A REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR

NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

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NOTES

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The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) – an autonomous institute within the United Nations – conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to a variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations.

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This *Reference Methodology for National Weapons and Ammunition Management Baseline Assessments* is a UNIDIR Tool, designed to contribute to ongoing State efforts to strengthen governance, oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout their life cycle at the national level in order to prevent diversion and misuse, address illicit proliferation, and reduce and mitigate risks associated with unplanned explosions.

This reference methodology should be considered a working document subject to changes, additions, editions, updates and corrections. The working reference methodology document is meant to stimulate discussion, debate and feedback. It is to be understood as a *reference*: it does not pursue a "one size fits all" approach but recognizes that it is one of several methods available to the community of practice in conducting national assessments on weapons and ammunition management. The authors may revise and correct the text without announcing the edits or issuing a formal erratum. As such, users are encouraged to use the most up-to-date version of this reference methodology, as posted on the unidir.org site.

The use of this reference methodology is voluntary. UNIDIR welcomes and encourages all feedback on improving the present methodology and building on it for future iterations.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ATT	Arms Trade Treaty
AU	African Union
CVR	community violence reduction
CSO	civil society organization
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
FP	Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition ("Firearms Protocol")
HQ	headquarters
IED	improvised explosive device
IATG	International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
ITI	International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons ("International Tracing Instrument")
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MOSAIC	Modular Small-arms control Implementation Compendium
NGO	non-governmental organization
NCB	National Central Bureau
PSCs	private security companies
PSSM	Physical security and stockpile management
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SME	subject matter expert
SSR	security sector reform
SOP	standard operating procedure
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
UNREC	United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
UNPoA	United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
UNRoCA	United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UN PoE	United Nations Panel of Experts
UN GoE	United Nations Group of Experts
WAM	weapons and ammunition management
WCO	World Customs Organization

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WHAT IS WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT?

Weapons and ammunition management (WAM) is the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal. WAM does not focus on small arms and light weapons only, but on a broader range of conventional weapons, related systems, and ammunition.

WHY IS WAM IMPORTANT?

Armed violence claims over half a million lives each year, and the annual global economic costs of armed violence run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Poorly regulated arms and ammunition and their misuse are key contributors to these human and associated socioeconomic costs and pose a significant challenge to peace, security and development.

Security and humanitarian risks posed by unregulated and illicit arms and ammunition are multifaceted. Their diversion contributes to strengthening the capacity of armed spoilers, including criminal and terrorist groups, and to exacerbating situations of insecurity. Illicit arms and ammunition are multipliers of armed violence, including gender-based violence, displacement of people, serious human rights violations, international crimes, and organized crime. The impact of their misuse ranges from direct[1] to long-term effects.[2] States affected by patterns of recurring armed violence are often disproportionately burdened by arms-related risks, impeding their efforts to establish and implement adequate national controls to secure and regulate State-owned materiel and to prevent diversion, mitigate risks of unplanned explosions, and address illicit proliferation as well as misuse.

Among policymakers and practitioners, WAM is increasingly recognized as a fundamental component of conflict prevention and actions to tackle armed violence, ensuring that States can exercise governance, oversight, management and control over the full life cycle of arms and ammunition within their national territory. Moreover, the effective implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions,[3] a wide range of subregional, regional and multilateral instruments, as well as control systems at national levels, require States to have effective and comprehensive WAM frameworks in place. This is why the 2018 United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament places WAM at the centre of efforts for "Disarmament That Saves Lives". More broadly, WAM contributes to the prevention and development agendas by helping create a safe and secure environment conducive to sustainable development.[4]

1 The short-term effects of unregulated and illicit arms and ammunition and their misuse include deaths, injuries, displacement of people and individuals, and psychological harm.

2 The long-term effects of unregulated and illicit arms and ammunition and their misuse include undermining access to health and education, the delivery of humanitarian services, the protection of civilians, and sustainable development.

3 For example, over the last decade, the United Nations Security Council has increasingly introduced WAM as part of United Nations peace operation mandates and related obligations in situations of armed conflict, as part of stabilization efforts, and as an integral component of monitoring and implementation of United Nations arms embargoes.

4 By creating a safe and secure environment to advance peace, justice and strong institutions (Sustainable Development Goal [SDG] 16), poverty reduction (SDG1), economic growth (SDG8), health (SDG3), gender equality (SDG5), and safe cities and communities (SDG11).

WHY A REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENTS?

Comprehensive, holistic and systematic national WAM baseline assessments are an essential prerequisite for informing and guiding effective strategic formulation, programme planning, and monitoring and evaluation, and they – more broadly – support governance and accountability.

This *Reference Methodology for National Weapons and Ammunition Management Baseline Assessments* codifies the current UNIDIR methodology, which has been used to design and implement national WAM baseline assessments for 11 States (2015–2020), in cooperation with subregional, regional, United Nations and other partners. At the African regional level, WAM is recognized as a key contributor to the African Union Roadmap for Silencing the Guns, and the five-year action plan for the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons. This reference methodology represents UNIDIR's practical contribution to these as well as other efforts at subregional, regional and international levels to undertake comprehensive national WAM baseline assessments, drawing on lessons learned while applying and refining the methodology with partners.[5]

The codification of this reference methodology seek to enhance transparency, and its release responds to two particular needs: first, to provide practical reference and guidance on how to implement a strategic WAM baseline assessment at the national level; second, to enhance the knowledge of interested United Nations entities, regional organizations and specialized NGOs and enable them to jointly and collaboratively support assistance-requesting States in undertaking WAM baseline assessments at the national level. The release of this reference methodology is also expected to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on assessment methods and approaches associated with WAM.

WHY CONDUCT A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT?

The establishment of a national WAM baseline allows comparison and measurability of variation or progress over time periods, as well as impact, in different environments. A national WAM baseline assessment should be designed to be useful to all interested States. It can be undertaken and conducted in various environments and contexts, including:

- Where indicators point towards an increasingly volatile security situation, underlying grievances, or emerging conflict(s)
- During a conflict where political will exists among relevant national and local stakeholders to prioritize efforts to address risks associated with arms and ammunition
- In a transitioning security or stabilization environment
- In a post-conflict setting
- Outside of a conflict setting, in an environment experiencing various levels of armed violence, including in urban or localized settings
- In situations of relative peace and stability (where such an assessment may also be applicable).

5 For general information on this broader UNIDIR workstream and related research, publications and events, see www.unidir.org/projects/supporting-policies-and-frameworks-weapon-and-ammunition-management.

WHO IS THIS DOCUMENT FOR?

This document and its submodules are intended for use by:

- Policymakers and government officials
- United Nations headquarters, field missions and country team representatives and staff
- National technical experts and officers
- WAM or related field managers or programme, technical and planning officers
- Subject matter experts and facilitators

WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT?

A national WAM baseline assessment aims to assist States in their efforts to comprehensively and systematically assess WAM institutions, and their policy and operational processes and capacities, in line with international, regional and subregional obligations and commitments as well as relevant international standards and technical guidelines. Specifically, a WAM baseline assessment aims to:

- Map national institutions and their responsibilities for the full life cycle of WAM
- Support the identification of the current status and priority needs as well as areas for enhancement across the life cycle
- Support the collective identification of options for the host Government to implement such enhancements
- Support the design (or review) of a national road map and/or strategic plan to strengthen the national framework governing WAM

One of the general, key guiding principles and prerequisites for a national WAM baseline assessment to be effective is national ownership. Its design, planning and implementation, as well as the assessment results and findings, are to be nationally led, owned and driven (further general and guiding principles are introduced in Module 1 of this reference methodology).

WHAT KEY WAM FUNCTIONAL AREAS ARE CONSIDERED PART OF AN ASSESSMENT?

This reference methodology is primarily designed for strategic- and operational-level WAM baseline assessments. The methodology pursues a comprehensive, life cycle approach to the management of weapons and ammunition, and seeks to establish a WAM baseline of stakeholders, processes and practices at the national level, across 10 key functional areas:

- National coordination mechanism
- Legal and regulatory framework at the national level
- Transfer controls
- Stockpile management
- Marking
- Recordkeeping
- Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition
- Processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition
- Weapons collection
- Disposal including destruction

The reference methodology is sufficiently flexible and adaptable for it to be contextualized and situated in different environments and contexts. In this regard, these key WAM functional areas are considered non-exhaustive (i.e. some may be explored in more depth; additional WAM functional areas may be considered; or context-specific arms-related threats, risks and dynamics may be taken into account). Where relevant, applicable or necessary, the methodology distinguishes between weapons management and ammunition management functions. The substantive focus and scope of a WAM baseline assessment may be defined or redefined, expanded, and adjusted during the design and planning phase of a national baseline assessment, taking into account the needs and priorities at the national level.[6]

WHAT FORMAT DOES A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT TAKE?

A national WAM baseline assessment takes the form of a series of consultative meetings, both at strategic/policy and operational/technical levels, which facilitate inclusive, participatory and gender-sensitive dialogue by all relevant stakeholders, and decision-making among relevant national stakeholders on WAM and related issues. The national consultative meetings are organized in a sequence, with various national and international stakeholders operating at different levels of governance. Typically, this series of meetings and activities is conducted over a week-long period (five days), although the duration of in-country implementation will vary depending on the scope of the assessment, as designed and agreed with the host State.[7] The design and planning of such a national WAM baseline assessment takes three to five months.

A 'NATIONAL ROAD MAP' TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL WAM FRAMEWORK

One of the key results of a national WAM baseline assessment, and the starting point for follow-up activities to strengthen WAM, is the development of a 'national road map' on WAM. Such a road map – presented in the form of a report (and annex) – includes the current status of WAM institutional capacities and processes; identification of WAM enhancement opportunities; and options for implementation, by key WAM functional areas, prioritized over a time frame and including actor-specific attribution of WAM roles and responsibilities.

6 This reference methodology is not designed to facilitate an in-depth legal review and analysis of potential gaps in the legal and regulatory framework applicable to arms and/or ammunition controls at the national level. Instead, it identifies and takes into account the scope and applicability of existing national legislation and regulations in the assessment of WAM policies, institutions and relevant management processes. National WAM baseline assessment findings may include, where relevant, recommended options to conduct a more detailed assessment analysis of legal frameworks pertaining to WAM at the national level, including in some cases to review or revise existing legislation and/or regulation.This reference methodology does not constitute or replace technical assessments (e.g. of ammunition depots, weapon storage or other sites). Such technical assessments can, however, also inform a national WAM baseline assessment or be resulting, recommended options and activities.

7 Generally, the consultative meetings are organized in the following sequence over the period of one week: (i) a formal, high-level national consultative meeting; (ii) a segment of national technical consultations; (iii) bilateral meetings; (iv) a coordination meeting among international partners and assistance providers; (v) a visit to specific operational sites (optional); (vi) another segment of national technical consultations; and (vii) a final, formal high-level national meeting.

WHAT IS THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THIS DOCUMENT?

This document is structured in a modular way as follows:

MODULE 1. Introduction, Purpose and Context (Sections 1–3)

This module provides an introduction to national WAM baseline assessments, the reference methodology, defining key terms and terminologies, and general principles (Section 1). It defines the purpose, goal, and objectives of a national WAM baseline assessment (Section 2), and situates it in varying contexts and highlighting linkages and synergies with broader security institutions, rule of law, peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes (Section 3). It primarily serves as informational purpose, introducing context and applicability

MODULE 2. Planning and Design (Section 4)

Module 2 (Section 4) covers key aspects of the timely, effective, and efficient planning and design of a national WAM baseline assessment, including stakeholders and participation, the scope of a baseline assessment, specific additional design and practical planning considerations. It serves as a practical guide for those planning and designing a national WAM baseline assessment.

MODULE 3. Implementation and Reporting (Sections 5–6)

This module contains core elements of the national WAM baseline assessment methodology developed by UNIDIR, with supporting of host States, UN, and other partners (Section 5). It serves as a practical guide for those implementing a national WAM baseline assessment. Module 3 also provides guidance for those who report on a national WAM baseline assessment (Section 6).

MODULE 4. Review of the Reference Methodology (Section 7)

This module (Section 7) provides possible ways for utilizing a national WAM baseline assessment, possible next steps and follow on activities, once a first assessment has been implemented. It also looks at potential ways forward to further review and strengthen the baseline assessment reference methodology.

MODULE 1:

INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE, AND CONTEXT SECTIONS 1-3

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. WHY WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT MATTERS

Armed violence claims over half a million lives each year, and the annual global economic costs of armed violence run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.[8] Poorly regulated arms and ammunition and their misuse are key contributors to this human and associated socioeconomic cost and pose a significant challenge to peace, security and development.

Security and humanitarian risks posed by unregulated and illicit arms and ammunition are multifaceted. The diversion of such materiel contributes to strengthening the capacity of armed spoilers, including criminal and terrorist groups, and to exacerbating situations of insecurity. Illicit arms and ammunition are multipliers of armed violence, including gender-based violence, displacement of people, serious human rights violations, international crimes, and organized crime. The impact of their misuse ranges from direct effects such as deaths, injuries, displacement and psychological harm, to long-term effects that undermine access to health and education, the delivery of humanitarian services, protection of civilians and the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). States affected by patterns of recurring armed violence are often disproportionately burdened by arms-related risks, impeding their efforts to establish and implement adequate national controls to secure and regulate State-owned materiel and to prevent diversion, mitigate unplanned explosions at munition and other sites, and address illicit proliferation as well as misuse.

As such, policymakers and practitioners increasingly view weapons and ammunition management (WAM) as a fundamental component of conflict prevention and actions to help tackle armed violence. WAM is an essential tool for States to exercise governance, oversight and management over the full life cycle of arms and ammunition, and it forms the basis for the effective implementation of national control systems as well as relevant regional and multilateral instruments. In the past decade, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has increasingly included WAM as part of United Nations peace operation mandates and related obligations in situations of armed conflict, and as part of stabilization efforts as well as an integral component of the monitoring and implementation of United Nations arms embargoes.

WAM is recognized as a key contributor to "Disarmament That Saves Lives" in the 2018 United Nations Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament, the African Union Master Road Map of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020, as well as the five-year action plan for the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. More broadly, WAM contributes to the prevention and development agendas by helping create a safe and secure environment to advance peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG16), poverty reduction (SDG1), economic growth (SDG8), health (SDG3), gender equality (SDG5), and safe cities and communities (SDG11).

8 See G. Hideg and A. Alvazzi del Frate, Darkening Horizons: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2018–30, Small Arms Survey, 2019, www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Violent-Deaths-Scenarios.pdf.

1.2. ADVANCING WAM POLICY AND PRACTICE: UNIDIR'S APPROACH

UNIDIR seeks to promote knowledge and dialogue among States, the United Nations system, international and regional organizations, and specialized NGOs on ways to strengthen national, regional and multilateral frameworks and approaches to govern the through-life management of weapons and ammunition to prevent their diversion and misuse, and to reduce and mitigate risks associated with unplanned explosions.

UNIDIR's research-based approach to strengthen WAM is grounded and centred on national and regional ownership and experience. Through its applied research, and in cooperation with national authorities, regional organizations, and United Nations partners, UNIDIR pursues a bottom-up, evidence-based approach for enhancing knowledge on ways to improve WAM policy and practice. Building on this cumulative knowledge, UNIDIR focuses on generating ideas and facilitating dialogue "upstream" at the cross-regional and multilateral levels to identify good practices and lessons learned, to strengthen shared understanding among the community of practice, and to enable a "learning loop" to improve WAM policy and practice, while informing the applicability of WAM in broader peace, security and development agendas. UNIDIR's approach to WAM promotes a United Nations system-wide approach.

UNIDIR utilizes four services in the delivery of its WAM research:

- **WAM baseline assessment at national levels:** Supporting States to (i) assess and identify their WAM policy and practice baselines by facilitating a consultative multi-stakeholder national dialogue, and (ii) subsequently assisting national stakeholders to establish national road maps, in cooperation with relevant regional organizations and United Nations partners, to promote a cohesive approach to WAM.
- **Dialogue at regional and global levels:** Utilizing the Institute's convening power to initiate and facilitate dialogue among States, regional organizations and specialized entities on ways to improve national and regional WAM policy and practice.
- **Lessons learned for improvements and continuous learning:** Enhancing knowledge on WAM by capturing lessons learned and good practices at national, sub-regional and cross-regional levels, thereby informing improvements in WAM policy and practice.
- **Practical tools to support implementation:** Generating demand-based practical tools for States and specialized organizations in assessing and addressing arms- and ammunition-related risks, thereby supporting implementation efforts of States and partners on the ground.

The desired impact sought is (i) for States to establish and implement comprehensive national, regional and multilateral frameworks governing the full life cycle of weapons and ammunition to prevent diversion and misuse and to reduce and mitigate the risks of unplanned explosions, and (ii) for the United Nations and relevant specialized organizations to provide high-quality advice on these topics. At the national level, this effort will contribute to establishing and strengthening accountable and reliable national security sector and governance architecture. At the regional level, this effort will support States and regional organizations in developing and implementing credible regional strategies and road maps for the management of weapons and ammunition.

More broadly, UNIDIR seeks to promote knowledge on means and methods in which WAM can contribute to achieving peace, security and development goals, including but not limited to conflict prevention, armed violence reduction, accountability of the security sector, protection of civilians, and advancement of the SDGs.

1.3. ABOUT THIS REFERENCE METHODOLOGY

A national WAM baseline assessment is an essential prerequisite for informing and guiding effective strategic formulation, programme planning, and monitoring and evaluation; in addition, and more broadly, such assessments support governance and accountability. However, WAM baseline assessments are not consistently undertaken by States and remain underused by the expert community. Where assessments are undertaken, they may not be comprehensive in assessing the full management cycle of weapons and ammunition, or they may be more specifically focused at the technical levels. While specific and targeted technical assessments are important and necessary, when conducted in isolation, they only reveal part of the problem and what needs to be done to address it. Moreover, practical guidance is limited on strategic-level assessments of WAM that involve the mapping of national stakeholders and the review of institutions and processes relating to decision-making on, and implementation of, WAM at the national level. UNIDIR has produced this reference methodology to fill the gap that existed for a practical resource for entities undertaking comprehensive and strategic baseline assessments on WAM. In developing this methodology, UNIDIR built on its current baseline assessment methodology and drew on lessons learned in its application.

Since 2015, States, together with UNIDIR, have undertaken a series of in-country baseline assessments to inform and strengthen WAM policies and practices at the national and regional levels. These baseline assessments, organized under the ownership and lead of the host Governments,[9] take the form of a national consultative process that facilitates dialogue and decision-making among all relevant national security stakeholders on WAM and related security issues. The methodology draws from, and aligns with, relevant international guidelines, in particular the voluntary, practical Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). As of September 2020, 11 States (Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Iraq, Liberia, the Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Somalia) have conducted national-level baseline assessments on WAM in cooperation with UNIDIR and relevant regional organizations (particularly, the ECOWAS Commission), United Nations entities (including peace operations, special political missions and country teams), and specialized NGOs, with a view to developing a road map towards a comprehensive national WAM framework.

This document represents the codification of the existing UNIDIR reference methodology, which has been used to design and implement baseline assessments on WAM at the national level. The codification and release of the baseline assessment methodology responds to two particular needs: first, to provide practical reference and guidance on how to implement a WAM baseline assessment at the national level; second, to enhance the knowledge of interested United Nations entities, regional organizations and specialized NGOs and enable them to jointly and collaboratively support assistance-requesting States in undertaking WAM baseline assessments.

The codification effort seeks to (i) promote transparency and respond to these needs by making the reference methodology widely available and providing practical guidance to support its implementation and (ii) better facilitate engagement by interested stakeholders in WAM baseline assessments. The release of this methodology is also expected to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on assessment methods and approaches associated with the management of arms and ammunition at the national level. In this regard, this methodology is to be understood as a

9 Reference is made here and throughout the document to the "host government": the government of a State that undertakes a national WAM baseline assessment.

reference: it does not pursue a "one size fits all" approach but recognizes that it is one of several methods available to interested stakeholders to inform their planning and conduct of a national WAM baseline assessment. Users may apply this methodology flexibly to meet the needs of the national context and priorities, whether in full or in part (see Section 1.5).

The methodology is primarily designed for strategic- and operational-level WAM assessments. A technical assessment of tactical capabilities of national stakeholders, including detailed assessment and analysis of storage and materiel conditions, is beyond the scope of this methodology (see Section 4).

The methodology has undergone a review process and integrates feedback received from relevant policymakers and expert practitioners. Internal review includes revisions by researchers and subject matter expert (SME) consultants, including SMEs who have substantively led or supported the facilitation and implementation of UNIDIR WAM baseline assessments. External review includes revisions by representatives and experts of national authorities, United Nations entities, regional organizations, and specialized NGOs that have engaged with UNIDIR in the implementation of national WAM baseline assessments.

This is a living, working document and may be subject to modifications and revisions based on new trends and findings, lessons from different regions and countries, as well as new tools and methods that would help further improve the national baseline assessment methodology.

1.4. AUDIENCE OF THIS DOCUMENT

The language and content of this document have been carefully and purposefully chosen. They seek to strike a balance between strategic, policy-oriented language and technical, operational language in order to communicate to different target audiences.

This document is intended for use by:

- **Policymakers and government officials of States** involved in policy development and decision-making on WAM, formulation of WAM-related mandates and national strategies, and planning and decision-making for the allocation of resources and provision of international assistance related to WAM.
- **Competent national authorities of States** receiving WAM assistance, including those responsible for planning and identifying national needs and opportunities, as well as for coordinating implementation and follow-up actions related to national WAM baseline assessment.
- **Representatives and staff of United Nations** headquarters, field missions and country teams working on mandates, mechanisms for the allocation of resources and budgets, as well as planning, implementation and reporting on weapons or ammunition management programming, projects and related activities.
- **National technical experts and officers** of relevant national competent authorities involved in the planning, organization and implementation of national baseline assessments, including day-to-day WAM operations and activities in the country.
- **WAM or related field** (e.g. small arms control; mine action; explosive ordnance disposal [EOD]; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration [DDR]; community violence reduction [CVR]; security sector reform [SSR]; arms embargo) **managers, programme and technical officers** leading or involved in the planning, organization and implementation of a national WAM baseline assessment, as well as day-to-day WAM operations and activities in the country.
- **Country directors, managers, experts, practitioners or staff** of other international organizations, regional organizations or specialized expert NGOs involved in WAM advocacy and policy, or operational WAM, or related field activities.
- **SMEs and facilitators** who lead or support the substantive preparation, facilitation and implementation of a national WAM baseline assessment. This document is also intended to serve them when preparing a national WAM baseline assessment report.

1.5. STRUCTURE OF THIS DOCUMENT

This document is structured so that users can easily extract, review, use or circulate subsections in a flexible, modular way. This guide does not seek to explain every activity carried out during a national WAM baseline assessment. Instead, it helps readers through the planning, design and implementation of the assessment process. Readers can use it holistically throughout the whole assessment or to better understand and apply the methodology at particular points in the assessment process.

Sections 1–3 are primarily informative, introducing the context for and applicability of a national WAM baseline assessment. Sections 4–6 serve as a practical guide to the design, planning and implementation of a baseline assessment. Section 7 looks at potential ways forward to further review and strengthen the baseline assessment methodology.

MODULE 1: INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE AND CONTEXT

Section 1 provides an introduction to national WAM baseline assessments, the methodology contained in this document, key terms, definitions and general principles.

Section 2 defines the purpose, goal and objectives of planning and implementing a WAM baseline assessment.

Section 3 situates national WAM baseline assessments in varying operational contexts and highlights relevant links and synergies with broader national and regional security institutions, rule of law, and peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes.

MODULE 2: PLANNING AND DESIGN

Section 4 covers key aspects related to timely, effective and efficient planning and design of a national WAM baseline assessment.

MODULE 3: IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING

Section 5 contains core elements of the national WAM baseline assessment methodology developed by UNIDIR, with the support of host States, and United Nations and other partners.

Section 6 provides guidance for those who report on a national WAM baseline assessment.

MODULE 4: REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY

Section 7 provides possible ways for utilizing a national WAM baseline assessment as well as possible next steps and follow-on activities once a first assessment has been implemented.

1.6. KEY WORKING TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

This document does not provide a comprehensive glossary of terms and definitions. A comprehensive list of terms and definitions applicable to small arms control is available in the Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC 01.02 Glossary, available at www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/mosaic). A comprehensive list of terms and definitions applicable to ammunition management is available in the IATG 01.40 Glossary, available at www.un.org/disarmament/ammunition.

Weapons and ammunition management (WAM) is defined in this document as the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing, and disposal.[10] WAM does not focus on small arms and light weapons (SALW) only, but on a broader range of conventional weapons, related systems, and ammunition.

Baseline in this document refers to a justified, relational reference in space and time of WAM institutional and operational capacities, practices and procedures, which allows comparison and measurability of variation or progress over time, as well as impact, including in an evolving peace and security environment. Such a baseline can be established, followed, monitored and reviewed across a number of key WAM functional areas, or a specific key WAM functional area at the national, subregional or regional unit level of analysis.

Assessment in this document refers to a mapping of WAM stakeholders and a related examination of institutional and operational capacities, practices and procedures in key WAM functional areas, as well as decision-making processes among these stakeholders.

This reference methodology and its accompanying process do not constitute or replace technical assessments, such as safety or security assessments of ammunition depots or security assessments of weapon storage sites. Such technical assessments can, however, inform a national WAM baseline assessment or be resulting, recommended options and activities.

Life cycle approach in this document refers to the life cycle of weapons and ammunition from a geographical point and space in time of manufacture or production throughout the various life cycle phases to final disposal, including destruction at another point in space and time. For ammunition, the term may be used elsewhere similarly or interchangeably to describe "whole of life" or "whole of life cycle" or "through-life" management of ammunition. For the purpose of this document, the term "full life cycle management" is used interchangeably with the term "through-life management".

