In 2022, the Government of the Central African Republic (CAR), via the designated national lead entity, the Commission nationale de Lutte contre la Prolifération des Armes Légères et de Petit Calibre (ComNat-ALPC) conducted a weapons and ammunition management (WAM) follow-up baseline assessment at the national level in cooperation with and with technical assistance from the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), with the organisational and logistical support of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA).

Taking the first baseline assessment of 2017 as a reference, and applying UNIDIR’s reference methodology, the baseline follow-up assessment provided national authorities of the CAR an opportunity to evaluate comprehensively and systematically, through a nationally-led consultative process, together with international stakeholders, not only the key progress made since 2017, but also the current WAM policies, capacities, processes, practices and procedures, in line with international, regional and sub-regional obligations and commitments, as well as relevant international standards and technical guidelines.

This country insight presents key findings of the WAM baseline follow-up assessment in CAR, covering the period until April 2022. This publication draws from and is based on a comprehensive report transmitted by UNIDIR to the Government of CAR in early August 2022.1 This country insight does not reflect and take into account more recent changes and developments including with regards to WAM in CAR since April 2022. Nevertheless, most of the main findings as well as the identified options to further strengthening WAM in CAR remain relevant and valid.

The insight is structured as follows: following an introduction to the national context and the situation of WAM in CAR, key findings and observations are presented by key functional areas (see also Box 2). What follows are the implementation options identified and validated during the consultative process (see also Boxes 3 and 5). Elements of the UNIDIR team’s analysis, based on information gathered during the process, and additional opportunities for improvement are also presented, where indicated. The final section provides perspectives for the use of the assessment results and the implementation of the identified options for strengthening the national framework governing WAM in CAR.
Box 1: What is WAM?

WAM is the oversight, accountability and governance of weapons and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, end-use control, tracing and disposal. WAM covers conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, ammunition, components, and related material.

Box 2: WAM key functional areas part of a national baseline assessment

UNIDIR’s reference methodology used and applied for the weapons and ammunition baseline follow-up assessment at the national level includes an assessment by key WAM functional areas. This approach and methodology aims to assess the entire life-cycle management of weapons and ammunition, to the extent possible, thereby promoting a holistic approach to understanding the institutions, capacities, practices, procedures and actors including stakeholders involved in WAM.

The different key functional areas are:

- National coordination mechanism;
- Legal and regulatory framework at national level;
- Transfer controls;
- Stockpile management of weapons, and ammunition;
- Marking of weapons;
- Recordkeeping;
- Weapons tracing and ammunition profiling;
- Processing of recovered weapons and ammunition;
- Collection (and civilian possession);
- Disposal, including destruction of weapons, and ammunition.

The integration of gender-responsive policies and practices in WAM is considered as a cross-cutting issue, and strengthens the national security sector, oversight, accountability and governance of weapons and ammunition. A gender-sensitive approach to arms control and disarmament, as well as women’s participation in WAM, is integral to the planning, design, implementation and monitoring process and to a national baseline assessment of WAM and WAM initiatives and activities.

Box 3: Options and a national ‘roadmap’ towards a national framework for WAM

One of the key results of a national WAM baseline assessment - which forms the basis for a follow-up assessment and activities to strengthen WAM - is the development of a national ‘roadmap’ on WAM. Such a roadmap sets out the current status of capacities and processes for WAM, WAM enhancement opportunities, as well as options for implementation by key functional areas, organised by prioritisation over a time-frame and actor-specific attribution of roles and responsibilities. Options may include international WAM support and assistance.
## Summary of options for strengthening the national WAM framework in CAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Continuous</th>
<th>Short-term</th>
<th>Medium-term</th>
<th>Long-term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Coordination Mechanism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and Regulatory Framework at National Level</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transfer Controls</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile Management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stockpile Management of Weapons</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stockpile Management of Ammunition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marking of Weapons</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recordkeeping</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Tracing and Ammunition Profiling</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing of Recovered Weapons and Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collection (and Civilian Possession)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Disposal, including Destruction</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Weapons</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Ammunition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Stakeholders

- National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of SALW (ComNat-ALPC)
- Presidency of the Central African Republic
- Office of the Prime Minister of the Central African Republic (Bureau de la Primature de la RCA)
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Central Africans Abroad (MAEFCE)
- Ministry of National Defence and Army Reconstruction (MINDEF)
- Ministry of the Interior and Public Security (MISP)
- Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and the Keeper of the Seals (MINJ)
- Ministry of Water, Forests, Hunting and Fishing (MINEFCP)
- Ministry of Finance and Budget (MINFB)
- Ministry of Planning and the Economy (MINPLAN)
- Ministry for the Promotion of Women, the Family and Child Protection (MPFFPE)
- Sectoral ministries (in general)
- General Staff of the Armed Forces (EMA)
- Central African Armed Forces (FACA)
- Security and Defence Force (SDF)
- DDRR/RSS/RN coordination mechanism
- Coordination Committee for the Monitoring of the Sanctions Regime (CCSR/RCA)
- Coordination Committee for the Control and Management of Weapons and Ammunition (GdT)
- Defence and Security Committee of the National Assembly (CDS-AN)
- Implementation Unit of the National Programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration and Repatriation (UEPNDDR)
- United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Mission for the Stabilisation of the CAR (MINUSCA)
- Panel of Experts assisting the UNSC 2127 Committee regarding the Central African Republic (GoE RCA)
- United Nations Mine Action Service in the CAR (UNMAS-RCA)
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (ONUDC)
- African Union (UA)
- Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC)
- Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA)
- European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-CAR)
- Gender SSR Coordination
- Central African Civil Society
- Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FDS)
- Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
The Central African Republic (CAR), a country rich in resources in the centre of the African continent, has since its independence from France in 1960, suffered several military-political crises and has been affected by various successful or attempted rebellions and coups. Following the 2015 elections, the current President of the CAR has given some hope for a return of state governance, stability and peace consolidation through a process that culminated in the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic between the government and the 14 main armed groups. From 2017 onwards, there has been a major change in the political and security situation in the CAR with increased cooperation between the governments of the CAR and the Russian Federation. The impact of this cooperation on the political and social environment, on security governance and on other government actors and partnerships remain relevant and of actuality today. Despite the various efforts made by the Government, a large part of the territory is still out of its control, with military operations by Security and Defence Forces (SDF) and other security personnel continuing in some areas of the country against persistent attacks by certain armed groups. In fulfillment of commitments made in a joint Roadmap for Peace adopted in 2021, aimed at revitalizing the peace process, the President of the CAR unilaterally declared a ceasefire in 2021. Despite this, political and security tensions have persisted in the absence of tangible progress with regards to the political dialogue. In this complex context, several actors continue to play major roles at different levels in supporting and assisting the CAR in its efforts to achieve security, stability, peace-building and sustainable development. In 2021, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) renewed the mandate of MINUSCA until 15 November 2022. In July 2021, the UNSC also renewed the sanctions regime, including the arms embargo regime on CAR, as defined at the time in resolution 2588.

