This report analyses key trends in the use of UASs by NSAGs in Myanmar, with a particular focus on post-coup developments. It aims to provide researchers, policymakers and practitioners with an overview of how these systems have been adopted and employed by various groups across the country, and of their implications for evolving conflict dynamics. It examines the types of NSAGs deploying UASs, the geographical distribution of incidents, as well as the primary targets and impacts of their operations. The report also explores trends in the craft-production, modification and weaponization of these systems, identifying the key factors enabling the rapid adoption and diffusion of UAS capabilities among NSAGs, including the widespread availability of commercial components, access to open-source knowledge, decentralized knowledge-sharing networks and improvised production practices.

By examining the Myanmar case, the report provides insights into the expanding role of uncrewed systems in contemporary armed conflicts. It highlights the challenges that the growing development and use of these systems may pose for existing arms control frameworks, as well as for international security and stability more broadly.

Citation: Joshua Angelo Estrada Bata and Bárbara Morais Figueiredo, “The use of uncrewed aerial systems by non-State armed groups: Exploring trends in Myanmar”. Geneva: UNIDIR, 2026. https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/26/ERC/01

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In June 2023, UNIDIR initiated research examining craft production of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The objective of this research is to increase knowledge and understanding of craft-produced SALW and raise awareness of the challenges for preventing and addressing their illicit proliferation, trafficking and misuse. This report aspires to be a first step towards a global and more comprehensive dialogue on the issue of craft-produced SALW. The findings presented in it draw primarily on UNIDIR’s “Global survey on addressing the global craft production of SALW”, which was distributed to all United Nations Member States throughout 2023 and in early 2024. A total of 80 countries from all regions of the world contributed to this study by completing the survey.

This report explores key types of craft-produced weapon and manufacturing techniques, and profiles the main actors involved in the production and use of these weapons. It also delves into the existing international, regional, and national frameworks that regulate illicit manufacturing and address, most often implicitly, the issue of craft production. Finally, it considers key challenges to efforts to address this global challenge and avenues to improve these efforts. This report intends to provide international and regional organizations and states, in particular their law enforcement agencies, with a representative, yet non-exhaustive, benchmark on the issue of craft production of SALW. The report encourages a new, global dialogue on this critical issue.

Citation (EN): Matilde Vecchioni, “Unregulated Production: Examining Craft-Produced Weapons from a Global Perspective”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024. https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/24/PACAV/08

Référence(FR): Matilde Veccioni ” Production non-réglementée : Examens des armes artisanales à l’échelle mondiale”, UNIDIR, Genève2024, https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/24/PACAV/10

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The analysis in the report is based on a data set of incidents of UAS use by NSAGs in Africa in the period January 2018–June 2023.

Citation: Bárbara Morais Figueiredo (2024). “The Use of Uncrewed Aerial Systems by Non-State Armed Groups: Exploring Trends in Africa”, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/CAAP/24/PACAV/01

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The 4^th Review Conference of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade of Small and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), held in 2024, established an open-ended technical expert group (OETEG) to develop recommendations for the full and effective implementation of these instruments in light of developments in SALW manufacturing, technology and design. The first meeting of the OETEG takes place in New York this week and will examine measures to counter illicit 3D-printing of SALW, alongside other issues. Several considerations are outlined below for national and international experts as they seek to identify effective strategic and operational measures to enable States to implement the PoA and ITI in preventing the illicit 3D printing of SALW. 

Why is 3D-printing a problem for SALW control?

The UN PoA and ITI provide a series of measures that States should take to counter the illicit manufacture and trafficking of SALW. 3D-printing of SALW poses several challenges for PoA and ITI implementation, including: 

• the decentralized and unregulated production of these weapons; 
• the commercial availability of production machinery (i.e. 3D-printers);
• the production of unmarked weapons; and
• the intangible flows of knowledge online. 