Diversion refers to the phenomenon whereby at one point in space and time, arms, ammunition or related material at any stage in their life cycle are diverted from the legal sphere/ possession of authorized end users to the illegal or illicit sphere, to (an) unauthorized end user(s) or for unauthorized or unlawful end use(s). Diversion occurs in defiance of national and/or international law. Note that there is currently no internationally agreed upon definition of the term diversion nor of the different types of diversion that occur.[11]

10 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, "4.11: Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management", 2020, www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.11-Transitional-Weapons-Ammunition-Management.pdf.

11 See Group of Governmental Experts on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, "Diversion Typology", GGE/PACAS/2020/3, 10 February 2020, https://undocs.org/GGE/PACAS/2020/3; B. Wood, The Arms Trade Treaty: Obligations to Prevent the Diversion of Conventional Arms, UNIDIR, Issue Brief no. 1, 2020, https://unidir.org/publication/arms-trade-treaty-obligations-prevent-diversion-conventional-arms.

1.7. GENERAL AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1.7.1. National ownership

Generally, in and by principle, the State through its relevant and competent national institutions and authorities has the sovereign right and responsibility to control and manage weapons and ammunition on its territory, as well as on those entering, transiting or exiting its territory, in a secure, safe and accountable manner. Therefore, national ownership and leadership are considered a prerequisite and an essential component of planning, organizing and implementing a national WAM baseline assessment. The information and knowledge generated by a national WAM baseline assessment, its results and possible subsequent steps (e.g. the development and implementation of a road map to strengthen the national WAM framework) are to be nationally owned and led. Unless required by a relevant body of law, including relevant national law or regulation, conducting a national baseline assessment is voluntary. Those entities assisting the host State in the design and implementation of WAM baseline assessments are best characterized as supporting actors, providing advisory and technical support services under the lead of the host Government and its designated national authorities, in alignment with relevant regional and international arms control instruments, standards and guidance, including the IATG and MOSAIC.

1.7.2. Comprehensive and integrated approach to WAM

A comprehensive and integrated approach to WAM recognizes that efforts to better manage and control arms and ammunition are linked to and inform broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, and peacebuilding processes. Where applicable, national baseline assessment should be coordinated with other relevant activities of broader peace processes, including but not limited to, ceasefires and arms control measures associated with transitional security arrangements, arms embargo measures where existent and applicable, DDR, and SSR (see Section 3). Further, the findings of the baseline assessment should be situated within the broader national security or development architecture and processes to ensure sustainability and integration into the wider security and development goals of the State. A holistic approach to WAM also entails the need to be inclusive with actors involved in the assessment (see Section 1.7.3). Further, a comprehensive approach to WAM necessitates that functional WAM measures, such as stockpile management, are not assessed in isolation from other functional WAM measures, such as transfer controls and disposal, among others. This ensures that the assessment is comprehensive by design and that the results of the assessment do not lead to a partial response or to siloed programming at the national level.

1.7.3. Inclusive, consultative and participatory

A comprehensive approach to WAM requires inclusive engagement with a wide range of stakeholders operating at different levels of WAM policy and practice at the national level. This may range from policymakers responsible for strategies relating to national security, development plans and related budgets; competent national authorities responsible for developing and overseeing regulations of arms and ammunition; operational officers who manage different aspects of WAM measures, from transfer controls to disposal; enforcement and judiciary actors responsible for addressing violations of rules and regulations; assistance providers operating in the country to support the host State; civil society actors working in the field of arms control, peacebuilding and development; and communities affected by armed violence. It is therefore critical that a national WAM baseline assessment is conducted in an inclusive and consultative manner, with active and full participation of relevant local, national, regional and international stakeholders. This approach also promotes coherent planning, prioritization and the fostering of cooperation and dialogue among participating entities at the national level.

1.7.4. Gender sensitivity

Poorly regulated arms and ammunition and their misuse has significant gendered impact on individuals, communities and societies, hindering efforts to achieve a wide range of SDG objectives, including but not limited to SDG5, gender equality, and SDG16, peace, justice and strong institutions. The misuse of arms impacts gender in all contexts, from conflict, transitional or post-conflict settings, to environments suffering from armed violence. Strengthening WAM frameworks and practices can play an essential role in the prevention of gender-based and related violence. Moreover, integrating and streamlining gender policies and practices into WAM will strengthen the national security sector in the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition. Mainstreaming gender considerations in WAM policies and practices also supports the implementation of relevant international arms control instruments, as well as subregional and regional instruments. A gender-sensitive approach to arms control and disarmament, as well as women's participation in WAM, is an integral part of the planning, design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of a national WAM baseline assessment, and of WAM initiatives and activities.[12]

1.7.5. Safety and security

Handling weapons, ammunition and explosives comes with high levels of safety and security risks. In particular, inadequately managed conventional ammunition poses an explosive risk and threatens public safety.[13] The involvement of technically and appropriately qualified WAM personnel in the planning and implementation of a national baseline assessment is critical. Planners of national baseline assessments shall ensure that technical advisers who participate in them have formal training and operational field experience in weapon and ammunition management, including (but not limited to) storage, marking, transportation, deactivation and disposal, including the destruction of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

12 UNIDIR's Gender Programme is conducting research to develop a framework to integrate gender into UNIDIR's national WAM baseline assessment methodology. Key findings of this research have been integrated into this reference methodology.

13 See IATG, "01.30: Policy development and advice", https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-01.30-Policy-Development-and-Advice-V.2.pdf.

2. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT

National frameworks govern weapons and ammunition through the establishment of norms, standards, strategies and action plans. These frameworks are grounded and sustained by accountable security institutions, including systems and processes, at the national level that oversee the planning and resourcing required to effectively implement the framework. The maturity of such frameworks and the capacities of the responsible institutions, however, vary considerably from one country to another, as does their operational environment, all of which impacts the ability of States to design and implement effective WAM. The point of departure for a baseline assessment is recognizing that each State is unique in its challenges and opportunities to improve WAM and that there is a need for a shared understanding among national stakeholders on current strengths and vulnerabilities of WAM policy and practice as a starting point.

The development of a national framework on WAM is a continuous, nationally driven process, grounded on evidence of needs and priorities. Where relevant, framework development efforts may involve support of subregional, regional and international partners. It is also an incremental process, which should reflect the realities of what can be achieved with the resources available in a country at a specific time. Effective WAM requires a multisectoral approach, which necessitates an inclusive and holistic approach at the national level. In this regard, the strategic planning process to identify the current status of national management processes and practices, opportunities for their enhancement, and options for implementation to achieve them needs to be (i) grounded on information that is generated through an inclusive and consultative process involving all relevant national stakeholders and (ii) regularly monitored and assessed in terms of progress against the established baseline.

While there are various means and methods to assess and gather information on WAM, the common objective of a baseline assessment is to enable States and their national institutions to make good decisions about ways to improve WAM policy and practice and to gather and allocate resources to address risks associated with arms and ammunition in order to meet the needs of the security services and of affected communities. This is achieved by putting information together to build up a full picture of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the life cycle management of arms and ammunition. In short, strategic baseline assessments make good decision-making on WAM possible for national stakeholders.

The objective of a national WAM baseline assessment is to assist States in their effort to comprehensively and systematically assess WAM institutions and their policies and operational processes and capacities. Such an assessment is undertaken in line with international, regional and subregional commitments, as well as relevant international standards and technical guidelines, namely MOSAIC and the IATG. A national WAM baseline assessment aims to:

MAP NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Map national institutions and their responsibilities for the full life cycle of WAM

IDENTIFY STATUS AND PRIORITY NEEDS

Support the identification of the current status and priority needs, as well as areas for enhancement across the life cycle

IDENTIFY OPTIONS FOR ENHANCEMENT

Support the collective identification of options for the host Government to implement such enhancements

DESIGN A NATIONAL ROAD MAP

Support the design (or review) of a national road map and/or strategic plan to strengthen the national framework governing WAM

In doing so, the assessment lays the foundations for national efforts to strengthen WAM policy and practice. More broadly, national WAM baseline assessments provide a unique forum for national dialogue among security, development and violence reduction stakeholders to identify common challenges, priorities and ways to work together to address risks associated with arms and ammunition and to reduce suffering caused by them. Figure 1 further situates and illustrates the context of a national WAM baseline assessment. The assessment further promotes informed and evidence-based discussion on arms and violence at the national level and facilitates an exchange of lessons learned and good practice among a wide range of stakeholders, which may have broader benefits to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives.

FIGURE 1: Situating a national baseline assessment



One of the key results of a national WAM baseline assessment, and the starting point for follow-up activities to strengthen WAM, is the development of a "national road map" (and/or a strategic plan) to strengthen the national framework governing WAM. A national WAM baseline assessment and its results, including such a road map, have been and can be used by governments and relevant national authorities, both at strategic or policy and at operational levels, in several ways. For example, at the strategic level, national WAM baseline assessments and results have been used to:

- Review or inform national security strategies
- Develop a dedicated national WAM strategy
- Inform and support the establishment of a dedicated national WAM coordinating mechanism
- Establish, or reposition and leverage, a national WAM lead entity
- Inform the development of a dedicated national policy for ammunition management
- Inform United Nations partial arms embargo regime benchmarking, implementation, reporting and monitoring

At the operational level, for example, the results of the baseline assessment serve as an essential component in the subsequent development and/or review of national actions plans. Several States have also used national WAM baseline assessments and road maps to inform the development and/or revision and adoption of specific (written) operational procedures, as well as capacity-building programming and activities at the tactical level (further information on situating a national WAM baseline assessment is included in Module 2, Planning and Design, specifically Section 4.2).

3. CONTEXT AND SITUATION RELEVANT TO NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT

A national WAM baseline assessment takes place at a specific time in a dynamic security environment, shaped by different armed actors, the availability of different categories and types of arms and ammunition, flows, stocks and holdings, as well as their management and levels of control across a territory. There may be different types and degrees of threats and risks to public safety or subregional, regional, national or local security, or specific non-State armed groups posing threats to the integrity of a territory, zone or area. Different points, types and sources of diversion may lead to arms and ammunition ending up in the illicit sphere. Illicit flows of arms and ammunition may be linked to organized crime, supply networks or corruption. Together, these factors can contribute to different types and levels of armed violence.

A national WAM baseline assessment should be designed to be useful for all interested States. The assessment can be undertaken in various contexts, including:

- Where indicators point towards an increasingly volatile security situation, underlying grievances, or emerging conflict(s)
- During a conflict where political will exists among relevant national and local stakeholders to prioritize efforts to address risks associated with arms and ammunition
- In a transitioning security or stabilization environment
- In a post-conflict setting
- Outside of a conflict setting, in an environment experiencing various levels of armed violence, including in urban or localized settings
- In situations of relative peace and stability (where such an assessment may also be applicable).

Therefore, a national WAM baseline assessment needs to be contextualized and situated as part of design and planning and prior to its implementation. The methodology, its scope and related processes described in this document allow for sufficient flexibility and adaptability by users to align the assessment to national contexts and priorities. For example, the methodology is designed to draw from and inform the implementation of relevant and applicable international, regional and subregional normative frameworks and processes. It can also be used to create synergies and links with other arms control and related conflict prevention and peace operation processes, including in support or as part of peacebuilding, SSR and/or DDR, as appropriate. When applied effectively and consistently, relevant national stakeholders in a specific context and situation are engaged and consulted through dialogue in a form of participation in a national consultative process on WAM. Understanding the context and the applicability of the baseline assessment to support a range of national objectives is essential to maximize the impact of the baseline assessment and to facilitate the sustainability of WAM policy and practice over time.

3.1. NATIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

National legislation, regulation and standards form the principal framework for the management of arms and ammunition at the national level.[14] A national WAM framework encompasses in most cases at least one, or sometimes several, applicable national laws and regulations, which define the legal status of designated competent national authorities, their mandates, organization and functioning, as well as the level and scope of their WAM operations. In some cases, decrees or administrative procedures may exist in lieu of legislation or to further codify, operationalize and provide guidance on provisions contained in primary legislation.

The maturity of national legal and regulatory WAM frameworks, including enforcement of them, varies considerably among States. In many States, dedicated legal frameworks exist for the control of arms and ammunition by various users at the national level (State security forces and services, or civilians). In other cases, including in situations affected by conflicts, existing legal frameworks may be weakened due to the lack of rule of law, or they may be outdated or entirely absent. Reviewing and understanding the maturity and applicability of a national legal and regulatory framework is therefore an essential aspect of contextualizing national WAM baseline assessments.

The exercise of national WAM baseline assessments does not constitute or comprise a detailed legal review and analysis of gaps in national laws, regulations, decrees and administrative instructions. Instead, it identifies and takes into account the scope and applicability of existing national legislation and regulations in the assessment of WAM policies, institutions and relevant management processes. Findings from WAM baseline assessments may include, where relevant, recommendations to conduct a more detailed assessment and analysis of legal frameworks pertaining to WAM, including in some cases to review or revise existing legislation and regulations.

14 For detailed guidance on developing national standards for ammunition management, see www.un.org/disarmament/publications/more/a-guide-to-developing-national-standards-for-ammunition-management.

3.2. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL INSTRUMENTS

Domestic WAM efforts and initiatives are reinforced, and may be shaped, by a set of relevant international, regional and subregional instruments, with commitments that the host State has agreed to domesticate and implement with respect to WAM. Where these are UNSC resolutions and other legally binding instruments, the host State has an obligation to implement them.

3.2.1. United Nations Security Council

The UNSC has adopted thematic resolutions on SALW that refer to WAM, and numerous resolutions on related or linked thematic issues or tools (e.g. on conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, DDR, SSR, women, peace and security, arms embargoes, and preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons), in addition to country- or region-specific resolutions that are applicable, depending on the context. Overall, an increasing number of UNSC resolutions reference WAM obligations.[15] A national WAM baseline assessment should link, respond and feed in to these obligations. WAM-related obligations from UNSC resolutions may, depending on the context, apply directly or indirectly to a State; to one, several or all other Member States; to the United Nations (e.g. United Nations peacekeeping operations or special political missions); or to other actors (e.g. regional organizations). These obligations might require the State to strengthen WAM and might also mandate the United Nations or other actors to provide assistance to the State in this area of work. Such obligations may include reporting commitments to the UNSC. Where they exist, UNSC resolutions also define arms embargo regimes, corresponding mandates (e.g. monitoring and reporting by a panel or group of experts, a United Nations mission, or other actors), as well as conditions to be met for the UNSC to reassess arms embargo measures (see Section 3.3.1). A national WAM baseline assessment is a tool that can be used by States or the United Nations in all these scenarios.

3.2.2. International instruments

International instruments (see Box 1) to which the host State has committed or is a State Party should guide host Governments and their relevant national authorities to develop, strengthen or adjust national WAM frameworks to their national contexts and situations. The objectives of international instruments relevant to WAM vary, as do their implementation and review processes. Those involved in the planning and implementation of WAM baseline assessments should identify and review the relevant international instruments applicable to the host State and consider how such instruments can further support efforts to strengthen WAM at the national level. In particular, planners of the baseline assessment should ensure that legally binding instruments to which the host State is a party are reviewed and integrated as part of substantive preparations for the baseline assessment.

15 For a compilation and categorization, see United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Aide-Memoire: Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Decisions of the Security Council, 2nd Edition, 2020, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/aide-memoire-2ed-1.pdf.

BOX 1: International legally and politically binding instruments (arms control)

International legally and/or politically binding instruments include:

- The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (entry into force in 1983; legally binding for States Parties) and its relevant Additional Protocols
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (entry into force in 1999; legally binding for States Parties)
- The United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (adopted in 2001; politically binding)
- The International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (adopted in 2005; politically binding)
- The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition (entry into force in 2005; legally binding for States Parties)
- The Convention on Cluster Munitions (entry into force in 2010; legally binding for States Parties)
- The Arms Trade Treaty (entry into force in 2014; legally binding for States Parties)

Other international legally or politically binding instruments may also be relevant to WAM.

For example, international instruments relevant to WAM include voluntary or legally binding reporting commitments to help monitor implementation, which are useful for ensuring accountability and transparency, and more broadly, to demonstrate national political commitment to implementing international arms control norms. National reports that are submitted to show implementation of international instruments can provide a valuable source of information – a starting point – for the development of an initial country profile in preparation for a WAM baseline assessment (see also Module 2, Sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6). The results of the baseline assessment, in turn, can inter alia inform future national reports and can feed back into informing progress made in the implementation of relevant multilateral instruments.

Further, many international instruments have provisions for international cooperation and assistance that aim to support States in implementing their commitments. Findings of national WAM baseline assessments can supplement national efforts to identify gaps, vulnerabilities and needs in WAM and can inform the prioritization of international assistance.

3.2.3. Regional and subregional instruments

Regional and subregional instruments (see Box 2 for the African region) can also help guide and reinforce a national WAM framework. Regional and subregional instruments often form the basis of, as well as shape, positively influence and reinforce, the development and review of national legal frameworks at the national level. Regional and subregional instruments have also informed the development of relevant regional and subregional WAM strategies and road maps at the strategic level, and implementation action plans at the operational level, among participating States within a region or subregion. Where regional strategies or road maps may not exist at the regional or subregional level, national WAM baseline assessments can help identify and inform shared understanding among States on regional means and methods to address risks and gaps in WAM. Where such strategies or road maps exist, results of baseline assessments can help inform the review of such strategies or road maps and the implementation progress made by States. As in the case of international instruments, planners of the baseline assessment should

review and integrate regional and subregional commitments as part of the substantive preparations for the assessment.

BOX 2: Regional and subregional politically and legally binding instruments (arms control): Africa

The African Union's initiative, Silencing the Guns, is a politically binding instrument for African States.

For the African region and subregions, legally binding instruments (arms control) include:

- The Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the Southern African Development Community Region (entry into force in 2004, revised in 2020; legally binding for States Parties)
- The Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention; entry into force in 2009; legally binding for States Parties)
- The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa (entry into force in 2006; legally binding for States Parties)
- The Central African Convention for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition, and All Parts and Components That Can Be Used for Their Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (entry into force in 2017; legally binding for States Parties)

Other regional or subregional legally binding instruments may also be relevant to WAM in Africa.

3.3. SYNERGIES AND LINKAGES TO BROADER SECURITY PROCESSES

Taking a comprehensive and holistic approach to WAM is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate and manage arms and ammunition are not undertaken in isolation but aligned with DDR, security sector and broader rule of law, armed violence reduction and peacebuilding processes. WAM baseline assessments should recognize and identify concrete links and synergies with such broader processes and seek to use, where relevant, related tools to maximize the impact the assessment can have to help achieve supporting objectives at the national level. These national processes can often serve as crucial entry points or incentives to engage on WAM at the national level with wide range of stakeholders.

3.3.1. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of United Nations arms embargoes

United Nations arms embargoes are adopted and imposed by the UNSC to prevent or manage a conflict's armament situation by addressing a State and/or non-State armed actors in a country or geographical area over a defined time period. In general, the UNSC commits to review an arms embargo, usually on an annual basis, taking into account a variety of sources of information. These can range from information obtained as part of a reporting obligation placed on the State under the arms embargo; reporting by relevant panels or groups of experts monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo; reporting by relevant United Nations entities mandated by the UNSC to help monitor or implement the arms embargo; or reporting on conditions, sometimes referred to as benchmarks, set by the UNSC to support the reassessment of the arms embargo. Such conditions may include a general improvement of the security situation, progress made in SSR, DDR, or, – in some cases – explicitly strengthened national WAM capacity, practices and procedures.

In recent years, the UNSC has increasingly used a partial lifting of arms embargoes as a way to help States under embargo strengthen national security services to improve the security situation in the country (or a particular territory). This practice has seen, in parallel, the increasingly frequent introduction of WAM-related commitments and measures as part of the partial lifting of an arms embargo to address potential risks of arms diversion by those security services, while also aiming to address illicit arms proliferation and misuse. In such contexts, national WAM baseline assessments can help inform the design of national control processes and procedures to adequately implement the obligations set by the partial lifting of the arms embargo. The assessments can also help identify synergies between WAM priorities, obligations of the arms embargo, and the implementation of broader security sector strengthening processes. Where reporting obligations exist for various actors (e.g. host State, or United Nations mission, panel or group of experts), findings from the baseline assessment can serve as a useful additional evidence base reference to inform the implementation of a partial arms embargo, as well as progress made against established benchmarks, where relevant.[16]

16 See S. de Tessières et al., Applying Conventional Arms Control in the Context of United Nations Arms Embargoes, UNIDIR, 2018, https://unidir.org/publication/applying-conventional-arms-control-context-united-nations-arms-embargoes. The national WAM baseline assessment reference methodology has been applied, and key findings of UNIDIR WAM baseline assessments have been used to inform such processes, including to support implementation and monitoring of specific partial arms embargo regimes, such as in the Central African Republic and Somalia.

3.3.2. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of DDR

Where applicable, national WAM baseline assessments should be contextualized and situated in varying DDR contexts in mission and non-mission settings. In line with the new United Nations approach to DDR,[17] transitional WAM[18] is recognized as a DDR-related tool applicable in transitional settings, including in an ongoing armed conflict, where a peace agreement has neither been signed nor implemented and where disarmament as part of a DDR programme may not be the most suitable approach to manage and control the circulation of arms and ammunition because armed groups may be reluctant to disarm without strong security guarantees and arrangements. In contexts where a peace agreement has been signed and the necessary preconditions for a DDR programme are in place, transitional WAM can be used before, during and after the DDR programme as a complementary measure. Transitional WAM may also be used in combination with other DDR-related tools, including CVR programmes.[19] The disarmament component of a DDR programme also includes key WAM functions and operations, including the surrender or collection of weapons, ammunition and explosives; systematic and proper registration (and, where required, the marking of weapons); stockpile management (including accounting, transportation and storage); profiling and tracing (if needed and required); and disposal, including destruction.[20] The scope of national baseline assessments cover these WAM functional areas and thereby can help assess and inform risks, gaps, vulnerabilities and areas for improvements to implement WAM in the context of DDR. It may also help to situate and align DDR-related activities and processes to the national WAM framework as appropriate.

3.3.3. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of SSR

A national WAM baseline assessment may take place in a context where the host State is undertaking an SSR process.[21] WAM can be an effective entry point for ongoing SSR processes in several ways. Synergies between WAM and SSR may include the creation or strengthening of national security institutions and coordination mechanisms, including on WAM; processes to review national laws and regulations, including those on arms, ammunition and related material; national security strategies or defence plans and their implementation across a territory, which may include WAM or related activities; the rightsizing of defence and security forces, including the adaption of weapons and ammunition stockpiles to the size, needs and objectives of the forces; identification of surplus, unserviceable weapons and obsolete and unstable ammunition to be destroyed in relation to the operational readiness of security forces; a cost-effective, needs-based and efficient procurement policy and process for the acquisition of "new" or replacing weapons and ammunition; assessment of arms held by civilians in support of, or independent of, security services and their operations; or parliamentarian and public oversight, as well as corresponding accountability mechanisms for security services and their use of force. National WAM baseline assessments can help facilitate dialogue among national stakeholders

17 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, "2.10: The UN Approach to DDR", www.unddr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IDDRS-2.10-The-UN-Approach-To-DDR.pdf.

18 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, "4.11: Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management", www.unddr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IDDRS-4.11-Transitional-Weapons-and-Ammunition-Management.pdf.

19 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, "2.30: Community Violence Reduction", www.unddr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IDDRS-2.30-Community-Violence-Reduction.pdf.

20 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, "4.10: Disarmament", www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.10-Disarmament.pdf; S. de Tessières, Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context, 2nd Edition, United Nations Department of Peace Operations and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2021, www.un.org/disarmament/ddr-handbook-2ed.

21 For more information on small arms control in the context of SSR, see MOSAIC, "02.20: Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Context of Security Sector Reform", 2020, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/MOSAIC-02.20EV1.0.pdf.

responsible for or involved in these processes. Moreover, findings from the assessment can form a baseline from which priority actions can be identified and implementation progress can be monitored to support both SSR and WAM objectives at the national level.

3.3.4. National WAM baseline assessments in different armed violence contexts, including in local and urban settings

A national WAM baseline assessment can take place outside of an active conflict setting in an environment with high levels of armed violence.[22] Such armed violence may occur in urban settings, as well as localized contexts. The baseline assessment methodology is applicable and sufficiently flexible to be adapted to such a context, which may be characterized by increased presence of law enforcement operations targeting gangs, (organized) criminal groups and networks, and specifically the fight against illicit trafficking. The scope of arms and ammunition (e.g. categories, calibres) can differ from a conflict or post-conflict setting (e.g. there is likely more emphasis and focus on firearms and small calibre ammunition), whereas national actors and participation may also vary (e.g. more focus may be placed on national law enforcement, customs, intelligence entities, crime prevention and investigative authorities and agencies). Depending on specific context, as well types and patterns of armed violence, the baseline assessment methodology may be used to place focus on assessing specific WAM functional areas or management capacities, processes and practices of targeted national institutions.

22 See, op. cit., G. Hideg and A. Alvazzi del Frate, Darkening Horizons: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2018–30, Small Arms Survey, 2019, www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Violent-Deaths-Scenarios.pdf. See also, for example, MOSAIC, "02.10: Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Context of Preventing Armed Violence", forthcoming.



MODULE 2:

PLANNING AND DESIGN

SECTION 4

4. PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT

This section presents key aspects related to timely, effective and efficient planning and design of a national WAM baseline assessment by individuals of a government's national lead entity and partners (hereafter generically referred to as "planners"). Section 4 consists of four subsections: (i) stakeholders and participation; (ii) scope of a baseline assessment; (iii) additional specific design considerations; and (iv) practical pre-assessment planning considerations.

4.1. STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTICIPATION

A key principle of the WAM baseline assessment is a comprehensive approach to WAM, centred on inclusiveness as well as the involvement and participation of all relevant stakeholders during the assessment. Considerations related to actors and participation are an essential aspect of the planning and organization of a national WAM baseline assessment. A national WAM baseline assessment in most cases provides a unique opportunity for national stakeholders responsible for a wide range of WAM or related areas of work (e.g. broader arms control, SSR, DDR, peace-building, sustainable development) to gather, exchange on good practices and gaps, and engage in policy-oriented and operationally guided discussions on WAM while pursuing various goals and objectives.