The UNSC also committed to reviewing the arms embargo measures in CAR through the benchmarks established in the areas of SSR, DDR/R, and WAM. In 2020, the Council of the European Union extended the mandate of the EU Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM CAR). However, in December 2021 it suspended its specific mission to train Central African soldiers after it was found that some FACA operating together with bilaterally deployed security personnel and other security personnel were involved in violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.
Conflicts and armed violence in CAR are rooted in long-standing underlying factors and structural fragilities, while flows of illicit arms and ammunition, of which CAR is disproportionately affected, constitute one of the main drivers and vectors of the political economy of conflicts in the country as well as in the sub-region. These flows often coincide with the illicit exploitation of natural resources, organised crime, including across borders, and the illegal collection of taxes, including by non-state armed groups and other actors, in areas beyond state control where the rule of law is weak or non-existent.

The impact of the presence, misuse, diversion and illicit circulation as well as proliferation of arms and ammunition contribute to the vulnerable situation of the population, including gender-based violence, internal displacement, serious human rights violations and international crimes. They also undermine humanitarian action, the protection of civilians and hinder sustainable development in the country.

A national framework for WAM should not only take into account immediate needs, such as the requirements of the current arms embargo regime, but also future WAM planning needs, such as the DDR process, the consolidation of the SDF, the modification or possible easing and/or lifting of the embargo, and the resulting expansion of national stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. The development of such a framework should be the responsibility and a priority for the government of CAR, but also for international and sub-regional stakeholders and partners involved in the coordination, planning and implementation of WAM in CAR. Such a framework for governance and exercising oversight and accountability is essential for achieving security, stability, peace building and sustainable development in CAR.

Given the political and security situation in CAR, the resizing of the structure, capacities, strength and stockpiles of weapons and ammunition of the SDF to desired and defined levels, as well as the SSR strategy and in the National Defence Plan (NDP), as well as the DDR/RR process and CVR activities, efforts and activities aimed at expanding the WAM system in the CAR are necessarily transitional and incremental. As state authority and the rule of law are being re-established and expanded, the expansion of the emerging framework and national system as well as its coordination mechanism governing WAM from the centre in the capital to areas outside of Bangui and the entire national territory requires particular attention.
Key Functional Area 1: National Coordination Mechanism

In CAR, at the highest strategic level, the National Security Council (CNS) under the Presidency exercises governance, oversight and accountability over WAM. National ownership, including the commitment of high-level national authorities to WAM capacity building efforts, is diffused by the multiplicity of actors involved and overlapping activities. A plurality of national institutions and entities coordinate or participate in the coordination of WAM and WAM-related areas such as SSR, DDR/R and CVR, the implementation, monitoring and reporting on requirements of the UNSC arms embargo regime. As of April 2022, there was no single, dedicated forum or mechanism at the national level that allowed for effective and efficient coordination of WAM, including of international cooperation and assistance. There is also a disconnect between the strategic and operational levels of implementation of WAM activities.

The main structures and entities within the government of CAR with a role in the coordination of WAM and related areas are the following:

- The DDR/RSS/RN coordination mechanism;\(^{13}\)
- The Coordination Committee for Monitoring the Sanctions Regime (CCSRS/RCA);\(^{14}\) and
- The National Commission to Combat the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (ComNat-ALPC).\(^{15}\) At the technical level, the Coordinating Committee on Weapons and Ammunition Control and Management Mechanisms (Working Group, GdT)\(^{16}\) plays a key role.

The CAR government would benefit from a high-level dialogue between political, military and security entities on WAM and WAM-related areas, and to identify or define a single, centralised framework or mechanism for the development of a strategic approach (a 'roadmap', or national strategy) for the management of conventional weapons, including SALW, ammunition, components and related material. Ideally, such an approach would also be better aligned with, or integrated into, relevant broader strategies and plans in CAR.\(^{17}\)

In 2019, a national strategy and action plan (NAP) to combat SALW proliferation for the period 2019-2023 was developed, with the support from international partners.\(^{18}\)