While the first three challenges are also features for other types of craft-produced SALW, 3D-printing takes the issue from the physical to the virtual realm. The proliferation of digital blueprints online and the strong shift towards increasingly do-it-yourself designs that do not rely on the use of government-regulated components means that decentralized, undetectable networks can produce lethal 3D-printed SALW beyond the control of States.

It is therefore essential that the OETEG provides a platform for national and international experts to share current and emerging challenges posed by 3D printing for the full and effective implementation of the PoA and ITI, but also recommendations for: 

• legislation to ensure national control;
• international intelligence sharing and cooperation to enhance investigation protocols;
• the use of new technologies for disrupting illicit knowledge sharing; and 
• capacity-building, training and awareness raising to prevent the use of 3D-printers for illicit SALW production. 

Strengthening legal frameworks

A cornerstone of the effective implementation of international instruments is comprehensive national-level legislation. Several countries, such as Australia, Canada, Jamaica, North Macedonia and Singapore, have taken proactive measures to enhance their legislative frameworks by means of criminalizing digital blueprints for 3D production of SALW. The UK has proposed a similar bill to Parliament.

At the regional level, an EU Commission proposal from February 2026 to harmonize definitions and penalties to combat the illicit trafficking of firearms includes suggestions for EU Member States to introduce the following penalties in their national systems: 

• an upper limit of at least two years of imprisonment for the illicit creation, acquisition, possession and dissemination of 3D-printed SALW blueprints;
• five years for the possession of illicit firearms, components and ammunition; and 
• eight years for trafficking and manufacturing. 

While the criminalization of blueprints is a good first step, States should also ensure that their SALW control legislation covers the illicit manufacture, possession, use and trafficking of all forms of 3D-printed SALW and their components. 

Intelligence sharing and cooperation

Intelligence sharing and international cooperation between law enforcement agencies are crucial in stemming the proliferation of 3D-printed SALW. While many States already have national points of contact for PoA/ITI implementation, it does not appear that intelligence on 3D-printed SALW is moving beyond regional level exchanges between national firearms focal points and specialist units. States could consider ways of including information about illicit 3D-printed SALW in shared databases, such as INTERPOL’s ‘iARMS’. This all requires law enforcement agencies to develop and maintain approaches and protocols for data collection, analysis, and sharing related to seizures of 3D-printed SALW. 

Law enforcement agencies must also develop close cooperation with the 3D-printing industry. As stipulated in the outcomes from the 4^th Review Conference, bringing 3D-printing companies to the discussion table and promoting active dialogue without infringing on the legitimate uses of this technology is key. Cooperation must also be fostered with other stakeholders, such as postal services, e-commerce sites, and social media platforms, as these continue to be used to sell and promote 3D-printed SALW. 

New technologies to disrupt illicit 3D-printing

It is imperative for law enforcement agencies to use new technologies to detect and disrupt illicit networks involved in illicit information sharing and the production of 3D-printed SALW. Pilot projects are already underway that could lead the way. For example, the CEASEFIRE project, a three-year multidimensional project that was implemented during 2022-25 involving the EU, EUROPOL and INTERPOL, aimed to incorporate various cyber-detection methods, AI-driven tools, shared databases, information fusion and offline techniques to interdict illegal firearms trafficking, including the distribution of digital blueprints for 3D-printed SALW. Successful pilot projects could be expanded, replicated and sustained, while new initiatives should be developed.

Several US states are exploring the introduction of ‘blocking software’ to detect blueprints and block 3D-printing of SALW. At present, this has several limitations, including: 

• the need to be constantly updated to account for new designs;
• the susceptibility to circumvention;
• the risk of flagging false positives; and 
• the dependence on federal legislation mandating compliance by various stakeholders.

It remains to be seen if AI could help overcome the first two limitations. 

A promising development is the Secure Information Embedding and Extraction framework, which aims to embed unique fingerprints into 3D-printed objects that are resistant to physical tampering, breakage and digital interdiction. 