The baseline assessment methodology has been designed to follow a sequenced, consultative process with relevant national stakeholders, both at strategic/policy and operational/technical levels. Additionally, civil society organizations (CSOs) and regional and international partners may be involved in the planning and implementation of the baseline assessments. In some situations, it is beneficial for other actors, such as private security companies, to participate in select segments of the baseline assessments based on the host Government's determination. The roles and stakes of these different actors in a national WAM baseline assessment are explained in the subsections below. Section 4.4 provides information on how to prepare and organize a consultative process, which is also illustrated in Annex I (template programme of work) and Annex II (template agenda).

4.1.1. National actors

4.1.1.1. Political stakeholders

A key prerequisite for effective design and planning of a national baseline assessment is a good understanding of the government's internal structures and dynamics as they relate to WAM. This is a prerequisite to facilitate national buy-in and ownership for a national WAM baseline assessment and to inform subsequent follow-up activities, including allocation of the necessary resources to implement them. Planners are encouraged to seek engagement at high political levels of the host Government. The higher the political interest, support and leverage, the more likely that participation of key national stakeholders will be facilitated for the baseline assessments. It is also more likely that the results of the assessment will be followed, coordinated and implemented over time in a sustainable manner. Political leaders responsible for WAM in a host Government may vary from one State to another; thus, planners should identify the appropriate entry point for engagement in consultation with national stakeholders. Examples of high-level engagement include national security

advisers to the president; senior security and political advisers to the prime minister; chefs de cabinet; ministers or deputy-ministers of defence, interior or other relevant ministries; heads of national security services and institutions; and parliamentarians sitting on security- and defence-related committees that oversee activities and budgets in this domain.

4.1.1.2. Competent national authorities and focal points

In countries where a national coordinating body relevant to WAM exists, such an entity can serve as the focal point for the joint planning of a baseline assessment. While the mandates, placement in the government structure, and scope of such coordinating bodies vary among States, the principal functions of these bodies include coordinating national WAM policies, strategies or action plans to support the development, review and implementation of WAM-relevant activities.[23] In many cases, such coordinating bodies are referred to as national commissions or committees on SALW.[24] Such entities are often also directly responsible for or coordinate the reporting to relevant regional or international instruments. Planners should engage with such national coordinating bodies to identify relevant national authorities that should participate in the baseline assessment from strategic to operational levels. Further, planners should identify a wider set of national stakeholders involved in national security, humanitarian and sustainable development processes to ensure that dialogue on WAM is situated appropriately within the broader sets of national priorities. Examples of the national authorities most frequently and commonly engaged as part of conducting a baseline assessment include:

- Ministries of defence, interior, foreign affairs, trade, justice, finance, gender, etc.
- National security institutions and related agencies, including offices of national security, national intelligence agencies, and customs and border control
- National security services including the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and all other relevant[25] and related services
- National stakeholders responsible for SSR, peacebuilding, peace and reconciliation, violence reduction, DDR, and sanctions, including arms embargoes

4.1.2. Regional and subregional organizations

In addition to national stakeholders, planners should consider engagement with relevant regional and subregional organizations and their experts in the planning, design and implementation of national WAM baseline assessments. Regional approaches and cooperation on WAM have a critical, instrumental and important role to play in facilitating the implementation of existing regional and subregional instruments, strategies, road maps and action plans. Some regional and subregional organizations working in the area of WAM have dedicated offices, teams or capacities that support States of the region or subregion in the monitoring and implementation of WAM-related commitments. Where relevant, planners should identify such focal points and consider consulting them during the planning and design of the national WAM baseline assessment.

23 Depending on the placement of these coordinating bodies within the government, such entities may have more strategic or operational roles. In some cases, the entity may play a strictly coordination role, while in others it may be more involved in strategic or operational planning related to WAM.

24 Designations of commissions and committees vary among States. WAM-related coordinating bodies are often established through or recognized in a relevant national legal framework.

25 Relevant national defence and security services include, at a minimum, all those that hold, manage and/or control weapons and ammunition.

Practically, partnerships with a regional or subregional organization may be sought and established for the implementation of one or several national WAM baseline assessments in the respective region or subregion. This approach, taken by UNIDIR and the ECOWAS Commission for the West African region, for example, has helped to inform the development of the five-year action plan for the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention in 2020.

Another approach, taken in select cases in the Horn of Africa region, for example, may be to integrate an expert from a regional or subregional organization into the assessment team that facilitates the in-country national WAM baseline assessment. Further approaches include inviting a representative of a regional or subregional organization to participate in a number of relevant consultative meeting sessions during the national WAM baseline assessment.

These examples demonstrate the important and, in some cases, key role that regional and subregional organizations can play in supporting the implementation of the baseline assessment, as well as in feeding back the findings and results of the assessments into regional and subregional processes and aligning national road maps with regional and subregional road maps and action plans.

4.1.3. CSOs at the national level

CSOs highlight human security and safety needs as well as negative impacts associated with illicit and poorly managed arms and ammunition on affected communities. CSOs are also critical in putting pressure on governments to bring about change in behaviour and practice in the regulation and promotion of arms control, including in the fight against the illicit proliferation and misuse of arms at national and local levels.

In some cases, CSOs may be organized under WAM-related networks or associations (e.g. SALW control civil society networks; national NGOs specializing in academic, judicial, policy-oriented or field research; NGOs promoting gender aspects of arms control and disarmament; associations of local manufacturers and hunters). Planners should assess whether such networks and associations already form part of, and participate in, the national WAM coordination mechanism and related processes, which can inform the types and levels of influence they may possess on WAM-related matters.

Relevant CSOs present in the country may bring varying expertise, accessibility, insights and influence to conducting a WAM baseline assessment. Thus, planners should consider CSO roles and responsibilities as part of the planning of a national baseline assessment. Furthermore, planners should then consult relevant CSOs as well as the focal national authorities as part of planning on the potential roles and scale of CSO engagement to support the implementation and follow-up of the baseline assessment.

4.1.4. Assistance-providing and partner States

States may be in the position to use their own national resources to undertake a national baseline assessment and to operationalize follow-up activities to improve WAM policy and practice. However, some States may require, and subsequently request, financial, technical or advisory support from external stakeholders to undertake a baseline assessment and implement follow-up WAM enhancement activities. In such contexts, assistance-providing States, often referred to as partner States, play an essential role in the planning of the WAM baseline assessment. Partner States may have technical expertise relevant to WAM in a country through their embassies (e.g. defence and police attaches and advisers) or, in some cases, as part of multilateral peace or political missions or military operations (e.g. specialized military, logistics or other related roles). Planners should identify and map relevant partner States, and in particular the types and scale of assistance they can provide on WAM-related activities, as part of the planning and implementation of a baseline assessment. Depending on the host Government's indication, such partner States' representatives may be invited to participate in all or specific sessions of a national baseline assessment. Alternatively, they can be invited to a dedicated coordination and consultative meeting, as part of the in-country WAM baseline assessment process (see Annex I). Involving partner States in the assessment process may facilitate the assistance provided to the host Government in supporting follow-up implementation of WAM enhancement activities.

4.1.5. United Nations entities

Specific United Nations entities may themselves, as part of their mandate and in support of their mandated objectives, support a host Government and relevant national authorities in the design, planning and implementation of an integrated, holistic and comprehensive national WAM baseline assessment, thereby working towards strengthening the WAM framework at the national level. In other cases, United Nations entities may be mandated to support WAM and related activities in a country where a national WAM baseline assessment is planned and implemented. In such contexts, relevant regional United Nations entities or offices may manage WAM-relevant programming and projects in the country or remotely. In both scenarios, planners should consider the respective roles, responsibilities and contributions of United Nations entities in supporting the planning and implementation of national WAM baseline assessments. United Nations presence in a country where a baseline assessment is taking place may vary. The guidance provided below helps planners to identify the type of United Nations presence and actors who may be present and to situate engagement with United Nations stakeholders; however, it is not a comprehensive list. In mapping relevant United Nations stakeholders and assessing the roles they could play in supporting the implementation and follow-up to baseline assessments, planners could consider:

- **United Nations Resident Coordinator Offices and country teams:**[26] United Nations country teams currently exist in 131 countries and not only serve as a "one United Nations" portal to the activities of the United Nations in a country but also may have established programming or projects relevant to WAM. These may include peacebuilding or DDR and CVR initiatives that include risk education activities as well as weapons management components (e.g. obsolete weapons collection and destruction from affected communities) or capacity-building activities to strengthen security institutions and rule of law. There are ongoing efforts to promote the inclusion of arms and ammunition considerations into the common country analysis and the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.

26 See United Nations Sustainable Development Group, "Countries and Territories", https://unsdg.un.org/un-in-action/country-level.

Planners should consider how the national WAM baseline assessment and its results could contribute to such efforts and to existing programming and projects, in addition to consideration of how national WAM baseline assessment and results could inform the development of new initiatives.

- **United Nations peacekeeping operations:**[27] United Nations peacekeeping operations may have dedicated or related mandates to support WAM activities at the national level including in the context of DDR, CVR, SSR, SALW control, military operations conducted by United Nations troops, monitoring and implementation of an arms embargo, capacity-building of police and law enforcement, prevention of serious organized crimes, justice sector reform, or conflict analysis. Many of the peacekeeping operations have established formal or informal structures that facilitate or involve the planning and implementation of activities related to WAM, including through the convening of working groups (e.g. as part of SSR or DDR, arms embargo, or counter illicit trafficking working groups), or have designated focal office or points in the management of arms and ammunition (e.g. the United Nations Mine Action Service). Planners should consider how to best use existing mission mandates and components[28] to support the planning, implementation and follow-up of national WAM baseline assessments.
- **United Nations special political missions:**[29] United Nations special political missions may have a dedicated WAM mandate, or responsibilities to provide advisory or other forms of support (e.g. operational, technical) to a host Government on topics relevant to WAM, ranging from disarmament (e.g. laying down the arms) to monitoring and implementation of related processes that may have an arms control component, such as ceasefire, mediation, DDR, CVR, SSR and arms embargo. As part of the design of the national baseline assessment, planners should, on the one hand, examine the role that the United Nations special political mission could play in supporting the implementation and follow-up of the baseline assessment and, on the other hand, consider how the findings of the assessment could support the objectives of the political mission, as appropriate.
- **United Nations headquarters and other specialized entities:** Planners could also consider engaging with other relevant United Nations entities and bodies as part of planning for a baseline assessment, including with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and its three Regional Centres;[30] the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, including the DDR Section, SSR Unit and Mine Action Service;[31] the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Global Firearms Programme;[32] the United Nations Development Programme (see also United Nations country teams at the beginning of this list); United Nations Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate;[33] and relevant panels or groups of experts mandated to monitor the implementation of arms embargoes,[34] where they exist. Such engagement

27 See United Nations Peacekeeping, "Where We Operate", https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate.

28 For information and further guidance in this regard, planners can use the UNSC Field Missions Dashboard, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/field-missions-dashboard.

29 See United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, "DPPA Around the World", https://dppa.un.org/en/dppa-around-world.

30 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "Regional Centers", www.un.org/disarmament/disarmsec/regional-centers.

31 See United Nations Peacekeeping, "Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions", https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/office-of-rule-of-law-and-security-institutions.

32 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Global Firearms Programme", www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms-protocol/index.html.

33 See UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee, Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, "About Us", www.un.org/sc/ctc.

34 See UNSC, "Sanctions Committee Information", www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information.

at the planning stage would strengthen the knowledge of planners on the context of the proposed baseline assessment, help identify synergies in initiatives (e.g. with other technical assessments or capacity-building initiatives), and facilitate national efforts to coordinate implementation of follow-up activities post-assessment.

4.1.6. Other international and regional organizations and entities

Planners should also determine if there are other relevant international organizations working on WAM-related issues in the country of the baseline assessment prior to deployment. In Africa, such organizations might include African Union peace operations. European Union special technical assistance missions, or similar entities, can also support the strengthening of WAM at the national level. In particular, planners should consider engagement with the relevant assistance programming units of INTERPOL, which provides support to their respective national central bureaux, as well as the World Customs Organization, as relevant. Both INTERPOL and the World Customs Organization have various WAM-relevant programmes and projects that aim to support the operational capacity-building of States, in particular in the area of monitoring, diagnostics and tracing of illicit arms and related material, as well as international cooperation in the area of border controls and law enforcement. Where synergies exist, planners should consider integrating the knowledge and tools available from relevant existing projects by international organizations into the design of the WAM baseline assessment.

4.1.7. Specialized international NGOs

Specialized international NGOs with expertise in WAM may also be present in the country that is undertaking a national WAM baseline assessment. These NGOs may be providing or seeking to provide, various types of assistance in one or several WAM functional areas to national WAM authorities, defence and security forces, or CSOs. Specialized NGOs bring expertise and experience in support of relevant national authorities in the planning and implementation of specific WAM functional areas. They may also be undertaking activities that can support in the identification of priority areas for assistance. Depending on access and the duration of their presence in country, such specialized NGOs can offer technical advisory support to planners in the planning and design of national WAM baseline assessments. In turn, specialized NGOs may welcome engagement in national baseline assessment processes, where they may face challenges relating to access, or in obtaining a more comprehensive overview of how their assistance fits into the broader national strategic WAM planning process. Planners should consider the benefits of engaging with specialized NGOs in the implementation of the baseline assessment, taking into account how they may be able to support the identification of WAM gaps and needs as part of the assessment, as well as how they could facilitate the implementation of follow-up activities identified in the findings of the assessment.

4.2. SCOPE OF A BASELINE ASSESSMENT

4.2.1. General

The baseline assessment methodology pursues a life cycle approach to the management of weapons and ammunition, from the point of manufacture or production through to final disposal, including destruction, at the end of the life cycle. Such a holistic approach is critical for identifying relevant stakeholders that manage arms and ammunition at each stage of custody in the life cycle, to differentiate controls and management functions by the relevant and competent national authorities, and to assess potential vulnerabilities in the institutional WAM processes and capacities to inform ways to strengthen WAM at the national level. The assessment seeks to establish a WAM baseline of stakeholders, processes and practices at the national level across 10 key functional areas of WAM.

BOX 3: Ten key WAM functional areas

1. National coordination mechanism
2. Legal and regulatory framework at national level
3. Transfer controls
4. Stockpile management
5. Marking
6. Recordkeeping
7. Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition
8. Processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition
9. Weapons collection
10. Disposal including destruction

The functional areas covered under this methodology are not exhaustive. For example, this methodology currently does not cover governance and regulation of manufacturing of arms and ammunition. Further, where the host State may express interest, the scope of the assessment may be redesigned to be more targeted (e.g. to focus solely on ammunition management) or expanded to consider additional functional areas. Planners should consult the host State in the planning and design phase to jointly identify and agree on the scope of the assessment. Examples of additional WAM functional areas or considerations include manufacturing controls, craft production, and artisanal weapons control and management; broader focus on civilian possession; community-based WAM; WAM by authorized civilian or non-public entities (e.g. private security actors); and border controls; among others.

The design of the methodology aims to help assessors better understand:

- Existing national stakeholders and their institutional roles, responsibilities and functions relevant to WAM.
- The maturity of national WAM processes through mapping of the decision-making and implementation processes of national stakeholders and their institutional capacities to carry out their respective WAM-related roles, responsibilities and functions.

Under each functional area, the methodology seeks to identify relevant stakeholders, and the current status of their institutional WAM processes and related capacities and practices, including possible vulnerabilities and gaps, and to thereby facilitate the assessment of areas for enhancement in alignment with relevant international guidelines, namely MOSAIC and the IATG (see Section 4.3.3). Additionally, under each functional area, the methodology provides specific considerations pertaining to the safety of conventional ammunition, thereby separating arms management measures from ammunition management measures, where relevant and necessary (see Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Gender-sensitive approaches and considerations

are mainstreamed and integrated under each functional area, instead of being presented as a dedicated functional area of assessment.

A technical assessment of the tactical capabilities of national stakeholders, including a detailed assessment and analysis of storage and materiel conditions, is beyond the scope of this methodology. As such, this methodology is not suitable for such exercises. However, findings from technical WAM assessments at the tactical level conducted by the host State or its partners may form a useful preparatory resource for the assessment team should the host State permit the sharing of such information on a voluntary basis. Where such tactical-level assessment has not yet been undertaken at the time of the WAM baseline assessment, proposed follow-up

activities stemming from the baseline assessment may include a recommendation to undertake a more detailed technical assessment at the tactical level.

4.2.2. Assessment of current institutional processes, capacities and practices

A key component of the methodology is the assessment of existing, actual, de facto institutional and operational capacities and practices of national WAM stakeholders in key WAM functional areas (see Section 4.2.1). The identification of national stakeholders and their current institutional capacities and practices forms the essential backbone of the baseline. Assessors should work closely with the participating national stakeholders to differentiate between current institutional capacities and practices and those they aspire to achieve, as establishing a baseline of the current status enables the identification of opportunities for enhancement as well as options for implementing those opportunities and for making progress. The assessment team should be clear in its communication with national stakeholders prior to and during the baseline assessment that identifying a baseline of current institutional capacities and practices does not entail a critical investigation of the shortfalls of the State's WAM systems but, rather, aims to bring all stakeholders on the "same page" regarding the current state of play of WAM in the country.

On a practical level, the assessment team may use an internal reference matrix that presents the stakeholder mapping by WAM functional areas to populate information on the current baseline during the baseline assessment exercise (see Section 4.4.6).

35 The maturity categories draw on and are adapted from the Counter-IED Capability Maturity Model, as initially released as the UNIDIR Counter-IED Capability Maturity Model and Self-Assessment Tool. It can be accessed here: https://unidir.org/publication/counter-ied-capability-maturity-model-and-self-assessment-tool.

BOX 4: Tip on assessing institutional processes, capacities, and practices

As a guiding reference, the maturity of institutional processes, capacities and practices may be assessed and understood by assessors in three general categories:[35]

- **Initial:** Processes and practices range from ad hoc to basic management structures, and capacities to implement WAM may be limited or restricted in some or many functional areas.
- **Defined:** WAM processes and practices are established and codified, and institutional capacities are mature enough to adequately implement WAM functions.
- **Managed:** WAM processes and practices are well established and defined, and institutional capacities are optimized to effectively implement the full life cycle of WAM.

These categories are simply an internal reference tool for assessors. The categories do not seek to grade States and their institutional capacities; rather, they are intended to provide an indication and support the assessors in their effort to target the focus of their assessment appropriately on the national and local context as well as needs.

BOX 5: Tip on scope of assessment and time management

Due to time and resource limitation or access restrictions, it may not be always possible for the assessment team to conduct a detailed assessment of institutional capacities and practices for each WAM functional area. In other words, the scope may change or need to be adjusted during a baseline assessment in a country. In such a circumstance, communication with the national WAM lead entity is important, and the assessment should be characterized and presented as an initial assessment of the institutional capacities and practices. As such, and in anticipating such a scenario, planners should carefully consider the total time and resources available for the baseline assessment as part of the planning and design phase.

4.2.3. Identification of WAM needs and challenges

Based on the baseline of current institutional capacities and practices, the subsequent step of the assessment is to collectively identify the challenges and needs faced by national stakeholders in their effort to effectively implement their mandates and tasks on WAM. The assessment team should conduct this process in a participatory and consultative manner, whereby challenges and priority needs are clearly identified and defined by WAM functional areas and the respective national stakeholders responsible for management and implementation.

BOX 6: Tip for facilitation

The assessment team should work jointly with the designated national lead entity (see Section 4.1.1.2) in dividing roles and responsibilities in the facilitation of national consultations. To avoid, mitigate or defuse potential tensions in the identification of challenges and needs, the designated national lead authority should be prepared to provide political navigation support in the dialogue among national stakeholders. Further, to avoid a scenario whereby the identification of challenges and needs turns into a "wish list", the assessment team should be prepared to facilitate dialogue on gaining clarity in decision-making processes related to WAM activities (e.g. the authorization process pertaining to WAM activities), rather than focusing on operational capacity gaps and needs.

4.2.4. Identification of assistance needs

During the assessment of challenges and needs, the assessment team should promote an open and transparent dialogue on the types of assistance (e.g. technical, operational, expertise, financial) that may be needed to strengthen key WAM functional areas of the national framework. Such consideration should take into account what assistance may be available immediately and locally based on national budgets, as well as those types of support that may be achievable in the mid to longer term with external assistance. In this process, the assessment team may draw on relevant experience with and knowledge about the mechanisms available to facilitate international cooperation and assistance to help guide the dialogue among national stakeholders, as well as to manage their expectations.

4.2.5. Options to strengthen a national WAM framework

One of the key outputs of the baseline assessment is the identification and consolidation of consensus-driven options to support the strengthening of the national WAM framework, which forms a critical component of the national WAM road map (see Section 4.2.6). These options are generated based on the baseline of institutional capacities and practices and related challenges and needs, as identified by the national stakeholders. Each of the options is discussed, adjusted where needed, and validated by participating national stakeholders as part of the baseline assessment.

The assessment team should consider several factors in the identification and consolidation of options for enhancement. Options for the host Government to strengthen its national WAM framework should be:

SPECIFIC

(i.e. aim to strengthen a key WAM functional area process, capacity, practice or procedure)

MEASURABLE

(e.g. quantifiable at a higher and lower unit level of analysis to inform national WAM baseline assessment follow-on activities)

ORIENTED TOWARDS FUTURE RESULTS

(i.e. aim to strengthen a key WAM functional area process, capacity, practice or procedure)

REALISTIC AND ACHIEVABLE BY THE RELEVANT NATIONAL AUTHORITIES

(with the support of assistance providers, where present), thereby taking into account the national, regional, subregional and international environment, developments and priorities

4.2.6. Drafting of a road map to strengthen a national WAM framework

The end result of a national WAM baseline assessment, and the starting point for follow-up activities to strengthen WAM, is the development of a national road map on WAM. Such a road map is presented in the form of a report and includes:

Current status of WAM institutional capacities and processes.

WAM enhancement opportunities.

Options for implementation by key WAM functional areas, organized by prioritization over a time frame and actor-specific attribution of WAM roles and responsibilities. The articulation of options may include international WAM support and assistance providers.

The draft road map is jointly presented by the designated national lead authority and the assessment team to a high authority in the host State (e.g. Minister of Interior or Defence, National Security Adviser, Office of the Prime Minister), which then constitutes the adoption through appropriate means of the national road map to strengthen WAM.

Annex III includes a template for the creation of a road map document.

BOX 7: Tip for contextualizing the national WAM road map

At the strategic level, in some baseline assessments, the national WAM road map has been used by national authorities to review their national security strategies and, in some select cases, to develop a dedicated national WAM strategy. In some baseline assessments, the national WAM road map has also been used to inform and support the establishment of a dedicated national WAM coordinating mechanism and national lead entity. In another case, a national WAM road map has informed the development of a dedicated national policy for ammunition management. In select cases, national WAM road maps have also informed United Nations partial arms embargo regime implementation, reporting and benchmarking processes. At the operational level, several States have used national WAM road maps to inform the development or revision of national actions plans on SALW. Several States have also used national WAM baseline assessments and road maps to inform the development, revision or adoption of specific (written) operational procedures.

4.3. ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS

4.3.1. Specific considerations related to security

Processes related to security and accountability of weapons and ammunition primarily focus on preventing diversion into the hands of unauthorized recipients or unauthorized end users. Security and accountability considerations apply throughout the supply chain of weapons and ammunition, whether in storage, in possession or during their movement. Planners and assessors should ensure that the WAM baseline assessment captures decision-making process that inform the maturity of accountability systems in place to manage weapons and ammunition, as well as operational practices that physically secure and account for weapons and ammunition and their movements.

4.3.2. Specific considerations related to safety

Safety considerations apply primarily to ammunition and explosives due to their incendiary and explosive nature. This methodology recognizes and acknowledges the distinctive nature, threats and risks posed by ammunition and explosives, including as a result of poor handling, management or storage, and transport practices that may result in accidental or unplanned explosions. In this regard, planners and assessors should pay particular and specialized attention during the baseline assessment to WAM policies and practices relating to the safe and secure management of ammunition. Assessors should ensure that the baseline assessment captures decision-making processes that inform the maturity of safety systems in place to manage ammunition, as well as operational practices that enable safe handling, transport, storage and disposal of ammunition. Planners should ensure that the assessment team includes ammunition technical officers or an equivalent.

BOX 8: Tip for planners on ammunition technical personnel as part of assessment team

Where possible, planners should identify and integrate ammunition technical personnel as part of the assessment team, preferably those who are nationally qualified and certified to manage conventional ammunition or those who have been rostered through the technical validation exercise under the United Nations SaferGuard programme, or similar regionally led programme.

4.3.3. Relevant international standards and guidelines providing the point of reference to the methodology

The baseline assessment methodology draws from, and aligns with, relevant international standards and technical guidelines, in particular the voluntary, practical MOSAIC[36] and the IATG,[37] as well as complementary guidance documents.[38] The methodology does so by drawing on the guidance available and formulating it in the form of guiding questions that provide the basis of national consultations during the baseline assessment.

In turn, the recommendations for WAM enhancement identified as a result of the baseline assessment are guided by elements from these international guidelines and standards. Further, through this process, the WAM baseline assessment methodology can help raise awareness of these guidelines, and in some circumstances, inform and support the practical application and domestication of MOSAIC and the IATG in a national context. This integrated approach can also contribute to sharing of experiences and lessons learned in the application of these guidelines in different national contexts and inform discussions pertaining to relevant review mechanisms applicable to MOSAIC and the IATG as appropriate.

36 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC)", www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/mosaic.

37 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, "International Ammunition Technical Guidelines", www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG.