The integration and streamlining of gender aspects in the implementation of the NAP has been supported by the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) in cooperation with the ComNat-ALPC. Adherence to this strategy and the exercise of national ownership of the NAP has been challenging at different levels. A review of this approach, strategy and specific action plan deserves prioritisation by national authorities. If the ComNat-ALPC were to assume and fulfil a more important role in coordinating the management of arms, including SALW, and ammunition at the strategic level, a direct and institutional link between the ComNat-ALPC and the national security architecture should be created. The full operationalisation of the ComNat-ALPC, including the GdT, through the allocation of an appropriate and adequate national budget, as well as the mobilisation of international assistance, also remains a priority.
### Options for strengthening the coordination mechanism at national level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continuous</th>
<th>Sectoral ministries (including SDF)</th>
<th>ComNat-ALPC</th>
<th>International partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Present the results of the national WAM follow up baseline assessment, including progress, challenges and options for strengthening the national WAM framework, in relevant international fora.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote CAR's engagement in the implementation of international arms control norms, instruments and processes, both through active participation in international, regional and sub-regional conferences of States Parties and meetings, and through reporting under relevant instruments.</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC MAEFCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct a mapping of national level coordination entities and mechanisms (strategic and operational) dealing with WAM, or activities closely related to WAM (i.e. coordination and information sharing processes, frequency of meetings, decision-making processes, allocation of means and resources) within the national security architecture.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC International partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pending the effective establishment of the Supreme National Security Council, consider the creation of a direct link of the President of ComNat-ALPC to the National Security Council in order to maximise synergies (and planning) of WAM, defence, and security issues.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries (including SDF)</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarify the roles and responsibilities of the relevant strategic decision-making institutions in relation to WAM. For example, through the organisation of a high-level activity to strengthen complementarities and synergies.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC International partners</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure the participation of international stakeholders and partners in WAM in an appropriate coordination mechanism (at strategic level).</td>
<td>MINPLAN ComNat-ALPC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report on the results of the national WAM baseline assessment and follow-up, including the options available to strengthen the national WAM framework, within the different ministries and national structures.</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC Sectoral ministries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider streamlining between relevant strategic level (decision-making) entities and coordination mechanisms in relation to WAM.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work towards the full operationalisation of ComNat-ALPC, through the continuous allocation of a consecutive budget, as well as the mobilisation of international assistance, for its effective functioning in line with the tasks and missions assigned to it.</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC MINFB MINPLAN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradually decentralise ComNat-ALPC in line with the return of state authority through the provision by other ministries (e.g. territorial administration of staff already present in the regions).</td>
<td>MINFB ComNat-ALPC</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectively establish the Supreme National Security Council (CSSN).</td>
<td>Government National Assembly RSS Coordination ComNat-ALPC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Since the 2017 baseline assessment, a key progress has been the adoption by the Parliament and the promulgation by the government of CAR of the Law on the General Regime of Conventional Weapons, their Parts and Components and Ammunition in CAR in August 2020. The new law is comprehensive in its scope and areas of application, and in the identification of authorities, roles and responsibilities for WAM in CAR. It covers the entire life-cycle management of weapons and ammunition, and is harmonised with regional and international legal frameworks. This legal and regulatory framework at the national level also strengthens national capacity for effective implementation and enforcement of the provisions and measures of the UNSC arms embargo regime applicable in the CAR.

The operationalisation, effective implementation and enforcement of the new law and regime should however be accelerated including through the drafting of implementing decrees or procedures, as identified in the law.

In this respect, the provision of adequate resources to the Committee / GdT on WAM, which reviews and harmonises the current procedures and is responsible for drafting the decrees and procedures at technical level, has been identified as a priority in April 2022. In parallel, it is also important to continue efforts to raise awareness and sensitise the content of the new law in local languages so that all security actors, as well as the population as a whole, including women, young people, and victims of armed violence in CAR, have adequate knowledge of it and that there is national and local ownership in the application of the law. This is also important for regulation and measures and activities to address the large number of weapons in civilian possession.

Options for strengthening the legal and regulatory framework at national level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Continuous</th>
<th>Short-term</th>
<th>Medium-Long-term</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promote good governance by strengthening the capacity of internal oversight institutions of the defence and security forces, and ensure the implementation of sanctions when shortcomings are identified.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Accelerate the implementation of the law by supporting the WAM Coordination Committee / technical working group in charge of drafting the different decrees, procedures or protocols.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ensure that the gender aspect is considered in the process of implementation and enforcement of the law notably through the participation of women and representatives of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion in the Committee/GdT on WAM.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ComNat-ALPC MINDEF Sectoral ministries</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC Sectoral ministries International partners</td>
<td>ComNat-ALPC MPFFPE MINJ International partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ensure harmonisation of all provisions of the Law on the General Regime on Conventional Arms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Continue the sensitisation of specific groups on the law on the general regime on conventional weapons, their parts, components and ammunition, in a targeted manner and adapted to the local context in terms of gender, language, age and the needs of specific groups.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ComNat-ALPC Sectoral ministries International partners</td>
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<td>ComNat-ALPC Sectoral ministries International partners Civil Society</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Effective controls on international transfers of arms, ammunition and related materiel are necessary to prevent excessive, destabilising accumulation and illicit transfers, which pose risks and threats to national security, stability, peace building and sustainable development. Transfer controls must be designed and implemented effectively to minimise the risk of diversion of arms, ammunition or related materials.

The CAR participates in the international arms trade primarily by performing the functions of an importing state. The assessment of needs is done in a decentralised manner by each SDF and sectoral ministries. The system, process and authority to authorise an import is then centralised within and at the level of the Ministry of Defence. Transfers can only be made with the endorsement or the approval of the Presidency. As of April 2022, CCSRS/RCA was responsible for tracking requests from ministries, and for the processing of requests for exemptions and/or notifications from and to the UNSC 2127 Committee, for which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the interface. A certain coordination between the ministries is therefore ensured by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

As of April 2022, cooperation between actors mandated by the UNSC and/or those invited by the government of CAR to cooperate with national authorities in the initial management of imported weapons was done on an ad hoc "case-by-case" basis, with no formalisation of this cooperation and no operational procedure to facilitate WAM at this stage. While a register containing certain elements of information on transfers, including imports, appears to exist, registration at the time of import is not yet done in a systematic manner and adequate to the legal and regulatory framework at national level. As of April 2022, there was also no national capacity to mark imported weapons at a designated site before distribution to the SDF.

The main options for strengthening this key functional area of WAM include:

- Strengthening the post-delivery cooperation mechanism, through the establishment and operationalisation of a joint entity (with a national and a mixed international component), as well as strengthening the post-delivery cooperation mechanism including verification (along the supply chain), e.g. through the establishment of a joint verification entity (with a national and a mixed international component), and regular reporting to the competent national authority.
- The development of a protocol for the management of imported/supplied material, elaborated in cooperation with relevant international parties, in line with international and sub-regional standards and guidelines, and its adoption by the Central African authorities, which remains a priority.
- The drafting and dissemination of a summary document on the current UNSC arms embargo regime for CAR, in the country's official languages, for informed dialogue and the sensitisation of state entities and the Central African people.

