Cairo Workshop on
the Verification of Arms Control Agreements
and Confidence Building Measures
July 11-13, 1993
Final List of Participants

Egyptian Delegation

Mr. Nabil Fahmy
Counsellor, Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Major General (Ret.) Ahmed Fakhr
Director of the National Centre for Middle East Studies.

Brigadier General Al Said Abdel Razek
Ministry of Defence

Brigadier General Mokhtar El Fayoumy
Ministry of Defence

Mr. Osama El Greidly
Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Aly Erfan
Second Secretary, Cabinet of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Advisors

Major General Mahrous Al Qadi
Ministry of Defence

Colonel Mohamed Said
Ministry of Defence

Mr. Mahfouz Abd El Rahman
Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mrs. Iman Moustafa
First Secretary, Disarmament Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Ahmed Nameer Khalil
Second Secretary, Disarmament Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Mohsen Fathi Khalil
Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Tarek Sarwat
Third Secretary, Embassy of Egypt, Tel-Aviv

Dr. Amin Khashab
Consultant to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
U.S. Delegation

Mr. Robert Einhorn
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs.

Dr. Fredrick Axelgard
Special Assistant in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

Colonel Joseph Bavaria
Special Assistant for the Middle East Peace Process in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

Colonel Paul Sellers
Senior Military Advisor to the Director of ACDA

Ms. Jennie Pickford
Special Assistant, Bureau of Multilateral Affairs, ACDA

Major Patrick Michaelson
Country Director for Egypt, Department of Defence

Miss Elizabeth Sallies
U.S. Embassy in Cairo

Mr. James McVerry
U.S. Embassy in Cairo
Russian Delegation

Dr. Nikolay Revenko
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Viacheslav Pachenkov
Senior Officer of the International Legal Department of the Ministry of Defence

Dr. Andrei Baklanov
Minister Counsellor of the Embassy of the Russian Federation, Cairo

Mr. Vassiliy Ozoling
Counsellor of the Embassy of the Russian Federation, Cairo

Australian Delegation

Mr. Philip Allars
Counsellor and Deputy Head of Mission, Australian Embassy, Cairo

Ms. Bronte Moules
Delegation of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Bahraini Delegation

H.E. Mr. Mostapha Kamal Mohamed
Ambassador of Bahrain to the Arab Republic of Egypt
Canadian Delegation

Mr. Donald Sinclair
Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Division,
Department of External Affairs

Mr. Gerald Skinner
Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Canada, Cairo

Miss Virginie Saint-Louis
Embassy of Canada, Cairo

Chinese Delegation

Mr. Lin Zhongxiang
Second Secretary, Embassy of China, Cairo

EC Delegation

Representatives of the Presidency

H.E. Mr. Benoit Cardon de Lichtbuer
Ambassador of Belgium to the Arab Republic of Egypt

Mr. Hubert Cooreman
First Secretary, Embassy of Belgium, Cairo
Representatives of Member States

Denmark : Mr. Carl Balle Peterson
Counsellor, Embassy of Denmark, Cairo

France : Mr. Remi Frentz,
Counsellor, Embassy of France, Cairo

United Kingdom: Colonel Guy Sayle,
Military Attache in Cairo

EFTA Countries Delegation
H.E. Dr. Peter Pramberger
Ambassador of Austria to the Arab Republic of Egypt

H.E. Mr. Jan Stahl
Ambassador of Sweden to the Arab Republic of Egypt

Or alternatively

Miss Lisbeth Ekelof
Second Secretary, Embassy of Sweden, Cairo

Mr. Ilkka-Pekka Simila
Charge D'Affairs a.i., Embassy of Finland, Cairo

Indian Delegation

Mr. Avinash C. Gupta
Counsellor (Information and Political),
Embassy of India, Cairo
Israeli Delegation

Mr. David Ivry
Director General of the Ministry of Defence

H.E. Mr. David Sultan
Ambassador of Israel to the Arab Republic of Egypt

Mr. Hanan Bar-on
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Eitan Ben-Tsur
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Kutty Mor
Ministry of Defence

Mr. Eli Levita
Ministry of Defence

Mrs. Ela Afek
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Zri Meiv Shtauber
Government Employee

Mr. Rafi Yerushalmi
Liaison Officer
Japanese Delegation

Mr. Masaki Kuneida
Counsellor, Japanese Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva

Colonel Muneo Sakakieda
Defence Attache, Embassy of Japan, Cairo

Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation

Jordanians:

Dr. Abdallah Toukan
Palace Science Advisor

Brigadier General Mohamed Al-Qudah
Assistant Chief of Staff, Air Force

Colonel Majid Al-Rihani
Ministry of Defence

Palestinians:

Mr. Ziad Abu Zayad

Mr. Jamil Rabah
Kuwaiti Delegation

Mr. Aly Ibrahim Al Nakhilan
Third Secretary, Permanent Delegation to the League of Arab States

Mr. Naser Badr Abdullah Al Edwani
Embassy of Kuwait, Cairo

Omani Delegation

Colonel Hamad Bin Said Al Mahrouqi
Ministry of Defence

Mr. Manther Bin Madfoudh Al-Manthari
Second Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Qatari Delegation

Mr. Sultan El Awgan
Head of the Military Office,
Embassy of Qatar, Cairo

Tunisian Delegation

Mr. Jamal Al-Din Quirdah
Cabinet of the Minister of External Affairs

Colonel Bashir Bouseta
Ministry of National Defence
Turkish Delegation

Mr. Oguz Ates
First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ukrainian Delegation

Mr. Viktor Nagaichsouk
Charge d'Affaires a.i., Embassy of Ukraine, Cairo

Mr. Valery Grygorash
Third Secretary, Embassy of Ukraine, Cairo

U.N. Delegation

Mr. Prvoslav Davinic
Director of the Office of Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations

Yemeni Delegation

Mr. Yehia Ali Al-Shami
Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the Arab Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Colonel Dr. Mohamed A. Howal
Military Attache in Cairo
List of Experts
(By Order of Presentation)

On Verification: Concepts and Technologies:

Dr. Ed Ifft
Deputy Director for External Affairs of the On-Site Inspection Agency, United States

Dr. Nikolay Revenko
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation

On Verification in the Field of Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Svein Thorstensen
Director in the Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency

Ms. Bronte Moules
Delegation of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament, Australia

Dr. Carlos Augusto Alvim Silva
Secretary General, Brazilian-Argentinian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC)
On Verification in the Field of Chemical and Biological Weapons:
Colonel Terence Taylor
Defence Arms Control Unit, British Ministry of Defence,
The United Kingdom

Mr. Joop W. Scheffers
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands

On Verification in the Field of Conventional Weapons:
Rear Admiral Goren Wallen
Delegation of Sweden to CSCE, Sweden

Mr. Schuyler Foerster
Delegation of the United States to CFE, United States

On Aerial Verification and in the Field of Outer Space:
Mr. Ralph J. Lysyshyn
Minister Counsellor and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada
to the North Atlantic Council, Canada

Mr. Nicolas Eybalin
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Ms. Amy Smithson
Senior Associate of the Stimson, United States

Mr. Viacheslav Pachenkov
Senior Officer of the International Legal Department of the
Ministry of Defence, Russian Federation
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR

CAIRO VERIFICATION WORKSHOP

JULY 11-13, 1993

Host: The Government of Egypt

Venue: Cairo, Egypt

Nile Hilton Hotel

Date: 11-13 July 1993

Travel and accomodation: These shall be arranged and borne by the delegates in conformity with the rules of participation in the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (ACRSWG).

Rules of procedure: The workshop will follow the format and rules of procedure applied in the meetings of ACRSWG.

Size of delegations: Size of delegations should not exceed that agreed to in ACRSWG, however we encourage that the delegations to the workshop be of a smaller number with emphasis on the participation of experts on the subjects under consideration. Presenters shall be assigned separate seatings. For the field trip to the MFO site the delegations shall be a maximum of two members. Names of participants in each delegation should be submitted by July 5, 1993.

Working language: English. (Simultaneous Arabic interpretation will be provided)
Papers: Experts making presentations are invited to submit papers to the workshop on the topics under consideration. Papers should be provided to the host country by July 5 to facilitate timely distribution.
Programme of Work
For
The Cairo Workshop
On the Verification of Arms Control Agreements
and Confidence Building Measures

July 11:

9:00 am - 10:00 am
Registration

10:00 am - 10:30 am
Opening
Egypt - US - Russia

10:30 am - 12:00 am
Verification: concepts and technologies.
Presentations and discussion by the following experts:-

10:30 am - 11:15 am
Dr. Ed Ifft
Deputy Director for External Affairs of the On-Site Inspection Agency, United States.
11:15 am - 12:00

Dr. Nikolay Kevenko,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation.

12:00 pm - 2:00 pm

Lunch
- Hosted by Mr. Nabil Fahmy, Head of the Egyptian Delegation.