38 See, for example, guidance developed under the United Nations SaferGuard programme, such as the IATG implementation support guides, https://unsaferguard.org; see also Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, "4.10: Disarmament" and "4.11: Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management", www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/level-4.

4.4. PRACTICAL PRE-ASSESSMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

4.4.1 Expression of interest by the host Government

To achieve its objectives and intended outcomes, it is critical that a national WAM baseline assessment process is nationally owned and led. Where a national WAM baseline assessment is designed, planned and implemented with external support, a clear expression of interest by a national lead authority or a representative of the host Government is the first step for initiating the planning and organization of a national WAM baseline assessment. The format of the expression of interest may vary among States but often includes a request in the form of an official letter or other means of communication among the parties to be involved in the assessment. The second step – following the expression of interest, but prior to an agreement to engage – involves a discussion on the terms of reference, proposed programme of work (see Annex I), and the reference methodology for the WAM baseline assessment among the key stakeholders involved in the planning and design of the assessment. If a State seeks assistance from an external entity in jointly undertaking a baseline assessment, the steps described above are discussed and considered between the requesting State and the entity providing the support (e.g. between the designated national lead authority and the lead planner from the entity providing assistance).

4.4.2. Preparation mission and meetings with stakeholders in the country

Unless there is a presence by the co-organizing entity in the country where the baseline assessment is being planned, planners should undertake a preparatory mission to the country. During the preparatory visit, planners should undertake meetings with the designated national lead authority and with the wider range of stakeholders (see Section 4.1) to further strengthen national ownership, identify synergies, and ensure efficient, effective joint substantive and logistical planning and preparations. During this visit, planners should have a detailed discussion of the agreed programme of work of the national WAM baseline assessment and carry out awareness-raising and sensitization with the high-level national authorities, together with the designated national lead authority, to facilitate buy-in and participation from all relevant national stakeholders and partners. Planners should also discuss administrative and logistical aspects (e.g. venue, catering) as well as possible operational site visits. Such a preparatory mission and on-site meeting go hand in hand with a number of remote meetings to prepare for a national WAM baseline assessment.

BOX 9: Tip for remote preparatory "missions" (preparatory virtual meetings)

In situations where in-country preparatory missions are not possible due to travel or access restrictions, planners may consider a remote preparatory virtual meeting. Such a virtual preparatory "mission" should not necessarily result in a change of items to be covered by the planners and the host State (as described in Section 4.4.2). However, planners should consider both time and access limitations that national stakeholders may face in terms of participation in virtual settings. In particular, planners should keep in mind that not all national stakeholders will have stable and regular network access, which may be restricted due to security or a lack of the necessary network infrastructure at the national level. An ineffective preparatory process, either through lack of participation or challenges related to connectivity, may impact the implementation of the baseline assessment. Planners should consult the designated national lead authority on how to design a virtual session that would enable meaningful participation by the target stakeholders. Other partners may then also be consulted on the design and conduct of a remote, virtual preparatory mission.

4.4.3. Consideration pertaining to the use of information and the report

The information and knowledge generated and collected during the baseline assessment, as well as the resulting report (i.e. road map), is owned by the designated national lead authority. Planners should discuss and agree with the designated national lead authority on the use, including restrictions and limitations pertaining to the confidentiality of the information to be generated and used in the report, prior to implementing the baseline assessment. Planners should ensure that discussions with national authorities clarify the type of substantive information that can and cannot be generated and analysed by a baseline assessment to manage expectations (see Section 4.2.1). At an early planning stage, the designated national lead authority, representing the host Government, should be presented with reporting options and modalities (see Section 6), in addition to ideas, opportunities or concrete options on how to subsequently use a WAM baseline assessment report, including to support international cooperation and assistance.

4.4.4. Composition of an assessment team

An assessment team should represent various skill sets and experiences that facilitate the effective implementation of baseline assessments. A multisectoral, diverse assessment team is encouraged, taking into account the political, technical and process-related expertise needed to facilitate dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders at the national level. While composition and types of experts may vary from one context to another, an assessment team often includes the following functions:

- **Team lead,** who assumes political roles and leads on strategic planning and implementation of the assessment
- **National and/or regional expert,** who has strong knowledge of the local armed violence or conflict dynamics
- **SME(s)** on arms and ammunition management, including ammunition technical personnel
- **SME** on broader processes, such as peacebuilding, SSR, DDR and gender
- **Operational coordinator,** who facilitates the operational preparation (including logistics) of the baseline assessment
- **Rapporteur,** who produces the report of the baseline assessment

An individual may assume one or more of these functions. Planners should consider several points regarding the composition of the assessment team:

TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL OWNERSHIP.

A national representative or expert should be part of the assessment team. This may be achieved by integrating a representative from the designated national lead authority into the assessment team.

DIVERSITY IS ESSENTIAL.

Planners should ensure as part of team composition that gender balance and gender expertise, geographical representations, and language requirements are considered and integrated into the team.

ENSURE SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTISE.

Planners should ensure that there is subject matter expertise on the safety and security aspects of WAM. This is not limited to safe ammunition management but might also include broader WAM expertise, such as transfer controls, as well as profiling and tracing of weapons and ammunition, which are unique expertise and skill sets.

ENSURE POLITICAL AND POLICY EXPERTISE.

Planners should ensure that the team includes an individual (or several people) who can provide political and policy advice to the team and to the national authorities on WAM-related processes.

These factors and expertise all contribute to meaningful dialogue during the baseline assessment on a range of different issues at strategic and operational levels. All team members should (i) demonstrate awareness and sensitivity to local contexts and (ii) have experience in addressing these appropriately. Additionally, planners could consider team members' field experience, team dynamics, commitments and working methods as part of team composition considerations.

4.4.5. Pre-assessment desk research and information collection

The assessment team should conduct extensive desk research and an information collection exercise on WAM from relevant sources as part of the substantive planning and design phase prior to the baseline assessment in the country. Sources may range from primary data, such as national reports submitted by the host Government in the implementation of relevant international and regional instruments (see Section 3.2)[39] or existing baselines established in specific WAM functional areas, to secondary data such as research papers and analysis conducted by external entities on WAM relevant to the country. Such desk research should aim to cover information pertaining to the security situation, the status of the State's participation in relevant international and regional instruments, as well as the implementation of life cycle management of arms and ammunition. Desk research should also include the collection of information on the gendered impact of arms and ammunition in the country, as well as gender-sensitive national policy and practice relevant to WAM. Additionally, the assessment team may request support from the designated national lead authority for relevant national documents (e.g. national legislation, regulations, standard operating procedures) that can be provided in confidence, so that the assessment team can study and familiarize itself with the available content prior to the national WAM baseline assessment. Planners should designate an internal lead on desk research to facilitate information collection efforts for the assessment team.

39 National reports that are submitted to show the implementation of international instruments can provide a valuable source of information – a starting point – for the development of an initial country profile in preparation for a WAM baseline assessment.

Based on the information collected, a designated member of the assessment team should compile an internal background paper for the entire assessment team. This internal paper can also be a useful basis for the preparation of the report following the conclusion of the baseline assessment (see Section 7, as well as Annex IV explanatory Box 27 for a possible outline of the internal background paper).

4.4.6. Mapping of stakeholders, existing initiatives and activities

The assessment team should conduct advance mapping of national, regional, subregional and international WAM stakeholders in the country where the baseline assessment will take place. Such a stakeholder mapping should include the stakeholders' levels of involvement and placement relevant to WAM in the country (e.g. strategic, operational, tactical); their capacities; and the type of operations, programmes, projects and related activities they conduct. These should be categorized by the WAM functional areas predefined and determined together with the designated national lead authority. Where possible, the assessment team should also seek information on upcoming initiatives planned by national and other relevant stakeholders. This information should be integrated into the internal background paper in the form of a matrix table by WAM functional area.

4.4.7. Timing of assessment

The timing of a national WAM baseline assessment is important. To optimize the impact of a national WAM baseline assessment, it could be conducted in relation to (in no particular order):

- One or several relevant national events (e.g. the development or adoption of security transition plans, or post-offensive operations against adversaries to regain territories)
- Relevant requirements, including reporting requirements of a State or of a supporting United Nations mission or other United Nations entity (e.g. panels or groups of experts)
- Relevant review processes of UNSC committees (e.g. partial arms embargo regime measures, WAM or related measures), where applicable
- Review processes of international instruments, and regional or subregional road maps and actions plans, depending on the context

At the same time and importantly, political developments at the national level, such as electoral periods, should be taken into account to avoid timing that would distract the focus and attention of stakeholders away from the assessment.

4.4.8. Modalities and format of dialogue during the baseline assessment

A national WAM baseline assessment takes the form of a series of national consultative meetings at the national level. The assessment is designed to be conducted over five working days, although its duration will vary depending on the scope of the assessment as designed and agreed with the host State. The national consultative meetings are organized in a sequence, targeting various national and international stakeholders operating at different levels of governance at the national level. Generally, the consultative meetings are organized in the following flow:



The high-level consultative sessions that take place during a national WAM baseline assessment are formal events and require the necessary preparations and protocol in coordination with relevant ministries and offices within the host Government. The high-level segments are chaired by high-level national authorities to ensure full national ownership and visibility of the baseline assessment process. Planners should coordinate and design this segment in close consultation with, and under the advice of, the designated national lead authority to observe appropriate protocols.

BOX 10: Tip for planners on high-level segment planning

Planning and implementing the high-level segment of the baseline assessment requires appropriate and dedicated time by the assessment team. This includes obtaining buy-in from relevant ministries and offices of the host Government ahead of the baseline assessment to facilitate participation by authorities in the high-level segment. On a practical level, planners should exercise flexibility in the schedule of activities during the high-level segment of the baseline assessment, as there may be unexpected schedule changes or delays involving high-level authorities. That said, the high-level segments are critical in the access and sustainability of the baseline assessment, as well as in the follow-through implementation of the options identified to enhance measures at the national level. Planners are strongly encouraged to integrate and plan this segment early in the planning and design phase, together with the designated national lead authority, including as part of the pre-assessment preparatory mission in the country.

The technical consultation sessions are conducted under the Chatham House rule (i.e. participants are free to use information processed during and generated by the national consultative process, but neither the identities nor the affiliation of the speakers, nor that of any other participant, is to be revealed or attributed). The Chatham House rule seeks to facilitate active dialogue among participants. The technical sessions are often co-chaired between the designated national lead authority and the assessment team to facilitate interactive dialogue among the participants on substantive aspects of WAM. The assessment team may rotate and designate co-facilitation roles to different members of the team based on the WAM functional area being assessed to maximize the member's technical expertise and experience.

To ensure effective implementation of the baseline assessment, planners should ensure that all members of the assessment team are involved in the substantive preparation for the baseline assessments, including to engage in preparatory dialogue with the designated national lead authority on the above process.

BOX 11: Tips for assessors during the technical consultative sessions

Facilitating dialogue to assess relevant WAM functional areas within the allocated time in the programme of work can be a challenge for the assessment team. If not carefully managed, there may be a risk that some WAM functional areas will be assessed in more depth than others. In some cases, not all 10 key functional areas may be covered due to time constraints. Planners should ensure that time management is factored in as part of the design and planning of the technical sessions of the baseline assessment, in particular in relation to the scope of the assessment as agreed with the designated lead authority.

One good practice example includes identifying three to four key priority WAM functional areas with the host State in the design phase to ensure that the assessment, at a minimum, adequately covers those areas during the exercise (with other functional areas being briefly covered during the assessment or through a dedicated follow-on assessment). Another good practice example is to encourage the assessment team to use the time available outside of the consultative sessions to engage with national stakeholders, such as during lunch and tea breaks.

Such efforts not only strengthen informal networking and trust among participants but also, at times, facilitate follow-on informal discussions to fill information gaps on functional areas covered during the baseline assessment. Keep in mind, however, that informal discussions should not replace the scheduled consultative dialogues with national stakeholders, which are inclusive and participatory by design.

4.4.9. Considerations pertaining to possible site visits

Depending on the context of the baseline assessment, the assessment team may determine that supplementary assessments in the form of site visits may be needed to better inform the assessment, including improving the assessment team's situational awareness of the national practices pertaining to WAM. Recalling that this methodology is not designed to facilitate a technical assessment at the tactical levels, such site visits should be characterized as initial, selective and informative, rather than detailed, comprehensive and definitive, in informing the technical capabilities of stakeholders at the tactical level.

As part of this planning, planners should consider a number of factors:

- Access to sites can only be granted by the host State. Thus, the assessment team should consult the designated national lead authority early in the planning about the possibility of conducting site visits.
- The assessment team, in particular SMEs on WAM, should identify and consult national authorities on the areas of WAM they seek to further assess through site visits at the planning stage. This is because access to sites is often not provided by relevant national security services on short notice.
- Sufficient time should be allocated in the overall programme of work, as a site may or may not be in proximity to the meeting venue, and secure transport to and from the site may need to be organized in advance.
- Only those who are adequately trained in the safe and secure management of arms and ammunition should participate in technical visits to storage sites due to the potential materiel hazards posed to the individuals.

Generally, if prior information exists on the tactical-level capabilities of national stakeholders on WAM resulting from other technical national assessments, the assessment team is encouraged to use such information as part of the planning and design of the baseline assessment, rather than seeking to duplicate similar exercises in the country.

Site visits vary but often include weapon storage sites, ammunition depots, weapons marking and registration sites, national ballistics laboratories, judiciary depots, weapons–technical intelligence units that recover arms and ammunition from operations or crime scenes, weapons collection sites, and destruction sites. Site visits can be an opportunity for national experts to provide the assessment team with practical insights on practices and procedures in relevant WAM functional areas. Information obtained from site visits can further inform dialogue as part of the baseline assessment and the report.

If site visits form a part of the baseline assessment, the assessment team should recognize their potential limitations, including the scope and depth of technical assessment that may be possible with the available time and resources. For example, it may be only possible to visit one or two sites during the baseline assessment. In such cases, the assessment team should refrain from drawing wider conclusions about practices at sites that go beyond the visited sites. Should strong interest exist from the host State in conducting a more thorough technical assessment of storage sites at tactical levels throughout the country, the assessment team may consider either (i) including such a recommended option for consideration by national stakeholders (as part of the draft "national road map") as follow-up activities for another specialized entity to undertake, or (ii) seeking partnering arrangements with specialized entities during the planning stages to implement such a component.

4.4.10. Summary of pre-assessment resources

Planners should prepare the following documentation when organizing a national WAM baseline assessment:

- Invitation or expression of interest letter from the host Government
- Programme of work[40] for a national WAM baseline assessment
- Detailed agenda
- Invitations and distribution lists for national and international participants
- Drafts of formal high-level opening and closing speeches
- Communication strategy and information note for possible media requests and coverage
- Guiding questions for the high-level segment of the national consultations
- Monitoring and evaluation documents and tools (e.g. feedback questionnaires)

These documents should be shared and jointly reviewed with the host State through the designated national lead authority.

Additionally, planners should prepare the following internal documents in support of the substantive preparation of the assessment:

- A background paper produced by and for the WAM assessment team.
- A mapping of stakeholders by WAM functional area (e.g. a matrix table), which is to be used by the assessment team during the assessment.
- A series of reference technical guiding questions, organized by WAM functional area, to be used by the assessment team internally to orient and facilitate dialogue during the technical consultative sessions (see Module 3, Section 5). Guiding questions may need to be adjusted depending on context and substantive focus priorities, as identified by national stakeholders during the planning mission.

Planners should also help prepare, together with national and relevant international stakeholders, the following presentations for use during the assessment:

- Generic national WAM baseline assessment introductory presentation
- Presentation on international, regional and subregional instruments, as well as relevant technical guidelines and standards on WAM
- Presentation prepared by the national lead authority on its current national framework, including strategy and actions plan(s) for WAM
- Series of presentations prepared by national authorities on relevant WAM functional areas that help inform stakeholder mapping as well as existing institutional capacities and practices
- Presentations by participating international assistance providers on WAM assistance and cooperation
- Presentation comprising an explanation of substantive WAM functional areas
- Presentation summarizing preliminary key findings per WAM functional area and draft options to strengthen the national WAM framework, to be prepared during the baseline assessment prior to its conclusion

40 For the purposes of this methodology, the term “programme of work” is used interchangeably with the term “terms of reference”.

4.4.11. Overview of operational resource considerations

Operationalizing a WAM baseline assessment can take time. Planners should consider and factor in planning, implementation and follow-up timelines accordingly. For example, from the moment of the expression of interest by the host Government to the first day of the in-country WAM baseline assessment – depending on various factors such as political priority, security situation, operational capacity and support – a minimum period of three months should be factored in by planners. Further, planners should consider an additional one to two months for reporting and follow-up evaluations and discussions.

Planners should consider resource requirements to implement a baseline assessment at an early planning stage. While costs differ from one assessment to another, they often include the following considerations:

COSTS OF EXTERNAL SMES:

The cost of external SMEs may include travel-related costs, in addition to the cost of the SMEs' services, as appropriate.

ACCOMMODATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT TEAM:

Planners should factor into their budget the costs associated with accommodation for the assessment team. Planners should ensure that they carefully review accommodation sites that adequately meet relevant security and safety standards for the team in accordance with local and organizational requirements.

CATERING SERVICES:

As part of the in-country consultative meetings, planners may consider and budget for catering service for the participants for the duration of the baseline assessment.

TRAVEL-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ASSESSMENT TEAM:

Planners should adequately budget for the travel-related costs of the assessment team members. Additionally, planners should review any relevant entry visa requirements in the early stages of the planning, including whether supporting letters (e.g. invitation letters) are necessary from the designated national lead authority to facilitate entry visa permits. If the baseline assessment is being conducted in situations of active armed conflict or high levels of violence, planners should exercise due diligence in ensuring safe and secure travel arrangements for the assessment team, including risk assessment and subsequent risk acceptance by the assessment team members, where appropriate.

IN-COUNTRY VENUE FOR THE CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS:

Planners should budget for venue costs associated with the baseline assessment activities. The venue should cover the duration of the baseline assessment and offer corresponding logistics (e.g. meeting-related equipment). This cost may be offered as in-kind support from the host Government or supported by an in-country partner. Planners should consider the size of the venue as part of the planning and design of the baseline assessment in consultation with the designated national lead authority.

BOX 12: Tips on in-country venue for the consultative meetings

Past baseline assessments have hosted 35–70 participants. The reservation of smaller rooms in addition to the main consultative room for the duration of the baseline assessment has proven useful in facilitating bilateral consultations.

LOCAL TRANSPORT:

If not provided as in-kind contribution by the host Government or in-country partners, planners should consider and budget for costs associated with local transport, where needed. Planners should consider any safety- and security-related local travel restrictions that may apply to the assessment team as part of the planning process. Planners should also consult the designated national lead authority if there are any local transport costs associated with national participants of the baseline assessment, and if so, to agree on how such costs may be addressed.

LANGUAGE CONSIDERATION:

Planners should take into account the working language of the host State when planning for a baseline assessment and should assemble an assessment team with language skills applicable to the local context, where possible. Should the assessment team require language support to conduct the consultative process, planners should plan and budget for interpretation services. The use of interpretation may contribute additional time to the consultation and, in some cases, may restrict the ability of assessment team members to interact with national authorities.

PUBLICATION-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS:

Planners should budget for translation of the report, where needed. At a minimum, planners should consider translation requirements covering the host States' official language and English to facilitate ease of access and dissemination to national and other interested stakeholders.

MEDIA, PRESS AND VISIBILITY:

Planners should consult the designated national lead authority on the visibility of the baseline assessment at the national level, including engagement with the media and the press. Practical considerations may include preparation of joint press statements, media interviews and engagements (including radio or television), as well as visibility products (e.g. banners). Planners should consider and budget for associated costs, should such visibility activities not be provided as in-kind contribution by the host Government or in-country partners.



MODULE 3:

IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING SECTIONS 5-6

5. CONDUCTING A WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT

5.1. GENERAL

WAM baseline assessments take the form of a national consultative process that facilitates dialogue and decision-making among all relevant national security stakeholders on WAM and related security issues (see Section 3.3). During the baseline assessment, assessors should seek to facilitate dialogue among participants to generate information on actors, policies, processes and practices relevant to each WAM functional area, thereby identifying:

- The current status of actors and their WAM policy and practice
- Areas for enhancement
- Options to support implementation to achieve improvements

Under each functional area to be assessed, the assessors should seek to address the general guiding questions below, in addition to specific thematic questions relevant to each WAM functional area. These questions are not exhaustive; rather, they seek to provide assessors with basic reference material for assessing each functional area of WAM.

BOX 13: GENERAL GUIDING QUESTIONS

- What is the current (de facto) status of this WAM functional area?
- Which national actors are involved? Which national entity is leading this WAM functional area? Where applicable, what decision-making and authorization processes are relevant to this WAM functional area?
- Which mechanisms, procedures and practices are currently working to design, implement and evaluate this functional area? What good practices and procedures can be identified from current practices? Were particular lessons learned from past interventions?
- Are the current policies and practices applicable to this WAM functional area efficient? Are there potential gaps in actors, processes, procedures or practices? What are the primary challenges (policy, operational, technical, financial, etc.) associated with this WAM functional area?
- What are the (short-, medium- and long-term) priority needs and areas for enhancement for this functional area?
- What type of external support or assistance has been received to support design and implementation? What type of national or external support or assistance is currently available? What additional support may be needed for this WAM functional area?
- Which national actors should be involved (more or in addition)? If identified and needed, which external stakeholders should be involved? Which partnerships are to be fostered or developed?

The following subsections provide a brief description of each WAM functional area to be assessed, what information the assessors seek to gather during the consultations, and guiding questions to help assessors in facilitating dialogue with national stakeholders to generate baseline information on WAM policy and practice.

Under each WAM functional area, the assessors should seek to identify:

- Stakeholders relevant to WAM, and their respective roles, responsibilities and functions
- Decision-making processes on WAM (including what decisions, how decisions are made, and by whom) and the extent of their maturity level (i.e. initial, defined or managed), referred to in this method as "top-down validation"
- Implementation processes, and the extent of their maturity levels, that detail how implementing entities carry out those decisions or make a request to gain authorizations to implement WAM activities, referred to in this method as "bottom-up validation"

This approach enables assessors to cross-validate WAM actors, processes and practices at the national level.

The guiding questions presented under each WAM functional area may be subject to modifications and adaption to a specific national context by the assessment team, taking into account the preparatory research (see Section 4) and depending on the design of the baseline assessment as agreed with the host Government prior to deployment. **Where specific guiding questions under different WAM functional areas are related or linked, assessors should ensure that such links are considered.** The guiding questions presented in the following subsections should be considered by assessors as an initial entry point for consultations to foster deeper dialogue, rather than being understood as a checklist exercise.

Maturity of WAM policy and practice at the national level among States participating in the baseline assessment may vary considerably. As such, the relevance of the guiding questions across the 10 WAM functional areas may also vary. Assessors should take this into account when conducting consultations and, where necessary, adjust and adapt the relevant guiding questions to best reflect the local context.

5.2. NATIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISM

A national coordination mechanism on WAM ensures that all relevant parts of the government work together with national, regional and international partners to conceive, direct, monitor and evaluate the safe, secure and accountable practice of WAM. Establishing and implementing effective life cycle WAM and related control measures requires cooperation and coordination among a wide range of actors at different levels. Therefore, relevant international and regional instruments and guidelines recommend that there is a designated or established government entity to take the lead in providing overall policy direction and coordination for national WAM-related efforts. This can include the development, adoption and implementation of a national WAM strategy and/or specific national action plans. A coordinating body or mechanism may be known as the national coordinating authority or mechanism.[41] National coordination is needed for, and applicable to, all WAM functional areas.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain a better understanding of:

- The general mandate and role of the designated national authorities responsible for the coordination of weapons and/or ammunition management at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
- The general roles and responsibilities of national focal points on weapons and ammunition management across their life cycle at the strategic and operational levels
- The roles, composition and functions of coordinating bodies and mechanisms, including working groups, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
- Any differences in the coordinating mandate, roles, actors and functions between the management of arms and the management of ammunition
- The maturity levels (initial, defined or managed) of existing national coordinating bodies and mechanisms to implement their respective WAM roles, responsibilities and functions

5.2.1. Key guiding questions

- *Is there a national coordinating mechanism that oversees WAM policies and activities at the strategic level? If yes, which entities are represented? How often do they meet? Is national coordination on WAM centralized or decentralized? Is there a national lead entity providing overall WAM policy direction? Are there different national coordination entities for weapons management and ammunition management, or are they together under one coordination entity? Are the same entities responsible for coordination at the operational level?*
- *What are the main duties and responsibilities of the national coordinating mechanism at the strategic level? Is there a dedicated national strategy on WAM, or is WAM embedded within a broader national security strategy? Is there an existing national road map or equivalent to support the implementation of the national WAM strategy? Is there a dedicated national action plan in place to operationalize WAM activities? Where strategies and action plans exist, are they specific to arms or ammunition, or do they cover both types of materiel?*

41 In many States, these coordinating bodies are known as National Commissions on SALW. There are variations in the scope of work of such Commissions. Some Commissions strictly cover issues pertaining to illicit SALW, while others cover SALW held by both national security services and civilians. Recently, some Commissions have revised and expanded their mandates to cover issues pertaining to heavier categories of conventional weapons and to conventional ammunition. See also MOSAIC, "3.40: National Coordinating Mechanisms on Small Arms and Light Weapons Control", 2014, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-03.40-2014EV1.0.pdf.