The Government of the CAR could further increase international confidence in its national transfer control system through cooperation under the relevant international arms control instruments to which the CAR is a State Party, including the submission of regular implementation reports and active participation in international and sub-regional forums. This will also ensure that the CAR is well placed to benefit from international assistance opportunities in this area.
Options for strengthening transfer controls

**Short-term**

Continue the systematic and regular recording of all information contained in the notifications transmitted by the Secretariat of the UNSC Committee.

MINDEF  MAEFCE

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Ensure systematic and regular registration of all weapons (at minimum date of import, type of weapon, calibre, and serial numbers) and ammunition (at minimum date of import, type of ammunition, calibre, batches of ammunition) under the exemption regime, i.e. notified and, where appropriate, approved in advance, at the time of import.

MINDEF  Sectoral ministries

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Continue the joint verification mechanism for spot checks (including records of weapons and ammunition along the supply chain) and report regularly to the relevant and designated national authorities.

MINDEF  Sectoral ministries  International partners

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Draft and disseminate a summary document on the sanctions regime, particularly the UNSC arms embargo on CAR, in the official languages (French and Sango).

MAEFCE  Sectoral ministries  ComNat-ALPC

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Strengthen the post-delivery cooperation mechanism (for reception, safe and secure transport, initial storage, adequate and systematic registration), through the establishment and operationalisation of a joint entity (with a national and a mixed international component).

MINDEF  International partners

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Upon adoption of the national weapons marking code, explore with partner States and weapons suppliers the option of marking ordered (new) weapons in the country of export before delivery.

MINDEF  Sectoral ministries  MAFCE

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Work towards the establishment of a national arms transfer control system, in accordance with national law, and relevant international instruments (i.e. the Arms Trade Treaty, the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the International Tracing Instrument, the Firearms Protocol, the Kinshasa Convention and the Nairobi Protocol).

MINDEF  Sectoral ministries  ComNat-ALPC

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**Continuous**

- Draft and disseminate a summary document on the sanctions regime, particularly the UNSC arms embargo on CAR, in the official languages (French and Sango).
Effective stockpile management of weapons is an essential element of any SDF and is critical to ensuring the operational readiness, protecting national strategic assets, and reducing the risk of diversion (including of state-owned equipment to unauthorised or unintended end-users for illicit purposes). Conversely, effective stockpile management helps to identify, inter alia, unserviceable or surplus weapons, collected or voluntarily surrendered weapons, for disposal, as well as furthermore, to define procurement needs and requirements. Stockpile management responds to the "responsibility to protect", which requires a proactive approach to ensure that equipment is properly accounted for and secured, and stored safely.

In CAR, physical infrastructure planning takes place under the framework of implementing the SSR strategy including the PND, with the support from international partners (such as EUTM). As of April 2022, this planning extended to 2023. Since 2017, continued progress has been made in the rehabilitation or construction of physical infrastructure for the storage of weapons and ammunition (see section below), with the support from international partners, including MINUSCA (UNMAS) and UNDP. In places where the situation does not allow for the construction of permanent physical infrastructure, temporary storage solutions are used for FACA and SDF units. One of the major challenges raised in April 2022 was that some newly constructed storage sites remained "empty" or "unused", which can pose challenges to results-based programme management, resource mobilisation, and generally to progress in this important area of WAM. It should also be noted that due to the security situation and accessibility of remote areas, the number, volume and quantities of weapons transported remain relatively limited. With the exception of Bouar, the FACA continues to operate as a 'projection army' rather than a 'garrison army', the operationalisation of which is however foreseen in the SSR strategy and the PND.

Among the options identified by UNIDIR for strengthening this key area of WAM are:

- Clarify and regularly update the structure and functioning of the FACA and SDF (organigrams), from the highest (strategic) to the lowest (operational) level of units, as the identification of these units is a prerequisite and essential for planning the rehabilitation and/or construction of physical infrastructure.
- Gradually reduce reliance on 'personal' weapons at unit and individual levels in favor of 'state weapons', to ensure that infrastructure is used and that accounting and security systems for state weapons and ammunition are maintained.
- Ensure the integration of the physical infrastructure and accounting systems of the FACA and SDF, i.e. the use of State weapons (and ammunition) registration and record-keeping systems; as well as the weapons (and ammunition) movement and 'issue and receipt' registration system at individual level.

Central African Republic
### Options for strengthening stockpile management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Responsible Parties</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continue to conduct regular/unannounced inventories and inspections at the various levels of state weapons, including of needs-based planning (current and projected future needs).</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a career development plan for capacity building of staff (men and women) involved in the management of state weapons in order to avoid, in the long run, the loss of knowledge and expertise due to staff turnover.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct an inventory of &quot;empty&quot; or &quot;unused&quot; weapons storage sites.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen standards and procedures for weapons management at the individual level (towards a change from a “personal weapon” to a &quot;state weapon&quot; culture), as soon as the security situation allows it.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key Functional Area 4: Stockpile Management (ammunition)

Effective ammunition stockpile management is an essential element of any SDF and its operations. It is essential to ensure the operational readiness, protecting national strategic assets, reducing the risk of diversion, and for ammunition in particular, reducing the risk of unplanned explosions due to inadequate management of conventional ammunition stockpiles, and mitigating the effects of such explosions on the SDF and the civilian population.

In CAR, efforts are underway to develop a specific national capacity for safe, secure and effective ammunition management, including infrastructure, standards and procedures, and specifically trained SDF personnel. In April 2022, national authorities and experts raised the lack of ammunition in national stockpiles, without providing further information and reasons, which may be multiple. Some of the physical infrastructure (ammunition depot, temporary storage solutions) recently or newly built with the support and backing of international partners, remained "empty" or "unused". It was also found that the CAR has limited capacity for the safe, secure and efficient management of larger quantities of ammunition (beyond 14.5mm calibre), and other materials that require specific management. For example, specific infrastructure needs have been identified, including an appropriate national ammunition depot or the rehabilitation of the current national depot in Bangui.

