The resulting publication identifies relevant initiatives and good practices developed by Member States and the multistakeholder community and distils key insights, lessons learned, and recommendations on integrating gender perspectives into cybersecurity. It is intended to support Member States and other relevant stakeholders in their efforts to meaningfully integrate gender considerations in national ICT architectures and advance the implementation of the Framework for responsible State behaviour in cyberspace with a gender perspective in mind.

This publcation is structured into four chapters following the four focus areas of the workshops convened:

1. Gendered threats and impacts of ICT: Analyses how the use and misuse of ICT affects individuals and communities differently and illustrates the diversity of gendered impacts.
2. Gender and international law in cyberspace: Compiles examples and existing guidelines in which international law obligations and normative commitments can be interpreted and implemented in ways that reflect the lived experiences of those affected by ICT-related threats.
3. Mainstreaming gender into national cyber policies and practices: Examines gender equality commitments, multistakeholder participation, inclusive workforce development, and gender-responsive institutional mandates and incident-reporting mechanisms guiding national cybersecurity and digital policies and practices.
4. Gender-responsive cyber capacity-building: Explores examples of targeted upskilling initiatives that can contribute to the full, equal, and meaningful participation and leadership of women and other marginalized groups in technology design and development, cybersecurity measures and incident response, in the formulation of policies, and in cybersecurity governance and diplomacy.

The publication concludes with a list of cross-cutting recommendations stemming from the analyses in the chapters and overarching considerations gathered through the research project. In addition, a curated list of practical resources is also included as a toolbox at the end to guide further reading and engagement.

Citation: Allison Pytlak, Dominique Steinbrecher, Jessica Espinosa Azcarraga, Kathleen Scoggin, and Shimona Mohan. Mainstreaming Gender in Cybersecurity: A Compendium of Good Practices. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026. doi.org/10.37559/SECTEC/26/CR/06.

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Notably, there are divergent interpretations of “attack” and of whether “digital data” is an object under IHL. This deficiency of clarity, particularly concerning what constitutes permissible or impermissible cyber behaviour in armed conflict, could inhibit legal protections of civilians and civilian objects.

In an effort to facilitate future multilateral discussions on how international law, and in particular IHL, applies to cyber operations, this report highlights two main interpretive approaches found in scholarship and, most importantly, national positions on international law in cyberspace:

• A restrictive interpretation, which limits the notion of “attack” under IHL to cyber operations that cause physical harm and generally excludes digital data as an object.
• An expansive interpretation, which includes operations that result in a “loss of functionality” within the notion of attack and considers essential civilian data as a legally protected object.

Ultimately, the report argues that the incremental convergence of common understanding, while unlikely to ever achieve absolute uniformity, is crucial for establishing clearer international limits on the use of ICTs in armed conflict.

Citation: Giacomo Biggio and Andraz Kastelic. International Humanitarian Law and Cyber Operations: (Consequences of) Divergent National Interpretations of “Attack” and “Data”. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026.

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Over the course of its mandate, the OEWG adopted three annual progress reports and a final report. These outcomes helped further develop the existing framework and led to the establishment of a new permanent forum: the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs. In addition, the OEWG discussions also generated substantial material on how UN Member States addressed key issues related to ICTs and international security, which were not captured in the agreed reports.

This report provides an analysis of the evolution of the process and a detailed account of those discussions, including major themes and trends, across the main pillars of the framework: threats, rules, norms and principles, international law, confidence-building measures, capacity-building, and regular institutional dialogue.

This publication is made up of eight individual chapters, which can be downloaded and used independently or as a single volume (see Download section above):

• Chapter 1 | Introduction, by Dr Samuele Dominioni and Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli.
  Introduces the report’s focus on the 2021–2025 UN OEWG on ICT security, outlining its background, research questions, chapter structure, and methodology.

• Chapter 2 | Existing and potential threats, by Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli, Aamna Rafiq and Chimdi Igwe.
  Addresses how States have discussed and understood major ICT threats in the context of international security during the 2021–2025 OEWG.

• Chapter 3 | Rules, norms and principles of responsible State behaviour, by Dr Andraz Kastelic.
  Provides an overview of how States have addressed Rules, Norms, and Principles of Responsible State Behaviour in their use of ICTs during the 2021-2025 OEWG.