- *Are there other or dedicated national WAM coordinating mechanisms at the operational and tactical levels? If so, which entities are represented? At what frequency do they meet? Which entities lead such mechanisms at the operational and tactical levels? What is their relationship, including decision-making and information-sharing, with national coordinating mechanisms at the strategic level?*
- *What are the scope and depth of the mandates of the national entities dealing with WAM issues? Are they formal or informal? How are these entities resourced to carry out their respective WAM-relevant mandates?*
- *How do different national entities working on WAM coordinate and communicate with each other? Are there informal or formal channels of communication and information exchange?*
- *What roles do national entities play in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of WAM activities? Is this monitoring and evaluation centralized or decentralized? How often are WAM-related policies and activities assessed for their effectiveness and impact at the national level? Which national entities lead on such an internal monitoring and evaluation process?*
- *Which national authority or authorities act as designated focal points in participating under relevant international, regional and subregional instruments related to conventional arms control? Are there different national focal points for arms and ammunition? How do these national authorities coordinate, collaborate and share information for reporting purposes and requirements? Is there a set of domestic legal or procedural instructions in place for implementing multilateral and regional reporting commitments?*
- *Where applicable, how do national entities coordinate and share information on the implementation of an arms embargo? Is there a national authority that is a designated focal point to oversee the implementation of an arms embargo?*
- *Is there a designated national focal point specific to gender aspects of WAM? How does the national coordination mechanism account for and enhance the active participation of women in WAM activities?*

BOX 14: Tips on facilitating an assessment of the national coordination mechanism

- ✓ When assessing the structure and maturity of a national coordinating mechanism, consider requesting from the host Government a copy of relevant legislative or related documentation that presents the mandate, structure and functions of the coordinating body at the national level. Where possible, inquire if the host Government has an organization chart pertaining to WAM at the strategic level.
- ✓ Consider organizing the dialogue around governance levels to obtain clarity on coordinating structures and actors at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Pay particular attention to the placement of national coordination bodies in the governance structures (e.g. within a ministry, inter-ministerially) as well as the level at which they operate (e.g. strategic level, operational level).
- ✓ Inquire whether the coordination of arms and ammunition management activities are undertaken under a single national coordinating mechanism or whether coordination on ammunition is managed separately from arms.

5.3. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

The national normative, including legal and regulatory frameworks applicable in the country and within the jurisdiction of the State, in the form of national laws, decrees, regulations and/or administrative documents, form the basis of the national WAM governance structure and guide their implementation. These national frameworks may be additionally guided by relevant international and regional instruments to which the State is a party or a participant. In cases where the State is a party to a legally binding instrument, the State is responsible for domesticating those international and regional commitments into its national framework governing weapons and ammunition. Ensuring that multilateral obligations and commitments are domesticated and codified in relevant national legislation and regulations systematically and in a sufficiently uniform, harmonized and logical manner is fundamental to enabling the operationalization of WAM by the relevant national authorities in the country.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A basic overview of the existing national legal and other normative frameworks applicable to the governance, regulation and management of arms and ammunition throughout their life cycle
- An overview of regulations, and their maturity levels, applicable to access, ownership and possession of arms, ammunition and related parts and components, including the scope, the actors they apply to, related licensing processes, and any prohibitions, exceptions and exemptions within relevant national legal frameworks
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of the existing national legal framework

This section provides guiding questions relevant to obtaining a general overview of existing national frameworks. This methodology is not designed to facilitate an in-depth legal review and analysis of a national legal framework applicable to arms and/or ammunition controls. Rather, it seeks to obtain an overview of the existing applicable laws and regulations that govern arms and/or ammunition, which can inform dialogue around potential gaps and vulnerabilities in the legal and regulatory framework at the national level. Regulatory frameworks and administrative instructions applicable to specific WAM functional areas are covered in the subsections that follow.

5.3.1. Key guiding questions

- *Are there national laws and regulations in place to govern weapons and ammunition in your country? Does the law cover both arms and ammunition, or are there dedicated laws and regulations governing arms and ammunition separately? What is the scope of the law in terms of the life cycle of weapons and ammunition? Who is the law applicable to (i.e. who are the legal weapons holders in the country)? Are there any actors or categories/types of weapons and/or ammunition exempt from this law? To whom does the exemption apply?*
- *Is any legislative review process currently being undertaken (e.g. development or review of existing laws, or harmonization of domestic legal framework with international or regional instruments, where applicable)? If yes, who is the leading authority and what is the current status of the review process? How is the review of relevant laws expected to change the way that arms and/or ammunition are regulated and managed domestically?*
- *What are the differences in the national law and regulations for State-held and civilian-held weapons? Do these different regulatory frameworks define scopes and set different constraints and levels of applicability? For example, how do they define weapon and ammunition categories and types permissible for different users and for different uses?*

- *What legal requirements of the national law, regulations and provisions apply to State-owned weapons and ammunition (i.e. held by State security and defence services and agencies)? What is the scope of their application (e.g. in what functional areas do they apply)? Which authority has overall responsibility for authorizations and licences applicable to the access of arms and ammunition by State security forces and services? Are requirements from national law, regulations and provisions applicable to State-held weapons and ammunition codified in domestic procedures (e.g. standard operational procedures) or internal guidelines on the management of these weapons and/or ammunition?*
- *What requirements of the national law, regulations and provision apply to weapons and ammunition held by civilians? What is the scope of their application? What activities (e.g. production, acquisition, storage, use, sales) do they apply to? Are there relevant laws and regulations that apply to the control of arms and/or ammunition to private security companies? Are there relevant laws that regulate craft and artisanal production by civilians?*
- *Which national authority has overall responsibility for the authorization and licensing of civilian access to arms and/or ammunition? What types of preconditions exist to regulate the acquisition and possession of arms and ammunition by civilians? Are there established assessment criteria and categories applicable to the licensing of arms and ammunition to civilians? Are there any exceptions or exemptions?*
- *What types of capacities do the responsible national authorities have in upholding the relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks applicable to arms and/or ammunition? What type of penalties and enforcement mechanisms exist to address violations of relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks?*
- *Are there other relevant policy frameworks (apart from national law, regulation and administrative instructions) that help govern arms and/or ammunition at the national level (e.g. national policy on ammunition)? If so, what WAM-related areas do they relate to, and what is their scope of application?*

BOX 15: Tips on facilitating an assessment of the legal and regulatory framework at national level

- ✓ Assess whether and how regulatory frameworks apply to arms and ammunition held by both the national security forces and civilians (including private security companies where relevant).
- ✓ Pay particular attention to gaining clarity on how national laws, regulation and procedures govern the acquisition, possession and use of arms and ammunition by national security forces and by civilians. Make sure to inquire about any exceptions and exemptions that may apply, and to whom. Also assess whether these rules and regulations differ for different types of weapons and ammunition.
- ✓ Assess whether there are dedicated laws, regulations and procedures that apply specifically to conventional ammunition and explosives. Inquire whether relevant safety regulations exist for the control and management of conventional ammunition at the national level.
- ✓ Assess the institutional capacities of national stakeholders to apply the existing national laws and related procedures, including enforcement measures in incidents of violations. Examples of how this could be better understood include inquiring about existing activities pertaining to licensing processes (e.g. number of licences issued to civilians in the past years), as well as enforcement (e.g. number of violations documented and any information pertaining to prosecutions of individuals who have committed violations).

5.4. TRANSFER CONTROLS

Effective national controls over international transfers (including, as and where applicable, exports, imports, retransfers, transit and trans-shipment, as well as brokering) of weapons, ammunition and related materiel are necessary to prevent excessive, destabilizing and illicit transfers, which can pose substantive risks and a serious threat to peace and security. Illicit transfers can fuel or prolong conflicts, violent crime and instability; undermine sustainable development; and cause grave abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law.[42] Existing international, regional and subregional instruments and guidelines require that laws, regulations and administrative procedures for transfer controls are in place at the national level. National controls over transfers of arms, ammunition and related materiel must be effectively designed and implemented to minimize the risk of their diversion.[43]

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A better understanding of existing national law and regulations that control the international transfers of arms and ammunition, including their import, export, transit, trans-shipment and brokering
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, national management policies, procedures and practices applicable to the transfer chain, including assessment of transfer requests, authorization processes, recordkeeping, and relevant controls at post-delivery stages
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, national management policies and practices relating to enforcement, international cooperation and assistance, and transparency relevant to the international transfer of arms and ammunition
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national management policies and practices on international arms transfers

The guiding questions in this section focus primarily on the regulation of imports into the national territory of States that engage in international trade and international transfers (i.e. States that perform primarily importing functions). If a national WAM baseline assessment is taking place in a State performing primarily exporting or other functions (e.g. transit), depending on the substantive design agreed with the host Government prior to the assessment, the assessment team should modify and amend these guiding questions accordingly, also taking into account preparatory research.

42 See MOSAIC, "03.20: National Controls over the International Transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons", 2014, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-03.20-2014EV1.0.pdf; see also IATG, "03.30: International Transfer of Ammunition Module", 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-03.30-International-Transfer-Module-V.2.pdf.

43 See B. Wood and P. Holtom, The Arms Trade Treaty: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms, UNIDIR, Issue Brief No. 2, 2020, https://unidir.org/publication/arms-trade-treaty-measures-prevent-detect-address-and-eradicate-diversion-conventional.

5.4.1. Key guiding questions

General

- *Is there a national law or regulation that governs the international transfer of arms and ammunition? Is there a national control list defining which weapons and ammunition categories and items are subject to international transfer controls (including export, import, retransfer, transit, trans-shipment and brokering)?*
- *Which authorities are responsible for authorizing international arms transfers? Are international arms transfers licensed on the basis of a set of criteria by which each case is judged (i.e. authorized or denied)? What are these criteria (and are they defined in national law, regulations or documented policy)? By what process are they considered? How does the decision-making process function in practice?*
- *How does the national transfer control system interact or respond to UNSC resolutions and related obligations pertaining to international arms transfers (e.g. implementation of relevant arms embargo regimes, where they exist)?*

Imports

- *Which national authorities are responsible for authorizing the import of weapons and ammunition for State agencies (i.e. State-held materiel)? Is the import authorization process centralized in one single entity or are several national authorities involved in the authorization process depending on the intended end user?*
- *Are imports of materiel used by civilians or non-governmental entities (e.g. private security companies) permitted under national law? If so, which authorities are responsible for governing the import of items for civilians?*
- *Describe the step-by-step process for import authorization. What are the detailed steps to be followed, and by whom?*
- *Describe the process involved in evaluating the materiel needs of security forces and services. For example, how is the need for weapons and ammunition evaluated? Which entity or authority evaluates and approves procurement requests for arms and ammunition? Is the process of evaluating needs and making procurement requests centralized or decentralized? If centralized, which national authority or entity is responsible for the oversight of the evaluation of needs and materiel requests? If decentralized, which national authorities and entities are responsible?*
- *What types of records are maintained on the import of weapons and ammunition? Which national entities are responsible for maintaining records of imports? Are records of imports kept in a centralized or decentralized manner?*
- *Describe the cooperation with supplying entities on end use/r documentation and the provision of information contained therein. Which national authorities are responsible for overseeing and managing the end use/r control system at the national level? Is the process of recordkeeping of end user documents centralized under one entity or decentralized involving several national authorities? How are assurances provided in end use/r documentation followed through and implemented?*
- *Once a shipment arrives, what procedures are in place at the initial reception of the imported items (e.g. verification, notification of the exporter, registration, transport)? What accountability enhancement measures are undertaken on imported materiel (e.g. recordkeeping, marking, initial storage etc.) prior to their distribution down the supply chain? Do the same procedures apply to all forms of import (e.g. gifts, grants) and types of materiel, or are there exceptions?*

Exports

- *Are there national laws, regulations, administrative procedures and related processes that govern the export of arms and ammunition? Which national authorities are responsible for overseeing and managing exports at the national level? Describe the process that regulates the export of arms and ammunition, including the decision-making process (e.g. for authorization and denial).*
- *Describe the conduct of risk assessments on exports, including assessment of the potential risk of diversion. Which national authorities are responsible for the conduct of risk assessments for exports? Are other national entities involved in the conduct of risk assessments in particular diversion risk assessments? Are there national procedures and/or guidelines that guide the process for denial of exports?*
- *What types of records are maintained on exported weapons, and which national entities are responsible for maintaining records of exports at the national level? Are these records centralized or decentralized?*
- *Are there known cases of re-exports? Are provisions and measures in place to control retransfers of arms and ammunition? If yes, please describe the national process to regulate and manage re-exports. What authority is responsible for authorizations to re-export arms and ammunition?*

Other forms of transfers

- *Are provisions and measures in place to control transit and trans-shipments of arms and ammunition at the national level? If yes, describe the relevant regulation and related procedures. Which national entities are responsible for the oversight of transit and trans-shipment?*
- *When participating in multilateral peace operations, are there dedicated national processes that govern the transfer of arms and ammunition for use in United Nations or other peace operations (e.g. the African Union)? If yes, describe the authorization process for transfers applicable to deployment in peace operations. What authority is responsible for authorizing such transfers?*
- *Are provisions and measures in place to control the brokering of arms and ammunition at the national level? If yes, please describe the relevant regulation and related procedures. Which national entities are responsible for the oversight of brokering?*

Transparency and cooperation

- *Is there a civilian oversight and accountability mechanism (e.g. by parliament) in place with respect to international transfers of arms and ammunition? How does such a civilian oversight and accountability mechanism provide checks and balances on international transfers?*
- *If applicable, did the adoption and entry into force of international instruments, such as the Arms Trade Treaty, require an adjustment of national transfer controls? If so, in which areas and which provisions or controls? How were adjustments made, and by which national entities?*
- *Are cross-border cooperation frameworks or processes in place to address the illicit trafficking and proliferation of arms and ammunition across national territories? If yes, describe the type of cooperation (e.g. border management, law enforcement, judicial cooperation) and the entities involved in the cooperation, including any other external State entities.*

BOX 16: Tips on facilitating an assessment of transfer controls

- ✓ Assess the scope and maturity of existing regulations and procedures in controlling the various aspects of transfers – from imports and exports to transit, trans-shipment and brokering.
- ✓ Focus the dialogue on aspects of transfer control that are most applicable to the State in question. For example, if the State's interaction with international trade and transfers is primarily through imports (e.g. primarily through importing functions), focus the assessment on import controls. This will facilitate dialogue on the issues that are most relevant to national entities, while managing time.
- ✓ Identify which entities are responsible for the strategic oversight and governance of transfer controls, and where needed, hold bilateral consultations with them to obtain further information on authorization processes. Where applicable, seek to obtain copies of documentation applicable to the application and authorization processes pertaining to international transfer activities.
- ✓ Identify which entities are responsible for the physical management of transferred materiel at the time of import, and where needed, hold bilateral consultations with them to obtain further information on pre-transfer or post-delivery control measures. Pay particular attention to if there are specialized control measures that apply to the initial reception and safe and secure management of conventional ammunition prior to its distribution down the supply chain.
- ✓ Pay particular attention to domestic information management relating to end user controls. Focus the dialogue on what type of transfer information is kept, by whom and for how long, as well as for what purposes that information is used domestically. This dialogue will give an indication of the maturity of recordkeeping as well as what measures are in place to prevent or mitigate the risk of diversion relating to international arms transfers.

5.5. STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT

Effective stockpile management of weapons and ammunition is an essential element of any defence and security force and their operations. It is critical for ensuring the operational readiness of defence and security forces, protecting national strategic assets, reducing the risk of diversion (including from State-owned stocks to unauthorized or unintended end users for illicit purposes), and reducing the risk of, and mitigating the effect from, unplanned explosions resulting from inadequately managed conventional ammunition stockpiles. On the other hand, effective management of stockpiles can help identify surplus or obsolete weapons and ammunition, as well as unsafe ammunition for disposal, in addition to future procurement needs and requirements. The systematic control of weapons and ammunition stockpiles is in keeping with a philosophy of "due care", which requires a proactive, rather than reactive, approach to ensuring that weapons and ammunition are adequately accounted for, secured and safely stored.[44]

This section separates assessment questions into those dealing with arms management and those directed towards ammunition management. The guiding questions provided here are targeted primarily at the strategic level, namely, to identify actors and processes responsible for the safe, secure and accountable management of stockpiles. They are not technical questions suited for conducting a technical assessment of national stockpiles at the tactical level (i.e. individual depot or unit levels), which fall beyond the scope of this assessment.

5.5.1. Weapons

Poorly managed stockpiles are an important source of weapons for the illicit market. Stockpile management of weapons is the term used to describe those procedures and activities necessary for the safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation, and handling of arms. The effective management of weapon stockpiles is, therefore, an essential element of any WAM programming, as it can reduce the risk of arms diversion (e.g. the loss and theft of weapons and thereby their illicit proliferation). It can also be used to identify obsolete or surplus weapons, as well as future procurement requirements. The primary focus of this methodology is on security of weapons stockpiles.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible and involved in the secure stockpile management of weapons, their organizations and capacities
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, security policies and practices applicable to national stockpile management, including security regulations, operating procedures, risk assessment and management processes, physical security considerations including access control, and related security plans
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national management policies and practices on the stockpile management of weapons

44 See MOSAIC, "05.20: Stockpile Management: Weapons", 2012, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.20-2012EV1.0.pdf; see also specific and relevant IATG, www.un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/guide-lines.

5.5.1.1. Key guiding questions

- *Which national security forces and services are authorized to manage (i.e. possess, store, handle and transport) weapons? Are there any exceptions?*
- *Do these entities have codified regulations and procedures relating to the safe and secure management of weapon stocks? Describe the scope of these regulations and procedures applicable to weapons stocks, and how, when, and by whom these regulations and procedures are applied. Are these regulations and procedures centralized or decentralized across security forces and services? Do the regulations and procedures apply to all weapon stockpiles?*
- *Which national entities are responsible for overseeing and monitoring the application and the review of existing security regulations and procedures that apply to State-held weapons? How often are relevant personnel of security forces and services trained on the application of existing regulations and procedures?*
- *Which national entities are responsible for conducting risk assessments of storage locations? Describe what elements are considered as part of this risk assessment. Which entities are responsible for the oversight of risk management processes, including acceptance of risks?*
- *Which national entities are responsible for conducting needs assessments relating to technical capacity, equipment and infrastructure for the storage of weapons? How often are such needs assessments conducted?*
- *What regulations and procedures exist to account for the stocks of weapons throughout the supply chain (e.g. recordkeeping, issuance and receipt)? Describe the scope of the control measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, when and by whom these regulations and procedures are applied.*
- *What regulation and procedures exist to manage the physical movement of weapons throughout the supply chain (e.g. transport, distribution control)? Describe the scope of the control measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, when and by whom these regulations and procedures are applied.*
- *What regulations and procedures exist for the identification of surplus, obsolete or unserviceable weapons? Describe the scope of the control measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, when and by whom these regulations and procedures are applied.*
- *What measures exist for the monitoring and diagnosis of weapon diversion from stockpiles? Describe relevant control measures to prevent the diversion of weapons stockpiles. Describe how, when and by whom these control measures to prevent diversion from stockpiles are applied. In the event of suspected diversion, what measures are taken and by whom?*
- *Describe the national processes involved in the training of personnel in charge of the storage of State-owned weapons. Is the function of store manager professionalized? If yes, what incentive structures are in place to maintain store managers in charge and avoid the loss of knowledge and expertise over time due to staff rotation?*
- *How is the application of existing security regulations and procedures applicable to weapons different, if at all, in remote storage locations? Are particular challenges faced by security forces in the secure storage of weapons in remote locations?*
- *What are the key challenges and needs of security forces and services to strengthen the stockpile management of weapons at the strategic, operational and tactical levels? Describe the challenges and needs in particular in the areas of authorizations, coordination and tactical resource priorities.*

BOX 17: Tips on facilitating an assessment of stockpile management (weapons)

- ✓ Obtain as much information as possible from relevant national authorities on existing regulations and procedures applicable to stockpile management prior to the in-country conduct of the WAM baseline assessment. This will enable meaningful dialogue among participants on gaps in existing processes and practices.
- ✓ Assess early in the session if there has been prior technical assessment of risks and needs pertaining to national weapons storage. This will help the assessment team determine if there is an existing baseline of storage conditions and needs at the national level, which can help orient the consultations on priorities and needs.
- ✓ Dedicate time to understanding the maturity of stockpile management processes (e.g. how existing procedures are implemented, by whom and what challenges may exist), rather than strictly focusing the dialogue on the identification of material needs (e.g. infrastructure needs).
- ✓ Pay particular attention to clarifying processes codified on paper and measures actually being undertaken in practice. This clarification is essential in accurately identifying current status and areas for enhancement. Remember that the existence of practices does not necessarily mean that those measures are codified in formal documentation in the form of a regulation, procedure or administrative instruction.
- ✓ Assessors for this session should be assigned to technical experts (e.g. weapons storage technical personnel) to ensure that appropriate security and safety elements are adequately covered during the consultations.

5.5.2. Ammunition

Stockpile management is a wide-ranging term when applied to ammunition. In addition to the security measures applicable to prevent diversion, conventional ammunition has particular, specialized safety considerations due to its explosive nature. Ammunition may deteriorate or become damaged unless it is correctly stored, handled and transported, with the resultant effect that it may fail to function as designed and may become dangerous in storage, handling, transport and use, which may result in unplanned and accidental explosion at munition sites. Safe, effective and efficient stockpile management can also enhance security as it ensures that the best "value for money" is obtained from ammunition, which is an expensive commodity in bulk. It is therefore important that national authorities adhere to basic principles and that improvements in stockpile management, where needed, are made in an integrated and graduated manner as resources become available. Effective stockpile management is as much about developing appropriate procedures, processes and systems as it is about storage and security infrastructure. Infrastructure is expensive, but significant improvements in safety and security can be made at minimal cost through system and process improvements. Changes of attitude and the development of an ethos of explosive safety can have a major impact on reducing the current high global level of undesirable explosive events within ammunition storage areas.[45]

45 Language drawn and adapted from IATG, "01.30: Policy Development and Advice", https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-01.30-Policy-Development-and-Advice-V.2.pdf.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the safe and secure stockpile management of conventional ammunition, their organizations and capacities
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, safety and security policies and practices applicable to national stockpile management of conventional ammunition focusing on
- Measures to reduce the risk of accidental explosions
- Measures to mitigate and manage effects of accidental explosions
- Measures to reduce the risk of diversion
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national management policies and practices on the stockpile management of conventional ammunition

This reference methodology and the guiding questions below are targeted for national stakeholders at the strategic and operational level in the management of conventional ammunition stockpiles, in particular in the areas of policy, regulations, procedures and operational coordination. This method does not provide detailed technical guiding questions suited for tactical-level assessments relevant at the level of each storage unit and, thus, should not be applied for assessment for such purpose.