The status of ammunition stockpile management in April 2022 was indicative of an emerging and urgent need to strengthen the formal, safe, secure and efficient management system for ammunition, including ammunition of calibres above 14.5mm (conventional), in Bangui and the surrounding areas. Such a system should include structures, processes, including decision-making processes, procedures and organisational methods. National authorities could benefit from reviewing or developing an approach or policy covering, inter alia, security and safety risk management, and to identify priority areas for ammunition (and explosives) management. In general, the identification of priority areas for ammunition management, including those requiring international assistance, to target resources and programmes for their management, also remains a priority.
Box 4: A sustainable approach to capacity building for SDF personnel

Since 2017, national authorities and SDF personnel have benefited from numerous trainings in different areas of WAM, both by partners in CAR and through bilateral and/or sub-regional, regional or international partnerships. While these trainings have contributed to the capacity building of staff (men and women) in WAM, enhancing national ownership, the loss of knowledge and expertise due to staff rotation and/or promotions, and more broadly the development of a more sustainable and long term approach to personnel capacity building have been identified as priorities.

In order to render the SDF personnel capacity building approach more sustainable, and owned by national authorities including ministries and the SDF themselves, one of the options identified in April 2022 is the development of a career plan that takes into account the different capacity building needs of SDF personnel (men and women) at both strategic and operational levels in the different areas of WAM (including explosives), aligning with international standards and technical guidelines, and thus aligning with and contributing to the broader objectives of the SSR strategy including the PND. Such a career plan would not only improve the status of these professionals and staff (both male and female), but also avoid, in the long run, the loss of knowledge and expertise due to staff rotation or promotion.

The options identified in the April baseline follow-up assessment and in this country insight (in different sections) regarding capacity building of CAR SDF personnel in WAM should therefore be read and considered as a whole and with a gender perspective in all processes.

Options for strengthening the management of ammunition stocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Implementing Entities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuous</td>
<td>Continue to conduct regular/unannounced inventories and inspections at the various levels of state ammunition, including for needs-based planning (current and projected future needs).</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td>Develop a career development plan for capacity building of staff (men and women) involved in the management of state ammunition in order to avoid, in the long run, the loss of knowledge and expertise due to staff turnover.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-term</td>
<td>Conduct an inventory of “empty” or “unused” ammunition storage sites.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-term</td>
<td>Strengthen ammunition management standards and procedures at the individual level (towards a change from a “personal weapon” to a “state weapon” culture) as soon as the security situation allows.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>Strengthen the formal management system for safe, secure and effective ammunition management at the national level (including organizational structure, processes, procedures and methods).</td>
<td>MINDEF Sectoral ministries International Partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>Strengthen ammunition management standards and procedures at the individual level (change from a “personal weapon” to a “state weapon” culture) as soon as the security situation allows it.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Marking of Weapons

As of April 2022, one area where limited progress had been made since the 2017 assessment was the marking of weapons in CAR. The new law now provides the legal framework for weapons marking at the national level, and there is a political will on the part of the government of CAR to make weapons marking operational. ComNat-ALPC is the coordinating entity for the marking of weapons in CAR, while the Ministry of Defence is responsible for marking FACA weapons, including imported weapons, and those already in the national FACA stockpiles. The Ministry of Security and Territorial Administration is responsible for marking firearms for individual and private use.

By April 2022, a national marking code had been developed at the technical level within the GdT under the auspices of ComNat-ALPC, in line with international and sub-regional standards, and a pilot marking project was planned for Gendarmerie weapons, and for collected weapons for which a decision has been taken by a national authority to reintegrate them into the national stocks. While some operational capacity exists, it was however quite limited in April 2022.

At the strategic level, it is likely that the operationalisation of the marking of FACA and other SDF state weapons will require sensitisation by various regional and international stakeholders and partners of senior political and military authorities on the requirements of national and international legal frameworks as well as the benefits for the national WAM system. The adoption by the competent national authorities of the national marking code and a formal and common procedure are among the most important next steps. At the operational level, the CAR would benefit from the design, through ComNat-ALPC, of a specific national plan for the marking of newly imported weapons for the SDF, and those already under the jurisdiction of the Central African State. In the short term, pending a national marking process, intermediate measures could be considered and implemented by the CAR authorities and SDF to strengthen traceability and the accounting system, pending a full marking programme at the national level. In the medium to longer term, and considering the multitude of weapons to be marked, it would be advisable to strengthen the operational capacity for marking weapons in CAR.

Options for strengthening the marking of weapons

- **Start marking weapons with the country code during inventories now, pending a full marking process.**
  - Sectoral ministries
  - ComNat-ALPC
  - International Partners

- **Work towards the adoption by the competent national authorities of the national marking code(s), in accordance with relevant international and sub-regional standards.**
  - Sectoral ministries
  - ComNat-ALPC
  - International Partners

- **Develop a common Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) through the WAM Coordination Committee/Technical Working Group and pursue its adoption through the appropriate national mechanisms.**
  - Sectoral ministries
  - ComNat-ALPC
  - International Partners

- **Design a specific national marking plan (including scope, measurable objectives, and monitoring and evaluation).**
  - Sectoral ministries
  - ComNat-ALPC
  - International Partners

- **Integrate a gender perspective into the design and implementation of a national marking programme and into the marking operations (including the training and composition of the teams overseeing the programme and the marking operations).**
  - Sectoral ministries
  - ComNat-ALPC
  - International Partners
Key Functional Area 6:

Recordkeeping

In CAR, the national recordkeeping system for state-held weapons and ammunition is centralised at the Ministry of Defence, and then decentralised to the levels of the sectoral ministries for each SDF. Each sectoral ministry (and SDF) manages its own recordkeeping system, in most cases manually and in paper form. Accounting systems to manage movements/transactions from the center to the units, as well as issue and receipt systems, based on standard forms, have been developed, with support from international partners. However, in addition to the marking of weapons (see section on marking above), efforts are needed for an adequate and appropriate harmonisation of the national recordkeeping system for state-held weapons and ammunition, which would improve interconnectivity and interoperability, traceability as well as quantification of stocks, including for the assessment of future weapons and ammunition needs of the SDF.