Capacity building, training and awareness-raising

States must also focus on training law enforcement officers to identify and document 3D-printed SALW and their components, develop standard operating procedures for evidence collection, and enhance forensic capabilities. While developments within the forensic space that are focused on chemical signature tracing of polymers, toolmark analysis of nozzle and print bed deposition artifacts and fingerprinting of printers are still limited, they remain useful in aiding investigations and enhancing prosecution. Future developments in nano-topographical and micro-CT analysis may enhance forensic identification of 3D-printed SALW. All of this requires adequate resources.

International organizations like INTERPOL and the UN play a crucial role in assisting Member States develop their capabilities to counter the illicit production, proliferation and misuse of 3D-printed SALW. INTERPOL’s Project Stonefish and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’s SALW Fellowship Training Programme are examples of capacity-building programmes that aim to increase awareness and strengthen the investigative capabilities of Member States in this area. 

At the national level, States should consider introducing awareness programmes targeted at young people, given the increasing involvement of youths in the 3D-printing of firearms.

The way forward

Current proliferation trends suggest that the OETEG’s consideration of how to counter the threat posed by 3D-printed SALW is timely. UNIDIR has been actively supporting the preparations for all the issues under the purview of the OETEG, as can be seen in this recent report. Developments that seemed like a chimaera a decade ago have become a reality today. Therefore, it is imperative that we put the necessary preventive measures in place now to stem further misuse of this technology. 

At the same time, we have seen that 3D-printing has evolved rapidly and is not standing still. Therefore, we should already be considering how to ensure that opportunities like the OETEG, which brings together a unique group of national and international experts, can be used to address technological challenges as they emerge. The 2026 OETEG meeting will therefore be a useful “pilot” opportunity.  

The post Mitigating the proliferation of 3D-printed small arms and light weapons first appeared on UNIDIR.

In recent years, improvised weapons have become a pervasive threat to international security – from the role of weaponized commercial drones in conflicts in Myanmar, Sudan and Ukraine, to the use of DIY firearms by criminals and terrorists in Africa, the Americas and Europe. With production and use growing beyond State control, participants at the UNIDIR conference Inside the networks: How knowledge-sharing drives improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS production highlighted the urgent need for enhanced national, regional and international responses to this emerging threat.

Capabilities that were once limited to States and industrial arms manufacturers are now within reach of individual hobbyists, criminal networks, and terrorist organizations. It is a moment to rethink traditional approaches to arms control.

Ambassador Thomas Göbel, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament

One of the driving forces behind the proliferation of improvised weapons is the diffusion of knowledge on their production and use. One of the conference’s experts highlighted that “groups from across contexts copy the tactics and the expertise, not only the hardware.” Increasingly detailed guidance for acquiring, assembling and using improvised weapons is shared through online and offline knowledge networks. Therefore, it is a timely moment to raise awareness, foster information-sharing, and enhance joint efforts to counter the illicit production and use of improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS.

If we continue to treat improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS as separate challenges, we will fall short – because their uses and users are now inseparably connected.

Matilde Vecchioni, Associate Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, UNIDIR

Countering the spread of knowledge

Organized by UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, the conference on improvised weapons brought together over 80 participants from permanent missions in Geneva, international and regional organizations, national law enforcement agencies, civil society, and academia. The expert gathering  addressed the role of knowledge transfer in the illicit proliferation of improvised weapons.

Stakeholders discussed key trends and linkages in improvised production of SALW, IEDs and UAS, and unpacked the role of different knowledge networks in acquisition, production and use across conflict and non-conflict settings. The programme also addressed regional and national perspectives, exploring the use of improvised weapons in case studies from different geopolitical contexts – including Brazil, Myanmar, Somalia and Ukraine.  

Addressing improvised weapons proliferation

In the final roundtable session, participants shared best practices and challenges for addressing the illicit proliferation and misuse of improvised weapons observed in their work. Potential measures and some concrete next steps emerged to improve national, regional and international responses, focusing on three main areas for further developments and cooperation:

• Legislative approaches and policy frameworks:

Existing policy frameworks – international, regional and national – should be revised to keep pace with emerging trends in improvised weapons production. New legislative approaches also merit exploration, including the criminalization of possessing or using blueprints for the purpose of manufacturing weapons. Several countries, including Canada, North Macedonia, Singapore, and the State of New South Wales in Australia, have already adopted such measures. Monitoring their impact and effectiveness will be especially important for understanding how these policies may help prevent the misuse of 3D-printing technologies.