5.5.2.1. Key guiding questions

General

- *Is there a formal management system (i.e. organizational structure, processes, procedures, and methods) for the safe and secure management of conventional ammunition at the national level? Is the system codified in written documentation? Describe the scope of the system and to whom it applies.*
- *Is there a dedicated national ammunition management policy? If yes, describe the scope of the policy and its applicability.*
- *What safety regulations exist for the safe storage of ammunition? Which national entities are responsible for overseeing and monitoring the application and the review of existing safety regulations that apply to State-held ammunition?*
- *Do safety regulations consider hazard classification codes, storage of compatibility groups, quantity distances, and net explosive quantities as per the IATG?*
- *Which national entities are responsible for the oversight and governance of conventional ammunition storage sites? Are ammunition storage management oversight responsibilities centralized or decentralized across national security forces and services? What is the level of harmonization in regulations and procedures that apply to different security forces in the safe storage of ammunition?*
- *Is there a national stock accounting system for all types of State-held conventional ammunition? Describe the scope of the national stock accounting system and how it applies to safety as well as to security measures.*
- *Is there a national ammunition surveillance system and in-service proof of ammunition safety and stability? Describe the national process for evaluating the properties, characteristics and performance capabilities of ammunition.*

- *Describe the national processes involved in the training and qualification of personnel in the field of ammunition management. Are functions relating to conventional ammunition management professionalized? If yes, what incentive structures are in place to maintain trained and qualified personnel to avoid loss of knowledge and expertise due to staff rotation?*
- *How is the application of existing safety regulations and procedures applicable to ammunition different, if at all, in remote storage locations? Are particular challenges faced by security forces in the safe storage of ammunition in remote locations?*

Reducing risks of accidental explosions

- *What current procedures with respect to risk assessments and risk acceptance are applicable to conventional ammunition storage? Are procedures in place to determine how the risk assessments should be conducted? Which authority signs off and accepts risks related to ammunition and explosives?*
- *What ammunition storage planning processes exist at the national level that help to ensure that ammunition natures in storage locations meet the necessary physical and environmental protection? Which national stakeholders are responsible for overseeing and governing such planning processes? Which national entities are involved and consulted in the planning processes?*
- *What processes exist to identify and segregate serviceable and unserviceable ammunition natures? Which national stakeholders are responsible for the oversight of this process? How does the process differentiate between ammunition that is safe to store, use and transport, and ammunition that is unsafe and unserviceable? Describe the process taken at the national level to identify and segregate serviceable ammunition from unserviceable ammunition. More specifically, describe any national processes relevant to conducting technical inspection of ammunition stocks.*
- *What procedures exist to ensure appropriate stack management of ammunition (e.g. separate ammunition by its nature within storehouses, general maintenance of store cleanliness). Which national stakeholders are responsible for overseeing and governing this process?*
- *What processes and procedures exist to ensure that ammunition is stored according to relevant hazard divisions and compatibility groups?*
- *What processes, procedures and systems exist to ensure fire prevention at ammunition stores and sites, including dedicated risk assessments, climatic protection, vegetation control, firefighting equipment, prohibited articles and related enforcement measures?*

Mitigating and managing the effects of accidental explosions

- *Is there national legislation relating to safeguarding explosive storage areas? Describe the scope and nature of safeguards applicable to ammunition storage and related processing facilities. Which national stakeholders are responsible for the governance and oversight of safeguards applicable to ammunition storage sites?*
- *Is there a national process for the licensing of explosives, including the development, maintenance and enforcement of explosive limit licences? Describe the scope of the national explosive licensing process, and which national stakeholders are responsible for the governance and oversight of that process. Describe if explosive limit licences are applied to all storage locations, and how.*

- *What national processes and procedures exist to ensure that internal and external quantity distances for ammunition storage sites are respected? Describe the process of establishing and maintaining quantity distances, including the national stakeholders responsible for their oversight and enforcement.*
- *What practical measures are used by national stakeholders to prevent prompt initiation of adjacent storage in the event of accidental explosions (e.g. use of traverses, barricades or overhead protection)?*
- *What national preparedness processes exist to identify, respond to and manage incidents of accidental explosions? Describe the scope of the national preparedness processes, as well as relevant safety response plans and capacities, including for the ammunition site and for the population and environment impacted by the accidental explosion.*

Security measures to reduce the risk of diversion

- *What national processes exist to assess security risks associated with ammunition storage sites? Describe the risk management processes applicable to the security of ammunition storage, including by identifying any relevant security plans and procedures that may exist, and identify which national stakeholders are responsible for the oversight and enforcement of such risk management processes.*
- *What national regulations and procedures exist to control the vetting of personnel and the access of individuals, goods (e.g. vehicles) and services into sites that store ammunition? Describe the measures that are required to effectively implement access control for storage sites, and which national stakeholders are responsible for the oversight and enforcement of such measures.*
- *What regulations and procedures exist to account for stocks of ammunition throughout the supply chain (e.g. recordkeeping, issuance and receipt)? Describe the key control measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, when and by whom these regulations and procedures are applied.*
- *What regulation and procedures exist to manage the physical movement of ammunition throughout the supply chain (e.g. transport, distribution control)? Describe key control measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, when and by whom these regulations and procedures are applied.*
- *What practical security measures exist to reduce risks of diversion of ammunition stocks from individual storage facilities? Describe relevant security measures used by national stakeholders that either deter or restrict perpetrators from accessing ammunition stocks (use of parameter security measures, guards, etc.). What are some of the key personnel capacity and infrastructure challenges?*
- *What existing procedures are in place for the secure storage of surplus, obsolete or unserviceable ammunition?*

BOX 18: Tips on facilitating an assessment of stockpile management (ammunution)

- ✓ Obtain as much information as possible from relevant national authorities on existing regulations and procedures applicable to the stockpile management of ammunition prior to deploying the WAM baseline assessment. This will enable meaningful dialogue among participants on gaps in existing processes and practices.
- ✓ Assess early in the session if there has been prior technical assessment of risks and needs pertaining to the storage of ammunition, including at individual storage sites and units. This will inform the assessment team if there is an existing baseline status of storage conditions and needs at the national level, which can help orient the consultations on priorities and needs.
- ✓ Dedicate time to understanding the maturity of ammunition stockpile management processes (e.g. how existing procedures are implemented, by whom and what challenges may exist), rather than strictly focusing the dialogue on the identification of material needs (e.g. infrastructure needs). It is not possible to assess storage and materiel conditions, including for individual sites, from national consultations alone. Such a technical assessment at the tactical level is outside the scope of this methodology; thus, assessors should cooperate with relevant national and international stakeholders that are responsible for carrying out tactical-level assessments to obtain a more in-depth overview of practical safety and security measures and related technical capability gaps and needs applicable to individual storage sites, where appropriate and necessitated.
- ✓ Pay particular attention to clarifying processes codified on paper and measures actually being undertaken in practice. This clarification is essential in accurately identifying current status and areas for enhancement. Remember that the existence of practices does not necessarily mean that those measures are codified in formal documentation in the form of a regulation, procedure or administrative instruction.
- ✓ Assessors for this session should be assigned to technical experts (e.g. ammunition technical personnel) to ensure that appropriate security and safety elements are adequately covered during the consultations. For additional technical guidance on ammunition management, assessors may consult the following existing guidance:[48]
  - » Critical Path Guide to the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
  - » A Guide to Developing National Standards for Ammunition Management
  - » Utilizing the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines in Conflict-Affected and Low-Capacity Environments

5.6. MARKING

Effective marking and recordkeeping systems (see Section 5.7) together build a national accounting system. National accounting systems enable competent national authorities to accurately inventory weapons and ammunition in national stockpiles, as well as to identify potential points of diversion from stocks, thereby dissuading members of the defence and security forces from diverting State-held weapons and ammunition and preventing unplanned explosions. An effective accounting system requires at least five elements:

- The weapons to be marked and uniquely identifiable
- To ensure safety and through-life traceability, ammunition to be marked using United Nations explosive hazard classification systems and codes[46]
- Weapons and ammunition to be recorded in a national registry
- Weapons and ammunition to be recorded in the local weapons and ammunition accounts of the storage facilities or units of the defence and security forces where they are held
- Any movement of weapons or ammunition – for example, between storage facilities or units – to be documented

The following section focuses on assessing policies and practices pertaining to weapons and ammunition marking.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- ☐ A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the marking of weapons and ammunition, and their organizations and capacities
- ☐ An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicable to the national marking system for weapons and ammunition, including to define (i) what items should be marked at the national level, (ii) timing of marking, (iii) methods and format of marking systems, and (iv) measures applicable to deterring and counteracting the removal or alteration of markings
- ☐ A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national marking systems, including through procurement practices or through secondary marking of weapons

This section primarily focuses on assessing policies and practices pertaining to secondary weapons markings, while for ammunition the section focuses on primary markings. In the case of conventional ammunition, the methodology acknowledges that current marking practices of explosive ammunition include unique identifiers or lot (or batch) marking, generally allowing for tracing and safe storage management. In the case of small arms ammunition, markings in the packaging may enable tracing efforts. In addition, the methodology acknowledges that some States have mature national systems to enable effective marking of small arms ammunition rounds by batches and/or lots, which support efforts to prevent diversion and illicit proliferation of ammunition.

46 See IATG, "01.50: UN Explosive Hazard Classification System and Codes", 2015, http://data.unsaferguard.org/iatg/en/IATG-01.50-Explosive-hazard-classification-system-IATG-V.3.pdf.

5.6.1. Key guiding questions

- *What legal or regulatory requirements exist at the national level to mark weapons? Is the requirement to mark weapons codified in national legislation or a related legal framework? What is the scope of the marking requirements, and to which national stakeholders do they apply? Are there any exceptions? For example, do they apply to State-held weapons and to civilian weapons? What national authority is responsible for the oversight and management of marking processes? Are the national responsibilities for marking of weapons centralized or decentralized at the strategic level? Are the responsibilities centralized or decentralized for implementing the marking of weapons at operational and tactical levels?*
- *Has a national marking format been adopted? Describe the national marking format, as well as any associated method of marking used at the national level. Is there more than one marking format or method, depending on the type of weapons or national stakeholders that the items belong to (i.e. by end users)?*
- *Is there a national marking programme to facilitate the implementation of the national marking system? If yes, describe the scope of the national marking programme. This may include elaboration of:*
  - » *To which national stakeholders the national marking programme applies (e.g. State-held weapons and/or civilian weapons)*
  - » *Items that the marking programme covers, including any unique additional security markings and if any exceptions apply to items or end users*
  - » *Any requirements or strategies applicable to when a weapon is to be marked (e.g. at the time of manufacture, import, transfer, recovery from operations, or disposal)*
  - » *Which actors are responsible for the implementation of marking programmes and for which end users*
  - » *Associated geographic scope and time frame of implementation, if the marking programme is ongoing*
- *Where applicable, describe the marking procedures that apply to marking of weapons at the time of manufacture.*
- *Describe marking procedures that apply to weapons at the time of import. In the case of imports, describe if weapons are marked at the time of import, including what additional unique markings are applied to those already marked by the original manufacturer.*
- *Describe the marking procedures that apply to marking weapons already held by national security forces and services that may not have been marked at the time of import or transfer into their possession. Which national stakeholders are responsible for designing and overseeing such marking programme activities? How are marking operations sequenced to ensure that there are no gaps in the marking of weapons already in the hands of security forces and services down the supply chain at unit levels?*
- *Describe the marking procedures that are being applied, if any, to captured weapons from operations; collected and/or surrendered weapons from voluntary collection programmes; seized or confiscated weapons; unserviceable or obsolete weapons; and deactivated weapons.*
- *What is the existing procedure in place for the marking of civilian-held weapons and ammunition? What national authority is in charge of the design, oversight and implementation of this procedure? Is this procedure centralized or decentralized across responsible national stakeholders? Are particular challenges faced in the marking of civilian-held weapons and ammunition? If yes, please describe these challenges.*

- *On a practical level:*
  - » *How many weapons have been marked so far in the country? How many weapons have been marked at the point of manufacture?*
  - » *How many marking machines are currently in the country, and are they operational? What marking technologies and techniques are applied?*
  - » *Are marking operations static (i.e. central location) or mobile in nature?*
  - » *Are particular challenges faced in the marking of State-held weapons, including capacities and materiel needs? Describe any particular challenges in marking weapons in remote locations.*
  - » *How are gender considerations included in the national marking programme or operations? For example, is gender considered in the composition of marking operation teams?*

Additional marking considerations for ammunition:

- *What legal or regulatory requirements exist at the national level to mark ammunition? Is the requirement to mark ammunition codified in national legislation or a related legal framework? What is the scope of the marking requirements, and to which national stakeholders do they apply? Are there any exceptions?*
- *Has a national marking format been adopted for ammunition? Describe the national marking format, as well as any associated method of marking used at the national level. Is there more than one marking format or method depending on the type of ammunition or national stakeholders that the items belong to (i.e. by end users)?*
- *Where applicable, describe the marking procedures that apply to marking of ammunition at the time of manufacture.*
- *What is the existing procedure for the marking of civilian-held ammunition, if any? What national authority is in charge of the design, oversight and implementation of this procedure? Are particular challenges faced in the marking of civilian-held ammunition? If yes, describe these challenges.*
- *On a practical level: Are specific ammunition marking requirements (import codes, lot numbering of small arms ammunition) requested of ammunition producers at the time of the ammunition procurement process?*

BOX 19: Tips on facilitating an assessment of marking

- ✓ Obtain as much information as possible prior to deploying a WAM baseline assessment on weapons marking in the country, in particular to obtain information on national marking format and the status of the national marking system, in particular whether marking weapons or ammunition is a national requirement. This will help assess and verify with national experts the current status of implementation, while also enabling targeted and in-depth consultations on marking approaches and practices.
- ✓ Pay attention to the sequencing and prioritization of ongoing marking programmes, as this will inform assessors if there are critical gaps in marking new and existing weapons in a country. Also pay attention to gaining insight on strategic or operational challenges to the sustainability of marking programmes and activities.
- ✓ Assess the opportunities, benefits and challenges of integrating national marking requirements into weapons and ammunition procurement processes.
- ✓ Gain insight on what marking techniques work. This is often closely associated with marking machines and technologies. Consultations can provide an opportunity to obtain information on which marking technologies work in differing settings and capacities, which can be useful for assessors when considering enhancement options.

5.7. RECORDKEEPING

An effective national recordkeeping[47] system comprehensively records weapons and ammunition within the jurisdiction of the State. This includes records of transfers (e.g. exports and imports, end users and uses, transits or trans-shipments); the national stockpile; arms and ammunition in civilian hands; weapons and ammunition recovered from the illegal or illicit sphere; and disposals (e.g. destructions, international sales, donations). Relevant international and regional instruments and standards recommend a centralization of the recordkeeping system, managed by a competent authority of the State.[48]

For State-held weapons and ammunition, a national recordkeeping system, together with a national marking system, builds a national accounting system. One of its purposes is to record the weapon and ammunition life cycle along supply chains, including from centre to lower level units, and vice versa. An effective national accounting system enables national authorities to inventory arms and ammunition in the national stockpile accurately and efficiently. For example, the recorded information enables national authorities to quantify weapons and ammunition in the national stockpile, which enables them to identify surplus, obsolete or unserviceable weapons and ammunition. This, in turn, enables national authorities to forecast weapons and ammunition requirements and needs accurately, increasing operational efficiency and readiness and reducing unnecessary government expenditure. National accounting systems can be manually or electronically operated. Regular back-ups should be undertaken to ensure that records are not lost.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the recordkeeping and inventory management of arms and ammunition, and their organizations and capacities
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicable to the national recordkeeping system for weapons and ammunition, including to (i) define what records should be kept for weapons and ammunition at the national level; (ii) identify which national stakeholders are responsible for keeping such records as well as which other actors may need access to those records; (iii) identify the methods and format of recordkeeping systems applicable to weapons and ammunition, including particular safety considerations pertaining to recordkeeping of ammunition types, quantities and conditions
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of the national recordkeeping system for weapons and ammunition

This section provides guiding questions that apply to general recordkeeping processes applicable to both weapons and ammunition. The section also includes a series of recordkeeping-relevant guiding questions dedicated to safety considerations applicable to ammunition.

47 See MOSAIC, "05.30: Marking and Recordkeeping", 2012, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.30-2012EV1.1.pdf.

48 Ibid, p. 13

5.7.1. Key guiding questions

General

- *Is the recordkeeping of weapons and ammunition a national legal requirement? If so, what legal requirements exist for the recordkeeping of weapons? What legal requirements exist for the recordkeeping of ammunition? Describe the scope of national requirements applicable to the recordkeeping of arms and of ammunition, including:*
  - » *Which types of arms and ammunition the recordkeeping requirement applies to*
  - » *What types of information are required to be kept at the national level for arms and for ammunition, and for how long*
  - » *Which functional areas are covered under the recordkeeping requirements (e.g. international transfers, storage, transport)*
  - » *To whom the requirements apply*
  - » *If there are any exceptions*
- *What national authorities are responsible for the oversight and management of the national recordkeeping system(s)? Are the responsible national entities different for the recordkeeping of weapons and the recordkeeping of ammunition? Describe the differing roles and responsibilities applicable to the recordkeeping of arms and of ammunition.*
- *Which national authorities are recordkeepers (i.e. custodians of records) for weapons and for ammunition? Is the national recordkeeping system centralized under one central authority, or decentralized by security forces and services and their respective ministries?*
- *Describe the level of harmonization of the recordkeeping system across the security forces and services at the domestic level. To what extent are information requirements and reporting requirements harmonized at the national level across State-held weapons and ammunition?*
- *Are there operational procedures for the recordkeeping of State-held weapons and of ammunition? If yes, are these procedures codified in formal national documentation? Which national entities are responsible for the design, oversight and implementation of these procedures, both for arms and for ammunition? In particular:*
  - » *Describe the procedures for recordkeeping applicable to arms and to ammunition in the national registry.*
  - » *Describe the procedures for recordkeeping applicable to arms and to ammunition at unit and/or individual levels.*
  - » *Describe how the movement of weapons and of ammunition (i.e. change of custody) is recorded.*
  - » *Describe how the issuance and receipt of weapons and of ammunition are recorded at the unit and/or individual levels.*
  - » *Describe any national processes applicable to stocktaking and audits of weapons and of ammunition.*
  - » *Describe how records of the marking of weapons are kept. How is this information integrated with the national registry of weapons and with records held at the unit and individual levels, if relevant?*
  - » *What are some of the key challenges associated with recordkeeping of arms and of ammunition at the national level?*

- *Is the national recordkeeping system applicable to State-held weapons and ammunition managed manually or electronically? Describe any back-up systems or processes that may exist at the national level.*
  - » *If the recordkeeping system is operated electronically, which electronic system or tool is used?*
  - » *If the recordkeeping system is operated manually, are there existing recordkeeping templates applicable to national registries and to records at unit levels? Describe the scope and format of national recordkeeping templates applicable to arms and to ammunition.*

- *What national recordkeeping system exists to keep records of arms and of ammunition for civilians and private security companies? Which national authorities are responsible for the recordkeeping of civilian-held weapons and ammunition? What informational elements are kept by national authorities of civilian-held weapons and ammunition? Are records kept manually or electronically? How are records backed up? How often are inventories updated?*

Additional recordkeeping considerations for ammunition

- *Describe how all types of ammunition are recorded at the national level. In particular, are the types of ammunition and their information organized by operational, training, surplus and unserviceable categories?*
- *What are the minimum information requirements specific to ammunition? What additional information, if any, is kept in addition to types, quantities and locations (e.g. lot number and batch number, hazard classification code, hazard division)?*
- *Are there specific records kept in case of ammunition loss or theft?*
- *Describe what types of logbook and stack tally cards are kept for each explosive storehouse.*
- How often are stocktaking and audit exercises conducted?

BOX 20: Tips on facilitating an assessment of recordkeeping

- ✓ Proceed systematically and methodologically in identifying and mapping all recordkeeping authorities (i.e. custodians of records), as well as the type of records (i.e. informational elements) that they keep.
- ✓ Use hypothetical scenarios or specific examples that can help map out and understand the build-up and maturity of the national recordkeeping system.
- ✓ Pay particular attention to the level of centralization or decentralization of the national recordkeeping system. In this regard, certain degrees of a decentralized system are common, thus focus dialogue on the degree of harmonization and communication between the different registries and databases. This will also lay the groundwork for the assessment of tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition.
- ✓ Focus dialogue on the maturity of the national recordkeeping system and its information processing performance (e.g. by way of examples of informational inputs or expected informational outputs of the system).
- ✓ For ammunition, pay particular attention to the maturity of records kept on technical conditions of ammunition natures. While outside the scope of this assessment methodology, one method of good validation practice is often to compare the content of ammunition records applicable to a storehouse against materiel actually held in the storehouse, and to verify this content against explosive limit licences applicable to the storehouse to determine if safety requirements are being adequately met for that particular storage location.

5.8. TRACING OF ARMS AND PROFILING OF AMMUNITION

Most illicit arms and ammunition begin their lives legally in a factory (or are imported) but are then diverted to the illicit sphere during their life. Tracing is the systematic examination of tracking information related to illicit weapons and ammunition from their point of manufacture or most recent import, through the lines of supply, to the last legal titleholder, to determine the point in space and time at which the item became illicit. The purpose of tracing illicit weapons and ammunition (domestically as a priority, and internationally in a sequenced manner) is to establish the facts of criminal activities leading to diversion to the illicit sphere, which will help in identifying and enforcing adequate and appropriate countermeasures and in preventing future diversion or trafficking in arms and ammunition.[49]

As such, an effective tracing system enables and ensures that a State is able to identify the types of diversion it may face, including internal or external sources of illicit arms and ammunition (e.g. diversion points in space and time; suppliers, actors and individuals involved; criminals and criminal or organized crime networks involved; or terrorist groups acquiring arms and ammunition). An effective national accounting system (including marking) is an essential prerequisite for tracing operations. Further, national coordination on domestic and international tracing, including through information exchange, is considered essential to enable successful tracing operations.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the identification, documentation and tracing of arms and ammunition and the profiling of small arms ammunition, and their organizations and capacities
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicable to national tracing and profiling systems, including (i) domestic tracing systems, such as the roles and functions of national stakeholders, as well as essential information pertaining to the identification, documentation and tracing of arms and ammunition and the profiling of small arms ammunition; and (ii) means and methods of domestic and international tracing operations, including through internal and external cooperation and information exchange
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national tracing and profiling

49 See MOSAIC, "05.31: Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons", 2012, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.31-2012EV1.0.pdf; see also IATG, "03.50: Tracing of Ammunition", 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-03.50-Tracing-V.2.pdf.

50 See A.M. Baldo and M. Martinez Miralles, A Handbook to Profile Small Arms Ammunition in Armed Violence Settings, UNIDIR, 2021, https://unidir.org/publication/handbook-profile-small-arms-ammunition-armed-violence-settings.

Profiling of small calibre ammunition
This methodology recognizes that tracing individual small arms ammunition rounds poses various challenges for States. However, building evidence and capacity to document illicit small arms ammunition has unique benefits that can inform counter-proliferation strategies and activities. This methodology promotes tracing ammunition when feasible (e.g. through unique identifiers or lot/batch numbers identifiable in the items recovered or their packaging) and profiling small arms ammunition when tracing may not possible. Profiling of ammunition refers to data generation and the establishment of comprehensive baseline information regarding the volumes and origins of illicit ammunition, thereby providing information on the trends and patterns of diversion and illicit trafficking over time.[53]

5.8.1. Key guiding questions

- What are the existing legal requirements or regulations for the tracing and/or profiling of arms and ammunition? What authorities are authorized and responsible for the tracing and profiling of arms and ammunition? Is there a National Focal Point or similar structure in place for tracing and/or profiling of arms and ammunition?
- Is there a national strategy in place to counter illicit trafficking and illicit flows of arms and ammunition? If yes, describe the scope of tracing requirements in such a strategy. Which entities are responsible for the oversight of the implementation of such a strategy? Which entities are involved in the implementation of such a strategy?
- Provide a step-by-step description of the domestic tracing mechanism, indicating how responsible national entities undertake domestic tracing operations. This could include elaboration of the following:
  - » Is there a domestic coordination mechanism or body for tracing? If yes, describe the scope of the coordination body, its mandate and related resources available. Which national entities are part of such a coordination body?
  - » What procedures exist to facilitate domestic tracing operations? Are the procedures codified in written national documentation? Describe the scope of the procedures, to whom they apply and when, and if there are any exceptions.
  - » What information exchange processes and tools exist to facilitate exchange of information on illicit arms and ammunition? Are there specific procedures that deal with the tracing of seized or confiscated, captured, collected or surrendered, or lost and found weapons and ammunition, or is all such tracing streamlined into one centralized procedure?
- Is there a national system dedicated to keeping records and information on illicit arms and ammunition? If yes, is it centralized or decentralized? Which entity is responsible for holding such data, and which entities have access to this information? If data are decentralized, which security forces and services maintain this type of information? Describe the information elements kept and maintained by relevant national authorities on illicit arms and ammunition.

- Provide an initial assessment of how effective tracing operations have been at the national level. For example, is it possible to provide an estimation or figures on how many illicit arms and ammunition are recovered – that is, seized (e.g. by law enforcement in crime), captured (e.g. by the military, if applicable), surrendered or collected (if applicable) or found (in other circumstances) – per location, per month or per year by national security forces and services? How many of those items have been traced successfully domestically and, where relevant, internationally?
- Describe national procedures related to the profiling of illicit ammunition, if any. What national authority is responsible for the analysis of the information and data generated from the profiling of illicit ammunition, including small calibre ammunition?
- What informational or analytical products are generated based on the profiling of illicit ammunition? By whom? How are these informational and analytical products used at the national level? For example, are they used to inform the development of armed violence reduction strategies, counter illicit trafficking measures or counter diversion measures?
- Provide a step-by-step description of the process and mechanism in place to undertake and respond to international tracing requests. What national authority is responsible for international tracing operations and responding to international tracing requests? Which other national authorities are involved? How many international tracing operations are conducted on average per year? Are records of the results of these operations kept?
- Describe the nature and extent of cooperation with INTERPOL on domestic and international tracing activities. For example, what is the role of the INTERPOL National Central Bureau and its capacity to undertake domestic and international tracing operations? What is the level of use of INTERPOL resources and tools?
- Are other international or regional cooperation mechanisms used at the national level to facilitate international tracing operations? This may include bilateral or subregional legal agreements among States, information exchange among law enforcement and border control entities, as well as cooperation on implementation of United Nations arms embargoes.
- Is there a national system in place to collect information on the impact of illicit weapons and ammunition on women, men, boys and girls? If yes, describe the system and how the information is used for policy and/or operational planning and implementation to reduce armed violence and illicit proliferation.

BOX 21: Tips on facilitating an assessment of arms tracing and profiling of ammunition

- ✓ The maturity of domestic tracing systems for arms varies considerably between States. Assessors are recommended to focus on mapping out, in a step-by-step manner, practices of national authorities to initiate, or to respond to, tracing requests at the domestic level. Assessors should pay particular attention to the national processes for accurately identifying weapons, documenting them comprehensively, and initiating national coordination and information exchanges to identify the origin of the illicit arm. This will give at least an overview of the current status of tracing systems in the country.
- ✓ Assessors should determine the maturity of national processes for international tracing operations, either to make a request or to respond to one, independent from an assessment of the domestic tracing system (although this is heavily reliant on the maturity of domestic tracing systems). Assessors should focus the consultations on which actors are involved domestically and internationally, using one or two concrete examples of tracing operations, which will illustrate the national processes that may be in place. Assessors should also inquire whether these processes are codified in national documentation.
- ✓ Profiling ammunition may be a long-term process that necessitates dedicated capacity to document illicit ammunition over time and space if not already undertaken. Some States may have dedicated systems and capacities to comprehensively document ammunition in their territories, while others may not. Assessors should focus the assessment on the maturity of recordkeeping of ammunition more broadly at the national level, while paying attention to any dedicated databases or information sources for illicit ammunition, and how that information is used by national stakeholders.

5.9. PROCESSING OF ILLICIT ARMS AND TREATMENT OF ILLICIT AMMUNITION

How States process illicit arms and treat illicit ammunition – from the criminalization of illicit activities to ensuring accountability for items recovered from the illicit sphere – is an important component of any national WAM framework.[51] In addition to tracing (see Section 5.8), effective processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition can support the domestic judicial process by providing information and evidence on which illicit traffickers and violence perpetrators can be convicted, thereby helping to address impunity.[52] Further, in some contexts where national laws permit, recovered weapons and ammunition may be disposed of through several methods. In some such contexts, weapons may be disposed of by integration into the national stockpiles of security forces and services.[53] This requires clear regulation and articulation of related national processes to ensure that integrated weapons are marked, recorded and stored in accordance with relevant national laws prior to integration and that integration does not contribute to further illicit proliferation.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the processing of illicit arms and ammunition, and their organizations and capacities
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicable to processing illicit arms and ammunition at the national level
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the safe, secure and accountable processing of illicit arms and ammunition

5.9.1. Key guiding questions

- What are the existing legal requirements or regulations for the processing of weapons and ammunition *recovered from the illicit sphere or illicit activities, including criminalization? Which national authorities are responsible for overseeing the national processes relevant to the processing of illicit weapons and ammunition? How are law enforcement entities, the ministry of justice and military justice involved in the process?*
- *Is there a national strategy or policy on the processing of illicit arms or ammunition? If yes, describe the scope of the strategy or policy. In particular, is there a defined approach and methodology for decision-making on the final method of disposal of those recovered illicit weapons (e.g. destruction, reintegration, or other methods) and ammunition (i.e. destruction, or other methods)?*
- *Describe the role of the national justice system (e.g. the ministry of justice or the military justice system) in the processing of recovered illicit arms and ammunition (including in situations of seized, captured, surrendered, collected or found illicit arms and ammunition).*
- *Are recovered illicit arms and illicit ammunition considered as primary or secondary (supporting) evidence in judicial proceedings by the national justice system? Are registries of such weapons and ammunition maintained by authorities of the national justice system? If yes, are they linked to other "items" or "goods" in judiciary investigations or processes?*

51 For the purposes of this document, the term "recovery" is used and refers to arms and ammunition captured (e.g. by militaries in military operations), seized (e.g. by law enforcement, customs and border agencies), collected or surrendered (e.g. during DDR processes or CVR activities), or found (e.g. in caches).