• Chapter 4 | International law, by Andrea Gronke and Dominique Steinbrecher.
  Analyses States’ discussions on international law and its applicability to the ICT environment during the 2021-2025 OEWG.

• Chapter 5 | Confidence-building measures, by Dr Samuele Dominioni.
  Explores how States have discussed and developed CBMs, including the Global Intergovernmental Points of Contact Directory, during the OEWG 2021-2025.

• Chapter 6 | Capacity-building, by Dr Ekaterina Martynova and Moliehi Makumane.
  Identifies major milestones and themes discussed by States on Capacity Building during the OEWG 2021-2025.

• Chapter 7 | Regular institutional dialogue, by Pavel Mraz and Lenka Filipova.
  Examines how States have negotiated and agreed on the Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs during the OEWG 2021-2025.

• Chapter 8 | Cross-sectional analysis and conclusions, by Dr Samuele Dominioni and Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli.
  Conducts a cross-cutting analysis of all the chapters and identifies key factors that characterized States’ negotiations during the OEWG (2021-2025) and provides some concluding reflections.

Citation: Samuele Dominioni and Giacomo Persi Paoli (eds.). Unpacking the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on ICT in the Context of International Security (2021-2025). Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026. doi.org/10.37559/SECTEC/26/CR/05.

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By examining official documents, analyzing relevant laws and regulations, and investigating the structure of government agencies, this paper sheds light on the Republic of Korea’s potential to conduct international cyber operations and the principles likely to govern their deployment.

Citation: So Jeong Kim, International Cyber Operations: Doctrines and Capabilities of the Republic of Korea (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026).

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Through a series of dynamic, multi-stakeholder panel discussions, the event examined the ripple effects such incidents can have across borders and sectors, highlighting the growing interdependence of digital ecosystems.

This report also offers clear, action-oriented guidance for relevant stakeholders seeking to enhance resilience, cooperation, and preparedness.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, 2025 Cyber Stability Conference, Crisis Averted: Cyber Resilience in Action (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026).

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Organized into three interrelated sections, the report explores:

• Evolving cyberthreats: From attacks on critical infrastructure and supply chains to the rise of ransomware, disinformation and cybercrime, this section analyses how the growing scale and complexity of cyberattacks pose systemic risks to national, regional and global stability. It explains how these threats operate and includes case-based illustrations of their real-world impacts on peace and security.
• Cyberthreat actors: Examining the increasingly blurred lines between State and non-State actors in cyberspace. This section explores the motivations and tactics of various actors, including States, cybercriminals, hacktivists and private entities, and highlights how overlapping behaviours may complicate response.
• Emerging technologies: Focusing on artificial intelligence and quantum computing, this section outlines how technological advancements are reshaping offensive and defensive cyber operations. The report considers how these technologies offer new opportunities for cybersecurity while also creating new vulnerabilities and strategic risks for the international community.

Throughout, the report provides explanatory textboxes designed to help diplomats and policymakers better understand how cyberattacks work at a technical level, as well as case studies that concretely demonstrate the international security impacts of malicious cyber activity. By demystifying complex technical concepts and contemporary trends, the report hopes to support national and international deliberations to strengthen resilience, reduce risks and advance an open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace for all.

Citation: UNIDIR Security and Technology Programme, Securing Cyberspace for Peace: Insights into Cyberthreats and International Security in 2025 (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026).

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Drawing on desk research and interviews with national CSIRTs and international and regional networks, the brief analyses how domestic institutional arrangements shape CSIRTs’ capacity to engage in effective information exchange and collaboration at the bilateral, regional and global levels.

The brief identifies key challenges and highlights good practices to enhance information exchange and coordination, as well as offering practical recommendations to support States in strengthening national CSIRTs and advancing responsible State behaviour in cyberspace.

Citation: Samuele Dominioni and Helena Hinkel, Strengthening National CSIRT Cooperation: From Domestic Setups to International Networks (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026)

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This convergence introduces new and potentially significant risks. They include possible attacks on biological research and development facilities, targeting the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of information. In the context of international peace and security, ICT incidents present a spectrum of consequences, from minor to significant. For example, a minor event could involve a malicious actor spoofing an agricultural facility’s sensors to transmit false data to owner, impacting the annual production of crops. Conversely, a significant event could involve a malicious actor infiltrating the ICT systems of a biological research and development facility, to interfere with an automated production system, remotely altering the compounds, thus rendering its product ineffective, or worse, harmful.