2:00 pm - 4:30 pm

Verification of global, regional and bilateral agreements in the field of nuclear weapons.

Presentations and discussion by the following experts:-

2:00 pm - 2:45 pm

Mr. Svein Thorstensen
Director in the Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency.
2:45 pm - 3:20 pm
Ms. Bronte Moules
Delegation of Australia to the Conference on Disarmament Australia.

Coffee Break 15 minutes

3:45 pm-4:30 pm
Dr. Carlos Augusto Alvim Silva
Secretary General, Brazilian-Argentinian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC).

Peace Keeping and Observer Forces - Presentations by MFO and UNTSO, including field trip to MFO site.

July 13

9:00 am - 10:30 am
Verification in the field of chemical and biological weapons.

Presentations and discussion by the following experts:

9:00 am - 9:45 am
Colonel Terrence Taylor
Defence Arms Control Unit, British Ministry of Defence,
The United Kingdom.

9:45 am - 10:30 am
Mr. Joop W. Scheffers
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands

Coffee break 15 minutes

10:45 am - 12:15 pm

- Verification of conventional arms agreements.
Presentations and discussion by the following experts:-

10:45 am - 11:30 am
Rear Admiral Goren Wallen
Delegation of Sweden to CSCE, Sweden.

11:30 am - 12:15 pm
Mr. Schuyler Foerster
Delegation of the United States to CFE, United States.

Lunch Break 12:15 pm - 02:00 pm

2:00 pm - 5:15 pm

- Aerial verification, and in the field of outer space, including missiles and delivery systems.

Presentations and discussion by the following experts:-
2:00 pm - 2:45 pm

Mr. Ralph J. Lysyshyn
Minister Counsellor and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the North Atlantic Council, Canada.

2:45 pm - 3:30 pm

Mr. Nicolas Eybalin
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France

Coffee Break 15 minutes

3:45 pm - 4:30 pm

Ms. Amy Smithson,
Senior Associate of the Stimson Centre, United States

4:30 pm - 5:15 pm

Mr. Viacheslav Pachenkov
Senior Officer of the International Legal Department of the Ministry of Defence, Russian Federation.
Coffee Break 15 minutes

5:30 pm - 6:30 pm

Conclusion
Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East Working Group
(Cairo Workshop, 11-13 July 1993)

CONCEPTS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF VERIFICATION

Statement by the representative of Russia.

In the beginning of this statement it is necessary first of all to give definition of the verification and to outline its functions. The verification represents a process of establishing the nature of compliance by States participating in the agreements with their contractual obligations. This process includes: collection of information on the obligations provided for in the agreements, its analysis and adoption of decision on the character of compliance with specific conditions of the agreement.

The appraisal of day-to-day implementation of the provisions of that or another agreement is the major function of the verification. The verification should ascertain faithful and integral implementation by States of their obligations. It should also contribute to the establishment of confidence among the participating States. An important element of the confidence-building process is the possibility to collect information relating to a specific agreement. The inclusion in the agreement of the provisions which allow for other parties to openly demonstrate their commitment to the observation of those agreements contributes as well to the strengthening of confidence. For these two reasons the provisions prohibiting intentional withholding of information relating to the agreement, and specifically sanctioning the carrying out of verification with national technical means and by joint measures, have become widely spread components of new treaties.

Yet another function of verification consists in ensuring settlement procedures for unclear issues related to the implementation and observance of the agreements. Such procedures are necessary for the participating States since no agreement, whatever specific its provisions would be, may foresee all potential cases. The verification clauses may help to minimize unclear aspects and "false alarms" by ensuring exchange of data and greater openness between the participating States.
The agreed verification clauses can create confidence in the observance of the agreement and in the containing of any attempts of its non-compliance. It would be especially useful in this respect to provide for guaranteed rights of inspection of production sites which are most suitable for the prohibited activity.

Scrupulously defined verification measures can contribute to the prevention of the non-compliance. This may be done by timely warning on potential problems of compliance, for example, by sending notification to a country or countries which intend to undertake the prohibited activity, and by explaining the advantages of compliance with a treaty.

All the above mentioned control functions contribute to the establishment of required certitude that the agreements are duly respected by all participants, which is a prerequisite for a successful long-term arms limitation and disarmament process.

Different stages of verification process are often interrelated and may not always be clearly distinguished one from another. Free major elements can, nevertheless, be singled out:

a) gathering of appropriate information including surveillance of the conduct of other countries with respect to their obligations by the agreements;

b) analysis of the information gathered;

c) drawing up of conclusions on the basis of this information as to whether the obligations under the agreement have been complied with.