Existing regulations – such as those on readily convertible blank-firing firearms – can also inspire similar approaches for other improvised weapons, offering a practical pathway for controlling items and components with high misuse potential.

• Operational practices and investigations:

Improvisation is a process – and each step offers valuable opportunities to strengthen the prevention and disruption of illicit weapons production. Several national good practices from the UK, Brazil, Cambodia and others highlighted ways to enhance countermeasures by:

1. tracking the materials, technologies and hardware used in weapons manufacturing;
2. monitoring the individuals involved, including foreign fighters; and
3. following the flow of online knowledge – not only on the dark web, but also across open-source platforms.

Civil society actors involved in field and open-source investigations can also play a crucial role in mapping flows, hotspots and tendencies related to improvised weapons production.

• Information sharing and data collection:

Those involved in improvised weapons production – whether hobbyists, criminal networks, or actors in active conflict – constitute an inventive, fast-adapting, and continuously evolving community. As one participant put it: “If the international community cannot move as quickly or as collaboratively as they do, we will always be one step behind.“

Improving information sharing among all relevant stakeholders – national authorities, law enforcement, border control, civil society organizations, and through postal and shipping services and social media platforms – is therefore essential. This effort must also be grounded in stronger data collection: ensuring that those responsible for gathering information are trained to identify and record different types of improvised weapons accurately. This is critical for understanding emerging developments and identifying common trends. Civil society actors can provide innovative solutions to enhance data collection efforts.

Shaping a community for collective action

By bringing together policymakers, law enforcement officials, regional and international organizations, as well as civil society and academia, the conference helped bridge sectoral knowledge gaps and foster dialogue on potential cooperative solutions. This represents only a first – but significant – step towards more coordinated and effective action to counter the growing threat posed by the improvised production of SALW, IEDs and UAS.

The mix of law enforcement and national and international experts created a uniquely productive environment. The networking and cooperation opportunities offered during the event have been invaluable.

Participant’s feedback

UNIDIR remains committed to building on these discussions and advancing collective efforts to curb the spread of improvised weapons.

The post Facilitating cooperation to counter improvised weapon production first appeared on UNIDIR.

The spread and evolution of improvised weapons are strongly shaped by regional and national dynamics. Yet, a common thread is that their unregulated nature challenges established national and international arms control systems. As barriers to weapons production decrease, how should States and the international community adapt to this evolving threat?

Categories of ‘improvisation’

A first step is understanding what ‘improvised’ means. The table below illustrates two main categories of improvisation across three types of conventional weapons: improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms and light weapons (SALW), and uncrewed aerial systems (UAS).

Key common enablers and trends

The use and types of improvised weapons are contextual, but they also share commonalities. A series of regional expert consultations conducted by UNIDIR in 2025 shed light on key trends.  

In most cases, the non-industrial nature of improvised weapons, makes them relatively cost-effective, accessible and hard to trace – as such, they are strategically and operationally attractive to non-state armed groups (NSAGs), criminals and terrorists.

Emerging and dual-use technologies that are not intended for weapons production have amplified the accessibility, efficacy and manufacturing possibilities of improvised weapons. Take additive manufacturing – better known as 3D printing – as an example. Since 2020, there has been a steady rise in the number of 3D-printed firearms seizures globally, with North America, Europe and Australia recording the highest numbers.