By April 2022, in line with the new legal and regulatory framework at the national level, efforts were underway to harmonise the national system of registration and recordkeeping of State weapons and ammunition.

It was proposed that this harmonisation would take into account the system already in place and the existing procedures within the Ministry of Defence.

Options for strengthening recordkeeping

Follow the registration and terminology procedures through the WAM Technical Committee in accordance with the main international instruments in order to improve tracing capacity.

Start using the weapons registration software through a pilot project for weapons to be destroyed with a view to extending it to all weapons.

Establish a central register of information on destroyed weapons and ammunition.
Key Functional Area 7:

Weapons Tracing and Ammunition Profiling

Since 2017, the national system for tracing and profiling weapons, ammunition and components has received limited attention from the Central African authorities, the SDF, ComNat-ALPC, and security agencies, with limited progress noted as of April 2022. Institutional and operational capacities, as well as practices and procedures in this area, remain generally insufficient, but emerging. Strengthening them is essential, on the one hand, to combat illicit trafficking by non-state armed groups and criminals, as well as the flow of illicit weapons and ammunition into, on, or through the national territory, and, on the other hand, to counter theft, loss, or other forms of diversion of weapons and ammunition from national stocks belonging to the Central African state.

At the strategic level, the Central African authorities and ComNat-ALPC are encouraged to put in place a simple and practical national tracing system, requiring few resources and capacities for its operation, under the supervision and coordination of ComNat-ALPC and/or a focal point at the national level authorised and responsible for coordinating tracing operations at the national level, as well as carrying out tracing operations at the sub-regional and international levels.

At the operational level, such a system will include, at a minimum, the following components and activities:

- Designation of authorised focal points within ministries and SDFs (i.e. those overseeing and/or administering the central registers of state weapons and ammunition);
- The establishment of a specific coordination including information exchange mechanism, by giving competence to one of the existing coordination institutions;
- The creation of a central database on recovered weapons and ammunition;
- A standard operating procedure (under development within the GdT);
- The development of identification guides for weapons, ammunition and related materials; and
- The design and implementation of a tracing and profiling training course, for the proper and systematic recording and identification of recovered weapons and ammunition.

Cooperation and collaboration between the Central African authorities and the respective SDF and MINUSCA components within the Mission’s “Working Group on Illicit Arms Trafficking” should be revitalised and strengthened. The same applies for the cooperation between the government and the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the UNSC Committee. The national authorities and their partners could also benefit from the support of non-governmental organisations specialised in the tracing of weapons, ammunition and related materials. Finally, cooperation with UNODC and INTERPOL through the CAR National Coordination Office is also important to strengthen this key functional area of the national framework.
Options for strengthening weapons tracing and profiling of ammunition

- **Short-term**
  - Share information at sub-regional and regional levels and with specialised organisations in this domain, if the origin of recovered weapons and ammunition cannot be determined on the basis of national records.
  - ComNat-ALPC
  - SDF
  - INTERPOL
  - International Partners

- Develop and adopt guides for the identification of small arms and light weapons (categories, types and models), their ammunition and related materials in CAR to support state actors in the registration of weapons using the same terminology.
  - ComNat-ALPC
  - SDF
  - International Partners

- Develop and implement training courses for state actors in the identification of categories, types, and models of small arms and light weapons and their cartridges (CPAP).
  - Sectoral ministries
  - ComNat-ALPC
  - International Partners

**Key Functional Area 8:**

**Processing of Recovered Weapons and Ammunition**

Currently, there is no national approach or policy that implements the national law by codifying and operationalising it in one or more formal procedures governing the systematic and proper processing of recovered weapons and ammunition. The re-/integration of weapons into national stockpiles - which may be legitimate, provided that appropriate controls required by the national and international legal framework are implemented, including marking and recording to enable profiling and tracing - appear to be a widespread practice since 2017. This practice poses challenges, including for stockpile evaluations and needs assessment, quantifying future SDF needs and standardisation. Due to the absence of profiling, tracing and investigations, there is a loss of information that would allow for the development of an early warning mechanism, capacity, targeted measures and information for concrete actions for the detection and elimination of illicit trafficking as well as the prevention of the future acquisition of weapons, ammunition and components by non-state armed groups and other spoilers in CAR.

At the strategic level, as part of a high-level dialogue between political, military and security entities on WAM and related issues, these authorities could benefit from a specific dialogue and exchange aimed at consolidating an approach or policy defining the systematic and adequate processing of recovered weapons and ammunition.

As of April 2022, the development of a procedure (inter alia) for the processing of recovered weapons and ammunition was underway by the Committee/GdT of the ComNat-ALPC. Its adoption by the competent national authorities remains a necessity and a priority. With the support of ComNat-ALPC, the sectoral ministries and the Ministry for DDR (UEPNDDR) should then ensure its implementation, the exchange and streamlining of good practices in this area at the national level.

Given the number of authorised armed actors in the country, it is also necessary and a priority for the Central African authorities to engage these actors in cooperation and collaboration in the processing of recovered weapons and ammunition. The inclusion of national civil and military justice actors in these processes has also been identified as a priority in April 2022.
Options to strengthen the processing of recovered weapons and ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finalise, adopt and implement by competent national authorities Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), entitled &quot;Guidelines for the Management of Seized or Surrendered Weapons, Components and Ammunition&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record information on weapons (at a minimum, year of manufacture, country of origin, serial number) and ammunition (at a minimum, year of manufacture, country of origin, batch number) subject to civil and military legal proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proceed to the marking of recovered weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a coordination mechanism (including specific information exchange on recovered weapons) with focal points of all (authorised) armed actors in CAR.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Key Functional Area 9:

### Collection and Civilian Possession

In April 2022, the collection of obsolete, unwanted, non-functional and surrendered weapons and ammunition was done through different mechanisms, mainly:

1. During the formal DDR programme process (through the PNDDR Implementation Unit, under the high patronage of the Ministry of DDR, and only for the 14 groups that signed the APPR);
2. Through the Community Violence Reduction (CVR) projects;
3. Through the voluntary ammunition surrender mechanism at ComNat-ALPC in Bangui only; and
4. Specific and ad hoc activities called voluntary civil disarmament (VCD).