Unilateral ensuring and mutual exchange of data may also be useful even when this is not required by specific agreements. The extension of such practice may contribute to the strengthening of confidence and security and lay the grounds for subsequent arms limitation and disarmament agreements. The provision of non-sensitive data on the armed forces is an example of such voluntary measures.

A relevant document on this subject was submitted by cosponsors at the last meeting of the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East.

In order to be confident that the agreements are respected it is important to confine the collection of data exclusively to activities pertaining to specific obligations subject to verification. With agreement of all those involved this can be done in several ways, including:
- establishment of access to data collection sites, e.g. by restricting routes of aircraft flights and strictly restricting on-site inspections to concrete areas specified in relevant agreements;

- restriction of categories of instruments to be used, e.g. by allowing to use only definite types of on-board aviation devices;

- establishment of specific characteristics of instruments, e.g. indication of concrete instruments with a view to limit their resolution;

- development of relevant procedures to protect important information.

National technical means should primarily be used to conduct verification. These are meant to be devices under control of participating States and used for monitoring compliance with agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament. These means include observation satellites, air-based systems, such as radars and photographic cameras. It should be recalled that agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament include obligations not to impede utilization of these devices.

Observation with the use of national technical means capable of collecting relevant data at great distances is a major component of the system of monitoring compliance with many agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament. Such an observation does not violate internal activities of controlled States and does not require physical presence on their territory. To achieve greater efficiency the States can, as the case may be, agree on cooperation, i.e. to avoid using camouflage and other types of deliberate misleading, refrain from interference with means of observation, from telemetry enciphering or from transmitting telemetric data in such ways which impede their reception by other parties. Different observation capabilities have become a matter of preoccupation for a number of countries, particularly in the context of multilateral talks. This preoccupation as well as the wider interest in providing the international community with information pertaining to general security problems prompted a number of States to advocate using observation satellites as a central component of any international verification machinery.

The States that are not using satellites at present can unilaterally use for data collection manned aircraft or remote control unmanned aircraft with photographic
sensitivity but is cheaper than the one used in satellites. Besides, these facilities better meet tactical requirements of monitoring agreements of different types: unlike satellites, the routes of the planes can be modified and it is easier to reorientate them to the area of interest.

Among other types of unilaterally used verification means and national technical means are aircraft- and ship-based instruments, land-based radars and eavesdropping stations, as well as satellites. Altogether these verification means can present a consolidated picture of phenomena taking place on the Earth, providing experts with a great deal of data pertaining to the compliance with agreements.

Not only the data collected by technical devices under national jurisdiction and the exchange of data between the participating States which are parties to agreements on the limitation of armaments and disarmament contribute to this process, but also joint measures which simplify the collection of information, be it from the Earth, from air or from outer space.

The types of joint mechanisms are diversified enough, as it can be expected as regards the agreements which pursue basically different aims. Joint measures could include the design of the weapon systems and methods of their deployment which would simplify the verification procedure; the flight permission for aircrafts for the surveillance of the military facilities and activities; preliminary notification concerning the tests of certain weapon systems for purposes of more effective monitoring by other sides; conduct of joint experiments in the area of control to facilitate the monitoring measures; the organization of surveillance and inspection as regards the facilities or activities by foreign representatives and the inadmissibility of creating obstacles for national technical means.

Other forms of the joint measures allow to use on site different control devices both stationary and mobile. Sensors could be used for surveillance of more extended range of production facilities, areas of weapon deployment, depositories with more strict security measures and elimination facilities. Various instruments could be also used for application of different confidence-building and security measures alongside with the independent arms limitation and disarmament measures, in particular concerning the armed forces and
conventional armaments. In certain cases technology of marking military equipment could prove to be useful.

On-site inspections belong to joint intrusive measures. Close cooperation between a host country and inspectors is required for proper realization of the on-site inspections. For an additional specification of the rights and duties of both inspectors and the receiving party the detailed procedures should be conceived beforehand. This does not exclude the possibility to resolve any problem on site.

On-site inspections can play a prominent role as regards the control of the agreements observance as well as confidence building in armaments limitation and disarmament. On the other hand, it should be admitted that certain restrictions are inherent in the on-site inspections. All the participants should truly wish to fulfill the accord and should be committed to that cause, in order to make the on-site inspections conducive to the realization of the objectives set.