Several conflict theatres, such as Myanmar, Ukraine and more recently Somalia, have also witnessed the incorporation of 3D printing into modern warfare strategy. For example, Ukrainian forces have pioneered 3D-printed drones – such as the Titan Falcon and the Stinger – and have manufactured IEDs known as ‘candy bombs’ (a 3D-printed casing filled with conventional explosive). NSAGs in Myanmar have adopted tactics from the Ukrainian forces, building their own 3D-printed fixed wing drones (the Liberator MKI and MKII). They have also experimented with 3D-printed firearms. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab was reported to be using 3D-printing to manufacture explosives, weapons and drone components.

Manufacturers of improvised weapons do not just exploit new technologies but also commercial markets and materials. These include purchasing off-the-shelf drones for subsequent modification, computer numerical control milling machines, and chemical precursors. For example, triacetone triperoxide, which can be synthesized using commercially available materials, has been the explosive of choice in several ISIS-linked attacks e.g. 2015 Paris, 2016 Brussels, 2017 Manchester Arena. Converted firearms also remain a prominent challenge, particularly in Europe: they are reported to be involved in more shootings than ‘real’ firearms in the UK and comprise about 40% of annual seizures in the  Netherlands.

The main common enabler for improvised production, however, is not hardware – it’s knowledge. The transfer of technical expertise and ‘know-how’ across borders, ideologies, and networks sustains weapons production and supplements the accessibility of commercial technologies. Knowledge transfer happens at multiple levels: 

1. Knowledge and expertise transfer across groups: For example, African Islamic State affiliates such as Islamic State West Africa Province have benefitted from the transfer of drone expertise from affiliates in the Middle East. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula developed offensive drone capabilities as a result of knowledge and technology transfer from the Houthis. This signalled a cross-ideological transfer: both groups have maintained operational links and cooperation despite their opposing ideologies for pragmatic, tactical and operational reasons.
2. Knowledge transfer from conflict theatres to organized crime: Latin American organized crime cartels have, for instance, adopted improvised drones and IEDs to carry out attacks against enemy targets mimicking modern warfare techniques. Some cartel members have even travelled to Ukraine to learn, train and import expertise mimicking how foreign terrorist fighters travel to join terrorist groups overseas. 
3. Online knowledge transfer, through the open and dark web: Information on the manufacture of SALW is aplenty on open-source websites and platforms such as Odysee. Encrypted messaging platforms such as Rocket.Chat and Telegram have been used for the dissemination of weapons design files, the sale of black-market weapons, and information relating to their production. The spread of more traditional, artisanal weapons – known as ‘pumpi’ guns in Manipur – has also been accelerated by social media and encrypted messaging platforms.
4. ‘In-house’ knowledge development: Through the different – and at times overlapping – layers of knowledge available, NSAGs, criminal and extremist groups have also been developing specialized ‘in-house’ units for improvised weapons production. ISIS was one of the first terrorist groups to industrialize the procurement and development of drones in Iraq and Syria between 2016-2017. Since then, many groups have adopted similar tactics: in Somalia, Al-Shabaab has invested in hiring skilled personnel to experiment with 3D-printing technology; in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham developed their own indigenous drone programme, the Al-Shaheen Brigade; in Mexico, the Jalisco Cartel New Generation has a specialized unit dedicated to operating drones.

Finally, the accessibility of knowledge – particularly online – and the close link between improvised weapons production and new technologies translate to a final concerning trend: the involvement of youth. The improvised weapons programmes of NSAGs in Myanmar, for example, have mostly been driven by younger and tech-savvy recruits. Criminal and extremist plots involving 3D-printed firearms also increasingly involve young individuals. This further points to an overall characteristic of improvised weapons production: it collapses barriers between contexts, ideologies and potentially generations of producers. 

What can the international community do?

The regulatory challenges posed by improvised weapons are multiple and layered: no single approach – whether at the national, regional or international level – is a silver bullet. The prioritization of specific preventive measures to counter such weapons production and modification will inevitably vary depending on the regional and regulatory context. Nevertheless, several key elements can serve as the foundation for an adaptive, multi-layered counter-strategy.