Various scholars and practitioners have attempted to name and define a concept recognizing the unique characteristics of the infrastructure, data, vectors, and risk implications at this nexus. Cyberbiosecurity refers to a collection of practices aimed at addressing the potential ICT threats to those systems at the intersection of the digital and biological domains. More specifically, it includes methods, procedures and measures to tackle ICT threats to biosafety and biosecurity.

To better understand the nexus between ICT and the biological field, and as part of UNIDIR’s Science and Technology Watchtower project, this paper begins with an outline of some of the benefits introduced by the integration of advanced ICT in biological research and development.

It then introduces the above definition of the concept of ‘cyberbiosecurity’ and proceeds to outline some of the key risks at this nexus. The New Agenda for Peace launched by the Secretary-General in 2023 highlights the need for Member States to prevent the weaponization of emerging domains and promote responsible innovation (Action 11). The 2024 Summit of the Future was an opportunity for Member States to reaffirm their commitment to the prevention of biorisks and misuse of emerging technologies. This was particularly reflected in the Pact for the Future, specifically in Action 26 (to uphold disarmament obligations and commitments) and Action 27 (to seize opportunities associated with new and emerging technologies and address potential risks posed by their misuse). Cyberbiosecurity appears at the junction of these two goals.

This notion has however received tangential attention in the multilateral discussion on international ICT security, specifically the General Assembly subsidiary bodies the Groups of Governmental Experts from 2004 to 2021 and Open-ended Working Groups since 2019. In the context of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), limited attention has been given to cyberbiosecurity related issues. There are however cyber-related elements mentioned in documents and statements of the last 10 years.

Finally, in the United Nations Security Council, several States have expressed concern over the increase in cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure, including in the health sector, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic. While not encompassing all aspects of this issue, these discussions can help in sensitizing the international community and practitioners on the need for better measures.

One way forward could be to clarify the breadth of the concept of cyberbiosecurity through exchanges with relevant communities and considering cyberbiosecurity in the context of the ongoing BWC Working Group, notably in discussions on scientific and technological developments. This approach could allow for an exchange of views and good practices in the cyber domain and their applicability to biological research and development facilities.

Citation: Louison Mazeaud and Andraz Kastelic, “Cyberbiosecurity: A Matter of International Peace and Security?” UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/25/CBW/02.

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This report introduces a novel approach that not only highlights how existing cyber threats may impact people differently based on gender, but also provides actionable guidance to support more inclusive, equitable cybersecurity governance.

Citation: Katharine Millar and Verónica Ferrari, A Novel Approach to the 11 UN Norms for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace: Guidelines for Gendered Implementation. (Washington, DC: Organization of American States; Geneva: UNIDIR, 2025).

Partner

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In 2023, UNIDIR published its first report on subsea cables, entitled Wading Murky Waters: Subsea Communications Cables and Responsible State Behaviour. The initial scoping study sought to raise awareness of this essential transmission technology. Since then, a slew of new initiatives have been proposed, including at the international level, signalling both the strategic importance of the infrastructure and the need to strengthen security and resilience across all of its components.

This follow-on study sets out to understand what it means in policy and practice when governments qualify or designate subsea telecommunications cables as critical infrastructure (CI). The report draws from the CI literature to frame government approaches to security and resilience, identifying how government policy and practice interact with core CI concepts such as absorptive, restorative and adaptive resilience capacities. While subsea cable systems are generally designed and deployed with these capacities in mind, effective government action on security and resilience can contribute to strengthening them.

Citation: C. Kavanagh, J. Franken, and W. He. “Achieving Depth: Subsea Telecommunications Cables as Critical Infrastructure”. Geneva, Switzerland: UNIDIR, 2025.

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The author examines plausible scenarios, such as the emergence of an arms race in military applications of AI among regional states, which could either increase WMD proliferation risks in the region or, conversely, help reduce them. The paper also discusses key factors AI may have in the negotiations to establish a WMD-Free Zone, including urgency and the potential technical benefits of AI in arms control processes.