The multitude of mechanisms through which different national authorities, with the support from different sub-regional, regional and international partners, intervene in the collection of arms and ammunition and related materials, has resulted in a certain lack of clarity about national authorities, their roles and responsibilities. This has also posed challenges to coordination at the strategic and operational levels of this key functional area of WAM, as well as transitional WAM measures implemented before, after and/or in parallel to the formal DDR process and programme in CAR. Transitional measures aim to reduce the capacity of individuals and armed groups to engage in armed violence and conflict, as well as to reduce accidents and save lives by addressing the immediate risks associated with the possession of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

In general, the exchange of information and good practices between all actors involved in the handling of collected and surrendered weapons and ammunition, whether through the PNDDR process, or other mechanisms mentioned above, was highlighted as a priority for CAR authorities and the strengthening of this key WAM functional area. At the intersection of the strategic and operational levels, this functional area of WAM and transitional WAM measures would also benefit from the finalisation and adoption of the decree on the organisation and functioning of the Ministry of DDR for the planning and organisation, decision-making processes, and implementation of WAM activities during disarmament operations as part of the PNDDR.
In April 2022, the finalisation, adoption and implementation by the CAR authorities of a formal (written) procedure governing the processing of recovered weapons and ammunition, including collected and surrendered weapons, also remained an important priority (see previous section). It is important that CAR authorities continue with the systematic and adequate registration of weapons and ammunition, as well as contextual information. ComNat-ALPC would also benefit from continued and increased logistical and technical support for the voluntary surrender mechanism at ComNat-ALPC. Finally, there is a need to continuously raise awareness and sensitise the civilian population and communities of the various mechanisms, including the legal and regulatory framework that applies to them, and to ensure that expectations are managed, including for the confidence of the civilian population and communities in these processes and mechanisms.

Options for strengthening collection and civilian possession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>Responsible Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate the exchange of information and good practice between authorities responsible for DDR, voluntary surrenders and CVR.</td>
<td>SDF, ComNat-ALPC, MINUSCA/DDR, UEPDDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen women’s involvement in planning, decision-making, implementation of DDR, CVR, and weapons collection programmes.</td>
<td>MFPG, ComNat-ALPC, UEPDDR, Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record information on weapons (at a minimum, year of manufacture, country of origin, serial number) and ammunition (at a minimum, year of manufacture, country of origin, batch number) collected or surrendered.</td>
<td>SDF, ComNat-ALPC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen logistical and technical support (especially transport and storage) for weapons collected by ComNat-ALPC in Bangui (and in the country).</td>
<td>SDF, ComNat-ALPC, International partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proceed with a full inventory and inspection of weapons and ammunition subject to legal proceedings.</td>
<td>SDF, ComNat-ALPC, MJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure, at minimum, systematic and adequate database recording (physical and electronic) and record-keeping of all weapons in State stocks (e.g. purchases, weapons collected, transfers).</td>
<td>SDF, ComNat-ALPC, International partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validate and implement SOPs “Guidelines for the Management of Seized or Surrendered Weapons, Components and Ammunition”.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries, ComNat-ALPC, International partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopt the organisational decree of the Ministry of DDR.</td>
<td>Presidency of the CAR, Ministry of DDR, UEPDDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop the capacity of the registries of courts and tribunals (civil and military) to store and manage weapons and ammunition subject to legal proceedings.</td>
<td>MINJ, Military Audit Office, International partners, ComNat-ALPC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Functional Area 10:

Disposal, including Destruction of Weapons

In April 2022, it appeared that the competent national entity for decision-making on the method of final disposal of weapons and ammunition in CAR was the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Staff of the FACA. The new legal and regulatory framework designates ComNat-ALPC as the entity responsible for carrying out the destruction of weapons and ammunition. The role of the ComNat-ALPC in the destruction of weapons surrendered/collected during the formal PNDDR process, CVR projects, or other activities, and how these activities are coordinated with ComNat-ALPC, remained however unclear. The two main methods of weapons disposal applied by the CAR authorities and the SDF are (i) the re-integration of recovered weapons that are still functional into national stocks, or (ii) the destruction of non-functional and artisanal weapons. Given the security context and the weapons needs expressed by the SDF and the CAR authorities in April 2022, the destruction of recovered functional weapons was generally disparaged. In most cases, destruction activities were ad-hoc and conducted on a needs-basis, with the support from international partners, notably MINUSCA.

At the strategic level, an opportunity exists for further assessing and considering weapons destruction needs in relevant policies, strategies and plans by the Central African authorities, including the SDF. For weapons for which a decision has been taken by a competent national authority to reintegrate them into national stocks, it is crucial to apply appropriate controls and measures, including proper and systematic registration and marking, as required by the national framework. For weapons for which a decision has been taken by a competent national authority to destroy them, enhanced co-ordination of destruction activities between different national authorities, and also their partners, has been identified as a priority. The importance of proceeding with the rapid and local neutralisation of weapons awaiting destruction was also highlighted as important. At the operational level, the Central African authorities and the SDF could benefit from the revision and/or development of a specific common procedure dedicated to the destruction of weapons. Such a procedure would contribute to the application of the expertise already acquired by SDF personnel and the streamlining of good practices in this area through the SDF. It is also important that ComNat-ALPC takes responsibility for, or is consulted on, the coordination of destruction activities, so that it has or receives information on destroyed weapons, and for the creation, inclusion and regular updating of a register of destroyed weapons.