52 See S. de Tessières, H. Shiotani and S. Wilkin, The Role of Weapon and Ammunition Management in Preventing Conflict and Supporting Security Transitions, UNIDIR, 2019, pp. 5,18,19, https://unidir.org/publication/role-weapon-and-ammunition-management-preventing-conflict-and-supporting-security.

53 Recovered ammunition should never be integrated into a national stockpile.

- *At the operational level, are there formal (written) procedures covering the means and methods to process recovered illicit arms and ammunition? If yes, what is their scope and application, and who are they applied by? Describe relevant national processes at the operational level, from the point of recovery, through processing (e.g. documentation, storage, use as evidence, tracing), to disposal.*
- *What are the capacities in terms of infrastructure of the national justice authorities to safely and securely store "judicial" arms and ammunition going through a judicial process? Describe their management and processing from the moment of their reception on site, until they are disposed of.*
- *Where a competent national authority may decide to integrate recovered weapons and/or ammunition into the national stockpile as part of disposal, describe the procedure and control measures applied prior to their integration.*
- *Are there mechanisms that allow for follow-ups on recovered weapons for which the last legal titleholder can be identified (e.g. when bearing official markings or following a successful international tracing operation), including for restitution? If yes, describe those mechanisms*

BOX 22: Tips for facilitating an assessment of the processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition

✓ Practices for processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition, as well as the national stakeholders involved, may vary nationally. Assessors should first focus on gaining a basic overview of legal requirements, their scope, and the actors involved in various aspects of processing illicit arms and ammunition. This may include understanding the scope of criminalization applicable to illicit arms and ammunition generally.

✓ The mapping of processes and capacities at the operational level is essential for understanding the maturity of national processes relevant to managing illicit arms and ammunition that are recovered. In particular, assessors could focus on understanding processes related to how recovered items may be treated as evidence, how they are managed, and how they are disposed of.

✓ Integration of recovered weapons is relatively common in certain situations, where it is permitted by national law. This is particularly relevant in low-capacity contexts, where security forces and services may lack adequate serviceable weapons, which creates demand for integrating serviceable recovered weapons. In such cases, assessors should obtain an overview of the safety, security and accountability measures that are applied to recovered items prior to their integration.

✓ Processing recovered conventional ammunition (i.e. larger categories than small arms ammunition) constitutes a hazard activity and poses safety risks to individuals and civilian objects where such ammunition may be handled, stored and transported. This is particularly relevant for unclassified ammunition that is recovered, or in situations where national authorities lack the technical capacity to accurately and safely classify the recovered item. Assessors should ensure that consultations highlight such risks. Further, when mapping national processes relevant to the processing of recovered ammunition for use as evidence or for tracing or disposal, assessors could seek to understand the types of evidence that may be gathered by national authorities other than the physical evidence of illicit ammunition, such as the use of witness evidence or photographic or video evidence.

5.10. WEAPONS COLLECTION

Weapons collection, whether as part of an integrated DDR process or as a separate activity, removes illegal and/or illicit and unwanted weapons from civilian communities. It does so by encouraging individuals – and communities as a whole – to relinquish weapons and by rendering legal (e.g. through licensing or registration) weapons that may be held illegally under national law. By reducing the quantities of unwanted, illegal and/or illicit weapons in circulation, collection programmes can reduce the availability of these weapons, which might otherwise be used in armed conflict; political, ethnic or other forms of intercommunal violence; violent crime; and gender-based violence. A weapons collection programme is not a stand-alone activity. Removing tools of violence from communities without addressing the root causes of violence and conflict is unlikely to make a durable contribution to building peace and security.[54]

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the collection of illicit and unwanted arms, and their organizations and capacities
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicable to national collection programmes, including (i) identification of contexts in which collection programmes are designed and applied; (ii) assessment of needs and desired impact of collection programmes; (iii) planning of collection programmes; and (iv) physical implementation processes, including safety, security and accountability measures applicable to the collection process as well as items collected
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national weapons collection programmes

While this methodology primarily focuses on the collection of weapons, in particular small arms, it recognizes that collection programmes in reality may include light weapons and associated conventional ammunition and explosives. Dedicated guidance exists, including on safety measures applicable to the collection of ammunition, and should be strictly followed by the assessment team during consultations to raise awareness and shared understanding among national stakeholders of these risks.[55]

5.10.1. Key guiding questions

- *Are there existing legal requirements as defined by national law or regulation for the collection of illicit or unwanted weapons from civilians? Which national authorities are responsible for the design, oversight and management of national collection programmes? Are there any restrictions, prohibitions or limitations defined by regulation relating to the collection of weapons (e.g. prohibition of certain types of incentives, limitation placed on age of participants, restrictions on collection of certain types of arms or ammunition due to safety concerns)?*

54 See MOSAIC, "05.40: Collection of Illicit and Unwanted Small Arms and Light Weapons", 2012, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.40-2012EV1.1.pdf.

55 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, "4.10: Disarmament", www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.10-Disarmament.pdf; annexes of MOSAIC 05.40; S. de Tessières, Effective Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context, 2nd ed., United Nations Department of Peace Operations, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2021, www.un.org/disarmament/ddr-handbook-2ed.

- *Describe past and existing initiatives or activities being undertaken to collect weapons from civilians. What is the scope of such collection programmes? In what context was the collection programme undertaken and what were the main objectives (e.g. the collection of illegally held weapons; the collection of legal but unwanted weapons; the collection of legally held weapons with a status changed due to regulation amendments; reforms in licensing and registration of civilian-held weapons)?*
- *Is a collection programme integrated in national security or other strategies or policies (e.g. prevention of violence or violent crime)? How are collection programmes, if any, linked to broader national security sector processes (e.g. stabilization, DDR, CVR, broader armed violence reduction programming)? If applicable, how is weapons collection expected to link to or complement other programmes, such as voluntary civilian disarmament or other disarmament initiatives and activities?*
- *What existing procedures are in place for the assessment of needs and risks related to the collection of weapons from civilians? What national authority is in charge of such risk assessments? Which stakeholders are consulted on the conduct of needs and risk assessments?*
- *Where collection of weapons has been undertaken, describe the planning sequence, organization and implementation of the collection of weapons. Which national stakeholders were involved in the design of the collection programme? For illustrative purposes, describe the step-by-step approach taken to design and implement a collection programme.*
- *What communication and sensitization strategy exists for weapons collection? Is this strategy specifically designed to be gender-sensitive and to address all groups of society, including vulnerable communities and affected communities? Are special considerations made for women, children and youth taking part in collection programmes, with respect to incentives and/or criminalization of illicit detention?*
- *What alternatives to the collection of weapons (e.g. the registration and licensing of weapons) are considered? Describe how such alternatives have been considered in the context of past collection programmes, if applicable.*
- *What incentive structure (e.g. positive and/or negative incentive structure) has been considered or applied to maximize the results of weapons collection? Describe instances where certain incentives worked well, and where they did not. What were some of the key institutional, context or capacity challenges to the successful collection of weapons?*
- *If collection programmes include ammunition and explosives, are the national authorities in charge of the collection of ammunition and explosives the same as those responsible for weapons collection? What specific procedures are in place to assess risks related to the collection of ammunition and explosives? What specific safety procedures are in place to ensure the safe and secure handover and subsequent management of ammunition and explosives during the collection programme?*
- *Which national authority is responsible for defining the end state of collected weapons? What methodology and what informational elements are considered and taken into account to define the end state of collected weapons? What means and methods of disposal are considered for collected weapons?*

BOX 23: Tips on facilitating an assessment of weapons collection

- ✓ While good practice references exist for the design and implementation of collection programmes, there is no "one size fits all" and no one practice will be appropriate in all scenarios. The context in which the collection programme is designed varies considerably, as do the objectives, intended target audience and contributing incentives and limitations for such a programme. Assessors should seek to understand if there are domestic requirements for collection, if they are an integral part of broader national security processes or strategies, and if there are any codified procedures or guidance for the collection of weapons at the national level.
- ✓ Assessors are encouraged to gain a better understanding of the context of the collection and to assess if past collection programmes were able to achieve the intended objectives, and if not, why. Gaining insight on what constitutes successful collection in relation to the intended objectives, rather than strictly the number of weapons collected, is essential. This is primarily because the physical number of collected weapons may in fact be misleading: past experience has shown that collecting a certain number of weapons does not, in isolation, necessarily show a reduction in the supply or demand for arms in the target community or – more broadly – a reduction in armed violence.
- ✓ Fundamental planning considerations for a collection programme relate to the positive and/or negative incentive structure that can be provided to the participating community in return for participating in the collection exercise. Once again, there is no "one size fits all" model for incentives. Assessors should encourage open, inclusive dialogue among planners of collection and the target communities in the design, scope and desired end goal of the engagement prior to initiating a collection programme. Use of surveys may have benefits in this regard.[59]

5.11. DISPOSAL INCLUDING DESTRUCTION

At the end of their life, illicit arms and ammunition, surplus stocks, unwanted or obsolete weapons and ammunition, and unsafe ammunition are disposed of. The disposal of weapons and ammunition is an essential component of a comprehensive WAM framework. Disposal can serve several objectives: it can be undertaken to reduce safety risks associated with unsafe ammunition, to reduce illicit weapon and ammunition circulation, to reduce the risk of diversion of arms and ammunition to unauthorized or illicit users, and to reduce redundancies in costs associated with maintaining unserviceable materiel.

Disposal can mean destruction, transfer to another authority or entity, or sale or donation, either domestically or internationally (e.g. if weapons are still serviceable). National practices, including their means and methods for disposal, vary. This variation may be based on national legal frameworks, as well as operational needs, constraints and opportunities. Environmental concerns should also be considered when selecting which method of disposal to apply. The United Nations recommends and applies destruction as the preferred method of disposal for collected, recovered, or otherwise illicit or surplus weapons, ammunition and explosives.[57] After destruction, weapon parts and components rendered permanently unusable may still be recycled, donated or sold as usable scrap (e.g. for public artwork).[58] This section is subdivided by weapons disposal and ammunition disposal.

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:

- A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the disposal, and in particular destruction, of illicit, unwanted, surplus or unsafe arms and ammunition, and their organizations and capacities
- An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicable to national processes for disposal, including (i) the authorization process for disposal; (ii) planning stages that define the means and methods for disposal subsequent to the identification of the need for disposal; (iii) related security and safety procedures and practices at the operational level during implementation; and (iv) how disposal loops back and informs the need for new materiel
- A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of disposal activities applicable to arms and to ammunition

Destruction of arms, and in particular ammunition and explosives, poses significant safety and security risks. Assessors should be clear during the national consultations that activities pertaining to destruction should only be undertaken by those qualified to manage ammunition and explosives with specialized skills in EOD. This methodology is designed to help assessors obtain an overview of the national stakeholders, processes and practices pertaining to the destruction of arms and ammunition. The methodology is not designed to provide guidance on how to conduct destruction

56 See MOSAIC, "05.10: Conducting Small Arms and Light Weapons Surveys", 2018, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.10-2012EV1.0.pdf.

57 See MOSAIC, "05.50: Destruction: Weapons", 2012, p. 3, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.50-2012EV1.0.pdf; see also Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, "04.10: Disarmament", p. 30, www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.10-Disarmament.pdf.

58 See MOSAIC, "05.50: Destruction: Weapons", 2012; see also IATG, "10.10: Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition", 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-10.10-Demilitarization-and-Destruction-V.2.pdf.

at the tactical level and should not be applied for such a purpose. MOSAIC and the IATG, as well as related guidance documents, contain dedicated guidance available for such exercises.[59]

5.11.1. Weapons

5.11.1.1. Key guiding questions

- *What are the existing legal requirements and regulations for the disposal of weapons? Which national authority is responsible for the oversight and management of weapons disposal? Describe the means and methods permitted for the disposal of weapons by national law or regulation.*
- *Is there a national policy on the disposal of weapons? What means and methods of disposal are covered by such a policy? Which national authority is empowered to authorize disposal of weapons? Describe the step-by-step approach for receiving, reviewing and authorizing disposal of weapons. If the authorization process is differentiated by methods of disposal, describe the difference in the process for each method of disposal.*
- *For unwanted or unserviceable weapons identified for disposal, describe the process applicable to conducting serviceability checks. Who conducts such serviceability checks? When and at what frequency are serviceability checks conducted? Is serviceability a criterion considered in authorizing the disposal of weapons?*
- *Describe the process for requesting the destruction of weapons, from the evaluation of destruction needs through the different stages of the authorization process upstream. Which entities are responsible for making such an assessment of need? Are templates or standards available at the national level to facilitate the request for destruction of weapons?*
- *What existing procedures are in place for the destruction of weapons? Are there dedicated procedures that are applicable to varying methods of destruction? Is there a dedicated safety procedure for the destruction of weapons? Are these procedures codified in national documentation? Are these procedures harmonized within each defence and security force and service? Are these procedures harmonized across the defence and security forces and services?*
- *Describe the scope and sequence relevant to planning of weapons destruction. Which national entities are in charge of designing and planning weapons destruction? Describe how designing and planning for destruction of weapons are undertaken.*
- *Are destruction operations conducted on a permanent site or in a mobile manner? Are there any regulatory restrictions defining constraints and prohibitions on where destruction of weapons may be permitted? What challenges are faced by defence and security forces in the destruction of weapons located in remote areas?*

59 See MOSAIC, "05.50: Destruction: Weapons", 2012; see also IATG, including "10.10: Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition", 2015. Other useful references include United Nations Safer-Guard, Critical Path Guide to the International Ammunition Technical Guides, 2019, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Critical-Path-Guide-to-the-IATG-web.pdf, and UNIDIR, Utilizing the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines in Conflict-Affected and Low-Capacity Environments, 2019, www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/utilizing-the-international-ammunition-technical-guidelines-in-conflict-affected-and-low-capacity-environments-en-749.pdf.

- *Which national entities are responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of weapons destruction programmes and activities? Describe the relevant criteria applied to conduct monitoring and evaluation. How does such evaluation inform the materiel needs of security forces and services?*
- *Are weapons disposed of by application of methods and in ways other than destruction (e.g. transfers, sales, donations)? If yes, describe the other methods used and any relevant procedures that may exist to facilitate the disposal of weapons. Which entities are involved for such other methods?*
- *What types of records are kept for disposed weapons? Are records of destroyed weapons kept? Which national authorities keep records of disposed weapons, including for destruction? How long are these records kept? Are these recordkeeping requirements defined by national law, regulation or procedures codified in national documentation?*

5.11.2. Ammunition

5.11.2.1. Key guiding questions

- *What are the existing legal requirements and regulations for the disposal of ammunition? Which national authority is responsible for the oversight and management of ammunition disposal? Describe the means and methods permitted for disposal of ammunition by national law or regulations. Specify if different regulations apply for different types of ammunition natures.*
- *Is there a national policy on the disposal of ammunition? What means and methods of disposal are covered by such a policy? Are disposal and destruction methods considered at the procurement or acquisition stage? Which national authority is empowered to authorize disposal of ammunition? Describe the step-by-step approach to receiving, reviewing and authorizing disposal of ammunition. If the authorization process is differentiated by methods of disposal, describe the difference in the process for each method of disposal.*
- *Describe the process applicable to conducting serviceability checks for all types of ammunition held by the State. Which national authority is responsible for conducting such serviceability checks? When and at what frequency are serviceability checks conducted?*
- *Describe the process for requesting the destruction of ammunition, from the evaluation of destruction needs through the different stages of the authorization process upstream. Are requesting processes differentiated by the types of ammunition to be considered for destruction? Which entities are responsible for making such an assessment of destruction need, including the risks associated with keeping the ammunition in storage and its safety and security conditions? Are templates or standards available at the national level to facilitate the request for destruction of all types of ammunition?*
- *What existing procedures are in place for the destruction of all types of ammunition held by the State? Are there dedicated procedures that are applicable to varying methods of destruction? Are there dedicated safety procedures that correspond to the methods of destruction of ammunition? Are these procedures codified in national documentation? Are these procedures harmonized within each defence and security force and service? Are these procedures harmonized across the defence and security forces and services?*

- *Describe the scope and sequence relevant to planning of ammunition destruction. Which national entities are in charge of designing and planning ammunition destruction? Describe how designing and planning for the destruction of ammunition are undertaken for different types of ammunition, where relevant.*
- *Which national authorities are responsible for the identification of ammunition disposal sites? Are there any regulatory restrictions defining constraints and prohibitions on where the destruction of ammunition is permitted? What challenges are faced by defence and security forces in the destruction of ammunition, including at remote locations? Are destruction operations conducted in a mobile manner?*
- *Which national entities are responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of ammunition destruction programmes and activities? Describe relevant criteria applied to the conduct of monitoring and evaluation. How does such evaluation inform the materiel needs of security forces and services?*
- *Is ammunition (including surplus ammunition) disposed of in methods other than destruction (e.g. transfers, sales, donations)? If yes, describe the other methods used and any relevant procedures that may exist to facilitate the implementation of the disposal of ammunition. Also describe if there are any safety restrictions placed on other means of disposal applicable to ammunition. Which entities are involved in such other methods?*
- *What types of records of disposed ammunition are kept? Are records of destroyed ammunition kept? Which national authorities keep records of disposed ammunition? How long are these records kept? Are these recordkeeping requirements defined by national law, regulations or procedures codified in national documentation?*
- *Give an overview of the existing national EOD capacity (e.g. number of teams and trained personnel, types and quantity of equipment). Describe the national processes involved in the training of personnel in EOD. Are functions relating to EOD professionalized? If yes, what incentive structures are in place to maintain trained and qualified EOD personnel to prevent the loss of knowledge and expertise?*

BOX 24: Tips on facilitating an assessment of disposal including destruction

- ✓ Disposal means and methods may be defined by national law, regulation or policy. They may further be shaped by operational capacity, such as technical, financial and technological resources. As such, it is important that assessors try to obtain the full scope of disposal means and methods used by national stakeholders. The initial focus of the consultation could be dedicated to mapping out relevant authorization processes for the disposal of arms and ammunition, including the national stakeholders involved in such processes.
- ✓ Various means and methods exist for the destruction of weapons, some of which are outlined in MOSAIC module 05.50, annex B. Technological means and methods continue to evolve, which may shape future destruction methods available to States. However, State resources may place constraints on available methods. Assessors should seek to evaluate whether the existing means and methods for weapons destruction are "fit for purpose" and the best value for money, including from safety, security, environmental and resource perspectives.
- ✓ Types of ammunition and their characteristics are connected to the means and methods for their disposal. Assessors should pay particular attention to mapping all relevant types of methods used by the State to dispose of unwanted, surplus, illicit or unsafe ammunition. This will help focus the assessment of needs and challenges pertaining to specific ammunition types and associated methods of disposal faced by national authorities. Means and methods of demilitarization and destruction of ammunition can be viewed in IATG module 10.10. [63]
- ✓ Assessors should focus their assessment on gaining a better understanding of the operational capacities of the national entities responsible for the disposal of ammunition. This includes seeking to gain insight into existing technical knowledge and expertise in EOD, and related capacity or knowledge gaps at the national level. Assessors should also seek to gain information on specialized training programmes that may be available at the national level to national stakeholders in the area of EOD. This information on human and related resources, when put together with mapping of authorization processes, infrastructure and equipment capabilities, will give the assessment team a more holistic overview of the capacity gaps and needs.

60 See IATG, "10.10: Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition", 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-10.10-Demilitarization-and-Destruction-V.2.pdf.

6. REPORTING ON NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

The final stage of the WAM baseline assessment is the delivery of a report that presents the current baseline of WAM policy and practice, areas for enhancement, and options to support their implementation, organized by WAM functional area. This document is referred to as the *national road map towards a national framework for WAM*.

The first step in this process is the delivery of the enhancement options for implementation on the final day of the baseline assessment, as prepared jointly between the national stakeholders participating in the baseline assessment and the assessment team. To further strengthen national leadership and ownership of the process, the delivery of this "options document" is undertaken by the designated national lead authority by presenting it to its high authority in the government, at ministerial levels or higher. Onward distribution can include one or several other high national authorities. This options document is then annexed to the final report (see Annex III).

The distribution of the report and the level of confidentiality of the report should be discussed and determined in advance with the designated national lead authority. Further, the outline and expected structure of the report should be discussed with the designated national lead authority during the planning stages of a WAM baseline assessment (see Section 4). A template outline and structure are included in Annex IV. Identification and drafting of enhancement options need to be undertaken during the period of the baseline assessment in parallel to the consultative process as dialogue progresses. The final report should be drafted by experienced WAM SMEs and be reviewed by the assessment team to ensure accuracy and to address any key omissions. Ideally, the report should be drafted in the official working language of the baseline assessment and be made available also in English if that is not the working language of the assessment. Experience shows that drafting and finalizing the final report may take a minimum of three weeks, and up to two months for comprehensive editing and layout. The lead rapporteur may need to follow up with the national, regional and international stakeholders that participated in the baseline assessment to obtain additional information, as well as to clarify or verify specific and essential informational elements.

Several specific reporting modalities may also be considered by the designated national lead authority and its partners. If the production of the final report is time sensitive, an executive summary, an extract of the enhancement options, or a confidential advanced draft may be considered for production and release. In cases where sensitive information has been discussed or documented during the WAM baseline assessment, the designated national lead authority and the assessment team may consider redacted versions to enable wider dissemination of the **findings** report. In the medium term (two to three months after the assessment is concluded), the **findings** report can also be accompanied by a "WAM country insight", which presents a separate, independent report that presents the summary and an overview of the baseline assessment findings made available to the public to facilitate dialogue on international cooperation and assistance.

Where possible and permitted by the host Government, the **findings** report should also be shared with local, regional and international operational partners to facilitate the implementation of enhancement options identified in the report. This will ensure that assessment findings and recommendations to strengthen the national framework on WAM are not purely a knowledge promotion exercise but help translate knowledge into concrete actions on the ground. As such, the host

Government, in particular the designated national lead authority, is strongly encouraged to ensure that aspects of the report, whether in part or in full, are made available to relevant local, regional and international partners that may be in the position to provide assistance to implementation efforts.

BOX 25: Tip for reporting in a multilateral peace operation context

In United Nations or other peace operation and mission contexts, where a national WAM baseline assessment may support the implementation of one or several mandated objectives, a code cable may be considered by the mission to inform headquarters – immediately after the assessment – of its key results, findings and recommendations for ways forward.



MODULE 4:

REVIEW OF METHODOLOGY

SECTION 7

7. REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY

This reference methodology is a living document, informed by past experience with baseline assessments as well as by research and dialogue carried out with the community of practice on WAM. In particular, the methodology draws on UNIDIR's monitoring and evaluation of national WAM baseline assessments carried out between 2015 and 2020; a survey conducted of States that had participated in WAM baseline assessments; and dialogue held among participating WAM States and regional organizations and partners at the first regional seminar in 2020 on lessons learned from WAM on the African continent, co-organized by UNIDIR in cooperation with the African Union and the ECOWAS Commission.

This section presents several initial observations and reflections that offer insights into possible reviews that may be applied to this methodology in the future to improve its utility and applicability, including in regions where baseline assessments have not yet been undertaken.

7.1. INFORMING REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ROAD MAPS ON WAM

The WAM baseline assessment methodology is currently applied at the national level. That said, when coordinated with relevant partners at the regional or subregional level, the methodology can be used to inform the review and development of regional or subregional strategies and road maps for WAM. The baseline assessments can be conducted in all States within a region or subregion where national baselines are established, monitored and reviewed. Information on common risks, vulnerabilities, challenges and opportunities, including progress made in the implementation of enhancement options, could inform dialogue at a regional or subregional level comprehensively or across a number of key WAM functional areas. Such dialogue and exchange of information, lessons learned, and good practices may serve as a useful basis for the development and review of regional or subregional strategies, road maps or action plans for WAM. Such an exercise could also help identify priority information collection needs at national and regional levels to work towards strengthening national and regional frameworks. Such an exercise was considered and used by the ECOWAS region between 2015 and 2020, informing the five-year action plan by the ECOWAS Commission on SALW control.

7.2. LOCAL- OR SUBNATIONAL-LEVEL BASELINE ASSESSMENT

Past baseline assessment experience also indicates a potential benefit for conducting comprehensive or targeted scope baseline assessments at the local and/or subnational levels, where the designated national lead authority seeks to gain further detailed information on practices at the local levels. While the methodology may be broadly applicable to local-level assessments, dedicated attention and care would be needed to undertake mapping of local-level stakeholders and to adjust the guiding questions under each WAM functional area to better reflect the information needed at the local levels. Such a local-level assessment will need to be sequenced appropriately in coordination with a designated national lead authority and should take into account the careful management of the different political, institutional and operational relationships between the national, subnational and local stakeholders. No matter at which level the assessment is undertaken, the guiding principles of national (and local) ownership should be applied.