Citation: Nasser bin Nasser, “The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Regional Security, Threat Perceptions and the Middle East WMD-Free Zone”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2025, https://www.doi.org/10.37559/MEWMDFZ/2025/ZoneAI.

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Over the years, the Portal has evolved with new features and capabilities, including availability in all UN official languages, and enhanced content search and filtering functions. In response to the many questions we’ve received about the Portal, we created a booklet that provides an overview of the wealth of information available through this confidence-building tool.

Citation: Giacomo Persi Paoli, Lenka Filipová “Unlocking the UNIDIR Cyber Policy Portal: A Comprehensive User Guide”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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The roundtable was organized by the Chair of the Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021–2025 (OEWG), as requested by Member States in the second Annual Progress Report of the OEWG.

The purpose of this report is to summarize the discussions and highlights from this inaugural roundtable. It provides an overview of the key points and addresses the barriers to ICT capacity-building mentioned during the event.

Citation: Giacomo Persi Paoli, Samuele Dominioni, Aamna Rafiq, Lenka Filipová “Accelerating ICT Security Capacity-Building: Takeaways from the Global Roundtable on ICT Security Capacity-Building”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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However, the fragmentation of the ICT environment, and more specifically of the internet, has become an increasingly serious possibility, which is already occurring in certain settings. Indeed, the fragmentation of the internet can affect different and sometimes intertwined levels, including political, commercial, and technological. The purpose of this primer is to provide a brief and concise analysis of the possible effects and consequences of internet fragmentation on cybersecurity as broadly understood.

Citation: Samuele Dominioni (2023). “Internet Fragmentation and Cybersecurity: A Primer”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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To support the development of a shared understanding on the mandate and role of the cyber PoA, and acknowledging the critical role that the multi-stakeholder community already plays in the implementation of the framework of responsible State behaviour, UNIDIR offered a platform to non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, academic institutions, and the private sector to share their perspectives on the prospects of establishing a cyber PoA, and on its scope, structure, and content. This offer included a call for written inputs followed by a workshop.

Based on the analysis of the workshop and written inputs, this report presents a consolidated set of considerations and options for action to inform States’ discussions on the cyber PoA.

Citation: Security and Technology Programme (2023) “Drawing Parallels: A Multi-Stakeholder Perspective on the Cyber PoA Scope, Structure and Content”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland

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The purpose of the Conference was twofold: first, to advance the international discussions on how international law applies to cyberspace and to contribute to confidence-building by promoting transparency in order to reduce misperception and misunderstanding among the Member States and, second, to contribute to capacity-building by providing a platform for expert briefings and exchange of good practices.

This report provides a summary of the Conference briefings and discussions, an outline of the emerging convergent and divergent positions, as well as several suggestions for how to advance multilateral discussions on the application of international law to State conduct using ICTs and to ensure rule of international law in the twenty-first century. As such, the report charts the potential focus areas for future multilateral deliberations on the Charter and the use of ICTs in the context of international peace and security.

Citation: Security and Technology Programme (2023) “Use of ICTs by States: Rights and Responsibilities Under the Charter of the United Nations”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland

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In response to this demand and to increase the cybersecurity and resilience of Member States, the UNIDIR Security and Technology programme conducted a research study with three main objectives, which are to identify foundational cyber capabilities, strengthen States’ ability to effectively prevent or mitigate the impact of selected malicious ICT activities, and design a tool to better identify requirements and prioritize capacity-building interventions.

The outcomes of the research project can be found in these two publications. The first report, Part I. Mapping the Foundational Cyber Capabilities, is centered on the concept of Foundational Cyber Capabilities (FCCs), which are defined as the combination of policies and regulations, processes and structures, partnerships and networks, people and skills, and technology necessary to implement the Framework.

The second report, Part II. Introducing a Threat-Based Approach, proposes an approach that would allow governments to better assess their readiness to leverage the Framework to prevent or respond to specific malicious ICT activities and threats.

Citation: Samuele Dominioni and Giacomo Persi Paoli (2023) “Unpacking Cyber Capacity-Building Needs: Part I. Mapping the Foundational Cyber Capabilities”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland

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In response to this demand and to increase the cybersecurity and resilience of Member States, the UNIDIR Security and Technology programme conducted a research study with three main objectives, which are to identify foundational cyber capabilities, strengthen States’ ability to effectively prevent or mitigate the impact of selected malicious ICT activities, and design a tool to better identify requirements and prioritize capacity-building interventions.

