press, 2009

**Building air traffic capacity in Africa: options for improving security and governance**
SIPRI Policy Brief
Hugh Griffiths
SIPRI, October 2009

**Arms flows to the conflict in Chad**
SIPRI Background Paper
Pieter D. Wezeman
SIPRI, August 2009

**Multilateral peace operations:**
*Africa, 2008*
*Asia, 2008*
*Europe, 2008*
*Personnel, 2008*
SIPRI Fact Sheets
Kirsten Soder
SIPRI, July 2009
Handbook of Applied Biosecurity for Life Science Laboratories  
Peter Clevestig  
SIPRI, June 2009

Addressing drugs and conflicts in Myanmar: who will support alternative development?  
SIPRI Policy Brief  
By Ekaterina Stepanova  
SIPRI, June 2009

Prosecuting conflict-related sexual violence at the International Criminal Court  
SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security no. 2009/1  
By Ashley Dallman  
SIPRI, May 2009

Air Transport and Destabilizing Commodity Flows  
SIPRI Policy Paper no. 24  
By Hugh Griffiths and Mark Bromley  
SIPRI, May 2009

Enforcing EU Law on Exports of Dual-use Goods  
SIPRI Research Report no. 24  
By Anna Wetter  
Oxford University Press, April 2009

SIPRI arms transfers data, 2008  
SIPRI Fact Sheet  
Mark Bromley, Paul Holtom, Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman  
SIPRI, April 2009

China’s expanding peacekeeping role: its significance and the policy implications  
SIPRI Policy Brief  
Bates Gill and Chin-hao Huang  
SIPRI, February 2009

Reporting transfers of small arms and light weapons to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, 2007  
SIPRI Background Paper  
Paul Holtom  
SIPRI, February 2009

The CFE Treaty one year after its unilateral suspension: a forlorn treaty?  
SIPRI Policy Brief  
Zdzislaw Lachowski  
SIPRI, January 2009

The Supreme Court, the Bush Administration and Guantánamo Bay  
SIPRI Background Paper  
Kirsten Soder  
SIPRI, January 2009

Chronology of armaments, disarmament and international security 2008  
SIPRI Fact Sheet  
Nenne Bodell  
SIPRI, January 2009
ARMS TRANSFERS TO
ASIA AND OCEANIA

SIEMON T. WEZEMAN

CONTENTS

I. Introduction 1
II. Arms transfers to and from Asia and Oceania 1
   Arms imports 1
   Arms exports 4
   Transfers of small arms and light weapons 5
III. Transparency 6
IV. Conclusions 8
   Abbreviations 9

Box 1. Diversion of weapons to non-state actors: Chinese missiles to Hezbollah 5
Box 2. Gaps in export procedures: Indonesian rifles ‘disappearing’ 6

Figure 1. The recipients of major conventional weapons in Asia and Oceania, 2004–2008 3
Figure 2. The suppliers of major conventional weapons to Asia and Oceania, 2004–2008 3
Figure 3. The suppliers of major conventional weapons in Asia and Oceania, 2004–2008 4
Figure 4. The recipients of major conventional weapons from suppliers in Asia and Oceania, 2004–2008 4
Table 1. Military expenditure in Asia and Oceania, 1999–2008 2
Table 2. Participation by states of Asia and Oceania in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, 1999–2008 7

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Siemon T. Wezeman (Netherlands) is a Senior Fellow with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme, where he has worked since 1992. Within the Arms Transfers Programme he specializes in Asia and Oceania. His publications include several relating to international transparency in arms transfers, such as The Future of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, SIPRI Policy Paper no. 4 (August 2003), and Cluster Weapons: Necessity or Convenience? (Pax Christi Netherlands, 2005, co-author). He has contributed to the SIPRI Yearbook since 1993.