1. It is important to better understand and regulate access to dual-use goods, technologies, and components essential to improvised production. The 3D printing process is an excellent example of how preventative measures can be enhanced: it encompasses multiple stages – from blueprint design to software, hardware and materials. Each of these steps has potential for better prevention. This may include, for instance, the registration or certification of printers, regulation of blueprints, or collaboration with industry to embed detection algorithms in software platforms. Also, existing regulations – such as those on readily convertible blank-firing firearms – can inspire similar approaches and offer a practical pathway for controlling items and components with high misuse potential.
2. Although SALW, IEDs and UAS are usually boxed into separate regulatory frameworks, a few exceptions offer opportunities to advance regulatory approaches for improvised weapons. The implementation of Security Council Resolution 2370 is a prime example.
3. The diffusion of online technical guidance on improvised weapons production can be better contained. Systematic monitoring of digital spaces – particularly those hosting open-source blueprints or forums sharing illicit manufacturing instructions – is essential. Cooperation between law enforcement and social media providers can be promising in this space, enhancing online monitoring of illicit content.
4. Mapping and disrupting key knowledge nodes and networks is critical. Further research is needed to understand the social and technical ecosystems that facilitate and drive improvised production. This includes identifying influential knowledge nodes – individuals and online communities – that serve as accelerators for unregulated innovation, as well as potential loopholes that facilitate the diffusion of knowledge and guidance. Counter-measures can combine investigative tools with awareness-raising initiatives to diminish the appeal and accessibility of such networks. Information sharing, coordination mechanisms and intelligence cooperation at the national, regional and international levels are also key in this regard.

Potential approaches to strengthening national, regional and international responses to the illicit proliferation of improvised weapons are wide-ranging – and extend far beyond those mentioned above. The multi-layered nature of this issue makes designing a single global response a challenge – and a new international instrument on improvised weapons may not be needed. There are numerous entry points – both in existing frameworks and in operational practice – for developing tailored preventive and response measures against the proliferation and misuse of improvised weapons, and just as many actors that can play a decisive role in countering this threat. 

To advance this effort, at the end of 2025, UNIDIR will provide a dedicated platform to explore the many dimensions of improvised weapons production, with a focus on the networks that facilitate their spread. This year’s conference will mark a key step toward building the collaborative frameworks and technical awareness needed to curb this fast-evolving threat.

The post “Do not try this at home!”: Current trends and developments in improvised weapons production first appeared on UNIDIR.

Conventional weapons manufacturing technologies, material and ‘know-how’ are increasingly available. While developments in manufacturing apply differently to Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS), their improvised assembly and deployment present underexplored similarities and linkages. Given the ‘do-it-yourself’ nature of production and continuously improving durability and dependability, improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS are permeating conflict and non-conflict settings. Their growing appeal to a wide range of non-state actors, poses serious challenges for arms control and security.    

To raise awareness and enhance efforts to better understand and counter the threat posed by improvised conventional weapons, UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme (CAAP) is launching an initiative on “Breaking the supply chain: Countering the illicit production of improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS”. As part of this initiative, CAAP is organizing a series of online regional expert consultations.

These will bring together technical audiences to discuss key developments and trends in the acquisition of technologies and ‘know-how’ that are used to assemble and deploy improvised conventional weapons. The online consultations will be an opportunity for participants to share operationally-useful information and to identify good practices, lessons learned and potential challenges in countering the uncontrolled global dispersion of improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS. These consultations will inform next steps within UNIDIR’s initiative, including the planning of a policy-relevant international conference to be held in Geneva, in December 2025.  

When and where

The consultations will be structured following the United Nations Regional groups of Member States and will be held online, on Zoom. Discussions will be conducted under the Chatham House Rule. The consultations are scheduled to take place on the following dates and times:

• Western European and other States – 15 May 2025, 15:00 – 16:30 (CET)
• Latin American and Caribbean States – 12 June 2025, 15:00 – 16:30 (CET)
• Eastern European States – 8 July 2025, 14:00 – 15:30 (CET)
• Asia-Pacific States – 16 September 2025, 10:00 – 11:30 (CET)
• African States – 2 October 2025, 15:00 – 16:30 (CET)

Participation

UNIDIR welcomes the participation of law enforcement, national authorities, civil society experts and international and regional representatives working in the domain of improvised conventional weapons, border control and criminal intelligence. Please note that participation is upon invitation only. However, should you be interested in joining one or more consultations, you are welcome to contact Matilde Vecchioni at matilde.vecchioni@un.org or Theo Bajon at theo.bajon@un.org. 