Options for strengthening disposal including destruction of weapons

Wherever possible, recycle the components (e.g. wood) of destroyed weapons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF</th>
<th>ComNat-ALPC</th>
<th>International Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Strengthen national capacity for weapons destruction, including through ‘training of trainers’ (ToT), to ensure sustainability.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SDF</th>
<th>ComNat-ALPC</th>
<th>International Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Increase transparency in the handling of weapons to be destroyed and develop a register of weapons disposed of and destroyed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral ministries</th>
<th>ComNat-ALPC</th>
<th>UEPNDDR</th>
<th>International Partners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
### Disposal, including Destruction of Ammunition

As of April 2022, the process within the SDF for the identification of obsolete, unstable or unserviceable ammunition; communication between units and their hierarchies in Bangui; the decision making with regards to the method of disposal; and the authorising national entity or entities, remained imprecise and unclear. For the FACA, the decision on the destruction of obsolete, unstable or unserviceable ammunition is made at the level of the Army Chief of Staff. In April 2022, it was emphasised by national authorities that the majority of explosive ordnance disposal activities were done with the support from the Mine Action Service of MINUSCA (UNMAS in CAR), and its implementing partners. Currently, there appears to be limited national capacity in this functional area, which is under-utilised, also because activities are carried out on ad hoc, infrequent, needs-based manner.  


At the strategic level, there is an opportunity for a more thorough assessment and consideration of needs in the area of ammunition and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) including destruction. Generally, taking into account the current situation in CAR, it seems to the UNIDIR team necessary and appropriate to continue efforts towards the development of an appropriate, national EOD capacity, including, inter alia, inter-operable teams as well as the acquisition of specialised equipment, thereby contributing to the objectives of the SSR strategy including the PND. A need to increase transparency, and the creation at ComNat-ALPC of a register of destroyed ammunition, was also identified as a priority (see section on record-keeping).
The taking into account of environmental risks in the planning of ammunition (and explosives) destruction operations, and the need to reduce, as far as possible, the potential negative impacts of these activities on the environment, was also highlighted as important. Finally, the revision or the development of a common procedure dedicated to the disposal including destruction of ammunition (and explosives) was also identified as an option to strengthen this important functional area of a national WAM framework.

### Options for strengthening the disposal including destruction of ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Responsible Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build national capacity for ammunition destruction, including through “training of trainers” (ToT), to ensure sustainability.</td>
<td>MINDEF / SDF ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct an assessment of risks (including environmental risks) of ammunition destruction processes.</td>
<td>Sectoral ministries ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a specific national plan for the systematic destruction of ammunition.</td>
<td>MINDEF / SDF ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop and implement standard operating procedures (SOPs) for disposal, including destruction of munitions.</td>
<td>MINDEF / SDF ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhance transparency by developing a register of disposed and destroyed munitions.</td>
<td>MINDEF / SDF ComNat-ALPC International Partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Outlook

This publication presents a holistic approach to the management of conventional weapons, including SALW, ammunition, and components, with a focus on the progress made in WAM in the CAR between 2017 and 2022. The follow-up assessment sheds light on the progress made; and the institutional and operational capacities, existing and current processes, practices and procedures; and the challenges currently faced by the Central African authorities at the strategic and operational levels; as well as on options for further strengthening the national framework governing the life-cycle management of weapons and ammunition in CAR.

The results of the April 2022 baseline follow-up assessment are expected to allow and inform the CAR authorities’ revision of the national approach, strategies, and action plans, including the National Action Plan for the fight against the proliferation of SALW, as well as to update and develop a new roadmap facilitating the achievement of WAM objectives at the national level, in addition to informing the reporting to relevant international instruments. Further, the government of CAR has demonstrated a willingness to further consider and use the options, including to consolidate with international stakeholders and partners a ‘roadmap’ (or strategic approach) for strengthening the national framework governing the life-cycle management of weapons, including SALW, and ammunition in CAR.

Box 5: Situation, contextualisation, and use of a national roadmap for WAM

Generally, a national WAM baseline assessment and follow-up assessments (at an appropriate frequency) have been and can be used by states and national authorities, together with their sub-regional, regional and international partners, for the following purposes and in the following ways both at strategic and operational levels:

**Strategic level**
- Review or inform national security strategies;
- Develop a dedicated national approach and WAM strategy;
- Inform and support the establishment of a dedicated national WAM coordination mechanism;
- Establish, or reposition or leverage, a national WAM lead entity;
- Inform the development of a national policy for ammunition management;
- Inform United Nations partial arms embargo regime benchmarking, implementation, reporting and monitoring.

**Operational level**
- Develop and/or review National Action Plans (NAPs);
- Inform the development, revision or adoption of specific (written) operational procedures;
- Capacity building programming.

UNIDIR encourages the community of states, regional and sub-regional organisations and relevant international partners to consult this CAR WAM country insight, its country insight series, and the annual update series, as a basis for strengthening WAM policies and practices at different levels as well as planning, implementing and evaluating future programmes and projects related to WAM, and related areas, in CAR.
About UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) - an autonomous institute within the United Nations - conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament and non-proliferation, and the seat of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues relating to a variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR serves as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR's activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations.

Note

The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations regarding the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or regarding the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed are those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations, UNIDIR, their staff or the organizations providing assistance to the Institute.

Acknowledgements

UNIDIR expresses its appreciation to the Government of the Central African Republic, and the designated national entity, ComNat-ALPC, for the cooperation all along the WAM baseline follow up assessment, as well as to MINUSCA (in particular its Mine Action Service, UNMAS in CAR) for its logistical and organisational support.

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Translation, design and layout: Theò Bajon and Clara Palmisano
Notes / References

1. See “Vers un cadre national de la gestion des armes et des munitions en République Centrafricaine : Rapport narratif de l’évaluation et du suivi”, UNIDIR, 2022. The report is available at UNIDIR and at the national entity designated by the CAR government, ComNat-ALPC. It can be consulted or shared with interested parties by the ComNat-ALPC, upon consultation and request.


17. These include the National Recovery and Peacebuilding Plan; the National Defence Plan; and the SSR Strategy, among others.


20. Covering both state weapons and ammunition, as well as civilian.