The outcomes of the research project can be found in these two publications. The first report, Part I. Mapping the Foundational Cyber Capabilities, is centered on the concept of Foundational Cyber Capabilities (FCCs), which are defined as the combination of policies and regulations, processes and structures, partnerships and networks, people and skills, and technology necessary to implement the Framework.

The second report, Part II. Introducing a Threat-Based Approach, proposes an approach that would allow governments to better assess their readiness to leverage the Framework to prevent or respond to specific malicious ICT activities and threats.

Citation: Samuele Dominioni and Giacomo Persi Paoli (2023) “Unpacking Cyber Capacity-Building Needs: Part II. Introducing a Threat-Based Approach”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland

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Sponsor Organizations: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and Microsoft

Citation: Samuele Dominioni (2023) “Operationalizing a Directory of Points of Contact for Cyber Confidence-Building Measures”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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The conference provided a platform for structured discussion among State representatives on good practices in the field of inter-State cooperation and the relevant confidence- and capacity-building measures for more peaceful and stable international ICT environment.

Citation: Security and Technology Programme (2023) “Towards a More Stable and Secure ICT Environment: Unpacking Inter-State Cooperation”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

The post Towards a More Stable and Secure ICT Environment: Unpacking Inter-State Cooperation (Conference Summary Report) first appeared on UNIDIR.

El trabajo analiza los vínculos entre los temas prioritarios de MPS – la igualdad de género, la participación de las mujeres en la seguridad internacional, la prevención de la violencia contra las mujeres y su protección y las necesidades diferenciadas por el género – y la ciberseguridad internacional. También identifica las áreas prioritarias que deben abordarse para garantizar un ciberespacio inclusivo en cuanto al género y que proteja los derechos de las mujeres y niñas.

Citation: Lisa Sharland, Netta Goussac, Emilia Currey, Genevieve Feely, and Sarah O’Connor (2023) “Actualización del Sistema: Hacia una Agenda de Mujeres, Paz y Ciberseguridad”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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En cada uno de estos tres pilares, la investigación identifica diferentes dimensiones de las actividades relacionadas con la ciberseguridad que tienen implicaciones de género y que, en consecuencia, se deben considerar desde una perspectiva de género.

El informe propone recomendaciones para incorporar la visión de género mediante políticas y prácticas internacionales de ciberseguridad, de modo que se garantice que la ciberseguridad mejora la seguridad de las personas de todas las identidades y expresiones de género, además de la paz y seguridad internacional. La principal conclusión es que estos dos niveles de seguridad no pueden ser separados.

Citation: Katharine Miller, James Shires and Tatiana Tropina (2023) “Enfoques de Género en la Ciberseguridad: Diseño, Defensa y Respuesta”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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This report approaches subsea communications cables from a systemic perspective: as core elements of the broader ICT ecosystem. It begins with an overview of developments in subsea cable technology and associated ‘wet’ (undersea) and ‘dry’ (land) plant infrastructure and the main actors involved in the subsea cable industry. It then provides an overview of the more commonly cited threats and vulnerabilities relevant to subsea cable systems and related infrastructure, followed by an introduction to the extant subsea cable governance regime. Drawing in part from the Government Best Practices of the International Cable Protection Committee and existing recommendations negotiated under the umbrella of the General Assembly’s First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, it concludes with some preliminary recommendations on cooperative steps that governments can take to advance responsible State behaviour and to strengthen the resilience of subsea cable systems and related infrastructure.

TRANSLATIONS

The Executive Summary of this publication is available in the following languages:

• Arabic
• Chinese
• French
• Russian
• Spanish

Sponsor Organizations: European Union

Citation: Camino Kavanagh (2023) “Wading Murky Waters: Subsea Communications Cables and Responsible State Behaviour”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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The conference convened representatives from international organizations, industry, governments, and civil society to reflect on how to further progress in multilateral discussions and support more efficient policy interventions by national governments for critical infrastructure protection.

Citation: Camino Kavanagh (2022) “Cyber Stability Conference: Protecting Critical Infrastructure And Services Across Sectors”, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland.

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