The post Breaking the supply chain: Countering the illicit production of improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS first appeared on UNIDIR.

How to acquire, assemble and deploy different types of conventional weapons is no longer the knowledge of a few. Detailed guidance and ‘know-how’ on technologies, tools and techniques to assemble explosives, firearms, and to weaponize drones, are now globally accessible through decentralized knowledge networks – both online and offline. The diffusion of such knowledge has contributed to an increase in these devices’ uncontrolled production – and their eventual use. There is a pressing need to enhance international awareness and cooperation to more effectively prevent and respond to diffused and uncontrolled conventional weapons production.

In light of this, in 2025, UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme has launched a new initiative: “Breaking the supply chain: Countering the illicit production of improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS”. It seeks to raise awareness and enhance efforts to counter the threat posed by improvised conventional weapons. As part of this initiative, UNIDIR is organizing an international conference titled “Inside the networks: How knowledge transfer drives improvised weapons production”.

This day-long event will focus on the unique role played by online and offline networks for knowledge transfer on improvised weapons acquisition, assembly and deployment. It will provide a common space – beyond existing international frameworks – to explore how different networks and platforms are used to facilitate the uncontrolled proliferation of improvised weapons. The conference is intended as a global platform for sharing challenges, existing good practices and potential additional measures that can contribute to improving responses to this emerging threat. It will seek to achieve the following objectives:

• Bridge the gap between all relevant stakeholders – including policymakers, law enforcement, industry, and civil society – on the role of different knowledge transfer networks in the acquisition, assembly, and deployment of improvised SALW, IEDs, and UAS.
• Discuss key linkages and trends in knowledge transfer about improvised weapons – both across online communities and offline networks of non-state actors.
• Identify effective measures that stakeholders have implemented – or could implement – to improve national and international responses to the proliferation of improvised weapons.

The conference will host State representatives, law enforcement experts, civil society experts, industry actors and social media companies. It will be structured around four substantive sessions:

• Sessions 1 and 2 will provide an overview of the issue, focusing on key developments in improvised weapons production, and on the key role played by online and offline knowledge transfer networks. These sessions will be livestreamed and recorded.
• Sessions 3 and 4 will focus on specific case studies from different regions of the world, and will discuss key effective measures that different stakeholders can implement to contribute to preventing the proliferation of improvised weapons. These sessions will be conducted under Chatham House Rule and will not be livestreamed or recorded.

Agenda

08:30 – 09:00 – Registration and welcome coffee

09:00 – 09:30 – Conference opening

Welcome remarks

• Dr Robin Geiss, Director, UNIDIR 
• Ambassador Thomas Goebel, Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament

09:30 – 10:30 – Session 1: An introduction to improvised weapons

This session will set the scene for the conference and introduce participants to developments in the field of improvised weapons. It will establish the importance of focusing on the issue of improvised SALW, IEDs and UAS across the globe, as well as key linkages across these weapon types.

• Rueben Dass, Associate Research Fellow, International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research
• Matilde Vecchioni, Associate Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, UNIDIR

10:30 – 11:00 – Coffee break

11:00 – 12:00– Session 2: Online and offline knowledge transfer

This session will explore the relevance of knowledge transfer networks for manufacturing, acquiring and using an improvised weapon. It will unpack the unique role played by online communities and offline networks and connections in this layered acquisition process.

