

# Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## Third session

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### **Steps to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East**

#### **Report submitted by Canada**

1. Canada continues to advocate strongly for the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and specifically for the establishment of a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the region. Canada remains ready to support inclusive and practical efforts that genuinely aim to achieve consensus by all States in the region on the establishment of a Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone.
2. When carefully established and properly implemented, regional nuclear-weapon-free zones can enhance international peace and security. The responsibility for the creation of such zones should fall with the States of the region and be reflected in a process that is inclusive and freely arrived at, with full mutual consent of all States in the region.
3. At the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, a group of States introduced decision L.22, which proposed, inter alia, “the convening, no later than June 2019 for a duration of one week at United Nations Headquarters, of a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, to which all States of the Middle East, the three co-sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ... shall be invited”.
4. Canada abstained from decision L.22 at the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, as the proposal described therein did not sufficiently reflect the core principles of inclusion, consensus, consent and efficacy that underpin Canada’s policy and decision-making on the issue. While referencing a consensus-based decision-making process, the proposed conference could adopt decisions regardless of the actual number of States of the region represented. In Canada’s view, this process would not result in a meaningful effort to overcome the divergent perspectives and security concerns implicated in the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.



5. At the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, Canada voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 73/28, entitled “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East”. Canada abstained on resolution 73/70, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments” which, inter alia, called on States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to work towards the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Consistent with its long-standing position on the issue, Canada also voted against resolution 73/83, entitled “The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East”.

6. Canada also continues to call for the universal and full adherence and compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty by States in the Middle East. At the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Canada actively supported the adoption of a resolution on the application of safeguards in the Middle East by the IAEA General Conferences in 2005 and 2006. Canada regrets that it was unable to support this annual resolution from 2007 to 2018, given that changes presented by the drafters were not the result of a consensus approach and because the resolution during that time period did not address serious breaches in compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards requirements by some other States in the region, as determined by IAEA and reported by the Agency to the Security Council. Canada has also worked with other States in the context of successive IAEA General Conferences to prevent unhelpful and politically motivated resolutions from having a negative impact on efforts aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

7. Canada appeals to all States in the region to contribute further to regional stability and security by concluding additional protocols to their respective comprehensive safeguards agreements, which Canada considers the current verification standard pursuant to article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We urge those States in the region that have signed an additional protocol to ratify it without further delay.

8. Canada continues to support the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and appreciates international efforts spearheaded by European partners to preserve the agreement. Canada believes a coordinated multilateral approach is the best way to address shared concerns. While Canada remains concerned about Iran’s long-term nuclear ambitions and continues to challenge Iran on its human rights violations, ballistic missile programme and destabilizing regional activities, Canada believes the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action constrains Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon, as verified by IAEA. Iran must continue to fully implement all of the commitments it agreed to under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in order to build the international community’s confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful in nature. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action subjects Iran to an extensive international verification regime by IAEA which provides the international community with a high degree of insight into Iran’s nuclear programme. Since 2014, Canada has been the lead contributor to verification in Iran, having contributed a total of 13 million Canadian dollars to IAEA, including most recently, 1.5 million Canadian dollars in September 2018. Canada welcomes Iran’s provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement but urges Iran to expeditiously ratify the Additional Protocol as an additional confidence-building measure.

9. Canada remains deeply concerned about findings that point to possible undeclared nuclear material, facilities and activities in Syria, which suggest nuclear cooperation between Syria and North Korea in contravention of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Canada fully supported the IAEA Board of Governors resolution (GOV/2011/41) requesting the IAEA Director General to report to the Security

Council the assessment that an undeclared nuclear reactor existed at Dair Alzour, in breach of Syria's safeguards obligations. While recognizing challenges posed by the current security situation in Syria, IAEA continues to report that the Assad regime has failed to provide the cooperation, information and access necessary to address Syria's outstanding compliance issues. We continue to call on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance and to meet its own commitment to "fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve related outstanding issues". We also continue to urge Syria to bring into force an additional protocol as soon as possible. Only through full, transparent and proactive cooperation with IAEA can Syria restore confidence with respect to the scope and nature of its nuclear programme.

10. Canada continues to call on all remaining States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. As a confidence-building measure in advance of this ultimate goal, Canada has also called on these same States to separate civilian and military fuel cycles and to place all civilian nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. These statements are in conformity with both the policies and actions of Canada, which include Canada's voting record on the resolutions at the seventy-third session of the General Assembly, referenced in paragraph 5 of this report.

11. Canada recognizes the growing interest in nuclear energy among States parties in the Middle East and welcomes the announcements made by a number of such States concerning new initiatives in this field. In welcoming these initiatives, Canada notes that all nuclear power programmes should be accompanied by the strongest commitments to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security.

12. Canada continues to implement our Nuclear Security Summit commitments by promoting and enhancing nuclear security around the world, including in the Middle East region. To date, Canada has provided over \$24 million in assistance to Jordan to strengthen its nuclear detection capabilities to combat nuclear trafficking and smuggling, including through the installation of radiation monitoring equipment at key border sites, and the establishment of mobile counter-nuclear smuggling teams to monitor irregular crossing points along its border with Syria. As a part of more than \$54 million provided to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund, Canadian funds have also been used to safely and securely remove disused sealed radioactive sources from Lebanon and strengthen the physical protection and cybersecurity of nuclear facilities in Egypt.