7.3. REFINING THE SCOPE OF THE METHODOLOGY

Stakeholders engaged in the dialogue on WAM, including States, United Nations entities, regional organizations and specialized NGOs, have expressed or demonstrated interest in either broadening or refining the scope and depth of the WAM baseline assessment methodology. Expressed areas of interests include:

- Elaborating on additional WAM functional areas – including border controls, private security companies, community-based WAM, and craft production – as well as cross-cutting WAM issues, such as WAM and SSR, or WAM and CVR
- Introducing more in-depth guiding questions focusing on specific categories, calibres or items (e.g. heavy weapon categories, conventional ammunition, dual-use goods and items), as appropriate
- Exploring how WAM baseline assessments can better take into account arms-related security dynamics, threats and risks (e.g. proliferation of armed actors, terrorist groups, and organized crime), thereby supporting broader peace and security processes (e.g. peacebuilding, SSR, community safety programming) that may be ongoing in the country where a baseline assessment is being undertaken
- Identifying opportunities to create synergies with other existing approaches, assessment processes and methodologies in this field of work

7.4. INTRODUCING MEASURABILITY OF MATURITY COVERED UNDER THIS METHODOLOGY

The methodology in this document may also be reviewed to explore the feasibility of introducing more detailed measurability applicable to the maturity of national processes relevant to WAM functional areas. Generally, the views and feedback received from participating States in this regard were mixed (e.g. to not introduce metrics that constrain the flexibility and agility of the methodology); thus, such consideration would necessitate further dialogue to ensure a fair balance between measurability and adaptability.

7.5. SUPPORTING FOLLOW-THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION BY IMPROVED COORDINATION

While going beyond the scope and objective of this document, there is ongoing dialogue on how to best maximize the utility and impact of findings generated by national WAM baseline assessments. The discussion includes the following:

- Recognizing the need for improved coordination at the national level to implement a road map towards comprehensively strengthening a national WAM framework
- Awareness-raising and creating further buy-in, in addition to promoting adherence to assessment results and the road map by all stakeholders in relevant national, regional and international forums
- Using national WAM baseline assessment findings for the development of resource mobilization strategies by national authorities
- Establishing a national framework and mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the implementation of national road maps
- Informing the development of national strategies dedicated to WAM
- Supporting a more coherent international cooperation and assistance effort, and building on the assessment findings, by forming partnerships with operational partners to support implementation efforts

Many of these issues require partnership among participating States, the United Nations and other relevant WAM partners.

These review elements may be considered as part of UNIDIR's ongoing research efforts to strengthen WAM policy and practice, while promoting knowledge among States, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations, and specialized NGOs on ways to strengthen local, national, regional and multilateral frameworks and approaches to govern the full life cycle of arms and ammunition to prevent diversion and misuse and to reduce and mitigate the risks of unplanned explosions.



ANNEXES

GENERIC TEMPLATES FOR PLANNING, DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTION OF A NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT BASELINE ASSESSMENT

ANNEX I – TEMPLATE PROGRAMME OF WORK FOR A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT

BOX 26: Explanatory note on template programme of work and drafting

This template programme of work outline can be used for the design, planning and implementation of a national WAM baseline assessment. This is a template draft document, which will require adjustments and amendments as part of the planning and design phase of any specific national WAM baseline assessment. Sufficient consideration should be given during the design and planning phase to the allocation and repartition of time available for each of the WAM baseline assessment in-country activities, including each of the series of meetings, to ensure that each of them is meeting its specific objectives and expected outcomes of the capacity gaps and needs.

Baseline assessment to assist national efforts to develop or review national framework governing the full life cycle management of weapons and ammunition

Summary of the initiative
1. Background
2. Programme of work
2.1. Objectives and expected outcomes
Table 1: Objectives and expected outcomes of the WAM baseline assessment
2.2. Methodology
2.2.1. Proposed scope
2.2.2. Proposed dates
2.2.3. Location
2.2.4. Assessment team composition
2.2.5. Partners
2.2.6. Language (in-country consultations and findings report)
3. Proposed activities
3.1. Preparatory work prior to assessment (mission)
3.2. Day 1: In-country internal preparatory meeting by partners and assessment team
3.3. Day 2: National high-level consultative meeting on WAM strategies and priorities
3.4. Day 3: National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area baselines
3.5. Day 4: National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area baselines
3.6. Day 4: Bilateral consultations with key national stakeholders
3.7. Day 4: Bilateral consultations with key international partners
3.8. Day 4: Meeting with United Nations entities
3.9. Day 4: Consultative coordination meeting with representatives of assistance-providing and partner States
3.10. Day 4: Site visit [optional]
3.11. Day 5: Presentation and validation of preliminary findings and options to strengthen WAM
3.11.1. Day 5: National consultative technical meeting to present preliminary findings and draft options for a road map

3.10.2. Day 5: National consultative technical meeting to validate and adopt technical-level draft options and road map
3.10.3. Day 5: National high-level meeting to present findings, options and road map to strengthen the national WAM framework
3.11. After-assessment evaluation [assessment team internal, can be done remotely]
4. Support to be requested from partners
4.1. Venue
4.2. Travel considerations including visas
4.3. Accommodation
4.4. Local transport
4.5. Catering
4.6. Information regarding reimbursements
4.7. Opening and closing remarks
4.8. Media, press and visibility

PROGRAMME OF WORK – OVERVIEW OF SCHEDULE

DATES	DAY (DATE)	DAY 1(DATE)	DAY 2(DATE)	DAY 3 (DATE)	DAY 4(DATE)	DAY 5(DATE)	DAY 6(DATE)
ACTIVITIES	Arrival of assessment team to country	Preparatory internal meeting by partners and assessment team (3.2)	*** Start of meetings *** National high-level consultative meeting on WAM strategies and priorities (3.3)	National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area baselines (3.4)	National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area baselines (3.5) Bilateral consultations with key national stakeholders (3.6) Bilateral consultations with key international partners (3.7) Meeting with United Nations entities (3.8) Consultative coordination meeting with representatives of assistance-providing and partner States (3.9) Site visit [optional] (3.10)	National consultative technical meeting to present preliminary findings and draft options (3.11.1) National consultative technical meeting to validate and adopt technical-level draft options and road map (3.11.2) National high-level meeting to present findings, options and road map to strengthen national WAM framework (3.11.3) *** End of meetings ***	Departure of the assessment team from the country

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 2. NATIONAL HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIVE MEETING ON WAM STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES AND COMMENTS
09:30 – 10:15	**Session 1**: High-level opening	High-level welcoming and opening remarks.
10:15 – 10:30	**COFFEE BREAK**	If planned, this coffee break allows the high-level officials who gave the opening remarks to depart the meeting.
10:30 – 11:15	**Session 2**: Introduction to national baseline assessment of WAM framework	10 minute presentation format. The remaining time is allocated to questions and answers.
11:15 – 12:30	**Session 3**: National presentations on existing WAM framework, strategy and action plan	10 minute presentation format. The remaining time is allocated to questions and answers.
12:30 – 14:00	**LUNCH**	
14:00 – 15:00	**Session 4**: Review of WAM priorities, needs, vulnerabilities and challenges	10 minute presentation format. The remaining time is allocated to questions and answers.
15:00 – 15:15	**COFFEE BREAK**	
15:15 – 16:30	**Session 5**: Review of international and regional WAM priorities and assistance activities: • Presentation by international and regional partners on international and regional instruments and priorities • Presentation by international and regional partners on their international and regional assistance, support and capacity-building work • Review of assistance and types of assistance provided, • achievements and results of activities • Exchange of lessons learned and sharing of experiences	Discussion format.
16:30 – 17:00	**END OF MEETING, BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS**	After the meeting, interested national stakeholders may be invited to hold bilateral meetings with the facilitator or expert team.

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 3. NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE MEETING TO ESTABLISH WAM FUNCTIONAL AREA BASELINES

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES AND COMMENTS
09:30 – 10:00	**Session 1**: Overview of the WAM baseline assessment	This session introduces the schedule for the day and discusses expectations.
10:00 – 11:00	**Session 2:** Baseline assessment and process mapping: • Legal and regulatory framework at national level	This mapping is conducted through group consultations, moderated by the national WAM lead entity and its primary partner. It will follow the following methodology: • Mapping of institutions • Mapping of institutional and operational capacities • Mapping of practices and procedures • Mapping of authorization processes • Identification of areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation Each session may include group work to identify national options to strengthen management in these areas.
11:00 – 11:30	**COFFEE BREAK**	
11:30 – 13:00	**Session 3**: Baseline assessment and process mapping: • National coordinating mechanism • Transfer controls	Same as above.
13:00 – 14:00	**LUNCH**	
14:00 – 15:00	**Session 4**: Baseline assessment and process mapping: Stockpile management of weapons	Same as above.
15:00 – 15:30	**COFFEE BREAK**	
15:30 – 17:00	**Session 5**: Baseline assessment and process mapping: Stockpile management of ammunition	Same as above.
17:00 – 17:30	END OF MEETING, BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS	After the meeting, interested national stakeholders and experts may be invited to hold bilateral meetings with the facilitator or expert team.

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 4. NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE MEETING TO ESTABLISH WAM FUNCTIONAL AREA BASELINES (CONTINUATION)

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES AND COMMENTS
09:30 – 10:15	**Session 6:** Baseline assessment and process mapping: • Marking • Recordkeeping	This overview is conducted through group consultations, moderated by the national WAM lead entity and its primary partner. It will follow the following methodology: • Mapping of institutions • Mapping of institutional and operational capacities • Mapping of practices and procedures • Mapping of authorization processes • Identification of areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation Each session may include group work to identify national options to strengthen management in these areas.
10:15 – 11:00	**Session 7**: Baseline assessment and process mapping: • Tracing of weapons and profiling of ammunition • Processing of illicit weapons and treatment of illicit ammunition	Same as above.
11:00 – 11:30	**COFFEE BREAK**	
11:30 – 13:00	**Session 8:** Baseline assessment and process mapping: • Collection • Disposal of weapons • Disposal of ammunition	Same as above.
13:00 – 14:00	**LUNCH**	
14:00	END OF MEETING	

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 4. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES AND COMMENTS
14:00 – 15:00 (tbd)	**Session** Bilateral consultations with national technical experts from ministries and security forces.	Depending on the type, level and schedules of the meetings, the entire assessment team or individual members of the assessment team may be conducting these bilateral consultative meetings. The meetings are held at the conference venue or at relevant government offices.

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 4. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES AND COMMENTS
15:00 – 17:00 (tbd)	**Session** Consultative coordination meeting with assistance-providing and partner States **Session** Consultations with United Nations partners **Session** Bilateral consultations with NGOs and international assistance providers	These meetings are devoted to international partners, including the United Nations, expert NGOs and the donor community. These bilateral meetings are held separately from each other at the conference venue. The target participants for each of these bilateral meetings are subject to change, based on availability.

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 4. SITE VISIT

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES AND COMMENTS
15:00 – 17:00 (tbd)	**Site Visit**	Site visit by the assessment team together with national WAM lead entity and national technical experts.

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 5. PRESENTATION AND VALIDATION OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND OPTIONS TO STRENGTHEN WAM

TIME	ACTIVITY	NOTES AND COMMENTS
09:30 – 10:30	**Session 1:** Follow up consultations based on baseline assessment	
10:30 – 10:45	**COFFEE BREAK**	
10:45 – 11:15	**Session 2:** Sharing of preliminary findings • Baseline status • Key areas for enhancement • Identification of draft options	This session is devoted to presenting preliminary findings from the baseline assessments
11:15 – 13:00	**Session 3:** Discussions on WAM options: • Identifying actors for WAM functional area options • Setting targets: prioritization and time frame	This session is devoted to discussing the identified options to strengthen WAM.
13:00 – 14:00	**LUNCH**	
14:00 – 15:00	**Session 4**: Discussions on WAM options (continued) and validation • Refinement of WAM options • Validation of findings and WAM options	This session is devoted to national authorities validating the findings and options.
15:00 – 15:15	**COFFEE BREAK**	
15:15 – 16:00	**Session 5:** Presentation and delivery of WAM road map	Presentation by the national WAM lead entity to the high-level authority of the government of the validated WAM road map
16:00 – 16:30	**Session 6:** Closing	Closing remarks by high-level national authorities and organizers.
16:30	**END OF MEETING**	

This meeting is devoted to high-level national stakeholders on WAM.

Programme of work – Proposed participating entities and participants

1. National actors

To be identified by the lead co-organizing national WAM entity.

2. United Nations actors

To be identified by the lead co-organizing WAM entities.

3. International and regional actors

To be identified by the lead co-organizing WAM entities.

4. Civil society and specialized international NGOs

To be identified by the lead co-organizing WAM entities.

5. Embassies and representatives of current and potential assistance-providing and partner States

To be identified by the lead co-organizing WAM entities.

6. Media

To be identified by the lead co-organizing national WAM entity.

ANNEX II - TEMPLATE DRAFT AGENDA FOR A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT

[Day/month/year]
[Location], [Country]

[PROVISIONAL / FINAL] AGENDA

DAY [Day/month/year]

Arrival of external partners (and assessment team members).

DAY 1 – [Day/month/year]

In-country internal preparatory meeting by partners and with the national WAM lead entity of the host Government.

DAY 2 – [Day/month/year]
National high-level consultative meeting on WAM strategies and priorities, [Location]

Target audience: This meeting is designed for high-level national authorities and relevant national security services. Implementing partner organizations, international partners from embassies, international organizations and expert NGOs are also invited to participate in this meeting.

Time	Session	Speakers
09:30 – 10:15 *(tbd)*	**Session 1:** **Opening** Introduction of participants Group photo/media interaction	• Welcome remarks • Remarks by organizing partners • Opening remarks by government official
10:15 – 10:30	**COFFEE BREAK**	
10:30 – 11:15 *(tbd)*	**Session 2:** **Introduction to national WAM baseline assessment**	Moderation (tbd)
11:15 – 12:30 *(tbd)*	**Session 3: National presentations on existing WAM framework, strategy and action plan:** • Review of WAM priorities, needs, vulnerabilities and challenges • Questions and discussion	• National WAM lead entity • National WAM entities and stakeholders (tbd) Moderation (tbd)
12:30 – 14:00	**LUNCH**	
14:00 – 15:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 4: National presentations on existing WAM framework, strategy and action plan:** • Review of WAM priorities, needs, vulnerabilities and challenges • Questions and discussion	• All participants Chair(s) (tbd) Moderation (tbd)
15:00 – 15:15	**COFFEE BREAK**	
15:15 – 16:30 *(tbd)*	**Session 5:** **Review of international and regional WAM priorities and assistance activities:**	• International assistance providers Chair(s) (tbd)

	• Presentation by international partners on their capacity-building work • Review of assistance provided and result of activities • Lessons learned and sharing of experiences • Questions and discussion	Moderation (tbd)
16:30	**END OF DAY 2**	

DAY 3 – [Day/month/year]
WAM Baseline Assessment: National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area baselines, [Location]

Target audience: This full day of informal and technical consultations is designed for national experts from relevant ministries and national security services.

Time	Session	Speakers
09:30 – 10:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 1:** **Overview of the WAM baseline assessment**	• Lead substantive partner organization
10:00 – 11:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 2: National baseline assessment:** *mapping institutions, procedures and practices; mapping authorization processes; identifying areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation* • Legal, regulatory and policy framework	• All participants including assessment team Co-Chair(s) (tbd)
11:00 – 11:30	**COFFEE BREAK**	
11:30 – 13:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 3: National baseline assessment:** *mapping institutions, procedures and practices; mapping authorization processes; identifying areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation* • National coordinating mechanism • Transfer controls	• All participants including assessment team Co-Chair(s) (tbd)
13:00 – 14:00	**LUNCH BREAK**	
14:00 – 15:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 4: National baseline assessment:** *mapping institutions, procedures and practices; mapping authorization processes; identifying areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation* • Stockpile management (weapons)	• All participants including assessment team Co-Chair(s) (tbd)
15:00 – 15:30	**COFFEE BREAK**	
15:30 – 17:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 5: National baseline assessment:** *mapping institutions, procedures and practices; mapping authorization processes; identifying areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation* • Stockpile management (ammunition)	• All participants including assessment team Co-Chair(s) (tbd)
17:00	**END OF DAY 3**	

Day 4 – [Day/month/year]
WAM Baseline Assessment: National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area baselines, [Location]

Target audience: This half-day of informal and technical consultations is designed for national experts from relevant ministries and national security services.

Time	Session	Speakers
09:30 – 10:15 *(tbd)*	**Session 6: National baseline assessment:** *mapping institutions, procedures and practices; mapping authorization processes; identifying areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation* • Marking • Recordkeeping	• All participants including assessment team • Co-Chair(s) (tbd)
10:15 – 11:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 7: National baseline assessment:** *mapping institutions, procedures and practices; mapping authorization processes; identifying areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation* • Tracing of weapons and profiling of ammunition • Processing of illicit weapons and treatment of illicit ammunition	• All participants including assessment team Co-Chair(s) (tbd)
11:00 – 11:30	**COFFEE BREAK**	
11:30 – 13:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 8: National baseline assessment:** *mapping institutions, procedures and practices; mapping authorization processes; identifying areas for enhancement and potential options for implementation* • Weapons collection • Disposal of weapons • Disposal of ammunition	• All participants including assessment team Co-Chair(s) (tbd)
13:00 – 14:00	**LUNCH BREAK**	

DAY 4 – [Day/month/year] Bilateral consultation with key national stakeholders and international partners, [Location], & site visit, [Location]

Time	Sessions	Participants
14:00 – 15:00 *(tbd)*	Meeting with high-level government officials and key national stakeholders (tbd) Bilateral consultations with national technical experts from ministries and security forces.	• High-level government officials • National WAM lead entity • National technical experts • Assessment team

Time	Sessions	Participants
15:00 – 17:00 *(tbd)*	Consultative coordination meeting with assistance-providing and partner States Consultations with United Nations partners	• Assessment team • International partners and assistance providers

	Bilateral consultations with NGOs and international assistance providers	• Assistance-providing and partner States

Time	Sessions	Participants
15:00 – 17:00 *(tbd)*	Site visit	• National WAM lead entity • Assessment team • National technical experts

DAY 5 – [Day/month/year] Follow-up consultations and validation of preliminary findings and options, [Location]

Time	Session	Speakers
9:30 – 10:30 *(tbd)*	**Session 1: Follow-up consultations based on baseline assessment**	• All participants including assessment team Moderation (tbd)
10:30 – 10:45	**COFFEE BREAK**	
10:45 – 11:15 *(tbd)*	**Session 2: Sharing of preliminary findings** • Baseline status • Key areas for enhancement • Identification of draft options	• All participants including assessment team Moderation (tbd)
11:15 – 13:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 3: Discussions on WAM options** • Refinement of WAM options • Identification of actors for WAM functional area options • Target setting: prioritization and time frame	• All participants including assessment team Moderation (tbd)
13:00 – 14:00	**LUNCH**	
14:00 – 15:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 4: Discussions on WAM options (continued) and validation** • Refinement of WAM options • Validation of findings and WAM options	• All participants including assessment team Moderation (tbd)
15:00 – 15:15	**COFFEE BREAK**	
15:15 – 16:00 *(tbd)*	**Session 5: Presentation and delivery of WAM road map** Presentation by the national WAM lead entity co-organizing the WAM baseline assessment to the high-level authority of the government of the validated WAM road map	Moderation by national WAM lead entity (tbd)
16:00 – 16:30 *(tbd)*	**Session 6: Closing remarks**	• Remarks by organizing partners • Closing remarks by Government official
16:30	**END OF MEETING**	

DAY 6 – [Day/month/year]

Departure of external partners (and assessment team members).

Annex III – Template table of options for the development of a national WAM framework

Towards a national framework for weapons and ammunition management in Country X
Options for the Government of Country X

No.	Options	Time frame[64]	Actor(s)/stakeholder(s)
National coordination mechanism			
1.1			
1.2			
1.3			
1.4			
etc.			
Legal and regulatory framework at national level			
2.1			
2.2			
2.3			
2.4			
etc.			
Transfer controls			
3.1			
3.2			
3.3			
3.4			
etc.			
Stockpile management			
Stockpile management of weapons			
4.1.1			
4.1.2			

[64] The following indicative time-frames may be applied, e.g. short-term: 6 months to 1 year; mid-term: up to 2 years; and long-term: up to 5 years. Other time ranges can be defined and agreed upon by the group of national stakeholders including the national entity co-organizing the national WAM baseline assessment and leading WAM policy and strategy development. Timeframes can indicate prioritization and sequencing of implementation.

4.1.3			
4.1.4			
etc.			
Stockpile management of ammunition			
4.2.1			
4.2.2			
4.2.3			
4.2.4			
etc.			
Marking			
5.1			
5.2			
5.3			
5.4			
etc.			
Recordkeeping			
6.1			
6.2			
6.3			
6.4			
etc.			
Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition			
7.1			
7.2			
7.3			
etc.			
Processing illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition			

8.1			
8.2			
8.3			
8.4			
etc.			
Weapons collection			
9.1			
9.2			
9.3			
9.4			
etc.			
Disposal including destruction			
Disposal including destruction of weapons			
10.1.1			
10.1.2			
10.1.3			
etc.			
Disposal including destruction of ammunition			
10.2.1			
10.2.2			
10.2.3			
etc.			

ANNEX IV - TEMPLATE OUTLINE OF A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT REPORT

BOX 27: Explanatory note: Template draft outline of a national WAM baseline assessment report

The following provides a template outline of a national weapons and ammunition management (WAM) baseline assessment report. Its structure can vary and be amended, depending on the situation, the context and the WAM functional areas that are assessed. For baseline assessment (or reassessment) and monitoring purposes (e.g. cross-comparative analysis, regional or subregional lessons learned exercises, in-depth analysis of specific WAM functional areas), a similar or uniform outline structure should be maintained and continuously applied for national WAM baseline assessment final reports.

Towards a national framework for weapons and ammunition management in country X
About the organization(s)
Note
Disclaimers
Contents

Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Executive summary

1. Contextualization of WAM in country X
1.1. Situation relating to weapons and ammunition management

1.2. United Nations arms embargo [if applicable]
1.2.1. Patterns, types and frequency of arms embargo violations
1.2.2. List of recommendations made by the United Nations group of experts or panel of experts [Table A]
1.3. United Nations and other support for security sector reform [if applicable]
1.4. United Nations support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (and community violence reduction) [if applicable]
1.5. Armed violence, including urban and localized violence context [if applicable]

2. Mandates related to WAM in country X
2.1. Mandates of United Nations entities
2.2. Mandates of other international organizations
2.3. Mandates of regional and subregional organizations and actors

3. National, regional, subregional and international normative frameworks
3.1. National legislation and instruments (arms control) [Table B]
3.2. Regional and subregional conventions and agreements (arms control) [Table C]
3.3. International conventions and agreements (arms control) [Table D]

BOX 28: Explanatory note: Template draft outline of a national WAM baseline assessment report: international, regional and subregional instruments (arms control)

This section lists all relevant international, regional and subregional arms control instruments as well as national legislation and regulations pertaining to the control and management of weapons and ammunition. Separate tables may be used to present this information. Politically or legally binding international, regional and subregional instruments should be separately listed by adoption, accession, ratification and signature. Where international instruments include voluntary or legally binding reporting mechanisms and requirements, these should also be included, as should the number and dates of national reports submitted.

4. Introduction to baseline assessment and methodology
    - 4.1. Aim of establishing a national framework on WAM
    - 4.2. Aim of a national baseline assessment
    - 4.3. Baseline assessment in country X

5. Baseline assessment of the full life cycle management of arms and ammunition in X

5.1. National coordination mechanism
    - 5.1.1. General
    - 5.1.2. Current status
    - 5.1.3. Opportunities for enhancement
    - 5.1.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.2. Legal and regulatory framework at national level
    - 5.2.1. General
    - 5.2.2. Current status
    - 5.2.3. Opportunities for enhancement
    - 5.2.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.3. Transfer controls
    - 5.3.1. General
    - 5.3.2. Current status
    - 5.3.3. Opportunities for enhancement
    - 5.3.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.4. Stockpile management
    - 5.4.1. Stockpile management (weapons)
        - 5.4.1.1. General
        - 5.4.1.2. Current status
        - 5.4.1.3. Opportunities for enhancement
        - 5.4.1.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
    - 5.4.2. Stockpile management (ammunition)
        - 5.4.2.1. General
        - 5.4.2.2. Current status
        - 5.4.2.3. Opportunities for enhancement
        - 5.4.2.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.5. Marking
- 5.5.1. General
- 5.5.2. Current status
- 5.5.3. Opportunities for enhancement
- 5.5.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.6. Recordkeeping
- 5.6.1. General
- 5.6.2. Current status
- 5.6.3. Opportunities for enhancement
- 5.6.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.7. Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition
- 5.7.1. General
- 5.7.2. Current status
- 5.7.3. Opportunities for enhancement
- 5.7.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.8. Processing of illicit weapons and treatment of illicit ammunition
- 5.8.1. General
- 5.8.2. Current status
- 5.8.3. Opportunities for enhancement
- 5.8.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.9. Weapons collection
- 5.9.1. General
- 5.9.2. Current status
- 5.9.3. Opportunities for enhancement
- 5.9.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

5.10. Disposal including destruction
- 5.10.1. General
- 5.10.2. Current status
- 5.10.3. Opportunities for enhancement
- 5.10.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

Annex. List of options for consideration by Government X

The *Reference Methodology for National Weapons and Ammunition Management Baseline Assessments* codifies the methodology which has been used to design and implement baseline assessments with 11 States (2015–2020), in cooperation with subregional, regional, United Nations and other partners. It draws *inter alia* on lessons learned while applying and refining the methodology with partners. The Reference Methodology represents UNIDIR's practical contribution to ongoing regional efforts and new initiatives at different levels to undertake comprehensive national WAM baseline assessments.

This reference methodology is a practical tool to guide interested parties on how to implement a strategic WAM baseline assessment at the national level. It is being published to enhance knowledge and to promote consistency in the use of WAM baseline assessments by interested stakeholders. It will enable collaboration between States seeking assistance to undertake a national WAM baseline assessment and United Nations entities, regional organizations, and specialized non-governmental organizations that can provide support for such efforts.

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