Chair

• Sarah Grand-Clément, Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, UNIDIR

Speakers

• Rob Hunter-Perkins, Head of Research, Conflict Armament Research
• Paddy Ginn, Senior Expert, Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime
• Rajan Basra, Senior Research Fellow, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, King’s College London

12:00 – 13:00 – Lunch break

13:00 – 14:30– Session 3: Case studies from the world

This session will examine several case studies – from across all regions of the world – that show how knowledge transfer on improvised weapons has occurred. It will look at key related acquisition patterns and impacts from use in different conflict and non-conflict settings.

Chair

• Theo Bajon, Associate Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, UNIDIR

Speakers

• Olena Kryzhanivska, Policy Analyst, Ukraine’s Arms Monitor
• Barbara Morais Figueiredo, Researcher, Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, UNIDIR
• Nikhil Acharya, Independent Expert
• Natalia Pollachi, Project Director, Instituto Sou da Paz

14:30 – 15:00 – Coffee break

15:00 – 16:30 – Session 4: Effective measures for prevention and response

This session will focus on concrete measures that States, law enforcement, industry, and social media platforms have been taking, or can potentially put forward, to prevent unregulated improvised weapons production – with a particular focus on measures that can act upon networks of knowledge transfer, and contain such uncontrolled diffusion among unauthorised actors. It aims at identifying areas for cooperation, as well as further policy developments.

Chair

• Paul Holtom, Head of Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, UNIDIR

Tour-de-table discussion with government representatives, law enforcement, industry and social media companies.

16:30 – 17:00 – Wrap-up and closing remarks

When and where

Monday, 8 December 2025, Room V, Building A, Palais des Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.

Participants

Participation is by invitation only. The conference will bring together representatives from permanent missions, international and regional organizations, as well as national law enforcement experts and other key stakeholders working in the domain of improvised conventional weapons. An invitation with RSVP details and further information will follow.

Sponsorship

Sponsorship opportunities will be available for a limited number of participants. Further details will be provided in the invitation.

Further information

For any questions, please contact Matilde Vecchioni at matilde.vecchioni@un.org or Theo Bajon at theo.bajon@un.org.

The post Inside the networks: How knowledge transfer drives improvised weapons production first appeared on UNIDIR.

Recent developments in the illicit craft production of SALW pose significant challenges for effective implementation of the PoA. As part of a recent global study, UNIDIR has observed worrying trends in improvised and craft-produced SALW. This side event provides an opportunity to introduce key findings from UNIDIR’s study, as well as to examine regional developments and responses to prevent these weapons’ illicit proliferation and deadly impact. 

Speakers

Welcoming Remarks:

• H.E. Ambassador Olivier Caron, France

Panel Discussions

• Aline Shaban, Small Arms Survey: Terminology and typologies of craft production
• Matilde Vecchioni, UNIDIR: Introducing UNIDIR’s Global Study
• Ivaylo Stefanov, INTERPOL: Monitoring the development of craft-weapons and emerging threats  
• Major Adriana Maria Toston Diez, Guardia Civil Spain and Driver EMPACT Firearms: Developments in craft-produced weapons in Europe
• Callixtus Joseph, CARICOM Impacts: Trends and responses to trafficking in components and ghost guns in the Americas  

Panel discussion moderated by Dr. Paul Holtom, Head of Conventional Arms and Ammunition Programme, UNIDIR.

*A light lunch will be offered on the right side of Vienna Café starting from 13h00.

Where & When

20 June 2024, 13h15 to 14h30 EST, Conference Room CR-9 UNHQ, New York (in-person only)

Participants

UNIDIR encourages the participation of representatives and experts of States, regional organizations, NGOs and academics registered to attend the preparatory committee meeting specialized or interested in issues related to the Programme of Action on Small Arms and the illicit trade in SALW. UNIDIR will not provide support for participation for individuals that are not registered to attend.

For any additional information regarding the event, please contact Ms. Matilde Vecchioni (matilde.vecchioni@un.org). 

In partnership with:

The post New and Emerging Developments in Craft-Produced Small Arms and Light Weapons: Regional Perspectives    first appeared on UNIDIR.