The on-site inspections can take various forms. They can be held on systematic or ad hoc basis. For example, the Treaty between the former USSR and the USA on the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles provides for six different types of inspections which are successfully implemented in practice: inspections to verify the initial data; inspections to control the elimination of missile operational bases and auxiliary missile facilities; inspections to monitor the process of elimination of armaments which fall under the Treaty; inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination process; short notice inspections of the agreed facilities without the right to refusal, and permanent monitoring inspections of the portals of certain production facilities.

Obligatory and intrusive inspections could be effectively supplemented by voluntary invitations extended to qualified observers to visit for sufficient period of time and with proper degree of intrusiveness of facilities and areas where military activity gives rise to anxiety or doubt as regards the implementation of the agreement.

The inspections by invitation can also promote awareness of the participating States concerning the improved control procedures of implementation of the treaties in force or new treaties.
the afore described aspects. The system of the guarantees including the agreements on the cooperation between individual States and IAEA, data collection carried out by IAEA, system of on-site inspections with the use of contemporary technology and with the help of inspectors from many countries is widely considered to be highly successful.

The present descriptive review of the verification measures or approaches, methods, procedures and means connected with the verification is far from being exhaustive. New ideas on the verification are being put forward during current conferences and negotiations and in the course of analyses conducted by the governmental and non-governmental experts. In addition, the consultative activities are being improved and new devices, means and ways of monitoring of multi-purpose use can provide an important experience for further agreements on limitation of armaments and disarmament.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT BY RUSSIAN CO-SPONSOR AT THE VERIFICATION WORKSHOP

(Cairo, July 11-13, 1993)

Ladies and gentlemen,

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome you as participants of the first Workshop within the Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East Working Group in accordance with the decision taken at the Washington Meeting.

The outcome of the Group's Meeting in Washington, including the approved plan of intersession measures has been very highly appreciated in Moscow. We believe that implementation of this plan will help participants from the region to be acquainted with the international experience gained in the field of confidence-building measures and with the application of specific international treaties and agreements and to get better knowledge of their respective approaches to the issue of arms control and regional security in the Middle East and thus it will promote building of confidence and deepening of mutual understanding.

I would like to emphasize, as it was stressed by co-sponsors in their Concluding remarks on the Washington Meeting's outcome, that bilateral and multilateral tracks of the peaceful process are complementary and that our Working Group makes its contribution to the bilateral process as well as to the general security and stability in the area. We think that this Workshop is an important element of our large efforts to meet these goals.

On behalf of the Russian co-sponsor I would like to wish you, ladies and gentlemen, a success in your work.
Schedule of Events

Arms Control and Regional Security Intercessional Workshop
Visit to the Multinational Force and Observers
12 July 1993

0900  Depart Cairo Airport enroute El Gorah Airfield

1000  Arrive El Gorah, bus transportation to theater for introductory peacekeeping briefing by Multinational Force and Observers Director General Ambassador Wat T. Cluverius IV and Force Commander Lieutenant General Joop W.C. van Ginkel

1100  Remarks by United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Force Commander or his designee

1130  Three group tours of operations and logistics sites on North Camp

1300  Lunch at the MFO Dining Facility

1400  Enroute to remote sites in three groups, briefing and tour of operational facilities

1530  Enroute North Camp Theater

1615  Peackeeping question and answer forum with Multinational Force and Observers Director General Ambassador Wat T. Cluverius IV and Force Commander Lieutenant General Joop W.C. van Ginkel and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Force Commander or his designee

1645  Enroute El Gorah Airfield

1700  Depart for Cairo Airport

1800  Arrive at Cairo Airport
Ambassador Cluverius retired from the Foreign Service of the United States in June 1988. Immediately prior to his retirement he had served since October 1985 as Senior Advisor for Middle East Peace. Mr. Cluverius served as Consul General in Jerusalem in 1983-1985. Before his assignment to Jerusalem, Mr. Cluverius served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. He served as Political Advisor and Deputy to the President’s Middle East Envoys during 1980-1983, and as Director of the Office for Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq during 1978-1980. Concurrently, he served as well as a member of the U.S. delegation to the negotiations between Egypt, Israel and the United States. During 1976-1978, Mr. Cluverius was Ambassador of the United States to the State of Bahrain. Mr. Cluverius also has served as Deputy Director of the Office of Israel and Arab-Israel Affairs, 1973-1976, and in the Embassies of the United States in Jidda, Saudi Arabia and Tel Aviv, Israel.

Mr. Cluverius was born in Massachusetts in 1934; he was educated at Northwestern and Indiana Universities and served as an officer in the United States Navy during 1957-1962.